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How Do You Convince Children that the “Army”, “Terrorists” and the “Police” Can Live Together Peacefully? A Peace Communication Assessment Model

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirement for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Communication

by

Yael Warshel

Committee in charge:

Professor Daniel Hallin, Chair
Professor Patrick Anderson
Professor Carol Padden
Professor Michael Schudson
Professor Gershon Shafir

2009

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The Dissertation of Yael Warshel is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2009

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List of Abbreviations

Antenna Foundation Nepal	AFN
Anti-biological warfare air-purified bomb shelter	MAMAD (in Hebrew)
British Broadcasting Corporation	BBC
Capacity Building for Electronic Communication in Africa	CABECA
Center for International Development and Conflict Management	CIDCM
Common Ground News Service	CGNS
Development Communication	DC
Education for Conflict Resolution Programme	ECRP
International Development Research Centre	IDRC
Nayaa Baato Nayaa Paailaa	*NBNP*
Rechov Sumsum/Shara'a Simsim	*RS/SS*
Sippuray Sumsum	*SS*
Human Rights Watch	HRW
Hikayat Simsim	*HS*
Information and communication technologies	ICTs
International Court of Justice	ICJ
Iryo Nabonye Theatre for Reconciliation and/or Recrimination	*TR/R*
Israel Defense Forces	IDF
Israel occupation forces	IOF

Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics	CBS
Israeli Educational Television	IETV
Israel High Court of Justice	IHCJ
League of Arab States	LAS
Nashe Maalo	*NM*
New World Information and Communication Order	NWICO
Non-Governmental Organization	NGO
Organization of Islamic Countries	OIC
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics	PCBS
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	PFLP
Pan Asian Networking	*PAN*
Peace Communication	PC
Peace Education	PE
Peace Journalism	PJ
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder	PTSD
Search for Common Ground	SFCG
Self-efficacy	SE
Social Cognitive Theory	SCT
Star Radio	*SR*
Studio Ijambo	*SI*
Takalani Sesame	*TS*
To Reflect and Trust Jewish-German Program	*TRT*

United Nations, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization	UNESCO
United Nations Children's Fund	UNICEF
United Nations Development Program	UNDP
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa	UNECA
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	UNRWA
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	UNOCHA
United States Agency for International Development	USAID
United States Institute of Peace	USIP
Voice of America	VOA
Zimbabwe-Inter-Africa-News-Agency	ZIANA

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I conclude this section by noting that all those who I list above, while sharing the same space of these pages, nevertheless, hold wide and varied political opinions.

They stand here in my gratitude, together, apart. I alone take responsibility for the pages that follow.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

How Do You Convince Children that the “Army”, “Terrorists” and the “Police” Can Live Together Peacefully? A Peace Communication Assessment Model

by

Yael Warshel

Doctor of Philosophy in Communication

University of California, San Diego, 2009

Professor Daniel Hallin, Chair

This dissertation is divided into three parts. In Part I, I describe the historically applied global uses of communication in an effort to intervene into political conflict. I delineate and classify these practices into seven models. Next, I critically review the capacity of each practice to successfully manage conflict, and recommend these become the subject of scholarly inquiry as part of a new communication subfield I term “Peace Communication”.

In Part II, I begin an assessment of a peace communication intervention case, designed according to what I refer to as the “Mediated Contact Effects Model”. In Chapter 4, I conduct a concise production study in order to outline the encoding of the

case I assessed, namely Israeli and Palestinian versions of the television program *Sesame Street*. These television programs were co-produced by Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian and American teams, and together constitute a simultaneously *closed*, *open, glocal* and *hybrid* text.

After describing the text's encoding, I describe the methodologies I employed to, in turn, be able to assess its decoding by Palestinian, Jewish-Israeli and Arab/Palestinian-Israeli 5- to 8-year old children. Each of these groups of children interprets the Israeli-Palestinian ethnopolitical conflict, which is framed by the wider Arab-Israeli interstate conflict, through the categorical frameworks that they currently structurally occupy. These categories are, respectively, *stateless nation*, *statebearing nation*, and *state minority* and, they in turn, frame each group's organizational representatives' narrative goals towards (resolving) "the conflict", within the wider context of the interstate-system. Their goals are justice, security, and equality, respectively. In my effort to assess these children's interpretation of the text, I conducted an audience reception analysis. In order to conduct this analysis, I employed a combination of methodologies. These included comparative, multi-sited ethnographic, audience reception analysis, cognitive development, childhood and conflict zone field methodologies. I combined these methodologies with peace education praxis and used a mixture of largely qualitative, and, to a lesser extent, quantitative methods to carry out the study.

In Part III, I conduct the audience reception analysis. By including in it what I refer to as a "context analysis", I demonstrate how the respective categories of

stateless nation, statebearing nation and state minority formed the schema through which the three separate audiences filtered their interpretations of the efforts of the Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* text. Each audience accepted and negotiated the aspects of the text related to themselves and what I refer to as their "shared others" (e.g. Arab/Palestinian-Israelis for both Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians), typically interpreting both to be in the text and to be good-natured human beings. However, they opposed it to the extent that, in many cases, they did not even "see" their "others", or primary partner to "the conflict" in the text. I.e. with respect to the latter, Palestinian children and Jewish-Israeli children tended to simply erase each other from the text. The former erased the latter because they did not decode from the text the presence of "armies" and the latter erased the former, in part, because they did not decode "terrorists".

My findings shed light on the "normalcy" of life within zones of conflict. They describe how ethnopolitical conflicts are fundamentally rooted in limited and unequal forms of contact and help to explain the socialization processes at play that serve to make these and other political conflicts intractable. Moreover, they help to, in turn, trace precisely the reasons why the context of the conflict framing each of these children's lives led them to oppose the encoded mediated contact provided to them by the Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* text.

In light of their active decodings, in most instances, this peace communication intervention text ultimately suffered from difficulties in being able to potentially foster behavioral changes on the part of its audience members, particularly with respect to

their “others”, and, in turn, trying to either build or make peace. I conclude by recommending that mediated contact interventions encode both the structural and narrative contexts of their specific conflict into their design if they are to best stand a chance of effectively building and/or especially, of making peace.

Part I: Peace Communication: Creating a Sub-Discipline

Chapter 1: Historical Overview of Peace Communication

Peace Communication

A Definition and Introduction

Little is known about what role communication plays in managing political, and, in particular, ethnopolitical conflicts. Research into the use of communication as a mediation device between peoples engaged in political conflict, or what I will refer to as *peace communication,* has lagged far behind the practice. I propose the creation of a new subfield, namely, "Peace Communication". In Part I, I review the foundation of this proposed subdiscipline, categorize its various theoretical underpinnings – or seven models - and practices, and critically review the current state of empirical knowledge on the subject. In this Chapter, I describe the historical foundations of peace communication, presenting the case for the creation of a new sub discipline devoted to its study.

In Parts II and III, I provide as a case study a peace communication program in the form of a television program operating on the basis of a model of mediated contact. The particular case I outline is Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* and *Sesame Stories*. These television programs attempt to mediate conflict between Jewish-Israeli, Arab-Palestinian-Israeli and Palestinian children. They attempt to do so within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian ethnopolitical conflict, framed by the wider Arab-Israeli interstate conflict. I briefly describe the production of these

programs in Chapter 4, the methodology for my study in chapter 5, and then move to the primary focus of my analysis in Chapters 6 through 8 – the assessment of the audiences' responses to the television programs. I particularly emphasize the audience analysis I conducted with these populations, describing how and why they interpreted the programs as they did, in an effort to propose a model for both the assessment and evaluation of the efficacy of global peace communication intervention efforts.

Peace Communication Practice

End-goals. Peace communication intervention efforts typically target populations who experience political conflict on the ground rather than their leaders who are actually negotiating peace. They target these populations in an effort to *build peace*, or provide the grassroots support necessary for the *making of peace*.[1] As a point of clarification, peace communication projects may attempt to make peace *indirectly*, by producing large-scale public support for peace processes and platforms. They do not, however, try to make peace *directly* through the negotiation of political deals and platforms, as is the case with *Track I or II diplomacy.*

Peace communication interventions attempt to manage various facets of *political conflict* that pertain to *ethnopolitical-*, *civil-*, *interstate-* and *multi-state conflicts*. These facets typically range from efforts to alter how individuals construct their group-level identity, to reducing intergroup prejudice, to fostering reconciliation and or mutual understanding among conflicting groups. They may also include efforts to teach tolerance, induce compromise in intergroup political beliefs, encourage groups to view the narratives of their partners in conflict as legitimate, reduce

aggressive and violent behaviors of individuals, improve individuals' hope or optimism in favor of making peace, or foster new media technology use on the grounds that its increased use will build democracy or increase the economic efficiency of ethnopolitical groups who are economically disadvantaged to, in turn, build peace.

Communication channels. Whatever their direct aim, the practitioners of each PC intervention hope that by achieving change in one or more of the aforementioned conflict related behaviors, some aspect of the context of the given political conflict will be altered. These interventions are channeled through face-to-face interaction, radio, TV, film, Internet, puppetry, music, dance, theatre and so forth.

PC as compared with Development Communication. PC, as a practice overlaps in certain areas with development communication, peace education, and PJ though its boundaries differ and extend beyond all three. The one area of PC that seeks to foster new media technology use in order to increase the economic efficiency of ethnopolitical groups in order to build peace overlaps with the practice of *Development Communication (DC)*. DC seeks to use new media technology to spur socio-economic development. Therefore, PC programs of this type are similar in design, though their final outcome – peace – of course differs.

PC as compared with Peace Education. The other aforementioned goals of PC specifically, overlap with those of *Peace Education (PE).* However, their means are attempted via education, not communication. Education requires some form of communication to be sure, however, peace education neglects the role it plays. Thus,

PE for example, does not emphasize the important role discourse patterns play. In addition, PE only makes use of interpersonal communication. Thus, it does not pay attention to questions concerning media effects nor addresses the role played by technology in increasing economic efficiency (as relates to PC's overlap with DC).

PC as compared with Peace Journalism. *Peace Journalism (PC),* meanwhile, shares PC's goal of trying to induce compromise in intergroup political beliefs. It attempts to do so specifically by promoting the use of a specific style of journalism, or contents in the news media. In this vein, PJ forms one part of PC practice, but only a small part. PJ does not attempt to achieve the other aforementioned goals of PC. In addition, it relies on news media contents as the only means for trying to achieve the goal it *does* share with PC.

We Don't Know if Peace Communication Works

Whether Peace Communication actually "works" to help achieve any of the aforementioned goals, and, in turn, help manage some aspect of political conflict, is currently largely unknown. By and large, its efforts have not been assessed, nor has it been evaluated. Despite this lack of knowledge, popular and academic claims continue to suggest the power of these, or their exact opposite, *conflict communication*, as having a direct and powerful impact on individual and group-level conflict related behaviors. Peace communication has been argued to magically manage conflict, and conflict communication, whose claims are more common – to foment it. As an example from among the former, Dennis Ross claimed that the Oslo Accords between Israelis and Palestinians failed due to the lack of "people-to-people" projects. People

to people projects refer to grassroots peace building and public opinion altering interventions within the Israeli-Palestinian peace nomenclature. The majority of these programs, meanwhile use communication as their principle tool to elicit change.

From among the reverse examples, countless academic and especially policy claims have argued that Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) (and to a lesser extent, Radio Rwanda), caused the genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus by Hutus. When actually making use of evidence to support their claim scholars have at best made use of the work of Jean-Pierre Chrétien et al (1995), who analyzed only the *contents* of RTLM (e.g. Des Forges, 2007).

Whether addressing peace or conflict communication, correlation in place of regression, and content analysis in place of either media effects and audience reception analysis results have been used to "support" the claim that peace and conflict communication are effective. Thus, in the case of the former, policymakers and scholars have noted that a rise in violence occurred at the same time that RTLM broadcasted messages preaching hatred of Tutsis, and therefore, concluded that the latter led to the former. They drew such a conclusion without establishing any causal links between the two.

To prove their point, they could have instead conducted a media effects study of Hutu audience members' intergroup attitudes and political beliefs before and after the broadcast of the programs and provided controls to prove that, for example, by their listening to these messages, Hutus were causally led to adopt violent strategies against Tutsis. Doing so would have provided evaluation data to confirm such claims.

Similarly, to make their point, rather than offering transcripts of the station's broadcasts, or at best, citing Chrétien et al's content analysis of these, they could have in addition conducted an audience reception analysis in order to critically describe audience members' interpretations of said contents. Doing so would have provided assessment data that would confirm how audiences interpreted these broadcasts.

Instead, policy makers and scholars have assumed what the audience's interpretation of these broadcasts is and how much influence they have. Thus for example, they have assumed that when a radio announcer advocated the rape of Tutsi women by Hutu men, that Hutu men were tuning in, paying attention to these broadcasts, perceiving the announcer to advocate such an act and in turn proceeding to locate, detain and rape a Tutsi woman precisely *because* of these broadcasts. So too, it was assumed that if an announcer said Tutsis are bad people, that a Hutu listener did not previously share this negative attitude, and only *after* hearing the broadcast, came to adopt such an attitude and in turn, acted upon this new found attitude, for example, by picking up a machete and heading out of his home to kill his Tutsi neighbors – and also all because he heard such broadcasts, or said he had.

In brief, evidence attesting to these or similar claims remains non-existent, in the same way that, and in spite of popular and in part scholarly assumptions to the contrary, research of claims made about the power that propaganda *gave* Adolf Hitler during World War II remain non-conclusive.[2] On a related note, a commonly held belief among Americans has been that coverage of the Vietnam War played a central role in altering public opinion against the war. According to Daniel Hallin, "The

research literature, however, has never provided support for this view." (Hallin, 1997, p. 210). In other words, the assumption that communication plays a powerful role in conflict is not new. What *would* be new is evidence instead attesting to its power.

Despite this absence of assessment and evaluation research verifying the efficacy of peace or conflict communication, the practice of peace communication has, nevertheless, persisted. Donors have continued to fund peace communication projects, and practitioners to run them. This has to a great extent occurred due to the continued optimism about the ability of communication to manage conflict, or the basic assumption that if specific efforts are being made to manage conflict, these in turn *must* actually be managing conflict. As my review of analogous literature in Chapter 3 and my findings in Parts II and III demonstrate, this is never *necessarily* the case. Scholarly understanding of the intersections between communication and conflict must continue if there is ever to be any chance for peace communication to be effective.

The Historical Foundations of a Proposed Sub-Discipline of Peace Communication

Historical Reasons for the lack of Scholarly Interest in Peace Communication

Despite the proliferation of its practice, PC has not been thoroughly researched. It is essential to understand why this is the case. An understanding of this serves to 1) refute on-going popular and academic assumptions that claim that confirmatory research proves communication's powerful role in political conflict.

Such claims confuse both intellectual and applied understanding about what role, if any, communication has and may come to have in political conflict. A historical discussion of this subject serves to clearly demonstrate that, in fact, until the turn of this century, PC was not really researched. Second, an understanding of this history helps to make clear why PC research is imperative and allows us to 3) make sense of the current form or shape of this proposed subfield. Current interest in PC research is rooted in a limited set of questions. For example, scholarship is focused on attitude change rather than questions about group structural advantage. By making these limitations apparent, we would be in a better position to reflect on what direction the subfield might better take. In the following, I therefore provide an historical account of the development of the subfield.

PC as a mode of scholarly inquiry gained momentum during WWI, and especially WWII and the period immediately following it. PC was born out of the nexus of four separate scholarly movements: 1) modern communication studies, 2) modern conflict studies, 3) the contact hypothesis, and 4) social-psychological behavior change research.

Modern Communication Studies: Campaign Interventions and Applied Communication. In hindsight it appears as though PC would have found a natural place within the field of communication. Communication, in many ways, developed out of the experience of conflict. Much of its development, or at least interest in this area can be traced back to the practice and study of propaganda emission and decoding processes that transpired amidst conflict.[3] The historical origins of the relationship of

communication to conflict – specifically to *multi-state war* – or the involvement of multiple states in inter-state war- can be found in "modern times" during the period beginning in World WWI and ending in WWII. Theories of the direct effects of propaganda and persuasion and studies about their impact on individuals during circumstances of conflict developed during this time period. Concepts emerged concerning the direct effects of *messages* (e.g. Lasswell, 1927). Scholars began to analyze designed *campaign interventions*, which at the time were exemplified by official government diplomacy campaigns. Such scholarship (largely in the form of content analyses) in turn gave way to the institutionalization of *applied communication research*, or communication research concerned with applied problems.

Applied communication began to take shape in 1937 when the Rockefeller Foundation funded a radio project concerned with the study of the effects of messages on individual decision-making. This project in turn served as a seed for the intellectual growth of applied communication research when it later became institutionalized at Columbia University, moving there in the 1940s under Paul Lazarfeld's leadership. (Delia, 1987).[4]

PC programs are *communication campaigns*. Efforts to evaluate their effects and assess their interpretations (whether rooted in the power of communication as messages or as will be discussed later - media, factors of production, or other modes), are necessarily rooted in concerns about the impact of communication on applied problems. Therefore, the combination of these branches of communication research –

campaign intervention and applied communication research that emerged in response to the "World Wars," serve as a foundation for the development of PC. Concern about the effects of campaign messages are central to the first model, or methods, developed by practitioners to apply communication to build peace - the *Message Effects Model*. I categorize and describe this model in Chapter 2.

Conflict Studies. Interest in the study of conflict developed at the same time as the study of the relationship of communication to multi-state conflict, in particular after WWII. As Ted Robert Gurr explains, at the time, an interdisciplinary movement came about that sought to bring the theories and methods of social science research to bear on the problems of political conflict. These included, among others he mentions, in sociology, Galtung, in social psychology, Lewin, in economics, Boulding, and in formal studies including game theory, bargaining theories and decision-making, Anatol Rapoport (Gurr, 1980). These scholars came to provide the foundation for making sense of the root causes of conflict, and the mechanisms for postulating their resolve.

Contact Hypothesis Research. Together with these areas of social scientific inquiry to which Gurr points, two in particular emerged that became the most central to PC. The first, in the field of psychology was the contact hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that under the right conditions, contact can reduce prejudice and, in turn, improve negative inter-group attitudes. (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1988). According to Pettigrew and Tropp, Williams wrote the first meta-analysis on the subject (William's (1947, cited in Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), with enough publications on the subject

having accumulated just after the end of WWII. In1954, Gordon Allport made the contact hypothesis famous by publishing what has since become considered the most influential piece of scholarship on the subject. Allport's work, in turn, lead to a plethora of empirical studies about the effect of contact, including during situations of political conflict. The contact hypothesis forms the basis for two peace communication models – *contact effects* and *mediated contact effects*, which I will categorize and discuss in Chapter 2.

Social-Psychological Behavior Change Research. The other movement, which Gurr also notes, is that which was developing within social psychological circles, but more specifically, was dedicated to the study of behavioral change. Its development in the 1950s proved foundational for PC. At the time, according to Rosenstock and colleagues, social psychology was trying to develop an approach towards understanding behavior that was based on *stimulus response theory* and *cognitive theory.* The former is rooted in classical *conditioning theory* and *instrumental conditioning theory*, and is best exemplified by B.F. Skinner's work (1938). The latter is represented by Lewin's work, including his pioneering of *value expectancy theory* (Rosenstock et al, 1994). Lewin's theories, which he applied to the study of *group dynamics*, became central to the development of cognitive theory (Lewin, 1947, 1948). Hence, his work formed a central basis, not only for the study of behavioral change, and most certainly the branch emphasizing human cognition, but, also, for the study of intergroup relations. Lewin's contributions to behavioral change theories and the study of group dynamics together served as the foundation for the

study of behavioral change within and between groups, including ethnopolitical groups in conflict.[5]

In later years, Albert Bandura's work (Bandura, 1977a, cited in Rosenstock et al, 1994), which built upon the cognitive theoretical traditions Lewin helped pioneer, also became central to the development of cognitive theory. Bandura developed the concept of *Self-efficacy*. Self-efficacy refers to the idea that the perception one holds of one's ability to execute specified behaviors predicts how one will carry out the behavior. Self-efficacy has become the basis for another model of peace communication – *self-efficacy effects*. This model applies self-efficacy to communication by arguing that if people perceive themselves capable of communicating non-violently, they in turn are more like to communicate non-violently. I will discuss this model further in Chapter 2.

Parenthetically, cognitive theory, which forms the basis for behavior change analysis in PC, is quite distinctive from both classical conditioning theory and instrumental conditioning theory. However, it is often pejoratively and inaccurately labeled "behaviorist" by critical communication scholars. Most pointedly, cognitive theories, in contrast to conditioning theories, predicate behavior to be a function of rational thought, rather than a direct response. According to Rosenstock, "Cognitive theorists, along with behaviorists, believe that reinforcements, or consequences of behavior, are important, but for cognitive theorists, reinforcements operate by influencing expectations (or a hypothesis) regarding the situation rather than by influencing behavior directly (Bandura, 1977)" (Rosenstock et al, 1994, pp. 6).

Cognitive theories (which are rooted in the importance of reason, more so than behaviorist models of conditioning theory, which are rooted in response - whether automatic or conditional) (Rosenstock et al, 1994), came to assume a central role in social-psychological efforts to study conflict, and its resolution. In turn, cognitive theories became adopted by efforts that attempted to, in effect, disrupt and alter human behavior by inserting communication (known in the social psychological literature as "message cues") into the behavioral chain in an effort to stop the cycle of conflict and channel its resolution. In particular, cognitive theories have contributed the notion that if message cues are to in any way successfully alter behaviors, a single behavior *must* be isolated and targeted. In the absence of such isolation, change will not be feasible and therefore, attempting to actually evaluate any change would be impossible.

PC Becomes a Casualty of History

Despite the early foundations of PC, including the study of communication's relationship to multi-state conflict and early research about conflict (especially the development of the contact hypothesis and behavioral change theories modeled with specific attention paid to altering group and inter-group dynamics), the interest in conflict and its management leveled off, for a period of approximately 30 years. At this point, communication came to assume a largely American ethos. Since concern about the threat of war diminished in the US, communication, like the other social science disciplines maturing within this context, grew disinterested in the study of conflict. Behavioral change scholars meanwhile began to instead apply their analysis to questions of public health. According to Gavriel Salomon, contact hypothesis

scholars alone remained committed to the application of their social scientific methods to the study of conflict management (Salomon, 2004b).

The result of this history is a dearth of scholarship about PC. In addition, the little scholarship that *does* exist fails to pay adequate attention to the root causes of conflict. In turn, the existing scholarship does not explain how the causes of conflict relate to or factor into their resolve through the application of communication. The existing scholarship neglects theories concerned with how group level structural inequalities factor into the causes of conflict. Instead, given that this scholarship is about and inspired by scholars of the contact hypothesis, it emphasizes how individual level prejudices against groups factors into the resolution of conflict.

The Myopia of Conflict Studies: The Study of Protest Movements

According to Gurr, an interest in conflict (unrelated to communication) remained while so-called revolutionary wars for independence swept the Global South and protests, or riots, swept the Global North (e.g. as demonstrated by the works of Galtung, Russet, Rummel, Singer, Rappaport and North). However, once these conflicts leveled off in the 1970's, all that remained alongside scholars of the contact hypothesis's interest in studying racial, ethnic and religious prejudice, was an interest in studying people's participation in protest (Gurr, 1980). In other words, the bulk of research into conflict that was pioneered in Northern democracies about conflict became limited to those areas of conflict that, I would argue, remained of concern or problematic to Northern states, namely protest movements. The interest in protest movements, rather than other areas of conflict, remains quite noticeable today, within,

for example, American academia. Its emphasis has come at the risk of the neglect of the study of other forms of conflict, and or ways of making sense of conflict and its management.

Communication Loses Interest in Conflict

Meanwhile, the field of communication, modeled largely along American theoretic principles and interests, lost interest in conflict following WWII. Communication went further than the other social sciences. Instead of becoming only concerned with protest movements, communication came to simply ignore conflict altogether. According to Hallin, this is ironic given that “empirical media research originated to a significant extent in response to the mobilization of communication for war during the First World War.” (Hallin 1997, p. 206). In other words, the original interest in the study of communication, inspired by claims made about the communicative power of Hitler’s rhetoric and use of mass media, nevertheless - and ironically - disappeared. As a result, communication research that was not tied to the contact hypothesis, and especially that which was rooted in the study of media and message effects and audience reception of messages, did not apply their efforts to the study of conflict. Thus, historically in the 1990’s, we see a return to the same powerful media effects assumptions made about Hitler years earlier. Radio Rwanda was now similarly assumed to be play a powerful role in genocide, despite the absence of scientific evidence attesting to such claims.

The Myopia of Communication-Based Behavior Change Research: The Study of Health Communication. Scholars at the nexus of communication and social-

psychology behavior change research began to adopt the foundations of cognitive theory, specifically that found in Bandura's work. However, they did so only in application to questions about public health, dropping any interest in its application to Lewinian concerns about positive group dynamics. Therefore, both communication and social psychology behavior change scholars ironically came to ignore conflict. In the end, the very theories developed by social psychologists to study conflict merged instead to form the basis for the subfield of health communication. Had social psychologists and communication scholars continued along their original trajectory, peace communication may have instead been born in place of health communication.

Health communication ostensibly developed in place of peace communication for two reasons. This occurred first, as I have argued above, because behavioral change research moved away from its focus on conflict to health. Bandura's concept of self-efficacy thus became a central force moving health communication forward. As Rosenstock et al explain, the Health Belief Model (HBM) developed out of cognitive theory and to a lesser extent, stimulus response theory during the 1950s. In 1988, HBM incorporated self-efficacy (Rosenstock, Strecher, & Becker, 1988, cited in Rosenstock, Strecher & Becker, 1994). In turn, HBM provided the foundations for the development of health communication, affording scholars with a theoretical map to explain individuals' health related behavioral decisions. In particular, Bandura's concept of self-efficacy, or "'the conviction that one can successfully execute the behavior required to produce the outcomes' (Bandura, 1977a, cited in Rosenstock,

Strecher & Becker, 1994, p. 79)," made central the importance of challenges faced by individuals trying to carry out specified health related behaviors.

Second, communication came to assume a central role in the effort to alter, and therefore, evaluate the efficacy of health behaviors. During the late 1970's, the study of what role *cues to action*, or campaign intervention messages might play in influencing health behaviors came to be seen as a central factor in the health behavioral change process. As Rosenstock and colleagues explain, 'the concept of incorporating threatening messages to arouse behavioral affect (fear) became of interest (Leventhal, 1970, cited in Rosenstock, Strecher & Becker, 1994).' In 1975, Everett Rogers, in turn, argued in his *protection motivation theory* (Rogers 1975, cited in Rosenstock, Strecher & Becker, 1994) that communication could be useful for arousing fear and enhancing perceptions central to HBM. By 1983, Rogers also incorporated self-efficacy into his own theory. According to Rosenstock and colleagues, by this time, "The view of the joint role of fear and reassurance in persuasive communications… [became]… generally accepted" (Rosenstock, Strecher & Becker, 1994, P.10).

In other words, by the early eighties, the relationship between communication (particularly campaign studies) and behavioral change research (particularly its study of the use of self-efficacy to elicit change) was solidified. Thus, scholars adopted the notion that self efficacious dependent behaviors could be improved by using messages to, for example, model these behaviors. Ironically though, the merger between behavioral change research and communication occurred around concerns of health,

not conflict, despite the fact that both owe their origins to the experience of conflict. In short, health communication, not peace communication, matured into a subfield.

Communication Regains an Interest in Conflict: Journalism Studies. According to Hallin, beginning in the late 1970's, communication scholars regained interest in conflict in response to the Vietnam War (Hallin, 1997). However, their new PC relevant interest was limited to the study of media coverage of conflicts. They described how conflicts were covered and explained their corollary relationship to public opinion. Thus, people's interpretation and response to these, and in particular, to targeted communication campaigns to foment or ameliorate conflict continued to not be researched.[6] As a result, research into the efficacy of PC continued to be ignored and policy statements claiming effects remained unsubstantiated.

As is directly relevant to interest among journalism studies scholars in conflict, and more central to PC, these scholars interest in coverage of conflict became central to establishing peace journalism (Botes, 1998; Galtung, 1998; Manhoff, 1998; Shinar, 2004; Tehranian, 2002, etc.). Scholarship about PJ, very much like PC, began to take shape near the turn of this century. However, the new tradition of research about PJ, much like the practice of campaign interventions, has been directly concerned with promoting peace contents or "peace talk" in the news media, and advocating the exploration of the causes of conflict and resolving it, rather than focusing on violence. PJ is a scholarly tradition that specifically advocates the construction of PC campaigns in a manner that forms a subset of the message effects model, as I will elaborate upon in Chapter 2.

This interest in promoting peace, rather than conflict journalism evolved, however, into a study of news contents and their production. It did not evolve into an interest in exploring their interpretation or impact. That is, research into PJ seeks to explain why conflict versus peace contents are reported, and to describe how and why news stories about conflict are constructed. In this vein, PJ does not deal with questions surrounding the efficacy of peace communication. At the same time though, PJ serves as a contribution to and part of peace communication because of its advocacy orientation. PJ's interest in recommending methods to alter message output during and about conflict contributes to the practice of peace communication (as I will discuss further in Chapter 2). Research into PJ remains more prolific than that about the efficacy of PC. Unfortunately, however, it does not contribute to our understanding of communication's actual power or ability to play a role in managing political conflict given its focus on output, not the interpretation or impact of messages. It, like the wider group of communication scholars of which they are a part – i.e. journalism studies, comprised of scholars who study news coverage of conflict - instead emphasize the construction of said contents.

In short, the tools that served as the foundations for evaluating the efficacy of PC became a casualty of history, and perhaps, specifically of peace. Scholars ceased to apply these tools to the problem of conflict due to changes in the magnitude and nature of conflict, especially in the North, and the waning interest in its study becoming limited to protest movements, and specifically, within the field of communication, because of its American-centric development and growth. Communication, in turn,

merged with behavior change research traditions to instead study the problem of health. Meanwhile, the only exception to this waning PC research trend, the contact hypothesis, was not strong enough to create and sustain a subfield of PC. Further, it was only limited to the study of face-to-face interactions and, therefore, remained the exclusive domain of interpersonal communication research. Consequently, it therefore became adopted by education rather than communication scholars to focus on non-political forms of conflict management. In spite of this history, the practice of PC around the world nevertheless continued and even proliferated, and it did so without any connection to the lack of academic inquiry about its efficacy.

Four Scholarly Schools of Thought Concerning PC Practice

The proliferation of the practice of PC, which continued in spite of waning interest in its study, resulted in the creation of four intellectual schools of thought. These schools naturally developed around the contact hypothesis, given that it alone remained the arena for scholarly inquiry. The result of the contact hypothesis remaining the only arena of scholarly inquiry, however, was that even fewer scholars choose to study PC. The hypothesis, and especially how it was applied, was frowned upon by scholars more knowledgeable about the nature and determinants of political, especially ethnopolitical conflicts. As a result, the few scholars who retained an interest in conflict (and not just protest movements) did not see any potential for communication to play a role in managing it, and therefore, a reason to study it. This

point, as I will expand on below, proved critical to the formation of the resultant schools of thought surrounding PC.

These schools can be grouped into four categories. These include what I will refer to as the (1) peacemakers, (2) structural inequality, (3) ethics, and (4) context and design schools. In this dissertation, I adopt the approach of the fourth school. I conclude that PC efforts should be attempted, but must however be evaluated and, in turn, lessons learned from their evaluations, be applied if these efforts are to prove meritorious of being sustained and continued.

Peacemakers School

The first school, or what I will call the *peacemakers school*, is comprised of the exceptions. These are scholars who believe in the positive effect, or at least value the potential of PC when interventions are modeled properly. They believe PC interventions should be assessed and evaluated, and have maintained a scholarly tradition to that end, which has served to suggest PC may have a role to play in managing political forms of conflict. Their scholarship, which was limited to interventions modeled along the basis of the contact hypothesis, steadily improved our understanding of when contact was effective at reducing prejudice, improving intergroup attitudes, and helping to foster inter-group friendships. This branch of scholarship, therefore, demonstrated how contact might be effectively used, or as is equally important, when it should not be used. (see Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006 for a meta-analysis of all the relevant studies of the contact hypothesis).

Scholars who fit into this school sought to explore the impact of PC interventions that were channeled through interpersonal forms of communication, which transpired when individuals came into contact with one another. (Pettigrew 1998, Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Their line of inquiry, as was the case with the practice they studied, did not, however, always seek to use contact as a means to ameliorate political conflict. Rather, they focused on other forms of conflict. (See Jackman and Crane's related criticisms, 1986). Nevertheless, by analogy, they provide a base against which to draw design suggestions when assessing the role of PC in managing cases of political conflict.

It is worth nothing that among those who can be grouped together as peacemakers, not all argued that contact was effective (or always effective). Some of these scholars critically pointed out that it is difficult for contact to be effective if it is not applied properly, for example, if it occurs in situations where equality does not exist between the groups in question (see as examples Hewstone and Brown, 1986, and Hamburger 1994).

Finally, in recent years, this tradition has been extended by communication scholars in an effort to emphasize questions about interpersonal communication that ensues during contact. Like their predecessors, mainly social psychologists, these scholars evaluated contact, for example, dialogue groups, in order to assess whether contact influenced outcomes. They, in addition, assessed the role facilitated by discourse patterns and cultural based communication codes in trying to determine

positive outcomes through in person (Maoz and Ellis, 2001, Maoz and Ellis, 2003) and on-line based contact (Ellis and Maoz, 2007).

Structural Inequality School

The second tradition developed out of scholarship critical of the first, and thus historically succeeds it. Scholars fitting this school argued that individual attitudes have nothing to do with political conflict. Rather, the sources of such forms of conflict are differential group structural advantage. Thus, I refer to those fitting this school as part of the *structural inequality school*. These scholars, as a result, argued that PC interventions, which they contended focused solely on altering individual level prejudices, could not possibly be effective (see Jackman and Crane, 1986; and Olneck, 1990 for an analogous criticism about multicultural education programs). As a result, these scholars concluded that any efforts to manage political conflict should rather try to alter structural inequalities (See Wimmer, 2002 with respect to trying to end xenophobia). Therefore, these scholars opted away from using the tools of their disciplines to evaluate the effectiveness of PC interventions, since simply put, they already knew the answer to the question of whether PC was effective. According to them, it was not.

The Ethics School

The third school was comprised of those concerned about ethical questions. They began to write just shortly after those from the second school. Scholars party to this school held the same assumptions as those who can be described as focused on questions of structural inequality. They too believed that group level structural

inequalities were the cause of political conflict, and formed its mode of organization. Since these interventions did not address structures, they could not manage conflict. These scholars, however, went one step further, arguing that in fact these interventions further *entrenched* conflict. They argued that PC interventions were unethical because they supported the status quo, a condition of inequality. These interventions did so by maintaining the dominance of the existing majority group at the expense of the minority group/s.

According to these scholars, by addressing only prejudice and the question of whether groups engaged in political conflict could be encouraged to become friends in the absence of efforts to address underlying structural cleavages, PC interventions in fact entrenched existing unequal group relations and made more lopsided the gap between the powerful and weak. In short, PC interventions further entrenched structural violence, producing a peace based on cease-fire, not a commitment to equality and justice (Troyna, 1993). Therefore, like the second tradition, they refrained from evaluating PC. They concluded that PC was immoral and unethical and by studying it, they felt as though they were endorsing it. As a result, they avoided it entirely. In effect, they protested PC, out of concern for its adverse impact. In so doing, however, they assumed that PC projects only targeted intergroup individual level attitudes.

The Context and Design School

My own intellectual assumptions, out of which I have designed my assessment of the *Sesame Street* television programs and impetus for generating recommendations

about the proposed creation and nature of a sub discipline of PC, emerge from the fourth school. This school (the most recent historically) having emerged alongside the interest in evaluation that began around the turn of this century, is concerned with the context in which an intervention operates, and how that intervention is designed. Scholars party to this school argue that while conflict is not the result of individual level inter-group attitudes, or certainly not these alone, the diagnosis, or rather, misdiagnosis of the root sources of conflict by some PC interventions does not mean PC is ineffective. In other words, the problem does not lie in the nature of PC programs, or more generally, the choice of using communication to manage conflict. Rather, the problem lies with the design and performance of these programs. Specifically, as these scholars have argued, these programs do not heed context. They ignore the contexts of structural inequality that define political, especially ethnopolitical conflicts. Thus for example, programs modeled on the contact hypothesis only addressed prejudice rather than, or in addition to, structural inequality. In such cases, the problem is not that PC is not or cannot address structural inequality. Rather, the problem is that historically practitioners using this model have simply not used contact to address structural inequality. Connolly and Maginn have best argued this point, in their case, with respect to the use of the contact hypothesis (Connolly with Maginn, 1999).

Parenthetically, this fourth school has been most prolific with respect to evaluating school violence interventions. Though not about political conflict, this line of research has at least provided *some* insight into studies concerning the prevention of

violence. In one analogous example, Huesman and colleagues, in their study of school violence interventions programs argued that context *must* be heeded if such programs are to be effective. They advocated an *ecological*, or context-based approach to school violence intervention programs. According to them, not just the students but also the parents of students being targeted in schools had to be targeted because they make up the wider community within which students reside.

According to Huesman and colleagues, "The contextual emphasis represents a shift from an individual model focused primarily on cognitive factors to an ecologic model that emphasizes the dynamic interaction of individual and environmental risk markers." (Huesman et al, 1996, p. 121). If aggressive and violent behavior is to be eliminated, they concluded, it will only be by targeting the systemic context level. Therefore, by association, evaluations of school violence intervention programs must in turn assess the influence of these other inputs on youth's behaviors in concert with assessments of messages targeted at them the intervention (Huesman et al, 1996).

The Lack of a PC Scholarly Tradition

The resultant combination of these four scholarly schools was that until the turn of this century, peace communication scholarship remained what it is: a disparate scholarly tradition in which the first group of scholars proceeded full-steam ahead, and the second and third essentially ignored or even boycotted efforts to analyze their impact. Thus, it is only with the advent of the fourth schools that we see a return to an interest in trying to understand and if possible, improve the practice of PC.

PC Practice

In comparison with PC scholars, the attitudes of PC practitioners relate to only one school of thought – the peacemakers school. This is because they, like scholars associated with this school, believe in the positive effect of PC interventions or at least their potential to achieve positive effect. It is precisely for this reason that PC practitioners continued to move full-steam ahead and, at best, ran programs in association with the peacemakers' tradition of scholars, though more typically, without any association.

Typically, practitioners remained unaware of any criticism surrounding their efforts. Therefore, they typically ran PC projects uncritically, either unaware of or ignoring the lack of evidence surrounding their impact, or even worse, ignoring the potential that they might do more harm than good through their efforts. Many of them believed, and still do, that any efforts one makes towards peace must simply produce just that - peace. The result of this disconnect between practice and scholarship, particularly the combination of critical assessment and evaluation scholarship is that PC projects, for the most part, remained unevaluated, on the one hand (Warshel, 1999, and for related overlapping projects in Peace Education see Salomon and Nevo, 2002), and ignored by those who did not believe in their worth, on the other.

In particular, most PC practitioners have not taken context into account. They have failed to do so because most are not trained in conflict studies. Rather, they have tended to be activists, who while committed to peace, have not been trained to analytically and critically make sense of the sources and nature of political conflicts.

Thus, they do not know what routes to attempt in efforts to achieve peace, or even what kind of a peace to try to achieve. They for example do not have a basic understanding of the differences between peacebuilding and peacemaking, *security* and *justice*, or *positive* and *negative peace* (See Chapters 2 and 5 for a discussion of these concepts and Galtung, 1969 for the definition of positive and negative peace).

Why and How PC Interventions Should be Assessed and Evaluated

As a result of the history I have described, consequently, we do not know how and in what ways PC is effective. Furthermore and worse, claims that we do, and that in fact PC is effective, have led to a situation in which conflict management funds are used for potentially useless, and even worse, harmful policies. For this reason I argue that it is essential that PC projects be assessed and evaluated.

Assessing and evaluating PC interventions requires that we study people. Specifically, it means scholars should study how people interpret messages targeted at them, make use of technologies, their communication patterns and interactions, and how they, in turn, act on these messages and technologies. In other words, I am not just proposing that scholars study actual PC interventions but that they study how those people who are targeted by them make sense of and apply them. This means continuing scholarly inquiry into contact and discourse analysis patterns (where interpersonal communication is used in the intervention), and beginning to conduct audience reception and media effects research (where mass mediated information is used in the intervention) and studying technology acquisition (where media technology is used).

Audience studies, in particular, can help map-out audience interpretation of PC interventions and explain the meanings people draw from them, and most importantly, *why* they draw the meanings that they do. Media effects research can help determine, at least the changes in people's attitudes, beliefs, self-efficacy and behavioral

intentions, and at most, might extend to include observations to evaluate the link between changes in these former variables, to changes in people's behaviors.

The Returning Interest in Conflict Related Behaviors and Communication Campaigns: The Re-Genesis of PC Scholarship

Only since the turn of this century have scholars begun assessing and evaluating the impact of PC efforts other than those modeled along the contact hypothesis and, as is related, interventions using means other than interpersonal communication. (See as examples Abdalla, Shepler and Hussein, 2002; Breed, 2006; Cole et al, 2003; Schochat, 2003; Paluck, 2007; Warshel, 2007). At this time, we begin to see the development of the aforementioned fourth school of PC scholarly inquiry. In addition, summaries of these studies begin to appear in the online listservs of the Rockefeller Foundation's funded Communication Initiative Network (www.comminit.com). The Foundation's inclusion of these studies – studies of applied communication in the context of political conflict – serve to provide the longest historical link with PC's origin. The Rockefeller Foundation, as will be recalled, originally funded the first studies of applied communication in the 1930s. Nearly 70 years later, alongside the returning interest in conflict, they extended this commitment. As a result of their efforts, a database for scholars interested in the role of applied communication in political conflict exists. Scholars simply now need to fill this database.

This dissertation meanwhile, is an attempt to pick up where history left off in the 1950s. It is an attempt, therefore, to ensure the proper place of peace communication, or the study of the efficacy of efforts to use communication to mediate between peoples engaged in political conflict, alongside health communication, political communication, development communication, and cognitive development communication.

The Purpose of this Study

In the following I will assess a case of a PC intervention. I do so in order to help lay the foundations for this proposed sub discipline, first by simply generating relevant literature on the subject. Such literature, or rather the evidence it provides, will help us to learn more about what, if any, impact PC programs are having. If PC is unable to achieve any of the goals found, or at least argued to be potentially useful in the management of conflict, I recommend that donations and practitioner efforts be applied to alternative methods that are already established as effective for the management of conflict. Simply expending resources on ineffective measures or worse, those that create the opposite of what PC seeks, is simply put, bad policy. As one important example, to date, at least twenty to twenty five billion dollars have been spent on Israeli-Palestinian people-to-people projects (Baskin and Al-Qaq, 2004), the majority of which are peace communication programs. Spending these amounts without evidence attesting to their utility seems odd, but doing so in the presence of evidence pointing to their ineffectiveness is absurd. I have therefore first and foremost

conducted an assessment of a PC intervention in an effort to encourage other assessments and evaluations of PC interventions.

Second, I will assess a PC intervention in an effort to investigate whether and how these programs can be altered to be made more effective if they are not currently so. Specifically, I will address questions about whether PC interventions are capable of changing intergroup attitudes, inducing group members to favor making peace, changing structural relations, providing optimism about the future, and/or gratifying by providing comfort and reconciliation, and teaching empathy.

Third, I have conducted my assessment because I wish to advocate a conceptual map or model for how to assess and evaluate the efficacy of PC interventions. Fourth, I have done so in an effort to be able to advocate appropriate methodologies for conducting PC research. Foremost among these, I emphasize a methodological concern for context. I focus on the interstate system as the proper unit from which to begin a macro analysis, given my assumption concerning the power of the interstate system in both creating a context for political conflict and in influencing ethnopolitical patterns of conflict. Organized peoples strive to obtain states as their highest goals, rather than other political units – e.g. empires.

Fifth and finally, I conducted an audience reception analysis because such assessments are especially lacking. An audience reception study has never been conducted about a PC intervention into a nationalist case of ethnopolitical conflict. Therefore, in short, I seek to fill this gap in the literature and provide an introductory model for analyzing the efficacy of PC.

Recommended Frameworks for PC Scholarship

The Primacy of Contexts

In their study of a PC intervention modeled along the contact hypothesis, Connolly and Maginn advocated that attention be paid to the given context in which an intervention took place. They argued that attention should be paid to what happens in the micro- and macro-contexts in which people live. In the case of their study, they therefore critically described the intervening role played by the disco party for Catholic and Protestant Northern Irish youth – where the two groups were placed in contact, and the communities to which these youth returned home to once the disco party contact intervention came to an end. As Connolly and Maginn aptly demonstrated, the reality of that macro context interacted with and altered the micro intervention contact experience in which the youth partook. The contact between the two sets of youth did not work to reduce prejudices. Rather, it simply infused the already awkward and competitive dynamics present in the context of teenage disco-parties with the realities of the youth's outside world. That world is one in which the two respective groups targeted by the intervention are negatively prejudiced against one another, and are in conflict. As a result, the intervention simply provided a forum for the expression of these tensions, with the youth framing the disco dynamics as being a contest between Protestants and Catholics.

Connolly and Maginn concluded by recommending that scholars include macro contexts into their analysis of contact and methodologically opt for one type of

qualitative observation or another, in place of experimental studies. When doing so they designated the state to be the unit of analysis for the context we should heed. In their recommendation they do not specify whether that context is the United Kingdom, or more likely, only Northern Ireland. They only discuss the context of life in Northern Ireland but do not explicitly state that it, or "the state" more specifically, is the context in which they recommend an analysis be rooted.

The Context of the Interstate System. With respect to conducting assessments and evaluations of PC interventions into political conflict, I therefore, wish to stretch the boundaries of their very useful point further. I wish to critically situate the concept of *context.* By context we should not only look at the state. Rather, we should like at the entire context of our world system. Today that system is an *interstate system*.[7] Therefore, I denote the interstate system as the applicable unit of analysis for making sense of the efficacy of PC interventions.

I recommend that scholarship about PC heed the context of the structure of the interstate system, including the inequality that it institutionally has demarcated around and through peoples. The interstate system, or more specifically the political, economic, ideological (or, in other words, cultural or social) and military powers that have constructed it, help constitute humans into groups, configured into bounded ethnopolitical and civic categories. Thus, when a peace communication intervention tries to foster change, it must contend with how individuals interact with these forces, including how they *respond* to them, with or against other individuals; and secondly, how they *act* upon them as part of a group. Therefore, when designing and evaluating

peace communication interventions, I argue that it is vital to understand not just the human behavior these interventions attempt to alter, but the very context with which human beings interact today and in the future. By setting up the interstate system as our first unit for analysis, we gain insight into what intervening role political, economic, ideological and military forces play in the social-psychological interpretation and interactions human beings will have in PC interventions.

According to Michael Mann, these sources of power: political, economic, ideological and military, 'integrate and disintegrate modern relations' (Mann, Web article). Thus, it is these sources of power, part and parcel of people's everyday modern existence, that I suggest scholars of PC consciously include in their attempt to make sense of PC's potential for altering the everyday existence of people's lives amidst violence.[8]

People targeted by a PC intervention view their everyday lives, defined by these sources of power, as "normal". It is "normal", I argue, despite the violence that daily permeates their lives. By trying to make and build a negative and further, positive peace, the study of the efficacy of an intervention should, therefore, strive to assess and evaluate whether an intervention has managed to achieve some facet of change that leads to an alternative structure or configuration of the existing structures in which these sources of power are communicated. In other words, PC scholarship needs to determine whether PC interventions have managed to prevent facets of military aggression, and, at the same time, achieved some form of an equal balance between economic, political, and ideological resources, and partners to conflict

perception of all these sources of power. For example, scholars seeking to determine whether a PC intervention has been successful might ask whether and what kind of impact it has had on helping in some small way to achieve a cease-fire, alter legal and political rights, influencing equitable access to economic goods, instilling a system of universal suffrage, official recognition of ethnopolitical minority groups' languages, and all group's party to the given conflict's perception that such changes are just.

The Context of the State. As part of their critical inclusion of the inter-state system when evaluating and assessing the success of a PC intervention, scholars must naturally include and make sense of the state's role and function in the given conflict. I define the state using the combination of Max Weber and Hendryk Spruyt's definitions. Thus, I assume it to be "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber, 1946). In addition, as Spruyt reminds us, it is not an innate part of the world system. States have not always existed, but simply beat out their competitor units - city-states, city-leagues, empires and so forth. A state, as he elaborates, is a sovereign and hierarchical institution. It exercises consolidated rule. It, as compared and contrasted to previous world system political units, is centralized in authority and territorial. It is tied to a specific demarcated bounded space and is territorially exclusive, with its rule ending at it borders (Spruyt, 1994). In addition, states are mutually re-enforcing and therefore serve to entrench the current world order, or interstate system (Spruyt, 1994; Giddens, 1985).

Finally, to the above definition I wish to add and clarify what the existence of

states also means for the worlds peoples and related conflicts between them. Debates about states and the conflicts ensuing over them have resulted in the popular and scholarly assumption that states are 1) the *right* of nations. Meaning, people simply presume it normal that human beings should be ordered by states, despite the fact that they have not always been; 2) land should be owned by people, and 3) people should lead sedentary lives. They should live in only one place, thereby enabling space to be clearly demarcated and bound. Together, these three presumptions, which are part and parcel of the existence of states and conflicts over them, further define the framework for and nature of the interstate system, and what this current matrix of the world system means for conflict, and in turn, efforts to use communication to manage conflict.

The Context of Ethnopolitical Conflict. In order to assess and evaluate the efficacy of PC within a modern context, or today's world order, scholars must, in addition, make sense of the nature of conflicts operating within a world demarcated by states. To that end, it is important to understand that conflict was on the rise between the 1950s through the 1980s. However, since 1991, or the end of the cold war, the "number and magnitude of armed conflicts with and among states have lessened… by nearly half" (Gurr, 2001, highlights page). Thus for example, the number of armed separatist conflicts being waged in 1991 was forty-nine, and by 2004, had decreased to twenty-five.[9]

According to Gurr, specific attention paid to managing conflict (which is best represented by the creation of the UN) played a role in reducing conflict. Interstate

wars, he explained, were, for example, "uncommon after the UN collective security system was established following WWI. In the 1990s, there were very few interstate wars and their magnitude and durations were mostly limited" (Gurr, 2003, p. 13). Therefore, if we assume Gurr's analysis to be correct, namely that efforts to manage conflict have indeed helped reduce the number and magnitude of conflicts, and these do not simply correlate with the reduction in conflict, than conflict management we might conclude, may be effective. Therefore, PC, as one tool with which to manage conflict, may indeed have a role to play in reducing conflicts within today's world system, and therefore, should be a subject for scholarly analysis.

Second (and most central to our concerns), in order to observe whether PC is effective, we should focus our analyses on ethnopolitical forms of conflict. Ethnopolitical conflicts have replaced inter-state wars as the most common kind of conflict (Gurr, 2001), and have been four times more likely to break out into war than interstate conflicts (Toft, 2003, p. 3). Therefore, studies of PC as a sub discipline should emphasize an understanding of specifically ethnopolitical over other forms of conflict.

Methodological Considerations for The Design of PC Studies

The utility of PC should be assessed and evaluated by drawing upon both communication and conflict research. This combination enables us to make critical sense of the power of communication within given contexts. Contrary to current studies that neglect an analysis of the root causes of conflict and/or assume

communication to be powerful, I advocate measures that emphasize one particular aspect: an assessment of how a given context, in this case, conflict, intervenes and redirects and even obfuscates the direction and influence of communication patterns. The design of PC studies should also rest on an understanding of the processes (or flows) and influence of targeted communication efforts. Earlier studies only analyzed the contents of interventions without paying attention to how said contents flowed and became interrupted by conflict. To this end, I focus my attention on trying to provide PC scholars with a map for how to analyze communication flows *within* given contexts (such as political conflicts operating within the larger context of the inter-state system). That map has heretofore been overlooked.

Conflict Studies: Post-Modern Approaches

The research into conflict studies that I advocate as useful for peace communication researchers to adopt are drawn largely from sociology and political science, including the claim that an analysis of military, political, economic and ideological forces organize society (Mann, Web article). In turn, I argue, these factor into the causes, and, therefore, solutions to conflict. Furthermore, I argue that constructivist approaches (e.g. Anderson, 1983; Cederman, 1997; Gurr, 2000), especially state-centric models (e.g. Brubaker, 1996) best describe the organization of ethnopolitical conflict. They provide for a dynamic analysis of organized human behavior, incorporating the role of event and practice based identity formations and dialogical responses to them. So too, do they stipulate the importance of the role

consciousness, invention and imagination about the "who" or "what" organized and bounded humans are or will become.

To a lesser extent, I borrow from psychological and psychobiological studies of cultural and group boundaries (Brubaker, 1996; Medin and Atran, 2004); Romney and Moore, 2001; Cole, 1996). I do so in an effort to make better sense out of political conflict. Political conflict is a dynamic process that involves bounded or seemingly bounded human beings. By borrowing from this literature, we can make better sense out of the relations between groups in political conflict. The notion of *groups* presupposes that humans are bounded to *some* degree. And only by understanding these boundaries – their creation and perception – can we then begin to theorize about what role, if any, the tools of conflict management (in this case - communication) may in turn provide to effect these.

Additionally, I argue that the root causes of a given conflict are best understood through a combination of an historical understanding of the specifics of the given conflict and its comparison with other conflicts. I combine these two theoretical models for studying conflict in order to 1) be able to understand the narrative approaches and concerns of all so-called groups party to a conflict, as these factor into the organization of the given conflict, and 2) to make clear sense of how a given conflict indicator (for example, state government type), and specific events, factor into the causes of said conflict.

Ethics-Based Approaches. Finally, I include ethics based approaches to conflict and development aid studies (Uvin, 1998) as essential for conducting PC

scholarship. These approaches warn of the potential for interventions to aid violence. According to Peter Uvin, if the context in which an aid intervention operates is not taken into consideration and properly understood, that intervention may indirectly aid violence. If that context is one of structural inequality, simply inserting aid can supply the resources necessary for continuing structural violence and transform it into physical violence. Therefore, I recommend that analysis's of PC make use of theoretical approaches that attempt to both critically and ethically assess given contexts, lest conclusions about the so-called "success" of PC interventions fail to define success according to the definitions of all parties to a given conflict.

Communication Research

As part of the effort to assess efficacy, I borrow from the peacemaker's tradition of psychological and later, communication studies of interpersonal communication achieved through contact. To this end, I borrow from the contact literature I previously described that emphasizes communicative discourse patterns (Maoz and Ellis, 2001, 2007). Additionally, and as is crucial for the creation of PC, I extend these traditions, to study mass communication interventions. Therefore, I borrow from other communication subfields dedicated to the study of the effect of mass communication, namely those engaged with the applied study of communication campaign interventions – directed or targeted mass media interventions. To that effect, I turn to the combination of health (e.g. Goldberg, Fishbein and Middlestadt, 1997; Hornik, 2002; Singhal and Rogers, 2003), development (e.g. Hornik, 1988, Mansell and When, 1998; Servaes, 1999; Sim, 1954) political (Johnston, Hagen and Jamieson,

2004**;** Katz with Warshel, 2001) and cognitive development (e.g. Fisch and Truglio, 2001; Williams, 1986) communication studies.

Health and Political Communication Research. Research into the area of health, and political communication, in particular are useful for assessing changes in behavioral related variables and behaviors. These are rooted in the early legacy of PC that health communication absorbed at its own foundational stages. Given that history, it is therefore only fitting that peace communication now borrow from what health communication, and later, political communication, procured. In particular, what proves relevant are cognitive-based studies modeled along Fishbein's theory of reasoned action to map attitudinal and belief changes, as coupled with Ajzen's caveat about the theory. (Ajzen, 1985). Ajzen added an additional variable in order to account for limitations on one's ability to execute those behaviors that are not wholly within an individual's power to execute. This caveat is especially relevant for conflict contexts. In addition, Bandura's concept of self-efficacy is useful for evaluating changing levels of self-efficacy, as those in turn influence behaviors. Finally, behaviorist theories that argue that different types of behavior must be isolated are relevant for PC scholarship, i.e. if we are to be able to in any way test or analyze how an intervention is interpreted and what kind of impact it has on its target audience, we need to isolate different types of behavior in our analysis. To that end, it is essential that scholars focus on specific behavior rather than behavioral categories or goals (Fishbein & Cappella, 2006).

In order to be able to answer whether "an intervention worked", we have to not only specify what aspect of or in what way an intervention tried to manage

conflict, but what specific behavior it sought to alter. For example, the categorical goal of the intervention might be peacemaking. The achievement of peace-making - an abstract goal – cannot, however, be evaluated. Rather, specific behaviors would have to be delineated and disaggregated for analysis. We would need to ask whether, for example, changes in political belief fostered support for a proposed peace accord. In turn, we might answer this question by evaluating whether people who voted on a referendum supporting the accord during a specified time frame and in a specified location actually did so as a result of the PC intervention.

School Violence Intervention Communication Research. The relationship between health and peace communication has become most apparent where the study of school violence interventions is concerned. More than other theories, both the practice and research of these interventions have been modeled along the work of Bandura. School violence interventions studies have proven useful for providing benchmarks of 6 months for post intervention studies. These post studies attempt to verify real behavioral changes via both surveys and observation (per the usual constraints of research). They try to draw these conclusions via observation rather than through the measurements used in most areas of health and political communication, with the underlying assumption that the theoretical model employed in ones analysis is an accurate causal predictor for future behavior.

Evaluations of school violence intervention programs have achieved some success in improving youth's self-efficacy skills for engaging in non-violent conflict communication styles. This improvement has in turn served to reduce their intended

aggression and violent behaviors, for example, in schoolyards (Dahlberg et al, 1998). These findings, as will be discussed in later chapters, hold analogous importance for making sense of PC's efficacy.

Cognitive Development and Communication Research. Cognitive Development studies similarly offer PC useful design suggestions for evaluating intervention efforts - through pre and post studies. The contributions of this area of research are particularly useful for PC research about children. They instruct us in the importance of incorporating controls to make sense of exogenous change, which can be the result of developmental, rather than, for example, conflict or cultural based variables.

Development Communication Research.

Similarly, development communication offers the useful design suggestion of pre- and post-intervention studies. DC research additionally contributes an understanding of the importance of structural factors to these, including existing knowledge gaps in resource and skill allocation that are important to take into account when designing, assessing and evaluating PC. The existence of these gaps, on the one hand, necessitate that interventions emphasize the universal diffusion of resources, knowledge and skill building. In the absence of goals of universal access these scholars conclude that such interventions may instead widen existing disparities.

The attention this branch of communication research pays to previously existing knowledge gaps holds particular relevance to PC efforts channeled via technology. Scholars of DC interventions ask, "what a given intervention is actually

trying to achieve?" In their analysis they point to the importance of making transparent the aims of an intervention, including whether it seeks to spur development among only some or all sectors of a society. Questions that I in turn argue should be incorporated into a PC analysis include, "is a given intervention desired by all parties or imposed from above? "And how will the intervention be interpreted by the varying populations targeted by it?" (See Melone, Terzis and Beleli, 2002; and Howard, Rolt, Van de Veen and Verhoeven, 2003 for a discussion of related questions).

British Cultural Studies Communication Research. In addition, British Cultural Studies approaches afford utility for analyzing mass communication channeled PC interventions. British Cultural Studies approaches to communication have argued that micro contexts (typically TV viewing context) and macro contexts (audience background) must be assessed. Like their predecessors in the media effects tradition, they have argued on behalf of the importance of context, but rather than just describing it, they have emphasized it as the point of study. Therefore, PC scholarship can benefit by incorporating an analysis of contexts into study designs, alongside intervention contents.

Interpersonal Communication Research. Research heeding context when interventions are channeled via face-to-face channels (Connolly and Maginn) are, as previously mentioned, an imperative contribution for making sense of the actual impact of an intervention in real-world conflict-contexts. Finally, discourse analysis methods that actually analyze communication flows and patterns prove useful in that they go beyond just assessing contact, demographic factors, activities and motivations.

In particular, discourse analysis research that is relevant for PC is that which has demonstrated how stereotyped cultural patterns used by individuals in dialogue can limit and even generate responses that prevent opportunities for peaceful outcomes. (Maoz and Ellis).

Methodological Recommendations for the Design of PC Assessment and Evaluation Research

In summary, when conducting research into the efficacy of PC interventions, I argue that such studies should be designed in a manner that incorporate the theoretical principles and lessons learned from the areas I outlined above. These include social-psychological approaches made use of in the study of the contact hypothesis, political, health and cognitive development communication, together with development communication, critical communication studies, British cultural studies and discourse analysis methods. Together, these can help us to make sense of the interpretation and behavioral response of peoples to an intervention situated in the context of political conflict.

Chapter 2: A Classification of the Interventions of Peace Communication Into Political Conflict, and Their Theoretical-Practical Map

When attempting to assess and evaluate the efficacy of peace communication and to promote relevant study designs, we must first look at what aspects of peace communication actually exist: namely the practice. Since their modern origins in the 1940's, peace communication programs world-wide have been designed on the basis of seven models, or some combination thereof (See Warshel, 2005, 2006a, 2006b where I developed most of these models). Practitioners designing communication campaign interventions into political conflict have sometimes knowingly employed these models, though most commonly they have done this unknowingly.

These models include what I term (1) "*Message Effects*", which are predicated upon large and direct media effects theories that link back to the work of Lasswell (1927), and which are combined with a variety of other theories, including knowledge gap theories. (2) "*Contact Effects*", which are predicated upon by first Allport (1954) and later Pettigrew's (1988) work on the contact hypothesis. (3) "*Media-Technology Effects*". These combine modernization brands of technological determinism rooted in Lerner's (1958) work with democracy and freedom of expression interdependence theories, and democratic peace theory. (4) "*Mediated Contact Effects*", which are a combination of the contact hypothesis and technological homogenization theory, the latter being described by Innis (1972). (5) "*(Embedded) Factor of Production Effects*". These combine agency-structure theories of technology (or comparative institutionalist

approaches) concerned with the embedded nature of economic relations, with social inequality conflict theories concerning relative deprivation - described by Wilson III (1998), or theories of laissez-faire capitalist innovation and production with capitalist peace theory. These resemble aspects of knowledge gap theories 6) *"Self Efficacy Effects"*, which employ Bandura's work on self-efficacy (1986). And, finally, (7)*"Empathy and Reconciliation Effects"*. These emphasize the post genocide and politicide reconciliation theories discussed by Bar-On (1995) and Bar-Siman-Tov (2004). See Appendix A for a typology of these 7 models, (including their historical origins and uses).

Below I (1) classify these models, (2) detail the assumptions concerning the root causes and communication-oriented solutions to conflict that underlie these seven models, (3) outline these models' historical origins and (4) their uses. I do so first and foremost to point out the theoretical underpinnings of these PC models. To date, practitioners have assumed particular theoretical frameworks, but not overtly stated them. By pointing out what theories underlie their programming and clearly describing their origin and application, it will be possible to make sense of the logic that underpins peace communication interventions worldwide. Second, with this clear theoretical and practical map in hand, it will also be more feasible to assess and evaluate the efficacy of these interventions. A map, or the seven-model classification scheme which I have designed, will enable us to assess and evaluate programs against their specified intended behavioral outcomes: analyzing whether and to what extent a program achieves its stated intentions. This will allow both practitioners and scholars

to learn whether PC is problematic as a result of shortcomings in the nature of programs as practiced (whether an individual model is theoretically flawed or whether a given program ill applies given theories), or whether new models altogether need to be designed in order to revamp the practice.

As part of (4) my discussion of the uses of these models, I outline illustrative PC programs and the policy objectives of each. Additionally, in Appendix B, I include these programs websites, and as relevant, the most active PC organizations in the field. I include these details in order to more clearly define the practice of PC and to offer the reader a resource guide to PC, which is essential for establishing this sub-discipline.

At present, it remains unclear whether practitioners have been aware of the theories that underlie their assumptions about what kind of solution-oriented policies will help end world conflict. Perhaps their practices have matched the theories by accident. Alternatively, practitioners may have legitimated their assumptions on the basis of the theories, considering that the practice and theories developed at the same time, and likely, as part of a larger existing historical milieu. Either way, what is clear is that both the practice and the theory fit the same paradigmatic thinking, and one way or another, the theories below correlate with each of the seven peace communication models.

Model I: Message Effects

The Assumed Problem

PC programs organized along the *Message Effects Model* stipulate that a lack of information prevents us from knowing that we all want peace. Said another way, ignorance is the cause of conflict. Programs organized according to this model initially responded to inter-state conflicts, followed by ethnopolitical ones. Without paying attention to such changes in the nature of the conflicts, these programs assumed that ignorance (rooted in the lack of contact between peoples, and, in turn, prejudice about the "other") was and remained the cause of conflict.

The Solution

Practitioners operating under the logic of the message effects model, therefore, assumed that the reverse of ignorance – knowledge – was the solution for managing conflict. Without paying much attention to specific variables, they argued that message broadcasts would lead to knowledge acquisition. Knowledge would, in turn, persuade recipients of the said messages to adopt peace. The great capabilities that these practitioners ascribe to communication is reminiscent of persuasion and propaganda theories (e.g. Lasswell, 1929).

Persuasion and Propaganda Theories

As Harold Lasswell best put it, according to these theories, "Propaganda is one of the powerful instrumentalities in the modern world."' (Lasswell, 1920, p. 220, cited

in Petty & Priester, 1994). Several events transpired in the 1920s after Lasswell wrote these words which, according to Petty and Priester, provided "credence" to the notion that messages have a direct and powerful effect. The most famous among these were the response to the broadcasting of Orson Wells' *War of the Worlds* in 1938, and the previously noted rise to power of Hitler (again seemingly the result of his persuasive oratory and media skills). Thus, despite the fact that no evidence was provided to demonstrate the causal relationship between messages and public response to the broadcast of *War of the Worlds* or Hitler's rise to power, scholars nevertheless began to think that messages had a direct effect and were powerful (Petty and Priester, 1994). Similarly, practitioners began to assume that messages were the most effective tools for trying to persuade people to live in peace.

Message Effects Practice

Message effects' practitioners, or those who use communication to manage conflict out of the assumption that their power will resolve conflict, believe messages flow in one of four ways which, in turn, lead people to adopt peace. I organize these four flows or paths into four different message effects subtypes. These include the: (A) "*Free Flow Propaganda"* or "*Public Diplomacy*" subtype, (B) "*Protectionist*" or "*Dependency*" subtype, (C) the "*Free-Flow Censorship (Objectivity)*" subtype and (D) the "*Talk Peace -Peace Journalism*" subtype. See Appendix C for a typology of the 4 subtypes of the Message Effects Model.

Message Effects Subtype A: Free-Flow Propaganda or Public Diplomacy Effects (The American Model)

The Assumed Problem

Propaganda or Public Diplomacy is Missing

The *free-flow propaganda*, or *public diplomacy model subtype* represents the earliest variant of the message effects model. Its practice began in 1942 and continues to the present day. This model was born in response to the period in which inter-state conflicts were the norm. Through 1978, the majority of these, meanwhile, were comprised of decolonization conflicts. During this time frame, democracies were at war with dictatorships. The former were concerned by the centralized nature of dictatorships, fearing their inability to "communicate" with these state's peoples. As a result, democracies sought to "combat" the propaganda emitted by these dictatorships with, in effect, their own propaganda-laden message campaigns. Thus, practitioners who employed this subtype operated at the inter-state level, broadcasting their message from one state "at" the other.

In its early days, these campaigns were employed in an effort to end conflict, particularly by enabling one state, most typically the United States, to convince another (or its people) to bring about cease-fires. In other words, the United States hoped that by appealing to the peoples of those states with whom they were at war during WWII, they could either (1) foment internal opposition or revolution against those states' centralized authoritarian leaders or (2) persuade those "states" (i.e. its

leaders) to create a cease-fire and forge peace with the United States. Given their historical origins, these were government, not NGO sponsored interventions.

After WWII, practitioners continued these efforts. At that time, they targeted recently independent Southern states. They did so out of the hope that they could (1) create "friendly" new states that would not go to war with their former colonizers, and / or (2) to prevent conflict between these previously non-existing states (which, therefore, previously posed no threat) with other (previously existing) Northern states.

The aims of this iteration of the Free Flow Propaganda subtype were to forge North-South cross-state allegiances for the purposes of preventing future conflicts, and ending any in-progress conflicts. As before, interventions that fit this subtype targeted entire "states" (both the elites and the masses). They did so by working to "instill democracy" from above. They used messages to convey that freedom of expression or the free flow of information was important. At the same time, however, interventions operating during this time period shifted towards targeting the states' critics. As conflicts evolved into more ethnopolitical forms, the targeting of state critics - now minorities - or what Ted Robert Gurr would label "Minorities at Risk" (MARs),[10] became particularly explicit. Third party interveners began operating under the altruistic guise of wanting to broadcast "balanced information" to states where all the information was government controlled, and where, therefore, the voices of minorities, in particular, were silenced.

Democracy, Owed to the Lack of Messages, is Missing

Throughout the post WWII interstate war years, and into the ethnopolitical conflict years, a greater emphasis was placed on democracy. Practitioners argued that it played an important role in trying to sustain peace. Practitioners using this variant of the message effects model began to argue on behalf of (1) freedom of expression and democracy independence theories and (2) democratic peace theory. By providing balanced (or a more free flow of) information -- which really just amounted to alternative information -- these practitioners assumed that democracy would prevail. In turn, democracy would create peace *within* the state, and prevent a given state from going to war *with* a new third party state or other currently existing democratic states.

Theoretical Underpinnings

Freedom of Expression and Democracy Interdependence Theories

According to Freedom of Expression and Democracy Interdependence theories, communication, specifically messages, is capable of bringing about democracy. John Dewey voiced the existence of such a relationship (1927). He argued that freedom of expression is necessary for creating democracy, and, furthermore, that the free flow of communication and democracy are interdependent – i.e. one cannot exist without the other. Drawing on the earlier work of Carlyle, who argued, "Invent the printing press and democracy is inevitable," (cited in Dewey, p. 110)[11] Dewey viewed communication as a “prerequisite” (Dewey, 1927, p. 152) for democracy. In this vein, he argued that communication is a means to an end: democracy.

Second, democracy, according to Dewey, could not be maintained without the free flow of information that is necessary for the co-creation of ideas and policies that are representative of democratic communities. "The notion that men may be free in their thoughts even when they are not in its expression and its dissemination has been sedulously propagated," he explained (p. 167). Democracies must safeguard the free flow of information, so that in turn, people have access to the information or ideas required for them to be able to design legislation.

Finally, Dewey also viewed communication as an end in and of itself. Only through communication (including mass communication), he argued, could a dispersed group of people (both geographically and in thought) come to experience the sense of unity indicative of democratic governments. The ritualistic features of communication, meanwhile, would maintain this unity.

Following Dewey, others have expanded on why communication is essential for democracy. Communication, whether measured by freedom of expression (e.g. total number and type of media outlets), has commonly come to be assumed as essential to the functioning of democracy. According to Brian McNair, mass media, as an institution, has come to be expected to assume the role, in a democracy, of informing citizens, educating them about the meaning and significance of facts, and providing them with a platform for political discourse. Mass media, he adds, also plays a role in democracies by serving in the capacity of a watchdog, giving publicity to governments and political institutions, and by serving as a channel for the advocacy of political viewpoints (McNair, 1999 cited in Melone, Terzis and Beleli 2002).

Democratic Peace Theory

The evolving nature of the Free-Flow Propaganda Message Effects subtype's emphasis on democracy as playing a role in promoting peace rested upon the concept of *democratic peace theory*. Democratic peace theory has its roots in the British Manchester School of liberal peace theories. (Ceadel, 1996) and dates back to the earlier philosophical writings by Abbe de saint-Pierre, Rouseau, Bentham, and most famously Kant, in his *Perpetual Peace*. (see Gartzke, 2007 p. 167 for a historical synopsis).

According to arguments made by scholars who have since built upon these original philosophies (1) democratic states do not go to war with each other (e.g. Babst, 1964, 1972; Small and Singer, 1976; Rummel, 1979, 1983, 1985; Levy, 1988; Maoz and Russett; 1992, 1993), (2) within states, civil wars are less likely (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch, 2001), and (3) the more democratic a state, the less likely it is to engage in physical violence vis-à-vis its minority groups (Gurr, 2000, Kaldor, 1999). In short, democracy promotes *negative peace*.

Their argument for why the relationship between democracy and peace exists varies between normative (Maoz and Russet, 1993) and structural explanations (Gelpi & Griesdorf, 2001). With respect to normative explanations, arguments range from the idea that democracies respect human rights, and that free people abide by the norm that free people should not go to war with other free people. With respect to structural explanations, the idea is that free people constrain their leader's political options. Since the masses are the ones who go to war, in a democracy they will vote against

volunteering their own bodies for war, as contrasts with a dictatorship, where their bodies will simply be volunteered (Russet, 1993). Further, leaders must contend with institutional constraints that exist within a democracy which prevents it from quickly and uncritically mobilizing state resources (Gelpi & Griesdorf, 2001).

The Solution

Information

During WWII, practitioners operating along the logic of the free-flow propaganda subtype of the peace communication message effects model argued that in order for peace to prevail, the existing information in-equilibrium had to be corrected. Censorship *between* states had to be curtailed in order to allow for the free flow of messages between states. Once messages flowed freely between states a given state would be made aware that the other state (with whom it would otherwise go to war) wanted peace. Since all states (or at least its peoples) wanted peace, they argued, the only problem was that states party to interstate conflict, were simply unaware that their partner or potential partner state to conflict wanted peace, just like they did. News media, as a result, became the channels of choice for this subtype. “Free” (i.e. alternative) news feeds would report a state’s desire for peace.

Information and, In Turn, Democracy

Following WWI, and especially during the later ethnopolitical phases of conflict, the assumed direct relationship between messages and peace transformed into an assumed intervening relationship between messages and peace. Democracy took

the place of the causal link between the two. Thus, practitioners sought to transmit messages in order to instill democracy and in, turn, peace. Nevertheless, and regardless of the changing nature of conflicts, practitioners still believed that alternative information was *the* answer to the problem of unbalanced information flow, and the resultant lack of knowledge. In short, this subtype was predicated upon the transmission of external government sponsored (foreign policy) news broadcasts of messages that were intended to persuade the target audiences of another “state” (or its peoples) to adopt peace.

A critical caveat of these efforts is that they did not pay explicit attention to minorities’ needs. For example, they did not concern themselves with whether these groups had the economic means necessary to cultivate *democracy from below*. They simply assumed that messages had powerful effects and would reach people no matter what. On the other hand, as targeted state elites argued, these interventions in fact paid too much attention to minorities. According to them, these interventions sought to foment *revolutions from below*. This latter criticism remains often voiced by some Southern governments. They continue to argue that minorities align themselves with these external “state” broadcasts in an effort to foment coups against their host states. They argue this, even though these interventions are today operated by NGOs not governments, believing the two to be inseparable.

The Practice

Programs operating on the basis of the concept of this *free flow propaganda subtype of the Message Effects Model,* have, more than anything else, been American in design. They are what today is being studied by the sub-discipline of *Public Diplomacy*. Radio has traditionally been the most common channel for these messages, as well as, in more recent times, satellite television.

Voice of America

The most emblematic of these efforts have been the American state-owned Voice of America (VOA), and secondarily, the state-owned British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) targeted programs. VOA began broadcasting in 1942. They did so initially to broadcast their own version of events, which was presumed sufficient for keeping peace. According to their own accounts, the VOA began broadcasting, "As a response to the needs of peoples in *closed and war-torn* societies for *reliable news*." (Voice of America, 2008). In their case, reliability meant promoting American diplomatic interests in inter-state relations. Meaning, the additional information provided was really American diplomatic information that the United States deemed to be previously missing from the information equation.

Later, following WWII, during combined multi-state conflict scenarios and or ethnopolitical conflicts, VOA began using messages in an attempt to instill democracy, and, in turn, peace through programs like Radio *Free* Asia and Radio *Free* Iraq. In this respect, the terminology "free" was meant to connote not just the free flow of information but also the bringing about of a "free people." And free people, VOA argued (in a style reminiscent of democratic peace theory), are a peaceful people who

do not go to war with the US but rather become her ally. In the case of the VOA, the threat of interstate conflicts (especially against the US) remained the greatest emphasis and concern, regardless of the conflict stage in which this news media outlet was operating. The goal of the later phases of VOA programming were also in keeping with American foreign policy interests. However, these programs provided (or at least claimed to provide) reliable democratic tending information in order to develop and sustain these interests.

Sample Policy Statements. Accordingly, relevant parts of the VOA charter (VOA Charter, drafted and signed in 1960 and 1976, respectively), state that:

> The long-range interests of the United States are served by communicating *directly* with the peoples of the world *by radio*. To be effective, the Voice of America must win the attention and respect of listeners. These principles will therefore govern Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts:
>
> 1. VOA will serve as a consistently *reliable and authoritative source of news*. VOA news will be *accurate, objective, and comprehensive.*
> 2. VOA will *represent America, not any single segment of American society*, and will therefore present *a balanced and comprehensive* projection of significant American thought and institutions.
> 3. VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively, and will also present responsible discussions and opinion on these policies. (Public Law 94-350). (Voice of America, 1976).[12]

Thus, the VOA has emphasized the importance of broadcasting "American" foreign policy ("the state," or elite, formerly *state bearing nations'*[13] opinions) in order to *directly* reach their target audiences: people within states. In turn, their goals are to persuade these people to respect American interests.

The bulk of such free flow propaganda or public diplomacy message effects programs have been directed by northern states at southern states, but they have also been used more generally to promote one state's foreign policy interests vis-à-vis another with regards to maintaining inter-state peace and proscribing its nature.[14] Thus for example, in 2002, Egypt's state-owned Nile Sat TV created a Hebrew language news program in an effort to reach Israelis *directly*, as part and parcel of the Arab-Israeli conflict (BBC, 2001; VOA 2002).

Message Effects Subtype B: Protectionist or Dependency Effects

The Assumed Problem

The Protectionist or Dependency subtype of the message effects model developed in the 1970s, independently of public diplomatic (and mainly US official government interventionist) efforts. It was internationally predominant for a period of approximately twenty years, side by side with the American VOA model. This variant arose in the period after WWII when ethnopolitical conflicts were replacing interstate conflicts. Most pronounced, however, was its relationship to the Vietnam War. Practitioners applying this subtype were responding to (1) public diplomacy, particularly the VOA example of subtype A, (2) the decolonization element of the interstate war period, and (3) the multi-state conflict period of the Vietnam War. As a result, these practitioners took on an entirely state-centric approach to conceptualizing the audience for their messages. They uncritically focused upon the state, assuming it to be a uniform whole.

The proponents of the protectionist message effects subtype were concerned by what they saw as an existing system of *structural inequality* that privileged Northern states at the expense of Southern ones. According to Johann Galtung, structural violence is the institutionalization of inequality of opportunity and its implementation against a particular group. That inequality is characterized by discrimination, injustice, and exclusion. It damages the physical, social and psychological wellbeing of the group (Galtung, 1985). In their case, protectionist effects scholars and practitioners

argued that people in the South, whom they described in general (uncritical) terms were the victims of such structural inequality.

Jorg Becker best argued the supposition espoused by practitioners of this variant of the message effects model. Becker viewed the world system in its entirety as comprised of information haves and have-nots. The structural reality of these haves and have-nots, he argued, represented the very expression of structural violence. The context of the world system prevented the periphery from producing communication and technology, and helped to reinforce the existing unequal status quo. Since information was flowing in one direction (from North *to* South), the peripheries were in a position in which they had to rely on the center (the North) for capital, ownership and so forth. According to Becker:

> The Structure of the international news system must be seen as nothing short of a 'classic' expression of structural violence, because it systematically denies the periphery – and even more the peripheries within the periphery! – access to communications production and technology. 'Classic' is, indeed, the proper term to apply to this structure because the unmistakable imbalance of power in favor of the centers automatically makes the peripheries even more dependent on the metropolitan centers for access to the communications media than they are, for example, for access to property ownership, work, capital and raw materials. Thus, *the existing international information system* – and not only that of the news agencies – *is not only an expression of structural violence but in addition an essential instrument for stabilization of this system of violence*. (Becker, 1982, p. 235).[15]

In addition to their concern about the existing system of structural inequality, protectionist peace communication practitioners accepted the criticism voiced by the weak, or as of yet unstable Southern states. Namely, they were concerned that the

North might try to re-assert control over those states, not so much via direct conflict leading to the re-establishment of colonial enterprises, but rather, indirectly, via cultural imperial domination. Practitioners, in this case NGOs, feared that this would occur both from above, and by divide and conquer from below. That is, Northern states, they feared, would be able to sow the seeds of dissent of the Southern minorities against the dominant *national group* representing their respective states.

Critical Note Concerning Nations. Of critical importance here is that these practitioners did not perceive these Southern peoples to be minorities in actuality, and certainly not *national minorities*. Rather, they overlooked their voice as inauthentic externally constructed voices. As constructivists and postmodern scholars who look beyond the label of "colonialism" would argue, they did not view these voices as something that was the product of these peoples' own consciousness and construction. Thus, while these practitioners were concerned by the potential splintering of the state, they nevertheless still viewed the state as one undifferentiated national mass. Similarly, Schiller used the term "nations" and "states" in his writings interchangeably and therefore, uncritically. He simply equated both terms with the meaning of the word "country." In his case, he was really referring only to the institutional or administrative geographic entities and their borders and thus meant *states* (Schiller, 1976).

According to constructivist and post-modernists, by definition, a *nation* is a *community* that imagines itself as being limited and sovereign. (Anderson, 1983) It is a group with ideas about nationhood (Appadurai, 2000). In contrast to a *non-national*

community, *nations* consciously and actively pursue states of their own or (may) already possess one. National identity, as both constructivist (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1993; Hobsbawm, 1983) and emergent postmodernist definitions (Brubaker) assert, is neither primordial nor reified. Nations are social constructs that are the composite of collective memories, historical events and norms. While these identities are enduring, at the same time they are malleable, and can be shaped and altered over-time (Gurr, 2000).[16]

The Solution

Equal Information Flows

These scholars argued that conflict - in this case, structural violence - would be resolved by closing the existing North-South information gap. During the heyday of this model, information was flowing from the North to the South and practitioners were applying the public diplomacy effects subtype. In other words, dominant ethnopolitical groups in the North were intervening in the South, and targeting minorities. As a result, practitioners endorsing the protectionist subtype argued that *structural violence* against the South would end if the existing unidirectional pattern of information flows were altered. In turn, rather than appealing to state critics, as was the case with the public diplomacy effects practitioners, these practitioners appealed to states as a whole in an effort to get them to (seemingly) reverse the flow of information. By pursuing this route, these practitioners provided support to “the state”

(i.e. the dominant ethnopolitical groups) to develop the information necessary to reverse the direction of flow.

At the time, these proponents assumed the information flow was traveling from the Northern to the Southern *states.* However, it must be critically clarified that in fact, the flow to which *they* pointed during this time period was traveling from the Northern states (the dominant ethnopolitical groups controlling the state) to specifically Southern *minority groups*.[17] This distinction is important. It demonstrates an irony. While these practitioners (as well as the theorists of this subtype) responded with critique of those practitioners espousing the public diplomacy approach to PC interventions, who neglected the importance of *media ownership patterns*, when it came to conceptualizing the state, they nevertheless adopted a completely uncritical *realist* approach. These practitioners and scholars did not view states as being comprised of elites and minorities. Instead, they rather saw Southern states as the minority, vis-à-vis Northern states.

These practitioners assumed, in line with Herbert Schiller (Schiller, 1976), that to effectively manage conflict first, the power of messages had to be harnessed. Schiller was grounded in the tradition of large message effects still in fashion in communication at the time (though this is not a label he would have applied to himself). Second, these practitioners, like Schiller, argued that the export of messages to the global South had to be restricted in order to protect Southern states from the effects of dominant (i.e. Northern) messages. Southern messages would only stand a chance amidst all the “noise” from the North if the latter’s messages were limited in

number or simply restricted all together. And third, these practitioners argued, to best expose the North to these messages (or as Schiller argued, to enable Southern states to be exposed to their own messages), the North necessarily had to help the "third world," (the South) develop the necessary resources to broadcast messages. This could be achieved by developing "indigenous media".

Proponents of this theory believed that increased exposure to cultural content and artifacts produced by non-indigenous foreign states (in the North) would lead to the rejection of and decline in adherence to local state values (in the South) and result in either the erosion or substitution of those values. These changes in turn would lead to behavioral changes that would prove harmful to Southern states. According to Schiller, "forces that influence consciousness are decisive determinants of a community's outlook and the nature and direction of its goals." To Schiller, communication represented precisely those forces that influence consciousness and which, therefore, naturally threatened Southern states. In his eyes, the owners or senders of propaganda or persuasive messages – the US, most typically – were essentially brainwashing the South and at the same time, creating a market for the export of their economic goods.

Adherents to the protectionist subtype argued that a change in the flow of goods – in this case, information - was necessary, considering the havoc wreaked by communication flows. Newly freed states had to be protected from creeping US imperial propaganda in order to ensure the existence of balanced flows. They argued

that this was especially important given that this propaganda was flowing in the same direction as colonial military control had: namely from North to South.[18]

Additional Theoretical Underpinnings

According to John Night (Night, cited in Schiller, 1976), the United States was capitalizing on the notion that communication was directly powerful. Namely it was capitalizing on the notion that modern propaganda helped the Nazis and Fascists come to power and expand during WWII. According to Night, "'had not the Nazi and Fascist forces in Germany and Italy seized and dominated the press and all communication facilities at the start, the growth of these poisonous dictatorships might well have been prevented and the indoctrination of national thought in the direction of hatred and mistrust might have been impossible.'" (Night, cited in Schiller, 1976, p. 25).

Given such concerns (or fear) over how powerful a role communication had seemingly played during WWII and could come to play in the future in the "indoctrination of national thought in the direction of hatred and mistrust," states wanted to ensure they had control over their own communication vehicles. State independence, or freedom, in turn, meant not only political but communication sovereignty.[19] Therefore, protectionist effects practitioners argued that state media institutions had to be protected.

Eliminating Structural Violence

The causal assumptions made by these practitioners was that ultimately, if message flows were re-balanced, structural violence would be eliminated. In turn, equality and justice would be established. In this regard, communication's function in ending structural inequality became coded as *information*, meaning as an *economic commodity*. The existing dependency of states in the Global South on states in the Global North for information would end if Northern information exports were restricted and Southern information production was cultivated. Restrictions on the North would provide an opening for the South. Cultivation meanwhile would enable the South to produce information. In turn, the existing knowledge gap would be closed.

In addition, through the creation of Southern production, the North would also come to learn of the needs of the South. According to these practitioners, the North would necessarily become more sympathetic to the needs of the South by virtue of their learning about these needs. The North's prior prejudices would be transformed and somehow it would decide to cease to wreak structural violence against the South. Thus, for example, the North might learn that the South suffers from poverty and as a result, alter its behavior. It might treat Southern states better and, in turn, further efforts to help the South cultivate its own information flow in order to ensure the new environment of more equal flow was maintained.

In sum, under the paradigm of the protectionist or dependency message effects peace communication approach, the target of indigenous media support was the state (or uncritically, the dominant ethnopolitical groups leading the newly established post-

colonial states in the Global South). Despite the goals of this model - to correct the imbalance in flow – which, therefore, necessarily meant being able to target Northern states with the newly produced messages, targeting of the North was less readily achieved. Northern states were targeted in an effort to sustain the newly established post-colonial peace between states.

Ultimately, however, in practice the target of the messages produced by the "state" (the dominant Southern ethnopolitical groups) ended up largely being only minority groups in the South. The Southern "states" used their newly formed communication infrastructures, garnered with the help of foreign aid, to target minority groups for the purposes, of "uniting the state." Southern states sought to ensure that "their" minorities did not come to believe that their lives during the colonial period, or northern administration, was preferable to that which they were experiencing under the current leadership with whom they shared some history and culture.

Where ethnopolitical divisions ran deep, "state" run information flow was not, however, appreciated by minorities. Thus, these practitioners argued, whether it was the existence of these media as economic goods or commodities (which served to train people and provide employment of locals, by locals and for locals), or the communication messages indigenous media-outfits produced, structural violence would be ended, and its reverse, equality and justice, would be established and sustained.

The Practice

The result of these arguments was the development of a host of UNESCO programs, designed in the sprit of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). NWICO was launched in the 1980s to help close the existing knowledge gap. Apart from supporting NWICO's world policy and being its chief proponent to restrict the export of northern contents (via the MacBride Commission's Resolution 4/19 UNESCO findings), UNESCO developed news media outfits in the South in order to make peace.

UNESCO's effort included (1) helping to build media infrastructure and (2) running journalism-training workshops to teach locals how to produce radio programs and news agency reports. These programs were done with the authorization of state governments. As a result, members of the dominant nation typically benefited from these efforts. For example, they comprised the journalists "selected" for UNESCO's free training workshops. Ostensibly, such peace communication programs helped create state media infrastructures in the South since the media were government controlled in the states within which UNESCO intervened.

In other words, UNESCO peace communication programs of the protectionist or dependency subtype inadvertently helped establish and eventually centralize communication infrastructures into the hands of the dominant nations of former colonial states.

ZIANA

The Zimbabwe-Inter-Africa News Agency (ZIANA) is a classic example of the results of such protectionist effects intervention efforts. As with so many other news outfits, UNESCO helped create this South-based *parastatal*, or government owned, news organization. While UNESCO's motivation for helping to develop ZIANA was largely rooted in development concerns, it was also meant to function indirectly in the service of peace within the larger context of NWICO.

To that end, UNESCO helped establish ZIANA in 1982. In turn, it was heralded as a great example of new "indigenous" Southern media. At the same time ZIANA was designed as a government controlled institution. That institution, however, was and remains uncritically controlled by the dominant nation in Zimbabwe - the Shona (and in particular, a small circle of Shona elites). In an effort to maintain so-called national "unity, development and peace", the government restricted ZIANA's reporting through a system of control, exercised primarily through indirect censorship measures (Warshel, 1996). Thus, like other products of the protectionist subtype, given practitioners' uncritical targeting of the "state," these newly created news outlets served state dominant groups.

While these programs were created to enable the South to export messages to the North, most were only picked up within the Southern state itself or regionally within the South. As a result, they ultimately focused their news production on trying to effect intra-state unity (as with the case of ZIANA). Only more recently have news outfits that are a product of the practice of protectionist effects PC efforts begun to reach the North. Some have gone on-line where Northerners can read them if they

choose. Whether they achieve high consumption rates in the North is, however unclear.

Sample Policies

Policy statements indicative of the protectionist or dependency message effects subtype include the 1978 UNESCO Declaration on the Use of Mass Media to Prevent War. Representative of this was a passage stating, "*Mass media can contribute to mutual understanding*. There is *a need to correct the equilibrium in communication flows and work towards greater reciprocity by correcting the inequality in flows.* This can be achieved by *giving the mass media the conditions and resources to gain strength*."[20] The conditions and resources to which this declaration referred to were a world system in which Northern information flows were restricted and Southern flows were promoted.

The UNESCO Declaration on Foundational Principles concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War, November 1978 included some other representative passages. For example, Article III, 2. p. 13, states:

> *In countering aggressive war*, racialism, apartheid and other violations of human rights *which are inter alia spawned by prejudice and ignorance, the mass media, by disseminating information on the aims, aspirations, cultures and needs of all peoples, contribute to eliminate ignorance and misunderstanding between peoples, to make nationals of a country sensitive to the needs and desires of others*, to ensure the respect of the rights and dignity of all nations, all peoples and all individuals without distinction of race, sex, language, religion or

> nationality and *to draw attention to the great evils which afflict humanity*, such as poverty, malnutrition and diseases, *thereby promoting the formulation by States of the polices best able to promote the reduction of international tension and the peaceful and equitable settlement of international disputes.*[21]

The assumption in these UNESCO declarations was that the balancing of information flows would enable an increase in knowledge on the part of all states party to conflict. In this case, those states who were at a disadvantage in the South – i.e. those unable to produce knowledge about their needs – would be able to communicate that they, like Northern states, wanted equality.

A final example of a representative statement comes from this same declaration. Similar to the first, Article VI, states:

> *For the establishment of a new equilibrium and greater reciprocity in the flow of information, which will be conducive to the institution of a just and lasting peace* and to the economic and political independence of the developing countries, *it is necessary to correct the inequalities in the flow of information* to and from developing countries, and between those countries. To this end, it is essential that *their mass media should have conditions and resources enabling them to gain strength and expand*, and to co-operate both among themselves and with the mass media in developed countries.[22]

Message Effects Subtype C: Free Flow Anti-Censorship (Objectivity) Effects

The Assumed Problem

Subtype C of the message effects model, the *Free Flow Anti-Censorship (Objectivity)* variant came into practice during the 1990s, when ethnopolitical conflicts were the norm and were clearly understood to be so by practitioners. Like the protectionist or dependency advocates, these practitioners believed that an existing system of structural inequality was the cause for conflict in our world system.

However, since these conflicts by and large transpired within states, not between them, they focused on providing balance within the state. These practitioners began to sense a need for creating a balance between the dominant ethnopolitical group that so-called represented or controlled "the state" and its minorities in order to end structural violence being leveled against minorities within (and across) states. Since minorities were suffering from systematic social, economic and or political discrimination (Gurr, 2000), or structural violence, these, as the cause of conflict needed to be addressed.

By intervening, these practitioners hoped to equip minorities in the South with the ability to transmit their own messages. These messages could in turn be used to target the dominant ethnopolitical groups within their own states, and, to a lesser degree, states in the North. The persuasive nature of the messages, practitioners argued, would serve to convince the former to cease their discriminatory practices, and the latter, to offer transnational or third party support for the cause.

In contrast to the first phase of the free flow propaganda subtype, the free flow anti-censorship (objectivity) subtype of the message effects model was entirely wedded to the concept that democracy brings about peace. For their part, free flow anti-censorship practitioners were responding to the failings of *anti-colonialism*, and instead operating under the logic of *post-colonialism*. As adherents to post colonialist thinking, they criticized the newly independent states as, in fact, the spatial equivalent of the dominant ethnopolitical group, or statebearing nation's, nationalist yearnings. They did not, as the states themselves claimed, represent the entire population who had come to be made to fit together in the same state, owing to the colonial demarcations that forced them together in the first place (e.g. for Africa, literally via the Berlin Conference's Treaty of 1842).

Thus, these free flow anti-censorship (objectivity) peace communication practitioners did not just advocate civic independence, but freedom, and in a myriad of forms. They advocated freedom of thought, freedom of expression, (defined by them as laissez-faire economics), and most importantly, freedom of representation (defined by them as democracy).[23] They argued that if minorities could not obtain a nationalist state of their own, at least, in civic terms, they should be able to equally share "their" state. Therefore, interventions operating along the logic of the free flow anti censorship message effects model sought to equip minority ethnopolitical groups, especially *stateless nations*[24] - those minorities seeking a state of their own - within states, with the necessary resources to broadcast their message.[25]

The Solution

Practitioners operating under the guise of this subtype advocated, as with all the other subtypes of the message effects model, that firstly, messages are powerful. Secondly, all nations and ethnopolitical groups should be accorded the right to freely express themselves as part and parcel of their right to self-determination. These practitioners, therefore, adopted a motto of “freedom of expression”. They applied the combined logics of democracy and freedom of information interdependence theories to argue that freedom of expression was essential for establishing democracy, and, in turn, peace. In concert with the Free Flow Propaganda (subtype A) practitioners, they therefore, argued that the free flow of messages, or the “free flow of information” should be encouraged.

However, unlike the free-flow propaganda practitioners, they argued that freedom of expression would best be achieved by ending censorship within Southern states, rather than between (Northern and Southern) states. In this respect, the free flow anti-censorship subtype serves as a hybrid compromise between the Free-Flow propaganda subtype (subtype A) and the protectionist subtype (subtype B).

