

UC Berkeley

Other Recent Work

Title

The Atlantic Alliance and Geopolitics: New Realities and New Challenges

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1v68f9k5>

Author

Lie, Kai Olaf

Publication Date

2009-05-04

Kai Lie*
04.05.09.

Draft

The Atlantic Alliance and Geopolitics: New Realities and New Challenges

Summary: This paper is based on the hypothesis that the new geopolitical environment for the Atlantic Alliance is mainly influenced by the following five elements: The renaissance of Germany as the central player on the European theater after the collapse of the Soviet Union; the shift of American geopolitical focus from Europe to the Middle East and central Asia; the increasing geopolitical influence of petroleum energy resources; the increasing power of china; and the differing perceptions of political reality within the Atlantic Alliance. The new situation was clearly demonstrated after 9/11 when the “neocons” were able to implement their ideas about how to handle Iraq and the Germans rejected their arguments and refused to participate. With Obama as president it seems to be a certain rapprochement with the “old Europeans” in substance as well as methods in foreign policy. But the world is moving away from the bipolar world that the military alliance could feel comfortable with and towards a more dynamic theatre where the German Russian “strategic partnership” is a central feature of what can be labeled “The New Atlantic Reality”

*Ambassador Kai Lie has an academic background in international relations from Berlin, Chicago, Washington, and Cambridge, with Hans Morgenthau and Reinhard Niebuhr as theoretical underpinnings. He spent his career primarily in the Norwegian diplomatic service concerned with NATO matters in posts on Atlantic and Baltic shores in the capitals of Washington, London, Stockholm, and Tallinn, as well as two years in Beirut and Damascus.

This is an attempt to identify the most important elements of the new geopolitical environment in which the Atlantic Community now finds itself 60 years after its foundation. It was then a world dominated by the western sea powers and with the continental powers of Germany and Russia seriously weakened by the ravages of war on their territories. The British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin was still able to realize his idea of a western defense alliance under US leadership as a military containment of the Soviet Union. When the NATO pact was signed it was also directed at Germany; as NATO's first secretary general Lord Ismay revealed in 1967, the meaning of the Alliance was to "keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down. It would however in retrospect have been more appropriate to consider it as an instrument to keep the Germans in the Western Camp.

The inventor of the concept of containment, the American diplomat George Kennan, had not intended it as primarily a military alliance, but rather as a political answer to a political challenge. As an instrument more along those lines was the Marshall Plan that he was also instrumental in creating. It was however the nuclear stalemate that kept the peace in Europe throughout the Cold War.

The most important geopolitical change affecting the North Atlantic Community since the end of the Second World War is the fall of the Berlin wall on Nov. 9. 1989 followed

by the collapse of the Soviet Empire. With the fall of the Berlin wall and reunification, Germany was destined again to become the major player on the European scene.

Since then we have seen that the US has changed its main strategic focus from Europe to the Middle East and Central Asia manifested by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

These wars have drained Washington financially and politically while Moscow to a great extent has been able to recover financially and politically thanks to the revenues from its export of petroleum products. This was clearly demonstrated during the Georgian conflict in August 2008, even though as a military power Russia lags quite a bit behind the United States.

A central factor in these geopolitical changes is petroleum energy. During the cold war, the focus was mainly on military power. But now security is increasingly dependent on other factors also. Developments in weapons technology together with intelligence and communications systems have reduced the importance of distance and location, while secure access to energy, especially petroleum energy take on increasing importance in the game for power and influence. The areas where the interests of the powers confront each other have therefore shifted accordingly – to the sources of petroleum energy.

Another important geopolitical shift is caused mainly by China's increasing economic and political power and thirst

for petroleum energy. This eastward geopolitical shift is further enhanced by the financial crisis that became apparent in September 2008.

Finally, differences in perceptions of political realities within the Alliance might now have political consequences. During the Cold War, such issues were just not openly debated in Washington and the European capitals. This inhibition changed after the integrating effect of the Soviet Union as a common enemy of the Atlantic Alliance was reduced.

The main characteristics of the new political situation for the Atlantic World might thus be summarized under five headings:

- a) The fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the German renaissance as a political player
- b) The US shift of geopolitical focus from Europe to the Middle East and Central Asia.
- c) The increasing power-political significance of petroleum energy sources
- d) The emerging power of China
- e) The difference in perceptions of political realities within the Atlantic Alliance

Each of these factors will be examined below.

1 The fall of the Berlin wall and the German reemergence as a major player.

The initial factor making for a new Atlantic reality after the Cold War is the re-emergence of a reunited Germany as the strongest political element in Europe, free to pursue its own national interests. This was not immediately apparent at the time of reunification on Oct. 3. 1990. Germany had lost the war and since 1945 been trained to lie low and hide behind EU and NATO when anybody asked what they thought. A characteristic symptom for the new situation was the clear and definite German no to participate in the Iraqi operation – an operation that the US had defined as a primary and vital interest. This rejection came as a shock, whose effect probably was enhanced by the usual German clear and blunt language, some would say intellectual brutality.

Germany was different from France and Britain who had the nuclear bomb and permanent seat in the Security Council in support of their status. Germany adjusted itself to American policy, oftentimes against German public opinion as in the case of the deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles in the 1980s or the engagement in Afghanistan today.

Even NATO membership was not an easy matter to have the Germans accept. They seemed to have had a different assessment of the threat. The American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles himself had to promise to help the Germans get their eastern territories back in return for membership.¹ Germany joined NATO on May 6. 1955. As

the Hungarian uprising in 1956 showed, this American promise could not be kept without the risk of nuclear war.

When the Germans secured in Moscow what Washington could not deliver, this must have changed the basis for Germany's relations with the Western Alliance.

Germany could now dare to talk about their national interests. It was Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroeder who first clearly signaled the change. In a speech to the Bundestag on Sept.13. 2003, he declared that questions of importance for the German nation from now on would be decided in Berlin and nowhere else. (“--- in Berlin entschieden und nirgentwo anders”)

The initial reaction was that Schroeder had endangered the relations to Washington. Contrary to the political situation in France, much of the German political and intellectual elite must be characterized as Atlantic oriented. They consider European cooperation as part of or even as a precondition for closer Atlantic cooperation. The decision on a new German course as defined by Schroeder was thus taken on the top level above this elite and with broad support in the German public at large.

