Title
Prestige, Humiliation and International Politics

Author
Barnhart, Joslyn

Publication Date
2013

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Prestige, Humiliation and International Politics

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Political Science

by

Joslyn N. Barnhart

2013

.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Presitge, Humiliation and International Politics

by

Joslyn N. Barnhart

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Los Angeles, 2013

Professor Arthur Stein, Chair

Why do states pay costs to engage in international competitions over issues of little immediate material or strategic interest to them? This dissertation argues that a substantial portion of state behavior, commonly attributed to security concerns, is actually driven by competitions for prestige. States often acquire territory or weapons or exert their independence in international affairs not out of concern for their security but out of a desire to persuade other states that they should be listened to. The dynamics of such prestige competitions are not well understood. Among my findings, I discover that states which have recently experienced a publicly humiliating event will be more likely to pay costs to seek prestige because they want to minimize decline in influence that might result from their demotion in the eyes of others. Also, if the humiliated state is near enough in influence to the dominant state in the system or region, the dominant state will match the humiliated state's prestige investment, generating an international race for prestige. These dynamics are illustrated within the Scramble for Africa and the nuclear arms race for parity during the Cold War.

The dissertation of Joslyn N. Barnhart is approved.

Robert Boyd

Michael Chwe

Barry O'Neill

Marc Trachtenberg

Arthur Stein, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2013

Table of Contents

VITA

EDUCATION

Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, CA
M.A. in International Studies, May 2005
Fields of Concentration: Political Theory
Coursework in International Relations, Political Philosophy and
Thesis: *The Neural Basis of Political Decision-Making*

Reed College, Portland, OR
B.A. with a Major in Biology and Minor in Psychology, May 1998
Thesis: *Gene Therapy of the Neurodegenerative Diseases*

PAPERS and CONFERENCES

"The Impact of Humiliation on International Behavior And Prestige-Seeking," *Under Review.*
- Presented at the *Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association*, Chicago, April 2012.
- Presented at the *UCLA International Relations Reading Group*, March 2012.
- Presented at Wesleyan University, January 2013.

"Prestige and Territory: Status and Imitation in The Scramble for Africa"
- Presented at the *Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association*, Chicago, April 2011.

HONORS and AWARDS

- Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation International Nuclear Security Dissertation Fellow, 2012 - 2013
- UCLA Distinguished Teaching Award, 2012
- UCLA Dissertation Year Fellowship, 2012 - 2013

- National Science Foundation, EITM Scholarship, 2012
- Collegium of University Teaching Fellow, UCLA 2011 - 2012
- Santa Fe Institute Graduate Workshop Fellowship in Social Science Computational Modeling and Complexity, Summer 2010
- Graduate Summer Research Mentorship, UCLA Graduate Division, 2008, 2010
- Santa Fe Institute Complex Systems Summer School Scholarship, 2009
- UCLA Political Science Departmental Summer Award, 2008, 2011, 2012
- Bradley Foundation Fellow, 2007 - 2008
- UCLA International Institute Global Scholar Fellow, 2006 - 2008
- UCLA Regents Stipend, 2006 - 2007
- Claremont Graduate University, Research and Teaching Assistant Fellow, 2003 - 2005

Chapter One:

Introduction

This dissertation focuses on the importance and role of prestige and prestige-seeking in international relations. The desire for prestige is a significant motivator of state behavior which has not typically been emphasized by scholars in the field of international relations. Instead, standard conceptions of international politics have emphasized factors revolving around power. The mainstream view of the field places security at the heart of state interests. Security necessarily depends upon a state's power and the its ability to defend itself. The desire for wealth, a secondary yet significant motivator of behavior in the standard view, also often relies upon power. Material gain is often achieved through conquest and the use of power. Power is even key to those conceptions of international affairs which incorporate a role for nonmaterial ideological motivations. Power is necessary to survival of the state and its ideology and it facilitates ideological expansion through coercive means. The bulk of scholarly work has therefore viewed international relations as a perpetual competition for power. Its focus has largely been on the material and utilitarian motivations of states.

Utilitarian conceptions of state behavior which emphasize the short-term maximization of relative military capabilities, material accumulation, or security, however, leave many important cases of state behavior unexplained. It is often argued, for instance, that states

seek territory primarily because it can provide strategic advantage and wealth. The value of territory, in this conception, lays in the quality of its strategic locations and its natural resources. As will be shown, however, vast quantities of territory have been conquered without a thought to their strategic or material value. It is also argued that states acquire weapons solely for the power and security they provide. Yet, as we will see, states frequently engage in the development and acquisition of weapons even when they recognize the weapons in question provide no additional material utility.

This dissertation argues that many important cases of state behavior do not involve competitions for power as much as they involve competitions for prestige. The dynamics of competitions for prestige have largely been ignored by scholars. While powerful actors in the system obtain their influence from their ability to hurt, the prestigious wield influence because they possess qualities held in high esteem by a majority of their social group. States are drawn to prestige-seeking both because they value having a voice in the international system and because they value the respect of others for its own sake. More than a trivial consideration, the quest for prestige often leads states to act in ways which detract from their near-term security and interests. It leads states to pay costs to conquer territory with no obvious material or strategic benefits. It leads states to devote material and human resources towards the development of sophisticated weapons systems that provide little extra security. The desire for international prestige shapes the behavior of powerful states far more than current models in the field allow and, often times, far more than do existential

threats to security, the absence of which can often be taken for granted in the modern state system.[1]

That states are often motivated by a desire for prestige at the cost to their immediate interests raises important questions. In what ways do states go about seeking prestige? Are some states more likely to engage in prestige-seeking than others?[2] Is prestige-seeking more likely to occur in some international contexts than in others? How do the prestige-seeking behaviors of one state impact the behavior of others? Finally, and more generally, why would prestige hierarchies emerge within the international system in the first place? The chapters below provide answers to some of these questions.

First, I argue that not all states will be equally likely to seek prestige at all times. International hierarchies, whether based in power, wealth or prestige, are perpetually subject to change. Some change comes in the form of slow and gradual accretion and decline – the gradual rise of Chinese power as a function of slow increases in the size of the Chinese population, for instance. International hierarchies can often adapt to such gradual shifts without dramatic or violent state action. Other change comes in the form of sudden shocks – unexpected events which call positions within the hierarchy into question. These shocks

[1]Existential threats have possibly declined because of norms against conquest which have arisen in the second half of the 20th century. See Zacher (2001) and Fazal (2004). The threat of major power war may also have declined more generally. See Wendt (1999, Ch. 7) makes this argument. Also Mueller (1989).

[2]Prestige-seeking may include both attempts at augmenting prestige and attempts at maintaining existing levels of prestige.

are harder for the system to adapt to without state action. Shocks to prestige hierarchies include events which humiliate, or lower the image of a state in the eyes of others. Such humiliating international incidents, which might include surprising defeats or losses of territory, lead to the sudden re-estimation and potential downgrade of a state's prestige. The humiliated state is then in a position to shore-up its existing prestige by actively investing in demonstrations of its prestigious qualities. It acts in the hope that it can redress any downgrade of its social status and any resulting loss of respect and voice within the international system.[3]

Prestige-seeking does not however occur in isolation. Because prestige is a constant-sum good, investments that increase the prestige of one state cause a decline in the prestige and influence of others. Decisions by one state to invest in their prestige therefore increase the incentive of others to match these investments in prestige even when such investments come at a cost to their immediate interests. Other states match prestige investments for fear that, if they do not, their prestige will decline in the eyes of others. I argue that such patterns of investment can develop into *international races* for prestige in which added prestige is assigned to the state which acquires the highest amount of the good. The degree

[3]This emphasis on the impact of past events on state behavior in the present also represents a departure from the mainstream of the field which perceives state behavior to be driven by current calculations of power and resolve. Also, as will be discussed, while much of the literature on status and international relations focuses on the desire status among emerging powers, the emphasis here is on prestige-seeking among states that confront potential decline in the eyes of others.

to which a participant in an international race values the good at the focal point of the race therefore depends on the amount it perceives that other participants value the good and not on the inherent value that the state itself assigns the good. The interests of the state are determined not by their own current calculations of what is needed for security but are determined by the interests of other states. As an example, a decision by one state to increase the size of their strategic arsenal in hopes of accentuating their prestige may lead other states to build up their arsenals in kind even if those states receive little added benefit from more weapons and even if they would not have chosen to acquire more in a vacuum.

International races for prestige are far from rare or peripheral to international affairs. As will be shown, the Scramble for Africa at the end of the 19th century, an event which oversaw the conquest or annexation of over 95% of the African continent, was an international race for prestige. Britain, Germany, Italy and France conquered vast swathes of African territory despite acknowledging the costs of of acquiring and maintaining the African colonies. They did so in an effort to acquire the prestige associated with being able to easily conquer and hold land abroad. As the Scramble wore on, the pace of conquest became feverish, as conquests by one country spurred further conquests by others. The competition became less about gaining prestige through single acts of territorial occupation and more about gaining the prestige associated with possessing the *largest amount* of African territory.

The dramatic buildup of strategic arsenals during the middle of the Cold War at the

end of the 1960s was also an international race for prestige. Both the United States and the Soviet Union recognized the limited utility of adding weapons to their already substantial arsenals while continuing to pursue strategic parity with the other despite the costs. The Soviets originally engaged in a buildup of its arsenal in order to match the prestige of the US; the US responded to this build-up not because it found inherent value in acquiring additional weapons, but because US leaders perceived that the Soviets and other states believed that the state with the largest arsenal was the most prestigious. The degree of concern the United States applied to matching Soviet arsenal sizes therefore was driven not by American military interests but by beliefs about what competitors perceived to be of interest.

Not all cases of prestige investment lead to international races for prestige. While prestige competitions are constant-sum, every investment made by others does not increase a state's incentive to invest an equal amount. As will be demonstrated, a state has little incentive to match another state's investment unless the state is convinced that the investment could actually result in its demotion. Such a challenge is unlikely to come from those with significantly less prestige but instead from states with approximate but slightly lower prestige. As will also be shown, the likelihood that a state will join a competition for prestige increases with the number of other participants in the competition. Finally, a successful challenge depends upon the creation of common knowledge that the objective of the bid is to actually increase the investing state's prestige. As will be discussed, this

requires not only that each individual state perceives the investment as a bid for prestige but also that these states perceive that other states also believe this to be true. What is prestigious relies in this way upon how members of a particular social grouping define prestige. It is this element of social construction which differentiates prestige from other common motivations in international politics.

States and Primates: Prestige, Power and Influence

Biologists have long known of the strong tendency among animal species of all types to form social hierarchies. A social ranking among chickens, in fact, was among the first to be discovered in 1935.[4] Among primate males, these social rankings are most often based on antagonism, demonstrations of power and the potential for conflict.[5] The relative power to hurt serves as the basis for social position as well as for the the distribution of influence within these groups. And with higher rank usually comes preferential access to goods and to mates as well as the enhanced attention of others.

Within international relations, realist approaches to thinking about international hierarchy most closely resemble these conceptions of social rank in dominance-seeking primates. In such conceptions, states in the international system exist in a Hobbesian world of in-

[4]As Barkow et al. (1975) notes, a social ranking among chickens was among the first to be discovered in 1935. Chance (1967) notes the importance of differential attention within primate social structures. See also De Waal and Waal (1997), Barkow (1989), De Waal (1991), Chapais (1988).

[5]Among females, social placement within the group is often based on fertility and reproductive success.

security and anarchy in which they can trust no one and can rely only on their ability to hurt others. When 'prestige' is included within these traditional conceptions, it is defined as the "shadow of power." Prestigious states are those that have "perceived power," or those that have been able to sufficiently convince others of their ability to hurt so that they do not have to directly demonstrate their physical dominance over others in order to wield influence. Morgenthau (1960) states that "a policy of prestige attains its very triumph when it gives the nation pursuing it such a reputation for power as to enable it to forgo the actual employment of the instrument of power." It is of course true that many symbols of international prestige overlap with symbols of national power. Additionally, power may act as the grounds for prestige. This is not the same as saying however that power garners prestige. A very powerful state may or may not have prestige. It may be respected by others for its power and the way in which it wields its power or it may lack the respect and esteem of others even though it is powerful because it wields its power as might a bully.[6]

If prestige is not necessarily rooted in competitive ability, then what is its basis? As anthropologists have noted, humans, and some primates, are unique in that they freely confer influence on others on the basis of characteristics having nothing to do with their

[6]As Robert Bierstedt has put it, "Prestige is frequently unaccompanied by power and when the two occur together power is usually the basis and grounds of prestige rather than the reverse." To illustrate that power can occur without prestige and prestige without power, he offers the examples of policemen and Albert Einstein respectively. We can imagine that the former would be far more likely to obtain the voluntary deference of others through persuasion than would the latter. See Bierstedt (1950).

ability to exert physical power or physically enforce their will among others.[7] Barkow et al. (1975) argues that natural selection likely transformed the tendency for social dominance among primates into the human need to evaluate the self as higher in rank than others. As cognitive maps of humans adapted to include notions of socially transmitted norms, the need to maintain self-esteem and the respect of peers came to be achieved through prestige-seeking based less on direct demonstrations of dominance and more on abstract evaluations. Some groups came to respect and defer to those with exceptional intellectual abilities, for instance, even when those individuals were unable to effectively coerce others.[8]

Sociologists have demonstrated convincingly that concerns about esteem and social rank extend to the level of groups. Social identity theory tells us that an individual's identity is also shaped by the identity of salient social groups in which they are a member.[9] Individuals will be sensitive to the esteem of their group and will even be willing to pay costs to enhance their group's prestige at a cost to their immediate interests.[10]

---

[7]See Barkow et al. (1975) and Henrich (2001).

[8]Albert Einstein and Stephen Hawkins both garner prestige because of their exceptional intellectual abilities; doctors are deemed prestigious because of their ability to save lives. Amongst some traditional societies, prestige is bestowed on those who are able to effectively hunt turtles or on those who throw the most extravagant funeral feasts. See Smith and Bird (2000) and Smith et al. (2003).

[9]See Luhtanen and Crocker (1992), Abrams and Hogg (1988), Bergami and Bagozzi (2000), Ellemers et al. (1999), Tajfel (2010), among others.

[10]See Tajfel and Turner (1979),Tajfel (2010).

Given the pervasiveness of prestige motivations at the individual and group levels, we have no reason to think that such motivations would not also play a significant role in shaping the behavior of states at the international level.[11] It is difficult to interpret state decisions to make investments in deeds that lack significant material or strategic returns, such as sending a man to the moon, hosting costly international sporting events or conferences, or acquiring costly yet barren African colonies, for instance, in other terms. It is similarly difficult to explain why the focal point of such expenditures - colonies in one period, nuclear weapons in another - changes so drastically over the course of international history if interest in them is not rooted in some constructed social conception of prestige, the desirability of which can change over time.[12]

[11]That prestige should be incorporated into our understanding of international relations is not news to those who actually conduct foreign policy. Nineteenth century leaders frequently cited the need for states to maintain prestige and esteem in the international system. See Brunschwig (1966) for numerous quotes by the French Minister Jules Ferry at the end of the 19th century which demonstrate an obsession with maintaining Frances 'rightful place in the world.' Paul Nitze also once deemed prestige to be 'the most important tool of foreign policy' and Henry Kissinger warned leaders against the 'fashionable debunking of prestige.'

[12]While early realist scholars cited the importance of 'prestige,' they maintained an entirely instrumental interpretation of the term. Morgenthau defined prestige as 'the image in the mirror of our fellows' minds.' Morgenthau (1960, pp. 86 - 87). For him, however, prestige specifically represented a reputation for power, or the ability to pursue one's own interests while forgoing the use of power and force. See also Gilpin (1995).

Definitions

Before continuing the discussion of the role of prestige in international politics, it is useful to lay out the exact definition of prestige and distinguish it from related concepts in the field. I define prestige as follows: an actor holds prestige when group members believe that other group members believe that the actor has a desirable quality. With such consensus comes respect, prominence and freely conferred influence within a social group. Prestige is subjective and socially constructed, residing at the level of second-order beliefs, or beliefs about others' beliefs. Only when actors believe that other members in the group believe a possession of a particular good is prestigious, for instance, does an actor in possession of that good have prestige. What is viewed to be prestigious therefore is subject to change over time and place, depending on the collective and intersubjective views of a particular social group. This is evidenced at both the level of individuals and states. For example, beauty may be assigned prestige within many communities. Each community, however, may develop a different conception of what constitutes beauty and these conceptions are subject to change as the makeup of the social group's preferences shift over time. At the level of states, while colonies and imperial reach were deemed to be highly prestigious at the end of the 19th century, such endeavors today have entirely lost their prestige.

Scholars and statesmen have often used 'prestige' synonymously with terms such as honor, status, and resolve, each of which can be distinguished from the definition of prestige used here. Prestige differs from concepts such as honor and resolve in that the conference

of prestige on an actor is at the level of second-order beliefs, or beliefs about others' beliefs. Honor exists at the level of first-order beliefs. An actor may possess honor without others knowing about it as is shown in the case of a soldier dying honorably yet in solitude. Similarly, a state may possess the resolve to follow through on its threats and promises without any other states knowing the true degree of their determination. The notion however that an actor may possess prestige without the knowledge of others is inconceivable.[13]

'Prestige' is very similar to 'status' - the terms are often defined synonymously in common usage, especially when applied to individuals. Both concepts acknowledge some ranking or hierarchy within a group in which placement in the higher tiers of the hierarchy bestows privileges not experienced by those lower in the ranks. Both concepts are also based on the subjective beliefs of others. Among states, however, the terms are sometimes conceived of differently. We speak of states having 'great-power status' or 'regional-power status' – these terms make clear the strong connection in the international system between military or economic power and status. An actor can have great-power status, however, without having prestige if they are able to wield power effectively but lack the respect of others, as was true of the Soviet Union during most of the Cold War. Similarly, states can have prestige for a particular quality but not have particularly high status.[14]

Finally, reputation is similar to prestige in that it resides within the judgment of others

[13]This section draws on O'Neill's discussion of prestige. See (O'Neill, 2001, Ch. 12).

[14]See Wohlforth (1993).

and is held at the level of second order beliefs. One does not hold a reputation in a vacuum. Individual A's belief about the qualities of individual B also does not constitute B's reputation if A's beliefs are not impacted by perceptions about how others perceive B. Otherwise, A merely holds an impression of B developed throughout the history of their direct interactions with each other. In this way, reputation and prestige are similar. Unlike prestige, however, reputation is not bound with esteem. States in the international system may hold reputations for many things, good and bad. A state may have a reputation as a bully, a quality that lacks collective respect. A state is only prestigious if they are collectively admired in some way.

Also, as it is typically used in international relations, 'reputation' typically refers to a reputation for honesty or resolve.[15] All actors hold common definitions of what constitute acts of honesty or resolve. Common knowledge about what others perceive to be honest therefore is not required for a reputation for honesty to develop. Instead, what is required is knowledge of how others perceive their history of interaction with others. Resolve is commonly defined, for instance, as "the extent to which a state will risk war to keep its promises and uphold its threats."[16] Each state may, through their own interaction with state A, hold a judgment about how resolved state A is. They may hold this judgment without knowledge about how resolved others perceive A to be. For state A to hold a

[15]See Sartori (2005), Mercer (2009), Guisinger and Smith (2002).

[16]Definition from (Mercer, 2009).

reputation for resolve, however, states must have some impression that other states also perceive state A to be determined to follow through. Having a reputation for resolve of course does not make state A prestigious unless there is some commonly-held belief that resolve is admirable and worthy of respect. It could be instead that states collectively judge resolve to be a mark of unbending stubbornness that should not be encouraged. In such a case, any influence possessed by the resolved state would result from its potential to hurt. Prestige differs in that others bestow influence because they believe that the community believes that you should be respected and not because they perceive any threats you might make are genuine.

The concept of a social hierarchy rooted in prestige is distinct from other conceptions of hierarchy used in the field. The typical conception of international hierarchy is rooted in relative military capabilities and the ability to compel others.[17] Lake (2009) however distinguishes hierarchy rooted in compulsion with that rooted in authority. Authority is exercised by a state when it commands subordinates to alter their intended course of action and when the collective group believes that the state has the right to issue such orders and to use coercion against non-compliers.[18] Compulsion however relies on the ability to hurt

[17]See Waltz (1979). Gilpin (1995) also refers to a hierarchy based in the ability to coerce, though he calls it 'prestige.'

[18]See Lake (2009, pp. 17-18). As Lake argues, typical conceptions of hierarchy not based in military capability rely on formal-legal relationships between states. Subordinates therefore comply not because of who the state is or because of the traits that it has but because of the legal role that it plays.

others and does not benefit from perceptions of legitimacy but more closely resembles bullying. In the sense that subordinates confer the right to rule on their superiors, authority acts as a 'bridge between compulsion and choice.' According to Lake, authority can be distinguished from coercion in that the former is viewed by the collective group as legitimate while subordinates feel no obligation to comply when being coerced. Lake's concept of authority is similar to prestige hierarchies in that subordination to superiors is a collective choice. Prestige hierarchies differ, however, in their source of authority. In Lake's case, authority relies on a "bargain between the ruler and the ruled premised on the former's provision of a social order of value sufficient to offset the latter's loss of freedom." Subordination within prestige hierarchies is premised on the possession of traits that superior states in the hierarchy possess. Prestigious states are listened to because of who they are and because others deem their strategies for dealing with a variable environment successful.

Layout of Dissertation

The dissertation is presented in two parts. The first part, which includes chapters 2 and 3, lays out a theoretical framework for understanding how prestige functions in the international system. Chapter 2 presents a general discussion of why states seek prestige, the reasons why some states are more apt to seek prestige than others, and how states go about seeking their prestige. The chapter also relates the contributions of this project to the broader literature on prestige and status in international relations. Chapter 3 fo-

cuses on the dynamics of prestige competitions, on how investments intended to boost a state's prestige affect the behavior of others and on when such investments will generate an international race for prestige. Through a set of theoretical models which incorporate elements of both evolutionary and rationalist frameworks, it shows that those states that have suffered the largest rapid decline in prestige will be those with the greatest incentive to invest in augmenting their prestige. The set of models shows why states in the international system would ever pay attention to and participate in socially constructed hierarchies such as those based on prestige. The models also specify the conditions under which states prefer to participate in and support international outcomes based on relative prestige rather than those pursued through coercion and direct conflict and those under which it makes sense for states to invest in their prestige at a cost to their own immediate interests and security. The incentive of other states to match such investments in prestige is not constant but increases as the investments of others increase.

Part II turns to empirical investigations of international prestige. Chapter 4 focuses on the question of which states will be most likely to seek prestige. It focuses on one answer: states that have experienced an international humiliation in the past are more likely to actively seek prestige. The chapter focuses on the domain of territorial losses and gains. The chapter shows statistically that humiliating events that call into question a state's prestige, like the loss of territory through coercive means, are among the significant drivers of future decisions to seek prestige through territorial gains. Using an expanded and

recoded dataset of territorial change, this chapter finds robust support for a new theory of humiliation in international politics.

Chapters 5 and 6 present case studies of two significant prestige competitions of the last two hundred years. The chapters also illustrate the dynamics theorized within Part I. Chapter 5 focuses on the role that colonies played as prestige goods within the Scramble for Africa at the end of the 19th century. Through comparative case studies, I show the importance of prestige motivations amongst four key players within this imperial race for territory - Britain, France, Germany, and Italy - and demonstrate three general points about the dynamics of prestige competition within the Scramble for Africa in the 1880s and 90s. Far from an isolated case, territorial change in Africa at the hands of Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Belgium accounts for more than 25% of all acts of territorial change since 1816. Chapter 6 focuses on the role that prestige concerns played in motivating the nuclear arms race for parity between the United States and Soviet Union during the late 1960s. The chapter shows that the Soviets' goal of nuclear parity was rooted in the Soviet desire to enhance the prestige of the Soviet Union vis a vis the United States and its belief that nuclear parity and highly visible technological advances in their strategic arsenal would help them obtain equivalent political influence with the United States in the international system. The Americans' fears about maintaining parity with the Soviets were driven not by military concerns or their own notions about prestige but by their beliefs about what other states in the system believed to be prestigious and their fears that failure to respond to

Soviet advances would lead to a decline in American influence in the international system.

I then conclude in Chapter 7 with a discussion of the implications of these findings about the prevalence of prestige concerns and prestige competitions. I address whether or not such competitions for prestige should be encouraged and whether or not prestige competitions are as dangerous as arms races motivated by security concerns. Also, if prestige-seeking is largely about obtaining respect and voice in international affairs, can providing the rewards of prestige ameliorate more pernicious forms of competition? Finally, I address whether or not prestige-seeking and competitions for prestige are relics of the past. Arguing that prestige concerns are still prevalent in the current international system, I discuss the forms which international prestige currently takes.

References

Abrams, D. and Hogg, M. A. (1988). Comments on the motivational status of self-esteem in social identity and intergroup discrimination. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 18(4):317–334.

Barkow, J. (1989). *Darwin, Sex, and Status*. University of Toronto Press.

Barkow, J. H., Akiwowo, A. A., Barua, T. K., Chance, M., Chapple, E. D., Chattopadhyay, G. P., Freedman, D. G., Geddes, W., Goswami, B., Isichei, P., et al. (1975). Prestige and culture: A biosocial interpretation [and comments and replies]. *Current Anthropology*, pages 553–572.

Bergami, M. and Bagozzi, R. P. (2000). Self-categorization, affective commitment and group self-esteem as distinct aspects of social identity in the organization. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 39(4):555–577.

Bierstedt, R. (1950). An analysis of social power. *American Sociological Review*, 15(6):730–738.

Brunschwig, H. (1966). *French Colonialism, 1871-1914: Myths and Realities*. FA Prager.

Chance, M. R. (1967). Attention structure as the basis of primate rank orders. *Man*, 2(4):503–518.

Chapais, B. (1988). Rank maintenance in female japanese macaques: experimental evidence for social dependency. *Behaviour*, pages 41–59.

De Waal, F. (1991). Rank distance as a central feature of rhesus monkey social organization: a sociometric analysis. *Animal Behaviour*, 41(3):383–395.

De Waal, F. and Waal, F. (1997). *Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals*. Harvard University Press.

Ellemers, N., Kortekaas, P., and Ouwerkerk, J. W. (1999). Self-categorisation, commitment to the group and group self-esteem as related but distinct aspects of social identity. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 29(2-3):371–389.

Fazal, T. (2004). State death in the international system. *International Organization*, 58(02):311–344.

Gilpin, R. (1995). *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Guisinger, A. and Smith, A. (2002). Honest threats the interaction of reputation and political institutions in international crises. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46(2):175–200.

Henrich, J. (2001). Cultural transmission and the diffusion of innovations: Adoption dynamics indicate that biased cultural transmission is the predominate force in behavioral change. *American Anthropologist*, 103(4):992–1013.

Lake, D. A. (2009). *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Cornell University Press.

Luhtanen, R. and Crocker, J. (1992). A collective self-esteem scale: Self-evaluation of one's social identity. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 18(3):302–318.

Mercer, J. (2009). *Reputation and International Politics*. Cornell University Press.

Morgenthau, H. (1960). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. A. A. Knopf.

Mueller, J. E. (1989). *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*. Basic Books New York.

O'Neill, B. (2001). *Honor, Symbols, and War*. University of Michigan Press.

Sartori, A. E. (2005). *Deterrence by Diplomacy*. Princeton University Press.

Smith, E. A., Bird, R. B., and Bird, D. W. (2003). The benefits of costly signaling: Meriam turtle hunters. *Behavioral Ecology*, 14(1):116–126.

Smith, E. A. and Bird, R. L. B. (2000). Turtle hunting and tombstone opening: public generosity as costly signaling. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 21(4):245–261.

Tajfel, H. (2010). *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, volume 7. Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, H. and Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, 33:47.

Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. McGraw-Hill.

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Wohlforth, W. C. (1993). *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War*. Cornell University Press.

Zacher, M. (2001). The territorial integrity norm: International boundaries and the use of force. *International Organization*, 55(2):215–250.

Chapter Two:

Who Seeks Prestige, Why and How

The introduction laid out the definitions of prestige. This chapter will lay out in more detail a theory of why states pursue prestige, which states will be most likely to seek prestige when, and finally how they go about pursuing prestige once they decide to do so. It will also distinguish the arguments made in this project from those in the existing literature on prestige-seeking in international relations. The theoretical groundwork presented in this chapter will be empirically supported in the later empirical chapters of the dissertation.

I. Why Seek Prestige?

This section addresses the question of why states sink costs in order to acquire prestige. It also explores why states have an incentive to defer to states with respected traits, a question which is explored in greater theoretical detail in the next chapter.

Why do actors, whether individuals or states, seek prestige? Social scientists have provided two different answers to this question. On the one hand, there are those who maintain an instrumental view of prestige. They argue that prestige is pursued solely as a means to an end.[1] While actors may be willing to invest in prestige at a cost to their

[1]Runciman (1998), Lin (1990).

immediate economic or material interests,[2] they may be willing to do this because of the longer-term material and economic benefits which having prestige can provide. At the level of individuals, the prestigious may experience greater access to goods and resources, to mates and to decision-makers. The association between high placement within a social hierarchy and increased material benefits has in fact been demonstrated in experimental settings. Ball and Eckel (1996) demonstrate that proposals of how to divide a dollar made to high status individuals within the context of the ultimatum game were higher than those made to low status actors. According to Ball et al. (2001), such benefits extend to experimental market conditions in which individuals assigned high status positions received a higher price on average for goods than did individuals with low status. Ridgeway et al. (1998) also demonstrates that actors assigned low status within an experimental setting are willing to adopt beliefs that disadvantage them against higher status actors.[3] Social hierarchies based on prestige also appear to help groups function more efficiently by resolving coordination problems within organizations and by rewarding competence.[4] Such benefits increase individuals' incentives to invest in their prestige.

For a growing body of social scientists, however, the rationale for pursuing prestige extends beyond instrumental concerns. These scholars instead argue that actors pursue

[2]See Frank (1985), Robson (1992), and Huberman et al. (2004).

[3]See also Thye (2000).

[4]Blau (1964), Berger et al. (1980). See also Loch et al. (2000) and Willer (2009).

prestige as an end in itself, without regard to the associated benefits or costs.[5] In this view, the impetus for prestige-seeking is the boost in psychological well-being associated with high placement in social hierarchies.[6] The emotional benefit derived from high social rank is deeply embedded within our biology. Scientists have shown that those individuals at the top of the social hierarchy experience an increase in pleasurable serotonin levels.[7] Economists have also demonstrated experimentally that individuals pursue prestige even without the promise of instrumental benefits. Huberman et al. (2004) has shown that individuals within an experimentally constructed social group are willing to forego monetary rewards in exchange for short-lived status recognition and without the promise of any tangible benefits in the future.[8]

Scholars in the field of international relations have generally focused on prestige and status as psychological and emotional drivers of state behavior.[9] They have argued that states pursue prestige largely because it feels good rather than for the means to greater

[5]Veblen (1899) described status as a resource in itself, the desire for which he viewed to be a universal human characteristic.

[6]Barkow et al. (1975), Barkow (1989), Frank (1985).

[7]Raleigh and McGuire (1994) shows that serotonin levels are highest among those vervet monkeys at the top of the social hierarchy and that these levels decrease if they are demoted. Booth et al. (1989) demonstrates similar patterns of serotonin levels within college fraternities.

[8]See also Loch et al. (2001).

[9]Lebow (2008) and Markey (1999).

resources it might provide. Drawing on psychological theory, scholars in international relations have used Social Identity Theory as a framework for understanding status-seeking in the international system.[10] Social Identity Theory tells us that individuals are motivated not only by their personal placement within the social hierarchy but that they also compare the social rank and achievements of groups to which they belong with the ranking of other members of some reference group.[11] Motivated by a desire for positive self-concept that extends to their social group, individuals can be motivated to maximize the social rank of their in-group in contrast to some out group at the expense of their own individual self-interest.[12]

Assessing the relative importance of psychological or instrumental motivations in shaping state behavior, however, is difficult. In practice, states may be motivated by both 'rational' or instrumental motivations in which individuals pursue high social standing because of their expectation of resulting material benefits and 'irrational' emotional mo-

[10]See Larson and Shevchenko (2010), Larson and Shevchenko (2011), **?**, Wohlforth (2009), **?** and Pouliot (2011). Markey (1999) and Lebow (2008) focus more general on the psychological benefits to members of collectives which receive public recognition of eminence. Murray (2010) argues that states seek status recognition for the stability and predictability of social outcomes that it provides.

[11]The reference group can be of equal stature or slightly superior, according to Brown and Haeger (1999). I add that for state in decline, the important reference group are those states that have long been perceived as inferior in rank.

[12]See Turner (1978), Oakes and Turner (1980), Tajfel (2010), and Tajfel and Turner (2004).

tivations in which prestige is pursued because it produces a positive psychological boost. Distinguishing between the two rationales may not be at the heart of the conceptual exercise. While prestige-seeking may lead individuals to pay costs and to accept suboptimal outcomes in the near-term, therefore making it irrational by traditional economists' standards, psychological motivations likely did originally have an adaptive and instrumental basis. The desire for social standing and prestige can be viewed as evolutionarily adaptive in the sense that such concepts came to elicit positive psychological responses over the course of evolutionary history in part because having prestige was long associated with exclusive material and social benefits.[13] Thus, we can assume that actors are guided by both instrumental and emotional considerations, whether they are explicitly conscious of it or not.

There is clearly ample evidence within the historical record that state leaders desire high prestige and esteem for their state. Countless statements made by nineteenth and twentieth

[13]Henrich (2001) argues that natural selection led to the human tendency to base social rank on culturally desirable traits, selecting for those within a social group who were best able to identify and imitate others' who offered more successful models of how to interact with shifting environmental variables. In this model, a willingness to defer to those who may have acquired better information about the environment often allows for greater proximity to the prestigious actor and as a result an increased knowledge of their model at a lower cost than would required by individual learning. At the individual level, therefore, prestige likely evolved as a learning efficiency. For more on the adaptive aspects of emotions, see Tooby and Cosmides (1990), Cosmides and Tooby (1994).

century leaders alike provide evidence that the individual desire for prestige extends to the social groups to which an individual belongs. Leaders of declining and emerging countries, of states small and large, have at times declared a near-obsession with maintaining their state's 'rightful place in the world,' with obtaining its 'place in the sun,' with establishing 'the name and respect' of their nation in the eyes of others.[14] Such comments are often made in the context of justifying the acquisition of prestigious goods such as colonies or the latest in sophisticated weaponry. The statements demonstrate a general desire for esteem while leaving the exact motivation for wanting prestige, whether instrumental or emotional, less clear. The best evidence is likely found in what is not said. Rarely are calls for national prestige and esteem followed or preceded by instrumental discussions of the tangible benefits associated with high rank. A 'place in the sun' is not discussed as a position via which greater security or material needs may be met but rather is presented as a goal in and of itself. The degree of voice acquired by those with high rank appears to be a valued resource in its own right, regardless of the benefits having influence within international

[14]Such quotes are numerous throughout the historical documents. For examples, see Holmes (2004) on von Bulow's call for Germany's place in the sun. Any of the numerous quotes by the French Minister Jules Ferry at the end of the 19th century demonstrate an obsession with maintaining Frances rightful place in the world. See Brunschwig (1966). The Dutch also saw technical development in the 1950s as a way to establish the Dutch name and obtain the respect of other nations. See Van der Veen (2000), quoted in Gilady (2006, p. 194).

affairs might provide.[15]

III. When will states be most likely to seek prestige?

This section lays out a more precise hypothesis about when we would expect states to be most likely to engage in prestige-seeking behavior. Those few works addressing prestige-seeking behavior provide few answers to which states will be most likely to seek prestige when. Accepting that states pursue prestige for the psychological benefits that positive self-identity provides, for instance, does not tell us exactly when states will be most likely to bid for prestige. Social Identity Theory (SIT) argues that groups seek prestige when the comparison of the prestigious achievements of their group with other groups is lacking. By this logic, all groups but the most prestigious would have a perpetual incentive to vie for prestige, at least until their group becomes the most prestigious. Clearly, however, all states are not vying for prestige at all times.

