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Concern For Other Racial and Ethnic Groups and Hope/Fear For America

By

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THESIS

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Committee in Charge

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Introduction

Using the American National Election Study (ANES) survey from 2020, I analyze the relationship between concern for other racial and ethnic groups and how hopeful respondents are about how things are going in America. In May 2020, protests broke out across the country in response to George Floyd's death. Roughly 15 million to 26 million people in America participated in protests and demonstrations in response to George Floyd's death (Buchanan 2020). These massive protests and the inclusive media coverage of the events provide a unique time period where race and ethnicity were at the forefront of discussion and concern for many Americans. Because these BLM and George Floyd protests were so close to the 2020 pre-election ANES survey, which was administered between August 18, 2020, and November 3, 2020, I hypothesize that individuals' concerns regarding race and ethnicity would be salient during this time. Additionally, I expect that the extensive media coverage of the protests would make some respondents more aware of the current conditions for racial and ethnic minorities. Therefore, I expect that the level of concern respondents felt for other racial and ethnic groups affects their perspective of our current conditions in the U.S. and negatively affects how hopeful respondents feel about how things are going in the country.

Theory/Literature Review

Impersonal Influence

While America was experiencing intense racial tension and protests nationwide in 2020, constant coverage captured these moments across media platforms. If individuals were not directly impacted by the BLM and George Floyd protests, they were likely watching them from home on the news or social media, especially given that most individuals were on lockdown and

stuck at home due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the extent of coverage that the BLM protests received, I expect that racial tensions and concerns were at the forefront of many Americans' lives. But how did that influence political attitudes or perceptions of Americans? Mutz (1992) discusses the relationship between impersonal influence and political attitudes. Impersonal influence, according to Mutz (1992), is the “influence that derives from individuals’ perceptions of others’ attitudes, beliefs, or experiences. ‘Others’ in this case refers... to the anonymous ‘others’ outside an individual’s realm of personal contacts” (Mutz 1992, 90). Therefore, we might expect that the millions of Americans who are watching or experiencing these protests may be experiencing impersonal influences regarding levels of race and ethnic concern and how things are going in America.

Mutz (1992) depicts collective opinions' influence on individual opinion-making, and oftentimes, such impersonal influence is achieved through the media. While the media might not be influential enough to form others' opinions directly, Mutz (1992) emphasizes the media's ability to inform individuals about others' opinions or thoughts. That is, “[i]mpersonal influence simply suggests that influence flows from perceptions of collective opinion as well as collective experience” (Mutz 1992, 92). Furthermore, we might expect individuals who experience these “impersonal influences” from the media’s depiction of the racial tensions and BLM protests in 2020, might have greater levels of racial and ethnic concern for others. This theory is based on the assumption that individuals are significantly influenced by the media and that such issues depicted in media coverage remain salient enough to influence political attitudes in the lives of viewers.

Media Framing

As shown throughout the media framing literature, the way media is framed influences the public's perception of an issue (Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997; Nelson et al., 1997; Jacoby, 2000; Chong and Druckman, 2007; Iyengar, 1996). Chong and Druckman (2007) observe the influence of frames in mass media as it relates to opinion leaders' transfer of information to the public. Framing, according to Chong and Druckman, “refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue” (104). Moreover, frames alter individuals' judgments on issues by making subtle changes in the explanations of these issues (Iyengar 1987, 816). Therefore, the way issues are framed influences public perception. Following the brutal death of George Floyd, video footage was spread globally, resulting in uproar and protests. During the BLM protests in 2020, we saw two primary frames perpetrated by the media: (1) police brutality, racial equality, and justice for Black Americans; and (2) lawlessness and violence among rioters, tapping into the fears of “internal enemies” (Klein et al., 2022; Cowart 2022). The way Floyd’s death and the BLM protests were framed altered the perceptions of racism in law enforcement.

Fridkin et al. (2017) analyze individuals' responses to two articles that frame a violent confrontation between a Black woman and a White police officer as either an issue of police brutality or law and order. Fridkin et al. (2017) find that respondents who received a frame focused on law and order were more likely to support the White police officer, while respondents who received a police brutality frame were more likely to support the African American woman. Similarly, individuals who received frames focused on police brutality and racial equality were likely in support of BLM protestors, while those who received the violence and lawlessness frames were likely opposed to the BLM protests. These frames were often spread by partisan

media sources; therefore, individuals' perceptions of these events are likely shaped by party identity. As Chong and Druckman illustrate, by reframing issues, individuals/media can transform well-established issues into a “new” perception of an issue and, therefore, possibly an entirely new issue. Understandably, individuals must have some understanding of a concept or policy in order for a framing effect to happen.