When Germany was reunited, there were plenty of fanciful speculations about where this would lead. Ever since Bismarck, the rest of Europe has always been less than enthusiastic about a united Germany, and so also this time. In Britain Margaret Thatcher imagined that an economically powerful Germany might achieve what Hitler

didn't. The French press was full of the same sort of suspicion. A professional analyst like Professor John Mearsheimer at the University of Chicago suggested that the time had now come for Germany to acquire nuclear weapons. Paris in all haste produced the Maastricht Agreement designed to anchor Germany more securely to the EU by replacing Germany's power instrument, the DM with the EURO.

The fears were unfounded; the Germans made further European integration its primary foreign policy objective². Of course this means sharing power and on a fair and mutual basis. But that can hardly have been what Paris and London had in mind with European cooperation. It is therefore hard to see how a common EU foreign policy can be realized in the foreseeable future. The French rejection of the EU constitution in the referendum in 2005 made this even less likely.

But regardless of the fate of the EU, Germany's power and influence will increase the more the role of NATO and the US in Europe is reduced. The Russians are out of Central Europe.

A most important aspect of the new German role however, is its partnership with Russia especially regarding petroleum energy.

The perception of this relationship is different in Washington and Berlin. This is explained by different interests as well as different geopolitical perspectives and

historical experiences. The sea powers based in London and Washington have traditional global interests while Berlin share with Moscow a more continental orientation. These differences in traditions and perspectives are bound to influence priorities and interests in relation to alliances. Thus the Germans never were convinced that their outer defense perimeter was the Hindu Kush; 85% of them are against the engagement there.

Peter the Great attempted to create a window to the west when he established the Russian capital in the brackish swamplands innermost in the Bay of Finland early in the 18th century. Since then the Germans have been important for Russian modernization especially industrial development. It is this sort of cooperation that the sea powers of the west have seen as a challenge to their interests. Typical is the warning by the Oxford geographer Sir Halford J. Mackinder (19) to the western negotiators at Versailles not to make a peace that could lead to German-Russian cooperation at the expense of the West.

It is in keeping with this tradition that Washington has warned about dependence on Russian petroleum energy supplies, while Berlin has sought closer energy cooperation with Moscow. The Russians on their side see the Germans as their closest and most important partner in Europe. There is a mutual dependence; the Germans need Russian energy and the Russians need German capital and technology, not least if they are to develop an economy less dependent on petroleum export.

It seems that the western sea powers after the Cold War either missed a chance or deliberately failed to draw Russia into closer cooperation with the rest of Europe; into what Gorbatshev labeled “the Common European Home”. This left the field to Germany alone. The result has been a very pragmatic, close and dynamic relationship between the biggest energy producer in the world and the world’s largest industrial exporter. It is this relationship between Berlin and Moscow that now again dominates the continent. It is these two capitals that traditionally have decided the fate of the nations between them, either through war or agreement. This explains the American support for East Europeans NATO membership.

The American concerns about German-Russian energy cooperation started in the 1960ies with the German deliveries of steel pipes for the Russian gas export. It was the chancellor Willy Brandt and his advisor Egon Bahr that initiated this “Ost-Politik”, officially seen by the alliance partners as a contribution to “Détente”.³ This energy cooperation was developed further by the former chancellor Schroeder during his meetings with president Putin in 2005. The present German coalition government of Chancellor Angela Merkel has not changed this policy; in fact Merkel confirmed the continuation of this “strategic relationship” in her inauguration speech as well as during her visit to Moscow in 2006.

In preparation for the NATO summit in April this year, Chancellor Merkel in the Bundestag on March 25. proposed that the new NATO strategic concept should

include all potential problem areas including energy supplies and stressed the importance of relations with Russia as the cold war was irrevocably over.

Whatever the outcome of the elections to the Bundestag in September this year, this policy is not expected to change. The Social democrats still follow the line that Egon Bahr defined as Germany's own way, in his book "Der Deutsche Weg"(03). The present foreign minister Franz-Walter Steinmeier is the SPD candidate for chancellor. He was Schroeder's closest advisor and sees Europe as the bridge between Washington and Moscow.

Germany has not displayed great enthusiasm neither for NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe nor for the deployment of elements of the American National Missile Defense System (NMD) there. It was Germany supported by France that prevented Washington from realizing its plans to give Georgia and Ukraine firm promises of NATO membership through the Membership Action Plan (MAP) during the NATO meeting in Brussels in December 08.

There is no doubt that Obama has a major challenge regarding Washington's relations with Berlin.

2 The American geopolitical reorientation

The other important change affecting the Atlantic Alliance is Washington's shift of its main geopolitical focus away from Europe and towards the Middle East and Central Asia.

The first indications of this change in American geopolitical orientation came after the oil boycott in the 70ies with the Carter Doctrine of Jan. 23. 1980 warning that hindrances in the way of oil supplies to the West was to be considered as a threat against American vital interests. To implement the doctrine a Rapid Deployment Force under US Central Command was established. The doctrine was made into law during the Clinton administration in 1999 for the purpose of securing the supplies from Central Asia and South Caucasus. (The “Silk Road Act”)

Another manifestation of Washington’s geopolitical reorientation from Europe to the Middle East and Central Asia was a reduction of forces in Germany from 500 000 during the Cold War to 60 000 after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Washington has managed to draw the North Atlantic Alliance in the same direction. In fact, Afghanistan is seen as a critical test for the Alliance. There has even been talk in the US of opening up for membership for Israel, Australia and Japan. The Alliance that was meant to be a defense alliance limited to the defense of American European allies, is now operating “out of area”. The only substantial contributions in this direction have come from London. But symbolic contributions from allies have a useful political function in turning unilateral initiatives into multilateral operations.

Measures to implement a new policy were suggested by Paul Wolfowitz and associates long before 9/11 and were

laid down in the “Project for the New American Century” (PNAC), in 1997. ⁴

It is like a reverse domino theory; first Iraq, then Iran and the rest. The project included unilateralism and preventive attack, methods contrary to the international rules of conduct that Washington and the western world over the years had achieved general acceptance of.