Much of the literature incorporating SIT focuses predominantly on status-seeking and the peaceful accommodation of emerging powers.[16] Prestige does not rise automatically

[15]Scholars have shown that individuals place great value on having a voice within a decision-making process. Those whose preferences are listened to within negotiations are happier than those who aren't, even if the outcome of negotiations doesn't correspond with their preferences. For the literature on the importance of giving actors voice, see Hunton et al. (1998), Van den Bos (1999), Lind et al. (1990).

[16]Larson and Shevchenko (2010) focuses on the status motivations of a resurgent Russia since the fall of

with a state's rise in military and economic capabilities. Emerging states often actively invest in augmenting their prestige just as they invest in augmenting their power relative to others. A large number of prestige-seeking states, however, are not emerging powers. They are states which possess significant prestige and which confront a decline in their social position – states which once held a higher degree of prestige than they do at present. I argue that, rather than deciding to pursue prestige based on comparisons of the achievements of one's group with the achievements of other groups, states more often base their decision to seek prestige on their estimation of self as compared to their degree of prestige within the international system. States possess a particular self-concept which depends in part on their historical level of prestige within the international system.[17] This self-concept will be disproportionately high among those who were once held in higher esteem than they currently are. Once a state has been held in high-esteem, it will be reluctant to downgrade its self-concept even as it faces a decline in its prestige as perceived in the eyes of others. Prestige-seeking will be likely amongst such states.

Research within social psychology provides evidence in support of this argument. Traditional appraisals in the field of psychology of status-seeking among individuals focused

---

the Soviet Union and on an emerging China. **?** focuses on an emerging India.

[17]This notion of the self-concept of the state is similar to that of those who focus on recognition theory, which argues that a state's identity comes into existence only through the recognition of others. Through recognition, a stable state identity is formed from which the state's foreign policy will be derived. See Murray (2010), Ringmar (1996), and Wendt (2003). Also, Greenhill (2008).

on the incentives of those with low self-concept to choose violence as a means of increasing their esteem in order to make up for what they lack and to match the social position of others.[18] More recent evidence suggests, however, that it is in fact those individuals with high self-appraisals who will be more likely to engage in violence or to seek to reestablish their social position and that they will be especially likely to do so when their self-concept is challenged or called into question by some event or by the actions of another actor.[19] Actors with high self-esteem will act to shore up their position when there is a possible discrepancy between their own appraisal of self and the external appraisals of others.[20] Such actors have more to lose in allowing for downward estimations of their position. Thus, they are extremely reluctant to revise their self-estimation downward and to allow others

[18]See Toch (1969).

[19]See Baumeister et al. (1996) and Bushman et al. (1998).

[20]Theories of status inconsistency argue that states seek status when their is some discrepancy between a state's position within the hierarchy of power and military capability and its social position and subsequent degree of status and influence over international affairs. This assumes that a state's self-appraisal is rooted in an objective measure of its relative power. The theory offered here in contrast suggests that all actors, and especially those with high self-regard, will be reluctant to downgrade their estimate of self even if their relative power declines. Actors self-appraisals are therefore less rooted in some immediate, objective measurement. On status inconsistency, see Galtung (1964), Schweller (1999), and Wallace (1971). Wohlforth (2009) argues that states will be more likely to engage in status-seeking when there is ambiguity about the order of dominance within the status hierarchy or when there is an inconsistency among the status portfolios of powers, situations that are most likely to occur within multipolar systems.

to maintain more negative appraisals of them. High self-concept therefore doesn't make actors immune to criticism, but makes them more sensitive to it because they have come to feel more entitled to respect, resources and favorable outcomes.[21]

Applying this set of behavioral motivations to the international system, we would expect states whose high self-concept has been challenged in some way to be more likely to engage in actions aimed at maintaining their prestige. Motivated by a desire to avoid a downward self-appraisal and a downward estimation in the eyes of others, states with relatively high prestige that have suffered an international humiliation, or a downgrade in their estimation in the eyes of others, will be more likely to pay costs to shore up their prestige.[22] Prestigious states will be those most accustomed to wielding influence and often to controlling resources. They will have incentive to invest in their prestige both in order to avoid the psychological stress of confronting a painful downgrade in self-concept and to avoid the potential downgrade in international respect and influence that accompanies high prestige.[23]

International humiliations have an impact on prestige-seeking because of the way they affect the second-order beliefs at the heart of prestige hierarchies. States may be humiliated

[21]See Baumeister et al. (1996, pp. 7-9).

[22]As Lebow (2008) notes, it is prestigious states that have the most to lose and which often have the resources to engage in prestigious acts.

[23]As will be discussed in chapter 4, previous theories of international humiliation have focused on humiliation's emotional impact and the resulting emotional desire for revenge.

as a result of some event that challenges a state's self-concept, such as loss in conflict or the loss of territory. Such events lead other states to question their perception of the humiliated state's prestige because it leads them to assume that other states may be questioning that state's prestige as well. A single, highly visible act which calls into question the belief that states have about others' beliefs about a state's prestige can lead to the development of common knowledge that the humiliated state is less prestigious than had been thought in the past. The humiliated state therefore has an incentive to reassert its prestige in hopes of shaping public perception and counteracting decline. This was the case, as will be shown, for France which suffered a deep humiliation with its loss of Alsace-Lorraine to Prussia after the Franco-Prussian war and which responded to this loss by asserting its prestige on the northern shores of Africa.[24]

Humiliation may also result from more direct challenges by other states, which include instances of more prestigious states blatantly ignoring the interests of others or failing to provide them with sufficient voice and influence within international fora. This behavior on the part of the more prestigious state signals to other states that they should question their beliefs about others' beliefs about how much prestige the humiliated state holds in the international system. The humiliated state, strongly biased against downgrading its own

[24]Chapter 4 argues that such cases of humiliation resulting from the loss of territory have driven a significant amount of territorial expansion in the last 200 years as the humiliated states have sought to shore up their prestige by acquiring new territories.

self-concept, recognizes the social repercussions of being ignored and attempts to exert itself all the more forcefully. This was the case, for example, with Russia prior to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Russian esteem was challenged by the fact that the United States completely ignored Russian statements of opposition to American intervention. Russia felt particularly humiliated in this instance because it thought the fall of the Soviet Union had brought about an increase in Russian esteem. That the Americans treated Russia so brusquely, despite recent heightened cooperation and alliance between the two countries and the supposed enhancement in Russian esteem, led Russia to assert itself more forcefully within the United Nations than it would have otherwise by more strongly voicing its opposition to American intervention at the side of France and Germany.[25]

III. How do states seek prestige?

The previous sections have outlined why states seek prestige and when they will be most likely to do so. This section addresses the ways states go about augmenting their prestige once they decide to do so. Larson and Shevchenko (2010) describe three strategies which states utilize to manage their status: social mobility, social creativity and social competi-

[25]See Ambrosio (2005). As will be shown, Germany felt similarly disrespected when its petition to Britain for to oversee German emigrants in Africa was ignored, leading Bismarck to decide to plant the German flag in East Africa, thereby establishing Germany's first official colony in Africa.

tion.[26] Social mobility involves the imitation of institutions, values, or practices of more prestigious states in the hope of joining their elite ranks. For instance, in the years after World War II Japan sought to join the ranks of "civilized states" by adopting liberal democracy and by condemning the use of military force.[27] Rather than imitating the qualities of the elite, states may also engage in social creativity by emphasizing their own unique achievements in hopes that such achievements will emerge as the basis for new dimensions of status. Social creativity assumes that there are many prestigious qualities which states may possess and that a state may possess more of prestigious quality A than it does of quality B. When states are not able to join the elite ranks through the imitation of others or by creating new measures of prestige, they sometimes seek to outdo more prestigious states in the areas where those superior states dominate. Such social competition may involve competition over spheres of influence, arms racing or military demonstrations.[28] States seeking to challenge the social order will engage in social competition with the aim of shaping others' perceptions of who holds prestige in international society rather than

[26]While Larson and Shevchenko (2010) refers to 'status' rather than prestige, their definition of status, that it is "based on a groups standing on some trait valued by society," is similar to that of prestige used here. Also, status management strategies seek either to maintain existing levels of status or to augment status.

[27]See Larson and Shevchenko (2010).

[28]See Larson and Shevchenko (2010, pp. 71 - 75). For skeptics on the willingness of states to engage in competitions for prestige rather than security, see Lake (2011) and Thompson (2011).

the aim of augmenting their military or economic capabilities.

In practice, it can be difficult to differentiate these strategies within the international system. As Larson and Shevchenko (2010) note, state policies may combine all three. Symbols of prestige, for instance, may be pursued with the intention of emulating the acts of the prestigious in hopes of joining their ranks or with the intention of outdoing and challenging the prestigious by obtaining the good in greater numbers. As will be shown, for instance, the initial move by France to conquer Tunisia, an act which in part initiated the Scramble for Africa, could be considered an act of social mobility. France wanted to rejoin the ranks of the great powers after its humiliation during the Franco-Prussian war and therefore imitated the imperial practices of great powers by acquiring an African colony. Later on in the Scramble, French action in Africa arguably shifted to a strategy of social competition in which they competed for preeminence with Britain over which would be the state that would obtain the largest amount of African territory.

This dissertation focuses primarily on acts of social mobility and social competition in which states seek to join the ranks of the elite or to obtain preeminence amongst the elite. I focus on two forms in which strategies aimed at augmenting prestige can take: the acquisition of symbols of prestige in order to demonstrate valued characteristics and the demonstration of existing influence and prestige.

Demonstrations of Prestigious Characteristics

Prestigious characteristics are those which a majority of a social group believe to be valuable and admirable. Consensus about prestige develops around deeds or characteristics that can distinguish individuals or states in some way. Admirable characteristics within the international community may be economic strength, technological prowess, degree of modernization, cultural innovation, the ability to organize one's citizens, leadership abilities in a multilateral setting or competitive ability. States often signal these admirable characteristics through the acquisition of prestige symbols. A prestige symbol is a good acquired not for its function but for the express purpose of signaling their expectation of elevated prestige and social standing.[29] Prestige may be bestowed on those with possessions which are rare, either because of their expense or because they are finite, or on those who obtain possessions in unmatched quantities or sizes. Symbols of international prestige have included nuclear weapons,[30] conventional weapons such as aircraft carriers or dreadnought battleships,[31] and, as this dissertation demonstrates, territory and colonies.[32] In general,

[29]See Plourde (2008), Etzioni, Gilady (2006), O'Neill (2006) and Larson and Shevchenko (2011).

[30]See Sagan (1996), O'Neill (2006), and Kinsella and Chima (2001).

[31]See Gilady (2006), Art (1973) and Murray (2010) argue that states acquire aircraft carriers and large navies respectively to gain prestige. See also Eyre and Suchman (1996) for the symbolic utility of weapons. For an interesting example of a prestige symbol, see Neiman (1997) on the development of Mayan monoliths erected to demonstrate the ability to organize one's citizens.

[32]Prestige symbols need not always be material goods however. An actor may also be able to exhibit their valued abilities through altruistic acts which contribute to the public good, often at a cost to the

the actions states choose to engage in while seeking prestige will be dictated by the variety of status symbols available in the international system at the time, as well as by the states' capabilities. Provided they have the capability to do so, a state would like to demonstrate their prestige in as many ways as concurrently possible.

International symbols of prestige also often demonstrate power and strength. The influence derived from prestige symbols however is not based in the use or threatened use of power. Prestige symbols may seek to convey the competitive ability of the state. Again, however, the respect associated with such symbols of competitive ability is not derived from the ability to hurt but from the prestige associated with competitive ability. The international community may deem the ability to compete militarily against others as a valuable and prestigious trait worthy of respect, leading states to initiate direct conflict in the pursuit of prestige.[33] Russia, for instance, was primarily motivated in its escalation

signaler, such as the punishment of transgressors within the community or the contribution of goods for public consumption. See Gintis et al. (2001), Smith and Bird (2000), Smith et al. (2003), and Bliege Bird et al. (2001).

[33]Scholars have laid out systemic conditions under which prestige-seeking will be more likely to lead to direct conflict or under which states engage in conflict with the intention of demonstrating their ability to compete effectively, thereby increasing their prestige within certain international environments. **?** focuses on status accommodation of emerging powers, arguing that that peaceful accommodation of status-seeking states will be more likely when the hierarchy has the institutional flexibility to accommodate states in a number of different ways, when the rising state and the dominant power do not consider each other as potential rivals or when they share a potential adversary, and when the rising state is in the early rather

leading up to the Crimean War by a desire to avoid a humiliating decline in prestige at the hands of the Turks.[34] The desire for prestige also apparently guided French action in the Crimean War and the Franco-Prussian War as well.[35] At other periods of international history, however, including the present one, a dominant segment of the international community has decided that direct conflict and the demonstration of competitive ability are not acceptable paths to prestige. Instead, such demonstrations are interpreted as overly aggressive and bullish, even deserving of international condemnation rather than reward.[36]

Just as prestigious characteristics can change over time, the symbols of valued characteristics are also subject to change. During the 1400s, large canons came to symbolize prestige and technological prowess. The competition for the largest and most prestigious canon carried on far past the point of functionality, with the largest canons becoming too heavy to transport to the field of battle.[37] While dreadnought battleships symbolized the peak of modernity and technical prowess at the end of the 19th century, such characteris-

---

than late stages of rise. Kang and Wohlforth (2011) argues that status dilemmas share similar conflict-prone dynamics with security dilemmas, including uncertainty and difficulty signaling status claims.

[34]See Kang and Wohlforth (2011) and Lambert (2011).

[35]On French prestige, see Lambert (2011) and Howard (1990). Swedish escalation in the Great Northern War has been understood in similar terms. See Lebow (2008).

[36]On the shift away from the acceptable use of force, see Florini (1996), Zacher (2001), Holsti (2004), Barkin and Cronin (1994).

[37]As noted in O'Neill (2006, p. 5).

tics have at different times been embodied by aircraft carriers, space programs and nuclear weapons in the period since World War II. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the prestige associated with nuclear weapons also has been called into question. With the emergence of norms against nuclear proliferation, those 'rogue states' which pursue nuclear weapons face sanctioning by the international community.[38]

Throughout much of international history, territorial acquisition was also viewed as prestigious. The ability to acquire territory demonstrated the ability to successfully project influence abroad, an act which required wealth and organizational capacity. Arguably, the prestige associated with colonies peaked with the Scramble for Africa. By the middle of the 20th century, the possession of colonies was no longer in accordance with international societal values. By 1950, those states still in possession of colonies confronted a growing norm of territorial integrity and the increasing likelihood that failure to relinquish their colonies would lead to the diminishment of their status.[39]

While what will be deemed to be prestige symbols will depend on the set of values and norms held by a community, in order to be maximally effective, such symbols should

[38] As will be discussed in chapter 7, prestige in the current era is likely assigned to exertion and leadership within international affairs and organizations. See Ambrosio (2005) on Russian assertiveness within the UN. Also, see the New York Times Editorial "Discord Among Allies," (March 23, 2011) on prestige motivations in the French push towards intervention in Libya.

[39] Crawford (2002). See Brogi (2002) on French resistance to giving up their 'patrimony of prestige' in Africa in the 1950s and 60s.

have some combination of the following properties. They should be exclusive in some way, either as a result of being expensive, being difficult to manufacture, or being in short supply. As will be discussed, in the case that an international race for prestige emerges, exclusivity might also take a superlative form in which states compete to obtain the most of a particular good. Prestige may also accompany being the first to acquire a good or achieve something difficult, an inherently exclusive act. It is also useful that a symbol of status be highly visible and that it attract a large audience, in that way better generating common knowledge amongst observers of the achievement.[40] Also, as O'Neill (2006) notes, it is important that an act designed to signal status have a clearly demarcated line of success or failure, thereby making it easier for others to take note of the achievement.

That symbols of prestige are continually evolving prompts the question of how such symbols form in the first place. Often, the goods are first pursued for their functional utility. If the good is exclusive in some way, once one state has the good, others will covet it because of its exclusivity and will imitate the prestigious by acquiring it.[41] As in the case of international races for prestige like the Scramble for Africa and the Cold War competition for nuclear superiority will show, as more states covet and acquire it, the symbol will often take on an exaggerated form as the competition becomes more about acquiring the most of

[40]See O'Neill (2006) on the importance of visibility. See Gintis et al. (2001, p. 114) on the importance of 'broadcast efficiency' and the ability for a signal to attract a wide audience. See also Eyre and Suchman (1996).

[41]See Veblen (1899), Frank (1985), Frank (1988) and Gilady (2006).

the item or about acquiring the biggest. The competition often leads states to acquire the goods at levels beyond functional utility and often leads to the formation of an endogenous valuation of the item in question.

Many discussions of prestige symbols, including the discussions presented later in this dissertation, focus on goods that come at a cost but are not useful. Veblen's theory of conspicuous consumption, for instance, argues that prestige-seeking individuals will pay a premium for luxury items even though the more luxurious versions provide no additional utility. Louis Vuitton handbags, for instance, which often come at a $1000 premium or more, offer no greater utility for carrying things than do generic handbags. At the international level, states have acquired expensive and highly sophisticated aircraft carriers even when they lack the air force to use them.[42] They have sunk resources into dreadnought battleships even though security would be better served by investing elsewhere.[43] As this dissertation shows, they acquire colonies without resources or strategic value and they add thousands of weapons to strategic arsenals even though 100 weapons would be as militarily effective as 5000. This is not to say however that prestige symbols inherently lack utility. Prestige goods may provide a great deal of utility, as nuclear weapons demonstrate. Goods

[42]See Gilady (2006). For models of conspicuous consumption in anthropology and economics, see Plourde (2008) and Gintis et al. (2001). Handicap models in biology also perceive conspicuous but inefficient and potentially dangerous displays by animals as demonstrations of valued ability. See Grafen (1990) and Hawkes and Bliege Bird (2002).

[43]See Murray (2010).

are prestige goods, however, when states acquire them for what they symbolize to others without regard to their utility. This dissertation focuses on cases of international prestige goods in which no military or strategic explanation can be assigned to their acquisition, cased in which prestige is clearly separable from utility, because these are the easiest in which to truly assess the degree of influence that prestige concerns have on international behavior.

Demonstrations of Prestige and Influence

The direct or indirect demonstration of one's abilities is not, however, the only way that states manage their prestige. States may also shore-up or enhance their prestige by showing that they are able to do things that only influential powers are able to do. It is as Charles De Gaulle once suggested – that prestige not only represents influence, it produces influence.[44] Because prestige is subjective and resides within the second-order beliefs of actors, states can enhance their image in the minds of others if they are able to demonstrate that other states in the international system already perceive them to be prestigious and influential. Doing so may generate common knowledge that the state is being listened to by others and is therefore prestigious, thereby forcing a re-estimation of the state's prestige in the minds of others. States might do this through highly visible demonstrations such as heading multilateral interventions or taking active roles within international organizations. They may engage in actions which demonstrate that they are able to exert themselves in

[44]See Cerny (1980, Ch. 3).

international affairs without being stopped by other powers in the international system. As Chapter 5 will show, the French acquisition of territory in Tunisia in 1881 demonstrated not only France's ability to easily take territory abroad, it also demonstrated that France maintained sufficient influence and prestige to take the territory without being opposed by other powers. That France went unopposed in its Tunisian exploits because of its prestige rather than because of its military power and ability to hurt is evidenced in the statements of British and German leaders which suggest that, in leaving French expansion unopposed, they were simply allowing France its due given its high placement within the social hierarchy.

Prestige, Costs, and Resolve

Just as symbols of prestige may or may not provide utility, they also may or may not involve cost. Models of conspicuous consumption treat prestige goods as costly signals in which an individual's type is conveyed by the size of their investment.[45] Individuals and states often pay costs to demonstrate their prestigious qualities and to distinguish themselves from others who are not able to make such investments. Engaging in colonial expansion, for instance, distinguishes those able to project power abroad from those who are not able

[45]Plourde (2008) presents a model of prestige goods which explicitly treats their acquisition as costly signals of skill level aimed at gaining deference from others. See Lachmann et al. (2001) for a model in which actors are able to signal their quality without paying costs.

to do so or who can only do so at a greater relative cost. Unlike the demonstration of type through costly signals, however, prestige-seeking oftentimes involves emphasizing how easy and relatively costless something is to do rather than how difficult and expensive. While costly signals of resolve require that a state demonstrate the lengths it is willing to go to to defend its interests, to demonstrate the possession of a prestigious quality, it is better to make its demonstration look effortless. Prestige-seeking acts aim at distinguishing one's self from those in lower positions in the hierarchy. They often do little however to distinguish oneself from potential rivals or peers. French action in Tunisia, for instance, distinguished it from the likes of Spain which couldn't at the time manage a large empire abroad. The acquisition of Tunisia however gave Britain little reason to reestimate French power or competitive ability given that the expansion was conducted at a relatively low cost against a relatively weak power.

Prestige-seeking also differs from costly signals of resolve in that demonstrations of resolve often involve conveying to a particular adversary the willingness to engage in a certain action. Prestige-seeking on the other hand is about demonstrating a quality more generally to all states within the international system. The rhetoric surrounding prestige and resolve should therefore reflect these different audiences. In the case of prestige, we would expect leaders' rhetoric to discuss their motivations in terms of a more general audience. With its actions in Tunisia, for instance, France notes that "*Europe* is watching" to see how they will behave, not Germany or Britain in particular. In the case of resolve, statements more

often address motivations in terms of specific rivals.

How does prestige-seeking affect the behavior of others?

The previous section described the conditions under which a state would most likely to pay costs to manage its prestige, regardless of the actions of others. Prestige and influence are however zero-sum goods which means that the actions taken by one state aimed at managing its prestige inherently challenge the existing prestige and influence of other states. We would fully expect therefore that prestige-seeking by one state would directly impact the decision of other states about whether or not to invest in their prestige. The following chapter presents the conditions under which the prestige investments of one state may generate an *international race* for prestige in which states compete for the prestige associated with acquiring the largest quantity or the most advanced version of some prestige good. In such cases, the states involved choose to invest regardless of the material or strategic value of the good they are competing over but because they fear a failure to invest while others are investing will lead to an eventual decline in their position within the social hierarchy.

References

Ambrosio, T. (2005). The Russo–American dispute over the invasion of Iraq: international status and the role of positional goods. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 57(8):1189–1210.

Art, R. J. (1973). *The Influence of Foreign Policy on Seapower: New Weapons and Weltpolitik in Wilhelminian Germany*. Sage Publications.

Ball, S. and Eckel, C. (1996). Buying status: Experimental evidence on status in negotiation. *Psychology and Marketing*, 13(4):381–405.

Ball, S., Eckel, C., Grossman, P., and Zame, W. (2001). Status in markets. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 116(1):161–188.

Barkin, J. S. and Cronin, B. (1994). The state and the nation: changing norms and the rules of sovereignty in international relations. *International Organization*, 48:107–107.

Barkow, J. (1989). *Darwin, Sex, and Status*. University of Toronto Press.

Barkow, J. H., Akiwowo, A. A., Barua, T. K., Chance, M., Chapple, E. D., Chattopadhyay, G. P., Freedman, D. G., Geddes, W., Goswami, B., Isichei, P., et al. (1975). Prestige and culture: A biosocial interpretation [and comments and replies]. *Current Anthropology*, pages 553–572.

Baumeister, R. F., Smart, L., and Boden, J. M. (1996). Relation of threatened egotism to violence and aggression: the dark side of high self-esteem. *Psychological Review*, 103(1):5.

Berger, J., Rosenholtz, S. J., and Zelditch, M. (1980). Status organizing processes. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 6:479–508.

Blau, P. M. (1964). *Exchange and Power in Social Life*. Transaction Publishers.

Bliege Bird, R., Smith, E., and Bird, D. W. (2001). The hunting handicap: costly signaling in human foraging strategies. *Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology*, 50(1):9–19.

Booth, A., Shelley, G., Mazur, A., Tharp, G., and Kittok, R. (1989). Testosterone, and winning and losing in human competition. *Hormones and Behavior*, 23(4):556–571.

Brogi, A. (2002). *A Question of Self-esteem: the United States and the Cold War Choices in France and Italy, 1944-1958*. Praeger Publishers.

Brown, R. and Haeger, G. (1999). Compared to What?: Comparison Choice in an International Context. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 29(1):31–42.

Brunschwig, H. (1966). *French Colonialism, 1871-1914: Myths and Realities*. FA Prager.

Bushman, B. J., Baumeister, R. F., et al. (1998). Threatened egotism, narcissism, self-esteem, and direct and displaced aggression: Does self-love or self-hate lead to violence? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75:219–229.

Cerny, P. G. (1980). *The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (1994). Better than rational: Evolutionary psychology and the invisible hand. *The American Economic Review*, 84(2):327–332.

Crawford, N. (2002). *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention*. Cambridge University Press.

Etzioni, A. International prestige and peaceful competition. *Pre*.

Eyre, D. and Suchman, M. (1996). Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach. In Katzenstein, P. J., editor, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, pages 79–113.

Florini, A. (1996). The evolution of international norms. *International Studies Quarterly*, pages 363–389.

Frank, R. (1985). *Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status*. Oxford University Press.

Frank, R. H. (1988). *Passions Within Reason*. Norton New York.

Galtung, J. (1964). A structural theory of aggression. *Journal of Peace Research*, pages 95–119.

Gilady, L. (2006). *Conspicuous waste in international relations*. PhD thesis, Yale University.

Gintis, H., Smith, E. A., and Bowles, S. (2001). Costly signaling and cooperation. *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 213(1):103–119.

Grafen, A. (1990). Biological signals as handicaps. *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 144(4):517–546.

Greenhill, B. (2008). Recognition and collective identity formation in international politics. *European Journal of International Relations*, 14(2):343–368.

Hawkes, K. and Bliege Bird, R. (2002). Showing off, handicap signaling, and the evolution of men's work. *Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews*, 11(2):58–67.

Henrich, J. (2001). Cultural transmission and the diffusion of innovations: Adoption dynamics indicate that biased cultural transmission is the predominate force in behavioral change. *American Anthropologist*, 103(4):992–1013.

Holmes, J. (2004). Mahan, a place in the sun, and germany's quest for sea power. *Comparative Strategy*, 23(1):27–61.

Holsti, K. (2004). *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Howard, M. (1990). *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871*. Psychology Press.

Huberman, B., Loch, C., and Önçüler, A. (2004). Status as a valued resource. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 67(1):103.

Hunton, J. E., Hall, T. W., and Price, K. H. (1998). The value of voice in participative decision making. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 83(5):788.

Kang, D. and Wohlforth, W. (2011). Status Dilemmas and Inter-State Conflict. Unpublished manuscript.

Kinsella, D. and Chima, J. (2001). Symbols of Statehood: Military Industrialization and Public Discourse in India. *Review of International Studies*, 27(03):353–373.

Lachmann, M., Szamado, S., and Bergstrom, C. T. (2001). Cost and conflict in animal signals and human language. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 98(23):13189–13194.

Lake, D. (2011). Authority, Status, and the End of the American Century. Unpublished manuscript.

Lambert, A. (2011). *The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy Against Russia 1853-6*. Ashgate Publishing.

Larson, D. and Shevchenko, A. (2010). Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy. *International Security*, 34(4):63–95.

Larson, D. and Shevchenko, A. (2011). Managing Rising Power: The Role of Status Concerns.

Lebow, R. (2008). *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*. Cambridge University Press Cambridge, United Kingdom.

Lin, N. (1990). Social Resources and Social Mobility: A Structural Theory of Status Attainment. In Breiger, R. L., editor, *Social Mobility and Social Structure*. Cambridge University Press.

Lind, E. A., Kanfer, R., and Earley, P. C. (1990). Voice, control, and procedural justice: Instrumental and noninstrumental concerns in fairness judgments. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 59(5):952.

Loch, C., Yaziji, M., and Langen, C. (2001). The fight for the alpha position: Channeling status competition in organizations. *European Management Journal*, 19(1):16–25.

Loch, C. H., Huberman, B. A., and Stout, S. (2000). Status competition and performance in work groups. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 43(1):35–55.

Markey, D. (1999). Prestige and the origins of war: Returning to realism's roots. *Security Studies*, 8(4):126–172.

Murray, M. (2010). Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War. *Security Studies*, 19(4):656–688.

Neiman, F. D. (1997). Conspicuous consumption as wasteful advertising: a darwinian perspective on spatial patterns in classic maya terminal monument dates. *Archeological Papers of the American Anthropological Association*, 7(1):267–290.

Oakes, P. J. and Turner, J. C. (1980). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour: Does minimal intergroup discrimination make social identity more positive? *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 10(3):295–301.

O'Neill, B. (2006). Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige. Cowles Foundation, http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d15b/d1560.pdf.

Plourde, A. M. (2008). The origins of prestige goods as honest signals of skill and knowledge. *Human Nature*, 19(4):374–388.

Pouliot, V. (2011). Setting Status in Stone: The Negotiation of International Institutional Privileges. Unpublished manuscript.

Raleigh, M. and McGuire, M. (1994). Serotonin, aggression, and violence in vervet monkeys. In Masters, R. D. and McGuire, M. T., editors, *The Neurotransmitter Revolution: Serotonin, Social Behavior and the Law*.

Ridgeway, C. L., Boyle, E. H., Kuipers, K. J., and Robinson, D. T. (1998). How do status beliefs develop? the role of resources and interactional experience. *American Sociological Review*, pages 331–350.

Ringmar, E. (1996). On the ontological status of the state. *European Journal of International Relations*, 2(4):439–466.

Robson, A. J. (1992). Status, the distribution of wealth, private and social attitudes to risk. *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, pages 837–857.

Runciman, W. (1998). The selectionist paradigm and its implications for sociology. *Sociology*, 32(1):163.

Sagan, S. (1996). Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb. *International Security*, 21(3):54–86.

Schweller, R. (1999). Realism and the present great power system. In Kapstein, E. and Mastanduno, M., editors, *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War*. Columbia University Press.

Smith, E. A., Bird, R. B., and Bird, D. W. (2003). The benefits of costly signaling: Meriam turtle hunters. *Behavioral Ecology*, 14(1):116–126.

Smith, E. A. and Bird, R. L. B. (2000). Turtle hunting and tombstone opening: public generosity as costly signaling. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 21(4):245–261.

Tajfel, H. (2010). *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*. Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, H. and Turner, J. C. (2004). The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior.

Thompson, W. (2011). Status Conflict, Polarity, and Hierarchies.

Thye, S. R. (2000). A status value theory of power in exchange relations. *American Sociological Review*, pages 407–432.

Toch, H. (1969). Violent men: an inquiry into the psychology of violence revised edition. *American Psychological Association*.

Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. (1990). The past explains the present: Emotional adaptations and the structure of ancestral environments. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 11(4):375–424.

Turner, J. C. (1978). Social categorization and social discrimination in the minimal group paradigm. In *Differentiation Between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, pages 101–140. Academic Press London.

Van den Bos, K. (1999). What are we talking about when we talk about no-voice procedures? on the psychology of the fair outcome effect. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 35(6):560–577.

Van der Veen, A. M. (2000). *Ideas and interests in foreign policy: the politics of official development assistance*. PhD thesis, Harvard University.

Veblen, T. (1899). *The Theory of the Leisure Class: 1899*. AM Kelley, bookseller.

Wallace, M. (1971). Power, status, and international war. *Journal of Peace Research*, pages 23–35.

Wendt, A. (2003). Why a world state is inevitable. *European Journal of International Relations*, 9(4):491–542.

Willer, R. (2009). Groups reward individual sacrifice: The status solution to the collective action problem. *American Sociological Review*, 74(1):23–43.

Wohlforth, W. (2009). Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War. *World Politics*, 61(01):28–57.

Zacher, M. (2001). The territorial integrity norm: International boundaries and the use of force. *International Organization*, 55(2):215–250.

Chapter Three:

The Systemic Effects of Prestige-Seeking

The objective of this chapter is to present the beginnings of a theoretical framework which move us towards a formal description of when and how prestige changes hands and when prestige competitions emerge in the intentional system. Chapter 2 discussed the individual motivations for prestige seeking, arguing that individual states are more likely to seek prestige when they have experienced an international humiliation which threatens their existing prestige. This chapter addresses the systemic factors that influence state decisions to invest in their prestige. It argues that state incentives to invest in prestige increase with the amount that other states are investing. In some cases, the prestige investment of one state will emerge into an international race for prestige. In other cases, this is less likely to be so. This chapter begins to lay out the conditions under which such races might arise. It also discusses the conditions under which states will be more likely to pay attention to socially constructed hierarchies rather than international hierarchies based in relative military power.

The models presented in this chapter present the following arguments. First, states are in part willing to participate in socially derived hierarchies based on prestige because these hierarchies provide a more cost-efficient mechanism of resolving who has influence in the international system than does allocating international influence based on uncertain

and potentially costly estimations of military capabilities and resolve. Participation here refers to the willingness to defer to others that have higher relative prestige. Second, states are willing to participate in prestige hierarchies when the costs of conflict are sufficiently low that states will risk making high demands of others and thereby risk conflict and its costs. In these cases, states prefer to accept international outcomes based in relative prestige and will be willing to do so even if a successful prestige strategy involves paying costs to engage in prestige competition with others. Additionally, a population dominated by states willing to participate in prestige hierarchies is relatively stable against strategies which involve threatening or coercing others in order to obtain more favorable international outcomes.

If we assume that international outcomes depend on the relative prestige of those states interacting, then the marginal benefit of a constant increase in prestige decreases with prestige. This implies that states have differential incentives to invest in developing their prestige depending on their current level of prestige relative to others in the system. Those states with lower relative prestige will receive a larger marginal benefit from investing than will those at higher levels of prestige, suggesting that those states at the top of the hierarchy have the least incentive to invest until a sufficient number of others have invested that their position in the hierarchy is challenged. States that have experienced a recent possible decline in their prestige will also have more incentive to invest in their prestige than they would have otherwise.

Finally, if we assume that influence in the international system is based in part on relative prestige and that states are interested in maintaining or growing their current level of influence, then the decision of states to invest in developing their prestige depends to a great deal on whether or not other states in the system are investing in prestige. The investments of all other states however do not affect an individual state's incentive to invest equally. Whether or not the prestige investments of those seeking to augment their prestige will develop into an international race for prestige in which states make prestige investments in the hope of acquiring the most of some prestige good depends on the relative level of prestige of the investing state. The closer an investing state's position within the social hierarchy, assuming the investing state has less prestige, the more incentive a state will have to match its investing. States may be willing to invest in prestige races over items or issues they have little material or security interest in at an immediate cost to themselves when enough others are investing in the competition. In this way, the value of the race is endogenous to the competition – it depends on the amount that other states are investing rather than on the inherent value of the goods or issues being competed over.[1]

[1]This logic is similar in part to that of the security dilemma which argues that states' decision to invest in arming will depend on the investments of others. In order to maintain security, states will have an incentive to match or best the military investments of others. The ways that the dynamics of prestige competitions are similar and different to the logic of the security dilemma however is discussed in further detail below.

Methods

To develop and illustrate the logic of prestige and prestige races, I rely on a mixture of formal logic and agent-based simulations which include a role for social learning as well as rational calculations. In addition to looking at how prestige functions within static populations, I employ tools from evolutionary game theory to explore how the strategies employed within the population change over time as a function of states learning from the recent experiences of others. This is a fitting approach to the study of issues of prestige and prestige for both substantive and methodological reasons. Substantively, I am interested in explaining shifts in the distribution of international influence as a result of shifts in prestige hierarchies. Influence is zero-sum – there is only so much to go around. Thus, we would expect the incentives of states to invest in their influence and to defer to the influence of others to depend significantly on how the distribution of influence changes over time. Understanding how this distribution changes, a primary focus of evolutionary approaches, is important if we are to understand why certain periods of international history are dominated by competitions for prestige such as the Scramble for Africa while other periods are not. In order to explain this, we need to explain the differential incentives of states to invest in their prestige over time and why certain behaviors become dominant at certain times. Also, prestige is a social construct; what is deemed to be prestigious changes over time as a function of beliefs and ideas that shift as a result of social cues. Thus, it makes sense to study it in the context of strategies that evolve through a process

of social learning from others.

