UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Democracy and
The Political Ascendancy of Broadcast Television
In Latin America: 1950 through 1970

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirement for the degree of Master of Arts
in
Latin American Studies
by

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The thesis of Harry L. Simón is approved and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2009

DEDICATION

Dedicado a Papa Juan, en paz descanse.
We miss you very much "Dude."
A mis queridas Adriana y Luz Victoria,
Y por supuesto Mama Kiki, Mama Luz, y Papa Sacatín,
Sin ustedes hubiese sido imposible llegar hasta este punto.
Con todo respeto y agradecimiento
A los chilenses Cecilia y Rommel.
Y con mucho orgullo a mis compas,
que tuvieron tanta paciencia
durante mi desaparición académica.
Un fuerte abrazo a todas y todos,
porque colectivamente nos vamos formando.

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

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Professor Daniel C. Hallin, Chair

The increasing importance of television within the modern political history of Latin America is a well-established fact, yet there are relatively few academic investigations that focus on analyzing the relationship between political systems and television models. This thesis attempts to provide an historical overview mapping the

political trends of the first twenty years of television history in the region, and looks critically at the pervasive instrumentalization of television and its political ascendancy in Latin American. By establishing links and indexing these general trends between Latin American political systems, democratic change, and the deployment of television we can better understand the fundamental role this form of mass media has played in the region since its introduction to the region in the 1950s through 1970.

Introduction

In Chile on October 5, 1988 a cheerful and thoroughly innocuous television campaign helped cajole an electoral victory from a military dictatorship that had been in power for fifteen years. Four months later, on February 16, 1989, a nationally televised presidential press conference in Venezuela sparked a national uprising and catalyzed the precipitous decline of the *Pacto de Punto Fijo,* the two party system of government that had lasted forty years. Although occurring at nearly the same historical moment, these incidents ushered in divergent outcomes that framed the political history of their respective nations for the next two decades. The consequences of these events, albeit dissimilar, were inextricably bound to the prevailing political and economic model of the period that became known as neoliberalism. Furthermore, the *Plebiscito* and the *Caracazo* came to symbolize the apex of neoliberalism in Chile and Venezuela, reflecting the regional political and economic shifts that Latin American governments had been compelled to assume since the previous decade.[1]

Perhaps it was no coincidence that television played a key role in these two complex and distinct national moments? Although impossible to prove, it is less

[1] During the late 1980s, dictator Augusto Pinochet allowed the convening of a national plebiscite *(el Plebiscito* in Spanish) to decide the future course of Chilean national politics. The1988 *"NO"* campaign was organized by political parties opposed to a continuation of the dictatorship. A *"Sí"* or "yes" victory would have been a mandate for the dictator to stay in power for another eight years. The numerous political parties conforming the *"NO"* campaign became known as the *Concertación* and have retained political power since 1988/89.

The Venezuelan *Caracazo* of February 27-29, 1989 was the name given to the popular uprising and subsequent massacre provoked by the announcement of IMF-mandated austerity measures *(el Paquete Económico)* in Caracas. The imposition of the *Paquete* was nationally televised and delivered by then president Carlos Andrés Pérez (AD), who, at the time, had been in office only two weeks, after having run a nationalistic, anti-IMF, anti-neoliberal campaign. The protests expanded across the country and lasted three days until violently repressed by the military. Official figures placed the number of deaths at 277, but among caraqueños, the most consistent number cited is closer to 10,000. It was after this massacre that Hugo Chávez began planning a coup with other military officers opposed to the *Puntofijista* parties.

complicated to surmise that the unfolding and final outcome of events in Chile and Venezuela would have been fundamentally different had it not been for the central role played by TV. Television was not just the medium through which these incidents were broadcasted to millions of people, but it served as a catalyst for a political phenomenon that was more far-reaching and complex than a typical TV broadcast. In these two cases, television became midwife to a latent popular consciousness that had reached the threshold of evolving into a political force. Once articulated widely enough, millions of individuals acted upon this popular consciousness, and dramatically changed the course of Chilean and Venezuelan political histories. It is the evolution of these types of televised events that I intend to track through this investigation.

More precisely, my central research questions are the following: *In Latin America, what key political and economic factors contribute to the increasing political importance of television? Is there a relationship between the political ascendancy of television and the restructuring of the Latin American state?* The answers to these queries put into play numerous social, political and economic concepts, and contradict some long held assumptions about democracy, freedom of the press, and democratic culture in Latin America.

Framed within these considerations, a striking similarity between the Chilean *Plebiscito* and the Venezuelan *Caracazo* becomes clear - the political ascendancy of TV. Rooted in the transformation of the Latin American state and on rapid advances in mass media systems, the characteristic of Latin American television that has proven

resilient since the 1950s - in spite of endemic economic crisis and political instability - is its expanding power over politics.

Over twenty years later, what triggers Chilean memories about the *"NO"* campaign and has become most emblematic of the 1988/89 transition, are the TV ads with their now famous jingle. It should come as no surprise that after two decades of uninterrupted electoral victories for the *Concertación* parties, they still revert to the famous melody for their campaigns.

In Venezuela, under the Presidency of Hugo Chávez, television has become one of the most important battlefields during the country's most recent period of political polarization. The nationally televised surrender of Lieutenant Coronel Hugo Chávez after the failed coup of 1992, and his famous phrase *"por ahora",* marked both the end of *Puntofijismo* and the beginning of *Chavismo* in that country.[2] Ten years later, the 2002 "golpe mediático" that removed Chávez was initiated through a manipulation of televised images, while the video of Chávez dramatically emerging from a helicopter to be reinstated two days later reverberated across Latin America.

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[2] On February 2, 1992 Chávez led a coup against the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez, and by February 4th the rebellion had been all but put down. Chávez agreed to turn himself in, but with the condition that he be allowed to freely address the nation on the government TV channel, Venezolana de Televisión, and to appear in his paratrooper uniform, including his red beret. During his statement Chávez spoke directly to Venezuela, explaining the goals of the failed coup in relation to the *Caracazo*. He assumed responsibility for the failure, and electrified those watching with the sentence: "Sadly we have not achieved our objectives – For Now… (*Por Ahora...*)". *Por Ahora* quickly became the slogan for what later would be the Bolivarian Revolution, or *Chavismo.*

The *Pacto de Punto Fijo*, or the "Pact of the Immovable Point", was an agreement signed in 1958 on the eve of the collapse of the Venezuelan dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez. The objectives were to divide power amongst three political parties, Acción Democrática (AD), Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI), and Unión Republicana Democrática (URD), and to isolate the Communist Party. In practice, the Pacto imposed a bipartisanship between AD and COPEI since URD quickly diminished within the electoral system. Though technically the *pacto* was only to last through the end of the first government of Rafael Caldera (COPEI), in reality it was maintained until 1999 when Hugo Chávez assumed the presidency of Venezuela. The subsequent fragmentation of AD and COPEI represented the end of *Puntofijismo* and a dramatic shift in Venezuelan politics.

The drama, as well as the greater political significance of these episodes would, quite literally, have been impossible had it not been for television.

Other similar occurrences permeate the modern history of Latin American electoral politics. Examples include the 1988 Televisa aggression against Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, and the media giant's unwavering support of the electoral fraud perpetrated by Salinas de Gortari in Mexico that ultimately helped break its national television monopoly. In Brazil, the 1989 presidential election of Fernando Collor de Mello set a new benchmark of political influence for *TV Globo.* And most recently, the 2009 election of Mauricio Funes in El Salvador is an allegory for the political ascendancy of television in Latin America. Funes, the first leftist president in the history of El Salvador, won the election as a candidate for the *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (FMLN), a former *frente guerrillero* transformed into political party. Unlike previous FMLN candidates, Mauricio Funes was not a veteran combatant, but a morning TV personality. Ultimately, the FMLN achieved through the power of television what they were unable to do through armed insurrection.

These are only a handful of dramatic political events that would not have developed into transcendental political moments had it not been for television. Mapping out the political evolution of the mass media within the framework of democratic discourse and political change as it has unfolded in the region exposes a deeper and more complex link between events in Chile and Venezuela in particular, and in a broader historical sense underscores the considerable importance of the relationship between Latin American political and media systems in general.

What makes the political power of Latin American TV continue to grow? What are the roots of the sixty-year nexus between TV and political change? The historical expansion of TV has been propelled by the development of new technologies, private and state investment, as well as the market driven principles of private ownership and deregulation that took hold of broadcast TV well before the more generalized period of state level neoliberal restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s. In spite of the commercial logic that has dominated Latin American television since its inception, dictators, democrats, and revolutionaries alike immediately recognized the political power that could be channeled through the small screen. Control of broadcast TV has always been an intensely debated issue, and arguably, it was inevitable that its political influence would continue to advance unchecked into the more recent history of the region.

Throughout Latin America, television has become the principal political medium for mass communication, capable of redefining economic boundaries, reinforcing or undermining democracy, surpassing the influence of traditional political parties, and even overturning ruling governments. Steadily extending its reach for over sixty years, it has been used to elect candidates and unseat dictators, and more recently, there have been moments when television has served as a yoke harnessing spontaneous acts of popular dissatisfaction with government, and helped to dramatically alter the political direction countries would take in subsequent years. Attributing to TV such power that it could provoke momentous political change may

seem irresponsible, but in the dynamics of Latin America history stranger things have been argued.

It is not my intention to simply reassert the observation that television is an important factor within the contemporary political history of Latin America, nor will I attempt to prove that TV is the only aspect influencing political change in the recent histories of Chile and Venezuela. There is no need to restate the obvious, since it is a well-established fact that *TV has always been political*, not only in Latin America but also throughout the globe. Furthermore, aside from television, other forms of mass media have played important political roles, and critical economic, social, and historical elements have animated the history of the region as well. The significance of these non-televised factors must not be underestimated.

What I offer here is an attempt to map out the increasing centrality of television within Latin American politics during its first two decades - since its introduction in the 1950s through the 1960s. By charting its general history in relation to the political and economic context of the period since its introduction, I attempt to identify trends within the medium, index its prevailing structural tendencies and political logic, and chart the quantitative and qualitative evolution of television as a political force in Latin America.

The implications of this expanded media power have been enormous. As I advanced in my research, the pervasive political instrumentalization of Latin American media systems has convinced me that any discussion about democracy must include an overview of the mass media. Not to consider this topic is to offer an

incomplete picture of what is involved in the development of a democratic tradition in the region. Furthermore, there is urgency to this research considering the dramatic rise of counter hegemonic movements rejecting neoliberalism, within which television has played a fundamental role. This is underscored by the fact that current Latin American governments, particularly those on the left, routinely have their democratic credentials judged internationally by media system models adopted, and levels of regulation to which these media systems are subjected.

In the end, the goal is to develop empirical and theoretical models that can be followed and applied throughout the region. These ideas are not original - what I have done is to weave together existing academic work in Communications, Economics, History, Latin American Studies, and Political Science to broaden and link existing scholarship focusing on democracy and the political ascendancy of mass media in Latin America. This is not the first, nor will it be the last effort analyzing these questions, but with it I hope to contribute to the field by establishing connections between economic and political structures, democracy, and mass media, in order to present conclusions in a comprehensive, original, and compelling way.

Organization of Thesis

This thesis will attend to the first twenty years of television history – the 1950s through 1970. Within these first two decades the prevailing ideological and economic structures of TV were introduced and consolidated, and illuminate the development of this form of mass media into the subsequent years. Mapping these historical points of reference is key to understanding the logic of broadcast media in Latin American in general, and the growth of television in particular. These historical markers are useful and prove consistent over time because they correspond to the major political and economic transitions in the region as a whole.

The remainder of this introduction presents an overview of the most influential academic resources relating to Latin American democracy and media systems that were referred to in the development of this thesis.

In Chapter I, I establish the theoretical and conceptual frameworks upon which this thesis is constructed. This chapter also provides a statistical analysis of the Latin American demographic transformation of the last sixty years.

Chapter 2 begins the focus of this investigation covering the development of television in Latin America. My timeline starts with the 1940s when the initial stages of experimentation and formative debate were taking place and dovetails into the 1950s, when the majority of Latin American countries initiated their first officially recognized televised broadcasts. This period was introductory for TV in Latin

American and was marked by the nationalist political and economic policies that prevailed in the region throughout those years.

Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive look at the transition from the 1950s into the 1960s, as well as the dominance of private-commercial TV as it was established in Latin America.

Finally, in the last chapter entitled Conclusion I share my impressions regarding the theoretical and conceptual implications of this research, and describe my plans for future research in the field. The Appendices include charts representing the data sets developed for this thesis, as well related documents.

Researching Latin American Television

The existing literature that focuses on the political history of Latin America is extensive. This is especially true with regards to recent developments of Latin American democracy. Dozens of works examine the so-called democratizing *third wave*[3] – representing the general trend throughout the region as countries transitioned away from dictatorships towards procedural democracies. Political scientists such as Frances Hagopian, Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnel, Thomas Skidmore, and Peter Smith offer a variety of writings describing the strengths and weaknesses of Latin American democratic institutions, and some of these investigations are in their second and third editions.

All have been useful in mapping out the historical trajectory of Latin American democracy, as well as drawing out from these national histories regional models of democratic change. Yet none of these scholars ventures into providing a comprehensive analysis of the links between political and media systems. Other studies focus on the relationship between media systems and politics, but most focus on European and North American media systems. One such work that proved useful is *Comparing Media Systems,* by Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini. Although

[3] Samuel P. Huntington is recognized for having coined the phrase *third wave* as a metaphor describing the transitions to procedural democracy that took place in Latin America and other parts of the world. Peter Smith describes the importance of this thesis: "From a global perspective, Samuel P. Huntington has posited the existence of three broad "waves" of democratization: a 'long wave' stretching from approximately 1828 to 1926, followed (and ended) by a 'reverse wave' from 1922 to 1942, • a 'short wave' from 1943 to 1962, with a reverse wave from 1958 to 1975, • a 'third wave' from 1974 to 1990… This analysis has become so widely accepted that identification of so-called 'third wave' has become part of the standard vocabulary of political science." I find Huntington's analysis disingenuous, and a whitewash of the violence and repression from which the *third wave was* generated. This perspective inspired a rich discussion with Professor Smith about Latin American political history and neoliberalism.

concentrating on Europe and the United States, the book provided useful, conceptual frameworks applicable to Latin American television.

I was surprised by the limited research that has gone into tackling the important relationship between the political and the televised in Latin America. When compared to the literature available on the political history of Latin America, there exist a relatively small number of contemporary academic investigations focusing on Latin American media systems, and fewer that concentrate on television. Thomas Skidmore addressed this question in 1993, attributing this lack of research to a perceived intellectual prejudice against television on the part of Latin American scholars, the relatively recent transition away from military dictatorships towards procedural democracy in the region, and the dominant position of commercial media analysis versus academic research (8-11). Since 1993, more investigations have been published, although nowhere near what should exist, given the political power wielded by Latin American television.

The literature analyzing Latin American media systems includes works by scholars such as Elizabeth Fox, Valerio Fuenzalida, and Silvio Waisbord. The researchers whose work focuses primarily on Latin American television that I found especially useful were Guillermo Orozco, John Sinclair, and Tapio Varis. Recent books published by Greg Grandin and David Harvey also provided me with resources mapping out the political economic trends in Latin America that were essential in contextualizing my media centered research.

As I poured over these studies of Latin American history and media systems, I encountered additional limitations with the available resources. There are numerous other authors who offer investigations that focus on specific Latin American countries, although these studies concentrate primarily on television in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and more recently Venezuela. Within these there seems to be an entire sub-discipline dedicated exclusively to the *telenovela* – ranging from its impact on popular culture, to its role as the principal export as a television genre produced by Latin American media conglomerates. Yet, I was not able to find any comprehensive, fully integrated analysis on the political history of Latin American television. These limitations are further concentrated in the existing data sets that focus on the deployment of TV in the region.

Three principal sources of information focus on television and its deployment in Latin America: UNESCO, the World Bank, and the ITU. I quickly came to realize that the quality of each of these data sets was quite poor. There are gaps in the information, inconsistencies, and contradictory numbers, as well as different forms of measurement that are used over time.

The first source is a series of reports developed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The data provided in these reports offers the "number of television sets per 1000 inhabitants" of countries around the world, and covers a period roughly between 1965 and 1997. For numerous reasons, researchers will find the UNESCO data frustrating, although there are a handful of especially problematic limitations. For example, there are major gaps in the

numbers themselves, with data provided for one year, and then not again until a period ten years later. I also found ongoing inconsistencies within the numbers themselves, with 1980 UNESCO reports offering different data when compared to 1998 UNESCO, for example, reports for the same country during the same time period. Nonetheless, the UNESCO data is the most consistently cited source by academics and international institutions.

The second source of television information I referred to is the World Development Indicators (WDI) database maintained by the World Bank. This database provides researchers with hundreds of data sets covering "macroeconomic, social and environmental data" from across the world (World Bank). Here I found numbers reflecting the "percent of households with television", loosely covering the years 1992 to 2005. I found this percentage to be more useful for representing the range and penetration of television in a given country than the UNESCO method, although like the UNESCO numbers, the WDI data was riddled with gaps and inconsistencies. The WDI data sets are also widely cited by scholars and international institutions since they pick up roughly where the UNESCO data ends, making these numbers the most current available.

The third major source of information I found was the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) database accessible only through the reference desk at Geisel library. Having reviewed the numbers, I can speculate that the ITU data is a compilation of the UNESCO and WDI data sets that include some of their own calculations. This database offered television related data organized both by "sets per

1000" as well as "percent of households with television". Of course, I found these numbers to be inconsistent and at times contradictory as well. Only a handful of academics cite this data set in their research, perhaps due to the increased difficulty of accessibility, as compared to the UNESCO and WDI data, which are available as online resources.

My statistical problems did not end here. As if my research were the target of some nefarious plot committed to undermining my mental wellbeing, I found that individual authors such as Fox, Sinclair, and Waisbord often cited numbers from these sources, but provided conflicting figures. It seems that they encountered the same difficulties I have been confronted with. Even more disconcerting was the occasional appearance of wildly different numbers provided by the statistics ministries of some Latin American countries (especially Chile). I quickly realized that a centralized data set covering the deployment of television in Latin American did not exist, and that developing my own would be a basic goal of this thesis.

