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Issues, Value Cleavages, and Political Change in East Asia

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¹More than a decade ago, Flanagan and Lee investigated the relationship between level of development and the emergence of the Authoritarian-libertarian (A-L) value cleavage.¹ Using two data sets and 18 countries at four distinct levels of development, ranging from an annual per capita GNP of \$260 to one of \$13,160 for the year 1982, we found no evidence of an A-L value cleavage at the fourth and lowest level of development. The conceptual sub-dimensions either failed to cluster as predicted by the A-L pattern or clustered in ways that violated the expected pattern. By the time they reached societies with \$1000-3000 per capita GNP, where something like 50-60 percent of the populations have moved out of agriculture into cities and into secondary education, the A-L value cleavage was clearly present in all cases. Thereafter, with higher levels of development the pattern of item clustering both within and across the various conceptual sub-dimensions of the A-L cleavage strengthens as does the scale's predictive power to other social and political attitudes and behaviors. Because our sample included Asian, Latin American, African, and communist nations as well as Western ones, we concluded that the A-L value change is a universal phenomenon that occurs in all nations when they reach a certain level of development in terms of GNP, urbanization, educational level, etc. The analysis demonstrated that the A-L value change phenomenon emerges at a level of development that could not be explained by Ronald Inglehart's theory of a materialist-postmaterialist (PM) value change.²

This study examines evidence bearing on this hypothesis in East Asia. If the A/L value change theory holds, we expect that the A/L value cleavage clearly emerges in countries with higher level of development (i.e., Japan, Singapore) but does not appear in those at a substantially lower level of development (i.e., Indonesia). In doing so, we first briefly explain the nature of the value change process and outline why it is occurring, thus empirically demonstrating its causal antecedents. We then empirically analyze the political consequences of this value change in four important areas. We will look at the relationship between value change and growing levels of social and political alienation along a number of key attitudinal dimensions. We also investigate the relationship between value preferences and a "New Politics" agenda and political involvement. Finally, we explore the social bases of party support and then assess evidence of and possible reasons for differences, if any, in orientations between party identifiers and nonidentifiers in Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The study is based on the 1999-2001 wave of the World Values Survey (WVS). The selected 5 East Asian nations exhibit drastically different levels of development levels: Japan, Singapore, Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia.³

¹ Aie-Rie Lee is a professor of political science at Texas Tech University. A previous version of this paper was delivered at the conference "The Development of Electoral Democracy in East Asia," hosted by the East-West Center, the Center for the Study of Democracy at UC Irvine, and the East Asia Barometer; Honolulu, Hawaii, July 17, 2006.

Conceptualizing Value Change and its Causes

The materialist/postmaterialist (PM) and authoritarian/libertarian (A-L) theories of value change present alternative interpretations of the most important politically relevant value change that has taken place in the advanced industrial societies. Before we proceed with our analysis of the emergence of this value change phenomenon in East Asia, we need to summarize these two contrasting theories of value change and their associated causes. The causal explanations of value change are central to the two theories because one's conceptualization of the causes of value change inevitably defines its nature. Inglehart's conceptualization of how values are changing and why is well known and can be briefly summarized as follows. Drawing directly from the Maslow needs hierarchy, he simplifies Maslow's original five levels to distinguish between two types of needs -- the lower and most basic material needs (for the physical necessities of life and for safety) and higher level needs (belonging, self-esteem and aesthetic and intellectual). All these needs are viewed as positively good, but for individuals socialized in conditions of affluence and security during their early formative years, a fundamental change occurs in the relative emphasis they attach to these lower level needs which permanently de-emphasizes their priority relative to the higher level needs. In Inglehart's conceptualization, therefore, Materialists are those that attach a higher priority to the basic material needs of life, while the Postmaterialists attach a higher priority to the higher level belonging, self-esteem, aesthetic and intellectual needs.

The A-L theory of how values are changing and why may be less familiar to the reader and, because it has been evolving over time, we will need to elaborate it here in somewhat greater detail. It is important to note that there is a considerable overlap in the items used to tap the A-L and M-PM scales. As has been noted elsewhere, roughly 75 percent of the items Inglehart uses for his M-PM scale can be incorporated into an A-L scale.⁴ Only 25 percent, those related to economic wants and concerns, are explicitly excluded as distinct and inappropriate for an A-L scale. A large number of other types of items, that are excluded from the M-PM formulation, are included in the A-L scale. While this suggests that there are some inevitable similarities in the two theories of value change, there are also a number of key differences in both the conceptualization of the old values (where societies are coming from) and the new values (the direction in which they are moving).

Basically, Flanagan and later Flanagan and Lee argue that the over-arching concept that integrates the notion of libertarian values is self-actualization.⁵ To achieve the goal of self-actualization, the individual requires freedom in three separate but interrelated domains. These are a social domain to provide freedom from the tyranny of authority, a psychological domain to free the individual from rigidly held traditional beliefs and customs, and a physical domain to afford freedom from material limitations. The drive for self-actualization and its expression in the social, psychological and physical domains then defines the scope of the A-L value change, which occurs along three distinct sub-dimensions: Deference to Autonomy, Conformity to Openness, Austerity to Self-Betterment. What follows are brief explanations of and distinctions among these three dimensions of the A-L cleavage.

According to Flanagan and his associates, a shift from deference to autonomy refers to growing emphasis on equality rather than hierarchy, on self-assertive individualism and independence rather than a passive compliance or submissive resignation, and a general orientation towards seeking more self-determination and control over one's own life.⁶ This

dimension captures the general decline modern societies are experiencing in the respect, loyalty, dependency, and obedience that all outside authorities and institutions can command, from parental authority, to the community, to the church, to one's boss, to the political authorities.

The second dimension of A-L change is in the psychological domain, representing a movement from an emphasis on conformity to an attitude of openness. That is seeking a freer environment to facilitate self-actualization by throwing off the constraints of traditional customs and religious beliefs, opening oneself to new ideas, adopting more accepting attitudes towards new lifestyles and broader range of moral behavior. This also includes more tolerance of and empathy with people or groups that are different from oneself, including religious or ethnic minorities.