There are also methodological benefits to the multi-method approach employed here. First, with the agent-based approach, I can allow the state of the system to evolve in more complicated ways than would be possible using more technical dynamic rationalist approaches while at the same time allowing for agents to use reasonable decision rules.[2] Second, evolutionary game theory provides a means of studying the evolution of behaviors as a function of what others in the system are doing. It allows for the composition of players in the system to change over time and allows for the relaxation of the demanding rationality assumptions.[3] Behaviors within this approach are understood as "phenotypes" or "strategies" that describe what an actor will do in any situation that may arise; actors are not required to think or make sophisticated calculations about how to play the game. Instead, players acquire strategies through adaptive processes such as social learning and imitation which result in the selection of more successful strategies.[4]

[2]For examples of the agent-based approach within international relations, see Axelrod (1997), Cederman and Gleditsch (2004), Cederman (2002), Epstein (2011).

[3]For early discussion of evolutionary game theory within biology, see Maynard Smith (1982) and Smith (1984). For excellent general descriptions of the application of evolutionary game theory within economics, see Gintis (2000), Bowles (2009, Chapters 2 and 11). For a discussion of evolutionary models and evolutionary game theory within international relations, see Kahler (1999). As Kahler states, evolutionary game theory provides "a promising avenue for melding realistic reasoning assumptions, strategic choice, and a dynamic provided by selective pressures acting on populations of actors." See Kahler (1999, p.181).

[4]See Kahler (1999, pp.177-181) for more on the benefits to evolutionary game theory over strategic

In the models below, states pursue strategies which lead them to behave differently depending on the type of player they are interacting with. Those states playing conflict strategies, as will be described, engage in rational calculations that determine what kind of demands they want to make on others, given the probability that they will end up in conflict if their demands are too high. Those players pursuing prestige strategies also engage in calculations about whether or not it is optimal for them to invest in attempts to boost their prestige. The dynamic versions of the models then incorporate a process of social learning through which the distribution of strategies evolves over time.[5] By social learning, it is meant that individuals adopt strategies once they receive empirical evidence from past rounds of play of its relative success over their current strategy.[6] Thus, they

choice.

[5]Waltz (1979) acknowledges a role for systemic and institutional change through both competition and through 'socialization,' by which he appears to mean a process of social learning. Wendt (1999) argues that cultural selection through imitation and social learning play a greater role in contemporary social and international change than does natural selection, or the selecting out of weaker strategies through conflict and state death. Modelski (1990) argues that world politics has been a process of evolutionary learning. By evolutionary learning, he means that the international system itself learns through a macro-historical evolutionary process of natural selection followed by periods of innovation, the more useful of which are passed down to later generations.

[6]Definitions of social learning differ among scholars. This definition is closest to that of Peyton H. Young, who defines social learning as imitation based on sufficient evidence by early adopters that the trait is worth adopting and thus restricts the focus to imitation based on payoff-relevant information. See

are making decisions based on recent events and payoffs in previous rounds rather than optimizing given their expectations about future play. This distinguishes the approach from both rational choice approaches and from other mechanisms of cultural evolution such as individual learning, in which each behavioral trait is learned independently by individuals and are not passed on to the next generation, and conformism and imitation, both of which rely on exposure to strategic types.[7]

The use of social learning as an adaptive mechanism within international behavior is justifiable on a number of grounds. States exist in a noisy international environment. It is difficult to assess the state of the environment accurately enough to make calculations that represent every possible future distribution of types and then act optimally. In the models below, in which power and prestige are distributed across the population and in which power and prestige change from round to round, optimizing best-response calculations would require states to assess the incentives of every state in the system to alter their strategy given their different levels of relative power and prestige in each period and given who they were most likely to interact with.[8] Such calculations come at tremendous cost, the expense

Young (2009).

[7]A large formal literature explores the relative role that different processes of cultural evolution play in the diffusion of innovations and social institutions. See Boyd and Richerson (1988), Henrich and Boyd (1998), Henrich (2001), Young (2006), among others.

[8]Empirical evidence indicates that individuals learn from the recent experiences of others and that individuals do better off in noisy environments when they take cues from the experiences of others. See

of which would be jeopardized if all other states in the system failed to act according to their best response. Instead, it makes sense that states look to the recent strategies that others have employed and the related payoffs they have received and then draw conclusions about what strategies led to varying levels of success. A substantial literature in international relations has also established the important role that social learning has played in the international diffusion of political institutions and traits.[9]

This chapter will proceed with a presentation of three sets of models. The first set of models builds upon a baseline simulation of players pursuing either a conflict strategy, in which states rationally calculate their optimal demands and responses given uncertain power distributions in the population, or a prestige strategy in which outcomes are settled according to relative social influence. The second set of models assesses state incentives to invest in their prestige at an immediate cost to their security and material interests. The third set of models combines the baseline interaction model and the prestige investment model and analyzes the conditions under which prestige strategies are stable within shifting environmental contexts. Given the common criticism that the results of agent-based approaches are too complicated and potentially too stochastic to parse, the models presented

Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Rendell et al. (2010).

[9]See Cederman (2001). Cederman and Gleditsch (2004) uses an agent-based model to demonstrate that both natural and social learning play in the diffusion of democratization. Simmons et al. (2006), Simmons et al. (2007) and Fordham and Asal (2007) have looked at the role of adaptive mechanisms and social learning in the diffusion of liberal economic and political institutions.

here are intended to be cumulative to make clear the important underlying mechanisms that are driving the results at each stage.

Models of Prestige

Model Ia: Prestige and Conflict Hierarchies

I start by presenting a base model of influence allocation in the international system in which their is no updating. The model enables the comparison of two allocation strategies, one of which distributes influence in the international system according to prestige hierarchies and the other of which allocates influence according to power hierarchies.[10] The results of the model establish the conditions under which a 'non-rational' prestige strategy, in which states simply agree to divide influence based on their relative prestige,[11] outperforms a rational security maximizing strategy in which states optimize based on their knowledge of the distribution of power in the system and the costs of conflict. I assume that states are uncertain in their knowledge regarding the underlying distribution of power in the system. Because prestige is rooted in the common knowledge of the international community and arises through the subjective measurements of others about which actors possess characteristics worthy of respect and deference, I assume that states are able to

[10]'Power' here and in the rest of the chapter will refer to relative military power.

[11]That this would be a realistic strategy for states to pursue is justified by the definition of prestige. By definition, bestowing prestige or prestige upon others involves giving deference and influence to those actors that the group believes possess desirable characteristics.

know their place within the prestige hierarchy with greater certainty than they know how exactly they would fare in power competitions with others.[12]

In this baseline simulation of the model, states play one of two strategies – a conflict strategy or a prestige strategy – in their effort to divide a one-unit good.[13] In each time period, one state of each strategic type is randomly selected to initiate an interaction with another state chosen at random. In all cases, the initiating state is referred to as state A and the responding state as state B. All players possess a level of military capability p_i which is distributed uniformly between (0, 1] at the beginning of the game and which consists of some observable level of power π_i and some unobservable quantity of power $\epsilon_i \in (0, \overline{\epsilon}_i)$. All states also possess some amount of prestige s_i which is common knowledge among all players and which is initially distributed uniformly between (0, 1] and independently of p_i. If both state A and state B are prestige players, they agree to divide the one-unit good according to their relative prestige, which is known by both parties. The outcome of this prestige interaction therefore is that state A obtains $\frac{s_A}{s_A + s_B}$ while state B obtains

[12]Scholars have certainly argued that uncertainty about prestige or the lack of prestige recognition can lead to conflict. Kang and Wohlforth (2011) argue that status dilemmas similar to security dilemmas develop because of uncertainty about relative status. Inconsistencies about status may of course develop. I argue simply that states have greater, not perfect, knowledge of their prestige relative to others than do of their relative power. This is discussed in greater detail below.

[13]All simulations presented in this chapter were implemented using Netlogo 5.03. See http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/.

$\frac{s_B}{s_A + s_B}$. The payoff associated with this prestige outcome may be more or less than the outcome the responding state could achieve by fighting.

If either state A or state B are conflict actors, each round of the game has two stages. In the first, state A makes either a high or low demand $x \in (\underline{x}, \overline{x})$. State B then chooses to accept the demand or to fight. State A's power p_A is known by both parties. State B knows its own power, but state A knows only B's observable level of power π_B and not whether state B is π_B or $\pi_B + \overline{\epsilon}_B$. State B will fight whenever it is of type $\overline{\epsilon}$ and the initiator has made a high demand $\overline{x}$. Each state pays a cost of conflict c if fighting ensues. Otherwise, if a low demand is made or if state B is a low type and a high demand is made, it will accept the division of the good as outlined below.

Even a low power type of state B, with $\epsilon = 0$, will choose to fight a demand $\overline{x}$ if what it can get from acceding to the demand $(1 - \overline{x})$ is less than it thinks it can get from fighting, or if:

$$\left[\frac{\pi_B}{\pi_B + p_A}\right] - c > 1 - \overline{x}$$

This value of x sets the upper bound for what state A can offer without experiencing conflict. Both high and low power types of state B will fight any demand greater than $\overline{x}$ so state A has no incentive to make any greater demand. The largest demand state A can therefore make without a fight from state B is:

$$\overline{x} = 1 + c - \left[\frac{\pi_B}{\pi_B + p_A}\right]$$

The lower bound on the demand that state A can make is set by the point at which a high power type of state B will be indifferent between fighting and accepting the demand $(1 - \underline{x})$, defined by:

$$\underline{x} = 1 + c - \left[\frac{\pi_B + \overline{\epsilon}_B}{\pi_B + \overline{\epsilon}_B + p_A}\right]$$

While state A does not know the type of state B, it does know the distribution of high power type in the system. Let q be the probability that $\epsilon = \overline{\epsilon}_B$ and $1 - q$ be the probability that $\epsilon = 0$. State A will make demand $\overline{x}$ when $EU(A|\overline{x}) > EU(A|\underline{x})$. Thus, when:

$$q\left(\frac{p_A}{\pi_B + \overline{\epsilon}_B + p_A} - c\right) + (1 - q)\left(1 + c - \left[\frac{\pi_B}{\pi_B + p_A}\right]\right) > 1 + c - \left[\frac{\pi_B + \overline{\epsilon}_B}{\pi_B + \overline{\epsilon}_B + p_A}\right]$$

State A will therefore be willing to make demand $\overline{x}$ when:

$$q < \frac{p_A(\overline{\epsilon}_B - \underline{\epsilon}_B)}{2c(\overline{\epsilon}_B + p_A + \pi_B)(p_A + \underline{\epsilon}_B + p_A)}$$

Each simulation of the model was run for 100 time periods, involving two hundred interactions between players. This baseline model was simulated 500 times for each set of model parameters, including varying values of the c, q and $\underline{\epsilon}$ and $\overline{\epsilon}$. The baseline version of this model does not include an evolutionary component. Cumulative payoffs were recorded for each player over the course of each run. The average payoffs of each strategic type were then calculated at the end of each run.

Results

In the first round of simulations, the frequency of conflict and prestige players in the population was 50%. Figure 1 below illustrates the average cumulative payoffs for states

Figure 1: Average Payoffs by Strategic Type with 50% Conflict, 50% Prestige



employing the conflict strategy and states employing the prestige strategy as a function of the costs of conflict c in the graph on the left and the probability of high power types in the system q on the right.[14] In no parameterization of the model did the average payoff of the conflict strategy exceed that of the average prestige payoff. We see that states receive the greatest relative benefit from playing a prestige strategy when the costs of conflict or the probability of high power types in the system are relatively low.[15] In these cases, either the potential costs of conflict or the likelihood of ending up in conflict are low, making it more likely that state A will risk making a high demand of state B that might lead to conflict if state B is a high power type. Once the costs of conflict or the probability

[14]For these simulations, $\bar{\epsilon}_B = .2$ and $\underline{\epsilon} = -.2$.

[15]The differences between average conflict and average prestige payoffs become only more pronounced when additional time periods were added to the model.

of meeting a high power type player increases above .7, states are no longer willing to risk making a high demand because of the high likelihood and the high costs of potential conflict; in these cases, the frequency of conflict in the international system drops to zero. The effect of varying the values of $\underline{\epsilon}$ and $\overline{\epsilon}$ had a similar impact on average conflict payoffs, with states playing the conflict strategy becoming increasingly unwilling to risk conflict by making a high demand as the potential range of military capability for player B increased.[16]

Model 1b: Evolutionary Dynamics of Prestige Strategies

In addition to understanding how prestige strategies perform within static populations, we are also interested in the likelihood that prestige strategies are able to emerge and spread within a population dominated by conflict players. In order to develop an understanding of how the distribution of strategies in the population changes over time as a function of the costs of conflict and the initial distributions of strategic types in the system, a learning stage was added to the Model 1a. At the end of each round, one player is selected to assess the relative fitness of its strategy in light of payoffs received in recent interactions by both conflict and prestige players. The state adopts the strategy which has produced the highest

[16]To test model robustness, power and prestige were both assigned at the beginning of the game using an exponential distribution of power and prestige, a potentially more realistic capture of how these variables are distributed among states in any given time period. The results were not substantively altered by this change in distribution.

Figure 2: Convergence by Strategy, Varying Initial Frequencies



average payoff over the last 10 rounds of play for each strategic type.[17] All other aspects of the model, including the rules of state interactions and payoff updating remain as in the model described above.

Five hundred trials of this dynamic model were run for 500 time periods at various parameterizations and with different initial distributions of strategies in the population. In all trials of the model, the population converged to either all prestige players or all conflict players. The percentage of trials that converged to each strategic type given different initial frequencies of the two strategies in the population is illustrated in Figure 2. The graph shows the frequency of convergence to each strategy within each set of 500 trials as a

[17]States only update their type when there are at least 3 data points representing recent payoffs for both strategic types. Otherwise, they maintain their existing strategy.

function of varying the initial frequency of prestige players in the population from .05 to .9 and with the costs of conflict at .1 and the probability that a conflict player would be a high power type at .4.[18] We see that the population converged to all prestige players 40% of the time when the initial population of prestige types in the system was only 5%. As the initial population increases, so does the frequency with which the system converges to all prestige types. Populations initially consisting of 90% of prestige players converged to all prestige players roughly 75% of the time, suggesting that it is relatively less likely that conflict players are successfully able to invade a population of prestige players than the reverse.

While each run of the model leads to the convergence of one of the two strategic types in this model, these figures also illustrate a notable amount of variability in the outcomes for each set of variable values. If playing a prestige strategy advantages players at a certain set of parameters, why would the system converge to prestige in only a fraction of the trials? The variation is in part a result of path dependence within each run of the model. When prestige players, for instance, are infrequently represented in the initial population, they are initially chosen to interact less frequently with other prestige players and therefore receive fewer advantageous prestige payoffs.

Variability also depends, however, on the initial distribution of power of the actors playing each strategic type. While power and prestige are distributed uniformly and ran-

[18] Again, the values of $\bar{\epsilon}$ and $\underline{\epsilon}$ were held at .2 and -.2 respectively.

domly, there can be significant difference in the average power and the range of power among those playing a strategy that is initially represented by only a small fraction within the population and these differences can impact the rates of convergence in each run of the model. Logistic regression analysis was performed to assess the correlation between initial distributions of both prestige and power in the initial population as well as the the largest individual measures of power and prestige in the system with the likelihood that the system converges to conflict or prestige outcomes. The analysis shows a statistically and substantively significant relationship between the difference in average power among the initial conflict players and the average of power of the prestige players. Though power is distributed randomly in the population, power is often not distributed randomly between the two types when the initial population of either type is very small. Increasing the difference between the initial average power of conflict players and that of prestige players increases the odds of the system converging to the conflict strategy eight-fold ($p = .015$). The initial differences in the average prestige of both strategic types does not significantly correlate however with the likelihood of convergence onto either strategic type.

Model 1c: The Effect of Connectivity

The dynamic model above assumes that all players have an equal chance of interacting with all others in any round, regardless of their strategic type. We can easily imagine however that those playing prestige strategies would be more likely to interact with other

prestige players than they would be to interact with conflict players; we can also imagine that these varying rates of interaction might impact how often a prestige strategy is able to successfully invade a population of conflict types.[19] In order to assess the impact of the degree of connectivity on the rates of convergence to each strategic type, links between players that evolved over the course of each trial were added to the dynamic model above. States are able to interact only with other states with whom they are linked. In all time periods and in all runs, all players of each strategic type were connected to all other players of their strategic type. Each prestige player was also then linked to a fraction x of the total number of conflict players in any given time period. This degree of connectivity across strategic type was varied from 0 to 1 within an initial population of 10% prestige players in the population. The model was again run for 500 trials for each set of parameters, with costs of conflict of .1 and the probability of high power types at .3. The results are presented in Figure 3.

We see that prestige players are more easily able to invade conflict populations as the probability that they are paired with other prestige players increases. They are best able

[19]This increase in interaction could be understood as stemming from the greater likelihood of forming alliances with like strategic types and then engaging in joint ventures that require coordination. It could also be possible that prestige players prefer to engage more with other prestige players because of the relative advantages of doing so or that states of like type are more likely to be geographically proximate to like types who they interact with more. See Fordham and Asal (2007) and Cederman and Gleditsch (2004).

Figure 3: Convergence by Strategy, Varying Connectivity



to invade a population of conflict players when they interact only amongst themselves. In this case, when the degree of connectivity is 0, the prestige strategy successfully invades a population dominated by 90% of conflict players in 100% of trials. As the number of links with conflict players increases and with it the probability that prestige players and conflict players will interact increases, the likelihood of prestige convergence decreases.mThe case in which the degree of connectivity is 1 equates to the model 1b above in which all states have connections to all others and in this case, as above, the system converges to prestige strategies in roughly 40% of the trials.

Discussion of Model I

These baseline models have shown the conditions under which the non-optimizing strategy of allowing outcomes to be settled by relative prestige outperforms conflict strategies in

which states optimize their payoffs given their knowledge about the costs of conflict and the distribution of high or low power types in the system. The outcomes settled on within each interaction can be thought of as the division of an actual good or as a measure of the relative influence of the two interacting states. As described in chapter 2, influence can be arrived at through the threat or use of coercion or can be acquired through the possession of characteristics that enough states in the international system collectively deem to be valuable and prestigious enough that they merit respect. These models have shown that states which allow relative prestige to decide relative influence often outperform states that rely purely on coercion or the threat thereof to decide relative influence. This is despite the fact that states adhering to relative prestige hierarchies often forego benefits they could obtain from making high demands of others and despite the fact that prestige and power in this model are distributed independently. Prestige hierarchies and the hierarchy of military capabilities are often correlated of course. The current model however shows that states can do better by allowing hierarchies that have nothing at all to do with the underlying structure of power and military capabilities but which rely on socially constructed hierarchies to dictate outcomes.

The intuition of this model rests on the uncertainty involved in direct conflict. Given that prestige is a subjective measure rooted in the second-order beliefs of a social grouping, prestige hierarchies, by definition, entail less uncertainty than do power hierarchies which can only be established for certain through direct conflict between players. This is not

to say there might not be competing notions of the prestige hierarchy. Some states may believe that they have been judged too low within the prestige hierarchy and may wish to contest their rank. But the rank should be more or less known by all.[20] Of course, one could say that there would be relatively high agreement on rankings of relative power as well. But, unless observers have witnessed the frequent use of power and the outcomes of direct conflict, these rankings can only be based on assessments of other factors and not actually on how well states would do in direct confrontation. While military investment or GNP may correlate strongly with military capability, a significant amount of uncertainty in conflict outcomes resides in unobservable factors such as relative resolve and the efficacy of military organization and decision-making.

The dynamic models provide insight into when prestige-based outcomes are most likely to invade and become dominant within the international system. As the prestige model suggests, this is most likely to occur when conflict states are most likely to end up fighting and paying the costs. In the case of this model, this happens when the costs of conflict are low enough such that states risk making high demands which could lead to costly conflict. Once the costs or certainty of conflict becomes too high, states will never engage in conflict because they will never make risky demands. If prestige states are able to control who they interact with or if geographic proximity for instance acts as a constraint on the types of

[20] Alcock and Newcombe (1970) presents a survey of individuals asked to rank states according to their prestige. They find a high degree of consistency amongst these rankings.

other players they interact with, prestige players are able to do exceptionally well and to easily take over a population. Additionally, a population of prestige players is relatively stable, with conflict players rarely able to successfully invade a population of prestige players when they have few cross-strategy interactions.

Model 2: Prestige Investments

The set of models above looked at the conditions under which allocating influence in accordance with prestige hierarchies provided an advantage over settling influence hierarchies through the threat of force and coercion. We now turn to the conditions under which states have an incentive to pay costs to invest in their prestige. This model builds on the baseline model described above, but allows for states playing prestige strategies to augment their absolute prestige over time through investments in prestige goods.

The first version of this model presents a pared down assessment of when actors in a population of all prestige players will choose to pay costs given that their interactions result in the payoffs described in Model 1 above - each state obtains a share of a one-unit good in proportion to their relative prestige within the interacting dyad. States are chosen to interact randomly in each time period. Unlike in the model above, however, prestige is allowed to accrue over the course of the trial. Prior to the interaction in each round, all states in the population participate in an investment round in which they make a calculation about whether or not to invest in prestige. This calculation is made by

comparing the payoff they would get in an interaction with a player of average prestige in this round if they invest in their prestige versus what they would get if they do not choose to invest. Their expectation about the average prestige outcome in the current round is based on the distribution of prestige in the system in the last round of the game. The cost of a prestige investment is the same for all players and is subtracted from a state's cumulative payoffs when a state chooses to invest. The model assumes that the boost that each state gets from a prestige investment is the same for all players in each round and is a proportion of the average amount of prestige in the system. The prestige boost exists in the range from $[0, \frac{1}{x} * \text{total-prestige}]$ with $x \in (0, 1]$.[21]

The model was run for 500 trials with a fixed population of 10 prestige actors and at varying values of the cost of prestige investment. We can think of this small population as the group of states in the international system who are competing for elite prestige or who are competing for access into the great power club. The total number of prestige investors in each time period was calculated and the results are reported in Figure 4. Four patterns of prestige investment emerge as a function of different costs of prestige investment. The graph on the left in Figure 4 illustrates these patterns; the graph on the right provides information about the relative prestige of the states choosing to invest in a

[21]The range of costs of investment which impacted outcomes was dependent on the value of x and the prestige boost received from an investment. The four patterns described below were maintained for all values of prestige boost with differing ranges of cost.

Figure 4: Prestige Investments Over Time



given time period. Specifically, it shows the average prestige of prestige investors relative to the average prestige of non-investors in each time period.

In the graph on the left, we see with the dark blue line that when the cost of investment is relatively low, all states will have an incentive to invest in prestige in every time period.[22] The red line shows on the left illustrates a medium cost range when not all prestige players have an incentive to invest in every round, instead with only a few investing at first and the number increasing over time until all states eventually become investors. A slightly higher range of costs of investment produce yet another unique investment pattern. In the case of 'medium-high' costs as represented by the light blue line, we see that the number of investors

[22]As an example, in the case that the boost provided by a prestige investment was .01 * total-prestige, all states chose to invest when costs were between $[0, .03]$. Medium costs in this example are between $(.03, .06]$. Medium-high costs are between $(.06, .1]$ and high costs between $(.1, .4)$.

rises to its peak in the first round and then declines over time, eventually resulting in an alternative pattern in which a fluctuating fraction of states invest in prestige. Finally, when the costs of investment are in the high range, we see, as demonstrated by the purple line on the left, that fewer actors invest, again the lowest prestige states in the system, thereby increasing the average prestige of the population and decreasing the range of the distribution of prestige. When costs are high, however, this increase in average prestige is not sufficient to incentivize states with higher prestige to pay the costs for prestige investments. Once the lower prestige states have decreased the range of the prestige distribution a sufficient amount through their initial prestige investments, no states have any further incentive to invest.

The graph on the right shows the average prestige of those states choosing to invest relative to the prestige of non-investors in the system over 10 time periods. The red line shows the average relative prestige of investors when the costs of prestige investment are in the medium range. The line shows that the states making investments in early rounds are those with the lowest prestige in the population. The effect on a state's relative prestige of a boost in prestige depends on the state's existing levels of prestige relative to others. Thus, low prestige states receive the greatest marginal benefit from a prestige boost. Early investments by these low prestige states increase the incentive for higher prestige states to invest over time as their relative prestige declines in relation to the average prestige in the population. We see that the player with the highest prestige has the least incentive to

invest, choosing to invest in prestige only after those with lower prestige have invested and have thereby caused a decline in the largest state's relative prestige. When the costs of investment are sufficiently low, all states have an incentive to continue investing indefinitely.

The light blue on the right shows the average relative prestige of investors when costs of investment are higher. Again, it is the low prestige states that have an incentive to make early investments, even when few others are investing. As the low prestige states invest, the average prestige in the system increases and the range of the prestige distribution decreases, with those higher prestige players maintain their absolute prestige positions. As the range of prestige narrows, two groups form, with their prestige grouped at opposite ends of this prestige range. These two groups then alternate in making prestige investment indefinitely, with the prestige investment of the lower prestige group increasing their prestige above that of the non-investing group and giving the now-lower prestige group incentive to invest.

Result: Incentives to Invest

It can also be demonstrated formally that a state with lower prestige will be more willing to pay a cost to invest in prestige than will a different higher prestige state or the same state with higher prestige. To show this, we find the cut point of the cost of investment, c^*, at which states are indifferent between investing in prestige and not investing. If we assume that costs of investment can vary, then we can show that a cut point exists above which states will choose not to invest. Let $b \in [0, \infty)$ be the boost player's receive to their prestige

when making an investment. Assume an n-player population in which the prestige of others is represented by x_i and a given player's prestige is represented by s, where the prestige of all players is greater than zero. A player then in expectation receives the following utility in interactions with prestige players when making an investment in their own prestige:

$$EU(Inv.) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[\left(\frac{s+b}{s+b+x_i} \right) - c * n \right]$$

A player will be indifferent between investing and not investing when the cost of investing is:

$$\mathrm{c}^* = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[\frac{1}{n} \left(\frac{s+b}{s+b+x_i} \right) \right] - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[\frac{1}{n} \left(\frac{s}{s+x_i} \right) \right]$$

Taking the derivative of the cost of investment with respect to prestige, we get:

$$\frac{dc^*}{ds} = \frac{1}{n^2} * \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[\frac{1}{s+b+x_i} - \frac{s+b}{(s+b+x_i)^2} - \frac{1}{s+x_i} + \frac{s}{(s+x_i)^2} \right]$$

This equation simplifies to:

$$\frac{1}{n^2} * \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[\frac{x_i}{(s+b+x_i)^2} - \frac{x_i}{(s+x_i)^2} \right]$$

We see that the sign of the derivative is negative and therefore that the value of investment costs at which states will be indifferent between investing in prestige and not investing in prestige will decrease as prestige increases. This result indicates that when a state loses prestige, its cut point will move to the left, meaning that the state will be willing to spend more to get a boost in its prestige than a state with relatively high prestige or than the same state with higher prestige in a previous round.

Discussion of Model II

This model illustrates two key points about how prestige may function in the international system. First, it provides insight into which states will be the most likely to invest in prestige. Those states with relatively lower prestige than others within a reference group will have a greater incentive to invest in boosting their prestige than do those states at the top of the hierarchy who are most interested in preserving the prestige quo at the lowest cost to themselves. The model also illustrates that states who lose prestige will have a greater incentive to invest. As discussed in chapter 2, such a decline in prestige may result from an external shock which calls a state's prestige and influence into question. An external shock might be experiencing a humiliating event that causes one's prestige to be questioned in the eyes of others. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, the loss of territory is an example of an international humiliation which calls states' prestige into question. Chapter 4 provides statistical evidence that such incidents make states more likely engage in prestige-seeking behavior than states whose prestige has not suffered a decline.

The second key point which the model demonstrates are the conditions under which prestige investments by a single actor are likely to escalate into competitions for prestige in which the valuation of the item being competed over is determined by beliefs about how much others want it rather than by an individual's valuation of the item itself. As the model shows, as one state's prestige increases, the relative prestige of other states declines. This increases the incentive of states confronted with a relative decline in prestige to match

the prestige investments of the initial investors with their own. Thus, the decision to invest or not is dependent on the investment decisions of others. As the number of investors increases, the average prestige in the population eventually increases to the point at which high prestige states decide it is worth it to pay costs to invest or risk losing their position as high prestige states. Again, we see why the state with the highest prestige has an incentive to wait until a sufficient subset of lower prestige players have boosted their prestige before being willing to pay the cost to boost their own.

Both of these dynamics are born out in the cases of prestige competition during the Scramble for Africa and the nuclear arms race in the later 1960s, as will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6. In both cases, a lower prestige state makes investments in prestige goods which initiated the competition; the state with the highest prestige had the least incentive to invest, choosing to do so only after the investments of others presented a sufficient challenge to its place within the prestige hierarchy. In the case of the Scramble for Africa, we also see that the incentive for France to invest in its prestige increased following its humiliating defeat and loss of territory in the Franco-Prussian war. Following this loss, France became adamant about reclaiming its prior position within the prestige hierarchy and went about doing so by investing in territorial acquisition in northern Africa. Britain, the most prestigious state at the time, felt that it was dragged reluctantly into the prestige competition in Africa only after successful cases of French and German colonial acquisition. In a similar way, the Soviet Union decided to engage in a direct challenge of US prestige

by committing to balance the prestigious strategic arsenal of the United States. Only after the USSR grew successful in their prestige bid did the United States commit to matching the investments of the Soviets. Also in both cases, once the race for prestige arose, the participating states had an incentive to invest indefinitely to prevent others below them from eroding their prestige. In many cases of races for prestige, investments are curtailed only once the entire resource being competed over is depleted or acquired or once the competing parties reach an agreement limiting amounts of investment, as occurred with SAL treaties between the US and Soviets during the nuclear arms race.

Also of note in the model is that prestige investors are choosing to pay costs to invest in prestige at the detriment to their immediate interests. They are choosing to invest in items that may have no direct and immediate material or strategic value to them and which, as long as enough others in the system are investing, they have incentive to pay costs for indefinitely. Failure to do so could result in allowing their relative prestige and thereby their influence to decline over the long term. This dynamic is similar in some respects to that defined by the security dilemma in which states respond to others' investments in military capability in order to avoid allowing their relative power to decline and undermining their security. In the case of the security dilemma, states may feel forced to match the investments or actions of others because of their uncertainty about whether investing states are acting for defensive or offensive purposes. In this way, conflict or competitive investments in power may arise despite state intentions. International races for prestige as modeled here however

involve states paying costs that detract from their immediate security. Additionally, it is assumed that states accurately perceive that others are making investments in order to accrue prestige by definition at the expense of others.

It is also worth noting that the cost of investment in this model is the same for all states. A state's decision in this model to invest in prestige goods does not provide information about whether the state is of a certain type. This distinguishes the current version of the model from models in which inefficient or suboptimal investments can be understood as displays of conspicuous consumption that serve as costly signals of differential prestige and quality.[23] Here, differential incentives to invest are not dependent on the underlying ability to pay costs but on the fact that the boost that a state receives from an investment depends on the numbers of others investing in prestige or the amount of their total investment. This is not to say that the ability to pay differential costs to acquire prestige goods or to make a display of ability does not distinguish higher prestige actors from lower prestige actors. As argued in chapter two, states often make investments in prestige specifically for the sake of distinguishing themselves from those of lower prestige. It is simply to show that differential costs need not be the driving force for seemingly inefficient prestige investments.

Model III: Evolutionary Dynamics of prestige and Conflict

[23]See Gilady (2006), Neiman (1997), Smith and Bird (2000), Smith et al. (2003) and Bliege Bird et al. (2001).

A final version of the model incorporates both the decision by prestige players to invest in their prestige, interaction with conflict players, and social learning based on the ten most recent payoffs by strategy. The goals of the model are to develop an understanding of the conditions under which the prestige investment strategy described in Model II is able to invade a population of conflict players and to develop an understanding of how the cost of prestige investments and the relative costs of conflict and prestige impact how the distribution of types in the population evolves over time.

This model builds upon the exact features of Models I and II presented above. In each round, one prestige player is selected randomly to calculate whether or not it wants to invest in its prestige. This decision to invest is made as described in Model II, with the state making a rational calculation of the outcome it can expect from a prestige interaction against an average prestige player with and without a boost in its prestige. The boost in prestige obtained is the equivalent to .5 times the average prestige of prestige players in the population in a given round. Two players are then randomly selected from the population to divide a one-unit item. As in the baseline model above, if the interaction involves at least one conflict player, there is a chance the dyad will engage in conflict, both paying a cost. If two prestige players interact, they divide the unit according to their relative prestige. The payoffs are as described above. Finally, one random player is then selected to decide if it will maintain its strategy or adopt the opposing strategy. This decision is based on which strategic type has produced the higher payoffs on average in its last 10 interactions. Unlike

in the models above, the power of states also accrues over time. In addition to receiving an increase in their payoffs equivalent to their proportion of the one-unit item, players engaged in a conflict interaction receive the equivalent amount added to their power which accumulates over the course of the trial.

Results

This model was run 500 times for 500 time periods with an initial population of prestige players set at 10% and with varying values of cost of conflict, cost of prestige investments, and degrees of connectivity between the two strategic types. The model converged to one of the two strategic types in every trial of the model. Figure 5 illustrates the percentage of the 500 runs which converged fully to prestige strategies as a function of the cost of prestige investments on the x axis and as a function of the degree of connectivity between prestige actors and conflict actors, as represented by the four colored lines.[24] The model was run with 10%, 30%, 50% and 100% of connections between the strategic types and was run at costs of prestige investment ranging from 0 to .2. The brackets above the graph also indicate the average number of prestige investors present in each trial that resulted in prestige convergence. We see that when the costs of prestige investment are low, more than 80% of players on average are investing in prestige at the end of the game. As the costs of prestige increase, the number of investors drops to less than 10%.

The graph demonstrates the following facts about the dynamics of prestige strategies

[24]The cost of conflict was held constant at .1 and the probability of meeting a high power type was .3.

Figure 5: Convergence Towards Prestige As Function of Initial Distributions



over time. As we would expect, given results in the previous models, prestige strategies are most likely to successfully invade a population of conflict players when the degree of connectivity between strategic types is lowest. Here we also see that prestige convergence is slightly less likely when states playing prestige strategies are also paying costs to engage in intra-strategic prestige competitions. When the costs of prestige investment are low, all low prestige states will be willing to pay them early on, forcing states with higher prestige to also eventually invest in the competition. All prestige players then pay a cost for prestige competition that makes them less effective in their competition with conflict players. As the costs of prestige investment increase, all states remain willing to pay costs for the competition but also suffer more against conflict types. This is represented by the dip in

the frequency of convergence around $c = .05$. As costs of prestige investment continue to rise, few prestige states are still willing to invest in the competition with other prestige players, making the prestige population as a group more effective against conflict players.

Results of additional trials also indicated that increasing the cost of conflict impacts the frequency of convergence as we might expect given results of earlier models. As the cost of conflict increases, fewer players in a conflict interaction are willing to risk making a high demand and potentially ending up in a costly conflict. The probability of conflict therefore decreases with its costs with the result of increasing average conflict payoffs and consequently the frequency of trials that converge to all conflict players. The impact of this increase in success for conflict strategies is low however. Increasing the cost of conflict to .4, for instance, while keeping the frequency of high power types in the system at .3, has the impact of increasing the frequency of trials which converge to conflict by roughly 7% across the board. The general patterns of convergence reported in Figure 5 hold in this instance.