To advance in this effort, I extracted and distilled the numbers from each of these sources (UNESCO, WDI, ITU, individual scholars, and individual countries), charted them out, dropped the outliners, averaged those numbers that were similar, calculated ratios were there was an overlap in years/data sets, and finally transferred these final numbers into my own data set measuring "percent of households with television". These charts are here provided as an appendix.

This adventure in academic research forced me to make several course corrections impacting the focus of my project. My preliminary thesis research

proposal was significantly different than what I have developed. Originally, my plan included a more theoretical foundation, a deeper critique of neoliberalism, and a more precise comparative analysis of television in Chile and Venezuela. Of course at the time I first presented my research proposal I had not considered the need to develop my own empirical data sets. Furthermore, due to the time and space constraints of a M.A. thesis, I have had to eliminate over half of what I already had in rough draft form and was planning to include in this investigation. Yet, I do not feel that this represents a setback for my work, since I now have a solid foundation and general framework from which to build upon my future research in the field. What I have developed here can serve as an introduction to a more developed historical account of the political ascendancy of Latin American television.

I. A Primer for Latin American TV History

In their article "The Barriers to Media Opening in Latin America", Sallie Hughes and Chappell Lawson challenge the assumption that there is a direct link between media and political democratization: "Despite the spread of electoral democracy, few countries in Latin America have established the sort of media regimes that systematically reinforce popular representation and governmental accountability… The region's media are dominated by private oligopolies that often drown out more civic approaches found, among other places, in independent publications… Because the news media play such an important role in modern democracy, increasing independence and pluralism in the media remains an important element of the political reform agenda in Latin America…" (2005b: 9) Clearly, any informed discussion linking television to democratic change in Latin America involves taking into consideration the economic, political, social conditions within which this change is taking place. In fact, it is not possible to fully understand the evolution of Latin American TV without understanding the broader historical context since the period of its introduction.

In order to establish this context, political, economic, communications, and demographic frameworks are necessary to organize and index the political history of Latin American television. Individually, these frameworks can be established from theoretical consensus amongst Latin Americanists, regional historical trends, as well as empirical data sets. When considered together as an interrelated set of conditions,

these frameworks provide a primer for a fully integrated interpretation of the development of TV in the region and its relationship with democratic change.

I have divided this primer into five sections. The first provides broad descriptions of the economic models prevalent in Latin America since the 1950s, and primarily cites literature focusing on Latin American history. The second section is an overview of the categories used by political scientists to characterize and index forms of Latin American governments. The third section primarily references communications research and focuses on the structures and functions of specific television institutions, models, and methods that either directly or indirectly relate to the political discourse in a country. The forth section presents graphical representations of the demographic transformation and the deployment of television in the region, distilled from data sets described in the introduction to this thesis. Finally, the fifth section contextualizes the role of the United States in the development of TV in Latin America.

One of the goals in providing this information is to highlight the multiplicity of factors involved in the evolution of Latin American television and its political ascendancy. Table 1 presents an index and overview of Latin American political, economic, and media systems. This timeline offers a broad perspective on the correlation of political and economic forces in the development of mass media systems in the region.

Table 1: Trajectories of Latin American Economic, Political, and Media Systems

	ECONOMICS	**POLITICS**	**MEDIA**
1830 to 1930s	"Enclave" economy based primarily on export-import growth. Greatly dependent on industrial power of US and Europe.	Oligarchy or military dictatorship. Political power concentrated among urban political elite, and rural landed elite. Formation of S.I.P.	Elite newspapers as political instrument. Limited range of information. Introduction of radio in the 1920s. Mass media still non-existent.
1940 to 1950s	Contraction of export-import economy and introduction of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). Active state intervention in the economy.	Authoritarian regimes, populism, co-optation, limited popular democratic engagement. Introduction of *modernization* projects. Formation of A.I.R. Strong regional nationalism.	Rapid growth of radio. Radio and cinema primarily deployed as nation building mass media. Print media becomes more accessible, though still primarily elite and urban. Primacy of private-commercial broadcast radio at national levels. Introduction of television.
1960s	Primacy of ISI and increasing agrarian reform. Expanding state intervention and nationalization. Major increase in national debt.	Rapid political growth of urban working class, contending political power of urban industrial elites against landed elites. Expanding popular political participation. Regional impact of Cuban revolution. Widening ideological range of political discourse. Nationalism and anti-imperialism.	Radio is dominant as first form of broadcast mass media, and its political instrumentalization is the norm. Consolidation of television. Increasing debate over public responsibility of mass media. Beginning of shift from national TV to regional networks, increase of direct investment by US media corporations into TV. 5 to 17% TV households.
1970 to 1980s	Stagnation in ISI, slow return to export-import dependency and economic restructuring. Debt crisis, austerity, and acceleration of neoliberalism. Economic policy insulated from national political debates.	Class struggle, social and political polarization, rise of military dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, intensified violent repression of Latin American left. Dismantling of welfare state, pronounced market fundamentalism. Rise of "Washington consensus".	Rapid expansion of television, repression and censorship of other media forms and political communication. Withdrawal of direct US investment in TV. Introduction of color TV. Wide debate over power of mass media, cultural imperialism, and NWICO. Deregulation, privatization, and further commercialization. Growth of Satellite and videotape technology. 17 to 46% TV households.

Table 1: Trajectories Latin American… Media Systems, *cont.*

	ECONOMICS	**POLITICS**	**MEDIA**
1990 to 2000	Final dismantling of ISI and primacy of neoliberalism. Instability - sharp economic contraction and capital flight followed by expansion. Final stages of mass privatization. Slight decrease in poverty with significant increase in inequality.	Narrowing ideological range of political discourse. Transition to procedural democracy, *alternancia*. Democratic discourse as marketing, citizens as consumers. Delegitimation of traditional political actors.	Domination of TV as mass media, complete penetration of region. Latin American media conglomerates become dominant form of business. Some professionalization of journalism. Introduction of internet, and cable/satellite TV. 46 to 69% TV households.
2000 to Present	Endemic economic crisis of neoliberalism. Accelerated regional integration. Global political and economic crisis.	Widening ideological range of political discourse. Shift to the left of regional governments. Increased pluralism, indigenous struggles. Regional integration, and political rejection of neoliberalism. Rise of repressive national security states.	Decline of print media, political ascendancy of television, expansion of cable TV and internet. 69 to over 80% TV households.

Sources: COSF 140C, Spring 2008, D. Hallin. Skidmore and Smith 62.

Three Economic Models, 1940 to the Present

In broad strokes, there have been three models that have defined economic development in Latin America in the past one hundred years - the enclave export-import economy, Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), and neoliberalism. As the economies of Latin American countries changed, they influenced the development of their media systems, although these changes in media characteristics were not necessarily a direct consequence of economic policy. In fact, over time the form and content of TV was consistently more globalized than the national economies within which they developed. Nonetheless, the early growth of TV took place within the parameters of the prevailing economic model.

There is still disagreement as to precise characteristics and timeline of these economic models, but there exists a general academic consensus on the differentiation of the periods and principal modes of economic development within the majority of Latin American countries. Understanding the characteristics of each model is important to identify patterns and trends that link them to their respective mass media systems.

The first economic model was known as an enclave, export-import economy, and was widespread from approximately 1880 to 1930 and the beginning of the Great Depression. Thomas Skidmore and Peter Smith explain that Latin American countries became major producer of agricultural, pastoral goods, and other raw materials for export to industrial countries around the world.

> The development of these exports was accompanied by the importation of manufactured goods, particularly from Europe. Latin Americans purchased textiles, machines, luxury items, and other finished products in relatively large quantity. Thus there occurred an exchange, though the prices of Latin American exports were far more unstable than the prices of Europe's exports… As development progressed, investment flowed into Latin America from the industrial nations… British, French, and North American investors also put capital into mining ventures, particularly in Mexico, Chile, and Peru. This meant that the Latins themselves would not have to invest there. It also meant that control of key sectors of the Latin economies was passing into foreign hands. This established… an "export-import" form of economic growth that stimulated development in the raw-materials sectors of the Latin American economies. The impetus and capital came largely from abroad. With the adoption of this alternative, Latin America took a commercial road to "dependent" economic growth – dependent, that is, on decisions and prosperity in other parts of the world. (43-44)

By the 1930s Latin America was already considered a major developing consumer market on a world level, and broadcast mass media was dominated by an increasingly commercialized radio. This period was essential to influencing the debate surrounding models and types of regulation of television in the 1940s and 1950s, underscoring the observation that "media institutions evolve over time; at each step of their evolution past events and institutional patterns inherited from earlier periods influence the direction they take" (Hallin and Mancini 12).

Following the export-import economy, the subsequent economic model was known as Import Substitution Industrialization or ISI, and was prevalent from the 1930s through the 1970s. Peter Smith offers a useful description of ISI:

> The worldwide Great Depression of the 1930s exerted a devastating impact in Latin American countries that relied on the export of raw materials to foreign markets in Europe and the United States. In

> response to this calamity, states throughout the region adopted an activist stance in economic affairs. Essentially, they sought to protect their economies from the vagaries of the international market by nurturing and protecting national industries. This broad policy… had three basic goals: to assert economic independence, to create jobs for a burgeoning work force, and to promote economic growth. From the 1940s to the mid-1970s the strategy met with considerable success… ISI was working, and interventionist states were leading the way. (214)

It was under this nationalist economic policy that TV was introduced. Counter intuitively, the introduction of television in the majority of cases was not bound to a nationalist logic. Instead, mirroring the patterns of an enclave economy, were national private commercial interests partnered with foreign interests in the development of a television industry modeled on the media system of the United States. In other words, the economic orientation of Latin American television systems was never bound to the national priorities articulated within ISI, and as this economic model declined, TV continued to expand, and later positioned itself almost perfectly with the violent transition from ISI to the third economic model.

In the 1970s the third overriding economic model became known as neoliberalism. Despite having lost its hegemonic position over the previous decade, neoliberalism continues to be the dominant economic philosophy into the present. Neoliberalism is not only an economic model, but a political, ideological and cultural force as well. David Harvey provides a brief description of the economic characteristics of neoliberalism, "At a practical level, structural readjustment translates into the confrontation of… trade union power, attacking all forms of social solidarity that hinder competitive flexibility… dismantling or rolling back the commitments of

the welfare state, the privatization of public enterprises… reducing taxes, encouraging entrepreneurial initiative, and creating a favorable business climate to induce a strong inflow of foreign investment…" (23).

Historically, centralized Latin American states had expanded their reach and influence over populations throughout the period of ISI retreated and diminished under neoliberal restructuring. Furthermore, in the vast majority of cases, national economic policy was divorced from political deliberation – it was simply taken off the table, and in some cases fixed to international institutions and multilateral trade agreements that subordinated national economic policy debates to the dictates of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR).

These three economic models are very important, particularly at their points of transition, since it was at those moments of intense political change and the emergence of different political actors that the contest over television models was being most sharply articulated. All economic models have an underlying ideological organization to them, yet neither import-export or ISI required the violent realignment and containment of existing economic, social, and political forces to accommodate the transition from one model to the next. In other words, between export-import and ISI, new configurations of democratic practice were emerging and the ideological range was quite broad. Between ISI and neoliberalism, the ideological range was forcibly narrowed, popular democratic participation was repressed, and political engagement was quashed to historical lows. Throughout these phases the ideological range of TV

became increasingly bound to the ideological range of the prevailing economic model, neoliberalism.

Democracy and Forms of Government in Latin America

There existed a greater diversity in the types of government in Latin America relative to the economic models they were compelled to apply. Although it is beyond the scope of the investigation to analyze the relationship between economic development and modes of governance, it is nonetheless necessary to at minimum provide a general categorization of the different forms of state administration. With this in mind, I use four relative categories as a rubric to survey the evolution of institutional power from the 1940s onward. Since this investigation only runs between the 1950s through the 1960s, the range of modes of governments is relatively narrow, although there are nuances within each category that I attempt to address here. These categories have been adapted from the work of Peter Smith in his book *Democracy in Latin America,* and Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America*. Table 2 offers an historical overview by country, as well as classifications of Latin American regimes, matching these to the prevailing economic model.

Table 2: Classification of Latin American Political Regimes, 1945-2003

Country	Year	Regime		Country	Year	Regime
Argentina	1945	Dic		Guatemala	1945-1953	PD-P
	1946-1951	PD-P	*Key:*		1954-1985	Dic
	1952-1955	PD-A			1986-2003	PD
	1956-1958	Dic	*- Dem, Democratic;*			
	1958-1961	PD		Haiti	1945-2003	Dic
	1962	Dic	*- PD, Procedural Democracy;*			
	1963-1965	PD		Honduras	1945-1956	Dic
	1966-1972	Dic			1957-1962	PD-P
	1973-1974	PD	*- PD-A, Procedural Democracy – Authoritarian;*		1963-1981	Dic
	1975	PD			1982-2003	PD
	1976-1982	Dic		Mexico	1945-1945	PD
	1983-2003	Dem	*- PD-P, Procedural Democracy – Populist;*		1946-1952	PD-A
Bolivia	1945-1952	Dic			1953-1963	PD
	1953-1963	PD-P			1964-1970	PD-A
	1964-1971	Dic			1971-1981	PD
	1972-1981	Dic	*- Dic, Dictatorship.*		1982-1999	PD-A
	1982-2003	Dem			2000-2003	Dem
			- Red, ISI;			
Brazil	1945	Dic		Nicaragua	1945-1979	Dic
	1946-1963	Dem	*- Blue, Neoliberalism.*		1980-1990	PD-P
	1964-1984	Dic			1991-2003	PD
	1985-2003	Dem				
				Panama	1945-1947	PD
Chile	1945-1972	Dem			1948-1955	Dic
	1973-1989	Dic			1956-1967	PD
	1990-2003	Dem			1968-1989	Dic
					1990-1993	PD
Colombia	1945-1948	PD-A			1994-2003	Dem
	1949-1957	Dic				
	1958-1973	PD-A		Paraguay	1948-1988	Dic
	1974-1989	Dem			1989-2003	PD
	1990-2003	PD				
				Peru	1945-1947	PD
Costa Rica	1945-1948	PD			1948-1955	Dic
	1949-1981	Dem			1956-1961	PD
	1982-2003	Dem			1962	Dic
					1963-1967	Dem
Dominican Republic	1945-1965	Dic			1968-1979	Dic
	1966-1973	PD-A			1980-1982	Dem
	1974-1977	Dic			1983-1984	PD
	1978-1993	Dem			1985-1987	Dem
	1994-1995	PD			1988-1991	PD
	1996-2003	Dem			1992-1994	Dic
					1995-2000	PD
Ecuador	1945-1947	Dic			2001-2003	Dem
	1948-1962	PD-A				
	1963-1967	Dic		Uruguay	1945-1972	Dem
	1968-1969	PD-A			1973-1984	Dic
	1970-1978	Dic			1985-2003	Dem
	1979-1999	Dem				
	2000	PD		Venezuela	1945	Dic
	2001-2003	Dem			1946	PD
					1947	Dem
El Salvador	1945-1983	Dic			1948-1957	Dic
	1984-1991	PD-A			1958-1979	Dem
	1992-2003	Dem			1980-1998	PD-A
					1999-2001	Dem
					2002-2003	PD-P

SOURCE: Adapted from Hagopian and Mainwaring 3.
NOTE: The year of a regime transition is coded as belonging to the new regime.

It is notable that between 1950 and 1970 only six of the twenty governments listed in Table 2 are classified as having been democratic in nature. Furthermore, considering the total years between 1950 and 1970 for all nineteen countries listed in Table 2, only 24% of those years were under governments classified as democratic (Hagopian and Mainwaring 3). The dominance of undemocratic regimes was thus the hallmark of the historical period within which television was brought to Latin America. In spite of the autocratic environment into which television was introduced, it is nonetheless necessary to set a democratic benchmark against which to measure forms of government and political participation, and the relations between individual citizens and the state. By establishing a democratic point of reference, the evolution of television as an expanding influence on political power can be inductively measured over time.

For the purposes of this investigation, I will use a definition of democracy offered by Peter Smith; "the concept… entails three principles: 1) the principle of *participation*, such that no substantial segment of the population is excluded from the effective pursuit of political power; 2) the principle of *competition*, such that there are free, fair, and regular contests for the support of the population- in other words, legitimate elections; and 3) the principle of *accountability*, such that political rulers and elected representatives serve as "agents" of their constituencies and must justify their actions and decisions in order to remain in office" (7). According to this definition, it can be assumed that political participation and engagement is good for democracy, and that political disengagement and lower voter turnout are indicative of

a diminishing democracy. Furthermore, additional types of government can be categorized by the relative absence of democratic standards.

Throughout this thesis I refer to "procedural democracy" as a class of government that maintains the protocols and institutions of an electoral democracy but, for whatever reason, falls short of being classified as a democracy. A procedural democracy can be "semidemocratic, under leaders who came to power through elections that were free but not fair – when only one candidate had any reasonable prospect of winning, or when elected leaders were obliged to share effective power with or cede it to nonelected groups (such as landowners or the military)". Moreover, it can be "oligarchic, when electoral competition was essentially fair but not free - with candidates from dominant elites and suffrage restricted to a very small percentage of the adult population" (Smith 23).

I include additional descriptors such as "populist" and "authoritarian" when indexing governments, if these secondary forms directly or indirectly influenced the degree of instrumentalization of television. "A definition of populism as a political strategy includes two key characteristics: populists relate to the masses in a top-down fashion that seeks to subordinate or bypass established forms of political intermediation, and they focus their efforts on appealing to a previously excluded political constituency" (Boas 29). For a definition of "authoritarianism" Peter Smith cites Juan Linz; "Authoritarian regimes are political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except at some points in their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a

small groups) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones" (Smith 10). In this thesis populist procedural democracies are those that actively speak to the interests of the poor and disenfranchised, while authoritarian governments are those that repress and contain these sectors of the population.