Like the protectionist practitioners (subtype B), the free-flow anti-censorship practitioners (subtype C) maintained a critical interpretation of the necessary economic conditions and therefore, included provisions for providing the resources states (or groups) required to in fact be able to alter the flow of information. However, because the conditions or context seemingly changed in the 1990s when use of this variant of the message effects model began, contrary to the protectionist variant

(subtype B), the free flow-anti censorship variant (subtype C) no longer sought to restrict exports of messages to (Southern) states. These practitioners were not concerned about the threat of Northern messages (e.g. US based messages). Rather, they were concerned about messages being generated by the dominant ethnopolitical group within Southern states relative to minorities within those Southern states. Since the focus was now on conflict divisions existing internally within the state,[26] they sought to ensure that the have-nots within the state were not being discriminated against and had the capability to respond with their own propaganda or persuasion message campaigns. In turn, they referred to the results of such campaigns as the dissemination of "objective" news.

Thus, this model instead advocated that which the free flow propaganda subtype advocated – the free flow of messages, but emphasized achieving it via the elimination of censorship *within* the state, thus allowing minority critics within the state the opportunity to speak. Thirdly, these practitioners argued, again like the protectionist subtype, that resources should be provided to these information have-nots in order to enable them to freely express themselves and produce the messages necessary for altering information flow. They, however, instead allocated these resources to minorities, not to the "state."

Theoretical Underpinnings

Import Resources Necessary for Developing Independent Media Sources

To this end, the logic of the arguments of the free flow anti-censorship practitioners was closer to the writings of Ithia de Sola Pool than any other scholar. Pool's argument was not per se motivated out of an interest in redirecting flows to favor the South, nor its minority groups, but rather, as a response to the new status-quo of an increase in non-US, specifically Southern based radio, television, film and video flows (as too, greater attention, and so awareness now paid to other kinds of communication flows). Nevertheless, his scholarly arguments are most reminiscent of those made by the free-flow anti-censorship practitioners.

Historically, the "third world," would not have realistically been able to obtain the support it required from the North to establish equal flows via censorship of the North. Simply put, the South was incapable of censoring the north. Rather, in order to achieve the same net result, the South instead had to turn to the option of resource development. In many cases, developing these resources meant opening up the doors to Northern imports even further. That is, the South had to import Northern technology in order to obtain those resources necessary, for example, to develop news production studios.

The option of opening itself up to the North, versus censorship of the North, was amenable to the North. Thus, Pool argued accordingly, only by removing restrictions on the North could the necessary "conditions" for developing "indigenous" sources of media growth be achieved. (Pool, 1990). According to Pool,

> *Dependence occurs whenever advanced countries possess know-how and techniques that developing countries are not able to acquire for*

> *themselves at will*. Independence is therefore promoted by unrestricted free flow of information between countries so that *the developing country can acquire for itself whatever intellectual and cultural products it desires at the lowest possible price.* The freer the flow of information, the wider the developing country's range of choice and the sooner it can acquire for itself the ability to produce the same sort of information or programming at home. (Pool, 1990, p. 204).[27]

However, unlike Pool, as well as Schiller before him, the practitioners of the free-flow anti-censorship model moved beyond the use of the term “country” to critically specify the difference between nations and states, and, therefore, looked beyond the black box of the so-called “state” and noted structural differences between groups within it, including within the more recently independent states.

In short, though the free flow anti-censorship subtype developed in opposition to the protectionist dependency subtype of the message effects model theoretically aligned with Schiller’s call to restrict information flow from the North, the result, ironically, was a 1990’s marriage between Schiller’s argument in the 1970’s and the victory of the post 1942 practice of the American free flow propaganda Lasswellian argument. PC interventions now sought to ensure the “free flow of information” and end censorship within states.

Like the protectionist practitioners, these practitioners still believed that an equal balance of flows would spell the end of structural violence (but in this case between ethnopolitical groups). They also believed that by equipping minorities with the power to export messages, minorities would, in turn, be able to persuade dominant groups within their states – i.e. the statebearing nations who held a monopoly on

messaging capabilities – to provide for their needs. To a lesser extent, these practitioners also thought they would be able to reach, and therefore influence Northern states to offer these minorities assistance in their "struggle" within their states. Therefore, the statebearing nations (at the insistence of Northern states) would alter their behaviors vis-à-vis their state's minority groups. Structural violence would thereby end, and its reverse would be achieved: equality within the state, or for those minorities seeking states of their own, justice.

Law. Apart from the emphasis on technology acquisition and journalistic training, in their newer iterations, practitioners of the free flow anti censorship subtype have turned to legal frameworks as a means for fostering the conditions necessary to encourage the development of "indigenous media." Indigenous media, now minority media, have instead come to be referred to as "independent media." The logic of these newer iterations that seek to promote the development of independent media are best explained by the concerns raised by Peter Krug and Monroe Price. They discuss the importance of reforming media laws in order to ensure that the necessary legal conditions exist (and are policed) to in fact enable free liberalized media (once trained and resource equipped) to function. (Krug and Price, 2002). If these media are allowed to operate unhampered to gather news and produce content without fear of harm to their bodies, they may be able to represent all the voices within a state. (Price and Krug, 2002).[28]

Language. These practitioners have also begun to develop multi-lingual programs in states were minorities speak languages other than those spoken by the

statebearing nation. They argue that by producing multi-lingual broadcasts, minorities will be able to access the messages produced by their own peoples. In such cases, practitioners have emphasized the need to foster the conditions necessary for the generation of minority or independent media and support for these in their intervention efforts, rather than, per se, trying to persuade the dominant group to “listen” to the minority’s message. These practitioners are focusing on the economic generating function of independent media industries in order to structurally benefit minorities.

The Practice

New programs operating under this logic (1) promote message output, (2) do not censor (imports *to* and *within* states), (3) promote “indigenous growth” by creating “independent media organizations” within states, and (4) in their later iterations, are not necessarily only directed at Southern states, as was the case with the protectionist dependency programs in the 1970s. In other words, these new programs are completely different from what Schiller and NWICO advocated. They engage in the very activities the newly independent “states” feared. Namely, they, as third parties help the state’s critics broadcast messages that the ruling regimes fear will lead to their overthrow via third party aided coups.[29]

However, as far as the principles of communication and conflict management are concerned, these programs operate along the exact same message effects assumptions as did the protectionist-dependency subtype. That is, they assume, as with all the other message effects subtypes, that messages are powerful. Therefore, their

focus is on trying to ensure that the necessary conditions, capabilities, and access for information have-nots exists so that they will have the same information capabilities as the information-haves in order to transmit powerful messages to their audiences. If they have this capability, namely that of broadcasting propaganda, they can persuade their audiences to respect their interests. As a result, the free flow anti censorship (objectivity) programs focused primarily on (1) media capacity building of independent outfits and/or (2) training workshops for independent journalists in the Global South.

***Studio Ijambo*, Burundi**

Studio Ijambo (SI), an independent radio station in Burundi, (http://www.studioijambo.org) is an illustrative case. Search for Common Ground (SFCG), one of the most active peace communication organizations today (with headquarters in the US), provided support for the formation of *SI.* They provided the resources necessary for the South (in this case, critics internal to it) to produce their own programming, including by providing the needed capital, technological inputs and in a manner reminiscent of Pool's writings, the "know-how and techniques" through journalism training programs. The main goal of *SI*, like other intervention efforts of the free flow anti-censorship subtype, is to make use of messages in order to influence peoples in conflict, specifically by providing credible, objective and balanced news programming.

In this case, *SI* is unique in that it seeks to disseminate its message across not just Burundi, but the entire Great Lakes Region of Africa. Given that the historical

conflict between Hutus and Tutsis is one marked by the problem of *conflict contagion*, whereby conflict between groups regionally spill over from one state to another, the radio station sought to instead target all the states within which these two nations reside. In addition, *SI* boosts online audio news feeds, which in addition to Kirundi, are broadcast in French, enabling non-Kirundi speakers, including in the Global North, to tune in. In its description of *SI*, SFCG writes,

> Responding to the need for balanced and anti-inflammatory broadcasting to counter, "hate radio" in the Great Lakes region, Studio Ijambo was established in Burundi in March 1995. Studio Ijambo is an *ethnically balanced team of journalists producing radio programs to promote dialogue, peace, and reconciliation. Their programs examine all sides of the conflict and highlight the points that can unite, rather than divide Burundians* (Search For Common Ground, 2002).[30]

The Studio Ijambo slogan, "Dialogue is the future," captures the essence of their mission." (Search For Common Ground, 2002). The station thus emphasizes the need for balanced coverage, and equal representation of its members, as the method through which to achieve reliable coverage, as an alternative to state (then Tutsi controlled) media. Importantly, *SI* positioned itself as an answer to the phenomena of hate media or conflict communication, most infamously symbolized by Rwanda's RTLM (originally presented in Chapter 1). SI's staff believed that by broadcasting balanced messages to Tutsis, Hutus, Batwa, and Ganwas, alike, they would be able to promote dialogue, peace and reconciliation[31] (See Search for Common

Ground Burundi for description of Studio Ijambo, and Sinhuhije, 1998, and Kulick, 2002 for more information).

The mission statements of organizations like SI that adopted this message effects subtype suggest that they are using messages to not only persuade people, by virtue of the assumedly sheer power of messages, but also to ensure balance, and in turn have influence. However, in practice, these organizations have not been successful with respect to the latter. Ultimately, they tell the side of the conflict that was previously left untold and seek to persuade the audience of its side, whilst referring to such an effort as "balance" or "objectivity", despite the fact that in practice they really only function on theories of persuasion. Thus, they *do* fill a needed gap – providing previously unknown information - but are *not* objective, as they aim to be. Hence, I only refer to this subtype by name as parenthetically "objective".

Star Radio Liberia

Another example of the free-flow anti-censorship (objective) subtype is *Star Radio (SR)*, Liberia. *SR* began broadcasting in 1997 (www.starradio.org.lr) and is operated by the Hirondelle Foundation. Hirondelle is a Swiss foundation that is active in the creation of "independent media", and which runs a multitude of radio programs in Africa along the logic of the free-flow anti-censorship subtype. Like SI, *SR's* funding comes from the North, in this case, from the European Commission, Switzerland, the UK, the Netherlands and Norway. Also like *SI*, the main thrust of the station is to provide credible balanced news programming. It broadcasts in Liberia,

though also boosts online audio news feeds so that its English broadcast can be picked up anywhere including in the North. Star Radio's charter statement exclaims:

> 1. STAR radio is an *independent radio station* for Liberia and the Sub-Region.
> 2. STAR radio Inc. is a *Liberian entity* with a board of Liberians.
> 3. STAR radio has *partnership* with Hirondelle Foundation, Media for Peace and Human Dignity.
> 4. STAR radio
>
> I. Broadcasts *impartial and credible information* on the situation in the country and the region.
> III. Promotes professional journalism by *training young journalists.*
> IV. *Promotes the freedom of speech*.
> V. Its journalism is *well-sourced and based on sound evidence, relying on fact rather than opinion*, giving the audience the opportunity to decide for themselves on the issues of the day.
> VI. *Does not discriminate about* age, sex, *ethnicity*, religion or the lack of it *or nationality*.
> VII. Broadcasts news and programmes on issues that are relevant to the daily lives of the Liberia citizens and *in support of peace*, activities of the civil society, development and humanitarian activities, capacity building, human rights and child protection, *civic education and electoral assistance*.
> VIII. Takes account on the traditional culture of Liberia in its programmes as well as reflecting contemporary trends.
> X. *Observes strict political impartiality and seeks to remain independent in its broadcasts and the choice of its collaborators*.[32] (Star Radio, 2006).

Star Radio's objectives emphasize the importance of impartial, credible and independent journalism. In practice it adds previously excluded voices, namely those of ethnic, including ethnopolitical national minorities (non-Americo-Liberians), or those critical of the Liberian leadership. Additionally, as noted, it fosters training, and, while receiving support from the North, cautiously notes that Hirondelle is a

“partner,” not an owner, and that Star Radio is indeed a Liberian entity (despite the voice critical of the governing state-bearing nation it has broadcast) (See Radio Netherlands Media Network, 2000 for more information about Star Radio).

Subtype Comparison

In both the cases of Studio Ijambo and Star Radio, while content programming is locally based, sponsorship and funding are coming from the North (from SFCG and Hirondelle). Thus, these programs also provide support to the growth of local media (like the protectionist-dependency subtype programs that provided financial support to the growth of local media). However, rather then donating funds or support to “the state” directly, these free-flow anti-censorship sponsored programs fund independent media outfits, which, as a norm, are comprised of minorities either in whole, or at least in part, who are not in control or party to the government (e.g. in many African states – not to those member to the one party state government).

In this case, the fears voiced earlier by dominant ethnopolitical groups (leaders) of Southern States became apparent. In 2000, then President of Liberia Charles Taylor shut down Star Radio due to fear of powerful messages. In justification of this action, he explained: "‘during my administration, STAR Radio will not come back on the air... Only the government has the right over the airwaves in this country. It is not the right of anyone to run a radio station. It is a privilege. Your right is to free speech.’" (Taylor quoted in Radio Netherlands Media Network, 2000).

Taylor feared that free-flow anti-censorship radio stations like Star Radio would help Liberian minority groups align with Northern states (for example, with

Switzerland in the case of the Hirondelle Foundation) to destabilize the dominant group – Americo-Liberians (or in part, simply his own rule). He did not believe that these stations sought, rather, to end Liberia's civil war by uniting the state. Surely, Taylor thought, if Star Radio was sponsored by the Swiss, its contents had to in fact be controlled by third party-interventionists, not local Liberians (whose minority groups, could, in any case, pose a threat to Taylor and Americo-Liberian control of the state).

Open Broadcast Network (OBN) Bosnia and Herzegovina

Finally, in their newer iterations, the focus of these programs is not just on minorities in the South but also on those in the North. The focus of the practitioners is on anywhere where ethnopolitics remains a concern, though predominantly in the South where nationalism has not (yet) finished playing itself out, in contrast to much of the North. Representative examples are programs in the former Yugoslavia. One such example is the Open Broadcast Network (OBN). While located in the North, OBN is also largely funded from the North, like the older iterations of PC programs of this subtype.

OBN is a network that supports the development of independent TV stations in Bosnia. When founded, its goal was to "support pluralist democracy, freedom of expression and independent journalism and to provide programming on an inter-entity level, accessible to all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina." (Jusic, 2001 p. 24). Meaning, the network, according to this statement, sought to produce plural ethnopolitical programming. As part of this, it in addition emphasized the importance of multi-lingual access as a means for encouraging the growth of independent media.

Message Effects Subtype D: Talk Peace-Peace Journalism Effects

The Assumed Problem

Subtype D of the message effects model, or the talk peace-peace journalism subtype began in 2000. It developed in response to the wider inter-state system conflict context of the time, namely the predominance of ethnopolitical forms of conflict. Practitioners operating under the guise of this subtype held the same assumptions regarding the causes of conflict as did the free flow anti-censorship practitioners. They assumed that information was missing, the result of which was ignorance. In turn, they targeted any applicable state within the world system where these conflicts were occurring with messages. Like the earlier subtypes of the message effects model, practitioners using the talk peace subtype (subtype D) felt that independent media needed to be developed, or at least, as was more often becoming the case, only supported. Thus, financial support in this respect was, similarly, directed towards minority groups who seemingly did not have the same production capacities required to participate equally in the dissemination and reception process of messages.

Where the targeting of the disseminated messages was concerned, again, like the free-flow anti-propaganda practitioners, these practitioners argued that messages should be transmitted by minorities to the dominant ethnopolitical group *within* the state. However, as more independent media outfits began appearing on the scene globally, offering alternative messages that voiced minority concerns, minorities also

became a target. Minorities were targeted in order to ensure messages did indeed flow between all parties to a conflict.

More importantly though, these PC programs implored all ethnopolitical groups to enter into dialogue with each other, in order to understand not only their concerns, but the more status quo, or security-based concerns of the dominant ethnopolitical group/s. Talk Peace practitioners not only believed that knowledge acquisition would alter prejudice (what they believed to be the root of conflict, causing dominant groups to commit structural violence against minorities) and a lack of understanding of the fears of the dominated groups by minorities, but also that conflict was *also* due to a lack of constructive solutions, which, as a result, led to the existing unequal structures.

The Solution

Thus, the talk peace-peace journalism practitioners did not advocate the transmission of persuasive messages or propaganda, but rather mass mediated dialogue (which, critically should be noted, also attempts to persuade readers that dialogue is *the way*). Thus, they responded to ethnopolitical conflict in a manner identical to that espoused by the free-flow anti-censorship practitioners (subtype C), with the exception that they added a fourth condition or stipulation. Making peace was not just a matter of increasing the volume of messages, but also, the contents of said messages mattered too. While subtype C is concerned with contents too, namely that they be comprised of previously excluded voices; subtype D practitioners believe that

peacemaking can not be achieved by only providing “alternative,” (additional) information. Rather, they believe that additional information *must* be constructed appropriately if peace is to be made. At the same time, they do believe, just the same, that messages are powerful and deterministic. However, they do not believe that messages should help one party achieve victory over the other. Rather, they believe that their influence should result in the achievement of common ground between conflicting parties. Therefore, talk peace practitioners seek to provide information that specifically is written in a peace style that promotes a common ground.

The messages transmitted by talk peace programs have to make clear that the sender of the message “wants peace,” and intends to engage in dialogue rather than monologue. In this respect, this part of the variant most contrasts with the free-flow propaganda (subtype A) variant. It emphasizes dialogue over monologue, out of the specific intention of trying to reach a compromise. In other words, these message effects practitioners do not just want to “balance” information, irregardless of what content is being generated, as contrasts with subtype B, and some extent C. The latter emphasis on balance was, in part, the result of practitioners framing information as an “economic commodity,” whose value lied only in the identity of its sender (e.g. the reified conception of its identity as being either Southern or Northern in origin), not in what the sender actually had to say. The goal of the talk peace practitioners is to instead actively script or construct the contents of messages in order to promote reconciliation. This goal is rooted in the belief that journalists mediate conflict (whether they intend to or not).

Theoretical Underpinnings

Invitational Discourse

To this effect, talk peace-peace journalists practitioners apply the theories of invitational discourse. They do not employ the model of persuasion with respect to the kinds of peace solutions or compromises they wish to bring about. They do not try to make use of arguments and evidence in order to change the attitudes or beliefs of the other party/s to a conflict, without being open to change in themselves. They, unlike their predecessors, consciously understand themselves to be participants in the conflict. Instead they are vested in a commitment to equality, recognition, and self-determination (Foss & Griffin, 1995). In this respect, a message disseminated in the talk peace style would represent all parties in a non-oppositional manner. It would make use of a style of communicating that tries to open, rather than end discussion so that the broader picture can be understood. Using invitational discourse methods, talk peace practitioners would attempt to promote change and transformation, not only through normal attitude changes, but also through the incorporation of new ideas and perspectives and critical inquiry.

Peace Journalism

According to its theorists, talking peace is specifically meant to help achieve a deeper understanding of a conflict, and promote constructive and creative solutions for resolving it. This subtype, as currently practiced, is synonymous with peace journalism. (Botes, 1998; Galtung, 1998; Manhoff, 1998; Shinar, 2004; Tehranian,

2002). It is defined in opposition to Johann Galtung's model of war or violence journalism. Galtung proposed peace journalism as the proactive interventionist response to what he documented as the state or status of journalism worldwide. He argued that journalism was too concerned with describing war and violence, and reported on it as though it were a disease whose state needed to be documented. Instead, he advocated that journalistic coverage focus on writing about peace and the deeper meaning of conflict and its management. Journalists should write as though they are trying to treat and cure a disease, not as through they are only trying to describe what it destroys.

In order to write about conflict in the manner advocated by Galtung, journalists have to describe the sources of a conflict, its deeper roots, solutions for the conflict, consequences that will result if the conflict is not resolved, and focus on highlighting the work of those seeking to prevent violence and who are working towards reconstruction, reconciliation & resolution. Further, Galtung argued, journalists should strive to humanize all sides, represent victims of all parties as worthy of empathy, seek to devise interlocking solutions for all parties that might elicit unexpected paths to pursue in an effort to find creative solutions that will benefit everyone. Journalists, he explained, should write in such a pro-active style, rather than framing the conflict as an "us" versus "them" win-lose scenario. They should focus on the shared realities of living with conflict rather than blaming one side or the other. And, as Botes, has argued, journalists should also encourage parties to a conflict to seek win-win

solutions for everyone. They should also devise ways to empower non-elites to take part in peace building (Botes, 1998).

The Practice

Programs designed along the talk peace variant participate in efforts to promote critical content message production by engaging in (1) the media capacity building of independent outfits (e.g. providing financial subsidies to journalists) and (2) advocating and or training journalists in the requisite style for covering conflict in *a fair and just manner.*

Common Ground News Service and Elias Sartawi Journalism Awards

Thus, for example, SFCG Middle East Media programs (www.sfcg.org/programmes/middleeast/middleeast_media.html) include as part of their strategy the Common Ground News Service (CGNS): (www.commongroundnews.org), and Elias Sartawi Journalism Awards (www.sfcg.org/sfcg/sfcg_cgawards_me.html). The former publishes peace journalism framed articles, and the latter awards encourage journalists to write articles in the vein of peace journalism by honoring those journalists who demonstrate such content creation. For example, CGNS promotes articles that feature soldiers of peace rather than soldiers of war – i.e. everyday people doing a part in their communities to build peace.

According to SFCG, CGNS publishes, "*balanced and solution oriented* articles by local and international experts that *promote constructive perspectives and encourage dialogue.*" (Search for Common Ground Middle East, SFCG Website).[33]

Meanwhile, "the [Elias Sartawi] Awards recognize and encourage journalism that contributes to a *better understanding between people* and *maintaining political dialogue* in the Middle East." Further, they, "honor articles that *try to open windows of understanding* onto the people in the region, and the issues that divide them, *provide insight* into regional issues and debates, *contribute to political dialogue, expose readers to new perspectives* and *help to lay the groundwork for peaceful solutions*."[34]

In this respect, the clear addition and emphasis on fair-just-peaceful solution-oriented content and political dialogue applicably demonstrates the difference between this variant and the free flow anti-censorship variant of the message effects model approach to PC interventions.

Medios Para la Paz

A second talk peace example comes from Latin America's last remaining conflict hotspot, Columbia. As part of their talk peace orientation, the organization, Medios Para la Paz (www.mediosparalapaz.org) asked itself "Have we as journalists become one more actor in the armed conflict that has stricken our country for more than half a century?" and "Can we, with words, with our reports about the war, contribute to the establishment of favorable conditions for peace? (Marquez, Medios Para la Paz Website). To this end, a collective of journalists and other interested parties founded Medios Para la Paz in 1998. (Medios Para la Paz$_{3,}$ Medios Para la Paz Internal Document). They have since produced a manual to teach journalists precisely how to cover conflict and a glossary of terms to provide them with the exact kinds of

solution oriented terms they might employ when covering conflict in order that they be able to effectively mediate it (e.g. between left-wing guerrilla movements and conservative Columbian paramilitaries) (for more information about Medios Para la Paz see also Howard, Francis, Veen and Verhoeven, 2003).

Furthermore, in their description of their organization, Medios Para La Paz firstly emphasizes the importance of balanced and accurate flow, but argues on behalf of the *quality* and not just the *quantity* of flows. They write, "Medios Para la Paz (MPP) *searches for a journalism able to defend the accuracy and equilibrium in the information*. This is the reason why we recommend to *practice some professional underlying routines* for journalism, such as: To contrast sources and to confront versions (quantity and quality of informative sources)."[35] (Medios Para la Paz$_1$, Medios Para la Paz Website).

Second, they emphasize the need for message flows to be critical, stating that it is important,

> To try to maintain the presence of the journalist in the place of the events in which he or she must cover the information. *To contextualize the news and the events*. We mean, to make reference to background facts and *to know the development of the history, the place and actors involved into the news*. *To attend to the process, not just to the informative flash produced by a shocking incident*. To avoid confusion between the whole and its parts. *To have a critical sense in front of each version about the events* (war reports, communications, pronouncements, interviews). (Medios Para la Paz$_1$, Medios Para la Paz Website).[36]

Third, they emphasize the importance of solution oriented critical content, stating as another objective, "to foment the journalist's language disarming when they treat subjects related with peace and violence, and *to stress the importance of their role as an instrument of understanding and reconciliation.*" (Medios Para la Paz$_3$, Medios Para la Paz Internal Document).[37] Furthermore, they explain in their Mission Statement that "Our proposal is to call to the professionals of media so that, *as journalists, we contribute to the permanent reflection on violence and on overcoming this through pacific means*. We aspire to disarm the language and to break the passivity and the indifference in front of armed conflict, *to unblock the ignorance of its causes, to stimulate the sensitivity of its consequences and possible solutions*." (Medios Para La Paz$_2$, Medios Para la Paz Website).[38]

The Message Effects Subtypes

In conclusion, peace communication model I - message effects - is comprised of four subtypes, which all focus on the powerful role messages play. Namely, they argue, messages play an important role in increasing people's knowledge, and in turn altering their attitudes or beliefs towards peace-building and/or –making, and/or as economic commodities in and of themselves, whose very effects are felt in their export. Their export represents the information flow that structures our world system, and when emitted by information have-nots, serves to alter structural inequality and in turn build peace. Subtypes C and D not only pay attention to the weight of messages but also to their contents. The former does so with respect to so-called concerns about objectivity. In practice however, it has only served thus far to add previously excluded voices and so still relies on the weight of messages, including their economic and in terms of the style it employees, its persuasive abilities. Subtype D, on the other hand, does so with respect to dialogue promotion. Finally, all four subtypes primarily rely on the genre of news media as their chief channel for disseminating or exporting their peace-promoting messages out of the intention of directly building or making-peace, or indirectly, via democracy promotion.

Model II: Contact Effects

The Assumed Problem

Beginning in the 1950s, when ethnopolitical conflicts became the predominant form of conflict and decolonization conflicts made up the bulk of the remaining inter-state conflicts, practitioners began to apply the contact effects model as part of their effort to use communication as a tool to manage conflict. They did so side-by-side with the message effects free flow propaganda-public diplomacy model. In their case, these practitioners believed that negative individual-level intergroup attitudes fueled conflict. In other words, they believed World War II and ethnopolitical conflicts that followed, arose out of hatred and negative stereotypes. Like many of the practitioners who made use of the message effects model, contact effects practitioners believed prejudice to be the cause of conflict. The former believed prejudice occurred due to a lack of information or knowledge about one's partner in conflict, while the latter believed prejudice was due to the lack of experience and/or interpersonal communication mediated dialogue experiences with one's partner to conflict.

The Solution

Practitioners making use of the contact effects model believed that a change in attitude, especially one which leads to friendships between individuals[39], was the solution to managing cross-group conflict. These practitioners primarily focused on building, rather than making peace, in contrast to the main thrust of the message

effects model. In their efforts, they employed the concept of the Contact Hypothesis to design their programming.

The Contact Hypothesis

This hypothesis argues that under the right conditions, contact can reduce prejudice and, in turn, improve negative inter-group attitudes. (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1988). In order for contact to produce positive intergroup attitudes, it has to meet the four conditions specified by Allport. Namely, there has to be (1) equal group status within the situation,[40] (2) common goals, (3) intergroup cooperation (e.g. common goals have to be pursued *without* having internal competition between groups), and (4) support from authorities, laws or customs (Allport, 1954). In addition, according to the fifth criterion Pettigrew added, the contact situation *must* provide the opportunity for friendships to be forged between groups (Pettigrew, 1998). By achieving friendship status, individuals are in turn more likely to generalize their newfound experiences about the "other", with whom they have become friends, to the said other's group. Furthermore, this desired type of contact is more likely to occur when greater contact (per capita) is achieved within the designed contact scheme (Maoz, 2002).

Practitioners applying this model sought to bring individuals into contact with one another, assuming that the structured interpersonal communication – or dialogue- that transpired between individuals would lead them to develop more positive attitudes towards one another, become friends, and in turn, generalize their new found attitudes

towards each other's groups. As a result, they would strive to develop more cross-group friendships and therefore, be opposed to cross-group conflict.[41]

The Practice

Seeds of Peace

An example of a program modeled along the contact effects model is the Seeds of Peace (SP) program. Begun in 1993, it attempts to build peace by trying to forge friendships between its teenage participants. They bring these teenagers into contact at their campground in Maine, USA (and during follow-up meetings) with the aim, as SP argues, to provide opportunities for youth to forge friendships before they develop cross-group prejudices and hatred for one another. Thus, for example, in their description of its Middle East Program, SP explain,

> Seeds of Peace has focused primarily on *bringing Arab and Israeli teenagers together before fear, mistrust and prejudice blind them* from seeing the human face of their enemy. Seeds of Peace goes beyond international agreements and treaties. *It reverses the legacy of hatred by nurturing lasting friendships that become the basis for mutual understanding and respect*. By training these young leaders in conflict resolution skills, Seeds of Peace helps them become the seeds from which an enduring peace will grow. (Seeds of Peace).[42]

As part of their effort, SP has brought: (1) Israeli, Palestinian Jordanian, and other Middle Eastern teenagers (e.g. Moroccans, Tunisians, Qataris and Yemenites) together, in order to build peace in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, (2) Indian and Pakistani teenagers, to try to build peace in the context of their inter-state conflict,

(3) teens from the Balkans (including the former Yugoslavia): Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia (and Kosovo), Montenegro. Macedonia, Croatia and Albania to try to build peace with respect to their former ethnopolitical conflict, and (4) Afghani and (5) Greek and Turkish Cypriot youths, to build peace within the contexts of each of their respective ethnopolitical conflicts.

During the camp, Seeds of Peace practitioners maintain the five requisite conditions specified by Pettigrew (which includes Allport's four criteria), in the hope of being able to alter the negative intergroup attitudes of the youth campers. Firstly, equality is ensured in the situation by the requirement that all campers wear identical green Seeds of Peace T-shirts, meet in a "neutral location" – in a location that is not considered that of any of the groups involved, and speak in English. Secondly and thirdly, the camp runs activities like the "Olympics," which are organized to ensure cooperation devoid of cross-group competition. Fourthly, SP has obtained the official sanction necessary for contact to succeed – support from authorities. All participants have been hand-selected by their governments. Fifth and finally, they create opportunities for friendships to be developed, and further -- to be maintained, through follow-up activities.

Follow-up activities include conferences, workshops (held for example in Jerusalem) and Internet chat opportunities. As part of these, SP provides participants with educational and professional experiences in an effort to prolong the interpersonal dialogue experiences that their camp contact experiences afforded. It is SP's hope then that these new found friendships will be maintained once the teens have returned to

their conflict-context-ridden environments. (For more about the program, see Wallach, 2000 and Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, 2007).

Finally, SP assumes that the development of friendships will lead to peacemaking between the groups. Therefore, it is critical to point out that they specifically select teens from each of the above named places, which they perceive as holding elite status or leadership potential. They believe that these youths' new found friendships will have an impact on their political views and so in turn directly influence peace-making back at home. They hope peacemaking will be directly influenced by these same youths when they transform into their respective groups' future political leaders.

Israeli-Palestinian Dialogue Groups

In addition to Seeds of Peace, there exist numerous examples of sponsored dialogue groups who work along the same principles of the contact effects model. There are several for example, targeting Israelis and Palestinians, which are organized by the Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), Givat Haviva and Neve Shalom/Wahat Al Salam (Oasis of Peace). These work along the same principles as SP, but also target adults, and tend to be shorter and are typically "one-offs". A *one-off* intervention transpires during a single meeting that lasts a day (or a few days at most). Therefore, even when organized according to Allport's four criteria, they provide little opportunity to meet Pettigrew's fifth criterion. While they *may* offer the opportunity for friendships to form, they don't provide the needed continuity to

allow for them to flourish, especially vital given the challenges that on-going conflicts pose.

SAWA Lebanon

A final example of contact effects I include here to help illustrate this PC practice comes from UNICEF's *SAWA* (*Together*) initiative. SAWA brought together Palestinian, Druze, Maronite Christian, and Sunni and Shi'a Muslim youth who were of differing social status to participate in their peace camps. The program involved a number of components, including the peace camp, which began in 1989, near the end of the Lebanese Civil-War (1975 to 1989). The camp lasted until shortly thereafter in 1991. During 1989, SAWA held 34 summer peace camps and 79-day camps for 29,000 children, and in 1990, 60 summer camps and 155-day camps for an additional 30,000 children, such that by the end of the initiative in 1991, 100,000 Lebanese children had participated (Anderson, 1999). (See also Dibo, 2005 for more information about SAWA).

SAWA's camps were modeled along the contact hypothesis. They sought to give Lebanese youth a chance to get to "know one another and to learn about their country through discovery and sharing and enable the children to live together positively, sharing human, social and relational values through creative and recreational activities" (Anderson 1999, p. 99). They were organized in an effort to meet the five requirements of the contact hypothesis (and in addition with respect to equality – sought to achieve this within the situation given that the camps were comprised of children from differing social status). Most pointed from among the four

criteria met was the official support it received from UNICEF. UNICEF's support apparently convinced parents, otherwise opposed to allowing their children to participate, to attend the camps. For example, Christian parents reportedly allowed their children to participate because of UNICEF's sponsorship and guarantee of neutrality and safe passage for their children, despite the fact that the camps took place in Muslim controlled areas.

Model III: Media-Technology Effects

The Assumed Problem

Practitioners who adopted the media-technology effects approach to PC believed the root causes of conflict to be primitiveness, for example, illiteracy.

The Solution

The reverse of primitiveness, modernity, these practitioners argued, was therefore, synonymous with peace. In order that peace prevails, the so-called primitive masses had to, therefore, be eliminated. According to these practitioners, modernizing them could eliminate primitive peoples. They could be modernized through the introduction of that which was modern - technology and democracy. In turn democratic peace would prevail.

During the heyday of efforts to use this model, i.e. the 1950's and 1960's, ethnopolitical conflicts had already begun to predominate, but among interstate conflicts, de-colonization conflicts still accounted for the bulk of interstate conflicts. In this respect, the focus of practitioners using this model was on the preventing of the (re-) occurrence of conflict between newly independent states and their former colonizers, and to a lesser extent, on the prevention of new ethnopolitical conflicts. These programs were run alongside both the message effects free flow propaganda-public diplomacy and contact effects modeled peace communication interventions, but clearly held different assumptions about what were the root causes of conflict.

Theoretical Underpinnings

The theories that correlate with the assumptions of this model combined (1) a brand of technological determinism subsumed under modernist traditions and (2) freedom of expression & democracy interdependence theories with (3) democratic peace theory.

Modernist Technological Determinist Theories

The first part of the equation for this model begins with the modernist technological approach. Its underlying premise – i.e. that literacy necessarily leads to modernity - was best argued by Daniel Lerner. His approach was rooted in the technological deterministic or strong *media* (as opposed to *message*) effects approach of the Toronto School of communication scholars, beginning with the work of Harold Innis. In 1958, Lerner argued that communication, as measured by the technology of literacy, was the causal result of urbanization. In turn, he argued, literacy generated greater degrees of communication, as measured by "media participation" - newspaper, radio ownership and cinema attendance density rates. Media participation, in turn, generated higher literacy rates. Invoking a variant of freedom of information and democracy interdependence theory, he subsequently argued that the combination of greater media participation, with literacy, would lead to greater democratic participation. He used voting figures to measure the latter.

Lerner explained the modernizing role of the technology of literacy in his own words, "persons in the world were to be effected directly... by the communication media" (Lerner, p. 53)[43], and even though he did not define literacy to be a technology, his technological deterministic approach to it was clear. He argued that, "literacy is the basic personal skill that underlines the whole modernizing sequence." (p. 64). By teaching people, particularly in rural areas where literacy was not “naturally occurring”, how to read and write, they would begin to consume and produce media. Doing so would in turn improve their literacy abilities, and together, lead them to become involved in reading and producing of newspapers and in turn, learn how to vote. The end result would be democracy where it previously did not exist.

Invoking a positivist approach, Lerner concluded that technologies (like literacy) not only modernize along an essentialist historical path, but they do so *universally*. "[That model] follows an autonomous historical logic... each phase tends to generate the next phase by some mechanism which operates independently of cultural or doctrinal variations." (p. 61). “The same basic [Northern] model [of modernization] reappears in virtually all modernizing societies on all continents of the world, regardless of variations in race, color and creed." (Lerner, p. 46)

The Practice

Practitioners whose work reflected the same kind of thinking as Lerner, assumed that the introduction of new media technology (e.g. literacy) into situations of conflict, especially in a rural areas, was the method by which communication could be

applied to help manage conflict. Firstly, it would bring about democracy. Secondly, applying democratic peace theory, these practitioners assumed that democracy would in turn establish peace. In short, the media-technology effects practitioners believed that if they introduced media technology (i.e. literacy) into a situation of conflict, they could bring about the entire modernist process Lerner spoke of, and, in addition, bring about peace.

Thus, from the synthesis of these arguments was born a policy of media technology effects in which PC practitioners believed that by introducing media technologies, a chain of events would necessarily occur, which would lead to the inevitable modernist result: the establishment of liberal peace. Technology would modernize the primitive masses who necessarily, would become more educated (because they were now literate), politically involved (because they now could read and write news), more free (because they were now voting) and therefore, non-violent. *Modern democratic people*, as this line of reasoning goes, are by definition non-violent. Influencing this chain of events via the introduction of technology would, therefore, create world peace. The kind of peace was, however, uncritically specified. Practitioners simply referred to cessation of violence between states. Therefore, we can assume practitioners uncritically meant that the introduction of literacy would lead to negative peace.[44]

UNESCO World Literacy Campaigns

UNESCO and UNDP's Experimental World Literacy Programme represents the original and quintessential example of the media-technology effects

'modernization through literacy' approach to peace communication. These programs were launched following UNESCO's establishment of World Literacy Day in 1966. They originally ran between 1967 to 1973 and have continued in other forms since, as for example through UNESCO's "Education for All" Campaigns. The programs focused squarely and solely on literacy as the chief agent for making peace.

At the inception of the idea for these programs, in 1964, then Director-General of UNESCO, René Maheu wrote,

> But *to bring literacy to adults on a mass scale* will have no chance of success without the understanding and active support of the general public, since it calls for nothing less than a general mobilization of all mankind. This is so not only because of the funds it would require but, more important, because *the very unity of mankind is at stake*. At a time when science is opening the gateway to the stars, it is unthinkable that two-fifths of mankind should still be prisoners of ancestral darkness. Or are we to have two types of human beings – one for the stars, the other for the caves? *There could be no hope of peace if we tolerated an iniquity as flagrant as this unequal division of the benefit of progress.* (Maheu, 1964).[45]

Since then, these projects have continued, as for example, on the occasion of World Literacy Day, 2002, during which time UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in his press release number SG/SM/8353/OBV/286, made even more clear the logic of these interventions, declaring,

> *Literacy is essential* to the development and health of individuals, communities and countries. *It is a condition for people's effective participation in the democratic process. It is the basis for the written communication and literature that have long provided the main channel for cross-cultural awareness and understanding.* And, at the

> same time, it is the most precious way we have of expressing, preserving and developing our cultural diversity and identity. *Literacy, in short, is a prerequisite for peace.*[46] (UNDPI, 2008)

Since they first began in the 1960s, these programs have come to assume a more embedded approach to literacy acquisition. By embedded I mean they *embed* the effects of these within cultural practices (Evans, 1995). That is, they have been less deterministic with respect to their assumptions about whether they in fact can *necessarily* achieve peace. For example, in their description of a Regional Conference in Support of Global Literacy, held in 2007, UNESCO wrote, “As a key instrument for lifelong learning, indispensable for effective participation in social and economic life and *essential for peace, literacy is a very important issue in the region.*”[47] (UNESCO, 2007).

More recently, their programs have indeed not focused solely on literacy promotion, which was the case in the past, but also on its *combination* with skill training. Nevertheless, the more deterministic brand of policy statements are still being made today. One example can be found from The White House Conference on Global Literacy, which was launched in an effort to boost the efforts of UNESCO’s LIFE (Literacy Initiative for Empowerment), USAID and the US State Department and US Department of Education effort to eradicate illiteracy, to which the 2007 conference noted above was a follow-up. In a letter to the conference, American First Lady Laura Bush wrote, “Global literacy is the most important long-term investment we can make to secure the world’s peace and prosperity for all generations.” (White House Conference on Global Literacy).

Model IV: Mediated Contact Effects

The Assumed Problem

Practitioners making use of the mediated contact effects model held the same set of assumptions concerning the root cause of conflict as did contact effects practitioners, with one exception. These practitioners held one additional stipulation, or simply emphasized it to a much greater extent. In scenarios of ethnopolitical conflict, they argued, adversaries are typically segregated from one another (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998), and/or the number of people who can be purposively brought into direct contact to participate in contact experiments is too limited to be able to effectively use contact to manage conflict. In other words, they argued that it is impossible to reach the amount of contact necessary to effectively build peace via interpersonal communication. Practitioners intentionally adopted this model beginning in the 1990s.[48] By the time they did so, efforts to use the protectionist-dependency message effects model had begun and already ceased, whereas one of the other message effects subtypes, the free-flow propaganda model continued to be used, as too, the contact effects, and media-technology effects models. In addition, the remaining two variants of the message effects model, the (embedded) factor of production effects model, the self-efficacy effects model, and (soon thereafter), the reconciliation effects model where beginning to be adopted alongside it. In other words, the 1990s proved to be the period of great diversification in attempts to apply communication to the problem of political conflict.

These variants and models began to operate when ethnopolitical conflicts predominated, and further when conflict, following the end of the Cold War, began to decline. In their case, the mediated contact effects practitioners were, in many respects, responding less to the geographic distance between ethnopolitical groups than to constructed separation. Regardless of whether or not the separation amounted to formal segregation between groups in conflict, it nevertheless had to be bridged remotely.

The Solution

Given their assumptions, these practitioners argued that the tool for managing conflict was what I will refer to as "mediated contact". They subscribed to the logic of the contact hypothesis, but believed that contact could only be operationalized via the use of mass media. By using mass mediated forms of communication, they could create the opportunity for contact where it otherwise did or could not exist. Specifically, they subscribed to a brand of technological determinism known as *homogenization theory*.

Homogenization Theory's Underpinning

Homogenization theory was developed by Harold Innis. Innis argued that "media that emphasize space," or lightweight and, therefore, easily portable media such as paper, predispose populations to homogenize across national boundaries (Innis, 1972). In other words, as James Carey, who later updated Innis's work

explained, space binding media necessarily break down nationalism. (Carey, 1968) This breakdown functions to create a global village that enables remote groups to enter into contact with one another. In summary, space-binding media mediate contact virtually.

The Practice

It should be noted that most (though not all) practitioners subscribed to Innis's deterministic approach. That is most, but not all, assumed mass media to be overly deterministic. Irregardless of whether the five requirements of the contact hypothesis were adhered to, they believed that by simply mediating representations of conflict, groups would become friends, and, in turn, unite together in peace. (See Warshel, 1999 regarding the overemphasis placed on mass mediation for achieving peace.) Those practitioners that did *not* ascribe to the deterministic aspect of homogenization theory, nevertheless, still argued on behalf of the utility mass media afforded for bringing distant people into contact with one another, including for participating in ritual bonding practices (e.g. watching the same television program at the same time). Finally, while no applicable theorist combines the contact hypothesis with homogenization theory, practitioners applying the mediated contact effects model combined them.

Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian *Sesame Street* and *Stories*

Examples of interventions modeled along the mediated contact effects model are the cases I will discuss in Part II. These include two seasons of Israeli and

Palestinian *Sesame Street*, and one season of Jordanian *Sesame Street.* These programs included in their first season: Sesame Workshop, Israeli Educational Television (IETV) and Palestinian Al-Quds' Educational TV's Israeli/Palestinian *Rechov Sumsum/Shara'a Simsim* (Israeli/Palestinian *Sesame Street)*. In their second season, these were the Israeli HOP!'s *Sippuray Sumsum (*Israeli *Sesame Stories)*, Palestinian Al-Quds' Educational TV's *Hikayat Simsim* (Palestinian *Sesame Stories*) and Jordan Pioneers' *Hikayat Simsim* (Jordanian *Sesame Stories*). These programs, produced by Sesame Workshop in conjunction with the aforementioned local television professionals, in addition to local educators, sought to use mediated contact to try to promote "tolerance and mutual respect" between their three to seven year-old audience members within the context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

In the first season, the television programs sought to achieve mutual respect between Jewish-Israeli, Palestinian-Israeli and Palestinian children. According to Charlotte Cole and other members of the program's affiliated research team, the first season, which aired in April 1998, sought to "demystify and break down cultural stereotypes by introducing young Palestinian and Israeli children to one another." (Cole et al, 2003, p. 410). In particular, they sought to use "cross-over" segments as their mediated setting for attempting to achieve this. That is, they brought Israeli characters from their street (symbolizing their state) into contact with Palestinian characters from their street (symbolizing their future state) in order to simulate contact between the two groups across the divide. As Cole et al explained, both the Israeli and Palestinian series included, "'cross-over' segments, that is, segments in which

characters who inhabit the Israeli street (*Rechov Sumsum*) visit their friends on the Palestinian street (*Shara'a Simsim*) and vice versa." (Cole et al, 2003). In other words, Al Quds TV, IETV and Sesame Workshop sought to actively use the television programs as a way to homogenize or bridge the separation between Israelis and Palestinians.

The second season (though this was the first season for the Jordanian audience), began airing in 2003. During that season, the producers sought to also encourage tolerance and mutual respect with Jordanian children. However, during the second season, they instead made use of "parallel stories." That is, they inserted segments from each of the separate television programs in order to juxtapose images of the in- and out- group/s, for the purposes of de-mystifying the differences between them and to attempt to evoke impressions of the possibility of contact. In other words, the producers of the second season opened a window onto what was going on next door, seemingly across the neighbor's yard or behind the barriers that separated them, in order to evoke the concept or interest in contact. In light of the fact that the actual contact was more muted during the second season, according to their press-release hailing its start, Sesame Workshop announced that they would, nevertheless, remain focused on trying to achieve mutual respect, understanding and tolerance. Accordingly, they explained:

> At a time when television and other media are transmitting difficult news, *Sesame Stories* will encourage children to appreciate similarities and differences in their own culture and others. *Sesame Stories* celebrates the diversity of the human experience and examines that

> diversity from within the child's own home and community, as well as in broader societal contexts… . Based on the world-renowned children's series *Sesame Street*, the centerpiece of each *Sesame Stories* episode is a tale chosen for its ability to illuminate the core themes of tolerance, child self-empowerment, empathy, and respect. (Sesame Workshop, 2003).

In their summative evaluation following the second season, Sesame Workshop noted that, in particular, their emphasis was to provide Jewish-Israeli children with opportunities for mediated contact, while instead trying to evoke pride among Palestinian-Israelis and Palestinians, and in addition, for the latter, security. Thus, they sought to provide "Jewish-Israeli children with opportunities to meet their Palestinian-Israeli neighbors and for Palestinian-Israelis to see themselves depicted proudly on-screen" (Arafat, Bar-Lev, Abou Shmeiss and Abyad, 2003, p. 3). And for Palestinian children, to create,

> a setting that was both sufficiently familiar as well as novel, and that was able to capture a sense of fantasy and security for Palestinian children. The Palestinian team also examined the appeal of live-action segments in order to help answer the team's questions of how to depict diverse Palestinian children engaged in activities that foster pride in oneself and one's culture, respect for others, and a sense of hope for the future." (Arafat, Bar-Lev, Abou Shmeiss and Abyad, 2003, p. 3).[49]

With respect to the homogenization theory, the television programs, for their part never, however, assumed a deterministic approach in line with that of Innis. That is (and to their credit), they never assumed that by watching television, audiences would necessarily homogenize. Instead, they actively constructed the messages characters in the program would say in an effort to try to forge homogenization across

audience members. In addition, they hoped that by having the medium of television at their disposal, they could target all Israeli and Palestinian children, whom they otherwise had no opportunity to put into contact with one another.

Finally, with respect to the contact hypothesis, the television programs had authoritative support in that they provided a scenario in which (1) equality within the situation existed, i.e. everyone in the television program was represented as being from the same socio-economic status, (2) participants were not shown as being in competition with each other, and (3) when presented as interacting together, the participants cooperated with one another. (4) They also met repeatedly in the program and only had limited degrees of separation between them (e.g. the main characters all had friends in common and those whom they met also had relatives in common), such that the opportunity for the characters to establish friendships actually existed. Finally, 5) the television program had authoritative support. It was sponsored by an internally recognized "neutral" third party – Sesame Workshop, and within their respective ethnopolitical groupings, was co-produced by respected producers of children's television programming.[50] I will return to the contents and nature of this PC intervention, which was modeled along the scheme of mediated contact, in more depth in chapter four, given that it is the case study under discussion in Part II.

Macedonian *Nashe Maalo*

The Search for Common Ground (SFCG) Macedonian youth targeted television program *Nashe Maalo* (*Our Neighborhood*) is another example of an effort to apply communication to the problem of political conflict, using the mediated

contact effects model as its guide. The television program targets seven to 12-year-old ethnic Albanian, Macedonian, Roma and Turkish youth in an attempt to alter their negative inter-group prejudices of one another. The television program's curricular goals are to promote intercultural understanding, offer strategies for conflict prevention in a multicultural context, and teach conflict resolution skills for dealing with conflict in everyday life.

With respect to homogenization theory, the program provided simulated or vicarious experiences of contact. And pointedly, in her description of the television program, Lisa Shochat, who at the time was manager of development and research for Common Ground Productions, SFCG's media division, argued, "the *lack of interethnic contact* [between Macedonian youth in conflict] *gives rise to prejudice* and fear, *sowing the seeds of* instability and, potentially, of deadly *conflict*." (Shochat, 2003, p. 81).[51] Therefore, the television program must strive, she argued, to build "tolerance and understanding across these barriers in Macedonia" (Shochat, 2003, p. 81). Furthermore, as she argued with respect to one of the ethnic groups party to the ethnopolitical tensions in Macedonia, the television program holds "the potential to affect this [negative] image of the Roma positively by depicting activities and occupations that counter ingrained, negative stereotypes." (Shochat, 2003, p. 91). That is, by mediating contact and doing so specifically by having the characters provide knowledge that runs counter to stereotypes (as reminiscent of the message effects model), stereotypes, in turn, could be altered, she concluded.

As with the case with the Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian *Sesame Street* programs, the curricular goals of *Nashe Maalo* actively tried to script the contact hypothesis into their series, not assuming that because contact was mediated, it would magically homogenize their audience. In scenarios of interpersonal contact, the five criteria of the hypothesis attempt to limit or force pro-social interactions that overcome stereotypical assumptions or observations of the out-group. With mass communication, non-stereotyped pro-social interactions instead are or have to be represented and expressed via the characters as specified messages. To this effect, again, *Nashe Maalo* portrayed the characters expressing messages that are pertinent to representing contact in its "perfect" form, whereby the *dialogue between characters* fit the five criteria of the hypothesis.

Thus, in *Nashe Maalo* the characters of each of the respective ethnic groups were (1) portrayed as equal, (2) cooperated across their group divides, (3) avoided competition between one another (or at least demonstrated how they resolved competition between themselves when it arose), and (4) were depicted as neighborhood friends. Whereas, 5) the television program itself has the seal of authoritative support that emanated from having the sponsorship of both SFCG and Sesame Workshop. Both organizations are valued at the international level and are perceived as neutral third party interveners.

As an important note, the Nashe Maalo intervention combined some other features apart from mediated contact with it. As is the case with many peace communication interventions, they do not always, or only conform to one model, but

may combine aspects of others simultaneously. In this case, *Nashe Maalo* also included direct contact effects. Their production team was specifically organized to comprise people representing each of the respective Macedonian ethnic groups. This was done not only as a method to ensure that each group's narratives were expressed in the program, but also to provide the opportunity for contact experiences among production team members which, in turn, could simultaneously, influence them.

Finally, *Nashe Maalo* also adopted an ecological (Huesman et al, 1996) or context focused approach (Connolly with Maginn, 1999) in their intervention. That is, in an effort to be able to simultaneously target people in the children's environment who potentially constituted their *opinion leader,* they combined out-reach materials in their effort. These included parent-teacher guides, a pop music video and CD, a children's magazine and an interactive website (www.nashemaalo.com).

Model V: (Embedded) Factor of Production Effects

The Assumed Problem

Proponents of the (embedded) factor of production effects model adopted one of two subtypes, with many projects in the earlier years fitting subtype A, and in the latter years, B. Proponents of subtype A, i.e. the *Factor of Production* subtype, argued that *underdevelopment* was the source of conflict. Proponents of the subtype B, i.e. the *Embedded Factor of Production* subtype, argued it was the result of *uneven development*, or *inequality.* In both cases, they were responding to ethnopolitical conflict. Accordingly, they believed, the lack of inputs to spur either state-level *development* or *even development* across all ethnopolitical groups within a given state generated conflict.

In other words, like the message effects proponents, they argued that a communication gap existed. However, in their case, the (embedded) factor of production effects proponents (both strands A and B) coded communication as *(technological) input*, and the message effects proponents, as *knowledge* (and for message effects subtypes B through D, also as *economic commodities)*. Furthermore, the (embedded) factor of production effects proponents argued that the gap (*ignorance)* did not lead to prejudice, and in turn conflict. Rather, the gap (*under or uneven development*) led to desperation or frustration, which in turn led to conflict. This happened because the communication gap was not due to a lack of knowledge, but rather a lack of sufficient input into the production processes necessary to generate further or even development.

The Solution

Practitioners making these assumptions about the root sources of conflict argued in turn that its source (i.e. under-development or uneven development) could be removed by either (1) spurring development, or (2) closing the gap between the information haves and have-nots. The proponents of subtype A argued the former, and proponents of subtype B the latter.

Historical Beginnings of the Model

Links to Development Communication Practice

Practitioners began adopting the (embedded) factor of production approach in the 1990s. The origin of this model can be found in development communication models that date back to the 1960s (e.g. as related to the theoretical work of Schramm, 1964, and as described in practice in Sim 1954) during which time technological innovation and production theories were being applied. Interventions designed prior to the 1990s according to the development component of this model were therefore naturally limited in scope. That is, they sought only to spur economic development, but did not, in turn, link development to conflict.

Technological Production and Embeddedness

Initially, practitioners applying the (embedded) factor of production effects model assumed a somewhat deterministic approach with regards to the importance of technology and its ability to *necessarily* breed efficiency. However, these factors of production practitioners typically (and quickly) began to adopt the more embedded

approaches found in subtype B, as too, more practitioners of the subtype B persuasion began to enter into operation.

Contrary to subtypes B through D of the message effects model (which viewed messages not just as powerful but as economic commodities), (embedded) factor effects practitioners saw communication instead as actual *factors of production*. In other words, the former sought to empower those in the South and give them a voice. They sought to give them a form of wealth – but they did not intend for that wealth to be invested, as though it were a factor of production that could spur their economic development. Rather, their intention was only to give them the power to speak and/or to not to be a position whereby their only option for obtaining information was from the North. The (embedded) factor of production effects model practitioners, by contrast, sought to encourage people (and eventually teach them) how to *invest* their newly acquired wealth and make it grow.

Theoretical Underpinnings

Practitioners extending the practice of the development communication model in the 1990s to the (embedded) factor of production effects approach combined two of three sets of theories in their efforts to create positive peace: (1) technological innovation and production – whether embedded or not with (2) capitalist peace theories or alternately with (3) its critical variant, which is rooted in theories of inequality and conflict.

Absolute or Relative Deprivation Theories

Specifically, subtype A factor of production practitioners argued in concert with (1) the *capitalist peace theorists'* (e.g. Gartzke, 2007) concept of *absolute deprivation,* while subtype B embedded factor of production practitioners adopted (2) the *conflict and inequality theorists*' concept of *relative deprivation theory* (e.g. Wimmer, 2002, Gurr, 2000).[52] With regards to the former, they stipulated that the resultant reduction in poverty would alleviate the desperation for resource acquisition, or anger, that drove conflict. And with regards to the latter, they argued that by ending structural violence against the information have-nots, who were typically ethnopolitical minorities, and replacing this with a situation of equality and or justice, the "aspiration-achievement gap" (Nelson, 1998 p. 22) that led to frustration and, in turn, violence on the part of ethnopolitical minorities, would close. (See Nelson, 1998, Wilson III 1998, and Gurr, 2000 for related discussions).

Capitalist Peace Theory

Capitalist peace theories, which, like democratic peace theorists, emanated out of the Manchester Liberal School, argue that facets of economic development or economic forces effectively manage conflict. Capitalist Peace has its roots in the philosophies of Montesquieu, Paine, Bastiat, Mill, Cobden, Angell, and John Stuart Mill, who "'saw market forces as "'Rapidly rendering war obsolete'" (Mill, 1902, p. 390 cited in Gartzke, 2007 p. 170). In addition, Schumpeter (1950) argued that it was not so much democracy (as the democratic peace theorists argued), but rather its interaction with capitalism that served as the foundation for liberal pacifism. In contrast to the democratic peace theorists, capitalist peace empiricists found that the

correlation between democracy and negative peace held only within advanced industrialized economies (See Mousseau, 2000; Hegre, 2000; and Mousseau, Hegre and Oneal, 2003, all cited in Gartzke, 2007). In other words, they found that it was not democracy, but rather economic development that serves as the glue for maintaining world order.

According to Erik Gartzke, capitalism and common interstate interests maintain peace. He measured the former through the combination of (1) economic development (individual level productivity, calculated by GDP, divided by population size), and (2) a rise of global capital financial markets, which allowed for new kinds of communication and competition. For example, it enabled financial or monetary policy coordination and integration (presumably owing to market size, robustness, and openness), which, in turn, provided, (3) states with common, rather than opposing interests. As a result, states would hold compatible foreign policy preferences (as measured by an agreement on UN agenda items, calculated by the UN General Assembly voting records).

Furthermore, he and his colleague, Quan Li explained that most democratic peace empiricists used trade in goods and services as their measure for capitalism (Gartzke and Li 2003 cited in Gartzke), but did not look closely enough at economic development (e.g. Maoz and Russet), and altogether ignored capital markets. Trade, Gartzke explained, may, however, in fact, be the least important variable with regards to the role capitalism plays in forging peace (Gartzke, 2007). He concluded that

democratic peace theorists, as a result, may therefore be confusing the role democracy plays in creating a negative peace.

Laissez-Faire Capitalist Innovation and Production. Factor of production practitioners who adopted capitalist peace theory, in applying technology to the problem of political conflict, therefore, emphasized the important function economic development played in peace. Specifically, they emphasized the role of *laissez-faire* capitalism. They endorsed a motto of "liberalization of communication infrastructure." In so doing, these practitioners did not pay attention to existing socio-economic gaps within the states in which they were intervening. In addition, they neither paid attention to the notion that economic relations are embedded in other structures, namely, political, social and military. Thus, they advocated the introduction of new communication technologies sans any prescriptive about who should be the recipients of these technologies or any accompanying laws to regulate the resultant outputs.

Embedded Technological Production (Comparative Institutional Approaches)

In its later phases, beginning in the late 1990s, most practitioners adopted both the more embedded and critical approach representative of subtype B. They argued that while technology needed to be introduced, it had to be (1) skillfully introduced, for example, by paying attention to issues of access and skill building with respect to technology adoption. These arguments relate to the writings of Wilber Schramm (Schramm, 1964)[53] and later, Ernest Wilson III. (1998, 2004).

In greater detail, according to Wilson III's discussion of "IT-as-embedded-factor-of production," "Not only can it [- Information Technologies (IT) -]

substantially improve domestic economic productivity, but can also make less-developed-countries much more competitive in global markets." (Wilson, 1998 p. 21). The increasing speed in which information can be transmitted, including by cutting out intermediaries, and at a decline in costs, enables for increased mobility. Increased mobility, in turn, generates greater amounts and types of interactions and can help improve efficiency in a multitude of services and industries because "IT is increasingly embedded in all sectors." That fact, "is what is making the revolution." Wilson III concluded.

Wilson III employed a *comparative institutional approach* in which he built on the earlier writings of Karl Polyani and Peter Evans (See Evans, 1996, whose work specifically describes the embedded nature of communication technologies and Polyani, 1957, whose work describes the embedded nature of economics more generally). Wilson III explained that factors of production - in this case – communication technologies - are embedded in social and political institutions. Therefore, he concluded, in his meta-analysis of relevant IT research,

> incorporating IT into an organization will fail to produce positive, sustainable results unless it is strategically and efficiently introduced, and carefully led and nurtured through re-training and organizational changes. This is true universally but especially in LDCs, since under-developed countries typically lack the necessary organizational skills to exploit advantages offered by new IT. Just dropping new computers into old structures does not gain efficiencies (Hanna, 1991; Hanna and Boyson, 1991; Sazanami and Edralin, 1992; Myers, 1991; Adkins, 1988; UNCSTD, 1997, cited in Wilson, 1998, p. 27).

Further, Wilson III went on a few years later to outline the seven embedded factors that should be considered when introducing new communication technologies. These included 1) physical access, (2) financial access, (3) cognitive access, (4) design access, (5) content access, (6) production access, (7) institutional access, and (8) political access. (Wilson, 2004**).**

Critical Capitalist Peace Theory And Concerns About Equitable Diffusion and Universal Access

Second, practitioners adopting the embedded factor of production subtype B effects approach argued that technological inputs have to be equitably diffused, as Wilson III also argued (1998). These practitioners felt that the problem was not so much one of underdevelopment but rather was much more a problem of uneven or unequal development - i.e. the existence of a communication gap that needed to be closed. Thus, combing theories of structural violence, or structural inequality with capitalist peace theory, they espoused what one might refer to as *critical capitalist peace theory*.

As Wilson III points out with respect to conflict management, “when new technologies are introduced into society, there is no guarantee that their benefits will be equitably allocated. New wealth generated by the introduction of new technologies may simply be captured by the powerful and the wealthy.” (Wilson III, 1998, p. 23). Similarly, peace communication practitioners who espoused the same ideology argued that programs trying to create peace by spurring economic development must introduce their initiatives by taking into account the context of the conflict and the

existing structural cleavages within the given conflict in which they, as practitioners, were intervening. This concern, consequently, is a point that has best been articulated by Peter Uvin, albeit with respect to the more general aid development work carried out by development practitioners (Uvin, 1998). In his case, Uvin takes this argument much further to warn that if aid practitioners do not heed the context of the environments in which they are operating, they may indirectly aid violence.

According to the work done by the UN Commission for Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD), which Wilson III discusses, heeding such ethical and critical concerns then meant that when practitioners introduced new technological factors, they had to couple these with an understanding of (1) organizational change, (2) learning opportunities and (3) the links between communication technology applications and specified development priorities (e.g. whether universal access was a prioritized goal within the given scenario). According to Wilson III, if these factors are not taken into account, populations excluded from communication technology acquisition and their use, namely have-nots, may face greater harm to their living, health and environmental standards, and in turn, the results might lead to reactionary forms of fundamentalism that pose a potential threat to the status quo – i.e. the stability of the haves. (Wilson 1998).

The Practice

Subtype A

As with most democratic peace scholars, who as Gartzke points out, did not think about capitalism “critically” (typically only using trade as their measure of capitalist impact), those designing programs modeled along the factor of production subtype A effects model did not specify what facets of capitalism mattered either. They neither emphasized trade in goods and services, nor capital markets with respect to trying to make peace. Instead, these practitioners focused on straight growth in GDP, using *aggregated* economic development figures. (Gartzke, 2007)

Separately from Gartzke’s critique, these practitioners neither pointed to what about economic forces specifically, or what kinds of economic forces, more generally, mattered. For example, did it matter whether these forces were organized capitalistically or socially, and or to what extent with respect to either? The practitioners only argued on behalf of generating economic development, namely by increasing the efficiency of the economic output of the individual information technology user.

Though not critical about it, thinking in specifics or even making direct references to capitalist peace theories, the projects factor of production effects practitioners created emphasized the development measure that Gartzke described. They focused on an increase in GDP, relative to population size, based on the increase in output generated via greater individual economic efficiency (whether the direct result of the technological input, or in combination with for, example, the seven “access” criteria Wilson III discussed). Second, they emphasized development growth

either *overall*, or as generated among *specific disadvantaged segments* of a state's population, usually rural dwellers, ethnopolitical minorities and/or women.

Subtype B

In the newer iterations of the embedded factor of production subtype B PC programs, rather than assuming a deterministic and a strictly capitalist peace approach, practitioners adopted a line of reasoning that was the same as that of Wilson III's. Out of fear that technological input would be squandered or misused in the production process, they instead designed their interventions by also including appropriate training in the use of these input.

Secondly, practitioners specifically directed their efforts towards information have-nots, rather than relying on laissez-faire capitalist modes of innovation and production. In situations of ethnopolitical conflict, they argued, if the goal was to promote economic development in order to close existing resource gaps, laissez-faire approaches would simply not work. This was the case, they argued, because human intervention was already involved in re-allocating inputs (or resources) in the first place and so *directed involvement* was required in order to ensure their equitable re-allocation.[54]

Leland Initiative Africa

As an example of these programs, beginning in the mid-1990s, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) established the *Leland Initiative*. Its aim was to diffuse Internet technologies to over twenty sub-Saharan African states. Initially, Leland reflected subtype A - factor of production effects. It

focused on technology and economic development. It sought to build telecentres in low access areas (e.g. within an African state). At the same time, it emphasized the modernist language of “leap-frogging.” Its proponents assumed that all Africa’s ailments would be resolved via a “technological revolution”. They paid no attention, for example, to the fact that the people they were targeting, in many cases, did not have the skills to use the Internet technologies they were delivering, let alone even electricity to power computers for accessing these technologies.

Later, the Leland Initiative adopted the embedded and critical approach of subtype B – *embedded* factor of production effects. Thus, for example, it coupled telecenter sites with training, and also sought to ensure that these were located in regions populated by state minorities and stateless nations. Telecenters became an especially popular way to try to achieve *universal access*. At the very least, they offered groups an affordable telecommuting option that was geographically proximate, no matter how remote (rural village) or isolated (mountainous) from communication resources, and its precursor - transportation, they were.

Consequently, Leland’s approach became more critical, in connection with the University of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM’s) *African Telematics Initiative*. CIDCM, like the newer iterations of embedded factor of production effects practitioners, sought to foster universal access. Universal access became code for trying to ensure that all citizens, regardless of to which ethnopolitical group they were member, would be within

accessible reach (geographically and politically) from an applicable information and communication technology (ICT) resource base. (Schware, 1999).

Thus, in concert with CIDCM, The Leland Initiative began to ask, "Will the Internet advance development in Africa?" Furthermore, wishing to connect this to questions about resource allocation and conflict, it asked, "Do the media promote or retard ethnic, religious, or class conflicts?" (CIDCM African Telematics webpage). Through asking these questions, USAID-Leland began adjusting its approach.

CABECA and ACACIA, Africa and PAN, Asia

In the 1990s, The Canadian International Development Research Center (IDRC) established regional programs like the Capacity Building for Electronic Communication in Africa (CABECA), and later ACACIA; and Pan Asia Networking (PAN) Initiatives for the purposes of promoting the growth of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in Africa and Asia. They sought, like Leland, to achieve the same development and, in turn, conflict management goals. From the beginning, however, IDRC paid more specific attention to matters of training, access and communication gaps of emphasis to subtype B. Thus, for example, ACACIA sought to demonstrate how ICTs could enable communities to solve their development problems in "*ways that build firmly on local goals, cultures, strengths, and processes*; build a body of knowledge capable of identifying the policies, technologies, approaches, and methodologies instrumental in *promoting the affordable and effective use of ICTs by marginalized communities*, such as women." (IDRC, About Acacia).[55] In their description of the first phase of the Acacia Initiative, IDRC stated:

Acacia will *work mainly with rural and disadvantaged communities*, and particularly their women and youth groups. Often these communities find themselves isolated from the ICT networks to which their urban counterparts increasingly have access. Yet at the same time these communities demonstrate enormous creativity and enterprise living in an environment with little in the way of services and information. With Acacia, IDRC intends to support this creativity and enterprise by *demonstrating the benefits of a local capacity to use information and communication in solving local development problems*." Acacia aims to achieve three mutually reinforcing objectives that combine to *promote equitable, sustainable, and self-directed development among disadvantaged and rural communities in sub-Saharan Africa*. (IDRC, Acacia Phase I).[56]

Model VI: Self-Efficacy Effects

The Assumed Problem

Self-efficacy effects modeled PC programs began to be employed in the 1990s, in response to ethnopolitical forms of conflict and school-based individual-level youth violence non-political conflicts. The root of conflict, according to practitioners who adopted this model, lay in the use of poor interpersonal communication skills. Lacking in the use of constructive peace promoting communication styles, people, in turn, became aggressive and employed violence to mediate problematic situations (rather than deferring to the use of non-violent forms of communication). They did not make use of constructive communication styles because they perceived themselves to not be sufficiently skilled in the use of such styles, and indeed were not skilled in their use.

The Solution

Practitioners operating along the logic of the self-efficacy effects model, therefore, concluded that if they could inspire belief in their *self-efficacy*, or perceived ability to verbalize their cross-group concerns within people, and do so through *integrative* or *promotive* forms of discourse, and also teach these people the skills necessary for expressing these needs, for example, verbally, rather than through fighting, the result would be people who discussed, rather than fought out their concerns. The latter result is essentially synonymous with Galtung's *negative peace*, or the absence of violence, albeit in individual rather than collective terms. In other words, practitioners thought that if participants learned to make use of non–conflict communication styles, and believed they were capable of achieving these styles of

communication, they would become adept at communicating their individual goals towards resolving group conflict. In turn, violent forms of communication would be removed from the group level-cross-group communication equation.

Self-Efficacy Theories

The imperative these self-efficacy effects practitioners placed on skill acquisition and self-efficacy has its foundations in the writings of Albert Bandura and his colleagues.[57] According to Bandura and colleagues, improvements in individual perceived levels of self-efficacy moderate one's behavior (Bandura, 1986; Bandura, Adams and Beyer, 1977). "Perceived self-efficacy is defined as people's judgments of their capabilities to organize and cause courses of action required to attain designated types of performances. It is concerned not with the skills one has but rather with the judgment of what one can do with whatever skills one possesses." (Bandura, 1986, p. 391). In other words, it is the "conviction that one can successfully execute the behavior required to produce the outcome" (Bandura, 1977, p. 126). Whether discussed in relation to either Bandura's *Theory of Social Learning* or *Social Cognitive Theory (SCT)*, self-efficacy effects practitioners emphasized the facet running through both theories – *perceived self-efficacy* (confidence in one's ability to be skillful at the given behavior) and *self-efficacy* (the actual skill) as these pertained to reducing aggression and violence. Self-efficacy and its perception are also thought to play important roles in reducing aggression and violence (e.g. Huesman et al, 1996; Murray et al, 1999; Orpinas et al, 2000).

Application of The Theories of Self-Efficacy

When applied to conflict, the goal then is to get people to perform non-conflict communication, or constructive peace promoting styled-behaviors. These communicatory behaviors can be achieved by enhancing a person's perception that they can successfully execute such behaviors (e.g. engage in integrative dialogue with their partners to conflict). By then implementing such behaviors, they meet the peace communication practitioner's defined goal for *peace* - a reduction in violence. This reduction in violence, according to proponents of this model, occurs by mere virtue of the fact that individuals may (due to their perception and the combination of actual skill building) become capable of engaging in non-conflict communication styles. Groups, meanwhile, may become adept at using conventional politics rather than violent protest and so peace too, is achieved between them.

However, it should be clarified, regardless of whether the use of such communicatory behavior (i.e. the intervening variables) in turn achieve the sought after outcome (i.e. the final dependent variable of peace), the individual's or group's desired outcome is never guaranteed. Performing the specified communicatory behavior may or may not lead to the desired outcome expectancy (from the perspective of the individual or individuals within the wider context of intergroup conflict being targeted by the peace communication intervention). A desired outcome expectancy in the context of conflict would be for the performance of constructive peace promoting communication behavior to result in the out-groups partner to conflict acquiescing to the in-groups desired conflict-ending goal.

Selective Application of Bandura's Model

Practitioners, it must be noted, have not taking into account outcome expectances. You can teach people to behave non-violently, but this does not mean doing so will actually help them achieve their goals. And a caveat worth noting here is that according to Bandura, if they are (or as a result become) politically cynical and distrust the system, they, in fact, become the *most likely* candidates for pursuing military action, (Bandura 1986, p. 450).

It is also important to clarify that in their application of Bandura's concept of self-efficacy these practitioners used his concept of *self-efficacy* not *collective-efficacy*. Collective efficacy pertains to, "judgments about group capabilities to make decisions, to enlist supporters and resources, to devise and carry out appropriate strategies, and to withstand failures and reprisals." (Bandura, 1986, p. 450). As a result, when operationalizing perception, practitioners have focused on the role of *aggregated* perceived self-efficacy in moderating individual's level of aggression and violence. Thus, if applied at the group level, for example -- by channeling what Gurr would call violent protest into the use of conventional politics, -- practitioners using this model would not have taken into account the burden of collective organization and decision-making.

Applying Bandura's Self-Efficacy Knowledge Acquisition Methods

Bandura argued that there were four methods by which a person could acquire knowledge about their self-efficacy, all of which were integrated into their eventual self-efficacy judgment about their ability to carry out specified behaviors and which

were differently weighted. The four methods include, “performance attainment,” (2) “vicarious experiences of observing the performances of others,” (3) verbal persuasion and allied types of social influences that one possesses certain capabilities,” (4) and “physiological states from which people partly judge their capabilities” (Bandura, 1986, p. 399). Thus for example, SCT (Bandura, 1986) emphasized the role of observation in heightening one’s confidence in achieving a given behavior (and or attaining mastery of the given behavior).

Thus, in application, aggression and violence could be moderated by for example: (1) getting participants to act out simulated behaviors as part of peace communication interpersonal communication interventions, or (2) modeling the behavior for them via mass mediated channeled PC interventions (allowing them to observe others perform non-aggressive behaviors).

Peace Promoting Communication Styles Theoretical Underpinnings

The peace-promoting communication styles that practitioners have taught to groups engaged in political conflict in order that they stop fighting or stop applying distributive (*win-lose*) aggressive forms of communication in tense situations have included: (1) integrative (*win-win*) styles of communication, and 2) promotive forms of communication. The latter include *invitational discourse* (Foss & Griffin, 1995), *cooperative argument* (Maoz & Ellis, 2006), *dialogue* (Gergen, 1999), and *reconciliation* (Bar-On, 1995; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004).

The Practice

Program curricula modeled along the self-efficacy effects model aims to equip participants with the combined perceived self-efficacy and self-efficacy necessary for being able to communicate with their partners to conflict using peace promoting communication styles. These programs have attempted to equip their participants with these beliefs and skills, typically either by making use of interpersonal forms of communication to train participants in the specified behavior, or by making use of mass communication to enable audiences to observe the behavior in question (e.g. on television), to be able in turn, to replicate it.

American School Violence Intervention Programs

Practitioners who adopted the self-efficacy PC effects model with respect to interpersonally channeled interventions typically applied these within schools in an effort to stem non-political based school violence (See for example Huesman et al, 1996; Orpinas et al, 2000, both regarding school violence intervention programs in the US).

An example of a self-efficacy effects intervention also channeled through interpersonal communication, but rather emphasizing political forms of violence, is the UNICEF, Sri Lankan Ministry of Education National Institute of Education (NIE), and the Quaker Peace and Service NGO sponsored youth targeted, *Education for Conflict Resolution Programme (ECRP)*. ECRP was started in 1992. It was based on the goal of promoting perceived self-efficacy in *general terms* (as opposed to promoting it with respect to specific behaviors). In their curriculum, they discussed the

goal of promoting self-efficacy (skills) in the use of non-conflict communication styles through mastery acquisition.

Specifically, they trained participants in (1) communication skills such as, on the one hand, how to listen with empathy or "without judging, evaluating or moralizing" and, on the other, how to "persuade others without coercion", (2) problem solving skills, such as how to negotiate and protest nonviolently. The practitioners combined the former self-efficacy skill training with efforts to promote participant's perceived self-efficacy, but again, did so in rather general terms.

They did so through the promotion of what they termed *affirmation skills*. Promotion of affirmation skills, for example, included teaching participants how to "perceive problems positively and creatively." These skills also included what really related more to *self-concept* in social psychology terminology. For example, it meant that practitioners strove to develop and sustain participants' positive self-image, and to value their "own personal worth" (See Kolucki, 1996 for more detail). Such a focus, again, meant a generalized promotion of self-efficacy, not tied to any one specific behavior, and thus, was rather more akin to the promotion of self-concept and not an especially good application of self-efficacy.

Finally, ECRP also taught interpersonal skills, which included pushing participants to "relate oneself to the outer world and people with a positive attitude." The latter can again be related to perceived self-efficacy but in very general terms, and so constitutes a somewhat poor application of self-efficacy. Given that most political conflict programs typically neglect to isolate such behavior and therefore apply the

concepts of self-efficacy too loosely, I chose to use the example of UNICEF's Sri Lankan program, because it is *indeed* rather representative of the norm of self-efficacy PC modeled programs.

Parenthetically, this last point illustrates the importance of describing the theoretical underpinnings of peace communication programs, as I outline in this chapter. Only by outlining the relationship of the theory to the practice will it be possible for scholars to adequately assess and evaluate whether the programs are effective and whether and how to improve them. As UNICEF's Sri Lankan program demonstrates, a program may simply do a bad job of applying the theories (knowingly or unknowingly). Consequently, I will return to this point in Chapter 3, where I review empirical evidence about the efficacy of the theories that underpin the seven peace communication models of practice.

In the case of UNICEF's Sri Lankan program, the goal of the program is "to create awareness of and to strengthen beliefs in non-violent means of conflict resolution" (Kolucki, 1996 p. 34). In other words, though their application is not precise, in terms of policy, UNICEF and its affiliates in Sri Lanka clearly wanted to make the program's participants aware that non-violence could be a means for expressing group concerns. They furthermore wanted to strengthen their participants' beliefs in the importance of non-violence.[58]

Second, they sought, "to develop skills and attitudes among young people to enable them to resolve conflict through peace means" (Goals as described in Kolucki, 1996, p. 34) In other words, through the task mastery training they (assumedly)

provided, ECRP sought to develop young peoples' skills in how to communicate using non-conflict styles and to promote their perceived self-efficacy (expectances) with respect to their beliefs in their ability to carry out the given behaviors – i.e. use of peace promoting communication styles. In addition, they sought to "promote an understanding among different ethnic, religious and social groups," and "to strengthen values of tolerance, compassion, understanding and respect for others." (Kolucki, 1996, p. 34)

Nayaa Baato Nayaa Paailaa Nepal

A mass communication channeled example of a self-efficacy effects peace communication program is the Nepalese *Nayaa Baato Nayaa Paailaa* (*Treading Upon a New Path*) radio soap opera. Begun in 1996, it is produced by SFCG and the Antenna Foundation Nepal (AFN) non-governmental organization (NGO). It is predicated upon observation as the method for enhancing self-efficacy. In its case, it tries to get its youth audience to replicate the non-aggressive and non-violent communication the characters in the television program model for them.

SFCG and AFN hoped that by watching the program, the audience would learn how to practice peace promoting communication styles, improve their belief in their ability to use said communication styles, and begin using them. In turn, SFCG and AFN hoped, the audience's greater belief in their ability to use those styles, combined with the actual learned skill of using these styles, might lead them to communicate non-violently with their Nepalese partners in conflict, i.e. other groups and castes.

One of the general objectives *Nayaa Baato Nayaa Paailaa* (*NBNP)* hoped to achieve was the "strengthened capacity of the target groups in conflict mitigation at local and national levels." As part of the conflict mitigation techniques they sought to instill in their youth audience, they hoped that they the youth would learn to "analyze the pressures on them in terms of what choices they have and how to respond to those pressures." Furthermore, they hoped the youth would "utilize the tools of dialogue and discussion to prevent and resolve disputes at personal and community levels."(Antenna Foundation program description webpage).

Most pointedly, in their curriculum, SFCG and AFN hoped that the youth audience for *NBNP* would come away from watching the television programming believing, that "they have choices", "that they can have an impact on root causes by working together across dividing lines", "that they have a role in community building"; "that cooperation with elders is effective and possible"; "that discussion, debate and understanding are better alternatives to solving conflict"; and that "they have a role as conveners/peacemakers in their communities" Secondly, they also wanted adults to, in turn, "believe that cooperation with youth can help resolve societal/community problems". (Described by Rolt in Loewenberg & Bonde, 2007, p. 139-140). In this vein, the radio program's concern with effectively empowering their target audience's perceived levels of self-efficacy became apparent.

Model VII: Reconciliation Effects

Historical Background To the Concept of Reconciliation

The seventh or *Reconciliation Effects* model emerged in the mid 1990s. In many respects, however, it is a product of WWII, specifically of the Holocaust, or the genocide of Jews by German Christians. However, engagement with the holocaust typically only began with "the third generation" of both the *perpetrators* and their *victims.* Therefore, efforts to manage its political repercussions have only emerged years later. (See Dorff 1992, for why reconciliation was not possible with the first generation, cited in Albeck, Adwan & Bar-On, 2002). Although the reconciliation effects model actually emerged during the heyday of ethnopolitical conflicts, it rather became synonymous with efforts to apply conflict management to post-genocide scenarios. Its methods are also applicable to politicides, though they have not yet been applied to these situations. Similarly, while it can (and has) been applied to cases solely of ethnopolitical conflict, in practice, such applications are quite rare.

The Only PC Model from Among the Seven, Which Is Applicable to Genocides and Politicides

This model differs from the other six models because those are inappropriate for post-genocide and politicide reconciliation -- certainly initially, and perhaps even up to and including the third generation. The distinction lies in the difference between the goals of genocides and politicides, as these contrast from political conflicts. First and foremost, genocides and politicides are meant to eliminate the other party to the

conflict. According to Barbara Harff, a *genocide* is defined as "the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents – or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities – that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political or politicized group." (Barbara Harff in Marshall & Gurr 2005, pp. 57) Furthermore, in a genocide, the perpetrators define the group in terms of their communal characteristics, whereas in *politicides*, they define them primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and to the dominant groups (Harff, 2005 in Marshall and Gurr).

Second, typically, the result of the goal of elimination is that non-genocidal political conflicts are more combative in nature (versus "passive"). Third, they typically involve much higher numbers of victims. Victim counts, meanwhile, remain the only "objective"[59] marker of conflict. These three distinctions, i.e. (1) the goal of elimination and its results, (2) less combat and (3) typically more dead, render persuasion and compromise unlikely and, therefore, unrealistic. Thus, the other six peace communication models prove inapplicable to cases of genocide and politicide.

Their application to these scenarios also raises ethical questions that go beyond the traditional friendship without justice model that the ethics camp (third camp) I described in chapter one raises. In other words, while scholars of that camp disapproved of the idea of encouraging the in-group to become friends with an out-group that practiced structural violence against them, the ramifications of establishing friendships with those opposed to the in-groups' very survival has been deemed by practitioners as even more ethically questionable.

Thus, the reconciliation effects model is the only one that has been applied to genocides. It has, for example, been applied to the case of the Hutu genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda, and still even with this model, beginning only with the third generation where the Holocaust has been concerned. Finally, it has been applied to cases of solely ethnopolitical conflict (e.g. the Israeli-Palestinian case). This again, however, is rare, and it is the only model applicable for genocides and politicides or at least the only one that has been applied to genocides, regardless of whether the genocide in question was rooted in an ethnopolitical conflict contest, as in the case of the Rwandan genocide, or not, as in the case of the Holocaust.[60]

Negative Intergroup Attitudes After, not Prior to Genocides and Politicides Must Be Addressed

As a side note, regardless of whether the genocide or politicide in question was due to negative intergroup prejudices (a point which many scholars refute as the cause for genocide, and with which I concur),[61] post genocide, this distinction is irrelevant with respect to reconciliation effects model. Regardless of the cause of the genocide, in other words, regardless of whether negative intergroup prejudices existed before or during the genocide, they exist after it. They have also most likely formed on the part of the perpetrators as a result -- as a psychological mechanism enabling them to justify their decisions to have killed -- and have certainly formed on the part of the victims following the genocide. Therefore, while I would argue that they are not relevant prior to the event, regardless, negative intergroup prejudices must be addressed post-genocide.

The Assumed Problem and Its Theoretical Underpinning

According to Dan Bar-On, if negative intergroup prejudices that exist between perpetrators and "survivors" (surviving victims) are not addressed, the experiences may influence their child rearing practices, and, in turn, their own children's child rearing practices. While not trying to forget the past, without reconciliation he argued, survivors will not be able to transform in such a way so as to not adversely influence their children's futures by inadvertently passing down their negative experiences to them (Bar-On, 1995).

According to Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma H. Bennink, reconciliation is necessary "when the societies involved in a conflict evolve widely shared beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and emotions that support adherence to the conflictive goals, maintain the conflict, de-legitimize the opponent and thus negate the possibility of peaceful resolution and prevent the development of peaceful relations." (Bar-Tal and Bennink chapter in Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004, p. 13). Furthermore, societal beliefs – "formed in the course of the conflict, disseminated to society members, maintained by societal institutions, and supported by collective memory… fuel the continuation of the conflict relations and constitute obstacles to the progress of peacemaking." (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2001 cited in Bar-Tal and Bennink in Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004, p. 13).

The Solution

The emphasis of the reconciliation effects project has not been on making sense of the sources of genocide and, therefore, trying to prevent them. Rather, as

might be expected, per the limitations of the tools communication has to offer, these practitioners have solely focused on fostering reconciliation among victims and perpetrators. In other words, these projects have focused on ways to move forward, in spite of the past. The projects then, in effect, constitute "listening projects." Though rooted in the power of messages, like the message effects model, they do not operate on the principles of persuasion theories. They do not try to persuade participants to, for, example compromise with or submit to their partners in conflict's wishes or demands. Doing so is deemed unrealistic and unethical. Instead, the messages involve an exchange of stories and dialogue. These are combined with contact experiences meant to evoke awareness about, and, at the same time, attached to it, affect on the part of the perpetrator for the victims' suffering - or *empathy*, and the acknowledgement by the victims of a need to move forward for the sake of future generations.

As Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (2004) explains, reconciliation attempts to get the parties to achieve a stable peace and prevent the re-occurrence of violence by helping them to overcome "the built up bitterness and grievances of a protracted conflict," (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004, p. 4). It helps them "in altering their hostile perceptions and mutual fears." (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004, p. 4). He defines Reconciliation as "restoring friendship and harmony between the rival sides after conflict resolution, or transforming relations of hostility and resentment to friendly and harmonious ones." (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004, p. 4)

Reconciliation encourages, a promotive communicative relationship that includes (1) ways to manage future conflicts, (2) mutual respect, (3) security, (4) humanization of the other, and (5) establishment of a trusting and cooperative discourse. It involves finding new ways for former enemies to redefine their relationship to include forgiveness and empathy, and to accept the other. The assumption is that victims and aggressors cannot move forward unless the painful questions of the past are addressed first. This involves issuing apologies, trying to forgive, compensating, sharing a perception of what amounts to a just peace, holding mutual respect for the "others'" national identity, and sharing basic peace values and a willingness to turn over a new leaf. (Tavuchis 1999; Scheff, 1994, Shriver, 1995; Kelman, 1999 - all cited in Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004) (See also Staub, 2006 for further theoretical discussion of the concept of reconciliation) In short, these theories examine forgiveness and techniques for managing the rage, fear, guilt, anger, and humiliation that have arisen as part and parcel of genocide and politicides.

Testimonials: Truth on Record and Recrimination

Finally, a subset of reconciliation projects go one step beyond just reconciliation. They try to document the truth. They seek to foster confessions and incriminate in a manner in keeping with the philosophy of truth and reconciliation commissions. These commissions seek to incriminate in order to be able to present a historical account of the "truth" – a memory upon which a people can stand and move forward and a written testimonial of "the past".

These efforts are associated with literature on truth and reconciliation, which emerged in the early 1990s following the first 15 such committees (the first having had been Uganda's, in 1974 (Haynor, 1994).[62] In this respect, their efforts resemble the main tenant of truth and reconciliation commissions, which as Priscilla Haynor explains, "are often referred to as serving a 'cathartic' affect in society, as fulfilling the important step of formally acknowledging a long-silenced past." (Haynor, 1994, p. 600). Parenthetically, despite the limited application of the reconciliation effects model to date only to genocides, this literature emerges from a variety of conflict scenarios out of which truth and reconciliation commissions were set-up.

The Practice

The Blue House Germany

An example of a program operating along the logic of the reconciliation effects model is The Blue House, located in Breisach, Germany. The house, purchased by the Fordeverein Association to preserve Jewish culture in Breisach, was established in 1999, largely under the founding direction of Christiane Walesch-Scneller. The Blue House Project, which operated out of the Blue house itself, has held teaching seminars about the Holocaust. These seminars brought together Breisach's former Jewish resident' survivors and their descendents, with the current members of Breisach's community and local school children for dialogue. It did so in order to firstly commemorate the anniversary of the deportation of Jews from Breisach and other

German towns. And secondly, it did so in order for the Jewish participants to share their family's personal histories with the Breisach participants.

The sharing by the prior Jewish residents emphasized *reconciliation*, not *forgiveness*. That is, the experience of sharing and listening attempted to enable participants to come to terms with their past in order to allow everyone involved to move forward by breaking the silence surrounding the Holocaust. The silence, which existed not just across the groups, but also within each, respectively, caused the topic to be taboo, thereby rendering the voicing of it off-limits. Thus, by beginning to describe the indescribable, the Blue House believed it could enable future generations to move forward. Participating surviving descendents they argued, sought to move forward, and through the cathartic process of sharing, could do so without blaming the current generation of non-Jewish, specifically Christian, Germans for their parent's and/or grandparent's sins. However, the Jewish participants were neither encouraged nor expected to forgive the latter for their sins, as doing so was not the aim of the project. In addition, the Blue House Project argued, without their (and related) projects, Germans and Israelis would not be able to forge relations with one another.

As part of their efforts, the Blue House ran the *Dances for the Blue House* project. Through it, the New York based Battery Dance and Drastic Action dance companies performed at the Blue House in an effort to revive the memory of the town's lost Jewish communities. The Dances for the Blue House project, in choreographing their work and seeking to engage with their German Blue House audiences, posed such questions as, "How does an individual cope with tragedy,

inherited, and present?" "What can young people in Germany and the US, Jews and non-Jews, take from the events of the holocaust?" "How does one pay respect to the victims of a tragedy?" "Who is responsible for safe-guarding the lessons of WWII, now that the direct experience is passing into history, as survivors and perpetrators die?" (Battery Dance Company, dances for the blue house)

Through these questions, the dance companies sought to use their dance pieces to explore methods of coping, respect for victims, and the development of a type of truth or *storage* for the past in order that the victims and history not be forgotten. By doing so, they believed, those involved could move forward, rather than remain frozen in the past by their inability to store the events – a process that could never occur without their first being able to voice them. (See also US Consulate General-Frankfurt Germany, 2006 for another description of the project)

To Reflect and Trust a Jewish-German Program

A similar example of a reconciliation effects PC program is the *To Reflect and Trust (TRT)* program, which Dan Bar-On began in 1992. TRT was, in its original inception, a joint discussion group between children of parents who were part of the Nazi regime and Jewish survivors resident in Germany, the US and Israel (Albeck, Adwan, & Bar-On, 2002).[63]

Theatre for Reconciliation and Recrimination Rwanda

A third example is *Theatre for Reconciliation* and/or *Incrimination*. According to Ananda Breed's research about these kinds of theatre collaborations, such efforts involving theatre "may help reconstruct relationships that have been severed through

genocide while simultaneously promoting a hopeful future." (Breed, 2007, p. 507) The theatre programs, she goes on to explain, can be likened to traditional cleansing ritual of "Kugangahura," in which people cleanse themselves from a bad event. Quoting participants after these kinds of theatre experience, Breed writes "When they confess, it gives morality." (Breed, 2007, p. 509) "As one survivor confided, when she does theatre, she forgets that the person next to her killed her five children." (Breed, 2007, p. 513). In this respect, theatre offers an opportunity for mediated contact, but precisely in order to elicit *catharsis* on the part of the audience so that they may move forward in order to begin living their lives again.

In the case of many of the Rwandan theatre programs, they also go the aforementioned one-step further. They attempt to elicit "recrimination." Referring explicitly to the role it played in relation to Rwanda's own truth and reconciliation committees, Breed notes "Theatre is being used to elicit memory of the genocide to aid in the testimonials and confessions for the Gacaca proceedings." (Breed, 1997**,** p. 511) In this case, these theatre interventions try to codify the process of reconciliation and place the "truth" on paper.

Iryo Nabonye. One specific example of Rwandan Reconciliation Theatre is the play *Iryo Nabonye* (*What I Saw*). *Iryo Nabonye* was originally performed in April 2004 and funded through the Survivors Fund. It was directed by Aimable Twahirwa, who directs the Arts and Drama Department at the National University of Rwanda, and created together with the joint efforts of a team of twenty Rwandans, comprised of

both perpetrators and victims of the genocide. As explained in the *In Place of War* project summary for the play,

> In one scene, all the actors are portrayed at a school. The teacher asks the students to conjugate the verb 'forgive,' but the students refuse because they had seen their families killed. A 10 year old boy stands up to say, 'I forgave', 'You forgive', and then points to the audience 'You tell the truth'. *Here, the play directs the audience to ask for pardon and to tell what happened during the time of the genocide*. The classroom scene is intended as a direct association with the Gacaca courts in which genocide perpetrators testify before the communities in which the crimes were committed. (In Place of War project website description for Iryo Nabonye).[64]

Furthermore, as one of the play's actors explained, "The main purpose [of the play] is to give a message about what happened before and after the genocide. *The message is to reconcile, that is the main purpose - reconciliation*."[65] (In Place of War In their Own Words website description for Iryo Nabonye).

The Seven Models

Globally, the seven models of PC have historically been used by practitioners in an effort to manage conflict and have operated in a manner reminiscent of the above-cited theoreticians, with or without practitioners' awareness. By offering a clear theoretical and practical map of the state of the practice of peace communication, this chapter has tried to offer both practitioners and scholars a resource guide to PC. This guide has outlined the theoretical and practical state of PC globally, now allowing for a critical analysis of PC to be made. With this guide in hand scholars can now assess programmatic shortcomings, whether the result of the use of a theoretically flawed PC model or the ill application of an effective theoretical model by a given program . So too, it will now be possible to suggest new models to revamp the practice altogether if necessary (and/or if at all possible).

PC, designed along one of these seven models, has been practiced since the 1940s, despite the lack of research attesting to its efficacy. By now providing the history of the practice globally and delineating and classifying the nature of the practice, it is my hope that scholars will be able to design assessment and evaluations whereby they can isolate discrete behaviors and/or variables in order to determine whether, per the objectives of a given program and the underlying logic upon which they operate, and their application of these, programs are achieving their stated behavioral outcomes and/or indirect structural changes.

In Chapter III, I will review what we do presently know about the efficacy of each of these models, through inference (from analogous research), and where direct research about PC is available, via empirical evidence.

Chapter 3: A Critique of the Seven Peace Communication Models And Recommendations For Their Further Practice and Research

The lessons we can garner from analogous research in the fields of communication and conflict studies as well as the formative stages of scholarly inquiry into the efficacy of peace communication suggest that communication is not so powerful as to bring about the sweeping changes to political order that practitioners have claimed it will (or at least have worked on) for over the past 65 years. Peace communication as a practice may be ineffective, and, furthermore, may cause more harm than good. Therefore, a thorough critique of its use is essential in order to guide future scholarship on the topic. In this chapter I, therefore, conduct a qualitative meta-analysis of all research relevant to the subject. To the best of my knowledge no such meta-analysis exists. I, therefore, contribute much needed scholarly knowledge by providing a comprehensive analysis of the state of peace communication - the sub-discipline whose creation I am proposing.