The conditions under which a population of prestige players could be invaded by conflict players were also investigated. The model was run for 500 trials with the initial frequency of conflict players representing 10% and 20% of the total population. In only 2% of the trials at either initial frequency level were conflict players able to invade a population dominated by prestige strategies, indicating the stability of a population of prestige players.

In conclusion, this model shows that the incentive for individuals to pay the cost of

prestige investments and receive lower payoffs in order to increase or maintain their outcomes against other prestige players comes at the cost of their average performance against the population of conflict players. Nevertheless, prestige strategies are able to invade populations of conflict players in a high number of trials when there are constraints about what strategic types they interact with. Without these limits on connectivity, prestige players are still able to invade conflict populations somewhere between 30 and 40% of the time.

Conclusion

In addition to laying out the conditions under which prestige strategies are most likely to emerge and spread within the international system, the models have illustrated the following key points about prestige and races for prestige which are relevant to the material presented in later chapters. First, state interests are often constructed by the interests of other states in the system or in their reference group. That state behavior is reactionary is not an unfamiliar dynamic within international relations. Both the security dilemma and realist theories about the balance of power and relative gains suggest that state investments in military capabilities will often be driven by the decisions of others to invest in their military capabilities, whether the investments by others are motivated by defensive or offensive intentions. In these conceptions, states desire to match the investments of others in order to maintain their security and out of fear of what others might do to them if they become increasingly vulnerable. In the case of prestige investments, states will match the

investments of others because they do not want to lose a voice in the international system. While having a voice and influence over international outcomes can certainly translate into enhanced security, I argue and show in later chapters that state desires for influence are often motivated by the psychological attractions of being perceived as influential often more so than they are by the desire for the resulting security.[25]

Second, states are often willing to make investments in prestige which they wouldn't have otherwise at a cost to their immediate security. Unlike in the case of competitions over military capabilities in which state investments contribute directly to their security, prestige goods often provide little inherent security or material value and instead come at a cost to those involved in the prestige competition. As we will see in the cases of both the Scramble for Africa and the nuclear arms race for parity, the focal points of the competitions, territory in the first case and strategic arsenals in the second, were deemed to be of little material or security value by the states making the investments. Instead, the value of the items was endogenous to the competition in that they lay in the degree to which other states invested in them. The more that others invested, the greater the incentive for others to invest.

As the models also show, however, it is not the costs of the goods that necessarily drive

[25] As we will see in later chapters, the rhetoric surrounding prestige investments often makes explicit that states desire influence for reasons unrelated to security concerns but because they want to be influential. See Ambrosio (2005) and Kinsella and Chima (2001).

state investments in them. While other models of prestige have shown that prestige goods are often pursued as costly signals of competitive ability or other characteristics that a social group might find valuable and prestigious, the models here focus on the fact that states do not have to distinguish themselves in their ability to pay costs that others cannot in order to be willing to make prestige investments. As will be shown, the intention of prestige investors is often to distinguish themselves from those within the ranks below them. It is also possible however that states demonstrate their prestige by showing that they are able to engage in an act without having to pay a cost simply because they are sufficiently influential that others allow them to do things to enrich or shore up their prestige.

These models also provide insight into which states will be most likely to pursue prestige. Those states with less prestige or those states that have recently lost prestige will be more likely to invest than those with higher prestige. This suggests that past events that called into question a state's existing prestige has the potential to shape future state behavior in ways that have previously unaccounted for in the literature.[26] Those states at the top of the prestige hierarchy will have the least incentive to pursue prestige since they prefer the status quo. They will invest only once they perceive that a sufficient amount of investment has been made by other states that its position in the prestige hierarchy can successfully be challenged. Prestigious states whose positions are challenged by investments made by those

[26]It is this effect of past humiliations and potential prestige decline on future state-seeking behavior that will be the subject of the next chapter.

beneath them will have a significant incentive to match the prestige investment. Once the investment has been matched, the initial investor then has an incentive to invest a higher amount, leading to an escalation in investments that is driven not by each state's individual desire for the good but indirectly by the amount the other investing states are willing to invest.

References

Alcock, N. Z. and Newcombe, A. G. (1970). The perception of national power. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, pages 335–343.

Ambrosio, T. (2005). The Russo–American dispute over the invasion of Iraq: international status and the role of positional goods. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 57(8):1189–1210.

Axelrod, R. M. (1997). *The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-based Models of Competition and Collaboration*. Princeton University Press.

Bliege Bird, R., Smith, E., and Bird, D. W. (2001). The hunting handicap: costly signaling in human foraging strategies. *Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology*, 50(1):9–19.

Bowles, S. (2009). *Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution*. Princeton University Press.

Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (1988). An evolutionary model of social learning: the effects of spatial and temporal variation. *Social Learning: Psychological and Biological Perspectives*, pages 29–48.

Cederman, L.-E. (2001). Modeling the democratic peace as a kantian selection process. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(4):470–502.

Cederman, L.-E. (2002). Endogenizing geopolitical boundaries with agent-based modeling. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 99(Suppl 3):7296–7303.

Cederman, L.-E. and Gleditsch, K. S. (2004). Conquest and regime change: An evolutionary model of the spread of democracy and peace. *International Studies Quarterly*, 48(3):603–629.

Epstein, J. M. (2011). *Generative Social Science: Studies in Agent-based Computational Modeling*. Princeton University Press.

Fordham, B. O. and Asal, V. (2007). Billiard balls or snowflakes? major power prestige and the international diffusion of institutions and practices. *International Studies Quarterly*, 51(1):31–52.

Foster, A. D. and Rosenzweig, M. R. (1995). Learning by doing and learning from others: Human capital and technical change in agriculture. *Journal of political Economy*, pages 1176–1209.

Gilady, L. (2006). *Conspicuous Waste in International Relations*. PhD thesis, Yale University.

Gintis, H. (2000). *Game Theory Evolving: A Problem-centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Behavior*. Princeton University Press.

Henrich, J. (2001). Cultural transmission and the diffusion of innovations: Adoption dynamics indicate that biased cultural transmission is the predominate force in behavioral change. *American Anthropologist*, 103(4):992–1013.

Henrich, J. and Boyd, R. (1998). The evolution of conformist transmission and the emergence of between-group differences. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 19(4):215–241.

Kahler, M. (1999). Evolution, choice, and international change. In Lake, D. A. and Powell, R., editors, *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, pages 165–96. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kang, D. and Wohlforth, W. (2011). Status Dilemmas and Inter-State Conflict. Unpublished manuscript.

Kinsella, D. and Chima, J. (2001). Symbols of Statehood: Military Industrialization and Public Discourse in India. *Review of International Studies*, 27(03):353–373.

Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. *UK: Cambridge*.

Modelski, G. (1990). Is world politics evolutionary learning? *International Organization*, 44(01):1–24.

Neiman, F. D. (1997). Conspicuous consumption as wasteful advertising: a darwinian perspective on spatial patterns in classic maya terminal monument dates. *Archeological Papers of the American Anthropological Association*, 7(1):267–290.

Rendell, L., Boyd, R., Cownden, D., Enquist, M., Eriksson, K., Feldman, M. W., Fogarty, L., Ghirlanda, S., Lillicrap, T., and Laland, K. N. (2010). Why copy others? insights from the social learning strategies tournament. *Science*, 328(5975):208–213.

Simmons, B., Dobbin, F., and Garrett, G. (2007). The global diffusion of public policies: Social construction, coercion, competition or learning? *Annual Review of Sociology*, 33:449–472.

Simmons, B. A., Dobbin, F., and Garrett, G. (2006). Introduction: The international diffusion of liberalism. *International Organization*, pages 781–810.

Smith, E. A., Bird, R. B., and Bird, D. W. (2003). The benefits of costly signaling: Meriam turtle hunters. *Behavioral Ecology*, 14(1):116–126.

Smith, E. A. and Bird, R. L. B. (2000). Turtle hunting and tombstone opening: public generosity as costly signaling. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 21(4):245–261.

Smith, J. M. (1984). Game theory and the evolution of behaviour. *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 7:95–125.

Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. McGraw-Hill.

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge Univ Pr.

Young, H. P. (2006). The spread of innovations by social learning. Unpublished manuscript.

Young, H. P. (2009). Innovation diffusion in heterogeneous populations: Contagion, social influence, and social learning. *The American Economic Review*, 99(5):1899–1924.

Chapter Four:

When Do States Seek Prestige? The Effect of Humiliation on Conquest

In 1881, thirty-four years after its last act of territorial expansion into Africa, French leaders decided to invest in a new imperial mission to spread French influence in Africa, starting with Tunisia. What motivated this decision to expand? International relations theory offers numerous possible explanations for this act of conquest. Standard realist conceptions would have us believe that France was motivated by security concerns - France expanded into Tunisia because of the economic and strategic gains it believed it could acquire there and because of the possibility that these gains would translate into enhanced security for the French state.[1] Another common explanation roots the motivation for conquest in domestic politics, with some scholars arguing that decisions about conquest are driven by the interest of internal domestic factions and others arguing that leaders attempt to raise their popularity ratings, possibly to divert the public from economic or civil unrest, with popular acts of nationalist expansion.[2] Detailed analysis of the case of French expansion into Tunisia however shows that neither of these rationales were at play. The French, with their knowledge of north African resources established during their reign in Algeria, did not expect to find significant economic or material resources in

[1] See Mearsheimer (2003), Waltz (1979) among others.

[2] See Snyder (1991) and Tir (2010). Also Pickering and Kisangani (2005).

Tunisia. In fact, French explorers with knowledge of the arid region remarked that the only thing 'plentiful in the desert was air.'[3] Additionally, Tunisian annexation was not popular among the French masses. French leaders had to engage in an active political and media campaign to create public enthusiasm for Tunisian expansion after the annexation had already occurred.[4]

What then explains this important case of territorial expansion, a case which contributed significantly to the start of the Scramble for Africa and the conquest of 95% of the African continent over a 15-year period?[5] This chapter argues that this case and many others cases of coercive territorial expansion should be understood as acts of prestige-seeking and that these instances of prestige-seeking become more likely once a state experiences an international humiliation which calls its prestige into question. In the case of the French annexation of Tunisia, for instance, France was motivated not by immediate security concerns but by the humiliation France had suffered with its loss of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany ten years before. This loss was perceived as a deep humiliation which left the French people emotionally scarred and French leaders fearing a decline in French prestige and a subsequent loss of France's influence in the international system. This fear of demotion led

[3]Roberts (1963, p. 177).

[4]As will be discussed, the French masses largely focused on the effort to regain the lost territories of Alsace and Lorraine and felt that expansion into Tunisia was an unnecessary diversion.

[5]For connections between French expansion in Tunisia and the Scramble for Africa more generally, see Sanderson (1974).

France to demonstrate its ability to take territory on the northern shores of Africa at relatively low cost. The argument that past humiliating behavior shapes state policy stands in contrast to standard realist theory which largely discounts the impact that past humiliating experiences have on future decisions to act aggressively, more commonly arguing that state behavior is driven largely by current calculations involving the balance of power and interests.[6]

This chapter explores the impact that past humiliation has on future decisions to seek prestige. As discussed in Chapter 2, theories of prestige-seeking in international relations have largely left unexplored when exactly we would expect prestige-seeking behavior by states. Social psychologists have argued that individuals are more likely to seek to reestablish their social position when their self-concept is challenged or called into question.[7] As applied to states in the international system, we would expect those whose high self-concept has been challenged to be more likely to engage in actions aimed at maintaining their social position. Such a challenge to a state's self-concept might occur as a result of some event such as loss in conflict or it may result from more direct challenges from other states that choose to ignore the state's interests. This chapter looks in particular at the impact that coerced territorial loss might have on a state's self-concept and its subsequent behavior.

Through both case analysis and quantitative analysis of an expanded and completely

[6]See Waltz (1979), Press (2005), and Mearsheimer (2003).

[7]See Baumeister et al. (1996)and Bushman et al. (1998).

recoded dataset on territorial change, the chapter presents a test of the hypothesis that humiliating incidents like the loss of territory through coercive means increase the probability that states engage in prestige-seeking behavior such as conquest or annexation in the future.[8] I find that experiencing a humiliating territorial loss through conquest or annexation raises the probability that a state will attempt a coercive territorial gain in the future by 153%. This result maintains when controlling for balance of power and security variables such as recent territorial gains by regional competitors, relative capabilities, and the total degree of territorial change in the international system. This increased probability of attempted coercive gains also extends beyond attempts to regain the recently lost territory and additionally exists not only in the few years immediately following the territorial loss but in fact decades into the future. In contrast, when territory is lost as a result of a voluntary agreement which does not result in national humiliation, there is no significant impact on subsequent foreign policy decisions about expansion. These results strongly suggest that state behavior is motivated not only by current security calculations but is also significantly motivated by what has happened in the past. Events which generated a state of humiliation will cause states to behave more aggressively then they might have otherwise.

I hypothesize that this increase in rates of attempted conquest after a humiliating

[8]'Annexation' differs from 'conquest' in that, while coercion and threat may have been implied, it was not applied or used.

loss is driven not by economic interests but by a desire for emotional satisfaction achieved through revenge-seeking and by a desire to maintain and augment international prestige. Analysis of the case of French expansion in Tunisia also calls into question the likelihood that such cases can be explained by domestic factors such as diversionary tactics or bids for national popularity. As the results show, while prestige concerns following a humiliating loss are not the sole motivators of territorial acquisition, they do explain far more territorial change than international relations theory has accounted for can not be understood in strictly material terms.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, I present a theory of humiliation and draw implications from the theory about which states will be most likely to seek coercive territorial gains. After laying out a set of primary hypotheses, I explore and define hypotheses related to alternative explanations of territorial gains, particularly those logics rooted in material and security concerns. Third, I describe the data on territorial change and define the variables employed. Results of a statistical test of the impact of coercive territorial loss on the likelihood of future gains are then presented. Following the statistical analysis, I return to the case of French expansion at the end of the 19th century to demonstrate that the primary and persistent mechanism driving French decisions was indeed a sense of national humiliation and a desire to recapture French great power prestige. I conclude with a discussion of how these results apply to state behavior in the current day.

Humiliation and International Politics

Structural theories in international relations conceive of state behavior as driven largely by immediate security concerns and current assessments of relative capabilities and interests. Waltz (1979) asserts that self-interested states respond to immediate structural imperatives to balance or bandwagon against possible threats in order to ensure their security.[9] Press (2005) argues that leaders, in determining the credibility of another state, focus on the "here and now" and not on an adversary's past behavior.[10] Such conceptions have largely ignored the role that past experiences, especially humiliating past experiences, may have on future state behavior.[11]

Other scholars have argued that states are ultimately concerned about how their strength and credibility are perceived by other states in the system. Thomas Schelling, for instance, has argued that "face," by which he means a state's credibility or its reputation

[9]Offensive realist theory is also set in the present, with states permanently engaged in an unrelenting, offensive pursuit of power whenever they have the military and economic means to do so. See Mearsheimer (2003).

[10]Press (2005, p. 1).

[11]There are a few important exceptions in the IR literature that explore ways that the past influences future behavior. Leng (1983) looks at failure in past rounds of conflict bargaining and argues that states that failed to obtain their objectives will be more aggressive in the future. Huth (1988) argues that states when states were 'bullied' in past rounds of bargaining, that future efforts at extended deterrence will likely fail.

for action, is "one of the few things worth fighting over."[12] In this conception, those states that have been made to look weak or to be lacking in resolve in the past might engage in actions in the future aimed at demonstrating their strength or their willingness to pay high costs in order to keep a promise or back up a threat. A failure to do so would leave these states vulnerable due to their decreased ability to deter security threats.

I argue that past humiliations should be incorporated into our understanding of how past experience shapes future state policy and that humiliations can have a unique impact on state behavior because of their impact on assessments of state prestige. Just as we believe that individuals' responses to circumstances are shaped in part by their past experiences, I argue that the history of a state's violent interactions with others likely shapes its present and future in ways that have been unaccounted for in our theories of state behavior.

The role that humiliation plays in shaping international affairs has recently received renewed attention among international relations scholars exploring the relationship between emotions and state behavior.[13] Intentional acts of humiliation, those acts intended to debase or degrade an individual or group, have been connected to increased levels of socio-political violence at the individual level within contemporary politics.[14] Additionally, a

[12]Schelling (1966). Mercer (2009) has argued on the other hand that reputation is not worth fighting for.

[13]See Moïsi (2007), Callahan (2004).

[14]See Saurette (2006) focuses on the role that George Bush's humiliation during 9/11 played in shaping the American response. Lindner (2006) also focuses on humiliation as the 'putting down and holding down'

state of national humiliation has been connected to acts of revenge rooted in a desire for the emotional satisfaction obtained from punishing the punisher.[15] In this conception, the degree of humiliation a state feels, following defeat in conflict for instance, will correlate with the degree of violence they inflict on the state that intentionally or inadvertently caused their humiliation. The analysis of humiliation presented here focuses on the impact of a state of humiliation rather than on intentional acts of humiliation. I define humiliation as the belief that one's position has been lowered in the eyes of others and that this lower estimation will result in a decline in respect and deference. Because humiliation involves beliefs about others beliefs, it is likely that there is at any given time a general consensus among individuals or states about what events are likely to result in humiliation. This makes it possible for the idea of "national humiliation" to be incorporated in political discourse at the national level. A state may therefore feel humiliated even though another state did not act with the express intent of humiliating it and even though it has not yet suffered a decline in its international prestige.[16] The state of humiliation may be

of some Other. Wolf (2011) perceives humiliation as an extreme form of disrespect in which an actor is treated with less respect than that actor believes their prestige accords them.

[15]See Harkavy (2000) and Lowenheim and Heimann (2008).

[16]I argue that a state's ability to 'feel' a particular emotion exists in so far as emotional reactions are incorporated into public and political discourse within the state. The US experience in Vietnam, for instance, has often been captured within American discourse as a national humiliation at both the popular and the national level. For discussion on the plausibility of viewing the state in anthropomorphic terms,

accompanied by negative emotional responses which drive the state to seek revenge on the inflictor of their humiliation.[17] The impact of humiliation also however logically extends beyond this desire to avenge one's self against one's humiliator. Humiliated states fear a decline of prestige and resulting influence resulting from other's lowered estimations of their abilities and their social position following the humiliating incident.[18] These states will therefore be likely to act in ways that seek to demonstrate their valued abilities and their existing influence in the international system in order to shore up their 'rightful position' in the international system and to forestall any decline in influence and prestige that could result from others re-estimations.[19] As will be shown below, a response aimed at shoring up prestige may differ from a response intended to convey strength in that prestige responses do not always involve the willingness to pay high costs. Prestige assertions aimed at preventing prestige demotion seek to distinguish one's position or abilities from those

see Wendt (2004) and Ringmar (1996).

[17]For the role of emotions in international politics, see Crawford (2000); Mercer (2005) and Ross (2006). The dynamics of humiliation and counter-humiliation may be responsible for enduring rivalries over long periods. See Saurette (2006) and Lowenheim and Heimann (2008).

[18]A growing literature has focused on the ways that a state's desire to have their social identity recognized affects policy. See Murray (2010); Ringmar (2002); Wolf (2011).

[19]This is in keeping with our use of 'humiliation' at the individual level. An individual may be humiliated by their her performance in a presentation, for instance, and may fear that observers will lower their estimation and subsequently treat her with less respect. The humiliated individual may then work harder than she might have otherwise in order to shape others' perceptions of her abilities.

with lower prestige and fewer capabilities. Such signals often do little to convey to potential rivals useful information about relative strength or willingness to pay costs in conflict with a more equally sized power.

Before turning to ways in which humiliated states may behave differently than non-humiliated states, it is important to first establish what types of events might count as international humiliations. While the rigorous study of humiliation has largely been avoided because of the seemingly 'fuzzy' and subjective nature of the state of humiliation, I argue that we can make reasonable assumptions about the conditions most likely to generate international humiliation.[20] Defeat in conflict, the loss of territory, having membership to an international organization denied, or having interests ignored by more powerful states, for instance, could all be perceived as humiliating international events. Additionally, we can assume that not all humiliating events are likely to humiliate equally and that intuitive estimations can be made about relative degrees of humiliation resulting from events. For instance, we can assume that a rapid defeat in conflict to a smaller or weaker opponent would likely be more humiliating than would a long-drawn out battle with an equally-sized adversary that ends in loss.[21] In terms of territory, we can assume that territory lost

[20]Authors have cited the difficulty of measuring the subjective mindset of humiliation as cause for not testing theories of humiliation all while acknowledging its significant impact on international behavior. See Saurette (2006), Harkavy (2000) and Lebow (2008).

[21]There is evidence that France was far less humiliated, for instance, by its loss against many other powers in the Napoleonic Wars after years of fighting than it was by its rapid loss to Prussia. Schivelbusch

through coercion or annexation and a threat to use force would be far more humiliating than would territory lost through more voluntary means such as mutual agreement or plebiscite. States may also be humiliated by more direct estimations of their esteem in the system, even if such events are less visible, such as being denied membership to an international organization or having a bid for cooperation with a more influential state denied.[22]

While I argue that the impact of humiliation alters the future attitudes of all states, I hypothesize that we are likely to see the largest degree of impact on great powers. The elite states in the system are the primary holders of prestige and influence; they therefore have the most to lose from a humiliating incident which they fear might lead to them being downgraded out of the league of great powers, thereby rendering them less relevant in the international system. They are also the states with the greatest capabilities to respond to any emotional suffering or fears of decline they experience following humiliation. Thus, while weaker states may desire to gain prestige after a humiliating loss, it is the great powers that have the ability, for instance, to pursue non-contiguous territorial expansion abroad following a humiliation.

The actions states choose to engage in while in a state of humiliation will be dictated

---

and Chase (2004).

[22]There is evidence that Germany occupied its first colonies in East Africa as a result of being ignored by Britain in its request for joint action there. While this act of humiliation was not highly visible to others, it provided Germany with a direct estimation of its esteem in Britain's eyes. It chose to send Britain a message about how it expected to be treated in the future by joining the colonial fray.

by the variety of prestige symbols available in the international system at that time of the humiliation, as well as by the states' capabilities. States driven by a desire for emotional satisfaction will likely aggressively target the state originally responsible for their humiliation if they have the capabilities to do so. A state which has been humiliated and fears a resulting decline in prestige will want to more generally display abilities that others perceive to be valuable markers of prestige. As discussed, what is viewed to be a key marker of prestige changes over time, providing evidence for the socially constructed nature of such symbols. Colonial possessions were viewed to be highly prestigious towards the end of the 19th century, for instance, but came to be viewed by the mid 20th century as reprehensible. Some periods also offer more means to prestige than do others. Provided they have the capability to do so, a state would like to demonstrate its prestige in as many ways as possible concurrently - by acquiring nuclear weapons, initiating a space program, and by asserting itself within international decision-making, for instance.[23] States that have recently experienced a humiliation however have often suffered a subsequent loss in capabilities which limits their ability to pursue various avenues of prestige. Thus, while states most likely prefer to demonstrate prestige in the manner in which they lost it, ie. by defeating others if they have been defeated or by retrieving lost territory, they will also fear further humiliation if they are unsuccessful. They will therefore either bide their time until they are more certain of their success or will turn to other less risky and less costly

[23]Gilady (2006).

paths of garnering prestige. In the case of territorial loss, for instance, we would expect states to seek territorial gains from the state that just took territory from them. Fear of potential failure and the surefire estimations of decline that might result, however, often prevent humiliated states from targeting that state that humiliated them in their pursuit of prestige. As will be shown in the empirical analysis below, states turn to the conquest of other, less costly and less contended territories, often territories which hold little material or strategic value for them, in effort to convince others they remain both powerful enough to project power abroad and influential enough to do so without being stopped by other great powers.

Hypotheses about Territorial Expansion

The loss of territory through coercive means has been perceived by state leaders as a form of national humiliation that can leave deep emotional scars on the national psyche and which can leave state leaders believing they need to act in order to defend its current prestige.[24] The specific impact that coercive territorial loss has, however, on the way the losing state behaves in the future has not been studied systematically. On the other hand, that territorial acquisition has been perceived by leaders as means to enhanced

[24]Lord Salisbury noted, for instance that the French loss of Alsace-Lorraine would serve as a "constant memorial of humiliation." Quoted in Kennedy (1953, p. 71). A large literature also connects territorial disputes to enduring rivalries and increased likelihoods of conflict. See Diehl (1999), Senese and Vasquez (2003), Newman (2006), Huth and Allee (2003), Huth (1996), among others.

international prestige during certain periods of international history has been established within the literature.[25]

I argue that territorial loss should impact future state behavior and in particular state attitudes towards coercive territorial gain. Territorial losses that occur through different means, however, will not all have an equivalent impact on future attempts at coercive territorial gains. While a great deal of territorial change over the last 200 years has resulted from violence or the threat of violence, states often willingly engage in transfers or exchanges of territory or agree for ongoing territorial disputes to be adjudicated by third-party observers. If the theoretical argument above is correct, we would expect that states that experience coercive loss to be more humiliated than states that haven't lost territory or than those that have lost territory through voluntary means. As a result of this humiliation, we should expect that states will seek revenge on the state that has taken its territory by aggressively retrieving its lost territory. We can also expect the humiliated state to exhibit its capabilities and its international influence more generally by seeking coercive gains at the expense of other states in the system as well. This logic leads to the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1a: Experiencing a coercive territorial loss raises the probability

[25]Holsti (2004) has discussed the role of territory as a means of prestige, focusing on royal extensions of domains in the 17th and 18th century, while Lebow (2008) has argued that territory continued to provide prestige into the 19th century.

that the losing state will attempt coercive territorial gains in the near future.

Hypothesis 1b: The increased probability of attempted gains will come at the expense not just of the states responsible for the recent humiliation, but from other states as well.

These future attempts at coercive territorial gains at the expense of other states will be pursued because of what acquiring the territory symbolizes to others - that the state has the capability and independence necessary to take territory without being prevented by others, an ability that not all states have. The state should be treated accordingly as a powerful state that must be allowed to participate in the shaping of international outcomes.

In contrast, we would expect that losses occurring through more voluntary means to be much less humiliating for a losing state than losing territory through coercion and therefore that voluntary losses would have very little impact on future attitudes towards territorial gains, leading to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Experiencing a voluntary territorial loss will have no significant impact on the future probability of attempted territorial gains.

Also, in keeping with recent scholarship which has found evidence for the emergence of a norm of territorial integrity since 1945 stigmatizing territorial expansion in the international community, I predict that the correlation between past coercive loss and future coercive gains holds only in the pre-1945 period.[26] Additionally, I hypothesize that humiliation

[26]Zacher (2001); Fazal (2011).

should impact all states, not just great powers, even though lesser powers may pursue coercive gains at lower rates because of their limited capabilities.

Alternative Hypotheses

To the extent possible, in the empirical analysis, I attempt to control for competing hypothesis about territorial expansion. As stated, international relations offers numerous hypotheses explaining conquest and coercive territorial gains. The realist view of territorial expansion perceives the value of territory to lay in its material or strategic value. Waltz (1979) and others hypothesize that a state will seek to balance territorial gains made by potential rivals with territorial gains of it's own in order to maintain the relative proportion of capabilities. Failure to balance gains made by others, and especially gains made by states in one's region which serve as the greatest existential threat, puts a state at greater existential risk.[27] Concerns about the need to keep up with the gains of others and to prevent relative gains by others could also logically generate periods of heightened competition with expansionary policies diffusing throughout the system as states attempt to keep up with the gains of others. This logic generates the following hypothesis.

> *Relative Gains Hypothesis:* A state will be more likely to attempt territorial gains if other states within its region have recently engaged in territorial expansion.

[27]Fazal (2011) applies this logic of the security dilemma to explain the increased likelihood of buffer state death.

Concerns about relative power and the need to maintain relative balance with rivals would also lead a state to attempt gains to make up for losses in capabilities or resources that might result from a territorial loss, coercive or otherwise. In such a case, we would expect the following hypothesis to be true:

> *Capability Loss Hypothesis:* A state will be more likely to attempt territorial gains immediately after a loss if the state lost substantial military and economic capabilities as a result of the territorial loss.

Mearsheimer (2003) in a similar vein perceives the advantages of conquest to lay in the material and strategic utility of territory, but hypothesizes that states will pursue territorial expansion when they have sufficient relative advantage over a potential target. They will expand in attempt to acquire regional hegemony, regardless of the expansionary policies of potential rivals, leading to the following hypothesis capturing the offensive realist logic.

> *Relative Power Hypothesis:* As a state's relative dyadic capability increases, so will the probability that the state attempts coercive territorial expansion.

Finding support for this hypothesis would not necessarily undermine the hypotheses on humiliation, given that a state seeking prestige after a humiliating loss will also more than likely take territory from those from who are less able to defend themselves.

Additionally, there is the possibility that states are motivated to pursue territorial expansion by a desire for economic and financial gain. Testing the power of this motivation

would optimally rely on data on the amount of resources that expanding powers perceived to exist in all territorial regions prior to an act of expansion.[28] Such data does not exist and would be extremely difficult to acquire. Importantly, however, we have no reason to expect that the material value of territory would bias any correlation we find between past territorial loss and future attempts at coercive territorial gains. The same can be said of the strategic value of a given territory. While a state might desire a piece of territory for the strategic advantages it provides, there is no reason to think that this desire would be correlated with a past humiliating loss and as a result bias the relationship between a past humiliation and the probability of future action.[29]

Research Design and Data

To analyze the effect of coercive territorial loss on future acquisition behavior, I used a recoded and expanded dataset of territorial change and a grouped duration test of all politically-relevant directed-dyad years from 1816 to 2000.[30] I estimated coefficients using

[28]Data gathered post-hoc about resources available within conquered regions would not allow for an accurate test since the amount of resources conquerers actually find may differ dramatically to what they expected to find in the region.

[29]The material or strategic value of territory might affect what territory a state that has recently lost territory chooses to expand into after its coercive loss. It would not however explain why states were more likely to seek territory after losing territory through humiliating means.

[30]The dyadic form of the data was used in order to control for revenge gains within the same dyad and because it enables testing the relevance of relative capability within the dyad to territorial acquisitions.

logit, employing cubic polynomials as suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010) to control for temporal dependence between observations of the dependent variable.[31] The recoded dataset builds considerably on the dataset of territorial change for the period 1816 to 2000 collected in Tir et al. (1998). This original dataset contained 826 cases of territorial change for the period through 2000 and coded instances of change as resulting from one of six types of mechanisms: conquest, annexation, cession, secession, mandated territories, or unification.[32] In my updated version of this dataset, I recoded each of the 826 cases according to nine procedural mechanisms: conquest, annexation, mutual exchange, secession, unification, independence, arbitration, mandated territories, and decolonization.[33] The largest benefit of this recoding is that it enables clearer distinction to be drawn between territorial

---

Politically-relevant dyads were used because we were interested in dyads in which expansion was plausible. It appears implausible, for instance, that the Bahamas would choose to expand in Iraq.

[31]Inclusion of t, t^2, and t^3 produced very similar results as inclusion of cubic splines, as suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010). The possibility of time dependency between the observations of the dependent variable was considered both on a systemic scale, a regional scale, and a country year scale. In the first two cases, the number of 'events' during the period was far higher than the 50% upper bound that the authors suggest for tests of temporal dependence. In the case of temporally dependent regional gains, the analysis was highly skewed by Europe, which accounts more more than 65% of all cases of territorial gain. These 297 gains were distributed over 114 of the 187-year period in question.

[32]For more information, see the coding details provided in Tir et al. (1998). All cases of independencies were coded as "-9."

[33]For further description of these mechanisms, contact author for the coding rules.

change achieved through compensation or mutual agreement and cession of territory that took place through conquest or annexation. Within the original dataset, all instances in which a piece of territory is passed from one state to another is coded as "cession" of territory. It was important for my purposes to distinguish between exchanges in which coercion played a role and those where it didn't. The original dataset also did not capture the full degree of territorial change taking place during the period of colonization during the 19th century given that change was coded only if colonizers actively occupied the territory and not if they simply claimed the land but did not place citizens on the ground. For my purposes, it is not important to distinguish between occupied territory and non-occupied territory since the simple act of claiming the land may provide the best means to prestige. I therefore added 66 cases of territorial change in which a state claimed but did not occupy territory for a total of 892 total cases. These include cases of colonization in which colonizers claimed land but did not actively occupy it as well as other cases of exchange that were not included in the original dataset.[34] It is important to note that both the original and the updated territorial change dataset omit instances of wartime conquest in which the territory does not remain in changed hands following the end of conflict. If the conquest is formalized in a post-war treaty, the case is coded as conquest.[35]

[34]Additional cases were coded using The Statesman's Yearbook and the World Almanac. See Turner (2000) and Webb (1936).

[35]The original dataset includes some instances of territorial loss that occurred just prior to the eruption of world wars, the response to which would be difficult to capture since it likely occurred during wartime

Dependent Variable

The variable *coercive attempted gain* was coded as "1" if a successful territorial acquisition took place through coercive means in that country year or if the state attempted a coercive territorial gain, as measured by Militarized International Disputes dataset, and "0" if no coercive territorial gain was achieved or attempted. Attempted gains were those in which the highest act of hostility listed for the country within a MID was either the occupation of territory, even if temporary, or the threat to take territory and in which no subsequent transfer of territory took place.[36] Cases of *voluntary attempted gain* were also coded as "1" if a successful territorial acquisition took place through voluntary means.[37] Once all cases of territorial acquisition not occurring through clearly coercive or voluntary means were dropped, the dataset included 738 cases of successful and attempted gains, with 540 of those being conducted through coercive means and 198 through voluntary means.

---

and would not be included in the dataset. To account for these irregularities, all losses which occurred during the periods 1914-1919 and 1939-1945 were dropped. All cases of territorial change which resulted in state death were also dropped due to the inability of the deceased state to respond with gains of its own.

[36]This approach does not account for disputes in which the objective of one party was to take territory but in which the highest level of hostility surpassed the occupation of territory. In many such cases, the occupation of territory would likely lead to war.

[37]'Voluntary' means of acquisition include mutual exchange or compensation. Cases of 'attempted voluntary gains' were not included largely because of the time demands of coding all failed attempts to negotiate over territorial outcomes.

Independent Variables

The variable *coercive loss* was coded as a "1" in the country year in which a state lost territory though conquest or annexation, which involves the threat of coercion, and as "0" otherwise. The variable *voluntary loss* was coded as a "1" in the country year in which a state lost territory though mutual exchange or compensation and as "0" otherwise or when a case of coercive loss occurred within the same period.[38] The territorial change data included 263 instances of territorial loss by entities that were not listed as states in the State System Membership data at the time of the territorial change. Given the intent of this project to assess the impact territorial loss has on the future behavior of states, these instances of territorial change at the expense of non-state actors were not included within the dataset, leaving 247 cases of both coercive and voluntary territorial loss.[39] Additionally,

[38]The analysis of the impact of territorial losses focuses on conquest, annexation and mutual exchange only, omitting cases of decolonization, secession, unification, third-party arbitration and wars of independence primarily because the degree of humiliation caused by these methods is much less clear. It is also possible that coercion was used to arrive at outcomes of "mutual exchange" in which each side in the dispute received some territory exchange for their own or received compensation in exchange for land. Much larger powers may have applied coercive pressure on smaller powers that may be unaccounted for.

[39]See Correlates of War Project. 2008. State System Membership List, v2008.1. Online, http://correlatesofwar.org. The majority of these cases of loss by non-state actors occurred during the process of colonizing Africa. Inclusion of losses by these non-state actors would skew results of statistical analysis since the vast majority of these entities lacked state resources and the ability to respond to loss with subsequent gains of their own. Of these 247 cases of loss, 105 occurred through conquest or

territorial gains made during the first year of a state's life and any year that the state is reborn after a period of state death were not included in the dataset, leaving 574 remaining cases of territorial gain in the dataset.[40] Four additional variables were coded as "1" if a state had experienced a coercive loss in the last five, ten, fifteen, or twenty year period; similar variables were created for voluntary loss. Figure 6 in the appendix provides a list of example cases of states that experienced a coercive territorial loss and that attempted territorial gain in ten years that followed. Cases of *revenge gains* were coded as "1" when a state had lost territory to the other state within the dyad within the last twenty years and "0" when the state had not experienced a loss to its dyad partner in that time frame.