Many Americans were well aware of police brutality as a racialized issue prior to the death of George Floyd and the 2020 protests. However, the rise in media coverage of the issue and the mass response across social media amplified the issue at that time. “[Floyd’s] death set record levels of activity and amplification on Twitter, prompted the saddest day in the platform’s history and caused his name to appear among the ten most frequently used phrases in a day where he is the only individual to have ever received that level of attention who was not known to the public earlier that same week” (Wu et al. 2023, 1). Given the unprecedented coverage of George Floyd’s death and the uproar in protests (roughly 8,700) between May 25 and July 31, 2020, I would expect race and ethnicity to remain salient during the ANES pre-election survey, which took place between August and November 2020 (Major Cities Chiefs Report).

Factors that may influence individuals’ evaluations of national and local conditions

Recent literature shows that racial tension and concern influence perceptions of the country and our political processes. Reny and Newman (2021) illustrate the effect of widespread social protests following the death of unarmed Black citizens due to police brutality on “opinion-mobilizing.” Moreover, Reny and Newman (2021) provide evidence that these protests— which are racialized by nature—led to the polarization of opinions due to political and racial orientations. Reny and Newman (2021) find that the George Floyd protests increased “perceived anti-Black discrimination” and decreased likeability towards police in individuals

who are liberal and have low levels of prejudice. Meanwhile, conservative respondents who hold high levels of prejudice either had small, short-term shifts or remained the same. Reny and Newman (2021) show how the George Floyd protests further politicized and racialized the sphere of race and law enforcement within the US. Reny and Newman (2021) found long-lasting racializing effects on the issue of law enforcement in the U.S. and increased racialization in those who are more liberal. This study shows the long-term effects of the George Floyd protests, as the racialization of law enforcement had long-term effects in respondents who were more responsive and concerned with such racial issues (i.e., the less prejudiced respondents). Therefore, I would expect to find similar long-term influences of this racialization from the George Floyd protests, and, therefore, racial tensions will remain salient during the ANES pre-election survey in November.

It is important to recognize that there are various factors that influence individuals' evaluations of national and local conditions aside from levels of racial and ethnic concern. As Stimson (2004) discusses, public opinion changes over time depending on the country's circumstances. Stimson suggests that public sentiment is influenced by various factors, such as political events, economic conditions, and social issues. Additionally, Stimson discusses how independent and centrist voters often make decisions based on their perceptions of whether general conditions are going well or bad. According to Stimson, centrists are likely concerned with economic stability, social cohesion, and the well-being of the country overall (see also Zaller, 2004). Their evaluations of whether things are going well or poorly may depend on how effectively the government addresses these concerns, promotes bipartisan cooperation, and achieves positive outcomes on critical issues. Additionally, Stimson's work highlights the fluctuations of public opinion among independents and centrists. Stimson (2004) emphasizes the

importance of understanding these shifts in public opinion for policymakers and political actors. While public opinion and social issues remain crucial factors in shaping political dynamics and policy outcomes, it is important to understand that numerous factors influence evaluations of the country's conditions.

Therefore, Stimson suggests that whether conditions are good or bad will influence political behavior, with one of these conditions possibly being racial and ethnic concerns. Similarly, Zaller (2004) shows that "floating" (swing) voters are especially responsive to the right track, wrong-track national conditions in their voting behaviors. According to Zaller (2004), one would expect that current conditions (i.e., economic conditions, practical governance, social issues, etc.) would influence political behaviors. Therefore, it is important to understand how race and ethnic concern influences perceptions of whether things are going well or not, given that there are possible political repercussions. There are numerous factors that may influence perceptions of national and local conditions in America, and racial and ethnic concerns may be one condition.