Observers have suggested three main motives for this American reorientation in the direction of the Middle East; two strategic and one political in character:

- a) Desire to deny access to forces that might endanger the free flow and price-setting of petroleum products, both important for American economy and security (the former treasury secretary Allan Greenspan argued in favor of this in his „the Age of Turbulence“ (07)) ⁵
- b) Increasing political and strategic importance of Central Asia as the back door of Russia and China – the next American challenge.(Carter’s advisor, Brzezinski in his “The Grand Chessboard” (97) argued that it would be of decisive importance for the US to gain control of Central Asia)
- c) Influence of the Israel oriented lobby in Washington especially as regards American policy in the Middle East.(AIPAC) (Carter (07) as well as Fulbright (66) have made a point of this, while lately Mearsheimer/Walt (07) have presented it in a scholarly fashion in their “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy”)

Whatever the explanation, the shift in US policy priorities seems to have been based on a long-term strategy. Thus Washington did not leave the Iraqi problems to others like Iraq's neighbors as suggested by the Baker/Hamilton report. Construction of military bases in the area and political comments pointed in the same direction. In connection with the preparation for a Status of Force Agreement in June 2008 it was revealed that Washington wants long term use of its 30 military bases in the country, control of Iraqi air space, immunity for its personnel, etc.

The focus has however now shifted from Iraq to the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and the increasingly unstable Pakistan. Iran being the strongest element in the region has increasing influence. Obama wants to open contacts that way and on March 5 extended invitation for Iran to participate in a conference on Afghanistan. During his visit to Ankara a few days later he reiterated American support for Turkish membership in the EU arguing that it would contribute to the bridge building towards the Muslim world.

A problem for the American policy in the area is that the continental European allies do not see in the Afghan terrorists the same threat as Washington does. Thus when the American secretary of defense, Bob Gates, during the security conference in Munich at the end of January this year suggested a contribution from the NATO Rapid Response Force in connection with the Afghan elections in August, the German defense minister Franz-Joseph Jung rejected the idea. Chancellor Merkel confirmed this

rejection during the NATO summit. When President Obama in advance of the meeting presented his new Afghan strategy he underlined the objective of militarily defeating Taliban while at the same time promising increased diplomatic efforts including approaches to what he called the moderate Taliban.

In facing the financial and economic crisis President Obama has also on this issue met disagreement from his central European allies on how to deal with it. Washington wants to stimulate demand by spending more, the Central Europeans with Germany as the strongest advocate finds that more stringent regulation of financial markets are called for, rather than more stimulus.

A lesser issue is the question of Georgia's relations to the Western Alliance. The Germans don't see eye to eye with Washington here either. They were never in agreement with the American efforts to encourage Georgian NATO membership. The Georgian crises must be seen as continuation of the "Great Game" that started as a struggle between Britain and Russia more than hundred years ago for the control of access to the petroleum resources in the area. Georgia is in a central strategic position as a transit area. The Bush administrations encouragement of Georgia's policies played right into the hands of Moscow that now could establish a line of demarcation for its sphere of influence here.

In connection with the foreign ministers meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE) in Helsinki on December 2-5 last year Berlin supported Moscow's proposal for a European security conference based on the Helsinki agreement. Through this process Moscow might gain recognition of its sphere of interest. Such spheres were last time defined in the final declaration of the OSCE in 1975. The East European territories that were the objects of this process have since lost much of their strategic interests. A definition of spheres would however still legitimate political involvement by the powers in their respective spheres. Thus there is still disagreement about what was the deal in connection with the reunification of Germany. It is clear that the two presidents Bush and Gorbatshev agreed that Germany should still be a NATO member, but that there were to be no foreign troops or nuclear weapons on former East German territory. According to Moscow there was further agreed that there would be no extension of NATO into the former Warsaw pact countries or deployment of American military instruments like the NMD installations in Poland and Tsjeckia. (This has, according to Der Spiegel online International 03/30/09, later been confirmed by the former US ambassador to Moscow (1987-91), Jack Matlock. As his source he refers to James Baker who was the Secretary of State at the time.)

3) The geopolitical effect of the new petroleum energy situation

A most important factor shaping the new Atlantic reality is the geopolitical consequences of access to petroleum energy. Increasing demand and diminishing reserves

characterize the situation. The IEA estimates that global energy demand will increase by 50% by 2030. (It is now 84 million barrels per day MBD). At that rate, known reserves might be depleted in 30 years. The yet undiscovered fields would be difficult and expensive to develop. American suggestions for solutions to the energy problem such as ethanol, tar sand and oil shale or promotion of nuclear power in India, are all disputed.

While most US oil imports come from the Middle East or other unstable areas, natural gas originates almost entirely in North America. Recent discoveries of natural gas fields in Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas and Pennsylvania have drastically improved the long-term supply picture for the United States. American natural gas resources are now estimated to last for 100 years with the current rate of consumption (according to the Wall Street Journal of April 30.09)

The US is the world's largest oil importer and consumes 25% of global production, but has only 2-3% of global reserves.

Russia is in a very different position as the largest petroleum producer in the world. But it is critically dependent on export of petroleum products. They account for 30% of GDP. The country is therefore vulnerable when it comes to price reductions of these products. This vulnerability has been confirmed during the current financial crisis. (The sudden price reduction right before the collapse of the Soviet regime is another reminder) ⁶

The most important petroleum producing area in the world is the Middle East with 60% of proven global oil reserves and 45% of gas reserves. The focus of energy hungry capitals has therefore always been on this area.⁷

In the struggle for influence here the sea powers have used “gun boat diplomacy”, while the Germans are better remembered by the Berlin-Byzants-Bagdad rail project. The Germans have traditionally had better relations to the peoples of the area, but the sea powers in the end gained full control of this oil rich region.

Now however, these traditional and important American sources of oil here, like Saudi Arabia, are less stable and reliable. The major oil fields in Saudi Arabia are mature and their capacity is expected to decline. The United States in seeking other sources did therefore focus on Iraq. But this source does not seem too secure either now.⁸

US energy supplies are also adversely affected by other changes. The western oil companies’ share of the market has been drastically reduced. They now control no more than 3% of global reserves and produce only 10% of oil and gas. (Exxon Mobile, Chevron, BP and Royal Dutch Shell). The rest is controlled by state-owned giants like the Saudi Aram co and the Russian Gaazprom.⁹

The petroleum energy market would be further effected if the idea of a gas monopoly modeled on OPEC is realized.¹⁰

The enormous Russian petroleum resources are most favorably located for supplying Europe and for meeting the energy needs of Germany. Germany is Russia's largest customer and most important partner in the petroleum sector. By 2020 Germany might import 60-70% of its energy from Russia. (Today Norwegian and Russian exports account for 21% and 31% respectively of German oil needs and 40% and 31% of German gas imports.)¹¹

In order to reduce European dependence of Russian petroleum resources the US has promoted various projects. The expensive Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan pipeline is the best known. The Nabuco pipeline project for Caspian natural gas from Azerbajdjan via Turkey to Austria would have the same effect. It is to be completed by 2020 but Gaazprom wants Azerbajdjan to deliver its natural gas to the Russian pipeline network.