The third dimension, a reaction to change in the physical domain, is a shift from a preoccupation with the values necessary for physical survival in conditions of scarcity to the search for personal happiness and fulfillment. This includes improving one's living environment and general quality of life, through a stronger emphasis on self-understanding, self-improvement and the expansion of one's knowledge, skills and capacities, and through a greater willingness to relax austere codes that inhibit the pursuit of personal pleasures and self-indulgences. Authoritarian values on this dimension thus stress the importance of hard work, diligence, self-discipline, and other work-centered values and a frugal and austere lifestyles. Libertarian values are those that put greater emphasis on self-fulfillment, self-indulgence and the pursuit of personal pleasures and leisure activities.

As far as the timing of the emergence of the A-L value dimension, the A-L theory points to a strong relationship between levels of socio-economic development and the emergence of libertarian values. The list of the new conditions of life associated with libertarian values provides some clues as to what that level of development might be. First, it would appear that industrialization, the motor of socio-economic change, has to proceed to a sufficient degree to draw large portions of a population out of the stultifying climate of agrarian life and into the cities. Moreover, the pace of change has to accelerate to the point where the rewards of innovation and independent initiatives can be clearly seen and realized, at least in some sectors of society. Second, the advance of literacy, education, science and information should proceed to the point where they break the hold of traditional norms for a large segment of a society, such that it becomes increasingly open to the new, skeptical of the old, and tolerant of the different. Third, a growing equality of incomes, lifestyles, education and information -- driven by expanding industrialization, affluence and mass consumption and by the diffusion of the media -- should proceed sufficiently to undermine traditional deferential norms within substantial parts of a society. Finally, welfare bureaucracies and welfare benefits must be sufficiently developed to remove substantial portions of the population for personalistic dependencies on patrons and relax the austere code of behavior necessary for survival in marginal subsistence economies that have no public safety nets.

Clearly we are identifying some very long-term social change processes here, whose initial onset and final completion may span several hundred years. Even in the early stages of these processes, conditions of life conducive for the nurturing of libertarian values may pertain for some very small elite groups. For the A-L cleavage to become a mass phenomenon capable of mobilizing mass energies and raising issues to the national political agenda, much more development is necessary.

Level of Development and the Strength of the A-L Cleavage

One way to determine the stage of development at which the A-L change emerges is to examine the patterns of item clustering across countries at different levels of development and see if any consistent differences emerge. As indicated in Table 1, we can group the nations roughly into four development levels. The high income nations – Japan and Singapore -- had a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in 2000 of roughly \$22-35,000. The upper middle income nation -- Korea-- with a GNI per capita of \$9,790; the lower middle income nation -- the Philippines-- with a GNI per capita of \$1,030; while the low income nation -- Indonesia -- with a GNI per capita of \$590. Our other four indicators in the table exhibit similar declines, although they are not quite as dramatic. The percent of the non-agricultural labor force as a percent of the total population increased monotonically across the four categories. Similarly the percent urban and the secondary school enrollment ratio drops across categories. Finally, the human development index - a value of the composite index of physical life quality - drops from 0.934 in Japan to 0.680 in Indonesia. The Philippines certainly stands alone as far below the other three higher level nations across all five indicators.

If we are going to determine the level of development that is required for the A-L value cleavage to emerge, we must first determine our decisional criteria. In short, how do we test for the timing of the emergence of the A-L value change phenomenon. The A-L change is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. A number of different kinds of value and attitude change are occurring more or less simultaneous, such as a decline in respect for authority, a growth in open mindedness and tolerance and a rising emphasis on self-fulfillment. While our theory explains why these different attitude cluster are drawn together through a process of change, the sheer number of distinct manifestations of the three different sub-dimensions create a very large array of discreet attitudes that are predicted to cluster. Some of the A-L sub-dimensions are associated through similar causal agents, others stem from different sources that are simply rapped together in an overall process of industrialization and development.

One way to test how fully the A-L dimension has emerged is to see how strongly items both within and across sub-dimensions cluster. Prior to its emergence, the various different kinds of A-L items would simply not be expected to cluster as predicted. As the A-L dimension begins to emerge, evidence of the A-L cleavage should appear, but the predicted pattern of clustering should be relatively weak both in terms of the number of items that load as expected on a first unrotated factor and the strength of the loadings. As the dimension more fully emerges, both the number of the different facets of the A-L cleavage that load on the first factor and the magnitude of the loadings should increase.

Table 2 presents the 12 items we use to operationalize the A-L value dimension. Each of these items is derived from the responses to one to three questions asked on the WVS. The table presents the factor loadings across the 12 items for each of the 5 nations. Eight of the 12 items are directly related to the deference-autonomy sub-dimension of the A-L value cleavage. Thus

Table 1. Economic and Social Indicators for 5 East Asian Countries, 2000

	Japan	Singapore	Korea	Philippines	Indonesia
UN income category	High OECD	High non-OECD	Upper-middle	Lower-middle	Low
GNI/Per Capita (US \$, 2000)	35,280	22,890	9,790	1,030	590
Percent of non-agricultural labor force	95	- ^a	90	60	55
Percent of population urbanized	79	- ^a	80	59	40
Net secondary enrollment ratio ^b (2000/01)	101 ^c	N/A	91	53	48 ^d
Human Development Index	0.934	0.902 ^e	0.878	0.753 ^e	0.680

^a Singapore is a city state.

^b The net enrollment ratio is the ratio of enrolled children of the official age for the education level indicated to the total population of that age.

^c With universal secondary education, the enrollment ratio exceeds 100 percent because some pupils are below or above the country's standard secondary-school age.

^d Data refer to the 1999/2000 school year.

^e 2002 figure.

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statics; World Bank, World Development Reports; C.I.A., World Factbooks; U.S. State Department, Background Notes.

respondents classified as authoritarians prefer a society that puts more emphasis on respect for authority, maintaining order, teaching children obedience, and where it is best to follow one's superior's instructions regardless of their own opinions. Conversely, libertarians prefer a society that stressed freedom of speech; giving people more say in government, on the job, and in their communities; teaching children independence; and one in which the workplace affords the individual more opportunities for using his or her own initiative.⁷

The second and third categories are not well tapped. One libertarian and one authoritarian item tap the dogmatism or open versus closed belief system aspect of this dimension. Authoritarians are much more likely to believe that God is important. Libertarians are more likely to stress teaching children to develop their imaginations, encouraging a rich fantasy life. Why? The libertarian is more likely to promote imagination as creating new possibilities, whereas the authoritarian is more likely to see it as delusional.