While I expect levels of race and ethnic concern to influence evaluations of national and local conditions in America, it is important to recognize the influence of the economy on perceptions of the country's conditions. Fiorina (1981) depicts the role of retrospective voting in national elections. Specifically, Fiorina shows how retrospective voting is when voters make decisions based on recent events or conditions rather than just their future plans. Moreover, Fiorina argues that retrospective voting is significantly influenced by economic conditions. That is, politicians are held responsible for voters' perceptions of economic conditions (Anderson 2007). Therefore, it is crucial to recognize the influence of economic conditions on individuals' perceptions of how things are going in America.

Additionally, political scientists have explored the role of emotions, particularly hope, in this context. Brader (2008) shows that voters—including politically knowledgeable voters—are influenced by emotions. Simply altering the imagery and wording in campaign ads can significantly influence the emotions of voters. Brader (2008) finds that emotional appeals manipulate politically knowledgeable citizens. That is, emotions matter in politics and in evaluations of current conditions. These sources provide a strong foundation for understanding the various factors that shape voters' evaluations of national and local conditions and their impact on political behavior and outcomes.

Research Design

The American National Election Study interviews respondents in a pre-election survey and a post-election survey every election year. In the 2020 ANES pre-election survey, 8,280 respondents were interviewed between August 18, 2020, and November 3, 2020. In the post-election survey, respondents were re-interviewed between November 8, 2020, and January 4, 2021. These respondents were surveyed online, over the phone, and/or via live video interviews. Interviews were conducted in Spanish or English. In this paper, I am seeking to determine if concern for other racial and ethnic groups who are less fortunate than the respondent affects how afraid/hopeful respondents feel about how things are going in the country. My independent variable is concern for racial and ethnic groups who are less fortunate, and my dependent variables are how afraid/hopeful respondents feel about how things are going in the country. In the pre-election survey, respondents were asked:

“How often would you say that you have tender, concerned feelings for people from another racial or ethnic group who are less fortunate than you?”

Respondents were then given options between the values 1 to 5, with 5 being “extremely often,” 4 “very often,” 3 “somewhat often,” 2 “not too often,” and 1 “not often at all.” This question is coded as the *raceethnicconcern* variable in my analysis. Additionally, respondents were asked:

“The next few questions are about how you feel about how things are going in the country these days. How hopeful do you feel about how things are going in the country these days?”

Respondents were then similarly given options between the values 1 to 5, with 1 being “not at all,” 2 “a little,” 3 “somewhat,” 4 “very,” and 5 “extremely.” The question on hope was coded as the *hopeful* variable in my analysis. The same question was asked on fear, questioning how afraid respondents are about how things are going. This is my fear variable.

In this paper, I am seeking to determine if concern for other racial and ethnic groups who are less fortunate than the respondent affects how hopeful respondents feel about how things are going in the country. My research question asks: whether concern for other racial and ethnic groups affects how hopeful respondents feel about how things are going in the country. Using the 2020 ANES data, I will analyze the relationship between concern for other racial and ethnic groups and how hopeful/fearful respondents feel about how things are going in the country. Note that I factored the race and ethnic concern variable to indicate that it should be treated as a continuous variable. I would expect to find that greater concern for other racial and ethnic groups decreases their hope for how things are going in the country and increases fear.

Hypothesis 1: Having greater concern for other racial and ethnic groups increases the probability that respondents feel more afraid about how things are going in the country these days.

Hypothesis 2: Having greater concern for other racial and ethnic groups increases the probability that respondents feel less hopeful about how things are going in the country these days.

Findings

Race and Ethnic Concern and Fear for Country

When looking at the relationship between concern for other racial and ethnic groups and how afraid respondents feel about how things are going in the country, my findings confirmed my hypothesis. As shown in Table 1, the results tell us that a one-point increase in concern for other racial and ethnic groups leads to a 0.2 unit increase in fear of how things are going in the country. This indicates that a one-unit increase in race and ethnic concern is associated with a 0.2-point increase in the fear variable. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The constant term is 2.9, which represents the expected value of the "afraid" variable when the "raceethnicconcern" variable is zero. Therefore, increasing concern for other racial and ethnic groups results in a 0.2-point increase in fear. Moreover, these findings suggest that there is a significant relationship between race and ethnic concern and fear, as an increase in the race and ethnic concern variable is associated with a higher level of fear.