To test the relative gains hypothesis, I include two variables that capture its logic. First, the dichotomous variable *gainer in my region in the last 5 years* codes, as it suggests, whether or not another state within a state's region attempted a territorial gain in the last five years.[41] Additionally, I include a continuous variable *activity in the system* which

annexation, 142 through mutual exchange.

[40]These cases were omitted because they did not allow for the testing of the hypotheses that gains are made at higher rates following losses. The vast majority of these gains are also associated with the process of unification.

[41]Regional data was taken from the COW dataset. The impact of regional gainers in the last seven years, three years, and one year were also checked for robustness, but did not change the results significantly. The impact of system-wide gains made by others, rather than just regional gains, was also tested, but was less significantly correlated with attempted gains than were regional gainers.

is a count of the total number of states in the system attempting expansion in any given year. To test the relative power hypothesis, a variable *relative capability* was coded which measures the relative dyadic capability for each dyad-year using the ratio of 'cinc' scores as taken from the Correlates of War dataset.[42]

Capabilities

States are also not only limited by their capability relative to other states but are also limited, I argue, by their current capability relative to their capability prior to a territorial loss. States that lose significant absolute capabilities as a result of or subsequent to a loss will be less likely to engage immediately in expansion.[43] This will likely be especially true among great powers who possess the greatest amount of influence and therefore have the greatest to lose by shifting perceptions of their prestige. These states will desire to regain their prestige but will also fear further detriment to their prestige if they fail in their attempt. They will therefore wait until they are more certain of their success in engaging in successful expansion.[44] Thus, I include the variable *relative absolute capabilities after loss* that captures a state's absolute capabilities in each of the twenty years following a coercive

[42]'Cinc' scores were obviously not available for any of the non-state actors which often served as targets of expansionary policies. Capability in these cases was coded as 0.

[43]As is shown below, states that loss capabilities as a result of territorial loss take on average 13 years to return to their pre-loss capabilities.

[44]See Trager (2012) for a description of the Russian desire to regain prestige after their humiliation following the Crimean War and their statement that they would 'wait for their time to come.'

loss relative to its absolute capabilities in the year of or the year before the loss.[45]

Results

If the theory of humiliation presented here is valid, we would expect to see an increased probability of an attempted territorial gain in the years following a coercive territorial loss (*H1*) and we would expect that these gains would extend beyond attempts to retrieve lost territory (*H2*) as states seek to reestablish their prestige through territorial gain. We would also expect to see a much lower impact of less humiliating voluntary losses (*H3*). The results presented in Figure 1 below provide substantial support for each of these three hypotheses. The first column shows the correlation of experiencing a coercive territorial loss in the prior twenty years and attempted coercive territorial gains. We see that for states with a coercive loss, the log odds of an attempted gain increases by 1.01.[46] The second column presents the same model including *revenge gains*, or those coercive gains attempted at the expense of a dyad partner that had taken one's territory in the last twenty years. When controlling for revenge gains, a coercive loss in the last twenty years corresponds with a .917 increase in the log odds of an attempted coercive territorial gain. In more substantive terms, the predicted probability of attempting a territorial gain which is not an act of revenge is 1.53

[45]The measure of absolute capabilities was obtained by adding the six components that comprise 'cinc' scores.

[46]A list of sample cases of coercive gains following coercive losses can be found in Figure 6 in the Appendix. This value is significant at the .001 level.

Figure 1. Grouped Duration Models

Variables	*Model 1: Coercive Loss*	*Model 2: Coercive Loss w/ Revenge*	*Model 3: Coercive Loss w/ Controls*
Coercive Territorial Loss in Prior 20 Years	1.01**	.917**	.781**
	(.11)	(.20)	(.18)
Voluntary Territorial Loss in Prior 20 Years	.193	.174	.179
	(.13)	(.22)	(.22)
Revenge Gain in Prior 20 Years		.910*	.972**
		(.30)	(.31)
Relative Capability After Loss	3.22**	3.20**	2.70**
	(.64)	(.88)	(.81)
Dyadic Relative Capability	1.46**	1.53**	1.41**
	(.14)	(.26)	(.25)
Gains In My Region Last 5 Yrs	.779**	.802**	.674**
	(.13)	(.17)	(.16)
Total Systemic Gains in Year	.146**	.146**	.126**
	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)
Joint Democracy			-1.76**
			(.36)
Scramble for Africa			1.69**
			(.31)
Time Since Attempted Gain	-.065**	-.066**	-.07**
	(.08)	(.02)	(.01)
Time Since Attempted Gain x 2	.001**	.001**	.001**
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Time Since Attempted Gain x 3	.000**	.00**	.00**
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)

** = Coefficients significant at the .001 level. * = Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
N = 180,578 Robust standard errors, clustered by dyad, in parentheses below.

times higher among states that have had a coercive territorial loss than among those that have not.[47] Within neither model is there a significant correlation between voluntary territorial losses and a future attempts at coercive territorial gains. Column 3 shows the results when additional controls - whether or not both states in the dyad were democratic and the scramble for Africa - were included in model two. We see that even when controlling for regime type, for the period of rapid expansion at the end of the 19th century, for revenge gains, as well as for structural imperatives that there is a strong correlation between prior coercive territorial loss and future attempts at coercive gains.

The same models were also run using voluntary attempted gains as the dependent variable. In none of the models does coercive loss in the prior 20 years or voluntary loss in the prior 20 years correspond to a change in voluntary attempted gains significant at the .05 level. The coefficient describing the relationship between coercive losses and future voluntary gains is positive (.452) and significant at the .10 level while the coefficient that relates past voluntary losses with future voluntary gains is not significant at all.

Figure 2 below presents the results of model 2 in terms of increased percentage of predicted probability of attempted coercive territorial gain. We see support for our primary hypotheses as well as for the relative gains hypothesis and the relative power hypothesis. As stated above, the probability that a state attempts a coercive territorial gain increases by 153% if the state has experienced a coercive territorial loss in the prior twenty year

[47]Holding gainers by others and revenge gains at 0 and all other variables at their means.

Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities



period, when controlling for revenge gains.[48] This compares to an increase of only 15% following a voluntary territorial loss, an increase which cannot confidently be distinguished from the possibility that voluntary losses have no effect at all. Additionally, having a gainer in your region in the prior 5 years also leads states to attempt gains at a higher level - with the probability of attempting a gain increasing by 133%. Finally, a one standard deviation

[48]This result as well as the others in the figure were found by using observed values of the other variables in the model. See Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan (2013) for a discussion of observed values and predicted probabilities. In each case, the other primary variables of interest were set at zero, relative capability and total activity in the system were held at their mean, and relative absolute capability after loss at 1. For instance, the increase of 153% following a prior territorial loss was found when holding prior voluntary losses, revenge gains and prior gainers in the region at zero.

increase in the ratio of relative capabilities of the states in each dyad increases the chance a state will attempt a gain by 86%.[49]

We should not assume that experiencing a prior territorial loss will impact the probability of attempted gain equally in each of the years after the loss. A state's ability to attempt gains in each year after a coercive loss may vary, depending on potential factors including the state's level of capabilities relative to its capabilities prior to territorial loss or the costs of territorial expansion in the neighborhood. To get at the differences in the probability of gains by year in the time following a coercive loss, a four-term polynomial counting the twenty years following a loss was added to model 2.[50] Figure 3 below shows the probability of attempted gains over a twenty year period following a coercive loss, as represented by the blue, curved line. The red line represents the probability of an attempted coercive gain for a state that has not experienced a loss, a probability that is equivalent in all years.[51]

---

[49]This equates to an increase from .5 relative dyadic capability to an relative dyadic capability of .915, or in other words a comparison between a dyad in which the states are evenly matched to one in which one state has a very significant advantage in capabilities.

[50]All observations of this variable 'time since coercive loss' that did not lay within a twenty year period of a loss were coded as 21.

[51]Again, these probabilities are found holding voluntary loss in the last 20 years, gainer in my region in the last five years, and revenge gains in the last twenty years at zero, relative capabilities at its mean, and absolute capabilities after loss at 1.

Figure 3. Predicted Probability of Attempted Gain for Twenty Years After Loss



We see that the probability of a gain in the few years following a loss is roughly double the average probability of a loss in that year without a loss. This period is followed by a moderate decline in the probability of attempted gain from years four to eleven and then a significant leap in the probability between years 11 through 18 following a loss. In year 16, the probability of an attempted gain is nearly triple the rate of gain when no coercive loss was experienced. The high probability of gains in the first year suggests that a few states that have the ability to attempt gains do so as soon after a loss as possible. The decrease in probability which follows the fourth year is possibly accounted for by a decrease in military capabilities among states that must rebuild prior to engaging in expansion again. That the average state involved in a coercive territorial loss subsequently experiences on average a 5% decline in their military capabilities and that it takes them on average about 12 years

before they return to within 99% of their pre-loss capabilities speak to the plausibility of this explanation.The fact that humiliated states appear to delay attempted gains until they have recouped military and economic capabilities also strongly suggests that states do not seek coercive attempted gains following a loss out of a desire to make up for what they have lost.[52]

Time and Major Power Prestige

The models presented so far have assumed that rates of coercive loss and rates of subsequent gains have remained similar during all years over the period 1816 to 2000 and among all states in the international system. Scholars however have argued that in fact patterns of territorial expansion and contraction have changed over the course of the 20th century, with a norm of territorial integrity and unique attitudes about the sovereignty of territory arising sometime after the end of World War I and solidifying after World War II.[53] This would lead us to expect that states which experienced a humiliating loss in the post-1946

[52]The rates of territorial gain in the years following these states' return to pre-loss capabilities are not significantly different from the rates of gains among those states who lost territory but whose capability levels did not decline. Running the grouped duration model while omitting cases in which states experienced significant loss of capability as a result of a coercive territorial loss from the domain had no significant impact on regression outcomes.

[53]See Zacher (2001), Fazal (2004), Holsti (2004).

period would attempt coercive territorial gains at a lower rate than in the pre-1946 era.[54] Additionally, acts of territorial expansion have usually distinguished major powers from lesser or regional powers in the system; the motivation to respond with an act of expansion following a humiliating loss may be stronger among those states that view themselves as major powers and believe they have a reputation for prestige worth protecting.

To test these theories, post-1946 and major power dummy variables were interacted with the primary explanatory variable, coercive territorial loss in the prior 20 years.[55] The results of this triple-interaction are presented in Figure 4 below, which shows the change in predicted probabilities when a major power or non-major power has experienced a coercive territorial loss in the prior 20 years in the pre and post-1946 periods.[56] We see that in each case, the change in predicted probability is positive but that only in the case of major powers prior to 1946 is this change significantly distinguishable from no change at all in the probability of an attempted gain following a coercive loss. This is likely because of the

[54]We would also expect the overall numbers of coercive territorial change to drop dramatically.

[55]The year 1945 was chosen as a possible cut-point largely because of precedence within the literature rather than because of a belief that the transition to a norm of territorial integrity occurred spontaneously in that year. To determine if there were structural breakpoints in attitudes towards territorial expansion, chow tests were conducted for a variety of cut points between 1910 and 1950. No statistically significant cut point was found however, suggesting that any change in attitudes towards territory arose gradually.

[56]These results were obtained by setting observed values of the other variables, as described above, and clustering by dyad.

Figure 4. Change in Pr of Attempted Gain After Loss by Time and Major Power prestige

	Non-Major Power	*Major Power*
Pre-1946	+47% (.00422)	+92.3%** (.00509)
Post-1946	+23.5% (.00135)	+262% (.00017)

*Baseline probability of attempted gain in parentheses.

paucity of data for the post-1946 period, in which only 92 cases of coercive attempted gains took place, as compared with 448 in the pre-1946 period. Of those 92 post-1946 cases of gain, 13 took place following coercive losses.[57] Also, as would be expected, and as illustrated by the numbers in parentheses, the baseline probability of a coercive attempted gain, when a state has not experienced a coercive territorial loss, is lower in the post-1946 period than in the pre-1946 period. Major powers also account for a larger number of attempted gains following coercive losses than do non-major powers, with major powers accounting for 152 cases and non-major powers 49 cases though out the entire time period.

Additional Checks for Robustness

Numerous additional tests were performed to assess the robustness of the results and to test the sensitivity of the results to model specification. Each model was rerun omitting

[57]The number of cases of attempted gains following coercive loss in the last 20 years is as follows, by quadrant: among non-major powers, 41 cases occurred pre-1946 and 8 cases after. Among major powers, 147 cases took place before 1946 and 5 afterwards.

independent and control variables one at a time. The basic results were unaffected by omission of any one or any group of right-hand side variables. Clustering by country and by country-year reduced the standard errors and left the substantive results largely unchanged. Inclusion of a variable for regime type, rather than joint regime type, was not found to significantly correlate with attempted gains and did not significantly alter other significant correlations.[58] Additionally, various versions of variables were considered, including whether other states in the region had gained in the last 3, 10, or 20 years, and including different measures of relative capability such as iron and steel reserves or absolute capability rather than relative capability. Inclusion of the dyadic descriptor variable *contiguity* also had no effect on the core findings, though is was itself significantly correlated with attempted gains in the directions we would predict. Attempted gains were far more likely between contiguous countries.

Alternative Explanations for Findings

What other possible factors might explain the correlation we find between prior coercive loss and coercive attempted gains? As discussed above, while the material or strategic value of a territory may make it more attractive to expanding states, a desire for economic or strategic gains does not explain why past coercive losses would correlate with increases

[58]The variable for joint democracy was ultimately included because of the high degree of correlation between regime type and those states engaging in the scramble for Africa. When both regime type and the scramble were included, regime type was found to have no significant correlation with attempted gains.

in the probability of future attempted gains, especially given that states appear to recoup their lost capabilities prior to engaging in expansion. Other possible explanations include individual or leader prestige as a motivator of expansionary behavior following a humiliating loss. Leader attempts at expansion might stem from a desire to raise their popularity ratings after an unpopular territorial loss. In this case, we would expect an attempted gain to occur within a relatively short time frame following a loss while a given leader remains in office. Given that a leader's tenure has on average is a little over four years over the past almost 200 year period, the result that a significant amount of expansion comes more than a decade following a humiliating loss, calls into question the significance of leader prestige in motivating expansion after loss.[59] Additionally, it is possible that leaders engage in expansion in order to divert the public from difficult economic or political times, but it is again unlikely that such a desire would explain the relationship between past losses and future attempted gains.[60] Territorial gains are often not popular among domestic audiences and instead, as the case of French expansion in Tunisia will show below, are viewed to be economic drains and distractions from domestic woes.[61]

[59]Data on leader tenure taken from the *Archigos* data project. See Goemans et al. (2009). Extreme outliers pull the mean far to the right of the median leader tenure of around 2 years.

[60]Also, in many cases, as the case of the French conquest of Tunisia will show below, expansion lacks popular support and must be sold to the masses after the fact.

[61]Tir (2010) shows that territorial conflicts correspond with an increase in a leader's unpopularity. It is possible that a leader's popularity declines as a result of a coercive territorial loss and that therefore

Finally, it is also possible that a state, following a coercive loss, is motivated to attempt coercive gains by a desire to convey resolve or strength to both enemies and allies. Over 83% of the cases included here among those in which states attempt coercive gains after coercive losses, however, are those in which the aggressive power had a 50% or greater edge in the ratio of relative capabilities over the state losing territory. Thus, the large majority of cases here involve large powers colonizing smaller and weaker territories. We can imagine that such acts of expansion, while involving direct coercion or the threat of coercion, likely did not require a display of strength on the part of the conqueror that might have effectively impressed other potential great power rivals as to the state's competitive abilities. It would therefore seem likely that states engaged in acts of expansion against weaker states in order to signal to observer states in the international system that they should be considered among those with great power prestige because they are both capable of doing something that only other great powers can do easily and because they have sufficient influence to engage in international expansion without being constrained by other great powers. For similar reasons, it would also seem difficult to convey resolve, or a willingness to pay costs in order to follow up on a promise or a threat, through such relatively low cost acts of expansion.

---

leader popularity could correlate with the main independent variable of coercive loss. The large amount of attempted gains that occur more than a decade and a half after a territorial loss again suggests, however, that many of the attempted gains are not made by the same leader who oversaw the loss.

Case Analysis: French Expansion & the Aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War

The empirical analysis above provides substantial support for the hypothesis that states are often motivated to seek coercive territorial gains because they have experienced humiliating territorial losses in the past. I have argued that this correlation is driven in part by a state's desire to prevent a decline in its prestige and influence following a humiliating event. The preceding analysis has called into question possible alternative explanations for this correlation, including economic, strategic, and security variables, a desire for prestige and the level of individual leaders, and the desire for the humiliated state to demonstrate strength or resolve. Still other plausible explanations exist, such as the possibility that seeking territory may be popular nationally, allowing a leader to boost his or her popularity, or that leaders are driven by the desire for emotional satisfaction following a humiliating event. I now return to the case of the 1881 French expansion into Tunisia and examine French motivations in detail in order to shed some light on mechanisms that might drive state response to humiliation. The study of French policy in the early 1880s more clearly illustrates the logic of the argument that states attempt coercive gains in order to demonstrate their unconstrained ability to do so as they seek to reestablish their prestige after a humiliating loss and further calls into question material and domestic theories in explaining the relationship between past loss and future gains.[62] As will be shown in the next chapter,

[62]While this case describes the response of one country, France, to international humiliation, we have no reason to believe that this reaction to humiliation is unique to the French. If we safely assume that

this is far from an isolated case of European expansionism. Historians have argued that French expansion into Tunisia in 1881 initiated the Scramble for Africa which entailed the conquest of 95% of the African continent.[63]

On April 28, 1881, France entered Tunisia with 28,000 troops. By May 6th, the French had occupied the two major cities and established a protectorate over the state.[64] This was the first act of expansion that France had engaged in on the African continent since its last act of continued expansion into Algeria 10 years earlier and it was the first act of expansion in Africa by any other European power outside of southern Africa in over 13 years.[65] What prompted this important act of expansion by the French? That the international system had experienced a period of relative calm in the preceding decade suggests that France

---

all states desire to maintain their influence, we can assume that they will act whenever that influence is threatened by a humiliation in order to stabilize the effects of the humiliation through prestige-seeking. This case of France merely sheds light on this type of thinking. It may coincidentally also be true that the French have experienced more humiliating events than other states in the last 200 years and therefore have engaged in more prestige-seeking.

[63]This is in contrast to earlier interpretations of the Scramble which placed the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 at the theoretical beginning of the Scramble. See Sanderson (1974) and Galbraith (1978), Cain and Hopkins (1993, p. 366-367).

[64]While the French confronted rebellion in June, it was quickly put down. The total expedition cost France 8 lives.

[65]The British did expand their holdings in South Africa in 1871 and took 21,000 square km of territory in Lesotho in 1868.

wasn't attempting to balance the gains of others, as security logics would suggest. French military and economic capabilities had largely returned to their pre-Franco-Prussian war levels by inception of the occupation, suggesting it wasn't a desire to make up for losses in capabilities that motivated French expansion. Additionally, expansion was not rooted in popular support - the French public had in fact grown weary of African expansion following decades of violent and costly intervention in Algeria.[66]

The roots of French expansion into Tunisia instead extend deep into the preceding decade.[67] In May 1871, France has been forced to accept a humiliating defeat at the hands of a growing Germany which no one had expected to win.[68] By the time of the French surrender to the newly unified German state, Paris had been under siege for months, its residents had been starved, and, in a true act of effrontery, Wilhelm I of Prussia had been crowned emperor of the new German state within the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. If these

[66]As one prominent journalist put it at the time, "There had never been an epoch nor a country more indifferent to distant adventures than the Third French Republic..." Quoted in Townsend et al. (1941).

[67]Newbury and Kanya-Forstner (1969) demonstrates that the plans for French expansion into Africa had started to take shape immediately after the end of the Franco-Prussian war. It would take massive post-war rebuilding and the rise of Freycinet and Ferry to enact the plan.

[68]The blow to French self-confidence was particularly intense since the French had sunk prestige into defeating the Prussians. They had announced its importance to their image and then lost, suffering a larger blow than they might have without such a declaration. The fact that they then lost despite having declared it of the utmost importance deepened their humiliation. See Howard (1990).

events had not sufficiently humiliated the French, in May of the same year France has been forced to cede 1694 villages in the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine in the Treaty of Frankfurt.[69] The deep scar the loss of Alsace-Lorraine left on French national perception would be embodied by Leon Gambetta's famous utterance, "think of it always, speak of it never" and would be taught to school children throughout France for years to come.

Before the post-war treaty was even signed, statesmen throughout Europe, including the man responsible for the humiliation - Bismarck himself, recognized the substantial impact that the French loss of Alsace-Lorraine might have on European affairs. They predicted the loss would lead to a dramatically different French policy than might have otherwise come about. None of these statesmen, however, including the French, appear to have interpreted the imminent shift in French actions as resting in security concerns. Lord Salisbury foresaw at the time of the treaty that the "ceded territory would be a constant memorial of humiliation" but predicted that "[France] will not again attack Prussia single-handed." He foresaw that there would be a day when the dreams of the Germans would "cross the path of some country strong enough to resent them: and that day will be to France a day of restitution and revenge."[70] Thus, it was acknowledged that France would harbor resentment and anger about the loss which would one day translate into direct revenge on Germany.

---

[69]Howard (1990), Raymond (1921), ger.

[70]Quoted in Kennedy (1953, p. 71).

It was not only the resulting negative emotions that drove French expansionary policy however. Both Prime Minister Gambetta and Jules Ferry, his successor and the architect of France's colonial policy in the 1880s, believed that France's stature had been called into question following the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and both believed that it could be regained with expansionary action in Africa.[71] Rather than exacting immediate revenge on Germany, they turned to the shores of North Africa, all with the loss of Alsace-Lorraine freshly in mind. As Jules Ferry himself noted at the time "Must [France] hypnotize [itself] with the lost provinces... and should we not take compensation elsewhere?"[72] Desiring to reshape its image in the eyes of others, France opted to behave as great powers do in hopes that others would continue to treat it as a great power. It would exert influence over others in distant lands. Gambetta announced this effort in 1881, declaring that "In Africa, France will take the faltering first steps of the convalescent." Even more to the point, Senator Challemel Lacour noted that,"The reverses of some ten or twelve years ago have rendered it necessary for France to make her influence felt among distant populations..."[73] As British observers put it at the time, it was clear that "France would like to find in Africa an outlet for the energies or ambition which may have received a check on the Continent of Europe."[74]

---

[71] See Sanderson (1974, p. 9).

[72] Quoted in Hyam (1964).

[73] *Ibid.*

[74] *Ibid.*

Why then the focus on Tunisia? France first set its eyes on Tunisia in part because of its proximity to Algeria, but also because the bid by Italy to gain support for an Italian colony of Tunisia had drawn its attention. France did not however view possible Italian expansion as a security threat. Instead, since its humiliation a decade prior, France now feared an even more despised fate - dropping in the eyes of others to a level of prestige lower than that of Italy or Spain. Thus, once it seemed as though Italy might convince the Germans and British to allow their expansionary policy to take root in Tunisia, France began an aggressive campaign to ensure that it instead would be able to exert its influence there.[75] When France eventually annexed Tunisia in 1881, it had attempted to do so with the tacit consent of all interested parties except, notably, for that of Italy. This move marked, in French eyes at least, the comeback of French influence in the international system. As Gambetta wrote to Ferry upon the signing of the treaty with the Bey of Tunis in 1881 establishing the Tunisian protectorate, "there will be people everywhere who will not like it, but they will have to put up with it. France is becoming a Great Power again."[76]

These efforts by France to seek compensation for its lost prestige by conquering those much weaker than itself speak against the likelihood that France was engaged in an effort to rebuild its reputation for resolve. In such a case, France would have wanted to engage in costly actions that demonstrated its strength and determination rather than in

[75]The response of the other European powers will be addressed in greater detail in the next chapter.

[76]Quoted in Brunschwig (1966, p. 57).

a demonstration that they had the capability to walk into Tunisia largely unopposed. As one influential French statesman put it in his effort to convince Gambetta of the need to go into Tunisia, "Europe is watching us, is making up its mind whether we amount to anything or not; a single act of firmness... without serious danger, without bloodshed, and we shall regain our place in the esteem of other nations."[77] Two interesting elements of this quote suggest that the motivation was in fact prestige-seeking rather than a signal of strength or resolve aimed at potential rivals. The emphasis on "Europe" as the observer rather than on Germany or some other specific rival suggests that France was concerned more about its general perception within the international system than about warding off rival threats. Additionally, the quote suggests that France does not expect to pay significant costs in terms of bloodshed or to face considerable risks with its expansionary act. While demonstrating their ability to project power abroad without bloodshed arguably sends a stronger signal of strength than does an ability to project power abroad though at considerable cost, it is still not clear what useful information potential great power rivals might gather about France's ability to fight a equally sized foe in direct conflict based on its performance against a much smaller rival. Instead, the act of expansion was primarily aimed at reinitiating France's prominent role within world affairs by distinguishing France from lesser powers unable to maintain empires abroad and by demonstrating that it could easily exert itself in distant lands without constraints imposed on it by others, as a Great

[77]St. Vallier to Barthelemy St. Hilaire on January 26, 1881. Quoted in Ganiage (1959, p. 632).

Power would.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the impact of past international humiliation on aggressive state behavior and hypothesized that the humiliation caused by coercive territorial losses would lead states to seek coercive territorial gains at a higher rate. The results of the empirical analysis provide ample support for this theory that past experience shapes future policy. The probability of attempted coercive gains for those states that had lost territory through coercive means was 153% higher over a twenty-year period than it was for non-humiliated states. This increased probability excludes efforts by a state to take territory from the state which recently humiliated it, efforts that can clearly also be driven by the desire to recoup prestige. While realist variables such as the presence of regional gainers or relative capability also significantly correlate with higher rates of attempted gains, coercive loss appears to have a significant impact on a state's decision to seek gains regardless of these material and strategic variables. In none of the analysis did past non-humiliating voluntary loss correlate with novel future behavioral patterns.

These results proved highly robust to alterations of model specification and proved highly robust among great powers in the pre-1945 era. Establishing the relationship between past humiliating experience and future aggressive action in the post-1945 period and among non-great powers was hindered by a lack of sufficient data, though the coefficients

remain positive suggesting that the relationship may hold even in these restricted domains. That few data points for coercive territorial change exist in the post-1945 era speaks to the likely emergence of a norm of territorial integrity. It does not tell us however about how states which have experienced a rare case of coercive territorial loss in the post-45 era are most likely to respond. It is possible that those humiliated states are more likely to pursue more peaceful means of territorial gain.[78] This would suggest that what is viewed to provide international prestige has changed in the post-war period. We would, at any rate, have no reason to think that the impact of humiliating events on a state's propensity for prestige-seeking as described above has declined within the contemporary era. It is likely that humiliation simply increases the likelihood that states will engage in more contemporary forms of prestige-seeking behavior.

While we have found significant support for the theory that states that have experienced a past humiliation will behave differently in the future than they would have otherwise, disentangling the emotional from the instrumental motivations for action remains difficult. On the one hand, it is likely that the state of humiliation is accompanied by a negative emotional state that leads states to lash out in search of emotional satisfaction. While the state or states responsible for the initial act of humiliation would serve as the most likely target of this revenge-seeking, it is also possible that injured parties

[78]No correlation was found between past coercive loss and future voluntary gains in either the pre or post 1945 periods, though the lack of data in the 1945 period hinders the formation of a significant finding.

may seek emotional comfort by lashing out at other states as well. On the other hand, humiliation engenders instrumental concerns as well among states who fear a decline in prestige and seek to demonstrate to others that they should maintain their pre-humiliation prestige. While I have demonstrated that the latter mechanism was the primary motivation in the case of French expansion in Tunisia, it is possible that emotional concerns also drove a substantial portion of the cases of future aggressive behavior. Future research should engage in additional case analysis in order to pinpoint how these two mechanisms function in driving future state behavior.

Finally, support for the finding that humiliation shapes future behavior towards territory raises the question of what other behavioral domains might be impacted by humiliating events. As stated, some element of response to humiliation is likely time-specific. Rather than pursuing colonies and empires, it is possible that states in the immediate post-war period sought nuclear weapons as symbols of enhanced prestige which could distinguish them from lesser powers.[79] Additionally, with more recent efforts to enforce norms against nuclear proliferation, the means to prestige have likely shifted again, possibly towards greater assertiveness of independence and leadership positions within international forums and organizations.[80] It also seems entirely plausible, given the findings here, that humiliation

[79]See Crawford (2002) on the process by which colonization came to be viewed as less prestigious.

[80]See Ambrosio (2005) for a description of Russian prestige-seeking via assertiveness against the US actions in Iraq in 2003. Heading international interventions abroad such as France's recent initiative in Libya could also be contemporary prestige symbols.

could lead states to initiate conflicts they wouldn't have otherwise or to acquire other sophisticated weaponry they might not need all in the hope of signaling to other states in the system how they expect to be treated and the level of influence they expect to hold. The correlation between international humiliation and these behaviors is the subject of current research, as is the relationship between the degree of humiliation and a state's endeavors to recoup prestige. These questions aside, though, one point seems clear: contrary to dominant explanations, just as we believe that individuals' responses to circumstances are shaped in part by their past experiences, the history of a state's violent interactions with others likely shapes that state's present and future policies in ways that have been unaccounted for in our theories of state behavior.

Figure 6. A Selection of Cases

Country	*Territory Lost*	*Lost To*	*In Year*	*Territory Gained*	*In Year*
Austria-Hungary	Lombardy	Italy	1859	Denmark	1864
China	Kazakhstan	Russia	1871	Vietnam	1881
China	Tibet	India	1950	Taiwan	1955
France	Alsace-Lorraine	Germany	1871	Cochinchina	1874
				Tunisia	1881
France	Nigeria	Britain	1898	Fr. West Africa	1899
				Morocco	1903
India	Kashmir	Pakistan	1949	China	1950
Italy	Ethiopia	Ethiopia	1896	Turkey	1905
Italy	Somalia	Somalia	1905	Albania	1914
Italy	Fiume	Yugoslavia	1924	Egypt	1925
				Albania	1926
Netherlands	Indonesia	Britain	1819	Papua New Guinea	1828
Russia	Danubian Princ.	Austria-Hungary	1854	Caucasus	1858, 1859
				Japan	1861
Russia	Sakhalin	Japan	1875	Turkmenistan	1876
				Romania	1878
				Transcaspia	1881
Russia	Vilna	Poland	1921	Japan	1925
				Afghanistan	1926
Spain	Cuba, Philippines	United States	1898	Morocco	1907, 1908
Turkey	Bosnia-Herz., Cyprus	Austria, Britain	1878	Mongolia	1880
Turkey	Libya, Dodecanese Ils.	Italy	1912	Iran	1916
Britain	Equatorial Guinea	Spain	1843	South Africa	1847
Britain	Oregon	United States	1843	Brunei	1847
				Myanmar	1852
Britain	Sudan	Sudan	1884	Botswana	1885

References

A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe: From" Hereditary Enemies" to Partners, author=Germond, C. and Türk, H., year=2008, publisher=Palgrave Macmillan.

Ambrosio, T. (2005). The Russo–American dispute over the invasion of Iraq: international status and the role of positional goods. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 57(8):1189–1210.

Baumeister, R. F., Smart, L., and Boden, J. M. (1996). Relation of threatened egotism to violence and aggression: the dark side of high self-esteem. *Psychological review*, 103(1):5.

Brunschwig, H. (1966). *French Colonialism, 1871-1914: Myths and Realities*. FA Prager.

Bushman, B. J., Baumeister, R. F., et al. (1998). Threatened egotism, narcissism, self-esteem, and direct and displaced aggression: Does self-love or self-hate lead to violence? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75:219–229.

Cain, P. and Hopkins, A. (1993). *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914*. Longman London.

Callahan, W. (2004). National insecurities: Humiliation, salvation, and chinese nationalism. *Alternatives*, pages 199–218.

Carter, D. and Signorino, C. (2010). Back to the future: Modeling time dependence in binary data. *Political Analysis*, 18(3):271–292.

Crawford, N. (2000). The passion of world politics: Propositions on emotion and emotional relationships. *International Security*, 24(4):116–156.

Crawford, N. (2002). *Argument and change in world politics: ethics, decolonization, and humanitarian intervention*, volume 81. Cambridge University Press.

Diehl, P. (1999). *A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict*. Vanderbilt University Press.

Fazal, T. (2004). State death in the international system. *International Organization*, 58(02):311–344.

Fazal, T. (2011). *State death: the politics and geography of conquest, occupation, and annexation*. Princeton University Press.

Galbraith, J. (1978). The british occupation of egypt: Another view. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 9(4):471–488.

Ganiage, J. (1959). *Les origines du Protectorate français en Tunisie (1861-1881)*. Presses universitaires de France.

Gilady, L. (2006). *Conspicuous waste in international relations*. Yale University.

Goemans, H., Gleditsch, K., and Chiozza, G. (2009). Introducing archigos: A dataset of political leaders. *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(2):269–283.

Hanmer, M. J. and Ozan Kalkan, K. (2013). Behind the curve: Clarifying the best approach to calculating predicted probabilities and marginal effects from limited dependent variable models. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1):263–277.

Harkavy, R. (September 2000). Defeat, National Humiliation, and the Revenge Motif in International Politics. *International Politics*, 37:345–368.

Holsti, K. (2004). *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Howard, M. (1990). *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871*. Psychology Press.

Huth, P. (1988). *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*. Yale University Press.

Huth, P. (1996). Enduring rivalries and territorial disputes, 1950-1990. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 15(1):7–41.

Huth, P. and Allee, T. (2003). *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, volume 82. Cambridge University Press.

Hyam, R. (1964). The partition of africa. *The Historical Journal*, 7(1):154–169.

Kennedy, A. (1953). *Salisbury, 1830-1903: Portrait of a Statesman*. J. Murray.

Lebow, R. (2008). *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*. Cambridge University Press Cambridge, United Kingdom.

Leng, R. (1983). When will they ever learn? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 27(3):379–419.

Lindner, E. (2006). *Making Enemies: Humiliation and International Conflict*. Praeger Security Intl.

Lowenheim, O. and Heimann, G. (2008). Revenge in International Politics. *Security Studies*, 17(4):685–724.

Mearsheimer, J. (2003). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. WW Norton & Company.

Mercer, J. (2005). Rationality and psychology in international politics. *International Organization*, 59(1):77–106.

Mercer, J. (2009). *Reputation and International Politics*. Cornell University Press.

Moïsi, D. (2007). Clash of emotions-fear, humiliation, hope, and the new world order, the. *Foreign Affairs*, 86:8.

Murray, M. (2010). Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War. *Security Studies*, 19(4):656–688.

Newbury, C. and Kanya-Forstner, A. (1969). French Policy and the Origins of the Scramble for West Africa. *The Journal of African History*, 10(02):253–276.

Newman, D. (2006). The resilience of territorial conflict in an era of globalization. In Kahler, M. and Walter, B. F., editors, *Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization*, pages 85–110. Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK.

Pickering, J. and Kisangani, E. (2005). Democracy and diversionary military intervention: Reassessing regime type and the diversionary hypothesis. *International Studies Quarterly*, 49(1):23–44.

Press, D. (2005). *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats*. Cornell University Press.

Raymond, D. (1921). *British Policy and Opinion During the Franco-Prussian War*. Columbia University Press.

Ringmar, E. (1996). On the ontological status of the state. *European Journal of International Relations*, 2(4):439–466.