The third category is operationalized by two items that tap into this dimension of self-denial versus self-indulgence. Authoritarians are more likely than libertarians to believe that people should love and respect their parents regardless of the parents' qualities or faults. Conversely, libertarians are more apt to believe that parents should have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children.

We also developed a measure from a number of questions that measured the extent to which the respondents felt that various kinds of individual actions could be justified, running on a 10-point scale from never to always. In each case the issue is to what extent individuals should be restrained from exercising their own preferences at the expense of society or others. The "self-interest over common good" item is coded so that the always response is the highest. Here we are looking at the extent to which respondents are willing to condone actions in which there is no victim other than the state or society in general. Libertarians, then, are those that are more likely to condone cheating on taxes, avoiding a fare on public transport, and accepting a bribe.

The problem with secondary analysis is that one has to rely on the items that someone thought to put on the survey. Therefore we do not have an optimal representation of the A-L value cleavage, in that several of the central aspects of categories two and three are missing. For example, there is nothing that directly taps the conformity or openness to new ideas facets of category two, nor is there anything on hard work and frugality or enhancing one's quality of life and self-fulfillment for category three. Other work has demonstrated the inclusion of those aspect in the overall A-L value cleavage.⁸ Nevertheless we certainly do have an A-L dimension, and even if it is not fully articulated, it does cover a broad array of distinct elements whose association could only be explained by the A-L value change phenomenon.

While all the signs are as expected for Japan, Singapore, and Korea, with the libertarian item loadings being positive and the authoritarian items negative, the A-L item clustering starts to break down when we move to our category 3 nation - the Philippine - and completely breaks down in Indonesia. For Indonesia, the patterns appear to be almost random, with nearly half of the items still exhibiting the wrong sign: Only three of the six libertarian items have the correct sign and four of the six authoritarian items. Since our computation of the percentage of items strongly loading on the factors requires both the predicted sign and a level of .300 or above, only about 25 percent of the Filipino items now pass that test. The average loading score of .230 for the Philippines reflects the near breakdown of the A-L dimension even more clearly. The factor

Table 2. Factor Loadings for 12 Libertarian and Authoritarian Items on the First Unrotated Factor

	Japan	Singapore	Korea	Philippines	Indonesia
Authoritarian Items:					
Respect for authority	-.343	-.274	-.204	-.092	-.226
Maintain order	-.666	-.775	-.555	-.842	-.213
Teach child obedience	-.175	-.234	-.443	.056	-.709
Must follow superior's instructions	-.233	-.126	-.277	-.279	.156
God is important	-.377	-.235	-.334	-.078	.040
Must love parents	-.347	-.278	-.248	-.141	-.179
Libertarian Items:					
Protect freedom of speech	.354	.531	.379	.488	.260
More say in gov't, job, community	.666	.635	.521	.658	-.120
Teach child independence & imagination	.385	.283	.433	.108	-.647
Prefer job where can use	.198	.041	.296	-.061	-.042
Parents should have own life	.226	.421	.481	.073	.399
Self-interest over common good	.082	.295	.094	.124	.305
N of Cases ^a	1157	1477	1197	1191	940
Average Loading	.337	.344	.355	.230	.107

^a Due to the large number of missing cases, each of the factor analyses employed the pairwise deletion procedure. Figures are average number of cases.

analysis is telling us, therefore, that the A-L dimension still emerges, but it is somewhat weakly defined, in that a number of items do not load most strongly on this first unrotated factor, but rather pull off and load on one or another successive factors. This reflects the weakening explanatory power of the first factor and the poorer fit between the citizen's belief systems and the A-L dimension. When we turn to the category 4 nation of Indonesia, the situation further worsens, with only 25 percent of the items meeting our test of correct signs and .300 or above loadings and the average loading score of .107. Table 2 indicates that the A-L dimension is weaker for category 3 level of development and does not exist at the category 4 level.

The rather weak fit for Singapore surprises us. While all the signs are correct, the percentage of items loading .300 or above is only 33 percent, which is well below what we would have expected for a country with a high level of economic development. To investigate the source of this deviation, each of the 12 items was recoded from 1 to 10, where 10 equals the most libertarian response. The mean score for each item across each nation's entire sample was then computed. When we sum across the entire 12 mean scores for Singapore, we get a combined means score of 3.65. The combined scores for Japan and Korea are 5.47 and 5.08, respectively. Singapore's score is more authoritarian than the average scores for Japan and Korea. Its unexpected high authoritarian score can be almost completely accounted for by seven of the 12 items – the two Inglehart items (maintain order and more say), the three authority/parent items, the teach child obedience item, and the religion item.⁹

It would appear, then, that these authority and religion items explain the deviation we find for Singapore in the authoritarian direction. This deviation, in turn, can probably be attributed to the fact that Singapore's experience with authoritarian rule for nearly four decades had moved to culture more rapidly in an authoritarian direction that would have been expected given its developmental level. Furthermore, in recent years, the Singaporean government has attempted to promote the Confucian ethic of hard work and respect for law in order to develop a greater Asian consciousness among the people.¹⁰

The above analysis has demonstrated that the A-L value cleavage is not limited to the advanced industrial stage of development,¹¹ but rather begins to emerge and have political implications at earlier stages of development in our category 3 country. However, no signs for such a cleavage are found in the category 4 nation where the large majority of the population is still rural peasants with very little education. Our conclusion confirms our earlier study that the A-L dimension is a universal phenomenon that appears in societies that reach a certain stage of development. With the pattern we find in the category 3 nation, it appears that something like 50-60 percent of a population must move out of agriculture into the cities and into secondary education before many signs of the A-L cleavage are likely to appear.