Finally, the third class of government is a "dictatorship". A dictatorship imposes "relentless repression to the point such that civil liberties are minimal" (Smith 265) and state institutions wield absolute power over citizens. Dictatorships are characterized by the prevalence of political repression and violence, censorship, and severely limited political engagement. A dictator or a small group within the government, i.e. the military, usually holds state power. This form of government is exemplified by the absence of procedural democratic norms.

Models of Latin American Television and Political Power

Generally speaking, when compared to print media and radio broadcasting, television has been nominally regulated and subjected to the least degree of government intervention. This is not to say that television has been a more democratic brand of mass media – in fact, history shows the contrary to be true. Conditioned by characteristics specific to its development and deployment in Latin America, television broadcasting was accessible only to a narrow range of privileged individuals within a given country. These political actors have primarily been ruling *caudillos,* national political parties, economic elites, commercial radio interests, and US media corporations. Each of these groups has consistently perceived TV as an economic and political force they are looking to harness and exploit. In fact, it can be said that the history of mass media in Latin America provides significant evidence that, generally speaking, television systems have always been instrumentalized by elite economic and political sectors.

TV has evolved parallel to Latin American democracy and has been instrumentalized in ways ranging from experiments in popular education, mass democratic mobilization, and helping distract populations from the programs of the most brutal of dictatorships. Since the 1950s private owners, protectionist states, rival political parties, and populist leaders have consistently used TV as an instrument to advance and defend their political interests. As opposed to insulating TV from manipulation, the legislative models TV was assigned in different countries usually complemented its instrumentalization.

For the purposes of this thesis I use the phrase *political instrumentalization* to classify the spectrum of political interventions commonly imposed upon Latin American television. As defined by Hallin and Mancini, "[Political] instrumentalization is control of the media by outside actors – parties, politicians, social groups or movements, or economic actors seeking political influence – who use them to intervene in the world of politics" (37). These styles of instrumentalization are wide ranging, and can be direct or indirect, depending on the country and context of the intervention.

The frameworks described in this section principally originate from the book *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics* by Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini, as well as the UCSD Spring Quarter 2008 *Communications as a Social Force* (COSF) 140C course "Comparative Media Systems: Latin America and the Caribbean". These sources were important for the theoretical organization of this thesis, and providing the conceptual outline utilized throughout the remainder of this study.

- State Ownership of TV Channels.

I begin with the role of the Latin American state, which has always been a key protagonist of the political instrumentalization of television. The most obvious forms of state intervention have been direct government ownership of TV channels, political censorship of broadcasts, and institutional regulation. Government ownership of at least one television channel was relatively widespread during the 1960s and 1970s, a period within which state television played an important role in developing cultural

and educational programming. Government broadcasting in the region generally did not develop into a tradition of public service television, and state channels were usually subjected to direct political instrumentalization under the control of the presidency. To this day, government run television channels continue to have a presence within the broadcast spectrum of numerous Latin American countries, although the vast majority of Latin American television channels remain private.

- Direct Censorship of Broadcast Television.

Censorship represents the most direct category of state intervention imposed on mass media. More commonly witnessed in periods of dictatorship, censorship under governments maintaining a procedural democracy has existed less overtly, utilizing more formal methods to keep unwelcome information off of the small screen. As referred to earlier, in addition to the ideal of democratic representation and popular accountability, for a government to be categorized as a democracy it must eliminate overt censorship. Self-censorship of TV broadcasting, on the other hand, has been far more common than direct state censorship; it is described later in this section.

- State Regulation.

Latin American governments have also imposed various forms of regulation on television, although on the whole, the region has proven to be a relatively weak regulator. Throughout the 1950s Latin American governments generally imposed little to no regulation of television, and when any existed, it was based on preexisting radio regulations from the 1940s and 1950s.

Regulation took on a variety of styles for the duration of the 1960s, and some of these types have proven resilient over time. One such manner of regulation is the legal requirement that broadcasters provide free access to political parties and their candidates in electoral periods, opening airwaves according to predetermined slots. Candidates and parties are then allowed to broadcast their electoral messages directly to the nation. The time slots are usually allocated to reflect the percentage of votes won in previous electoral contests.

During the 1960s and 1970s regulations prohibiting media concentration and monopolies were common. While these manners of regulation were widespread, they were most conspicuous in their lack of enforcement, particularly in those markets where powerful media corporations were established, such as in Mexico with Televisa, and Brazil with TV Globo. What has been generally true in Latin America is large-scale concentration of TV into a small number of private hands to be later reciprocated with overt and disciplined support for the ruling government.

Restrictions on foreign ownership of TV were most prevalent in the late 1950s and ran into the 1970s, but the elimination of these regulations was one of the key elements required by neoliberal restructuring. Even when they did exist, they were arbitrarily enforced, evidenced by the major direct US investment in TV during the 1960s. Finally, TV regulation that placed limits on the amount of advertising that could be broadcast per hour of programming was most widespread in media systems that had a strong emphasis on public service.

- State Licensing.

In most Latin American countries, the state is also the licensor of television broadcasting, claiming public ownership of the airwaves. Licensing requirements play a very important role in Latin American politics, and this has been one important manner in which media owners and government become intertwined. Broadcast licenses are often awarded to political elites, thus forming a media elite. Control over broadcast licensing is one of the most effective tools the state has to keep control of media content and/or to levy acquiescence with government policy. The ministries authorized to issue broadcasting licenses are usually politicized and therefore influenced by the ruling government. These commonly award broadcasting licenses to political allies or in exchange for political favors.

This is not to argue that regulation and licensing is synonymous with political instrumentalization. As Hallin and Mancini correctly observe, authentic regulation depends primarily on the establishment of a *rational legal authority*, "that is, an administrative apparatus that is autonomous of particular parties, individuals, and social groups, acting according to established procedures and is conceived as serving the society as a whole" (Hallin and Mancini 55). The authors argue that under such a political order, the instrumentalization of the media is less likely, and therefore, more aligned to democratic institutions, and accountable to the public good. This is in contrast to what Hallin and Mancini describe as *political clientelism,* or "a pattern of social organization in which access to social resources is controlled by patrons and delivered to clients in exchange for deference and various forms of support" (58). This second variety of social organization and political culture is foremost in Latin

America. “Adherence to legal norms is generally weaker where clientelism is strong; actors will expect to be able to use their connections to avoid inconvenient regulations… [this] contributes to instrumentalization [and] politicians can pressure media owners by selectively enforcing broadcasting tax, and other laws. Media owners, and in some cases perhaps prominent journalists as well, can exert pressures of their own…” (59). Acute political clientelism and corruption has been the norm in Latin America for generations, and there have existed consistent trends in the manipulation and abuse of TV regulation.

Throughout this study I gauge the degree of regulation and political instrumentalization with the following quantifiers: *direct, significant, moderate, limited,* or *none. Direct political instrumentalization* represents television broadcasting with no differentiation between television ownership and the state, i.e. TV in the Dominican Republic under the Trujillo dictatorship. *None,* or *No regulation* represents the opposite end of the spectrum, with no effective legal or state intervention over TV. All other designations fall within this range.

- Desacato Laws.

Libel and Desacato Laws also represent a class of state intervention. Officially, these laws were created to prevent the arbitrary sullying of reputations. They are usually presented under civil libel laws, but represent an indirect form of legal regulation. Generally resulting in lawsuits, criminal libel laws can be enforced to protect the state from media criticism, and only recently have these begun to be removed from Latin American legal statutes. Desacato laws have an extensive history

of being imposed repressively against contrary political opinions in the media, and have been used as an effective tool of authoritarian governments for silencing opposition.

- Indirect State Interventions.

Indirect modes of state intervention have been implemented as well. These indirect intrusions usually involve the financing of media, which in the case of television represents large amounts of capital investment that only the state is capable of providing. The allocation of subsidies and state capital investment into television infrastructure was a key element in its early development in the region.

Government advertisement has been a very important element in many Latin American countries, and the lists ranking national advertisers usually place government near the top. Although it was under a private-commercial model, when TV was introduced the insignificant number of TV receivers available among the population made attracting advertising a difficult, and at times impossible endeavor. It was here that state advertising played a major role, filling this vacuum with state advertising as an indirect provider of operational funding. Historically, government funding and subsidies for the media have been common. Finally, the exception of taxation on revenues, elimination of tariffs on the importation of TV technologies, subsidizing broadcast materials, and building networks and repeater stations to allow for a national audience, all have been forms of indirect state intervention over TV.

- Commercial Interventions.

Not all intervention and political manipulation of TV has come from the state. In fact, private forms of control have been more prevalent than state intervention. “It should be noted that the media can also be ‘instrumentalized’ for commercial purposes: advertising is essentially this, and media organizations are often subject to broader types of commercial instrumentalization, ranging from more blatant examples such as product placement in film and television programming and demands from advertisers for influence over editorial content, to more subtle kinds of pressures” (Hallin and Mancini 37). Commercial instrumentalization has been palpable for Latin American television and its absolute domination by private-commercial broadcasting. Private forms of control include advertising, access to new technologies, and technical expertise, each of these monopolized by personal and professional networks of radio and TV interests, and economic and political elites. Often, these sectors work in collusion to dominate the television market, and in some cases they are the same people. This concentration of economic and political power leads, of course, to private media monopolies or oligopolies, the most common condition of TV in Latin America since its introduction.

Self-censorship within commercial TV involves the logic of ratings and keeping advertisers happy. Due to self-censorship, there exists a strong ideological homogeneity within Latin American television, which has been principally used as a form of commercial entertainment. Self-censorship has become most pronounced when a political partnership has been formed between private owners and repressive governments. This has also been the case with advertising from the US, which would

indirectly wield influence of great consequence, as broadcaster actively avoided programming that might be in contradiction to the interests of US corporations.

- Two Models of Television.

During the initial twenty years after TV was introduced into Latin America, two possible models were debated and finally implemented - the *private-commercial,* and the *state-public service* models. The most prevalent was the private-commercial model. A 1972 UNESCO world survey of television described the private-commercial model of TV broadcasting as "opened up to private initiative which can make itself felt not only in the business management of the station but also in the shaping of the programmes themselves – through the advertising industry which utilizes the broadcast facilities. The principal object of programming is to obtain commercial profit, that is to say to satisfy the demand of the advertisers for a maximum audience at the lowest cost per unit" (Sterling 18). The same report defined state-public service television as more controlled, since "the broadcaster enjoys a monopoly granted to him by the government [and] he is under responsibility to provide a broadcast service which meets the interests of the nation at large and which develops television not only for entertainment but also for information and the greater spread of cultural values and education" (Sterling 19).

Through a mixed TV system, some countries attempted to combine the economic incentives of the private-commercial system with the public accountability of programming characteristic of public service systems. A "state-commercial" model is essentially the same as private-commercial TV system with the exception that the

initial capital investment was provided by the state, control of TV remained principally in the hands of private interests, although the frequencies and licensing rights belonged to the state as described earlier. This was a vital counterweight to private-commercial influence over TV. Most countries that adopted these hybrid models allowed legislatively defined public service goals to devolve and assumed characteristics of private-commercial TV. For example, Colombia maintains a state-run public service model that has taken in most of the characteristics of a private-commercial model.

Latin American private-commercial TV has a proven tendency towards monopolies or oligopolies, where one or several large powerful media interests dominate the industry, and may or may not permit the entrance of other TV interests or government intervention. These interests have tendened to develop their own political logic and articulate political interests in the face of regulation, even in direct opposition to nation interests. Fragmentation involves the diffuse organization of private-commercial television, where private interests are kept at bay through regulation, and not permitted to become concentrated. This occurred primarily in those countries where there had been consistent manners of regulation and political accountability over TV. For example, for decades Argentina prohibited the formation of national networks, which resulted in the fragmentation of its TV industry and, according to some scholars, blocked its development of a media empire comparable to Televisa and TV Globo (Orozco 52).

The Demographic Transformation of Latin America Was Not Televised

Since television was first introduced in the 1950s, Latin America underwent a frightening demographic transformation. Sixty years ago the region was 40% urban and its total population was 169 million. In 2005 Latin America was 68% urban and was home to 593 million people. This change has the area nearly tripling its total population between 1950 and 2005, and simultaneously doubling its urban population. Furthermore, these figures do not include Latinos residing within the United States, a population that the U.S. Census Bureau currently estimates to be within 40 to 50 million people of Latin American descent (3). This number of people ranks the Latin American population within the US as the third largest population among Latin American countries after Brazil and Mexico.[4]

The following graphs provide insight into the large-scale demographic and communications trends in the region. Graphs 1 and 2 show a visual representation of population growth and urbanization, providing rapidly expanding potential markets for TV as a commercial enterprise, which is essential to contextualizing the growth of TV and how it has become the most politically influential form of mass communication in Latin America.

[4] It is my intention to include the history of Spanish language television within the United States in more developed versions of this research. Spanish language TV in the US is in fact directly linked to the general history of Latin American television, but I have not included it here due to time and space limitations.

Graph 1:



SOURCES: United Nations UNdata, World Bank WDI.

Graph 2:



SOURCES: United Nations UNdata, World Bank WDI

As dramatic as this demographic growth is, it is softened by the averaging of the data from the different countries. When looking at population growth and urbanization in individual nations the statistics are more alarming, especially in large states such as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Colombia. This rapid transformation did not lend to the institutional stability of Latin American nations, and in ways I describe later, these changes exacerbated many of the social and economic tensions endemic to the region.

Had the first legislative architects of television been aware that Latin America would change so dramatically in so short a period, the original media models assumed in the 1950s might have been different, and the development of TV could have taken an alternate course. Yet, there is no doubt that Latin American television has since its introduction been greatly impacted by this demographic transformation. Explosive population growth and swift urbanization accelerated the rate of TV acquisition and geographic coverage since it provided a foundation for expansion sought by the prevailing market centered commercial logic of television.

Graph 3 represents the escalating numbers of television and radio receivers in use in Latin America from 1950 through 2005, and Graph 4 offers the levels of TV penetration in Latin America measured in “percent of households with TV”. These graphs illustrate the deluge of TV receivers into Latin America.

Graph 3:



SOURCES: ITU, UNESCO, WDI.

Graph 4:



SOURCES: ITU, UNESCO, WDI

It bears mentioning that broadcast radio and TV shared common historical roots and grew together. The divergence between the two mediums began to widen in the 1980s, when TV first surpassed radio as the principal mode of mass communication. I found that between economically more developed and poorer countries, radio had become more strongly established in the latter, and had it not been for the number of radios in smaller, more rural countries of Latin America the total number of TV receivers would have surpassed the number of radio receivers in the 1980s as well. In subsequent chapters I address the interesting political and economic shifts that took place during this period to explain this relationship between radio and television.

The convergence of rising population growth, rapid urbanization, widening geographic coverage, and expanding accessibility of TV receivers helped accelerate and complete the mass deployment of television by the late 1980s. Between 1950 and 2005 there was an increase of over 4000% in the number of television receivers in the region – a literal wave of television sets invaded every Latin American country, altering social, political, cultural and economic patterns in ways that no other mass media had done previously.

The Influence of the United States Over Latin American Media Systems

The evolution of Latin American media systems has also been greatly influenced by the United States. The dominant position held by the US over Latin America has been wide ranging, and has involved economic, political, military, and cultural interventions. The consequences of this power have been pervasive and complex. In other words, the pressures from the US should always be considered as a factor influencing the history of Latin America – not limited to instances of direct incursions, although these have been common and are most easily recognized.

This is significant given the rapid and consistent growth of television in Latin America has been bound to the private-commercial model since its inception – a model born in the United States, exported to Latin America with the direct intervention of US media corporations, and consolidated through political ties, shared economic interests, and an ideological affinity to North American consumer culture. The United States has played a key role in framing the ideological range and popular consciousness within Latin American through its direct and indirect foreign policy efforts throughout the region.

I believe that this final point is important to note here, even though this thesis does not focus on the multifaceted role the United States has played in the development of Latin American television - I did not include more information due to time and space limitations. The few pages reserved for that kind of research should not be misunderstood as an endorsement of the opinion that contemporary Latin American television has developed its own political and economic logic. I have come across

numerous investigations that posit such ideas, arguing that Latin American media corporations in the region became so powerful after the 1970s that they achieved a sufficient degree of independence from US media corporations and the US State Department, to render critical theories - such as *cultural imperialism* - less useful to understanding the development of TV in Latin America. For reasons I hope to make clear within this project, I am convinced that the principal concepts that buttress *cultural imperialism* are still relevant, and it is my intention to incorporate this theoretical framework into my investigation in the future. Television has become the ascendant form of mass media in political and cultural discourse in Latin America, while maintaining a close political and cultural link to the United States.

II. The Introduction of Television, Nation Building, and ISI

Officially, Latin American TV history was inaugurated in Mexico September 1, 1950 with the open transmission of the state of the union address by then president Miguel Alemán Valdés (Orozco 206). Within weeks, Brazil (September 18) and Cuba (October 24) began their initial transmissions as well (Sinclair 64; Cuba). As with most historical *firsts,* there is still considerable debate among these countries as to which opened the period of television in the region. There is in fact space for disagreement, since experimental TV had been functioning for years throughout Latin America. Yet, these dates coincide with the first recognition of TV by the state, either through official ceremony or public announcement of transmission. Ironically, the introduction of television through its recognition by the state belies the contention between TV broadcasting and Latin American governments. It was this relationship that soon became the locus of controversy among the growing influence of broadcast television, the private-commercial model, and the ability of the state to regulate and contain this model.

Notably, Brazilian, Cuban, and Mexican TV all began with private capital investment and under a private-commercial model. The significance of this should not be underestimated, considering that Brazil and Mexico were the two largest Latin American countries, representing 50% of the total population of Latin America and the largest potential commercial markets. Furthermore, Brazil and Mexico were the mother countries of the television empires Rede Globo and Televisa, respectively.

That Cuba was the third to deploy TV is important as well, since by the end of the 1950s the island nation had the highest percentage of TV receivers per household in Latin America, and was the birthplace a Goar Mestre, a name that rivals the notoriety of Emilio Azcárraga and Roberto Marinho in Latin American television history.[5]

[5] Goar Mestre, Emilio Azcárraga Vidaurreta, and Roberto Marinho are individual TV industrialists who concentrated great wealth and political power through their control of transnational media interests in Latin America, particularly television. Each of these men became a protagonist of the regional effort to establish private-commercial TV as the norm throughout Latin America. Their histories are described in more detail later in this investigation.