In the previous chapter, I classified the historical uses of communication to manage political conflict according to seven models while linking their practice to theory. I did so firstly to coherently compile their theoretical underpinnings. Secondly, I did so to classify the practices, in order to be able to compare and contrast these according to their intended behavioral and structural outcomes, and in turn, in this chapter, to assess and evaluate their use, and offer applicable recommendations, as well as a resource guide to help establish PC as a sub-discipline. Apart from these

reasons, my more specific aim in this chapter is to use this classification system in order to develop and recommend study designs by which to assess whether the models in fact solve what they aim to solve. Based on the limited available evidence and analogous research I compile together, I conduct a qualitative meta-analysis. The findings from my qualitative meta-analysis suggest that the results about the efficacy of peace communication are mixed. Effects are either positive, harmful or simply, there are none.

Instances in which positive effects were produced provide limited evidence that peace communication can be further cultivated to potentially serve a more central role in managing conflict when practiced in conjunction with other peace-building and -making efforts. Based on this evidence, I make critical suggestions about which of these models, or which specific facets of each of the models are most useful for pursuing the practice of the management of political conflict. In the conclusion to this chapter, I recommend where future research into the efficacy of peace communication should turn (see Appendix D for a critique of each of the models originally discussed in chapter two and as presented in Appendix A).

Analogous research in communication, though not specifically about conflict, has, in some cases, provided ample evidence to hypothesize about which models are most useful in contrast to others with respect to managing various aspects of political conflict. It is those that I recommend scholars initially focus their energy on assessing and evaluating. These models, or portions thereof, hypothetically, may have an impact on conflict. The others, most likely do not, and would not, even if improved.

Beginning from Part II, I will analyze a case based upon the mediated contact model (model IV). I do so because this model still holds plausibility with respect to potentially contributing to the management of conflict. In the following discussion, I lay out my criticisms of all seven models. In doing so, I will emphasize the communication-side research of relevance to the models because communication has never been critically evaluated to ascertain whether it is effective at managing conflict. Meanwhile, the conflict-side studies have, in many cases, been subjected to both rigorous research and debate. Therefore, I only report on those arguments and do not analyze them as part of my qualitative meta-analysis at length.

A Qualitative Meta-Analysis of the Efficacy of the Seven Models of PC

A Critique of Model I: Message Effects

Messages are Neither Direct, Powerful nor Especially Persuasive

Interventions making use of message effects attribute more power to messages than they deserve. Assuming messages alone will have impact, regardless of to which of the four subsets of this model we refer, is flawed. As William McGuire concluded in his exhaustive review of the literature on the topic, we have not empirically established that messages have a direct impact on people's behavior. Even when effects have been found, they are limited. In cases where statistical significance was established, messages only accounted for two to three percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Therefore, messages do not appear to be a particularly useful factor for explaining why individuals alter their attitudes, beliefs or behavior (McGuire, 1986, p. 177). Therefore, from a policy perspective, it does not make sense to invest in peace communication programs that assume that messages will produce direct and powerful outcomes. This holds true whether we are referring to the deterministic assumptions rooted in subtype one or two, or the more tailored contents approaches of subtype three and four, all of which attribute far too much power to the message.

Messages are neither powerful nor direct. Individuals *selectively expose* themselves to messages to eliminate those with which they disagree. In situations

where there exists ethnopolitical conflict, or even only ethnic, racial and religious tensions, viewers may choose not to expose themselves to known news channels with whose reporting they disagree, whether that of VOA's programming in Iraq or of Burundi's Studio Ijambo. With regards to the latter, for example, it may be evident to the audience that the voice which the station provides for them is not "the side" they want to hear from (or about), and even if tuning into some information, they can nevertheless, selectively perceive (Klapper, 1960; See Vidmar and Rokeach with respect to entertainment television) these news reports, critically negotiate them (Hall, 1973), and canalize their prior attitudes (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1948) by *using* stories of events to simply reconfirm their previously existing negative intergroup attitudes and beliefs about their partners in conflict in order to, simply, resist change.

Given that most communication flows *within* rather than *between* groups (Weimann, 1982) -- within scenarios where people live distantly from one another (as pertains to interstate or multistate conflicts), or in separation from one another (as pertains to ethnopolitical conflicts or civil wars) -- opinion leaders will, most commonly, be drawn from within the audience member's own ethnopolitical circles. If opinion leaders disagree with these reports, their editing of them may work in such a way whereby the audience is influenced to reach the same conclusions, time and again, no matter what (or how) a news story is told, concluding that "their side" in the conflict is right, and the "other" is wrong. Reception research into news consumption patterns address this question, but little such research (particularly concerning the reception of news about conflict) exists.

Finally, even if messages successfully "reach" given audience members, such that they receive and perceive the messages as their producers originally intended, the audience may nevertheless not alter their original behaviors. As *Attitude and Behavior Change* researchers have demonstrated, messages may result in no (or varied) effects on audiences' behavior (Ajzen, Albarasin and Hornik, 2007; Goldberg, Fishbein and Middlestadt, 1997).

In greater detail, with respect to first, subset one - the free-flow propaganda public diplomacy model - advertising the interests of one side which is party to a conflict does not guarantee that any actual behavior change will occur, including, most importantly, in the direction desired by practitioners. The vast array of health communication literature on the topic of attitudes, belief and behavior change serves as ample evidence of the inability of messages to foster behavioral changes of grand proportions. For example, as Martin Fishbein has argued, public service announcements explaining that cigarettes cause cancer do not necessarily reduce cigarette consumption. Most smokers already know this information, and in turn, public service announcements *adding* information about this do not per se influence smokers' or potential smokers' behaviors. With regards to interpersonal communication channeled diversity training programs, McCauley argues the same. Information does not necessarily lead to new beliefs, attitude change and, in turn, behavioral change. (McCauley, 2002).

So too, as in the case of the second subtype - the protectionist-dependency subtype - ensuring that a balance of information between all sides to a conflict exists

does not necessarily change beliefs, attitudes or behaviors. Similarly, eliminating the inequality in North-South flows alone is insufficient for ending structural inequality. This may, if successfully applied, go so far as to alleviate some aspect of global structural inequality. Messages, however, are not powerful enough, or, in other words, such rich commodities, for these alone to relieve structural violence – assuming structural inequality, of course, plays a role in the generation of conflict. In short, as long as the variants of the message effects model maintain their basic premises – that messages are *powerful and direct and/or persuasive* – their programming, it seems, will not in fact prove effective.

In the case of the third subtype - the free-flow anti-censorship model, its effort to achieve balanced, impartial and accurate reporting as part of its messaging strategy, may not be successful in the first place. Trying to achieve balanced reporting by ensuring that representatives of each warring group are represented, as Studio Ijambo attempts, does not ensure that the broadcasted content will in fact be altered. Just because Hutu, Tutsi and Twa journalists are represented equitably on the staff does not alone determine what they will report about. Assuming a one-to-one relationship between a journalist's identity and the content they produce suggests a reified and stereotyped concept of humanity. In addition, it suggests a limited view of journalism, which neglects research demonstrating the intervening influence of news practices and functions, political elites, editorial decisions and socio-economic, political and military contexts in which media industries exist (see for example Dor, 2004 with respect to editorial decisions, Horwitz, 2001 with respect to socio-economics and

Snyder and Ballentine, 1996 with respect to political institutions). In short, the fact that practitioners want to achieve balanced production is by itself not enough of a guarantee that it will be produced. In most cases, these types of peace communication programs end up just *adding* to the existing perspectives rather than producing balanced news content. In other words, they still operate along the dictums of persuasive messaging campaigns, not balanced reporting, whether intentionally, or not.

Second, even if their contents might instead be considered to help balance news reporting across a range of all the different existing media outlets in a state, given that they add new, previously non-existing perspectives, the standing of these peace communication created media industries may become placed in jeopardy. As an example, fear of the effect of *Star Radio* Liberia's additional information output led to the station's closure between 2000 and 2003 by the then President Charles Taylor (Radio Netherlands Media Network, 2004).

In short, liberalization – or the creation of multiple channels and sources - an impetus out of which the free flow anti censorship peace communication interventions operate - are, as Krug and Price sum up, by themselves insufficient for creating truly independent media, which at least presumably may be in a better standing to try to produce balanced coverage. They conclude that media are more likely to be truly independent when the safety of journalists and their access to information, particularly to government practices, are safeguarded, and government authorities do not interfere with their content production (Krug and Price, 2002).

Third, even if these practitioners are successful at creating new and more balanced information, again, this will not necessarily lead to anyone listening, adopting the information, alternating their attitudes, beliefs, and ultimately, behaviors. As points in historical fact, mere knowledge of even genocides does not necessarily lead to behavioral change and intervention. Assuming that awareness alone is sufficient for outcome prevention is naïve.

Fourth, if these new media industries, the product of peace communication campaigns, do manage to broadcast alternative and more "balanced" information representing the organizational views of all the ethnopolitical groups party to a given conflict and, therefore, transform themselves to become models of "independent media," they will, in effect, have managed to represent previously un-represented voices. However, these same media industries will not necessarily have managed to create jobs for the same, previously disenfranchised, peoples. Discussing the impact of liberalization processes on telecommunication and broadcasting in South Africa, though, not as a product of a specified peace communication campaign intervention, Robert Horwitz found that even while ownership switched from Whites to Blacks (from the state bearing nation to the Minority At Risk groups) – this did not produce more job opportunities for marginalized Blacks. (Horwitz, 2001). As he explained, "a widespread criticism is that, so far, black economic empowerment has not meant the creation of 'organic' black capital, that is, businesses organized by blacks from the ground up which produce entrepreneurial skills and new job opportunities in the process of producing commodities or services." (Horwitz, 2001, p. 349). Even when

minorities have not only gained *access* to media, but furthermore actual ownership over these industries, these factors alone have not determined that the structural violence these groups previously suffered from will have been ameliorated. Economic flows may not necessarily flow in the direction of these minority groups, even when those same minorities own these commodities.

In the South African case, jobs did not follow, because the available funds and reform options were limited in such a way that the owners, while now of a different ethnopolitical racial group, nevertheless still had to adhere to the old rules of profit, contemporarily influenced by the global flow of trade. The result, as Horwitz explains, was that these new owners avoided making any changes that might harm their investments. The analogy to draw from the history he describes then is that in order to ensure that a peace communication intervention is able to create jobs, it must, in the first place, be equipped with sufficient capital to ensure that jobs can be created. If it is not backed with sufficient (and perhaps even extensive) donor funding, enabling the PC program to actually intervene in market forces, wealth opportunities will continue to flow in their old direction such that, from a structural violence perspective, it will have done nothing to change the situation.

Finally, with respect to the fourth subset of the message effects model, i.e. the talk-peace variant, this one alone attempts to go beyond the production of multiple and seemingly balanced news information. It tries to invoke non-persuasive *message strategies* to alter people's behavior. While still wed to the idea of powerful messages, it, unlike the other variants, does not employ persuasion theories. Instead, it employs

theories of dialogue in an effort to create change. Programs using this model tell stories from the perspective of multiple partners to a conflict, and use a tone of invitational discourse. Thus, I would argue, while peace journalism efforts assume they can play a much larger role than I hypothesize, they may, at least, help create a forum for change.

Peace journalism is subject to the same problems described above regarding exposure, misinterpretation, reinterpretation and the like, but may have the opportunity to reach further. Specifically, it may help foster opportunities for creative problem solving that become impossible when traditional "us versus them" war reporting (Liebes, 1997) models are employed and conflicts are painted as black and white win-lose scenarios (Galtung, 1998) rather than as having the potential to achieve win-win solutions. As a caveat, in conflict, there may in fact not always exist opportunities for win-win outcomes, but rather, only, *lose less-lose less* options. In many cases the parties are already aware of the goals of their partners to conflict, such that there is no information they do not already possess. Simply put, one partner does not agree with the other in the first place. In such a scenario, peace journalism can, therefore, at best, offer a forum for debating compromise.

Thus, the talk-peace journalism subtype, in contrast to the former three subtypes of the message effects model, offers the greatest potential for facilitating behavioral and structural change. Ultimately, however, this model, like the first, ascribes too much power to messages without any attention being paid to context and reception. Consequently, the evidence provided for their influence, as with the case of

the remainder of the persuasive rooted premised interventions (whether trying to foment conflict or create peace) have yet to be demonstrated.

In short, with respect to the communication-side of the message effects model, to borrow from McGuire, the effects might be there, only no one has shown them. In his 1986 article he reviews “the dozen best-studied types of purported media effects without finding sizable effects to predominate in any of them,” to conclude that “it may be that the evaluation research is insensitive.” But given what has actually been shown empirically, we know that messages do not exert direct and powerful effects (McGuire, 1986, p. 177). And to that, I add, the burden is on those practitioners and policy-makers who claim communication builds or makes peace (or foments conflict) to prove these so-called effects.

Therefore, if researchers want to promote a better understanding of peace communication, I recommend they begin by testing the reception and effect of peace journalism contents to find out for what the content is useful for. In order to do so, researchers will have to assess or evaluate discrete cases of news production, because “the news media” themselves cannot be tested to determine discrete cases of direct effects. A specific suggestion would then be to assess and/or evaluate the audience reception and/or effect of a limited sample of *Common Ground News Service* articles or radio broadcasts from *Studio Ijambo* by those not previously exposed to the CGNS or *Studio Ijambo.* Discrete articles from the former, or specified segments from the latter, should be tested, and with respect to the usual caveats, preferably evaluated with control samples, and as part of a field, rather than lab, experiment.

Conflict is Not Caused by Prejudice

Apart from the problems raised above regarding the allegedly powerful, direct and persuasive abilities of communication, even if communication were all these things, and messages could convince people to not be prejudice against their partners in conflict, positive attitudes towards their partners would not eliminate the sources of a given conflict.

Conflicts are not due to prejudice. Hate comes after violence – whether structural or physical, not prior to it. Prejudice is used, rather, to justify violence. The counterfactual of the Holocaust, where, in relative European contexts, no prior history of German anti-Semitism existed, remains the bulwark case contradicting the argument that prejudice causes conflict, or worse, genocide.[66] Thus, as is often used to make the point that hate causes genocide, popular attention has been given to the fact that in the case of the Holocaust, Jews were labeled "mice," and in Rwanda, Tutsis, were labeled "cockroaches." Anecdotal use of these terms, however, does not in fact constitute evidence that negative intergroup attitudes existed towards Jews or Tutsis prior to either genocide. Rather, I would argue, these terms were constructed in an effort to *justify* the killings.

Neither Christian German nor Rwandan Hutu perpetrators decided to kill Jews or Tutsis, respectively, *because* they were "mice" or "cockroaches." Rather, their reduction of human beings to vermin in both these examples of genocide enabled perpetrators to justify their actions after the fact.

Genocides, as well as armed political conflicts, are, rather, the results of unilateral or mutually *perceived* threats (McCauley, 2002), structural inequality (Wimmer, 2002), or a complex relationship between structural inequality, its perception, and the perceived and real *capabilities* of parties to conflict (Gurr, 2000), resource and/or power drives, and/or a host of more complicated factors (e.g. see Mann 2005 with respect to genocides).

Therefore, in short, were communication messages even able to directly and persuasively convince people not to be prejudiced, conflict would not actually be resolved by practitioners' efforts to employ the message effects model, since this is neither the cause of political conflicts, nor genocides in the first place. In this respect, I recommend practitioners of the message effects models – whom typically have mass media training, also gain training in the study of conflict and its management, lest they continue to use these models and totally miss the mark regarding what factors, even, they should try to influence.

Final Caveat*: *Liberalism and Peace are Correlated. Finally, with respect to the free-flow propaganda public diplomacy model – if the free flow of information could actual lead to democracy, perhaps we could argue that communication does indeed help to achieve peace. However, the evidence surrounding democratic peace theory remains correlational, and therefore, while strong and confirmed by multiple sources with respect to inter-state peace (e.g. Babst, 1964, 1972; Small and Singer, 1976; Rummel, 1979, 1983, 1985; Levy, 1988; Maoz and Russett; 1992, 1993), internally, with respect to civil-wars (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch, 2001),

and internally, vis-à-vis minority groups (Gurr, 2000, Kaldor, 1999), these, nevertheless do not demonstrate causality. Therefore, whether it is democracy, or instead economic prosperity that determines the liberal peace, democracy's role, it is important to point out, remains highly contested. In short, I do not want to be overly pessimistic, but it is not entirely clear to what extent democracy creates and sustains peace, – even if communication may bring about democracy.

A Critique of Model II: Contact Effects

Critique of Contact Effects Assumptions

Interventions designed along the contact effects model that make use of the contact hypothesis have found mixed results. On the one hand, sufficient evidence suggests that the contact hypothesis can reduce negative intergroup prejudices in situations of political conflict, and more generally, political tension. It is most successful in doing so when modeled according to Allport's four requirements, and when in addition, per Pettigrew's fifth requirement, friendships form as a result of the participants' interactions with one another. (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). In some cases, however, contact has not only failed to transform negative attitudes, but rather, further entrenched them. (See for example Sims and Patrick, 1936 cited in Pettigrew, 1998). In addition, if contact effects programming is not structured according to accepted dialogue discourse codes and modes, it can instead promote greater antagonism (Ellis and Maoz, 2001). We may consider the incorporation of *constructive discourse patterns* to be a sixth requirement for effective contact. In addition, these programs can fail to alter negative intergroup prejudices if, according to Connolly and Maginn, they do not also take into account "broader social processes and institutions [in which racism and ethnic relations are inscribed]."

To achieve successful results, these unequal processes and institutions must be woven into the contact process itself. As they explain, and as I argue is most important

for the use of the contact hypothesis in situations of political conflict, that is, for use as part of peace communication,

> sectarianism operates across all levels of society, from the systemic and structural levels to the more sub-cultural and subjective ones. (Connolly w/ Maginn, 1999 p. 23) It therefore follows from this that any strategies aimed at addressing racial and ethnic divisions… need to be equally 'multi-layered' and involve not only challenges to the broader structural and institutional forms of division and inequality but also to its more micro and inter-personal manifestations (Connolly w/ Maginn, 1999, p. 24).

Therefore, I argue, the *structural realities* that exist beyond the situation must be taken into consideration as a seventh requirement for PC interventions. This means internalizing how those realities are expressed on a daily basis *through* the bodies of participants, including when they enter a camp or dialogue group. If these realities are not taken into account, the participants' intergroup attitudes will not be altered.

Generalization Problems. As related to concerns about the existing structural realities, even if attitude change occurs within the situation among participants, and in most cases, as Pettigrew and Tropp conclude, the resultant reduction in intergroup prejudice may nevertheless not always generalize to the wider out-group (See also Hewstone and Brown, 1986). In some cases, it may, at best, diminish *false polarization*. False polarization is the tendency to view one's partner to conflict as more extreme than they actually are, and assume that differences between your own and their group are greater than objective differences (Keltner & Robinson, 1993). Alternatively, rather than generalizing their new attitudes to the out-group as a whole,

in-group members may create sub-categories within which they place members of the out-group following an intervention. As a result, they instead categorize these out-group members as atypical of the rest of their group. In turn, the result is that in-group members view the out-group as more varied, but in fact, do not actually generalize their affect to their entire group. (Hamburger, 1994).

According to Pettigrew and Tropp, in most situations in which contact based interventions were attempted (though it appears they review a majority of non-political conflict cases), favorable attitudes did develop towards immediate participants. In addition, they were generalized to the entire out-group.[67]

Context and Re-Entry Problems. However, even despite the utility Pettigrew and Tropp have found, they too observe that contact can increase animosity between groups *when* institutional support for contact exists under conditions of competition or unequal status (Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). Thus, the problem of *context* (or the existing structural reality when groups are of a differing status per the realities of scenarios of ethnopolitical conflict) remains problematic.

As discussed above, context can prevent generalization beyond the situation. Clark McCauley refers to this as the “re-entry problem.” Participants may have changed their beliefs and, in turn, attitudes, about those members of the out-group with whom they interacted. However, they may have trouble putting those new attitudes into practice once they leave the more lab-like setting where the intervention took place, and return home. As McCauley explains, citing an example from the work of Ed Cairns in Northern Ireland,

> Protestant and Catholic boys together are being returned to their home neighborhoods by bus. At one stop, a boy's friends run up to greet him as he descends from the bus. This whole group, including the boy who just stepped off the bus, then turns to shout ethnic slurs and throw stones at the bus as it pulls away. This boy *is* the reentry problem, McCauley explains, and he solves it in the only way that leaves him a chance of behaving more positively another day. (McCauley, 2002, p. 255).

Simply put, changes that arose *in the situation* during a contact effects-based intervention may not be generalized beyond the specific dialogue group or camp situation. Contextual restraints that exist in the participants' lives – for example, those placed upon them by their social networks on a daily basis - *may* override these.

Context Problems and Sustained Change. Apart from making generalizing beyond a given situation a challenge, context can also prevent change from lasting. Even after participants have generalized their points of view to that of the wider out-group and begun applying their new found attitudes back at home, trying to defend their new found attitudes in the face of a society that is opposed to these new attitudes can often become an insurmountable trial. It can tear at the very fabric of the individual returning from a peace communication contact effects modeled experience, and thus the positive aspects of this experience can become slowly eroded. Little longitudinal research has been conducted into the long-term sustained effects of contact. Initial and limited findings estimate that prejudice reduction is sustained with respect to non-conflict situations (Eller and Abrams, 2003 and Levin et al 2003 cited in Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006, p. 768).

With respect to scenarios of political conflict, in her qualitative longitudinal dissertation study of Israeli and Palestinian *Seeds of Peace* participants, Edie Maddy-Weitzman concluded that the intervention's incorporation of follow-up programming to the main camp experience was vital for responding to the challenges that contextual realities imposed on the ultimate success of the contact effects programming she assessed. According to Maddy-Weitzman, follow-up programming served to help combat (1) the problem of re-entry, and (2) the tensions and questions that arose in participants' minds during periods of heightened conflict and crises. In addition, by (3) involving past participants as alumni in future planning for *Seeds of Peace*, *Seeds of Peace*, in turn helped empower its participants (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005). Such empowerment is vital, given that the participants, as a result of any sustained effects from the camp, would have already found themselves part of the minority attitudes or opinions within their respective public spheres, thereby placing them in a precarious position if trying to voice, defend or even just sustain their newly formed attitudes and potentially also opinions.

In summary, I conclude that we may view follow-up programming, or *attempts to sustain the effects of contact* as an eighth requirement for contact to be effective. In addition, more longitudinal research needs to be conducted to assess, and especially evaluate, the actual sustainability of contact effects programming (including combining this with follow-up efforts).

Friendships Lead to Knowledge About "the Other's" Historical Narrative

Learning about the other's historical narrative during contact experiences is argued to be another vital component for the efficacy of contact (Bar-Tal, 2004; Salomon, 2004a), and in general, with respect to both building and making peace (Scham, Salem & Pogrund, 2005). As for example Maddy-Weitzman found, again with respect to the *Seeds of Peace case*, "intergroup friendships can lead to increased access to and possibly legitimization of the narrative of the other side." (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 522). Programs, she concluded, therefore, need to include a component that enables participants to grapple with opposing narratives.

Perhaps we can then consider the *incorporation of each partner to conflict's narrative* as the ninth requirement for contact to be effective, at least within the context of political conflict. For certain, I would argue that if partners in conflict cannot reach a point at which they can speak about each others' opposing historical narratives, and, at the very least *begin* recognizing each others' parallel narratives *during* an organized contact effects program, they will not be able to do so *outside* the situation. Empirical research is currently being conducted by the Center for Research on Peace Education at the University of Haifa to determine what concrete roles learning about and/or accepting the others' narratives may, in turn, play in peace-building and -making. Such research will further help to elaborate on the role of narratives in making contact effective.

Changes in Intergroup-Attitudes and the Forging of Friendships Rarely Leads to Change in Political Beliefs

Finally, as discussed earlier, prejudices are not the root cause of conflict. Jackman and Crane (1986) studied the role of real-life contact within the context of a case of non-nationalist ethnopolitical conflict between Blacks and Whites in the US. They argued, with respect to negative intergroup attitudes,

> Instead of viewing such attitudes primarily as individual expressions of irrationality, parochialism, and animosity, we suggest they are a constituent part of a group's ideological defense of its interests… . [Therefore] the issue is not whether whites generalize to blacks as a whole from their personal experience of friendship with an individual black. Instead, the issue is how a relationship of intimacy with individual subordinates modifies the manner in which dominant-group members defend their privilege (Jackman and Crane, 1986. p. 481).

Given that political conflicts are typically between peoples with differing amounts of power, the real issue, as they point out, is not whether in- and out-group member's become friends as a result of their contact with one another, but rather, whether their friendships will lead those with advantages to change their political beliefs. The question then is whether the *advantaged group* will relinquish the privileges they currently possess outside of the intervention experience? As Jackman and Crane concluded, "If prejudice derives not from feelings of personal animosity but from an implicit sense of group position, then dominant groups will seek to defend their privilege no matter what brand of affect they feel toward subordinates." (Jackman and Crane, 1986, p. 481)

I would like to expand on their conclusion and add that in global historical terms such relationships are time-bound. Historically, we know that relationships shift.

Dominated groups have become the dominant (whether in the same space or that of another). Therefore, the question of relinquishing power is a double-sided one. It means that those currently *disadvantaged* or *dominated* may themselves one day seek to defend a reified conception of themselves as disadvantaged, even when they move into positions of power. As a result, the question is whether the disadvantaged, or dominated can also recognize the loss of safety and security such “relinquishing” represents for dominant groups.

Finally, it should be critically noted that if the dominated come to assume the future role of the dominant group rather than the role of an equal status group and, like other dominant groups, seek to defend their privileges, the scenario of structural violence, in this case that between the dominating and the dominated, will not have ended. In aggregate terms, structural violence will still exist, with only its players having *switched* or shifted places.

Jackman and Crane’s findings serve as a testament to the argument that prejudice change comes *after*, not before political belief change. As they demonstrated, even when friendships occurred, following attitudinal change, these friendships were not generalized in the form of a positive affect towards the wider out-group. In addition, in the majority of the cases, these did not in turn lead to a change in political preferences. Only in one third of the cases, did the contact lead to a change in cross-group political beliefs. (Jackman and Crane, 1988).

Therefore, Jackman and Crane conclude that, "The important question is not whether amicable contact can exist between groups of equal status, but whether such

contact can help to foster equality between groups who have unequal status." (Jackman and Crane, 1986, p 480). On a related note, following WWII, the United Kingdom and Germany, as one case, and France and Germany, as a second, were able to normalize relations despite the absence of attitude change. Attitude change, in turn, followed after peace was made. In other words, in these cases peacemaking happened in the absence of peacebuilding, which, nevertheless, followed the former. (See Feldman, 1999 for a related discussion about the normalization of German-French relations in the absence of prior reconciliation).

In light of these arguments, I argue that while friendships can be promoted in the absence of peacemaking, peacebuilding, in most cases, will not lead to peacemaking. Given the difficulty Jackman and Crane faced with changing political beliefs in the context of just political tensions, it seems all the less likely that political beliefs could, as a result, be changed (and sustained over time) amidst political conflict – or even worse – intractable cases of political conflict.

Changes May be Different Depending upon Participant's Power

As Gabi Salomon has pointed out, minorities may respond differently from majorities to contact experiences, given the inherent structural inequality that marks their relationship. Though asking the majority to recognize the legitimacy of a minority's narrative, in exchange it may, therefore, only be feasible to expect the minority to respect the security needs of the majority. Saloman, therefore, answers no to his own question, "Can any conquered, oppressed, or discriminated minority be expected to accept the narrative's legitimacy [sic] of the dominating or discriminating

majority?" (Salomon, 2004a, p. 281. See also Salomon and Nevo, 2001). In turn, he concludes, different expectations and programming may be necessary for each .We might, therefore, consider the need to provide *varied programming* as a tenth requirement to keep in mind when unequal relations - which characterize all ethnopolitical conflicts - are involved.

Final Analysis and Recommendations With Regard to the Worth of the Contact Effects Model

Ten Requirements to Better Ensure Its Success. In summary, peace communication programs modeled along the contact effects model appear effective at changing intergroup attitudes, especially when they adhere to the five stipulations of the contact hypothesis, though more studies of specifically, cases of political conflict, would help to further confirm this. Also, contact effects PC interventions may be more effective, especially given the limitations imposed by political forms of conflict, when they, in addition, adhere to the five requirements I have outlined above. Namely, they are more likely to be effective when they also are (6) structured constructively with respect to common discourse patterns of those peoples involved, (7) internalize the structural realities that exist beyond the contact situation, (8) attempt to sustain the effects of contact through follow-up initiatives, (9) incorporate each partner to conflict's narrative into the intervention, and (10) provide varied programming for minority, in contrast to majority, populations.

Caveats to Address in an Effort to Make Effective Use of Contact for PC. Overall, contact interventions are less likely to be effective at altering intergroup

attitudes in tenuous contact contexts, and can, in more limited cases, further entrench negative attitudes. In addition, while these attitudinal changes can typically be generalized to the wider group as a whole, due to problems of re-entry, they do not generalize in all cases, and in those that they do, they may not be sustained. Attitudinal change can lead to greater knowledge of the other's historical narratives but, in most cases, does not, however, lead to political belief change about the other group/s.

This last point is especially vital with respect to political conflicts. Given that, as Andreas Wimmer has argued, nationalism is not only about achieving statehood, but specifically exclusive statehood, the problem of context in the form of unequal power relations is the norm within the inter-state system. Institutions that were meant to achieve inclusive self-autonomy were systematically tied to forms of exclusion and encoded into the state (Wimmer, 2002). Hence, modern nation-states are meant to not only serve the interests of one nation, but also to do so at the expense of others. Returning to Connolly and Maginn's argument, therefore, racism and ethnic relations are inscribed into a state. And, moreover, I would add that ethnopolitical forms of relationships are not only inscribed into one specific state, but into the *state unit* by virtue of its design.

Given this reality, namely that once participants leave a peace communication program styled along the contact effects model they return to a scenario whereby unequal power relations exist, the effects of their contact may simply not be sustained. The inability for contact to sustain change has for example been demonstrated in South Africa (Foster and Finchilescu, 1986). In short, this model -- though promising -

- needs to pay much closer attention to problems of context when political conflict is concerned.

Weaving in the structural context of the inter-state system into contact-based PC interventions. In particular, as Connolly and Maggin have argued, the structural elements of the context need to be woven into the actual contact experience. And since I am arguing that the entire inter-state system is the structure about which we should be addressing this concern, the structural elements of each of the categories that partners to conflict occupy should specifically be woven into the contact experience. By this I mean that PC practitioner efforts that make use of contact should weave the context and goals of those categories partner to conflict - state minorities, stateless nations and statebearing nations - into their designs. *State minorities* want to be equally represented members of their states, *stateless nations* - to be represented, and *statebearing nations* - to maintain their nationalizing status. In Part II and III I will define, elaborate on and demonstrate the relevance of these categories. Therefore, here I will only note that the micro-context within which each operates, and their related goals, means contact interventions must not only address their specific structural realities (a product of the inter-state system) but must also address each category differently, according to their varied goals and needs.

Finally, such structural matters have to be discussed within the context of a contact effects program. If they cannot be dealt with within the constructs of the "safe" and neutrally located and structured environment offered by the intervention, than they cannot possibly be dealt with once participants return to their home environments.

Regardless of whether the contact experience takes place before or after peace has been made, it must be structured in such a way as to provide participants with the sort of safe space necessary to begin the expression and discussion of the difficult structural realities that exist between enemies.

Critique of Model III: Media Technology Effects

Technology is Relativistic

Peace communication interventions designed according to the media technology effects model are too deterministic. Efforts to diffuse technology do not lead directly to media consumption, democracy, and, in turn, peace. From the perspective of the communication side of PC interventions, we can conclude that programs espousing this model are ineffective based on the earliest iterations of related interventions. As Carolyn Marvin argued about media-technology generally, time and again predictions about their power have proven wrong (Marvin, 1998). Meanwhile, Lerner's thesis, on which much of this model is predicated, was based on corollary and not causal evidence, despite the fact that he nevertheless argued that the latter relationship existed.

To their credit, media-technology peace communication projects have, over time, became less deterministic in orientation. They have adopted an embedded approach and instead, argued that they can at least "improve" peace prospects rather than claiming they *will* achieve peace. Nevertheless, this model does not appear to have any applicable use for managing political conflict.

With respect to *media effects*, McGuire argued that media, like *messages*, only have limited effects on the dependent variable. (McGuire, 1986). In other words, media consumption is not dependent on the adoption of the technology of literacy. While being able to read and write certainly provides people with the opportunity to,

for example, read newspapers, these same people can nevertheless absorb the very same news from radio or television. In addition to which, we know from development communication studies, even people who are illiterate consume newspapers. They form community listening groups in which literate members read out-loud to them, thereby overcoming the barriers of illiteracy associated with newspaper consumption (see for example Saeed's observations in Pakistan, cited in Mazharul, 2002). In other words, while literacy may promote greater individual newspaper consumption, it by no means *determines* media consumption.

Second, as critical scholars of media-technology have underscored, methods used to teach technology acquisition override actual *knowledge* with respect to the acquisition and application of skills. As Michael Cole found in Liberia, schooling practices *teaching* literacy, not literacy itself, promoted cognitive development (Scribner & Cole, 1981). Thus, peace communication programs modeled along the media-technology effects model -- per their modernist assumption that literacy necessarily promotes not just higher media consumption, but also the cognitive intelligence and interest necessary to engage with media, and, in turn, democracy – do not, in fact promote democracy.

Democracy Correlates with Communication as a Media-Technology

Meanwhile, according to Christopher Kedzie, information technology, as measured by number of email nodes – or networks – is correlated with democracy. He argues, "As a single independent variable, interconnectivity more strongly correlates with democracy than any other variable." (Kedzie, p. 124-125). However, information

technology acquisition does not in itself lead to democracy, and, as discussed previously, while democracy and peace are correlated, they too may prove not to have a causal relationship. Therefore, even if literacy acquisition *was* able to promote the "media participation" (newspaper, radio ownership and cinema attendance density rates) about which Lerner spoke (Lerner, 1958), we have no evidence demonstrating that these in turn *causally* lead to democracy and peace.

Primitiveness Does Not Cause Conflict

Moreover, the notion that primitiveness, especially illiteracy, creates conflict is flawed. Conflict is just as much part and parcel of the modern as it is a part of the primitive. Some have even gone so far as to argue that, in fact, murder is the very essence of the modern, not the primitive (Mann, 2005). Therefore, were peace communication programs modeled along the media-technology effects model able to churn out literate populations who, in turn, developed into "modern people" – media consuming voting citizens, these practices in no way would constitute peace, not even negative peace. Modern human beings, as part of the global proliferation and replication of states, have sought their own self-representation in a state, often at the cost of both structural and physical violence to others.

In short, the media-technology effects model, even when operating with respect to a more embedded understanding of the relationship of media technologies and the importance of skill acquisition, at every level, does not serve to prove that which it causally claims. This model is least likely to achieve any effects and therefore

is also the one least worth scholarly efforts to assess and evaluate any applicable programming.

Critique of Model IV: Mediated Contact Effects

Media Do Not Homogenize

Contrary to the first axiom of the mediated contact effects model, and as is the same with respect to arguments made about the media-technology effects model, media do not necessarily homogenize and unify people. As Carolyn Marvin argues, not only with respect to the alleged direct and powerful functions of media, but specifically, with respect to homogeneity, arguments about the powerful effects and functions of media have been made time and time again, with the invention of each new media form. “Always,” she explains, “new media were thought to hail the dawning of complete cross-cultural understanding, since contact with other cultures would reveal people like those at home. Only physical barriers between cultures were acknowledged. When these were overcome, appreciation and friendliness would reign. If contact did not reveal people exactly like those at home, it would reveal people anxious to learn from those at home.” (Marvin, 1988, p. 194).

Despite their popularity and repetition, these arguments, as Marvin effectively demonstrated in her historical study of communication media and technologies, have never produced that which they sought or claimed. Historically, media, by virtue of their technological essence, have never in fact achieved homogenization, regardless of all predictions and intentions.

Mass Media are Advantageous Because They Can Target a Larger Proportion of Partners in Conflict as Compares With Interpersonal Communication

On the other hand, mass media *do* offer a more realistic opportunity to target significant portions of the populations of each ethnopolitical group in a conflict, in contrast to interpersonal communication channeled interventions. Therefore, mediated contact effects programming can potentially reach millions. This is in contrast to the few hundred or thousand people that are reached by a program designed along the contact effects model, which by definition is only channeled via interpersonal communication. In this respect, by virtue of the sheer percentage of the population a mediated contact effects program can reach, *potentially*, these programs may have a larger impact on managing political conflicts.

Second, it may be easier to encourage viewers to "meet" for contact through mass media rather than in person. In the former scenario, convincing people to overcome the fear associated with meeting "the enemy" may become insurmountable. On the one hand, yes, it is possible to convince people to meet in person. The example of Lebanese parents allowing their children to participate in SAWA, despite the danger to them (which I discussed in Chapter 2) is a testament to this possibility. On the other hand, turning on the TV or radio to tune into vicarious contact, does not pose the same kind of risks or obstacles and thus lends itself much more readily to "meeting." In turn, it is potentially easier to target a larger percentage of the populations in conflict.

Simulated Contact May Play a Role in the Management of Political Conflict

If mass media are then able to simulate contact among a potentially larger number of people, and so *mediate* pro-social relations, there may be some plausible

reason to consider the mediated contact effects model as more useful than the contact effects model. Practitioners applying the mediated model attempt to forge connections that do not exist within the real conflict context. They attempt to portray cross-group friendships (the result of cross-group contact) and/or simulate its existence between the viewer and characters with whom these programs hope the viewer will actively interact, in order that they can imagine being friends with their partners to conflict.

Some Mechanics and Clarifications about the Mediated Contact Effects Model

Messaging Patterns. In comparison to the contact effects model, which creates an opportunity for contact, the mediated contact effects model must *simulate* that opportunity. It must create a realistic presentation of contact with which a viewer can engage vicariously. To this end, the success of mediated contact rests upon messaging strategies employed by mediated characters, which represent the different partners to conflict. To be effective, these characters must *dialogically* engage viewers, lest they be unable to simulate opportunities for contact.

In Contrast to the Message Effects Model. While the mediated contact effects model makes use of messages, it differs from the message effects model. First, unlike the first three subtypes, the use of messages in the mediated contact effects model is not modeled along (or only) along theories of persuasive communication. Second, it differs from the fourth model, i.e. the talk peace-peace journalism model, in that it (a) channels its efforts through entertainment, rather than news media, and (b) with respect to outcome goals, while peace journalism tries to promote open discourse and dialogue (or invitational discourse) in an effort to portray multiple narratives and

invite critical and creative solutions to a given conflict, mediated contact programs are, instead, focused on trying to improve inter-group attitudes. (c) Peace journalism promotes pro-social solutions between parties. However, peace journalists are not trying to evoke pro-social relations between the audience and the groups about whom they are reporting. Peace journalists may hope they manage to induce their audiences to empathize with the people they are reading about, but coverage about them is not meant to elicit a vicarious experience of what regular and meaningful *social interactions* would be like with them. By contrast, mediated contact programming portrays fictional characters and dilemmas, and regularly portrays the characters in a scenario in which they are behaving or attempting to behave pro-socially with one another.

Communication Challenges the Mediated Contact Effects Model Faces Empirically

Selective exposure and the impact of perception on decisions to consume mediated contact. The contents of mediated contact intervention programs are comprised of entertainment media portrayals of pro-social relationships in an effort to foster positive intergroup attitudes and, ultimately, friendship. These contents, however, will not necessarily be interpreted uniformly by individual viewers, nor necessarily influence their attitudes, beliefs, and, in turn behaviors, as discussed earlier with respect to the message effects model. Findings suggest mixed results and the need for further research. Specifically, individuals *selectively expose* themselves to messages in order to eliminate those with which they disagree. In situations where

there exists ethnopolitical conflict, or even just ethnic, racial and religious tensions, viewers may choose not to expose themselves to, for example, a mediated contact effects television program containing ideas with which they ideologically disagree.

Alternatively, potential viewers may decide to expose themselves because they perceive the mediated contact effects program's aims as not being in opposition to their own ideologies. They may simply think it is a general education program, as opposed to one that deals strictly with the political goals of intergroup compromise (with which they may disagree), and so inadvertently, tune-in. In a boost to the peace communication potential of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street,* this is precisely how parents of its child targeted audience perceived the program when evaluating its worth for their children. (Applied Research and Consulting LLC., 1999). As a result, despite some parents' less moderate tendencies towards peacemaking, they nevertheless, did not advocate that their children tune-out from the show.

Parent's perceptions of the program, and therefore their decision to allow their children to tune in provided an opportunity for the program to simulate contact for its audience. It may be that the brand name of *Sesame Street* functioned to provide the seal of approval that enabled parents to "ignore" what messages the program was actually communicating to their children. In other words, with respect to mediated contact, product *branding* can be considered the equivalent of the *official support* the contact hypothesis stipulates as required for in-person contact.

Selective Perception and Cognitive Imbalance. Even though viewers may tune into a mediated contact program, they nevertheless may selectively *perceive* it.

As a result, any potential the intervention may have to manage conflict will be lost. Viewers may "canalize" their prior attitudes, as a result of a perceived cognitive imbalance between concepts portrayed to them to, in effect, altogether avoid any potential for attitude change. (Merton & Lazarsfeld, 1948). This is precisely what Vidmar and Rokeach (1974) found in their seminal study of the television program *All in the Family*.

In their study, White American and Canadian viewers of the TV program who held prejudicial views of minorities did *not* perceive the show to be a satire of its racist character, Archie Bunker, despite the producers' original intentions. Instead, they identified with Bunker and interpreted the show to argue in favor of racism. Therefore, despite the show's efforts to counter viewers' negative stereotypes about minorities, it instead reinforced them. Vidmar and Rokeach's findings about attitude maintenance relate to many earlier studies about belief-maintenance that Nisbett and Ross (1980) describe in a review of the literature (e.g. Asch, 1946; Neisser, 1976). These findings demonstrated that earlier information is maintained in the face of later information. Substantial research supports two rational for why earlier information is maintained.

Vidmar and Rokeach's findings might also be explained by borrowing from Sirkka Ahonen's argument (cited in Salomon & Nevo, 2002) concerning the failure of peace education programs. Hypothetically, the White viewers of *All in the Family* considered the "collective narrative, aspirations and pains" of the minority groups represented in the television program to be illegitimate. The narrative presented in the program could not, as Nisbett and Ross might argue, withstand the challenge of the

audience's prior narratives. Instead, it could only reinforce them. As a result, exposure to the program did not change the viewers' prior negative beliefs.

Critical Selective Perception. Apart from issues of selective exposure and perception, the traditions of *British Cultural Studies* and related reception studies remind us that audiences may also critically negotiate, or entirely oppose the dominant reading of a *text* (e.g. a TV program) as encoded (Hall, 1973) by its producer. That is, PC curricula may not necessarily be uniformly interpreted by their intended audiences. Even worse, they may be actively *read* in total opposition to that which its producers originally intended.

Thus for example, Lisa Shochat found that Macedonian viewers of *Nashe Maalo* often opposed the dominant reading of the TV program's main characters. As a result, they "misinterpreted" the character's ethnopolitical identity (Shochat, 2003). In that case, the opportunity for Macedonian audiences to have, for example, replicated the non-violent behavior modeled for them in the TV program was therefore "lost upon them." Those viewers who critically opposed the dominant reading of the character's ethnopolitical identity could not interact with their partners in conflict through mediated contact because, simply put, they actively "wrote" their presence out of the program. Thus, while the program succeeded in offering an opportunity for mediation - or in inviting the audience to interact with their partners in conflict - the audience effectively chose otherwise.

Similarly, in an earlier study I conducted about the first season of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*, Jewish-Israeli children "misinterpreted" the identity of

characters in the television programs (Warshel, 2004a). In several cases, the Jewish-Israeli children "misinterpreted" positive portrayals of Palestinian characters. They "mistook" the Palestinian characters for Jewish-Israelis. As a result, they "observed" Jewish-Israelis interacting pro-socially with other Jewish-Israelis, rather than what was intended for them to see – Jewish-Israelis interacting pro-socially with Palestinians. The program, therefore, at times missed out on opportunities to encourage pro-social interactions between Israeli children and Palestinians.

In my analysis I argue that these children's negotiated readings of the television series occurred because their perceptions of Palestinian national identity did not match what the producers intended to convey. In short, the characters can be read as producers of a mediated contact effects program intend (e.g. Whites as Whites, and Blacks as Blacks in the example of *All in the Family*), but serve only to reinforce pre-existing prejudices. Alternatively, they might be interpreted as being the opposite of that intended by the producers (e.g. Palestinians as Jewish-Israelis in the example of Israeli *Sesame Street*), and thus not have the potential to impact prejudices altogether. When either outcome occurs, the result does not constitute a positive intended outcome of peace communication, but rather the reverse and no effect, respectively.

Selective Perception and Conflict Context. The contexts within which audiences view mediated contact programs can also impact their interpretation. These contexts include the micro context of the specific viewing environment. For example, the discomfort of viewing a program at school versus the comfort of viewing it at home may alter interpretations of a program. So too, whether it is viewed alone or

with family or peers may change its interpretation (e.g. with parents, see Nathanson 1999; 2001).

As with the other peace communication models, the macro context environment also matters. The influence of a given program is dependent upon whether the intervention takes places in situations of tensions, rather than armed conflict. So too, the program's interpretation can be influenced by whether it is being consumed during periods of heavy or light fighting in the context of an armed conflict. In keeping with earlier discussions about conflict and crises periods posing a greater challenge to PC, the chance that viewers of a TV program such as or similar to *All in the Family* (which only aired within the context of ethnopolitical tensions and not intractable ethnopolitical conflict) would be affected in a desired direction is unlikely. The context of intractable ethnopolitical conflict poses a far greater test to a mediated contact program's ability to actually mediate contact effectively. As we know, prior contact (Maddy-Weitman, 2005) and other forms of peace building suffer during such crises periods of intractable conflicts, and can, during any period within an intractable ethnopolitical conflict, create the reverse of that which the practitioners intend. (Connolly with Maginn,1999; Cole et al 2003)

On the other hand, in the earlier study I conducted, I found that the more powerful ethnopolitical group within the situation, i.e. Jewish Israelis - interpreted Israeli *Sesame Street* as optimistic, and in turn, comforting. They did so despite the fact that the program was operating during a period of heavy fighting in 2001, and that the assumptions on the part of the producers was that trying to mediate contact during

a particularly heavy period of fighting would lead to adverse reactions. (Warshel, 2007). Thus, it is possible that mediated contact can still serve certain kinds of conflict management functions (e.g. promote optimism), and for some parties (statebearing nations), even during more difficult crises periods.

Reception and Interpersonal Communication. The *two-step flow model* and later elaborations describing multiple steps and unidirectional flow (Menzel and Katz, 1955, and Robinson, 1976 cited in Weimann, 1982) help provide one explanation about how tuning into mass mediated messages may lead to the kinds of mixed and opposing findings I have described above. The two-step flow theory argues that people filter their interpretations of messages through local or familiar interpersonal relations so that, in effect, messages pass through two stages or steps. People actively select *opinion leaders* upon whom they bestow the legitimacy to edit messages, thereby influencing what and how they read that which they think they saw or heard, and by which they are in turn influenced (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948).

As a result, in a scenario during which an ethnic Macedonian teenager tuned into the TV program *Nashe Maalo*, the teen may have "observed" pro-social relations between an ethnic Macedonian and an ethnic Albanian character in the show and expressed a sense of neutrality or positive agreement with the curricular aims of the program. However, as she watches the program, seated next to her best friend, the ethnic Macedonian may have overheard her friend scoff at the program. The friend, whom she regards as an esteemed opinion leader on the subject of friendship, may

suggest that the ethnic Macedonian is stupid for befriending the ethnic Albanian teen. As a result, the teen may then re-edit her original opinion, and end up coming away from the program with the opposite belief: becoming friends with an ethnic Albanian teen is a stupid idea. In other words, co-viewer comments by opinion leaders may intervene to edit messages - during the viewing the situation (as in this example) and afterwards.

The Interaction of Interpersonal Contact with Reception of Mediated Contact Efforts

Contributions My Study in Part II and III Will Make. According to Sheryl Graves, no study has ever assessed how contact relates to either the reading or the impact of mediated contact. (Graves, 1999) My study addresses this first gap regarding readings, as I will report on in Part II and III. By filling this hole in the literature, the data I have collected will enable me to trace the path of the interpersonal symbolic communication processes at play that explain why the children interpreted the *Sesame Street* programs attempt to model pro-social relations between them, as they so did. As will become evident in Parts II and III, my study therefore provides us with an understanding of how mediated contact PC intervention efforts are assessed within their layers of micro- to macro- inter-state system contexts and how interpersonal contact and communication in particular, may interact with and alter the outcomes of mediated contact intervention efforts.

Intergroup Attitude Changes As a Result of Mediated Contact Are Sometimes Generalized

As Cole et al. found, in a situation of intractable conflict, the effort by the first season of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* to reduce negative intergroup attitudes worked with two populations (Jewish-Israelis and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis), but in the case of the third (Palestinians), actually increased their negative intergroup attitudes (Cole et al., 2003). In other words, the impact of the program's curriculum goals was the opposite of that which was intended by the producers of the programs with respect to the Palestinian audience members. These mixed results, as they explain, were generalized to "Arabs", by Jewish-Israeli children, and to "Jews", by Arab/Palestinian-Israeli and Palestinian children.

Ethnopolitical Groups May Interpret and React Differently to Mediated Contact

As I have argued elsewhere, depending upon the groups' relationship to the interstate system, whether as a state bearing nation, stateless nation or state minority, groups may react differently to cases of mediated contact, thereby explaining the mixed results found in the Cole et al, study (Warshel, 2007). More specifically, different groups, depending upon their relation to the inter-state system, will interpret and be influenced by mediated contact intervention efforts differently. Thus, as I argued there, with respect to the *Sesame Street* programs influence on the audience member's intergroup attitudes:

> Depending on its relation to the unit of the state within the interstate system, the structure of each lens holds different potentials for expectations and goals with respect to the concept of peace and, therefore, peacebuilding. As a result, children who are members of these categories, contemporarily endowed with these respective lenses that delimit the nature of their daily existence, read this peace

> communication intervention differently, and in turn, were influenced by it differently. In short, to understand how an audience receives and is influenced by peace communication, it is essential to understand the contexts through which the intervention is attempted and how audience members relate to those contexts. (Warshel, 2007, p. 314).

In otherwords, as with the contact hypothesis, effects can differ, depending upon who is being affected.

In this case, I argue that it is not just whether someone is a member of a minority or majority group, as Salomon and Nevo argued with regard to contact. (Salomon and Nevo 2004a; and also see Salomon 2004a) Rather, it is the groups' relationship to the interstate system and their current position within this system that helps to determine their interpretation of mediated contact effects programming and its influence upon them.

A given ethnopolitical group will interpret the contents of a mediated contact intervention vis-à-vis a civil rights, nationalist, or security perspective, in a manner that relates to their position as a state minority, stateless nation or statebearing nation, respectively. With respect to interpretation, the children in my current study, as I will report on in Part III, wove the narrative describing their enemies – the "police", "army" and "terrorist" respectively, into their interpretation of the *Sesame Street* programs, and, at the same time, wrote out the others' historical narrative. That is, Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children, or the state minority in the study, were unlikely to weave in the narrative of the "terrorist" or the "army", no Palestinian child wove in the narrative of the "police" or the "terrorist", and no Jewish-Israeli child wove in the

narrative of the “army” and the “police” into their readings of the *Sesame Street* programs.

The Contributions My Study in Part II and III Will Make. In other words, as I will report on in Part II and III, this comparison demonstrates the working nature of ethnopolitical boundaries at play, as these intersect readings of PC mediated contact interventions. As I will discuss, the ethnopolitical construction of audience members' categorical grouping vis-à-vis the interstate system mediates the audience's interpretation of mediated contact.

The Overall Known Potential of Mediated Contact Intervention Efforts on Attitudes and Stereotypes

Overall, PC programs modeled along the mediated contact model do not simply homogenize peoples. Instead, they can be selectively received, selectively or critically perceived, have no impact on audience's attitudes, be generalized and have mixed effects, or worse, achieve the opposite of the positive attitude or stereotypical belief change its' designers originally intended. Finally, the results can differ dependent upon which given ethnopolitical categorical groupings are tuning in.

Intergroup Political Beliefs Have Not Been Effected by Mediated Contact

Apart from the research into reception, attitudinal and stereotype effects, which appear mixed, the limited evidence suggests that beliefs are not impacted via mediated contact effects efforts. In her dissertation study of the Rwandan radio soap opera, *Musekeweya (New Dawn)*[68], Elizabeth Levy Paluck found that the radio program failed to change audience members' beliefs. These included beliefs about how

violence develops (whether ordinary people are responsible for violence, or just "evil people,"), scapegoating, and whether it is one's moral responsibility as a bystander to intervene when others are promoting conflict. (Paluck, 2007, p. 22).

Notably, audience beliefs about whether traumatized people have the ability to recover were actually changed in the reverse of the intended direction, such that audience members were significantly less likely to believe recovery was possible following the intervention (Paluck, 2007). Finally, Paluck notes, there was one exception - audience members came to believe that intermarriage promotes peace – as the producers of the program intended. However, this exception was not statistically significant. (Paluck, 2007).

Paluck's findings can be explained by the research Nisbett and Ross review, per my discussion above. Prior beliefs are not easily altered in the face of new information. In addition, as Jackman and Crane's findings with respect to the contact hypothesis helped establish, beliefs are simply more resistant to change than attitudes. This is true whether the change is attempted via real or simulated contact. Thus, while there exists evidence of positive attitude changes due to either contact or mediated contact effects programming, with respect to beliefs, they appear highly resistant to change.

Intergroup Perceived Social Norms Have Been Effected

On the other hand, the same radio soap, according to Paluck, did influence *perceived social norms*, or beliefs about how Rwandans behave and should behave (Paluck, 2007). All measured social norms, she found, were influenced in the intended

direction. These included perceived norms about intermarriage, open dissent, trust, and talking about personal trauma (Paluck, 2007).

The role of third person effects. I would argue that *Third person effects* research (Paul, Salwen and Dupagne 2000) might help to explain why mediated contact effects programming in the case of *Musekeweya* served to influence perceived social norms, despite the fact that beliefs were not altered. From the perspective of third person effects literature, we might frame her findings as follows: after exposure, viewers came to believe that *other* people believe they should behave according to the radio program's proscribed normative advice. However, they – the audience members themselves – did not, as a result of tuning in -- come to believe that they too, should behave in such a manner.

The role of cultivation theory. Alternatively, I argue, cultivation theory (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan and Signorielli, 1986) might explain these results. Following exposure, audience members came to believe that in fact, other Rwandans *already* did behave in the normative manner proscribed by the program. To this end, they concurred with the social norms recommended by the program, but were not actually influenced by it to believe they should behave in accordance with it. Assuming the audience's exposure to *Musekeweya's* contents amounted to the greatest percentage of their media consumption habits, or that all their other consumption was of contents of the same genre, this, I would argue, rather than third person effects, might have accounted for Paluck's findings.

Beliefs about ourselves versus others. As is somewhat related, in my 2001 study, the children I interviewed reported that they believed *other* children would be effected by Sesame Street's peacebuilding message, not them. (Warshel, 2007) Thus, it appears that mediated contact effects efforts may influence audience perceptions about how they believe others should behave, and perceptions about how others will be influenced. On the other hand, mediated contact effects efforts may not necessarily also influence the audience's own personal, especially political beliefs, or goals about conflict and resolving it.

Social Psychological Uses for Mediated Contact Intervention Efforts

A subset of media effects research, *uses and gratifications* research, I argue, may be used to demonstrate how communication can contribute to PC through means other than trying to positively impact intergroup attitudes in the hopes of building cross-group friendships or interdependence between groups. Uses and gratifications theory suggests that audiences may use messages, and media, for functional needs and purposes (Blumler and Katz, 1974). Thus, in the case of PC, they may for example, find it of no use, or alternatively may use it for reducing stress and promoting levels of optimism.

For example, in my 2001 study, I found that Israeli *Sesame Street* was gratifying to its Jewish-Israeli audience. According to them, it provided them with comfort and made them feel more optimistic, which in turn may have reduced their levels of stress. These children expressed unease during a period of heavy fighting in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Notably, in spite of their parents' shift away from more

conciliatory policies with regards to peacemaking during that same timeframe, they nevertheless found the program's peacebuilding message gratifying (Warshel, 2007). *Meanwhile,* stress, which the show may have helped to reduce, is one of the vexing bi-products of ethnopolitical conflict, and thus, in need of closer scrutiny by peace communication practice and scholarship. Stress reduction may promote the more general psychological health of a society, something that those living in or post conflict require.

In addition, optimism has been argued to be the best predictor of an individual's willingness to compromise politically (Shikaki, 2006). Thus, as I found in my earlier study, the optimism the show may have promoted may in turn have helped to promote political compromise. In other words, hypothetically, mediated contact effects programming I argue, may play a promising role in shifting political beliefs indirectly – namely via the promotion of optimism. More research, however, needs to be conducted into the influence of mediated contact on optimism and its relationship to political beliefs, and whether optimism does not just predict, but in fact universally influences political beliefs.

The Ability of Mediated Contact to Alter Audience Behavior

Message Effects and Behavior. Lastly, notwithstanding all the above caveats about whether audiences will receive and interpret mediated contact as intended by its creators and whether, in turn, their attitudes, stereotypes, beliefs, social norms, stress or optimism may be influenced by a mediated contact intervention (and generalized with respect to attitudes), these may not have any influence on the audience's

behaviors. Even if the program's message successfully "reaches" a given audience member, it may not entirely alter their original behaviors, as described with respect to the message effects model.

In other words, and as relates to the earlier example I described using *Nashe Maalo*, even if the ethnic Macedonian teen's friend agreed that becoming friends with an ethnic Albanian was a good idea, the teen nevertheless might not *intend* to become friends with an ethnic Albanian because she believes her parents would forbid her from doing so and, therefore, would prevent all such contact. As a result, her behavioral intentions would not change and, in turn, she would never befriend an ethnic Albanian as a result. In other words, she does not execute the behavior, despite the "influence of the show" on her via the editing of an opinion leader (her friend).

Alternatively, following exposure to the program, she may conclude that befriending an ethnic Albanian is a good idea, and her parents concur. However, since she does not live in an integrated neighborhood containing ethnic Albanians, acting on her behavioral intentions will fall outside of her range of volitional control. Therefore, she cannot, and thus will not, befriend an ethnic Albanian. In short, the context within which she lives will have interacted with the program's ability to exert influence on her.

In a final example, following exposure to *Nashe Maalo*, an ethnic Macedonian may alter his political beliefs about say, whether Albanian should be promoted as an official language side-by-side with Macedonian. Nevertheless, he may not, in turn, join a protest in support of this initiative.

In the case of *Musekeweya*, Paluck found that while beliefs were not impacted by the radio program, listeners, nevertheless, were more likely to engage in deliberation and debate about non-conflict topics following the intervention (Paluck, 2007), and separately of this, were more likely to speak up about the subject of community trust (or lack thereof) in front of their neighbors (Paluck, 2007**)** These, according to Paluck, can then be seen as evidence of behavioral outcomes owed to the intervention.

Presumably, such behavioral outcomes could help reduce violence *if* they helped facilitate the future adoption of political, rather than violent protest.[69] This, however, assumes that greater practice in deliberation and active disagreement generally lead to the adoption of political rather than violent protest. Given, however, that people may avoid political debate (Eliasoph, 1998), it is not clear that a one-to-one relationship exists between Paluck's findings regarding increased debate, about what was essentially a non-political matter, with people's choice to turn to politics as their medium for protest In other words, just because Rwandans who tuned into the radio program came to deliberate more actively following their exposure with respect to the questions posed to them – specifically, about how to share a free tape-recorder – it does not mean that deliberation over such a question would in turn have any bearing on their political deliberations, especially when they concern deadly politics. Violence may still be adopted prior to future attempts to deliberate (or prior to attempts to avoid deliberation). In addition, were the use of political deliberation to occur as a result, whether it could be sustained for a meaningful period is of course also unclear.

Finally, it should, however, be noted that Paluck did not assess behavior regarding other perceived social norms including, for example, what kind of interactions the audiences wanted to pursue with their counterpart groups (including whether they were more likely to encourage or pursue intermarriage). Thus, we don't know whether these normative changes had an impact on behavior as a result of this mediated contact attempt.

Effects and Contexts. Finally, while there exists evidence that audiences' intergroup attitudes and perceived social norms are influenced by mediated contact, direct behavior may still never be altered because it falls beyond the audience member's volitional control. Longitudinal research has yet to be carried out in order to assess the lasting imprint of attitudinal and perceived normative belief change on viewers' behaviors.

A Final Note About Media Homogeneity: The Function of the Ritualistic Use of Media

In ritualistic terms, media may serve to facilitate homogenization, as the first part of the mediated contact effects model stipulates. However, it does not achieve such results because of the technologically deterministic assumptions its practitioners make, nor do so directly. I am returning to this part of the model now in order to make a recommendation about how to redesign the mediated contact effects model, or incorporate aspects of it into other PC models.

In her ethnographic study of women's television viewing habits in Egypt, Lila Abu-Lughod found that social cohesion formed during the co-viewing of television.

(Abu-Lughod, 1995). Thus, were a mediated contact effects program in practice terms thought about as being able to homogenize, not because of its direct technological power, but rather, because it may function as a mediating *artifact*, mediated contact could be argued to play a potential role in helping to foster homogeneity.

However, the creation of such an opportunity for homogeneity to develop requires re-thinking the mediated contact model and applying it in a completely different fashion. Namely, partners to conflict would need to view mediated contact effects programming *together,* as part and parcel of, for example, a context effects program in order to create the opportunity for homogeneity. Simply viewing the program in parallel will have no influence in this respect.

To this effect, incorporating a co-viewing component into mediated contact intervention efforts could serve as a mediating device during dialogue groups, as for example, if the intervention, or medium through which it is channeled is instead conceptualized as an *artifact*. (See Cole, 1996 with respect to artifacts). Co-viewing could be used as a means for initially breaking the ice and bridging a gap between the groups. It could in particular help with respect to difficult discussions about historical narratives, including when groups are trying to work together to accept parallel narratives or to forge shared narratives. In other words, the role mediated contact *as artifact* might play within contact effects programming is another area that needs to be researched, and a reason why the development of PC as a sub-discipline is sorely needed.

Conflict is Not Caused by Prejudice: On the Need to Incorporate Structural Realities and Historical Narratives Into the Intervention

As per my earlier discussion, conflict is not caused by prejudice. Thus, while attitudes may in some cases be generalized (e.g. as was the case with the positive findings from Cole et al.'s 2003 study), people will not necessarily generalize their new attitudes to their political beliefs, nor alter their behaviors to bring about structural change. In their defense, mediated contact programs do not typically try to create political change. However, per the arguments made by Connolly and Maggin, they should make it their goal. Specifically, these PC programs need to incorporate the existing structural realities, lest they are not able to change them, and the wider structures that characterize ethnopolitical forms of conflict remain.

Contributions My Study in Part II and III Will Make. Similarly, with respect to my earlier discussion about the importance of incorporating narrative discussions into dialogue groups, mediated contact efforts need to incorporate them too. In addition, they need to incorporate existing structural realities by incorporating structural displays, or contextual examples of unequal access to resources, into programming. Thus, contrary to *Sesame Street's* conscious effort to avoid engaging with the conflict itself, as I will describe in Chapter 4, it, and other mediated contact interventions would more likely stand the chance of influencing political change if they incorporated such structural displays and historical narratives into their programming.[70]

Final Analysis/Recommendation About the Worth of the Mediated Contact Effects Model

In short, simply replacing contact with mediated contact does not magically achieve peace. Technology is embedded in social relations and therefore requires heeding the intervening effects of the relations or contexts present in any given conflict. The introduction of new media technologies alone does not resolve social-psychological barriers to communication and behavior. If characters' messages are carefully designed and introduced according to concepts of invititational discourse, these programs may have the potential for limited effects in spite of research into the exposure to and polysemic interpretations of media.

Contributions My Study in Part II and III Will Make. However, as I will demonstrate in Part III, great challenges exist with respect to ensuring that audiences indeed interpret content as intended within the context of conflict, and in this specific case, nationalist ethnopolitical forms of conflict.

Findings about the generalization of intergroup attitudes following exposure to mediated contact intervention efforts in the intended direction are mixed. The program and the audience member's own position with regard to the interstate system may temper their influence in the context of a given conflict. Beliefs ultimately don't appear to be influenced. In other communication campaign domains, for example in health communication, it may be that attitudes, not beliefs, are what most influence health related behaviors. However, with regard to peace communication, I argue that rather it is precisely beliefs that most influence conflict-related behaviors. Therefore,

the research to date, albeit still limited, suggests that using mediating contact to influence structural change is very difficult. Changing the contents, including the message strategies involved in mediated contact effects programming may prove to ease some of these difficulties, as too, experimenting with a mixed model whereby participants engage in co-viewing. Such programming would, of course, need to be created, and in turned assessed and evaluated, in order to establish whether its effective.

Critique of Model V: (Embedded) Factor of Production Effects

Technologies are Embedded in Social Relations: Without Access and Motivation to Use Them They Will Not be Adopted

Peace communication interventions working to introduce technologies into conflict-ridden societies have not fostered increased economic output, unless users were motivated to use them and they were introduced by paying attention to necessary *access* requirements, including relevant skill development. As I discussed earlier, the use of media technologies do not predetermine any set outcome. (McGuire, 1986; Marvin, 1988). Old interventions that assumed the introduction of technologies alone were sufficient were too deterministic. Borrowing from political economy, economic relations (Polyani, 1957), and information technology productivity specifically (Evans, 1995), are embedded in social and political relations. If these relations (not to mention intersections with military relations) are not heeded, interventions modeled along the factor of production effects model have been found to be ineffective. As Wilson III concluded following his analyses of the information technology sectors, in general, in Ghana, China and Brazil, the adoption of information technology proved unlikely without attention being paid to access. (Wilson III, 2004). Access (together with of course interest and motivation to use these technologies) must exist in order that they be adopted.

Embedded-Minded Adoption of New Technologies May Promote Economic Growth

Adopters of Internet technology who specifically were beneficiaries of factor of production effects modeled interventions designed with the importance of the concept of embedding kept in mind have benefited financially. As one example, IDRC found that in all the states were ACACIA's joint PADIS CABECA Sub-Saharan African intervention was initiated, users of email saved money on their communication costs. While not an example of efficiency generation promotion, such savings are an example of a cost-benefit to the user (Schware, 1999). Such cost savings to users, among other benefits, may, more generally, in turn help foster economic growth. For example, users might have then taken the money they saved and invested it into business development, thereby helping them to overcome the burden of future rent costs.

The relationship between communication and efficiency promotion remains unclear, however – whether users have in turn invested the saved money that is the result of new technology use is not clear. According to the limited evidence "The relationships between information and communication technologies, on the one hand, and other societal outcomes like productivity, investment, and inequality, on the other," remain inconsistent and unclear. (Rodriguez and Wilson, 2000, p. 35 cited in Wilson III, 2004, p. 325). While there are indications that communication as an embedded factor of production has saved users money, and so too, providers, whether these have in turn fostered overall economic growth remains less clear.

Capitalist Peace Empirical Literature Correlates

Meanwhile, according to Gartzke, capitalist peace correlates are more significant than democratic peace correlates, such that economic growth is arguably more related to peace. In particular, the variables of global financial markets and economic development count more than trade in goods (Gartzke, 2007). In other words, the individual economic productivity embedded factor of production effects interventions attempt to promote, if successful, can help foster peace, given that aggregated individual productivity leads to economic development. While Gartzke contends that the causality is still subject to debate, the point then is really that the causes of peace in more prosperous democracies remains unclear. Nevertheless, evidence suggests some role for economics in the promotion of peace, even if perhaps they are only intervening.

Economic Relations are Embedded in Power, Especially Within Scenarios of Ethnopolitical Conflict

Even if economic efficiency and increased productivity prove to be the causal link, as Gartzke's corollary data asks us to think about, these do not, however, necessarily spell peace. The establishment of peace depends on for example who benefits from among different ethnopolitical groups, and within which sector of the economy. That is, if the information-haves continue to benefit, economic gaps will become greater – and serve as a potentially larger source of tension in a conflict. Again, however, these are all conditioned upon social phenomena and are not pre-determined. As Joan Nelson concludes, with respect to a review of the relevant literature, the relationship between economic conditions and peace is not direct. "The

effects of economic factors depend on the broader context." For example, "Worsening economic conditions can provoke civic conflict, but so can interrupted progress, or even steady but sufficiently fast progress." (Nelson, 1998, p. 23).

In short, when embedded, programs modeled along the factor of production effects model have proven capable of cutting costs to users and suppliers of information technology. However, it is unclear to what extent these, in turn, have been used to generate greater productivity, profit and employment growth. So too, it is unclear to what extent such economic development would help foster peace. Economic growth appears to play some role in fostering peace, but that it be distributed equitably also matters.

Directed embedded (or non-laissez faire) approaches to economic development are required in order to ensure that minorities gain equitable access to media technology (Wilson III, 1998). Without such policies, they are less likely to gain access, and in turn conflict over inequity cannot be resolved. At the same time, to what extent equitable distribution matters is, however, also an empirical question, particularly given that conflict as a result of inequity is itself mediated by groups.

For example, the decision to protest violently is mediated by a group's perceived collective self-efficacy with respect to whether they believe the use of violence will be an effective tool for achieving their goals, and by their actual capacity to wage violence. And so too, it is mediated by the capacity to wage violence on the part of counterpart group with which the given group is at odds (i.e. that which represents the government with which they are at odds), as Gurr has argued. (Gurr,

1970 cited in Nelson, 1998; Gurr 2000). If a group protesting "the state" does not believe it has the means to combat the state and/or does not indeed have the training and weapons capability to do so, regardless of inequity, their ability and choice to protest will certainly be limited.

Critique of Model VI: Self-Efficacy Effects

Perceived Self Efficacy and Skills Regulate Aggressive and Violent Behavior

A considerable amount of empirical evidence has been produced to suggest that enhancing self-efficacy in combination with training in the use of peace oriented communication styles regulates aggressive and violent behavior. In other words, these can lead to negative peace, or the absence of violence (e.g. Wilson, Lipsey and Derzon, 2003, which include among the meta-analysis of interventions they studied, those that combine these criteria). However, these results have only been demonstrated in (1) cases of school, not political, violence, as (2) channeled via face-to-face communication, and (3) when targeting individual level self-efficacy.

Context Matters: Negative Peace is required to Maintain Newly Established Non-Violent Behavior

As has been demonstrated in studies of school violence intervention programs, the benefits of an intervention have only been sustained when participating students were permanently removed from their conflict-ridden environments (e.g. if removed from their schools). (Heydenberk and Heydenberk, 2000). School based programs can create the shift to effective non-violent negotiation techniques, but these must be practiced in a cooperative environment if they are to be (and remain) effective (Johnson & Johnson, 1995). In other words, while self-efficacy effects programming can help *lead* to such stable and secure environments, if these programs are not practiced in a cooperative environment, they will prove ineffective. Without a change

in the environment, non-violence will not be sustained. In short, context matters with respect to the self-efficacy effects based programming too. (Huessman, 1996).

Therefore, it is unclear how the self-efficacy effects model can work with respect to ethnopolitical conflict and civil wars, unless, following their participation, participants are permanently removed from the conflict environment (e.g. the state in which they live). This consequently is the same re-entry problem McCauley refers to with respect to the contact hypothesis. Simply put, unless structural changes are also introduced, the self-efficacy effects model does not appear sustainable within the context of ethnopolitical conflict and civil wars.

Self-efficacy effects modeled peace communication interventions, could hypothetically be sustained, if, for example, segregated state unit models for each nationalist group were created after the intervention, thereby ensuring the populations' permanent removal from the prior conflict context. This in effect is what the Oslo Accords proposed by opting for a two, rather than single bi-national state solution.

A second option for ensuring the viability of the self-efficacy effects model and introducing and sustaining negative peace would be to introduce population exchanges into the details of a wider peace settlement. Historically such practices have, for example, been implemented between Bulgarians and Greeks, Greeks and Turks, and Hungarians and Slovaks following WWI and WWII. That I include this option here will no doubt raise some eyebrows. My point in mentioning it, however, is not to make a recommendation about population exchanges one way or the other, but simply to illustrate, hypothetically, what sorts of options would be required to sustain

the outcome of a self-efficacy effects intervention in scenarios of either ethnopolitical or civil conflict. Unless all use of violence is simultaneously eliminated, partners to conflict have to be separated – whether by the creation of new boundaries or the movement of peoples across old boundaries. In short, future research needs to address this problem of re-entry or context with respect to self-efficacy effects programming for these forms of political conflicts.

With respect to interstate and multi-state conflicts, self-efficacy effects programming results could, hypothetically, be sustained once violence ended, provided that two conditions are fulfilled. One is that all tension inducing sources would have to be removed from the given state– i.e. troops would have to be withdrawn. The other is that the state would need to be stable and secure. In other words, if the former condition – troop removal - left a power vacuum and destabilized the state, any positive effects from self-efficacy effects programming would likely not be sustained in any case.

How Does Context Interfere with the Application of New Behavior?

Volitional Control. In more specific terms, conflict-ridden environments may disrupt the application of the individuals' newly acquired non-conflict communication skills. This "disruption" may occur because the conflict situation involves behaviors that are not under the individual's *volitional control.* An application of Icek Ajzen's theoretical modeling here would serve to explain that executing the new behavior actually falls outside of the individual's realm of volitional control. According to Icek Azjen, the concept of volitional control, as measured by *perceived behavioral control*,

is integral to making sense of what factors or processes ultimately prevent an individual from executing a behavior they otherwise intended to execute (Ajzen, 1985; 1988; Ajzen, Albarasin, & Hornik, 2007). An individual who intends to engage with their partner in conflict in non-conflict communication styles, for example, by employing invitational discourse dialogue methods rather than weapons to communicate, ultimately may be unable to reach her partner in conflict in person to employ the former.

For example, in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a Palestinian otherwise on his way to meet with an Israeli in order engage in dialogue, if encountering a *flying* (or random) checkpoint that prevented him from actually physically meeting with the Israeli, would find himself therefore, unable to execute his intended behavior. What other behavior he might then instead execute is of course varied, but the point is that the behavior he originally intended to execute may not be executable.

In contrast to Ajzen, Bandura (who does incorporate structural elements of the environment into his theory) points to these structural elements as preventing the individual's already performed behavior from achieving the desired *outcome expectancy*. In other words, in the aforementioned example, the Israeli and Palestinian would have already met eachother for dialogue. Nevertheless, doing so might still not produce the outcome desired by one of them. The latter may for example, not agree with the former politically. Consequently, as a result, the latter does not change who he voted for in the last elections or his decision to forgo violent protest in favor of

non-violent behavior even though they did manage to meet for dialogue. Ajzen, like Bandura, would argue that not only could the Palestinian, not behave in the manner the Israeli wishes, but in addition, the Palestinian may not even manage to engage the latter in dialogue in the first place. He could not engage with him in dialogue because the flying checkpoint was a variable that was outside of his volitional control.

How this is measured, whether via *perceived self-efficacy* or via *perceived behavioral control*, differs with respect to Bandura and Ajzen's models respectively. Both, nevertheless, point to the importance of thinking about structures when modeling behavior change.[71] In both their cases, however, they are arguing that the person will not intend to engage in the behavior in the first place due to contextual restrictions. Researchers can combine both their measures to compare the utility of either of their theories for evaluating behavioral intentions as a consequence of self-efficacy effects programming for achieving the behavior and its ultimately desired behavioral outcome.

I should note that I am also separately arguing that in a context of conflict, where unpredictability exists, Ajzen and Bandura's approaches to behavioral intentions do not always apply. Certainly unpredictability itself – when so common - becomes worked into the behaviors of those living in zones of conflict and can be successfully measured by *behavioral intentions*. However, when enough new and peculiar incidences of unpredictability prevent individuals from executing those behaviors they set out to execute and sustain in the first place, they have not factored

these into their behavioral intentions. Thus, context can still alter the outcome of an individual's behavioral intentions.

Mass Mediated Differences: Teaching Self-Efficacy via Modeling

More recently, efforts have been made to incorporate self-efficacy effects modeling into mass mediated interventions, though research into its efficacy has yet to be conducted. Therefore, research needs to provide evidence about whether and how the influence of self-efficacy effects interventions differs when channeled via mass communication as compared with interpersonal communication. Thus, for example research needs to be conducted into the effects of the new SFCG radio program in Nepal, *Nayaa Baato Nayaa Paailaa (Treading Upon a New Path)* which began in 2006. Such research could assess whether, via Bandura's SCT's mechanisms of teaching self-efficacy through vicarious experiences of observing the character's performances (Bandura, 1986), youth living in the hills districts of Nepal adopted the use of non-violent communication strategies. In addition, per the signing of the peace agreements between the government and Maoist rebels, longitudinal research could be conducted to evaluate whether peace-making alone was sufficient to enable these youth to sustain their new non-violent communication skills.

Collective Not Individual Self-Efficacy May Moderate Conflict

Finally, practitioners applying the self-efficacy effects model in cases of political conflict have remained focused on trying to moderate individual level self-efficacy rather than collective self-efficacy. These practitioners have assumed that the lack of individual self-efficacy with respect to one's ability to engage in non-violent

communication is what causes conflict. It is not. Where self-efficacy does come into play in conflict, rather collective self-efficacy does, as Bandura has argued more generally with respect to political organization (Bandura, 1986).

According to Bandura, *perceived collective self-efficacy* is the belief that people "can solve their problems and improve their lives through concerted effort." (Bandura, 1986, p. 449). "In the arena of social activism, perceived collective efficacy is reflected in judgments about group capabilities to make decisions, to enlist supporters and resources, to devise and carry out appropriate strategies, and to withstand failures and reprisals." (Bandura, 1986. P. 450).

Therefore, I recommend that peace communication programs designed along the self-efficacy effects model instead try to inspire a belief in (1) participants' individual *self-efficacy*, or perceived ability to be able to execute their behavioral roles *as part of a collective*, and also (2) their perception of their group's ability, as a whole, to engage in conventional politics – meaning inspiring the individual to perceive that their group can be effective at bringing about political change via conventional politics. Thus, if these programs are better focused on inspiring change in both these measures of self-efficacy, they would stand a better chance at positively influencing political change. If they take these two kinds of self-efficacy into account, they are more likely to be able to help bring about the adoption of non-violence within situations of political and not just school violence.

An Overall Estimate of the Self-Efficacy Effects Model

In summary, the self-efficacy model is effective at reducing aggressive and violent behavior in school settings, and can be sustained when students are permanently removed from their conflict environments. Similarly, it may be applicable to scenarios of political conflict, though political conflict poses a larger challenge to this model's ability to manage conflict. Whether the self-efficacy effects model can withstand such a test still needs to be assessed and evaluated. Such change is more likely to be sustained if warring populations are permanently separated from one another – via population exchanges, separate states or via other applicable policy approaches. Without it, it seems almost certain that change cannot be sustained. We know that non-violent strategies *are* pursued in scenarios of conflict (e.g. most famously as in the case of Gandhi, or see for example Awad, 1984 for an argument for its use), but whether these are pursued by people who were previously violent (as opposed to those who practice non-violence in the first place), or as a direct result of this type of intervention is less clear. In addition, future research needs to make separate assessments about whether, when behaviors are not executed, individuals *intended* to engage in non-violent communication as a result of an intervention, but ultimately failed to do so because of structural variables. By disaggregating between these two outcomes – i.e. intended behavior and behavior in practice - we can learn whether, on the one hand, the self-efficacy effects model is useful for sustaining negative peace in the absence of a violent context, or whether that context proves insurmountable.

In addition, whether the same effects can be achieved when viewers engage in the vicarious practice of various behaviors by observing characters using non-conflict communication styles in a mass mediated program, rather than via direct interpersonal engagement, needs to be evaluated. Finally, programs using the self-efficacy model should instead switch to a model of collective self-efficacy. While these programs may be able to reduce violence in an aggregate form, they will not reduce collective violence. Even when one individual carries out an act of violent protest (e.g. a suicide bombing), these in almost every case are rooted in collective attitudes and not simply just individual decision-making. Programs that could effectively alter collective self-efficacy and, in turn, produce lasting reductions in the use of violence, would help restore negative peace in situations of armed conflict.

In short, the self-efficacy effects model cannot build peace (nor, in its defense, is it designed to). That is, while it may very well help bring about political cease-fires, or the end to armed conflict, devoid of any structural changes, it is unlikely to make and sustain peace.

Critique of Model VII: Reconciliation Effects

Reconciliation May Allow People to Heal

Evidence about the impact of reconciliation effects programming suggests that it can help participants come to terms with their past in order to begin the process of moving forward. As Dan Bar-On and colleagues have found in the case of the TRT, participants were able not, “to forget or to be done with the past, once and for all, but to find new ways to live with it.” Achieving success via the programs’ emphasis on clinical psychology-like story telling experiences and reflections about those meant that they could, as a result of their participation in the TRT, live with the holocaust “more consciously, but in less threatening and self-destructive ways.” (Albeck, Adwan and Bar-On, 2002, p. 309).

The limited evidence about the utility of reconciliation programming for healing remains anecdotal however. More research needs to be conducted into its impact on healing, and to in turn help understand what healing can help with. In addition, it is necessary to understand how these limited findings, garnered from efforts channeled through face-to face communication relate to mass mediated programming efforts.

Reconciliation Effects Programming Can Encourage Empathy for Others

The Musekeweya Rwandan soap also incorporated reconciliation effects programming into its design by specifically using the theoretical writings of Ervin

Staub. According to Paluck, the soap significantly promoted empathy for Rwandan prisoners, genocide survivors, poor people, and political leaders (Paluck, 2007).

Reconciliation May Elicit Confessions

Apart from evidence suggesting that reconciliation effects programming can help heal and elicit empathy, there also exists some anecdotal evidence indicating that mass mediated channeled reconciliation interventions can lead to confessions on the part of the perpetrators of genocidal crimes. According to Ananda Breed, audience members watching reconciliation plays in Rwanda jumped up during the plays and admitted their part in the genocide. Apparently, this has become common enough that Gacaca court judges came to strategically place themselves within the audience in an effort to encourage these confessions and ensure their related documentation with the courts (Breed, 1997). More research also needs to be conducted in order to determine the extent to which confessions have occurred as a result of reconciliation programming.

Overall Estimate of this Model: What are the Uses for Healing, Empathy and Truth Confessions?

Furthermore, more research needs to be undertaken in order to assess the precise role healing and empathy can play in the promotion of peace. Since proponents of this model are not arguing that conflict exists due of a lack of healing or empathy, they, in effect, are not reaching beyond their capabilities but rather are only stipulating they can *add* to the solution. To this end, the reconciliation effects model seems to be capable of doing just this – adding to the solution.

According to Gabriel Salomon, empathy and understanding the history, experiences, practices, and intentions of another group help sensitize the conflicting parties to various resolution possibilities. (Salomon, 2004). In other words, *empathy* can make communication between enemies possible, and open them up to more creative solutions. So too, *reconciliation* is crucial for conflicting parties who have ended violent conflict, but have to continue to live and work together. It enables former enemies to try to redefine their relationship in such a way so as to be able to move from a negative to a positive peace. At its core, positive peace requires that former enemies learn to trust each other, and that is something which reconciliation may lend to.

Countering these assertions, however, are arguments that political settlements have been reached in the absence of empathetic relations and/or forgiveness. Thus, as Feldman has pointed out, West Germany and Israel were able to normalize interstate relations in the absence of so-called "German-Jewish" reconciliation following the Holocaust (Feldman, 1999). In other words, forgiveness is clearly not essential for peacemaking. However, this example is about normalization between not just two separate states, but also non-contiguous, and further, non-regionally neighboring states. That is, such peacemaking did not necessarily have to be followed by peacebuilding. Peacebuilding would, however, be required in cases of conflict in which parties have to continue to live next to eachother, or, even more challengingly, *with* eachother. In such cases, reconciliation effects programming can certainly play a role in helping move former enemies from a scenario of negative to positive peace.

Conclusion

Further Research Into Peace Communication is Necessary

In summary, while prolific in practice, scholarship about peace communication has been less then adequate, emerging largely only at the turn of this century. Among the existing relevant scholarship I have reviewed, there are a few notable dissertations, and, in my own case, my 2007 article that I referenced earlier and conference papers about peace communication that I presented during and since my Masters, degree beginning in the late 1990s. This serves as another testimony for just how recent interest in the topic of peace communication assessment or evaluation actually is. Nevertheless, besides the great strides made since the turn of this century, more assessment and evaluation research needs to be conducted in order to establish the utility of peace communication programs and suggest improvements for their design.

Scholars Should Emphasize Those Models that Carry the Greatest Chance for Altering Behaviors and Structures

From among the seven models into which I have classified global peace communication practice, I believe of that the following 7 models or specific subtypes are of most potential use. (1) The peace journalism variant of the message effects model, and (2) the contact effects model. The latter model has only been useful for achieving a reduction in intergroup prejudice and promoting friendships, which is essential for peacebuilding after peacemaking has occurred. However, I argue that it does not especially help establish the latter as it has been practiced. Similarly, (3) mediated contact, which should also be researched, suffers from the same problem as

contact effects programming, though on a one-to-one comparison rate of participant to viewer, it is less likely to achieve friendships due to the challenges involved of polysemic interpretations. On the other hand, it *can* potentially achieve a larger number of friendships per capita, per the great volume of people it can target simultaneously.

(4) Embedded factor of production effects programming should also be researched further. Programs designed along this model can generate efficiency if a given intervention is designed along subtype B, by taking into account the embedded nature of economic relations and concerns about achieving universal access, rather than opting for laissez-faire technology diffusion approaches. This model can alleviate some amount of structural inequality. However, whatever changes it leads to must be sustained over time and might be able to reduce violence only in so far as the combination of *perceptions* of structural inequality, and group *organizational factors and decisions* would have led groups to pursue violent strategies in the first place. In other words, though this subtype will not necessarily reduce physical violence, it can help mitigate structural violence.

On the other hand, if factor of production effects programs were still to be designed along subtype A – using the laissez faire-approach, but -- in contrast to how they were designed in the past -- by using an embedded approach, and if capitalism in fact has a causal relationship with the avoidance of physical violence, than this subtype would have a role to play in cases where inequality was not the source of conflict. For instance, it may play a potential role in cases of multi-state and interstate

war, but is not likely to play a role with respect to civil wars and certainly not in the case of ethnopolitical conflicts. This subtype (with the embedded modification) should also be researched further to assess and evaluate its utility.

(5) Self-efficacy effects programming, provided practitioners switch to promoting collective rather than individual self-efficacy, can, I believe, prove useful in helping to establish negative peace, and should, therefore, be further researched. Sixth and finally (and more limited in scope), reconciliation effects programs may be useful as tools not to per se manage political conflict, but rather to help move societies from negative to positive peace.

In contrast to these above seven models and or subtypes that I mention as being worthy of further scholarly focus, I do not recommend further research into the following four models or subtypes: (1) programs designed along the media-effects model. This model constitute poor policy and, therefore, is not worth further investment on the part of either scholars, on the one hand, and practitioners or donors, on the other. Nor would I recommend further study into: (2) the free flow propaganda-public diplomacy, (3) protectionist-dependency or (4) free-flow anti-censorship subtypes of the message effects model. Apart from that, I question the ability of these three subtypes to exert powerful enough outcomes, given their reliance on messages in and of themselves and/or their persuasion capacity, their theoretical underpinnings, or in the case of the latter, practice, do not get at managing the root causes of conflict, nor proscribe either a just or a sustainable peace, as outcomes.

In summary, with respect to research, in order of greatest priority (and also considering what research currently exists), I rank firstly (1) the peace journalism subtype of the message effects model, (2) mediated contact effects, (3) embedded factor of production effects subtype B, (4) a modified embedded version of factor of production effects subtype A, and (5) self-efficacy effects models as being in most urgent need of research into their efficacy.

Secondly, more research needs to be conducted into (6) reconciliation effects. However, because reconciliation programs do not aim to be as far reaching with respect to both trying to establish negative *and* positive peace, they arguably fall in secondary importance to the need to research the former models.

Thirdly, research into (7) contact effects programming is also important. However, because this model does not suffer from the dearth of research that the others do, research into it, in contrast to the other six, falls in the rank of the third area in greatest need of research. In parts II and III, I describe my assessment of a mediated contact effects model, thereby filing a hole in the dearth of research that exists about one of these five priority area models and/or subtypes. I specifically select the mediated contact model from among these because the case I analyze – i.e. Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* - represents the best application of PC and therefore, affords us with the greatest opportunity to learn about when, where and how PC is or is or is not effective.

Part II: Illustrating How to Approach the Assessment and Evaluation of Peace Communication Through a Discussion of Methodologies and the Encoding of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street by its Producers*

Chapter 4: Conceptualization of the Intervention as a Peace Communication Case for Analysis

I am assessing the efficacy of a peace communication intervention designed along the mediated contact effects model that seeks to manage conflict between Palestinian, Jewish-Israeli and Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children, through the use of the technology of television. That intervention consists of two seasons of the co-produced versions of *Sesame Street* known as *Rechov Sumsum/Shara'a Simsim* and *Sippuray Sumsum* and *Hikayat Simsim*. My study of this case of peace communication will, therefore, look at the potential utility of mediated contact effects.[72]

Assessing what Aspects of Conflict the Intervention Helps Manage

Success at Mediating Contact

I will discuss the ability of the intervention to build peace on the basis of whether it (1) adheres to the principles and requirements of the contact hypothesis, and (2) is able to mediate this experience of contact. As I described in Chapter 3, the aims and contents of the intervention do adhere to the requirements of the context hypothesis. Therefore, I am focusing my assessment on the question of whether these programs successfully *mediated* the contact experiences they broadcast to viewers, to in turn attempt in some way to manage conflict.

Mediation through observation. Contact may be mediated *via* two methods. The first occurs when the audience observes pro-social behavior between the partners

to conflict in the mediated program. For the intervention to successfully mediate contact through such a method, the audience would have to model the pro-social behavior displayed for them. That is to say, in accordance with the modeling mechanisms aspects of Bandura's Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) (Bandura, 1986), which I discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the audience would have to vicariously identify with the characters in the *Sesame Street* programs and, in turn, model their pro-social behaviors.

Mediation through "transportation". Alternatively, the other method by which the intervention may mediate contact is by effectively establishing a relationship between the audience and the characters on the screen representing the members of the audience's partner/s to conflict. If an audience member is "transported" into the television program in such a way so as to vicariously engage in relations with the oppositional characters and can, therefore, effectively *imagine* contact, the program could effectively mediate contact via this mechanism too.[73]

The Efficacy of Mediated Contact

How the audience interpreted the text: five areas for assessment. In my assessment, the findings of which I begin reporting on in chapter six, I assess the role which mediated contact played in audience members' interpretation of the *text* – i.e. the contents of the *Sesame Street* programs. Specifically, I assess whether the experience of mediated contact (1) created an impetus for intergroup attitude change, (2) created an impetus to generalize new-found positive intergroup attitudes, and (3) provided effective contact experiences to, in turn, enable audience members to build

friendships with their partners in conflict. Independently of points two through four, which are direct outcomes traditionally researched by scholars of the contact hypothesis, I also collected data in order to be able to address more recently researched outcomes of contact. These include (4) data about whether the intervention effectively mediated contact in an effort to cause audience members to want to meet partners in conflict – a point I earlier mentioned that Ifat Maoz has raised with respect to contact effects interventions (Maoz, 2002). (5) I, in addition, collected data about more critical outcomes of contact, namely whether the interventions effectively mediated contact in order to instill changes in political beliefs. This is a point that Jackman and Crane have raised, demonstrating that, in the majority of cases, friendships do not lead to changes in political beliefs. (Jackman and Crane, 1986). Specifically in order to address this concern, I collected data about how mediated contact relates to the audience's goals towards (resolving) their conflicts as situated within concerns about group advantage versus disadvantage.

Assessment Measures for Mediated Contact

How the audience interpreted the text: direct measures. In an effort to measure the programs' ability to mediate contact, with respect to the above five named assessment areas, I designed the research in order to be able to assess (1) how the audience interpreted the identity of the characters in the programs, (2) what sense the audience made out of the languages spoken in the programs, (3) what attitudes they adopted towards the characters, (4) whether they generalized these attitudes to the group the character in the television program was intended to represent, (5) the

audience's interpretation of the pro-social relations demonstrated in the program, (6) the audience's attitudes towards the demonstration of these and (7) their interpretation of structural topics within different program segments. In my report of the findings, which begins in Chapter 6, I limit my analysis to the programs' abilities to mediate contact with respect to measures one through four.

Peace Communication Assessment: Audience Reception Analysis

I chose to conduct an assessment in order to primarily do what, to the best of my knowledge, represents the first audience reception analysis of a peace communication intervention operating within the context of an ethnopolitical nationalist conflict - the hardest test case these efforts try to mediate. Thus, my study is the first such analysis to explain how a case of PC is interpreted within such a context, and specifically the first audience reception analysis (or use of the requisite study design for assessing mediated contact) to explain how a case of mediated contact is interpreted.

Second, I conducted an assessment, and therefore specifically an audience reception analysis, in order to add to the existing scientific evidence rather then replicate it with a second media effects analysis of the same intervention. Thus, my study will seek to elaborate on the kinds of study designs appropriate not just for assessing but also evaluating PC, while at the same time, provide the assessment findings that heretofore are unknown about the specific *Sesame Street* programs I assessed.

With respect to the first reason, I therefore contribute groundbreaking knowledge about how audiences read peace communication interventions and in turn provide knowledge that is (1) useful for communication-based audience reception analysis literature, and (2) the practice and assessment of peace communication.

Contributions to Audience Reception and Peace Communication Practice and Assessment Literatures

With respect to audience reception analysis literature, my original research improves our understanding of how audiences *read*, or interpret, negotiate and re-appropriate peace communication interventions operating in situations of nationalist ethnopolitical conflict, including during periods of crisis. As Justin Lewis has argued, far fewer *audience studies* are conducted, as compared with their less time consuming alternative, namely *content analyses.* (Lewis, 1991) Content analyses, as I discussed in Chapter 1, provide no data about the audience's reception of content. As we might expect, audience studies conducted during times of war are even rarer (Hallin, 1997), as war scenarios considerably complicate efforts to interview, observe and interact with subjects. Correspondingly, we know little about how audiences, whether they are comprised of adults or children, read peace communication programming in situations of political conflict. By conducting an audience reception analysis, I contribute to audience reception studies literature, including, specifically, about reception patterns within zones of conflict. With respect to the practice of peace communication, this knowledge may help practitioners improve peace communication programming and

provide policymakers and donors with the ability to decide whether to recommend and fund peace communication, as I have discussed in earlier chapters.

By borrowing from audience studies methodologies in order to conduct an assessment, I contribute to the practice and analysis of peace communication, and assessment literature. I do so by illuminating the processes at play and the larger dynamic contexts within which the children's reading of the programs were situated, and which, in turn, helped direct the manner in which they were influenced by the television programs.

In contrast, the Cole et al study (2003) I described in Chapter 3 evaluated the effects of the *Sesame Street* programs, thereby explaining how the programs *influenced* the audience. They conducted a *quantitative media effects study*. In it, they exposed the children to the television programs, as a group in a lab-like setting, and evaluated the effect, among other variables, on their inter-group attitudes through pre- and post-test surveys. These surveys were each 15 minutes in length. (Cole et al, 2003).