There is no common EU energy policy able to influence energy supplies. Germany has therefore had to take care of its own interests in securing its petroleum supplies.¹²

The former Bundeskanzler Schroeder focused on that task. During the Hannover trade fair in April 2005 he devoted his entire opening address to German – Russian cooperation with special emphasis on energy. Putin was present and it was announced that the Germans (BASF branch Wintershall) was to be involved in the development of a large West Siberian gas field (Juzjno Russkoje) throughout the whole production and distribution line. It was also announced that the Germans (Wintershall) would

be engaged with the Russians (Gazprom) in the construction of a gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea from Viborg to Greifswald. The pipeline is to be completed by 2011 and will make the supplies to Germany from the gas fields of Western Siberia independent of transit through Poland and the Baltic States as well as the Belarus and Ukraine. The former German chancellor Schroder oversees this pipeline project as a member of the board.¹³ The Baltic pipeline took on further importance when Moscow last year decided that gas from the enormous newly discovered gas field in the Arctic Ocean, the Stockman field, would be channeled to Greifswald through this pipeline.

In October 2008 an agreement was signed in St Petersburg in the presence of President Medvedev and Chancellor Merkel giving E.ON Ruhrgas part in the development of Juzjno Russkoje. In return for the German deal (with Wintershall), Gazprom, who now controls practically all energy distribution of Eastern Europe, gets a larger share (49%) of the German distribution (Wingas). This gives Gazprom greater direct access to the European gas market.

The mutual dependence between Germany and Russia in the energy field is based on long term contracts of 20-25 years. Gas pipelines are of special importance in this connection as they are of a more permanent character. Oil is easier transported through other means.

Germany's experience as well as its interests regarding energy security means that high priority is given to a stable relationship with Russia. Berlin thus wants to avoid moves

that could antagonize Moscow, like Missile Defense installations on the Russian border or NATO extension to Ukraine and Georgia.¹⁴

When Washington has called attention to the increasing European dependence on Russian energy supplies, the Germans have argued that there is a mutual dependence because the Russians need German capital and technology. Without Germany as a customer Russia might furthermore be tempted to turn to China which would hardly be in American interests. Pipelines are now under construction in that direction from East Siberia and Kazakhstan.

4) *The emerging role of China*

Chinas increasing financial and political power are seen as the beginning of a new geopolitical era with effect also on the Atlantic Community. A manifestation of these changes was seen in July 2008 with the collapse of the WTO conference. China demonstrated then that the Atlantic world no longer alone rules world trade as it did during the opium war in 1842 when the British forced China to accept the import of opium. The new era is reflected by the fact that the first visit abroad by the new secretary of state Hillary Clinton was made to China and the Orient rather than to the European allies as has been customary. China happens to be America's biggest creditor. With its record economic growth and financial strength is also fast emerging as a challenge and competitor in the energy

market. In 2007 China's oil demand increased by 16%. In 20 years China is expected to consume 10% of global production (more than 9 million barrels a day.) China's thirst for natural gas can absorb half of Russian production today (of 600BCM) and is expected to double its needs by 2030(to over 16BBD according to IEA).

It seems that China tries to secure for itself as much as possible of the available energy fields on the international market. While the US has been preoccupied with Iraq, China has also secured itself oil and gas supplies from everywhere else in the world, not least from the Middle East.¹⁵ China has an advantage by not having had a role as a colonial power. It has had success in Iran and Sudan and even in America's back yard, in Venezuela. China has obtained access to Kazak and Turkmen oil and gas. A pipeline from Kazakhstan to China (Sin kiang) was opened on Dec.15, 2002. China is also negotiating delivery from Russia and Uzbekistan. New pipelines are to be built from the Kirgiz fields to western parts of China.

Russia in 2007 made an agreement about the construction of a gas pipeline from Altai to Sinkiang. An oil pipeline is planned from Irkutsk to the Pacific with a branch southward to Daqing in China from Skovorodino (The East Pacific Ocean, ESPO pipeline). This will be giving Russia direct access to a new enormous market.

A most serious challenge to US interests, not least in the petroleum sector, is the Chinese initiative to create a formal framework for cooperation between China and Russia in

the newly created Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). (Other members are the four Central Asian countries Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan.) Russia has suggested Iran as a member but China is reluctant. China seems above all to be interested in Russian petroleum energy and in the exclusion of the US and Japan from Russian oil trade as well as from influence in Central Asia. ¹⁶

The Chinese challenge is now economic and political in character, but it is also slowly transforming and modernizing its military machine.

The challenge to the Atlantic World might however be of a different nature from the one it met in relation to the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington had hoped to spread liberal democracy and market liberalism. This seems to have been based on a miscalculation. Instead we are witnessing how Asia with China as the leading element challenges the world order that has existed since the 17th century, built on European ideas and technology. This has been the base of the Atlantic cooperation.

5) The difference in perceptions of political realities on the two sides of the Atlantic.

Another element in the picture of the New Atlantic Realities is the difference in perceptions of, or rather presentation of, political realities between the Americans and the “old

Europeans”, especially between Washington and Berlin. With Obama as president it is expected that the perception-gap will be considerably reduced even though the presentation of American policies might have the usual wrappings.

It was not so apparent during the Cold War for example that the American prescription emphasized American central role, while the European script aimed at an international legal order. Thus, in reality the US had veto power in the World Bank as well as in the International Monetary Fond. Even the central article V in the NATO treaty has a wording that is less than unconditional in its commitment; otherwise Congress would not have ratified it. It reads: “--- each party will assist the party attacked by such action as it deems necessary”

Further differences are illustrated by some examples related to the current conflict in the Middle East:

a) . Ever since the “Founding Fathers”, Americans have perceived their policies as being based on principles that are universal and different from the conventional power politics of “The old Europeans”. This means that regardless of how realistic or power political based American policies might be, it always has had to be wrapped and sold in ideological terms. In such a struggle for the “good” against the “evil”, negotiations or compromises are made difficult. The old Europeans on their side tend to see struggles on the international scene to be caused by conflict of interests, making

compromises and non-military solutions easier attainable.¹⁷ Neither would they be likely to believe in boycott of for instance Iran as this would create a vacuum that China and Russia would be more than willing to fill. Such attitudes might be reflected in Obama's willingness to talk to the Iranians.