The Origins and Founding Principles of Latin American TV

When TV was first established in Latin America it was generally perceived as a technological novelty, with its purpose and direction prescribed by the political actors of the time – principally authoritarian and populist governments.[6] As described earlier, throughout the first years regulation was rarely articulated, and based primarily on antiquated radio broadcasting laws. Only Chile, Colombia, and Peru imposed moderate to significant regulation over television through the first years of its development. Of these countries it was only in Chile that this regulation originated from organic national debate and a broad political consensus within the country. Even before TV had arrived, Chilean politicians were of the same mind in their rejection of the private-commercial model of television, and instead agreed to develop one of Latin America's few enduring examples of public service television. "The first channels were tucked away in the Chilean universities; many hoped to shield the new technology from commercial abuse and political manipulation" (Fox, *Tango* 117). Clearly, insulating TV from overt political and/or commercial instrumentalization was already a consideration at this initial stage of its development.

By far, the most common pattern for the introduction of Latin American television and its official deployment was private ownership and an absence of regulation. Private ownership was almost exclusively in the hands of well-connected families, radio interests, or elites from the most powerful political and economic

[6] Of the Latin American governments that established TV in the 1950s, six were dictatorships, three were populist/nationalist, and two were authoritarian. Four governments were procedural democracies, and only Chile was governed by a fully functional democracy.

sectors of the population. John Sinclair underscores this point by explaining that the foremost actors within Latin American television had been "US interests, Latin American governments, and entrepreneurs", with each of these rotating or sharing leading positions over time (13). This is a useful assessment that proves consistent and can be applied across the history of this form of broadcast media.

A 1940s global campaign led by US interests and advocates of commercial media in Latin America wielded tremendous influence during the formative years of television, and bound national governments to their perspective when these initiated legislative deliberation on what models their countries would assume. TV was to become a promoter of US consumerism and an advocate for its vision of democracy across the world.

> CBS executive F.A. Willis explained this philosophy at a 1938 U.S. Senate hearing when he argued that the CBS shortwave networks serving Latin America sought to 'portray American democracy to other peoples and nations [and] present a graphic cross section of all phases of our national life, a living pattern of democracy at work… [including] what we offer in the way of entertainment on the radio screen and stage… a general portrayal of American fashions, products, and produce; in short an unbiased, timely, and inviting tapestry of America today – a country which whatever its problems, still has room for Shirley Temple, Charlie McCarthy, and Snow White in the hearts of both young and old, rather than gas masks on the heads of both young and old.' (Skidmore 44)

This campaign was animated by stirring images of an idealized American democracy – an ascendant democratizing force, emerging from the devastation of World War II and the fight against fascism, bolstered by expanding economic power and atomic dominance. This was the prevailing ideological order into which TV was

introduced to Latin America. Early on, the idea that less/no intervention or control by the state over television was linked to "freedom" and democracy. Undemocratic and unfree was any manner of state intervention or public service accountability. This became the most important democratic tenet for television deployment in Latin America. As described by Edward Herman and Robert McChesney, the actions influencing the organizing principles of Latin American communications were not confined to democratic rhetoric and images of Snow White, and had been a priority for the United States since the 1940s:

> U.S. [media] firms were… establishing themselves as global enterprises with the active support and encouragement of the U.S. government. These ventures met with resistance in Europe, but were more successful in Latin America, where the U.S. government policy was one of applying 'the principle of the Monroe Doctrine into the field of Communications.' Accordingly, the U.S. government established the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in the early 1940s under Nelson Rockefeller with the express mission of expanding U.S. commercial and political influence over Latin American media and culture… In the postwar period the United States championed the notion of the 'free flow of information' as a universal principle. With its newfound power, the United States was able to get the 'free flow' principle enshrined as official policy in the newly formed United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Free flow was at once an eloquent democratic principle and an aggressive trade position on behalf of U.S. media interests. The core operational idea behind the principle was that transnational media firms and advertisers should be permitted to operate globally, with minimal governmental intervention. In the view of U.S. policy makers, this was the only notion of a free press suitable for a democratic world order… [Therefore] it was in the post war years that the contours of the contemporary global media system became apparent. (16-18)

Clearly, mass communications in Latin America, primarily radio and later TV, were being analyzed and molded years before individual Latin American governments

had taken up the debate. The US led UNESCO protocols were not binding, and externally pressuring Latin American governments to impose a private-commercial model of TV as subject to the "free flow" doctrine was in fact not crucial since it already had powerful advocates within Latin American commercial radio interests.

Founded in 1946, the Asociación Interamericana de Radiodifusión (A.I.R.), functioned as a regional cartel of private radio broadcasting owners. A.I.R. was a broad transnational alliance corresponding with all the nations that established TV in the 1950s, with the exception of the Dominican Republic and Haiti whose governments were considered pariahs, even amongst fellow dictatorships. Listed among the founders and presidents of A.I.R. were businessmen from eighteen countries, including future notable Latin American television figures such as the aforementioned Goar Mestre and Emilio Azcárraga, representing Cuba and Mexico respectively (A.I.R.). Raúl Fontaina of Uruguay was another key figure. These men had already become leading actors in the establishment of TV in their own, as well as other countries in the region.

John Sinclair describes the prematurely globalized nature of Latin American television: "By 1945, the links between the Latin American entrepreneurs and the US networks NBC and CBS were formalized with the formation of A.I.R. At its first congress the following year, A.I.R. resolved to concentrate on the establishment of television, and from then on lobbied the various national governments to ensure that television was introduced on a commercial 'American' model, rather than a 'European' state-operated basis… [and] became particularly interventionist during the

1950s with the promulgation of its 'Panama Doctrine', which bound its members into a mutual defense of their private interests" (Sinclair 13).

The "Panama Doctrine"[7] was in fact a declaration on behalf of both the Asociación Interamericana de Radiodifusión and the Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa (S.I.P.), and was signed by the then president of A.I.R. Goar Mestre on March 23, 1952. Furthermore, since the 1950s to the present, both A.I.R. and S.I.P. have been among the most ardent advocates of private-commercial media throughout Latin America, and have repeatedly invoked the "Panama Doctrine" as a defense against most forms of regulation.

This level of regional coordination in the defense of mutual interests is especially significant, since it marshaled direct patronage from the United States. A.I.R. leadership was keenly aware of this support, as well as the active sponsorship of powerful US media interests. By championing the well-financed and internationally sanctioned democratic credentials of the private-commercial model of television, A.I.R. became the most powerful advocate for private-commercial television in Latin America, successfully blocking, throughout the 1950s, the development of a public service tradition for television in the region.

The efforts of the cartel helped divorce the discussion of TV accountability from individual governments and national interests in the name of democracy. This is yet another process that exemplified the regional and globalized nature of the

[7] See Appendix G for the full text of the Panama Doctrine.

establishment of TV, in spite of the nationalist and populist effervescence that dominated the region in the 1950s.

Although the die had been cast in favor of private-commercial TV, once the legislative debate began within Latin America, different brands other than the private-commercial model were considered. In almost every country the possibility of public service model of television was considered at some level, and attended to at least rhetorically as was required by previously established legislation over broadcasting.

As the discussion advanced, it centered on the two principal models of television that were considered viable options, both defined by the position of TV relative to the role of the state. The private-commercial model, most closely identified with that of the United States, had its powerful advocates within Latin America. It anchored the logic of broadcast television to that of a private industry, with limited regulation and/or control from the state, "financed by advertising, operating in competitive markets but with one or more large companies controlling a significant market share" (Fox and Waisbord 1). On the other hand, Latin American governments saw the public service model as associated with European designs, that would bind television to the state, and would regulate the responsibility of television to the public good, thereby subordinating commercial interests to national interests.

If left to their own accords, perhaps the nationalist discourse prevalent in Latin America during the 1950s would logically have expressed itself within media policy and the development of TV. It seems natural that the Chilean model of University control, the hybrid Colombian state-commercial model, or the Argentinean model of

strict regulation would have become the norm, but these were the exceptions. Indeed, what did end up happening was the opposite - the near total domination of private-commercial TV across Latin America, embedded within the Cold War logic of containment.

> The globalization of the commercial model [came] about partly by plan and partly by simple natural processes as profit-seeking companies seek[ed] out business opportunities across borders. The plan element encompass[ed] the attempt by the U.S. government, and sometimes its allies, to encourage private enterprise, open economies, and market-based media systems throughout the world, to pry open economies, and to destabilize and overthrow non-market friendly governments. (Herman and McChesney 149)

There were technical aspects to the debate as well. Through the 1950s there existed three principal international *broadcasting standards,* also known as *TV definition* – 525, 625 (CCIR), and 625 (Soviet). These broadcasting standards corresponded to different spheres of influence around the global, with 525 lines linked to the United States, 625 (CCIR) lines to Western Europe, and 625 (Soviet) lines to the Soviet Union (Sterling 6-13). The selection of a broadcast standard would delimit the types of programming (and advertising), and the origin of broadcasting equipment and receivers.

Thus, the legislative contest over the establishment of TV in individual Latin American countries became a diplomatic question, with every decision possibly taking on divergent interpretations and provoking international repercussions. When it was all said and done, only three Latin American countries adopted a form of the public service model of television, and only two adopted a broadcast standard other than 525

lines.[8] Finally, as a secondary consequence to these technical and legislative preferences, Latin American TV audiences would be exposed to primarily North American programming well into the 1960s. In other words, European programming was not an option for Latin American broadcasting, much less Soviet productions. Imported "canned" material from the US became the norm. "American TV programs dubbed into Spanish or with Spanish titles [were] sold through the international departments of the large package-producing and syndicate firms. Old feature films [were] staple fare on Latin American television channels… The quiz show, the give-away program, the amateur hour, and other familiar features of American broadcasting [were] readily adapted to local formats" (Beltrán 45).

Clearly, the active role assumed by A.I.R. and S.I.P tilted the discussion in favor of the private-commercial model, and by the early 1950s television had not yet been thoroughly scrutinized by the full range of political actors within individual countries. Only a select few participated in any type of initial discussion as to what model of TV should be implemented; therefore, television did not develop within existing legislative frameworks, national deliberation, nor as a possible cultural/ public service space.

As illustrated in Graph 1, the formative debate of television took place in a Latin America that was still primarily rural, and during a period of relatively limited mass political engagement (though it was expanding rapidly). Undoubtedly, early

[8] Interestingly, among the first Latin American countries to introduce TV, all chose the broadcast standard of 525 lines except Argentina and Venezuela, which chose 625 (CCIR) lines. The curious debate over broadcasting standards ended with the development of new technologies that allowed the reception of a spectrum of lines of definition (Sterling 26).

television investors were aware of these conditions as key to capturing the TV market before it became a contending mode of mass media - subjected to new popular demands for access - and challenges to the status quo could be fully articulated.

Graph 3: Latin American Population Growth and Electoral Rolls, 1950 to 2005.



SOURCES: ITU, UNESCO, WDI, IDEA.

* Excludes voter rolls of non-procedural democracies, i.e. military dictatorships, colonies, socialist republics, etc.

During this period voter rolls throughout Latin America represented 12 to 16 percent of the total population, hardly illustrative of a functional democracy. Across the region, mass political engagement and mobilization were still limited although growing. Procedural democracies were a clear minority, and political parties were still vehicles for political domination and containment, usually concentrating political power around a caudillo versus an ideological and political platform.

Consequently, the prevailing undemocratic arrangements of political power converged with international pressures and internal economic interests to solidify the dominance of private-commercial TV throughout Latin America. The inorganic introduction of television into the region was such that it preemptively linked it to narrow political and economic interests in Latin America, establishing a political, economic, and ideological monopoly over its control that proved to be unremitting throughout its history. The same way Latin American democracy had been limited to a relatively small privileged class, access to and control over TV would be narrow as well.

Thus for Latin America, the "free flow" doctrine of the United States had been consolidated within an undemocratic environment. What this meant for television was that it would be deployed under a quasi-feudal commercial logic, effectively dissociating its progression from national deliberation and accountability, and public service TV would not be considered a possible alternative in the majority of Latin American countries. In this sense, TV was ahead of neoliberal curve becoming principally privatized and commercialized since the 1950s. The role of state regulation

of television was diminished or blocked ideologically by the "free-flow" doctrine – economically bound to a commercial-market logic imported from the USA, with a pubic service TV under funded or not funded at all and politically beholden to national structures set up by regional and international interests. In the majority of Latin American countries, limited or no regulation was imposed on broadcast television. Only Colombia (under a dictatorship), Puerto Rico (with FCC regulation as a US colony), Peru (under a procedural democracy), and Chile (under a democratic regime) imposed moderate to significant regulation over their initial forms of broadcast television.

Furthermore, this political environment and the amount of capital investment needed for the arrangement of television systems helped fix its deployment in Latin America to the private-commercial model imported from the United States. The undemocratic introduction of television to the region bound all future debate regarding regulation and public accountability to stay within the logic of private-commercial TV. And it was not only the methods of TV organization that were brought in from the US, but more often than not, the TV systems themselves were literally shipped from the north in crates (cameras, editing equipment, receivers, etc.), and deployed on the whims of the ruling regimes.

> Rather than restricting the activities of U.S. corporations in Latin American television, the right-wing and totalitarian regimes of the era generally seemed to tolerate, even encourage, a multitude of simultaneous activities, including competition among stations. While the tolerance of multiple stations may on the surface appear to run against the grain of the strict control associated with political totalitarianisms, in practice, authoritarian regimes tended to control

> broadcast journalism strictly but simultaneously allow a wide range of entertainment programming…" (Skidmore 46)

The social and political repercussions of this arrangement would not be fully seen until several decades later. This overriding position of private-commercial TV becomes more evident as the history of its deployment is charted out.

Table 3: Introduction of Television, Government, and Capitalization in the 1950s.

Year TV is Introduced, Country (Government)	**- Primary Capitalization/ - Initial Model/ - Principal Channels, Owners and Investors/**	**- Regulation/ - Political Instrumentalization/ - Definition**	**- Population/ % Urbanization/ - Notes/ - Sources***
1950			
Brazil (Dutra procedural democracy)	- Private capital. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 3 PRF3-TV Tupi Difusora, A. Chateaubriand, General Electric.	- Limited regulation. / - Limited instrumentalization. / - 525 lines.	- 54 million. / 36% urban. / - Radio networks influential in introduction of TV. Brazil was the largest country of Latin America and represented the largest potential market in the world for television in Portuguese. First regulation instituted in 1962. / - 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 16, 18, 19.
Cuba (Prio Socarras procedural democracy)	- Private capital. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 4 Unión Radio Television, G. Pumarejo Such, RCA Victor. Channel 6 CMQ-TV, G. Mestre Espinosa.	- Limited regulation until 1960. / - Limited instrumentalization. / - 525 lines.	- 5.9 million. / 57% urban. / - The Bautista dictatorship seized power in 1952. Cuba quickly established the most develop TV system in Latin America. Goar Mestre was a central figure in the establishment of TV in Cuba, and later in numerous other Latin American countries. Within the next 7 years Cuba would have the greatest numbers of TV sets per household in Latin America. / - 13, 14, 18, 19.
Mexico (Alemán procedural democracy/ authoritarian)	- Private capital. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 4 XHTV, R. O'Farrill Silva/ Channel 2 XEW, E. Azcárraga Vidaurreta/ Channel 5 XHGC, G. González Camarena.	- No regulation until 1959. / - Significant political instrumentalization. / - 525 lines.	- 27.7 million. / 43% urban. / - Was largest Spanish speaking potential market in Latin America and was equal in size to Spain in 1950. Political custodian of TV was Miguel Alemán, even after leaving the presidency. PRI consolidated during this period. In 1955 3 channels merged into Telesistema Mexicano (TSM). / - 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 16, 18, 19.
1951			
Argentina (Perón procedural democracy/ populist)	- State capital. / - Public service-commercial model. / - Channel 7 LR3 Radio Belgrano TV, State Ownership.	- No regulation until 1957. / - Moderate political instrumentalization. - 625 lines (CCIR).	- 18 million/ 66% urban/ - Commissioned by Eva Perón. A 1955 military coup removed Juan Perón from Office. 1957 law banned foreign ownership (expelling ABC, CBS, and NBC) and the formation of TV networks. / - 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19.

Table 3: Introduction of Television, … 1950s, *continued.*

Year TV is Introduced, Country (Government)	- Primary Capitalization/ - Initial Model/ - Principal Channels, Owners and Investors/	- Regulation/ - Political Instrumentalization - Definition	- Population/ % Urbanization/ - Notes/ - Sources*
1952			
Dominican Republic (H. Trujillo dictatorship)	- State and private capital. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 4 La Voz Dominicana, J. Arismendy Trujillo Molina, A. Santamaría, and RCA.	- No regulation until 1966. / - Direct political instrumentalization. / - 525 lines.	- 2.6 million. / 26% urban. / - José Arismendy was the brother of the dictator Rafael Trujillo Molina. Trujillo's dictatorship mounted one of the most obvious examples of instrumentalization of TV in Latin America. / - 9, 18, 19.
Venezuela (Pérez Jiménez dictatorship)	- State capital. / - Commercial Model. / - Channel 5 YVKA-TV Televisora Nacional.	- Limited regulation until 1959. / - Significant political instrumentalization. / - 625 lines (CCIR).	- 5.6 million. / 49% urban. / - TV introduced as modernization project under dictatorship. One year after state TV set up, 2 private channels established. / - 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 18, 19.
1954			
Colombia (Rojas Pinilla dictatorship)	- State capital. / - State-public service-commercial model. / - Televisora Nacional.	- Significant regulation. / - Significant political instrumentalization. / - 525 lines.	- 13.5 million. / 39% urban. / - TV introduced as modernization project under dictatorship. Was not commercialized until 1958 when dictator was removed. / - 4, 5, 6, 10, 18, 19.
Puerto Rico (U.S. colony)	- Private capital. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 2 WKAQ-TV Telemundo, A. Ramos/ Channel 4 WAPA, J.R. Quiñones.	- Moderate regulation. / - Limited political instrumentalization. / - 525 lines.	- 2.3 million. / 42% urban. / - Regulated by the FCC of the US. Both original channels were illegal since they had not registered with the FCC. / - 14, 18, 19.
1956			
El Salvador (Lemus dictatorship)	- Private capital. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 6 YSEB-TV, B. Esersky, G. Pinto, T. Alfaro.	- Limited regulation. / - Significant political instrumentalization. / - 525 lines.	- 2.4 million. / 37% urban. / - B. Esersky established TV with direct help from G. Mestre of Cuba. / - 1, 2, 5, 15, 18, 19.
Guatemala (Castillo Armas dictatorship)	- Private capital. / - Private commercial model. / - Channel 3 TGBOL, R. Herrera Dorion, E. Barrios Pedroza, E.C. Dubiel, M. Bolaños García, J. Wilson.	- No regulation until 1985. / - Significant political instrumentalization. / - 525 lines.	- 3.7 million. / 28% urban. / - TV introduced as modernization project under dictatorship. / - 7, 15, 18, 19.