Audience reception and context analysis. I decided not to replicate their study, and therefore, instead opted to conduct an audience reception analysis, and in addition include in my analysis something rarely done – namely a study of the *context conditions* in which the audience interpreted the *Sesame Street* programs. I choose to do so in order to help trace the path of what happened when the children were tuning into the programs to in turn be able to explain why they interpreted the programs as

they did, as this would in turn shape how their attitudes and beliefs were ultimately influenced.

Apart from that the Workshop, by contrast, conducted a quantitative media effects study, its scholars also emphasized different sets of literature in their analysis. That is, they made use of communication and cognitive development literature. The Workshop has established a useful and robust tradition of evaluation scholarship in these areas. In fact, they have been leaders with respect to the subfield of cognitive development communication, making theirs and related studies about *Sesame Street* bulwark examples within an analysis of the effects of communication campaign interventions on cognitive development during early childhood, and in particular, with respect to literacy acquisition. In this respect, scholars based out of Sesame Workshop, and those whom they hire as consultants in conjunction with their regional projects do not emerge out of a tradition of or training in peace communication. Rather, they emerge from an understanding of children and media, usually with training in the fields of education, psychology and communication. To this end, when conducting their evaluations, the workshop focuses on matters of child development so that, for example, they emphasize age-appropriate methods for conducting research with children. I give credit to their emphasis on these developmental stages, which I in turn incorporated into my own study in order to more appropriately design it.[74]

Accordingly, when Cole et al. evaluated the Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* programs, they did not expand to evaluate it from the perspective of theoretical and methodological conflict studies approaches. While their study represents a

pioneering effort, like the other mediated contact studies I reviewed in Chapter 3, whether these are assessments or evaluations, *none* stress the importance of context in their analyses. As a result, none incorporate ethnopolitical context for reading into their analyses and hence, do not make use of the growing literature on ethnopolitical conflict and related methodologies to interpret and explain their findings. In my analysis, I incorporate such conflict studies-based literature, as per my recommendations for including these, together with communication-based literature, which I discussed in Chapter 1.

Measures for assessing conflict contexts. As part of my effort to incorporate these communication and conflict studies based literatures, apart from just assessing the audiences' reception of the programs, I, therefore, assessed the role of two separate measures in order to make sense of the conflict *context*, both from a historical narrative and from a structural perspective. The first measure was comprised of a series of intervening or *situating factors*, and the second, of *dialogical environmental factors*. I assessed what role these factors played in relation to the audiences' interpretations of the programs. With respect to the first measure, using the audiences' own self-reports, I assessed the role of their (1) intergroup attitudes, (2) identity constructs, (3) conflict experiences and (4) goals with respect to (resolving) the conflict. With respect to the second measure, I assessed the role of (1) the audiences' community environment, including the context of the conflict and contact experiences, (2) the school environment, including classroom teacher/s, (3) the home environment, especially focusing on their parents, and (4) television viewing environments.

Contributions to Conflict Studies

As part and parcel of my assessment effort, I also contribute to conflict studies literature, particularly to conflict zone ethnographies of violence literature. I do so by providing rich detail about the audience members' routine "normal" daily lives amidst conflict. That is, I provide a portrait of what daily life is like for Palestinian, Jewish-Israeli and Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children amidst conflict. These details are situated in specific relation to the varying historical narratives deployed by each of these peoples to describe the very same context of conflict, thereby shedding light on how the same conflict is both differently *perceived* and *experienced* across each of its participating members.

According to Hallin, there is not much audience reception or ethnographic research into how the public gathers information about war and gives meaning to it or the way war affects the routines of their lives (Hallin, 1997). I collected data about these concerns with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, framed by the Arab-Israeli conflict. I report on the effects of these conflicts in the daily lives of the children I studied. beginning in Chapter 6. In doing so, I simultaneously provide a critique on scholarship that makes the assumption that "public" opinion,[75] and even more typically, *national and civic identity*, are adult-only phenomena,[76] thereby generating new knowledge about public opinion and national and civic identity, particularly within the context of conflict.

Interpreting RS/SS as a Text

From Production to Reception

In order to assess the audience's reception of the intervention, I treated the intervention – namely the *Sesame Street* television programs - as a text. In other words, in my study I assessed the audience's reception of a text. Before reporting on how the audience interpreted the text in Chapters 6 through 8, I will describe the actual text (and its encoded content) in the remainder of this chapter.

Contributions to production and reception analysis literature. By describing what was encoded into the text, and in turn decoded from it by the audience, I provide the reader with a comprehensive understanding of the path from decoding to encoding. Such an analysis contributes to both production and audience reception analysis communication literature, by demonstrating the relationships between both ends of the text process. Such analyses are extremely rare. For instance, one of the only examples is Wilkins and Downing's study of the text process of the film *The Siege* (Wilkins and Downing, 2002). The way in which Wilkins and Downing organized their discussion of the text in their article-length description is very interesting, and provides a wonderful illustration of the sorts of components involved in conducting this type of comprehensive analysis. In turn, I organize the discussion of my study of a specifically PC text that is much larger in scope by using their illustrative example as a template of sorts. I begin this chapter by describing the encoding side and than proceed through the remainder of Part II to describe and compare what the audience interpreted from the production teams attempts to build peace between and among them.

By contrast, communication scholars typically instead conduct either one or the other – that is, they either conduct a *production study* describing what production processes were at play in the inscription of the text, or a *reception analysis*, describing what was read out of the text by the audience.

Contributions to Peace Communication Practice, General Scholarship and Assessment Literatures. By conducting this dual analysis I also enable the reader to gain a sound grasp of the practitioners' original aims, as these ultimately become incorporated into a peace communication intervention, and in turn, what the target recipients do with the intervention, as it may direct whether, how and to what extent the recipients' behaviors and/or existing structures become altered. By linking the practice to the scholarship of PC, I provide a study design that best enables practitioners to incorporate such study findings into their design, and which in turn makes the study of their efforts more amenable to further assessment and evaluation by scholars.

Critical Audience Reception Approaches to the *Sesame Street* Programs

Semiotics

From a semiotics approach, the *Sesame Street* programs are a closed text. As Umberto Eco has argued, authors of *closed texts* assume model readers. They try to narrow-down the meaning of the text. (Eco, 1979). By definition, an intervention is a closed text. It is created with a target audience in mind and with the express aim of trying to target them with a message, through which they hope to alter their behaviors

in a specific form and direction. In the case of closed texts, if someone other than the model readers reads it, it becomes open to "aberrant readings" (Eco, 1979, p. 8). *Aberrant readings* contradict or upset the intentional design of the text. Thus, my study of the *Sesame Street* text is meant to assess whether the readers read it as was intended by its authors, or rather, if they – the readers – engaged in aberrant readings, and if so, I describe what those readings were, and furthermore, why they read it differently within the context of their conflict-ridden lives.

Aberrant readings can occur because the meaning of a specific utterance or gesture may differ due to the *internal context* of the text. What a character says can have one meaning in one instance, and a different meaning in another, based upon the internal context. Aberrant readings can also occur because meanings may differ, as a result of what Eco refers to as "intertextual knowledge." The meaning may differ in relation to a common frame, rooted in common experience, or in relation to another text. For example, a reader may read a text through a particular cultural frame or, in the case of my study, through the lens of the genre of children's television. Or, in another example, if the character they are watching in one television program is an actor in another program. In such a case, perhaps they would identify differently with said character and, in turn, his or her on-screen actions. In paradigmatic terms, the concept of intertextual knowledge is rooted in Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of *dialogism* (Bakhtin, 1981).

Hybrid Audience Studies Approaches

Television, on the other hand, according to John Fiske (who builds upon Eco's work) is by definition polysemic. "In order to be popular, television must reach a wide diversity of audiences and to be chosen by them, [sic] must be an open text (Eco, 1979) that allows the various subcultures to generate meanings from it that meet the needs of their own subcultural identities. It must, therefore, be polysemic." (Fiske, 1986, p. 392).

Thus, *Sesame Street* is simultaneously attempting to be a closed text in order to alter behaviors, and, at the same time, leaving itself open. It is trying to be an *open text,* or a text that is planned in such a way as to allow for readers to read it on different levels, so that it can effectively cater to the variability found in a mass audience. In this respect, in order to achieve that which a contact effects intervention cannot, a mediated contact effects intervention is able to target "the masses," through its openness.

In addition, Fiske argues, "the polysemy of television lies not just in the heteroglossia from which it is necessarily constructed, but also in the ways that different socially located viewers will activate its meaning potentially differently (Fiske, 1986, p. 394). Bakhtin, whose work Fiske also uses, defines *heteroglossia* as "the base condition governing the operation of meaning in any utterance." "At any given time, in any given place, there will be a set of conditions-social, historical, meteorological, physiological-that will insure that a word uttered in that place and at that time will have a meaning different than it would have under any other conditions;

all utterances are heteroglot in that they are functions of a matrix of forces practically impossible to recoup, and therefore impossible to resolve." (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 428).

In my study, I assess (1) what aberrations the audience made - these represent these polysemic meanings about which Fiske writes, and (2) I search for what segmented viewing patterns may have emerged across the varying meanings they made. In addition, I (3) assess the audience's readings in the context of their "normal" viewing environment. I will explain this further during my discussion of my study methods. I assessed the audiences' readings within the so-called normal context due to my concerns about heteroglossia: as these relate to external context. I wanted to ensure that the audience member's construction of meaning during the research scenario actually will serve as an internally valid measure for the meanings they would "normally" construct when typically viewing the television programs. By doing so, in contrast to the more lab-like setting employed in quantitative media effects studies, including in the Cole et al study, I could better ensure that the findings would prove internally valid when making sense of the usefulness of "the text" as a device of peace communication.

British Cultural Studies

I applied British cultural studies approaches to my audience reception analysis in my effort to describe those aberrations the audience might make and explain their cause – that is, what features of the internal context or intertextual knowledge leads to these readings. I explored not just the polysemy of their interpretations – what Fiske refers to as the *liberal pluralism* of reception responses, but also to the power relations

involved in their reception, as he distinguishes between these (Fiske, 1986). I position my readers as not being simply incapable of reading or "getting" the text, but rather, as being actively capable of decoding it. To this end, I employ Stuart Hall's thesis assessing the segmented viewing patterns in which audiences participate, in an effort to determine whether, in their readings, they accept the meanings encoded into the text and so adopted the *dominant reading* encoded by the producers, *negotiated* it, or *opposed* it altogether (Hall, 1973).

In my effort to explore the audience members' active negotiations of the text, I will not only state what aberrations they made, but, in addition, I will attempt to explain the root causes of these aberrations. In doing so, I emphasize Eco's discussion of the importance of intertextuality. By assessing the differing frames that are rooted in the audience members' common contextual experiences, I can help situate the reasons behind their interpretations, and in turn, explain why they drew such interpretations.

More explicitly, by using British Cultural Studies methodologies, which emphasize context for audience members' ideological belief systems and the meanings they themselves make out of programs (Seiter, 1999)[77], I am able to not only explain the processes by which the audience members were influenced by the television programs, but why they are influenced (if at all) in a particular direction. To this end, I first ask how context intervenes in the interpretation of the *Sesame Street* text, and second, what do these interpretations tell us about the audience members themselves?

Research Questions

The Role of Context in Interpretation: Research Questions For Assessing the Role of Situating Factors Using Audience Self Reports

With respect to the first topic, i.e. how context intervenes in the interpretation of the *Sesame Street* text, specific questions I sought to explore fell under my measure for assessing the role of the four intervening, or *situating factors* I described above. Using the children's self-reports, I sought to explore the questions listed below. I focus on some more than others in my discussion of the audience member's decoding of the text.

First, would how the audience constructs their own identity alter their interpretation of the text? If so, how? For example, would an Arab/Palestinian-Israeli child construct his or her identity as "Arab," "Arab-Israeli," "a Palestinian in Israel," "Palestinian," "Israeli," "Muslim," or "Christian," or instead, in relation to a specific local regional identity, say as "Jaffan," meaning a person who is from the city of Jaffa?

Two, would how audience members construct their partner to conflict's identities (whether, for example, as one or two separate categories, and in relation to their construction of their own identity), alter their interpretations of the text? If so, how? For example would a Jewish-Israeli child construct the other as "Arab," or instead as comprising two partners in conflict - an "Arab-Israeli" and the other, a "Palestinian"?

Three, would the attitudes the audience adopts towards their partners in conflict, as relates to Vidmar and Rokeach's findings about the canalization of intergroup attitudes (Vidmar and Rokeach, 1974), alter their interpretations of the text? If so, how? For example, if a Palestinian holds negative intergroup attitudes towards Jewish-Israelis, would that, in turn, cause them, likewise, to adopt negative attitudes towards Jewish-Israeli characters in the programs?

Four, would audience members' experiences with the conflict alter their interpretations of the text? If so, how? This question tangentially relates to Phillip Schlesinger's study of women viewing violence in which he demonstrated that individual-level experiences with violence altered audience member's interpretation of the text (Schlesinger, 1992).

Five, more specifically, how would the audiences' experiences with the conflict – whether as victim and or participant – differentially alter their interpretation of the text? For example, when a Jewish-Israeli character entered the frame, would a Palestinian child victimized by the conflict choose to tune out and so not even expose him or herself to the text? Conversely, would a Palestinian child who participated in the conflict shout at the screen when a Jewish-Israeli character entered the frame, and, in turn, adopt a negative attitude towards that character?

Six, would the audience's contact experiences with members of either (or both of) the other two ethnopolitical groups in the conflict alter their interpretations of the text? If so, how? For example, would Jewish-Israeli children who had contact with

Palestinians alter their interpretations of the text, as compared with if they had no such contact experiences?

Seven and specifically, would the type of contact the audience had differentially alter their interpretation? For example, how would Palestinian children's contact experiences with Jewish-Israelis who were soldiers in the Israeli army, versus with those who were settlers/residents of a Jewish-Israeli settlement/development in the West Bank/Judea and Samaria differentially alter their interpretations?

Eight, would the audience members' goals towards (resolving) the conflict alter their interpretations of the text? If so, how? This question relates to Jackman and Crane's findings that most statebearing nations who achieved friendship did not hold the goal, or political belief, of structural change for the state minority. For example, if an audience member believed that their partners in conflict had to be eliminated, would they reject the text as simply a utopian ideal of no interest to them?

The Role of Context in Interpretation: Research Questions For Assessing the Role of Situating Factors Using Observation Methods and Parent Reports

Furthermore, with respect to my observations and parents-reports, I sought to explore the below questions, some of which I focus on more than others in my discussion. One, would audience member's interpretations differ in relation to how outside observers interpreted their experiences with the conflict, in contrast to how *they* themselves interpreted those conflict experiences?

Two, would audience interpretations differ in relation to how outside observers interpreted their contact experiences with members of the other two ethnopolitical groups, in contrast to how *they* themselves interpreted those contact experiences?

Three, would I find interpretations that correlated with the type of school audience members attended, and their specific teachers? With respect to the former, would I, for example, find a difference in interpretations between Jewish-Israeli and Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children who attended a mixed Israeli school, comprised of Jewish-Israelis and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, versus a school where each attended separately?

Four, would I find interpretations that correlated with differences in audience members home environments? In particular, as a form of a socializing agent, would their parent's political beliefs, and separately of that, political preferences, relate to their interpretations? For example, with respect to the latter, would Palestinian children whose parents voted in the previous Palestinian elections for Fatah rather than Hamas interpret the text differently?

Five and finally, would I find interpretations that correlated with differences in the audience's home television viewing environments? For example, if an Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience member read the text, akin to her "normal" television viewing habits alongside seven relatives who made comments throughout, versus a second audience member, who by contrast read it alone, would their interpretations differ?

Interpreting the Audience: Research Questions for Describing, Interpreting and Evaluating Audience Members' Lives Amidst the Conflict Contexts.

Lastly, with respect to the second topic I explore - what do these audience interpretations of the programs tell us about the audience - I sought to explore two fundamental questions. First, what do these children's comments about their conflict context experiences tell us about the nature of the conflict, including its degree of intractability, and second, what do their comments tell us about differing narrative views about the conflict?

Encoding Process

Prior to addressing the research questions above, I begin by making sense of the steps involved in the textual analysis process. According to David Morely, the shortcoming of the active paradigm of audiences is that we focus too much on audiences, at the risk of 'the neglect to [sic] all questions concerning the economic, political and ideological forces acting on the construction of texts." We assume, "that reception is somehow the only stage of the communication process that matters in the end." (Morely, 1993, p. 15). In the case of the *Sesame Street* texts that are the subject of my study, they are the result of the three forces Morely specified, in addition to which I add military forces, as discussed in Chapter 1. In the same way that the audience is subject to these four forces (i.e. economic, political, ideological (or social) and military), so too are the producers involved in creating these texts.

Scope of the Textual-Based Discussion

As I described in Chapters 1 through 3, peace communication interventions have followed specific paradigmatic models and have been influenced by correspondingly different periods of conflict. Nevertheless, the *Sesame Street* texts were the result of specific social forces (as I intimate below). While my data, as I will discuss in Chapter 5, enables detailed analysis of the construction of the text, I limit the discussion here to only those specifics that are directly relevant for making sense of the children's reception of the text's PC capabilities.

As I will elaborate on below, I describe the text as a simultaneously localized and hybrid text. Consequently, by unpacking the text in order to explain its hybrid features (that is, that it is a product of three very different Middle Eastern political units) rather than simply lumping the three together in my description and calling the show's assembly simply a local product (in contrast to a global product) as most accounts of Middle Eastern media production do, I will contribute to existing knowledge about the diversity of Middle East media production.

In addition, as I will elaborate on below, I describe the expressed resultant text of these programs. On the one hand, they effectively model the contact hypothesis' five criteria. On the other hand, on screen, they do not, however, engage with the problem of the violence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, framed by the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. To this end, I contribute to the existing knowledge about the general nature of *Sesame Street* programming for children. I raise the issues about the dilemma posed by children's programming that on the one hand, struggles to represent utopian visions for children, but on the other hand, by specifically doing so,

potentially renders their own efforts to build and make peace (given their lack of narrative and structural engagement with conflict) impossible (per my discussion in Chapter 3).

The Intervention as a Text

History of the Production Process

In order for the reader to better understand the text, I begin my discussion of its encoding with a description of the history of its production. The television programs were first aired in 1998. They were based on the original American Sesame Street (www.sesameworkshop.org/sesamestreet), produced by then Children's Television Workshop (CTW). CTW is today known as Sesame Workshop (www.sesameworkshop.org). As part of its international *co-productions* around the world, which span at least twenty-three adaptations,[78] Sesame Workshop established co-productions in the Middle East. The Israeli and Palestinian co-produced versions of *Sesame Street* that are the subject of my study were the third co-productions of *Sesame Street* in the Middle East. Kuwaiti *Open Sesame* (*Yiftach Ya Simsim)*, which was broadcasted throughout the Middle East, was the first. It began airing in 1979.

The Israeli Sesame Street and Stories. The original version of Israeli *Sesame Street* (*Rechov Sumsum),* began broadcast in 1983, and was the second version in the Middle East, after *Yiftach Ya Simsim*. *Rechov Sumsum* was produced exclusively in Hebrew. A decade later, in 1998, the co-production version of *Rechov Sumsum*, produced in conjunction with the Palestinian Authority, known as *Rechov Sumsum/Shara'a Simsim* - i.e. *Sesame Street* in Hebrew and Arabic, respectively, began to broadcast. It was produced mainly in Hebrew, and contained some Arabic. It was broadcast to the Israeli audience on the government-leased (and therefore semi-commercial) channel, Channel 2, during a time-slot reserved for the government

owned Israeli Educational Television (IETV). IETV was the Israeli producer for the series.

The third version of Israeli *Sesame Street* was Israeli *Sesame Stories* (*Sippuray Sumsum/Hikayat Simsim*) (www.sesameworkshop.org/international/ il/eng/home.php). *Sippuray Sumsum* was co-produced in an association of sorts with the Palestinian Authority and Jordan. Independent media outfits in each produced Palestinian, and independently, Jordanian *Sesame Stories (Hikayat Simsim*).

The Israeli version of *Sesame Stories included two versions produced by the independent production company, Gold Zebra Communications. The first, Sippuray Sumsum,* was meant to target the majority of the Israeli population – Jewish citizens, whose primary language is Hebrew. This version was produced entirely in Hebrew, with some Arabic. It began broadcast in August 2003 on the independently owned *HOP!* Children's Channel (www.hop.co.il), which broadcasts both on *YES* satellite and *Hot* cable stations throughout Israel. Together, the channel achieves over 90% penetration rates (Michael Cohen Group, 2005). Afterwards, it began to be broadcast on Israeli Channel 2 with Arabic subtitles. (Communication Initiative Network, August 2007)

The second version, *Hikayat Simsim* was targeted to the minority of the Israeli population – Arab/Palestinian citizens, whose primary language is Arabic. It was identical to the first, but was dubbed almost entirely into Arabic. This version began airing in October of 2005 on the Israeli Broadcasting Authority's (IBA) government-owned Channel 33.

Palestinian Sesame Street and Stories. Palestinian *Sesame Street (Shara'a Simsim),* the Palestinian version of the Israeli-Palestinian co-production of *Sesame Street,* began airing together with the Israeli version in 1998. *Shara'a Simsim* was produced in Arabic, and contained a small amount of Hebrew. Its second season, marking the Palestinian version of the Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian co-production, *Sesame Stories (Hikayat Simsim*), (www.sesameworkshop.org/international/ps/eng/home.php) began broadcast in November of 2003. It was produced mainly in Arabic**.**

The Palestinian versions are produced by the independently owned Al-Quds Educational TV, part of the Institute of Modern Media at Al-Quds University, located in Al-Bireh, part of the Al-Bireh-Ramallah Governorate. The first season was broadcast on Al-Quds TV and its seven independent affiliates to children in the West Bank and limited parts of Gaza (Applied Research and Consulting, 1999). The second season was broadcast across the West Bank and Gaza on the independently owned Ma'an Network - an affiliation of 10 independent television broadcasters, including Al-Quds TV.[79]

Consequently, Al-Quds TV is a direct recipient of UNESCO's earlier message effects programming. UNESCO provided resources and training in its pre-foundational stages, as for example, having helped train Daoud Kuttab, who established the Institute of Modern Media at Al-Quds University, through which the television station is operated.

Jordanian Sesame Stories. The first season of Jordanian *Sesame Street* was Jordanian *Sesame Stories (Hikayat Simsim*) (www.sesameworkshop.org/international/jo/eng/home.php). It was produced by the production company, *Jordan Pioneers* (www.jordanpioneers.com), in conjunction with the Israeli and Palestinian versions of *Sesame Stories*. Jordanian *Hikayat Simsim*, first began broadcast in October 2003, and aired on the government-owned Jordanian TV (JRTV).

Separate Programming. Following the season of *Sesame Stories,* the cross-Middle Eastern peace communication project was disbanded. During the 2006-2007 school year, each of the production teams embarked on its own new and separate *Sesame Street*. While the Israeli fourth season continues to try to build peace between Jewish-Israelis and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, it does not try to build peace beyond its citizen population, which the Palestinian and Jordanian versions do not aim for either.[80] In addition, the three production teams no longer work together. Hence, my analysis of the audiences member's reception is limited to the earlier two seasons.

The Operationalization of the Intervention Text

The texts whose readings I assess are a composite of two seasons of the Sesame Workshop sponsored interventions. They include the combination of the Israeli-Palestinian co-production of *Sesame Street - Rechov Sumsum/Shara'a Simsim*, and the Israeli and Palestinian versions of the Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian co-productions of *Sesame Stories* – Israeli *Sippuray Sumsum/Hikayat Simsim* and Palestinian *Hikayat Simsim.* Together, these two seasons represent the peace

communication versions of *Sesame Street* produced for Middle Eastern audiences. Consequently, they also constitute the first peace-promoting efforts of Sesame Workshop. In my study, I assess the Israeli and Palestinian audiences' reception of the combination of these two seasons.

Encoding Steps

Apart from being conscious of the processes involved or the bigger picture of the text's encoding, I additionally make sense of the specific encoding steps that were involved in the text's construction. According to Hall, apart from the process of *decoding* in which readers engage, there exists a process of *encoding* of the actual text. In conceptualizing the *Sesame Street* programs, I elaborate on three encoding steps. These include (1) *intended encoding* - the curriculum design for the television shows, (2) the *encoding process* - the production process, and (3) *expressed encoding* - the actual television programs as end-products.

The first step involves the team of educators, communication and child development experts who were part of each of the respective (Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian) production teams. They wrote up the curriculum for the television programs, negotiated it, and created its final output – curriculum documents. The second step is comprised of the media production personnel who were involved in executing the curriculum and incorporating the facets of the production process into it. These facets included art design, direction, acting, camera work, lighting, and so forth. This step involved a set of negotiations in which the producers of the program had to engage as part and parcel of today's global media production environment. The third

step is the final output post-production. It extends beyond what the producers negotiated. It ultimately rests with the final abilities of actors, sound personnel who laid music tracks, the effective shots taken by the camera operators and the post-production process of editing individual segments into final coherent episodes.

Intended Encoding of the Text: the Curriculum

Most Testable of any Peace Communication Intervention

I selected the *Sesame Street* productions over other peace communication interventions because the practitioners, spearheaded by Sesame Workshop, are one of the few that evaluate their efforts. By doing so, they understand the importance of setting up the encoding process, *before* any production actually begins. As a result, they, in contrast with other PC practitioners, are much more cognizant of the relationship between input and outcome effects. In their case, they make use of cognitive theories and so design their interventions with clear concrete and testable goals. The fact that they contemplate the input side of the equation is evidenced in their well thought out curriculum design, and separately of that, the training they provided their production teams.

The producers of the *Sesame Street* programs clearly laid out their curricula so that, in fact, there is something for scholars to actually analyze, assess and evaluate. Like other PC practitioners, they provide general mission goals, but go extensively beyond this to design step-by-step curriculum goals. The curriculum documents in turn specify clear and discrete behavioral goals. In other words, in contrast to many

practitioners, the goals of those involved in the Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian peace communication co-venture were defined and clearly written up, and as will be recalled from my discussion in Chapter 1 regarding the contribution of cognitive theories to PC analysis, these documents are written in such a way whereby how the television programs are interpreted and what kind of influence they in turn exert can indeed be assessed and evaluated. As a result, I selected their intervention. I believed it would yield the most useful illustration off of which to establish the sub-discipline of PC, including by outlining, on the one hand, the steps involved in making an excellent PC intervention effort to, on the other, generating a clear step-by step assessment of what outcome objectives it achieved.

Curriculum Encoding of the Two Seasons of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*

Together, the production teams agreed to a shared basic curriculum, from which each team created some of their own specific goals. The base curriculum formed the grounds for the producers' intentional encoding of the texts. This basic curriculum differed from the first to second season of the television programs.

First Season. In its first season, the curriculum was split into five areas, the first four of which are based on the original American model of Sesame Street. The fifth meanwhile, is the unit that was specifically introduced in an effort to promote peace. These five areas included (1) Child's World, (2) Social Units, (3) Reading, Mathematics and Writing, (4) Cognitive Organization and (5) Mutual Respect (Children's Television Workshop, 1997). The fifth area is where the bulk of the effort to build peace took place (Labin, 2001, author e-mail correspondence). In seeking to

use the program to build peace, in their first season of joint efforts, the programs worked both inwardly along civic lines—by seeking to foster respect among Israelis and Palestinians within each of their own civic societies—as well as outwardly. In their first season, the programs developed cross-over segments. *Cross-overs* provided Israelis and Palestinians with the opportunity to visit one another's street in order to cultivate pro-social relations and in turn, friendships.

Second Season. In its second season, the curriculum areas included (1) emotional skills, (2) social skills, (3) physical skills, (4) cognitive skills and (5) respect and understanding. During this season, with respect to trying to build mutual respect across civic lines, the production teams pulled back and instead tried to humanize and demystify Israeli and Palestinian identity through separate, but analogous, stories (Salamon, 2002). Hence, they focused on respect and understanding in a broader sense, and not specifically, on "mutual respect." Their streets, symbolic of states, still both existed. Yet, Israeli and Palestinian characters no longer participated in cross-over visits between the two streets in an effort to bridge their divide. In addition to which, neither visited their new mediated neighborhood state – Jordan. Instead, each version worked only inwardly within their civic societies.

Thus for example, Israelis focused on mutual respect between Jewish-Israelis and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, and on the goal of developing pride and self-esteem among Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children. Palestinians, for their part, focused instead on other questions of diversity – for example, relations between peoples with disabilities versus those without, and above all else, empowering Palestinian children and

encouraging their pride and self-esteem. Meanwhile, Jordanians focused on topics like the environment and conservation (Sesame Workshop, 2003), largely avoiding the issue of diversity altogether.[81]

As specific examples of their PC encoding efforts, in the first season they created stories depicting commonalities shared by Israelis and Palestinians (for example, they both like and eat similar foods). They also depicted them cooperating together to achieve common goals, while avoiding competition (for example, they help each other when the other has a problem), thereby modeling two of the contact hypothesis' criteria. They depicted the two as being equal within the series – each having their own "sesame" street, mutually negotiated and settled upon by the respective production teams, and they also sent the message that friendship is possible between and among Israelis and Palestinians (showing characters representing members of the other group as friends) thereby modeling the fifth requirement of the contact hypothesis – the opportunity for friendship and further, its actualization.

In their second season, they continued to model cooperation in the absence of competition, equality in the situation and friendship, therein among Jews, Muslims and Christians, albeit all among civic Israelis (meaning ethnopolitically between Jewish-Israelis and Palestinian-Israelis), and as, however, broadcasted only in the Israeli version of the program.

Encoding Process: The Production Process

The Negotiation Process. The *Sesame Street* programs are produced in multiple and distributed production zones. They are a product of the aforementioned

three, and later, at least four separate production teams and geographically related separate production zones: New York, Amman, Al-Bireh-Ramallah and Tel-Aviv.[82]Apart from agreeing upon the curriculum, these three, and later four teams consequently negotiated the final format for actualizing the curriculum into a production. Conflicts existed that were rooted in the effects of *political* (e.g. the start of the second Palestinian uprising), *economic* (e.g. reliance on donor funding), and *military* forces (e.g. avoidance of cross-team meetings within either Israel or the Palestinian Authority because of the need to rely on Israeli military permitted entry for one or more of the teams). In addition, however, and more often than not, these conflicts were rooted in more mundane individual level *social* forces - creative and personal disputes. During both seasons, meanwhile, the American team functioned as mediators. While I interviewed members of each of the four production teams with respect to these processes and negotiations, I do not report on my findings from those interviews in this study. Instead I only mention the above in order to make the point that, *as with all texts*, a process of negotiation was involved in the creation of these final texts, which is never by any means simple.

Distributed Multi-Zone Production Process. To borrow from Kathy Moran's depiction of the text of Spanish *Sesame Street (Barrio Sesamo/Barri Sesam)*, the result of these negotiated processes was a "*glocalized" production* – a product of the global and local simultaneously (Moran, 2006). The text combined locally produced segments from each of the three Middle Eastern teams who interpreted the global concept to fit local concerns, in addition to segments taken from Sesame Workshop's

Sesame Street International Library (Sesame Workshop, 2003). The latter were then dubbed into Hebrew or Arabic for use in each local version of the program. In specific terms, during season two, the Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian productions incorporated 61, 102, and 41 American segments respectively (Sesame Workshop, 2003).

In addition, to its *glocalized* nature, what is meant as "local" in the Middle Eastern context is, in addition, further complicated by the fact that the local is in fact a *hybrid* product of the teams presence in each of the three "local" Middle Eastern zones of production. Thus, for example, during both seasons, in an effort to encode the agreed upon curriculum, each production team decided to incorporate segments that the other local production teams had produced. Therefore, each version of the Middle Eastern *Sesame Street* programs is not just a localized adaptation of the American *Sesame Street*, but simultaneously, are also an adaptation of other local Middle *Eastern Sesame Streets*. In specific terms, in an effort to encode analogous stories, as specified in the Curriculum Coordination document for season two, the Israeli production, apart from a total of their own 214 segments, incorporated 40 Palestinian and 13 Jordanian segments. The Palestinian production, meanwhile, apart from using their own 170 segments, incorporated 16 Israeli and 14 Jordanian segments (Sesame Workshop, 2003).[83] Through such methods, the four sites of production were woven together into one final coherent mediation tool.

Set Design. During the first season, the production teams decided to create a set design that differed from all *Sesame Street* productions that had existed prior to this.

The action in these programs occurred around two separate, rather than a single "Sesame" street. The rationale for employing two streets was in response to changes in the political context brought about through peacemaking processes that had in fact led to the development of the series. The series was created in response to the increased momentum in the early 1990s on the Israeli–Palestinian front of the Arab–Israeli peace process. When the idea for the series first germinated, after the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords between Israelis and Palestinians, peacebuilding was being used, on the one hand, to sustain the progress that had been made on the formal peacemaking level, and, on the other hand, to provide a base on which final status negotiations could be made and settled. These peacebuilding efforts were then meant to sustain and bring about specified political, economic, military and social changes.

Given this context, the set design, or the imagined geographical space upon which the producers agreed, implemented the vision sought by the Oslo Accords between Israelis and Palestinians —a two-state solution. Therefore, the set consisted of two streets: "Rechov Sumsum" and "Shara'a Simsim." The former street symbolized the secured existence of the state of Israel, and the latter, the realization of Palestinian national aspiration. As Daoud Kuttab, Director of the Al-Quds Modern Media Institute, explained it, "We wanted a Street of our own. We were only at the start of the peace process and independence and we wanted to strengthen our separate identity. In America and South Africa there are problems between blacks and whites, but these are all tensions inside one state, and therefore there is a different logic in *Sesame Street* in those places. Here the situation is different, and we wanted to

observe what society wants." (Kliener, 2002)

Format. During the second season, the teams concluded that they would work separately.[84] In spatial terms, therefore, the result was three separate states. Inter-textually, one saw a window onto the other states. Through the use of analogous stories, which were produced as individual segments and then interspersed into an episode, the format provided the audience with the opportunity to look out across at their neighboring states.[85] Yet, one only looked. Citizens from each respective state did not interact because crossover segments were absent.

Characters. The regular characters that inhabited the programs during season one consisted of Muppets, as well as child and adult humans. There were two Palestinian and two Israeli Muppets. The Palestinian Muppets consisted of two hand-maneuvered Muppets, one a 3-year-old orange female monster named Haneen and the other, a rooster named Karim. The Israeli Muppets consisted of one hand maneuvered Muppet who was physically almost identical in appearance to Haneen. The exception was that this 3-year-old girl monster named Dafi was pink. The second Israeli Muppet was a freely standing 5-year-old male porcupine Muppet (i.e. he was a person dressed in a costume) named Kippi.

The regularly seen human Palestinian characters included two adults - Adel, a male music teacher and Um Nabeel, a female shopkeeper and two children - Leila, a 12 year old female and Sami, Um Nabeel's 9 year old grandson (Children's Television Workshop, 1999). Among the regularly seen human Israeli characters, to name a few examples, there were the adults - Esti, a grandmother; Amal, a Palestinian-Israeli

female doctor, who also happened to be Adel's cousin; Sharon, a bookstore owner who wore a knitted yarmulke ("kipa srooga"), symbolizing the moderate degree of his religiosity and the two children - Jasmine, a six year old girl and Adam, a male teenager.

The Israeli programs during season two eliminated the original cast and completely altered the program. In it instead, they included four main characters. These included two red and orange colored boy Muppets – Brosh and Noach, aged five and seven, respectively. In addition, they included two young adult humans, Tzachi and Ibtisam, who were male and female, respectively. Tzachi, Brosh and Noach – the three Jewish-Israelis lived together in one house, and Ibtisam – the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli character, a university student, was their neighbor. The Palestinian program, meanwhile, retained the same main characters, among the Muppets, Haneen and Karim, and Adel- the human character. Finally, the Jordanian program included two Muppets, a 4-year-old monster girl named Tonton, and a 6-year-old boy named Juljul, and one human adult male character, Grandpa Sesame ("Jiddo Simsim").

Expressed Encoding: The Television Programs

During season one, the resultant text – the final actual programs - constituted 70 thirty-minute long episodes of *Rechov Sumsum/Shara'a Simsim*, and twenty 15-minute long episodes of *Shara'a Simsim*. In addition, the productions included

outreach materials, distributed in schools, and an audiocassette to accompany the Palestinian version.

During season two, the final output constituted twenty-six 30-minute long episodes of Israeli *Sippuray Sumsum*, of which twenty-one were dubbed into Arabic for Israeli *Hikayat Simsim*. The latter appears visibly different from all the other versions because the characters interactions are dubbed, and at least to this viewer (who is familiar with the production concept of dubbing, which empirically may differ from the children targeted by the program) it appears that dubbed voices are speaking for the characters, rather than them speaking for themselves. Additionally, twenty-six 30-minute episodes of Palestinian *Hikayat Simsim*, and of Jordanian *Hikayat Simsim* were also produced independently of the Israeli version (and of each other).

All versions were produced in a *magazine format,* whereby each episode was comprised of self-contained segments that were tied together by a running theme. In addition, connecting segments, based on the theme, introduced and concluded the episode, to in effect bracket the meaning of the segments that came in between. Independently of the television episodes, each production included outreach materials for schools, and for the Israeli versions additionally included a website, which children could access to play related educational games. Finally, the Palestinian and Jordanian versions also included public service announcements, featuring the programs' characters. These aired on the *Ma'an* and JRTV, networks, respectively.

Modeled Pro-Social Relations, including Friendship Through Contact

As I have previously discussed, the overall text that is the subject of my analysis – i.e. season one and two combined - adhere to Allport and Pettigrew's five combined requirements for the contact hypothesis to be effective, with respect to the text's attempt to mediate contact. As a result, its chances of being able to influence the audience to change their intergroup attitudes and to, in turn, become friends with their partners in conflict is improved. However, independently of whether the text can, in fact, mediate contact, it is essential to point out what the final total encoded text attempts to communicate to its audiences.

Disengagement with the Conflict Contexts: A Utopian World

The final output is a text that does not directly engage with the structural and narrative realities of the conflicts in which they seek to intervene. Rather, their design, while rooted along mediated contact (or, in more specific terms, where the curriculum guidelines for the program were concerned), the agreed upon production, including set design and format, and in turn, the final expressed output was one in which the production teams worked to emulate a utopian world from start to finish. In that world, the conflict had already been solved – there existed two, and later, three separate states – Israel and Palestine, and later Jordan, side by side each other. Thus, rather then showing the world as it is – where there exists two states –Israel and Jordan, and a non-state institution – the Palestinian Authority, and trying to work, with a pickaxe, so to speak, to slowly but steadily, hack away at the multiple layers of the conflict associated with its unresolved status, the text instead portrays a context devoid of conflict.[86]

The programs, in this respect, resemble all other Sesame Workshop co-productions, with one exception, South African *Sesame Street*. Thus, whether the problem is inequality, as in the United States, when the workshop first broadcasted *Sesame Street* in an effort to be able to provide non-formal education to children of lower socio-economic classes, it nevertheless portrayed all of its characters as being of an equal socio-economic status. They portrayed them in line with the imagined society the American dominant ethnopolitical class envisioned - a classless society, despite the existence of structural realities proving the contrary. Similarly, in the case of Bangladesh where the program, *Sisimpur,* seeks to intervene into the problematic context of child labor, we never actually see child laborers enter the frame. So too, in the case of *Rechov Sumsum/Shara'a Simsim* and Israeli *Sippuray Sumsum/Hikayat Simsim* and the Palestinian and Jordanian *Hikayat Simsim*, we never actually see the Israeli-Palestinian ethnopolitical conflict, nor do we see the Arab-Israeli interstate conflict enter the frame. True, we see partners to conflict enter the frame, but they are never portrayed as enemies, rather, only and always as friends and/or neighbors, without a conflict existing between them.

Takalani Sesame by contrast. South African Sesame Street, *Takalani Sesame*, by contrast, best illustrates this disengagement with the structural context we find in typical *Sesame Street* productions. *Takalini Sesame* intervened into the context of one of the highest HIV prevalence rates in the world, including among children.[87] In this case, however, in order to help children adjust to this reality, *Takalini Sesame* actually shows the problem on the screen. It features the HIV-positive Muppet Kami. By

including her in the production, *Takalani Sesame* has been able to directly engage with the issue of what it means to be HIV positive, and so too, what it means to deal with issues of loved ones who are HIV positive, and their subsequent death. Unlike *Takalani Sesame*, the other Sesame Workshop co-productions (including those I analyze) portray a world in which the problem they are attempting to resolve is absent.

Where is the Conflict? Thus, when I discuss the reception of the text of the Israeli and Palestinian Sesame Street programs in the following chapters, it must be understood that the text disengages with the structural realities and narratives of the conflicts of which it is a direct product and in which it directly tries to intervene. As part of the contact it attempts to mediate and the messages it simultaneously broadcasts displaying the partners to conflict interacting pro-socially, during season one, and living peacefully side by side one another in separation, during season two, it neglects to point out that a conflict actually exists, and that the continuing violence is a daily occurrence. Thus, while we see members of the "other" groups on the screen, we do not see the structural realities of the conflict and the narrative framing of these.

As examples (which I include to illustrate my point, and not to draw comparisons across by degree of suffering nor offer as the only kinds of suffering experienced), from the perspective of Jewish-Israelis, we do not see the ramifications of terrorist attacks; from the perspective of Arab-Palestinian-Israelis, we do no see the ramifications of home demolitions, and from the perspective of Palestinians, we do not see the ramifications of imprisoned family members.

Conflict Should be Avoided. Avoiding the conflict in the narrative of the program may not necessarily be problematic. Certainly, there are those who would find the suggestion of actually showing the conflict, for example the ramifications of terrorism, home demolitions and imprisonment, to be inappropriate for the genre of children's programming. Moreover, as I found in a study I conducted in 2001, Jewish-Israeli children tuning in during the first season found the program optimistic and, in turn comforting, *precisely* because, while portraying the partners to the conflict, it disengaged from the reality of the said conflict and showed them in another light. As a result, the audience explained that it gave them hope for a better future (Warshel, 2007).

Peace Can Only Occur When Conflict is Not Avoided. On the other hand, according to the research discussed in Chapter 3, with respect to questions about belief change that Nisbet and Ross review, showing the conflict, may in fact be the best, if not the *only way* to change beliefs. The narrative and structural elements of the conflict, it seems, have to be addressed, if peace is indeed to be built and made. Moreover, if death can be discussed in South Africa, why can't it be discussed between and among Israelis and Palestinians?

The Resultant Text Nevertheless, regardless of one's political opinion about whether the context should be "shown," it is vital that before I discuss the children's reception of the text, the reader first understands with what text the audience was actually asked to engage. Hence, I have outlined the above. This makes possible the complete understanding of the text, as Morely argued. A thorough understanding of

the text is essential for relating the text to the wider context – both that within which the text was *constructed*, and that within which I will describe its *consumption* by the audience.

Thus, in this case, Palestinian, Jewish-Israeli and Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children were asked to expose themselves to a utopian text that disengaged from the structural realities and narrative perspectives of the problem with which it sought to engage, and about which it sought to alter these children's behavioral patterns, and the existing under-girding inter-state systemic structures. It is this relationship that I will be discussing in the following chapters.

Chapter 5: Methodologies

In this chapter I describe the methodologies I employed for analyzing the peace communication intervention. The purpose of this description is two-fold. First, it is meant to serve as a proposal for how one would design a study in order to evaluate and assess the efficacy of a particular peace communication intervention. To this end, this chapter demonstrates how one would design a study in accordance with the context and design school approach to peace communication analysis that I described in Chapter 1, and which I advocate as the basis upon which to establish the sub-discipline of peace communication.

Second, it is meant, more specifically, to explain how I conducted my assessment of a mediated contact peace communication intervention. The case I am analyzing, Israeli and Palestinian versions of *Sesame Street* is a text. Therefore, in order to be able to assess its efficacy, or make sense of what those targeted by it think about it, I had to conduct an audience reception analysis. The description I provide below, in turn, serves to illustrate why it is important to make use of comparative and context-based (including multi-sited and conflict zone methodologies) and peace education concerns about representing parallel narratives if one is to effectively assess and evaluate the efficacy of peace communication interventions. Additionally, it is also meant to demonstrate why, when children are targeted (as is quite common

globally), is it important to also include child, or cognitive, development and childhood specific methodologies.

The reception study that I begin discussing in Chapter 6 reports on data derived from three geographic communities. Each community represents one of the three ethnopolitical groups involved in the Israeli-Palestinian ethnopolitical conflict, namely Palestinians, Jewish-Israelis and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis. As I argue below, with respect to both comparative and peace education methodologies, at least one community representing each partner to the conflict should be included as part of any peace communication analysis. Thus, I compare and contrast these three communities' narratives and structural contexts.

I selected their specific geographic communities of residence largely on the basis of the amount of opportunities they afforded their residents for *contact* with one or the other of the two ethnopolitical groups. By making such a selection, I sought to illuminate the importance of understanding the narrative and structural elements of both the Israeli-Palestinian ethnopolitical conflict and the wider Arab-Israeli interstate conflict from the perspective of each of these three groups. This I argue allows me to situate the children's reception responses within the macro-political, -economic, -social and -military contexts that mark their daily existence, and, in turn, dialogically interact with their reception of the mediated contact effort.

In order to be able to achieve this, I departed from typical reception studies to extend its meaning and include, as part of it, what I refer to as a *context analysis study*. Specifically, I conducted an ethnography of the environs of the children's community

in order to be able to describe the local structural contexts within which they were growing, including their contact experiences with members of the other two groups. Contact is a component that is vital for making sense of what role the other two groups play in defining each group's own given conflict contexts. In addition, through a combination of structured activities in which I asked my research subjects to engage (such as "shooting back" images of their community environs) and surveys and interviews addressed to them as well as others in the community (parents, teachers and community leaders), I described their narrative depictions of the macro context, including their interpretations of any contact experiences.

By conducting the two-layered context analysis described above, I was able to situate the children's reception in the macro-political, -economic, -social and -military contexts. By doing so, I extended the scope of my analysis beyond the ethnographic parameters that are typically made use of in audience reception analysis studies. As a result, I was able to situate their responses beyond just the micro-viewing context, or the context within which they viewed the television programs.

I conducted the fieldwork for this study from May 2004 through July 2006. During that time period, I carried out the *reception*, or decoding part of the study, together with the related *context analysis* portion, and the *encoding*, or production portion of the study I described in Chapter 4. This fieldwork built on an earlier phase of fieldwork that I conducted in 2001 (described in Warshel, 2007) and the secondary resources that I first began analyzing in 1999.

Comparative Methodologies

Intervening into Two Conflicts

As part of my audience reception analysis (including context analysis) and related encoding study, I employ a comparative approach. I do so in order to make sense of the conflict contents within which audience members of the *Sesame Street* texts read the programs. "The conflict" in which The *Sesame Street* text intervenes, however, is actually comprised of two, not one, conflicts – the Israeli-Palestinian ethnopolitical conflict *and* the Arab-Israeli inter-state conflict. The challenge in conducting an assessment of the utility of the text as a peace communication device is then to make sense of the text within both of these conflicts, *as well as* the way in which all its participants make sense of them. Each conflict is completely related to the other, affecting, intertwining with and fueling the other. Nevertheless, they are still two distinct types of conflict, and most discussions about this specific "conflict" do not clearly appreciate or even recognize that there are two distinct conflicts at play. Most discussions instead focus on one or the other conflict as a narrative-framing device. More problematically, they do not incorporate both into their discussions and, similarly, do not shed more light on the reasons for "its" intractability. Hence, as I outlined in Chapter 1, the aim of this study is to make use of conflict studies research in order to clearly articulate the importance of these two types of conflict and the role these play in creating the context into which the *Sesame Street* programs attempted to intervene.

Scope of the Study

In this study, I will not provide an elaborate historical overview of these conflicts. My study is about the efficacy of a peace communication intervention into "a conflict," not a study of the conflict itself. For this reason, and because historical analyses of conflicts, especially of the Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflicts, are readily available, I do not provide a discussion of their histories here. (For a description of their histories see, as just two examples, Shafir, 1989 concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and Penslar, 2007 for an illustration of a specifically comparative study of Israel, including in relation to these conflicts). Nevertheless, I encourage the reader and warn practitioners engaged in interventions, and scholars engaged in their analysis, to acquire a strong understanding of the history of these or any other conflicts in which they are intervening or studying, lest they misinterpret the facet of the root causes of the given conflict/s which they seek to understand and/or remedy. Such misinterpretations may lead practitioners to intervene in a manner that results in their creating more harm than good, as relates directly back to Peter Uvin's warnings with respect to intervention efforts, in general. Uvin argued that the NGO community that intervened in Rwanda indirectly aided the genocide there because of their ignorance of the context into which they were intervening. With respect to scholars, such misinterpretations may lead to erroneous interpretations of the results of given interventions, and, in turn, problematic recommendations about their effects.

Comparative Historical Narratives

The participants in the Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflicts, meanwhile "live" different aspects of these conflicts, and hold divergent historical narratives with respect to each. It is therefore essential to understand these conflicts from the vantage points of all parties involved, both in terms of their structures and its narratives. Making sense of the context of a given conflict is not just a matter of providing a narrative account, but rather comparative narrative accounts. A discussion about how there are always "two sides" to any conflict is oversimplified. To this end it is important to incorporate the concerns discussed by peace education scholars, who argue that a conflict should, at the very least, be expressed through parallel narratives. (Firer and Adwan, 1997; Adwan and Bar-On, 2004) If one agreed upon narrative cannot be achieved, than parallel ones should be provided. To this end, I stretch this concern to say that the narratives of *all* ethnopolitical groups party to a given conflict should be incorporated, as well as an understanding of the structural components of the conflict as they each experience them. In short, multiple perspectives are necessary for making sense of the context within which a peace communication intervention attempts to intervene, *if* is to be able to alter the very structure of that conflict, and the behaviors of its participants.

Constructing the Audience

In an effort to make sense of the *Sesame Street* texts within both these narratives and structural contexts, I adopted a comparative methodological approach to

my study. Doing so enabled me to compare the participant's experiences with and perceptions of the conflicts. In order to engage in comparative methodologies, however, one must decide what to compare, and moreover, designate actual categories for comparison. Comparative methodologies, by definition, require corpuses that are bounded, lest there is nothing to compare "across" or "between." In my case, I therefore had to formalize how I compared across the peoples in "this conflict", what constitutes a bounded so-called group within "the conflict", and whom, and how many of these groups exist. While these issues may seem obvious, they are not.

Theoretical Considerations

Categories, not groups. Debates exist about group boundaries, where they lie, or if they even exist in the first place. With respect to the latter, Rogers Brubaker has argued that groups do not exist, rather only *categories* do. Groups are not clearly recognizable or bound units. A group, he argues, "denotes a dynamic political stance," "a family of related yet competing stances - not a static condition, not a distant 'thing.'" (Brubaker, 1996, p. 66) Rather than forming the semblance of a group, people assume a stance, which, in a given moment, appear to take the shape of a group, despite the fact that it is actually a hybrid of competing forms. People, he later went on to argue, instead constitute categories, from which they move in and out. At times, categories become vested with more "groupness" and at other times, with less. (Brubaker, 2002).

Douglas Medin and Scott Atran (2004) and Romney and Moore (2001) have pointed out that it is still difficult to categorize where one culture ends and another begins. These scholars engage in cross-cultural psychological and sociocultural

anthropological studies of human cognition, and phonemic and kinship systems. In their methodological approaches to comparing these abilities and structures, they ask 'what in effect constitutes the basic unit of culture to compare across?' The latter scholars suggest the use of the term "paradigm", and argue that the more components are shared, the more similar the meanings will be in a given system. In turn, the more similar these meanings, the more closely individual components will constitute a "perfect paradigm", though they conclude that no paradigm is perfect.

Based on Romney and Moore's argument I, therefore, selected *categories* (which are roughly similar to *paradigms*), rather than groups of people, or, specifically, bound cultures, for the purpose of comparison. In telling the story of the conflict from the perspective of, therefore, at least every *category of people* involved, I nevertheless, still had to determine what the said categories would be. I grappled with the issue of where I should draw boundaries, whether along civic, ethnic, geographic and or ethnopolitical axes. Ultimately, I considered the following five options, before making my final selection.

Civic Categories. The first option I considered was citizenship categories. In constructing such divisions, I would be conducting my analysis by comparing the reception of two groups, namely Israelis and Palestinians. Doing so would have meant that I would be including not just the Jewish citizens of Israel but also the Arab/Palestinian citizens of Israel into my categorical analysis of the audience's interpretation of the text of *Sesame Street*.

Geographic Categories. The second option I considered was geographic categories. Constructing such divisions *could* result in my constructing two groups. One would be comprised of people who live in the West Bank and Gaza, and the second, of those living in Israel/the rest of Israel, which I will refer to as *Israel proper* from this point forward. The result is that I would include Palestinians and Jewish-Israelis living in the former geographical regions into my categorical analysis, and compare them against Jewish-Israelis and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis living in the latter.

National Categories. The third option I considered was national categories. This option would have resulted in my dividing people up into two national groups. The first would be comprised of Arabs and the latter, Jews. Doing so would place Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, together with Arab Palestinians into one group, and Jewish-Israelis into a separate group. Many researchers of these populations have indeed grouped Arab/Palestinian-Israelis together with Palestinians, or rather, constructed Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians as dyadic opposites, in an attempt to quantitatively measure the extent to which Arab/Palestinian-Israelis effectively constitute membership of one group as compared with the other (see with respect to dyadic formulations, Peres & Yuval-Davis, 1969; Rouhana, 1993).

Ethnic categories. A fourth option I considered was to use ethnic categories. In this case I *could* choose to construct three, rather than two ethnic categories and select groups comprised of Arabs, Europeans and “Others.” In doing so, I would end up grouping (a) the responses of Palestinians – all of whom are Arab, together with (b) Arab/Palestinian-Israelis - all of whom are also Arab, with (c) those Jewish-Israelis

who are ethnically Arab ("mizrahim"/"sepharadim" in Hebrew, depending upon one's narrative preference) into separate categories. I would in turn compare this category of "Arab", which consequently would constitute the largest category by a vast plurality, against the smaller categories of (2) ethnically European Jewish-Israelis ("Ashkenazim"), and (3) the remaining "other" category of Jewish-Israelis.

National and Civic Axes Combined Category. The fifth option I considered was combining civic and national axes. This is the option I selected. In deploying this option, I constructed three groups to compare across. These included Palestinians, Jewish-Israelis and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis. I selected this option because, as I argued in Chapter 1, civic and national axes are of most relevance to behavior within the context of political conflicts. As I argued in that chapter, with respect to modern conflict, the interstate system, or, more specifically, the political, economic, social and military powers that have constructed it, has helped categorize humans into groups, configured into bound ethnopolitical and civic categories. It is the politicization of these identities (not simply ethnicity), in conjunction with citizenship (not simply one's geographical place of residence), that matter the most in these contexts – especially within ethnopolitical conflict contexts.

The reason that I argue that the combination of these identities, together with citizenship, matters the most is illustrated by the fact that within the state of Israel, the *ethnic* category of "Arab" is not what is critical. Rather, what is critical is the *ethnopolitical* category of "Arab". It is this latter category, in dialogue with the Jewish ethnopolitical category, that constitutes difference within the *state* of Israel (and

included as part and parcel of this, the *non-state institution* of the Palestinian Authority). In Israel, the *politicized Jewish ethnopolitical identity*, or the national category for which Israel was established, takes primacy. Like *all* groups who have achieved statehood - as part and parcel of nationalism – so too, has *this* group pushed forward its ethnopolitical identity as primary. As I discussed in Chapter 1 in reference to Wimmer's work, inequality is systematically inscribed into the modern state (Wimmer, 2002) as part and parcel of nationalism. These ethnopolitical categories, combined with citizenship rights – whether for those who are citizens of the state of Israel, or instead of the non-state institution of the Palestinian Authority -- the latter, however, unable to guarantee the same degree of citizenship rights as the former due to its non-state status - are what constitute the context for the behavior of people and, in turn, in this case, the audience for *Sesame Street*.

Arab/Palestinian-Israelis constitute their own third group. Thus, for example, Arab/Palestinians in Israel hold greater privileges than do Arab/Palestinian citizens in the Palestinian Authority, by virtue of the fact that the former hold *state citizenship*, and the later hold *non-state citizenship*. Within the current matrix of the inter-state system, it is the institution of the state that possesses the right to bestow the entire package of privileges associated with citizenship. This distinction, meanwhile, is what makes all the difference with respect to what the same national group can or *cannot* do within the wider matrix of the inter-state system context.

With respect to this example, it is important to point out that qualitative research has established Arab/Palestinian-Israelis as a separate or third category of

peoples, using their own perspectives as a measure. Mary Totry criticizes Peres and Yuval-Davis (Peres & Yuval-Davis, 1969), and independently of them also Nadim Rouhana, (Rouhana, 1993), for their quantitative methodological approaches to assessing Arab/Palestinian-Israelis' construction of their own identity, in which she says, they "assumed from the start that there are only two ways to interpret and to understand the experience of Palestinians in Israel: either they are Israelis or Palestinians." (Totry, forthcoming, p. 24). Totry, in turn, demonstrated that these people have, instead, developed an extra-local or regional identity, whereby "most of them felt that they belonged neither to the Palestinian nor to the Israeli World, they had become a distinct group." (Totry, forthcoming, p. 27). She, like Amara and Kabaha (1996) before her, found that Arab/Palestinian-Israelis push their Islamic identity to the forefront, because it "was more convenient to deal with than with the other identities and was not in conflict with them." (Totry, forthcoming, p. 26)

In the subsequent chapters, I will demonstrate how the axes of these two categories of ethnopolitical and civic identities effectively function to determine the context for the lives of the three groups of people who fit these categories. In turn, their responses to the text of *Sesame Street* suggests the level of "groupness" they form when responding to the text, and conversely, what role it might play in trying to change their grouping behavior into these, rather than, for example, one of the other four categories I contemplated using. Doing so *might* serve as an identification technique for altering how each person interacts with and relates to who (or what) constitutes their "enemy other."

Three Categories of Analysis

Once I decided to designate the audience for the *Sesame Street* texts as three separate categories on the basis of these peoples' relationship to the interstate system, namely *politicized ethnic identity and citizenship rights*, I designated three specific categories for comparison. These are a *stateless nation, statebearing nation* and *state minority*, depicted in the diagram below. Each of these categories, I argue, have different relationships with the interstate system in terms of the opportunities they hold for exercising military, political, economic and social power. Group entry into such categories is fluid, not fixed. So too is the extent to which group members accept the dominant hegemonic organizational goals of their so-called group leaders who "represent" them and give them a so-called voice.

Table 5.1: Comparative Categories for Analyses of the Population

Stateless nation
Statebearing nation
State minority

Statebearing Nation

I define a *state-bearing nation* to be an ethnopolitical nationalist group that already possesses a state. A state, according to Brubaker, is not so much a state, as it is a "nationalizing state." A nationalizing state is not static. Meaning that the state's "state-bearing nation" sees the state to some extent as an *unfinished product*.

Therefore, to varying degrees, it has an interest in promoting its "language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, or [their] political hegemony". (Brubaker, 1996, p. 63). Its members, consequently, may take for granted their privileged position, and do not necessarily even perceive of themselves as *nationalizing*. Rather, others may perceive them that way.

Over time, the statebearing nation may become less conscious of its ethnopolitical nationalizing status as its constructs become inscribed in the state, taking on the appearance of neutrality and what is presumed "normal" or the natural order of things. If the status quo is challenged, security, becomes their greatest goal vis-à-vis the state. While members of any given categorical statebearing nation may hold different opinions and relate differently to other categories of people, whether more or less inclusively, it is in their categorical interest to maintain that which is considered a natural right in the inter-state system – one's own state. The result, typically, is that a majority adopts the rhetoric of security, especially at the organizational representative level. This point marks and defines their pseudo environment of conflict, which is quite distinct from the pseudo environment that permeates the lives of other categorical members. Hence, the filter through which groups making up this category read an intervention is steeped in the cloak of security. In brief, with respect to the concept of peace, statebearing nations, given their advantaged position of already possessing a state, are likely to seek to maintain the status quo. Therefore, their definition of peace will tend to be *security* – the cessation of physical violence (with the absence of structural change).

Stateless Nations and State Minorities.

Given the realities of the inter-state system in which states exist and persist, out-groups have been created. The result has been, with few exceptions, *multi-national states*. States privilege the nation that controls them administratively – i.e. the statebearing nation, leaving others out. Those not members of the statebearing nation, namely the minorities - be they non-national communities or nations, are therefore *disadvantaged* within this current context. According to Gurr, there are at least 275[88] such out-groups, whom he refers to as minorities at risk (MARs)[89], that make up the current matrix of largely multi-national states. (Gurr, 2000). These groups make up 1 billion (or one-sixth) of the world's population. They are minorities within the borders of “their own” states because they are not part of the statebearing nation who controls their respective state. States, however, are the administrative units that have been endowed with the legitimate right and moreover, responsibility to protect the world’s people. By virtue of the powers they possess in the form of citizenship, welfare guarantees, security and non-intervention sovereign status, none other than states are today endowed with the normative power to protect the world's peoples, even amidst these so-called globalizing times. In brief, it is the state alone that can provide the full package of citizenship rights. Nevertheless, in spite of its obligations to those who reside inside their borders, states do not provide equality to all “their members.” Currently, as much as at least 116[90] of the states that make up our global system do not, *in practice*, guarantee equal rights to those who are not members of their dominant nations. (Gurr, 2000).

Included among those ethnopolitical groups that Gurr constitutes as Minorities at Risk (MARs) are groups that fit the categories I refer to as *stateless nations* and *state minorities*. The distinction between these two categories is that the former, in contrast to the latter, do not seek a state of their own. The existence of the interstate system, including its creation of out-groups, has influenced group goals. The institutional changes brought on by the advent of the state, including (1) spatial ownership, (2) mutually exclusive borders and (3) the centralization of governance has served to crystallize the process of national consciousness, a model which others have learned from, and which has slowly given way to the break-up of empires, where they previously existed. The result today is that these groups seek change. And, as long as states exist, the options for groups that are members of these categories become limited and directed. In turn, their goals become informed by that which is in the nature of a state. A state, as will be recalled from my definition in Chapter 1, is (1) nation-centric, (2) maintains the so-called legitimate right to make use of physical and structural violence, is (3) centralized in authority, (4) spatialized, (5) owned by its dominant nation/s, (6) promotes sedentarization within its boundaries and (7) is mutually exclusive.

The goals of stateless nations, as with the statebearing nations before they achieved statehood, are to achieve self-autonomy over *their own state* in order to legitimize their place among “the community of nations”. Adopting the rhetoric of justice, especially at the organizational representative level, the majority of groups that are members of the category of “stateless nations” presume states to be a *right* to

which they are entitled. They, just like statebearing nations, take for granted the notion that states *should* exist, have not *always* existed, and moreover, that not *all* groups possess a state. This point marks and defines their *pseudo environment of conflict* – or the grid through which they frame and read their conflict as though a text in and of itself.

Hence, while members of stateless nations, like statebearing nations, hold a variety of opinions, they filter conflict through the cloak of justice. With respect to the concept of peace, stateless nations, given their disadvantaged position relative to the interstate-system, are likely to seek to alter the status quo. Therefore, their definition of peace *will tend to be justice*, namely the elimination of structural violence through control of "their own" state.

A *state minority*, meanwhile, is a non-national ethnopolitical group that resides within a state, with or without citizenship rights. The goals of state minorities are to achieve improved rights or autonomous regions internal to the state within which they reside. With regards to the former goals, they may seek the extension of truly *plural* democratic rights – an extension, which while it exists in varying degrees, has yet to be truly pluralized anywhere across our interstate system. Alternatively, they may seek affirmative action, or the establishment of consociational power-sharing quota system arrangements, guaranteeing them equal access to the state. Consequently, the goal of improved rights is the most sought after goal by ethnopolitical groups (Gurr, 2000). As is relevant, the bulk of concerns about discrimination that ethnopolitical groups

express pertain specifically, to citizenship rights (Wimmer, 2002). It is this quest for equality that marks the pseudo conflict context for state minorities.

State minorities, like statebearing and stateless nations, also hold differences of opinions, but in their case, they filter these through their quest for equality. With respect to the concept of peace, state minorities, given their disadvantaged position relative to statebearing nations who have provided them with citizenship rights within "their" state, are likely to seek equal rights. Therefore, a state minority's definition for peace will tend to be *equality* – an elimination of structural violence through the establishment of equal rights relative to the statebearing nation.

To summarize, in a comparative perspective, statebearing nations are advantaged (relative to state minorities and stateless nations) within a given state. By *advantaged*, I mean that they hold greater opportunities and access to advantages, and overall, *are* more advantaged, not that every single member is necessarily more advantaged than members of the other two categories, and according to all economic, social, political and military criterion therein. For example, individual members of the latter two categories may have higher incomes than those of the former.[91] With the respect to the stateless nations, they are not *necessarily*, or *always* more disadvantaged than state minorities. Rather, what sets them apart is that their goals typically differ. Stateless nations typically want peace through justice, and state minorities typically want peace through equality.

Categorical goals to which groups may subscribe translate into frames through which group members interpret their conflict. Individual group members do not

necessarily or always interpret a conflict in-line with the categorical frames in which "their group" is situated. However, they are positioned in such a way whereby reading their given conflict through these, rather than *other* categorical frames is easiest. As a result, in order to read the conflict through other frames, they must: (1) be conscious that they read them through a particular frame at all, and (2) must *actively* seek out other frames through which to read. If they do not read through other frames, they are not likely to make sense of the conflict from a different world-view or categorical perspective. Finally, groups can (and do) move in and out of these categories. Thus, for example, a people who subscribe to the paradigm of state's rights may, at another time, instead subscribe to the doctrine of self-autonomy. By doing so, they would be moving out of the category of state minority and into the category of stateless nation.

The Three Separate Historical Narratives of "the Conflict" Into Which the Text Must Intervene

By designating the categories of statebearing nation, state minority and stateless nation as my base for comparison, I, in effect "solved" my problem with respect to deciding where one "culture" would end, and the other would begin for the purposes of making comparisons. The result was that I compared across these three categories, and in turn, across Jewish-Israelis, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis and Palestinians as their current positions are situated *in relation* to each of these categories.

Thus, as Michael Cole has argued with respect to cross-cultural psychology and the need to construct measures that are meaningful within a "culture" (Cole, 1996), I assessed the audience's interpretation of the *Sesame Street* text within the constructs of each of their own respective *meaning systems*. In other words, I analyzed these three groups in relation to their specific conflict contexts – using both the structural and narrative elements that are associated with these categories. The relationship between the categories and groups, as I compared the in my study, is depicted in the diagram below.

Table 5.2: The Groups Being Studied, in Relation to the Category in Which They Are Currently Situated.

Category	Groups
Statebearing nation	Jewish-Israelis
State minority	Arab/Palestinian-Israelis
Stateless nation	Palestinians

The structural relationships of these three categories of groups party to the two conflicts and their related narratives clearly relate to the political goals for (resolving) the conflict voiced by the audience members for the *Sesame Street* texts. The audience members' political goals in turn, relate to what the text had to work "against", and enter into dialogue with to try to mediate contact with them. In other words, the minds of the members of the audience are not a blank slate. Rather, by age five, their minds, as I will demonstrate, are already filled with, well versed in, and able to apply the framing techniques deployed by each of the specific categories that their groups currently relate to in the conflict; as a function of their current position, relative to the

matrix of the inter-state system as either a statebearing nation, stateless nation or state minority.

Practical Considerations

Apart from the theoretical concerns I have outlined above, I also needed to split the audience up along the axes of Palestinian, Jewish-Israeli and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis for practical considerations. As the reader will recall, the "text" is actually comprised of three separate texts (one Palestinian and two Israeli versions of *Sesame Street*) that were created especially for each of these three groups of people. Apart from trying to retain the intentions, or encoding of the text in order to assess its use as a peace communication device, I also had a practical problem. I could only show the Hebrew version to the Jewish-Israeli children. Therefore, if I showed them the Palestinian version, for the vast plurality, I would have had to, for example, dub it into Hebrew. The opposite case would have been the same for the vast plurality of Palestinian children. On the other hand, I could, however have switched the versions for the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli and Palestinian children.

In either case, however, whether I dubbed (and, therefore, altered the expressed language of the text) or simply switched versions where there was no linguistic challenge, I would have altered a meaningful component of the *intended* encoding of the text. I would have shown the children versions that thematically were not intended and organized expressly for them. By doing so, it would have also been more challenging to explain the designed utility of the *Sesame Street* programs as practiced, and as it, therefore, functions as a case of peace communication. Therefore,

in short, by selecting the categories to which these groups currently relate, I also rendered my ability to explain the policy implications of my assessment study somewhat more easy.

The Audience: Palestinians, Jewish-Israelis and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis

I define the three groups I compared in my study, namely Jewish-Israelis, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis[92] and Palestinians, respectively, as Jewish citizens of Israel, Arab/Palestinian citizens of Israel, and Palestinian citizens of the Palestinian Authority, as depicted in the diagram below.

Table 5.3: National and Civic Identity of the Three Groups

Groups	National & Civic Identity of these Peoples
Jewish-Israelis	Jewish citizens of Israel
Arab/Palestinian-Israelis	Arab/Palestinian citizens of Israel
Palestinians	Palestinian citizens of the Palestinian Authority

Group Organizational Goals: Narratives

My choice to demonstrate the perspective of these three groups of people – that is, to include at least one perspective of each party involved in the conflict, must further, be broken down to note that no group holds just one single view. Rather, the view that is most commonly discussed and that which I will elaborate on below is what I refer to as the *organizational view,* or the view which is held by the elite, specifically "legitimated" political parties representing each group. Such

representation may not be viewed as legitimate by all members of the group, be ruptured, factionalized, or in conflict and totally divorced from non-elites. Thus, I note that while I will begin my analysis in Chapter 6 with the organizational views of each of these three groups, I hold them up as *grids*, or narratives, through which to assess whether those who comprise these categories did, in turn, (1) express goals in-keeping with the organizational views that hegemonically define "their" groups goals, and, (2) in turn, to assess whether they read the text through these goals and their related overarching contexts.

Scope of The Study Design and Reported Findings

Once I designated the three groups for study – Jewish-Israelis, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis and Palestinians, I selected seven sub-populations, resident in six geographic communities, as my field sites. The study I performed with these seven populations at these six community sites was based on the methodologies and methods I describe in the remainder of this chapter**.** My selection of these communities and study design is meant to help provide a cornerstone for how to design a peace communication assessment and evaluation study and, therefore, is very broad in its scope.

In the proceeding chapter, I report on my findings from the study, but specifically from only three of the communities, one representing each of the three groups. I report on one community per group. I do so because, on the one hand, given the broad scope design I describe, these together are sufficient to illustrate how to

conduct a study of peace communication, and specifically, to assess this intervention.. On the other hand, I also do so because what I report on is sufficient for illustrating these points within the context of the scope of a dissertation. A dissertation does not allow for the more extensive reporting that would be requisite to describe the findings from all the communities I studied.

Independently of the research I carried out in each of these sites, I also analyzed the text of the *Sesame Street* programs, as reported on in Chapter 4. The analysis of the text involved my visiting four additional geographic sites, namely those that constituted the headquarters for the production of each of these texts: New York City (the headquarters of Sesame Workshop), Tel-Aviv (the headquarters for both IETV and HOP! Studios), Al-Bireh, Ramallah (the headquarters for Al Quds Educational Television; and Amman (the headquarters for Jordan Pioneers).

In turn, I *compare* my findings regarding the glocalized hybrid encoded text (as reported in Chapter 4) with my findings of the three different audience members' decoding of the text (as I report on in Chapters 6 through 8), in order to make my final assessment of the texts' efficacy, as based on the nature and rationale for any aberrant readings of the text made on the part of the audiences.

Context Analysis Methodologies

Multi-Sited Ethnographic Methodologies

The *Sesame Street* texts are a product of four geographic locations, and yet, at the same time, are placed in dialogue with the multiple communities across the geographic locales of Israel, the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan who, in turn, consumed them. I conducted multi-site ethnographic field research in order to be able to make sense of the consumption of the glocalized and hybrid texts by the different and distributed audience members, each existing within their own social, political, economic and military contexts.

According to George Marcus, changes in the locations of cultural production make essential the need to conduct *multi-sited ethnography*, in contrast to single sited ethnography. (March, 1985). Therefore, in trying to study the relationship between these multiple sites of production with respect to *Sesame Street*, on the one hand, and its reception on the other, I adopted this methodology.

As some might criticize, in terms of the time investment, multi-sited ethnography translates into less deep analysis per single site. However, it does not necessarily have to mean non-ethnography, nor quasi-ethnography per se. Rather, it is precisely the kind of ethnography that allows the ethnographer to compare and contrast the different interpretations of glocalized and hybrid texts. By using this method, I was able to assess the target audiences' dialogical interaction with what the four production sites had woven together into one coherent mediation tool. In simple

terms, I followed the texts from their initial praxis of encoding all the way to their reception in multiple locations, and, therefore, contexts. By doing so, I can therefore try to answer questions about what the texts mean within each of the three narrower contexts through which the three groups read "the conflict", and, in turn, the texts. In brief, I applied these multi-sited ethnographic methodologies in order to look at the connections, associations and suggested relationships between the four locations of production and their related diffuse and diverse practices of reception.

Conflict Zone Methodologies: "Fieldwork Under Fire"

In order to make sense of the contexts of the conflicts within which each of the three separate audiences were interpreting and responding to the texts, I employed conflict zone methodologies. Conflict zone methodologies stipulate that studying life "under fire" is not about studying obvious moments of conflict. It is not about rushing to the scene of an explosion or a protest. As Robben and Nordstrom so aptly note, what scholars should pay attention to is how people, in their *ordinary life*, adjust to conflict (Nordstrom & Robben, 1995). It is the regular, "normal", even mundane, moments that constitute the defining moments of life within a zone of conflict. In this respect, I chose to focus on, "everyday violence." (Robben and Nordstrom, 1995, p. 3) as that which constituted the conflict contexts for the audiences I studied. As Robben and Nordstrom point out, "Violence is a dimension of living," (Robben and Nordstrom, 1995, p. 9), it "is a dimension of people's existence, not something external to society and culture that 'happens' to people." (Robben and Nordstrom,

1995, p. 2), “human lives can be constituted as much around their destruction as around their reconstruction.” (p. 13). Building off of this, what is most revealing, I argue, is how human beings adjust, get on and get through their lives, *in spite of* conflict. Families living within zones of conflict work, eat, cook, clean, watch television, socialize just as do those who live outside of zones of conflict, and likewise, simply regard these activities as “life.”

It is not the rarer and or more visible moments – bombings, shootings, rape, mutilation, the erection of barriers, or destruction of infrastructure that define human life amidst conflict. Rather, I argue it is the most mundane tasks, quietly and discretely re-shaped by conflict that define precisely what life is like and what it *means* within a zone of conflict. To this end, in the proceeding chapters, the picture I paint of the conflict context is rooted in what both the audience members themselves described as their “normal life,” and what I observed as their “normal” lives, day in-day out.

Empathy for Audience Contexts

In order to both be able to explain the “normal” contexts of the audience members’ lives, and to exercise peace education praxis as a methodology, I argue that it is necessary to empathize with the context of each group’s respective conflict – both from their structural and narrative perspectives. By doing so, it becomes possible to make sense of the meanings *they* construct from the peace communication text, and to do so, specifically, in relation to the context of the conflict in which they live, including as *they* also make sense of that context.

Reflexivity. I worked reflexively in order to achieve an empathetic understanding of the three conflict contexts. I thought not just about the perspective of each audience category, but also my own dialogical relationship across the three. Such reflexivity is essential for making sense of how to design a study about peace communication. Anthony Smith has argued that people typically engage in "participant primordialism," and so make assumptions about those with whom they're interacting on the basis of their "ethnic" identity, and in turn, as a result, relate to them differently. (Smith, 1998). For this reason, I argue, who we are as researchers *may* make all the difference. It may make a difference however, not just for reasons having to do with ethnopolitical identity, but also, for example, for those having to do with gender, or more simply, with how we communicate with and approach our research subjects, and with what motivations we do so.

While research subjects may not necessarily know our (multiple) identities, guess them appropriately, or, in turn, necessarily respond by deploying participant primordialism or in any specified fashion (rather by ascribing a negative or positive attitude), that they *may* do so, is a concern which any research into peace communication must address. As part of a study design, scholars of a peace communication intervention should, therefore, incorporate elements into the process that will help effectively guide research findings, should such dialogical exchange occur, and/or enable a scenario for their reflexive analysis, after the fact.

I continuously thought about these concerns before, during and since the research. In my write up, however, I only describe those details that became pertinent.

In other words, while I argue that such reflexivity is essential for designing a study, I do not argue that extensive discussion of it is necessary for the *writing-up* of one's findings. More specifically, I believe *some* reflexive accounts have problematically extended themselves into personal autobiographies. As my goal here is to report on findings for the purpose of illustrating how to study peace communication, I refrain from turning the next pages of discussion into this other kind of genre. In short, I only report on those details then that are directly relevant to making sense of the findings I report on, beginning from Chapter 6.

Empathy and the Limits of Reflexivity as Criticized by Conflict Zone Methodologies

My reflexivity with respect to how I entered into and approach fieldwork, and my conscious decision to refrain from providing extensive personal details here, are rooted in the critical concerns raised by conflict zone methodologists regarding scholars who have positioned themselves as explorers or heroes in the context of their research, or simply, have entered into the research because they were "frontline" thrill seekers who, as these methodologies criticize, were more interested in themselves, than in those whom they researched. Finally, security concerns germane to the nature of research within a zone of conflict prevent providing details about everything. Thus, while you can take every reflexive detail into account when you design a study, as I argue one should, security concerns may prevent you from then describing all of these details, in contrast with other kinds of research.

The problem of the explorers. With respect to the first concern, contrary to scholars who position themselves as explorers who "discover" the victims, or participants in "their" (meaning, the scholar's) conflict, I preferred to adopt a methodology whereby I did not position myself as an explorer. More specifically, my research does not aim to "discover" Jewish-Israelis, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis and Palestinians. Thus, the goal, which I recommend for the design of all peace communication studies, is *not* to go about research as though the result is to be able to say one "knows" a certain group of people. Rather, the goal is to try and gain enough expertise in order to be able to empathize with the contexts of their specific conflicts, so that one can, in turn, make their best effort to try to effectively analyze the meaning and influence of the intervention from their perspective.

The problem of the heroes. With respect to the second concern, I also wished to steer clear of the kind of anthropological discourse, particularly coming from some who have gone into dangerous zones, in which the researcher has cast him or herself as a hero. In such scenarios, researchers have been criticized for apparently forgetting who or what their subject matter was, i.e. the people who live, daily in those zones – not themselves- the researchers. These accounts, ironically, are often given by scholars who profess to speak for the subaltern. At worst, such scholars cast themselves in the form of saviors of the subaltern, and/or war-torn victims of conflict. They see themselves not only as having discovered these "poor people," but also as having made great sacrifices and placed themselves in harms-way in order to give *them* a voice. Furthermore, these scholars believe this since, according to them, as a result of

their research "the world is now aware of the plight of these people". As Kevin Avruch has argued, such researchers are in fact not speaking for the subaltern. Instead, they are speaking for themselves. (Avruch, 2001).

As a result, while professing to be reflexive with respect to their own role in the research, and therefore, providing elaborate details about themselves, I would argue that such research write-ups, rather may go so far as to use the concept of "reflexivity" as a veil to create a public persona. At their worst, they use the opportunity to publicize their own careers. In brief, such scholars *may* pursue research within zones of conflict in order to establish their careers on the backs of the victims they are professing to be saving. In the case of the conflicts I discuss, such scholars may do so, regardless of which of the three groups they position as the victim. In summary, I am wary of over-explanations of reflexivity due to the so-called heroism genre of conflict studies, and similarly recommend such wariness when interested scholars conduct future peace communication research.

The problem of the "frontline" thrill seekers. With respect to the third concern, as Cynthia Mahmood (1996) has discussed, there are scholars who partake in fieldwork within and about zones of conflict out of a sense of adventure. (Bourgois, cited in Mahmood 1996, p. 19). Such goals for entering the research – i.e. because the researcher interprets it as being "sexy" or "exciting" -- are not necessarily conducive to developing empathy across groups. Therefore, similarly, I would hope that those who choose to pursue research into peace communication take this ethical concern into account. Specifically, I would hope that people engage in this kind of scholarship

because they would like to be able to procure scientific knowledge about the efficacy of these efforts in order to improve the lives of all peoples living within conflict zones.

Security within conflict zones. With respect to the final concern, in order to do this type of research, quite frankly, not every detail can or needs to be reported. Therefore, with respect to *writing-up* one's findings, I argue that it is problematic and at times even unethical to include every detail about one's contacts and movements. In the end, if research is *about* conflict, or its management, *the protection of human subjects* – both with respect to the researcher and the researched (who have in fact volunteered to help the former, and placed their trust in them) – have to be safeguarded. When researchers exit the field, life continues, and realistically, that life is still grounded in on-going conflict where security continues to matter for all peoples involved thereafter. In summary, I recommend that scholars conducting peace communication research strive to balance all the ethical concerns I listed above.

Conflict Zone Methodologies and Achieving Access

In order to empathize with each categorical context, and related groups partner to a given conflict, it is necessary to gain access to each of the respective contexts. In the case of the research design I used, and that which I propose as being particularly useful for entering these contexts as "far" as possible, I recommend the home as a site of research. I designated the home as my primary research site because I hoped to gain better access to peoples' *back stage*, rather than, *front stage* [93] "normal" identities.

Concerns about spies and politics. In order to gain deeper access, peace communication scholars must overcome what Sluka, and many other conflict zone scholars describe as the “spy” problem (Sluka, 1995). Often, the communities within which the researcher is conducting fieldwork, view him or her as a spy. This problem, as he and others point out, is especially pervasive when conducting fieldwork within zones of conflict. Similarly, Avruch points out that the politics and patriotism of conflict zone researchers are typically also called into question. (Avruch, 2001).

Such questioning has occurred with respect to the populations with which I worked. Typically, and often stereotypically, this has at times taken the form of concerns that a researcher is coming for political reasons, with respect to Jewish-Israelis, to give them “a bad name”. With respect to Palestinians, this has at times taken the form of concerns that an Israeli soldier is coming disguised as a researcher to gather intelligence, and among Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, this at times has translated into a concern that a member of the Israeli equivalent of the IRS (“mas achnasa” in Hebrew) is coming disguised as a researcher to “get them” for failing to file their taxes. Tamar Liebes (1997) and Götz, Lemish, Aidman and Heysung (2005), have, for example, discussed problems they encountered working with the latter communities, where respondents, according to them, were more anxious or critical of the research process, relative to Jewish-Israelis.

Apparently, due to the particular design process I describe below, I rarely found that families whose homes I and/or my research assistants entered expressed such anxiety or mistrust. While political questions arose, in many cases, such

conversations were muted, and my own political beliefs were in fact taken for granted. I believe this to be the case because of how I actively oriented myself to the fieldwork *prior* to entering into it. I was able to prepare in such a manner because I had the opportunity to learn from those accounts of fieldwork written prior to mine, some of which I have mentioned above. As a result, I was able to better gain entry in an effort to try and make sense of these family's lives and related community environs. I therefore recommend the below, together with a large time investment, as useful practices to engage in when conducting peace communication studies

Operationalizing Multi-Sited, Conflict Zone and Peace Education Methodologies to Achieve Access

In an attempt to achieve the kind of access necessary to carry out this research, I oriented myself to the fieldwork in the following ways. I (1) set up relevant professional affiliations, (2) was flexible, (3) actively re-negotiated my identity in relation to each changing conflict context, including by living in or adjacent to the geographic communities where I conducted the field work, (4) educated myself appropriately about each narrative framed context, and (5) worked with research assistants who lived in or adjacent to some of the communities in which I worked. In addition, I believe that due to the fact that I (6) studied a seemingly apolitical topic, and (7) am a woman, together these two latter factors lent themselves to my gaining access to each of the contexts, and more specifically, each of the geographic

communities within which I worked more easily. Finally (8) I employed a two-step sampling process, which also eased the challenge of gaining access.

The importance of multiple affiliations. First, prior to beginning the fieldwork, I took the step of setting up multiple research affiliations. During the tenure of my fieldwork, I had four affiliations. These included my primary affiliation with the University of California at San Diego (UCSD), the Palestinian American Research Center, whose overseas office is based in the Palestinian Authority, and two Israeli universities – one with the communication department of Tel-Aviv University, and the second, with the education department of the University of Haifa, specifically, with their Center for Research on Peace Education. (CERPE). As part of the fieldwork process, I could call upon these affiliations in order to assuage any potential concerns on the part of my interviewees about my "real" purposes in coming to "study them." Given that all these institutions supported my efforts, and in turn believed in my good-faith effort to try and achieve empathy across each of the perspectives, I thought prospective research participants would be more likely to believe this to indeed be the case when they encountered me and/or my assistants.

Jeffrey Sluka has argued that where one's funding is coming from may have an impact on people's interpretations of one's effort as a scholar to gain entry (Sluka, 1995). Therefore, I took care to "cover my bases" as it were, and affiliate myself with institutes that would be acceptable to people of varying political beliefs. On the other hand, obtaining these affiliations of course meant that that each institution tacitly accepted me as a scholar (as opposed to an activist with a political agenda), as well as

my proposed research. In other words, there was nothing in my research proposal, or related grant applications, that suggested that I was going into this project with any intention to "use" these institutions to achieve something else. Rather, in keeping with the great respect I hold for the quality of the scholarly work produced and/or funded by each respective institution, I hoped to be able to represent the respective populations empathetically and from a reflexive point of view that was indeed a reflection of the kind of research scholars affiliated with each of these organizations or institutes have typically tried to achieve.

Knowledge germane to the context of each conflict. Apart from spending a great deal of time carefully researching each of the three population samples prior to entering the field, in particular, I studied each of the geographic community sites I selected within each of the three population samples prior to actively beginning my direct research with the audience for the *Sesame Street* programs. Doing so enabled me to move past many reactions that might have otherwise prevented my entry into the community.

Thus, for example, because I had done background research on the television landscape for each of the three population samples, I was aware of the fact that the Israeli *Sesame Stories (Hikayat Simsim*) program was the only program being broadcast in Arabic on Israeli television for Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children. When I would describe the research to Arab/Palestinian-Israeli schoolteachers, their typical response, therefore, was one of disinterest. They would state that "there are no television programs here in Israel for our children," and then proceed to explain why

the study would be inapplicable to their students, and therefore why sampling them would for example be irrelevant.

However because I was already aware of this concern, I was able to respond to it appropriately. Moreover, I was also able to preempt negative reactions. As part of my introduction, I began to explain that "*Hikayat Simsim* is the only program in Arabic," and proceed from there to explain why I was interested in learning what use, if any, Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children found in this program. I in turn instead only encountered keen interest in the topic and my research on the part of Arab/Palestinian-Israeli schoolteachers.

The importance of flexibility and comfort. A third criterion for effective entry seems to me to involve becoming comfortable within each research site. If the researchers are not comfortable themselves, I would certainly expect those with whom they are engaging will not feel comfortable during the scenario and so the research results may also be less illuminating. In my case, contrary to what was most often asked of me, namely "Aren't you afraid to enter those people's homes?", I did not perceive entry into the home to be a cause for fear or discomfort. From my perspective, and as I responded when asked, I rather replied: "No. Don't you think it's scarier for them to let me into their homes and leave me alone with their children?" As I explained, if people are not afraid to leave a researcher alone with their children, that is if people are not afraid to leave their children alone with a complete stranger (which I believe is a perfectly legitimate response), I do not (nor did I) think I had cause for

concern. Thus I concluded, "how can I be afraid of them? They're taking a greater risk than I am."

Active and flexible re-positioning of identity in relation to zones of conflict and multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork and peace education praxis. Apart from trying to be at ease, or as I recommend for peace communication scholars, doing research with which they feel they can be at ease, *living with* each community is very important. Because of where I chose to live during my fieldwork, my "background credentials" and political beliefs, as I learned, were assumed, not questioned. Specifically, during my field work, I came to be assumed to be "one of us" or at least "not opposed to us."

As Marcus argued with respect to multi-sited fieldwork, "in practice, multi-sited fieldwork is always conducted with a keen awareness of being within the landscape, and, as the landscape changes across sites, the identity of the ethnographer requires re-negotiation." (Marcus, 1995, p. 10). In my case, because I combined multi-sited ethnography with conflict zone methodologies and peace education concerns in which I tried to adopt the praxis of representing multiple perspectives by actively engaging with and living (albeit as marginally as one can in the course of a research project) within each respective group's "normal" conflict context, I changed my *location of residence* to adapt to a community within the context of each group's specific conflict.

Such changes in residence allowed for suppositions about my identity to change sufficiently, and in turn, often meant I rarely had to address concerns about my

allegiance, because such concerns rarely ever came up. During the course of the fieldwork, I moved several times in order to live in or adjacent to each of the geographic communities where I conducted the field work. By residing amongst each of the three population samples, the result was that my allegiances as it so happened were rarely questioned. Thus, in an effort to enhance entry and empathy, I recommend peace communication researchers attempt to live within the conflict zone of each of the peoples whose response to an intervention they are trying to determine and understand.

Typically, researchers studying Palestinians, Jewish-Israelis and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis have resided with only one of these populations, not two or all three. Thus, by practicing what was essentially a peace education approach to research – i.e. by being concerned that I understood and represented conflict through parallel narratives (Firer and Adwan, 1997; Adwan and Bar-On, 2004), or in this case, all narratives of those party to the conflict, which in turn required working with all parties involved, my allegiances, as I have explained, were less likely to have been questioned. In addition, because I went the extra step of living with all three parties involved, my allegiances were, even more so, rarely questioned. In brief, within the context of these conflicts, it appeared so “abnormal” or impossible for me to be anything but “for” whatever group with whom I was living, or at the very least, not any kind of threat.

Confederate research assistants. In addition, I hired research assistants who lived in or adjacent to the communities I sampled. In some communities I carried out

the research alone, in others I carried it out together with, or in conjunction with my assistants. Working together with them as part of the latter scenario further assisted me in gaining entry into many of these communities.

The Utility of the research product. Since I happened to have been studying a seemingly apolitical topic, namely a children's television program, people across the there sample populations were not suspicious of my presence as a researcher, but rather, were often disinterested. Though they were very hospitable and curious about why I was conducting the research and what I hoped to find, they allowed me to go about my work without paying critical attention. They often found it amusing that I considered their children experts, and wanted to speak with them *in particular*. Furthermore, their children suggested the most apolitical source of information to which one could ever turn. Additionally, because my research simultaneously addresses the subfield of children and media, I was also able to, for example, address concerns that Jewish-Israeli parents, in particular, had about their children's viewing of "too much" television.

Thus, my research appeared apolitical and also useful, especially on a micro-level to those parents (typically mothers) who probed me with questions relating to the negative effects of television viewing on children, which I was happy to answer. After the research, they would therefore, for example, ask me to recommend specific television shows or websites that their children might consume, as an alternative to their current consumption patterns.

Thus, while I selected these television programs because they represented the best effort at using peace communication to intervene into a conflict, interestingly enough, their dual nature – i.e. as a genre of children's educational television programming - enabled research into peace building and making. I would argue that such a finding, in turn, suggests that when conducting research into peace communication, the perceived political, or rather *apolitical nature* of an intervention may help researchers to gain access to and render analysis of its utility more feasible.

On being a woman. I believe that by virtue of the fact that I am a woman, apart from the perceived apolitical nature of the intervention, it seems that I also gained greater access to all the communities in which I worked. Rather than being harassed, which is often is a universal supposition when the two concepts – *women* and *conflict* – are juxtaposed, typically, those families whom I visited took care of me. Apart from being asked to join families during meals, across all the samples, people made sure that I was not harmed. Since I was either alone or with a research assistant who was most typically another woman, the families being interviewed were mainly concerned that I, or we, make it home alright, especially if we completed the interviews after dark. Thus for example, the families whose children we were interviewing offered to give us rides home, or when I was alone for example accompanied me to my bus-stop and waited there with me until the bus arrived.

Thus, ironically, while conflict is not typically a "woman's place", it was being a woman, as I began to learn, that was *precisely* what allowed me entry into the world of conflict. I therefore believe that being a woman helped me to gain access into

people's homes, and, in doing so, gave me access to that which is the most political – namely peoples' backstage lives (or something closer to it than what normally transpires beyond the door to their homes).

Inside the home, it is more difficult for one to "hide" one's "true" self. So too, with respect to life within a zone of conflict, it is where what appears the most "normal" (those activities that are simply taken for granted as "how life is") most often occurs. Meanwhile, the so-called "normal" moments I was able to observe within these homes were, in fact, the least normal when viewed from the perspective of a zone of peace. As a result, these moments constitute what is the most *basic* political aspect of life within a zone of conflict.

Two-step Sampling process. Finally, within each of the three groups, I employed a two-step sampling method, which further helped me to gain entry to them, and which I, therefore recommend. The first visit I made to family homes was to administer more general surveys about the children's television viewing habits and the parents' preferences surrounding these. Entering the home in order to ask these apolitical questions made future entry easier. After having asked these questions, and, in effect, having "won-over" the children (who always enjoyed questions about their favorite television shows), and thereby having put the family at ease as to my identity as a researcher and a "safe" woman entering their home to study their children's television viewing habits, I did not encounter much difficulty asking those whom I selected about whether I could return for a second, or even third more intensive visit. A sufficient number of families even viewed my time in their home as a free-baby-

sitting opportunity, or, for some stay-at-home mothers, as entertainment. In summary, the families with whom I worked did not typically view my activities as problematic, but rather, as something worthwhile.

With respect to the second visit, during which I entered into more political topics, I explained that my interest was in understanding how, given the realities of these children's lives, the *Sesame Street* program helps them navigate through it as they grow up within the context of conflict. I explained this question specifically in relation to what I understood to be the narrative concerns for each of the three peoples. Specifically, with respect to the Jewish-Israeli children, I explained that given the "situation" with respect to the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children, "the lack of resources" and finally, with respect to the Palestinian children, the "occupation": what would be most of use to *them*? I explained that I hoped to shed light on how *their* children interpreted the program in order to make sense of the program (and related programs) from *their* perspective, and, in turn, to be able to recommend improvements to meet their needs – meaning, to manage the conflict, also from *their* perspective.

Access Across the Contexts

In summary, by spending a great deal of time reflexively and actively designing my research in relation to each population sample, and each specific community within it, and finally within each specific geographic community (largely prior to entering the fieldwork), I believe I was able to gain better access to the three population samples I studied, as well as the respective geographic communities within each. Doing so gave me the opportunity to make a good-faith effort to try and

empathize with the contexts of the three conflicts. As a result, I was in a better position to try and understand each of these contexts in my effort to situate the children's interpretations of the *Sesame Street* intervention within these.

Child Specific Methodologies

Child Developmental, Categorical and Geographic Knowledge

Given that my audience was comprised of children, I included two additional methodologies to ensure that I was interpreting the responses appropriately, namely child, or cognitive, development and childhood methodologies. These methodologies are germane to peace communication interventions that target children. Children, consequently, are a popular target population for peace communication. In an effort to operationalize these methodologies, I therefore began each interview with measures specific to cognitive development. I employed these in an effort to separate *culture* from *cognition*. If a child had not yet developed the cognitive skills necessary to make sense of categories, sub-categories, and relationships between categories at the same- and the sub-level, and, as a consequence, interpreted the text differently, I ruled out the possibility that their responses were due to cultural differences across or within the groups.

In particular, I emphasized the use of measures that assess geographic knowledge, including those that specifically relate to an understanding of one's civic identity. (Piaget & Weil, 1951; Jahoda, 1964; Brown, 1980). By using these methodologies I was able to distinguish between whether a child made sense of their contextual surroundings in a particular way because he could not grasp them (the result of cognition), or rather because he constructed them that way (the result of cultural or personal variation). The latter is what would be more commonly

interpreted, and even assumed, with respect to adult research subjects, though not so typically with children.