- b) Obama does not seem to share his predecessor's illusions as to the feasibility of solving the problem Washington has in Iraq by the introduction of democracy. It could be argued that a truly free and democratic Iraq, unless it is divided into three parts, would be in close touch with Iran and the Sheas in the oil rich areas of Saudi Arabia. This would constitute a formidable power concentration of a population group that can hardly be expected to take decisions in keeping with US interests.¹⁸
- c) As to the complex problem of the Middle East, Berlin as the rest of Europe, tend to see the Palestine-Israel conflict as a key problem that first has to be resolved. The US and Israel were the only ones to disagree with this perception until Obama shortly after his inauguration said that this conflict is related to Afghanistan, Iran, Syria as well as Lebanon. Obama did go far in the Israeli direction when he during the election campaign suggested the whole of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and by appointing a declared Israel supporter as his chief of staff. In this context it is interesting to note that Obama early during the campaign expressed his misgivings of pressure groups that threatened to take the power away from the American people. Immediately

after the inauguration he placed restrictions on the activities of these lobby groups. AIPAC is one of the most influential pressure groups in Washington with a country wide range.¹⁹

As to Obama's general approach to political problems, he has emphasized pragmatism in the exercise of power. He has promised to renew American diplomacy and foreign and security policy, by employing all elements of power, not only military power, but economic and political power as well as American values which he has characterized as a most important export item.

Obama has already set in motion the withdrawal of forces from Iraq as he has promised. On the other hand he has signaled increasing military efforts in Afghanistan. To have allies contribute to these efforts might not be an easy matter. As many as 85% of the Germans are against being involved in Afghanistan and observers are displaying increasing skepticism about the feasibility of a solution with the methods hitherto employed. To this comes increasing problems for the forces already there. Eighty percent of NATO supplies come through Pakistan. The increasing influence of the militant Islamists in the border areas now threatens these supplies. It seems that the Pakistani army does not have full control of the Khyber Pass area. Obama has now declared the Afghanistan-Pakistan area as one arena of battle.

As to the NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, Obama has not pursued the issue. The issue of Missile Defense elements in Eastern Europe he promised during a visit to Prague on April 4. this year to pursue as long as Iran continues its nuclear program, but reiterated that the system first had to be proven effective. It could be argued that both issues look more like attempts to challenge German -Russian relations than measures to further American security interests. The shelving of these ideas would not be met with German objections to say it mildly. Neither would the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from German soil. This issue is also being reviewed by the Germans themselves as reflected in an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of Jan.9.2009 signed by four most prominent German statesmen; Helmut Smith, Egon Bahr, Richard Weisacker and Hans-Dietrich Genscher. They want the American nuclear weapons withdrawn from Germany.

The financial crisis now threatens to divide the Atlantic world on how to organize and control the market. There is a growing realization that the blessings of market liberalism have been oversold. The Germans never really were convinced by the Anglo-American arguments about what the free market would do for social and economic programs. The German always wanted a greater degree of predictability, security and regulation, but the financial and political sticks and carrots from Washington, starting with the Marshall Plan, made them grin and bear it.

There is no doubt that the challenge that Germany represents for Washington and London is larger than polite politicians and media would openly admit. It might be that it was the recognition of this challenge that made Obama decide during the election campaign to make his only presentation of himself outside the United States in Germany. It took place at the Siegessaule in the Tiergarten in the heart of Berlin where he was hailed by 200 000 Germans.

Conclusions

The geopolitical framework of the Atlantic Alliance will most likely be influenced by major new trends that now can be discerned:

The international power patterns, systems and instruments are in flux. At the same time some basic underlying traditional interests and patterns are reemerging and making themselves felt on the Atlantic Alliance. The new geopolitical element of major consequence is the reappearance of Chinas economic and political power that inevitably will be translated into military power. This means that the international system will no longer be based on a stable bipolarity between two superpowers, but develop into a multi polar system with more mobility among the players.

After the collapse of the Soviet Empire there is increasing evidence of a weakening of the unity of NATO. Since then the Alliance has tried to find a new purpose in Eastern Europe and in “out of area”, but there is no agreement on how far to move the fence posts eastward or how to handle the problems in the Middle East. Since the EU failed to unite under a new constitution after the French rejected it in the referendum in 2005, there is ever lesser unity in the EU. Neither in NATO nor in the EU has it been possible to agree on a unified policy on the more important foreign policy issues such as how to handle the financial crisis, the war in Afghanistan, or NATO’s extension to Georgia and Ukraine.

This trend seems to confirm the traditional international order where the primary actors are the nation states. They do cooperate in international organizations in furtherance of their mutual interests, but power is not and never was located in Brussels or New York. It is located in the national capitals like Washington and Berlin. Illusions about a different reality might have been inspired by political motives or be due to lack of insight or to excessive legalism.²⁰

In the changing international environment, nations form new partnerships in the pursuit of their national interests. A typical example is the cooperation between Berlin and Moscow based on the German need for Russian petroleum products. This is evoking the traditional concern in the sea powers. This new independent foreign policy of the

dominant European power is in reality the most important feature of what can be labeled the New Atlantic Reality.

It is fair to conclude that the Germans did not initiate the changes we now see in Atlantic relations, by many characterized as a crisis. These changes were initiated when people like the authors of the PNAC (the “neocons”) succeeded in realizing their plans about changing the American foreign policy in a Middle Eastern and unilateral direction at the expense of international cooperation in NATO and the UN etc. Even if US policy now turns more multilateral, NATO’s role as a consultative forum is still much reduced.²¹ The Alliance might just not have the same function any more for Washington. A purely military alliance like NATO might not be designed for the new challenges. Neither seem measures like deployment of NMD elements in Eastern Europe or NATO’s expansion to Georgia to have sufficient approval among the allies.

Even if Washington has come to pursue a more multilateral course and now has a president of a classic realistic school in the Lincoln tradition, the concern is that the recent trend in the relationship between the Anglo-American world and the continental Europeans, especially between Washington and Berlin, might not be a temporary phenomenon reversible by change of leadership in the capitals. It seems to be a shift in political priorities and geopolitical perspectives, based on serious assessments of national power and interests. Methods and manners might change, but such interests don’t change with the change of regime neither in Moscow nor in Washington or Berlin.

(This article is based on interviews with decision-makers and academics in Berlin and Washington DC. This was made possible with financial support from a Ruhrgas fund distributed by the Norwegian Research Council, from the Norwegian People and Defense Organization, from the Norwegian Fulbright Alumni Association and from Chuck W (anonymous). It was very helpful to get office facilities at my old Alma Maters; the Otto Suhr Institute at the Free University in Berlin and at the School of International Service at American University in Washington.)