Table 3: Introduction of Television, … 1950s, *continued.*

Year TV is Introduced, Country (Government)	**- Primary Capitalization/ - Initial Model/ - Principal Channels, Owners and Investors/**	**- Regulation/ - Political Instrumentalization**	**- Population/ % Urbanization/ - Notes/ - Sources***
1956 ***cont.***			
Nicaragua (Somoza dictatorship)	- State and private capital. / - State-commercial model. - Channel 8 Televisión de Nicaragua. L.F. Hidalgo, A. Somoza, RCA.	- No regulation until 1960. / - Significant political instrumentalization. / - 525 lines.	- 1.6 million. / 37% urban. / - TV introduced as modernization project under dictatorship. Radio would remain most important form of mass media for decades. / - 14, 15, 17, 18.
Uruguay (Batlle Berres democracy/ populist)	- State capital. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 10 SAETA, Raul Fontaina.	- Limited regulation until 1964. / - Significant political instrumentalization. / - 525 lines.	- 2.4 million. / 79% urban. / - From 1952 to 67, abolished presidency and established a National Council of Government. Batlle Berres (a former journalist and radio station owner) was the second president of council from 55 to 56. TV regulation began under these circumstances. / - 3, 4, 5, 6, 18, 19.
1958			
Peru (Prado procedural democracy, 2nd term)	- State capital. / - Public service model. / - Channel 7 AODTV Garcilazo de la Vega/ Peruvian Ministry of Education, UNESCO.	- Moderate regulation. / - Significant political instrumentalization. / - 525 lines.	- 9.7 million. / 46% urban. / - TV was established as an educational effort in coordination with UNESCO. This was a notable distinction, although was quickly disrupted when Prado was removed from office by a coup in 1962. Soon after public channel was established four private-commercial channels were licensed. / - 4, 5, 6, 18, 19.
1959			
Chile (Alessandri Rodríguez democracy)	- State capital. / - Public service - commercial model. / - Universidad Católica de Valparaíso and Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile en Santiago.	- Significant regulation. / - Limited political instrumentalization until 1970. / - 525 lines.	- 7.5 million. / 67% urban. / - Initial restriction/regulation of commercial TV resulted university control though a political consensus among a wide range of Chilean political parties. The universities were seen as the only institution capable of guaranteeing a political pluralism to TV. State TV established in 1969 with Televisión Nacional de Chile (TVN). / - 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 16, 18, 19.

Table 3: Introduction of Television, … 1950s, *continued.*

Year TV is Introduced, Country (Government)	**- Primary Capitalization/ - Initial Model/ - Principal Channels, Owners and Investors/**	**- Regulation/ - Political Instrumentalization - Definition**	**- Population/ % Urbanization/ - Notes/ - Sources***
1959 ***cont.***			
Ecuador (Ponce Enríquez procedural democracy/ authoritarian)	- Private capital. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 4, L. Zambrano, M. Rosembaum.	- Limited regulation. / - Significant political instrumentalization. / - 525 lines.	- 2.6 million. / 38% urban. / - Two private individuals set up first channel with little technical or economic support. / - 13, 18.
Honduras (Villeda Morales procedural democracy/ populist)	- Private capital. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 5 HRTG-TV, F. Lardizábal, R. Sempé, R. Zelaya Smith, RCA, ABC.	- Limited regulation. / - Significant political instrumentalization. / - 525 lines.	- 2 million. / 23% urban. / - Villeda Morales was removed from office in 1954 by a military coup. He returned to office and was again removed in 1963 and followed by a military dictatorship. / - 11, 15, 18.
Panama (de la Guardia procedural democracy/ authoritarian)	- Private capital. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 4 RPC-TV, C. and F. Eleta.	- Limited regulation. / - Significant political instrumentalization. / - 525 lines.	- 1.1 million. / 41% Urban. / - The first TV broadcasting established in Panama was in 1956 by the US Dept. of Defense to serve the Canal Zone. First commercial broadcast of RPC-TV was in early 1960. Ernesto de la Guardia faced an attempted coup in 1959. - 15, 18

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The Context of the 1950s

The economic and political context of the 1950s had been carried over from the previous decade. Before the 1950s Latin America was economically dependent on the industrial power of the United States and Europe, and social change was linked to the slow economic development of the region (Skidmore and Smith 42). In the first half of the twentieth century, regional economic activity was built on an import-export economy. The ten years of the Great Depression (1930 to 1940), and the subsequent disruption caused by World War II increased regional economic isolation while ISI became the economic model that was beginning to take hold across the region.

The most influential political actors during this period emerged from the landed elites, the church, and military forces. Their political ideologies generally ranged from fascist veneration, conservative nationalism, and feudal entitlement. Internally, Latin America was culturally fragmented – the telegraph had only been partially deployed, and commerce, broadcast communication, and national culture were concentrated in urban centers. Latin America was still primarily rural (60%), and the vast underdeveloped spaces throughout the region were largely disconnected from national cultural, political, and economic forces. As had been the case since the colonial period, capital cities served as political hubs, and the majority rural populations lived in relative isolation, disengaged from larger national and international concerns and debates.

Anti-communism, containment of the Latin American left, and resistance to the influence of the Soviet Union was the supreme ideological tendency emanating

from the United States in the post war period, and governments that espoused support for the US-led anti-communist crusade found a political and economic ally in the emerging American empire. Latin American governments in the 1950s were generally nationalistic and authoritarian, assuming military dictatorship as a common method of wielding state power. It was a time of national formation, economic development, rigid ideological lines, and political containment.

Radio was the leading mass medium of the time and remained so until the 1980s. Due to the relatively low entry capital needed for its deployment, its range and penetration were extensive by the 1950s and the arrival of television. The development of radio broadcasting had been influenced by the "free flow" doctrine, and its privatization was championed by the same forces that later demanded private-commercial TV, such as A.I.R. and S.I.P. As a result, radio had become increasingly commercialized and profitable by the 1940s.

This overlap between broadcast radio and early TV benefited the latter since it found fertile ground for initial introduction and deployment by receiving radio generated capital investment as well as technical experience. James Schwoch described the early relationship between Latin American radio and TV as multifaceted as it was important.

> The transition form radio to television in Latin America was marked by reciprocal relationships and also by a whirlwind of activity from international capitalists of the broadcast and entertainment industry. To no one's surprise, the bulk of activity came from corporations centered in the United States. During a fifteen-year period (roughly 1955-1970), this range of activities included direct ownership of stations, investment in production companies, assistance in drafting

> legislation, massive exports of television programming, and extensive consulting services in the technical, administrative, regulatory, and programming spheres. Among the consequences of this activity was the rapid growth of television stations in many Latin American major cities, thereby providing a semblance of programming choice for Latin American audiences. (Skidmore 46)

Television was deployed just as a wave of international investments from US based corporations was cresting. Since the United States had emerged from WWII as the leading political and economic power in the world, it had as a goal the successful transfer of its massive war time economy into control over a peace time commercial economy, seeking out and claiming expanded markets for consumer goods within the US and globally. This increasingly globalized economic force was key for Latin American television – the region was naturally considered a major potential market close to the US, attracting increased advertising investments, as well consuming American TV programming and the receivers themselves. This arrangement clearly made for a lucrative circular business investment by North American media corporations such as ABC, CBS, NBC, and RCA (Herman McChesney 21).

Voter roles were greatly expanded throughout this period, growing to a quarter of the total population by the end of the decade. Across Latin America, for the first time sizeable percentages of national populations began participating in electoral procedures, with 1959 witnessing democracies and procedural democracies outnumbering dictatorships by over 2 to 1. This ratio sharply contradicts the political environment ten years earlier, which was marked by a majority of dictatorships by

nearly the same proportion. A groundswell of political engagement and mobilization was palpable across the region.

The Latin American Modernizing Project

Powerful examples during this period of nationalistic governments motivated a popular consciousness in Latin America. Leaders such as Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico, Juan Perón in Argentina, and Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, raised expectations for national development across the region, and nationalistic governments, including many dictatorships, invested escalating amounts of state capital into the so-called "modernization projects". Some of these projects were wild whims of authoritarian political leaders, but others were efforts to bring about the further development of the nation and its expanding urban centers. According to Thomas Skidmore and Peter Smith "modernization theory" was formulated in the 1950s and 1960s, and "held that economic growth would generate the social change that would in turn make possible more 'developed' politics. The transition from a rural to an urban society would bring a change in values… Most important, a middle class would emerge – to play both a progressive and moderating role" (7).

Modernizing projects consisted of pavement for roads connecting capital cities to other areas, national electrification systems, radio transmitters, telegraph and later telephone, development and expansion of deep-water ports, expansion of rail lines, universities, airports, bridges, and other major capital intensive investments into national infrastructure. While these capital-intensive forms of infrastructure were not generalized throughout all of Latin America, it was in most countries at least a declared institutional objective of the 1950s and 60s.

In many ways, this regional modernizing current complemented the ideological framework of the period – nationalism, economic growth, and anti-communism. José Figueres Ferrer in Costa Rica, the revolutionary movement in Bolivia, and the populist Peruvian military dictatorship exemplified the anti-communist nationalism that became prevalent throughout the 1950s. Furthermore, these varieties of nationalism, in line with the ideological tenets and general worldview the United States, had been promoted in the region since before WWII. Television played an expanded role under these nationalistic sorts of authoritarianism. As Elizabeth Fox and Silvio Waisbord explain, the 1950s were a period of "[national] development communication [that] focused on the use of broadcasting to provide education, information, and modern values to the 'traditional masses'" (3).

Governments throughout the region were well versed in the intrinsic power of broadcast mass media in advancing modernization campaigns of their countries. Within individual Latin American countries, radio had been a wondrously effective tool in the forging of a new national consciousness, as well as shoring up the political power of individual caudillos or political interests. By the end of the 1950s, TV was nowhere near as useful a form of mass communication, but regional political actors had become keenly aware of its potential.

The mass media was especially useful on the promotion of caudillos when it came to political mobilization. The horizontal organization of political parties and allies in the mass media were useful vehicles for the concentration of power in the hands of the strong leader, and became instruments to mobilize popular support when

it was needed. As a consequence of the expansion of mass mobilization and organization came the mass political engagement of people, as well as the articulation of their demands. Political parties began to be stressed, and new tensions developed as the state and newly established democratic institutions were pressured by recently mobilized popular organizations.

Links Between Political and Media Systems

The category of government that had introduced television in the region during the 1950's was principally procedural democracy, even though, as it was noted earlier, most procedural democracies of the period had strong authoritarian tendencies, and the significant majority of the rural population in the region was not engaged politically. Nonetheless, commercial models of TV outnumbered other types of models by 3 to 1. Procedural democracies showed a preference for private capital used in TV development, while military dictatorships were evenly divided between private capital and state capital investment in TV deployment.

In hindsight, it is apparent that early television industrialists were politically promiscuous, ready to invest in any country, as long as there was a possible market to exploit. State level efforts at establishing television within the context of "nation building" and modernization were usually opportunistic, and "largely successful when motivated by the need for increased political control of the media, but largely unsuccessful when motivated by considerations of public services or national culture" (Fox And Waisbord 2).

Drawing from Table 3, only a handful of countries introduced alternative models of television, and most of these models were dismantled relatively quickly without ever posing any real challenge to the dominance of the private-commercial model. Bucking the trend of private-commercial TV, exceptional efforts at a public service television were introduced in the following countries:

- Argentina, in 1951, under the Perón populist procedural democracy.
- Colombia, in 1954, under the Rojas Pinilla military dictatorship.
- Peru, in 1958, under the Prado procedural democracy (with direct economic and technical support from UNESCO).
- Chile, in 1959, under the Alessandri democracy.

Of course, the forms of "public service" provided by each country depended on the kind of government in power. In Argentina and Colombia "public service" included a notable degree of political instrumentalization of TV. Nonetheless, each of these experiments in Latin American public service TV was notable due to the restriction of definitive commercial interests. The Peruvian model was the first television system that was linked to educational and cultural endeavors. Later, other countries received sponsorship from "development programs of international agencies and organizations such as UNESCO, the Alliance for Progress, and the Organization of American States, [that] made funds available for communication equipment and programs to use the mass media to promote health, education, rural improvements, and family planning" (Fox and Waisbord 3). Most of these exceptional experiments withered on the vine as external funding dried up and/or internal political support declined. Only Chilean public service TV partially endured, and to this day continues with a small but significant level of public service regulation in its commercially centered TV system.

Political instrumentalization of TV was not as overt in the 50s and 60s as it would become in later years. This was due primarily to the fact that TV was still a luxury, principally accessible to the wealthy and privileged classes, which limited its political capacity to influencing large sectors of the population; its full market potential was significant, yet still embryonic. This is not to say there was not political control of TV during this period, private-commercial TV was "paradoxically… both unregulated and highly controlled." (Fox and Waisbord 1). There was not outward indoctrination, as much as inward and self-reflective management – it was a manner of preemptive instrumentalization, looking to secure total control of the new technology before its full power had been realized.

Post World War II production of TV technology allowed for greater export of television receivers, and RCA, NBC and ABC were the greatest beneficiaries in the region (Herman McChesney 21). This effort had the very public support of the US State Department, and in many ways was seen as a public-private partnership advancing the commercial and political interests of the United States in Latin America. TV was to become not just a technological novelty reserved for the wealthy, but a popular consumer necessity, perhaps not immediately, but definitely over the long term.

III. The 1960s: Commercial Consolidation, Political Engagement, and Rising Contention

The 1960s were a decade of ideological renovation in Latin America, as much as it was throughout the rest of the world. National development and economic expansion in the 50s stimulated social struggle and political change in the 60s. Rising "third world" perspectives marked a break with the ideological conservatism and parochial nationalism of the previous period. Vibrant intellectual and cultural movements complemented the political environment, and throughout Latin America there was a strong sense that a page had been turned in the history of the region, and that it would be the workers and the poor who would become the subjects of this new chapter. Regional opposition to authoritarian governments developed in the wake of a post World War II wave of anti-colonial, national liberation movements that had surfaced in Africa and Asia. Change was happening across broad sectors of Latin American society, and television became the subject of a reinvigorated critical debate for media democratization.

The Context of the 1960s

The 1959 triumph of the Cuban revolution was central in electrifying the popular consciousness. In important ways, the toppling of the Bautista regime and the subsequent ascendancy of the *barbudos* impelled Latin American political elites to reconsider long-standing alliances and further undermined the governing political logic of the 1940s and 1950s. Shocking was the idea that a popular movement supported in urban centers as well as among rural populations could overturn a dictator that had enjoyed the long-standing and open support of the United States.

The impact of the Cuban revolution can't be overstated. It sent a cold chill down the spine of more than one brutal military strongman in the area, although it did not pose a threat to the elected governments of the rest of the region. In other words, relative to the violent regimes in Central America and the Caribbean, the Cuban revolution was perceived as a democratizing and modernizing force. Even when there was no pressure of consequence, dictators feared any possibility of popular challenges to their authority.

The expansion of urbanization, industrialization, and political participation was incremental and internal to individual Latin American countries, but consistent enough to be regarded as a general regional trend. These developments were partially born from, and later accelerated by the relative success of ISI, "as growth rates hovered in the 5 to 6 percent range for much of the period (the annual average was 5.1 percent in the 1950s, [and] 5.4 percent in the 1960s. The international community responded

with praise for economic ‘miracles’ in Mexico, Brazil, and elsewhere. ISI was working, and interventionist states were leading the way” (Smith 214).

Yet economic expansion alone was not enough to resolve the mounting stratification within Latin American societies. ISI had helped promote economic productivity, but it also had broken up traditional patterns of social and political interaction. Modernization projects and industrialization had drawn in waves of people from rural areas, rapidly concentrating socio-economic tensions in urban centers. Intensified levels of national consciousness, class solidarity, and popular organization exacerbated rising economic inequality in the final stages of ISI. By the late 1960s, ISI driven growth began to slow and economies began to suffer from stagnation. The consequences of massive levels of national debt assumed by activist states and the rapid integration of an urban industrial working class converged and further contributed to an already explosion social and political environment.

It must be noted that 1959 and 1960 represented a high point for democracy in Latin America. Of the nineteen countries listed in Table 2, thirteen governments were either democracies or procedural democracies, representing 93% of the total population of Latin America. Of the six countries that suffered under dictatorships, all were in Central America and the Caribbean with the exception of Paraguay. Together these governments had control over 7% of the total population of Latin America. These dictators were a rogues gallery of notoriously violent and sadistic elements: Duvalier in Haiti, Lemus in El Salvador, Somoza in Nicaragua, Stroessner in Paraguay, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, and Ydígoras in Guatemala.

At the beginning of the decade, electoral rolls spiked at their highest point in 1960, representing 25% of the total population of Latin America. This was more than double the 12% ten years earlier. As the decade wore on and the region became more polarized, there was a dramatic drop in the rate of electoral participation. By 1970 voter roles had been violently forced back down to 15%, just above where they had been twenty years earlier.