Category and sub-category relations. Thus for example, Piaget and Weil found that children do not understand the concept of a state as a geographic unit that is distinct from a city according to sub-level categorical status until the age seven or eight. In other words, they found that until that age, children living in Geneva were unable to make sense of the designation of Geneva as a sub-category of Switzerland. (Piaget & Weil, 1951). I used such measures to establish children's comprehension of category-sub-category relationships in order to interpret their other responses throughout the study.

Verbal versus drawn measures. Second, due to debates in the literature about the use of verbal responses on the one hand versus drawn responses as ways of demonstrating the difference between these categories (Piaget and Weil, Jahoda, 1964; Brown, 1980) on the other, I asked children to respond through the use of both oral and drawn means, and discussed each kind of answer they provided with them.

Non-political geographic categories and sub-categories. Third, debates exist in the literature about the complications that arise when national identity is not directly tied to the geographic component of the unit of the state, such that children cannot make sense of the former if it is not directly tied to the latter (that is, typically when they are asked about relations of stateless nations and state minorities to states). Therefore, I hypothesized that similar and related complications would arise with respect to my population samples. I also asked them about the relationship between

less politically-dependent geographic units, for example, “streets” in relation to “cities”. By doing so I could nevertheless critically ascertain their cognitive understanding of categorical relationships and so disaggregate these from more cultural or political interpretations of other categories I might try to ask them about.

Comparing across the groups. Fourth, with respect to my earlier discussion of comparative methodologies, specifically with respect to the need to establish measures that are meaningful to all respondents, I made comparative adjustments when using these measures so that I could interpret whether a given child misunderstood or constructed his or her geographic surroundings. For example, when posing relevant questions, I used the term “village” as a subcategory of “state” for children who were less familiar with cities, and “city” when I was speaking with those less familiar with villages.

As relates to reception of the text. By using these methodologies, I was, likewise, able to assess whether a child constructed meanings from the *Sesame Street* programs because she “misunderstood” them, or rather, because she was actively engaging in aberrant readings of the text.

Childhood Methodologies

Children are active readers. In an effort to interpret the audience’s responses to the texts of the *Sesame Street* programs, I went beyond the use of British cultural studies models that generally position “people” as active viewers, to include children. To this end, I applied the use of childhood methodologies that argue that children are also active readers.[94]

Children are Capable Research Subjects. Second, I applied these same methodologies to argue that children are capable of participating as research subjects. As I demonstrate in their responses in the proceeding chapters, and as I have discussed elsewhere (Warshel, 2007), contrary to popular beliefs, children are capable of providing cogent responses. Furthermore, I structured the interview questions in such a way that I could ensure their responses went beyond the reply, "I don't know." As Dafna Lemish has argued, when children provide this reply, it is not because they cannot understand the subject matter under discussion. Rather, the interviewer has failed to engage them. (Lemish, 1997, p. 113). Therefore, I tried to carefully structure my questions in order to obtain detailed responses from them, as is readily illustrated in my findings. In turn, I argue that scholars conducting assessment and evaluations of child-targeted interventions should make use of these applicable methodologies.

Design

Field Experiment

In order to explain the rationale behind the children's comparative engagement with the text across multiple sites as I have described in the methodology sections above, I designed the study as a field experiment. I sought to isolate what role the variable of *contact* played in altering the children's *interpretation* of the text. In order to do so, I designed the study by selecting contact and non-contact communities as the basis for conducting the context analysis.

More specifically, out of an interest in comparing the aforementioned role of the four dialogical environmental factors on the children's interpretation of the text, namely (1) *community*, including conflict context and contact experiences, (2) *school*, including classroom teacher/s, (3) *home,* focusing especially on their parents, and (4) *television-viewing* environments - I selected the six geographic communities that would enable me to make these comparisons. Specifically, though, I selected these six geographic communities by virtue of the contact they afforded so that I could in turn compare the role contact, as part of context, played in altering the audience's response to the text.

In contrast to the other variables, comparison by the amount and nature of contact could *only* be made at the unit level of a community. Due to an extensive degree of separation within and between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, children have contact with the other two-ethnopolitical groups almost entirely on the basis of their communities of residence. Therefore, I selected research subjects within each of

the three groups on the basis of their residence in what I refer to as *contact* and *non-contact* communities. The former afford some kind of contact experiences with members of one of the other two ethnopolitical groups. The latter afford no, or less contact than what is typical.

Field versus laboratory experimental designs. Given that my study was not conducted in a laboratory, I naturally selected communities based on how people actually live. The challenge, therefore, was to be able to locate group contact and non-contact communities for comparison across not just the two, but all three of the groups. In particular, the challenge was to find communities where contact existed in the first place. The nature of contact by community could be variable. Since, however, in many cases no contact whatsoever exists, for example, for Jewish-Israelis with Palestinians, or for Arab/Palestinian-Israelis with Palestinians, the only option in each of these cases was to be able to find an actual example of contact. Meanwhile, since it is nearly impossible, on the other hand, to find Palestinians who do *not* have contact with Jewish-Israelis, this meant that *less*, rather than *no* contact was the only option available in the field.

In either case, whether I selected the contact or non-contact community, the choice of the type or nature of contact was extremely limited because, in fact, limited *forms* of contact define the nature of the conflict. People, especially children may have contact with only one category "of the other." For example, Jewish-Israeli children's contact with Palestinians is almost entirely limited to contact with day laborers, and no other professional category of Palestinians. Therefore, in short, in order to make sense

of the role the context of the community played in the child's life, I first had to select the community by whether it afforded *any* kind of contact experience. Thereafter, I could determine what else marked the child's community context.

By using a field rather than laboratory design, I was, however, better able to generalize my findings as to whether, how and to what extent the peace communication intervention could make a difference within the context of real on-going intractable conflict. It is for this reason that I recommend field over laboratory designs. The former better improve the applicability of peace communication analyses to policy recommendations.

By my having selected the communities in order to ensure that I could isolate responses between for example an Arab/Palestinian-Israeli child who had contact with Palestinians versus one who did not, the design enabled me to analyze how contact might interact with mediated contact efforts to potentially alter the outcomes of the latter. According to Sheryl Graves, *no* study has ever been conducted into the effects of contact on mediated contact (Graves, 1999). Therefore, by selecting communities with precisely this goal in mind, I sought to add not only to knowledge about the reception of a mediated contact effects intervention, but also to how real-world conflict contexts, including uneven and varying contact experiences, actually influence the outcome of mediated contact.

In addition, as I discussed in Chapter 3, understanding context is of paramount importance, and thus a study design for peace communication, as I did in my case, should ensure that the nature of the context can be incorporated. Doing so means that

one should make sense of how both contact and non-contact experiences orient and alter the potential of a peace communication intervention to change behavior and structures.

Seven sub-populations resident in six geographic communities. To this end, I sought to analyze the seven sub-population samples that are resident in the six geographic communities I selected. These included, among the Jewish-Israelis, Alfei Menashe and Jaffa. Among the Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, these included, Uhm Al-Fahm, Jaffa and West Barta'a. And among the Palestinians, these included, East Barta'a, located in the West Bank, and the Khan Younis refugee camp, in Gaza. Table 5.4 lists the sup-populations and respective geographic communities I sampled.

Table 5.4: Sub-Populations and Geographic Communities by Groups

Groups	**Geographic Community 1**	**Geographic Community 2**	**Geographic Community 3**
Jewish-Israeli Sample	Alfei Menashe	Jaffa	
Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Sample	Uhm Al-Fahm	Jaffa	West Barta'a
Palestinian Sample	East Barta'a	Khan Younis refugee camp	

Total Group N = 3
Total Sub-Populations of Groups N = 7
Total Sub-Geographic Community of Groups N = 6

Contact and Non-contact communities and triangular three-way comparisons. With respect to contact and non-contact communities, Jewish-Israeli residents of Alfei Menashe typically have contact with Palestinians but not

Arab/Palestinian-Israelis. Thus, Alfei Menashe is a contact community with respect to Palestinians but a non-contact community with respect to Arab/Palestinian-Israelis. Meanwhile, Jewish-Israelis resident in Jaffa typically have contact with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis but not with Palestinians.[95] In an effort to limit this study, especially given how large in scope it already was, I ultimately chose not to, in addition, include a third Jewish-Israeli community where children had no contact with either Arab/Palestinian-Israelis or Palestinians. I would, however, typically recommend this type of three-way or *triangular design* for *each* of the ethnopolitical groups under study.

In this case of the Israeli-Palestinian ethnopolitical conflict, since three ethnopolitical groups are involved, a triangular comparison analyzing a peace communication intervention should include a study of a total of 9 sub-population communities. Such triangular design studies have not been conducted about conflict or its management and instead scholarship, if about all groups involved, at best, never in turn describes all of these groups' perspectives about each of the others.

While I recommend such a design as the optimal design to the interested peace communication scholar, due to the limited availability of resources involved in conducting this study as part of a dissertation, however, and because my study was already incredibly extensive, I decided to omit one Jewish-Israeli community. Since I studied two Jewish-Israeli communities that had no contact with either of the other two groups in the earlier study I conducted in 2001 (Warshel, 2007), I decided to omit this type, rather than the other communities for my purposes herein.

Arab/Palestinian-Israelis resident in Jaffa typically have contact with Jewish-Israelis but not with Palestinians. Arab/Palestinian-Israelis resident in West Barta'a typically have contact with Palestinians, but not so much with Jewish-Israelis. Fahamouweys, or residents of Uhm Al-Fahm, meanwhile, have little to no contact with either group.

Finally, Palestinian residents of East Barta'a typically have contact with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, while those resident in the Khan Younis camp instead typically had contact with Jewish-Israelis but not with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis. In the case of the East Barta'a, they also have contact with Jewish-Israelis, as is representative of the vast majority of Palestinian communities. There, contact, however, was typically more limited than that which those living in the Khan Younis camp experienced. Therefore, I refer to East Barta'a as a *less-contact with Jewish-Israelis community*, and the latter a *more-contact community*. Because the vast majority of Palestinians typically have contact with Jewish-Israelis, I did not include a Palestinian non-Jewish-Israeli contact community. It is practically impossible to find Palestinian communities that do not have contact with Jewish-Israelis – certainly any that would be representative of Palestinian life in the context of the conflict. For this reason, I felt that including such a community would not add to the policy utility of the implications of the findings. Table 5.5 shows the sub-populations and the respective geographic communities I sampled, according to their triangular status as contact or non-contact communities.

Table 5.5: Sub-Populations and Geographic Communities by Groups According to their Triangular Contact

Groups	Contact with Palestinian Communities	Contact with Arab/Palestinian -Israeli Communities	Contact with Jewish-Israeli Communities
Jewish-Israeli Sample	Alfei Menashe	Jaffa	
Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Sample	West Barta'a		Jaffa
Palestinian Sample		East Barta'a	Khan Younis Refugee Camp

Table 5.6: Sub-Populations and Geographic Communities by Groups According to their Triangular Non- or Less-Contact Status

Groups	Non (or Less) Contact with Palestinians Communities	Non (or Less) Contact with Arab/Palestinian -Israeli Communities	Non (or Less) Contact with Jewish-Israeli Communities
Jewish-Israeli Sample	Jaffa	Alfei Menashe	
Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Sample	Uhm Al Fahm Jaffa		Uhm Al Fahm West Barta'a
Palestinian Sample		Khan Younis Refugee Camp	East Barta'a

Sampling

Thirty Five To Eight Year Old Children From Each Community

Once I selected the six geographic communities, I randomly selected at least 30 five to eight year-old children from each of the seven sub-populations resident there. The target audience for the programs ranged from children aged three or four to

seven. Accordingly, I sampled five to eight year olds. Due to the difficulty of engaging human research subjects younger than age five in the type of children, media and conflict based research I carried out, I began from this age. I sampled up through age eight in order to be able to clearly bracket audience responses, including as interest in the text by the audience after age seven waned over the course of the children's eighth year of life. In summary, my study was therefore comprised of seven sub-population of five to eight year-old Palestinians, Jewish-Israelis and Arab/Palestinian Israelis. The Palestinians were resident in East Barta'a and the Khan Younis refugee camp, the Jewish-Israelis in Alfei Menashe and Jaffa, and the Arab/Palestinian-Israelis in West Barta'a, Jaffa and Uhm Al Fahm.

Sampling Selection

I employed a range of random sampling methods across the geographic communities, with respect to the peculiarities and requirements of each. These ranged from door-to-door random sampling in the Khan Younis refugee camp, to the selection of every fifth child off the principle's master list from West Barta'a Elementary school's grade one through three classrooms, and all affiliated kindergartens, to a random selection from returned-signed parent forms giving me permission to do the research with their children, which I distributed in all Alfei Menashe Tsofei Sharon Elementary School's grade one through three classrooms, and all affiliated kindergartens. In cases such as the latter, I first had to obtain parent-signatures, however, the exceptionally high rate of return among parents made possible random sampling from among the signed parent forms nevertheless.[96]

Family sample

Total Population Sample of 550. Once I had selected the child sample, I also sampled their families. This typically included one parent respondent, in addition to the child and any of their siblings who fit the five to eight age range. Thus, in effect I surveyed at least 30 families within each of the seven sub-populations. In total, this came to at least sixty Jewish-Israeli families, ninety Arab/Palestinian-Israeli families and sixty Palestinian families. The result was a total sample size of 550, of whom 230 were parents, and 320 were children.

Sample Reported On In This Study

From among the at least thirty families within each community, I purposefully selected at least 10 children within each to whom I returned in order to conduct the *full reception study*.[97] I selected the children in order to have equal numbers of boys and girls, and in order to have at least two children each from among the four age samples represented. The total number of children included in the full reception study was 65.[98]

Communities Reported on in this Study

For the purposes of this study I discuss one community from within each of the three groups in order to focus the study on the importance the categories of statebearing nation, state minority and stateless nation hold. Specifically, I focus on the role of these categories in constituting a filter through which the children read and interacted with the *Sesame Street* texts. One community each is adequate to demonstrate the main point I wish to make in this study. Namely, I wish to demonstrate how and why it is important to include a *context analysis* in any peace

communication assessment or evaluation, including one that is specifically tied to those categories that are the result of the current political, economic social and military matrix of the interstate system, in this case statebearing nation, state minority and stateless nation.

In the proceeding chapters I will therefore report on a total of thirty children, ten from each of the groups, to in turn sufficiently demonstrate these results in my assessment. The children I report on came from the communities of East Barta'a, Alfei Menashe and Uhm Al-Fahm, as depicted in the diagram below.[99]

Table 5. 7: Populations and Geographic Communities by Groups Reported On In This Study

Groups		**Geographic community**
Jewish-Israeli Sample		Alfei Menashe
Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Sample		Uhm Al-Fahm
Palestinian Sample		East Barta'a

Since I am reporting on only one geographic community per ethnopolitical group, I will not report my comparisons within each group in this study. Therefore, I will not be discussing my assessment with respect to whether salient differences emerged at the geographic community level, internal to each ethnopolitical group. As a result, I also will not discuss my comparison of the role additional kinds of contact afforded, given that this variable is confounded with the variable of one's community of residence. I nevertheless reported on my inclusion of these communities above due to my additional goal of recommending applicable study designs that are firmly

grounded in the fourth school of thought applicable to peace communication.

Procedure

Research Process

In addition to, and as in part overlapped with the multi-sited ethnographies I conducted, I also administered surveys and conducted interviews. I began these by first pilot testing both. Thereafter, I began the formal stages of administering them. First within each of the six communities my research assistants and/or I visited family homes, where we administered a television consumption and preference survey to both the children and their parents. We followed this with a second and, often, third, visit to family homes. A third visit was made if all components of the research process were not completed during the second visit. The second (and if necessary, third) home visit consisted of two interviews with the child.

The interview questions during the second (and third) visit were divided into two sessions to ensure that the child had a break between what, on average, amounted to a two hour and fifteen minute interview session. I created an interviewing toolkit that was comprised of a game-board, *Sesame Street* related game pieces, child specific cognitive measurement scales, and a variety of toys. I created this for the purpose of engaging the children during the interviews and to be certain that their responses to my questions were internally valid.

The questionnaire I designed for use in the interviews was comprised mainly of qualitative open-ended questions. As part of the questionnaire, I asked the children to respond to questions both through oral and drawn means of expression. I asked them to respond through such means of expression in order to effectively engage them

throughout the interview process. Doing so also provided me with differing data with which to triangulate their responses. At the close of the first interview, I asked the children to engage in an activity – I asked them to "shoot-back" images of their home context.

After the first interview, the children were shown the respective *Sesame Street* mock episode. They viewed the episode alongside some relatives and friends with whom they normally watched TV (as reflected in their responses in the television preference and consumption survey to which they had previously responded during the first visit). This viewing period served as a basis for asking the child questions about the text of *Sesame Street*. Following the viewing, the second interview took place. And finally, at the end, their parents were surveyed a second time.

Language in which the research was conducted. All surveys were translated into Arabic and Hebrew and overseen to ensure consistency across the translations. All interviews and oral administration of surveys with the Palestinian samples were conducted in Arabic, and with the Jewish-Israeli samples, in Hebrew. Finally, when it came to the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli samples, a combination of the two languages were used.

Research assistant's involvement. I personally conducted the textual analysis part of the study alone and the bulk of the field research, including the decoding study. After I provided them with extensive training, my research assistants assisted with the family-based parts of the field research. I administered approximately one-third of the surveys myself, another third together with my research assistants, and a final third

were administered by my research assistants alone. I conducted approximately 40 percent of the second and third home visits myself, another 40 percent together with my research assistants, and the final 20 percent were conducted by the research assistants alone.

In addition, the research assistants translated the majority of the surveys, and translated and transcribed the majority of the interviews into English. I oversaw the entire process of translation and transcription. My research assistants also entered more than half of the data from the surveys into SPSS during the analysis phase of the research.

Data Analysis

I reviewed all field notes and visual documentation, separating descriptions from interpretations and evaluations on the basis of the Describe, Interpret and Evaluate (D.I.E.) method. After the interviews were transcribed and translated verbatim into English and I had reviewed them for consistency and accuracy, I systematically hand-coded and analyzed the interview responses. After my research assistants and I translated the open-ended survey responses into English, together with closed ended responses, they were, in addition, then quantified and entered into SPSS, for systematic coding and analysis.

Translation and Transcription. I oversaw all transcriptions and translations of interviews from Arabic and Hebrew into English, and translations of surveys from Arabic and Hebrew into English for consistency across the versions. I did so through the use of a variety of techniques, including by analyzing each myself, randomly spot-

checking the lengthy transcripts using the technique of back-translation, and in addition, by also circulating blind copies for review across the assistants.

To ensure the transcripts provided an accurate replication of the interview scenario and that the translations from Arabic and Hebrew to English were consistent with spoken forms in each, I first provided my research assistants with extensive training in transcription and translation processes. With respect to the latter, I addressed concerns about maintaining accuracy, the essence or meaning of major expressions in each language, and of translating these into grammatically correct American English, or alternatively, into language that is not grammatically correct if the given child made grammatical errors in the Arabic or Hebrew original.

I also addressed concerns about creating verbatim accurate transcriptions that included in them the transcription of ambient sounds. I wanted to be sure that, as part of my analysis of the data, these sounds were included. Given concerns about dialogical responses, by including these sounds, I could better ensure that I was not interpreting interviewee statements in a vacuum and thereby generating more laboratory-like findings, in spite of the field design. I therefore, rather, actively interpreted the interviewees' responses as a function of the way in which the interviewer asked the questions, rapport during the interview situation, and whatever other activities were transpiring within the micro context of the interview period (for example interruptions by siblings, visits by mothers, and/or the sound of a call to prayer from a local or neighboring mosque).

Methods

My audience analysis study, or assessment of the *Sesame Street* texts as a peace communication intervention, provided a “more” holistic understanding of the children's responses as a context for the research findings. The methods I employed involved multi-sited ethnography of their community environments, including interviews with community officials, residents, visits to the children’s schools and interviews with teachers. In addition, I also conducted two to three home visitations, involving observations of the children with their families, surveys of them and their parents on the first visit, and interviews before and after their observations of their viewing of the series, during the second (and third) visits.

Textual Analysis Methods

In order to begin the audience reception study I had to make sense of the text as I described it in chapter four. In order to analyze the text, I conducted four levels of analysis, I (1) consulted curriculum documents, (2) interviewed production team members, and visited production sites in order to interpret their intended output, (3) observed all episodes of the program and (4) reviewed news and entertainment coverage about their broadcasts.

Production Team Interviews

In order to be able to provide background data about the text, and independently of it, compare its encoding to the actual decodings made by the audience – I personally interviewed production team members. I interviewed 27 team

members from Israel (from both IETV and HOP!), Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and The United States, combined. In doing so, I purposefully selected a diverse range of production team members from each of the four teams, in order to have a balanced understanding of the negotiated expression process. These members included curriculum designers, producers, camera and sound people, as well as actors. In addition to the interviews, I visited each of the four sites, and spent a significant amount of time at both Al-Quds Television and HOP! Studios, thereby having had observed some of the inner-workings of the production process. Apart from what I discussed in Chapter 4, I do not report directly on these interviews in this study because their scope is too large. I nevertheless recommend such a design for providing a comprehensive analysis of a peace communication intervention effort.

Program Episode Viewing and Selection

I viewed all episodes in the programs. In turn, I systematically selected one episode each from those made for the Israeli and Palestinian audiences respectively, to show the children from the corresponding groups in my study.

Media Coverage of the Programs

I read and watched global coverage of the productions in order to make sense of their history, and to be able to set the text in dialogical relationship to its coverage, emphasizing specific coverage by American, Palestinian, Jordanian and Israeli media. I do not systematically report on the coverage in this study, though I point out that, in limited instances, it may have influenced exposure rates (i.e. in Jordan, news coverage was initially intensely negative so theoretically it might have influenced parents'

interest in highlighting it for their children, and therefore, theoretically whether their children tuned in).

Mock Episode Selection

Once I made sense of the text, I edited together a mock episode so that I could show the children a single episode as part of the study. In order to create the mock episode, I edited together three different 45-minute episodes out of each of the three different versions of the program. I used the second season of the peace building programs as the basis for each episode. I selected the episode from each version of the programs, in-keeping with the actual intentions of the encoders of the text. With respect to my audience, this meant that I selected two episodes – one from Palestinian *Hikayat Simsim*, and the other from Israeli *Sippuray Sumsum,* to show to the Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli audiences specifically. Subsequently, I showed the same episode of Israeli *Sippuray Sumsum* to the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience, though in the version that had been dubbed into Arabic specifically for them as part of the original production. My use of the two separate episodes meant that I would be asking the audience to comment on different versions of the program. I chose to do this in order to use those episodes that were actually intended for these respective groups, thereby allowing me to best determine the utility of the Sesame Street intervention in accordance with its actual peace communication intention.

Jewish- and Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Mock Episode Base. From among the twenty-six Israeli episodes of *Sippuray Sumsum*, I selected the episode *The Fans*,

which focused on democratic values, including majority-minority relations, pride and different perspectives. I selected the corresponding episode in Arabic.

Palestinian Mock Episode Base. From among the 26 Palestinian episodes of *Hikayat Simsim*, I selected *The Big Test,* which focused on child empowerment, and local geography.

Resultant Mock Episodes. The resultant mock episodes for all three groups were based on my effort, on the one hand, to balance concerns about maintaining the internal consistency of the text – and, on the other, to ensure that the study effectively served as an assessment of a peace communication intervention text. Therefore, with respect to the latter concern, after I selected the base episodes, I added more peace building segments into each mock episode. This would allow me to have sufficient data to study. As part of my effort to include more such segments, I selected segments from both the old (containing the cross-over segments) and the new season (containing the parallel stories). In selecting these segments that I, in turn, interspersed throughout a given mock episode, I selected the same ones to include in each of the three mock episodes. The segments I selected had originally been intended for all three audiences by the production teams.

By editing the mock episode together in this manner, I was able to use both what was intended for the audience, and at the same time, more specifically, study the audience's interpretations of the different types of segments used across the two seasons. The elimination of cross-overs between the two seasons may have potentially affected the ability of the text to mediate contact. By removing them, the production

teams in effect limited the number of options for establishing mediated contact, since the audience could no longer observe Israelis and Palestinians interacting on screen. By including both types of segments I could, therefore, study the *Sesame Street* peace communication programs as a single intervention case and conduct an analysis of the audience's interpretation of it as a discrete text.

Finally, to avoid making the mock episodes too long, where it did not interrupt the internal context of the episode, I removed some segments that were not tied to the organizing theme from the base episode, and replaced them with the peacebuilding segments. The result was that the peacebuilding segments were integrated into the text as a whole and inserted in a manner to help maintain a viewing period that was not too extensive for the child audience participating in the study.

Television Consumption and Preference Analysis Methods

Once I selected the seven sub-populations for study, and created the three mock episodes for use across each of the three groups, I conducted a study of the children's engagement with the episodes within each of the specific field site communities I designated for my study. Before asking them questions about their viewing of the episodes, as I described above, my research assistants and/or I orally administered home-based surveys to children and their parents. In the surveys, I asked children about their television and electronic game consumption habits, and parents, about their preferences about these. In addition, in the surveys, I asked the parents for background information such as their education and income levels, place of birth, and

independently of this, information about media ownership density rates within their home.

These surveys provided a context for situating the *Sesame Street* programs in relation to the children's "normal" television viewing patterns and consumption preferences. In addition, they provided the necessary background statistics about each family. These surveys constituted the first family visit involving the population of 550. I do not, however, explicitly report on the findings from these surveys in this study.

Full Reception Study

Apart from the television consumption and preference surveys I described above, I included the context analysis, audience analysis and parent analysis methods I describe below in the *full reception study*. The full reception study is based on my research with the 65 children and their corresponding families.

Context Analysis Methods

Multi-Sited Ethnography

My analysis of the context within which the audience members live is based on my multi-sited ethnography within each of the field sites where I conducted the full reception study. In order to carry out the ethnographies in each site, I resided in or adjacent to each of the communities, the importance of which I described earlier as part of my methodological concerns. Specifically, while conducting the bulk of the fieldwork in Alfei Menashe, I lived two towns over in Ra'anana (adjacent to Kfar

Saba) – a *Jewish-Israeli city*, located in Israel proper. I, however, spent the bulk of my days in Alfei Menashe, as was the case with each site during the period I conducted research there. While conducting the bulk of the fieldwork in Jaffa, with respect to both the Jewish-Israeli and Arab/Palestinian-Israeli sub-samples there, I lived in Jaffa – a *mixed city* in Israel proper. While conducting the bulk of the fieldwork in East Barta'a, West Barta'a, and Uhm Al-Fahm, I divided my residence between East Barta'a and Kfar Kara, spending most of the time in the former, while living in the latter. Kfar Kara is an *Arab/Palestinian-Israeli village,* located across the street from the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli and Palestinian Barta'as. In addition, it is 10 minutes away by car from Uhm Al-Fahm, in Israel proper. Finally, I wrote field notes and made photographic and video documentation of each of the communities and the homes of the children with whom I conducted the audience reception analysis.

Community Interviews. As part of my community-based ethnographies, I interviewed community leaders, school officials, child-activity center employees and teachers in each community, in order to obtain background information about the respective communities, especially from the vantage point of its child populations.

Better contextualization of the study. As a result of my use of conflict-based literature, and, in turn, my choice to use all the context based methods described above, in the end, I believe I was better able to contextualize my findings.

Audience Analysis Methods

Self-Report Interviews

The second visit to a child's home began with the use of the first of the two interviews. These interviews formed the basis of the self-report responses I discuss in the proceeding chapters.

First Interview. In the first interview, I began by verifying the use of the instrument I created in order to ask the children the subset of questions from among the mostly open-ended qualitative questions that were closed-ended and quantitative. The bulk of the closed-ended questions were fastened along a 5-point Likert scale, usually in combination with a semantic differential scale. Once I had established that a given measure would indeed measure the child's relative agreement/disagreement or likes/dislikes, the interview proceeded onto the other questions.

In order to establish the internal validity of my measurement instruments, I asked the children to tell me, for example, the extent to which they "like or do not like watching television" and the extent to which they would "be happy or sad if their parents forbade them from watching television." I asked them to respond by pointing out to me the extent of their like, dislike, happiness or sadness along a smiley face scale I had constructed.

The next group of questions I posed to the children related to the cognitive development-based geographic categories I described earlier that are necessary for conducting research with children, especially when trying to make sense of how they *understand*, in contrast to how they *construct* their civic and national identities.

Third, the questions then moved on to addressing those issues that formed the majority of the questionnaire. These questions composed the situating–factor

questions regarding the children's intergroup attitudes, and constructs of theirs and the other groups' identities.

Shooting-Back Photos

Fourth and finally, at the end of the first interview, I employed a *shooting-back* photographic technique so that the children could document their community in order to "see" how they viewed its context through their eyes.[100] In my instructions to them, I explained that "if you met a child who has never been here, what would you want them to know about life here? Go ahead and take three or four photos of what it is you would like them to know about, so that they can know what it's like here."

Reception Analysis Methods

Episode Viewing

Following the first interview and the children having shot a few photographs, my research assistants and/or I showed them the mock episode that was produced specifically for the audience of which they were a member – a combination of *Shara'a Simsim* and *Hikayat Simsim* for the Palestinian audience, a combination of *Rechov Sumsum* and *Sippuray Sumsum* (in Hebrew) for the Jewish-Israeli audience, and a combination of *Rechov Sumsum* and *Sippuray Sumsum* (in Arabic), for the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience.[101]

Naturalistic viewing environment. In order to try to maintain a 'naturalistic' viewing environment, I had the child view the episode in the room where they normally watched television, be it their own room, the living room or family or game

room. In addition, I had the child view the episode alongside some relatives and friends with whom he or she normally watched television, or alone, if that was how he or she typically watched television. I asked that the children watch the program where and with whom they normally watch it, so as to render the micro viewing context in the study more readily generalizable to the usual micro viewing context. In addition to the other viewers, these children may have watched the show during its screening, and my research assistants and/or I also watched alongside them. Thus, as a caveat, the research scenario, like any research scenario, was not entirely "natural." My efforts to try to make the study adhere more closely to a natural situation, therefore, came closest to what Philip Schlesinger has argued is a compromise between the "controlled artificiality of the psychological experiment and the naturalness of the domestic setting" (Schlesinger, 1982, p. 27).

Observation of the Viewing

While the children were watching the episode, my research assistants and/or I observed them within the context of the audience with whom they were co-viewing the program, using a tally sheet to note their movements, activities and to write down any conversations that transpired during the program, whether about it or in interruption of it. In addition, we drew a diagram of their seating locations, and videotaped and/or photographed their viewing of the episode, leaving the camera in an unobtrusive location at the corner of the room.

Reception Interview

Following the children's viewing of the episode, I conducted the second interview. In it, my research assistants and/or I asked them about their reception of the program. The questions discussed included the seven measures for assessing mediated contact that I described in Chapter 4, whereby I asked the children to describe the identity of the characters in the program and the segments they viewed, as well as their attitudes towards each. The second set of questions in this questionnaire addressed the encoding of the text, specifically from the perspective of the children. The children were asked about their knowledge of production conventions and opinions about the intentions of what messages the text was trying to convey. Third, this questionnaire addressed the experiences the children had with the conflicts – as they perceived it - and what goals they have towards resolving it.

The children's answers to the first set of questions allowed me to interpret what readings they made from the text, and compare and contrast them to the text as measured by my earlier textual analysis, including the intentions of the producers. The second set allowed me to compare the children's reception in relation to questions concerning the glocalized and hybrid nature of the text. I do not, however, discuss the answers to these questions in this study, because these extend beyond questions of peacebuilding and making into global media questions that are beyond the scope of the points I wish to make in this study. Finally, the third set of questions formed my understanding of their narrative approach to the pseudo-conflict context within which each group of children lives.

Parent Analysis Methods

Parental reports. After completing the second interview with the child, my research assistants and/or I orally administered a survey to the parents. This survey served the purpose of gathering information about the parents' news consumption habits, political voting preferences and beliefs, constructions of their own identity, their attitudes towards the other two groups, and their reports about their children's contact experiences with the other two groups. The aim of these questions was to supplement information about the child with parent socialization data, and to be able to triangulate these with the child's own self-reports.

Finally, with respect to my methodological concerns regarding trying to draw comparisons across groups, I employed the use of items (for example, names of newspapers relevant to the macro reading context for each group) and terminology (e.g. "West Bank" versus "Judea and Samaria") in the survey that were, respectively, "appropriate" for each of the three groups to which the parents were a part. Thus, I took care to address these concerns with respect to the parents as I had similarly done with the children.

In addition, by orally asking the questions, I was able to take the added precaution of adjusting the more politically charged terminology-dependent questions (like the "West Bank" versus "Judea and Samaria" example above), dialogically in relation to the individual family's specified political beliefs. Thus, by paying attention to what they were saying during the visits, we tried to make use of those terms that were most appropriate to the research participants, based on *their* earlier comments. In

other words, while each respective ethnopolitical group, and more specifically, those residents to specific geographic communities, are more likely to make use of one term over another, this is not always the case. I invested great effort in designing the research in this way in order to, on the one hand, make use of terms that are appropriate to the context of each group, but also, at the same time, to avoid assuming individual people necessarily held a particular viewpoint, so as to myself avoid engaging in participant primordialism as a researcher.

Part III: Illustrating How to Approach the Assessment and Evaluation of Peace Communication Through a Discussion of the Decoding of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* By its Audience Members

Introduction

The Assessment of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*

The audience members for the *Sesame Street* (and *Stories*) television programs, Palestinians, Jewish-Israelis and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, are situated around "the conflict" from differing vantage points. The Palestinians are a stateless nation, Jewish-Israelis, a state-bearing nation, and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, a state minority. My audience reception analysis will demonstrate how they directly or indirectly filter their readings of the television programs through each of the respective ethnopolitical vantage points from which they are positioned around "the conflict".

Their decodings of the text of these television programs, as I assess them, differ from what the Palestinian, Israeli, Jordanian and American production teams encoded into them. In most cases, the audience members seemingly did not recognize their defined *other*, or main partners to conflict in the text, and instead actively *erased* them from the text. On, the other hand, the audience members typically did read their *shared other*, meaning the other group whom, while a partner to the conflict, represented a partner with whom they share either their national or civic identity, and/or whom they do not define as their total enemy, into the text.

The text of the television programs, as a first basic step, holds the potential to influence these audience members' behaviors in those instances in which the audiences actually participated in one or both of the following. One, they viewed their

partners in conflict (represented by characters in the *parallel segments* of the television programs), and in turn, could vicariously interact with them. And/or two, they observed their partners in conflict interacting together (as represented in the *cross-over segments)*, and, therefore, observed cross-group interaction.

The television programs had great difficulty it would seem with respect to trying to influence audience members' orientations towards their "others" in light of the interpretations the audience made. On the other hand, the programs helped develop a base on which to exert influence upon audience members with respect to their "shared others." The programs hold the potential to, in turn, communicate that the characters representing the audience members' shared others are good, nice people, and also, within the cross-over segments - that they can (and do) engage pro-socially with one another, to the audience members.

The children's decoding of such affect factors, meaning, whether they decoded these "shared others" as good people and/or as people who are capable of interacting non-violently, serves as a necessary second step in the chain of variables essential for influencing the target audience members' behaviors. The ability of the programs to alter some facet of the audiences members' behaviors would only seem to be possible, if (1) audience members read their partners in conflict in the television programs in the first place, and (2) in turn, decoded the possibility that among them, there can (a) exist good people, and (b) exist among these good people individuals who are capable of interacting pro-socially with people from the audience members' own ethnopolitical groups, and finally, (3) generalized these possibilities to the group that the decoded

character represented as a whole. Only after these decoding steps are satisfied, so to speak, does it seem plausible that media effects (or relevant attitudinal, self-efficacy and belief changes and, in turn, behavioral changes), might be possible, in the first place.

In Chapters 6 through 8, I describe each ethnopolitical group and their decoding of the text, as situated within the larger context of their reading of it within the confines of "the conflict." I do so by devoting one chapter to each group, starting with the Palestinians, and providing relevant contextual and reception details about each, which contributes to the academic literature in several areas. I begin each chapter with a description of the given ethnopolitical group's narrative lens, or the grid through which they filter the conflict. While these narratives are well known, most accounts instead group them together as the "Arab" versus "Jewish" narrative, rather than by providing the specific (and different) narratives of Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians. By instead providing legitimacy to the view that all three have separate narratives in their own right, and including all three together here, I make all their accounts available in one source.

After providing the given group's narrative overview of "the conflict", I proceed from there to describe one of the geographic communities in which I conducted my multi-sited ethnography of the ethnopolitical group as my basis for *this* study (e.g. I describe East Barta'a). By providing this background data about each community, based on the combination of my ethnography, secondary literature, and the statistical information available from the Israeli Census Bureau of Statistics (CBS)

and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), I add to area studies literature. In particular, I (1) provide new knowledge about how adults perceive life in Alfei Menashe, (2) translate knowledge about how adults perceive life in Uhm Al-Fahm from Arabic into English, (3) provide new knowledge about children's perspectives about life in both communities, as well as in East Barta'a, and (4) provide new knowledge about all three communities with respect to how outside communities, particularly those representing the other two ethnopolitical groups, perceive each of the given communities.

By providing this background data, and especially by providing a triangular perspective – whereby I explain not only the given ethnopolitical group's perspective of their community (e.g. how Palestinians living in East Barta'a view their own community), but then, in addition, also describe how the other two group's (Jewish-Israelis and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis) perceive it relationally, I serve to additionally, (5) provide a deep three-way triangular understanding of each community (in dialogical relationship to each ethnopolitical group).

To the best of my knowledge, no research has over provided this kind of multiple analyses. The result is ultimately *nine perspectives* (that is, three perspectives about one community each representing the three ethnopolitical groups, or, as seen in another way, three perspectives each – one about the given ethnopolitical group's own community - and two more about their perspectives of the other two).

After providing the background details about the community I report on my findings from the reception study. Apart from (6) providing what, to the best of my

knowledge, is the first reception analysis of a peace communication intervention operating within the context of an ethnopolitical nationalist conflict, as part and parcel of my main aim to provide an illustration of an assessment of a PC intervention as a template for designing assessment and evaluation research about PC, by using reception studies to do this, I push the envelope on reception studies literature to a stage beyond what is typically done. Specifically, by combining reception studies literature with literature about the contact hypothesis in order to ask whether the children generalized their decodings to the wider groups that the characters represent, instead of just stopping to ask about what attitudes they adopted towards the characters, I (7) carry reception analyses one step further: to the level of generalization of attitudes.

As will become evident from my findings, I also (8) demonstrate that oppositional readings can occur in multiple directions, and through the audience's use of multiple factors. The decoding of ethnopolitical characters may take place in unexpected ways, given that race, or more "obvious" divergent ethnopolitical features are not the central defining factors in "the conflict" under analysis, and, in turn, how its mediated for the audience (and ultimately, how *they* decode it).

In addition, I take reception studies forward in another direction. I do so by going beyond my discussion of how the audience decoded the text and whether they generalized their attitudes towards the characters they decoded to the groups they represented as a whole. Namely, I (9) conduct a context analysis, in order to be able to explain why they decoded the program in the ways they did and whether they, in turn,

generalized what they decoded. My context analysis, combined with the children's answers to my open-ended questions, meanwhile, serve to contribute to three more areas, namely literature about children and stereotypes, children and conflict, and finally, conflict studies literature.

I (10) contribute to literature about Jewish-Israeli, Arab/Palestinian-Israeli and Palestinian children's stereotypes and attitudes about one another. In particular, I build on earlier literature by using a qualitative approach in which I let the children construct their own as well as the other groups' identities, and couple this with my related observations and their parents' survey responses. I provide novel and more nuanced details with regard to their attitudes and stereotypes, since other studies (such as the very helpful earlier studies from Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005; Cole et al, 2003; Teichman, and Yehuda, 2000; and Teichman and Zafrir, 2003) instead employ largely quantitative closed-ended methods.

I also (11) contribute to literature about children's passive and active involvement in conflict. Research into this topic has been conducted about these groups, in particular, about Palestinian children, during the first and second Palestinian uprisings. I contribute to this literature by adding knowledge about these children's lives within the context of conflict during the second uprising, its waning, and end. I do so by adding a qualitative perspective to the mainly quantitative approaches previously used, and also, by specifically discussing topics like children's leisure patterns, rather than focusing on post-traumatic stress disorder PTSD as has been most common (as in the case, for example, of the useful wealth of research conducted by

the Gaza Community Health Program, including for example, Punamaki, Quota and El-Sarraj 2001; Quota and Odeh, 2005; Sarraj and Quota, 2005; Quota, Punamaki and Sarraj, 1997).

Twelfth and finally, as becomes evident from the children's (and their parents') responses in the proceeding chapters, and my own observations, and as I reiterate in my conclusion, I demonstrate a novel rationale for why "the conflict" is intractable. As the data will reflect, all it takes is five years for a human being to be politically, economically, socially and militarily encoded before they have already come to internalize and further, even deploy their relevant groups' narrative and organizational goals, regardless of what intergroup attitudes they may hold.

While I was not trying to answer such a question in my study, namely, "How or Why does a conflict become intractable?", but rather trying to figure out whether and how communication can be effectively used to intervene into conflict, my findings nevertheless contribute to another way for making sense of intractability. They contribute by providing an answer that goes beyond the explanations that instead typically point to the history of a conflict to explain cause and effect. My answer instead illustrates the process of socializing to conflict one successive generation after the next. To this end, my answer contributes to conflict studies literature. Finally, apart from, in a sense, providing a window into just how bad "the conflict" is, my findings further help make PC practitioners aware of just how intractable are many of conflicts in which they are trying to intervene.

Chapter 6: The Palestinian Audience's Reception of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*

The Stateless Nation as an Audience

Narrative Vantage Point Vis-à-Vis the Conflict

As members of a stateless nation, or, in their case, citizens of a non-state institution, Palestinians constitute Minorities at Risk (MARs) (Gurr, 2000). They comprise a population of roughly 4 million.[102] Like other stateless nations, they seek to achieve *justice (“el-ensof”* in Arabic*),* or the elimination of structural violence through control of “their own” state. From a narrative vantage point, they view “the conflict” through the lens of the *Israeli-Palestinian ethnopolitical conflict*, positioning themselves - “the Palestinians” - as its victims under “occupation” (“ehtelal” in Arabic) by “Zionists” or “Jews.” Meanwhile, those who are the more authentic Palestinians, namely, those who are citizens of the Palestinian Authority, are its greatest victims. By contrast, “48 Arabs” (“Arab tamania wa’arbaein” in Arabic), meaning, pejoratively, Arab/Palestinians-Israelis who, since 1948, became a state minority of Israel, are its victims only secondarily, relative to Palestinians. On the opposing ends of the triangular relationship between these two groups, meanwhile, stand the statebearing nation, Jewish-Israelis, whom they define as the conflict’s aggressors.

As MARs, by definition, Palestinians suffer from political, economic and social discrimination. From their perspective, they are “occupied” by Israel. Politically, they hold citizenship rights as part of the Palestinian National Authority. However, they do not possess a state – the premier political institution – in this case – one that is bordered and contiguous, and not threatened by the encroachment of settlements, a separation barrier and check points. Instead, and typically from a

primordial perspective, they are regarded by their opponents as merely “another” Arab group of people, and, therefore, not deserving of an “additional” state. Separately of this, with respect to political-geographic statehood rights, the refugees among them do not possess the “right of return” to their non-state Palestinian Authority to the lands they were forced to “flee”. And, in addition, the remainder of them do not hold the “right” to return to the homes they were forced to “flee” in 1948.

Economically, Palestinians are dependent upon the Israeli economy (Roy, 1995). This is most prominently expressed in limited trade opportunities (see for example UNCTAD, January 1998; UNCTAD June 1998), as well as dependence on day laborer positions within Israel (Farsakh, 2005), which are predicated upon low wages and no benefits. In addition, Palestinians argue that they suffer from the confiscation of access to water (See also Davis, Maks, Richardson, 1980; Dillman, 1989 for related discussions) and land resources, and, among the latter, the right to residency. Land resources, meanwhile are further impacted by the separation barrier (see as examples discussions found in the International Court of Justice and Israel High Court of Justice Court rulings and UNOCHA documents) and settlements. Economically, they also suffer as a result of the dwindling number of “bread-winners,” owed to many Palestinians fathers and brothers being held in Israeli prisons (Abu-Baker, 2004), and tax withholdings by the Israeli government.

Socially, with respect to the symbolic meaning of land (Toft, 2003), they suffer from not currently possessing Jerusalem as their capital, and infringements upon private freedom of movement owing to checkpoints and the separation barrier. In

addition, where military matters are of concern, relative to the Israeli military, they have less *quantitative* strength. This quantitative difference manifests itself in the "success" of Israeli military incursions, for example, a higher death toll during the second, or Al-Aqsa Palestinian Uprising ("intifada" in Arabic), relative to the combination of almost entirely Jewish- and to a lesser extent, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis. Specifically, 4,005 Palestinians, relative to 1,017 Israelis were killed between the start of the uprising and the end of 2006 (B'Tselem report cited in Ha'aretz, 2006).[103]

With respect to their organizational, or representatives' goals towards (resolving) the conflict, Palestinians seek political, economic, social and military rights. Some of their goals overlap with respect to which of these four areas of rights that they pertain. Nevertheless, roughly, these manifest themselves *politically*, as the desire for a state[104] that is democratic in organization, and which protects their rights. Most prominently, they seek a state that will protect their right to freedom of movement and through contiguous space, via the removal of settlements. *Economically*, they seek the right to work in Israel (at least until statehood is achieved), land and water rights, an end to home demolitions and the release of prisoners ("sujanna" in Arabic) being held in Israeli prisons, so that they can rebuild their society and develop their communities.

With respect to *social*, including symbolic and ideological concerns, they seek a state that is Islamic, as per the ethnopolitical religious essence of Palestinian *nationalism*, and as subsumed under the larger umbrella of Arab nationalism. Apart

from its religious component, historically, this brand of nationalism, which underpins Palestinian social goals, has been predicated on the West Bank (Lesch, 1985) and defines Jerusalem ("Al Quds" in Arabic) as its symbolic capital. (See Segal, Levy, Sa'id and Katz, 2000 for an interesting related critical discussion).

Finally, Palestinians would also like family members held in Israeli prisons to be released so that they can rebuild their families (socially). Consequently, the release of family members from prison has ranked as the number one Palestinian concern. (As one of many examples see Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research Center Poll # 15, 2005). This is likely the case because essentially every Palestinian has a friend or relative in jail. As a specific example, in April 2006, there were 9,400 Palestinians being held in Israeli jails and detention centers (PCBS, 2006).[105] This amounts, *very roughly*, to a scenario whereby approximately 1 out of every 425 Palestinians were being held in Israeli jails or detention centers during April of 2006.[106] Fourth, *militarily*, Palestinians seek security in the form of an end to Israeli military incursions, and as part of the very definition of a state, a standing military.

Palestinian Village in the West Bank, Palestinian Authority

The Palestinian audience for *Sesame Street* (Palestinian *Shara'a Simsim and Hikayat Simsim)* in my study was comprised of 5- to 8-year-old residents of the stateless nation village of East Barta'a ("Barta'a Al-Sharkiyaa" in Arabic). See Appendix E for Photographs depicting the village. East Barta'a is located in the West Bank. Specifically, it is located in the Jenin Governorate in the Northern part of the Palestinian Authority. (See Photograph 1 in Appendix E for a photographic map of its location). It is comprised of a population of 4,174 (Qabaha, 2003), all of whom are Muslim. Approximately, 1,400 of its residents are below the age of eighteen, of whom 400 are aged zero to five, and 1000, six to eighteen (Qabaha, 2005, author interview). I derived my 5- to 8--year-old participants from among these 1, 400 residents aged zero to eighteen.

The most common profession in the village is teaching, which earns 1,500 to 2,000 New Israeli Shekels (NIS) per month (Qabaha, 2005, author interview). This amounts to $343 to $458 (according to the 2005 mean average exchange rate of 4.37 NIS to 1 USD, retrieved from x-rates.com, 2005), The village, however, has a high unemployment rate, with some residents placing the estimate at 60%. As a result, several residents have instead decided to continue their education.

According to Ghassan Qabaha, the head of the East Barta'a local council, "probably" 75% of the residents voted in the January 2005 Palestinians elections for Abu Mazen (Qabaha, 2005, author interview), out of the left of center Fatah list. Parents in my sample, meanwhile, voted in the 2005 and 2006 elections for Fatah and

other secular non—Islamist parties. An example of the latter included the communist (and therefore, economically liberal) but politically conservative on the peace process Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) – Martyr Abu Ali Mustapha's list.

In terms of infrastructure, the village is comprised of a mixture of older and more large-scale refurbished homes that vary in design, one from the other. Male residents regularly build new homes. Just before getting married they will typically join together with friends and relatives to build a house for themselves and their soon to be wives. Roads are narrow, and paved in only parts of the village. Each home has access to a limited amount of water, which according to Ghassan Qabaha, is measured daily via timed increments (Qabaha, 2005, author interview). Finally, there exist four mosques in the village.

East Barta'a represents the eastern part of the village of Barta'a. Barta'a was one of three Palestinian villages that were divided in half between Israel and Jordan in 1949 by the *Jordanian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement,* in part, formally concluding the 1948 War/Israeli War of Independence. Following the 1967 War/Six Day War, the entirety of each of these three villages became a part of Israel. Thus, East Barta'a, then part of Jordan, together with its western side, became part of Israel. Following the 1993 Oslo Accords, East Barta'a became part of the Palestinian Authority (PA). East Barta'a was designated part of *Area A* – under full PA control. Thus, the village was again re-divided. East Barta'a residents received Palestinian citizenship while residents of the west - West Barta'a ("Barta'a Al-Grabiya" in

Arabic) retained Israeli citizenship. Similarly, the same occurred in the other two 1949 villages.

Following Israel's construction of the separation barrier, completed in the Northern triangle ("Al-Muthalath" in Arabic/"Ha'mishulash" in Hebrew) and Southern triangle in the early 2000s, these civic divisions became more concretely sealed. Apart from the differences in their identities that developed as a result of the different citizenship rights and requirements each acquired prior to its construction, passage between the two sides of these villages - one Palestinian, and the other Israeli - became legally restricted. Under Israeli state law, which also pertains to the Palestinian Authority, Israelis are not permitted to enter Palestinian Authority controlled areas, and likewise, Palestinians, are not allowed to enter into Israeli controlled areas.

Practically, however, these divisions remained more porous. In the other two villages divided by the 1949 armistice agreements, where the separation barrier was erected roughly along the armistice, or "green line" through the construction of a wall, it became relatively simple to, in turn, enforce the restriction of passage between the two sides of the village. By contrast, in Barta'a's case, a barrier was instead erected to the east of East Barta'a. As compared with the other two villages, Israel elected to keep Barta'a united for humanitarian reasons. In its case, Barta'a is comprised almost entirely of members of the same clan ("Hamoula" in Arabic) – the Qabaha/Kabaha clan. As a result, rather than construct the barrier to the West of East Barta'a, between the two parts of the village – where it would have ran along the "green line", Israel

instead chose to retain the geographic integrity of this village for the sake of its clan. Israel chose to do so by constructing a fence and gate to the east of East Barta'a (thereby making it geographically part of Israel, as opposed to the opposite choice, which Israel could have pursued, namely the construction of a barrier to the west of West Barta'a. In the latter case, West Barta'a, together with East Barta'a, would have become geographically part of the West Bank instead of part of Israel proper).

As a result, rather than a metal fence dividing the village of Barta'a to mark the green line, the line is only apparent to the naked-eye in certain parts of the village. It is apparent where a wadi naturally divides the two parts (and presumably why the armistice agreements designated those areas as a division in the first place). In other parts of the village, the green line, however, simply amounts to an invisible line between the butcher shop and clothing store, located in the village's outdoor market ("suk" in Arabic). (See Photograph 2 in Appendix E illustrating where the wadi "divides" the village).

Consequently, the seemingly random location of this in effect "invisible" division is symbolic of the discord that often exists between agreements that elite level players sign (in this case the Jordanian-Israeli armistice agreement) and thus, write into history, and the so-called "normal" life that takes place day in, day out, for people at the local level. Thus, while everything to one side of these shops legally constitutes Israel, and those to the other, the Palestinian Authority, at the local level, daily life takes place *through* this *written* divide and in spite of its structural reality.

During the period of study, Barta’a’s separation barrier, located to the east of East Barta’a and referred to by Palestinians as “the wall” (“jadar” in Arabic), was physically comprised of a fence (like the majority make-up of the entire barrier) and gate. Just prior to my fieldwork in 2004 the gate most used by residents was Barta’a Gate. By the time of my fieldwork, however, it was the Rehan Gate, which is located southwest of the Shaked Gate.

From a Palestinian perspective, the Rehan Gate is located between East Barta’a, enroute to Jenin. Not withstanding the travel time through the gate, Jenin is approximately 15-20 minutes away from the gate by car. From a Jewish-Israeli perspective, the gate is located south-east of the Rehan development/settlement, along road 596 (Machsom Watch, 2004), where it borders the “seam line” (“kav hatefer” in Hebrew), the zone that runs between the barrier in the West Bank and Israel proper. From an Arab/Palestinian-Israeli perspective, the gate is located “on the back road” running between the local triangle villages, the city of Uhm Al-Fahm and Barta’a. The gate, according to UNOCHA is open from 7AM to 9PM. Consequently, during 2006, the checkpoint at Rehan made up one of 66 permanent checkpoints (B’Tselem report cited in Ha’aretz, 2006).

During the period of study I heard no criticisms from Palestinians suggesting that the gate was not opened during those hours it was scheduled for operation. On the other hand, as is the case in all areas of the separation barrier, discrepancies existed between Palestinian and Israeli military reports regarding treatment at the gate and whether the army had allowed Palestinians to pass through during emergencies. (For

further details see Machsom Watch notes about checkpoint activities as part of their effort to offer a third point of view, 2004). From the perspective of the residents of Barta'a, I was told by several of the families about a resident who was "killed at the gate by the army." As one of his relatives, Marwan, [107] recounted to me, Husni Mustafa Qabaha, was prevented from obtaining medical attention during closed gate hours, and ultimately died there from a heart attack (See also Gideon Levy for a journalistic account of this event, September 2007). Thus, Qabaha exemplified one of 43 Palestinians, who since the creation of the separation barrier, and up through the end of 2006, were denied medical treatment and subsequently died as a result (UNOCHA, 2007).[108] His and the others' deaths may be argued to be cases of what I will perhaps coin "military malpractice".

The movement of East Barta'a's residents is restricted. They spend the bulk of their time solely in Barta'a. Apart from this, they tend to be Jenin-bound, given that it is the village's main city reference point. Since Barta'a's residents are located within the seam line, they are required to obtain permits from the Israeli army (permits which, for example, must be renewed every six months) in order remain in their homes, which are now considered a closed military zone. As Palestinian citizens, being that they are not allowed to enter Israel, they are technically not allowed into West Barta'a either. Hence, per the difficulties of regularly passing through the gate, thereby, on the one hand, cutting them off to a large extent from the rest of the West Bank, and on the other, the restrictions placed on their moving in the other direction – into Israel - they have been rendered relatively immobile.

In practice, however, residents regularly *do* enter Israel – *however* mainly only as far as West Barta'a. While they can be fined or jailed, the Israeli border police ("mishmar hagvul" or MAGAV" for short in Hebrew) regularly turn a blind eye to this. East Barta'a residents recounted to me that the border police often tell them "go home." For their part, as I observed, East Barta'a residents, if in a car, for example, may stop and exchange their Palestinian Authority license plated cars for a friend's Israeli license plated car, driving into West Barta'a (inside Israel proper) with it, and than swapping it back for their own car when they reach the invisible mark of the green line and drive back into East Barta'a inside the Palestinian Authority.

During the period of study, I never saw Israeli border police enter the village, but rather, regularly saw them run "flying," or mobile checkpoints, to the west of West Barta'a. Police stop at the junction of highway 65 (the main road running along the Triangle/Wadi Ara in Israel) and, to a lesser extent, east of East Barta'a, on road 611 between the Rehan Jewish development/settlement, en route to the gate. Either of these routine locations made up one of the average of 160 flying checkpoints, which were in operation in the West Bank during any given week in 2006 (UNOCHA report cited in Ha'aretz, 2006).

Apart from West Barta'a, with minor exceptions, residents recounted to me that they "sneak" pass the flying checkpoints and enter other parts of Israel. Examples were stories in which mothers mentioned to me that their husbands found day laborer jobs "here and there" in nearby Arab/Palestinian-Israeli villages. Or that they (in particular, women who held Jordanian citizenship), whom, from the perspective of

Israel are illegal residents (they are neither citizens nor residents of the Palestinian Authority, per Israeli identity card requirements), sneak across highway 65 at night for emergency gynecologist visits in the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli village of Kfar Kara. And finally, men in their twenties and thirties sought to sneak across for a night out on the town, for example to Nazareth, the largest ethnopolitically Arab city in Israel. Finally, it is worth mentioning that anywhere between 35-40% of East Barta'a residents (usually men) have married "up" to women in West Barta'a (Totry, forthcoming puts it at 40%). These marriages have enabled these men, in most cases, to obtain Israeli identity cards that allow them unrestricted access to Israel. Consequently, I did not include children from these "mixed" marriages in my Palestinian sample because these children formally, due to their citizenship rights, are rather Arab/Palestinian-Israelis.

Community-Based Facilities and Resources for Children

East Barta'a is comprised of four primary schools. One is a girls school ("Madrasat Binat Taneweya" in Arabic) for grades one through twelve, two more are boys schools ("Madrasat lel Baneen" in Arabic), of which one is for grades one through seven, and the second for grades eight through twelve. Finally, there also exists one mixed boys and girls school ("Madrasat Farouk" in Arabic) for grades one through ten. I obtained my random sample of children from each of the three schools containing children in grades one through three. During the 2001 to 2002 school year, 255 of East Barta'a's school-children, meanwhile, attended the girls school, and 357 attended the boys schools (Qabaha, 2003). In addition, there are three formal pre-

kindergartens (“rawda” in Arabic) for children aged three to four).[109] There is one local sports club in East Barta’a, which includes a multi-purpose room (Qabaha, 2005, author interview). In terms of play, I otherwise observed children, especially boys, playing organized sessions of soccer or kick-the-can out on the playing field outside of the boy’s school, out on the street, (See Photograph 11 of boys playing soccer in Appendix E as an example) or atop rooftops. In addition, boys made occasional trips to Jenin to watch soccer matches. The girls, meanwhile, played other games (See Photograph 10 of children, including girls, playing outside in Appendix E), hung around outside or by the market.

Cross-Contact Opportunities Afforded by the Community

Contact with Jewish-Israelis

The community’s contact with Jewish-Israelis, like nearly all Palestinian communities, comes in the form of contact with Israeli soldiers, the majority of whom, are Jewish. In the case of East Barta’a residents, their contact is with soldiers who operate the Rehan checkpoint. In addition, East Barta’a tends, more than other Palestinian communities, to be a stopping point for Jewish-Israeli peace activists.

Relations with Jewish-Israelis from the perspective of East Barta’a. From their perspective, their contact with Jewish-Israelis is entirely with the army (“jaysh” in Arabic) who check them at the gate, and whom some characterize as keeping them locked inside a pen as though animals, and second with “settlers” (“mustawtiniin” in

Arabic), whom, in contrast to themselves, they observe passing through the checkpoints without having to wait.

Greatest Contact Opportunity with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis

East Barta'a is the only Palestinian community that has *regular* multi-faceted contact with Arab-Palestinian-Israelis, due to its unique situation inside the seam line between the Green Line and West Bank-Israel division. The other half of the village is comprised of 3,182 people (Qabaha, 2003), who make up the rest of the Kabaha clan. In contrast to East Barta'a, more women, including mothers, work outside of the home (though there exist more job opportunities overall, relative to East Barta'a because of their holding Israeli citizenship). In addition, while likewise Muslim, West Barta'a residents are less religious, relative to East Barta'a. As an example of one measure, women, in particular, dress more liberally. Fewer wear a headscarf ("hijab" in Arabic) for the purposes specifically of religious observance and instead only tie their hair back. In addition, more wear pants, in contrast to the usual dress or skirt worn by women in East Barta'a.

Relations with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis from the Perspective of East Barta'a. From their perspective, East Barta'a residents have family ties to Arab Palestinian-Israelis. However, in general, they see Arab-Palestinian-Israelis, specifically their West Barta'a Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Kabaha relatives, as "48 Arabs," who are less educated then they, the Qabaha side of the clan. Nevertheless, those with stores greatly appreciate the business Arab/Palestinian-Israeli customers (who especially come from neighboring communities in the Triangle/Wadi Ara) bring

to their shops. (For more about Barta'a and the relations between both sides of the village see Amara & Kabaha, 1996; and Totry, forthcoming).

Perspectives of the Other Groups about the Community

Barta'a from the Perspective of Jewish-Israelis: "That Palestinian Village By the Gas Station in Wadi Ara".

From the perspective of Jewish-Israelis living nearby, East Barta'a is located east of Kibbutz Barkai and southwest from Katzir. Within Judea and Samaria/the West Bank, East Barta'a runs east along road 611 en route to the Rehan, Shaked and Hinnanit Jewish developments/settlements, whom together comprised a population of 1,468 in 2006 (Foundation for Middle East Peace). These communities respectively lie 1.5, 2.9 and 2.3 kilometers east of the Green line (Peace Now). For those living elsewhere in Israel, if familiar with the village, it is located inside the territories ("shtacheim" in Hebrew), just beyond "the gas station in Wadi Ara."

East Barta'a from the perspective of Jewish-Israelis is located on the seam line, it is a place to shop, and a place through which terrorists ("mechablim" in Hebrew) can enter Israel. This, for example, occurred in 2003 when an Islamic Jihad terrorist entered using a Jordanian passport (Israel Ministry of Defense, 2004). Additionally, it is a place for which the Israeli army can find Palestinian collaborators, and a place to practice peace. West Barta'a, *via* resident Riad Kabaha, the co-director of Givat Haviva (and who following fieldwork, became the head of Basmah regional council,

including West Barta'a), facilitates a long of list of peace business activities throughout the village.

East Barta'a from the Perspective of Arab/Palestinian-Israelis: "Our Primitive Brothers"

From the perspective of Arab/Palestinian-Israelis living nearby in the Triangle/Wadi Ara region of Israel, East Barta'a is located "where the market is," next door to Arara, and across the street from Kfar Kara. From the perspective of those living in other parts of Israel, it is often mistaken for the nearby, though larger village of East Baqa ("Baqa Al-Sharkiya" in Arabic), which consequently is one of the other three villages divided in 1949. Arab/Palestinian-Israelis resident locally view Barta'a, as a whole, as more "primitive", "less clean", and made-up of "less educated" residents. In particular, it is the location to come to for low-cost shopping at the market, which runs from West into East Barta'a.[110] Low-cost products used to be brought in from the West Bank, though, during the period of study, these amounted to more of a mixture, and so consequently prices rose for visiting shoppers and Barta'a residents alike.

Meanwhile, from the perspective of West Barta'a Arab/Palestinian-Israelis specifically, residents of East Barta'a are territories' ("Idafi" in Arabic) Palestinians. They are more "primitive", and "less clean", though not per se less educated than they. As West Barta'a residents made a regular point of telling me, in reference to East Barta'a, "I don't go over there," or "I've never been there." My observations, however, often contradicted their pronouncement of their avoidance of East Barta'a.

This suggested that in order to live up to their expectations of their identities as Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, they had to actively reject being "Palestinian". If they did not perform in such a manner, they might, in turn, be mistaken for Palestinian by wider Israeli society. In addition, they would then have to engage with those Palestinians who instead consider them to be "48 sell-out Arabs" – an imitation of the real thing, or simply put, unauthentic Palestinians.

Palestinian Reception Analysis: Active Resistance and Adoption of the Text

Accepted Themselves and the Shared Other

Saw Palestinians. All (or the majority of) the Palestinian audience members – i.e. the children in East Barta'a included in my study - interpreted there to be "Palestinian" characters in *Shara'a Simsim* and *Hikayat Simsim*. A minority, or 20%, of the children said the characters were "Arab" because they were from Haifa. However, it was unclear from the combination of (1) how these audience members constructed their own identity and (2) those of their "shared others," and (3) whether *they* defined Haifa to be geographically located inside "Israel" or "Palestine", if by this explanation they meant that the characters in the program were specifically Palestinian, or rather Arab/Palestinian-Israeli, or just generally Arab (including both the former categories). Therefore, I tentatively conclude that either the majority (or all of) the Palestinian audience members "saw" Palestinians in *Hikayat Simsim*, as was encoded into the text.

Saw Arabs. Similarly, all (or the majority of) the Palestinian audience "saw" "Arab" characters, by which they were referring to or including Arab/Palestinian-Israelis in their definition for Arab.[111] By comparison (and as will be recalled from Chapter 4) Arab/Palestinian-Israelis were encoded into the text.

According to the audience, the characters to which they were referring were "Arab," because they "speak Arabic," because they "look like it" or, in other words, they "look normal" (which consequently also served to indicate that the audience member thought that the character 'looks like me'). The audience also defined these

character to be “Arab” because they argued that “people like them,” – and, therefore, they must be Arab, or because they are “from Barta’a” or “Haifa”.

In asking how they knew the characters were Arab, one child, an 8-year-old girl named Nwar who defined “Arab” to include all Arabs, including Palestinians, and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, explained her answer in reference to one of the characters. She said because, “she doesn’t kill people, she respects them…[she must be Arab].” (Nwar, 8-year-old girl).

Actively Resisted the Text: Erased the Other: “Jews”

The majority of the Palestinian audience did not see Jewish-Israeli characters in the program, or, as they referred to them - “Jews” - in spite of their having been encoded into the text. Meaning, the Palestinian audience actively resisted the text of *Sesame Street* in such a way as to not observe the pro-social relations between Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians, in spite of the fact that these were encoded into the text. According to these children’s interpretations, there were no “Jews” in the program.

Converted the Other. Those who did not see “Jews” in the program interpreted the Jewish-Israeli characters to be “Arab” or “Palestinian.” Among them, half converted the characters to Arabs, by which they were referring to (or included) Arab/Palestinian-Israelis in their definition of an Arab. As part of this conversion process, these audience members were more likely to convert Jewish-Israelis into Arabs, which at times meant that they only converted the character’s *national* identity (i.e. when they converted Jewish-Israeli characters into Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, as opposed to Arabs, thereby generally maintaining the character’s civic identity).[112] The

minority, by contrast, changed both the *civic* and *national* identity of Jewish characters to instead read out of the Jewish characters, characters that represented their own ethnopolitical group, namely Palestinians.

Finally, Nwar converted a Jewish-Israeli character into an American. She argued that the character was American because he spoke Hebrew. Nevertheless, that character, referring to Adam, the teenage Jewish-Israeli boy I discussed in Chapter 4, acted like he was Arab, according to her, because, "Eh...he thanks people, and he doesn't, I mean, kill and like this." (Nwar, 8-year-old girl).

The minority who accepted the other. Among the minority (or 40% of Palestinian children) who saw "Jews" in the program, half of these, or 20% of the children, interpreted all three ethnopolitical groups to have been represented in the program. It was unclear whether the other 20% also did so, or rather, only interpreted "Arabs" and "Jews" to be in the program. It was unclear because these audience members represented the children who defined characters as "Arab" on the basis of their being from Haifa.

Cognitive Imbalance Between "Jewish" Characters' Identity and Palestinian Attitudes Towards Them

As part of their active resisting of the text, among the 40% of the Palestinian audience members who did in fact see "Jews" in the program, in at least half of the cases, they concluded that those characters were "bad" people, whereas in the other half, they vacillated or tried to hedge the actual identity of the character and make them out to be only *partially* Jewish. The latter scenario, whereby Palestinian children

tried to hedge the identity of characters they had previously defined as Jews, occurred after they were asked about whether they thought the given character was "a good person". This hedging, which is an in effect *negotiation* of the text, is aptly illustrated by the discussion below with Mohammed.

> Interviewer: How did you know that he is Jewish?
> Mohammed: Because he speaks Hebrew.
> Interviewer: He speaks Hebrew. Is he like all the Jews*?*
> Mohammed: Eh...
> Interviewer: All the...?
> Mohammed: No.
> Interviewer: Not... . Are all the Jews like him?
> Mohammed: No.
> Interviewer: Why?
> Mohammed: Because those Jews disbelieve ("biyikfiroo")...him, no. Right he's Jewish, but he doesn't disbelieve. *Those* disbelieve.
> (Mohammed, 8-year-old boy)

This distinction Mohammed and other members of the Palestinian audience made with respect to their attitudes towards characters they defined to be "Palestinian" and "Arab", in contrast to those they defined as being "Jewish" is notable. Their attitudes towards the Jewish characters contrasted with their interpretation of Arab and Palestinian characters. The Palestinian audience adopted a positive attitude towards *all* of the characters they defined to be *Arab* or *Palestinian* in the show. In other words, only in the limited instances in which the Palestinian audience members interpreted there to be Jewish characters in the program, did they begin to engage in oppositional readings of the text's encoding of only good-natured, nice characters. It suggests that the Palestinian audience was unable to cope with the contradiction, or perceived

cognitive imbalance, that existed between the concept of a "Jewish" character and a "good person". This becomes further evident when I describe below how these children constructed Jewish identity. Their inability to cope illustrates Heider's concept of *Balance Theory* (1944).

The discussion below with Leila about one of the Jewish-Israeli characters whom she identified as "Jewish" illustrates the cognitive imbalance members of the Palestinian audience perceived (and sought to re-balance) with respect to their construct of "Jews" on the one hand, and the character's having all been encoded as kind and good natured, i.e. all essentially likeable (if not loveable) characters on the other hand. Leila, like other members of the Palestinian audience, defined *good people* to be Muslims. Consequently, she like her fellow Palestinian audience members, also defined herself as Muslim. Deploying the logic of binary opposition, Palestinian audience members proceed then to define Jewish people to be *bad*. Thus, for example, in Leila's case, the interviewer asked her, "OK, is she [the Jewish character] good or not good?" Leila in turn replied, "Not good." The interviewer then asked, "Not good. Ok. Why is she not good?" Leila concluded, "Because she is not Muslim, and is with the army ("jaysh" in Arabic)" (Leila, 5-year-old girl).

Meanwhile, the character Leila was referring to was the teenage Jewish-Israeli boy, Adam. His ponytail consequently, caused many children (regardless of their ethnopolitical identity) to interpret him to be a girl. In the segment to which Leila was referring, Adam is portrayed interacting pro-socially with Palestinians during a cross-over segment in which he rides in on his bicycle wearing a purple T-shirt and jeans. In

other words, this purple T-shirt clad teenager was oppositionally interpreted to be a soldier who is not Muslim by a 5-year-old Palestinian girl.

Linguistic Imbalance

The Palestinian audience members' oppositional readings of the text went beyond just their reinterpretation of (1) Jewish-Israeli characters' identities and (2) the nature of whether Jewish-Israelis (or rather, "Jews") could be good people. The Palestinian audience also went so far as to (3) reinterpret the primary language spoken by Jewish-Israelis – Hebrew. Fifty-percent of them did not decoded Hebrew from out of the text. The majority of the entire Palestinian audience interpreted English to have been spoken in the program, despite the fact that it was not encoded into it. In the majority of these cases, they interpreted English to have been spoken in place of Hebrew. In the minority, or 20% of the cases, they interpreted it to have been spoken both *in place of* and *in addition to* Hebrew. In opposing the text in such a manner, the audience converted not only the identity of the characters but their language (or at least modified and split it with English) in order to make it fit into their own group's context.

According to the majority of the Palestinian audience, it was either impossible for the characters to speak Hebrew, or only Hebrew, because that would have made them "Jews", or regular "typical Jews". Thus, in contrast to Mohammed, who initially (and later only partially) interpreted a Jewish-Israeli character to be Jewish because he spoke Hebrew, the majority of the Palestinian audience concluded that the possibility that the Jewish-Israeli characters spoke Hebrew (or only Hebrew) was not feasible.

This was because, in the first place, the characters were encoded as good people. And the possibility that Jews could be good people was simply not something these audience members could accept. Thus, they simply wrote out the usage of Hebrew as an identifying marker for “Jews” from the text in order to retain balance (and in contrast to Mohammed, whom in order to retain the balance, described the Hebrew speaking “Jewish” character as somehow *not* Jewish because he was also a believer – presumably in Islam *too*).

Alternatively, and finally, it may be that the majority of the Palestinian audience members were unfamiliar with Hebrew (or at least with the relationship of its sign to the word “Hebrew”, or “ibrani” in Arabic), or that it is Jewish-Israelis, specifically, who speak this language known as Hebrew. Therefore, they did not recognize its use (or named use) in the text. Given that when asked, the majority of the Palestinian audience did not include Hebrew as part of their construct for what they defined as “Jewish” identity, my latter interpretation may be more likely. However, since my research assistants and I did not specifically ask these audience members whether Jews speak Hebrew, I cannot make this conclusion.

Limited Positive Intergroup Affects Towards the “Other” Not Generalized

In the limited instances Palestinian audience members interpreted Jewish-Israeli characters to be Jewish (or at least partially so) *and* adopted positive attitudes towards those characters (in spite of a potential imbalance), they explained that these characters were *not,* however, representative of Jews in general. These audience members, representing 20% of the Palestinian audience, thus *accepted* some part of

the encoded text. They happened to have personally had (or observed) a positive mediated contact experience with a "Jewish" (or partially Jewish) character in *Sesame Street.* In their case, the text's active relationship to them served to meet the first pre-requisite for the *mediation* of contact that I described in Chapter 3. The text mediated contact between these few Palestinian audience members and (at least) "Jews" (or partial Jews).

However, these audience members then proceeded to explain that these Jewish characters on the screen, really only 'partially Jewish,' were in fact exceptions to the rule. Therefore, despite the text's ability to have had mediated some kind of contact experience for them, these audience members, nevertheless, did not generalize these experiences towards "Jews" as a whole. Thus, in the example I discussed earlier, after Mohammed explained that the Jewish character, unlike Jews in general, is a believer, when next asked, "Are there a lot of Jews like him?" he replied, "No." (Mohammed, 8-year-old boy). In other words, according to him, most Jews are *non-believers*, by which he meant non-Muslims, and regardless of any exceptions displayed on *Sesame Street*, and as he and other children proceeded to explain, are an "army."

Palestinian Audience Construction of "the Other" Audience Members – Jewish Israelis: "An Army of Non-Believers"

Jews are an Army

In order to make sense of the audience's reception of the program, I asked them to define their concept of a "Jew" ("yehudi" in Arabic). In turn, I found that they constructed Jewish identity in a stereotypical fashion (and later ascribed a negative attitude to this stereotype). They constructed Jews to be an "army," ("jayshe" in Arabic), typically using this plural organizational term rather than the singular term, "soldier" ("jundi" in Arabic). Thus, they defined all Jews to be of only one identity, or, more specifically, only one professional-identity (i.e. the soldier), but also did not perceive them to be individuals, but rather only a group. Interestingly, their usage fits more approximately with the definition of a state that I described in Chapter 1, whereby it is the "human community" that exercises "physical force" (Weber, 1946), and not disparate individuals.

Alternatively, if the Palestinian audience did not specifically refer to individual Jews as an army, they nevertheless described them in a related one-dimensional functional capacity as, for example, both Nabila and Tareeq did. They described Jews as, "*those who carry a gun*" (Nabila and Tareeq, 6 year-old girl and boy, respectively).

As an example of the former, in the discussion below, Sohair verbally articulated how she identified Jews as an army.

> Interviewer: How do you know that he is a Jew?
> Souhair: Because his clothes are different from a person.

> Interviewer: What are his clothes? What does he wear?
> Souhair: A green hat and green clothes [referring to the color of Israeli military uniforms].
> Interviewer: Mmhm. And a person, what does he wear?
> Souhair: Person? Normal clothes.
> Interviewer: What do you mean? Normal?
> Souhair: Pants. (Souhair, 7-year-old girl).

See also Appendix F, Figure 1 for Souhair's accompanying drawing of a "Jew". As is related, Tareeq explained, "If I see something he is wearing like the Jew I know he is Jewish." "He is wearing a hat and he has a gun." (Tareeq, 7-year-old boy). In turn, when I asked the children to draw a "Jew" (given that they were not familiar with the term "Jewish-Israeli," and instead defined Jews to be their partner's to conflict), they drew images of soldiers.

Most interestingly, after searching intently for a crayon in the color khaki, and not finding it, I watched one child after another, oppose or defy the limited color options with which I provided them during the interview, to instead construct the color khaki (which represented the specific green to which they were referring). They would construct the khaki color – the color of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)/Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) military uniforms – out of the green and brown crayons with which I had provided them. Only by merging the two colors did they then conclude that they had indeed satisfactorily constructed a "Jew", whom, in response to my question they, in addition, believed they, "could recognize, if they saw out on the street." See Nwar's drawing of a khaki colored "Jew" in Appendix F, Figure 2 as an example. In short, as Tareeq, explained it most succinctly, "[the Jew is not like me] because he is a soldier ("jundi" in Arabic) and I am a boy (Tareeq, 7 -year-old boy).

“Jews Carry Guns, Destroy Homes and do Not Let *the People* Pass…”

In describing Jews, how they look, or what they functionally do, other representative stereotypical responses the Palestinian audience provided, and to which they adopted negative attitudes, included: “If he carried a gun, he’s a Jew.” (Ahmed, 7-year-old boy); the related drawing by Nabila depicting a “Jew” carrying a gun in Appendix F, Figure 3; “they shoot...they kill.” (Khaled, 6-year-old boy); “they kill the people.” (Tareeq, 7 -year-old boy); and “They demolish [the houses]” (Nwar, 7-year-old girl).

With respect to the latter, and the topic of home demolitions, Nwar described why she loves “Palestine.” She loves it because of the nature one can find in Palestine. However, she explained in a relevant fashion, she doesn’t like it when there are ruined or broken things around, as happens when “Jews” sometimes destroy infrastructure. In her own words, “I don’t like for there to be ruined stuff, and it’s not nice, and like this.” “For example, destroyed houses...” “At times, the Jews demolish them (Nwar, 8-year-old-girl).

In the discussion below, Mohammed explained the negative stereotypical function he defined “Jews” to carry out at checkpoints.

> Mohammed: “He doesn’t let...half the…the men…eh…half the men…ehm… and the women… they don’t let them sometimes pass…
> Interviewer: Pass where?
> Mohammed: At the checkpoint (“machsom”, Hebrew term employed).
> Interviewer: Why?
> Mohammed: Because they are bad.
> Interviewer: Mmhm.
> Mohammed: The Jews.

(Mohammed, 8-year-old boy)

In another example, when we asked whether she knows of people who are not Palestinian, 8-year-old Nwar replied, “I know that the Jews are not Palestinians” (Nwar, 8-year-old girl). When we next asked why they were not Palestinian, she, in turn, replied with a negative stereotype, “They, I mean, kill the people.” In an attempt to clarify we then asked, “You mean the Palestinian doesn’t kill people and the Jew kills people? Hah?” Nwar, in turn responded, “Yeah. And they expel them (Nwar, 8-year-old girl). To this end, Nwar stereotyped Jews as those who functionally kill Palestinians and who expelled (or displaced) them from their homes.

In summary, when asked to provide their construct for “Jews”, the Palestinian audience stereotyped them as an army, or, according to the related functions they performed, and established that this army was something towards which they held a negative attitude. Implicit in their descriptions was that the army was not a force that protected *their* human community (and which, therefore, does things *for* them – *the* people) but rather, one that does things *against* them.

“Jews” are “Non-Believers” or “Infidels”

Apart from constructing Jews in a negative stereotypical fashion as an army, or describing them according to functions associated with “the army”, 70% of the Palestinian audience also constructed Jews in either a *semi-neutral* or *semi-derogatory* fashion, as those who are *non-believers* or *infidels.* In their descriptions, the Palestinian audience members used the term “kafir” to designate Jews to be non-Muslims, and/or according to the precise degree or type of non-believer Jews

amounted to within an established Islamic hierarchy. Thus, according to the translation employed and/or one's opinion of the use of the word "kafir", the following discussion with Souhair aptly illustrate this kind of semi-neutral (or derogatory) conception of Jews deployed by the majority of the Palestinian audience. In the discussion, I note parenthetically that I employ the former translation, interpreting the audience *at this point* to only have meant that "kafirs" are different (or not necessarily different in a negative way). However, the usage of this term by them in other parts of the interview during which they couch non-believers as bad suggests the latter interpretation with respect to their final analysis of non-Muslims and/or "kafirs". In the discussion, the interviewer asks Souhair, "What does the word Jew mean?" Souhair replies, "A non-believing ("kafir") person." The interviewer then asks: "What does non-believer mean?" Souhair in turn explains, "A non-believer doesn't worship God… . They don't worship our Lord, they worship the idols, and they don't pray, and they don't read Qur'an (Souhair, 7 -year-old girl).

In another related example, Mohammed elaborated on the concept of Jews as non-believers, providing more gender-specific details. Accordingly, he explained Jews are non-believers, "Because the girl…when they grow up, eh…the girl, when they grow up…she stops being shy…and when eh…when…when the boy, when the boy grows up, he begins to disbelieve, he becomes Jewish" (Mohammed, 8-year-old boy).

Finally, in the most apt example, combining both the construction of Jews as an army and as non-believers, Nwar explained how, via deductive reasoning, she determines that if she encounters someone in the middle of the street, she would be

able to ascertain whether they are “Jewish”. According to her, there are three methods that may be employed. The first she explains, is “if I am walking in the street, and he was Jewish...now, I want to know -- if the call to prayer sounds and if he goes to the mosque and doesn’t pray.” (Nwar, 8-year-old girl). If he does not go to pray, she explained, he must be Jewish. Second, if there was no mosque call sounded, she could ask the person. However, she does not speak their language she explained so, for her at least, this option would be difficult to pursue. Therefore, she would have to turn to the third option. She would know the person is Jewish if, “I would see him - if he kills the people, or not” – then she could conclude, if he kills the people, he is for sure Jewish. (Nwar, 8-year-old girl).

Very Negative Attitudes Held Towards Jews

After the Palestinian audience had constructed who their “other” or primary partner to conflict – “Jews” was, I specifically solicited their attitudes towards Jews. I asked them “how often would you want to play with X?”, “How much would you want to go to school with X?”, and “how nice is the X”, inserting Jew in place of the “X” question, per their use of this term for their partner to conflict, rather than Jewish-Israeli or another term altogether. The majority, or 90% of the audience adopted *very negative* attitudes towards Jews. I based this upon a summative index score I constructed for the three questions above, which I rated along a five-point Likert scale. The minority was the one audience member who held *negative* ranging to *very negative* attitudes towards Jews (Tareeq).

Palestinian Audience Construction of The "Shared Others" – Arab/Palestinian-Israelis; "The Same As Us But Live Somewhere Else"

Constructed Arab/Palestinian-Israelis as Similar but Geographically Different

The Majority, or 78% of the Palestinian audience who provided a clear answer (or the response from 70% of the total sample, whether clear or not) constructed their "shared others" – Arab/Palestinian-Israelis or Arabs more generally, to be people who were like them but lived somewhere else. According to them, these people had their same or similar identity characteristics, but lived somewhere else. They did not live in Palestine. Rather, they lived in Israel or as one specifically argued, in West Barta'a. In some ways, as the Palestinian audience explained, their shared others were characteristically different. They for example, were "half-half" – they sometimes prayed, sometimes did not, and spoke Arabic and English, as Nwar explained. They had more wealth and do not shoot at the army in comparison to them, the Palestinians, as Khaled explained. Twenty percent explained that they are the same as us, defining all Arabs, all Muslims and all Palestinians to be identical. Among these, Souhair also added that Israelis are identical too (to which she was referring to Arab/Palestinian residents of West Barta'a).

As was generally the case, and as was made evident from Tareeq's drawing, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis are, therefore, those Palestinians, who are just like Palestinians, but live in Israel, not Palestine. In the drawing, Tareeq depicts Palestine as a separate geographic unit from Israel. After drawing these geographic relations on a map he created, he, in turn, pointed out that these "shared others" are just like him,

but live *there* - in Israel – instead (see Tareeq's drawing depicting these geographical relations in Appendix F, Figure 4).

Attitudes towards the shared other. Eighty-eight percent of the Palestinian audience who provided a clear answer (or 70% of the responses from the total sample, whether clear or not) held a *positive* to *very positive* attitude towards their shared others. Only 12.5% clearly held a negative attitude towards them.

Reception Analysis Based on the Palestinian Audience's Constructs of Identity

Correcting the Cognitive Imbalance in the Portrayal of the Other

My findings with respect to the Palestinian audience's interpretation of the Jewish-Israeli characters – their "others", or primary partners to conflict, in part concur with Vidmar and Rokeach's findings (Vidmar and Rokeach, 1974) about unintentional mediated contact effects programming, which I discussed in Chapter 3. As will be recalled, in their study, viewers of *All in the Family* who held prejudicial views of minorities did not perceive the show to be a satire of its racist character, Archie Bunker, despite the producers' original intentions. Instead, they identified with Bunker and interpreted the show to argue in favor of racism. Therefore, despite the show's efforts to counter negative stereotypes of minorities, it instead reinforced the audience members' previously held views. In the case of the Palestinian viewers of the *Sesame Street* program, all of them were prejudiced against Jews (including the majority who were *very* prejudiced). In turn, when asked, the majority did not perceive

the Jewish characters in the program to be "good people" despite the fact that they were encoded that way by the production teams.

While not necessarily reinforcing their previously existing views (since the majority of the Palestinian audience wrote Jews out, and all of them wrote Jewish-Israelis out specifically), what does become apparent is the unlikelihood that Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* can alter the Palestinian audience's intergroup attitudes towards "Jews" (including Jewish-Israelis), or achieve other ends in an effort to help manage "the conflict". Rather, it seems that if the Palestinian audience recognizes Jews as being encoded into the program, or are specifically told that "Jews" are in it, when asked to comment, they may very well use the program to instead justify their prior attitudes towards Jews.

What also begins to become clear is an explanation for the results Cole *et al*. (2003) found with respect to the program's first season having likely caused Palestinian children to adopt more negative intergroup attitude towards "Jews" as a result of watching the program. While the majority of the Palestinian audience in my study did not read Jews in the program, in relation to the Cole *et al*. (2003) study, it may be that, in general, Palestinian audience members, apart from (1) writing out Jews from the text, do not (2) generalize any positive attitudes they develop about Jewish characters in the program and (3) nevertheless, reinforce their prior negative attitudes about Jews (or at least certainly if they read them into the program). As one alternative, since the Cole *et al.* study did not use controls, it is possible that the attitudinal change that occurred towards "Jews" (rather than the lack of any change at

all that we might expect from the majority writing Jews out) was the result of history effects. As a second alternative, the research scenario may have inadvertently "caused" the Palestinian audience to read Jews in the program, thereby prompting the reinforcement of their prior attitudes, rather than complete "oversight" of their attitudes when viewing the program. This might be the case because the research scenario specifically required that they reply to questions about "Jews" as part of the pre- and post-closed-ended survey design.

My findings are also in part analogous to assessments of contact effects programming that, similarly to the Vidmar and Rokeach study, depicted participants as having perceived some type of cognitive imbalance. In order to cope with it, they ultimately reinforced their prior negative intergroup attitudes or beliefs following contact and/or used their experiences that might have ran contrary to these to instead justify these attitudes or beliefs (Connolly and Maginn, 1999; Ellis and Maoz, 2001). Such reinforcement, as will be recalled (according to Pettigrew and Tropp) is rare, especially when all the requirements of the contact hypothesis are adhered to, as was the case with the Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* interventions. However, the bulk of the studies Pettigrew and Tropp reviewed were not derived from ethnopolitical, especially nationalist conflict contexts. As I discussed in Chapter 3, ethnopolitical conflicts pose a greater test to effective contact than do scenarios of ethnopolitical tensions. Thus, the need to correct the imbalance (in one way or the other), would seem more likely.

Multi-factor and -directional cognitive imbalance (transforming effects, group identity and linguistic factors in multiple directions). In other ways, however, the findings from the Palestinian audience in my study differs from the cognitive imbalance felt by the audience members in the Vidmar and Rokeach study (1974), or those found as part of contact effects programming in the studies of Connolly with Maggin and Ellis and Maoz, and attempts by the audience/participants in those studies to correct the imbalance, by reinforcing their prior attitudes towards each respective identity group. These findings differ first because the Palestinian audience in my study attempted to recreate a cognitive balance by using more than just the variables of *group identity* and *attitude*. In the case of watching *All in the Family*, the American and Canadian audience did not have the option of re-interpreting the race of the characters available to them. For example, they could not interpret the White American character, Archie Bunker, to be a Black American (certainly not as readily). On the other hand, in the case of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*, the Palestinian audience, *could*, and, in fact, *did* reinterpret facets of Jewish-Israeli identity through what I argue to be *active* decoding of the text.

Skin color is not a defining characteristic across the national categories of “Jewish” and “Palestinian,” nor is it ethnopolitically salient like race is in the United States. Therefore, unlike the case of watching *All in the family*, if the audience for *Sesame Street* perceived a cognitive imbalance, they could correct it either by altering the character’s identity or their attitude towards the group they represent. In addition, unlike *All in the Family*, where everyone spoke in English (and presumably so did all

the viewers studied), they could also more readily reinterpret the languages spoken by the characters. In their case, the majority of the Palestinian audience made the decision to alter the characters' identities *and second,* the language they spoke (or at least its name).

Third, my findings differ from those found by studies of contact effects programming during which participants attempted to correct the cognitive imbalance they perceived. If individuals participate in an organized contact scheme, they know the identity of the other groups involved during the process of participating. The organizers provide them with sufficient signposts to indicate the ethnopolitical group affiliation of everyone in the room. As a result, in such scenarios participants' imbalance has been found to only run along one factor and in only one direction – attitude. Like in the case of the mediated contact modeled in *All in the Family*, reinterpreting the individual's identity proves extremely difficult. Therefore, it seems, these participants do not make use of identity to correct the imbalance. And forth, they neither make use of language to do so either.

Thus, in contrast to the relevant findings of both mediated contact and contact effects interventions, in my study, the audience re-balanced the perceived cognitive imbalance, not only by making use of factors not previously used (identity and language), but also by doing so in multiple directions (when, in the minority of cases, they also (or instead) adjusted their attitudes towards the characters whose identity or language they did not alter). As a result, the audience did not necessarily reinforce their prior attitudes, since they were in turn provided (perhaps by a text that was too

open?) with the additional option to simply *not* engage with their partner in the conflict altogether.

My findings with respect to the Palestinian audience's opposition to both the identity of characters and accompanying attitude towards them, reconfirm Shochat's study of Macedonian youth's reception of *Nashe Maalo* (Shochat, 2003), and some of what I found earlier in 2001 with my study of the Jewish-Israeli audience for the first season of the Israeli-Palestinian *Sesame Street* (Warshel, 2004a). In addition, my findings add the additional criteria that audiences can oppose language, or at least its name - to the point of total *inversion*.

Balance with Respect to the Portrayal of the Shared Others

With respect to their shared others, the Palestinian audience accepted the text. This correlates with their constructs of this group's identity and their corresponding attitudes. As a result, they did not perceive any cognitive imbalance that they had to correct. Therefore, the Palestinian audience actively decoded the text in a manner that paralleled its original encoding.

To this end, the Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* program may hold the potential to change Palestinian intergroup attitudes towards Arab/Palestinian-Israelis and/or other Arabs more generally. This is a point that Cole *et al.* (2003) do not explore because they compare the three sample groups only along the national axis, engaging in a comparison of their responses about only "Jews" versus "Arabs". On the other hand, the children's attitudes at base were, in any case, positive towards these shared others. Interestingly, their attitudes, as children, somewhat differs from the

general mixed (though not necessarily saliently negative) attitudes expressed by Palestinian adults. Palestinian adults within East Barta'a, and more generally, express some of the same negative attitudes towards Arab/Palestinian-Israelis that I described earlier in this chapter. In addition, as was also made evident in my surveys in East Barta'a, the parents in my sample also held negative prejudices towards other Palestinians – those from Gaza, or simply those who were from anywhere *other than* East Barta'a.

Constructs Determine Reception, or Does it?

The Palestinian children's construction of Jews as an army suggests why they, in turn, erased Jews or Jewish-Israelis from the text. However, rather than limiting my analysis to this point, which most audience studies and media effects studies do, I sought to find out *why* they constructed Jews as an army and adopted very negative attitudes towards them. By doing so my analysis will help shed light on the paths leading to the audience's interpretation and response to the text – as I have, in addition, laid out its encoding, including its production in Chapter 4. In order to trace the Palestinian audience's constructs, including that of Jews as an army, and make sense of why they decoded the text as they did, I analyzed the context in which they interpreted the programs and constructed these identities. In particular, I emphasized their contact with their partners to conflict and experiences with the conflict. Context, as I have discussed in earlier chapters, intervenes in content interpretation and may

altogether over-ride it. To this end, I begin by discussing the Palestinian audiences' contact experiences with Jewish-Israelis.

Context Analysis: Palestinian Audience Narratives of the Context

Contact with Jewish-Israelis

Self reports. According to their self-reports during the interviews, the majority of the Palestinian audience in my study had contact with Jewish-Israelis. The contact they describe, however, is limited to contact with IDF/IOF soldiers as part and parcel of the existing structural realities within which they live. The context they perceived largely matches the constructs and attitudes they painted about "Jews." Therefore, by looking at the context the audience described themselves, we can trace why the Palestinian audience constructed Jews to be soldiers. Given that they described their interactions with the army negatively, including, for example, by providing stories about how boys engage in acts of resistance against the army at the checkpoint, this may also help explain why the Palestinian audience holds negative intergroup attitudes towards Jews more generally.

This context, it should be noted, helps explain why they perceived Jews as an army, and not as soldiers per se. The former is more likely the result of false polarization on the part of the Palestinian audience (typical of groups within ethnopolitical conflicts), whereby as part of their stereotype that all Jews are an army, they also perceived them to be more homogenous than they actually are – i.e. as forming a single unit, rather than as being individuals.

In addition, with respect to the most common form of mediated contact with Jewish-Israelis that they report experiencing – i.e. vicarious interactions with televised news coverage of the conflict - the majority of them said they have seen "Jews" –

meaning an army or those who carry guns – on TV "doing bad things." With respect to the former, the children articulated their contact experiences with the army at the Rehan Gate checkpoint. As Tareeq verbally explained in reference to one of his drawings, "This is a Jew, meaning soldier (jundi)." "The Jew is in... over there in Jenin." "And...and... Jenin is next to Barta'a." "They are... the Arabs -- are *Muslims*; and the army ("jaysh"), are *pigs*. (Tareeq, 7-year-old boy). In another example, Nwar drew this context. She depicted the Rehan Gate, en route to Jenin. See Appendix F, Figure 5 for Nwar's drawing depicting the kinds of contact experiences she has had with soldiers at the checkpoint as an illustration of contact with "Jews" from the vantage point of the Palestinian audience.

Parental reports. I surveyed the Palestinian audience's parents in order to be able to triangulate the audience's self-reports about the contact, and offer, what in some cases, a child audience cannot – namely more precise information. Their parents, meanwhile, though not pointing out their children's contact with soldiers, indicated that their children do not have any regular contact with Jewish-Israelis.

Contact with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis

Child Reports. All the children who provided a clear answer (or 80% of the sample) reported having had contact with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, and or defined them as identical to Palestinians so still, nevertheless, reported having had contact with them. From among the 80% who gave a clear answer, 38% said they have seen them at work or that one of their parent works with them. Separate of that, from among the 80% who gave a clear answer, 25% reported that they have "Arab"

classmates, and another 25%, that they play with them. Thirty-eight percent (from among the 80%) reported that Arab/Palestinian-Israelis have been in their (or their relatives') home in Palestine, or conversely have gone to visit them in Israel (meaning West Barta'a), or are their relatives.