Notes

1 Stipulated in the Paris Agreements of Oct.24, 1954. It seems the Germans shared Kennan's view that a devastated Soviet Union was not a military threat of the magnitude that London and Washington insisted on. The situation today is similar. The Germans don't want American nuclear weapons on their soil as they see them as a threat for being targeted by nuclear weapons rather than being protected by them. Neither do the Germans see a global terrorist threat directed at them from Afghanistan as the Americans do.

2 This was outlined in a speech by the German foreign minister Fischer at Humbolt University in Berlin on May

12. 2002. Whether Fisher miscalculated or not, he managed to smoke the fox out of the hole. It is essential to keep in mind that the European idea from the start primarily was a French project to take care of what they see as “the German problem”. Germany saw it in its interest to follow suit by sharing its coal and steel industry with France. Now they gave into the French idea to bury the Deutsche Mark for the EURO. All the while the Germans have been the greatest contributors to the EU budget while the French have been the main recipient of EU subsidies.

3 Kennan also encouraged Willy Brandt to pursue his “Ostpolitik” according to Karl Kaiser in “A sceptic of Human Nature: George F Kennan was an early advocate for the New Europe” in The Atlantic Times, May 2005.

4 The new American profile is not only characterized by its geopolitical turn in the direction of Middle East and Central Asia. The Bush administration turned in the direction of unilateral preemptive strikes, first use of nuclear weapons etc at the expense of “deterrence” and “containment” as basis for policy. This is a policy shift that the neo-conservatives around Bush have advocated ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Paul Wolfowitz argued in a memo in 1991 already that nothing should be allowed to challenge Washington’s hegemony. This was reflected in a draft of the “Defense Planning Guidance” for 1994-99 that was leaked to the New York Times in 1992. In 1997 Dick Cheney, Lewis Libby (later to become Cheney’s chief of staff), defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz signed the declaration “Project for a new American

Century” (PNAC). This was followed by a letter to President Clinton and the president of the Senate, Newt Gingrich advocating that Hussein should be removed and that the US establish a stronger military presence in the Middle East. In September 2000 they advocated preemptive war to secure American global interests.

These thoughts became policy after Sept. 11, 2001. They were presented on Sept 17, 2002 in the “National Security Strategy of the United States”. In the “Nuclear Posture Review” in Jan 2002 the lowering of the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons is foreseen.

One strategic thinker in this process is former chairman of the National Defense Council, Richard Perle. He had previously produced a report to Israel’s Likud party about the elimination of Saddam Hussein.

The inspiration and teacher of many of those behind this policy was Professor Albert Wohlstetter at the University of Chicago. The ideas about so-called tactical nuclear weapons and “Star Wars” came from here. The philosophical base for these neo conservative ideas originated with a professor at the same university; Leo Strauss (1899-1970). The perhaps most influential spokesman for these circles today is Irving Kristol who like Robert Kagan advocates American “benevolent hegemony”.

5 Observers suggest that the US interest in the Middle East might not be motivated so much by its own energy needs as by the desire to control energy flows and prices in general. They see the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline less motivated by US need for oil than by the desire to position itself in the Caspian area. (The Norwegian Statoil is partner in this project). US strategy in the area (laid down in the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999) aims at influencing oil and gas export from the Gulf countries making it bypassing Russia, Iran and China. The US reacted negatively to the gas pipeline from Russia to Ankara that was opened November 16. 07, in the presence of the heads of state of Russia, Italy and Turkey. It will furnish Turkey with 60% of its needs for gas but has capacity in excess of that.

An important impediment to US ability to project power in the area would be the acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction by countries in the area. It belongs to the picture that Israel, though closely tied politically to the US is not of strategic importance for Washington.

6 Russia exports 2/3 of its oil production (9MBD), and 1/3 of its gas production (620BCM). It is the largest producer of natural gas (with 590 BCM in 2004, expected to reach 700BCM in 2020 and last 100 years) and on par with Saudi Arabia in oil (9,5 MBD in 2004) with reserves expected to last 40 years.

7 The sea powers of the West succeeded in establishing themselves there through gunboat diplomacy. The Germans failed with their Berlin - Byzants – Baghdad concept. They

also failed with the overland trek over the Caucasus in WWII. When Schroeder advocated membership for Turkey in the EU for strategic reasons, this might possibly also be seen in light of German energy needs.

The most active player in the area now is Washington as Britain's ally and successor.

Russia too is active in the area. In May 08 it made an agreement with Turkmenistan about a gas pipeline to cover Russia's own needs. There are also agreements with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to improve the delivery system to Russia. This will enhance Russian control of the energy fields of South Asia and increase Russian export potential for Europe. The US had promoted another plan; a pipeline to Europe via the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Turkey. This would have reduced European dependence on Russian gas. It seems that the Russians have blocked this attempt.

8 Iraq has 10% of global reserves, 115BB. Some think they have the double of that. The Iraqi oil is clean, close to the surface and therefore inexpensive to extract. (1 dollar per barrel against 15 in the North Sea)

9 According to the IEA, the organization created to protect Western interests in the petroleum sector, close to 90% of petroleum energy will be supplied by non-western countries. (These new giants are

ARAMCO,GAZPROM,CNPC,Nat Iranian Oil Comp,
Petroleos de Venezuela,Petrobras and Petronas.)

10 At the meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in Qatar in April 07, Venezuela proposed the creation of a gas cartel modeled after OPEC. Putin and the Iranian representative supported this. The GECF members have 70% of world reserves.

11 Persistent instability in the Middle East might give other petroleum producing areas increased importance. The Arctic areas are especially interesting in this context; they represent stability and thereby security of supply.

According to the US Geological Survey the Arctic might harbor 25% of the remaining petroleum resources of the world, most of it on the Russian side. There might be as much as 16 billion tons of oil and 82 trillion cm of gas in the Russian shelf. It is estimated that 60% of the oil is to be found in the Pechora Sea and 53% of the gas in the Barents Sea and 30% in the Kara Sea. The output from the offshore oilfields here some think might reach 50-60 mill. tons by 2020 and from the onshore fields 40-50 mill tons. Russia has the world's largest gas reserves, 40% of the total.