With rising population and urbanization, new sectors of society had come into political life and placed new demands on the state. By doing so, these emerging political forces increasingly challenged the political monopoly of ruling elites. This represented a political shift that had begun in the late 1950s, and was to gain strength into the 1960s. “Instead of spreading general prosperity, economic growth in the 1960s… generally made economic distribution more unequal… Meanwhile, politics was hardly following the model predicted by many experts on modernization. The middle strata… forged a sense of ‘class consciousness’ which, in critical moments of decision… led them to join the ruling classes in opposition to the popular masses” (Skidmore and Smith 7). National and regional scholars as well as political actors disputed the benefits of ISI and criticized the growing stratification of society under this economic model. Furthermore, they chaffed under the undisputed domination of the US, and became more closely linked to the revolutionary fervor that came to define the decade.

National urban elites benefiting from industrialization and national development challenged traditional political powers became another impetus for

further and more radical style of modernization. Popular mobilization was an increasingly common source of urban power, displacing the influence of landed elites and other traditional political classes. Within the nationalistic discourse still prevalent during the period, landed elites and the church began to be delegitimized and politically marginalized. The expanding use of mass media by nationalistic governments spilled over into neighboring countries and reinforced a regional consciousness that had already been agitated within the context of national liberation struggles in Latin America and the world. Traditional elites were increasingly perceived as backward elements – an obstacle and historical relic, holding back the "modernizing project" of the nation. In most cases their power was diminished, although not eliminated.

Animated and amplified by the example of the Cuban revolution, new insurgencies sprang up across the region. Latin America had changed, and undemocratic regimes and ruling elites would find it increasingly difficult to contain the popular masses. Repressive regimes felt threatened, and were being destabilized across the region. Political and economic elites feared the growing radical popular discourse, and had since abandoned their nationalistic perspectives they found acceptable through the 1950s. More often than not, Latin American elites abandoned modernization discourse, nationalism, and democratic rhetoric, and assumed increasingly reactionary postures in the face of the growing threats from below.

It was not Cuban funding nor training that generated the most serious threats to their power and privileged positions, but the example the revolution provided with the

articulation of a different political and economic model. The millions of newly mobilized students, workers, urban poor, and rural agricultural workers demanding agrarian reform, public education, and political power for the majorities was too much for many of these sectors to handle. This was increasingly reflected in TV, as monopolies and oligopolies strained and contorted to keep these images off the TV screen.

Students, workers, intellectuals, and artists were calling for an economic, political, and social transformation of Latin America, demands that made the ruling elites increasingly apprehensive and readily willing to turn to the most reactionary sectors of society – including the military - to stop the advances of the masses. After all, the state had always been theirs, and they weren't about to give it up. These sectors also found a willing ally in the United States.

A regional counter insurgency was launched in the late 1960s that would devastate the region for generations. Soon the democratic gains of 1960 had been completely reversed, and 1970 represented a new low for democracy in Latin America. Of the nineteen countries listed in Table 2, only seven governments were either democracies or procedural democracies, representing 39% of the total population of Latin America, while the dictatorial governments had control over 61% of the total population of Latin America. Of the twelve countries that suffered under dictatorships, by 1974 three more would be added to the list.[9]

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[9] These statistics would fall even more with *golpes* in Uruguay in 1972, Chile in 1973, and the Dominican Republic in 1974.

In response, military officers received their training in the US and their political cues from US corporate interests and the State Department, in Washington DC. In many countries, already stressed democratic institutions did not survive, and military dictatorships seized power across the region.

Television played an essential role during this dark period in Latin American history. The first few years are described here, but the most chilling episodes began in the 1970s. It is my intention to address the full history of the evolution of TV in future research.

Regulating Commercial Dominance

The well-established private-commercial preeminence over Latin American television faced its strongest challenges during the 1960s. In the area of television, the Cuban revolution had brought about the nationalization of one of the most developed television systems in Latin America, and all commercial programming was eliminated in favor of a state-owned public service monopoly. This example reinvigorated national debates for public service accountability and regulation of broadcast television in the region. State intervention and regulation was strong from both ends of the political spectrum – left governments struggled to revive a public service model, and this period saw the introduction of the most innovative uses of TV as a tool advancing popular education and culture. On the right, more concentration and private-commercial consolidation was the primary goal.

A.I.R. continued to play a leading role, preemptively framing the relationship between the state and private-commercial television. In the late 1950s the Mexican radio owner José Luis Fernandez, and the Uruguayan Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, both leading figures within A.I.R., drafted the policy document *12 Bases de la A.I.R. para Uniformar la Primera Legislación Interamericana de Radiodifusión.*[10] This twelve-point guide provided an outline for legislation that defended the interests of Latin American private-commercial television broadcasters. In 1960 Mexico, and in 1964 Venezuela each adopted most of these points as legal frameworks for

[10] The translation is "A.I.R.'s 12 Bases for the First Uniform Inter-American Broadcast Legislation".

broadcasting. Through the 1960s, a majority of Latin American government followed suit (Fox *Tango* 41, 70).

This period was distinct, since it represented the initial stages of de-nationalization of television. In this sense the late 1960s were the period of the highest level of commercial self-censorship of television since its introduction in the 1950s. The central differences between the 1950s and 1960s were in terms of regulation and the domination of the private-commercial model of television across the region.

Concentration over TV became a critical issue, as it had not been addressed previously in any critical way, and in several countries it was supported and promoted. TV began to be differentiated in Latin American countries between those governments that developed strong ties (reaching near partnerships) between commercial TV and the state – sponsoring monopolies and oligopolies, such as in Brazil and Mexico, versus those where it was "fragmented" and contained through regulation, direct intervention, and, in some cases, expropriated and nationalized, as in Argentina. In the former, vast media empires were common, and in the rest national media was limited in scope.

As political repression enveloped the region, a full partnership developed throughout this period between private television broadcasters and dictatorships. Where this relationship was most firmly established and most enduring was in one of the largest markets, Brazil. (Fox And Waisbord 4). In many cases, there was no need for government censorship of television. Since these were so highly concentrated, monopolized, and in such close political proximity to the government, broadcasting

something outside of the government line was nearly impossible. Owners of TV maintained close relationships with the ruling regimes – whether they be authoritarian, nationalistic, or military, and at times, programming was tailored to the goals of the state.

For obvious reasons, direct censorship rose sharply as it had not existed in the 1950s, and those TV systems that were more politically instrumentalized seemed to develop closer ties to the ruling regimes, and to further consolidate their hold on TV monopolies. Within the highly polarized environment, private-commercial TV was distanced from regulation and public service accountability. Public service TV was commonly denounced as being communist inspired in the context of the critical and radical discourse of the time, and was ferociously opposed, even when embedded in a larger context of democratic changes and reform. Those elements that were monopolies of large markets developed more quickly into international media empires by the end of the 1960s.

Under military dictatorship TV was at times seized, but most of the time it was instead directly instrumentalized, although it generally remained in private hands. Content was either directly censored, or self-censored to be completely commercial and washed of all political features that undermined the dictatorships. The clearest forms of regulated private-commercial ideological homogeneity in unity with the state took place during this period. In some ways, the perception of television as an instrument to be used as radio had been used under the original ideas of nation building was no longer relevant. The true power of television would not be realized

with the engagement and development of isolated rural communities into a national project, but instead as an instrument to demobilize and atomize a new politicized urban majority - another repressive means to contain popular urban struggles. Private-commercial TV and reactionary state power closed ranks to stop the spread of leftist ideology. This clearly occurred in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico in the 1960s, and would continue in the 1970s.

This is precisely the political and economic environment needed for multinational media forces like Televisa and Globo to advance as media monopolies, now un-tethered from their own states, yet still enjoying support within these states when needed. Although there were other trends that resisted the overall trend towards further deregulation and total privatization, television entered this phase, thus commencing the transition to the near total privatization and media monopoly existing in Latin America today. It was at this point that the penetration of TV and urbanization rate made it a more powerful tool for reaching and entire country.

Crucial during the period of ISI in Latin America is the fact that the dominant logic of private-commercial television seemingly ran contrary to the basic principals of ISI and national liberation. In practice, business was booming, and private-commercial TV had no problem navigating these waters, since expanding urban centers and a new industrial working class made for fertile grounds in the development of consumer markets, which translated into increased revenues from advertising.

Throughout the early deployment of television in the 1950s and 1960s, the US could not be challenged in the area of television programming. While early Latin

American television may have included elements of social responsibility and nation building, the lack of professional programming and technical skills involved in its production was such that public service broadcasting could not compete with commercial programming from the US. Entertainment and "canned" programming from the US blanketed the region. The 1960s represented the growth of consumer choices among a growing range of available channels and genres imported from the US.

In the 1960s, ABC made important investments in Latin America, purchasing stock in five Central American TV stations and forming the Central American TV Network (CATVN), and in 1968 followed the same strategy farther south with the formation of the LATINO network (Contreras 73). The principal TV ideologies remained consistent and narrow. Television was fundamentally important to contain and integrate the new masses into political projects, especially in larger countries of Latin America.

During this period there was a transition in TV programming toward a mass audience of less educated urban poor. Within the convergence of population growth, rapid urbanization, low educational levels, high poverty rates, and increasing TV penetration, this trend in programming accelerated and soon became the norm. The move from national media systems to regional Latin American systems was accelerated, breaking and alienating a regional consciousness in conjunction with the state terrorism that had been unleashed.

The 1960s ushered in the period of Latin American ascendancy as a globalized media power. This further coincided with the violent purging of democratic discussion, and imposition of ideological homogeneity, and isolation of critical media analysis within Latin America. Just as national economic policy came under the control of experts, and was insulated from the democratic process and political debate, media systems were removed from the table of democratic discussion and control, considered part of the development of a modern economic order, and further deregulated and privatized.

In spite of the political counterinsurgency in the streets of Latin American, intellectual and political criticism of mass media was at an apex in the late 1960s. Works by Chilean writer Ariel Dorfman, Belgian sociologist Armand Mattelart, Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, and North American sociologist Herbert Schiller published some of their most important critiques of cultural imperialism throughout this period. Media elites felt increasingly intimidated by the pressure to reform and democratize TV, especially with critical positions being assumed within international forums that began to gain momentum by the end of the decade.

> Historically, communication policy debates had been almost exclusively local or national in scope. In many Western European capitalist nations- as in the Third World – commercial media interests were powerful but not omnipotent… International communication politics… historically refereed relations between nation states, accepting the existing balance of power as given. It tended to favor technocratic responses to the international regulation of communication, and eschew controversy. Now, for the first time, global politics dealt with the social implications of the emerging global media system. Moreover, the major global institutions that dealt with communication issues – the United Nations, UNESCO, and the

> International Telecommunications Union (ITU) – now had majorities comprised of Third World nations and sympathetic communist governments. The impetus for the global media debate came from the Movement of the Non-Aligned Nations (NAM), which comprised over ninety member nations by the 1970s. (Herman and McChesney 23)

Table 4: 1960s, Broadcast Television, Ownership, Regulation, and Penetration.

Country - Governments	**- Concentration/ - Model/ - Prin. Channels, Owners & Investors**	**- Regulation/ - Political Instrumentalization**	**- Population (in millions)/ % Urbanization/ - % TV Households*/ - Notes/ Sources****
Argentina – 1958-61: Frondizi - PD 1962-65: Guido, Illia - PD 1966-72: dictatorship.	- Oligopoly. / - Mixed state and private-commercial model. / - Channel 9 – NBC. / - Channel 11 – ABC. / - Channel 13 – PROARTEL, G. Mestre, ABC, Time-Life, CBS.	- Moderate regulation. / Significant censorship. / - Moderate political instrumentalization.	- 24 million / 79% urban. / - 44% TV households. / - Restrictions on forging ownership of TV were circumvented through national associations. Prohibitions on networks limited expansion of TV monopolies. Military coups in 1962 and 1966 defined governments through the 1960s. / 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 21, 23.
Bolivia – 1960-63: Paz Estenssoro – PD-P 1964-69: Ovando, Barrientos - dictatorship. 1969-71: Ovando, Torres - dictatorship.	- TV introduced in 1969 with state capital. / - State monopoly. / - Public service. / - Channel 7 ENTVB.	- No regulation until 1970. / Significant censorship. / - Direct political instrumentalization.	- 4.2 million. / 40% urban. / - 3% TV households. / - This was a period of instability and military dictatorships. The Ovando regime considered itself leftist. No regulation until 1970 when TV broadcasting was declared exclusive right of the state. / 3, 5, 18, 19, 20.
Brazil – 1956-61: Kubitschek – Dem 1961-63: Goulart - Dem 1964-85: dictatorship.	- Oligopoly. / - Private-commercial model with significant state subsidies. / - TV Tupi - A. Chateaubriand, J. Salom. / - REI – R. Machado de Carvalho. / - TV Globo – R. Marinho, Time-Life.	- No regulation until 1962. Thereafter, limited regulation. / Significant censorship. / - Significant political instrumentalization.	- 96 million. / 56% urban. / - 20% TV households. / - Military coup in 1964. The greatest numbers of private TV licenses were authorized by both Kubitschek (15) and the military dictatorship (25) during the 1960s. Throughout 1960s the dictatorship invested heavily directly and indirectly into TV development and infrastructure. By 1966 there was a near partnership between military dictatorship and TV-Globo. / 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 16, 18, 21.

Table 4: 1960s, *cont*.

Country - Governments	**- Concentration/ - Model/ - Prin. Channels, Owners & Investors**	**- Regulation/ - Political Instrumentalization**	**- Population (in millions)/ % Urbanization/ - % TV Households*/ - Notes/ Sources****
Chile – 1958-64: Allessandri R. – Dem 1964-70: Frei Montalva – Dem	- Plural. / - Mixed university-public service and commercial model. / - Channel 4 Universidad Católica de Valparaiso - ABC. / - Channel 9 Universidad de Chile. / - Channel 13 Universidad Catolica de Santiago – PROTEL, L. Letelier, J. del Rio, R. Vergara, ABC, RCA. / - TVN – Government network.	- No regulation until 1970. / - Limited to significant political instrumentalized, increasing throughout 1960s.	- 9.6 million. / 75% urban. / - 18% TV households. / - Chilean TV was not regulated other than limiting its control to the universities. These channels could be run commercially, and some formed associations with private media companies. As conditions in Chile became more polarized through the 1960s, control of TV became a major point of contention among opposing political sectors. TVN, a government run national network, began broadcasting in 1969. / 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 16, 18, 21, 23.
Colombia – 1958-62: Lleras C. – PD-A 1962-66: León V. – PD-A 1966-70: Lleras R. – PD-A	- Plural. / - Mixed state-public service and private-commercial model. / - Channel Inravisión, Caracol TVC. / - Punch - Peñalranda. / - Radio Television Internacional (RTI) - F. Gomez Agudelo. / - Channel 9 Teletigre – C. de Montejo, ABC.	- Significant regulation. / - Moderate censorship. / - Limited political instrumentalization.	- 22.5 million. / 55% urban. / - 12% TV households. / - Inravisión was the "state-owned, commercially operated television" institute with exclusive control over TV broadcasting. Private programmers could rent airtime on channels established by Inravisión. The largest of these programmers were Caracol, Punch, and RTI. / 4, 5, 6, 10, 18, 21, 23.
Costa Rica – 1958-62: Echandi J. – Dem 1962-66: Orlich B. – Dem 1966-70: Trejos F. – Dem	- TV introduced in 1960 with private capital. / - Monopoly. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 7 Televitica - C. Reyes, R. Picado Esquivel, ABC. / - Channel 6 Telecentro – M. Sotela Pacheco, C. Alfaro, C. Eleta, NBC, Televisa (Mex).	- Limited regulation until 1978. / - Moderate political instrumentalization.	- 1.8 million. / 39% urban. / - 20% TV households. / - TV was introduced in Costa Rica in 1960 with Televitica. Debate between implementing a public service versus private-commercial model delayed TV. A.I.R. and S.I.P. played key roles in this debate. Was finally deployed with private capital and under a private-commercial model. / 8, 18, 21, 23.

Table 4: 1960s, *cont*.

Country - Governments	**- Concentration/ - Model/ - Prin. Channels, Owners & Investors**	**- Regulation/ - Political Instrumentalization**	**- Population (in millions)/ % Urbanization/ - % TV Households*/ - Notes/ Sources****
Cuba – 1959 Triumph of Cuban Revo. 1960-76: Dorticós T. - Socialist republic.	- Cuban TV was nationalized in 1960. / - State monopoly. / - Non-commercial public-service model. / - Channel 6 CMQ-TV. / - Channel 2 Telerebelde.	- Direct regulation. / Significant censorship of former ruling elite. / - Direct political instrumentalization.	- 8.7 million. / 60% urban. / - 15% TV households. / - Cuban TV was nationalized in 1960 and became part of the Instituto Cubano de Radio y Televisión (ICRT). First ICRT director of TV was José Antonio Caínes Sierra. By the mid 1960s almost all former private owners of Cuban TV had left the island. Cuba was the only TV system in Latin America that was completely non-commercial. / 13, 14, 18, 21.
Dominican Republic – 1952-61: Trujillo – dictatorship 1961-62: Balaguer – dictatorship 1962-65: Bosch et al – dictatorship 1966-73: Balaguer – PD -A	- Duopoly. / - State and private-commercial model. / - Channel 7 Radio Televisión Dominicana (RTD) – Government channel. / - Channel Rahintel – P. Bonilla, ABC. / - Channel ? Colorvisión – Bérmudez. /	- No regulation. / Significant censorship. / - Significant political instrumentalization.	- 4.6 million. / 40% urban. / - 8% TV households. / - Color TV was introduced in the Dominican Republic in 1969. Trujillo was assassinated in 1961 and his private media holdings (radio and TV) were nationalized. In 1965 a US invasion exacerbated the political turmoil and was a powerful TV message to Latin American governments, especially Cuba. The Balaguer presidency was authoritarian and political violence was common. / 9, 18, 21, 23.
Ecuador – 1960-62: PD-A 1963-67: dictatorship 1968-69: PD-A	- Oligopoly. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 4 – P. Norton, L Salem D., L. Noboa Naranjo./ - Ecuavisa – X. Alvarado, Mantilla Ortega, ABC. - Channel 10 – I. Pérez P.	- Limited regulation. / - Moderate political instrumentalization.	- 6 million. / 39% urban. / - 9% TV households. / - The evangelical church had a strong presence in Ecuadorian TV during it first two decades. Later private interests dominated the medium./ 13, 18, 22, 23.
El Salvador – 1960-79: dictatorship	- Monopoly. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 2, 4 TCS – B. Esersky, ABC.	- Limited regulation. / - Significant political instrumentalization. /	- 3.6 million. / 39% urban. / - 10% TV households. / - Polarization and increasing political violence against the population defined the 1960s. The catholic church became increasingly active in politics and mass media. / 1, 2, 5, 15, 18, 21, 23.