As development proceeds beyond the category 3 level (the Philippines), the A-L dimension not only emerges, but becomes richer and broader, with a wider range of conceptually related phenomenon clustering more tightly together. There does, however, appear to be a threshold beyond which a further strengthening of the cleavage does not occur. Once a certain proportion of a population adopts libertarian values, further movement in the libertarian direction will continue to shift the balance but will not increase either the definition or intensity of the cleavage. Indeed we might speculate that at some future level of development, the clarity of the cleavage should wane as fewer and fewer Authoritarians remain. In the meantime, as we have demonstrated elsewhere,¹² the emergence of the A-L dimension in the category 1 through 3

nations is carrying with it a wide-ranging set of implications for social and political change in these societies.

The Consequences of the A/L Value Change

The shift from authoritarian to libertarian values has important implications for a number of key political attitudes. In this study we have focused on the consequences of the A/L value change, particularly in regard to its impact on rising levels of alienation, the emergence of the New Politics issue agenda and increasingly non-compliant modes of elite challenging political behavior. The top portion of Table 3 displays the sources of the A-L value change. As expected, we find age and education to be the two most significant variables in explaining libertarian values in all nations except Phillippines: Those who are young and/or highly educated are more likely to support libertarian values.¹³

Table 3 also reports the associations between libertarian values and two measures of satisfaction and five attitudinal measures of alienation. For the most part, these correlations are the same signs across the first three nations: Where the A-L scale has emerged, libertarians, compared to authoritarians, are less satisfied with their lives and financial situations, more tolerant, less nationalistic, less trusting of both social and political institutions, and more to the left of the political spectrum. Also, as we might expect, the correlations for the last two category nations are mixed; all are small and statistically insignificant, suggesting that the A-L value cleavages have not fully developed in those nations. While the differences in the strength of the correlations between Filipinos and Indonesians are much smaller, the correlations for the latter are overall somewhat higher than those for the former.

We included the satisfaction items because their associations with values are largely counter-intuitive. It is the libertarians after all that should feel the most liberated and self-filled. They have broken with the constraints of traditional morality and social norms that bind authoritarians to more submissive attitudes towards authority and a sense of duty in sacrificing personal interests for the sake of others. Libertarians focus on the pursuit of personal self-realization and indulgent personal pleasures and they live in nations where the opportunities for the realization of their goals is at an all time high. We thus imagine that libertarians should be significantly happier with all aspects of their lives. Instead we find the opposite pattern. In every nation, with the exception of Indonesia, the signs are virtually all negative across both measures of satisfaction. Libertarian values are negatively associated with satisfaction with life as a whole in 4 of the 5 nations, with financial satisfaction in 1 of the 5 nations.

While the WVS studies do not include a question on satisfaction with politics, we suspect that the relationship between values and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy is strongly negative. Libertarians should be far more dissatisfied with politics than authoritarians. Why this is the case has little to do with which laws are on the books and which side is winning the war in parliament and the courts. Rather it has everything to do with the worldview of our two value types. Libertarians' expectations regarding their own rights and government's responsibility to meet their demands and to remove all restraints on the free exercise of their autonomy exceed the ability of any political system to deliver. Libertarians are dissatisfied with

Table 3. The Association between Social Characteristics and Psychological Variables and Values (Pearson's r)

	Japan	Singapore	Korea	Philippines	Indonesia
SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS					
Age	-.26	-.20	-.31	(-.04)	-.11
Education	.12	.26	.25	(-.02)	.14
Income	.10	.16	(.02)	(.03)	(.04)
Sex(male)	-.08	-.06	(.01)	(-.03)	(.05)
SATISFACTION					
Life	-.07	-.08	-.07	-.09	(.04)
Finance	-.11	(-.03)	(-.04)	(-.02)	(.01)
ALIENATION					
Tolerance	- ^a	.15	.16	-.06	(-.06)
Nationalism	-.25	-.08	-.19	(-.02)	-
Soc. institutional distrust	.21	-	.16	(-.02)	.08
Gov. institutional distrust	.35	-	.22	(.02)	.16
Leftist ideology	.28	-	.20	(.02)	(-.02)

^a Items were not included.

Note: All coefficients are significant at the .05 level except those in parentheses.

politics because they expect far more from government than do authoritarians. The result is a much greater level of alienation from all political institutions and authorities. And this is what we find in Table 3.

In looking at the five measures of alienation, first it appears that libertarians are less alienated from other racial or religious groups and from people whose life-styles or behavior patterns are different from their own. Libertarians are more tolerant of other people who are ethnically or socially different from themselves. The A/L scale does not include a direct measure of tolerance. Rather we are operationalizing tolerance as a separate scale. Nevertheless, our theory predicts that libertarians as postmodernists will be more comfortable with pluralistic cultures and behavior patterns.¹⁴ According to our operational definition, those that score low on our tolerance scale are those that identified more kinds of people that they would *not* want to have as neighbors. This includes people with different kinds of lifestyles or personal issues (heavy drinkers, people with criminal records, people who have AIDS, emotionally unstable people, drug addicts and homosexuals). Libertarians are more open to and tolerant of a plurality of cultures and lifestyles. We find significant positive relationships between libertarian values and tolerance in Singapore and Korea, with correlations of .15 and .16, respectively. Libertarians are not alienated from different ethnic or lifestyle groups. They are alienated from societal and governmental institutions and even from a sense of nationhood.

Our measure of nationalism is from one item on the degree of pride one expressed in their own nation. In three out of four nations, Libertarians are significantly less likely to express this kind of nationalism. Values distinguish levels of nationalism most strongly in Japan and Korea and least in Singapore. This suggests that libertarians' distrust of authority influences their sense of nationalism most strongly in post-imperial state, Japan. Libertarians are also much more distrustful of societal and governmental institutions. Our measure of trust in societal institutions asked respondents to indicate their level of confidence in four institutions: major companies, the TV, the press, and unions.