Table 1: Fear Regression: How Race and Ethnic Concern Influences Fear for Future of America

Dependent variable: afraid	
raceethnicconcern	0.3*** (0.01)
Constant	2.5*** (0.04)
Observations	7,324
R ²	0.1
Adjusted R ²	0.1
Residual Std. Error	1.2 (df = 7322)
F Statistic	444.4*** (df = 1; 7322)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

These findings tell us that the greater concern respondents have for other racial and ethnic groups, the more afraid those respondents feel about how things are going in the country. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between concern for other racial and ethnic groups and how afraid respondents feel about how things are going in the country. As shown in Figure 1, the more concern respondents have for other racial and ethnic groups, the more fearful they are for the future of our country.




Figure 1: Race & Ethnic Concern and Fear for the Future of America

Race and Ethnic Concern and Hope for Country

Now that we have analyzed fear, we will now turn to our second hypothesis to determine the relationship between race and ethnic concern and hope. Through regression analysis, I analyze the relationship between concern for other racial and ethnic groups and how hopeful respondents feel about how things are going in the country. As shown in Table 2, the results show that a one-point increase in concern for other racial and ethnic groups leads to a 0.2-unit decrease in hope for how things are going in the country. Moreover, given that the coefficient for the race-ethnic concern variable is -0.2, this indicates that a one-unit increase in “raceethnicconcern” results in a 0.2 unit decrease in hope. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The constant term is 3.1, which represents the expected value of the

hope variable when the "raceethnicconcern" variable is zero. In essence, there is a significant relationship between race and ethnic concern and hope, where an increase in race and ethnic concern is associated with a decrease in hope. However, it is important to note that the model has a relatively low (3%) ability to explain the variation in the "hopeful" variable.

Table 2: Regression Hopeful: How Race and Ethnic Concern Influences Hope for Future of America

Dependent variable: hopeful	
raceethnicconcern	-0.2*** (0.01)
Constant	3.1*** (0.04)
Observations	7,315
R ²	0.03
Adjusted R ²	0.03
Residual Std. Error	1.1 (df = 7313)
F Statistic	228.5*** (df = 1; 7313)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

These findings tell us that the lower level of concern respondents have for other racial and ethnic groups that are less fortunate, the more hopeful they are for the future of our country. Moreover, the greater concern respondents have for other racial and ethnic groups, the less hopeful they are for the future of the United States. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between concern for other racial and ethnic groups and how hopeful respondents feel about how things are going in the country. As shown in Figure 2, the more concern respondents have for other racial and ethnic groups, the less hopeful they are for the future of our country.




Figure 2: Race & Ethnic Concern and Hope for the Future of America

Interactions: 2016 Vote Choice

When analyzing additional interaction terms, I looked at variables that would amplify how afraid/hopeful respondents feel about how things are going in the country. I looked at how respondents' vote choice in 2016, alongside their concern for other racial and ethnic groups, affected how afraid/hopeful respondents feel about how things are going in the country. In the survey, respondents were asked: "Recall of last (2016) presidential vote choice: which one did you vote for?" Respondents were then given the options of 1 "Hillary Clinton," 2 "Donald Trump," and 5 "Other." Due to the small number of respondents who selected "other," I decided

to remove all “other” responses. This question was coded as the “votechoice2016” variable in my analysis.

Table 3: Regression Votechoice2016 and Hopeful: How 2016 Vote Choice Influences Hope for Future of America

Dependent variable: hopeful	
votechoice2016Hillary Clinton	-1.1*** (0.03)
Constant	3.1*** (0.02)
Observations	5,902
R ²	0.2
Adjusted R ²	0.2
Residual Std. Error	1.0 (df = 5900)
F Statistic	1,736.1*** (df = 1; 5900)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

When looking at the relationship between hope and 2016 vote choice in Table 3, I find a one-unit increase in vote choice leads to a -1.1 point decrease in hope. Individuals who voted for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election have roughly a 1.1-point decrease in hope compared to those who did not vote for Clinton, and these findings are statistically significant. These findings are depicted in Figure 3, as Trump voters clearly have a higher level of hope when compared to Clinton Voters. Figure 3, when combined with Table 3, demonstrates the existing relationship between respondents' vote choice in 2016 and hope for the future of America. Specifically, respondents who voted for Hillary Clinton have lower levels of hope for the future of America, while respondents who voted for Donald Trump have higher levels of hope for the future of America.