Table 4: 1960s, *cont*.

Country - Governments	**- Concentration/ - Model/ - Prin. Channels, Owners & Investors**	**- Regulation/ - Political Instrumentalization**	**- Population (in millions)/ % Urbanization/ - % TV Households*/ - Notes/ Sources****
Guatemala – 1960-86: dictatorship	- Monopoly. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 3 TGBOL – R. Herrera Dorion, E. Barrios, ABC. - Channel 7 - Channel 11 TGMO-TV	- No regulation. / Significant censorship. / - Significant political instrumentalization.	- 5.4 million. / 36% urban. / - 5% TV households. / - During the 1960s the dictatorship intensified its repression against armed movements, and strongly censored the media under this guise. / 7, 15, 18, 21, 23.
Honduras – 1957-62: Villeda M. – PD-P 1963-81: dictatorship	- Oligopoly. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channels 5 and 7 – R. Ferrari, ABC. / - Channels 6 and 69 – R. Nodarse.	- Limited regulation. / Significant censorship. / - Significant political instrumentalization.	- 2.7 million. / 29% urban. / - 3% TV households. / - / 11, 15, 18, 23.
Mexico – 1958-63: López M. – PD 1964-70: Díaz Ordaz – PD-A	- Monopoly. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channels 2,4,5 Telesistema Mexicano (TSM) - M. Alemán Valdes, ABC.	- Limited regulation to 1969. / Moderate censorship. / - Significant instrumentalization.	- 50.6 million. / 59% urban. / - 14% TV households. / - Color TV was deployed for 1968 Olympics, also scene of Tlatelolco Massacre. Although operating together under TSM, the channels remained in the names of individual owners to circumvent constitutional prohibition of monopolies. During this period began exporting programming to US Spanish speaking market. / 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 16, 18, 21.
Nicaragua – 1960-79: dictatorship	- Duopoly. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 2 – O. Sacasa Sarria. - Channel 8 Televisión de Nicaragua – A. Somoza.	- Limited regulation. / - Direct instrumentalization. /	- 2.4 million. / 47% urban. / - 11% TV households. / - Nicaragua was under the Somoza dictatorship during this period and TV was maintained as a quasi-family monopoly until 1979. / 14, 15, 17, 18.

Table 4: 1960s, *cont*.

Country - Governments	**- Concentration/ - Model/ - Prin. Channels, Owners & Investors**	**- Regulation/ - Political Instrumentalization**	**- Population (in millions)/ % Urbanization/ - % TV Households*/ - Notes/ Sources****
Panama – 1960-64: Chiari – PD 1965-67 Robles – PD 1968-89: dictatorship	- Duopoly. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 2 – Chiari family, ABC. / - Channel 4 – Eleta family. / -	- Limited regulation. / - Direct instrumentalization. /	- 1.5 million. / 48% urban. / - 34% TV households. / - General Torrijos was the defacto leader of Panama from 1968 until the early 1980s. He was a populist whose control of Panamanian politics came after decades of political violence and instability, and his influence lasted for decades. TV was dominated by elite families throughout the 1960s. / 15, 18, 23.
Paraguay – 1954-89: dictatorship	- TV introduced in 1965 with private capital. / - State and private duopoly./ - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 9 Sistema Nacional de Televisión (SNT).	- Significant regulation. / - Significant censorship. / - Direct political instrumentalization.	- 2.4 million. / 37% urban. / - 9% TV households. / - The dictatorship directed TV through the National Department of Press and Propaganda (DENAPRO). / 6, 18, 19.
Peru – 1956-62: Prado – PD 1962: dictatorship 1963-68: Belaúnde Dem 1968-79: dictatorship	- Private oligopoly until 68, then state and private. / - Private-commercial model until 68, then Mixed. / - Channel 4 Com. P. de Radiodifusión Radio America. / - Channel 9 Com. P. de Producciones Radiales y TV - Miro Quesada, NBC. / - Channel 13 Panamericana TV - G. Mestre, CBS.	- Erratic regulation, significant after 1968. / - Significant political instrumentalization.	- 13.2 million. / 57% urban. / - 13% TV households. / - A wild time for Peruvian TV began in 1968 when Belaúde was overthrown by a leftist military coup led by Juan Velasco Alvarado. / 4, 5, 6, 18, 21.
Puerto Rico – (U.S. colony)	- Duopoly. / - Private-commercial Model. / - Channel 2 Telemundo – A. Ramos. / - Channel 4 WAPA-TV – J.R. Quiñones. /	- Moderate regulation. / - Limited political instrumentalization.	- 2.7 million. / 58% urban. / - 41% TV households. / - Still under regulation of the FCC. / 14, 18, 21.

Table 4: 1960s, *cont*.

Country - Governments	**- Concentration/ - Model/ - Prin. Channels, Owners & Investors**	**- Regulation/ - Political Instrumentalization**	**- Population (in millions)/ % Urbanization/ - % TV Households*/ - Notes/ Sources****
Uruguay – 1952-67: Nat. Council – Dem 1968-72: Pacheco A. – Dem	- Oligopoly. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 10 Saeta TV – Fontaina. / - Channel 4 Montecarlo TV – Romay. / - Channel 12 Teledoce – Scheck, ABC. / - Channel 5 – Government channel.	- Limited regulation. / - Limited political instrumentalization.	- 2.8 million. / 82% urban. / - 23% TV households. / - From 1952 to 67, abolished presidency and established a National Council of Government. The *Servicio Oficial de Difusion Radio Electrica (SODRE)* was a state owned company that managed government radio and TV non-commercial broadcasting. / 3, 4, 5, 6, 18, 21, 23.
Venezuela – 1959-64: Betancourt – Dem 1965-69: Leoni O. – Dem 1969-74: Caldera R. – Dem	- Oligopoly. / - Private-commercial model. / - Channel 4 Venevisión – D. Cisneros, ABC. / - Channel 2 RCTV – NBC. / - Channel 8 CVTV – Vollmer Group, G. Mestre, Time-Life, CBS.	- Limited regulation. / - Significant instrumentalization.	- 10.7 million. / 72% urban. / - 45% TV households. / - Although legislation existed limiting forging ownership of media, it was not enforced. / 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 18, 21, 23.

**Numbers are for 1970.*

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21. Sterling, Christopher
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Demographic and Technological Change

By 1970, half of the total population of Latin America was urban, and since 1950 the total population had grown by 58%, totaling 117 million new Latin Americans, many of whom made up the threatening urban poor. It was during this period that affluent urban areas built up under modernization projects began to be surrounded by millions of rural migrants moving into shanty towns, later enclosing the urban centers as an ominous reminder that they had been excluded from the new urban industrial wealth that had concentrated in the cities.

By the end of the 1960s, every Latin American country had established television and the largest and most economically powerful Latin American countries had well-established coverage, and the number of receivers began to grow rapidly. Latin America's population was evenly divided between urban and rural, and a television could be found in 17% of households. The total number of television receivers in the region had gone from less than 100,000 in 1950, to nearly 17 million by 1970. TV had become a force to contend with. Although still quite limited, this penetration of TV across the region had already made it a formidable ally for governments looking to consolidate their expanding economic and political vision of a modern Latin American state. Television would not come into full bloom as a useful mass media platform for political instrumentalization until the 1970s.

Television receivers were still very expensive, and as shown by its levels of penetration, had not realized a its full potential as a tool to reach and influence

national populations. Again this is related to the overall history of the democratic process, but Latin America was changing.

The deployment of color television was important in the overall development of TV, since it required a consolidation, modernization, and reorganization of the industry as a whole, one that was conscious of its political potential, as well as considered the future of the enterprise that laid the foundation of what was to come. This was considered when choosing new forms of regulation and organization for television, since complete penetration and total coverage was close enough on the horizon that it needed planning. The introduction of videotape and satellite communications accelerated the expansion of TV by decreasing the technical and logistical obstacles of transmission, and instigated a leap forward for the expansion of coverage. Each of these factors helped prepare Latin America for the introduction and deployment of color television in the following decade. This was especially important to authoritarian regimes that depended, in many ways, upon a monopoly of control over information. The development of communications satellites in the 1960 and 1970s accelerated the changed and power of television. (Parks and Kumar 29)

Conclusion

The First Twenty Years Leading Into the Second Forty Years of Latin American Television

Does democracy naturally translate into democratic media systems, or are mass media systems of and within themselves democratizing forces that help open political systems? The history of Latin American television provides a negative answer to each of these questions.

If the preexisting order in a country is democratic, the media system is more likely to be circumstantially democratic. If the political order is undemocratic, media systems have a tendency to be more rigidly instrumentalized, concentrated, and undemocratic. Democracy and mass media are most organically paired when there exists a democratic discourse that resonates with and mobilizes popular democratic action. For those exceptional moments in Latin American history, when communications technologies have been most clearly identified as having played a role in advancing democratic change, it has usually been that these were tools used by democratizing forces within the larger social and political context of the historical moment. The most commonly observed pattern has international, state, demographic, and market forces binding the deployment of broadcast television systems in Latin America to undemocratic regimes, and rather than promoting democratic change, its development was primarily useful to reinforce or advance existing political, economic, and social hierarchies.

Democratic change in Latin America advanced from 1950 to 1960, and then retreated by 1970. On the other hand, since its introduction in the 1950s broadcast television grew steadily in influence and reach through 1960, then exploded into the 1970s, nearly quadrupling it presence throughout Latin America, in relation to the previous decade. Clearly, the development of TV during its first twenty years was not dependant on the existence of democratic standards in the host country. This thesis has provided evidence that the opposite may be true – while accountable to democratic standards and regulation, the growth of television proved to be slow and fragmented. On the other hand, when unbound by civic responsibility and democratic norms, television systems expanded exponentially.

In spite of the tenuous link between Latin American television and democracy, its consistent political instrumentalization proves that there is a firm correlation between television and politics. It is within this second relationship where the basic argument of this thesis is substantiated – the political ascendancy of Latin American television began in the 1950s and has ran unchecked into the 1970s. More developed versions of my research will present subsequent historical periods in Latin American TV history, and reaffirm what scholars of cultural imperialism have argued, that the "system has at its disposal the informational apparatus and the cultural institutions that influence, if not determine, social thinking [and]… this explains why informational and cultural power have become key factors in governance… How these are deployed is no less decisive for social control than are the army and the police" (Schiller Number One, 136-37).

When first introduced in Latin America TV was more a technological novelty, representative of modernization and nation building, used to culturally "develop" and integrate a primarily rural population. Contemporary Latin American television, on the other hand, is identified through transnational media empires, serving the commercial interests of global capital within the largely urbanized Latin American market.

A subtle yet transcendental shift took place as the political ascendancy of mass media systems was accelerated and the emergence of broadcast television as a preeminent space of political struggle was confirmed. Untethered from national debate and accountability, and relatively insulated from regional economic crisis, the TV industry grew dramatically.

The inorganic nature of the deployment of television was especially pronounced for the duration of these first two historical periods since the political instrumentalization of communications technology was primarily linked to state initiatives in partnership with economically and politically powerful social classes. The massive market potential of TV made private-commercial domination of Latin American television a foregone conclusion, since through its commercial prism, it represented too rich a source of potential wealth to leave to public service TV (Fox and Waisbord 20). By the late 1960s, public service TV became an academic argument, and for all intents and purposes was no longer an option to be taken seriously again.

The most consistent form that Latin American television has taken since the 1950s has followed an almost feudal logic, embedded in the larger private-commercial

model that has been the most prevalent throughout the media history of the region. The political ascendancy of Latin American television has been ideologically subservient, compliant, and homogenous, denationalized, and utterly undemocratic.

First we must consider the subjective and transitory modes of democratic discourse, as it has changed over time. The meaning of democracy during the 1940s and 50s, as well as democratic values, changed dramatically over the different periods of TV history in Latin America. These changes helped define the role of the state and the individual citizen, the economic order of the period, and the dominant ideological frameworks at an international level.

The 40s and 50 paired democracy with modernization, nationalism, markets, and the free flow doctrine. Anti-fascism, and in some countries anti-communism, were the clarion calls of national economic and cultural independence, representing a broadening ideological range, although still concentrated among elite political classes. Consequently there existed a widening ideological range, but a narrow engagement and participation for sectors of Latin American society. Plagued by low educational levels and limited but rapidly growing mass communications systems, mass mobilization a principal mode of political engagement for growing sectors of the population. The world was emerging and beginning to recover from WWII, and the most powerful democratic discourse was bound to the United Nations and the allied powers.

The 60s matched democracy to popular political engagement, broad economic development, and social justice. The principal dispute during this period was the

struggle over flows and cultural imperialism, and it impacted temporarily the history on television of the region. Latin American governments, private investors, and US interests had their agenda tempered by the wave of popular and critical struggle that went counter to what they had set in motion in the 1950s. Popular Latin American demands for self-determination and anti-imperialist solidarity provided the foundation for the widest ideological range of radio. A growing popular consciousness existed in Latin America, in spite of government discourse.

While Latin American political and economic systems have covered the full spectrum from the left to the right, in national broadcast media systems the private-commercial model has consistently reigned supreme, and for television this translated into a consistently narrow ideological slant from the center right to the hard right.[11]

During the early stages of neoliberal "reform" in the late 1970's and the 1980s national mass media (audio-visual and print) became tools for advancing the reconfiguration of the relationship between Latin American governments and Latin American people.[12] TV became a form of mass media that offered disciplined, region wide, and consistent, unwavering ideological discipline and hegemony. It is at this

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[11] There have been exceptions to the private-commercial model such as in Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Argentina, Peru, although all of these were offered more as experiments in alternatives and only Cuban television has not reverted back to a private-commercial model.

[12] As I have slowly worked out the "big" ideas behind my research, I have become increasingly aware of the importance of contextualizing media democratization within what happened to the media during the period of military dictatorships in Latin America. Of course for this thesis it would be too wide a net to cast, but it would be possible to include this type of investigation in a future dissertation. So I pose the question here: what was the role/reporting of the existing media during the most violent periods of the military dictatorships in Latin America? What was conspicuously *not reported* during a time of the most severe atrocities? To what degree was this due to direct military censorship, and how much due to self-censorship?

point when the shift in the role of the media in Latin America is linked to the shift in the economic model.

Whereas class divisions and class struggle were undermined, the material conditions continued. In Latin America, the characteristics assumed by media technologies and the degree to which they have been incorporated into our lives becomes definitive to freedom, modernity, and self-identification. Mass media forms such as TV offer a series of virtual realities – virtual democracy, virtual success, virtual freedom, virtual identity. Each is disconnected and divorces the definition from the sources – the national from the economy, the individual from the identity, the class from its interests, the cultural from the nation, etc. When they converge these elements represent a perpetual ideological whitewash of Latin American television.

Today, Latin American television is rife with classist, misogynistic, and racist imagery and ideology. Both terrible and ironic is that television is now the most important source of information for the great majority of people in Latin America. The average person in Latin America spends a minimum of three hours per day watching television. (Orozco 15).

Modern media systems have a permanent potential capacity of instantly (and often unintentionally) articulate and amplify previously latent social and political tensions. A video image or a phrase can be equally capable of generating and mobilizing popular rage, as channeling divergent interests into a common cause.

Within the United States we are all too familiar with this expanded media influence, even if publicly these events are not usually recognized as being media driven.[13]

This is most clearly established when media systems advance and are organic to consumer centered postindustrial countries. In these countries developments and introductions of new forms of media follow the needs of internal markets (consumer trends, market needs, research and development, access to private capital, etc), political indicators (regulation, state capital investment, military technologies opened to consumer use, etc.), and more recently international integration. Advanced capitalist economies in countries such as the United States are home to these advanced media technologies for simple reasons – the economies, developed media literacy, consumer markets, research and development centers, etc. are generally most concentrated in these spaces. Furthermore, these countries provide the most profitable markets for their deployment, and therefore the incentive to increase these profit margins even further. In other words, information technology is fully integrated into the reigning political, economic, and social order, and in fact, can be considered an essential component of the infrastructure of the modern capitalist economy.

In the global south this has not been the case until recently. In Latin America for example, the political order and democratic institutions are continually under tension, economic stability is temporary at best, and the social order is one of a continual presence of extreme inequality. Under these circumstances of continuous

[13] The 1991 televised beating of Rodney King and subsequent L.A. riots, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the media campaign before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 are all historical events where subsequent social and political consequences were amplified due to the extensive media coverage each received.

tension over the past sixty years mass media technologies have been introduced and have had very different roles when compared to the industrialized north. What we see occurring is an inorganic information technology being introduced to an already unstable political environment, and the consequences have been far from constructive.

Arguably, this has been the case with print, radio, film, the Internet, and, of course, television. As each of these communication technologies was introduced into Latin America, it provoked significant and often unexpected changes in the economic, political, and social order. Unlike the media systems of advanced capitalist countries, where media structures complement and are organic to the economic and political order, these technologies in Latin America have been inorganic and often have sharpened and exacerbated existing tensions in the social fabric.

This has been the case in general throughout the Third World. In Latin America, in particular, the deployment of television was inorganic, commercially organized yet not necessarily connected to national market development. Television was always perceived as a tool for political ends. This is the early history of television in Latin America - the deployment of a technological curiosity that, in the end, has consumed a continent.