Western oil companies had hoped to participate in these largest and undeveloped gas field in the world. Just one of these fields (Shtokman) is more than twice as big as the largest field so far in the North Sea, the Norwegian Troll Field, and 10 times bigger than the Snøvit, the first production in the North. It is an open question when Russian off shore fields will be developed however. The

Russians may give priority to the enormous Yamal fields further east. They will be connected to the pipeline systems from West Siberia that provide Central Europe with gas. Russia exports 65% of its gas production to the EU countries through this network. A new 4000 km Yamal-Europe pipeline is planned (with an annual capacity of 33 BCM after 2010).

These Arctic oil and gas fields derive their attractiveness for energy hungry capitals not only because of the stability of the area, but also from the transportation perspective. They are located closer to American and North European markets than the Middle East or the Caspian area. The straits of Bosphorus have been restricted for large tankers by an IMO regime replacing the Montreux Convention of 1936. Similar restrictions are imposed on the Baltic entrances. Russia is therefore increasingly dependent on her Arctic harbors for the export of oil as well as gas. An oil pipeline has long been contemplated from West Siberia to Murmansk. So far smaller tankers reload oil from Siberia at Murmansk.

12 Until LNG becomes a more common mode of transporting gas than pipelines, Germany's favorable geographic location in relation to the source prevents any serious competition

The Germans also appear to be in a most favorable political position in relation to the Russian energy sector. This sector is bound to be the subject of political decision making. Choice of partners in the Russian energy business might

therefore not necessarily be based only on commercial considerations.

13 A similar project to this North Stream pipeline is being developed from Russia across the Black Sea to Europe through Bulgaria. This South Stream pipeline will have one branch to Italy and Greece and another via Serbia that will be important for Russian gas distribution to Europe.

14 These intermediate range nuclear weapons, the Soviet SS-20 and the American Pershing II, were removed by the INF agreement between Reagan and Gorbatsjov in 1987. It is this agreement that Putin suggested to abandon unless it was extended to the new NATO members in Eastern Europe. In June 2007 he offered facilities closer to Iran in Southern Russia and Aserbaidjan. Washington did not accept the offer. Putin earlier that year suspended the agreement limiting conventional forces in Europe (CFE), an agreement not ratified by the US.

15 How sensitive an issue the competition for energy is, became apparent by the way the US senate blocked the Chinese purchase of Unical in the summer of 2006. In this connection another feature of this global competition is worth mentioning. It is the changing trading pattern characterized by a tendency in the direction of more long term contracts like the ones between China and Iran and between Germany and Russia. This is neo-mercantilism at its best (or worst) at the expense of globalization; the free market is getting less to trade with; the government controlled oil companies are increasing their share of the

market at the expense of the international oil companies. To what extent the latter are also connected to national power interest is another matter.

16 Neither Russia nor China welcome prolonged US presence in Central Asia. After 9/11 the US obtained bases in Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan. Uzbekistan closed the base (at Kharshi-Khanabad) in Nov 2005. Kirgizstan did close the Manas air base in February 2009 after first having changed its mind when the US lease was increased from 2 to 22 million Dollars. All the while the Russians increase their presence in the country. In 2006 China signed an agreement with Turkmenistan for delivery of 30BCM gas pr year over the next 30 years. The summer of 2007 CNPF signed an agreement with Turkmenistan about a pipeline directly to China. Until now it has been piped through Russia.

Turkmenistan will also deliver gas to India and Pakistan via a pipeline through Afghanistan, and to Europe and Turkey via the Caspian Sea. Construction of pipelines to the West from the Caspian Sea bypassing Russian territory now seems less likely however.

The „Peace Pipeline“ might be challenged by Washington's offer to India of assistance in connection with its nuclear program. This might thus be seen as another contribution to the isolation of Iran. Iran is a member of the IAEA, while India, Israel and Pakistan are not.

17 This old realist or orthodox approach was represented in the US during the post-war period by academics like Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr and diplomats like George Kennan. They would not ignore the role of military power, nor that of “soft power”, advocated by the liberal Joseph Nye. But they would reject a (“Skinnerian”) approach tending to seek military solutions to political problems. (MLF is a case in point)

18 Carsten Voigt, the German government coordinator for German-American cooperation expressed surprise at the belief that democracy in the area could be promoted by sending Saudi Arabia billions worth of weapons. The German foreign minister expressed similar thoughts. The former director of Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Christoph Bertram has observed that unilateral policies as conducted in Iraq do not succeed. Der Spiegel 32/2007.

The Germans have similar doubts about the wisdom of measures against Teheran. Economic sanctions would just mean that Chinese and Russian interests would replace those of the West. Forgoing natural gas from Iran, with the second largest reserves after Russia, would make Europe even more dependent on Russian supplies.

Samuel Huntington („The Clash of Civilizations—,”) and Robert Ardrey („The territorial Imperativ“) have their own interesting ideas about the nature of the challenges faced by the western democracies.

19 Charles Freeman that Obama had designated as the head of the National Security Council resigned in the beginning of March referring to the total lack of respect for truth by the Israel lobby. Stephen Walt (07) has referred to this incident as another confirmation of the power of the Israel lobby as described in the book about the subject he has written with John Mearsheimer; “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy”.

20 Similar reasons might explain illusions about the role of sub-units of the nation state system, be it business corporations or terror organizations. Thus the influence and effect of al-Qaida in international politics has often been widely exaggerated after 2001. The importance and benefits of private international financial and business corporations have also been exaggerated. The states now have to bail them out. The financial crisis is so far managed neither by supra national nor sub national organizations, but by the individual nation states.

21 The situation has similarities with the constellations in Europe at the end of the First World War, when Mackinder, warned the Western peacemakers at Versailles not to construct a peace that would further German-Russian cooperation at the expense of the West. Today the German quest for secure energy supplies is the central element in this new relationship between Berlin and Moscow. This constitutes a challenge for a political alliance that we until now have been accustomed to view as permanent.

Bibliography

Andrews, David M.(ed)(2005) *The Atlantic Alliance under Stress*. Cambridge: University Press.

Ardrey, Robert(1967) *The Territorial Imperativ*. London: Cullins.

Bacevich, Andrew (2008) *The Links of Power:The end of American Exceptionalism*.

Bahr, Egon,(2003) *Der Deutsche Weg*, München, Carl Blessing Verlag.(2008)

Betts, Richard K. *Conflict after the Cold War*. New York: Pearson and Longman.

Blix, H.(2004) *Disarming Iraq*. London: Bloomsbury.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1997) *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*. New York: Basic Books.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew (2004) *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*. New York: Basic Books.