Figure 3: Effect of Vote Choice on Hopefulness

Table 4: Regression Votechoice2016 and Afraid: How 2016 Vote Choice Influences Fear for Future of America

Dependent variable: afraid	
votechoice2016Hillary Clinton	1.0*** (0.03)
Constant	2.9*** (0.02)
Observations	5,909
R ²	0.2
Adjusted R ²	0.2
Residual Std. Error	1.1 (df = 5907)
F Statistic	1,234.7*** (df = 1; 5907)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Additionally, when looking at the relationship between fear and 2016 vote choice in Table 4, I find a one-unit increase in vote choice leads to a 1.0-point increase in fear. This table indicates that individuals who voted for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election have roughly a 1.0-point increase in fear compared to those who did not vote for Clinton. These findings are statistically significant. The findings depicted in Figure 4 suggest that there is an existing relationship between vote choice and levels of fear. Figure 4 illustrates this relationship by depicting greater levels of fear among Clinton voters and lower levels of fear among Trump voters. Moreover, respondents who support Trump are likely to be more hopeful and less fearful of the future of America. There is a significant relationship between vote choice (specifically for respondents who voted for Hillary Clinton) and fear. Ultimately, voting for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election is associated with an increase in fearfulness.




Figure 4: Effect of Vote Choice on Fear

Table 5 depicts the relationship between hope and both concern for other racial and ethnic groups and the 2016 vote choice. I find that a one-unit increase in race and ethnic concern and hope results in a 0.05 unit decrease in vote choice (Hillary Clinton). That is, the relationship between race and ethnic concern and hope varies depending on whether individuals voted for Hillary Clinton or not. However, these findings are marginally significant at the 0.1 level. Moreover, there are significant relationships between race and ethnic concern and vote choice individually, as well as their interaction with the hopeful variable. Higher levels of race and ethnic concern and voting for Hillary Clinton in 2016 are associated with lower levels of hopefulness.

Table 5: Interaction Term (hopeful) Regression: How Race and Ethnic Concern and 2016 Vote Choice influences Hope for Future of America

Dependent variable: hopeful	
raceethnicconcern	-0.1*** (0.02)
votechoice2016Hillary Clinton	-0.9*** (0.1)
raceethnicconcern:votechoice2016Hillary Clinton	-0.05* (0.03)
Constant	3.3*** (0.1)
Observations	5,286
R ²	0.2
Adjusted R ²	0.2
Residual Std. Error	1.0 (df = 5282)
F Statistic	534.5*** (df = 3; 5282)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Additionally, there is some evidence to suggest that the relationship between "raceethnicconcern" and "hopeful" differs depending on the vote choice in the 2016 election.

Therefore, as shown in Figure 5, if respondents voted for Trump and had lower levels of concern for other racial and ethnic groups, they felt more hopeful about how things are going in the country. Whereas individuals who voted for Hillary Clinton and who have greater levels of concern for other racial and ethnic groups that are less fortunate felt less hopeful about how things are going in the country.




Figure 5: 2016 Vote Choice and Race & Ethnic Concern and Hope

Additionally, Table 6 depicts the relationship between fear and both concern for other racial and ethnic groups and the 2016 vote choice. I find that a one-unit increase in race and ethnic concern and fear results in a 0.2 unit increase in vote choice. This indicates that the relationship between race and ethnic concern and fear is modified by individuals' vote choices in

the 2016 election. These findings are statistically significant. Furthermore, the regression analysis suggests that there are significant relationships between the variables "raceethnicconcern" and "votechoice2016" individually, as well as their interaction with the fear variable. Higher levels of race and ethnic concern" and voting for Hillary Clinton in 2016 are associated with higher levels of fear. Moreover, the interaction term indicates that the relationship between race and ethnic concern and fear is influenced by individuals' vote choices.