Appendices

Appendix A – Latin American Electoral Rolls, 1950 – 2005.*



Electoral Rolls (excludes non-procedural democracies)	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	
Argentina	8.6	0	10.2	11.5	0	15	0	18.7	20.3	22.2	24.3	26.1	Argentina
Belize	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.067	0.085	0.093	0.105	0.135	Belize
Bolivia	1	1.1	1.3	0	0	0	0	2.1	2.2	3	3.9	3.7	Bolivia
Brazil	0	15.1	18	0	0	0	0	0	83.8	100	110	124	Brazil
Chile	0.6	1.2	1.8	2.9	3.3	0	0	0	7.6	8.1	8.1	8.2	Chile
Colombia	2.8	0	4.4	6.1	7.7	10	13	15	13.8	18	22	26.5	Colombia
Costa Rica	0.166	0.295	0.4	0.55	0.675	0.95	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.9	2.2	2.2	Costa Rica
Cuba	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Cuba
Domin Republic	0	0	0	0	1.8	2.1	2.5	2.9	3.3	3.7	4.3	5.3	Domin Republic
Ecuador	0.432	0.7	1	0	0	0	2.1	4.1	5.3	6.5	7.7	9	Ecuador
El Salvador	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.8	1.7	2	2.8	3.3	3.6	El Salvador
French Guiana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	French Guiana
Guatemala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.2	3.7	4.6	5.5	Guatemala
Guyana	0	0	0	0	0.3	0.425	0.43	0.43	0.381	0.4	0.44	0.492	Guyana
Haiti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.3	3.7	4.2	3.5	Haiti
Honduras	0.3	0.411	0.65	0	0	0	0	1.9	2.5	2.8	3.3	4	Honduras
Mexico	3	8.9	10	13.7	21.7	25	28	35.3	39	47	58.8	70	Mexico
Nicaragua	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	1.6	1.8	2.4	2.8	3.7	Nicaragua
Panama	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	1.7	2	Panama
Paraguay	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2.2	2.7	Paraguay
Peru	0.776	1.6	2	2.7	0	0	0	8.3	10	12.4	14.6	16	Peru
Puerto Rico	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Puerto Rico
Suriname	0	0	0	0	0	0.16	0.17	0.2	0.247	0.269	0.265	0.334	Suriname
Uruguay	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.8	0	0	0	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.5	Uruguay
Venezuela	0	0	3	4	4.2	5	7	8.5	9.5	10.5	11.7	14.3	Venezuela
	19.074	30.606	54.25	43.15	41.475	58.635	57.7	102.197	214.313	255.262	292.91	333.761	
LATI	19	31	54	43	42	59	58	102	214	255	293	334	

* Excluding non-procedural democracies. *Sources: IDEA.*

Appendix B – Latin American Total Radio and Television Receivers, 1997 - 2003

	A	B	C	D	E	F
150						
151	Radio Receivers per 1000, 1997 - 2003 ITU					
152				pop millions	total tvs millions	
153		Argentina	697	38	26.5	
154		Belize	50	0.274	0.014	
155		Bolivia	671	8.8	5.9	
156		Brazil	433	181.8	78.7	
157		Chile	759	16	12.1	
158		Colombia	548	43.7	23.9	
159		Costa Rica	816	4.2	3.4	
160		Cuba	185	11.2	2.1	
161		Domin Republic	181	9.2	1.7	
162		Ecuador	422	12.8	5.4	
163		El Salvador	481	6.5	3.1	
164		French Guiana	25	0.175	0.004	
165		Guatemala	79	12.1	0.948	
166		Guyana	50	0.738	0.037	
167		Haiti	18	9	0.162	
168		Honduras	411	6.6	2.7	
169		Mexico	330	101	33.3	
170		Nicaragua	270	5.3	1.4	
171		Panama	300	3.1	0.93	
172		Paraguay	188	5.7	1.1	
173		Peru	269	26.6	7.2	
174		Puerto Rico	761	3.9	3	
175		Suriname	50	0.447	0.02	
176		Uruguay	603	3.3	20.8	
177		Venezuela	292	25.7	7.5	
178			8889		241.915	
179						

Sources: ITU

Appendix C – Latin American Total Population in Millions, 1950 - 2005

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
111																
112	Total Population in Millions		1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005		
113																
114		Argentina	17.2	19	20.6	22.3	24	26	28.1	30.3	32.6	35.8	36.9	38.7		Argentina
115		Belize	0.069	0.08	0.091	0.107	0.12	0.129	0.146	0.166	0.189	0.217	0.25	0.292		Belize
116		Bolivia	2.7	3	3.4	3.7	4.2	4.8	5.4	6	6.7	7.5	8.3	9.2		Bolivia
117		Brazil	54	63	72.7	84.3	96	108.1	121.6	136.1	149.5	161.6	174.2	186.8		Brazil
118		Chile	6.1	6.8	7.6	8.7	9.6	10.4	11.2	12.1	13.2	14.4	15.4	16.3		Chile
119		Colombia	12	13.8	16.8	19.6	22.5	25.3	28.4	31.6	34.9	38.3	41.7	44.9		Colombia
120		Costa Rica	0.966	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.3	2.7	3.1	3.5	3.9	4.3		Costa Rica
121		Cuba	5.9	6.5	7.1	8	8.7	9.4	9.8	10.1	10.6	10.9	11.1	11.3		Cuba
122		Domin Republic	2.4	2.8	3.3	3.9	4.6	5.3	5.9	6.6	7.3	8	8.7	9.5		Domin Republic
123		Ecuador	3.4	3.9	4.4	5.1	6	6.9	8	9.1	10.3	11.4	12.3	13.1		Ecuador
124		El Salvador	2.2	2.4	2.6	3	3.6	4.1	4.6	4.8	5.1	5.6	6.2	6.7		El Salvador
125		French Guiana	0.025	0.029	0.032	0.04	0.048	0.056	0.068	0.088	0.116	0.139	0.165	0.202		French Guiana
126		Guatemala	3.1	3.6	4.1	4.7	5.4	6.2	7	7.9	8.9	10	11.2	12.7		Guatemala
127		Guyana	0.423	0.486	0.569	0.645	0.709	0.734	0.761	0.754	0.731	0.739	0.734	0.739		Guyana
128		Haiti	3.2	3.5	3.9	4.3	4.7	5.1	5.7	6.4	7.1	7.8	8.6	9.3		Haiti
129		Honduras	1.5	1.7	2	2.4	2.7	3.1	3.6	4.2	4.9	5.6	6.2	6.8		Honduras
130		Mexico	27.7	32.3	36.9	43.1	50.6	59.1	67.6	75.5	83.2	91.1	98	103.1		Mexico
131		Nicaragua	1.3	1.5	1.8	2.1	2.4	2.8	3.3	3.7	4.1	4.7	5.1	5.5		Nicaragua
132		Panama	0.86	0.977	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.9	2.2	2.4	2.7	2.9	3.2		Panama
133		Paraguay	1.5	1.7	1.8	2.1	2.4	2.7	3.1	3.6	4.2	4.8	5.3	5.9		Paraguay
134		Peru	7.6	8.7	9.9	11.5	13.2	15.2	17.3	19.5	21.8	23.9	25.7	27.3		Peru
135		Puerto Rico	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.7	3	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.7	3.8	3.9		Puerto Rico
136		Suriname	0.215	0.25	0.29	0.332	0.372	0.364	0.356	0.383	0.402	0.416	0.436	0.452		Suriname
137		Uruguay	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.9	3	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.3		Uruguay
138		Venezuela	5.1	6.2	7.6	9.1	10.7	12.7	15.1	17.5	19.8	22	24.3	26.6		Venezuela
139			163.858	188.022	214.782	247.224	281.349	318.083	357.331	397.691	437.738	478.011	514.685	550.085		
140																
141		USA	5	6	6.8	7	9.6	10	14.6	20	22.4	27	35.3	42.7		
142			168.858	194.022	221.582	254.224	290.949	328.083	371.931	417.691	460.138	505.011	549.985	592.785		
143																
144		LATI	164	188	215	247	281	318	357	398	460	478	515	550		
145																
146																

Sources: UNdata and WDI.

Appendix D – Latin America, Percent of Households with Television, 1950 – 2005.



	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
36																
37	% TVs per Household		1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005		
38																
39		Argentina	0	1.2	6.3	22	44	46	54	64	75	86	95	95		Argentina
40		Belize								14	16	37	35	93		Belize
41		Bolivia	0	0	0	0	3	4	22	27	44	47	46	63		Bolivia
42		Brazil	0	0.6	2	17	20	23	35	53	60	81	84	90		Brazil
43		Chile	0	0	0	2	18	39	36	51	78	90	94	97		Chile
44		Colombia	0	0.7	2	6	12	22	28	30	50	70	80	85		Colombia
45		Costa Rica	0	0	7	11	20	23	24	27	72	76	84	89		Costa Rica
46		Cuba	2	5	9	12	15	21	44	62	38	64	68	70		Cuba
47		Domin Republic	0	1	2	5	8	13	26	29	31	35	74	76		Domin Republic
48		Ecuador	0	0	0.7	3	9	12	21	22	29	54	76	85		Ecuador
49		El Salvador	0	0	1	4	10	13	25	28	45	74	82	83		El Salvador
50		French Guiana	0	0	0	0	18	39	72	68	63	63	83	81		French Guiana
51		Guatemala	0	0	3	5	5	7	10	10	21	31	39	50		Guatemala
52		Guyana									12	15	31	59		Guyana
53		Haiti	0	0	0	0	0.2	2	2	2	2	17	23	27		Haiti
54		Honduras	0	0	0	0.3	3	4	7	27	30	36	44	57		Honduras
55		Mexico	0	1	8	11	14	16	20	41	54	86	90	93		Mexico
56		Nicaragua	0	0	1	4	11	15	24	25	31	53	59	60		Nicaragua
57		Panama	0	0	11	21	34	42	46	62	65	67	78	79		Panama
58		Paraguay	0	0	0	8	9	10	11	12	26	68	75	79		Paraguay
59		Peru	0	0	4	8	13	18	23	34	42	63	67	66		Peru
60		Puerto Rico	0	18	28	36	41	57	61	68	72	88	87	97		Puerto Rico
61		Suriname	0	0	0	6	20	25	30	31	37	59	65	66		Suriname
62		Uruguay	0	0	9	17	23	29	29	54	78	81	82	92		Uruguay
63		Venezuela	0	6	15	32	45	46	51	59	67	80	82	91		Venezuela
64			0.09	1.456521739	4.739130435	10.01304348	17.18260869	22.86956522	30.47826087	37.5	45.52	60.84	68.92	76.92		
65																
66																
67		LATI	0.09	2	5	10	17	23	31	38	46	61	69	77		
68																
69																

Sources: UNESCO, WDI, and ITU.

Appendix E – Latin American Urbanization, 1950 – 2005.



	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
1	% Urban		1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005		
2																
3		Argentina	65.3	69.6	74	76	79	81	83	85	87	89	90	91		Argentina
4		Belize	55.3	54.7	54	52.5	51	50.2	49.4	48.4	47.5	47.5	47.8	50.2		Belize
5		Bolivia	33.8	35.3	36.8	38.3	39.8	41.3	45.5	50.5	55.6	59.4	61.8	64.2		Bolivia
6		Brazil	36.2	40.5	45	50	56	62	67	71	75	78	81	84		Brazil
7		Chile	58	63	68	72	75	78	81	83	83	84	86	88		Chile
8		Colombia	33	39	45	51	55	58	62	66	68	70	72	74		Colombia
9		Costa Rica	34	34	34	36	39	41	43	46	51	56	59	62		Costa Rica
10		Cuba	57	58	58	59	60	64	68	71	73	74	76	76		Cuba
11		Domin Republic	24	27	30	35	40	46	51	54	55	58	62	67		Domin Republic
12		Ecuador	28	31	34	37	39	42	47	51	55	58	60	64		Ecuador
13		El Salvador	37	37	38	39	39	42	44	47	49	54	58	60		El Salvador
14		French Guiana	54	59	63	66	67	69	71	73	75	75	75	76		French Guiana
15		Guatemala	25	28	31	34	36	37	37	39	41	43	45	47		Guatemala
16		Guyana	28	29	29	29	29	30	30	30	30	29	29	28		Guyana
17		Haiti	12	14	16	18	20	20	20	23	28	33	36	43		Haiti
18		Honduras	18	20	23	26	29	32	35	38	40	42	44	46		Honduras
19		Mexico	43	47	51	55	59	63	66	69	71	73	75	76		Mexico
20		Nicaragua	35	37	40	43	47	49	50	51	52	54	55	56		Nicaragua
21		Panama	36	39	41	44	48	49	50	52	54	60	66	71		Panama
22		Paraguay	35	35	36	36	37	39	42	45	49	52	55	58		Paraguay
23		Peru	41	44	47	52	57	62	65	67	69	70	71	71		Peru
24		Puerto Rico	41	42	44	52	58	63	67	69	72	87	95	97		Puerto Rico
25		Suriname	47	47	47	47	46	50	55	64	68	70	72	74		Suriname
26		Uruguay	78	79	80	81	82	83	85	87	89	90	91	92		Uruguay
27		Venezuela	47	55	62	67	72	76	79	82	84	87	90	92		Venezuela
28			40.064	42.564	45.072	47.832	50.392	53.1	55.716	58.476	60.844	63.716	66.104	68.296		
29																
30		LATI	40	43	45	48	50	53	56	59	61	64	66	68		
31																

Sources: UNdata and WDI.

Appendix F – Latin American Total TV Receivers in Millions, 1950 – 2005.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
72																
73	Total TVs in Millions		1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005		
74																
75		Argentina	0.007	0.076	0.443	1.6	3.5	4	5.1	6.5	8.1	9.6	11.5	12.6		Argentina
76		Belize								0.023	0.031	0.039	0.044	0.12		Belize
77		Bolivia					0.035	0.045	0.3	0.42	0.75	0.85	0.99	1.4		Bolivia
78		Brazil	0.00002	0.141	0.76	5	6.7	8.4	14.8	25	30.8	38.9	58.3	67		Brazil
79		Chile	0	0	0.00005	0.052	0.509	1.2	1.2	1.8	2.7	3.6	4.2	5.1		Chile
80		Colombia	0	0.03	0.1	0.35	0.81	1.6	2.3	2.8	3.8	7.3	11.9	12.8		Colombia
81		Costa Rica	0	0	0.025	0.5	0.1	0.137	0.155	0.2	0.62	0.75	0.94	1		Costa Rica
82		Cuba	0.03	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.595	1.3	1.9	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.4		Cuba
83		Domin Republic	0	0.01	0.02	0.5	0.1	0.18	0.4	0.5	0.6	1.3	1.6	2		Domin Republic
84		Ecuador	0	0	0.01	0.042	0.15	0.252	0.5	0.6	0.88	1.7	2.8	3.4		Ecuador
85		El Salvador	0	0	0.01	0.035	0.092	0.135	0.3	0.35	0.6	0.97	1.5	1.6		El Salvador
86		French Guiana	0	0	0	0.0013	0.0024	0.0062	0.014	0.017	0.021	0.025	0.039	0.047		French Guiana
87		Guatemala	0	0	0.032	0.055	0.072	0.11	0.175	0.207	0.475	0.6	1.6	2		Guatemala
88		Guyana									0.028	0.035	0.07			Guyana
89		Haiti	0	0	0	0	0.011	0.015	0.017	0.019	0.028	0.25	0.38	0.586		Haiti
90		Honduras	0	0	0	0.0022	0.022	0.034	0.065	0.28	0.37	0.45	0.75	1		Honduras
91		Mexico	0	0.5	0.75	1.2	1.8	2.7	3.8	8.5	12.4	20	28	30		Mexico
92		Nicaragua	0	0	0.005	0.016	0.055	0.083	0.16	0.19	0.258	0.475	0.61	0.71		Nicaragua
93		Panama	0	0	0.03	0.07	0.13	0.185	0.225	0.35	0.4	0.47	0.55	0.65		Panama
94		Paraguay	0	0	0	0.035	0.045	0.054	0.068	0.085	0.22	0.75	1.2	1.4		Paraguay
95		Peru	0	0	0.1	0.21	0.395	0.61	0.895	1.5	2.1	3.3	3.8	6		Peru
96		Puerto Rico	0	0.15	0.25	0.35	0.41	0.63	0.725	0.85	0.93	1.2	1.3	1.3		Puerto Rico
97		Suriname	0	0	0	0.007	0.028	0.034	0.04	0.044	0.055	0.08	0.11	0.12		Suriname
98		Uruguay	0	0	0.1	0.2	0.28	0.351	0.363	0.7	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3		Uruguay
99		Venezuela	0	0.08	0.25	0.65	0.95	1.3	1.7	2.3	3.2	3.7	4.5	5.6		Venezuela
100			0.03702	1.087	3.08505	11.1755	16.5964	22.6562	34.602	55.135	72.666	99.644	140.283	160.133		
101																
102		LATI	0.04	1.1	3.1	11.2	16.6	22.7	34.6	55.1	72.7	99.6	140.3	160.1		
103																

Sources: UNESCO, WDI, and ITU.

Appendix G – A.I.R., "Panama Doctrine"

Doctrina de Panamá sobre Libertad de Expresión.

S.I.P - A.I.R. Panamá, 23 de marzo de 1952.

La Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa y la Asociación Interamericana de Radiodifusión tienen como principio común la defensa de la libertad de expresión en los hemisferios americanos y como objetivo específico, el laborar por el mantenimiento de los principios básicos de una sociedad libre y democrática que permita la existencia de la libertad individual y la dignidad humana.

Ante la realidad de que en algunos países de las Américas vienen aconteciendo con insistencia supresiones o coacciones a la libre expresión por gobiernos que atentan contra esos soberanos derechos de los pueblos, los dos organismos arriba nombrados expresan su honda preocupación por los incidentes ocurridos y por los que puedan ocurrir, y.

DECLARAN, que cualquiera agresión contra la libertad o la dignidad individual, o cualquier acto que cercene o limite la libertad de expresión de cualquiera persona o entidad que defienda o practique la libertad de expresión a través de la prensa y la radio constituye agresión contra todos los miembros de la Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa y de la Asociación Interamericana de Radiodifusión.

Panamá, marzo 23 de 1952.

GOAR MESTRE (AIR) - LUIS FRANZINI (SIP).

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