To convey a more concrete sense of what these differences mean, we recoded the A/L scale into four categories. Selecting cut points that divided the Korean sample into four groups, with roughly 25% in each category labeled strong authoritarian, weak authoritarian, weak libertarian, and strong libertarian. Substantial majorities of libertarians on average had little or no trust across all of these institutions in all nations but the Philippines (authoritarians and libertarians had same levels of distrust -- 36 percent). It is instructive to identify the one societal institution in which authoritarians display higher levels of distrust than libertarians, namely, unions in both Korea and the Philippines. Here the differences are significantly smaller, but authoritarians still exhibit higher levels of distrust (51 to 48 and 45 to 39, respectively). Remember that due to their significantly higher levels of education, libertarians tend to be more affluent. Therefore, libertarians' greater trust in unions is not for economic or class representation reasons at least in Korea. However unions are, by nature, elite-challenging institutions that engage in protest activities to effect political change. So the key difference here may be that authoritarians see unions as disruptive of the social order. Filipino authoritarians are more distrustful of the major companies than their libertarian counterparts (41 to 25). As reported in Table 3, the correlations between values and societal institutional distrust were .21, .16, and .08 in Japan, Korea and Indonesia.

When we turn to governmental institutions the differences between authoritarians and

libertarians become even sharper in all but the Philippines. The scale includes six governmental institutions – the parliament, the civil service, the parties, the government, the police and the armed forces. On average 70% of the strong libertarians express little or no trust in these six governmental institutions compared to only 49% of the strong authoritarians across the first three nations. As we might expect, authoritarians and libertarians divide most sharply on the more authoritarian of these institutions. Thus the sharpest differences are found on perceptions of the police and armed forces, where for the Japanese sample we find that 64% and 46% of the strong libertarians report little or no trust compared to only 31% and 16% of the strong authoritarians. We find the sharpest difference in the armed forces for the Korean sample: 52% of the strong libertarians report little or no trust compared to 27% of the strong authoritarians. It is interesting to note that a great majority of Koreans, regardless of their value types, exhibit high levels of distrust on the parliament (85% of strong authoritarian vs. 95% strong libertarian), the government (62% vs. 83%), and the parties (87% vs. 96%). The smallest difference between value types are found on the political parties in Indonesia. Still even here three-fourths of strong libertarians distrust the political parties compared to two-thirds of the strong authoritarians. As Table 3 reports, the correlations across the nations between values and governmental institutional distrust are .35, .22 and .16.

The libertarians' distrust of virtually all institutions is not only a reflection of their distrust of authority but also of their feeling of loss of autonomy in the face of large, faceless institutions. What they cannot control, whatever threatens the exercise of their autonomy, they do not trust. They do not believe that large institutions can be trusted to promote their own personal interests. Rather they believe that these institutions are likely to act in ways that will be detrimental to their freedom, environment, financial security or safety. Thus we see pollution, product safety and corporate greed becoming major issues, with a relatively new phenomenon emerging of demonstrations against international organizations and large corporations.

The association between libertarian values and leftist ideology requires some explanation. If left and right were still defined exclusively in economic terms then we would not expect to find a substantial correlation here. The A/L value change is not really related to redistributive economic issues. Given the libertarians' higher levels of tolerance towards all groups, we might expect them to have somewhat more favorable attitudes towards the disadvantaged than authoritarians as a social justice issue. Still libertarians feel even less of a sense of their own moral duty to meet the needs of others than do authoritarians. Therefore we believe that the major reason for the strong relationship found between leftist ideology and libertarian values is that, as Inglehart¹⁵ has shown, the political left and right are increasingly being redefined by the New Politics issues rather than the Old Politics redistributive economic issues at least in Japan and Korea. The biggest difference between value types for the four nation sample on this variable is that 17 and 30% of the strong Japanese and Korean libertarians define themselves as left compared to none of Filipino and Indonesian counterparts.

The A/L Value Cleavage and the Changing Issue Agenda

One of the most profound consequences of the emergence of the A/L value cleavage has been its impact on the issue agenda. Beginning in the 1960s, the advanced industrial democracies began to witness a major change in the kinds of issues that were most salient among their mass publics.

Up to that point, the Old Politics, which centered on distributive economic issues, had defined the issue agendas and party systems in these nations.

Many of these demands, particularly as they began to be legislated into law and acted out in society, became intensely offensive to traditional mind folks who held authoritarian values. As a result of the mobilization and counter-mobilization around this New Politics issues agenda, social issues began to replace economic issues as the most divisive position issues in the advanced industrial democracies. The emergence of this New Politics within these nations also began to realign electorates as the more educated Libertarians, who had traditionally supported the political right for economic reasons, began to shift to the left based on their liberal positions on the social issues. Conversely the less educated, who had historically voted for the left for economic reason, began to move towards the right based on their conservative stance on the New Politics social issues.¹⁶

Can we find similar patterns in East Asia? What happens when we turn to the New Politics issue agenda?¹⁷ Given that the New Politics issue positions are so deeply rooted in the A/L value cleavage and the associated worldviews that underpin each side of these value differences, we should expect to find far stronger associations between values and these issues than we did with the alienation measures reported in Table 3. Again, the pattern would be for stronger relationships in wealthier countries. That is precisely what we find in Table 4. Here we have organized the issues into four distinct types of issues that give us a broad, though not exhaustive, representation of the New Politics issue agenda. While the available WVS items limited us, there are no major omissions in presenting the most prominent types of New Politics issues.

Not unexpectedly, we find the strongest association between values and the five morality issues. Authoritarianism purports to provide the individual with explicit moral guidelines. Conversely libertarianism believes that no such absolute principles exist, but that rather morality is just a matter of personal preference, what feels right to the individual. Libertarian values have broken with traditional morality and support much more permission orientations towards moral choices. Thus, authoritarians and libertarians are sharply divided on the issues of abortion, euthanasia and suicide, prostitution, homosexuality and alternative family values. The last issue was derived from two items, one asking if the respondent felt that marriage was an out-dated institution and the second asking if it was all right for a woman to choose to have children out of wedlock and without a stable relationship with any man. Libertarians are far more likely to endorse alternatives that radically diverge from the traditional family.¹⁸ The averages across the five morality items are .24, .25, and .22 for Japan, Singapore, and Korea and .12 for the Philippines and .05 for Indonesia.