Parental reports. According to parents of the audience members 100% of the audience had regular contact with specifically, Muslim-Arab/Palestinian Israelis. In addition, 90% reported Muslim-Arab/Palestinian-Israelis even visit in their homes (and this in spite of the fact that it is both technically illegal for them as Israeli citizens to do so and that, additionally, West Barta'ans tend to deny this kind of contact).

Conflict Context: "They are to Blame, But Here, Life is Nice"

Child Oral and Photographic Reports. In describing the conflict, the majority of the Palestinian children explained that "Jews" and "Arabs" or "Jews" and "Palestinians" fight. One however, simply said that they do not interact at all. "Jews," the Palestinian audience explained, are to blame for this. In this respect, the Palestinian audience positioned itself as the passive victim within the conflict. Since they are not Muslims, they explained, Jews, by definition, are not peaceful people, and therefore are to blame for the conflict.[113] The discussion below with Nabila demonstrates this logic.

> Interviewer: Ok, tell me...the Arabs and Jews together, are they good or not good?
> Nabila: Not good.
> Interviewer: Not good, why?
> Nabila: The Jews are not good...
> Interviewer: Ah-huh...

Nabila: And the Arabs are good.
Interviewer: Why are the Jews not good? What do they do? What do they do? What is not good that they do?
Nabila: They kill us.
Interviewer: Mmhm. Ah-huh, and what else do they do?
Nabila: They are infidels/disbelievers ("kafreen"), they are not good.
Interviewer: Ah-huh, infidels/disbelievers ("kafreen"), what else do they do? They kill you and what else do they do?
Nabila: They stop us at the checkpoint ("machsom," Hebrew term employed). […]
Interviewer: Ok, what would you say to the Jews so that...the...the relations become good? I mean, so there won't be killing ("katil")...what would you tell them?

Nabila: *Become* Muslim ("yisilmoo") and worship our Lord ("rabnah") and…

Interviewer: You said become Muslim ("yisilmoo"), how would they become Muslim?

Nabila: Pray and worship our Lord and...

Interviewer: How are they going to pray? [You told me before] They don't pray? How are they going to pray? What should we do so that we can get them to pray?

Nabila: We tell them.

(Nabila, 6-year-old girl)

A second example with Ahmed illustrates this same logic.

Interviewer: What do you have to do to or for them so that they change these things that are not good?
Ahmed: They *become* Muslims.
Interviewer: They should become Muslims?
Ahmed: Yeah.
Interviewer: How are they going to become Muslims?
Ahmed: Eh...this...they believe...eh...in God ("Allah"), our Lord ("rabnah"), and believe in the - our Qur'an.
Interviewer: How are they going to read the Qur'an? [You told me before] They don't know. How? How are they going to read? They... .
Yeah, how?
Ahmed: We teach them.

> Interviewer: Will they agree to learning? Would they accept learning?
> Ahmed: No.
> Interviewer: Ok, then what are we going to do?
> Ahmed: *(no response)*
> Interviewer: We are going to teach them to be Muslims, they won't accept to be Muslims. So what are we going to do for them so that they don't do things that are not good to us? […] Ok, what do [we] tell these people (nas) that do things that are not good? What do you tell them?
> Ahmed: Eh...they are going to fire [meaning, hellfire].
>
> (Ahmed, 7-year-old boy)

As is made evident by the logic of these statements, the Palestinian audience positioned themselves as the *victim* in the conflict, and deployed the organizational narratives espoused by their wider ethnopolitical group in order to achieve this position. By definition, they concluded, since they are Muslims, they are *good*. Jews, on the other hand, an army of non-believers, are *bad*. Jews, not the Palestinians, are responsible for the conflict, including the checkpoints, the home demolitions, expulsions and killings that the audience described.

With respect to the reverse, positioning themselves as actively involved in the conflict, and specifically as *aggressors*, the majority of the Palestinian audience explained that they were involved, albeit only vicariously. The majority of the Palestinian audience played games in which they re-enacted the conflict. As part of their re-enactment, they assumed the role of the aggressor. Two-thirds of those who played these games are boys.[114] Among these was Mohammed. He also played his favorite computer game as part of his process of re-enacting the conflict. When playing it, he identifies with the shooter and, as he explicitly demonstrated to me, earns points each time he "kills Jews."

Ahmed, meanwhile, was the exception. He moved his actions from the vicarious to the real. According to him, he actively resisted. He once shouted at a soldier at a checkpoint "no, it's not allowed!" after "someone shot someone" in an effort to prevent the soldier from shooting (Ahmed, 7-year-old boy). His involvement – shouting out – was the limit of what the Palestinian audience members' reported on as their active involvement in the conflict.

However, when I asked the Palestinian audience members about what life in Barta'a was like for them on a regular basis, they said it was nice. They explained that on a regular basis, after school, they eat, change clothes, study and go out to play, in varying order. They liked to play games with their friends, including Atari video and computer games, soccer, and, as Khaled said, riding on a bulldozer ("jarrafah" in Arabic). In addition, they enjoyed riding their bicycles, watching television, the nature in Barta'a, the pigeons, chickens, birds, and sleeping. They also liked school, their teachers, and reading.

Similarly, when I asked them to photographically document what they most wanted *other* children to know about with respect to what life was like where they lived, they typically produced images of herbs, rooms in their homes, images of siblings or parents, and/or copies of paintings or photos hanging on the walls in their homes, *not* images of conflict, the border police, or the army. Some of their images can be seen in Appendix G.

Exceptions. A minority of the Palestinian audience, however, mentioned that they did not like their life there so much. As Mohammed explained, people always

scream and fight, so he would rather live in Bethlehem or Australia. (Mohammed, 8-year-old boy). A second child, Leila, explained that she did not like living in East Barta'a because the streets are not nice (Leila, 5-year-old girl).

Consequently, though much of the green line is invisible – not clearly partitioned by the wadi - the poorer condition of the narrow streets in East, as compared with West Barta'a *does* make apparent the separation between the two sides of the village. The condition of the streets is symbolic, in literal terms, of the depressed economic conditions in the Palestinian Authority, relative to Israel. According to Sarah Roy, such economic differences are the result of "de-development" processes by Israel (Roy, 1995). Therefore, these streets might be viewed as an example of structural inequality, or the economic component of violence performed by Jewish-Israelis, as part and parcel of "the conflict."

Context Analysis: Participant Observation of the Palestinian Context

Contact with Jewish-Israelis

Context, according to the audience's own self-reports and those of their parents only reveals part of the picture, however. It reveals the context that the audience and their parents perceive from their vantage point. I, therefore, choose to offer another basis against which to judge context, namely my multi-sited participant observations in the community. While I do not offer my interpretation as "fact" versus the audience's mere "perception," I include it here in order to help triangulate their reports for the purpose of being able to offer a "more complete" description of the contexts.

My ethnographic accounts revealed a slightly different picture from that which the Palestinian children and their parents described. As the children said, they do have contact with the Israeli army.[115] However, in light of the fact that their parents never mentioned this contact, I conclude, rather, that their contact with them is irregular. They spend the bulk of their days inside Barta'a and never leave. They do not pass through the checkpoint on a daily basis. They are in school during the week, and are less likely to pass on days they are in school, going home instead after. In addition, girls sometimes pointed out to me that it is only their brothers, not they, who go to the checkpoint. In contrast with what the children and the parents mentioned, if a flying checkpoint was in operation as they were leaving Barta'a towards the West Bank/rest of the West Bank for the gate, the children could have also seen border police (many of whom are Jewish).

Most importantly, however, the Palestinian audience may on occasion have seen Jewish peace activists in Barta'a. However, neither the audience, nor their parents, mentioned this. They only mentioned those they see more often, namely members of the military. From a Jewish-Israeli perspective, this is striking. The Palestinian audience cannot imagine Jews to be anything other than an army. Therefore, even when they see Jewish-Israelis in real life, the imbalance between their constructs of "Jews" and their negative attitudes towards them, as contrasts with what a Jewish (including Israeli) civilian peace activist represents, causes them to correct this cognitive imbalance even in person, by concluding that these people are *not* in fact Jews.

Consider, further, from a Jewish-Israeli perspective (with respect to local residents) when the children are passing through the checkpoint, for instance when coming back from Jenin to East Barta'a, they are traversing Hinnanit, Shaked and Rehan, inside the Judea and Samarea region of Israel. Yet, nevertheless, these Palestinian audience members cannot imagine that Jews can constitute civilians – whether residents of local developments/settlements in Judea and Samaria, or peace activists associated with Givat Haviva, specifically in Wadi Ara or other peace promoting NGOs. So too, they cannot imagine that Jews could simply constitute a religious, non-ethnopolitically-based group, all of whom, in addition, are not Israeli citizens.

The Palestinian audience's need to correct the perceived cognitive imbalance with respect to encountering civilian and good "Jews", whether they encountered them

through mediated or real contact makes evident their inability to accept another concept for Jews. Interestingly, their need to make a correction reflects the same kind of inability to cope with what is new and different, which the Palestinian intellectual Edward Said argued with respect to Europe's inability to cope with Islam. In 1979, then criticizing Europe's view of the "East," or "Orient" (by which he was referring to the Middle East) Said wrote about Orientalism that, "such a category is not so much a way of receiving new information as it is a method of controlling what seems to be a threat to some established view of things. If the mind must suddenly deal with what it takes to be a radically new form of life - as Islam appeared to Europe in the early Middle Ages - the response on the whole is conservative and defensive." (Said, 1979, p.59). "Europeans," according to Said, essentially had to correct their cognitive imbalance and so were simply defensive towards Islam.

In the case of the Palestinian audience for *Sesame Street*, these Muslim Palestinian children were responding to Jewish-Israelis. They had to suddenly deal with the concept of Jews as civilians, who are not (or not currently) members of a *military*, or a hierarchical centralized state-controlled armed force, and who can be good (including if members of a military). However, these Palestinian audience members were unable to deal with such concepts, which contradict those they currently held. Their defensiveness, in turn, was made evident in their simply erasing Jewish-Israeli characters out from the text. As they concluded, it was not feasible that good people could be Jewish-Israelis or "Jews".

The audience's *need* to correct the cognitive imbalance, like that which Said described of Europeans vis-à-vis Islam, comes from the same impetus. While historically, the phenomena and structural realities are very different (and would require a lengthy comparative analysis to equate to or contrast from), at the instance of *practice*, in either account, both peoples faced the same problem, namely how to handle something new and different that did not reflect their prior way of looking at the world. And both reacted in the same way - they were defensive and had to correct the imbalance and resist the different and unwanted reality in some way.

Symbolic transfer of the meaning of "Jew". For the Palestinian audience, it seems, there exists one, and only one definition of the "Jew." As they grow up in East Barta'a, year after year, and wait in line at the checkpoint, they see soldiers. When they see a soldier, they are communicated to by the older members of the community that, "there are the Jews." In turn, "Jews" have become an "army" and the "army" has become "Jews." In other words, the older community members have re-framed these younger members contact experiences. There is a schema (Neisser, 1976**)** through which these children have come to make sense of their experiences as a basis for filtering through all else, whether it was their contact or mediated contact experiences.

The overarching ethnopolitical grid through which the Palestinian audience filters the conflict causes them to interpret Jews one-dimensionally, and, at best, with two dimensions – as an army and as non-believers. In turn, the Palestinian audience interpreted the text of *Sesame Street* on the basis of Jews being an army. Since no army was depicted in the text, according to the majority of the Palestinian audience,

no Jews were encoded into it. In the few cases, as I have mentioned, when audience members *did* decode Jews, they adopted negative intergroup attitudes towards them, described them as somehow also being Muslim and simply did *not* generalize their positive attitudes towards the wider out-group of "Jews" as a whole.

Contact with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis

I observed the Palestinian audience around Barta'a (both East and West), playing or attending social activities. During these occasions and activities, they interacted with their Arab/Palestinian-Israeli neighbors from West Barta'a. My observations here concurred with the descriptions the Palestinian audience and their parents provided to me through their private individual comments (and in spite of the general public statements they otherwise pronounced about lack of interactions between both sides of the village). Furthermore, my observations help explain why the audience decoded Arabs and/or Arab/Palestinian-Israelis from the program. They had "usual" or "regular" multi-dimensional contact with them and held positive attitudes towards them. There was no potential imbalance for them to have to correct.

Though education versus economic status differs from one side of the village to the other, interestingly, the Palestinian audience expressed positive attitudes towards Arab/Palestinian-Israelis. This is notable for two reasons. First, in spite of the concerns raised by Jackman and Crane (1986) with regard to contact transpiring between those of unequal SES status, rarely leading to political belief change; as far as attitude was concerned, these children still at least held positive attitudes. Second,

these children's attitudes contrasted with that of their parents more generally, as discussed by Mary Totry (Totry, forthcoming).

Conflict Context

One of the more emblematic examples of the "normality" of the context of the Palestinian audience members' lives comes from one of the female audience members. She has never been to Jenin. According to her, only boys are allowed to go to the checkpoint. She has been prevented from leaving Barta'a for its main satellite city because there exists a checkpoint and gender inequality To her, this seemed perfectly normal. It was this so-called normalcy, which those living outside of conflict zones would regard as "abnormal." Universal assumptions about "normal" child development would argue that this is not an appropriate method for "how a child should be raised," and is legitimized by the evidence of high rates of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) among Palestinian children (Punamaki, Quota and El-Sarraj 2001; Quota and Odeh, 2005; Sarraj and Quota, 2005; Quota, Punamaki and Sarraj, 1997). But this reality is *precisely* what constitutes normalcy for the Palestinian audience. And it is this adjustment, this frame through which they view their lives, and, in turn, their adjustment that becomes the norm.

This Palestinian girl does not leave her village because girls do not resist the occupation by going to the checkpoint. Staying in the village is normal, that is the place where girls can and do remain. Such an adjustment represents what the concept of "normal" means amidst the organizational Palestinian structural inequality narrative

that seeks the goal of "justice," and specifically, in these cases, "freedom" ("hurriya" in Arabic).

As was apt, Abed responded when asked, "What is the army? What do they say? What do they wear? What do they do?": "If someone wants freedom ("hurriya" in Arabic), they send him back." (Abed, 5-year-old boy). The notion that one can be "sent back," without attention to the alternative reality, namely that outside of a zone of conflict, one simply moves freely, in short, constitutes a "normal" reply because that is what the army *just does* and how life *just is.*

Another child, when asked what he knew about "Jews", and about where he gathered his information about them, explained that he learned about them from his uncle, because "the Jews" imprisoned him. Israeli prisons, meanwhile, have become an incubator for self-education and political empowerment, particularly for the Palestinian martyr ("shaheed" in Arabic)/terrorist ("mechabel" in Hebrew). (See Harlow, 1992 for an interesting related discussion). Thus, as part of this child's "normal" upbringing, like all other children whose relatives or family friends are, or have been in Israeli prisons, his uncle relates his own contact experiences with "Jews" through the lens of the Israeli prison system. In turn, this Palestinian child makes sense of who are "Jews". The contact experience these prisoners have with Israeli prison wardens, in turn, gets communicated to Palestinian children as a "normal," everyday part of their understanding of what "the Jew" is, on the one hand, and how people live "freely" as a regular part of life – in *prison*, on the other.

Conclusion

The Palestinian audience's response was similar regardless of their parents' voting decisions, their classrooms and teachers, or their TV viewing environment. I believe the influences with respect to why they decoded the program as they did are due to more macro-level variables functioning at either the community or wider ethnopolitical group level. For further study, I plan to delve into the comparative communities I gathered data from, but which I did not include in this study, in order to be able to interpret whether these re-framing mechanisms stopped at the community level, or instead continued across communities whereby they encompassed the ethnopolitical group as a whole more generally. Either way, these children clearly re-interpreted "the conflict" through the filter of their ethnopolitical group's narrative approach towards it, and in turn, decoded the text of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* through this same filter.

Chapter 7: The Jewish-Israeli Audience's Reception of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*

The Statebearing Nation as an Audience

Narrative Vantage Point Vis-à-Vis the Conflict

As members of a statebearing nation, or in their case, nationalizing citizens of a state, Jewish-Israelis seek to retain control over their state. The state is comprised of a population of approximately 7.1 million. Jewish-Israelis make up approximately 80% of the population (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2006), or 5.7 million people. Like other statebearing nations, they seek *security ("beitachun"* in Hebrew*),* or the cessation of physical violence directed against them. From the vantage point of the narrative, they view "the conflict" through the lens of the *Arab-Israeli interstate conflict*, thereby positioning themselves, i.e. "the Israelis," as its victims. In contrast, Palestinians, as part and parcel of the Arab states, are the aggressors. Meanwhile, they perceive Arab/Palestinian-Israelis to be an internal threat, given their shared national identity with the former.

As a state within the context of the Arab-Israeli interstate conflict, Israel is out numbered twenty-one-plus to one. This includes states member to the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Palestinians, who, together with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis constitute, "the enemy within" Israel's disputed territories and the state, respectively. As a result, Israel is outnumbered by the ethnopolitically-Arab states and Palestinians and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis combined, twenty-two to one. At times, when members of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) are added to the count, given that they periodically align themselves with the LAS, Jewish-Israelis also perceive Israel to be outnumbered fifty-six states-plus to one. This alignment, or rather OIC related interstate conflict, has most recently been best reflected in the case of Iran, together

with various members of the Arab States, who do not believe in the principle that ownership of states is not a right, but rather, specifically, that within the context of the interstate system, *Jewish-Israelis* do not have the right to own a state. That is, from the perspective of Jewish-Israelis, Israel is, therefore, quantitatively outnumbered, including by those who do not believe Israel should exist as a state unit (nor presumably, as any kind of political unit).

As part of an inter-state conflict in which Israel is outnumbered, the state suffers from political, economic, social and military discrimination. Politically, from the perspective of Jewish-Israelis, while for example, Israel is a member state of the United Nations, in contrast to other member states, it has been discriminated against. Due to debates about which *regional group* it belongs to, and the subsequent lack of status conferral, the de-facto result is that Israel was barred from serving on the UN Security Council **(**Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations). This situation and/or Israel's non-alliance configuration vis-à-vis the LAS and OIC alliances, has resulted in a situation whereby UN agenda items are, therefore, (1) disproportionately focused on Israeli violations relative to those of other states. In addition, it has resulted in a situation whereby (2) the resultant resolutions and (3) related "fact-finding reports" concerning Israel are biased against her.

From the narrative perspective of Jewish-Israelis, economically, Israel suffers from economic boycotts by members of the LAS and to a lesser extent, OIC (cf. Weiss, 2006 for an argument suggesting that its effects, however, are difficult to estimate and not likely strong). Israel's water supply is, in part, dependent on regional

sources from the Golan Heights and West Bank and, in turn, would be threatened by future "land for peace" agreements it may make with Syria and the Palestinian Authority (See Gleick, 1995 for related discussion). In addition, Israel's water sources also remain potentially threatened by the diversion of freshwater sources by Arab states other than Syria (See Wolf, 1996; for related regional discussions on water in the entire Middle East; and Giordano, Giordano and Wolf, 2002).

Socially, Israel suffers from disputes over symbolic rights to retain Jerusalem ("Yerushaliem" in Hebrew") as its state's capital, including the resultant decision by other states to physically establish political relations with Israel in the form of an embassy in Tel-Aviv, rather than Jerusalem. In addition, within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel's critics assume that she holds the *unique* status of being a multi-national state in which its ethnopolitical religious statebearing nation is nationalizing. As a result, Israel suffers from discrimination as a "Jewish state," whereby Zionism, or Jewish nationalism, is assumed to somehow be fundamentally different from other nationalist movements per forma. There is a failure to recognize that all states are a product of nationalism, whether predicated upon ethnopolitical religious, ethnic or racial identity, or some combination thereof. While there exist numerous Christian and Muslim ethnopolitical states, in the case of a Jewish state, where there exists only one, ironically, greater attention is paid to it, and in turn, negative prejudices are directed towards it. This normative stance, or "singling out" of Israel, results in travel bans to Arab, as well as other states. In addition, it results in

boycotts of a social nature, such as boycotts of Israeli academics, which are rooted in prejudices based on one's "national" identity as an Israeli.

Militarily, Israel is at a *quantitative* military disadvantage in terms of the number of soldiers and weapons it has at its disposal relative to the combined strength of the LAS (and further, the OIC). Therefore, from the Jewish-Israeli perspective, it must turn to nuclear weapons (akin to Pakistan's needs vis-à-vis India). In doing so, it seeks to obtain a *qualitative* advantage in order to defend itself, most importantly, against the potential of another Holocaust.

According to the Jewish-Israeli narrative, Israel's weak quantitative standing vis-à-vis these other states is, meanwhile, best reflected in the large number of inter-state wars in which it has had to participate in its short history – i.e. seven in total (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, 2006, and including an attrition war). In addition, it has been subjected to scud attacks from Iraq during the Gulf War, and on-going terrorist attacks during the "retaliation actions" period involving infiltrations from Jordan, and Egypt and to a lesser extent, Lebanon, throughout the years. Apart from these, it has, in addition, been subjected to two "wars" – ethnopolitical conflict crises periods - with the Palestinians (the first and second intifada), whilst the Palestinians were being *pay-ridden*, or receiving economic support and military training from other states. Pay-riding has most prominently been practiced by Iran and members of the Arab states (e.g. Iraq and Syria). Israel's total death toll through these wars has amounted to the death of 22,372 "Israeli soldiers" between 1860 up through May

2007, and since the establishment of Israel in 1948 through May 2007, of an additional 1,614 civilians in terror attacks (Stern, May 7, 2008).

With respect to their organizational, or representatives' goals towards (resolving) the conflict, Jewish-Israelis seek political, economic, social and military rights. Some of their goals overlap with respect to which of these four areas of rights they pertain to. Roughly, however, these manifest themselves politically, as the desire to maintain a Jewish and democratic state. Economically, Jewish-Israelis want remaining Arab boycotts to end. Socially, including symbolically and ideologically, they seek to maintain a Jewish state with Jerusalem as its capital. In addition, they want to see an end to biased "normative" judgments about either "Zionism" or "Israeli foreign policy," that they perceive as condemnation based on Anti-Semitic motives.

Militarily, Jewish-Israelis seek secure borders, including a security fence, secure waterways, an end to Palestinian terror, and for Palestinian prisoners "with blood on their hands" (imprisoned for terrorism) to remain in prison in order to prevent them from harming Israeli society again. Finally, they seek and end to missile attacks, pay-riding, or aiding of Palestinian terrorists, and the prevention of the possibility of nuclear attacks by unfriendly LAS or OIC member states.

Jewish-Israeli Consensus and Quality of Life Development/Settlement in the West Bank

The Jewish-Israeli audience for this analysis was comprised of five to eight year-old statebearing residents of the Alfei Menashe Jewish-Israeli development/settlement town. Geographically, Alfei Menashe is located in the West Bank. Along its north-south axis, it lies in/adjacent to the center of Israel, 2.8 kilometers east of the Green Line (Peace Now). Under the Oslo Accords, Alfei Menashe was designated part of *Area C*, namely areas that are under full Israeli control. Its residents refer to the community as a “development” (“yishuv” in Hebrew), whereas most of their fellow Jewish-Israelis instead refer to it as a “settlement” (“itnachlut” in Hebrew), and to them specifically, as settlers (“mitnachlim” in Hebrew). At the same time however, Alfei Menashe has, at times, been referred to by political elites as a *consensus settlement* – a settlement that should remain part of Israel under a future peace agreement.[116] This is due to the fact that Alfei Menashe is already located so close to the Green Line and because, in addition, the separation barrier, as constructed, has included it in the “Israeli side,” so that in essence it is now geographically part of Israel.

The community of Alfei Menashe is comprised of 5,826 residents (Foundation for Middle East Peace)[117]. Seventeen percent of residents are aged 9 and below. Eight percent are specifically, between the ages of 5 and 9 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistic, 2005a). I derived my five to eight year-old sample from among these five to nine year-olds, whom amounted to a population of 466.

The average monthly income in 2002 was 7,700 NIS (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2004c), amounting to $1,625 (according to the 2002 mean average exchange rate of 4.74 NIS to 1 USD, retrieved from x-rates.com, 2002), slightly above the mean average for all of Israel at 6,089 NIS (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004a) In 2003, that average was 8,119 NIS (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005a). The community is located atop a hill. Apart from its original ("vatikim" in Hebrew) neighborhood, which is a small section with smaller and older homes, it is comprised of largely refurbished larger sized homes, similar to those found in affluent sections of the Sharon region in Israel proper. Per capita, each resident uses 102 micro-cubic meters of water (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005a). In terms of a shopping component, the center of the community has about two or three blocks of shops, at best. In other words, apart from a supermarket, residents are entirely dependent on other communities for their shopping needs, for which they usually turn to Kfar Saba, located inside Israel proper.

Alfei Menashe was established in 1983, originally to house IDF soldiers enlisted in permanent ("keva" in Hebrew) service. Since then, however, it has expanded greatly from its original design and core of homes, which now instead represent only the original neighborhood in the community. From among the three types of Jewish-Israeli settlements (1) quality of life, (2) moderate ideological and (3) extremist ideological (Sheleg, 2004), Alfei Menashe has grown to become a quality of life settlement. Since its original core of residents, others (who now constitute the vast majority of the community) primarily settled there (and as well as in the nicer more

upscale houses) due to the economic benefits they could accrue from moving to the settlements. By comparison with the other two kinds of settlements, they did not come out of ideological motivations. They did not come to become Judea and Samaria pioneers/West Bank settlers. In addition, by comparison, they are (2) more politically moderate, (3) less religious, and (4) chose to move to a development/settlement that is geographically located on the fringes of Israel proper, rather than one located further into the West Bank interior.

The economic benefits that attracted Alfei Menashe's residents to settle in this community consist of the large government subsidies, for example, on water and public transportation, which are provided to development/settlement communities. With respect to the former, the government compensates Mekorot, the state water company in order that Mekorot can, in turn, offer lower prices to the residents (Ha'aretz, 2003b). With respect to the latter, during the period of my study, Egged, the Israeli national bus company, provided a 50% subsidy for bus transport to and from Alfei Menashe. In turn, subsidies such as these enabled residents to buy more on a shekel to shekel basis. As a result, they could, for example, more easily purchase and refurbish their homes or travel inexpensively through/to Israel, to their places of work.

During various periods, development/settlement residents have also received tax breaks (at times amounting up to 720 NIS per month, provided that their earnings did not exceed approximately 10,000 per month). They received these tax breaks because they live in areas that have been designated by the state as "National Priority A regions" (See for example Ha'aretz, 2003a). These areas include settlements and

border communities located in the North and Negev desert in the South (See also Bassok, 2003).

With respect to their economic, rather than ideological motivations for choosing to move to the development/settlement communities, Alfei Menashe "settlers" are, as a result, *more* politically moderate, relative to the other two kinds of development/settlement communities. Accordingly, as one example, in 1992, as much as 36.2% voted for the left of center Labor and far left Meretz parties, while 60% supported Hawkish parties, and 2.4% voted for the National Religious Party (NRP) (Bar-Tal, Jacobson, and Freund, 1995). In 2006, 13% voted for the Gil - Israel Pensioners one-platform party, 2% for the far Left Meretz party, 11% for the left of center Labor party and 31% for the centrist Kadima party. The remaining 36%, meanwhile, voted for parties on the right and religious parties, amounting to 26% and 10%, respectively. These included 18% who voted for the right of center-Likud party and another 8% who voted for the far-right-Yisrael Beitenu party, with respect to the former. With respect to the latter, these included 6% who voted for the National Religious Party – Mafdal and 3% and 1% respectively, who voted for the religious parties of Shas and United Torah Judaism (Peace Now website).[118]

In 2003, and with respect to whom they planned to vote for in the upcoming elections, the parents of the children in my sample reported to me that they voted for Likud and Mafdal, and to a lesser extent Labor, Kadima and even the far-left Shinui party. One mother, Iris, however, mentioned that, with respect to the 2003 elections, neither she nor her husband voted . When I asked her why they did not vote, she

offered up the reason for why her husband did not vote. According to her, he did not vote because the only people he wanted to vote for were dead. These included the far right member of parliament Rehavam Ze'evi and Me'ir Kahana, the founder of the Kach party that was banned by Israel for being "racist against Arabs" (meaning, for being prejudiced against ethnopolitical Arabs) (Iris, the mother of Yariv, 5 year-old boy). Parenthetically, while only one set of parents in the sample, and ideologically different from the rest, their views provide an important backdrop for understanding children's exposure to and reception of the *Sesame Street* programs, as I will explain later in the conclusion.

Second, apart from their overall political preferences being more moderate relative to other development/settlements, per their status as a quality of life settlement, Alfei Menashe's residents are also comparatively *less* religious. Accordingly, approximately 75% are secular (Bar-Tal, Jacobson and Freund, 1995). As relates to this, nearly every parent I surveyed made a point of emphasizing to me that, "I'm not religious." By emphasizing this point, especially given that I did not specifically ask them whether they were religious, they were dialogically responding to assumptions most Jewish-Israelis in the interior make about them as "settlers" who "are all religious." Finally, as another measure of religiosity, relative to moderate and extreme ideological settlements, there are only two synagogues in the community.

Third, like other quality of life settlements, Alfei Menashe is located on or near the Green Line, allowing most residents to continue to work inside Israel proper. "Alfei", as the residents refer to Alfei Menashe for short, is located adjacent to the

Sharon Region. It is located specifically on the outskirts of Kfar Saba, Israel, off of route 55. And in fact, many of the resident families I surveyed were originally from Kfar Saba and had moved "one town over" (approximately 10 minutes drive by car) in order to be able to afford a better quality of life. Several simply characterized themselves as extended residents of the Sharon region, rather than as residents of Judea and Samara/the West Bank.

As some parents explained, they moved to Alfei in order to be able to offer their children a "better quality of life". Thus, in contrast to the other two kinds of settlements, their homes are far *more* elaborate, made of more costly materials, larger in size, and their design is more varied in relation to one another.[119]

As a final description of the community, I also note that the separation barrier surrounds it. In this case, a fence surrounds it. In terms of its physical structure, the fence is similar to the one around Barta'a. However, Alfei's residents refer to it as a "separation fence" ("gader ahfradah" in Hebrew), rather than a wall ("jadar" in Arabic).

Community-Based Facilities and Resources for Children

Until high school, children in Alfei go to schools that are located within the community. These schools include one elementary school - Tsofei Sharon Elementary School, which also includes a kindergarten as part of it, and one junior high school, Tsofei Sharon Junior High School. The exception, however, is the minority of children who are religious, and so are instead bused to neighboring communities in order to be able to attend religious schools. Thus, for example, among my sample, one of the

children was bused daily to Kochav Ya'ir, located a few minutes away within Israel proper. Meanwhile, all students are bused outside of Alfei Menashe for high school, most to Kfar Saba. The mean average of number of students per class in Alfei is 32 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005a).

The children in my study all came from Tsofei Sharon elementary school and kindergarten, with the exception of a few religious children I purposively selected. I included one of these children in the reception study in order to have a proportional, per community, sample, in this case between the religious and secular-traditional residents in Alfei.

Where children's play patterns come into the picture, playgrounds dot the community, and there also exist five parks or overlooks, a community center where various after school extracurricular activities are offered, as well as a soccer field, and basketball and tennis courts**.** See Appendix H for photographs illustrating some of the playgrounds in Alfei. Typically, when school ended each day, parents of the children among the ages I studied came to pick up their children. Alternatively, and as I often spotted them, the children would walk from school to one of the nearby shops that sells ice-cream, before then getting picked up by their parents and proceeding home.

Cross-Contact Opportunities Afforded by the Community

Highest Contact Opportunities with Palestinians

From among all the communities in Israel, Alfei Menashe appears to offer its population, particularly its child population, the greatest opportunity for contact with

Palestinians. However, contact opportunities primarily take the form of contact with day laborers. While neither employees of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) nor the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) were able to offer me exact statistics on the location where Palestinian day laborers work, especially within which specific communities they are employed in, in order to provide me with an exact statistic asserting that Alfei Menashe is the one that offers the greatest amount of contact, the following factors, nevertheless, suggest this to be the case.

First, this appears to be the case because since the construction of the separation barrier (and in part for Jewish-Israelis prior to its erection), Israelis (including Arab/Palestinian-Israelis) by and large have had no contact with Palestinians, except with those who are day laborers. Second, it appears that Palestinian labor has migrated to the development/settlement communities, in contrast with other Israeli communities. According to Leila Farsakh, this is the result of the permit restrictions Israel has placed on Palestinians, preventing them from entering Israel proper, and thus what work is available to them (Farsakh, 2005; see also Korkus for a related journalist account). Third, the majority, or 63% of Palestinians employed by Israelis work in the construction sector, (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005). Fourth, according to Dror Etkes, Director of Peace Now's Settlement Watch, the largest construction projects where Palestinians are employed is on 11 settlements (Etkes, 2005, author email communication). Thus, in all likelihood, it would seem that those 11 development/settlement communities, in contrast to other Israeli communities, offer the largest opportunities to their residents for contact with

Palestinians. In turn, through my site visits, notwithstanding some other variables I took under consideration, I determined Alfei Menashe to provide the greatest opportunity for contact with Palestinians, particularly for Jewish-Israeli children, among the 11 options.

I determined Alfei Menashe to offer the greatest opportunity for such contact for Jewish-Israeli *children,* in particular, following my observations during my site visits because sixth, Palestinian day laborers work *inside*, not *beside* the Jewish-Israeli settlement/development. Children, in contrast to adults, meanwhile, are more likely to have contact with day laborers if they work inside rather than outside constructing buildings.[120]

In contrast, in Alfei, the day laborers instead work inside the community, building homes and cleaning in and outside of them. As a result, these Jewish-Israeli children, as in the case of children in general, are more likely to have contact with them since their lives tend to revolve more inside their communities than is the case with adults. Therefore, I selected Alfei Menashe as a contact community, in this case, the one that best offered Jewish-Israeli children contact opportunities with Palestinians and which, in turn, would afford me the opportunity to observe how this kind of contact interacted with the children's interpretations of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*'s mediated contact efforts.

Relations with Palestinians from the Perspective of Alfei Menashe. From their perspective, the residents of Alfei Menashe used to have good relations with Palestinians. These primarily took the form of relations with the nearby city of

Kalkilya, and those villages that surround Alfei Menashe. According to Alfei Menashe's community brochure, which was published in an effort to encourage Jewish-Israeli migration to Alfei, there existed mutual respect between the residents of Alfei Menashe and its Palestinian neighbors (Alfei Menashe Local Council). Thus, for example, Alfei provided Palestinians with employment opportunities and connected Kalkilya to its sewage grid (See Emcke and Grossbongardt, 2005 regarding the sewage). Additionally, residents of Alfei, like those in the Sharon region of Israel, used to shop in the nearby Palestinian markets in Kalkilya, up until the start of the first Palestinian uprising in 1987 (See also Gan-Mor and Previs, 1998).

Additionally, as one family relayed to me, they used to visit one of the neighboring Bedouin villages [the Bedouin Palestinian villages of Abu Farda and or Arab ar Ramadin al-Janub] for tea, (family of Ari, 8 year-old boy). However, prior to the first Palestinian uprising, relations changed. As Iris, the mother, explained to me, this occurred as a result of a terrorist attack. Iris, herself also happened to be part of the original core of residents/settlers in 1983. She moved to Alfei together with her family, just after they were evacuated from the settlement of Yamit in 1982 (then returned by Israel to Egypt). Since then, Iris explained, she grew up, including during her childhood years, in Alfei. As a child, Iris explained, she used to play with the local "Bedouins" [the neighboring Bedouin Palestinians]. And, as she fondly recalled with specifics, used to go for rides on their horses (Iris, mother of Yariv, 5 year old-boy).

However, as Iris explained, everything changed after the attack against the Moses family. In April 1987 Palestinian terrorists/martyrs threw a petrol bomb into a

car along the Kalkilya - Alfei Menashe road, killing Ofra Moses, and severely injuring her husband and children (Friedman, 1987). In December, just after Ofra Moses's death, when the first Palestinian uprising began, and up until the start of the second in September 2000, 490 Israelis were killed. Among them were 180, who, like Moses, were killed while in the West Bank or Gaza (including civilians and soldiers), and like her, fifty-five, were development residents/settlers (Shragai, 2003).

As Iris explained to me, after that terrorist attack ("pigoa" in Hebrew), "the fences went up", and all contact with Palestinians ended (Iris, Mother of Yariv, 5 year-old boy). After that, she explained, she no longer had any interest in inviting anyone who was not Jewish into her home. Alfei Menashe has since erected a statue commemorating the attack, which is visible throughout many parts of the community. See photograph 4 of the statue commemorating the lives of the Moses family in Appendix H.

In general, Alfei Menashe, as its local city government council projected through its welcome brochure, hoped to maintain quiet following the attack on the Moses family. They hoped to keep the peace, and for their part, continued to "allow in" Palestinian day laborers and, in addition, Bedouin-Palestinians. This became the sole form of contact its Jewish-Israeli residents maintained with them, and only via restricted permitted access. The Bedouin-Palestinians enter Alfei Menashe with fewer restrictions and are allowed unrestricted access within the settlement during their work designated hours – until 7PM. Generally, while in certain respects viewed as "Arabs" by Alfei's resident's and basically as no different from other Palestinians, these

Bedouin Palestinians largely continued to *not* be viewed by residents of Alfei as a security risk. Meanwhile, for the most part, things have been quiet, apart from drive by shootings that have taken place along the Alfei road. However, as many residents, including Iris, reiterated to me, these shootings transpired further down the road – near Malai Shomron or Ariel. Consequently it seems, these residents pointed this out dialogically, in response to assumptions they felt many Jewish-Israelis within the interior make about their choice to live in Alfei Menashe. As they explained, "Israelis" 'assume these attacks have taken place immediately outside of Alfei Menashe, and that therefore, we are insane to choose to live there.' Alfei's residents reiterated to me that in fact, it is quite the contrary. They are by no means crazy.

From their perspective, many of Alfei's parents think the community is safe, and as Iris explained, living here is safer then living in the interior. If you compare the number of terrorist attacks that have occurred, for example in Netanya, you can easily see that it is safer to live here (Iris, mother of Yariv, 5 year-old boy). In general, as its residents have hoped, things have remained "quiet" in Alfei vis-à-vis their Palestinian neighbors, since the Moses attack and throughout the period of my research.

No contact with Arab-Palestinian-Israelis

Apart from some occasional contact outside of Alfei, or a friend or colleague here or there, Jewish-Israelis residents of Alfei did not mention regular contact with Arab-Palestinian-Israelis.

Relations with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis from the Perspective of Alfei Menashe. From their perspective, Alfei Menashe residents consider the neighboring

Palestinian Bedouins to either pose no risk or only a muted security risk, similar to that which is posed by Arab-Palestinian-Israelis in general, as compared with Palestinians. Alternatively, they would simply categorize them as a separate category of peoples, namely “good” Arabs. In general, they see their relations with them as being OK, and, therefore, as for example, Sharon explained to me, they are permitted to “roam freely” throughout the community. And as Sharon’s son, Ari reported to me, he plays basketball with a “Bedouin” at his after-school program. (Ari, 8 year-old boy). Finally, some residents mentioned having occasional contact with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis who are their friends are or colleagues.

Perspectives of the Other Groups about the Community

Alfei Menashe from the Perspective of Palestinians

From a Palestinian perspective, Alfei Menashe crisscrosses through the Palestinian Authority’s Kalkilya governorate. Specifically, it is located north of the Palestinian villages of Ad Dab’a, Ras at Tira, and Wadi ar Rasha, whose combined populations total eight hundred and twenty. Alfei Menashe lies east of the Bedouin-Palestinian villages of Arab Abu Farda and Arab ar Ramadin al-Janub, whose combined populations total two hundred and fifty three. (UNRWA statistics; See B’Tselem, July 14, 2008 for a description of the latter village).

The “wall,” (“jadar” in Arabic) according to Palestinians, wraps around Alfei Menashe, and includes in it a disparately located new community, Givat Tal. Givat Tal is connected to the rest of Alfei Menashe via an internal bypass road that runs above

and around these Palestinian villages, and specifically is being built on land that is a part of the village of Hirbat Islah. Palestinians in all these villages are now part of what Israel has constituted a closed military zone. Israel has constituted it as such because the construction of its separation barrier has served to locate these villages in the "seam line" ("kav hatefer" in Hebrew). The residents of these villages must, therefore, now obtain residency permits to "remain" in their homes (just as is the case with East Barta'a's residents). These villages have thus become sucked into the "Alfei Menashe separation barrier enclave" (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 2004 and 2005; and see also Ushpiz, 2005 and Hass, 2004 for relevant discussions).[121]

With respect to the construction of and inclusion of Givat Tal into Alfei Menashe, The Road Map in 2003, following up on the Mitchell Plan, in 2001, stipulated that no new settlements could be built by Israel. However, Israel argued to the US, in spite of the Road Map, that what would come to be referred to as "natural growth within existing settlements", was essential for Jewish-Israelis (Weisglass, 2004). Thus, from a Palestinian perspective – the creation of Givat Tal was an attempt by Israel to, in essence, build a new settlement via a loophole. The US "allowed" Israel to build Givat Tal because it connected this new "settlement" to an existing settlement and simply called it a "neighborhood" within the already existing development/settlement. Israel did this despite the fact that this claimed *one* development/settlement traverses through Palestinian villages (See PLO Negotiations

Affairs Department for a summary discussion of “loopholes” in the expansion of settlements, 2007).

Finally, with respect to child residents of developments/settlements, more generally, Jewish-Israeli children living in development/settlements have higher rates of PTSD, as compared with their fellow Jewish-Israelis living inside Israel proper (Solomon and Lavi, 2005). From the Palestinian perspective, it therefore, makes no sense why a Jewish-Israeli family would *elect* to move their child to the “settlements”. Thus, generally speaking, as “settlers” (“mustawtiniin” in Arabic) Alfei Menashe parents are, from the Palestinian organizational point of view, simply “bad parents.”

Alfei Menashe from the Perspective of Arab/Palestinian-Israelis

Finally, from an Arab-Palestinian-Israeli perspective Alfei Menashe is located near Tira and Jaljulya. Consequently, some Jaljulya residents transport products (for example, agriculture) for sale into Israel from the Palestinian villages that neighbor Alfei Menashe (UNRWA).

Jewish-Israeli Reception Analysis: Active Resistance To And Adoption of the Text

Accepted Themselves: Decoded "Israelis"

All (or the majority of) the Jewish-Israeli audience members – the children in Alfei Menashe included in my study – interpreted there to be Jewish-Israeli characters (or at least characters who represented the same identity group as themselves) in *Rechov Sumsum* and *Sippuray Sumsum*. Sixty percent of the Jewish-Israeli audience referred to these characters as "Israeli", using the civic identity label applicable to all Israelis, rather than specifically the axes between it and the national identity (which also correlates to the labeling they apply to themselves as a statebearing nation). To a lesser extent, they referred to these characters as either "Israeli but specifically Jewish," "Jewish" or "Hebrew". From among them, it was not clear in the case of two five-year-old boys whether they read Jews generally or *only* Jewish-Israelis to be in the show. Thus I concluded that all (or the) majority decoded Jewish-Israeli characters. In the case of these two boys it was unclear, because one of them was the one who had used the label "Jewish" (Yariv, 5-year-old boy), and the other, "Hebrew" (Danny, 5-year-old boy).

Decoding Logic Employed by the Jewish-Israeli Audience for Reading "Israelis"

Language-based assumptions. The rationale the Jewish-Israeli audience members employed for making sense of the identities of characters in the text was based on a larger combination of assumptions than those used by the Palestinian audience members. From among those Jewish-Israeli audience members who provided

an answer, 56% based their assumptions on linguistic factors. They concluded that if characters spoke Hebrew, they were "Israeli" or "Jewish". Alternatively, if they spoke *both* Arabic and Hebrew, and/or Hebrew with an "accent" they were instead Arab/Palestinian-Israelis. By contrast, if they spoke *only* Arabic, they were Palestinian.

Production convention based-assumptions. At least one-third of the Jewish-Israeli audience members also clearly based their assumptions on a combination of production convention factors, to conclude that the characters were "Israeli". According to them, the producers of the program are solely Israeli, and therefore, given that it is an Israeli program, it had to, therefore, be produced in Israel and by association, its actors must also live in Israel too. Thus, for example, according to Roey, *Rechov Sumsum and Sippuray Sumsum* is an Israeli show. Therefore, he concluded, its characters *must* also be Israeli. (Roey, 6-year-old boy). Similarly, others explained that it is filmed in the HOP! Studios, which they also knew is located in Israel, and as Ari added, if, for example, there were any Arabic speaking Muppets in the program, then they must have also, therefore, come from "the Muppet bin" in Israel (Ari, 8-year-old boy).

Yariv, reaching the same conclusion about the identity of characters in the show instead explained that given the location of HOP!, the human characters must, therefore, live in Israel, while the animated ones, by contrast, he explained, are simply not real (Yariv, 5-year-old boy). The following dialogue between Roey and the interviewer further illustrates the logic deployed by the Jewish-Israeli audience

members who made use of production conventions to conclude “Israelis” were in the show.

> Interviewer: Do you know if they’re in Israel [referring to the characters]?
> Roey: Eh, because it’s an Israeli show.
> Interviewer: So what does it mean if it is an Israeli show?
> Roey: That its, that they’re Israelis.
> Interviewer: Ahh…OK. So, wait, if they’re Israelis, so where are they supposed to live?
> Roey: Eh, in the land (“eretz”) of Israel!
> (Roey, 6-year-old boy).

In another related example, Meital explained how she decoded the identity of one of the characters through a process that is reminiscent of Eco’s concept of intertextuality. Meital made use of television conventions to explain that she had seen one of the characters from Israeli *Sippuray Sumsum*, Tzachi (played by Jewish-Israeli actor Dror Keren), on another Israeli TV show, “War Winds”. Therefore, she concluded, his character must be “Israeli” (Meital, 7-year-old girl). Consequently, Keren had indeed acted in an Israeli sitcom (of almost the same name), *War Room* (“Cheder Melchama” in Hebrew). Interestingly, by comparison, none of the Palestinian audience members had made reference to other texts as part of their decoding process, for example, by making reference to other roles played by the character Adel (the Palestinian celebrity Hussam Abu-Eyshi).

As the reader may recall from my discussion in Chapter 4, in comparison with the Jewish-Israeli audience members’ production convention-based assumptions, the Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* text is in fact a glocalized and hybrid media

product. It is glocal, a product of both a “global” American media product and the local Middle Eastern production teams who interpreted it. At the same time, it is, in addition, a hybrid product produced and interpreted by at least three separate production teams (located in three separate geographic locations and governed by three separate political units), on top of its “global” United States base - Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan. Nevertheless, these Jewish-Israeli audience members were not cognizant of these elements in the encoding process (and in spite of the credits at the end of the episode), and, therefore, simply concluded that it is an “Israeli” product. They decided that it is “their own” television program. In this respect, the Jewish-Israeli audience members evoked what historically was the typical normative assumption made by television viewers worldwide, namely that whatever they viewed (even if it originated elsewhere), was in fact a home product. (See Bourdon, 2004 for a very interesting discussion on the subject).

The interesting by-product of the Jewish-Israeli audience members’ use of production-based assumptions (however, inaccurate) is that they, in turn, concluded that because it was an “Israeli made” show, not only did it mean that Israelis act in it, but also that the people who produce it care about them. And these producers, meanwhile, would not include people who would harm them, such as “terrorists”, in the text. As I will discuss below, the Jewish-Israeli audience directly connected Palestinians to “terrorism”. As a result, the majority of them provided this connection as an additional justification for why Palestinians were absent from the text. By

comparison, the Palestinian audience members did not employ production-based conventions to reach their conclusion to erase "Jews" from the text.

Physical features and other miscellaneous assumptions. To a lesser degree (specifically 22% of those who provided an answer), members of the Jewish-Israeli audience decoded the identity of characters on the basis of assumptions they made about their physical characteristics. According to these audience members, you can tell by the characters' facial features that they are either "Jewish" or "Arab". In addition, 22% also explained that they had heard the characters themselves state their identity on the television program and, therefore, as a result, "knew" their identities.

One of the children, meanwhile, Yariv, made use of normative conventions about the concept of the family, namely that a family is *not* comprised of "mixed" members, in order to interpret the characters' identities. He assumed that if a character's son is a specific identity on screen, he (the father) must, therefore be of that same identity. In this instance, Yariv interpreted Adam, the Jewish-Israeli male character (played by a Jewish-Israeli male actor) to be the son of Adel, the Palestinian adult male character. By comparison with the text's encoding, Adam did *not* in fact play his son, but rather his friend.

Finally, in his effort to further justify why not just Adel but all characters in the text could not be anything other than Jewish, Yariv also explained that none of the characters ruined or broke anything. They could, therefore, not be "the other" he designated as inherently bad. As an illustration of this logic, when Yariv described the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli character Ibtisam from the second season of the Israeli version

- *Sippuray Sumsum*, Yariv explained why she necessarily has to be Jewish, not "Greek" – the term he used to designate his enemy, whom from discussions with him, was clearly the name he used for labeling Palestinians.

> Interviewer: Now, tell me, do you know what she [referring to Ibtisam] is?
> Yariv: A human being ("ben adam", male form in Hebrew*)*.
> Interviewer: A human being ("ben adam", male form for the word in Hebrew). What else can you tell me about her?
> Yariv: I don't know.
> Interviewer: She's Israeli?
> Yariv: Yes.
> Interviewer: She's Jewish?
> Yariv: Yes.
> Interviewer: How do you know?
> Yariv: If I would see that she, in the movie, that she ruins [things], than she would be Greek.
> (Yariv, 5-year-old boy).

Thus, from Yariv's perspective (and in reverse of 8-year-old Nwar, the Palestinian audience member who said her partner to conflict - "Jews" ruin things within the context of her conflict), his partner to conflict - "Greeks," ruin things within the context of his conflict. In turn, to also correct the cognitive imbalance Yariv perceived in the text, he decoded it to be devoid of "Greeks". Yariv did so despite the fact that they (i.e. Palestinians, as well as Arab/Palestinian-Israelis), had been encoded into it.

Erased the "Other" But Accepted the "Shared Other": The Need to Correct the Perceived Cognitive Imbalance by Creating a Continuum from Palestinian to Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Characters

Like the Palestinian audience, the Jewish-Israeli audience reinterpreted the identity of the program's characters, or adjusted their attitudes towards them in order to correct the cognitive imbalance they perceived between the possibility that the text had characters encoded into it who were both "good people" and who also represented their partners to conflict. Cognitively, they sought balance between these two concepts, albeit in contrast to the Palestinian audience members, they achieved it by employing more nuanced and varied methods.

Opposed Palestinian characters. Seventy-five percent of the Jewish-Israeli audience members who responded with a clear answer did not decode the text to contain Palestinian characters, despite the fact that they were indeed encoded into it.

Accepted Arab/Palestinian-Israelis. On the other hand, a small majority of those who responded, 56%, did decode their shared others - Arab/Palestinian-Israeli characters - out of the text. As will be recalled, by comparison, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis were also encoded into the text. A minority, or 40% of this majority, it should be noted, provided answers which, while contrasting these characters from the "Arabs" whom they defined as their "others", may not necessarily have pertained only to Arab/Palestinian-Israelis. For example, Roey referred to Ibtisam, the encoded Arab/Palestinian-Israeli character as being "half Arab", by which he meant a combination of Muslim and Christian, and half-Israeli. (Roey, 6-year-old boy) In a second example Ari explained that Adel looked like a Jewish-Arab ("Aravi-Yehudi" in Hebrew). According to Ari, a "Jewish-Arab" is someone who has one parent who is Arab and another who is either Jewish or Israeli (two terms he confounded). Adel,

meanwhile, he added, also spoke Arabic and Hebrew with an "Arab accent". In contrast, Ari defined other Arab/Palestinian-Israeli and Palestinian encoded characters as "Arabs" (Ari, 8-year-old boy). In both cases, while more difficult to interpret than those of the other audience members, I included their answers among those who decoded Arab/Palestinian-Israelis because they both specify that the characters are not just "Arab" (the term they used to refer to Palestinians) but also "Israeli".

Converted the other and remaining shared others into "us". A *majority*, or 80% of those who opposed the existence of Palestinian characters in the text that provided a clear answer, converted the identity of the Palestinian characters to Jewish-Israelis (or usually specifically into "Israelis"). A minority of those who provided clear answers regarding into what else they converted Palestinian characters, or 25%, on the other hand, converted them into Arab/Palestinian-Israelis. In other words, the majority of the Jewish-Israeli audience members converted both the national and civic identity of Palestinian characters, as opposed to just their civic identity. Notably, those who converted them to Jewish-Israelis, like the *minority* of the Palestinian audience who had converted Jewish-Israeli characters into Palestinians, pushed the boundaries along both axes in their effort to convert them to an oppositional identity.

The members of the Jewish-Israeli audience who converted Palestinian characters into Jewish-Israelis (or typically into "Israelis") converted Arab/Palestinian-Israeli characters in the *Sesame Street* programs into Jewish-Israelis for the same reason. Namely, they simply assumed characters to be Jewish-Israelis, for the reasons I outlined above. Thus, in another example, Orna explained, if they are

human, the characters must be from Alfei Menashe (as opposed to dolls, who are from television) so, therefore, they are “Israeli,” (people whom she equated as sharing the same group identity with herself) (Orna, 5 -year-old girl).

Cognitive imbalance Between Palestinian Character’s National and Civic Identity, Arab/Palestinian-Israeli’s National Identity and Jewish-Israeli Attitudes Towards Both.

Geographically oriented civic imbalance between Palestinian characters, and Jewish-Israeli attitudes towards them. The minority of the Jewish-Israeli audience members who had converted Palestinians into Arab/Palestinian-Israelis geographically located them to Israel. Thus, Gali changed the location of the characters interactions in order to make it feasible for characters she would have otherwise been “forced” to consider as “Bad Arabs” (Palestinians, who live in “the state of Gaza”) to instead be “Good Arabs” (Arab/Palestinians who live in Israel.) She moved the setting in which the action in *Sesame Street* between a Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian character had transpired, to Tel-Aviv and the mixed-city of Jaffa (both in Israel). In Tel-Aviv and Jaffa, it was conceivable for her that an “Israeli” (by which she meant someone like herself - a Jewish-Israeli) would be interacting with an “Arab,” (by which she meant an Arab/Palestinian-Israeli) (Gali, 8 -year-old girl).

In comparison, a Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian were, in fact, interacting pro-socially on Sesame Street (“Shara’a Simsim” in Arabic). Meaning, symbolically, they were interacting in Palestine, per the set design encoded into the text. By instead moving the location from Palestine to, in turn, oppose the Palestinian character’s civic

identity, while retaining the national Palestinian element (or at least, the politicized ethnic Arab element), Gali, however, subverted the text. She did so in order that it instead portrayed what she perceived to be in the realm of the possible.

From a Palestinian perspective, Gali's response is striking. According to the Palestinian narrative, Alfei Menashe is located in the Kalkilya governorate of Palestine. Palestinians imagine this governorate *without* Alfei Menashe, and instead to be part of their future contiguous state – one that is absent of Jewish settlements interspersed between it. Yet, in spite of this narrative, and the fact that Palestinian day laborers do interact with Jewish-Israelis within *her own* community (as I describe further below), Gali could not "imagine" anywhere where Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians could actually have contact. Therefore, to correct the cognitive imbalance she perceived, she "had to" decode the encoded location of the interaction from Palestine to the Israeli cities of Tel-Aviv and Jaffa, where there – Arab/Palestinian-Israelis instead can, and do interact with Jewish-Israelis. In turn, she decoded Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, instead of Palestinians from out of the text.

National and politicized ethnic imbalance between Arab/Palestinian-Israeli characters and Jewish-Israeli attitudes towards them. One-hundred percent of the slightly less than half (i.e. the remaining 44%) of the Jewish-Israeli audience who had *not* interpreted there to be Arab-Palestinian-Israeli characters encoded into the text, converted them to "Jews". Meaning they converted them to "one of us", dropping their national identity, while retaining their civic identity. Among them, one of the Jewish-Israeli audience members, Rina, converted the character's religion, but not her

ethnicity. By doing so, she managed to, in effect, de-politicize the character's identity and, therefore, it would seem, sufficiently correct the existing cognitive imbalance she perceived.

Specifically, Rina converted the identity of Arab/Palestinian-Israeli character, Ibtisam, played by the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli actress Hend Ayoub, from a Muslim Arab/Palestinian-Israeli into a "Sephardia" (Sephardic Jewish-Israeli female) (Rina, 6-year-old girl). In other words, she maintained the ethnicity of the character, but converted her religion, thereby depoliticizing the character's identity.[122]

Linguistic imbalance. All the members of the Jewish-Israeli audience who watched the program recognized that, in addition to Hebrew, a second language was spoken in *Sesame Street*. Half of the Jewish-Israeli audience referred to that language as "Arabic", and the other half, who represented those who converted all Palestinian and Arab/Palestinian-Israeli characters into Jewish-Israeli characters, did not know the name of that "other" language. As a result, they instead referred to it by a different name.

On the one hand, they recognized that the Palestinian and Arab/Palestinian-Israeli characters whom they did not "see" in the text, and whom they instead decoded as being Jewish-Israelis, did *not* in fact speak Hebrew. Nevertheless, they did not "know" that these characters spoke Arabic, the primary language spoken by both Palestinians and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis For example, Orna labeled Arabic "English" (Orna, 5-year-old girl), which was similar to the Palestinian audience members having labeled Hebrew "English" (see Chapter 6). Meanwhile, another, Danny, labeled it

"Russian" and "English", despite the fact that he understood some Russian (Danny, 5-year-old boy), partially because it was spoken in his home. Another, Yariv, did not know what to call the Arabic he heard (Yariv, 8-year-old boy), and a fourth, Rina, just said it *sounded* like the language of "eichta buchta" – a term she made-up that does not exist in Hebrew (Rina, 6-year-old girl).

When pressed for more detail, Danny simply referred to all the characters as "Hebrews", which, per his description, historically, meant that they were Jewish slaves who spoke Hebrew. However, he clarified, some of them were both "Hebrew" and "English". Meaning that though the Arabic characters in Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street also* spoke English, they, nevertheless, shared the same identity as "Hebrews" who only spoke "Hebrew". As part of the latter group – i.e. the Hebrew and English speaking Hebrews - he included (1) the Arabic speaking Palestinian Muppet character Haneen, (2) the Arabic and Hebrew speaking Palestinian human character Adel, and (3) the Hebrew and to a lesser extent, English speaking human Jewish-Israeli character Tzachi. Danny referred to all three of these characters as "Hebrews", despite the diverse array of languages (and combinations of languages) they spoke, because he concluded that they all, in fact spoke *both* Hebrew and English (Danny, 5-year-old boy). Thus, according to him, no characters spoke Arabic.

In these cases where the Jewish-Israeli audience did not interpret Arabic to be part of the text, which again comprised *half* the Jewish-Israeli audience, it may also have been that these children simply did not know the *name* for spoken Arabic, i.e. the Hebrew word for Arabic, "Aravit". As a second possibility, it may also be that they

did not know that these identity groups, *specifically*, are the ones who speak this language known as Arabic.

Finally, given that the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli characters were encoded as also speaking Hebrew (and at times only Hebrew), and even Palestinian characters like Adel occasionally spoke Hebrew, on top of Arabic, they may have been more likely to "miss" the fact that certain Arabic speaking characters spoke Arabic, in comparison to 50% of the Palestinian audience's erasure of Hebrew. Yet, interestingly, this did not occur. It was *just* as common for the Palestinian audience to erase Hebrew as it was for the Jewish-Israeli audience to erase Arabic (and despite the fact that some Arabic speaking characters spoke Hebrew.

All Characters in the Text are Good

The Jewish-Israeli audience members interpreted *all* the characters in Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street,* whether they defined them as Jewish-Israelis, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis or Palestinians, to be "good" people. In other words, *in contrast* to the Palestinian audience, they ascribed the same affect that the curriculum designers, producers and artists had encoded into the program – positive images of good characters, regardless of which identity group they perceived them as belonging to. Thus, the minority (25%) of the Jewish-Israeli audience who decoded Palestinians out of the text, in addition to the small majority, or 56%, who decoded their shared others - Arab/Palestinian-Israeli characters - out of the text, together with the minority (25%) of those who converted Palestinians into Arab/Palestinian-Israelis (rather than

Jewish-Israelis), nevertheless, still interpreted these characters to be good natured people.

Positive Shared Intergroup Affects Unevenly Generalized Towards Palestinians and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis

However, the Jewish-Israeli audience members did not *necessarily* generalize their attitudes about these characters (who are all ethnopolitically Arab) towards those who are ethnopolitically Arab in general.

Not generalized towards Palestinians. Firstly, those Jewish-Israeli audience members who did interpret there to be Palestinians in the text who provided a clear response did *not* generalize them to Palestinians as a whole. As Lior clarified in his response below, if it were real life, the Palestinian he saw on the screen would not be nice.

> Interviewer: Okay. And what is he [*referring to the Palestinian character Adel from both seasons*] - nice, not nice?
> Lior: Nice. Very. Write very nice [responding dialogically to the interview process].
> Interviewer: Yes? More than *them* [*referring to the other characters in the program*]?
> Lior: What?
> Interviewer: More than everyone? He's the only one you said "very [about]".
> Lior: Right.
> Interviewer: What did he do that he was "very nice"?
> Lior: He explained to her [referring to the Palestinian character Haneen from both seasons] how to say the, this… the numbers.
> Interviewer: Mm-hmh.
> Lior: They [Palestinians] wouldn't explain in real-life.
> Interviewer: Mm-hmh.
>
> (Lior, 7-year-old boy).

Thus, like the minority of Palestinian audience members who interpreted there to have been good natured Jewish-Israelis in the text, in accordance with its encoding, these Jewish-Israeli audience members also, therefore, *accepted* some part of the text. They happened to personally have had (or observed) a positive mediated contact experience with a Palestinian character in *Sesame Street.* Thus, the text's active relationship to them served to meet the first pre-requisite for the *mediation* of contact. The text mediated contact between these few Jewish-Israeli audience members and Palestinians. And like, the Palestinian audience members before them, these Jewish-Israeli audience members proceeded to explain that, however, these "others" were *exceptions* to the rule, in their case for example, not real – just characters on television.

In contrast to the Palestinian audience members decoding of "Jews", these Jewish-Israeli audience members did not, however, conclude that the Palestinian characters were just "partial" Palestinians, as part of their effort to not generalize their new learning from the television program. Rather, they simply did not generalize them to the Palestinian population as a whole.

The majority did not generalize to Arab/Palestinian-Israelis. Secondly, in the *majority*, or 60% of the cases in which the Jewish-Israeli audience adopted a positive attitude towards the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli characters, they decoded (directly or via conversion), they did *not*, in turn, generalize their positive attitudes towards Arab/Palestinian-Israelis (or Palestinians) in the general population.

Interestingly, the *minority* (the 40%) *that did generalize* their attitudes towards Arab/Palestinian-Israelis constituted the same audience members who "recognized" that there were Palestinian characters encoded into the text. In their case (that of the 25% who responded and clearly so), these Jewish-Israeli audience members, it seems, generalized their attitudes because they distinguished between the two groups of peoples. They mentioned that these "Arabs" were in addition "Israeli". In *all* these cases, these audience members who distinguished Arab/Palestinian-Israelis from Palestinians, adopted less negative attitudes towards the former in contrast with the latter.

I proceed to describe these attitude patterns below, which, in turn, help to explain why, perhaps, they could generalize these attitudes, namely because they did not perceive there to exist a cognitive imbalance between the concept of a person who is ethnopolitically Arab and someone who is good. Rather, the imbalance was between a person who is specifically an ethnopolitically Arab *Palestinian* (non-Israeli citizen) and someone who is good. Alternatively, since the Jewish-Israeli audience tended to make use of the term "Israeli" not for its civic purpose, but rather to refer to themselves (both as Jews and Israelis), they could have been engaging in the same kind of hedging behavior in relation to the "shared other" that the Palestinian audience had engaged in when they attempted to stretch the identity of those characters they deemed to be their "others" – "Jews" - to instead make them out to be only partial Jews, for example, Jewish-Muslims.

Finally, by comparison with the Jewish-Israeli audience, rather than only constituting a minority (as was the case with the Jewish-Israeli audience), the Palestinian audience members instead perceived *all* their shared "Arab" others in the text to be good, and in turn, generalized this attitude towards non-Palestinian-Arabs, including Arab/Palestinian-Israelis in general**.** In this respect, we might interpret their comments to mean that the Palestinian audience members did not perceive generalizing concepts about their "shared others", or rather, those with whom they shared a national identity, to be as contradictory a phenomenon as it was for the Jewish-Israeli audience members, who instead, rather, shared their civic identity with them.

Jewish-Israeli Audience Construction of "The Other" Audience Members – Palestinians: They are Bad, for Example, They Commit Terror Attacks

Constructing the "Arab" or "Bad Arab" Other

When I asked members of the Jewish-Israeli audience to construct their "other", they pointed to "Arabs". Among these, Yariv, in addition, referred to them as "Greeks,"[123] (Yariv, 5-year-old boy) and another also referred to them as Muslims (Ari, 8-year-old boy).

A minority (30%) of the Jewish-Israeli audience constructed their "other" not simply as Arab, but rather, differentiated them as another group, about whom when asked to define this other group, they explained that it was synonymous with Palestinians. In his case, Lior differentiated them and gave them the name "Arab-Arabs" (Lior, 7-year-old boy) while Gali also differentiated them, but labeled them pejoratively as "Bad-Arabs" (Gali, 8-year-old girl).

In one final example, transposing the relationship between the two, Smadar referred to her "other" as "Jews" (Smadar, 5-year-old girl). According to earlier research with Jewish-Israeli children conducted by Daniel Bar-Tal and Yona Teichman, which used quantitative closed-ended measures to arrive at their conclusion, by age three or four, most Jewish-Israeli children are familiar with the concept "Arab", and by age five or six, up to as much as 82% are familiar with the concept (Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005). Thus, by comparison, Smadar, represented a case of the minority of Jewish-Israeli children, who are not yet familiar with any kind of concept for "Arab", at least according to its label, by age five. And in her case, she

was unfamiliar, regardless of the open-ended options with which I provided her. Instead, however, through my ethnography, it nevertheless became clear, that by "Jews", she meant Palestinians.

"Arabs" or "Bad Arabs" are Inherently Bad People, They Commit Terrorist Attacks

The majority, or 70% of the Jewish-Israeli audience, defined "the other" – whether "Arab" or one of the separate related constructions, in prejudiced terms as, by definition, inherently *bad people*.

Meanwhile, 70% also gave a negative stereotypical example for their "other". According to the Jewish-Israeli audience, their partners to conflict are "terrorists" ("mechablim" in Hebrew), or "people who want to kill us." Interestingly, when I asked them "What is a Palestinian?" they often drew a blank look. After re-asking the question, however, they eventually instead answered, 'oh, you mean a terrorist!' And by this, I conferred that they defined their partners to conflict to be "terrorists", and that it was Palestinians whom they interpreted as committing such acts.

For example, in Gali's explanation of "bad Arabs," (her term for Palestinians) who are inherently bad, she explained that they wear facemasks. In turn, when I asked her "what is a Palestinian?", she answered by drawing an image for me which Jewish-Israelis would typically associate as being a terrorist. See Appendix I, Figure 1 for her drawing (Gali, 8-year-old girl).

It was clear that the Jewish-Israeli audience held a negative attitude towards the concept of the term "terrorist", and in turn held a specifically *negative stereotype*

for Palestinians, from their choice to use the word "terrorist ("mechabel" in Hebrew). Had they instead for example used a phrase like someone who "martyred themselves in the name of God" ("eichreiv et hatzmu al-kiddush ha'shem" in Hebrew), I would have interpreted them to have deployed a *positive stereotype* for them. Notably, by referring to them as "terrorists", the Jewish-Israeli audience constructed Palestinians to be making use of specifically non-*state* legitimately sanctioned forms of violence.

Finally, it is important to note, however, only a *minority*, or 40% of the Jewish-Israeli audience members who defined Palestinians as "terrorists" constructed them as people who, *by definition,* were inherently terrorists or wanted to kill "us." They rather gave examples that they have committed or can commit terrorist attacks, but not that they necessarily do, nor that they are all terrorists. In comparison, all the Palestinian audience members constructed Jewish-Israelis as being, *by definition*, either an "army" or as people who "carry a gun".

"Arabs" or "Bad Arabs" are From Somewhere Else

Fifty percent of the Jewish-Israeli audience constructed the "other" as having been born in a separate geographic region, or as currently being from a separate geographic region. The "others" were from "the State of Gaza" (Smadar and Meital, 5- and 7-year-old girls, respectively), "Palestine" (Lior, 7-year-old boy) or, for example, were "born in Saudi Arabia" (Ari, 8-year-old boy).

In their responses, the Jewish-Israeli audience members emphasized Gaza geographically. This was most likely because their interviews transpired just a few months after the disengagement from Gaza/Israeli withdrawal from occupied Gaza in

August of 2005. Accordingly, residents of Alfei Menashe, including the parents I surveyed, were wearily cognizant of the potential ramifications the withdrawal from Gaza, in addition to four developments/settlements in Judea and Samaria/the West Bank, could pose to their future existence in Alfei Menashe. In one illustration, Meital depicted where these "others" lived. She drew the "border" that separates Alfei from the Arab State of Gaza as being located on the other side. See Appendix H, Figure 2 for her drawing. (Meital, 7-year-old girl)

"Arabs" and "Bad Arabs" Speak Another Language

At least 30% of the Jewish-Israeli audience also incorporated neutral linguistic definitions into their constructions of the "other". According to them, these others sometimes spoke "English", i.e. a foreign language, or only Arabic. Finally, a smaller minority, or 20% of the Jewish-Israeli audience constructed "the other" as being members of a particular religion or clad in religious-specific garb.

Mainly Very Negative Attitudes Towards the Other

In total, a majority, or 60%, of the Jewish-Israeli audience members held *very negative* attitudes towards their "others". Among the remaining population, a minority, or 30%, held what ranged from *very negative* to *negative* attitudes, and a final 10% held *moderately negative* to *neutral attitudes*. By comparison, 90% of the Palestinian audience, as will be recalled, held *very negative* attitudes towards "Jews".

In light of the Jewish-Israeli audience member's attitudes, it is interesting that the minority of the Jewish-Israeli audience members who interpreted there to be Palestinians in the text still, nevertheless, adopted a positive attitude towards these

characters, despite the obvious imbalance in their attitudes towards the group as a whole. For whatever reasons, this minority did *not* feel the necessity to have to correct this cognitive imbalance. As a result, an opening existed for these Jewish-Israeli audience members to *learn* something different about Palestinians from the text.

Jewish-Israeli Audience Construction of the "Shared Other" Audience Members – Arab/Palestinian-Israelis: For the Most Part, They're Not a Shared Other

Most of the Jewish-Israeli audience members did not define a shared middle ground, i.e. a "shared other". Only a minority (30%) of them in fact defined Arab/Palestinian-Israelis as being part of an independent category from Palestinians. Among those who separated the two, Palestinians, according to Meital's definition, are those "Arabs" who cannot enter Israel. As she explained:

> Meital: Like if he's Arab than he can't be in an Israeli state ("medina"), because the border ("gvul").
> Interviewer: Mm-hmh
> Meital: it [the border] tells us that the Israeli state ("medina") is over and a new state ("medina") begins, that she's not Israeli.
> Interviewer: Ahh. Eh, okay.
> Meital: And let's say I see him…
> Interviewer: Mm-hmh
> Meital: so I can't think he's an Arab because he's of course not an Arab because an Arab can't reach us.

By contrast, Meital explained, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis are those that *can* enter Israel.

> Interviewer: Um, there is another place except for these, that Arabs live?
>
> Meital: Eh, yes, there is Kfar Saba.
>
> Interviewer: Arabs live there?
>
> Meital: No, some of the Arabs. There are Arabs in all the world. Almost. There are in Tel-Aviv, there are in Kfar Saba, there is Ashkelon, there is eh…
>
> Interviewer: Wait, but I thought you said that they can't enter Israel?
>
> Meital: Yes, but Arabs that they're *also* Israelis…
>
> Interviewer: Mm-hmh
>
> Meital: They're also Arabs.
>
> Interviewer: Ahh, they can enter Israel?
>
> Meital: Yes.
>
> Interviewer: Ahh, okay. I understood. Wait, so there are two kinds of Arabs - those that are also Israelis and those that are not?
>
> Meital: *Yes*.
>
> (Meital, 7-year-old girl).

The Jewish-Israeli audience members largely constructed their own identity as "Israeli," not Jewish-Israeli and conflated the national category of "Jewish" with the civic category of "Israeli". In doing so, they overlooked the existence of the state minority. Nevertheless, despite their conflation of the terms, the Jewish-Israeli audience could still have been thinking of Arab/Palestinian-Israelis as "Arabs" who are a separate category from "Palestinians," and simply de-emphasized their civic identity because they did not perceive them to be part of "their country" (the Jewish nation) for which the state of Israel was created. However, they did not.

Consequently, their responses differ from what I found among the Jewish children living in the Israeli communities of Ra'anana and Herziliya in the Sharon

region, during my earlier field study in 2001 (Warshel, 2007). In Ra'anana and Herziliya they were much more likely to separate them into two categories. The Jewish-Israeli audience in Alfei Menashe, by contrast, was more likely to combine Arab/Palestinian-Israelis and Palestinians into the one category of "Arab."

Attitudes Towards Arab/Palestinian-Israelis

Among the minority who clearly defined Arab/Palestinians-Israelis (and/or other non-Arab-Palestinians) as forming an independent category from Palestinians, they held more positive attitudes towards Arab/Palestinian-Israelis (and/or other non-Arab Palestinians), in contrast to Palestinians. These attitudes ranged from *negative* to *neutral* attitudes. Specifically, with respect to their constructs for Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, Gali held *negative* to *neutral* attitudes towards "Good-Arabs" (Gali, 8-year-old girl), Lior, held *slightly negative* to *neutral* attitudes towards "half Arab-half Israelis" (Lior, 10-year-old boy), and Meital held *negative* attitudes towards those "Arabs" who were "born in Israel." (Meital, 7-year-old girl).

In light of the Jewish-Israeli audience's attitudes, it is interesting that the small majority that interpreted there to be Arab/Palestinian-Israelis (including the few who potentially may have also meant non-Palestinian Arab shared others) in the text, still nevertheless, adopted a positive attitude towards these characters, despite the obvious imbalance in their attitudes towards Arab/Palestinian-Israelis (and/or other non-Arab-Palestinians) as a whole. Since their constructs of them were not *entirely* negative, this may explain why these Jewish-Israeli audience members were "able" to adopt a positive attitude towards characters representing them.

Context Analysis: Jewish-Israeli Audience Narratives About the Context

Contact with "Others: "Arabs" or "Bad Arabs"

Child Self-Reports. From amongst those who responded, 67% of the Jewish-Israeli audience members reported that they hear or see those they defined as their "other." The type of contact they described, however, differed. It ranged, in the case of Roey, from contact with a terrorist, to a school employee with whom Ari played, to contact with an auto mechanic, as mentioned by Lior, to hearing them from a bedroom window when they prayed at night, as Smadar explained (Smadar, 5 year-old girl) and finally, to hearing them talking out on the playground, as Rina typically did. (Rina, 6-year-old girl).

Parental Reports*.* According to the parents' self-reports, *all* the children are exposed to Palestinians, including a majority (80%) of whom which have specifically had contact with them. The contact has taken the form of contact with Palestinian day laborers that have built or refurbished their homes, and, in one case, with an auto mechanic from Azun (through which the mother triangulated Lior's response). The contact the parents reported their children had with day laborers was especially interesting, considering that none of the children themselves reported interacting with day laborers (or at least understood them to be so professionally). On the other hand, parents often noted to me that their children were very young when the laborers had entered or built their homes, so even if the interaction was limited to the children watching them work, staring at them or just simply noticing them, they may have been too young to readily recall these forms of contact.

Contact with Arab-Palestinian-Israelis

Child Self-Reports. According, to the Jewish-Israeli audience members, a minority (30%) of them had seen Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, or structures they identify in connection to them. One, for example mentioned seeing a "tower", meaning a mosque minaret, in the Israeli city of Be'er Sheva, which he identified in relation to this group.

Parental Reports. Additionally, the majority (60%) of the audience, according to their parents, has had contact with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis or "Bedouins". The latter are Bedouin-Palestinians. The parents, however, consider these Bedouin-Palestinians to be a separate category. They construct them as a separate category, "Bedouin", or as being similar to Arab/Palestinian Israelis (or perhaps as specifically being Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Bedouins).

This contact is different from the more labor oriented contact they mention their children have had with Palestinians, and also includes Arab/Palestinian Israelis or Bedouin-Palestinians who have worked in their homes, but extends to also include employees at the elementary school in Alfei Menashe. With respect to school employees, one set of parents triangulated their child's response, but instead referred to the employee as a Bedouin. In contrast, the child, Ari, had made use of a more uniform definition of Arab for "the other" when mentioning his contact experience with this employee. These parents also cited the contact Ari had with Arab/Palestinian-Israeli friends, neighbors of Jewish relatives living in Upper

Nazareth, and with “Druze” who work in the tourism industry in Dalyat-Al Carmel, in the north of Israel.

Comparing the Reports. The difference between the parents’ response that the majority of the audience has had contact with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, in contrast to a minority of the children who reported the same, may be explained by the lack of separation the children tended to make between Arab/Palestinian-Israelis and Palestinians. Typically, their parents, according to their survey responses, did not separate the two categories of peoples as a result of their political beliefs. However, when asked specifically about their child’s contact with one group or the other, they replied with respect to the criterion of the two categories specified, “Arab-Israelis,” on the one hand, and “Palestinians,” on the other.

However, their children, by comparison, as owed to a combined matrix of developmental skills, and political beliefs, did (or could) not categorize these peoples as two distinct groups. Therefore, the children did not mention seeing Arab/Palestinian-Israelis. Rather, they only explained that they saw, heard or had contact with their “others” – who, through my discussions with them and my ethnographic observations, became apparent were Palestinians.

Conflict Context: “They are Bad, But Here It’s Fun”

Child oral and photographic reports. When describing the conflict in general terms, among those Jewish-Israeli audience members who provided a response, the majority (78%) defined their enemy other as being mean or behaving badly towards “us”, thereby positioning themselves, similarly to their Palestinian counterparts, as the

passive victims within the conflict. On the other hand, the minority (22%), instead explained that "we" are not friends with them, and while "*they*" may do bad things to us, they are not inherently bad.

Again, like the Palestinian children, the Jewish-Israeli children were invoking their wider organizational group's narrative. In their case, their narrative was couched within the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and, in turn, they were able to position themselves as "the conflict's" victim just the same. As part and parcel of this positioning, they may have also more typically, therefore, employed the term "Arab" rather than "Palestinian" to refer to their partners in conflict. More to the point, even when the Jewish-Israeli audience employed unrelated terms like "Greek" or "Jew", they still nevertheless referred to elements of the Arab-Israeli interstate conflict to describe their victim-hood. To illustrate this point, Ari explained that Israeli soldiers are at war with Arab soldiers, including among them, Egyptians (and this he said in spite of the cold peace established between Israel and Egypt since 1979). The discussion with Ari follows in detail.

> Interviewer: Ah, okay. I understand. So you say you want there to be peace between the country of Israel and Saudi Arabia? Is that what you mean?
> Ari: *(child nodded: yes).*
> Interviewer: Okay.
> […]
> Interviewer: That there will be peace on our planet. And why do you think than that adults fight? Someone tells them to fight? Or they decide by themselves?
> Ari: They decide by themselves.
> Interviewer: Yes?
> Ari: Yes.

Interviewer: How?
Ari: Um… that, that someone gets up and he says today we'll make a war. And then, and then brings a gun and shoots.
Interviewer: Why does he get up and say such a thing?
Ari: Because he can be evil and can be good.
Interviewer: Okay.
Ari: I don't know. That's how God ("elohim") created us.
Interviewer: That's how what? God ("elohim") created us?
Ari: Yes… . And than they shot back two missiles. And than we shoot back 3 missiles, and they shoot back 4 missiles. And 5, and 6, and 7, and 8, and 9, and 10.
Interviewer: So how does it end?
Ari: That all the soldiers ("chayalim") die.
Interviewer: What are soldiers?
Ari: Soldiers, I don't know.
Interviewer: Wait, who has soldiers? Israelis have soldiers?
Ari: *(Child nodded: yes).*
Interviewer: Who else has?
Ari: All the world.
Interviewer: So wait, with who, Israelis fight with someone?
Ari: Mm…
Interviewer: With who?
Ari: With Egypt.
Interviewer: Egypt? And they have soldiers?
Ari: *(Child nodded: yes).*
Interviewer: So adults from Israel fight with soldiers from Egypt?
Ari: *(Child nodded: yes).*

(Ari, 8-year-old boy).

Meanwhile, earlier in the discussion when asked what are "Arabs", Ari had replied, "Someone who was born in Saudi Arabia - in the Arab countries." In other words, according to Ari, Arabs, who are born in Saudi Arabia and live in the Arab countries, like Egypt, are at war with Israel. In another example, defining the conflict more broadly than just the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Lior referred to Saddam Hussein, incorporating him into the war he was describing.

> Interviewer: And who, is there something else, besides him, that is responsible for these things [referring to a war]?
> […]
> Lior: Ya'know ("Nu"), what's his name. An Arab.
> Interviewer (*joking*): Noah or Brosh [referring to two characters in the television program]? Just kidding!
> Lior: They're not Arabs.
> Interviewer: What's his name?
> Lior: Saddam. Saddam Hussein.
> […]
> Interviewer: And… wait, where is Saddam Hussein from?
> Lior: From Arbushkim.
> Interviewer: From Arbushkim? And from which state ("medina") is he?
> Lior: Eh, I think that…
> Interviewer: He's Palestinian?
> Lior: Of course.
> Interviewer: Ahh, okay.
> Lior : Palestinian, Palestinian!
>
> (Lior, 7-year-old boy).

In his case, Lior merged former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein with the Palestinians. Hussein pay-rode Palestinian terrorist/freedom fighters by paying their family's $25,000 for having had "martyred" themselves in the process of carrying out their missions during the Second Palestinian uprising. Within Jewish-Israeli circles, Iraq's involvement in this capacity became an infamous example of the pay-riding of Palestinian terrorism/freedom fighters by Arab states. Whether or not explicitly aware of this fact, Lior, nevertheless, included Hussein among his partners to conflict, and made him one with the Palestinians, i.e. part and parcel, of the same conflict Israel is fighting against all ethnopolitical Arab states and the Palestinians combined.

While positioning themselves as "the conflict's" victims, or, with respect to the reverse, positioning themselves as actively involved, only a *minority* of Jewish-Israeli

audience members explained that they were involved in the conflict, albeit only vicariously. This minority amounted to 20% of the Jewish-Israeli audience, all boys. These boys described how they played games like checkers or “the separation game”. They did so in a vicarious effort to try to either fight or manage the conflict. In their case, these boys always assumed the defensive role. Thus, Danny (5-year-old boy) and Lior (7 -year-old boy) always assumed the *defensive* role rather than the role of those whom *they* defined to be the aggressor. In comparison, the *majority* of the Palestinian audience described themselves as vicariously involved and specifically, adopted the role, instead, of the *aggressor*.

However, similarly to the Palestinian audience, when I asked the Jewish-Israeli audience not about people who differed from them – e.g. their enemies, or the conflict, but rather to describe what their daily lives were like - what they did each day after school - the picture they painted was not one of conflict. Instead they described to me how they enjoyed living in Alfei. It is “fun” they explained. They always mentioned that after school they ate – this was a central part of their day. In addition, though the order varied from child to child, they played and did their homework. They described their play as consisting of the playing of games, watching TV, playing with friends or pets, or playing outside on the playground. Additionally, after school, some stayed at Alfei’s after-school club, or attended extracurricular activities at the community center - e.g. a dance class, or as they also mentioned, they spoke with their parents. They prepared their homework at home, or, as Ari instead explained, immediately after school at the learning center (Ari, 8 -year-old boy).

Similarly, when I asked the Jewish-Israeli audience to photographically document what they most wanted other children to know about what life was like where they lived, they typically produced images of flowers, their bedroom, toys, and self-portraits, not images reminiscent of physical violence. In addition, they neither shot photographs that depicted aspects of the enemy-other to whom they pointed, including the neighboring and readily visible Palestinian villages. In other words, the Jewish-Israeli audience resident in Alfei Menashe perceived their lives to be full of school, games, and homework. See some of the photographs they shot-back in Appendix J for illustrations of this.

Caveat and Exceptions. At the same time, however, when I asked Meital why she thought it was fun to live in Alfei Menashe, she in contrast replied that "It's [because]… that there aren't terrorist attacks here, there aren't fires here, there aren't these, these things." (Meital, 7-year-old girl). Thus, part of the fun to which she pointed was rooted in a cognizance that their lives as residents of Alfei were peaceful relative to that of other Jewish-Israelis. Smadar, however, specifically said she that did not like living there and wanted to move to a new house. As part of our discussion she spoke about her fear of the "Jews", meaning Palestinians, who lived across the street (Smadar, 5 -year-old girl).

Context Analysis: Participant Observations of the Jewish-Israeli Context

Contact with Palestinians

As was the case with my ethnographic accounts of Barta'a, my ethnographic accounts of Alfei Menashe suggest a slightly different picture from that which the audience and their parents reported. Within the community, these Jewish-Israeli children *do* have regular contact with Palestinian day laborers. As their parents had all indicated, Palestinians had been inside their homes, and in fact built them. In addition to which I regularly observed Palestinians from the neighboring villages of Ad Dab'a, Ras at Tira and Wadi ar Rasha throughout Alfei Menashe working on homes. See photograph 5 in Appendix H depicting Palestinian day laborers working adjacent to a playground in Alfei as an example. Naturally, a great deal of construction was also going on in Givat Tal, though residents had not yet moved in, and since it was located all the way across the internal by-pass road, Alfei's children would not have been over there to see Palestinians.

Due to Alfei's location amidst Palestinian villages, I could regularly hear praying emanating from the surrounding mosques, which concurs with the children's reports that they heard "them". Thus, Roey recognized these and drew a mosque. See his drawing in Figure 4 of Appendix I. Separately of this, see also Photograph 13 in Appendix H of a neighboring mosque, suggesting the proximity of these to Alfei, and, in turn, the ability of the Jewish-Israeli audience members to regularly hear mosque prayers, which serves to triangulate one kind of contact these children all had.

Most striking, however was Smadar's account of the nature of her contact with respect to "the Jews" across the street who she heard at night. During one of our

meetings, she spontaneously moved over to her window to explain that "the Jews" over there want to kill her. Accordingly, she explained:

> Smadar: The Jews. Them, them, there. Look! Them there. (*Child moves to the window to the left of her bed and points across the way).*
> Interviewer: OK.
> Smadar: Them, there. Them, there. Those there, there, there, them.
> Interviewer: Umhm.
> Smadar: They want…
> Interviewer: Umhm.
> Smadar: to kill us.
> Interviewer: What?
> Smadar: They want to kill us!
>
> (Smadar, 5-year-old girl).

Smadar, as she recounted, could hear these "Jews" at night and, therefore, had difficulty sleeping soundly. While explaining this she pointed out where they lived – in the villages across the street. Meanwhile, her window, located to the left of her bunk bed, where she slept each night, looked out across at the Palestinian village of Ras at Tira. Thus, my ethnographic observations here led me to conclude that by her description of the "Jews" she feared and whom she also had contact with in the form of "hearing" them at night, she actually meant Palestinians. Thus, in describing her "others" I was able to ascertain that she transposed the label "Palestinian" with "Jew."

Meanwhile, with respect to another contact report, from Roey, who had said he had contact with Palestinians via contact with a terrorist, according to my interpretation, his, account, however, did not seem plausible. In our discussion, he told

me the story about how his bus driver to school earlier that day was the terrorist. Our discussion began as follows:

> Interviewer: So in your life you haven't met someone that isn't Jewish? Have you heard of people that aren't Jewish?
> Roey: No. I heard, I heard of terrorists ("mechablim").
> Interviewer: So they're not Jewish?
> Roey: No.
> Interviewer: No? How did you hear of them?
> Roey: I heard about them on the news.
> Interviewer: What did they say about them?
> Roey: Because they terrorize ("mechablim") buses and also today I saw a terrorist ("mechabel") on the bus.
> Interviewer: Yes?
> Roey: Today there was a terrorist ("mechabel") on the bus.
> Interviewer: Inside the bus?
> Roey: Yes.
> Interviewer: what did he do there?
> Roey: It's, they took him out of prison… . They took him out and it's him.
> Interviewer: Yes?
> Roey: He works in buses and then, and he, and he, and he terrorized ("chebel"), he terrorized ("chebel") people.
> Interviewer: How did he get to your bus?
> Roey: No, because he was a bus driver. Because they took him out of prison so he wanted to buy a bus and he bought it and then he worked.
> Interviewer: And wait, he drove you today on the bus?
> Roey: Yes.
> Interviewer: Yes? To where?
> Roey: Home.
> Interviewer: From where.
> Roey: From, from where I learn… .
> Interviewer: So wait, your driver that drove you home from [where you learn] is a terrorist ("mehcabel")?
> Roey: Yes.
> Interviewer: And how did you know this?
> Roey: Because I saw that he runs into cars.
> […]
> Roey: He kept to, to run into and run into…he, it was on the way and all of a sudden when he got there, we start from my house so he drove

> and boom, and we jumped in my house and they went, they went to the house, to their house from my house.
> […]
> Interviewer: This is the first time he drove you home?
> Roey: Yes, yes.
> Interviewer: Who usually drives you home?
> Roey: Someone who's named, who's named Hanan.
> Interviewer: And Hanan wasn't there today?
> Roey: Hanan wasn't there today. He's also the driver I like the most.
> Interviewer: Do you know why he wasn't there today?
> Roey: No.
>
> (Roey, 6-year-old boy).

In spite of his detailed description, I do not think it's plausible that Roey actually experienced this "terrorist attack", and, in turn, had direct contact with a Palestinian "terrorist." I heard of no terror attacks like the one that he had described on the news, and his parents had mentioned nothing about it either, which presumably they would have, had it occurred that day. In addition, the details seemed very much reminiscent of the composite of an attack that had occurred a few months prior to the interview, and the related discussions in the Israeli news. Therefore, I concluded, he mixed this prior attack and news reports (or secondary information about these) with his own experiences, in order to perceive having had experienced an attack. Yet, though it seems unrealistic that Roey experienced this terrorist/freedom fighting attack, he importantly, nevertheless internalized this physical violence as something he himself was witness to, and having had to escape, as a form of contact.

Finally, with respect to reports about contact via "hearing them" out on the playgrounds, Bedouin-Palestinians from the two villages of Abu Farda and Arab ar Ramadin al-Janub, including as I observed them, are out and around the children's

playgrounds. They clean them. In relation to this, see photograph 6 in Appendix H depicting one of them taking a break from his duties. According to Sharon, Ari's mother, Palestinians day laborers are not allowed to engage in any kind of work other than construction and must be under guard at all times, whereas the Bedouin-Palestinians are allowed to "roam freely." Thus, they are the ones out cleaning. My observation of laborers out on the playgrounds also concurred with the children's reports of "hearing" them out on the playgrounds, as voiced by Rina, who, in contrast to the others, told me that the playgrounds were her favorite spots for play in Alfei (Rina, 6 -year-old girl).

Contact with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis

I was unaware of contact with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, apart from specific parental reports about friends or colleagues whom they mentioned inviting over to their homes. Overall, I believe such contact is limited.

Conflict Context

Even though the Jewish-Israeli audience members live in a zone of conflict, they do not "see" it. Life around them is "normal", it is simply "life". Thus, for example, Rina explained, without so much as blinking an eye, how every day, when she comes home after school, she goes and plays inside her family's "MAMAD". MAMAD is the acronym in Hebrew for an anti-biological and chemical warfare air-purified bomb shelter. The discussion is below.

Interviewer: Now, you told me that you're in first grade, right?
Rina: Three.

> Interviewer: First Grade [Classroom] Three… And… can you tell me what you usually do after school?
> Rina: Yes.
> Interviewer: What?
> Rina: I eat. And I eat and I watch TV and than I do homework.
> Interviewer: Ahh.
> Rina: And than I go play.
> Interviewer: And than to play. Where do you play?
> Rina: In the anti-chemical and biological warfare air purified bomb shelter ("MAMAD").
> Interviewer (raising her voice): Here, where? Where is it, the anti-biological warfare air purified bomb shelter ("MAMAD")?
> Rina: (raising her voice and laughing): Anti-biological warfare air purified bomb shelter ("MAMAD"), here is the anti-biological warfare air purified bomb shelter (MAMAD). Where you are sitting!
> (Rina, 6-year-old girl).

Thus, Rina neither thought that a bomb shelter was an odd place to play, nor that it was odd that this was the room in which she was being interviewed. For her, it simply constituted a normal playroom (Rina, 6-year-old girl). To her, it was perfectly normal, as is typical throughout Israel, to regularly use such a room without a conscious relationship to its original meaning or purpose. Consequently, the Israeli government mandated that these shelters be built inside homes following the first Gulf War, as a direct response to the threat of chemical and biological weapons posed by Iraq. Thus, as this example suggests, the conflict exists in the lives of these Jewish-Israeli children – it defines it and passes through it, but its parts are perceived as normal and everyday, in spite of what a MAMAD otherwise represents. Meanwhile, this is the so-called normalcy, which those living outside of a zone of conflict would regard as abnormal, like they would with respect to the examples discussed by the Palestinian audience with respect to their lives in Barta'a.

In her case, Rina adjusted or framed reality through the Jewish-Israeli narrative of physical violence, which seeks the goal of security. By doing so, it became possible for her to conclude that it is perfectly normal to play inside a shelter. The shelter protects her from the more wide-scale ramifications of the Arab-Israeli interstate conflict – missiles, rockets and biological attacks. A shelter is required, and so she simply takes it for granted, and does not detect its presence. It does not acquire any meaning or salience, but simply becomes an unseen aspect of "Israeli" culture.

In another example, Gali was not cognizant of the separation barrier surrounding Alfei Menashe. She, like Rina neither "saw" it. Likely, this is because, to her, it is perfectly normal to require a fence around your community in order to secure your existence. After elaborately describing the function, and usefulness of the separation barrier, when asked if she had ever seen it in Alfei, Gali replied "No." When I pushed her on the subject, and asked her whether she had perhaps seen it anywhere, anywhere at all, given that it wraps around all of Alfei Menashe, is visible a few blocks from her home, and from some playgrounds and other parts, such that she could not miss it, she still, nevertheless replied "No." (Gali, 6-year-old girl) In other words, though the fence was directly visible before her eyes, and she even drew a separation barrier (see her detailed drawing illustrated in Figure 3, Appendix I), it did *not* exist in her world. The discussion is illustrated below.

> Interviewer: Ok. Wait, what, right, you told me that you saw one of these [- pointing to Gali's drawing of the separation barrier] in real life in Israel but you don't remember where? Was it here in Alfei Menashe?

Gali: *Not* in Alfei Menashe.
Interviewer: Not in Alfei Menashe?
Gali: *No*.
Interviewer: Never—you saw one in Alfei Menashe?
Gali: (nods: *no*)

(Gali, 6-year-old girl).

Later in the interview, in response to my having asked her several times whether she had seen it anywhere at all, *ever,* she did eventually recall where she had seen it. She turned to her father and asked him by what kibbutz near Gaza had they been to where she had been exposed to the separation barrier. *There*, by Gaza, was *where*, according to her, there exists a separation barrier. So too, it exists on the Israeli news where it was depicted. However, next to her *home* – where she lives – in Alfei Menashe, it does *not* exist. See in spite of this, photograph 14 in Appendix H, illustrating how close the barrier lies, even to some of Alfei's homes.

From Gali's framing, it was a good thing – the separation barrier is a protective, not a restrictive, device (as contrasts with the Palestinian audience's perception and who did "see" it). Thus, like the Jewish-Israeli audience members who did not "see" Palestinian day laborers, Gali did not "see" a fence physically constructed around her home.