Ringmar, E. (2002). The recognition game. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37(2):115–136.

Roberts, S. (1963). *The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925*. F. Cass.

Ross, A. (2006). Coming in from the cold: Constructivism and emotions. *European Journal of International Relations*, 12(2):197–222.

Sanderson, G. (1974). The European partition of Africa: Coincidence or conjuncture? *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 3(1):1–54.

Saurette, P. (2006). Are you dissin me? humiliation and post 9/11 global politics. *Review of International Studies*, 32(3):495.

Schelling, T. (1966). *Arms and Influence*. New Haven, Yale University Press.

Schivelbusch, W. and Chase, J. (2004). *The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery*. St Martins Pr.

Senese, P. and Vasquez, J. (2003). A unified explanation of territorial conflict: Testing the impact of sampling bias, 1919–1992. *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(2):275–298.

Snyder, J. (1991). *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Cornell Univ Pr.

Tir, J. (2010). Territorial diversion: Diversionary theory of war and territorial conflict. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(02):413–425.

Tir, J., Schafer, P., Diehl, P., and Goertz, G. (1998). Territorial changes, 1816–1996: Procedures and data. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 16(1):89–97.

Townsend, M., Peake, C., and Langsam, W. (1941). *European colonial expansion since 1871*. JB Lippincott.

Trager, R. (2012). Long-term consequences of aggressive diplomacy: European relations after austrian-crimean war threats. *Security Studies*, 12(21):232–265.

Turner, B. (2000). *The Statesman's Yearbook: The Politics, Cultures and Economies of the World*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. McGraw-Hill.

Webb, A. (1936). World almanac, 1868-1935. *Guide to reference books*, 5:120.

Wendt, A. (2004). The state as person in international theory. *Review of International Studies*, 30(2):289–316.

Wolf, R. (2011). Respect and disrespect in international politics: the significance of status recognition. *International Theory*, 3(01):105–142.

Zacher, M. (2001). The territorial integrity norm: International boundaries and the use of force. *International Organization*, 55(2):215–250.

Chapter Five:

The Scramble for Africa: An International Race for Prestige

The last chapter demonstrated that French expansion into Tunisia in 1881 was motivated by a desire for prestige following its humiliating loss of Alsace-Lorraine in the Franco-Prussian War. This chapter addresses how this act of prestige-motivated expansion developed into an *international race* for prestige. It will show through comparative case studies that, in addition to France, the behavior of Germany, Italy and Britain cannot be understood without accounting for prestige dynamics and that, as the Scramble went on, the prestige investments of one state cannot be understood without accounting for the investments of others. This was in spite of the perception by imperial leaders throughout the process of colonization that the colonies would serve as a drain on resources, would offer little in the way of economic growth, and would increase the vulnerability of their states. Decision makers developed beliefs that other states perceived the colonies to be essential to international prestige, setting in to motion a dynamic that led to the conquest of the entire African continent within a 15-year period.[1] To put the significance of colonial expansion during the Scramble for Africa into context, of the 885 cases in which territory

[1]These cases differ from symbolic competitions over weapons that usually originate within a clearly strategic or material logic for the competing parties and thereby provide a good opportunity to distinguish material interests from prestige. Often as competitions over weapons advance they lose touch with their original strategic logic. The case of the cannons that could shoot 360 pound cannonballs illustrates this

changed hands between states since 1816, 245 of them occurred in Africa at the hands of the British, French, Italians, Belgians, Germans, and Dutch. Changes in the imperial map of Africa accounted for more than one quarter of all instances of territorial change over the last 200 years.[2]

Prestige and Territory

Scholars have yet to apply notions of prestige-seeking to the important case of territorial expansion. As stated in chapter 4, international relations scholars, largely ignoring the role that prestige has played in decisions to expand in size, have instead focused on security or domestic motives for such decisions.[3] Realist scholars argue that the primary purpose of territorial expansion is the acquisition of the material or strategic value of territory. Given the anarchic structure and the resulting uncertainty that pervades the international envi-

point. Originally, having a larger cannon than a competitor provided some strategic advantage. The symbolic competition over larger cannons eventually however drained the weapons of their strategic value as they became too large to use. The same could be said for the competition over the number of weapons in Cold War nuclear arsenals. While the original weapons had significant strategic implications, eventually additional numbers of weapons added little strategic value at all.

[2]Data on territorial expansion was taken from the COW dataset on territorial change. See Tir et al. (1998).

[3]A notable exception is Lebow (2008) who argues that European imperialism was both a "bottom-up" and "top-down" project driven in part by middle classes wanting to expand their prestige through the expansion of the prestige of their nation, pp. 324 - 346.

ronment, states can never be certain about the intentions of others. States must therefore work to achieve relative superiority over others in order to ensure their survival. Territorial expansion offers a means of doing so, enabling economic growth through the provision of natural resources and expanded markets and in turn enabling militarily growth.[4] Another group of scholars root the causes of imperial expansion within domestic political concerns. In one conception, imperial expansion can be explained by the emergence of particular specific interest groups with overseas objectives.[5] When such groups assume power, they are sometimes able to form coalitions which trade policy choices, thereby paving the way for imperial expansion though not all groups ultimately desire it. Nationalist objectives are then used to justify this policy of expansion. Others cite the attempt by governments to divert disgruntled domestic audiences and to boost approval ratings by focusing on territorial expansion and wars of conquest.[6]

Detailed analysis of the years prior to and during the European scramble for Africa indicate not only that prestige considerations were the primary driving force behind much

[4]While Mearsheimer believes that conquest should be rampant within any international structure, Van Evera believes that conquest will occur when offense dominates the international system. When offensive technologies dominate, conquest becomes easier. See Mearsheimer (2003), Van Evera (1998), Waltz (1979). Also Bean (1973). For and IR model of expansion rooted in economic bases, see Friedman (1977); in its regime type, see Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Lake and O'Mahony (2004).

[5]Snyder (1991).

[6]Tir (2010).

of the expansion but also that the different stages of the Scramble adhere to the dynamics of prestige competitions. As the cases show below, the states that felt they were at risk of being allotted less influence than they expected made the initial acquisitions of the prestige good. Second, other states, taking note of this commitment of resources by the challenger, then recognized that all other states had also recognized this act for what it is - an attempt to gain prestige at the expense of others. Other states wanting to maintain their prestige then imitated the act of the challenger if they were able, generating an increasingly competitive international environment. Finally, as more of the good was acquired, the value to each actor of the focal point of symbolic competition was not related to the perception of its material or strategic value but was endogenously derived from the dynamics of the competition. The more states perceived that other states wanted African territory, the more they in turn wanted it, leading to an *international race* for prestige.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, I review the standard alternative hypotheses for African expansion at the end of the 19th century. I then turn to comparative case studies assessing the motivations behind the early instances of European expansion into Africa after 1880: the French foray into Tunisia, the British takeover of Egypt, Germany's decision to plant its first flag in East Africa, and finally Italy's ongoing attempts to acquire a colony of its own in northern Africa. Finally, I turn to the nature of state thinking during the height of the scramble from 1885 to 1900.

Alternative Explanations of Imperial Expansion in Africa

In 1880, less than 10% of the continent of Africa had been colonized by European powers. By the year 1914, a full 96% of Africa was consumed under protectorate or colonial status by just six European powers, and most predominantly by just two - France and England. That the European powers moved with such speed and conviction to conquer Africa during this particular 30-year period is remarkable in numerous ways. First, England, France, Portugal, and Spain had maintained small but gradually expanding footprints along the African coasts throughout the first half of the 19th century. However, gradual British and French expansion throughout this period had failed to generate any intense expansion or competition between rivals during that lengthy period. Those powers had long been able to assess the value of their African territories and had pursued expansion only in piecemeal fashion if at all, begging the question of what then led the Scramble to occur when it did.

With some important exceptions, historians have largely ignored the role that prestige has played in shaping decisions about territorial expansion and about colonial expansion in particular, focusing instead on economic, strategic and social motivations of imperialism expansion.[7] Classic treatments of the economic motivations for imperialism locate the value of colonies as new markets for the excess of goods and capital produced in developed, capitalist economies.[8] Later theorists, however, have noted that there was little about

[7]A well-regarded account by Sanderson (1974) argues that prestige was a likely cause. See also Howard (1990).

[8]See **?**. Lenin (1917) argued that the expansion of finance capital into underdeveloped colonies was the

the need for new markets that necessitated annexation of territory.[9] Over the course of the 19th century, the British had come to adopt this perspective, viewing protectorates as 'unwelcome burdens' and embracing the notion that 'trade, not territory' provided the means to the highest profits.[10] The costs of establishing protectorates represented an 'unnecessary reduction in marginal profit.'[11] There is also little evidence to support the notion that imperialism was driven by capitalists' or the landed interests' needs for foreign outlets for their surplus capital. Langer has noted that the most heightened periods of British colonial expansion in fact coincided with a sharp decline in overseas investment of capital rather than with increased capital export and A.J.P Taylor has pointed out that "the Economic analysis [of imperialism] breaks down in almost every case which has been examined in detail."[12] The sad state of the balance sheets of the British East Africa Company and many of the German charter companies by the end of the 1880s also suggest

'highest stage of capitalism,' driven by the need to both export excess capital and to acquire monopolies of the labour and resources and competition that capitalism required.

[9]See Robinson (1922).

[10]British experience following the American revolution had called into question the necessity for annexation of territory for economic gain. British trade with the former colonies not only increased following secession but became the most dominant trade route for England, leading policymakers to cite their good fortune at having lost the war. See Robinson (1922, pp. 160-8).

[11]Sanderson (1974, p. 10), Chamberlain (1974, pp. 40-44).

[12]Quote cited in Hammond (1961); Langer (1935). See also Fieldhouse (1961) and Platt (1968).

that there was often little surplus capital to go around.[13] Instead, as RJ Hammond has noted, "financial gain, as well as decent administration, seem to have been subordinated in the British East Africa Company to the acquisition of territory for its own sake."[14] In some countries like Italy and Portugal, there was actually a shortage of capital, leading to a situation in which, as Chamberlain has noted, "far from capital fighting to get out, it was almost impossible to persuade it to go."[15] There is also little to suggest that these capitalists and bankers had significant impact on the political decisions of Bismarck or the French government.[16] Instead, the French government in large part had to implore its businessmen and industrialists to invest in Africa years after the Scramble had already begun.[17]

It is also difficult to explain the colonization of Africa in terms of the more direct material motivations cited by realists. First, the material value of African colonies and colonization in general had long been called into question by European leaders. By the time of the Scramble for Africa, the French and British had some experience with African colonies. The French had found in Algeria that the only thing plentiful there was desert

[13]Chamberlain (1974) notes that the former was essentially bankrupt by 1890 and the latter were not far behind.

[14]Hammond (1961).

[15]Chamberlain (1974). See also Sanderson (1974).

[16]See Sanderson (1974) for more on the 'mythological beast' of economic imperialism; and Hyam (1999).

[17]Brunschwig (1966).

and the only thing 'plentiful in the desert was air.'[18] As viewed from positions of costs and benefits for the British, by the middle of the 19th century, it had also begun to look to some like the loss of the British empire "might not be of material detriment to the interest of the mother country."[19] In both cases, by 1880, the markets and the resources of Africa were of 'almost negligible importance to the European economy.' Bismarck had also noted in the cases of earlier British and French colonies in Africa that 'the expenditures often exceeded the gain,'[20] stating in 1871 that "I will have no colonies. For Germany to possess colonies would be like a poverty-stricken Polish nobleman acquiring a silk sable coat when he needed shirts."[21]

Robinson and Gallagher have offered the most prominent argument for the strategic rationale behind the Scramble for Africa. Refuting economic motivations, the authors cite British concerns that instability in Egypt would enable the French to 'steal a march on them in Cairo' thereby giving France command of the Suez Canal as the primary British motivation for occupying Egypt in 1882.[22] The annexation of Egypt set off counter French

[18]Roberts (1963, p. 177).

[19]Quote by Lord Melbourne, 1837. Quoted in Reid (1906). Also, by the 1830s, British policymakers were acknowledging that independence was the state towards which all prosperous settlement colonies were destined and moves were being made towards devolution in parts of Australia, Canada, and South Africa.

[20]Stoecker (1986, p. 17).

[21]Quoted in Townsend (1922, p. 18).

[22]Robinson and Gallagher (1965, ch. iv).

annexations that then led to the British to reply in kind. However, as numerous scholars have argued, the evidence for British fears of French expansion simply does not hold up.[23] In addition to a lack of documentary evidence that the British actually feared loss of access to the Suez Canal prior to their ground invasion in June 1882, the British privately acknowledged months prior to their invasion that the French had no interest in taking part in a solo or joint effort to restore stability in Egypt.[24]

Finally, historians have argued that social conditions at home drove imperialism abroad. The argument is largely that colonies abroad would act as a 'safety valve' for social unrest at home either through ensuring economic growth or by providing space for emigration. As Cecil Rhodes saw it, new markets would provide work for citizens and keep money in their pockets, thereby reducing the likelihood of civil unrest. In Rhodes' own words, 'If you want to avoid civil war, you must be an imperialist' and there is some evidence that Bismarck and Jules Ferry in France both held this view. There is little evidence, however, of how such concerns relate to the timing of the intensification of the

[23]There has been a great deal of evidence offered in refute of the Robinson and Gallagher argument. See Schölch (1976), Sanderson (1974) and Galbraith (1978), Cain and Hopkins (1993, p. 366-367), Hopkins (1986), among others.

[24]Schölch (1976, p. 775) cites Granville telling his man on the ground Malet on February 3, 1882 that the French were "strongly against English and French single or joint occupation as well as against any form of Turkish intervention in Egypt."

partition of Africa.[25] Rhodes uttered these statements in 1895, long after massive segments of African territories had already been claimed. Instead, the initial attitude of the colonial states towards the partition was more one of gamesmanship than of essential struggle for the cohesion of the homeland. As noted in Sanderson (1974), the partition of Africa was more the 'steeplechases of rival missions with their stock-in-trade of national flags' than it was a matter of national life or death.[26]

While these large-scale explanations may provide some insight into the background conditions that gave way to colonization, they completely ignore the political circumstances on the ground and the actual decisions to expand and in so doing fail to explain anything about the timing or location of each instance of expansion or the relationship of each of the cases of expansion to each other. The next sections of this chapter explore the immediate circumstances of the initial cases of expansion in Africa and looks at the motivations guiding the key decision-makers in the cases of colonizing France, Britain, Germany and Italy. The case studies demonstrate that France, Germany and Italy were motivated in their African expansion by a desire for a greater voice in the international system and that the actions of France in its drive to renew its place in the world, in part sanctioned by Britain and Germany, initiated the scramble. Britain was eventually motivated to expand by a desire

[25]See Sanderson (1974) for a more detailed argument on the timing.The account below will also relate the timing of civil unrest with territorial acquisition.

[26]Sanderson (1974) [pp. 14-5].

to maintain the relative influence that it had, but only after France had made significant strides. Germany was spurred on in East Africa after being humiliated by the British; the Italians followed them into the fray, for if Germany was expanding, Italy would have to also if it desired to be considered a member of the club of Great Powers. These initial cases gave rise to second order beliefs that such colonies were the key to international success and their value resided not in economics or strategy but in their symbolic value as prestige goods.

Imperial Expansion Before the Scramble: 1815 to 1870

For roughly seven decades prior to the Scramble in Africa, states had showed relatively little interest in colonial expansion in Africa. French statesmen after the Napoleonic Wars acknowledged that if they did seek African colonies again, it would solely be out of a desire for prestige. The Duc de Richelieu noted in 1816 that France would push to takes its former colony of French Guiana back from Portugal "not because of any real advantage we derive from [it]... but because it would be harmful to the dignity both of the King and of the State to concede anything to Portugal to which she has no sort of claim."[27] British attitudes towards the colonies after 1815 had come to be defined by "indifference tempered by uneasiness"[28] This policy of devolution or maintenance, but not expansion, of the empire

[27]Quoted in Brunschwig (1966, pp. 14- 5).

[28]During the wars, the public and policymakers became concerned about the expense of maintaining and defending the colonies Robinson (1922, p. 160).

after the defeat of its biggest rival made sense within the broader logic for British imperial expansion. Much British expansion had been rooted in concerns for its national security and its standing in the world. Throughout the 18th century, the British had expanded out of a fear of French expansion and with little enthusiasm for the act and expense of ruling.[29] Without a rival France attempting to overtake Britain's dominant position, British policy towards expansion could take more variable form.

Starting in 1830, just 15 years after the Napoleonic Wars, the French again embarked upon expansion in to Northern Africa. The motivation behind Charles X's first push into Algiers seems to have been a desire to distract domestic audiences from maladministration at home. While Algerian and French relations had ruptured in 1827 following a dispute over money owed indirectly by the French government to Algerian merchants,[30] the true cause of French actions in Algeria three years later seems to have been a desire by a vulnerable King to fill the eyes of the public with glorious adventures in exotic faraway lands in hopes of establishing a more absolutist government and suppressing his internal opposition.[31] The

[29]See Marshall (2005, p. 6). Seeley also argues that British territorial policy was driven more by fear of French expansion than by a desire to expand trade or out of singular ambition Seeley (1899).

[30]Upon arriving in Algiers in 1827, the French consul announced the intentions of the French government no to pay the dey directly, in response to which the Dey swatted the French consul six times on the arm with his ceremonial fly swatter and ordered him out of the room. This event led to a three-year blockade of Algiers. Aldrich (1996).

[31]See Swain (1933, pp. 359-60); Roberts (1963, pp. 176-77); Aldrich (1996, pp. 25-6).

King ultimately failed in his efforts to save the Restoration and his rule through overseas expansion - elections shortly afterwards brought the opposition back into power, leading to the eventual fall of the Restoration monarchy and the flight of Charles from France. Charles X first pushed into Algeria starting in 1830, providing France its first new imperial territory since Napoleon, though French commitment to her Algerian territory wavered for decades following. Algeria was a desert after all and the only thing plentiful in the desert, it was noted, was air; there were few economic benefits to be hoped for.[32] Nevertheless, the French pursued a violent course of suppression of Algerian masses and expansion deeper into the continent as the century wore on.[33]

It is important to note that these acts of expansion worried Britain but did not generate any shift in British foreign policy towards expansion. Instead of placing French prestige at stake in these acts by declaring them attempts to restore prestige and influence, the French worked diligently to minimize British upset and to deny any role for enhancing French status. Fearing British attempts to force withdrawal from Algeria and recognizing their likely ability to do so, the French did all they could to calm British fears that French actions in Algeria were not rooted in a desire for material expansion or personal interest. Instead, they cited the damage to their honor done by the Algerian Dey and the need to

[32]Roberts (1963, p. 177).

[33]The cause often given for this continued expansion was a need to protect the settlers that arrived after 1830. The situation for Frenchmen in Algeria was precarious at best. More French troops were sent to essentially protect French investment in the area. See Roberts (1963); Aldrich (1996, pp. 24-8).

keep the area safe from pirates through the enforcement of maritime laws for the good of all European powers. Thus, significant French prestige was not invoked here and no subsequent retaliatory acts of expansion occurred.

By the end of the 1870s, the African colonies of both France and Britain proved to be a net loss, yet the 1880s saw a massive effort towards further expansion. Brunschwig has described the paradoxes surrounding their colonial policies in the 1880s and beyond as follows:

> The British acquired an empire whilst declaring that colonies were on the whole harmful to their economy. Rather than colonies they preferred a free trade system. The French conquered an empire when their overseas trade was at a minimum and when their people were totally uninterested in the world beyond the seas.

The question thus remains as to what events exactly prompted the subsequent period of ever-increasing competition.

The First Steps of the Scramble for Africa, 1881 - 1885

Prior to 1880, there were a few instances of European expansion into Africa. However, these constitute a small fraction of the total area eventually taken. As table 1 indicates, between 1816 and 1881, there were just 20 separate instances of European expansion into Africa totaling 1,172,780 km^2, or just under 5% of the total African territory eventually

taken by European powers up through 1914.[34] Of this expansion occurring prior to 1881, just 156,473 km^2, or 13%, were taken at the hands of the British around South Africa while 87% was taken by the French, primarily in Algeria over a period of 40 years. In the four years period of 1881 to 1885, nearly 8,750,000 km^2 were taken by France, Portugal, Belgium, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

French Expansion into Tunisia, 1881: The European Response

The last chapter examined the motivations behind French expansion into Tunisia in 1882. This section will focus on the reaction of European leaders to the French desire for territory in Tunisia and will address why French expansion there went unopposed. As shown in the previous chapter, the roots of French expansion in 1882 and the Scramble for Africa more generally extended deep into the preceding decade. The loss of prestige suffered at the hands of the Prussians in the Franco-Prussian war and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine left a mark on the French psyche. Large segments of the French population and French leaders became focused on restoring French prestige. Such efforts were forestalled by the need to invest resources in domestic rebuilding after the war. Upon the fall of the anti-colonial monarchists in 1879, charge fell to Jules Ferry and Charles de Freycinet, both of whom were convinced of the need to take action in order to protect and enhance Frances world stature and both of whom came to believe that France could regain the preeminence it lost in Europe by pursuing expansion in the colonial sphere.

[34]Data taken from Tir et al. (1998).

Unlike previous acts of French expansion in Africa, that French expansion into Tunisia was motivated by a desire to shore up prestige following the loss of French territories to the Prussians was clear to all European leaders. As shown in the last chapter, French leaders' rhetoric clearly conveyed the connection between a desire to regain prestige and expansion into Tunisia. European leaders were aware of French humiliation following the war and fully expected France to eventually reassert itself in the hopes of reestablishing its position of social preeminence. The man responsible for French defeat and humiliation, Otto von Bismarck, was acutely aware of French ambitions to reclaim stature and feared that the French would direct their energies towards Prussia. He wanted to ensure above all that French claims to prestige were recognized in a way that satisfied the French; he felt that the best means to 'compensate' France was through territorial aggrandizement in Northern Africa at the expense of the expiring Ottoman Empire.[35]

The question then is what type of 'compensation' did Tunisia offer France. As discussed in chapter 4, the bankrupt desert country provided meagre resources. France also already had a strategic stronghold with its Algerian holdings, making it unclear what additional strategic utility the possession of Tunisia offered. Rather than material or strategic compensation, Tunisia provided France with the social recognition it sought and which

[35]As Langer (1925) notes, Bismarck's policy aimed to satisfy the ambitions of all powers who felt they required greater prestige and believed that territory abroad provided the best means of doing so. Bismarck encouraged England to take Egypt, Russia to take Bulgaria, and France and Italy to carve out influence around the Mediterranean. Langer (1925, pp. 59-60). See also Roberts (1963).

others apparently believed it deserved. That the European powers allowed France to increase its sphere of influecne unopposed indicates that France was attempting to augment its prestige an amount which was in keeping with how other European powers perceived it. Put another way, it is very unlikely that Germany and Britain would have allowed France to enhance its sphere of influence if they had not believed that France prestige merited it.

While German and Britain acquiesced to French expansion, thereby providing recognition of French prestige, French expansion had a different effect on less prestigious powers who were also interested in enhancing their own position within the prestige hierarchy. The Italians, for instance, perceived French expansion into Tunisia to be at their own expense. Throughout Bismarck's years of maneuvering on this question, the Italians had expressed a specific desire for Tunis and had at times received German signals in support of these aims. That the less prestigious Italian state might end up with an enlarged sphere of influence before France did spurred France to action. Failure to do so could send a signal that French prestige was lower than that of Italy. As one French diplomat put it, France would be "allowing itself be relegated to the level of Spain."[36]

The French took action in Tunisia therefore with the primary aim of consolidating French prestige. They did this by acting with the acceptance of other prestigious powers

[36]St.Vallier to Barthelemy St. Hilaire on Jan 26, 1881 in Ganiage (1959, pp. 632). As Sanderson notes, it was with these types of sentiments that Ferry and Gambetta were brought to action in Tunisia. Sanderson (1974, p. 9).

and by engaging in an action which clearly distinguished France from those beneath it on the social hierarchy. Doing so cost the French the friendship of the Italians and cost French leaders the support of the French masses, who believed that Ferry had played into the hands of Bismarck.[37] Nevertheless, French statesmen believed France was on course to reestablish itself in the eyes of other nations. Importantly, these actions took place prior to 1882 and the onset of the Egyptian crisis. While some historians have argued that the crisis in Egypt prompted the scramble for Africa as British moves led to French countermoves of expansion, the French had long planned to expand into Tunisia prior to these events.[38]

The British Expansion into Egypt, 1882

The British occupation of Egypt in the following year was less the result of a coherent policy of expansion than it was the result of 'muddleheadedness' and miscalculation.[39] Its impact on the Scramble for Africa, however, and on later French action, was significant. As we would expect, the British, as the most influential naval and colonial power, had little interest in gaining further territory and thereby further prestige. Instead, the British desired to protect and maintain their current influence when challenged. The French, in their role in the crisis, were attempting to maintain their relative influence by insisting that the Egyptian crisis by handled be France and Britain alone, as preeminent powers. The

[37]Kelly (1955). Ferry's government was immediately overthrown.

[38]Chamberlain (1974).

[39]See Chamberlain (1976) and Galbraith (1978).

end of the crisis, however, and the subsequent end of French influence in Egypt, left the French resentful and humiliated, leading them again to pursue territorial gains in hopes of renewing their status.

The French and British had maintained shared influence over Egypt from afar since the Convention of London in 1840; their citizens had developed considerable financial interest there.[40] By 1876, however, the Egyptian leader Khedive Ismail Pasha had run up sufficient debts that the Egyptian government was forced to declare bankruptcy. As the British and French took greater control over Egyptian finances in an effort to protect investments, an Egyptian nationalist movement, targeted against British and French bondholders, arose throughout the region. Britain and France responded by urging the Turkish sultan, nominally in control of Egypt, to remove Khedive Ismail from power and to replace him with his more pro-European son Tewfiq. The nationalists continued to accrue power, however, as the nationalist leader Arabi becoming the Minister of War in January of 1882. A naval demonstration by the French and British in May aimed at bolstering the position of the Khedive Tewfiq, had the unintended consequence of producing riots in the Egyptian streets which resulted in the killing of 50 Europeans, many of French and British descent. As the British faced the growing necessity to intervene militarily in order to defend its reputation,

[40]The Convention was signed by Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire and granted Muhammed Ali and his heirs control of Egypt in exchange for not undermining the stability of the Ottoman Empire.

French policy moved in the other direction, as Freycinet pulled all French ships from the harbor and refused to participate in any further military action in Egypt. Following an ultimatum by the British to remove all cannons from the port of Alexandria, the British bombarded and occupied the city along with Turkish troops. The era of French influence in Egypt was officially over.

What prompted these policy choices on the parts of the Dual powers? It was certainly not an interest in formal expansion on the part of the British. The British had maintained a status quo policy in Egypt throughout the mid-19th century and even up to the time of occupation, perceiving occupation to be a useless encumbrance.[41] Instead, the British appear to have been motivated by a desire to both protect financial interests and to maintain the Anglo-French entente throughout the early period of the crisis from 1876 to 1881. It was at the urging and authorship of the French that the Joint Note of January 8, 1882 was produced which took a hardline on protecting European financial interests and on maintaining Dual Control of the two powers in Egypt at any cost. Though the tone of the joint note struck Gladstone as too aggressive, he went along so as not to disrupt the alliance.[42] Following the release of the joint note and the subsequent increase in power by

[41]Disraeli to Salisbury, Nov 29, 1876. Sir William Harcourt, the majority leader, expressed doubt in 1881 that Britain could even sustain such expansion, declaring "We have already as much Empire as the nation can carry. If you have the heart too much work to do... you enfeeble its action and it succumbs." Quoted in Brunschwig (1966, p. 68).

[42]See **?** and Robinson and Gallagher (1965).

Egyptian nationalists, it seems that the British perceived their reputation for resolve to have been called in to question. Thus, while they desired to avoid direct intervention at all costs, preferring the internationalization of the crisis, with the incorporation of the other Great Powers, and the reliance on Turkish troops to subdue the nationalists as the ideal alternative, they moved closer towards intervention following the death of British citizens following the naval demonstration in May.[43] In the eyes of the cabinet, the perception was growing that restoring British influence in Egypt had become a 'prerequisite' for protecting British reputation and for securing British colonies throughout the world.[44] On June 12th, after ships had been put into place for the bombardment, the British Foreign Secretary Lord Granville claimed that the conquest of Egypt had been 'forced' upon them and bemoaned to Lord Spencer that the British takeover of Egypt was "a nasty business, and we have been much out of luck."[45] The British themselves recognized that they had been backed into the defense of British influence in Egypt because of the signal of potential weakness

[43]The British remained concerned about intervention, fearing the costs of occupation and that they would incite the other Powers by acting too hastily. The British cabinet felt that the perils taking on an armed intervention "are so formidable, and the jealousy of the Powers so great, that there can be no desire on the part of any Ministry to commit itself to precipitate action." Quoted in The Pall Mall Gazette, 2 February 1882, p. 1.

[44]"Copy of a Despatch from Earl Granville to the Earl of Dufferin respecting the Affairs of Egypt", 11 July 1882, *Parliamentary Papers*, Egypt 10. See discussion in Halvorson (2010).

[45]Quoted in Chamberlain (1974, p. 33).

the crisis sent to British colonies around the world.

For the French, the initial objectives in the Egyptian crisis were not only to protect the interest of French bondholders but also to maintain 'absolute parity' of influence with the British in Egypt.[46] With the annexation of Tunisia, France had become singleminded in its focus on raising its international profile and on balancing British influence at every turn. This in turn meant keeping other Great Powers out of the Egyptian domain despite repeated British attempts to internationalize the crisis.[47] The French in turn desired to minimize Turkish influence in Egypt, fearing the repercussions on Tunisia and Algeria of a pan-Islamic movement.[48] These objectives led to the heightened French role in Egyptian affairs from 1876 to 1881 and to Gambetta's January 1881 note threatening intervention in Egypt which he invited the British to sign. French policy changed quite dramatically however with the downfall of Gambetta on January 30, 1881. While Freycinet maintained interest in quelling Egyptian dissent, he, and the French people, were becoming less tolerant of paying costs to do so. While the French proposed the joint naval demonstration in May of 1882, they increasingly disagreed with the British proposal to follow up any bombardment with Turkish ground forces. As French public opinion swayed dramatically against the form of intervention proposed by the British taking the votes of the French Chamber with

[46]Packenham (1991).

[47]The French feared the diminishment of their status if the other Great Powers were invited to participate in Egyptian actions, thereby leveling the status hierarchy somewhat.

[48]See Blunt et al. (1907).

it, Freycinet was left with no choice but to pull French ships to the Port of Said the day before the British naval bombardment began in mid-July.[49]

The primary point of interest of the Egyptian case for the purpose of assessing the role of prestige in the scramble for Africa is less the British motivations for occupation than the impact of the event on the French. Though the blame for French inaction laid solely with the French people and French chamber, it was perceived by the French press that France had made a fool of itself in allowing itself to be beaten by Britain. The loss of Egypt was spoken by some in the same sentence as the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, referred to as the "second disaster" with consequences almost as disastrous for France as the war of 1870.[50] This humiliation, though self-imposed, presented France with a new psychological motivation for redemption of its prestige for fear that it would otherwise be reduced to the level of Italy or Spain. As will be seen, it led to a policy of expansion within Central Africa which likely would not have otherwise existed, thereby marking the true starting point in the race for Africa.[51]

[49]A request was also made by the British for French participation in the protection of the Suez canal following occupation. Freycinet took the request to the French Chamber, which voted it down, leading to his resignation the following week.

[50]See Sanderson (1965) and Andrew (1968) for the impact of the loss of Egypt on Delcassé and his later policy towards Egypt during the Fashoda crisis.

[51]The French would continue to demand compensation for withdrawing from Egypt or a return to Dual Control for decades after occupation, making it the most consistent point within their foreign policy. The

France and Britain in the Congo, 1882

Just as instability in Egypt was mounting, European competition in the Congo was also ramping up. The early stages of the competition for the African interior were driven largely by private charter companies. The official policy of the French government in 1880 was that it had no interest in the Congo; it primarily focused on the Mediterranean ports as the best routes to prestige. Nevertheless, the Frenchman de Brazza was independently maneuvering deep into the Congo and on September 10, 1880 signed an agreement with Makoko, chief of the Bateke, in which the chief promised to "cede his territory to France... and his hereditary rights of supremacy."[52] Brazza's expeditions into the Congo coincided with those of Leopold II of Belgium, who cherished hopes of increasing Belgian prestige through colonial expansion.[53] News of Brazza's success in besting Leopold did not initially make it all the way up official French chain of authority however. In July 1881, the British Ambassador in Paris inquired about the status of Brazza's agreement, to which the Quai d'Orsay replied that it was a matter of concern for the French committee within the AIA, the charter and development company that had supported the trip, and not a matter for

British however perpetually "refused to buy the French out of Egypt."

[52]Brazza had set out in effort to best Stanley who was returning to Africa on behest of Leopold IIs African International Association to carve out a piece of the Congo. See Brunschwig (1966, p. 44-48).

[53]Leopold noted often the model of Great Powers achieving their greatness through expansion. See Viaene (2008) and Aldrich (1996, p. 54). Leopold also noted that he saw Belgian expansion as 'a means of giving us a more important place in the world.' See Brunschwig (1966, p. 31).

the French government, which was officially not interested in the interior of Africa. This remained official French policy until the middle of 1882, when the French government began to change its tune on Brazza's expeditionary accomplishments.

Why this rather sudden shift? Most importantly, by June, it had become clear that Freycinet would have to shrink from Egyptian intervention; the government either sensed or feared that French public opinion would been incited by these events. As the months wore on, the growing perception that France had lost prestige in that encounter by allowing the British to go it alone increased the demand for France to make a display of its influence. The government and French people merely had to be convinced that the Congo provided the means to renewed prestige and Brazza led a powerful press campaign in support of his expeditions aimed at doing exactly that. With the Congo, Duclerc came to believe that he had the means to satisfy public opinion for a 'patriotic' act of grandeur without coming into conflict with the British, or so he thought.[54] Duclerc successfully pressed for French Parliament ratification of Brazza's agreements with the Makoko in November, 1882.

Throughout the late 1870s and early 80s, the French government had taken great care to not provoke the British in their quest for greater influence. Though France desired greater influence, they were not willing to risk conflict with Britain to obtain it. Though there were signs of British decline, Britain was still the dominant military force in the world.[55] Thus,

[54]Chamberlain (1974) and Brunschwig (1966).

[55]Sanderson (1974).

France had pressed for expansion in Tunisia, but only with the consent of the British. In 1881, the French had sacrificed lands in Senegal gained by French private expeditionary forces to British interests there to ensure they didn't poke the British into action.[56] The British to date however had expressed little interest in the Congo, leaving Duclerc convinced that it's annexation provided the least costly way to enhance French prestige. Yet, though the British had not expressed interest in the Congo prior to French annexation there, their tune changed soon after. The French treaty with Makoko had cut off Leopold from the water and hinted at French ownership of much of the west coast of Africa and a larger shift in influence towards France. These concerns led the British back into negotiations with Portugal, long dormant, over the Portuguese colonies in Goa, Mozambique, and the Congo. These negotiations led to the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of February 1884 in which Britain recognized Portuguese claims to the mouth of the Congo river and declared navigation of the Congo to be under the purview of an Anglo-Portuguese Commission.[57] Upon the signing of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty, however, there was immediate international outcry about these seemingly aggressive British policies in an area of international interest. The arrogance of British behavior in the Congo even provided the basis for a short-lived Franco-German reconciliation, with Bismarck backing French claims there. It also spurred on Germany's decision to gain influence at the expense of the British. Bismarck thus organized

[56]Brunschwig (1966, pp. 44-48).

[57]Chamberlain (1974).

the Berlin Conference in 1884 to address not only the Congo question, but also to address 'new occupations' within the continent.