Our second New Politics dimension, human rights issues, contains three scales. Here the highest overall correlations are found on our non-traditional women's role scale. That scale was derived from five items – whether women need children to be fulfilled, whether the role of housewife is as fulfilling as having a job, whether work, which takes mothers out of the home, is good or bad for their children, and two items that essentially ask whether man make better political leaders than woman do, or a university education is more important for a boy than for a

Table 4. The Association between New Politics Issues and Values (Pearson's r)

	Japan	Singapore	Korea	Philippines	Indonesia
The association between Libertarian Values and Support for:					
MORAL ISSUES					
Abortion	.19	.23	.19	.16	(.04)
Suicide/Euthanasia	.23	.27	.24	.16	.10
Prostitution	.18	.25	.14	.16	.08
Homosexuality	.31	.29	.34	.12	.08
Alternative Family Values	.30	.23	.22	(-.00)	(-.02)
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES					
Women's Rights	.22	.18	.21	(.03)	(.04)
Minority Rights	.21	.10	.14	.11	(-.04)
Non-traditional Women's Roles	.30	.21	.33	(-.01)	(-.03)
QUALITY OF LIFE ISSUES					
Environmental Protection	.09	.12	(.06)	-.09	-
Autonomous Jobs	.19	.14	.14	.06	(.06)
ELITE CHALLENGING ISSUES					
Social Change	.20	-	.18	(-.04)	-.07
COMBINED NEW LEFT ISSUES	.44	.40	.41	.17	(-.01)

Note: All coefficients are significant at the .05 level except those in parentheses.

girl. We were very limited in for the other two scales what we could use - one item for each scale. The women's rights scale asks whether when jobs are scarce if men had more right to jobs than women ; the minority rights scale—whether priority should be given to nationals over immigrants in hiring. Libertarians, because of their greater tolerance, their break with traditional values and their emphasis on the importance and right of each individual to seek full self-actualization, even at the sacrifice of others, are much stronger supporters of women's and minority rights than authoritarians. This does not mean that authoritarians are necessarily anti-women's and minority rights, but they certainly do not go as far as the libertarians do on these issues.

We have two representatives in Table 4 of what we call quality of life issues. The environmental issues scale is composed of three questions and demonstrates that libertarians are more willing than authoritarians to accept higher taxes to prevent pollution, to voluntarily donate money to environmental causes, and to support environment measures at the cost of jobs. The autonomous jobs item asks respondents about how business and industry should be managed. The item provided respondents with four options: 1) owners should run their business; 2) owners and employees should participate in selecting managers; 3) the government should be the owner; and 4) the employees should own the business. We changed the item ordering by making the government the second option and joint owner-employee management the third. If this was an Old Politics issue, the government ownership option should be coded as 4, the most leftist position. But for the libertarians on the New Left, government ownership is viewed as only slightly preferable to owner management. Their interest is autonomy, not equality. Equality can only be guaranteed by an all-powerful, outside third party, the government. However, autonomy can only be insured when the workers themselves are given maximum control. Here again we see contrasting worldviews. Authoritarians stress hierarchic authority and find security in the order it provides while libertarians stress autonomy.

The social change item essentially asks whether the respondent views the pace of political reform in their country as too fast or too slow. Libertarians are far more likely than authoritarians to feel that change is occurring too slowly and that major, radical changes are needed. When all of the 11 New Politics issue scales were combined into a single overall scale, the correlations between values and issue positions reach remarkably high levels for Japan, Singapore and Korea: .44, .40, and .41. However when we move to lower levels of development, not only are the magnitudes of the correlation weak, but also some of which even have the wrong sign. The combined issue scales for the Philippines and Indonesia are .17 and -.01, respectively. Note also 5 out of 11 correlations in the Philippines and 8 out of 10 in Indonesia are either insignificant or in opposite directions.

Political Involvement and the A/L Value Cleavage

In Table 5 we find that authoritarians have a more parochial and less cosmopolitan outlook on politics. They are significantly more likely than libertarians to be interested in local rather than national politics. The correlations with libertarian values range from a low of .07 in the Philippines to a high of .15 in Japan. The association between values and our psychological involvement scale is somewhat surprising. Remember that due to their significantly higher levels

Table 5. The Association between Political Involvement and Values (Pearson's r)

	Japan	Singapore	Korea	Philippines	Indonesia
Cosmopolitanism	.15	-	.11	.07	.09
Psychological involvement	(.04)	.16	(.03)	(.03)	.08
Support for democracy	(.00)	(.00)	.07	(-.03)	(.02)
Protest potential	.16	.27	.17	.08	.10

Note: All coefficients are significant at the .05 level except those in parentheses.

of education, libertarians tend to be more politically assertive and more likely to actively involve themselves in the political process. We would have thus expected to find libertarians exhibit higher levels of psychological involvement in politics. In fact, in three nations, Japan, Korea and the Philippines, there are no significant relationships between values and psychological involvement in politics. It appears that libertarians profess neither higher level of interest in politics nor frequency of discussing politics with friends than do authoritarians.

The WVS also includes items which tap one's orientations toward non-democratic political regime. Our support for democracy scale is composed of 4 items: Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections; having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country; having the army rule; and having a democratic political system.¹⁹ In general we find the relationship between values and support for democracy among the nations of East Asia is essentially non-existent. In each nation the mean score is above the midpoint of 2.5, ranging from 3.18 in Japan to 2.53 in the Philippines. More striking, however, is pro-democratic sentiments are more, albeit minor, in Singapore (mean=3.04) than in Korea (mean=3.01). Only in Japan and the Philippines are the levels of democracy between the strong authoritarians and strong libertarians statistically significant: The average score of strong authoritarians was 2.97 compared to 3.06 of strong libertarians in Japan. The opposite is the case for the Philippines: The score for strong libertarians is lower than that for their authoritarian counterparts (2.21 to 2.55).

The sharpest differences in Table 5 are found on the protest potential scale. The association between values and protest potential range from lows of .08 and .10 in the Philippines and Indonesia to highs of .27 and .17 in Singapore and Korea. The A/L value change has had a profound impact on citizens proclivities to engage in protest activities. The 5-item protest potential scale includes activities that range from signing a petition, which is not particularly unconventional, to increasingly aggressive and illegal actions, including joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes and occupying buildings or factories.²⁰

Sources and Attitudinal Differences between Party Identifiers and Nonidentifiers

Until recently, political parties in East Asia have not provided a system with a stable foundation of mass support and were thus incapable of attracting intense party loyalty from a large number of individuals. It is fair to say that a true or institutionalized party system did not exist in these nations except Japan until the early 1990s when, surprisingly, democracy finally arrived, and a full-fledged party system emerged in operation. Since then democratization has been gradual; it is not yet complete; and it is not yet clear what direction it will eventually take.