Table 6: Interaction Term (afraid) Regression: How Race and Ethnic Concern and 2016 Vote Choice influences Fear for Future of America

Dependent variable:	afraid	
Raceethnicconcern	0.1***	(0.02)
Votechoice2016Hillary Clinton	0.4***	(0.1)
Raceethnicconcern:Votechoice2016Hillary Clinton	0.2***	(0.03)
Constant	2.6***	(0.1)
Observations	5,293	
R2	0.2	
Adjusted R2	0.2	
Residual Std. Error	1.1 (df = 5289)	
F Statistic	448.7*** (df = 3; 5289)	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

You also see this play out in Figure 6. Trump voters who have the greatest level of concern for other racial and ethnic groups score lower on the hopefulness scale than Clinton supporters who have the greatest level of concern for other racial and ethnic groups. Additionally, Trump supporters who have the lowest level of concern for other racial and ethnic groups have a higher level of hopefulness than Clinton supporters who have the lowest level of concern for other racial and ethnic groups.




Figure 6: 2016 Vote Choice and Race & Ethnic Concern and Fear

Interactions: Preference for Building a Wall

I then looked at the relationship between hope and concern for other racial and ethnic groups and their preference for building a wall on the border with Mexico. By looking at respondents' preferences for whether or not they want to build a wall on the border with Mexico, I will get a vague understanding of the respondents' degree of tolerance towards the other "out" groups. This might provide some understanding of their tolerance for other racial and ethnic groups. Respondents were asked whether they favor or oppose building a wall on the U.S. border with Mexico, with zero meaning they oppose and one meaning they favor building a wall.

When looking at the relationship between hope and concern for other racial and ethnic groups and preference for building a wall, as seen in Table 7, I find that a one-point increase in preference for building a wall leads to a -0.9 point decrease in hopefulness. Additionally, when looking at the interaction term, the coefficient is -0.1 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. This indicates that the relationship between race and ethnic concern and hope is modified by the presence of the wall variable. Specifically, a one-unit increase in race and ethnic concern in the presence of the wall variable is associated with a decrease of 0.1 in hope. These findings show that even those who you would assume to be at the highest level of wanting equality and concern for other racial and ethnic groups (since they have concern very often and they oppose building a wall) will have a decrease in hopefulness. This follows along with my previous findings when just looking at the interaction between race and ethnic concern and hopefulness.

Table 7: Interaction Term Wall (hopeful) Regression: How Race and Ethnic Concern and Preferences for Building a Wall influences Hope for Future of America

Dependent variable: hopeful	
raceethnicconcern	-0.01 (0.02)
wall	-0.9*** (0.1)
raceethnicconcern:wall	-0.1** (0.03)
Constant	3.2*** (0.1)
Observations	6,025
R ²	0.2
Adjusted R ²	0.2
Residual Std. Error	1.0 (df = 6021)
F Statistic	590.4*** (df = 3; 6021)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01




Figure 7: Race & Ethnic Concern and Preference for Building a Wall on Hope

These findings are confirmed in Figure 7. Figure 7 shows that out of the respondents who have the greatest level of concern for other racial and ethnic groups, those who favor building a wall had a lower level of hopefulness than those who oppose building a wall. This implies that the less tolerant respondents were to other racial and ethnic groups, the more hopeful respondents felt about how things are going in the country. This is extremely fascinating as the narrative for building a wall is centered around this idea of a “crisis” in America; therefore, one may expect this narrative to increase fear and decrease hope. However, our findings suggest that

having less race and ethnic concern - which is associated with favoring building a wall - actually generates less hope and greater levels of fear.

Additional Variables for Discussion

We will now look at additional variables that might influence levels of hope for the future of America, aside from levels of race and ethnic concern. Specifically, in this section, we will examine the role of gender and partisanship on levels of hope for the future of America. This might provide additional explanations for why individuals may be more or less hopeful about the future of the Country. Table 8 depicts the relationship between race and ethnic concern, and Gender. It is important to note that I was only able to analyze men and women within the gender variables since there was an insignificant number of respondents in the other categories.

Table 8: Regression Race and Ethnic Concern Gender: How Gender Influences Race and Ethnic Concern

Dependent variable	raceethnicconcern
genderMale	-0.2** (0.1)
Constant	3.5*** (0.1)
Observations	266
R ²	0.01
Adjusted R ²	0.01
Residual Std. Error	0.9 (df = 264)
F Statistic	4.0** (df = 1; 264)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Specifically, Table 8 suggests that being male is associated with a 0.2-point decrease in levels of race and ethnic concern. Therefore, these results show that men have slightly lower levels of race and ethnic concern compared to women. This can also be seen in Figure 8, where you see a slight difference in race and ethnic concern between men and women; however, there is a relatively weak explanatory power of gender in explaining the difference in the race and ethnic concern variable.