These processes of neither seeing civilian Palestinian day laborers are analogous to those practiced by the Palestinian audience members who did not see Jewish-Israeli civilians, whether they were development residents ("metyahsvim" in

Hebrew)/settlers or peace activists. Thus, it seems, as part of their interpersonal contact, these audience members neither see structures or human beings that are right in front of their eyes – even if these exist in three-dimensions, nor too, it seems, if they exist in mediated form, moving across their television screens.

Analysis

Interpretation of the Conflict Through The Jewish-Israeli Organizational Narrative, Analogous to the Palestinian Audience's Own Interpretation

The Jewish-Israeli audience interpreted the conflict through their organizational group's narrative – the prism of the Arab-Israeli interstate conflict. They did so analogously to their Palestinian counterparts who had interpreted it through their own narrative – the prism of the Israeli-Palestinian ethnopolitical conflict. However, unlike the Palestinian audience, the Jewish-Israeli audience did not necessarily interpret the text directly or entirely through their narrative organizational perspective. Instead, they interpreted the text using a greater number of factors, most prominently language and knowledge about television production conventions, and, in turn, they read these through (or alongside) their wider organizational narrative.

More specifically, the assumptions members of the Jewish-Israeli audience made about the character's identity based on whether they spoke Hebrew and about production conventions, including about the production teams, actors and production location-set, led them in many cases to use these, in combination, to identify the characters' identities. These assumptions, combined with assumptions that they are protected – whether by a security fence, or by the permit-issuing process of ensuring that only "good" or "safe," Arabs can enter Israel, or Alfei specifically, led the members of the Jewish-Israeli audience to conclude that characters in Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* were not "Israeli" (Jewish-Israeli), because the production is

Israeli. And since, according to the Jewish-Israeli audience "Israelis" care about them, the producers, they concluded, would not allow non-Israelis onto the set.

Why did these audiences deploy different decoding strategies to interpret the text? A number of reasons can be used to explain why the Palestinian audience employed different decoding strategies from the Jewish-Israeli audience. Among these, one interpretation is that they differed because Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians are fundamentally different from one another in primordial terms. A second and more likely interpretation is that they differed because Jewish-Israelis are a state bearing nation and the latter a stateless nation. A third and also more likely interpretation is that they differed because Jewish-Israelis, as a statebearing nation, are nationalizing and so any infringement of the nation – for example by not speaking the national language, or speaking it "incorrectly" with an "accent" is not only considered an affront but also a threat to the very essence of the nation and status as the statebearing nation.

Conversely, perhaps, Jewish-Israelis, like their Palestinian counterparts, also interpreted at least the identity of the characters directly through their own narrative. While, in contrast to the Jewish-Israeli audience, the Palestinian audience did not use language to help them figure out that the characters they saw in the show were Palestinians (but rather, only to explain, in response to questions, why characters could not be "Jews"), language nevertheless was not just playing a functional role for them. Rather, it was playing a cultural role. The Jewish-Israeli audience has learned to pay attention and even notice that Arabic is relevant precisely because of the conflict.

When they say that they heard an "accent", this means that they heard an accent different from their own. This could mean a Palestinian-Arabic "accent" or a Russian "accent", both of which they can hear in Alfei or via mediated form on television. Russian however, while potentially signifying a foreigner, an immigrant, or "other" to the Jewish-Israeli audience never, however, signifies "the enemy." And even if the Jewish-Israeli audience did know the language was called "Arabic", it may, in addition, still have clearly signified to them, "that language which is spoken by the enemy."

This last interpretation relates to Carol Padden and Tom Humphries discussion about how "Deaf" children distinguish hearing people. They do so on the basis of language cues. In their case, they do so by making sense of whether people move their mouths (as opposed to sign) (Padden and Humphries, 1988). Thus, like "Deaf" children, the Jewish-Israeli audience distinguished between people based on these clear functional features – whether and how they spoke Hebrew. However, their ability to draw these distinctions rested on more than just functional features having to do with "proper" speaking of Hebrew. It rested on cultural assumptions, as Padden and Humphries demonstrate with respect to "Deaf" children and their own culture.

Understanding what constitutes an "Arab" accent, let alone even noticing it is part and parcel of the Jewish-Israeli cultural narrative, given that it counters the national narrative. Similarly, being primed to "look for" Arabic, rather than Russian or other "accented" languages, has assumed a salient cultural meaning. Looking for "Arabic" is equally a part of Jewish-Israeli culture in this respect, as looking for

"Hebrew" is within Palestinian and Arab/Palestinian-Israeli culture. However, as the statebearing nation, language is something the Jewish-Israeli audience wishes to maintain, as part of the practice of nationalizing itself. If another language is spoken, or if the national language is spoken "incorrectly" – i.e. with an accent, apparently this may constitute a threat to the nation which draws attention.

While language is an equally important factor for members of the Palestinian nation – whether Palestinian or Arab/Palestinian-Israeli, it, as demonstrated with respect to the Palestinian audience in Barta'a, was apparently less salient than it was to the Jewish-Israeli audience (and as we shall see, to the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience). In short, the Jewish-Israeli audience in this respect can be argued to, like their Palestinian counterparts, have in fact made *direct* use of their narrative for the purpose of drawing meanings from the text of the *Sesame Street* programs. On the other hand, those among the Jewish-Israeli audience who did not know the name for Arabic were precisely those who converted Palestinian and Arab/Palestinian-Israeli characters to Jewish-Israelis. Therefore, it may rather be, that in contrast to the Palestinian audience, they rather only made *indirect* use of their narrative.

Differences in the attitudes adopted by the Palestinian and Jewish- Israeli audiences towards their "others" and "shared others". Furthermore, recall that 25% of the Jewish-Israeli audience adopted positive attitudes towards characters they identified as their Palestinian others, in contrast to the 20% of the Palestinian audience members who instead hedged the identity of "Jews" to only adopt a positive attitude towards *partial Jews*.

In this case, there are two possible explanations for the different attitudes they adopted towards the textual representation of their “others”. One reason might be that Jewish-Israelis are less prejudiced then Palestinians towards those they define as their partner to conflict, similar to other statebearing nations, given that they have already achieved statehood – or a status quo, which they wish to maintain. In the Jewish-Israeli case this, for example, includes having day laborers who work *for* them, rather than the reverse. Alternatively and/or in addition, it may be that Palestinians, like other stateless nations who have not yet achieved their goals, engage in greater degrees of false polarization, as part and parcel of their efforts to achieve statehood (like their Jewish-Israeli counterparts and other statebearing nations who tried to do so before them).

Finally, recall that a *majority* of Jewish-Israeli audience members adopted positive attitudes towards characters they defined as their shared others – Arab/Palestinian-Israelis (and non-Palestinian Arabs), in contrast with the Palestinian audience who *all* adopted positive attitudes, in their case towards “Arabs”.

The explanation for this may be that Palestinians are less prejudiced than Jewish-Israelis towards those whom they define, as part and parcel of the conflict, to be their “shared other.” Alternatively, and/or in addition, it may be that Jewish-Israelis, despite the fact that they share their citizenship with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, do not perceive this to be as important as Palestinians do, with respect to sharing a national identity. Moreover, Jewish-Israelis may not per se wish to share aspects of their identity with them, and in brief, not define them to be a middle ground, or as

some kind of “shared others”, despite the fact that they correlate with them along one axes, while the Palestinians correlate along another.

Chapter 8: Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Reception of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*

The State Minority as an Audience

Historical Narrative Vantage Point Vis-À-Vis The Conflict

As minority citizens of a state, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis classify as minorities at risk (Gurr, 2000). They seek *equality ("mu'adel"* in Arabic*),* or the elimination of structural violence through the establishment of equal rights, (relative to the statebearing nation). As such, they seek to be treated as "ordinary" or "regular" citizens (as opposed to, for example, "special" citizens who have regional autonomy within a state, as some state minorities instead desire). Arab/Palestinian-Israelis comprise 20% (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2006), or about 1.4 million members, of the state of Israel. Amongst them, 83% are Muslim, 8.5% Christian and 8.3% Druze (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2006). From the vantage point of their narrative, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis interpret "the conflict" mainly through the lens of the Israeli-Palestinian ethnopolitical conflict. However, contrary to common assumptions, whereby they are viewed as an appendage of the Palestinians, they, unlike them, interpret the conflict from the specific perspective of "48," not "67" Arabs (i.e. "Arab saba'a wa'sateen" in Arabic).

From the perspective of Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, the "67 Arabs" (which are pejoratively termed so) are Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. They became "occupied" by Israel following the 1967/Six-Day War and are today citizens of the Palestinian Authority.

In contrast, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis perceive themselves to be neither represented by Israel, nor by the Palestinian Authority. As a bi-product of the signing of the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in effect

relinquished their right to represent Palestinians in Israel. (Ghanem, 1996) At the time, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis were generally supportive of this progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front of "the conflict." However, they received it with mixed apprehension, because it in effect determined their final status as the "unrepresented", "forgotten", or at best, "less represented" minority. More recently, since the construction of the separation barrier and the resultant marked decrease in contact between them and their Palestinian family members outside of Israel proper, they have in effect become a truly distinct ethnopolitical group.

Arab/Palestinian-Israelis view themselves as *victims, but in relative terms*. In other words, vis-à-vis Jewish-Israelis, who are the aggressors, they are the victim, but only relative to the Palestinians, who are more victims than they (see Totry, forthcoming, in relation to this discussion). At the same time, to a lesser degree, and depending upon which members of this ethnopolitical group one is considering, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis also view the conflict through the Arab-Israeli interstate narrative. In the quantitative surveys assessed by As'ad Ghanem (Ghanem, 2002) or Nadim Rouhana (Rouhana, 1997), those that self-identify themselves as "Arab", rather than "Palestinian", may be more indicative of those who view the conflict through the Arab-Israeli interstate narrative. As citizens of Israel, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis have been subjected to the same attacks as Jewish-Israelis during wars with Arab states, and in addition, to attacks by Palestinian terrorists/martyrs. Thus, during the second Palestinian uprising, among the 1,017 Israelis killed through 2006, as a rough estimate, thirty-eight of these were Arab/Palestinian-Israelis.[124]

As MARs, per definition, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis suffer from political, economic and social discrimination. From their point of view, *politically*, discrimination is expressed in relation to unequal access to the conferral of *city* status. When communities in which Arab/Palestinian-Israelis reside are not recognized as cities (but rather instead, for example, only as villages, despite their land and/or population size), the result, in turn, is economic discrimination. The communities receive reduced access to land and water resources, or worse, if altogether "unrecognized", they receive no access to these resources. The latter communities, not recognized as being any political unit whatsoever, are also, in turn, subjected to home-demolitions. Under Israeli law, if they reside on land on which they have no right to establish infrastructure and reside, these, in turn, can "naturally" be subjected to demolition. (See $Adalah_1$ for related court cases and discussions related to home demolitions). In addition, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis suffer politically, with respect to property rights (for instance home ownership) over properties they acquired prior to 1948, as well as in relation to efforts to obtain citizenship for their non-Israeli spouses.

From the vantage point of their narrative, *economically,* Arab/Palestinian-Israelis suffer from discrimination in job and housing opportunities that are meted out at the individual level. Employment positions that require security clearance in Israel are only given to those who have served in Israel's compulsory army. The majority (or *very roughly* at least 90% of Arab/Palestinian-Israelis) do not however serve in the Israeli army.[125] As a result, the bulk are subject to career restrictions, as most clearly manifested in their low per capita rate of employment in Israeli civil service positions.

Similarly, this same criteria for required military service is at times also used to bar access to home ownership and rentals.

Meanwhile, with respect to the Arab-Israeli interstate conflict, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, at the same time, suffer economically from boycotts targeted against Israel, with any loss of export revenues and investment funds impacting all Israeli citizens, regardless of their ethnopolitical identity, in the same way.

Socially, including symbolically, from their perspective, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis suffer from prejudice with respect to the features of Jewish nationalism in public life that manifests itself in the Israeli national anthem and flag. These symbols purport to represent all Israeli citizens, but instead serve as products produced by the nationalizing statebearing nation – to, like other statebearing nations - represent *itself.*

Meanwhile, with respect to the Arab-Israeli interstate conflict, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis are at times also subject to the same travel restrictions as their Jewish counterparts, including those to entering Arab states. Individuals in these other states are not always familiar with their existence in the first place, namely that there exist non-Jewish citizens of Israel, and may instead assume them to be Arab Jews, which in turn denies them their ethnopolitical identity and entry.

Arab/Palestinian-Israelis also suffer *militarily*. Military discrimination is most clearly expressed, according to the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli narrative, with respect to the lack of equal access to police protection Arab/Palestinian-Israelis receive. Contrary to the findings of the state's Or Commission that purported to address this problem, it failed to do so effectively (if even at all). (See Adalah's legal criticism of the Or

Commission as being too little too late in Dalal, 2003; and, independently of this, that of the Mossawa Center on their website, for more on this topic).

Secondly, with respect to the Arab-Israeli interstate conflict and Israel's quantitative disadvantage, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis are subject to missile attacks, and, independently of this, Palestinian terror/freedom fighting attacks. With respect to these military-related ramifications, they find themselves caught in an awkward position with respect to such attacks. They choose to support freedom for their relatives, but not necessarily at the cost of their own lives. Therefore, at times, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis are at a loss for words about how to in fact respond.

With respect to their organizational or representatives' goals towards (resolving) the conflict, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis seek to retain those political, economic, social and military rights they already have and obtain those that they do not. On the one hand, they are endowed with voting rights and the standing of Arabic as an official language, which they seek to retain. On the other hand, they desire politically equal access to land and water resources, an end to home demolitions, and the same full rights to property ownership as those they perceive have been provided to Jewish-Israelis, and equal immigration rights for their spouses. In terms of economics, thy desire equal access to housing and job opportunities, including with respect to the latter, the elimination of the prerequisite that one perform military service in order to obtain access to jobs which require security clearance.

In terms of social-symbolic concerns, they would like the Israeli national anthem and flag to eliminate references to Judaism, and Arabic to be more actively

used in *practice*. Finally, with respect to military matters, they seek security - to be *protected* by, rather than *targeted* by the police. Their desire for protection includes an end to what they perceive to be discriminatory that have resulted in 38 deaths between 2000 and 2006 by the Israeli police, security personnel and army (Mossawa, 2008). In addition, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis desire an end to both the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Arab-Israeli conflict in order to resolve Palestinian freedom fighting/terrorism and the threat of Arab state attacks altogether. With respect to the latter, in particular, harm from missile attacks, they also seek equal military protection via an increase in the number of bomb shelters available in their communities.

Consequently, it is important to mention that, in very rough terms, an equal number of Arab/Palestinian-Israelis have been killed by Israeli armed forces (mainly by the police) as have been killed by Palestinian terrorists/freedom fighters during the second Palestinian uprising. This reality summarizes the Arab/Palestinian interest, regardless of organizational political vocalized stances in favor of the Palestinians (more typically), or the Israelis. They seek an end to both these conflicts, once and for all.

Arab/Palestinian-Israeli City in the Triangle Region/Wadi Ara

The Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience of *Sesame Street* (i.e. Palestinian *Shara'a Simsim and Hikayat Simsim)* in my study was comprised of 5- to 8-year-old residents of the state minority city of Uhm Al-Fahm. Just after Nazareth, Uhm Al-Fahm is the second largest ethnopolitically Arab city in Israel. It is located in the Triangle Region/Wadi Ara, roughly between the central and northern parts of Israel. It is mainly surrounded by Arab/Palestinian-Israeli villages, and, to a lesser extent, by Jewish-Israelis communities. The latter largely take the form of collective (traditionally farming) communities ("kibbutzim" in Hebrew).

The population of Uhm Al-Fahm is 53,000.[126] Thirty-one percent of its residents are aged nine and below. Fifteen percent are aged five to nine (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005b), from which I derived my 5- to 8-year-old sample. Ninety-nine percent of the city is Muslim (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005b). The average monthly income in 2002 was 3,201 NIS (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004c). This income amounted to $675 (according to a 4.74 mean exchange rate in 2002, retrieved from x.rates.com, 2002). In 2003, the average monthly income was 3,357 NIS (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005b).

Uhm Al-Fahm was founded in the year 1265 (Gan-Mor and Previs, 1998). In 1984, Israel conferred municipal status upon it, which, in this case, classified it as a city. (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2005b). Uhm Al-Fahm is divided into four main neighborhoods – Mhagne, Mhameed, Jabareen, and Egbaria. Egbaria, which is the largest of the four neighborhoods, includes Ein Ibrahim, a sports stadium, and

Kina. Kina serves as the entrance to the city and includes in it a large shopping area. See Photograph 1 in Appendix K for a look at Kina. Each of the four neighborhoods represent an extended family, after whom the neighborhood, and in turn, all its residents, until the late 1990s, continued to be named (despite the fact that in present times they were not necessarily related) (See Jabareen, 1998a and 1999b; Palestinian Encyclopedia, 1986 for a history of the city).

Uhm Al-Fahm is considered to be the headquarters of the Northern Islamic Movement of Israel, under the leadership of Sheikh Ra'id Salah, the former Mayor of Uhm Al-Fahm. The Northern Movement split from the Islamic Movement – thereby creating a Northern branch - in May 1996 (Aburaiya, 2004). At the time, the Islamic Movement (now the Southern Branch) decided to participate in the then fourteenth Israeli parliamentary ("Knesset" in Hebrew) elections. The Northern branch instead decided to continue to boycott Israeli elections and have, since then, come to be considered the more radical of the two branches. The Northern branch operates from the outside rather than from the inside of the Israeli government process.

From the perspective of *Fahmouweeys* - the term residents of Uhm Al-Fahm used to describe themselves, and the local Arab/Palestinian-Israeli villages in the triangle who are dependent on Uhm Al-Fahm as its feeder city - Salah is seen as having successfully dispatched his youth to collect charity ("izaka" in Arabic) for the needy, and literally and figuratively, to have cleaned up the streets of Uhm Al-Fahm from drugs, crime and rubbish.

This high-density city is comprised of winding, narrow, and largely unplanned streets. Monies collected by Salah's youth have been donated to individuals in need, and to help re-pave the streets and to improve local infrastructure. Per capita, each resident uses 63 micro-cubic meters of water (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005b). This amount of water usage, by way of one comparison, amounts to only 62% of that which Alfei Menashe's estimated population of 5,300 residents (or 10% of Uhm Al-Fahm's total resident size population, as of the 2003 estimate) used in that same year (See Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005a for estimate of Alfei Menashe's population).

The size and condition of the houses in Uhm Al-Fahm varies considerably within the city. Separate of this, there are more than fourteen mosques (1991 and 1994 figures from Jaffa Research Centre, 1991, and Uhm Al-Fahm City Council, 1994, respectively) with plans to build more. The mosques prominently dot the landscape of the city, one example of which can be seen in Photograph 2 Appendix K, which depicts the Abu-Obeida Mosque. Abu-Obeida, the most famous among them, can be seen from many parts throughout Uhm Al-Fahm.

In October 2000, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis rose-up/rioted in solidarity with the Al-Aqsa, or second Palestinian Uprising ("Intifadah" in Arabic) against "Zionist Occupation". The uprising/rioting took place on the outskirts of the city, along Hwy 65, within Uhm Al-Fahm and six other Arab/Palestinian-Israeli communities. During the October Events ("Eiroueh October," as they became popularly known in Hebrew), two of its residents were killed by Israeli police. The two, Mohammed Ahmed

Jabareen and Misleh Hussein Abu Jarad[127] (Adalah$_2$), were among a total of 13 unarmed citizens killed during those events.

Consequently, since then, the look of Uhm Al-Fahm had come to reflect a seemingly more religious appearance. Most pointedly, as one measure, women had begun to more commonly wear headscarves ("ahjab" in Arabic). Previously, however, it had been less common for them to do so. According to the women with whom I spoke, this choice was rather a mark of their increased levels of cultural identification with the Palestinians. It was *not* something they donned because of an increase in their levels of religiosity. To drive home their point, they noted that they opted for colorful scarves over white – and more religiously symbolic – head-coverings. Also worth mentioning is that by their emphasizing this point, especially given that I did not specifically ask them what symbolic meaning they ascribed to the headscarves they wore, they were dialogically responding to assumptions being commonly made by Jewish-Israelis about their city having become both more fundamentalist, and politically so.

Community-Based Facilities and Resources for Children

There exists a mixture of federal and private federally subsidized schools and nursery schools in the city for its children. The city includes four high schools comprised of a total of 2,230 students, three junior high schools comprised of a total of 2,865 students, and twelve elementary schools, including two special education schools, which all together serve 6,008 students. The latter includes 1,107 pupils who are in first grade, 1,096 who are in second grade and 1,028 in third grade. Finally,

there also exist 120 kindergarten and pre-kindergarten (including nursery school) classes, three of which are run by the private nursery school foundation Dar Al-Tifl. Apart from a limited number of children enrolled in special education classes, there are 1,296 5-year-olds enrolled in all these pre-kindergarten classes in total (Jabareen, 2006, author interview). Meanwhile, the mean average number of children in each of these classes in Uhm Al-Fahm is roughly thirty per class (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005b). Compare this for instance to the lower, but nearly identical figure, in Alfei Menashe (*at thirty-two*).

The children in my study came from a combination of the first through third graders from the ten elementary schools and the private nursery schools. With respect to the latter, the children I sampled were the older siblings of children who attended Dar Al-Tifl (See Photographs 3 and 4 depicting parent's day at Dar Al-Tifl in Appendix K for a view of this nursery school).

As is customary for the majority of Arab/Palestinian-Israelis throughout Israel, the children in the Uhm Al-Fahm schools are educated in Arabic. From grades three onwards, they begin studying in Hebrew. The Head of the city's Education Department, Mahmood Jabareen, explained to me that there is interest among Fahmouweeys, however, to try to have some already start learning Hebrew in grade two (Jabareen, 2006, author interview). Finally, the majority of the children study within Uhm Al-Fahm, with the exception of approximately 250 students, who study in Haifa or Nazareth for example (Jabareen, 2006, author interview).

Parks and playgrounds are far and few within Uhm Al-Fahm. More than three of the former exist (Uhm Al-Fahm City Council, 1994). More recently, however, private foundations have begun to build playgrounds and parks (for example, Sikkuy's Friend's park project), but these were still not widespread. I otherwise observed children, in particular *boys,* playing in the street or at home.[128]

Limited to No Contact Opportunities with Jewish-Israelis or Palestinians

Jewish-Israelis rarely came to Uhm Al-Fahm during the period of my study. This trend grew considerably more pronounced following the October 2000 events. Meanwhile, the city's children rarely left Uhm Al-Fahm, given that, for all intents and purposes, the city is fully self-sufficient. On a regular basis, all the children's activities take place solely within the community (i.e. school, shopping and game playing). Meanwhile, since the construction of the separation barrier in the vicinity of Uhm Al-Fahm (or what amounted to the exact same fence that surrounds East Barta'a), the contact between residents of Uhm Al-Fahm and the Palestinians has decreased dramatically.

Relations with Jewish-Israelis from the Perspective of Uhm Al-Fahm. During the course of the fieldwork, in some respects, Fahmouweeys were trying to re-establish relations with Jewish-Israelis. This took on the form, primarily of the, "Bring Back Tourism to the Wadi" campaign. Residents were trying to encourage Jewish-Israelis to return as patrons to their local restaurants. The internal response to this campaign, or moreover, trying to encourage Jewish-Israelis to come to Uhm Al-Fahm, or simply be in contact with Fahmouweeys, was mixed. On the one had, some local

efforts existed, such as a joint Jewish-Arab Library project, and a well established effort on the part of Abu Shakra's Art Gallery to attract Jewish-Israeli artists and patrons to his gallery.

On the other hand, however, many residents were less than thrilled with these relations or wanted them to stop at their door, literally – at restaurants based at the foot of the entrance to the city - and not necessarily go beyond it. Residents spoke of their opinions that Jewish-Israelis entered the city only when it was time to enforce the payment of taxes to the state, and in turn often stereotyped visits by Jewish-Israelis to be for these reasons alone. Alternatively, they viewed Jewish-Israelis as policing the city to protect the interests of Jewish-Israelis, not Arab/Palestinian-Israeli residents of the city. In response to the latter - though more directly to the October Events - a new police station headquarters for the Triangle Region/Wadi Ara was set up on the edge of Uhm Al-Fahm during the period of fieldwork. From their perspective, the residents wanted a police force that would not just protect *against* them, but also serve them.

Limited to No Contact with Palestinians

Since the completion of the separation barrier in the region, contact between residents of Uhm Al-Fahm and Palestinians became very limited. Contact extended to occasional visits from relatives (provided they received permits from the Israeli army to visit), day laborers (provided they evaded the Israeli army and border police) and street children, who were regularly visible at the entrance to the city. The latter stand out on street near Uhm Al-Fahm's entrance from highway 65 to request donations for money from residents as they drive out.

Relations with Palestinians, from the Perspective of Uhm Al-Fahm. Residents regard themselves as being Palestinian, and in many cases identify as such *more* consciously than do the Palestinians themselves. Furthermore, they identify themselves culturally with them. However, at the same time, Fahmouweeys view Palestinians as somehow beneath them – "less educated", "less clean" and "less modern."

Uhm Al-Fahm from the Perspective of Jewish-Israelis

To Jewish-Israelis, Uhm Al-Fahm represents the seat of Palestinian nationalism within Israel, and, in particular, that from an Islamic religious extremist position. Salah, who was imprisoned in Israel for 2 years on charges of transferring funds to Hamas and having had contact with an Iranian foreign agent in May 2003 (Druckman, 2005), is typically viewed by Jewish-Israelis as "the enemy within" and a source of collusion between Palestinian "terrorists". The Jewish-Israeli viewpoint that the city plays a role in terrorism became especially pronounced during the second Palestinian uprising. This viewpoint developed, on the one hand, as a result of attacks that occurred just outside of the city or along highway 65, where the city is used as an identifying marker amidst all the much smaller towns and villages next to it on either side along the highway. Thus for, example, in September 2002, an Islamic Jihad suicide bomber blew himself up at a bus-stop located at the junction of Uhm Al-Fahm, killing Israeli police Sergeant Moshe Hezkiyah. Jewish-Israelis, meanwhile, widely viewed the suicide bomber as a terrorist who received help in carrying out the attack from Uhm Al-Fahm residents (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website).

At the same time, Jewish-Israelis also derived their impression of Uhm Al-Fahm as a "Palestinian terrorist aiding community" as a result of the direct assistance individual residents provided to terrorists, regardless of the location of where an attack took place. Thus, for example, in October 2003, Jamal Mhagne, an Uhm Al-Fahm resident drove a separate Islamic Jihad suicide bomber to her destination - the Maxim restaurant in Haifa – where she, in turn, killed 21 Israelis[129] (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004).[130]

Similarly, Uhm Al-Fahm, is commonly viewed by Jewish-Israelis as the primary root, or cause of the October 2000 riots ("mehoumout" in Hebrew), because they consider the city to be the seat of incitement for Palestinians in Israel – "Israeli-Arabs" ("Aravim-Israelim" in Hebrew). The city annually hosts a "Save Al-Aqsa" Mosque day, which Jewish-Israelis view (alongside the city itself) with apprehension as a threat to state security. Finally, the city has come to be interpreted by Jewish-Israelis as religiously fundamentalist (if not also politically so), per the choice of women to don headscarves, and the prominent place mosques visibly assume in the city's landscape, on top of their sheer number (despite their per capita relationship to the 53,000 residents of the city).[131]

Uhm Al-Fahm from the Perspective of Palestinians

From the Palestinian perspective, Fahmouweeys, to some extent, are viewed like other Arab/Palestinian-Israelis as "67 Arabs" ("Arab saba'a wa'sateen" in Arabic") who did not resist "Zionist colonization". In contrast, Palestinians view

themselves as proudly continuing to resist “the occupation” (“ehtelal” in Arabic), while Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, in effect, have continued to accept it.

Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Reception Analysis: Adopted and Negotiated the Text Accepted but Also Folded Their "Shared Others" Into Their Own Group

All the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members - the children in Uhm Al-Fahm included in my study - interpreted there to be "Arab" characters in *Sesame Street.* However, only 50% clearly interpreted there to be Jewish-Israelis (whom they referred to as "Jews)". Additionally, only a minority (30%) interpreted there to have been Palestinians. Most typically, the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members converted Jewish-Israeli characters into "Arabs" (whom they interpreted to be Arab/Palestinian-Israelis like themselves). Meanwhile, conversely, they converted the Palestinian characters into "Arabs". In other words, they narrowed the options available to them in the text to mainly reflect their own group.

Decoding the Logic Employed by the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Audience for Reading "Arabs"

Language based assumptions. The majority (or 75%) of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience who provided a clear answer said that the characters were "Arab" because of the language they spoke. In some cases, they explained it was because they spoke Arabic, while in other cases, it was rather because they spoke Hebrew. With respect to the latter, they explained that if the characters spoke Hebrew (specifically in addition to Arabic), they were, therefore, "Arab". Thus, for example, when asked about the identity of the Palestinian character Adel, who Saida converted to an "Arab", including how she knew he was Arab, she replied that it was because "he speaks Arabic (Arabi)." In response, the interviewer followed-up with "OK, tell me, are all

Arabs (Arab) like him?" to which Saida, in turn, replied "yeah", because "the Arab (Arab) learns Hebrew (Ibrani)". The Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members' rationale for these language justifications might perhaps have been, the result of their assumption that Palestinians, in contrast, only speak Arabic. Therefore, these audience members could have then distinguished Palestinians from "Arabs" (and from themselves) in this way.

Visual attributes-based assumptions**, **including a lack of police uniforms to indicate that characters were "Arab" and not "Jewish". The remaining minority (20%) of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience mentioned either physical attire or racial features as their rationale for deducing that characters in Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* were "Arab". Among the latter group, Mustafa specifically said that all the characters were "Arab" because they weren't wearing police or soldiers' uniforms like "Jews" do. One illustrative example, whereby Mustafa used the logic that if the characters were *not* dressed as police officers, they could *not* be Jews, is included in the dialogue below.

> Interviewer: How did you know he was Arab [referring to the Jewish-Israeli character Adam]?
> Mustafa: His clothes.
> Interviewer: So what about his clothes? Tell me about them?
> Mustafa: His clothes are *Arab.*
> Interviewer: What does that mean – Arab – how?
> Mustafa: His clothes are *not* like the police ("shurtee").
>
> (Mustafa, 5-year-old boy)

Converting Jewish-Israeli Characters to "Arabs", or Arab/Palestinian-Israelis

Similarly to the Palestinian audience members, the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience also converted Jewish-Israeli characters along a continuum from the national to the civic axis. The members of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience altered *only* the national identity of Jewish-Israelis. By converting Jewish-Israelis into Arab/Palestinian-Israelis they, in turn, maintained the civic identity with which these characters had been encoded – Israeli.

Roughly two-thirds, it appeared, said characters were Jewish due to the language they spoke. The remaining roughly one-third said that characters were either Jewish because of their physical attire or racial features, or "because the characters said so" – i.e. that they were "Jewish", in the program, similar to how members of the Jewish-Israeli audience had responded when using this same decoding rationale.

Converted Palestinian Characters to "Arabs", or Arab/Palestinian-Israelis

In the same way that they practiced conversion with the Jewish-Israeli characters, the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience converted the Palestinian characters along a continuum, in their case from the civic to the national axis. In the case of the Palestinian characters, the Arab/Palestinian-Israelis altered only their civic identity to retain their national identity as "Arabs".

Accepting the Text's Ascription of Pro-Social, Nice Jewish (-Israeli) and Palestinian Characters

Attitudes. The majority of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience who provided a clear answer (amounting to at least 67% from among them), adopted positive attitudes towards *all* the characters in the text. In other words, the Arab/Palestinian-

Israeli audience tended to adopt positive attitudes towards *both* of their “shared others” – the “Jewish” and “Palestinian characters” – which they had not erased from the text (or at least included when inaccurately labeling characters’ identities). In other words, the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members, including the 50% who clearly decoded as “Jews”, and 30% who decoded Palestinians, tended to hold positive attitudes towards all the characters, including these Jewish and Palestinian characters they “noticed”.

Specifically, among those who decoded “Jews” from the text, 80% said that all these “Jewish” characters were “good”. This included 20% (from among all those who decoded Jews) who made an isolated negative comment about an *individual* Jewish character who they thought was “bad” in some way. This 20%, however, made it clear that the remaining “Jews” were in contrast “good”. Finally, the remaining 20% of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members who decoded “Jews” said that they were “bad”.

From among those Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members who decoded Palestinians from the text, 100% said they were “good”. Sixty-six percent of them (from among the 100%) made an isolated negative comment about an *individual* Palestinian character that they thought was “bad” in some way. This 66%, however, made it clear that the remaining Palestinians (as was the case about the “Jewish” characters described above), in contrast, were “good.

Linguistic Interpretations

All the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members interpreted Arabic to have been spoken in the program, in addition to a second language. Sixty-percent of them interpreted that language to have been Hebrew [which included one audience member, Reem, whom, however, said she heard Hebrew, in addition, to a third language (Reem, 7-year-old girl)]. The remaining minority referred to that *other* language as “English”, “German”, “Jewish,” or simply did not label it.

Thus, like the Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian audience members, the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience decoded the fact that two languages were spoken out of the text. In the case of the Arab/Palestinian audience, however, in contrast, the majority (60%) was, in addition, able to correctly label the language. As an aside, two of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members who mentioned that “Hebrew” (“Ibrani” in Arabic) was spoken in Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street,* nevertheless, did not identify that there were “Jews” in the program. However, since most Arab/Palestinian-Israelis speak Hebrew (in addition to Arabic), this criterion alone would not necessarily have signified to them that the characters were in fact Jewish-Israelis. Moreover, given their ethnopolitical group’s much greater facility with both languages, rather than only one of them, it makes more sense that they *all* recognized that Arabic specifically was being spoken, and also that the *majority* recognized that, in addition, Hebrew, was being spoken in Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street.*

Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Audience Construction of Their "Shared Others"'

Audience Members – Jewish-Israelis: "Speak Another Language, Non-Believer/Bad People/Police"

Constructs of the "Shared Others": Jewish-Israelis

Fifty-percent of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience constructed "Jews" to be non-Muslims and or non-believers or infidels ("kafirs" in Arabic), just as the Palestinian audience had. Meanwhile, another fifty-percent constructed them as being inherently bad people. "Jews", they explained, are those who make war, fight, or are the "police" ("shurtee" in Arabic). Notably, in contrast to the Palestinian sample, they did not readily make use of the term "army" ("jayshe" in Arabic) or "soldiers" ("jundi" in Arabic). An exception was Mamoon who said that "Israelis" (not necessarily Jews/Jewish-Israelis) make war, therefore, Israelis, specifically men, are *sometimes* soldiers (Mamoon, 7-year old boy).

Additionally, a majority (63%) made use of a neutral category. That is, like what the minority (30%) of Jewish-Israelis said about their *"others"* - "Arabs", or "Bad Arabs" - the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience explained about this *"shared other"* that "Jews", specifically, speak another language. When explaining this, these Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience member referred to this other language as "Hebrew", "English", or as simply a "foreign language", or as Abeer said, that they speak with a "kaf" and a chaf". (Abeer, 6 year-old girl).

Among this majority, 50% did not, *in addition*, include one of the aforementioned negative constructs (e.g. that Jews are inherently bad) in their

definition of “Jews”. The Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience most likely decoded the program as in fact having Jewish characters because they so commonly constructed “Jews” as those who speak a foreign language.

Negative to very negative attitudes towards the “shared others”: “Jews”*, or *Jewish-Israelis. The attitudes that the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience held towards “Jews” ranged from *negative* to *very negative*. This is interesting to note, considering that the vast majority of the audience (80%), nevertheless, interpreted Jewish characters, to be “nice” or “good” people.

Hassan, however, did for example mention that *one* of the Jewish-Israeli characters, in contrast to the others, was “ugly” (Hassan, 7-year-old boy). This comment, however, did not differ, or rather, was “balanced-out” by another comment he made about *one* of several Palestinian characters, as for example, being “annoying”. In other words, in the few exceptions where the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members adopted negative attitudes or stereotypes about a “Jewish” character in Israeli and Palestinian Sesame Street, they did not adopt this towards all characters who they labeled “Jewish”. Rather (1) they held negative attitudes or stereotypes about *individual* characters, (2) expressed these about both *either* “shared others” and neither (3) much more so or less than they did about their own group. That is, Reem, for example, made an isolated negative comment about one of the “Arab” characters too (Reem, 7-year-old girl).

Generalized attitudes towards the “shared others”: “Jews”*, or *Jewish-Israelis. After concluding that characters could be both “Jewish” and “good” the

Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience, in turn, did *not* proceed to comment about how these characters were not representative of “Jews”, in general. Rather, they were able to generalize the attitude they adopted towards “Jewish” characters and the mediated contact they had observed or experienced towards “Jews” as a whole, by which they were referring to Jewish-Israelis.

Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Audience Construction of Their Other “Shared Others”’

Audience Members – Palestinians: “Dirty, Primitive/Live in Palestine

Constructs of The Other “Shared Others”: Palestinians

At least 50% of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience provided clear answers that constructed Palestinians as behaving or being “primitive” wearing “dirty” clothes and being “poor”. See how, as in a related example, Saida, who in an effort to explain that Palestinians are more traditional, in contrast with both “Arabs” and “Jews” (whom she considered modern, like herself) drew the former in more “primitive” traditional Islamic religious dress, and the latter in more “modern” clothes. (Figure 1, Appendix L, drawing by Saida, 8-year-old girl), Other members of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience, meanwhile, also constructed Palestinians neutrally as those who, for example, live in Palestine.

“Palestinians get shot at by the Army, or they are the army”. Finally, in isolated cases, Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members provided varied (and in some cases, it appears, transposed) answers. These included, in one instance Abeer who, for example, made use of the semi-neutral or derogatory category of infidels or

non-believers to label Palestinians, which these audience members otherwise typically reserved for "Jews" (Abeer, 6-year-old girl). While in another single instance, Mustafa constructed Palestinians, as the victims, explaining that they get shot at by the army (Mustafa, 5-year-old boy), or, in a final instance**,** as rather, the aggressors because *they* are also the army, as constructed by Mamoon (Mamoon, 7-year-old boy).

Decoding the logic employed by the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience for reading Palestinians. It is difficult to make sense of why the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members decoded Palestinian characters from the text when they did. It is difficult for two reasons. First, they did not always provide a justification for why they in fact did or did not "see" Palestinians in the text in the first place. Second, their answers all varied, one from the other, and considering that only a minority (30%) decoded Palestinians from the text, this variance meant that it was difficult to draw any real conclusion as to why the audience as a whole did not, versus did, decode them. For example, Hassan explained that a given character was Palestinian because he was from "Pakistan" (Hassan, 7-year-old boy). While this answer is difficult to interpret in the first place, he in addition was in fact referring to a Jewish-Israeli character. In other words, even though Hassan provided a justification for his reasoning, it still proved difficult to make sense of what logic he was employing.

Neutral Attitudes Towards the Other "Shared Other": Palestinians. The attitudes the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience held towards Palestinians ranged from *very positive* to *very negative*. The mean of all their scores indicated that they held *neutral attitudes* towards them. By comparison, the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience

adopted positive attitudes towards the vast majority of the characters in the text, including towards the Palestinian characters the minority of them decoded. Thus for example, Ibrahim said all the characters he labeled as Palestinian were "good", and did not, thereafter, hedge to somehow alter these characters' identities. He labeled Ibtisam (encoded, however, as an Arab/Palestinian-Israeli character) and Haneen (encoded as a Palestinian character) as both good. (Ibrahim, 6-year-old boy).

Generalization of Attitudes Towards the Other "Shared Other": Palestinians. Finally, these Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members generalized the positive attitudes they adopted towards the characters that they labeled Palestinians (even when the characters were not necessarily Palestinians) towards Palestinians as a whole. They did not say the "good" ones were exceptions to the rule. Rather, in contrast, when the majority (66%) had made a negative comment about a character, they made clear that it was limited to idiosyncratic features specific to those individual characters.

Context Analysis: Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Audience Narratives of the Context Contact with Jewish-Israelis

Child Self-Reports. According to their self-reports from the interviews, only 10 or 20% of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience have actually seen a Jewish-Israeli, and one of these, Mustafa, reported it only after his mother prodded him into answering "yes" to the question. She did so after explaining to him that those whom he sees when he leaves Uhm Al-Fahm to go to the Zoo are in fact "Jews" (Mustafa, 5-year-old boy).

Apart from Mustafa, a minority (30%) provided a vague reply, explaining that they have either seen Jews on television, or said "I know about them" – meaning, perhaps, at best, they have seen them from afar. Among those who provided these kinds of vague descriptions, whereby it was unclear whether the contact they reported about was in person, albeit from afar, or rather only mediated (and thus not meeting the definition for contact), two mentioned seeing one "Jew" holding a gun, and another, Mustafa, mentioned how "Jews" are "police" and "shoot".

With respect to Mustafa's construction of Jews as police, when asked "Who lives in Israel," he replied, "police." He was thereafter unable to provide any other specific features about Israel. Thus, the conversation continued with the interviewer asking, "Ok, police. What else? Who lives there?" and then the mother interjecting with "who lives there?", with the interviewer continuing on by trying to asking another question with, "Where is it located? Near where? Do you know?" to which Mustafa finally replied only "No". As the conversation continued, it became clear that

by police within Israel, Mustafa only meant Jews within Israel. Thus, when then asked, "So tell me what is a Jew? Does he dress like us?," he replied. "No." In turn, the conversation proceeded with the interviewer asking, "So what does he wear?" Mustafa in turn replied, "He wears police clothes." The Interview then followed-up his answer by asking, "What else?" to which Mustafa replied with silence. (Mustafa, 5-year-old boy)

These reports from the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience, including Mustafa's did not, however, provide the necessary details to try to make sense of whether they had actually indeed had these kinds of contact experiences with "Jews" (or to the point, with Jewish-Israelis) or rather, whether these were only their constructs of them and/or mediated experiences.

Parental Reports. According to the parental reports, a minority of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience has had Jewish-Israelis in their home. This ran contrary to all the reports provided by the children. Additionally, the parents did mention, however, that their children did not have regular on-going contact with Jewish-Israelis.

Contact with Palestinians

Child Self-Reports. With respect to Palestinians, a minority (30%) of the children reported having seen Palestinians in person, among whom, most mentioned that they have a Palestinian relative who, for example, lives in Ramallah.

Parental Reports. Compared to the children's reports, the majority of Arab/Palestinian-Israeli parents (80%) mentioned that rather, their children have had

contact with Palestinians. Fifty-percent of the parents explained that their children have regular contact with Palestinians and a majority of 60% explained that they have also had a Palestinian visit their home. Thus, by their parents' estimate, the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children's contact was slightly more frequent and intimate than they had alone described.

Conflict Context: "Jews and Arabs fight, but I like it here because I can play, shop and eat Bamba"

Child Oral and Photographic Reports. When describing "the conflict", 90% explained that relations are bad. The majority of these depicted these bad relations as "fighting" between "Jews" and "Arabs". A minority (44%) blamed "Jews" specifically, or only "Jews" for the fighting. Meanwhile, Hassan instead specifically blamed the Israeli government (Hassan 7-year-old boy). In other words, the majority, as differs from both the Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli audience members, did *not* position themselves as the victim. Instead, they blamed Jews and Arabs more generally. Thus, while, their respective ethnopolitical group seeks equality, the Arab/Palestinian-Israelis audience was less pronounced in asserting themselves to be the victim**.**

Among the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience, only a minority (20%) mentioned their vicarious active involvement in "the conflict". Thus, only a few among them, like the Jewish-Israeli audience (in contrast with the majority of the Palestinian audience) are vicariously involved. In addition, like the Jewish-Israeli audience, those involved are all boys. Specifically, the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli

audience mentioned that they play the “shooting” and “war” game. These games serve to simulate the conflict, and, in their case, like the Palestinian audience (in contrast with the Jewish-Israeli audience), the Arab/Palestinian audience specifically assumed the part of the *aggressor* in these games.

When describing their daily lives in Uhm Al-Fahm they, like the Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli audience, did not describe either the Israeli-Palestinian ethnopolitical conflict, or the Arab-Israeli interstate conflict. In addition, they did not describe the lack of infrastructure available for children’s leisure activities in Uhm Al Fahm. The lack of available areas for play might arguably serve as an example of the economic repercussions of the conflict, and, hypothetically, of the unequal resource allocations across communities within Israel.

Instead, these Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members painted a picture of normalcy amidst the fighting they described. They, like the other groups, described their rudimentary daily activities including, coming home each day after school, changing their clothes, eating and going to watch TV or play (in varied order). They liked where they lived because they enjoyed playing on the computer, eating, watching TV, going to play at their cousin’s house, going to the family restaurant, or simply outside.

And finally, as Ibrahim explained, because he also enjoys going to the store to buy ice-cream and “Bamba” (Ibrahim, 6-year-old boy). Notably, this Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience member was, therefore, describing in Arabic how he enjoyed his life in Uhm Al Fahm because he gets to go to the store and buy “Bamba”, *the*

quintessential "Israeli" snack. Bamba has come to assume the role of a popular cultural artifact, if not a representative Israeli icon. It is manufactured by Osem with Israeli children as its target consumers, including, for example, through television advertisements in Hebrew and through its electronic-game enabled website, which is also in Hebrew (www.bamba.co.il).

Thus, strikingly, from a Jewish-Israeli perspective**,** Ibrahim lives in what represents the seat of incitement for Palestinians living in Israel, Uhm Al-Fahm. Yet, nevertheless, he enjoys living in Uhm Al-Fahm because he can partake in the "national" pastime of eating the quintessential Israeli snack, Bamba.

Finally, when I asked the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience to photographically document what they most wanted other children to know about what life was like where they lived, they also produced images devoid of conflict. They typically produced images of rooms in their home, plants and herbs, copies of drawings hanging on the walls of their homes, and snapshots of their siblings or parents. See Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members' photographs in Appendix M for some examples.

***Exception*.** Though again, as with the other two audiences, a minority said that they, in fact, did *not* like living there. As Sufian explained, he did not like his neighborhood, Ein Ibrahim, because there weren't any clothing or toy stores in it (Sufian, 8-year-old boy). Notably, in contrast to the other two audiences, Sufian's answer does not relate to "the conflict". Rather, it seems, to him that it was "normal" that there should be clothing and toy stores that are readily accessible.

Context Analysis: Participant Observation of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Context

Contact with Jewish-Israelis

My ethnographic accounts of Uhm Al-Fahm suggest that contrary to Jewish-Israeli narrative assumptions, on occasion, Jewish-Israelis do visit Uhm Al-Fahm. In addition, a handful of Jewish-Israelis reside there. These, however, literally amount to only a handful and apparently include approximately eight woman who moved there after getting married to Arab/Palestinian Muslim men, some of whom converted to Islam, or, if they did not, are for all intents and purposes considered a separate category from non-Jewish "Jews" by the city's residents. The Arab affairs reporter for the Israeli daily newspaper Ha'aretz lived there during the period of study. In addition, some business had picked up with respect to Jewish-Israeli patrons, but this began mainly after the period of research. In addition, these Jewish-Israeli patrons tended to only visit restaurants that are located at the entrance to the city in Kina, or across highway 65 from the main part of Uhm Al-Fahm, at the entrance to Ein Ibrahim, not inside Uhm Al Fahm proper.

Meanwhile, in terms of interactions with, in particular, Jewish, Israeli soldiers, the children may have, on occasion, driven by the Rehan gate, but did not necessarily need to go through it, nor could they without special permission go through it, per the restrictions on Israeli citizens entering the Palestinian Authority. Therefore, neither did they, nor the adult members of their community interact with Israeli soldiers, whether

Jewish or not (with the exception largely of adults who received special work-related permits for transporting goods from the Palestinian Authority – e.g. agricultural products). The Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members and their parents' lack of discussion about soldiers, including constructs of Jews as an "army", relative to the Palestinian audience, concurs with the fact that they did not have to pass through the checkpoints on a daily basis, if at all. And thus, I conclude that they did not typically have this kind of contact with Jewish-Israelis either.

While not an example of contact, nor anything the children made reference to, it is important to note that during the period of study, a Jewish-Israeli terrorist/freedom fighter attacked Arab/Palestinian-Israelis. This attack may have, however, figured into the thinking of those Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children who constructed "Jews" to be inherently bad. In greater detail, in August of 2005, Eden Natan-Zada opened-fire on a bus traveling through the Triangle Region/Wadi Ara en route to Shfaram, where he killed four Druze-Israeli residents of the community. While the attack did not effect Uhm Al-Fahm residents, it nevertheless resonated throughout the entire Arab/Palestinian-Israeli community in such a way as to further bring their own security concerns to the forefront, in this case vis-à-vis Jewish-Israelis.[132] Thus, while no Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members mentioned this, nor their parents, it does provide an important contextual back-drop for making sense of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members decision to *not* stereotype all "Jews" as "terrorists", yet, nevertheless, still adopt negative to very negative attitudes towards them.

Finally, it is important to explain that Israeli police regularly dot highway 65 along the Triangle Region/Wadi Ara, directly outside of Uhm Al-Fahm. These police, however, are in fact comprised of a mix of Jewish-Israeli and increasingly more so, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis who are recruited regionally and with the coordinated intention of trying also to protect Uhm Al-Fahm residents. I observed these police officers more often on the outskirts of the city, rather than inside, with the exception of occasionally seeing them in Kina, along the entrance to Uhm Al-Fahm. At the same time, however, police were very visible on the city's outskirts along highway 65.

Given their heavy presence around the city, I would have expected more of the children to have mentioned them, though not necessarily only or specifically as part of a stereotypical construct of "Jews". Perhaps, however, the fact that they were not as readily present within the community influenced the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience's lack of reference to them. In addition, or alternatively, since these police units were steadily becoming more comprised of Arab/Palestinian-Israeli officers, and directives were being issued to all officers to *protect* Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, these audience members' orientation towards them *may* have been changing during this time period.

Contact with Palestinians

In terms of Palestinians, when older women received permits from the Israeli army allowing them entry into Israel to visit family members, they occasionally came to Uhm Al-Fahm. Accordingly, the children reported the existence of these family members, noting that they have Palestinian relatives in Ramallah, whom they have or

have not seen (which consequently, would be largely dependent upon their having had obtained permitted access). Thus, during my period of study, I was cognizant of the children having contact with the occasional family member who received a permit.

In addition, they also had contact with a limited number of male Palestinians who had managed to circumvent the separation barrier through Barta'a. These men arrived in order to work as day laborers for a block of time in the surrounding Arab/Palestinian-Israeli communities, including Uhm Al-Fahm (given that it is located 10 minutes from Barta'a by car). In the case of these men, the children would have seen them working, or should have seen them, similar to the Jewish-Israeli children in Alfei Menashe. Of course, in the case of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience, they would have comprehended that they were speaking "Arabic", or at least "the language I speak". The Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children, however, like the Jewish-Israeli children, did not "notice" these Palestinians, and therefore did not include them in their report about their contact experiences.

Context of the Conflict

The Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children had great difficulty explaining and actually determining their identity. While many explained that they lived in *"Israel"*, they pointed out that, however, they were not *"Israeli"*. Sometimes, a single child would say "yes, I'm Israeli" at one point in the interview, but "no" at another point. Yet, at the same time, most did not say they were Palestinian either. This inconsistency in their responses, certainly with the second example, in which the children would first say "yes" and then proceeded to say "no," or more generally, the

discomfort they exhibited with this kind of question, reflected the complexity of their having a national identity that, currently, is at ethnopolitical odds with their civic identity.

While similar responses can be heard from minority groups living in zones of peace, the striking difference, from an Israeli civic perspective, is that these children did not immigrate to Israel. They do not hold two or more citizenships, nor did they give up any. They were born in Israel and obtained only Israeli, and no other forms of citizenship. In their case, the complexity of their identities also arises from living a life in which they are privy to both the Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli narrative approaches to “the conflict”.

Similarly, from a Palestinian national perspective their responses are striking, since in terms of national identity, or more specifically, origin, they are from the same “group” of Palestinians who were resident in the British Mandate of Palestine before 1948. As a result, these Arab/Palestinian audience members face an incredible challenge with respect to trying to navigate their identities and so became flustered by seemingly simple questions about their identity. These challenges were best underscored by the following dialogue between the interviewer and Mamoon. The interviewer asked, “Ok … are you Palestinian?,” to which Mamoon replied “No, because I’m not from Palestine.” The Interviewer then asked, “So where are you from?,” to which Mamoon replied, “From Israel.” The Interviewer then followed up this reply by asking, “You are Israeli?,” to which an exasperated Mamoon replied by shouting, “*No, Fahemouwey*!” (Mamoon, 7-year-old boy).

According to Mamoon**,** he is *not* Palestinian because he was not born *there*, but instead in Israel. Yet, even though he just used one set of rules to explain why he is *not P*alestinian, namely, place of birth, apparently that same set of rules does not apply to why he is also *not* Israeli. In contrast with Palestine, he is in fact "from" Israel, but yet somehow, nevertheless, is *not* Israeli. Since he has no other political units comparable to a state from which to derive his civic rights, it seems, he instead draws on all that is left to him, his city of residence. In turn, he concludes his identity rests with Uhm Al-Fahm. By association, he equates his identity with this local regional identity, such that he is now Fahmouweey. By being from Uhm Al-Fahm and thereby pushing aside both the national and civic axes of his political identity, he can answer the question – or at least in the only way his "normal" life, living sandwiched between the "two conflicts" and their associated narratives, allows him. "I am Fahmouweey."

The Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children's responses concur with Mary Totry's findings with respect to adult Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, in the case of her study, living in West Barta'a. In her study she found that most respondents referred to themselves as Arab-Muslim Triangle residents. (Totry, forthcoming). They did so, similarly to Mamoon, when he shouted out "Fahemouwey," out of irritation about being pushed by both Palestinians and Jewish-Israelis on a tense and complicated topic, namely his identity. They, like Mamoon have become exasperated by the repeated questioning about their identity – currently constructed as mutually exclusive in nature as either (or neither) Palestinian or Israeli. In the case of these children, in turn, 100% also

responded with a "yes" when asked if they were "Muslim" and 80%, when asked if they were "Arab".

Yet, importantly, the incongruities of *living* somewhere, being *born* somewhere, and yet still *not* having that identity was "normal" for the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members. Somehow, they made sense out of the fact that they live in the state of Israel, were born in Israel, and have Israeli citizenship, but nevertheless, are not Israeli. And, at the same time, they did not construct themselves as being Palestinian. Only one – Hassan - said he "*used to be* Palestinian (Hassan, 7-year-old boy), but is not anymore because "Israel conquered Palestine."

The majority of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience did not identify themselves with Palestinians. They did not include themselves in the term "Palestinian", describing their own identity and, at the same time, constructed Palestinians to be very different from themselves. According to them, they were those who "wear dirty clothes", "live somewhere else", or in one case each, "get shot at by the army" (Mustafa, 5-year-old boy) or "are soldiers" (Mamoon, 7-year-old boy). Forty percent, meanwhile, *explicitly* stated that they were *not* Palestinian, either similarly, like the majority, concluding them to be different from themselves, or in the case of 5-year-old Fareehan, likely, because she was too young to be familiar with the term and so simply replied "no" to any questions about the concept.

Analysis

The Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience negotiated but did not oppose the text of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*. In their case, they had some limited amounts of contact with both Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians, including more multi-dimensional forms of contact, to have made sense of the existence of characters representing them in the text. The bulk of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members made their assessments on the basis of linguistic considerations, namely, whether characters spoke *only* Hebrew.

As a group, they did not have much direct experience with the physical violence manifestations of the conflict. While they were aware of it, according to their self-reports and were more likely per their (lack) of experiences, apart from understanding that “Jews”, or Jewish-Israelis are in conflict with Arabs generally [or as Reem explained, Israelis and Palestinians (Reem, 7-year-old girl)], to recognize that they speak Hebrew (or typically only Hebrew). Therefore, they made sense of the Jewish-Israeli characters being in the program and had a more nuanced or varied understanding of them so could, therefore, it seems, “accept” seeing positive portrayals of them.

On the other hand, these audience members have had experience with the economic manifestations of the conflict such as arguably, decreased water availability and leisure spaces. However, this seemed not to figure into their overall assessments. By contrast, and interestingly, they were even less likely to recognize Palestinians, in contrast with “Jews” in the text and to such a degree that it was difficult to make sense

of the attitudes they adopted towards them. In effect, they were more familiar with Jewish-Israelis and so more readily identified or interpreted their existence in the text.

Conclusion

Establishing Peace Communication

My aim in this dissertation has been to create a new sub-discipline within the field of Communication, namely Peace Communication (PC). My hope is to generate and inspire research into this sub-discipline. As I discussed in Part I, Chapter 2, the practice of peace communication first began in the 1940s and has proliferated globally ever since, despite the lack of any concrete research attesting to its efficacy. I delineated and classified seven models of PC practice, in the hopes that scholars would, as a result, become better positioned to design PC assessment and evaluation research (See Appendix A for a summary of the models).

In Chapter 3, I laid out seven areas (from among the eleven models practiced, and their related subtypes), which are in the greatest need of assessment and evaluation into their efficacy for managing political conflicts. As part of my efforts, I also sought to recommend applicable study designs for conducting future analyses. In Parts II and III, I therefore conducted an assessment of a PC intervention. Specifically, I conducted an assessment of a mediated contact effects (Model IV) intervention. I discussed the theoretical framework and practice of mediated contact effects in Chapter 2, as part of my larger discussion about the seven existing models of PC practice.

Practitioners first began using the mediated contact effects model in the 1990s at the close of the Cold War, when ethnopolitical conflicts began to predominate.

During this time period, the norm was (and remains today) conflicts between groups who lived in separation from but in close geographic proximity to one another. That is, they tended not so much to live geographically distantly from one another, but rather, in artificially constructed separation from one another. This separation made the use of remote bridges, or mediation, as that employed by the mediated contact effects model, an attractive method for bringing groups together into contact in an effort to try to manage conflict. Thus, practitioners began to adopt the use of this model alongside the others.

In parts II and III, I conducted an assessment of a mediated contact intervention, namely Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*. I did so using the approach of the context and design school that I described in Chapter 1. Most pointedly, I, therefore, stressed, first and foremost, the importance of (1) actually conducting research into the utility of a PC intervention in order to be able to speak to whether it can, per its aims, help in some way to manage political conflict, and (2) sought to do so specifically, by including context in as a primary element in the analysis. I theorized the importance of the interstate system as the context that provides the relevant backdrop for making sense of people's responses to a PC intervention. I, therefore, tried to make sense of how political, economic, social and military forces worked to construct and shape the target audience for the intervention, who then interacted with the intervention (as it tried to, in turn, re-shape them and/or these structures).

Mediated Contact Effects Peace Communication Model

As I discussed in my qualitative meta-analysis in Chapter 3, mediated contact effects interventions have been found to be useful for achieving a reduction in intergroup prejudices and for promoting friendships, which are essential for peacebuilding after peacemaking has occurred. However, I argued that, as it has been practiced, it has not especially helped establish the latter. Thus, I would now rather focus on the efficacy of mediated contact effects interventions for *both* building and making peace.

Assessment and Evaluation Study Design

Audience Reception and Context Analyses

In my assessment, or effort to assess the target audiences' interpretation of the mediated contact intervention, I sought to be able to trace the path of contextual factors that led them to draw the interpretations they did from, in this case, the text of the Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* television programs. In doing so, I, therefore, primarily conducted an audience reception analysis, which I extended to also include what I refer to as a *context analysis* study. Together, using the combined audience reception analysis and context analysis, I was able to suggest reasons for why the audience may have interpreted the text as they did. In doing so, I sought also to be able to explain when the intervention had an opportunity to elicit change among the audience, and most importantly, *why* it was or was not able to do so.

Concise Production Study

Before beginning my analysis of the audience's interaction with and interpretation of the text, I also conducted a concise production study. I outlined the encoding of the text, including its (1) intended encoding, (2) encoding process and (3) final expressed encoding. To analyze this, I briefly reviewed the (1) curriculum design, (2) production process and (3) television programs as end products in and of themselves, respectively.

I concluded that the text of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* with which the audience engaged was simultaneously *closed* and *open,* and a *glocal* and *hybrid* media form. The text effectively emulated the contact hypothesis, demonstrating pro-social relations across all three ethnopolitical groups, while adhering to the hypothesis's 5 requisite criteria. In addition, it depicted a utopian vision of the conflict and one that specifically disengaged from the structural realties and narrative perspectives of the problem with which it sought to engage (and about which it sought to alter the target audience's behaviors and the existing inter-state systemic structures that underlie them).

Conceptualizing the Audience

In Chapters 6 through 8, I compared the relationship between what was (or was not) encoded into the text and what the children decoded out of it, as situated within the wider context of the Israeli-Palestinian ethnopolitical conflict, and framed by the Arab-Israeli interstate conflict. I addressed whether and to what extent, by comparison with the text's effort at *modeling* contact, it was actually able to *mediate* contact, thereby providing the audience with the pre-requisite experience necessary for them to

have the opportunity to be able to alter their behaviors in ways relevant to the management of "the conflict".

To draw this comparison, I described distinct peoples, whom I grouped together for the purpose of analyses according to the crossroads of their national and civic identities. I reasoned in Chapter 5 that such a grouping, by which I, therefore, studied how a stateless nation, state bearing nation and state minority interpreted the text's effort to alter the ethnopolitical conflict between them, was the most appropriate form for making sense of the intervention's efficacy within the context of today's inter-state system. Thus, in Chapters 6 through 8, I described the Palestinian, Jewish-Israeli and finally, Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members' reception of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*, respectively.

Some Recommended Methodologies

I approached the subject matter through a combination of the methodologies I described in Chapter 5 and which I recommend for use with future PC study designs. These included comparative, multi-sited ethnographic and conflict zone field methodologies, together with peace education concerns about representing parallel narratives, and cognitive development and childhood specific methodologies.

Targeted Partners to Conflict Exposure to and Dialogical Interaction with the Mediated Contact Text

In Chapters 6 through 8, I demonstrated how, while accepting elements of the text, mainly with respect to their own ethnopolitical identity, the audience members

exhibited the tendency to negotiate it with respect to their "shared others", and totally oppose it with respect to their "others". I therefore question whether the *Sesame Street* interventions can plausibly change the audience members' intergroup attitudes, and, in turn, lead to friendships and help build peace, as it sought to do, and independently of this, whether it can also alter their political beliefs to, in turn, help make peace.

As I described in Chapter 3, in order to alter the audience members behaviors or cause indirect structural change, a number of criteria must first be satisfied. The audience must be (1) exposed to the intervention, (2) perceive it as intended and (3) accept it (or at least not oppose the text). Furthermore, the context, i.e. both the (4) macro conflict and (5) micro context, including any (6) opinion leaders who are viewing the program alongside the audience as part of their "normal" viewing environment and commenting on (or editing) the text, must not over-ride or alter the text's meaning to the point that it is no longer perceived or accepted as was intended by its encoders. In addition, (7) I questioned whether interpersonal contact might also play a role in influencing the reception of the text, specifically its function as mediated contact, and in turn whatever meanings the audience drew from it. These meanings, if the same as what was originally encoded, must still, finally, be (8) generalized beyond the text if it is to stand any chance at eliciting change.

Only then, once these steps are satisfied, is it plausible, for change to potentially occur. Thus, for example, if examining Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members who "saw" Jewish-Israelis in the text and accepted their encoding as "good" people and they in turn generalized the notion that Jewish-Israelis characters are (or

can be) good people towards Jewish-Israelis as a group, beyond the text, I questioned whether there would be a possibility that the text could, in turn, influence these audience members. Specifically, the text may *then*, from that point forward, have held the potential to, for example, (1) change their attitudes towards Jewish-Israelis to (2) intend to use peaceful communications styles when interacting with them and/or to have sought to meet them for real contact to proceed to (3) the actual possibility, in spite of existing structural realities to carry those behaviors through to their end. Finally, I noted, these paths and resultant effects may (4) differ whether those tuning in were members of a stateless nation, a statebearing nation or a state minority.

Exposure, and the importance of a successful brand name. With respect to the first variable, exposure to the mediated contact intervention must be ensured. While, naturally, I did not focus on this matter in my reception analysis, nevertheless it is relevant to point out that the Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* intervention seems to have successfully managed to achieve this criterion. As I discussed in Chapter 3, parents of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*'s child targeted audience perceived the program to be a general education program, as opposed to one that deals strictly with the political goals of intergroup compromise. (Applied Research and Consulting LLC., 1999). As a result, despite some parents' less moderate tendencies towards peacemaking, they, nevertheless, did not advocate that their children tune-out from the show.

Parent's perceptions of the program, and therefore their decision to not prevent their children from tuning in, provided an opportunity for the program to simulate

contact for its audience members. The brand name of *Sesame Street* (which I argued may be the equivalent of *official support* in the context of mediated, rather than interpersonal contact effects efforts) may have functioned to provide the seal of approval that enabled these parents to "ignore" what messages the program was *actually* communicating to their children (if tolerance across the three ethnopolitical groups was something with which they disagreed).

Thus, I did not perceive lack of exposure due to the potential of ideological disapproval by parents to be an area of concern for this specific intervention. My lack of concern in this respect was further reinforced by the similar responses I received from the differing parents in my study to the question, "What, if anything do you think this television program tries to show or teach?" Notable and most striking was the response I received from Iris in Alfei Menashe. Her response, combined with the television viewing practices I observed in her home, including as it related to her son's viewership of the program, best illustrate the wide appeal this television program has achieved among parents, and while not per se a guarantee of viewership by their children, certainly reduced the chances that their children will be prevented from tuning into it.

As the reader may recall from Chapter 7, Iris was the Jewish-Israeli mother from Alfei Menashe whose husband did not vote in the Israeli elections because the only two people he wanted to vote for, i.e. the banned "racist" Kahana and his Kach party and the far to the right Ze'evi, were dead. Therefore, her husband concluded that there was no one worthy left for him to vote for, and thus no reason to vote. Despite

his and the family's clear extreme right-wing political preferences (which were also considerably much farther to the right than the rest of the parents in Alfei Menashe), Iris did not consider the message of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* problematic. According to Iris's response to my question, the program tries to educate children about 'social behavior, friendship, interpersonal relations, tolerance between peoples and teach Arabic and Hebrew.' Such a curriculum, according to her, and despite her family's political preferences, was acceptable.

Even more interestingly, when I arrived for one of my visits, she was watching Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* with all of her children, including Yariv. As she explained to me, she watches television alongside all her children each afternoon, and *Sesame Street* is one of the regular round-up of series they watch together. Yariv, meanwhile, triangulated his mothers' response by correctly identifying specific character's names in response to a series of questions I asked him before he viewed the mock episode.

Thus, the producers of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*, managed to do an excellent job, as it were, of "masking" any perceived political motives of the show, and even from this family, who it would seem could not possibly agree with its peace communication efforts, since according to many a typical rank and file Kahana or Ze'evi follower, "A Good Arab is a Dead Arab!" ("Aravi tov zeh Aravi met!" in Hebrew) Thus, certainly, Arabs playing with Jewish-Israeli children could not be "good". Yet, to Iris, apparently, *Sesame Street* teaching tolerance was fine, even if it pertains to Arabs and Jews -- because it only demonstrated positive *individual*

relations between members of each group, devoid of contextualized *group*-political-goal orientations.

In brief, if Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* was “good enough” for Iris’s son, I would conjecture that it is good enough for other parent’s children too. And as was typical across all the interviews I conducted, parents spoke informally of their fond memories of *Sesame Street* during their day (whether they were referring to Kuwaiti *Open Sesame* or the original Israeli *Sesame Street*). In addition, they also conveyed the trust they placed in the “Sesame Street” brand. By making such comments and conveying their trust, they demonstrated the power of the brand-name and their endorsement of their children’s exposure to Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* [regardless of whether there were those among them who believe that the only good Arab is a dead Arab or from another narrative vantage point, believe in “Slaughter the Jews!” (“Itbach el Yahud!” in Arabic).] Finally, the level of success with respect to the intervention overcoming ideological opposition to its aims was best evidenced by the high rates of viewership it achieved [as was, for example, demonstrated during the first season (Applied Research and Consulting LLC, 1997)].

Did it dialogically engage viewers to effectively simulate the experience of contact? The producers of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* effectively managed to *model* all criteria of the contact hypothesis. To have effectively *mediated* this modeling, the text also had to contain characters that dialogically engaged the viewers, lest the intervention be unable to simulate contact opportunities for them. To this end, the audience members had to read pro-social relations out of the text, and specifically,

the notion that they were transpiring between each of the three partners to conflict (as encoded). It is the data that I collected about this facet of the text that I discussed in my study. I assessed whether in fact the audience perceived and/or argued there to be good relations transpiring between the three groups, and whether they in addition perceived and/or argued that characters representing each ethnopolitical group were good people (who could do good things, including interact peacefully with members of the other two groups, and do nice things to and for them).

Target Partners to Conflict, Interpretation of the Mediated Contact Text and Its Resultant Potential Efficacy

The Palestinian, Jewish-Israeli and Arab/Palestinian audience members wove the narrative describing their enemies – i.e. the "army", "terrorists" and the "police", respectively, into their interpretation of the *Sesame Street* programs. At the same time, they in addition, wrote out their "others"' historical narratives. That is, no Palestinian child wove in the narrative of the "police" or the "terrorist", no Jewish-Israeli child wove in the narrative of the "army" and the "police" and no Arab/Palestinian-Israeli child wove in the narrative of the "terrorist" or the "army", into his or her readings of the *Sesame Street* programs, and related rationale for their readings.

This comparison demonstrates the working nature of the inter-state systems construction of ethnopolitical boundaries, as these intersect readings of PC mediated contact interventions. As I found, the ethnopolitical construction of audience members' categorical grouping vis-à-vis the interstate system – whether as stateless

nation, statebearing nation, or state minority, and their accompanying goals for justice, security and equality, respectively, framed these audience members' interpretation of the mediated contact they observed and with which they vicariously interacted. More specifically, I found that each group decoded the text as follows below.

The Palestinian Audience members

Their decoding strategies. The Palestinian audience accepted, opposed and negotiated the text. They accepted it with respect to themselves, opposed and/or negotiated it with respect to their "shared others", Arab/Palestinian-Israelis and "others", Jewish-Israelis. All, or the majority of the Palestinian audience accepted that they, as too, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, were encoded into the text. The majority, however, instead opposed "Jews" (as they constructed them) and erased them out of the text.

All and/or the majority of the Palestinian audience members thought Palestinians and Arabs and/or Arab/Palestinian-Israelis were "good" people - the characteristic with which all of the text's characters had been encoded. In contrast, however, among the minority who did decode "Jews" out from the text, half interpreted the text to conclude they were "bad", while the other half decided "Jews" were still "good", but only after they had further adjusted their identity, first from Jewish-Israelis to "Jews", to finally only just partial "Jews" (who were also, for example, Muslim). Additionally, the minority who thought partial "Jews" were good, respectively, did *not* generalize these attitudes they adopted towards the characters representing "Jews" towards Jews as a whole. Finally, with respect to language, the

Palestinian audience negotiated the text. Fifty percent did not decode the language spoken by their "other", Hebrew, out from the text (while the majority instead decoded English as being spoken in addition to Arabic).

Construction of their "others" and "shared others"' identities. The majority of the Palestinian audience constructed their "shared others", that is, those whom they referred to as "Arabs", meaning Arabs and/or Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, as being like us, but living somewhere else. The majority, meanwhile, held *positive* to *very positive* attitudes towards them. On the other hand, all the Palestinian audience members constructed their "others", those whom they referred to as "Jews", as an "army", or, in a related one-dimensional stereotypical functional capacity, as "those who carry a gun". A majority also constructed them as non-believers or infidels. The vast majority of the Palestinian audience, meanwhile, adopted *very negative* attitudes towards "Jews".

Their contact experiences. All the Palestinian audience members have had contact with Arab/Palestinian-Israelis from the other side of their village – fellow members of the Kabaha clan from West Barta'a. The majority of the Palestinian audience has also had contact with Jewish-Israelis, albeit mainly in the form of one-dimensional contact with Israeli soldiers (the vast majority of whom are Jewish). In addition, however, they have had contact with Jewish-Israeli civilians, including residents of settlements/development communities, and, to a lesser extent, peace activists, though neither they, nor their parents mentioned this.

The context of their lives. The Palestinian audience depicted the fun and nice aspects of their lives when I asked them to describe and document it. Following their normal after-school routines, they, for example, went riding on bulldozers. Their lives are simply life – "normal" according to them. The majority (two-thirds of whom were boys) reported being actively involved in the conflict, albeit vicariously. They played conflict simulations games whereby they assumed the role they defined as the aggressor. Similarly, it was "normal", (especially) for boys, according to them, to pass through the Rehan Gate checkpoint en route to Jenin or elsewhere, to go for example to watch a soccer match. As they grew up in East Barta'a, year after year, these Palestinian audience members waited in line at the checkpoint and saw soldiers.

As they waited in line or passed through the checkpoint and saw a soldier, the older members of their community remarked, "there are the Jews." "Jews", as a result, have become an "army" and the "army" has become "Jews." The older community members re-framed these younger members' contact experiences. There is a schema operating through which these children have come to make sense of their experiences as a basis for filtering through all else, whether it was their *contact* or *mediated contact* experiences. Thus, interpersonal forms of communication circulating throughout the community had come to frame even their interpersonal contact experiences, and before any opinion leaders who may have potentially watched Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* with them could have ever re-edited the meaning of the text for them.

The text of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* had already been edited *well before* these children ever sat down to watch it within their "normal" viewing environments. It was edited daily through the symbolic meaning-making experiences they participated in day in and day out, as framed by their older community members (upon whom they bestowed the legitimacy as opinion leaders to shape the meanings they drew from the word "Jew" and, in turn, "army" and, several steps later -- when it came to their using this meaning to critically oppose the text of the *Sesame Street* intervention's effort to communicate something different to them). The text sought to mediate contact experiences for these children that were not with an Israeli solider towards whom they had negative attitudes and with whom they described negative interactions, but rather, with a "good" Jewish-Israeli, including instead ones who were their same age, and with whom they could vicariously interact about shared interests and positive ideals.

However, the majority of these stateless nation audience members perceived a cognitive imbalance with respect to this concept, and thus interacting with their "other" in such a fashion became simply untenable. The minority who "could" engage with it, as it were, and retained the identities of the Jewish-Israeli characters closer to what was originally encoded – labeling them as "Jews", still, nevertheless, negotiated the text because it just did not seem possible. The others finally, even if thinking it were potentially possible, still "had" to explain it away as an exception to the rules they knew. These "Jewish" characters were just individual cases of Jews and not real. Jews as a whole in real life are not like them, they concluded. Rather, only those who

they perceived to have encountered in their daily practices (as first framed by the older community member's performance of the Palestinian ethnopolitical narrative), were real.

Thus, in short, the Palestinian audience interpreted the text of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* on the basis of "Jews" being an "army". Since no army was depicted in the text, according to the majority of the Palestinian audience, no "Jews" could have been encoded into it.

The Jewish-Israeli Audience Members

Their decoding strategies. The Jewish-Israeli audience members also accepted, negotiated and opposed the text. In their case, they accepted it with respect to themselves, and negotiated and/or opposed it with respect to their "shared other", namely Arab/Palestinian-Israelis and their "others", namely the Palestinians. All, or the majority of, the Jewish-Israeli audience accepted the decoding of themselves, whom they typically referred to as "Israelis" in the text. A small majority accepted the encoding in the text of those whom they typically labeled "Arabs", Arab/Palestinian-Israelis and/or Arabs, but, on the other hand, the majority opposed Palestinians, erasing them out from the text.

All the Jewish-Israeli audience members who "saw" "Israelis", Arabs or Arab/Palestinian-Israelis and Palestinians in the text accepted them to be "good" natured people, as encoded into the text, including the minority who read Palestinians out from it. Thus, like the Palestinians, the Jewish-Israeli audience members accepted the encoding of themselves and their "shared others" whom they read out from the text

as also being good-natured people but, *in addition*, the Jewish-Israeli audience also accepted their "others" as they were – as Palestinians (without converting them into partial Palestinians) as being good-natured people too. However, the majority of the Jewish-Israeli audience did *not* generalize the concept that individual Arab/Palestinians-Israeli and/or Arab characters could be good, towards their concepts of Arab/Palestinian-Israelis and/or Arabs as a whole. Finally, none, meanwhile, generalized the good Palestinian characters they decoded towards Palestinians.

Thus, in contrast to the Palestinian audience, who had generalized the concept that their "shared other" is "good", namely that "Arab" characters in the text can be "good", the Jewish-Israelis did *not*. The Jewish-Israeli audience *neither* generalized their concept of a "good" "other" towards the whole group, as compared with the Palestinian audience who did *not* generalize their concept about (only) partial "good" others, namely partial "Jews" towards Jews as a whole. Finally, similarly to the Palestinian audience, fifty-percent of the Jewish-Israeli audience did not decode their "other's" language – Arabic - from the text.

Construction of their "others" and "shared others"' identities. Only a minority of the Jewish-Israeli audience members constructed a "shared other", comprised of Arab/Palestinian-Israelis and/or Arabs. Most simply considered these people to all to be part of the category of "others", for them, "Arabs". Thus, as I had posed the question in Chapter 4, "would a Jewish-Israeli child construct the other as "Arab," or instead as comprising two partners in conflict - an "Arab-Israeli" and the other, a "Palestinian"? In a development/settlement community, even a quality of life

one such as Alfei Menashe, at the close of the second Palestinian uprising, it appears that the audience constructed these people largely as only one category (and, in contrast with my earlier research at the start of the second Palestinian Uprising in the cities of Ra'anana and Herziliya, inside Israel proper). The minority of the Jewish-Israeli audience in Alfei Menashe, who constructed these peoples separately, Arab/Palestinians-Israelis, on the one hand, and Palestinians on the other, constructed the former as “Arabs” who can enter Israel and adopted *negative* to *neutra*l attitudes towards them.

The majority of the Jewish-Israeli audience, in contrast, rather, simply characterized Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, together with their “others”, i.e. Palestinians, as “Arabs” or “Bad Arabs”. The majority of these audience members constructed these peoples as inherently bad, and explained that they are people who commit “terror” attacks and “want to kill us” (though the majority did not stereotype them as doing so by definition or as all doing so, but explained that they are responsible for these acts). Another 50%, meanwhile, added a neutral explanation, saying that these “Arabs” or “bad Arabs” were born somewhere else. A small majority adopted very *negative* attitudes towards them, with the next largest minority adopting a *very negative* to *negative* attitude towards them.

Their contact experiences. The Jewish-Israeli audience members have some contact with Arab/Palestinian Israelis, though some of this is rather with Bedouin-Palestinians, whom their parents frame as being “Bedouins” and part of the category of Arab/Palestinian-Israelis or simply their own separate category. All of them have

contact with Palestinian (including the Bedouin-Palestinian) day laborers. In Chapter 4, I posed the question of whether interpersonal contact experiences might alter the audiences' interpretation of the text. To illustrate this, I posed the following example: Would Jewish-Israeli children who had contact with Palestinians alter their interpretations of the text, as compared with if they had no such contact experiences? To answer this question I compare against the Jewish-Israelis from Ra'anana and Herziliya in my earlier research. Thus, I tentatively suggest (based on the study having taking place, however, at the start rather than the close of the second uprising) that apparently they did not read the text differently as a result, since the Jewish-Israeli audience in Alfei Menashe even wrote out Palestinians, not just from their mediated contact experience through the *Sesame Street* text, but also from their unstructured interpersonal contact experiences. In comparison, in Ra'anana and Herziliya, the children instead delineated Palestinians to exist as their own separate category of people (Warshel, 2007).

The confounding variable here may be political preferences. Despite their being a quality of life settlement/development and thus relatively politically moderate (compared to other settlements/developments), Alfei Menashe is still further out on the less conciliatory, in this case, right-side of the political spectrum, relative to Ra'anana and Herziliya. Thus, while the settlements/developments offer Jewish-Israeli children the only form of contact that still exists with Palestinians today, the confounding variable is that they *are* developments/settlements in the West Bank/Judea and Samaria**.** As part and parcel of this, significant numbers of these

residents do not support the left of the political spectrum, or at least certainly are in the position where they need to defend either their right to live in the settlements/developments and/or their current lifestyles. Therefore, in the end, development/settlement children's contact experiences may be mitigated by these political variables.

The context of their lives. The Jewish-Israeli audience depicted the fun and nice aspects of their lives when I asked them to describe and document it, just like their Palestinian counterparts. Following their normal after-school routines, they would, for example, go to their community center to take dance classes. Their lives are simply life – "normal", according to them. Even though they live in a zone of conflict, they do not "see" it. Life around them is "normal", it is simply "life". A minority of them (all boys) play "separation" games, in which they assumed what they constructed as the defensive role. They played inside anti-biological and chemical warfare air-purified bomb shelters everyday without any conscious connection to the fact that it was not intended to be a leisure space for them. They did not "see" what it was intended for, just as, it seems, they neither "saw" the separation barrier – in their case, a fence wrapped around all of their community, which is visible just a few blocks from their homes and some of the playgrounds, such that they could not miss it, yet they still, nevertheless, did. The separation barrier did *not* exist in their world. And neither did Palestinian day laborers (while the majority reported that they heard or saw "them" - these "Arabs" or "bad Arabs" - somehow, none mentioned hearing or seeing day laborers, or those that clean their playgrounds *for* them).

These processes of not seeing civilian Palestinian day laborers practiced by the Jewish-Israeli audience were analogous to those practiced by the Palestinian audience members who neither "saw" Jewish-Israeli civilians, whether they were development/settlement residents nor, most pointedly, peace activists. In their case, the Palestinian audience interpreted the text directly through the salient interpersonal contact they do "see" – that which they have with the Israeli soldiers. Thus, it seems, as part of their interpersonal contact, members of both audiences see neither structures nor human beings that are right in front of their very eyes – even if these exist in three-dimensions, nor too, it appears, if they exist in mediated form, moving across their television screens while engaging in pro-social behaviors on Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*.

The Jewish-Israeli audience interpreted the text in*directly* or *alongside* their narrative organizational perspective, in contrast to the Palestinian audience**.** The Jewish-Israeli audience interpreted the text using a greater number of factors, most prominently, language and knowledge about television production conventions, which they, in turn, filtered *through (or alongside*) their wider organizational narrative. They made use of these factors to oppose the encoding of Palestinian characters in the text. If characters spoke only Arabic, according to the Jewish-Israeli audience, they were Palestinian, though, as will be recalled, only half read Arabic out from the text, and if they spoke Hebrew, in addition, to Arabic, than, according to the Jewish-Israeli audience, they were not Palestinian.

According to the Jewish-Israeli audience, since the show was also “Israeli made”, only “Israelis” act in it and those who produced it care about “Israelis”. People who about “Israelis” such as themselves, according to the Jewish-Israeli audience, would not include people in a television show made for them who might harm them. Therefore, according to the Jewish-Israeli audience no “terrorists” were on the show. And since the Jewish-Israeli audience directly connected Palestinians to “terrorism”, as a result, the majority of them in turn, provided this connection as an additional justification for why Palestinians had to, therefore, be absent from the text.

The Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members

Their decoding strategies. The Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience accepted, negotiated and opposed the text. They all accepted it with respect to the encoding of *themselves* in the text, just as the other two audiences had. They, however, negotiated the text with respect to their “shared others”, namely Jewish-Israelis, with exactly half the audience seeing “Jews” in the text, and opposed it with respect to their other “shared others”, namely Palestinians. Only a minority “saw” Palestinians in the text. In general, the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience converted those “shared others” they erased from the text into characters that instead represented themselves, namely other fellow “Arabs”.

Among them, all accepted the producers’ encoding of Arab/Palestinian Israelis and Palestinians as “good”, while a majority agreed with their encoding of Jewish-Israelis as “good”. Thus, they were more likely to “recognize” Jewish-Israelis in the text than they were to “recognize” Palestinians, while, at the same time, they were

more likely, however, to perceive a cognitive imbalance between the concept of "Jews" and "good" people, in contrast with the concept that Palestinians could be "good." Finally, , any characters who where either "shared others", which the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience could also reconcile as being "good", they generalized towards their larger respective groups (to "Jews", by which they were generally referring to Jewish-Israelis, and to Palestinians). Finally, 100% of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience decoded Arabic, while a small majority, 60%, decoded Hebrew from the text. Thus, it may be that they rather defined "Jews" to be more like an "other" than a "shared other", and thus did not hear Hebrew as often, or are naturally less familiar with it than Arabic. With respect to the latter, another interpretation then may be that fewer of them "heard" the language that was not their primary language (just like the other two audience members), or at least fewer knew the correct relationship between the sign and the word for it, "Hebrew" in this case.

Construction of their "shared others"' identities and their own. Fifty percent of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience constructed "Jews" as being inherently bad people, and a separate 50% constructed them as non-believers or infidels, while a small majority adopted a neutral category explaining that they speak another language (all those who did not define Jews as inherently bad were among these). The Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience adopted *negative* to *very negative* attitudes towards "Jews". With respect to Palestinians, about half of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience constructed them as "dirty", "primitive" and "poor". They, meanwhile, adopted a wide range of attitudes towards the Palestinians, ranging *from very positive*

to very negative, which averaged out to neutral. Consequently, unlike any other audience groups who were asked, and about whom their attitudes were solicited, the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members' answers about "Palestinians" alone, held the greatest variance.

Finally, with respect to their own identity, the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience had the most difficulty constructing it (both relative to the other two groups, when I asked them about themselves and relative to their construction of these other groups). In Chapter 4, I posed a question about whether how an audience member constructs their own identity will alter their interpretation of the text, and if so, how. To illustrate this, I posed the following example: would an Arab/Palestinian-Israeli child construct his or her identity as "Arab," "Arab-Israeli," "a Palestinian in Israel," "Palestinian," "Israeli," "Muslim," or "Christian," or instead, in relation to a specific local regional identity? Apparently, as I found, these children agreed to the label "Muslim" and secondarily "Arab", but, with respect to their own constructs, were most likely to adopt their regional identity, in their case, as Fahmouweeys. This might in turn explain why these audience members converted everyone else in the text to *themselves*. Instead of having to answer the typical question posed to them (including by their "shared others") of whether they are Israeli *or* Palestinian, they rather negotiated the text to answer that, "you are all like me!" They did not have be like one or the other of these two groups.

Their contact experiences. The Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience rarely had contact with Jewish-Israelis, and a majority, according especially to their parents'

reports had contact with Palestinians, in particular, it would seem, with those family members who received permits from Israel to visit them. Fifty percent of the parents explained that this contact was ongoing. Finally, these children also had some contact with Palestinian day laborers, though neither the children nor their parents mentioned this.

The context of their lives. Like the other audience members, the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience depicted the fun and nice aspects of their lives when I asked them to describe and document it. Following their normal after-school routines, they liked to eat the quintessential Israeli snack, Bamba. Their lives are simply life – "normal" according to them. A minority (all boys) reported that they were vicariously involved in the conflict via the "shooting" and "war" games they played that simulated it. In such games, they assumed the role they defined as the aggressor. The context of their lives, however, is one of confusion, given that their civic and national identities are currently at odds with one another. They found it difficult to answer basic questions about who they are. In their answers, they tended to *not* construct themselves as Palestinian, but while conversely explaining that they were born in or live in Israel, they concluded that they were neither Israeli (even if they established that their logic for determining the basis of one's group identity was place of birth).

Comparison Across the Three Groups

It appears that, according to a comparison across the results of the meanings that all three of the audiences decoded from the text, the Palestinian characters were

the *most* likely to be erased out from the text of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*. The "Jewish" characters, meanwhile, were the *least* likely to be perceived as also capable of being "good". When decoded from the text and also perceived as being "good", everyone's "shared other", namely, Arab/Palestinians-Israeli characters, were, in turn, *most* likely to be generalized towards the wider group they represented, i.e. either Arab/Palestinian-Israelis or Arabs. Similarly, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis were also "able" to generalize the encoding of good Jewish-Israeli and especially, good Palestinian characters to both their "shared others", namely towards Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians as a whole, explaining that "yes", these characters were like all Jewish-Israelis or Palestinians and/or that members of each group could certainly behave in the manner in which they were depicted in the text.

Fifty percent of the Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli audiences and 60% of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience each "heard" the language that was not their primary language, or at least knew the correct word for it, either "Hebrew" or "Arabic". It would have seemed more likely for Jewish-Israelis to have "missed" the fact that such Hebrew speaking characters in fact also spoke Arabic. Arab/Palestinian-Israeli characters were encoded into the text as *also* speaking Hebrew (and, at times, the audience watched them speak in only Hebrew, minus a word thrown in here or there in Arabic, as was the case with the character Ibtisam), and even Palestinian characters like Adel occasionally spoke Hebrew, on top of Arabic. Therefore, it would have seemed more likely for Jewish-Israelis to have "missed" the fact that such Hebrew speaking characters, in fact also spoke Arabic. Yet, interestingly, it was *just* as

common for the Jewish-Israeli audience to erase Arabic from the text as it was for Palestinians to erase Hebrew.

Thus, whether the Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* intervention tried to generate friendships or instead alter political beliefs towards compromise around specific political issues, there existed a basic problem – the children, by and large, did not "see" their "others" in its text, and, in half of the cases, their (and their "shared others"') primary language. Thus the producers' encouragement for these three groups of children to become friends was "lost upon them".

Similarly, if the producers had tried to advocate specific belief changes and the audience had still not recognized the characters who were encoded into the text interacting pro-socially, then changing their political beliefs would have proven difficult too. If the audience did not "recognize" those people who were speaking on behalf of their narrative views and goals towards (resolving) conflict, it would be difficult for them to, "recognize" (let alone agree) with the goals and peoples on behalf of whom these characters were advocating. Moreover, however, since the text disengaged from the conflict in the first place, and it (like the practice of mediated contact effects interventions historically) was not attempting to elicit any changes in the children's political beliefs (but rather to create a paradigm shift in their attitudes to generate friendships), it would not have likely achieved this anyhow.

Was the Text Too Open?

In short, the text was perhaps *too* open. The audience's prior attitudes were not necessarily reinforced as a result of having to view the television programs as a captive audience (as part of the research scenario), or as they normally would, namely by choice. Nevertheless, they found themselves facing the "option" of simply not having to engage with their partner to the conflicts altogether. Thus, not only did the text disengage from the conflicts, but also in its openness, may have in effect also "allowed" the audience to totally disengage from them.

Schematic Filtering

In the end, each audience group interpreted the text through their own respective ethnopolitical group's schematic approach to "the conflict". Each child first filtered their understanding of their context – the structural realities of their involvement at the local community level, including limited contact and the kinds of contact they have with one another, through their respective narratives. Second, they then proceeded to re-interpret the text of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* through these narratives.

In Chapter 4, I posed the question, "would the audience members' goals towards (resolving) the conflict alter their interpretations of the text? If so, how?" This question relates to Jackman and Crane's findings that most statebearing nations who achieved friendship did not hold the goal, or political belief, of structural change for the state minority. I, therefore, wondered, if an audience member believed, for

example, that their partners in conflict had to be eliminated, would they reject the text as being simply a utopian ideal of no interest to them?

As I discussed in Chapter 6, the Palestinian audience members argued that since they are not Muslims, “Jews”, by definition, are not peaceful people. Therefore, ”Jews” are to blame for the conflict. Accordingly, in order for relations to become good between the two, the Palestinian audience argued that they needed to instruct Jews to convert to Islam. As I found in further discussions with them, the Palestinian audience also concluded that *only* if Jews converted to Islam would it be possible to establish peace. Given these political beliefs, namely that they believed that peace could only exist if their “other” partner to conflict were eliminated, I wondered whether the Palestinian audience, would therefore, reject the text of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* as being too utopian?

The Jewish-Israeli audience also held similar political beliefs, namely that their “others” also had to be eliminated from the equation if peace were ever to be made. According to the Jewish-Israeli audience, Palestinians needed to be eliminated. In contrast to the Palestinian audience, however, they did not indicate a preference for what particular method to use to achieve this end. That is, the Jewish-Israeli audience explained, Palestinians could be imprisoned, killed or deported. So long as they were removed from the equation, what method was used was of less relevance.

Thus, I wondered, would the Palestinians audience (whose argument some might suggest in the extreme case constituted support for cultural, specifically religious genocide) like the Jewish-Israeli audience (whose argument some might suggest in the

extreme case constituted support for democide, life imprisonment, and/or spaciacide, or separating people from “their” space, or lands) consider the text too utopian? Given that the majority of both audience groups simply erased one another from the text, this question, it seems, became irrelevant. They never “had” to contemplate their “others” existence in the first place.

The audience members’ schematic filtering, and consequent erasure of their “others” from the text made it difficult to use the text to build or especially make peace between them. As Jackman and Crane argued, only in one-third of the cases in a situation of ethnopolitical tensions (not even intractable ethnopolitical conflict) did friendships (the optimal outcome possible for the contact hypothesis to achieve), actually lead to changes in political beliefs. Meanwhile, as, I have argued, if beliefs are not changed, the conflict, will not be resolved. As Jackman and Crane astutely observed, "the issue is not whether whites generalize to blacks as a whole from their personal experience of friendship with an individual black. Instead, the issue is how a relationship of intimacy with individual subordinates modifies the manner in which dominant-group members defend their privilege." (Jackman and Crane, 1986. p. 481). Given that political conflicts are typically between peoples with differing amounts of power, the real issue, as they pointed out, is not whether in- and out-group members become friends, as a result of their contact with one another, but rather, whether their friendships will lead those with advantages to change their political beliefs. The question I posed in Chapter 3 then is, ”will the advantaged group relinquish the privileges they currently possess outside of the intervention experience?”

And to this I added, the issue is also whether, not just in the case to which they allude (the statebearing nation relinquishes their so-called "rights" to statehood), but whether the stateless nation and state minority also recognize the loss of safety and security such "relinquishing" would represent for the statebearing nation, in order that they achieve their own so-called "rights" to a state or expanded rights, respectively. In global historical terms such ethnopolitical relationships have been time-bound. Historically, we know that relationships shift. Dominated groups have become the dominant (whether in the same space or that of another). Therefore, the question of relinquishing power is a double-sided one. It means that those currently *disadvantaged* or *dominated* may themselves one day seek to defend a reified conception of themselves as disadvantaged, even after they have moved into positions of power.

As a result, I ask whether the disadvantaged, or dominated, can also recognize the loss of safety and security such "relinquishing" represents for dominant groups. This is important, especially since if a dominated group comes to assume the future role as a dominant group, rather than the role of an equal status group, they, like other dominant groups before them, will almost certainly seek to defend their privileges as part and parcel of their efforts to inscribe their own nation into a state unit, such that the scenarios of structural violence they seek to rectify (between a dominating and dominated group), will not have ended. In aggregate terms, structural violence would still exist, with only its players having *switched* or shifted places.

Optimal Contact Does Not Exist

A condition of optimal contact does not exist within the context of political conflicts, and not least among these, their ethnopolitical and intractable forms. Groups typically live in separation from one another and even when they do not, they may simply avoid interaction. The kinds of contact I described in this study as being typical of those that *do* actually occur between the three groups are the norm and what practitioners have to work with. Namely, practitioners must intervene, in this case, into a scenario where contact transpires between (1) Israeli soldiers (who are mainly Jewish) and Palestinians, (2) Palestinian day laborers and Jewish-Israelis, and in more multi-faceted, albeit limited forms between (3) Palestinian and Arab/Palestinian-Israeli relatives, and in multi-faceted, albeit irregular forms between (4) Jewish-Israelis and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis. And, as, however, is even more typical, they must intervene into a scenario of (5) no contact at all.