In a country where political parties emerge, mere change their names, or disappear with extraordinary ease and frequency, it is natural that party identification is not salient. The question is, Does party nonidentification matter? Certainly, it does. Unlike the West, party nonidentification in East Asia could be a threat to democracy because it shows apathy about the political system. There remains the possibility that authoritarian figures will again separate themselves from party politics and perpetuate their rule by an arbitrary ban of parties, as happened in the 1960, 70s, and 80s. Furthermore, authoritarian figures might justify their conduct by claiming that a significant proportion of citizens display antiparty sentiment, thus confirming

that parties are irrelevant in the nation. In newly democratized nations, party nonidentification or nonsupport reflects neither passive contentment with the government's action nor satisfaction with the status quo. In this section, we explore: (1) Who are these party (non)identifiers?; (2) Are there any differences in values and issue orientations between party identifiers and nonidentifiers?

The party identification measure asks, "If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote?...If DON'T KNOW: which party appeals to you most?" Unfortunately, this item was missing from the Korean and Singaporean samples. For the purposes of this study, respondents who named the dominant or ruling party at the time of survey were considered as party identifiers or adherents, whereas those who chose "other" (Japan, Indonesia) or "no party to support" (Japan) or "don't vote for a party" (the Philippines) categories were treated as nonidentifiers or antagonists.²¹

Are party (non)identifiers distinct in social background? Our findings (data now shown) indicate that there are few significant differences in party identification between selected groups. In the Japanese case, men, respondents in their fifties with some high school education, respondents in the lower income class are party identifiers with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The most significant finding here in Japan was the age variation: Nonidentifiers are significantly younger than their LDP identifiers ($\tau\text{-}c = -.33$). For the Filipino case, the only exception in party support came from the education variable: Respondents with a high school and above were more likely to be party identifiers, whereas those with some primary education were nonidentifiers ($\tau\text{-}c = -.13$). Women, respondents in their fifties with some college education, and respondents in the upper-middle class were party nonidentifiers in Indonesia.

Finally, Table 6 presents the mean opinion scores for the six selected items for both party identifiers and nonidentifiers in Japan, the Philippines and Indonesia. On the effects of party preference on issues and value orientations, it might be assumed that partisan support for the dominant or ruling party indicates at least acquiescence to the prevailing political order, and that support for the opposition indicates some degree of rejection of the prevailing order. It is thus theoretically plausible that respondents who feel "close" to the ruling or dominant party are more likely to show support for authoritarian values, reject new politics issue agenda and protest activities.

As expected, supporters and non-supporters of the LDP in Japan exhibited significant differences at the .05 level in their opinions on all items except two (cosmopolitanism and support for democracy): The LDP identifiers are more authoritarian, less left issue oriented, more psychologically involved in politics, and less prone to protest than their nonidentified counterparts, as shown in Table 6. We also notice that there seem to be no significant differences between Filipino identifiers and nonidentifiers in all of 5 orientations. However, empirical results indicate that there is statistically significant differences in values between identifiers and nonidentifiers in Indonesia: Party nonidentifiers are significantly more libertarian than identifiers.

Table 6. Differences between Identifiers and Nonidentifiers on Selected Variables (in Mean Scale Scores)

	Mean								
	Sample Mean			Identifiers			Nonidentifiers		
	<u>Japan</u>	<u>Phil</u>	<u>Ind</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>Phil</u>	<u>Ind</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>Phil</u>	<u>Ind</u>
Libertarian values ^a	5.47	3.51	3.80	4.95	3.45	3.72	5.72*	3.51	3.97*
New left issues ^b	4.36	3.66	2.70	3.74	3.55	2.72	4.74*	3.74	2.74
Psychological involvement ^c	5.24	5.12	4.82	5.65	5.04	4.82	4.61*	4.97	4.72
Protest potential ^d	1.69	1.23	1.27	1.58	1.30	1.28	1.69*	1.24	1.28
Cosmopolitanism ^e	1.97	1.85	1.83	1.95	1.94	1.93	1.95	1.89	1.94
Support for democracy ^f	3.18	2.53	2.66	3.17	2.53	2.65	3.17	2.58	2.63

^a 1 = authoritarian; 10 = libertarian.

^b 1 = no support; 10 = much support.

^c 1 = least involved; 10 = very involved.

^d 1 = no protest; 3 = much protest.

^e 1 = not at all ; 5 = very.

^f 1= non-democratic; 4 = pro-democratic.

* $p = .05$.

Conclusion

We have demonstrated that the A-L value cleavage emerges in nations that have reached a certain level of development. This analysis found that this value cleavage had already clearly emerged in somewhere between our mid-category nations by the late 1990s and early 2000s. These were non-Western societies with GNIs around \$2,000 per capita, 30-40 percent of the populations still in agriculture, and 40-50 percent still living in small towns and rural settings. The emergence of the A-L value cleavage is clearly associated with level of development, but that level is well before what could possibly be explained by Inglehart's theory of postmaterialist values. Since the operational indicators of the A-L and M-PM scales overlap considerably and tap into the same phenomenon, yielding identical patterns of association with the kinds of political variables found in Tables 3 and 5, it would appear that clearly something quite different is taking place than what Inglehart's theory of a shift to postmaterialist value priorities would lead us to believe.

Two anomalies stand out: Singapore and the Philippines. The Singaporean national level of libertarian values appears a lot lower than some other nations at its state of economic development. As for the Philippines, the absence of systematic/expected relationship might suggest that there might be contrasting elements of Filipino culture that may have counterbalancing effects, such as income inequality, economic growth rates.²² However, this paper can not show that here. In any case, the aberration will have to await future studies.