Figure 8: Relationship between Gender and Race and Ethnic Concern

Now that it has been established that gender has minimal significant influence over levels of race and ethnic concern, therefore, we will turn our attention to the relationship between gender and hope. Figure 9 looks at this relationship between gender and hope. While this figure

may show slightly lower levels of hope among females than males, the results are not statistically significant ($p > 0.1$). Therefore the relationship between gender and hope is not statistically significant.




Figure 9: Relationship Between Gender and Hope

Table 9 examines the role of race and ethnic concern and gender on levels of hope. By examining this interaction in Table 9 and Figure 10, I am determining if there is a significant combined relationship with both race and ethnic concern and gender as the independent variables on the hope variables. This table shows that there is not a significant relationship between race and ethnic concern and gender on hope. However, race and ethnic concern alone has a

statistically significant influence on hope as higher levels of concern decrease levels of hope. Meanwhile, as depicted below, both gender and the interaction term do not have a statistically significant relationship with hope.

Table 9: How Race and Ethnic Concern and Gender Influence Hope

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	p-value
Raceethnicconcern	-0.2**	(0.1)	
GenderMale	-0.7	(0.6)	
Raceethnicconcern:GenderMale	0.2	(0.2)	
Constant	3.3***	(0.4)	
Observations		266	
R²		0.02	
Adjusted R²		0.01	
Residual Std. Error		1.2 (df = 262)	
F Statistic		1.8 (df = 3; 262)	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01




Figure 10: Race and Ethnic Concern and Gender on Hopefulness

Now that we have examined the role of gender and found that there is limited data to support gender as an explanation for respondents' levels of hope for the future of our country, we move on to examine party identification. Table 10 examines the relationship between party identification and race and ethnic concern. Table 10 suggests that there is a significant relationship between party ID and race and ethnic concern. Furthermore, the findings show that being Republican is associated with a 0.6-point decrease in race and ethnic concern. Figure 11 illustrates these findings. As shown in Figure 11, Republican respondents tend to have lower levels of race and ethnic concern compared to Democrats.

Table 10: Regression Party ID and Race and Ethnic Concern Results

Dependent variable		
Raceethnicconcern		
partyRepublican	-0.6***	(0.04)
Constant	3.7***	(0.03)
Observations	2,834	
R ²	0.1	
Adjusted R ²	0.1	
Residual Std. Error	1.0 (df = 2832)	
F Statistic	256.8*** (df = 1; 2832)	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01




Figure 11: Relationship Between Party ID and Race and Ethnic Concern

Table 11 looks at the relationship between party identification and levels of hope for the future of America. Table 11 shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between hope and party affiliation. Specifically, being a Republican is associated with a 1-point increase in hope. This brings into question our findings early when looking at race and ethnic concern and vote choice in Table 4. Table 4 indicates that individuals who voted for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election have roughly a 1.0-point increase in fear compared to those who did not vote for Clinton. Therefore, the findings depicted in Table 4 are more likely related to party affiliation rather than candidate support.

Table 11: Regression Party ID and Hope Results

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	p-value
partyRepublican	1.0***	(0.04)	
Constant	2.1***	(0.03)	
Observations		2,834	
R²		0.2	
Adjusted R²		0.2	
Residual Std. Error		1.1 (df = 2832)	
F Statistic		595.2*** (df = 1; 2832)	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11's findings are depicted in Figure 12, showing the relationship between party identification and hope for the future of America. Specifically, Figure 12 shows the findings that Democrats have significantly lower levels of hope compared to Republicans. These findings re-emphasize that the relationship between vote choice in 2016 and hope are likely due to party affiliation rather than candidate choice.