Callinicas,Alex (2003) *The New Mandarins of American Power*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Carr, Edward Hallett, (1939)*The Twenty Years' Crises.1919-1939*.London: Macmillan.

Carter, Jimmy (2007) *Palestine. Peace not Apatheid*.

Chomsky, Noam (2007) *Perilous Power: The Middle East and US Foreign Policy: dialogue on terror, democracy and justice*. London: Hamish Hamilton.

Clark, Victoria (2007) *The Rise of Christian Zionism*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Cooley, John K. (2005) *An Alliance against Babylon*. London: Pluto.

Cooper, Robert (2003) *The Breaking of Nations*. London: Atlantic Books.

Dannenberg, Julia von (2008) *The Foundation of Ostpolitik, the Making of the Moscow Treaty between West Germany and the USSR*. Oxford University Press.

Emerson, Michael (2001) *The Elephant and the Bear: The EU, Russia and the Near Abroad*. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.

Fischer, Joschka (2000) “From Confederacy to Federation- Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration”, lecture on May 2. at the Humbolt university in Berlin.
(www.auswaertiges-amt.de)

Fukuyama, Francis (1989) “The End of History”, *National Interest* (16): 3-18.

J William Fulbright (1966) *The Arrogance of Power*. New York: Random House.

Gaddis, John Lewis (2002) *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Greenspan, Allan (2007) *the Age of Turbulence. Adventures in a New World*. New York: Penguin Press.

Haftendorn, Helga (2001) *Deutsche Aussenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung 1945–2000*. Stuttgart/München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.

Hay, Willian Anthony and Sichertman, Harvey (2007) *Is there still a West?: The Future of the Atlantic Alliance*. Colombia: University of Missiory Press.

Hersh, Seymour M (1991) *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. New York: Random House.

Hersh, Seymour M.(2004) *Chain of Command*. New York: Harper

Huntington, Samuel P. (1997) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. London: Simon and Schuster.

Ikenberry, G. John (2001) “American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy”, *Review of International Studies* 27(special issue): 191-213.

Ikenberry, G. John (2002) *America Unrivaled. The Future of the Balance of Power*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

International Institute for Strategic Studies(2009)*The Military Balance*. www.iiss.org (accessed jan30 2009)

Kagan, Robert (2003) *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe i the New World Order*. New York: Knopf.

Kaplan, Lawrence,(1999) *The MLF Debate* in Douglas Brinkley and Richard Griffiths eds. *John F Kennedy and Europe*, Baton Rouge, p52ff.

Kapstein, Jeffrey and Steinmo, Sven (eds.) (2008) *Growing Apart? America and Europe in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge University Press.

Kennedy, Paul (1987) *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. New York Random House.

Kennan, George (1951) *American Diplomacy 1900--1950*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Keohane, Robert O. (1984) *After Hegemony*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Klare, Michael, (2008) *Shrinking Planet: the New Geopolitics of Europe*.

Krauthammer, Charles (2002) "The Unipolar Moment Revisited", *The National Interest* (70).(winter 2002-3) 5-7.

Kristol, Irving (1983) *Reflections of a Neoconservative*. New York: Basic Books.

Kupcham, Charles A. (2003) *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century*. New York: Knopf.

Laurant, Eric (2004) *Bush's Secret World*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Lucas Edward (2007) *The new cold War*. Basingstoke, Palgrave-Macmillan.

Lundestad, Geir (1986) "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe 1945-1952", *Journal of Peace Research* 23(3)(1986): 263-77.

Lundestad, Geir (2003) *The United States and Europe since 1945*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mackinder, Sr. Halford J. (1942) *Democratic Ideals and Reality*. New York: Henry Holt.

Mahan, Erin, (2002) *Kennedy, de Gaulle and Western Europe*, Houndsville.

Mauil, Hans W. (2004) (ed) *Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag.

Mauil, Hans W. (ed) (2006) *Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic*. Basingstoke; Palgrave-Macmillan.

Mead, Walter Russel (2005) "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk". *Orbis* 49.4. 589-598.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York & Condar: WW Norton & Company.

Mearsheimer, John J and Walt, Stephen M. (2007) *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy*. Farrar Strauss and Girough.

Meiers, Franz-Josef (2002) “A Change of Course? German Foreign and Security Policy after Unification”, *German Politics*, December: 195--216.

Melby, Svein (2004) *Bush-revolusjonen i Amerikansk Utenrikspolitik*. Oslo: Aschehoug.

Morgenthau, Hans J.(1948) *Politics among Nations*. New York: Knoph.

Niebuhr, Reinhold (1932) *Moral Man and immoral Society*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Nye, Joseph S.(2002) *The Paradox of American Power, Why the World's Only Superpower can't go it Alone* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nye, Joseph *Soft Power*. (2004)*The Means to succeed in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

Overholt, William (2007) *Asia, America and the Transformation of Geopolitics*. Cambridge University Press.

Risse, Thomas (2003) *Beyond Iraq: Challenges to the Transatlantic Security Community*. Washington DC: AICGS.

Rotblat, Joseph (2003) “President Bush satser sterkere på atomvåpen”, *Aftenposten* 06.08.

Sandalow, David (2008) *Freedom from Oil*, New York; Mc Graw Hill.

Schmidt, Helmuth (2004) *Die Mächte der Zukunft*. Berlin: Siedler.

Schroder, Gerhard (2006) *Entscheidungen, mein Leben in der Politik*. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe.

Schøllgren, Gregor (2004) *Der Auftritt-Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne*. Berlin: Ullstein.

Tenet, George John (2007) *At the Center of the Storm: my years in the CIA*. London: Harper.

U.S. Department of Defense (1993) *Defense Strategy for the 1990s*. Washington D.C.: GOP.

Verheyen, Dick (1999) *The German Question*. Oxford: Westview Press.

Vogel, Heinrich (2003) “Das Ende des ‘Westens’: Tabus in den transatlantischen Beziehungen”, *Internationale Politik* 25(2): 27--34.

Walt, Stephen M. (2007) *Taming American Power. The Global Response to US Primacy*. W.W. Norton.

Waltz, Kenneth (1979) *Theory of International Politics*. Reading Ma.:Addison Wesley.

Wenger, Andreas (2003) *International Relations: From the Cold War to the Globalized World*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

White House (2002) *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington D.C : The White House.

Wohlstetter, Albert, *The Delicate Balance of Terror*, Foreign Affairs , Jan. 1959, 211-234.

Woodward, Bob (2002) *Bush at War*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Woodward, Bob (2004) *Plan of Attack*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