NOTES

1. Only Japan and Korea were included from East Asia in our earlier study. See Scott C. Flanagan and Aie-Rie Lee, "Explaining Value Change and Its Political Implications in Eleven Advanced Industrial Democracies." Paper presented at the Fourteen World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. (1988); Scott C. Flanagan and Aie-Rie Lee, "The Causes and Socio-Political Implications of Value Change in the Advanced Industrial Democracies," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago (1990); Scott C. Flanagan and Aie-Rie Lee, "Value Change and Democratic Reform in Japan and Korea," *Comparative Political Studies* 33, no.5 (2000): 626-659;
2. Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Ronald Inglehart, "Value Change in Industrial Societies," *American Political Science Review* 81 (1987): 1290-1303; Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
3. Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan were not included in the survey; China, Vietnam included in the survey, but not in the study; Singapore included in the study for a comparison.
4. Scott C. Flanagan, "Value Change in Industrial Societies," *American Political Science Review*, 81 (1987): 1303-1319. The A-L framework is also more similar to Inglehart's more recent formulation of self-expression values: Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
5. Flanagan and Lee, "Explaining Value Change and Its Political Implications in Eleven Advanced Industrial Democracies"; Flanagan and Lee, "The Causes and Socio-Political Implications of Value Change in the Advanced Industrial Democracies"; Flanagan and Lee, "Value Change and Democratic Reform in Japan and Korea"; Scott C. Flanagan and Aie-Rie Lee, "The New Politics, Culture Wars, and the Authoritarian-Libertarian Value Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies* 36, no.3 (2003): 235-270.
6. See Scott C. Flanagan, Shinsaku Kohei, Ichiro Miyake, Bradley M. Richardson, and Joji Watanuke, *The Japanese voter* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 89-91.
7. Obviously, for each of these eight "deference-versus-autonomy" items there is both an authoritarian and a libertarian side of the questions. So we have recoded all 12 items presented in Table 1 so that for the 6 authoritarian items the high end of the scale is the authoritarian response and for the 6 libertarian items the high end of the scale is the libertarian response. The independence and imagination item combines two questions. Also Inglehart materialist/postmaterialist items were used by coding each response option in the sets of four choices as 2 (if it was the respondent's first priority), 1 (if it was the respondent's second priority) and 0 (if the respondent did not select the item). Then the three more-say-in-government, job, and community questions were combined into single item.
8. Scott C. Flanagan, "Measuring Value Change in Advanced Industrial Societies," *Comparative Political Studies* 15, no 1 (1982): 99-128; Flanagan, "Value Change in Industrial Societies".
9. On the other 3 A-L items (freedom of speech, teach child independence and imagination, prefer job where can use) , the Singaporean case falls only 12 percent below the mean for Japan. On two other items (follow

instructions, indulging self), Singapore stood 137 percent above the mean score for Japan. For a different interpretation of Singapore, see Zheng-Xu Wang and Ern-Ser Tan, "Self-Expression, 'Asian Values', and Democracy: East Asia in Global Perspective," in Russell J. Dalton and Doh Chull Shin, eds., *Citizens, Democracy, and Markets around the Pacific Rim: Congruence Theory and Political Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 50-72.

10. Dean W. Collinwood, *Global Studies: Japan & Pacific Rim* (Dubuque: McGraw Hill, 2006), p. 107.

11. As a comparison, the average loading and the percentage of items loading .300 or above for the 8 most developed nations in terms of GNP for the 1982-82 WVS were .432 and 89.7 for 16 A-L items. See Flanagan and Lee "The Causes and Socio-Political Implications of Value Change in the Advanced Industrial Democracies,"

12. Ibid.

13. The A-L scale is constructed by standardizing, equally weighing, and combining the 12 items reported in Table 2.

14. James W. Prothro, Charles W. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics* 22 (May 1960): 276-294; John L. Sullivan, Michael Shamir, Patrick Walsh, Patrick, and Nigel S. Roberts, *Political Tolerance in Context: Support for Unpopular Minorities in Israel, New Zealand, and the United States* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).

15. Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

16. Joel D. Aberbach, Robert Putnam, and Bert A. Robert, *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall, *The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist parties and Movements in Established Democracies* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Russell Dalton, *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006); Russell Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Beck, *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Herbert Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Ferdinand Muller-Rommel, ed., *New Politics in Western Europe: The Rise and the Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990); Robert Rohrschneider, "New Party versus Old Left Realignment: Environmental Attitudes, Party Policies, and Partisan Affiliations in Four Western European Countries," *Journal of Politics* 55, no.3(1993): 682-701.

17. Flanagan, "Value Change in Industrial Societies"; Oddbjorn Knutsen, "Cleavage Dimensions in Ten West European Countries: A Comparative Empirical Analysis," *Comparative Political Studies* 21, no. 4 (1989): 495-534; Paul R. Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, *Value Change in Global Perspective* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution*.

18. The Suicide/Euthanasia and the Alternative Family Values scales were each derived from two items. All the remaining morality issues were single items.

19. See Russell, J. Dalton and Doh Chull Shin, "Democratic Attitudes and Social Modernization' Hypothesis," in Dalton and Shin, eds., *Citizens, Democracy, and Markets around the Pacific Rim*.

20. In the Korean survey, the occupying building item was missing; two items (occupying building and joining strikes) were missing in Singapore.

21. Answer categories for this question provided are: 10 parties including “other parties” in Japan, 22 in the Philippines, and 17 in Indonesia. The sample sizes used in this analysis are: 316 (23.2%) and 327 (24.0%) in Japan, 143 (11.9%) and 254 (21.2%) in the Philippines, 211 (21%) and 328 (32.7%) in Indonesia for identifier and nonidentifiers, respectively. Party identifiers: LDP (Japan), LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP (Philippines), PDI (Indonesia); nonidentifiers: other/no party to support LDP (Japan), Don’t vote for a party (Philippines), other (Indonesia).

22. According to the World Bank, the proportion of people living in poverty in the Philippines is 39%, compared with 19% in Indonesia, and 5% in South Korea in the late 1990s. Even more strikingly, income distribution has hardly changed in 30 years. Most Filipinos live just above or just below the poverty line. The middle class remains tiny. Yet the people at the top end of the scale are not just well off, they are immensely rich: The average income of the richest fifth of Indonesians is about 4.5 times that of the poorest fifth, whereas in the Philippines the multiple is almost 11 times. See Richard Ulack, “The Philippines.” In Thomas R. Leinback and Richard Ulack, eds., *Southeast Asia: Diversity and Development* (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2000) pp.431-432.