Figure 12: Relationship Between Party ID and Hope

Table 12: How Race and Ethnic Concern and Party ID Influence Hope For Future of America

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	p-value
raceethnicconcern	-0.2***	(0.03)	
partyRepublican	0.7***	(0.1)	
raceethnicconcern:partyRepublican	0.1*	(0.04)	
Constant	2.7***	(0.1)	
Observations		2,834	
R²		0.2	
Adjusted R²		0.2	
Residual Std. Error		1.1 (df = 2830)	
F Statistic		222.8*** (df = 3; 2830)	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Now that we have established the relationship between party identification and race and ethnic concern and party identification and hope separately, Table 12 analyzes the relationship

between the interaction of party affiliation and race and ethnic concern on hope for the future of America. Table 12 shows that there is a significant relationship between race and ethnic concern and party ID on hope. Specifically, both race and ethnic concern and party ID are associated with a 0.1-point increase in hope. As shown in Figure 13, Democrats and Republicans with lower levels of race and ethnic concern have greater levels of hope compared with Democrats and Republicans with higher levels of race and ethnic concern. However, Republicans have an overall higher level of hope than Democrats.




Figure 13: Race and Ethnic Concern and Party ID on Hopefulness

Discussion

This study brings into question how individuals determine the state of affairs in the United States. Stimson (2004) and Zaller (2004) both highlight the significance of individuals' perceptions of how things are going in the country in shaping their political behaviors and decisions. As discussed in Stimson's (2004) work, individuals often look to the current state of affairs when making political decisions, and such perception of the direction of the country may influence such political behaviors. Additionally, Zaller (2004) illustrates voters as responsive to right track and wrong track, as well as national conditions in their voting behavior. So we would expect positive or negative conditions to influence political behaviors. Therefore, it is important to understand how race and ethnic concern influences perceptions of whether things are going well or not, given that there are possible political repercussions. My findings illuminate this notion by demonstrating that respondents who convey greater racial and ethnic concern for other racial and ethnic groups tend to have greater fear and a lack of hope in regard to how things are going in America. These findings suggest that race and ethnic concern can significantly alter individuals' evaluations of the country's conditions.

It is crucial to understand the role of race and ethnic concern on the perception of the state of the country, given the potential political ramifications. The findings in this study suggest that individuals' perceptions of how things are going in the country can be influenced by levels of race and ethnic concern which, therefore, may influence political decisions and behaviors. This study contributes to the literature on political behaviors and decision-making and holds significant potential political implications, as it emphasizes the importance of considering levels of race and ethnic concern as a factor for individuals' evaluations of the state of the country.

Conclusion

Using the American National Election Study survey from 2020, this study analyzed the relationship between concern for other racial and ethnic groups and levels of fear and hope towards the current state of affairs in America. These findings suggest a significant relationship between individuals' concern for other racial and ethnic groups and their level of fear and hopefulness regarding the state of affairs in the country. Specifically, the results indicate that individuals who express greater concern for other racial and ethnic groups tend to exhibit higher levels of fear and lower levels of hopefulness. In contrast, those who do not prioritize the well-being of other races and ethnicities demonstrate higher levels of hopefulness and lower levels of fear.

These findings hold particular relevance in the context of the George Floyd protests that took place across the United States in the summer of 2020. These protests are arguably a manifestation of the fear and lack of hope that individuals within the group and individuals who have concern for other racial and ethnic groups experienced. Furthermore, my findings that individuals with minimal concern for other racial and ethnic groups display greater levels of hope and lower levels of fear align well with the attitudes expressed by individuals who were unsympathetic or unsupportive of the George Floyd protests. These findings suggest that a lack of concern or understanding of experiences that marginalized communities face may contribute to a more hopeful perspective, as these individuals may not fully understand the gravity of the challenges faced by these groups. These findings shed light on an unsettling trend that suggests a lack of empathy and concern among Americans. This pattern may imply that individuals who have lower levels of racial and ethnic concern prioritize their own group's problems over greater societal considerations; therefore, these individuals contribute to an arguably more fearful and

pessimistic outlook for the future of the nation as a whole, especially for those who have greater levels of concern for other racial and ethnic groups. This notion sheds light on the potential consequences of a lack of intergroup solidarity, which may ultimately impact the welfare of society as a whole.

Ultimately, these findings suggest that individuals who have little concern for other racial and ethnic groups may hinder the progress and well-being of the nation as a whole. The implications of these findings suggest the need for efforts to increase empathy, collective concern, and inclusivity among individuals from various racial and ethnic groups. By increasing empathy and awareness of other racial and ethnic groups lived experiences, we may find ourselves in a more hopeful and less fearful country, where individuals can work towards managing challenges collectively.

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