The Causes of Early German Expansion

In 1868, Bismarck defended Prussian abstention from colonial expansion, saying:

> The advantages which people expect from colonies for the commerce and industry of the mother country are mainly founded on illusions, for the expenditure very often exceeds the gain, as is proved by the experience of England and France in their colonial policy.[58]

Bismarck worried not only about colonial drain on resources and the costs of administering them, but was also concerned that colonies would act as a drain on German military capabilities as well since they would have to be defended by powerful naval fleets which Germany did not have at the time. Additionally, Bismarck had no interest in becoming more reliant on parliament for funds to support colonial initiatives.[59] Despite Bismarck's persistent disdain for colonial adventures in Africa, however, by 1884, Germany had decided to acquire areas of Cameroon, Namibia and Togoland as German colonies, an area larger than Germany itself, and by 1886 had colonial holdings in Kenya and East Africa. Given

[58]At that time, Prussia also lacked an effective navy and sufficient manpower to engage in significant expansion.Stoecker (1986, p. 17). See also Pflanze (1990).

[59]Pflanze (1990, p. 122-3), Mommsen (1995).

his doubts about colonial profitability, why ultimately did he follow Britain, France, and Belgium into the colonizing fray?

Historians have long debated the overarching motivations behind Bismarck's sudden change of heart in April 1884 when he gave orders for the German flag to be planted in East Africa. They cite large-scale economic or social conditions that gave rise to Germany's need for expansion, attributing the shift in policy to the need to export capital, goods, or emigrants,[60] the desire for a "safety valve" to stave off social unrest,[61] or to Bismarck's desire for support from domestic merchant groups and a general public which was becoming increasingly bent on Germany establishing a colonial footprint.[62] While these arguments

[60]Smith (1978)

[61]Pflanze (1990, p. 116).

[62]Aydelotte (1937) As regards the AJP Taylor argument that Bismarck's expansion into Africa was aimed at angering the British in order to draw closer to the French, as Sanderson notes, it is not clear why the Germans needed a quarrel with England to arrive at this outcome nor why he would have aimed to anger Britain through colonial expansion rather than exploiting British strategic vulnerability in Egypt Sanderson (1974, p. 8). This theory also does little to explain the behavior of Italy, Belgium or Portugal or the timing of the partition. While social imperialist arguments have held up over time, arguments rooted in economic rationales have largely been discredited, with Mommsen (1982, p. 100-104) arguing that economic arguments were usually adduced as afterthoughts to justify territorial gains that had already taken place." See also Fieldhouse (1973), Pflanze (1990), Sanderson (1974). Such ambiguity exists about the German case primarily because decision-making was a private affair, with Bismarck guiding significant policies in ways he saw fit with little need to explain his rationales publicly or privately.

may offer insight into the underlying conditions surrounding German expansion, they offer little in the way of explaining exactly when and why Bismarck opted to expand where he did. Analysis of the immediate circumstances surrounding Bismarck's decision to plant Germany's first flag in Africa in April 1884 suggests he was motivated primarily by the peremptory attitude of the British towards his inquiries about territory in Angra Pequena in east Africa.

Bismarck's skepticism about the utility of colonies was well known. Throughout the 1870s and early 1880s, Bismarck had turned down requests from German merchants with footholds in Africa seeking protection from the German state.[63] However, requests initiated by Herr Luderitz, a factory owner in east African Angra Pequena, in late 1882 eventually resulted in the establishment of the first German protectorate there on April 24, 1884. What was different about this particular request? As late as mid-1883, Bismarck preferred that, rather than have the German state offer protection of the German traders, that the British would extend sovereignty over the territory of Angra Pequena and in turn assume responsibility for providing law and order in the region. He sent word as such to the British in February 1883. By August 1883, he had received no reply, at which point, he sent another "cautious inquiry" to the British seeking to determine British intentions towards the territory of Angra Pequena and to ascertain the basis of any claim to title of the land

[63]Pflanze (1990) cites Bismarck as saying privately in 1882 "I don't like colonies at all. They are only good as supply posts." (p. 114)

that the British might have had. Additionally, he inquired about provisions the British might make for the protection of German traders in the case that title was claimed. Again, response was slow in coming, leaving Bismarck bristling. The nature of the eventual British response in November, nine months after the initial German inquiry, did little to alleviate Bismarck's irritation. It stated that although the British had little interest in claiming Angra Pequena themselves, they would perceive "any claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction by a foreign power...[to] infringe their legitimate rights."[64] An irritated Bismarck followed up with a stronger note in late December, citing previous British admissions that they had no title to or interest in the territory and asking the to British provide some legitimate basis for their claim. This official enquiry too went unanswered for six months, leaving Bismarck irked and suspicious of British intentions.

Within a few months, Bismarck's hope that the British would extend sovereignty over the Angra Pequena territory in order to protect German traders had morphed into a concern that Britain would take the land while completely ignoring Germany in the process as well as a subsequent desire to preempt Britain in this attempt. Before any response to the strong December note was ever received from the British, Bismarck ordered the German flag planted on April 24, 1884 and Germany took responsibility for protection of the Angra Pequena settlements. He ensured that Germany would take no financial role in colonial administration and recognized that the inevitable costs of even colonial protection would

[64]Quoted in Pflanze (1990, p. 124).

have to be dealt with down the road.[65] Explorers even prior to the time of the German takeover sent reports questioning the economic value of Angra Pequena, citing "It is one of the least economic coasts on earth... no tree, no bush, no leaf is to be seen, nothing but sand.[66] Nevertheless, Bismarck proceeded into Angra Pequena primarily because of his growing indignation at Britain's flippant treatment of German interests.

For their part, London was shocked upon hearing of the German claims. The British had long taken Bismarck at his anti-colonial word and were not expecting his change of heart regarding German colonies. In a later apology to Bismarck for the slight, Granville claimed to have been guided by this impression in dealing with the German inquiries and had therefore deemed them of secondary importance. Bismarck could not fail to notice however that this formal British apology was not accompanied by a formal recognition of German sovereignty over Angra Pequena, leaving Bismarck even more indignant.[67] On June 1st, he wrote to Count Münster, the German ambassador to London, decrying the "unrestrained [British] claims against us in colonial matters. A Monroe Doctrine for Africa!...Public opinion in Germany will not endure the arrogance and selfishness of the English for ever."[68] On June 1st, Bismarck again decries the British arrogance, stating that "... the Monroe

[65]See Stoecker (1986, pp. 16-20); Smith (1978, pp. 27- 34); Pflanze (1990).

[66]Another German explorer, upon visiting the new protectorate, exclaimed "What a terrible desert we have acquired." Both quoted in Pflanze (1990, p. 134).

[67]Turner (1967, p.63).

[68]Letter from Bismarck to Count Munster, May 25th, 1884. Dugdale.

Doctrine, that monstrosity in International Law, was being applied in favour of England to the coast of Africa... This naïve egoism is in itself an insult to our national feeling, and you will please point this out to Lord Granville. The 'quod licet Jovi, etc.' cannot be applied to Germany."[69]

On August 7th, Bismarck ordered flags to be planted along the coasts to the north and south of Angra Pequena as well as in Cameroon, Togo, and Namibia, thereby acquiring within 5 short months a territory roughly three times the size of Germany itself and accounting for almost 83% of all territory that would be acquired by Germany in Africa. A few days following this move, he told Münster:

> London is not showing the consideration to our overseas trade to which it is entitled. If we fail to push our rights with energy, we shall risk, by letting them sink into oblivion, falling into a position inferior to England, and strengthening the unbounded arrogance shown by England and her Colonies in opposition to us... Seeing the want of consideration shown in British colonial policy, modesty on our part is out of place.[70]

Upon hearing of supposedly preemptive moves by Bismarck in Africa as well as in New Guinea, Chamberlain too expressed indignation, saying "I dont care about New Guinea, and I am not afraid of German colonization, but I don't like to be cheeked by Bismarck or

[69]Letter from Bismarck to Count Munster, June 1st, 1884. Dugdale.

[70]Letter from Bismarck to Count Münster, August 7, 1884. Dugdale

anyone else."[71]

The above comments suggest a primary rationale behind Bismarck's efforts in Africa: to press back against British attempts to altogether exclude German influence from African affairs. This is not because Germany had some inherent interest in African affairs. Bismarck had done all he could to ensure loose economic and political ties to his protectorates. Instead, it was because Britain's slights there signaled to Bismarck that Britain held Germany in low esteem and felt comfortable ignoring its interests. Failure to press back on these slights meant risking demotion to second-rate status in the perception of the international community. Assertion on the issue however meant signaling to Britain and the international community that Germany had influence in international affairs would have to be afforded greater respect than had been given. These calculations led Bismarck to thwart a policy of British expansion in east Africa that he had supported only months before and to engage in a costly exercise of protectionism that Bismarck had no immediate interest in.[72]

[71]Taylor and Percivale (1967, p. 71).

[72]Bismarck was not the only German incensed by British treatment. We see Bismarck cite growing animosity by the German public towards British arrogance, a movement he was all so careful to keep tabs on. As time went on, the expansion of the German footprint in the world became an increasingly predominant electoral issue among the German public, with Bismarck citing in 1885 that "At present, public opinion in Germany sets such great store by colonial policy that the government's position in home affairs largely depends on its success. The smallest corner of New Guinea or West Africa, even if in actual

The Causes of Italian Expansion

Italy's first case of large-scale expansion into Africa was in 1889 with the annexation of Ethiopia. Italy's expansionist policy had been in effect long before that however. As early as 1880, taking cues from French exploits, Italy began searching for Mediterranean colonies in order to raise its international profile. While Germany had come about as a relatively strong member of the international system, Italy had entered the system as a weakling.[73] If it desired therefore to enhance its position in the system, it would have to do so largely through self-promotion in whatever affordable ways it could and with the tacit acceptance or support of the Great powers, which was slow in coming. As described earlier, Italy decided to first stake a claim on Tunisia in 1881, placing her in competition with the French for the area. Though Bismarck initially hinted at potential lands for Italy in the deal, Italy was eventually shut out of the deal. Following the embarrassment of the "Tunisian bombshell," as it was called in the press, Italian opinion shifted back towards colonial indifference, with the Italian foreign minister Pasquale Mancini stating in 1881 and similarly in 1882 that "the system of territorial colonies is sterile and harmfula source of weakness rather than of strength. I fully believe that those nations which do not already have territorial colonies should not consider procuring them.[74]

---

fact completely worthless, is at present more important for our policy than the whole of Egypt and its future." Quoted in Stoecker (1986, p. 34).

[73]See Bosworth (1979) for a description of Italy's tentative rank at this time.

[74]Hess (1967).

This attitude largely held among the Italian public and the government throughout 1882 and 1883 but experienced a dramatic shift in 1884 when the Italians began again to angle for colonial holdings in Africa. What had changed? When colonization had been perceived as a game between just the British and French, the Italians had little reason to act. Bismarck's dive into the African competition in 1884 however had made an impact, profoundly affecting Italian statesman who saw German actions as setting a new precedent that could be easily followed.[75] As Hess has noted, the shift came with the recognition that "Colonialism was not be solely a French and British phenomenon. Germany had acted; Italy must act."[76] Of course, it would take numerous unsuccessful attempts before Italy obtained its first prize in the fight. With secret sanction by the British, Italy took the port of Massawa in Eritrea on the Red Sea in 1886 and took land near the horn of Africa in 1887. It would take two years of Italian military engagement for it to bring its coveted Ethiopia into the fold in 1889, though the colony would be lost again in 1896 after Italian defeat.

Above all, in these attempts, Italy wanted its 'place in the sun.'[77] It was a new state and had notions of grandeur. While it was relatively weak, participation in the scramble for africa might signal to others that Italy was more influential than they knew. As Prime

[75]Hess (1967, p.153).

[76]*Ibid.*

[77]Brogi (2006).

Minister Francesco Crispi in particular believed, if other Powers were acquiring colonies in Africa, Italy should also acquire them in order to look more like a Great Power.[78] The Italian statesman di Rudini also later admitted as such, acknowledging that Italy had sought colonies "in a spirit of imitation... for pure snobbism."[79] France and Britain had provided models for great powers behavior. Germany was going to join them in that fray. Italy chose to imitate them rather than be left behind.

The Height of the Scramble and Beyond: 1885 and 1912

In early 1884, Britain seemed dedicated to its anti-expansionist policy. Though it had moved to block the expansion of French influence in the Congo and had protected interests in Egypt and South Africa, it had not yet embarked on expansion into any new domains. Lord Derby, the Colonial Secretary at the time, even noted to Gladstone in December 1884 "there is something absurd in the scramble for colonies."[80] The first acts of German expansion initially did little to arouse the British out of their satiated torpor. The British press in fact referred to the early territories taken by the Germans in East Africa as 'sterile sand holes' and noted that if the Germans were foolhardy enough to embark there, the English would offer a "hearty welcome to the development of the Teuton abroad."[81] Nevertheless,

[78]Sanderson (1974).

[79]Quoted in Langer (1925, p. 281).

[80]Derby to Granville, December 28, 1884. Granville Papers.

[81]Quoted in Gifford et al. (1967, p. 4). Gladstone himself also wrote that "If Germany is to become a

a transition in British thinking occurred during 1884. While Britain had little interest in any particular colony of the Germans or French, Britain was concerned with its mounting number of diplomatic losses. Bismarck had been successful in establishing Leopold II as King of Belgian Congo and at pushing the French to expand their holdings in West Africa. Continued German expansion following the German elections of 1884 caused Britain to reassess its position that German expansion was merely an electoral gimmick. With the addition of this new expansionist power on the scene, British policy was finally destabilized; it became axiomatic in British official thinking that Britain must not be left behind.[82]

The general British position was that expansion of the British Empire was not in their interest, but French and German expansion unmatched by British expansion was even less so. As stated by Sir Percy Anderson in 1885, "protectorates are unwelcome burdens, but in this case, it is... a question between British protectorates which would be unwelcome, and French protectorates which would be fatal. Protectorates, of one sort or another, are the inevitable outcome of the situation."[83] The British also sensed that the Germans "intended to injure British interests in Africa wherever it may be possible."[84] As Sanderson notes, following numerous diplomatic defeats for the British between 1883 and 1885 and the

---

colonizing power, all I say is "God speed her!" Quoted in Porter (1975, p. 102).

[82]Boyce (1999).

[83]Quoted in Hyam (1999, p. 40).

[84]Lister to Salisbury, February 15, 1889. Quoted in Gifford et al. (1967).

perception of declining British prestige, the policy of colonial self-denial suddenly ceased to exist. The Brits would try to salvage something of their status in Africa by proclaiming protectorates.[85]

At roughly the same time that Britain was finally shifting its policy towards expansion, the French were doubling down on their colonial gamble. They still had yet to get the masses and the businessmen fully behind their endeavors. Though ousted from office in March 1885, Jules Ferry spoke to the French Chamber in July, touting the need for French expansion at all costs. Though Ferry's motivations for French expansion during his first term in 1881 and 1882 had been largely rooted in a desire to regain French prestige, the motivation he in part now touted was an economic one.[86] He also still relied heavily on political arguments that eventually won the day, arguing:

> To stand on the side from all European combinations and to regard expansion as a rash adventure... would mean we would cease to be a first-rate power and become a third or fourth rate power instead... France must put itself in a position where it can do what others are doing. A policy of colonial expansion is being engaged in by all the European powers. We must do likewise.[87]

This quote clearly demonstrates a predominant French take on the utility of the colonial

[85]Sanderson (1974, p. 28).

[86]Ferry's interchange with the Chamber is quoted at length in Brunschwig (1966, pp. 74-81).

[87]*Ibid.* [p. 80].

enterprise: colonial expansion in Africa is now the mark of a Great Power. If we fail to imitate others in their expansion, we will not longer remain among the ranks of the Great Powers where we belong. Instead, we will suffer further loss of prestige and influence. Of course, what Ferry fails to acknowledge with the quote was that it was largely the actions and attitudes of France that initiated this competition for prestige in the first place.

Bismarck, on the other hand, had grown disillusioned by African colonization by 1886. The colonies were proving to be expensive, as he had expected, and showed few signs of tangible rewards.[88] Nevertheless, pro-colonial forces in the German government continued to challenge him on his 'passivity' in the face of British encroachments in the Tanganyika region where Germany was a competitor. His declaration of a protectorate over the Benadir Coast was evidently intended to satisfy the demands of the colonialists, who demanded Bismarck drive a hard bargain with the British.[89] Bismarck however was removed from office in 1890 and with him went a moderate approach to German colonization. As Sanderson has noted, upon his departure, "Bismarck's pragmatism gave way to an official conviction that Germany's future greatness depended on further expansion overseas... and therefore to pressure for repartition."[90]

---

[88]Germany's colonies were smaller and fewer than those of other colonizing powers, possibly suggesting their role as a symbol of Germany standing up to British monopoly as well as Bismarck's inherent skepticism about their utility. See Sanderson (1974, p. 35).

[89]See Sanderson (1965).

[90]Sanderson (1974, p. 40).

In general, this enhanced focus on winning the imperial competition itself, rather than on the rewards of winning particular colonies, ramped up over the course of the 1890s. By the 1890s, the public demand for colonies in the name of national honor had reached a near 'hysterical' pitch in Britain and France.[91] 'Colonial jealousy' between Germany and Britain in South Africa had become Salisbury's chief concern by 1895, despite the fact much of the territory itself was deemed to be of little value.[92] Indeed, by the mid 1890s, many colonial ventures were failing economically.[93] Nevertheless, there was little talk of abandoning the colonies and focusing on strategies with greater material or even strategic value. Instead, colonizers became more convinced that maintaining colonies was essential for Great Powers wanting to remain great.[94] As Pflanze has stated of Germany's empire, despite the fact that the rewards of colonization were inadequate, colonies in Africa had

[91]Sanderson (1974).

[92]Gifford et al. (1967). We see this illustrated in the case of Morocco at the end of the century. The British view of the crisis over Morocco was as follows: "Of course the Germans will ask for Mogador and I shall tell Lord L. that if they do we must at least have Tangier - of course it is all rot and it would not matter to us whether the Germans got Mogador or not but I'm going to say so all the same." See Monger (1976, p. 189).

[93]For instance, even in 1895, output from the Belgian Congo made up for only 25% of colonial expenses.

[94]It might also be argued that the states were reluctant to give up their colonies because they had already sunk costs into them. Prospect theory would argue states would be more risk acceptant the more investment made and therefore more reluctant to give them up. This would not explain the heightened rhetoric surrounding their possession as the contest went on, however.

become "symbols of national pride and power, proof that Germany was a Weltmacht with far-flung possessions and a rival of Britain, whose achievements had so often and in so many ways incited Germans to envy and emulation."[95] The colonizers thus clung to their territories not out of a fear that others would occupy them and reap their material rewards but instead that they would accrue symbolic ones.[96]

By the mid 1890s, states that only a few years earlier had acknowledged the costs of colonies exhibited an increasing recklessness in their aim to win point by point competitions for territory and an increasing willingness to resort to military force. The Portuguese writer Eca de Quieroz refers to these impulses in discussing Portuguese expansion at the turn of the century: "Precisely what preoccupies us, what gratifies us, what consoles us, is to contemplate just the number of our possession; to point here and there on the map with the finger; to intone proudly "we have eight, we have nine; we are a colonial power, we are a nation of seafarers"."[97] As a result, the competition took an increasingly weighty tone. Colonial competition originally intended to enhance prestige and motivated by jealousy eventually became in the European mind nothing less than a competition for survival itself, even though the underlying value of the African territory did not change. In anything, the costs had become increasingly clear. Eventually, even Chamberlain had become convinced

[95]Pflanze (1990).

[96]See Brunschwig (1966, p. 99); Sanderson (1974, p. 41).

[97]Quoted in Hammond (1961, p. 583).

that "imperialism was... not only a form of survival. It was the *sole* policy for survival."[98]

Conclusion

The Scramble for Africa constituted a large portion of all cases of territorial expansion that have occurred over the last 200 years. We see in the cases above that the states engaged in this expansion were motivated to a large degree by concerns about prestige. France, Germany, and Italy each desired to gain prestige and influence in the international system while Britain tried desperately to hold on to its dominance. The aforementioned challengers attempted to gain prestige by establishing a reputation for influence through symbolic competition in Africa rather than by engaging in potentially risky conflict. We also see that these concerns about prestige often trumped considerations about the value of the territory itself; states invested in the administration of territories they believed would have little value and held on to territories that drained resources. While competition for prestige in Africa was less costly than direct conflict, it did require the commitment of significant funds and resources to both conquer and to administer the colonies.

The cases above also shed light on dynamic features of prestige competitions. First, France perceived that it had experienced a public loss of prestige and desired to get it back. Second, second-order beliefs played a role in enabling the challengers to mount a symbolic competition. Through the 19th century, interest in Africa had remained largely dormant.

[98]Quoted in Thornton (1965, p. 88).

With his success in channeling French desires for prestige towards Tunisia, Bismarck, with the consent of the British, established among the powers the belief that each of the others perceived land in Africa to be a path to greater prestige. Later expansion into Africa was then viewed with this lens, leading powers to attempt to balance the attempts of others. Third, we see that Britain was the last to alter its policy towards expansionism. It was the dominant power and had had little to gain from expansion prior to the successful challenges by France and Germany. This point enables us to distinguish this case from pure security dilemma logic which would suggest that states should match challengers no matter what to hold on to their relative advantage. Fourth, we see that the domestic desire for prestige was sometimes rooted in domestic public opinions and sometimes among governmental forces. Whether the push for expansion was driven by public opinion or executive agendas, the intent was the same: to obtain for their country a greater say in international affairs. While this could be perceived as an exercise in vanity, the states for the most part desired greater say as a means not just to security but also to greater influence in the future that would help them achieve their goals. Finally, once the competition began, the value of the territory at stake became endogenous, depending on how much it seemed that others wanted it. States invested more resources into the competition and as a result had even more at stake in its outcome. The mark of prestige changed from the ability to make any claims on land in Africa to the ability to match the expansion of others. The states came to view this competition itself, rooted largely in symbolism, as a key to survival.

References

Aldrich, R. (1996). *Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Alesina, A. and Spolaore, E. (1997). On the Number and Size of Nations. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(4):1027–1056.

Andrew, C. (1968). *Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale: A Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy 1898-1905*. Macmillan.

Aydelotte, W. (1937). *Bismarck and British Colonial Policy, 1883 -1885*. Philadelphia Press.

Bean, R. (1973). War and the Birth of the Nation State. *The Journal of Economic History*, 33(1):203–221.

Blunt, W., Arāhī, A., and Ninet, J. (1907). *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt: Being a Personal Narrative of Events*. TF Unwin.

Bosworth, R. (1979). *Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy Before the First World War*. Cambridge University Press Cambridge.

Boyce, D. (1999). *Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775-1997*. Palgrave MacMillan.

Brogi, A. (2006). Competing Missions: France, Italy, and the Rise of American Hegemony in the Mediterranean. *Diplomatic History*, 30(4):741–770.

Brunschwig, H. (1966). *French Colonialism, 1871-1914: Myths and Realities*. FA Prager.

Cain, P. and Hopkins, A. (1993). *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914*. Longman London.

Chamberlain, M. (1974). *The Scramble for Africa*. Longman.

Chamberlain, M. (1976). Sir charles dilke and the british intervention in egypt in 1882: decision-making in a nineteenth-century cabinet'. *British Journal of International Studies*, 2(03):231–245.

Dugdale, E. *German diplomatic documents 1871-1914: Bsimarck's Relations with England 1871-1890*, volume 1.

Fieldhouse, D. (1961). Imperialism: An Historiographical Revision. *The Economic History Review*, 14(2):187–209.

Fieldhouse, D. (1973). *Economics and Empire, 1830-1914*. Cornell University Press.

Friedman, D. (1977). A Theory of the Size and Shape of Nations. *The Journal of Political Economy*, pages 59–77.

Galbraith, J. (1978). The british occupation of egypt: Another view. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 9(4):471–488.

Ganiage, J. (1959). *Les origines du Protectorate français en Tunisie (1861-1881)*. Presses universitaires de France.

Gifford, P., Louis, W., and Smith, A. (1967). *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*. Yale University Press.

Halvorson, D. (2010). Prestige, Prudence and Public Opinion in the 1882 British Occupation of Egypt. *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, 56(3):423–440.

Hammond, R. (1961). Economic imperialism: sidelights on a stereotype. *The Journal of Economic History*, 21(4):582–598.

Hess, R. (1967). Germany and the anglo-italian colonial entente. In Gifford, P., Louis, W., and Smith, A., editors, *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*. Yale University Press.

Hopkins, A. (1986). The victorians and africa: A reconsideration of the occupation of egypt, 1882. *Journal of African History*, 27(2):376.

Howard, M. (1990). *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871*. Psychology Press.

Hyam, R. (1999). The primacy of geopolitics: The dynamics of British imperial policy, 1763–1963. *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 27(2):27–52.

Kelly, G. H. (1955). *The Political Development of the French Overseas Empire*, volume 3. Stanford University.

Lake, D. and O'Mahony, A. (2004). The incredible shrinking state. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48(5):699.

Langer, W. (1925). The European Powers and the French Occupation of Tunis, 1878-1881, I. *The American Historical Review*, 31(1):55–78.

Langer, W. (1935). A Critique of Imperialism. *Foreign Affairs*, 14:102.

Lebow, R. (2008). *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*. Cambridge University Press Cambridge, United Kingdom.

Lenin, V. (1917). *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Resistance Books.

Marshall, P. (2005). *The making and unmaking of empires: Britain, India, and America c. 1750-1783*. Oxford University Press, USA.

Mearsheimer, J. (2003). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. WW Norton & Company.

Mommsen, W. (1982). *Theories of Imperialism*. University of Chicago Press.

Mommsen, W. (1995). *Imperial Germany 1867-1918: Politics, Culture, and Society in an Authoritarian State*. Arnold London.

Monger, G. (1976). *The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907*. Greenwood Press.

Packenham, T. (1991). *The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912*. Harper Collins, New York.

Pflanze, O. (1990). *Bismarck and the Development of Germany, vol. 3: The Period of Fortification, 1880–1898*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Platt, D. (1968). Economic factors in british policy during the" new imperialism". *Past & Present*, (39):120–138.

Porter, B. (1975). *The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1970*. Longman New York.

Reid, S. (1906). Life and Letters of the First Earl Durham. 2 vols. *London*, 1:238–9.

Roberts, S. (1963). *The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925*. F. Cass.

Robinson, H. (1922). *The Development of the British Empire*. Houghton Mifflin Company.

Robinson, R. and Gallagher, J. (1965). *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*, volume 131. Macmillan.

Sanderson, G. (1965). *England, Europe & the Upper Nile, 1882-1899: A Study in the Partition of Africa*. University press.

Sanderson, G. (1974). The European partition of Africa: Coincidence or conjuncture? *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 3(1):1–54.

Schölch, A. (1976). The "Men on the Spot" and the English Occupation of Egypt in 1882. *Historical Journal*, 19(3):773.

Seeley, J. R. (1899). *The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures*. Macmillan.

Smith, W. (1978). *The German Colonial Empire*. University of North Carolina Press.

Snyder, J. (1991). *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Cornell Univ Pr.

Stoecker, H. (1986). *German Imperialism in Africa: From the Beginnings until the Second World War*. Hurst & Co.

Swain, J. (1933). The Occupation of Algiers in 1830: A Study in Anglo-French Diplomacy. *Political Science Quarterly*, 48(3):359–366.

Taylor, A. and Percivale, A. (1967). *Germany's First Bid for Colonies, 1884-1885: A Move in Bismarck's European Policy*. Archon Books.

Thornton, A. (1965). *Doctrines of Imperialism*. John Wiley & Sons Inc.

Tir, J. (2010). Territorial diversion: Diversionary theory of war and territorial conflict. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(02):413–425.

Tir, J., Schafer, P., Diehl, P., and Goertz, G. (1998). Territorial changes, 1816–1996: Procedures and data. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 16(1):89.

Townsend, M. (1922). *Origins of Modern German Colonialism, 1871-1885*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Turner, H. A. (1967). Bismarck's imperialist venture: Anti-british in origin? In Gifford, P., Louis, W., and Smith, A., editors, *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*. Yale University Press.

Van Evera, S. (1998). Offense, defense, and the causes of war. *International Security*, 22(4):5–43.

Viaene, V. (2008). King Leopold's Imperialism and the Origins of the Belgian Colonial Party, 1860–1905. *The Journal of Modern History*, 80(4):741–790.

Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. McGraw-Hill.

Chapter Six:

Prestige-Seeking and the Quest for Nuclear Parity

In 1956, President Dwight Eisenhower spoke of the need to limit the size of the American strategic arsenal, stating "If you get enough of a particular type of weapon, I doubt that it is particularly important to have a lot more of it,"[1] regardless, he made clear, of the size of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Four years later, his skepticism of the military utility of large nuclear arsenals remained unchanged. When told of the rapid growth rates of the Soviet strategic arsenal in 1960, he pointedly asked, "How many times could [you] kill the same man?"[2] Throughout his tenure as Secretary of Defense during the 1960s, Robert McNamara echoed Eisenhower in this skepticism, often citing American strategic arms buildup as wasteful and useless.[3] Nevertheless, Secretary McNamara oversaw the largest relative buildup of the American strategic arsenal witnessed throughout the Cold War, with the number of ICBMs increasing from 18 in 1960 to 904 by 1966 and the total number of

[1]Quoted in Gaddis (1982, p. 80).

[2]Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 187.

[3]Within McNamara's doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, there was little logic to support a strategic weapons buildup passed the point of a survivable second-strike capability since a truly "preclusive first strike" was not considered possible. This logic would suggest little utility in the US reacting to Soviet arsenal sizes. See O'Neill (2001, Ch. 13). Also Luttwak (1972, pp. 20-21) and Kull (1988, pp.22-23). Also see Wohlstetter (1958) for a classic description of the requirements of a secure second-strike capability.

nuclear weapons increasing from 20,434 to 32,040 over the same period.[4] Even following this buildup, in 1968 Secretary McNamara recognized in regard to nuclear weapons that "with any numerical superiority reasonably attainable, the blunt, inescapable fact remains that the Soviet Union could still effectively destroy the United States, even after absorbing the full weight of an American first strike."[5]

American leaders were not alone in their skepticism that nuclear superiority over the Americans would provide greater security. First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Vasily Kuznetsov, decried the pursuit of strategic superiority, stating, "One more aircraft. One more submarine. One more missile... What can that alter in a situation where both sides already possess weapons capability of killing everything on each many times over?"[6] Kuznetsov made this statement in 1977 after Soviet strategic arsenals had largely caught up with American strategic arsenals in terms of number of weapons. Both the US and the Soviets, however, had maintained the ability to blow each other up 'many times over' since the mid 1960s. Nevertheless, Soviet policy throughout the 1960s maintained as its objective to obtain strategic parity, if not superiority, with the American arsenal and Soviet supplies of ICBMs, warheads, and delivery devices continued to grow

[4]Data was taken from The Military Balance (1969) (1969) and Norris and Kristensen (2006). By comparison, the number of Soviet ICBMs had increased from 35 to 300 and the number of warheads from 1,605 to 7,089 over the same period.

[5]Quoted in Kahan (1975, p. 106).

[6]Quoted in Kull (1988, p. 253).

after parity with the United States was reached around 1969.[7]

The primary questions explored in this chapter are what rationales, if not military and strategic, guided the Americans and Soviets to obtain such enormous strategic arsenals and, more importantly, why did both sides allow their policies to be shaped by the concept of nuclear 'equivalence' all while acknowledging the concept's fundamental lack of strategic utility?[8] I argue that the answer lays in concerns about prestige.[9] In particular, I argue that

[7]Soviet ICBMs stockpiles increased from 1050 in 1969 to 1,618 at the time SALT1 was signed in 1972 and its number of nuclear warheads increased to roughly 45,000 at the peak in 1986. Data taken from The Military Balance (1971) (1972) and Norris and Kristensen (2006).

[8]This chapter will focus on the armament policy once a secure and second-strike capability had been acquired by both sides. It therefore assumes that there is a point of nuclear arming beyond which such weapons provide diminishing returns and are without military utility. As will be discussed, the US did continue to enhance its first strike capabilities throughout the Cold War. See Burr (2001). The presence of Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles that could go without detection ensured however that either country would be able to get off a second-strike.

[9]There is an extensive literature on the causes of arms races. See Gray (1974), Glaser (2000). Some argue that arms races are characterized by spiral models and that they decrease security between rivals. See Diehl (1983), Diehl and Kingston (1987), Wallace (1982). Others argue that arms races are driven by a desire to deter and that arming increases security. See Jervis (1976), Glaser (1992), Glaser (2004), Kydd (2000). There is also an extensive literature on optimal levels of arming. See Powell (1999), Downs et al. (1985), Glaser (2004). Rationalist arguments on optimal arming blame suboptimal arming on domestic factors. See Fearon (1998) and Glaser (2004). The desire for prestige may stem from domestic demand for or from leaders' desire to enhance national prestige at the expense of other states.

the Soviets' goal of nuclear parity as well as some of their choices about which weapons to develop were rooted in their desire to enhance the prestige of the Soviet Union vis a vis the United States and their belief that nuclear parity and highly visible technological advances in their strategic arsenal would help them obtain political influence equivalent with the United States in the international system. The Americans' fears about maintaining parity were driven not by military concerns or their own notions about prestige but by their beliefs about what other states in the system believed to be prestigious. The US desire to maintain prestige compelled US leaders to shape policy in order to convey strategic parity to observers, for fear that if they did not, the shifting beliefs of others would turn against them, rendering them less influential in international affairs. In addition to demonstrating the degree to which both sides in this competition were motivated by prestige concerns through archival evidence, I lay out the process by which these states thought the acquisition of superiority or the maintenance of parity might impact the hierarchy of prestige and thereby alter the balance of influence in the international system.

This case of nuclear competition is important to our understanding of the role of prestige in a number of ways. First, showing that prestige concerns motivated the development of strategic arsenals during the Cold War indicates that prestige doesn't just motivate behavior at the margins of international politics. Instead, it is responsible for core behaviors that are most often considered to result from security competition. Addition-

ally, the case helps highlight the role of second-order beliefs in shaping prestige concerns.[10] The United States did not believe the size of nuclear arsenals past the point of mutual assured destruction mattered militarily, but they did become convinced that the Soviets and third-party states believed nuclear superiority to be prestigious. The Soviets too indicated they believed that additional weapons past the number required for a secure and flexible second-strike response held little material or strategic value, yet they believed that the US likely perceived them to be prestigious.[11] States in both cases refused to rely on their own strategic assessments that the superior or growing stockpiles of the other side were not militarily threatening, instead often basing their policy on their second-order beliefs about what other states in the international system viewed to be important signals of prestige.

Finally, the case provides ample evidence not only that military considerations didn't predominate in decision-making but shows that prestige concerns expressly did. This distinguishes the case from those in which the argument for the importance of prestige in driving behavior must be made primarily through a process of elimination by showing that a particular state behavior cannot be attributed to any particular series of security, economic or strategic factors. In other words, there was a conflict between what the military goal would call for and the prestige goal. Both Soviet and US leaders stated explicitly that

[10]Second-order beliefs are simply beliefs about others' beliefs. See O'Neill (2006).

[11]As will be discussed, both the US and the Soviets, were somewhat concerned that other side might believe that large nuclear arsenals could translate into military advantages. The emphasis within diplomatic statements, as will be shown, however, was on the *political* utility of a large nuclear arsenal.

their policy decisions about strategic arsenal size were driven by their beliefs about others' beliefs about what was prestigious in the international system. Such explicit statements of prestige motivations are rare given the domestic incentives leaders face to cloak their foreign policy in military, strategic, or economic rationales. This case therefore offers unique insight into how second-order thinking played an active role in decision-making as well as into how and why symbolic advantages such as strategic superiority might translate into shifts in the distribution of influence in the international system.