Today, having no contact with Palestinians is especially common for the vast majority of Jewish-Israelis, and to a secondary extent, so too is Arab/Palestinian-Israelis and Palestinians not having any contact between themselves. Contact between Arab/Palestinian-Israelis and Jewish-Israelis, especially that which the latter experience (per their greater percentage), while existing, constitutes especially limited and irregular experiences of what Ghazi Falah once coined “living, together apart” (Falah, 1996). While some Jewish-Israelis and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis live together in mixed cities, they do not necessarily interact in meaningful ways. In summary, these sorts of mainly one-dimensional, limited and irregular forms of contact are

precisely what practitioners must deal with when trying to change people and the structures that underlie and form their “normal” every day existences.

***Inequality is a “normal”* facet of “the conflict”.** Furthermore, as part and parcel of this limited contact, unequal status between those who have contact is the norm. In the case of intractable conflicts such as “this conflict”, each successive generation is, meanwhile, socialized to this norm and the conflict itself, year after year, such that both inequality and conflict continue to persist.

Each generation of Palestinian children is socialized to the conflict, whether while playing soccer out on poorly paved roads and in school yards, rather than in specifically constructed children’s leisure spaces, or instead while at a checkpoint where a usually (but not always Jewish) Israeli solider checks them, and they might pass to go see a soccer match, travel to another community, or simply not at all, including if, for example, their parents are having a heart attack and need to reach a hospital.

“The conflict” and its accompanying norms are bequeathed to the next generation of Jewish-Israelis, inside their bomb-shelter where they play without paying attention to the fact that they are playing inside a windowless concrete shelter, not a room created for leisure, but rather, to ensure survival. Similarly, these Jewish-Israeli children do not “realize” that they are surrounded by a camera equipped and numbered fence which, in fact, they are *not* allowed to pass through via a checkpoint in order to visit communities that neighbor them (and which, in fact constitute the only communities they can readily view from their own windows), in this case, because,

once they have filtered the separation barrier through their ethnopolitical group's narrative, it is no longer of any relevance or interest to them – it is supposed to be there.

Finally, each generation of Arab/Palestinian-Israelis is socialized by virtue of going out to play where there is no playground in sight. Instead, they head out to the street to play. Similarly, they are also socialized by being repeatedly asked are you "Israeli *or* Palestinian", in spite of and despite their having Bamba in their hand and their breath smelling of its peanut flavoring, being an Israeli citizen, attending an Israeli school, living in Israel, having been born there, and yet having Palestinian family "on the other side", across the "wall/fence" with whom, despite that they are family, can not easily meet.

As each successive generation of Palestinians, Jewish-Israelis and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis become socialized to "the conflict", PC must grapple with the reality of structural inequality. As Jackman and Crane concluded about the contact hypothesis, "The important question is not whether amicable contact can exist between groups of equal status, but whether such contact can help to foster equality between groups who have unequal status." (Jackman and Crane, 1986, p 480). Thus, PC should attempt, as Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* should have, to foster equality across the scenario of inequality that defines the Israeli-Palestinian ethnopolitical conflict and the Arab-Israeli interstate conflict

Game playing as a representation of their conflict status. In all these cases, the Palestinian, Jewish-Israeli and Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children had great fodder

for their play. They did not need to possess a wide imagination to be able to play their conflict simulation games. Apparently, if you are Palestinian, you play these games more often and assume the role of the aggressor. If you are an Arab/Palestinian-Israeli or Jewish-Israeli, in comparison, you play less. The former two assumed the role of the aggressor, and the latter, the defender. In other words, as I found, the Palestinian children opposed their conflict context through their simulated participation in it. They countered their narrative role as that of the "victim of the conflict" to rather, become its aggressor in the play roles they assumed. Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children similarly adopted the role of the aggressor, even though they positioned themselves as relative "victims". Jewish-Israeli children instead, even though they also positioned themselves as "victims", preferred to be defenders. That is, it seems that they preferred to defend the status quo. Notably, it was only the Palestinian girls, *not* the Jewish-Israeli or Arab/Palestinian-Israeli girls who participated in the conflict through such vicarious efforts. In the case of their conflict scenario, apparently, the Palestinian's alone prompted involvement across gender lines.

Unlike children living in a zone of peace who have to "make this stuff up", the reality was readily available to these children. What was available, however, the micro conflict context in which each group lives, was *completely* different and not always analogous. The stateless nation and state minority members play the aggressor in order to get back what they believe was taken from them and is "rightfully" theirs, while the statebearing nation members play the role of the defender in order to retain what they believe is "rightfully" theirs. Each takes for granted the (1) existence of the inter-state

system, (2) the “right” of groups to own states in the first place and, in turn, for (3) states to be endowed with the greatest resource for protecting human beings across the world system – the right to bestow citizenship.

The stateless nation members, in their games, are, however, apparently the most active. They simulate political protest the most through their game playing. From the perspective of a structural violence approach to conflict, this is perhaps no surprise. They are the *most* disadvantaged within the context of the Israeli Palestinian conflict and so, therefore, have the *most* to gain. Thus, they vicariously participate in “the conflict” the most, with even the girls among them participating. In addition, they are the only ones who have an audience member who actually participated in reality -- to shout out to Israeli soldiers, “No, it’s not allowed”.

Conversely, from a physical violence appraoch to conflict, through their game playing, the stateless nation is simulating the biggest threat to stability. They mount the greatest protest *effort* and specifically, employ an aggressive stance, emulating real-life. In turn, these children’s daily play practices socialize them more deeply into their narrative position vis-à-vis “the conflict”, and further serve as the ultimate backdrop for their reception of the mediated contact intervention text.

Responding to Such Schematic Filtering

When designing a PC intervention a practitioner must confront and intervene in the reality of unequal status and the subsequent socialization of each generation to the existing norms of their lives that I have described. One cannot remove these, or

any other children in similar circumstances, from their conflict-ridden environment in order to achieve peace. Yet, as Heydenberk and Heydenberk (2001) concluded (and as I discussed in my qualitative meta-analysis in Chapter 3), it has been found to be necessary in the case of school violence intervention programs. With respect to the self-efficacy effects model, in order for the achieved effects of an intervention to be sustained (assuming it "worked" in some way in the first place), participants must, therefore, be permanently removed from their environment. I, therefore, hypothesize the requirement of permanent removal to be the same, regardless of which PC model is employed by an intervention.

In the case of "this conflict", or political conflicts in general, these children cannot, however, be "removed", certainly not without a political solution, theoretically in the form of either (1) a two state solution or (2) a population exchange. The former, however, has yet to be achieved, and the latter is vilified. And notably, even if the former political compromise were adopted, this would neither change part of the existing scenario in need of resolution, namely that Jewish-Israeli and Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children would still live together unequally in the state of Israel. So long as (1) the status quo is maintained and (2) without either solution, or some combination thereof, (3) the creation of a bi-national state or perhaps (4) the creation of a new world system, devoid of states, the context is just this – what it *is*, i.e. one defined by separation, inequality and repeated socialization to this context.

From my assessment of these three audience's reception of the PC text, as intersected by their wider contextual realities, it would appear that human beings only

have to have lived on this earth for 5 years before they have *already* been "successfully" politically, economically, socially and militarily encoded by the interstate system to find such scenarios of inequality and separation "normal". These children had already by this age readily adopted and applied to their worldview their groups' narrative and specifically, their categorical approach to "the conflict" as a stateless nation, statebearing nation, and state minority, in pursuit of justice, security and equality.

In light of this predicament, my best recommendation is to ensure that an intervention is, in the first place, "noticed" by the target audience (as it was encoded). Only then might there perhaps exist the *opportunity* to alter their attitudes, beliefs and/or self-efficacy levels and, in turn, their behavioral intentions and finally, should they overcome the structural barriers to achieve them, their actual behaviors.

The Children's Decodings as Insights into the Three Narrative Views or Life Worlds of "the Conflict"

The Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* intervention, which was the focus of this study, fell short of its desired outcomes. I, therefore, outline some potential recommendations, in the hopes that it might be improved to better foster change, especially given (as I discussed in Chapter 5) that it amounts to the best-exhibited practice of PC in itself. (The more general recommendations I make, which apply to any mediated contact effects intervention, and thus PC, more generally, are included in Appendix D). Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* demonstrated great difficulty in the

potential to alter its target audience members' behaviors, even when those audience members had been in this world for only 5 years. The stories the children told illustrate how ingrained the conflict already is, and therefore, why it is so difficult to foster change.

Paul Messaris, who wrote about the power or effect of images in advertising and for fostering change, argued that images held a greater potential to change children, in contrast to adults. According to him,

> adult attitudes about people of other groups are undoubtedly much more intractable than are the views of children. Older viewers inevitably bring an extensive history of past experiences on any particular encounter with a movie or other visual portrayal, and this history is bound to constrain the impact of the encounter. Furthermore, to put it bluntly, many adults often have too much of a stake in intergroup prejudice to allow themselves to be influenced by contradictory messages (Messaris, 1997, p. 123).

Messaris concluded that it would even be irresponsible not to, therefore, provide "positive lessons" such as those *Sesame Street's* programming affords to children by incorporating visual media like these into educational systems as "a means of enhancing cross-cultural knowledge and understanding." (Messaris, 1997, p. 123).

I submit this study, however, as evidence of the reverse. Children's attitudes are *already* intractable, and resistant to change, including to those lessons *Sesame Street* programming tries to present to them. While using visual imagery *can* exert an effect, under conditions of political conflict, it appears that by the age of five, it may *already* be too late to try to achieve an effect.

To quote form Padden and Humphries, whose descriptions of childhood stories are analogous in certain ways with respect to the stories the audience members in my study discussed with me; "These stories tell us not about 'childish' or 'naïve' views of the world, but rather about the unfolding of the human symbolic capacity. Children spend their time learning what things are supposed to mean and how to think about relationships between events. As children living in the world of their caretakers, they are powerfully guided by the conventions of their culture" (Padden and Humphries, 1988, p. 25). The various "recipes" and "instructions," these children acquire, as Padden and Humphries referred to it, become part of children's cultural systems, and, in turn, guide their perceptions and theories.

To this end, the audience members' interpretations, even when appearing to be completely "off", as for example, when transposing the category of "Palestinian" for "Jew", *do* tell us something. These interpretations give us a guide to what, in each respective ethnopolitical group, takes a *mere* five years to learn. All that is necessary for them to learn their respective scripts is for them to happen to have been a human being who was born and grew up within their *specific* systemic context.

By age five, the youngest children in my study, Palestinians, Jewish-Israelis and Arab/Palestinian-Israelis alike, already knew how one lives "normally" within each of their respective conflict zones. They unconsciously adapted their lives to life within each of their respective zones of conflict, unaware of another reality (including those of their partners in conflict). As a result, they came to take for granted the normalcy of their lives. It is normal to pass through checkpoints, or be rendered

immobile by them; to play inside bomb shelters, or to be completely flustered when someone asks you simple questions, like, “are you Israeli?” or “are you Palestinian?”

Conversely, if they switched places, surely each would find the other’s “normal” context to be rather abnormal. Nevertheless, these different contextual realities, combined with the structural realities within which each of the three ethnopolitical groups exist, in turn, formed the grid through which they directly made sense of the Israeli-Palestinian ethnopolitical and Arab-Israeli interstate conflicts. So too, they formed the grids through which these respective audience members, by and large, came to decode the text of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*.

I did not enter into this study to write about the causes for the intractability of certain political conflicts, but this finding is, nevertheless, vital. Efforts to manage conflict, including through peace communication must plan accordingly to begin from the axiom that, at least already by the age of five, children have already been sufficiently encoded to accept and adopt as “normal” their narrative approaches to their conflict. Peace communication practitioners must, therefore, address this reality in their interventions.

Children are not naïve, and as scholars who study children and conflict have argued, they should not be held responsible for doing what adults have been unable to do. They should not be expected to shoulder the burden of trying to build or make peace when adults have failed to do so. Such arguments, however, about whether interventions should, therefore, target adults or children, are not what is relevant. Trying to intervene from a young age, or “getting” human beings before they have

reached adulthood and have become "ingrained with hate" is irrelevant, it appears. From the age of five already, for the purposes of a peace communication intervention, children are already "adults". Thus, I am not sure these debates, in the end, actually, have impact on resolving the situation.

The Bad News

That children are already adults is the bad news. Secondly, peace communication programs are *just* communication – whether they are communication as message, media, contact, reconciliation, or factor of production effects. The effects, or potential lack thereof, of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*, may be viewed pessimistically by those who ascribe a great deal of power to communication. However, another way to view it is through the limited media effects paradigm. This intervention constituted just one communication program, and it had to compete with the context of "this conflict". From this vantage point, it is wondrous how any change ever occurs, or let alone that each audience member even generally negotiated the encoding of their "shared others" in the text. That is, the members of the audience were actually willing to "listen" as it were, to what the text of *Sesame Street* had to say to them about these groups.

Thus, change is difficult, and this should be of no surprise to those who evaluate applied health or political communication. Assuming (or hoping) optimistically that change will necessarily occur is a waste of donor and practitioner resources. I do not submit the findings of my study in order to suggest that PC is

useless. Before reaching such a conclusion, I rather submit these findings in order to try and pinpoint where resources should be targeted so that the best types of PC efforts can be attempted. Below, I suggest recommendations for improving Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*. If implemented, these should of course also be evaluated in order to determine whether they are, in fact, useful. Only through further research can we discover whether these programs can be potentially useful or simply, as I argued in Chapter 1, should be stopped, and resources instead be moved away from trying to use communication to manage conflict to instead investing it in other tools for its management.

The Good News

I will conclude the dissertation with the good news. Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* may not necessarily be so far reaching via its targeted efforts as to be able to change its audiences' behaviors. However, it is important to note that firstly, it, like any intervention can be improved and secondly, that other useful aspects, which I did not measure in this dissertation, *did* in fact emerge from out of it. With respect to the first piece of good news, I therefore suggest some recommendations for potentially improving the intervention.

Recommendations For Re-Designing Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*, Mediated Contact interventions and Peace Communication Programming More Generally

Labeling

Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* would benefit from the use of greater signposts for signifying that each character represents the specified ethnopolitical group in question. *Sesame Street* was grappling with, on the one hand, being a television program, and thus an open text, and being an intervention, on the other hand, and thus having to simultaneously be closed. In its case, it failed to be closed *enough.* Only by further closing itself, might it be in a better position to alter the audience members' behavior. The text demonstrated potential with respect to altering the audience's orientations towards their "shared others". However, if it wishes to go further, beyond just "getting" audience members to negotiate their readings of their "shared others", and to accept or just negotiate the encoding of their "others," or oppositional, main partners to conflict, it must contain better sign posting.

As Nisbett and Ross have argued, the best way to alter prior beliefs is by actually s*howin*g those beliefs, and then only *secondly,* by deconstructing them. As I discussed, the text did not actually show "the conflict" on the screen, including the three structural and narrative approaches to it. In addition, as some of the producers indicated to me during my interviews of them, it was important for them that they not include characters that represented each group stereotypically. However, as far as the management of conflict is concerned, this is precisely where the production may have erred. In order to break down audience member's pre-conceived constructions about their "others", the text might have begun by literally showing these "others," precisely as each audience views them, from their worst stereotypical constructs.

In other words, the producers could have begun the program by depicting soldiers, terrorists and police to the Palestinian, Jewish-Israeli, and Arab/Palestinian-Israeli audience members, respectively. By including these specific stereotypical characters, the audience would have made no “mistake” as to whom the characters actually represented. So too, in turn, the audience might have been able to identify which spoken language “went” with which group. In this way the audience might have decoded the identity of the characters precisely as the producers had intended.

Only after making sure the children were “on the same page” with respect to the encoding of the program, so to speak, could the production teams have then proceeded, layer by layer, to deconstruct these stereotypes. For example, they could have begun by portraying each of the stereotypical constructs of the “others” and “shared others”, and then literally, have had the characters remove their uniforms over the course of the programs to reveal, civilian clothes underneath. From there, they could have moved slowly to add more features in order to portray the characters as more than just one-dimensional stereotypes. In turn, the text could have evolved to depict multi-dimensional characters trying to engage with one another through pro-social contact.

This recommendation, however, would likely have been met with resistance by the production teams, certainly Sesame Workshop, given that *Sesame Street* is a *children's* program and a trusted brand name. In addition, to which, following my recommendations could potentially harm exposure rates. However, I argue, it should

not be met with resistance since the text containing the features I recommend would in fact *not* be introducing these children to anything they do not *already* know.

The children were the ones who drew images for me of the “army” and “terrorists”. They came up with these constructs, not me. I only asked them if they knew of any other people, apart from however they self-identified their own group identity. And it was in their answers to this simple question, in their description of people who differ from themselves, that *they* took me to these images. Alternatively, if showing such features of the conflict to these children is deemed problematic, another option is for this intervention, along with other child-targeted peace communication programs, to reconsider why they target children in the first place. Perhaps they should rather target adults, to whom they *can* show the conflict.

Local Production Teams Should Be Equipped with Conflict Management Experts

Sesame Workshop is right to have local production teams involved in the production who know their own respective societies. However, this alone is insufficient. The production teams also need to be comprised of experts in conflict and conflict management, media, childhood education and cognitive development. Hiring media production, childhood education and cognitive development experts who know the local context is, as Sesame Workshop did, vital but not enough. These individuals might be locals, but they are not experts in the analysis of and management of conflict.

Sesame Workshop and similar PC efforts should also hire conflict management consultants, rather than only meeting with them for consultation. Conflict management

experts need to be integrated from the start, at the level of curriculum development, so that conflict management principles can already be combined with child education and cognitive development theories to become encoded into the text. In short, by hiring such experts, Sesame Workshop and other PC practitioners would be in a better position to portray aspects of the conflict through each of the respective narrative approaches, and in turn, better able to design an effective - sufficiently closed - peace communication text.

Experimenting with the text as a mediated artifact. Finally, it would be interesting to employ the use of this text, rather as a mediating *artifact.* Attempting to do so might help foster homogeneity across the groups. As I discussed in Chapter 3, such an experiment could be attempted by bringing all three partners to conflict to *co-view* the series together. By, in turn, using the text as a triangulation device to foster interpersonal contact, some form of social cohesion might be achieved. Such an experiment, however, returns us to one of the basic problem faced by the contact effects model: i.e. the audience members would still all need to consent to being brought together, and in turn would actually have to be brought together. Yet, this combination of models – of mediated contact effects with contact effects – may, hypothetically, be a useful experiment to try.

The Positive Unmeasured Effects of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*

Lastly, there is the good news concerning the contributions of the intervention that I did not measure (or at least the data which I did not describe) in this dissertation.

These included such contributions as, firstly, my ability to “use” the program to conduct the research in the first place. All the externalities that emerged as a result of the research, all the contributions I believe this study makes that I outlined in the introduction to Part III, can in part be attributed, in the first place, to the existence of Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street*. As I discussed in Chapter 5, this intervention helped facilitate my entry to the research site – the home and all the data I was able to collect.

Secondly, the program also functioned not just as a mediated contact effects intervention but simultaneously as a contact effects intervention. During its first season especially, production team members at all levels of encoding interacted with one another and met for meetings sponsored by Sesame Workshop. These interactions provided the opportunity for behavioral change to occur among *these* participants. Thus, the text – while unlikely to exert an effect on the audience that could build, and certainly make peace, given their decoding within the current context, it could have, rather had an effect, at the encoding stage instead, thus transforming the *encoders.*

Third, the program allowed for the creation of Al-Quds Educational Television**.** According to my discussions with Daoud Kuttab, the Palestinian teams participation with Israeli and Palestinian Sesame Street allowed him to “piggy back” the creation of the television station itself onto the production of this television series (Kuttab, 2005, author interview). Thus, from the perspective of an embedded factor of production effects peace communication model, the intervention enabled Kuttab to open a television station and provide jobs to Palestinians. Thus, indirectly, the *Sesame*

Street production fostered economic development – an outcome important for managing ethnopolitical conflict.

As part and parcel of this economic development, which was a by-product of the production, I cannot speak to the question of *who* was hired – i.e. whether those who were hired served to operationalize a capitalist or critical capitalist approach to the embedded factor of production effects model. Nevertheless, what is most significant here is that the television station was able to provide jobs. Job creation is an important contribution for peace that Sesame Workshop *did* help to achieve, albeit rather from an embedded factor of production effects approach.

Thus, peace communication existed (albeit perhaps not from the perspective of the paradigm of media effects). Entire production teams were organized around (and even were organized for) the creation of this peace communication product – these *Sesame Street* programs. These teams, in turn, collaborated to create the production.

In other words, there exists a gap between the ideal or goals Sesame Workshop set forth for what their product could achieve, i.e. the effective mediation of contact in their hopes to, in turn, alter the audience members intergroup attitudes, and as I argued is also essential – to change political goals towards resolving the conflict. There are two ways to think about this gap.

First, this gap exists and it may suggest that this type of peace communication is not useful, or that the recommendations I have laid out can be followed to improve the effects of the production, and so it can, in turn, reach its media effects related goals. Second, at the same time, however, it should not be overlooked, that while not

the expressed curricular goals of the program, the process of *praxis*, or actually working on the production, was useful, as independent from and regardless of the wider impact of the curriculum on the audience. It may be that the process of engaging, via practice, as pragmatists would argue (e.g. Dewey, 1927), is what can help to build or make peace, but that the process of transmitting information in an effort to simulate contact and social interaction within the context of an ethnopolitical nationalist conflict, may, rather, as presently attempted, be insufficient (at least as it has been assessed to date).

Appendix A: 7 Models of Peace Communication Practice

Model	I. Message Effects	II. Contact Effects	III. Media-Technology Effects	IV. Mediated Contact Effects	V. (Embedded) Factor of Production Effects	VI. Self-Efficacy Effects	VII. Reconciliation Effects
Communication Mode	Communication as message (knowledge, economic commodity)	Interpersonal communication as contact	Communication as technology	Mass Communication as mediation	Communication as technological input	Communication as perceived self-efficacy and self-efficacy training messages	Communication as ritual
Years Practice Begins[1]	1940s to the present	1950s to the present	1960s to the present	1990s to the present	1990s to the present	1990s to the present	mid-1990s to the present
Causal Conflict Assumptions	Conflict is the result of prejudice, due to a lack of/unequal or incorrect communication about others/others' needs, or an information gap (knowledge gap)	Conflict is due to prejudice/negative intergroup attitudes, which stem from a lack of contact between peoples	Conflict is due to primitivism (i.e. illiteracy)	Conflict is due to prejudice/negative intergroup attitudes. These are the result of a lack of contact between people, due to the realities of the complex and geographically distant lives modern humans lead or human-imposed "segregated" lifestyles	Conflict is due to under or unequal development (structural inequality/communication gap)	Conflict is due to aggression and the inability to communicate one's position non-violently	Conflict can re-occur if silence is maintained and emotional wounds are not voiced.
Theory	Information/messages constitute power in and of themselves as economic goods, and exert direct effects on people's conflict behaviors. Broadcasted messages persuade partners to conflict to side with the message sender's conflict goals, either directly or indirectly (via democracy), or to engage in dialogue. Comprised of 4 subtypes (see Appendix B) Note: No single theorist has made this argument, rather it is a policy model. (The only exception is subtype 4: peace journalism theorists)	Interaction, when structured properly along the 5 criterion of the contact hypothesis, eliminates prejudice, and in turn builds peace	Technology eradicates primitiveness. Its reverse, modernity, leads to democratic participation and, in turn, negative peace. Note: No single theorist can really be attributed to having made this entire argument; rather it is a policy model.	Mass Media homogenize people. They mediate between them, simulating contact. If they emit messages portraying pro-social interpersonal interactions, they eliminate prejudice and, in turn, build peace. Note: No single theorist has made this argument, rather it is a policy model.	*Subtype A* Laissez-faire economic inputs foster economic development, thereby eliminating the sources of conflict – poverty - to establish peace *Subtype B* Directed economic inputs, when carefully inserted into the given institutional structures, close structural inequality gaps, thereby eliminating the sources of conflict - structural inequality - to establish equality and justice.	The combined development of self-efficacy skills and perceived self-efficacy skills for engaging in peace-promoting communication styles replaces aggression and violence, thereby establishing a negative peace	Listening provides the perpetrators with the experience necessary to empathize with the victims (and accept guilt) and move forward. Sharing gives the victims the opportunity to voice the past in order to move forward, by instead leaving a written testimonial in its place. Together, by moving forward, both prevent the return to violence.
Chief Theorists	1) Propaganda/persuasion theory: Messages	1) Contact Hypothesis: (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1988)	1) Modernist Theory + Democracy & Freedom of Expression	1) Contact Hypothesis: Allport (1954; Pettigrew, 1988)	*Subtype A* Laissez-faire capitalist	1) Self Efficacy (SCT/ SLT): (Bandura,1977;	1: Reconciliation Theories: (Bar-On, 1995; Bar-Tal &

	have direct effects: (Lasswell, 1927) *Subtype A: Free-Flow Propaganda/Public Diplomacy Subtype* *Phase I* + 2) Freedom of Expression *Phase II* + 3) Democracy & Freedom of Expression Interdependence Theories (Dewey, 1927) + 4) Democratic (Interstate) Peace Theory (Babst, 1964, 1972; Levy, 1988; Small & Singer; 1976; Rummel, 1979, 1983, 1985; Maoz and Russet 1992, 1993) *Subtype B: Protectionist/ Dependency Subtype* + 2) Structural Inequality of Information (Becker, 1982) + 3) Protectionist/ Dependency Theory (Schiller, 1979) *Subtype C: Free-Flow Anti-Censorship Subtype* + 2) Anti-Censorship/ Protectionism Technology focused Libertarianism (Pool, 1990) 2a) Legal Libertarianism: Thompson and Price, 2002)		Interdependence Theory: Lerner (1958) + 1a) Democracy & Freedom of Expression Interdependence Theories (Dewey, 1927) + 3) Democratic Peace Theory (Babst, 1964; Rummel, 1979, 1983, 1985; Levy, 1988; Small & Singer, 1976; Maoz and Russet 1992, 1993; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch, 2001; Gurr, 2000)	+ 2) Homogenization Theory: (Innis, 1950)	innovation and production theories focused specifically on IT as factors of production leading development + 2) Capitalist Peace Theory: *Subtype B* 1) Directed embedded IT (Comparative Institutional Approaches) led development: (Schramm, 1964) + 2) Critical Capitalist Peace Theory/Inequality & Conflict Theories of relative deprivation (Gurr, 2000, Nelson, 1998; Wimmer, 2002) - OR - 1) Directed embedded IT (Comparative Institutional Approaches) led development, combined with critical capitalist theory (Wilson III, 1998)	1986; Bandura, Adams and Beyer, 1977) + 2) communication styles for which SE needs to be improved: (Heydenberk & Heydenberk, 2000; Foss & Griffin, 1995; Gergen, 1999)	Bennink in Bar Siman-Tov, 2004; Bar Siman-Tov, 2004; Albeck, Adwan & Bar-On, 2002; Staub, 2006)

	+ 3) Democratic Peace: Intrastate (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch, 2001) & Ethnopolitical Conflict Theory (Gurr, 2000) + 4) Constructivism: ethnopolitical based discrimination (Gurr, 2000) *Subtype D: Talk Peace Variant* + 2) Anti-Censorship/ Protectionism Technology focused Libertarianism (Pool, 1990) + 3) Invitational Discourse (Foss & Griffin, 1995) + 4) Constructivism: ethnopolitical based discrimination (Gurr, 2000) - OR - 1) Peace Journalism (Botes, 1998; Galtung,1998; Manhoff, 1998; Shinar, 2004; Tehranian, 2002)						
Intervention Case Examples and Policy Statements	*Subtype A* VOA Promotes American Foreign interests through propaganda/public diplomacy initially meant to persuade other states/its critics to make peace, later to adopt democracy and in turn make or retain peace. Created as:	American based Middle East and South Asia-focused *Seeds of Peace* "Seeds of Peace has focused primarily on *bringing Arab and Israeli teenagers together before fear, mistrust and prejudice blind them* from seeing the human face of their enemy. Seeds of Peace goes beyond international agreements and treaties. *It reverses the legacy of hatred by*	UNESCO-UNDP Experimental World Literacy Programme "But to bring literacy to adults on a mass scale will have no chance of success without the understanding and active support of the general public, since it calls for nothing less than a general mobilization of all mankind. This is so not only because of the funds it would require but, more	*Rechov Sumsum/Shara'a Simsim* and *Sippuray Sumsum & Hikayat Simsim* Israeli, Palestinian & Jordanian TV Programs: *Season 1*: to "demystify and break down cultural stereotypes by introducing young Palestinian and Israeli children to one another." Both [the Israeli and Palestinian series] include 'cross-over'	*Subtype A* USAID *Leland* Initiative, Africa *Phase 1*: Diffused new technologies (internet) to African states to enable Africans to "leap frog". *Subtype B* USAID *Leland* Initiative, Africa *Phase 2*: Introduced new	School Violence Intervention programs Sri Lankan UNICEF, Sri Lankan Ministry of Education National Institute of Education (NIE), & Quaker Peace and Service NGO *Education for Conflict Resolution Program*:	*Blue House*, Germany "How does an individual cope with tragedy, inherited, and present?" "What can young people in Germany and the US, Jews and non-Jews, take from the events of the holocaust?" "How does one pay respect to the victims of a tragedy?" "Who is

	"a response to the needs of peoples in *closed and war-torn* societies for *reliable news*." *Subtype B* NWICO & UNESCO journalism training & indigenous media capacity building programs "Mass media can *contribute to mutual understanding*. There is a need to correct the equilibrium in communication flows and *work towards greater reciprocity by correcting the inequality in flows*. This can be achieved by giving the mass media the *conditions* and *resources* to gain strength." "the mass media, *by disseminating information on the aims, aspirations, cultures and needs of all peoples*, contributes to *eliminate ignorance and misunderstanding between peoples*, to *make nationals of a country sensitive* to the needs and desires of others, *to ensure the respect of the rights and dignity of all nations, all peoples and all individuals*"[2] ZIANA, Zimbabwe Parastatal news agency *Subtype C* *Star Radio*, Liberia	*nurturing lasting friendships that become the basis for mutual understanding and respect*. By training these young leaders in conflict resolution skills, Seeds of Peace helps them become the seeds from which an enduring peace will grow." *SAWA*, Lebanon Camp *Sought* to give Lebanese youth a chance to get to "*know one another* and to learn about their country through discovery and sharing and enable the children to live together positively, sharing human, social and relational values through creative and recreational activities."	importantly, because the very unity of mankind is at stake. At a time when science is opening the gateway to the stars, it is unthinkable that two-fifths of mankind should still be prisoners of ancestral darkness. Or are we to have two types of human beings – one for the stars, the other for the caves? There could be no hope of peace if we tolerated an iniquity as flagrant as this unequal division of the benefit of progress." UNESCO World Literacy Day/ Education for ALL Literacy Campaigns "It is a condition for people's effective participation in the democratic process. It is the basis for the written communication and literature that have long provided the main channel for cross-cultural awareness and understanding. And, at the same time, it is the most precious way we have of expressing, preserving and developing our cultural diversity and identity. Literacy, in short, is a prerequisite for peace"	segments, that is, segments in which characters who inhabit the Israeli street (*Rechov Sumsum*) visit their friends on the Palestinian street (*Shara'a Simsim*) and vice versa." *Season 2*: To provide "*Jewish-Israeli children with opportunities to meet their Palestinian-Israeli neighbors* and for Palestinian-Israelis to see themselves depicted proudly on-screen" (Arafat, Bar-Lev, Abou Shmeiss and Abyad, 2003, p. 3) *Nashe Maalo* Macedonian TV Program: "The *lack of interethnic contact* [between Albanian, Macedonian, Roma and Turkish youth in conflict] *gives rise to prejudice* and fear, *sowing the seeds of* instability and, potentially, of deadly *conflict*. The aim of the TV series, in turn, is to build "tolerance and understanding across these barriers in Macedonia" and potential[ly] to affect this [negative] image of the Roma positively *by depicting activities and occupations that counter* ingrained, *negative stereotypes*."	ICTs, sought to ensure training in their use, and their access by information have-nots. Uncertain about whether new technological inputs into production would necessarily spur development, they asked "*Will* the Internet advance development in Africa?" (CIDCM African Telematics webpage) And in an effort to critically point out how the neglect of equitable access to new ICTs could have variable results, they asked "Does the media *promote or retard* ethnic, religious, or class conflicts?" (CIDCM African Telematics webpage) IDRC *CABECA, Acacia - Africa and PAN – Asia* Initiatives Introduced new ICTs, sought to ensure training in their use, and their access by information have-nots Acacia sought to enable communities to solve their developmental problems in "ways that *build firmly on local goals, cultures, strengths, and processes*; build a body of knowledge capable of identifying the policies, technologies, approaches, and methodologies instrumental *in promoting the affordable and effective use of ICTs by marginalized communities*, such as women." "*Acacia will work mainly with rural and*	"To create awareness of and to strengthen *beliefs* in *non-violent means of conflict resolution*" "to develop *skills and attitudes* among young people to enable them to *resolve conflict through peaceful means*." *Nayaa Baato Nayaa Paailaa Nepalese Soap Opera* Targeted the promotion of peace-promoting communication styles across Nepalese castes and other groups. *In particular, they strive to get: "Youth [to] believe* that discussion, debate and understanding are better alternatives to solving conflict," and "that they have a role as convenors/ peacemakers in their communities."	responsible for safe-guarding the lessons of WWII, now that the direct experience is passing into history, as survivors and perpetrators die?" Reconciliation and or Incrimination Theatre, Rwanda Example from the play, *Iryo Nabonye* (*In Place of War*): "In one scene, all the actors are portrayed at a school. The teacher asks the students to conjugate the verb 'forgive,' but the students refuse because they had seen their families killed. A 10-year-old boy stands up to say, 'I forgave', 'You forgive', and then points to the audience 'You tell the truth'. *Here, the play directs the audience to ask for forgiveness and to tell what happened during the time of the genocide*. The classroom scene is intended as a direct association with the Gacaca courts in which genocide perpetrators testify before the communities in which the crimes were committed." "The main purpose [of the play] is to give a message

	"Broadcasts *impartial* and *credible* information on the situation in the country and the region. Promotes professional journalism by *training young journalists*. Promotes the *freedom of speech*." *Studio Ijambo, Burundi* "Responding to the need for *balanced* and anti-inflammatory *broadcasting to counter "hate radio"* Open Broadcast Network Bosnia and Herzogovina "to support pluralist democracy, freedom of expression and independent journalism and to provide programming on an inter-entity level, accessible to all citizens of Bosnia and Herzogovina." *Subtype D:* SFCG Common Ground News Service and *Elias Sarfawi Awards* "balanced and *solution oriented* articles by local and international experts that *promote constructive perspectives and encourage dialogue.*" *"to contribute to political dialogue, expose readers to new perspectives and help to lay the groundwork for peaceful solutions.*" *Medios Para La Paz,* Columbia				*disadvantaged communities*, and particularly their women and youth groups. *Often these communities find themselves isolated from the ICT networks to which their urban counterparts increasingly have access.* Yet at the same time these communities demonstrate enormous creativity and enterprise, *living in an environment with little in the way of services and information.* With Acacia, IDRC intends to support this creativity and enterprise by demonstrating the benefits of a local capacity to *use information and communication in solving local development problems.*" "Acacia aims to achieve three mutually reinforcing objectives that combine to *promote equitable, sustainable, and self-directed development among disadvantaged and rural communities in sub-Saharan Africa.*"		about what happened before and after the genocide. *The message is to reconcile, that is the main purpose - reconciliation.*"

	"Can we, with words, with our reports about the war, contribute to the establishment of favorable conditions for peace?"						

1. Models II through VII came into vogue during periods when ethnopolitical conflicts predominated. Models IV onwards, in contrast with models I through III, came into vogue during periods that were, in addition, nearly entirely devoid of interstate conflicts (including decolonization related conflicts).
2. Italics in all quotes added for emphasis by the author.

Appendix B: Table of Website Addresses for Featured PC Programs and Organizations

Featured Clearing House for PC and Related Communication Campaign Interventions

The Communication Initiative www.comminit.com

Featured PC Project Websites and Host Locations/Sponsorships/Partnerships and Target Population Locations

ACACIA-IDRC (Canada: Africa) www.idrc.ca/acacia/

PAN-IDRC (Canada: Asia) www.idrc.ca/panasia/

Blue House (Germany: German-Christians and Jewish populations globally) no website

Common Ground News Service (US: Middle East) www.commongroundnews.org

Education for Conflict Resolution Programme (UNICEF/UK/Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka) no website

Nilesat TV Hebrew language news program (Egypt: Israel) no website

Elias Sarwari Journalism Awards (US: Middle East)
www.sfcg.org/sfcg/sfcg_cgawards_me.html

Iryo Nabonye Theatre for Reconciliation and Recrimination (Rwanda) no website

Leland Initiative (US: Africa)
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/initiatives/leland.html

Medios para la Paz (Columbia) www.mediosparalapaz.org

Nashe Maalo (US: Macedonia)
www.sfcg.org/programmes/macedonia/macedonia_television.html

Nayaa Baato Nayaa Paailaa (US/Nepal: Nepal)
www.sfcg.org/programmes/Nepal/nepal_soap.html

Open Broadcast Network (Bosnia and Herzegovina) no website

Radio Free Asia www.rfa.org/

Radio Free Iraq www.iraqhurr.org/

Rechov Sumsum (US/Israel: Israel) www.sesameworkshop.org/aroundtheworld/israel

SAWA (UNICEF: Lebanon) no website

Studio Ijambo (US: Burundi and African Great Lakes Region via web)
www.studioijambo.org

Star Radio (Liberia and Switzerland: Liberia and English speaking world via the internet)

www.starradio.org.lr

Seeds of Peace (US: Middle East and South Asia) www.seedsofpeace.org

Shara'a Simsim (US/Palestinian Authority: Palestinian Authority) www.sesameworkshop.org/aroundtheworld/palestine

To Reflect and Trust Jewish-German Program (Israel: Israel, the US and Germany) no website

Website of Featured PC Organizations

Givat Haviva	www.givathaviva.org
CIDCM	www.cidcm.umd.edu
Hirondelle Foundation	www.hirondelle.org
IDRC	www.idrc.org
Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI)	www.ipcri.org
Neve Shalom/Wahat Al Salam (Oasis of Peace)	http://nswas.org
Quaker Peace and Service	http://www.quaker.org.uk/peace-social-witness
Rockefeller Foundation	www.rockfound.org
SFCG	www.sfcg.org
UNECA	www.uneca.org
UNESCO	www.unesco.org
UNICEF	www.unicef.org
USAID	www.usaid.org
VOA	www.voa.org

Appendix C: Model # I Message Effects (Knowledge Gap Theories): Information Imbalance/Censorship Prevents Us from Knowing That We All Want Peace

Intervention Phase	**Phase I ('42-present)** **Free-flow propaganda/public diplomacy subtype**	**Phase II ('70s-'80s)** **Protectionist/ dependency subtype)**	**Phase III*** **('90s - present)** **Free-flow anti-censorship (objectivity) subtype**	**Phase IV* ('00 - present)** **Talk peace/peace journalism subtype**
Conflict Phase	1) Interstate de-colonization conflicts still account for significant numbers of inter-state conflicts through '78 + 2) Ethnopolitical conflicts predominate	1) Interstate de-colonization conflicts still account for significant numbers of inter-state conflicts through '78 + 1a) Multistate war period of the Vietnam War + 2) Ethnopolitical conflicts predominate	Ethnopolitical conflicts predominate	Ethnopolitical conflicts predominate
Theory	Phase I 1) Messages have a direct and powerful effect on people's behavior 2) Curtailment of censorship *between* states – i.e. to ensure the free-flow of messages between states Phase II 3) Free-flow of messages *between* states will democratize states 4) Democratic *states* do not go to war with other democratic states	1) Messages have a direct and powerful effect on people's behaviors *2)* Restrict exports of messages to *states* in the Global South to protect them 3) Help *states* in the Global South develop their own "indigenous" sources of media, enabling them to develop information as an economic commodity/means of expression (thereby ending structural violence against them)	1) Messages have a direct and powerful effect on people's behaviors 2) Curtailment of censorship *within* states – i.e. to ensure the free-flow of messages within states 3) Help *states' critics* in the global south develop their own "independent" sources of media, enabling them to develop information as an economic commodity/means of expression (thereby ending structural violence against them) 4) Free-flow of messages *within* states will help establish and sustain democracy 5) Democratic states are less prone to *ethnopolitical conflict*	1) Messages have a direct and powerful effect on people's behavior 2) Curtailment of censorship *within* states – i.e. to ensure the free-flow of messages within states 3) Help *states' critics* in the global south develop their own "independent" sources of media, enabling them to develop information as an economic commodity/means of expression (thereby ending structural violence against them) 4) Talk peace
Target of Messages	1) State (dominant natio)/ethnopolitical groups in conflict within Southern state	1) Ethnopolitical groups within Southern states (to unify state) 2) (Northern states)	1) Dominant nation/ethnopolitical groups in conflict within Southern state 2) (Northern States)	1) Dominant nation/ethnopolitical groups in conflict within Southern state 2) (Northern States)
Target of "Indigenous " Media Support	State critics (MARs)	Southern states (dominant nation)	state critics (MARs)	State (dominant nation) & state critics (MARs)
Intervention Type	*1) Transmitting propaganda/diplomatic messages (Monologue)* e.g.: Radio Free Asia *Radio Free Iraq*	*1) Media capacity building (e.g. development of news agencies and radio stations) of gov't controlled outfits* *2) Training workshops for gov't employed journalists in the Global South* *3) Transmitting of propaganda/diplomatic messages (Monologue)* *e.g. Zimbabwe-Inter-Africa-News Agency (gov't controlled news agency)*	1) Media capacity building (e.g. development of radio stations) of *independent* outfits 2) Training workshops for *independent* journalists in the Global South *3) Transmitting of previously excluded persuasive (reliable/trustworthy/objective) messages (Monologue)* E.g. Star Radio, Liberia Studio Ijambo radio, Burundi Open Broadcast Network, Bosnia & Herzegovina	1) Media capacity building (e.g. provide financial subsidies to journalists) of *independent* outfits 2) Training workshops/manuals for *peace* journalists 3) Advocating and persuading about the importance of equal and just coverage (dialogue) e.g.: SFCG Elias-Sartawi & Common Ground News Service Media Para la Paz, Columbia

Appendix D: Critical Assessment of 7 Models of Peace Communication Practice

Model	I. Message Effects	II. Contact Effects	III. Media-Technology Effects	IV. Mediated Contact Effects	V. (Embedded) Factor of Production Effects	VI. Self-Efficacy Effects	VII. Reconciliation Effects
Critique of Assumptions and Recommendations For Further Study (Chapter 3, Part III and Conclusion)	Messages are neither direct nor powerful. They achieve limited results via direct persuasion, though they may hold use through dialogue designed messaging strategies: 1) Messages are not powerful and direct, they have been found to have limited effects (McGuire, 1986) Messages are: a) selectively received (Vidmar & Rokeach, 1974), b) selectively perceived (Klapper, 1960; Vidmar & Rokeach, 1974) c) canalized (Merton & Lazarsfeld, 1948; Vidmar & Rokeach, 1974), d) interpreted polysemically (Fiske) e) and negotiated (Hall) 2) Multiple-Opinion leaders edit the contents of messages (Weimann, 1982) and therefore, their meaning such that audiences may reach the same conclusions regardless of what is reported and how it is framed 3) Even if messages are received and interpreted by audiences in parallel with what their	Contact changes intergroup attitudes among participants and is often generalized, particularly in situations of non-political forms of conflict. More research into cases of political conflict specifically would further substantiate these findings. Attitudinal changes are not necessarily sustained. Nor, in turn, do they alter the majority of people's political beliefs, or behavior, and may differentially influence minorities, in contrast with majorities 1) Not all programs are created equally – some do not respect the 5 combined requirements (Allport, 1954 and Pettigrew, 1998) (especially the 5th, i.e. the opportunity to establish friendships) 2. In most cases, the use of contact has resulted in attitude changes among participants, especially when all 5 requirements were adhered to in studies of largely non-political cases of conflict, (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) 3) Attitudinal Change is more likely to occur if, in addition, (6) constructive codes & discourse patterns (Ellis & Maoz,) are included into the intervention	Attempts to diffuse technology (e.g. literacy) do not automatically lead to media consumption (e.g. newspaper or e-mail density rates) nor the cognitive abilities essential for effectively making analytical sense of what one reads or attempts to produce. Neither technology-use nor media consumption-use result in democracy, which is correlated with peace 1) Technology is not deterministic (McGuire, 1986; Marvin, 1988) 2) Technology use is embedded in social practices. Practices, not technology, promote cognitive development (Scriber & Cole, 1981) 3) While media-technology penetration (email density nodes) is correlated with democracy, (Kedzie, 1997), no proof of a causal relationship has been established. 4) Democracy is correlated with peace with respect to dyadic peace (Babst, 1964, 1972; Small and Singer, 1976; Rummel, 1979, 1983, 1985; Levy, 1988; Maoz and Russett, 1992, 1993), internally, with respect to civil-wars (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch, 2001) and internally, vis-à-vis	Media do not homogenize. Efforts to simulate contact through them may, at least, be consumed by larger numbers of people (compared to contact effects programming). In turn, messages emitted through them may/may not be interpreted as intended and may/may not influence audience's intergroup attitudes and stereotypes. Limited evidence suggests they may influence social norms regarding non-political topics, but are unlikely to effect political beliefs, and with respect to behavior, their influence is entirely unknown. 1) Media are not powerful and direct, they have limited effects (McGuire, 1986) a) Media do not homogenize (Marvin, 1988) 2) Messages are not powerful and direct, they have limited effects (McGuire, 1986), including when they are used as part of mediated contact to demonstrate pro-social messages a) Entertaining displays of contact are selectively received (Vidmar & Rokeach, 1974) b) Entertaining displays of contact are selectively	If an embedded and universal access targeted approach to technological diffusion is adopted, information technology may lead to cost-benefits on both the provider- and user-sides. Whether these generate economic growth and in turn peace is mediated by other factors 1) Media Technologies are not deterministic (McGuire, 1986; Marvin, 1988) 2) Economic relations (Polyani, 1957) and media technology (Evans, 1996) productivity are embedded in social and political relations. 3) If not embedded with respect to matters of access, information technology will not be adopted (Wilson III, 2004) 4) If carefully introduced with critical attention paid to the socially embedded nature of technology and economics, the insertion of information technological inputs can promote user- (Schware, 1999) and provider-side savings 5) It is not clear whether the adopted use of ITs promotes economic productivity (Rodriguez and Wilson, 2000 in Wilson III, 2004)	Aggression and violence may be reduced in situations of political conflict, but is unlikely to be sustained unless conflict-free environments can be maintained: 1) Self-efficacy and skills training reduce aggressive and violent behavior in school violence settings (Heydenberk & Heydenberk, 2000; Johnson & Johnson, 1995; Wilson, Lipsey and Derzon, 2003) 2) Behavior change is sustained when individuals are permanently removed from their conflict ridden environment (Johhnson & Johnson, 1995; Heydenberk and Heydenberk, 2000) 3) Hypothetically, negative peace, can be fostered in situations of political violence, if individuals are in a non-conflict environment during the intervention, and it is sustained by then permanently removing them from their	Reconciliation effects programming can enable people to work-through their past in order to deal with it on a conscious level and empathize, which makes communication easier, thereby helping to lead the way for positive peace when negative peace already exists 1) Reconciliation programming can enable people to work-through their past in order to deal with it on a conscious level and heal (Albeck, Adwan, Bar-On, 2002) 2) It can promote empathy (Paluck, 2007) 3) It may elicit truthful confessions (Breed, 2006) 4) Healing and empathy may make communication between enemies feasible (Salomon, 2004)

	senders intended, their attitudes, beliefs and behavior may not necessarily be altered (Ajzen, Albarasin and Hornik, 2007; Goldberg, Fishbein and Middlestadt, 1997) 4) With respect to the free-flow anti-censorship subtype (C) that practitioners want to achieve balanced production is in itself not enough of a guarantee that it will be produced. Other variables intervene to alter such outcomes, including political (Krug & Price, 2002; Price & Krug, 2002; Snyder & Ballentine, 1996), socio-economic (Horwitz, 2001) and military contexts, in addition to news practices and functions and editorial decisions (e.g Dor, 2004 with respect to editorial decisions) 5) Content production (even if balanced) does not translate into the level of economic output sufficient for alleviating structural inequality. While previously disenfranchised peoples may obtain a voice if so-called balance is achieved, socio-economic contexts can, nevertheless prevent media industries from in turn supplying these same people with jobs (Horwitz, 2001) 6) Dialogue or invitational discourse	4) Attitudinal change can, also, however, be eroded if (7) structural context (Connolly w/ Maggin, 1999), and (8) efforts to promote sustainability of the change (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005) are not adhered to or included in the intervention 5) In the majority of cases (largely of non-political conflict), attitude change due to contact is generalized to the out-group as a whole (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) 6) The problem of re-entry, may, as one cause, prevent generalization of attitude change to the wider out-group (McCauley, 2002) 7) Attitude change towards the wider out-group has been found to be sustainable in cases of non-political conflict (Eller and Abrams, 2003 and Levin et al 2003, cited in Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006, p. 768), but is subject to great challenge in cases of political conflict (Maddy-Weitmann, 2005). 8) Efforts to (9) incorporate each partner's conflict narrative (Bar-Tal, 2004; Maddy-Weitzman, 2005; Salomon 2004a) may theoretically improve the chances for change and its generalization to the partners to conflict's wider group 8a) Intergroup friendships may lead to knowledge about the other's historical narrative	minority groups) (Gurr, 2000, Kaldor, 1999), but may not necessarily cause peace	perceived (Vidmar & Rokeach, 1974) c) Entertaining displays of contact canalize prior stereotypes (Vidmar & Rokeach, 1974), d) Entertaining displays of contact can be negotiated (Shochat, 2003, Warshel, 2004a), and opposed (Warshel, argument in Part III and Conclusion) As a result, intergroup attitudes may not be altered (Warshel, 2007; Warshel, argument in Part III and Conclusion) e) Multiple-Opinion leaders edit messages (Weimann, 1982), including about those displaying pro-social contact 3) Audience members experience greater degrees of cognitive imbalance with respect to those whom they define as their "others" as compares with their "shared others". As a result, they tend to oppositionally decode messages about them (Warshel, argument in Part III and Conclusion) 4) These messages alter intergroup attitudes in the intended (positive) and unintended (negative) directions, and are generalized beyond the characters "in the situation" (e.g. beyond the TV program). (Cole et a, 2003) 5) Generalized attitude change may be	6) Economic development is correlated with peace (Gartzke, 2007) 7) Directed embedded, or non-laissez-faire, approaches to economic development are required to ensure minorities gain equitable access to media technology (Wilson III, 1998). Economic development alone, without attention paid to matters of equity, may reduce physical violence but it may also promote it (Nelson, 1998) 8) Equitable distribution of ITs by definition reduces structural violence, particularly if it generates economic productivity. This may reduce tension between information haves and have-nots. However, whether their equitable distribution reduces physical violence is mediated by a host of other factors (Gurr, 1970, cited in Nelson, 1998; Gurr 2000)	environments (e.g. via population transfer or creation of separate states)/ conflict is removed from their environment en masse (Warshel, argument in Chapter 3) a) The impact of such structural changes on sustaining violent protest reduction needs to be researched. In addition, whether any demonstrated change could be achieved if participants are not permanently removed from their conflict environment, needs to be researched (Warshel, recommendation in Chapter 3) 4) If behavioral change is not being achieved in cases of political conflict, research should assess whether, at least, behavioral intentions are being altered and behavior is not being executed due to structural variables beyond the participant's volitional control thereby proving, at least, the value of this model, but its inability to withstand the final test of context. (Warshel, recommendation studying Chapter	

	message strategies employed by the talk peace-peace journalism subtype (D), as contrast with the persuasion style employed by the other subtypes, may create a forum or opportunity for change, though this must be assessed and evaluated 7) Since "news media" themselves cannot be tested, researchers should conduct assessments and evaluations of discrete cases of peace journalism news production to determine whether their use of dialogue, creates a forum for possible change, and in turn helps manage conflict in any way (Warshel, recommendation in Chapter 3)	(Maddy-Weitzman, 2005) 9) Efforts to (10) provide varied programming for minority versus majority participants may theoretically improve the chances for change and its generalization to partner to conflict's wider group since the former's expectations, needs and in turn, responses to contact my differ (Salomon & Nevo, 2001; Salomon 2004a) 10) Intergroup friendships will not change most (2/3rds) people's political preferences (Jackman and Crane, 1986)		dependent upon one's current ethnopolitical affiliation and status within the macro context of the interstate system (Warshel, 2007) 6) Base attitudes and stereotypes develop as a result of community edited contact experiences, which frame the interpretation of these actual experiences of contact (Warshel, argument in Part III and Conclusion) 7) political beliefs do not change (Paluck, 2007), though perceptions of norms (normative beliefs) change (Paluck, 2007) 8) Mediated messages may promote optimism and reduce stress (Warshel, 2007) 9) Limited behavior (deliberation about non-conflict topics) can be altered (Paluck, 2007) as a result of mediated contact. Whether this can be sustained or generalized to political topics needs to be evaluated 10) It is unknown whether generalized intergroup attitudes, stereotype changes or beliefs might lead to initial and/or sustained behavioral change between the in- and out-groups with respect to politically relevant deliberation or other behaviors 11) A mixed intervention method whereby partners to conflict co-view		3) 5) Research needs to assess whether modeling of SE on television via SCT functions just as well as methods used to teach SE through interpersonal communication channeled programming (Warshel, recommendation in Chapter 3) 6) These programs currently foster the promotion of individual self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986). Instead they should focus on collective self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986) in order to end politically-based violence. 7) If successful, these programs will, at best, only achieve negative peace (or at least, as has been currently demonstrated) per their specified aims (Warshel, argument in Chapter 3)	

				mediated contact interventions as though it were a mediating artifact theoretically may encourage homogenization through the ritual activities involved in co-viewing (Warshel, recommendation in Chapter 3 and Conclusion) 12) Theoretically, a contextualized mediated contact model that incorporates structural and narrative elements of conflict into its design in an effort to dissolve prior beliefs and attitudes may help build and/or make peace (Warshel, recommendation in Conclusion)			

Appendix E: Photographs of East Barta'a

Photographs © by Yael Warshel, unless otherwise noted.

Photograph 1

Barta'a: A rough approximation of where Barta'a is in relation to other Israeli/Palestinian communities and with respect to the Green Line.

Kfar Kara, Israel is across the other side of the street from route 65 (main Wadi Ara Road)

Separation Barrier is up the mountain towards this direction

Jenin, Palestinian Authority is past the separation barrier in this direction

Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 2

The wadi dividing East from West Barta'a
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 3

View from East Barta'a towards (mainly) West Barta'a
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 4

East Barta'a neighborhood
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 5

East Barta'a neighborhood
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 6

An older home in East Barta'a
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 7

East Barta'a neighborhood. Graffiti on Map reads "Palestine."
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 8

An Israeli license-plated clad car parked outside a home in East Barta’a
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 9

Mosque in East Barta'a
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 10

Children playing atop a house in East Barta'a
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 11

Boys playing soccer, East Barta’a
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 12

Children in East Barta'a
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 13

Child displaying his favorite toy, East Barta'a
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 14

Wedding henna party ceremony in East Barta'a
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 15

Inside a newer home in East Barta'a

Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 16

Inside a home in East Barta'a

Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 17

Watching Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* in East Barta'a
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 18

Watching Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* in East Barta’a
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 19

Wedding Ceremony. Looking out at home's lit-up in Katzir, Israel from East Barta'a
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 20

View entering East Barta'a from/in West Bank
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 21



Separation barrier just to the east of East Barta'a leading up to Rehan Gate (checkpoint).

Photograph by Yael Warshel

Appendix F: Palestinian Audience Members' Drawings

Figure 1

a "Jew"
(drawing by Souhair, 7-year-old girl)

Figure 2

A “Jew”, whose khaki color contrasts with that of an “Arab”
(drawing by Nwar, 8-year-old girl)

Figure 3

A "Jew" who carries a gun

(drawing by Nabila, 6-year-old girl)

Figure 4

Geography
From left to right: each separate geographic unit, from top to bottom, reads in Arabic
(or is meant to read depending upon Tareeq's spelling):
Jenin, Palestine, Israel
Haifa, Uhm Al-Fahm, Barta'a

(drawing by Tareeq, 7-year-old boy)

Figure 5



Relations at the checkpoint ("machsom" in Hebrew)
The "Jew" on the right, according to Nwar, the Palestinian girl who drew this interaction at Rehan Gate, is organizing "Arabs," while the "Jew" on the left is checking their bags as they pass through the checkpoint. The "Arab" has passed (which is why we see him from behind).

(drawing by Nwar, 8-year-old girl)

Appendix G: Palestinian Audience Members Shooting Back Photographs, East Barta'a

Photograph 1

Photograph 2

Photograph 3

Photograph 4

Photograph 5

Photograph 6

Photograph 7

Appendix H: Photographs of Alfei Menashe

Photographs © by Yael Warshel, unless otherwise noted.



Map of Alfei Menashe with respect to surrounding Palestinian communities in the West Bank

Source: 20080708_Arab_a_Ramadin_al_Janubi_eng.jpg

Photograph 1

Alfei Menashe
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 2

Playground in front of a newer home in Alfei Menashe
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 3

Playground with construction bulldozer in the background in Alfei Menashe
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 4

Moses Family Commemoration Statue, Alfei Menashe
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 5

Palestinian Day Laborers working adjacent to playground in Alfei Menashe
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 6

Palestinian day laborer taking a break from cleaning a playground in Alfei Menashe
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 7

Excavator parked next to a new home being built in Alfei Menashe
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 8

Newer home in Alfei Menashe
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 9

Child in Alfei Menashe holding up the local phone book for 2002 to display his community's name
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 10

Watching Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* in Alfei Menashe
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 11

Watching Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* in Alfei Menashe
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 12

Watching Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* in Alfei Menashe
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 13

Looking out onto Hirbet Islah from Alfei Menashe
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 14

Basketball court outside family home in Alfei Menashe, bracketed by the separation barrier
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Appendix I: Jewish-Israeli Audience Members' Drawings

Figure 1



a "Palestinian"

(drawing by Gali, 8-year-old girl)

Figure 2

Border, on other side of which Arabs live
(drawing by Meital, 7-year-old girl)

Figure 3



The separation barrier

Drawing reads "separation fence" at the top, "Gaza", written twice on the right, "Israel" to the middle left and "land of Israel" ("eretz Yisrael" in Hebrew) to the far left

(drawing by Gali, 6-year-old girl)

Figure 4

Mosque neighboring Alfei Menashe
(drawing by Roey, 6-year-old boy)

Appendix J: Shooting Back Photos from Jewish-Israeli Audience, Alfei Menashe

Photograph 1

Photograph 2

Photograph 3

Photograph 4

Photograph 5

Photograph 6

Photograph 7



Appendix K: Photographs of Uhm Al-Fahm

Photographs © by Yael Warshel, unless otherwise noted.

Photograph 1

Kina, the entrance to Uhm Al-Fahm
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 2

Abu-Obeidah Mosque, Uhm Al-Fahm
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 3

Parent's Day at Dar Al-Tifl nursery school, Uhm Al-Fahm
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 4

Parent's Day at Dar Al-Tifl nursery school, Uhm Al-Fahm
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 5

Art-classes at Abu-Shakra Art Gallery, Uhm Al-Fahm
Photograph by Yael Warshel

Photograph 6

Inside a home in Uhm Al-Fahm
Photograph by Jasmine Mhagne

Photograph 7

Inside a home in Uhm Al-Fahm
Photograph by Jasmine Mhagne

Photograph 8

Watching Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* in Uhm Al-Fahm
Photograph by Jasmine Mhagne

Photograph 9

Watching Israeli and Palestinian *Sesame Street* in Uhm Al-Fahm
Photograph by Jasmine Mhagne

Appendix L: Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Audience Members' Drawings

Figure 1



The modern "person" (an "Arab") and "Jew" versus the more traditional Palestinian. Compare this girl's drawing from left to right of a person – a female, who she said was "like her" - to a "Jew". Both are dressed in pants. Contrast these with the Palestinian whom she described as more traditional and dressed instead in traditional Islamic religious dress.

(Note: presented image does not represent exact aspect ratio across the three images. The three drawings have been pasted together here into this single figure).

(drawing by Saida, 8-year-old girl)

Appendix M: Arab/Palestinian-Israeli Audience Shooting-Back Photos, Uhm Al-Fahm

Photograph 1

Photograph 2



Photograph 3

Photograph 4

Notes

[1] In this dissertation I exclude three sets of theories and practices concerning the relationship between communication and the management of political conflict from my definition of peace communication. I do so because the aims of these practices and theories are not to build or support the making of peace, and because they do not target grassroots populations that are party to the given conflict. First, I exclude international relations elite level *information theories* (e.g. Jervis, 1976) and *signaling theory* (e.g. Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998). The former theories debate how the amount or type of information held by a state may influence negotiations and ultimately, state level decision-making. The latter is concerned with making information during negotiation processes transparent in order to prevent the escalation of conflict. While these theories pertain to communication and the management of political conflict, my focus in on building peace and supporting the making of peace – not the technicalities of small scale elite level negotiation processes and practicalities- and generating such changes in followers, not leaders. In short, my interest and discussion in this dissertation pertains not to matters of reaching a compromise on the wording of an accord or changing a leader's opinion in a single instance, but rather on how to encourage people to change societal institutions, live, work and collaborate together permanently through the establishment of a *positive peace*.

Second, I do not discuss *human rights information and dissemination programs*. These seek to spread information about human rights abuses in an effort to alter situations of political conflict. They try to do so, for example, *via* videotape as in the case with the organization *Witness*.

Third, I do not discuss *early warning information systems*, or programs that use information as a means to track political changes in an effort to predict the outbreak of conflicts and, in turn, use information models and technologies to spread this information in order to prevent the outbreak of conflict. The *ICONS* early warning system is an example of such a program. Both these and human rights dissemination information programs make use of communication in an effort to manage political conflict. However, they are neither focused on building and supporting the making of peace by targeting grassroots populations' party to the given conflict.

[2] See as one example, William McGuire's exhaustive meta analysis about media effects, including relevant references to Hitler and World War II.

[3] According to communication historian Jesse Delia's critical parenthetical comments, communication research actual began prior to WWI. Therefore, the development of the field of communication cannot entirely be attributed to conflict, or WWI specifically. However, he notes, conflict was most certainly the impetus for its growth, as evidenced by the popularity it afforded the study of communication. According to Delia, "government-based propaganda in the world war resulted in a host of exposes, memoirs, commentaries, and studies that heightened interest in communication"

(Delia, 1987, p. 32). Thus, communication owes most of its origins, if not all of it, to conflict.

[4] Most of the applied research carried out was concerned with market related decision-making. Nevertheless, the move to Columbia represents the point in time during which the study of message campaigns become an institutionalized part of academia, where applied communication scholarship evolved.

[5] Lewin's work forms an essential base for research about groups and cross-group relations between individuals. At the same time, however, it should be critically noted that he employed a reified and often stereotypical approach to the concept of the group. Since his pioneering work, the study of groups has become much more critical.

[6] As is related, according to Hallin, communication research about conflict has centered on media and public opinion, war as culture, and media coverage of conflict. The latter has emphasized the study of television rather than print coverage. It has neglected to assess how audiences decode war news or provide much in the way of an ethnographic understanding about how members of the public gather information about war and give meaning to it, or the way that war impacts the routines of their lives (Hallin, 1997).

[7] Here I borrow from Lars Erik Cederman's argument that international relations should more aptly be described as interstate relations given that these relations transpire between states not nations. In this vein, I therefore refer to the current world system as an interstate system.

[8] Thus, by evaluating whether a PC intervention has altered intergroup attitudes, promoted gratification and or taught empathy, scholars might address questions about whether and how these changes are influencing social forms of power; and when promoting optimism, whether it is influencing peacemaking, and when promoting peacemaking and or altering structural relations, whether these are influencing all four forms of power, thereby managing some aspect of political conflict.

[9] According to Gurr, conflicts decreased first and foremost because the cold war, which fueled societal conflicts, came to an end (Gurr, 2000).

[10] I use the term "minority," as Gurr does when defining "Minorities at Risk," to indicate disadvantage. These groups suffer from political, economic and/or social disadvantage. They are not *necessarily* actual minorities in size, relative to the rest of the groups in their respective state. The vast majority of these groups do, however, happen to constitute a numerical minority.

[11] Worth mentioning here is also David Webster's "Building Free and Independent Media." While not in any way the intellectual equivalent or contribution that Dewey produced, it serves as the quintessential policy position paper on freedom of expression and democracy interdependence. It was published as one of the United States Information Agency's *Freedom Papers*, which aim to promote democracy world-wide (Webster, 1992).

[12] Italics added by author for emphasis.

[13] See Chapter 5 for my definition of a "state-bearing nation", and Kaufman, 2000 for an interesting discussion concerning the historically state-bearing nation of the United States).

[14] Signaling theory (e.g. Fearon 1994; Schultz, 1998) may be related here. Governments can use their state-owned media not just for the purposes of public diplomacy but also for negotiation, by using signaling. Consequently, signaling is the only consideration the international relations literature gives to the role communication might come to play in the management of political conflicts. This body of scholarship views communication merely as a tool for foreign relations. More specifically, it views communication as an elite tool for making-, but never building-peace. Also, it tends to focus only on single preventative cases and is understood as communication only when expressed via back-channel negotiations, or at best, second second-track diplomacy.

[15] Italics added by author for emphasis.

[16] See also my Chapter 5 for a further discussion of the term "nation".

[17] Parenthetically, these practitioners pointed only to radio, television and print news flow, (and later to entertainment flows channeled through these media, and film and video), neglecting other types of communication flows. For example, they ignored dance, theatre, game or cuisine flows.

[18] This element of the protectionist message effects subtype was obviously critical of the US "free flow of information" motto that went hand in hand with its government sponsored use of free-flow propaganda public diplomacy peace communication programs. From the point of view of protectionist effects practitioners, the propaganda public diplomacy model was itself a form of *propaganda* (used in the pejorative sense of the word). These practitioners felt this way because American media predominated during this time period. Therefore, on an economic level "free flow" could have meant nothing other than *American flow*.

[19] Parenthetically, the call by the United States during this time period for the free flow of information was welcomed in the South precisely because of the importance they ascribed to free communication for their newly independent states. However, according to Schiller (1976) this argument really constituted subterfuge for American national goals and private business (economic) objectives.

[20] Italics added by author for emphasis.

[21] Italics added by author for emphasis.

[22] Italics added by author for emphasis.

[23] Interestingly, scholars of citizenship and democracy have since critiqued democracy as insufficient for providing these ends and now instead advocate pluralism as the key for achieving universal representation.

[24] See Chapter 5 for my discussion of the term "stateless nation."

[25] Practitioners endorsing the free flow censorship subtypes arguments on behalf of the free flow of information *within* states - between groups - contrast to those endorsing the protectionist subtype. The former emphasized *nations*, while the latter uncritically emphasized *states* as those who should receive "indigenous media support".

[26] These conflicts ostensibly focused on the remaining unfinished nationalist projects that previously began in the North. Critically, it is important to note that such conflicts already existed prior to independence periods, they did not just arise post independence when practitioners began to notice them. On the other hand, they became much larger and so, in this way, signaled a changing global conflict context.
[27] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[28] See also Jusic, 2001 for another example. He argues about the importance of restructuring and re-organizing Bosnian media in order to loosen the ruling nationalist party's grip over mass media institutions.
[29] Historically, this subtype developed as a result of, on the one hand, a decrease in the importance of NWICO over the course of the 1980s, and on the other, specific sentiment directed against NWICO. NWICO was regarded by its critics as "censorship" not "protectionism." In other words, it was viewed as censorship or as restriction of Northern in favor of Southern news production. It was, therefore concluded that the doctrine and, consequently, any programs operating under its same assumptions, was anachronistic to the basic human right of freedom of expression.
[30] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[31] To the latter effect, they might be argued to take this subtype one step further towards four. Apart from providing balanced news, Studio Ijambo also developed entertainment programs like the documentary *Heroes* that highlights stories about inter-group solidarity between Hutus, Tutsis, Batwa, and Ganwas and *Our Family,* a soap opera that is about the life of two neighboring families from two separate ethnic groups. As I will discuss shortly, however, even when taking these other elements into account, subtype D is still far more squarely focused on the semantics and logic of dialogue promotion as a basis for building peace. Studio Ijambo emphasizes balanced information as the *key* to promoting behavioral change (or just straight knowledge building) (without paying attention to attitudes and beliefs).
[32] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[33] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[34] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[35] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[36] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[37] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[38] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[39] If such friendships lead to collaborative, integrative and cooperative ventures, we can relate them to Galtung's concept of *positive peace*.
[40] This first requirement is still debated. It is unclear wither equality in the situation (i.e. during a contact scheme) is necessary as Pachten found (Pachten, 1982 cited in Pettigrew, 1982, p. 66) or rather as a function of equal socio-economic status, as Jackman and Crane found (Jackman and Crane, 1988) or both.
[41] More recently, these assumptions are beginning to be criticized, and practitioners are paying attention. Making friends is not necessarily useful in the absence of (made)

peace. That is, friendships don't necessarily alter participants' political beliefs. Therefore, peace building may not be a key for trying to make peace.
[42] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[43] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[44] In more recent theoretical incarnations this type of modernist logic is visible in Benjamin Barber's writings about conflict. He argues about globalization, including technological advance (not about literacy specifically) and how modern people who have espoused the former are in conflict with traditional people, whom instead espouse primitive values. The result, he says, is "ambivalence within each culture as it faces a global, networked, material future and wonders whether cultural and national autonomy can be retained." such that this division generates conflicts *within* states (Barber, 2001, xvi).
[45] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[46] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[47] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[48] The American TV series, *All in the Family*, which began airing in 1971, can be thought of as an unintended example, and therefore, perhaps as one exception to the practice of using mediated contacts, beginning in the 1990s. It, however, was not an intervention campaign. It was not intended as infotainment, but rather, simply as entertainment that turned out to be operating on the logic of mediated contact effects.
[49] See Warshel 2007 for more about the changes from season one to two.
[50] The exception here might be with respect to Palestinian-Israelis, in that they did not have a separate production entity, though Palestinian-Israelis, certainly in the second season, comprised part of the staff producing the show and consulted about it.
[51] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[52] See Nelson, 1998 for a description of the distinction between the two concepts of absolute and relative deprivation.
[53] Some might argue that Schramm was deterministic in his writings about technology, however he clearly noted the importance of intervening factors in influencing technological outcomes, like the necessity of eliciting interest in the use of technologies (i.e. engendering attitudinal change) to ensure that they indeed be utilized by their recipients.
[54] In empirical terms, this last point best relates to Sarah Roy's thesis (1995), in which she has argued that "de-development" processes render equitable growth impossible.
[55] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[56] Italics added by author for emphasis.
[57] Bandura appears to be the only scholar central to the subfield of health communication who is directly cited by peace communication practitioners. The reason for this is unclear. Nevertheless, the mere connection is historically relevant, especially given that the connection between theory and practice in PC demonstrate historical correlation, as I have outlined in this chapter. However, their direct causal connection remains unclear.

[58] It is not clear that ECRP disaggregated their emphasis on the importance of non-violence from its actual usefulness in achieving ends. In other words, they probably tied its use to the necessary achievement outcome expectancies.

[59] Violent outcomes as "objective" as numbers are still always debated. See for example in Harff the large range in which she lists as the numbers of Tutsi and moderate Hutus killed by Tutsis during the Rwandan genocide. Or, as another example, debates about whether or not combatants should also be included in the figures necessarily renders such numbers less objective. Nevertheless, numbers are still *far more* objective than any other measure of violence available to us. Thus, for example, the numbers of those killed are more objective than trying to quantify sufferings of one conflict (or side), as compared with another, in order to objectively compare the intensity of the conflict (or results to one side) by counting the number of PTSD victims and the number of rape trauma victims in an effort to decide which of these acts is a more heinous outcome of the violence.

[60] The Holocaust was not a case of ethnopolitical conflict. While Germany did try to link its Jewish population to the Soviet Union, claiming the latter to be supporting the German Jewish population in an internal revolutionary effort against Germany as Michael Mann notes (Mann, 2005), in fact, at no time, was the Jewish population seeking to establish a state within Germany, nor equal status within it when such claims were being made.

[61] Though often assumed otherwise, the Holocaust, as a pivotal example, was not the result of negative intergroup prejudices. Germans, relative to other Europeans, were not anti-Semitic (See Mann, 2005 for a related discussion). And in the case of Rwanda, existing power differentials and stereotypes can be argued to have served as *justification* for the murders, but not their *cause.*

[62] See the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)'s Truth Commissions Digital Collection for a useful overview of these commissions worldwide: http://www.usip.org/library/truth.html#tc

[63] Since its origin, TRTs practitioners now also apply this model to current ethnopolitical conflicts – e.g. the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

[64] Italics added by author for emphasis.

[65] Italics added by author for emphasis.

[66] See Mann, 2005, for a related discussion in which he argues that neither the Holocaust, nor other genocides, was the result of evil manipulative elites who hated their victims, or primitive peoples who killed out of ignorance.

[67] Pettigrew and Tropp note that they have not found substantial differences by the location of contact schemes reviewed – most of the sample in their meta-analysis is from the US (71%), and the remainder are from elsewhere, presumably all in scenarios of political conflict. While this may suggest that there is more evidence of good rather than harmful effects, they are unclear about the differences over time – including in the US, when beginning since the origins of the application of contact to race-relations in the US for example, black-white relations were more politically charged. Thus, it is not entirely clear that the contact hypothesis is *as effective* as they presume. If all, or

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even the majority of the cases they reviewed had transpired within the context of political conflict (i.e. for use in peace communication), their findings would be more persuasive with respect to peace communication. So too, if more global cases were offered, the universality of the positive applicability of contact would be *more* effectively demonstrated (though in general, they do offer sufficient evidence with respect to this concern).

[68] Paluck characterizes the *Musekeweya* radio program as a reconciliation program, though she does not necessarily make clear that it is in fact a reconciliation program. Her discussion of different types of peacebuilding programs is not critical. She refers to all PC-like programs as media for peacebuilding, referring to these uncritically as either "anti-prejudice and anti-conflict media intervention[s]" (Paluck, 2007, p. 17) or "tolerance and peacebuilding media" (p. 18), and offers no distinction between the different types of interventions she uses to illustrate these. She only explains that these interventions are of two kinds, those that either try to incite or those that try to reduce prejudice and conflict, and simply that none are based on theory. She assumes these interventions are all focused on trying to *reduce prejudice* in order to manage conflict. From the description she provides, I would rather classify *Musekeweya* as a mixture of a mediated contact and reconciliation effects programming. It seems that the bulk is based on the former, given its effort to simulate contact and in turn alter opinions and beliefs about social norms with respect to the notion that scapegoating is wrong and open dissent and intermarriage are good, though it would appear to also bring in some reconciliation effects programming through its effort to encourage cross-group trust, heal trauma and promote empathy. Overall, it seems that most of the program's efforts, per her description, attempt the former – hence I place the bulk of the discussion about her findings under my discussion of mediated contact effects.

[69] By this I refer to minority at risk measures that have been used for political, as contrast with violent, protest. (see the Minorities at Risk Project for a distinction between the criteria used for these measures).

[70] As a caveat of importance to practitioners, incorporating such features, as in the case of the *Sesame Street* programs, might place them at risk of harming their brand name. In turn, per my earlier discussion of brand-name importance vis-à-vis parents, parents could as a result, restrict their children's exposure to the program. Therefore, they would not even "get" the first step of the intervention – be exposed to it. This points to the catch-22 reality faced by mediated contact effects programming, and is again another reason why more research is needed in order to better navigate the solutions to these dilemmas.

[71] Ajzen's work has been overlooked by PC practitioners and scholars, including of course, the structural inequality (2) and ethics (3) schools opposed to peace communication, given that they were altogether opposed to social psychology in the first place. Many among them lump cognitive theory, including Ajzen's own theory of Planned Behavior, with behaviorism and, in addition, have not extrapolated the useful components from either sets of theories. (See Warshel, 1999 for why Ajzen can be made relevant). I, therefore, include the concept of *perceived behavioral control* here

in relation to peace communication. It is integral to making sense of what factors or processes ultimately prevent an individual from executing a behavior they intend to execute.

[72] Due to the criticisms I laid out in Chapter 3 with regards to the technologically determinist nature of homogenization theory, I will not spend time discussing the potential of this intervention to homogenize on the basis of the fact that the intervention is broadcasted *via* communication technology. I do not believe it either is or can be effective at homogenizing people into a peaceful community on this basis. So too, the producers of these programs do not make these claims. They do, however loosely advocate its ritual abilities.

[73] By analogy with McCauley's discussion of the contact hypothesis and its use of "feet-first" approaches, in contrast to "head-first" approaches, these *Sesame Street* programs would be considered to be operating on the premise of contact effects, *if* they managed to effectively mediate contact. If instead, they were unable to mediate contact, they could still manage to provide ideas about the other, devoid of contact. In such a case, they might be evaluated as whether, per the message effects paradigm, they were effective. To this end, Cole et al found that the first season of the programs increased inter-group knowledge. For example, Palestinians learned that Jews speak Hebrew (Cole et al, 2003). That such knowledge in any way manages conflict does not however, appear to be supported by the literature in conflict and conflict management.

[74] Apart from helpful conversations with Sesame Workshop's employees and consultants to this effect, Lovelace et al, 1994 is one published example.

[75] The popular and academic use of the word "public opinion" (e.g. "public opinion poll") is really a misnomer. Those who survey these opinions, in fact, only count adult opinions. The proper term should thus really be "adult opinion", and only if pollsters and scholars start to count children can we even begin to make correct use of the term "public". Children and media researchers employing childhood approaches have aptly begun demonstrating this point. See for example Livingstone, 2001.

[76] With respect to the latter, see Jahoda, 1964; Hague, 2001, as some of the few exceptions.

[77] For more examples of British cultural studies methodologically designed audience studies see Schlessinger, 1992 and Gillespie, 1995.

[78] Cole, Richman and McCann Brown, 2001 put the number of adaptations at nineteen. Since that publication, more have followed, including *Sisimpur*, Bangladesh; Albanian *Rruga Sesam* and Serbian *Ulica Sezam*, Kosovo; and *Sesame Tree*, Northern Ireland.

[79] The original 10 members of *Ma'an* included one that was a production company, not a broadcaster – *Studio Ramatan*, though the network changed slightly over the course of the broadcast of *Hikayat Simsim*, such that all its members eventually became broadcasters.

[80] The Jordanian version of *Hikayat Simsim*, though initially intending to build peace with Israelis, ultimately, in its final post-production stage, did not.

[81] For more about the decision to change the programs between the two seasons, see Warshel 2007.
[82] In addition to the four geographic production zones, the Palestinians outsourced a portion of the animated segments during the second season to a company based in Italy (author interview with a production team member).
[83] The exception was the Jordanian version. While the Jordanian team incorporated Palestinian segments into their program, they ultimately decided not to include Israeli produced live action-segments, and therefore, stories depicting Israeli human characters (Jordanian production team members, 2005, author interviews). They did, however, retain Israeli short animations (Sesame Workshop, 2003), which they then dubbed into Arabic.
[84] Warshel 2007.
[85] Here, again, the exception was the Jordanian *Hikayat Simsim*, where awareness of the Israeli neighbor through parallel story programming containing human characters was absent.
[86] See Warshel 2007 for more about the utopian world they paint, and consequently Jewish-Israeli children's reception of it as such during its first season.
[87] UNICEF estimates the adult rate to be at 18.8% (UNICEF, 2007). Independently of that, one study found a rate of 14.8% among children aged two to nine in primary health care facilities (Shishana, 2005).
[88] This statistic is taken from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project. According to the calculations in Gurr, 2000, 17.5 percent of the world's population (or 1,032,132,000 people totaling 275 groups) collectively suffer or benefit from systematic political, economic and/or cultural discrimination vis-à-vis other groups in their state. Thirty-three of the 275 groups constitute the so-called advantaged groups. Each of the 33 make up less than 50 percent of their respective state. They are included in the MAR study because their combined privileges and small numbers make them vulnerable to repeated retaliatory attacks by disadvantaged groups. I write "at least 275" because twenty-eight groups who were previously excluded because they did not meet the criteria for the MAR project, or were simply overlooked, were planned to be added to the existing 275, amounting to a total of 303. Groups that do not merit inclusion in the MAR statistic include (1) those who are not significant enough in size (at least 100,000 strong, or who constitute at least 1 percent of their state's population), (2) & (3) are immigrants or refugees who have not been determined to be permanent residents in the states in which they currently live and/or (4) because they have failed to be detected by academics. This last stipulation is the most important for understanding why there clearly has to be more than 275, or moreover more than 303 groups. *Disadvantage* is a process that can easily go unnoticed. In order to be noticed, a group must have some amount of power - enough to get others to take notice of them. They must be able to write or talk about themselves, or instead, to have been able to implore others to do so for them. Without such ability, they remain unknown.
Becoming "known" meanwhile, usually requires transnational support, as groups are less likely to find support within the boundaries of their own state, where the source of

discrimination lies. Transnational support is often offered by other states or individual groups to those who fit the strategic needs of the latter, and not necessarily because a single group is more or the *most* oppressed, relative to others. Meanwhile, a measure for the relative levels of "oppression" is, from the get-go, anyhow difficult to fully determine.

[89] I use the term "minority", as Gurr does when defining "Minorities at Risk", simply to indicate disadvantage. Therefore, by minority I do not imply that these groups are actual minorities in their size relative to the rest of the groups in their respective state (Gurr, 2000). The vast majority of these groups do, however, happen to constitute a statistical minority.

[90] This statistic is taken from the MAR project. I write "at least 116" because four new states were to be added to the MAR study (Gurr, 2000), so 120 is probably more accurate.

[91] The income levels of several Jaffan-based Arab/Palestinian-Israeli families in my sample, in contrast to their Jewish-Israelis counterparts there, is an illustrative example demonstrating this point.

[92] Nadim Rouhana finds that about 65 percent of Arab/Palestinian-Israelis define themselves as "Palestinians in Israel." The remaining 35 percent, meanwhile, make use of the term "Arab" in categorizing their identity. (Rouhana, 1997). Therefore in an effort to represent all the different self-constructs deployed by members of this group, I employ the term Arab/Palestinian-Israeli in my discussion.

[93] See Goffman, 1959 for the meaning of the terms "back stage" and "front stage".

[94] See for example, Buckingham, 1997, 2000; Hodge and Tripp, 1986; Lemish, 1997; Livingstone, 2001; Messenger-Davies, 1997; and Warshel, 2007.

[95] With respect to communities I label as *non-contact communities*, some level of contact may exist, but relative to other community options, the contact assumes the form of an *exception* rather than a norm (for example, there may exist a limited number of "retired" or Palestinian collaborators with the Israeli army, who are now resident in Jaffa).

[96] In limited instances, I, in addition, included a few purposefully sampled children in order to have a sample that was a reflection of the given community. For example, less than 10 percent of Alfei Menashe is comprised of religious families. Children of these families, however, do not attend Tsofei Sharon. Therefore, I added a few religious children to the sample to reflect their (per community-level) proportion.

[97] I did not conduct the full reception portion of the study with children from the Khan Younis camp.

[98] Five additional children were included in order to have data to assess differences along a continuum of identities. These children were "mixed", including among them, children who, by marriage, were (1) mixed Jewish-Israeli and Arab/Palestinian-Israeli, and (2) mixed Arab/Palestinian-Israeli and Palestinian. I do not, however, report on the findings with respect to these mixed children in this study.

[99] I selected these three communities for inclusion in my study, on the basis of my having completed their analysis first.

[100] See Hubbard, 1991 as one application of this method.
[101] Ultimately, I made use of one or the other Israeli mock episode with respect to the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children. This was based on the individual child's comprehension levels and usual television viewing practices in either Arabic or Hebrew. In most cases, we showed the Arabic versions to children in Uhm Al-Fahm and West Barta'a, but the Hebrew version, by comparison, to those in Jaffa.
[102] 4,012,200 is the projected 2005 estimate for the Palestinian population provided by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS, 2004). However, 210,000 of these people are actually residents of East/eastern Jerusalem (Zimmerman et al, 2006). They are not citizens of the Palestinian Authority (nor of Israel, consequently). The US places the 2008 estimate for the Palestinian population at 4,149,173, which includes these non-citizen Palestinians/non-citizen Israeli residents in Jerusalem. (CIA West Bank and Gaza, July 2008 estimate). Zimmerman et al, on the other hand, also claim PCBS figures are inflated by 1 million. (Zimmerman et al, 2006). For my uses here, I am applying PCBS's estimate, subtracting the Jerusalem based non-citizen population that do not constitute the definition of Palestinian *citizens* who I studied and rounding up to obtain my estimate of roughly 4 million.
[103] These statistics include Palestinians who were killed by other Palestinians. Five-hundred and seventy-seven Palestinians were killed by other Palestinians through the period ending on June 30, 2008 (B'Tselem Website$_1$). Accordingly, the number of Palestinians killed specifically by Israelis, amounting to 3,428, was lower than the total number of deaths I cite in the main body of this chapter. Nevertheless, the main point regarding the *relative* number of deaths remains the same. Separately of that, I also note that on both sides, these figures include people whom at the time of death were involved in armed conflict, per B'Tselem's "clarifications regarding data on fatalities." (B'Tselem Website$_2$).
[104] The political party Hamas, can, however be argued to be seeking the *territorial* equivalent of an umma, a unit akin to an empire, not a state.
[105] Other statistics place the number of Palestinians held in Israeli custody in 2006 to be 9,075 (B'Tselem report cited in Ha'aretz, 2006) .
[106] My very rough calculation is based on PCBS's 2005 estimate of the Palestinian population, which I rounded up to 4 million, after subtracting Jerusalem Palestinian residents, and PCBS's figures of the number of incarcerated Palestinians. Consequently, PCBS's count was taken in April, specifically, because this represents the month during which Palestinians annually hold Palestinian Prisoner Day. While by no means exact, I include my estimate here only to make the point that a relationship with and recognition and knowledge of prisoners is a regular or "normal" characteristic of Palestinian society.
[107] All names used for community sources, community employees and others who wish to remain anonymous, and interviewees and their relatives are fictitious and bear no relation to original source's name.
[108] I have included the statistics listed on page 4 through the end of 2006.

[109] According to Mahmoud Kabaha, the principle of the West Barta'a school district, 250 children also attend Israeli schools (i.e. in West Barta'a). During a previous school year, that number was 340 (Totry, forthcoming). These children are not, however, included in the Palestinian sample because they represent the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli children I previously mentioned.

[110] This large shopping area was located in Jenin prior to the erection of the separation barrier. See Forte, 2002 for an interesting discussion about the performative ramifications and symbolic meaning that was associated with shopping there for Arab/Palestinian-Israeli women.

[111] In a few cases, while they explicitly said that there were Palestinian characters in the show, and independently of them, Arabs, when asked to define the concepts of "Palestinian" and "Arab" and compare and contrast the two; they, however, explained that in fact both peoples are identical and there exists no difference. Such contradictions, with respect to their definitions and, in turn, labeling of characters, made interpretation matters in a few instances more complex.

[112] Important to note is that while some audience members only converted the national identity of Jewish-Israeli characters (to *Arab/Palestinian-Israelis*), none converted only the ethnic (non-ethnopolitically based ethnic portion of the character's identity) – in this case by converting the Jewish-Israeli Ashkenazi characters to *Jewish-Israeli Mizrachi* or *Arab-Jewish-Israelis*. This was likely the case because the politicized element of the character's identity – that they are Jewish - overshadowed all other components since for them the children defined all Jews to be an army and therefore, as I will explain later, absent from the text.

[113] See Lewis, 1991 and Litvak, 2005 for a related discussion about the concepts of those who are members of the House of Islam ("Dar Al-Islam") as contrasts with the House of War ("Dar-Al Harb").

[114] See Rouhana 1989 and Merizian-Khazim, 1995 for related discussions about conflict re-enacting games Palestinian children played as part and parcel of the conflict during the first Intifada.

[115] A point worth clarifying is that the *majority* of Israeli soldiers are Jewish. My very rough estimate is that less than 2% are ethnopolitically Arab. These Arab/Palestinian-Israelis, however, are more frequently placed at checkpoints because of their Arabic language skills. As a result, ironically, in this case, the children in Barta'a are simultaneously also referring to Arab/Palestinian-Israelis as "Jews".

[116] See for example arguments including but also debating the very meaning of the political term "consensus": Friedman, and Etkes, 2007; Ofran, and Friedman 2008. Compare these with arguments that do not include Alfei Menashe in the consensus, and instead accept the term "consensus" to mean public consensus – though unspecified, as presumably being derived from public opinion polls: Jewish Virtual Library, 2007.

[117] FMEP Statistic is from 2006. Meanwhile, according to Israel Central Bureau of Statistics the population size was 5300 in 2003, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005a.

[118] Peace Now cites the Israeli parliament ("Knesset" in Hebrew) election site for this data (http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections17/heb/results/City_list.asp). However, it appears that the information for Alfei Menashe is no longer posted there. The statistic, however, adds up to 93 rather than 100%. Unless this indicates 7% of eligible voters did not vote, there is a discrepancy, but I choose, nevertheless, to cite it because I believe it provides a *generally* accurate indicator of the barometer of the community, politically, as a quality of life settement.

[119] Ironically, quality of life settlement homes have become stereotyped by members of the international community as representative of the luxurious living styles that Jewish political extremists living in the "settlements" have adopted. Yet, in fact, quality of life home-owners do not represent the same groups of settlers. They are the more moderate who did not, in the first place, move to the West Bank or Gaza for political reasons. In contrast, the extremist political settlers, tend *not* to live in homes like those who live in the newer sections of Alfei Menashe.

[120] In order to ascertain which of the eleven developments/settlements offered the most opportunity for contact with Palestinians, I made visits to developments/settlements on the list, only to observe that, in most cases, Palestinian day laborers were not present throughout the development/settlement. Rather, they worked on its outskirts. This was best exemplified in the case of the city of Ariel - one of Israel's largest developments/settlements. In Ariel, its industrial project – the Barkan industrial zone - is in fact located adjacent to the city, not inside of it. In other words, any Palestinians employed by Barkan are working just outside the entrance to Ariel, where community members would not have regular opportunities to make contact with them unless, for example, they were their employers. Most importantly, my study group – children aged five to eight, would not have much opportunity to interact with these Palestinains, let alone even notice them. Therefore, from among the eleven existing fieldsite options from which to choose to be able to observe the role of community-based contact in influencing these children's interpretations of mediated contact, Alfei Menashe appeared to be the best choice for study.

[121] Consequently, on the basis of a petition submitted by the five villages and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, the Israeli Supreme Court, (ISC) taking into consideration the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision that the barrier was illegal, declared, in contrast to the ICJ findings, that the "fence" was essential (September 2005 judgment). However, in accordance with the ICJ, the ISC agreed that the fence was causing too much injury to the residents of the Palestinian villages. Therefore, the ISC required that it be re-routed (Israeli High Court of Justice Case 7957/04), a ruling which the villages are now awaiting to have implemented (B'Tselem, July 9, 2008).

[122] However, Rina said the character spoke Spanish. By explaining this, she revealed that she did not know that the term "Sepharadi," literally meaning Spanish in Hebrew, does not in fact mean a "Spanish person" or *only* a Spanish person, in cultural terms in Israeli Hebrew. It can also mean an ethnically "Arab" or other "Eastern person." Consequently, her interpretation echos those of American children who do not know

what the term "Black" means. Sometimes they they think it refers to black hair rather than to skin color. (described in Padden and Humphries, 1988). Meanwhile, this child thought "Sepharadim" speak Spanish, despite that she herself is ethnically Arab.

[123] Yariv likely selected the term "Greeks" because according to story of the Jewish holiday of Hannuka, they fought with the Maccabees during "biblical times". His interview, meanwhile, took place just six-days prior to the start of Hannuka in December of 2005. In all likelyhood he had just been told the story by relatives or in his kindergarten, and therefore, dialogically made use of this term during our conversation.

[124] Thirty-eight is my very rough estimate, which I compiled by counting the number of ethnopolitically Arab names listed in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs "Memorial List of the Dead", up through the end of 2006. As a kind of correlation with my own estimate, the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz* placed the estimate through June 2003, as nine. Ha'aretz based their estimate on their newspaper archives. Finally, Arab/Palestinian-Israeli members of the Israeli Parliament estimated that the number of the dead amounted to twenty, also up to and through June 2003 (Ha'aretz, 2003 June 27).

[125] The exceptions are Druze-Israelis, whom are required to serve in the army, and another 5000 (during one estimated time-period) that were comprised of largely Bedouin-Israelis, non-Bedouin-Muslim-Israelis, and Christian-Israelis. See Kanaaneh, 2003 for a very interesting discussion about those who *do* serve and why. In total, those who serve appears to amount to less than 2% of all the Israeli population if one combines the unofficial figure in Kanaaneh and the IDF's estimate of Druze who serve. This brings the total number of Arab/Palestinian-Israelis who serve to be a very rough estimate of less than 10% from among their total population. See also Blech, 2008 with respect to Druze.

[126] Statistic measured from the close of 2003, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005b. In 2002, the population was 38,000, according to ICBS (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004c). In 1990, meanwhile, it was 26,000 (Gan-Mor and Previs, 1998).

[127] In addition, Ahmed Ibrahim Siyyam Jabareen, albeit from neighboring Moawiya, was also killed at the Uhm Al-Fahm Junction, according to a report by Human Rights Watch in 2000**.**

[128] See Al-Khalaileh, 2004 & 2006 for an interesting and analogous discussion about different gendered play patterns, albeit among Palestinian refugee children in the Al-Wihdat refugee camp in Jordan where play infrastructure are even more absent.

[129] Consequently, this attack, as in the case of others, killed Jewish- as well as, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis.

[130] As a point worth mentioning, this terrorist/freedom fighter who was driven by Mhagne (Hanadi Jaradat from Jenin) entered Israel via Barta'a on a Jordanian passport. This fact effectively represents a crux in relations between Jewish-Israelis, Arab/Palestinian-Israelis and Palestinians in "the conflict". This crux revolves around questions like whether, for example, Israel should allow in Jordanian passport-holding women (like those in East Barta'a who I described in Chapter 6) to receive emergency

gynecologist care, versus ensuring that Israelis (both Jewish and Arab/Palestinian) are not injured or killed by suicide bombers.

[131] Parenthetically, Uhm Al-Fahm has been the subject of a proposal by Avigdor Lieberman, the head of the far right Israeli political party, Our Home Israel ("Israel Beitanu" in Hebrew), to be transferred to the Palestinian Authority. Lieberman likens his proposal to population transfers for peace that I described in Chapter 3 that are one possible "solution" that I argued to be necessary if self-efficacy effects modeled interventions are to be viable within a situation of political conflict. I do not, however, interpret Lieberman to be making this proposal for the same reason (nor is he, alongside it, proposing a peace communication intervention to go with it). Within Israeli politics too, his proposal, has been widely criticized, and typically is not seen as a transfer for peace, as Lieberman frames it. Therefore, his proposal best represents an image of Jewish-Israeli perspectives of Uhm Al-Fahm, which, however, are more extreme than that of the general organizational view. I nevertheless, note it here in an effort to best help situate the symbolic meaning Uhm Al-Fahm holds for Jewish-Israelis. According to their narrative, it a hostile community within the state, worthy of concern.

[132] The terrorist/freedom fighter was widely regarded among Jewish-Israelis as a "terrorist ("mechabel" in Hebrew). *Terrorist attacks*, networked or individually carried out acts of violence, on the part of Jewish-Israelis (and as is the case generally with members of state-bearing nations), meanwhile, are a rare phenomenon. By comparison, Israel exercises violence via centralized military acts, coordinated by the Israeli army. Unlike terrorist/freedom fighting attacks, these are not designed with the intention to kill and injure as many as possible for the precise aim of raising public awareness about group political goals. (See Weimann and Winn, 1994 for a related discussion about the specifically, contrasting communicatory aims of terrorism/freedom fighting).

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