The chapter is organized as follows: first, I will discuss the previous literatures on the role of prestige in weapons acquisition and the extensive literature on perceptions and the Cold War. I will then turn to a discussion of the competition for numerical parity in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the rationales for participation offered by both Soviet and American leaders. This will be followed by a more in-depth theoretical exploration of how the hierarchy of prestige during this period resulted from second-order beliefs and of how the acquisition of such weapons beyond those required for a secure second-strike capability may translate into positive political outcomes, an important conceptual link that has remained in the literature both "obscure and vague," according to Robert Jervis.[12] This last point is particularly important for understanding how the hierarchy of prestige might deviate from the underlying hierarchy of capabilities in the international system.

[12]Jervis (1989, p.139) notes that why large strategic arsenals might lead to shift in political influence remains unknown.

Prestige and Weaponry in International Relations

The argument that weapons are often procured not primarily for the military advantages they provide but for their prestige and symbolic value is not a new one. Scholars have argued that a desire for prestige has motivated states to develop nuclear weapons.[13] Others have cited the desire for prestige as the motivation behind the acquisition of other advanced weapons, such as large navies, aircraft carriers, supersonic jets, and armed personnel carriers.[14] To this list, I add that prestige motivates states to not only acquire nuclear weapons but to pursue enormous nuclear arsenals as they engage in a competition over supremacy of numbers, a competition they believe the winner of which will acquire added prestige and international distinction. As the Cold War demonstrates, states pursue prestige symbols

[13]Sagan (1996) argues that France acquired a nuclear arsenal in an effort to restore the global *grandeur* France had lost during and after the war with the loss of its global empire. Kinsella and Chima (2001) have argued that India's development of a nuclear weapon was largely motivated by their desire for prestige and status. Johnston (1995) argues that similar motivations in part drove China's acquisition.

[14]Murray (2010) argues that Germany pursued dreadnoughts and significant naval development at the turn of the 20th century not for its military value but out of a desire to be recognized, primarily by Great Britain, as a Great Power. Gilady (2006) argues that aircraft carriers, as well as space programs, are symbols of modernity that have been acquired by states with little use for them but which desire them for their status. Eyre and Suchman (1996) focus on recent weapons acquisition primarily by new and developing third-world states and show that states are more likely to acquire flashy modern equipment like supersonic jets the more enmeshed they are in the international network through organizations.

in spite of and likely in contribution to heightened military environments. I also show that the specific weapons and delivery systems the Cold War powers chose to pursue were also affected by what they perceived others perceived to be prestigious.

The question then becomes: what is it about weapons that makes them symbols of prestige? In answering this, it is first important to distinguish the influence that derives from the prestige value of weapons from the influence that might stem from weapons' more coercive aspects. A state may acquire powerful weapons with the intention of signaling to other states that it now has the means and intention to exert deadly force if it does not get its way. Using such tactics to bully other states may expand their influence, but it likely reduces the chance that they will be viewed as prestigious by the international community given that the proclivity towards coercion is unlikely to be viewed as a positive and valuable characteristic by others.[15] Nuclear weapons are then interesting to consider within this context. Given that most of the international community believed that the threat to use nuclear weapons for offensive means lacked credibility after both sides in the Cold War had developed Mutual Assured Destruction,[16] it is unlikely that the leaders responsible

[15]There are exceptions to this. In the case that the international community is evenly divided into two camps, it may also be divided over what is viewed to be prestigious - it may be viewed as desirable by one group of allies to have a state within their group that is willing to act coercively and threateningly towards the enemy. This would likely not enable that state to gain within the international hierarchy of prestige but to gain in prestige only among his group of allies.

[16]For more on the logic of Mutual Assured Destruction, see Brodie et al. (1946) and Kahn (1960).

for the buildup of large strategic arsenals believed the weapons could be convincingly used as effective instruments with which to militarily dominate and threaten others. Thus, it would initially appear that it was not the coercive capacity of nuclear weapons that drew leaders to acquire them in large numbers.

If not their coercive capacity, then what attributes of weapons make them suitable prestige symbols? For one thing, weapons may convey a state's competitive ability which may be viewed as an esteemed trait by others. While demonstrations of competitive ability might at first seem synonymous with demonstrations of coercive ability, showing you have the ability and means to compete once a competition has been initiated is quite different than showing you intend to use your capabilities for coercive purposes.[17] Showing your competitive ability may serve as a costly signal that you are able to do something with greater ease and at a lower cost than other less able actors.[18] Within this framework,

[17]If and how these capacities of weapons relate to the possibility they can be used to 'exert psychological pressure,' as noted by the CIA, will be discussed in further detail below.

[18]Gilady (2006) makes this argument most clearly, arguing that states engage in conspicuous consumption in hopes of signaling to others their valuable ability to compete. Gilady's use of the term 'costly signal' in this argument is more similar to one of the first uses of the term within the Spence education model than it is to more recent uses of the term in International Relations which focus on states' ability to signal their resolve in a crisis by sinking costs. See in Spence (1973). Within the Spence model, the more productive the individuals, the lower their costs of pursuing an education, allowing potential employers to distinguish between the productivity levels of applicants.

states might be able to pursue weapons development at lower costs than others because they possess greater organizational or technical ability or because they possess greater resources, all of which might also be characteristics that individually garner esteem within the international community. In other words, advanced weapons development may provide states a way to show that they possess many valuable qualities that other states may view as prestigious.

This suggests that more costly weapons may be viewed as more prestigious. However, it is not solely cost that determines how prestigious a weapon will be perceived. Two weapons of the same cost may be perceived as garnering very different degrees of prestige. For instance, it was not only the cost that distinguished the early ICBMs as more prestigious and desirable than the available manned bombers at the time. It was the fact that ICBMs were new, that they represented the cutting-edge of strategic weaponry and technological advance, and this despite the fact that the early ICBMs were used primarily for defense because they were so inaccurate as to be ineffective at attacking military targets, a task left to the older manned bombers.

Two additional attributes of weapons make them optimal symbols of prestige in the international arena. First, the use and development of certain types of weapons are highly visible to others, thereby effectively generating common knowledge among others about a state's qualities as all who witness a state's acquisition recognize that all other states have in turn witnessed the acquisition, thereby aiding in the establishment of beliefs about what

others believe.[19] For instance, in 1961 Russia decided to test the 50-megaton Tsar Bomba, the most powerful nuclear device ever detonated, on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago.[20] Both the size of the device and the fact that the explosion was seen from 100 miles away ensured that this detonation would receive wide attention and that all observers would be sure they were not alone in what they witnessed, a demonstration of Russia's unsurpassed technical might. This made it more likely that beliefs developed among leaders about other leaders' beliefs about whether has Russia prestigious attributes. Thus, weapons that are large and visible, such as aircraft carriers and dreadnoughts, or those that draw attention for their technological prowess, such as supersonic jets or strategic delivery devices capable of launching multiple warheads, will be more likely to generate prestige than will weapons with technological attributes that are less visible or draw less attention.[21]

Second, the fact that weapons provide easy markers of success and failure also make

[19]Gilady (2006) and Sagan (1996) also make a similar point about the need for prestige symbols to be visible. O'Neill (2006) relates visibility with the generation of common knowledge.

[20]The bomb was also nicknamed Kuz'kina Mat, likely in reference to Khruschev's promise to the United States at the UN General Assembly in 1960 that he would show them a "Kuz'kina Mat," or something they had never seen before. See Sakharov (1990, pp. 215 - 220).

[21]Whether or not a submarine is quieter than other competing models would not, for instance, be visible; states therefore would be highly unlikely to pursue such advances for the sake of prestige. This also demonstrates the disconnection between actual military utility and prestige value, given that vastly quieter submarines may be exceedingly useful in wartime.

them suitable to be symbols of prestige. A state either technically possesses or does not possess a particular weapons and either successfully launches a new rocket or does not.[22] Of course, states have attempted to engage in the act of deception in regards to their weapons capabilities. Khruschev, for instance, advertised new Russian bombers before they could deliver bombs. These cases of deception are often exposed, however, as was the case of the supposed 'bomber gap,' reducing the incentives for states to bluff about their potentially prestigious successes. In most cases, as O'Neill (2006) notes, weapons provide a clearer barometer of success than do social advances such as education levels or levels of poverty which are difficult to quantify and compare. It is not surprising then that whether or not a state has more weapons than does another state, as opposed to more technical but less visible comparisons of attributes of weapons regarding accuracy for instance, might be conceived of as a marker of prestige given the clarity of the comparison. This comparative visibility provides incentives for states to compete for superiority in the case of strategic arsenals and in the case of the number of African colonies, as will be discussed below and as was discussed in the previous chapter.

Perceptions and the Cold War

[22]The North Koreans recently learned of the downsides of highly visible failure when the highly publicized launch of their Bright Star-3 observation satellite, a launch thought by the west to convey North Korea's ballistic missile capabilities, exploded 90 seconds into flight and crashed into the Yellow Sea. This event was seen to be highly humiliating for North Korea.

Leaders and scholars have long recognized the importance that perceptions played during the Cold War. American leaders at every stage of the Cold War placed concerns about perceptions at the heart of their strategic policy, often ahead of military concerns. These concerns were particularly emphasized however when the balance of strategic forces changed in some categorical way. For instance, following Soviet acquisition of the bomb, Eisenhower came quickly to recognize the bomb's lack of military utility, noting that while they could not be effectively used as weapons, the weapons do have "great psychological importance." Decades later, once the size of the Soviet strategic arsenals matched or even surpassed that of the US, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger so emphasized the importance of the "perceived equality" between the two powers in his annual report to congress that a congressional committee interpreted from the DOD report that the need to influence perceptions about superpower equality was the nation;s primary objective, independent of the military realities that would be required.[23] This emphasis continued into the 1980s, with Admiral Stansfield Turner, shortly after departing as the Director of the CIA, arguing that "changing the world's perception that we are falling behind the Soviet Union is as important as not falling behind in fact."[24]

[23]See Schlesinger (1974) for the original DOD report and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1975) (1975) for the congressional response and interpretation. Schlesinger's concern about perceptions over the military balance had not altered dramatically from that of his predecessor Melvin Laird or from that of his successor Donal Rumsfeld.

[24]See Turner (1981).

Scholars have acknowledged the important role that perceptions played during the Cold War and have helped elucidate what about the nuclear environment placed concerns about perceptions at the heart of military concerns. Robert Jervis has argued that nuclear weapons and Mutual Assured Destruction revolutionized military affairs in a way that brought perceptions and psychology to the forefront.[25] As Jervis notes, though they are the ultimate weapons, nuclear weapons can't effectively be used for achieving offensive aims or as instruments of war. Because the damage caused by the use of nuclear weapons would be so grave as to make the threat of their use incredible, the ability of states to make credible threats and to convey their primary interests may actually be reduced in a nuclear environment. This leads to a "weakening between physical capabilities and the behavior of states," a weakening which allows for "an unusual opening for the play of psychology, symbols and beliefs."[26] In other words, because they can't credibly be used for direct coercive purposes, the acquisition of these weapons can only translate into political influence indirectly and through processes involving "large elements of highly subjective assessments."[27]

This is not to say that the role of perceptions is limited to the nuclear realm. Wohlforth (1993) notes that there are two primary ways to understand how power works

[25]Jervis (1989), Schelling (1966) and Powell (1990) see that international conflict in the nuclear context is a competition in risk-taking.

[26]Jervis (1989, p.179) and all of Chapter 6. Also Jervis (1984).

[27]Jervis (1989, p.182).

in the international system. In the standard realist conception, espoused most notably by Waltz, the distribution of influence in the international community eventually coincides directly with the hierarchy of absolute capabilities in the system. As Wohlforth notes, however, this perspective of power says little about how relative capabilities translate into political influence. The perspective is challenged on this point by the fact that what constitutes power may change over time and because relative levels of capabilities typically become clear only in hindsight. In Wohlforth's conception, states can only rely on perceptions of others power, mainly because of the difficulty of measuring relative capabilities but also because there are many ways different indices upon which to construct hierarchies of power. In this conception, states can only come to understand their power positions through their perceptions of the statements and actions of other states in the international system.[28] Within the nuclear context, the reliance on perceptions goes even further, Jervis argues, given that states need not only worry about perceptions of capabilities but also more generally about the perceptions of others in order to maintain deterrence and to be able to convey resolve. Thus, even small events can matter since they may shift others' perceptions against you.

This gets at the notion that states that are not able to rely on objective measures of power and intention must rely not only on their perceptions of others but on their

[28]Wohlforth (1993, p. 181). Morgenthau was among the first to lay out this notion that states must rely on perceptions of power because of the difficulty of measuring absolute power. See Morgenthau (1960).

perceptions of others' perceptions. This leaves open the possibility for misperceptions at multiple levels. States may misperceive the power and intentions of others. But they may also misperceive the perceptions of others and these misperceptions may be used to guide their policy-making. These misperceptions then shape a new reality which other states then respond to in turn. It is as W.I. Thomas noted, that "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."[29] The reliance on perceptions also suggests that states may pursue policies not because they themselves believe them to be advantageous but because they believe others to believe them to be advantageous.[30] Steven Kull has equated this scenario in which states act in ways they believe to be against their immediate interest because they believe others think the issue important to that of a "drawing room comedy. All of the players know it's a farce but still play along because they aren't sure that ll others know it's a farce."[31]

What types of attributes did states want others to perceive they possessed during the Cold War? First and foremost, it was important to convey resolve to the enemy. Ensuring that the enemy perceived a state's determination to follow up on one's promises or threats at any cost if attacked or if primary interests were threatened was a key concept of deterrence. The extension of deterrence to allies also required that the enemy and allies alike perceive

[29]Quoted in Jervis (1989, p. 182).

[30]As will be shown in the documentary evidence below, these types of thoughts often guided American thinking about the importance of nuclear superiority.

[31]Kull (1988, p. 36).

that the state was willing to follow up on its promise to extend protection in the case of attack. Given that the strategic defense of Europe would likely lead to retaliatory attacks on the United States, instilling this perception was difficult. Determining how to best instill these perceptions of resolve, especially with the allies themselves, was a primary focus on American policy within the 70s and 80s. As a result of these concerns, American policy was shaped in large part by what American leaders believed European leaders believed to be the key signals of resolve; this led American leaders to engage in policies that they, if left to its own devices, would not have engaged in and which they felt had limited military utility.

The installation of MX missiles in Western Europe in the early 80s primarily resulted from such reliance on second-order perceptions. The decision to place American MX missile silos throughout Europe was made despite the consensus by 200 military experts and six previous Secretaries of Defense as expressed by the 1982 Scowcroft Report to President Reagan that the expensive deployment of these missiles would provide little additional military capability.[32] Such missile silos, they acknowledged, would be among the first targets within a first strike. The panel additionally acknowledged that the allies had a sufficient retaliatory strike capability without the additional missiles. Nevertheless, the

[32]Scowcroft Commission (1983). See also Kull (1985). There were those under Reagan, including Casper Weinberger, who started to at least speak of the possibility of"first-use." See Bundy et al. (1981) and McNamara (1983).

panel recommended the installation of the missiles, largely for reasons of perception and the need to persuade the allies of American resolve. Robert McNamara expressed these concerns at the time, acknowledging that "There is no military requirement for NATO to deploy the Pershing II's and cruise missiles... The Europeans are operating under a misperception... that the balance of MX missiles matters, but as long as they are, it must be treated as a reality."[33] Thus, signals sent to shape perceptions of resolve should be directed primarily at allies in part to control nuclear proliferation, even by allies, and in part to maintain a degree of influence over the allies who might feel compelled to defer to the US in exchange for credible offers of protection.[34]

While creating perceptions of resolve was certainly key to superpower policies during the Cold War, it was certainly not the only perception that the Americans and Soviets were concerned with. As the evidence will show below, both sides were concerned to a similar degree about perceptions of prestige; the Americans focused on maintaining the perception that they were the most prestigious member of the international community while the Soviets focused on being perceived as at least equally prestigious as the US. Concerns about prestige by definition involve perceptions of others perceptions, or second-order beliefs about what states think that other states think is valuable and should be

[33]Quoted in Kull (1988, p.41). Also see Turner (1981). Add more cites on MX missile decision.

[34]This model of working to convey resolve arguably applies more to the Western alliance. The Soviets relied more on domination and threatening means to obtain influence over its satellite states.

esteemed in other states. Both superpowers during the Cold War, therefore, acted in ways they might not otherwise have in hopes of convincing others of their status and in hopes that the high estimations of others would be accompanied by freely bestowed deference.[35] At the very least, they feared losing the voice they currently maintained in the international system and wanted to ensure they wouldn't be left behind as others signals of prestige shaped international perceptions. This meant that, as with concerns about resolve, the superpowers were motivated by what they thought other states thought was prestigious, sometimes leading them into policies that they themselves believed to have little direct value but which they believed held indirect value because others believed they did. Signals aimed at shaping perceptions of prestige were therefore not directed solely at allies but more generally to all observer states in the system and in this way are distinguishable from signals sent to convey resolve.

The next section of this chapter will argue that these concerns about prestige led to the dramatic build up of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and to a focus by the Americans and the Soviets on strategic equivalence that cannot be explained by military factors. Specifically, it will demonstrate that the Soviet desire to enhance its prestige led the state to make strategic parity with the United States its primary policy goal throughout the 1960s

[35]While states and leaders arguably do pursue prestige and status for its own sake and the psychological benefits it might provide, prestige also confers potential advantages of enhanced influence that both sides found attractive.

and early 1970s and it will show that the American desire to maintain its prestige generated concerns about "essential equivalence" among Americans even though they recognized that the concept at its heart had little military validity. Understanding the degree to which states were concerned about and motivated by prestige is only part of the puzzle however. How each side believed that the relative size of nuclear arsenals would translate into actual shifts in political influence in the international system is also essential to understanding how prestige functions and shapes states behavior.

The Competition for Nuclear Superiority and Perceptions of Prestige

Both superpowers shaped policy decisions about strategic arming based on the concept of strategic parity, but at different periods of the Cold War. The Soviets adopted the goal of developing equal numbers of strategic weapons as the United States under Khruschev shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963. The Soviets first focused on reaching parity in the number of advanced strategic delivery devices, with the number of Soviet ICBMs increasing from 300 in 1964 to roughly 1,050 in 1969, roughly the same as the US.[36] It took the Soviets longer to overcome the significant lead the United States had established in the number of strategic warheads, not reaching equal levels until roughly 1978.[37] Soviet

[36]ICBMs were considered to represent cutting-edge technology at the time and their development therefore drew attention from others.

[37]The US had 29,249 warheads in 1963 while the Soviets had 4,238. By 1978, both sides had roughly 25,000 warheads. These figures are taken from the Norris and Kristensen (2006) and are similar to the

warhead development did not stop at parity however but continued until 1986 when the stockpile reached a total of 40,723 warheads. This was despite the fact that the United States had decided to reduce its stockpile from its high of 28,335 in 1973.

American policy focused on the importance of strategic parity only once it became clear that the size of Soviet stockpiles of some delivery devices already matched American supplies and that the Soviets had every intention of catching up American with supplies of other weapons as well. These existing and potential asymmetries became most stark during the SALT I negotiations, which started in 1969. The US had not increased its number of ICBMs since 1967 because it had failed to recognize the progress the Soviets had made in ICBM development and had shifted their attention to MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) development and because military leaders had acknowledged the diminishing returns which would result from even larger stockpiles.[38] The SALT I agree-

---

data from the arsenal size data in Kroenig (2012).

[38]See McNamara (1967) and McNamara (1964). In the early 60s, Soviet leaders had employed a policy of "Launch upon warning" which involved launching weapons within minutes of receiving report that US first strike missiles were in the air. This policy would have advantaged larger arsenals. American leaders expressed doubts throughout the 60s about the reliability of early warning systems and in fact there were instances of false positive reports of Soviet launches. Such concern was expressed in an NSC document prepared for Kissinger in 1969. See Lawrence Lynn, U.S. National Security Council Staff, to Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, "Talking Paper on 'Firing on Warning' Issue," 1 May 1969. There were therefore few in the US who should unambiguous support for this policy. See Freedman (1989, pp. 252-3, 372). At any rate, the existence of SLBMs and assured second-strike

ment made in 1972 however solidified existing asymmetries, allowing for a Soviet stockpile of 1618 ICBMs to the Americans' 1054 and acknowledging rapid Soviet development of SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) by allowing the Soviets an eventual SLBM stockpile of 950 and the Americans a stockpile of 710. Largely because of their recent focus on MIRVs, which allow for the placement of several warheads within one missile, the Americans possessed a larger stockpile of nuclear warheads. They also maintained an advantage in the number of manned bombers, though were becoming increasingly obsolete.

The highly publicized SALT I agreement created common knowledge throughout the international community about the existing balance of forces, the status of which had previously not been well-known. It also brought the asymmetries to the attention of American statesmen and leaders like Senator Henry Jackson who in 1972 successfully attached an amendment to the SALT I agreement calling for "the President to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits for the Soviet Union." It was at this point that American political attention turned more towards "equality" with the Soviet Union and that military strategic became a secondary driver of American arming decisions.[39] The importance of "essential equivalence," a term used frequently within negotiations over the Jackson

capabilities would seem to render LUA and the possibility of a preemptive first-strike irrelevant.

[39]As noted in Kull (1985), until the time of the Jackson amendment, traditional deterrence policy had recognized the importance of shaping the enemy's perceptions about retaliatory capabilities and intentions, but that afterwards, perceptional priorities expanded at the expense of military reality. See p. 31.

amendment, played a prominent role with the thinking of numerous Secretaries of Defense for at least a decade afterwards, and this despite little agreement over what the policy implications of the term actually were.

That the Soviets and the United States chose to invest in policies driven by the goal of numerical parity with the other side presents a puzzle for IR theorists who perceive the arms race to be driven by military considerations alone. This is of course not to say that the buildup of strategic arsenals never makes sense. The need for a sufficient number of warheads and delivery mechanisms to ensure a survivable second-strike capability was always perceived as necessary to security and a successful deterrence strategy. While it is unclear exactly how many nuclear warheads are needed for a successful second-strike, we do know that the concept of MAD required, at least in Robert McNamara's mind, enough weaponry to kill 33% of the Soviet population and somewhere between 66 and 75% of its industrial capacity. A committee assigned by McNamara with the task of determining the arsenal size sufficient for deterring the Soviets determined that 76% of Soviet industry could be destroyed with only 400 one-megaton bombs. Based of the committees assessments, McNamara decided that 1000-1200 ICBMs would be sufficient for successfully imposing an assured second-strike retaliatory capability on the Soviet population. He in turn decided that for any additional forces, "the incremental gain in effectiveness diminishes."[40]

[40]McNamara (1967, pp. 393). McNamara's committee determined that the centralization of the Soviet economy, especially focused on heavy and military industry, made the country's industry particularly susceptible to destruction with only a few weapons. McNamara concluded that any more than 400 devices

It is also not accurate to say that neither side perceived any possible military advantage to a larger nuclear arsenal that would allow states to have more flexibility in deciding how to respond during a crisis. While it appears that American thinking was little effected by their numerical advantage during the Cuban Missile Crisis, it appears that the Soviets drew the conclusion that it had been America's advantage in the number of nuclear weapons that had led them to take greater risks and ultimately prevail in the crisis. The Soviets expressed concerns that the US might engage in an exercise of 'damage limitation' in the form of a 'preemptive first strike' in an act of defense. As noted in Trachtenberg (1985), it was likely these considerations which prevented the Soviets from making war preparations during the crisis because Soviet forces were less numerous and therefore more vulnerable than American weapons. That the Soviets perceived they had been in a position of weakness was made clear by the comment of the Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to an American UN representative following the incident that the US "will never be able to do this to us again."[41] While the exact impact of this experience on their subsequent decision to arm

would not meaningfully change the amount of damage "because we would be bringing smaller and smaller cities under attack." *Ibid.*, p.118. Also see McNamara (1964). See also Enthoven and Smith (2005) for a more detailed description of how sufficiency was determined in the 1960s; also Clearwater (1996), Kugler (1975), and Ball (1980).

[41]Quoted in Bohlen and Phelps (1973, p. 495). See also Lambeth (1979) and Betts (1987). Numerous recent empirical articles have addressed the advantages of nuclear possession or superiority for purposes of coercion, with varying findings. Kroenig (2012) argues more generally that numerical superiority can

has not been made precisely clear, it seems unlikely that the crisis, which led the states closer to direct conflict than at any other point during the Cold War, was not a factor in the decision to pursue a larger strategic arsenal.

Thus, while a desire for survivability and flexibility likely led both the US and Soviets to establish larger strategic arsenals, the development of arsenals past the point required for flexibility and survivability remains unexplained. There is also nothing about survivability and flexibility that necessitate a concern about parity or essential equivalence in the size of strategic arsenals.[42] More generally, as Robert Jervis notes, prioritizing parity with one's opponent rarely makes sense in the strategic context: "One could be 'far ahead' of the other side and still not have enough to destroy the required targets; one could be way 'behind' and still have sufficient forces to knock out all the targets one would want to."[43] The states also seemed to behave in ways that tacitly recognized this fact. The United States, for instance, in its focus on "essential equivalence" did not seek to achieve parity in all categories of weapons, but instead institutionalized asymmetries of SLBMs and ICBMs with their signing of the SALT I agreement. The US, as will be shown below, focused more on a equivalence in a 'general sense' rather than at every strategic level. A military logic for

---

lead states to take larger risks within a crisis. See also Beardsley and Asal (2009). Sechser and Fuhrmann (2012) find evidence that nuclear weapons have not been used effectively as means of compellence. Halperin (1987) provides qualitative evidence that states have not successfully coerced with nuclear weapons.

[42]Kull makes this point as well. See Kull (1988, p.10).

[43]Jervis (1989, p.200).

strategic balancing fails to explain these inconsistencies and this focus on relative number rather than on the absolute number of survivable warheads and delivery devices.[44]

The focus on numerical parity is also left unexplained by a host of other factors offered by scholars as rationales for arms race participation. Colin Gray explores seven possible such rationales, including deterrence, defense, diplomacy, domestic political advantage, domestic economic and industrial advantage, reputation or, as he at times refers to it, prestige, and technological advance.[45] While it has earlier been established that numerical parity past the point of survivability and flexibility cannot be easily explained by deterrence or defense needs, it is possible that domestic benefits to manufacturers or leaders responsible for procuring contracts might have contributed to parity obsession. There is little documentary evidence, however, to support a role for domestic motivations in arsenal buildup during the periods discussed below. In terms of the need for technological advance and not wanting arsenals to become obsolete, it isn't clear how this rationale could explain why states would accumulate large numbers of the same weapon.[46] Finally, Gray argues that both a desire for diplomatic or political advantage and prestige or reputation

[44]This focus on relative numbers extended to defense budgeting. In 1975, when a group of American Senators heard that the Soviets were spending twice as much as the United States, they made a push to simply match the Soviet budget. This was without knowing any details about the numbers or types of weapons the Soviets were developing, but only the bottom line number. See Kull (1985, p.34).

[45]See Gray (1974).

[46]See also Evangelista (1988) for a focus on innovation during the Cold War.

may lead states to participate in arms races. He acknowledges that both concepts rely on the perceptions of others and the desire by states to shape these perceptions in part for political gain. It is the role of these two concepts, distinguished by Gray but unified in the theoretical approach here, that will be addressed in depth in the case studies below.[47]

Striving for Parity: Soviet Policy in the Late 1960s and 1970s

While the Soviets might have perceived some advantages in creating more invulnerable supplies of weapons after the Cuban Missile Crisis, why they continued to pursue stockpile numbers matching those of the United States after obtaining a highly potent second strike capability cannot be understood without focusing on the continual Soviet belief that they were not being accorded the deference and degree of international influence they believed they were due. The Soviets began their quest for greater prestige shortly after the war and continued their quest until the period of detente in the 70s, once they perceived that their degree of influence had dramatically expanded. Thus, throughout the Cold War, the

[47]Gray distinguishes the two by arguing that reputation is more general more future-driven. It isn't clear that these two concepts are truly theoretically distinct however since a state often vies for a particular reputation in order to obtain diplomatic influence in future crises. Additionally, Gray acknowledges that diplomatic advantage may stem solely from perceptions and the fact that meaningless weapons may be important to influence if leaders think the weapons are important. Thus, it is difficult to disentangle these two concepts of political influence and prestige, as Gray describes them, given that both seem focused on shaping others' perceptions about a state's standing, current or future, in the international system.

Soviets pursued policies which they perceived to be viewed as prestigious by other states, especially in the United States, in the system. I argue that it was this quest for a greater international voice that led the Soviets to not only pursue but also to publicly highlight the importance of strategic parity in the late 1960s.

The Soviet Quest for Prestige before Parity

Soviet perceptions about the rightful amount of influence they should have in international affairs were largely shaped by their role in jointly defeating Germany. The Soviets believed that political influence should be allocated in a proportion equivalent to a state's military capability. Given the large conventional advantages of the Soviets after the war, they expected to have substantial say, equivalent to that of the United States, over the important post-war political events, including the occupation of Germany, the reconstruction of Europe, the future of Germany as well as to have influence over affairs in the Near and Far East.[48] The Russians became focused on asserting themselves as "the other superpower," as evidenced by Foreign Minister Molotov's announcement in February of 1946, that "The

[48]See Wohlforth (1993) for a detailed description of how the hierarchy of capabilities corresponded with the hierarchy of influence throughout the Cold War. Wohlforth provides an insightful analysis of the sources of influence during each period, which more often than not were not rooted primarily in relative military capabilities but in economic capabilities, centrality within the international network of states, or technological prowess. He argues throughout that prestige and the desire for influence was a primary driver of Soviet behavior, often more so than were concerns about possible military conflict.

USSR now stands in the ranks of the most authoritative of world powers. It is impossible to resolve the important issues of international relations without the participation of the USSR..."[49] Despite their expectations, the Soviets found themselves shut out of the majority of important post-war decisions. The substantial military capability that the Soviets had demonstrated during the war had failed to translate into an proportional position within the hierarchy of influence after the war.[50]

Even after the US and USSR entered an environment of Mutually Assured Destruction, the Soviets still believed that they had not achieved their 'rightful place' in international society.[51] Khruschev decided that the USSR would pursue prestige in part through the development of the most highly advanced technologies of the time, in the late 1950s ICBMs and thermonuclear devices in particular, believing that the mere possession of the most advanced weaponry would provide the cheapest path to influence. Ever one to acknowledge the importance of perceptions in shaping the hierarchy of influence in the system,

[49]Quoted in Larson and Shevchenko (2001), which addresses more broadly ways that the Soviet desire for status impacted their behavior.

[50]As Wohlforth notes, that ability in direct conflict did not correspond with actual political influence immediately after the fact calls into question realist assumptions that the nature of influence in the international system can be understood as a direct translation of absolute capabilities and resources. See *Ibid.*, Ch. 1 and pp. 129-133.

[51]Wohlforth (1993) argues that this battle for prestige and influence was a primary driver of the emergence of the two antagonistic alliances blocs during the Cold War.

Khruschev pressed the military to focus develop innovations that would draw attention to Soviet technological superiority even if the weapons were less militarily useful than other possibilities and even if they weren't exactly prepared to contribute to war-fighting. The ICBMs deployed in the late 1950s, for instance, lacked thermonuclear warheads to go on them and were too large to be deployed in large numbers.[52] The Soviets additionally opted to develop the 50 mega-ton Tsar Bomba even though its military utility was likely less than that of two 25 mega-ton bombs. In each case, Khruschev expected that the Soviets ability to not only acquire the advanced weapons but also to acquire them first would be perceived as prestigious by other states, as he noted in his statement to Averill Harriman in 1959 that "We developed the hydrogen bomb before the United States. We have an intercontinental bomb while you have not. Perhaps this is the crucial symbol of our position..."[53] Deference proportional to perceived Soviet capabilities was slow in coming however, as Khruschev acknowledged in a statement to Soviet military graduates in 1961: "Today it is acknowledged in the West that the forces of the Soviet Union... are not inferior to the forces of the Western powers... Yet our partners... nevertheless want to dominate in international agencies and impose their will these."[54] By the early 1960s, the Soviets

[52]See Luttwak (1976) on this and other examples of specific weapons that were pursued more for their prestige than for their military value. Also Wohlforth (1993, ch. 6) for ways that Khruschev tried to gain diplomatic advantage by shaping the perceptions of others as to Soviet prestige.

[53]Quoted in Wohlforth (1993, p.158).

[54]Quoted in Adomeit (1982, p.251).

had concluded that technological advance did not offer the means to the degree of influence they desired.

The Soviet Quest for Parity

Soviet focus in the mid 1960s turned to achieving strategic parity with the United States, by which was meant equality with the US in conventional force size and in the arsenal sizes of major strategic weapons and delivery devices. There are three primary reasons for this new focus. First, the Soviets appear to have believed that strategic superiority had provided the US with negotiating leverage. This is not to say that the Soviets themselves believed that the strategic weapons could be used to credibly coerce and threaten others. Soviet military and political leaders continued in fact to announce the military disutility of a focus on 'more' rather than on 'enough.' In addition to Kuznetsov's proclamation that more weapons were senseless in an environment in which both states could destroy each other many times over, Major General Rair Simonyan declared that "neither the addition of fresh consignments or armaments nor the increase of their destructive force can produce any substantial military advantage."[55] Brezhnev also echoed the sentiment about the pointlessness of superiority given the existence of large arsenals on both sides. Nevertheless, there seemed to be a consensus among the Soviets that they could not be in anyway 'inferior' and that American developments 'compelled' the Soviets to pursue a

[55]Quoted in Kull (1988, p. 253).

similar approach.[56]

While the prevalent view among Soviet leaders was the nuclear weapons could not be effectively used as military instruments or for coercive purposes, the Soviets were less sure about how American leaders perceived the weapons' utility. First, the Soviets feared that the Americans did not share their belief a nuclear advantage did not provide any military advantage and feared the existence of American beliefs that strategic superiority could be successfully exploited in a preemptive first strike. The Soviets in part translated the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis along these lines - the US might have believed they could use their weapons to their advantage, leaving the Soviets in a vulnerable position.[57] But it was not only the fear of actual use of the weapons that shaped Soviet behavior. The fact that the Americans might have believed in the utility of the weapons, even if they didn't intend necessarily to use them, was likely to make the US more aggressive and risk-seeking, in Soviet thinking, thereby raising the risk of accidental escalation or the possibility the US would attempt to blackmail the Soviets. For these reasons, the Soviets appear to have concluded that they would never again allow such a humiliating disaster to result from

[56]See *Ibid.*, pp.252-253.

[57]As laid out in Trachtenberg (1985), the Americans thinking and policy-decisions do not appear to have been impacted by their strategic advantage. Nevertheless, the Soviets were able to translate particular aspects of American policy and commentary as evidence of their belief that the state with more firepower would gain advantage with a preemptive first strike.

relative Soviet weakness.[58] The Soviets thereby grew to view parity with the US as a 'reliable guarantee of peace.'

It wasn't simply the desire to balance the US military perceptions that guided Soviet pursuit of parity however. The quest for strategic parity became intertwined with the continued Soviet quest for equal influence over international affairs which began shortly after the end of World War II. The Soviets had once thought that obtaining the ability to inflict equivalent damage on the US would translate into equivalent political influence. When that didn't work, it seems they then became convinced the US would respect strategic parity at all levels and that only then would the US be 'psychologically' convinced of the Soviet Union's equivalent status and treat it with the according deference.[59] They believed

[58]See *Ibid.*,[pp.156-161] for Soviet perceptions of the effect of the nuclear imbalance on the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis. He also notes, as stated earlier, that the relationship between a decision to increase arming and the Cuban Missile Crisis has not been firmly established. Again, however, it would be certainly worth explaining if such a connection didn't exist. Also Lambeth (1979).

[59]See Kull (1988, p.262). Larson and Shevchenko (2011) highlight three ways that states are able to challenge their status within the system: competition, mobility or imitation. In pursuing parity, the Soviets were choosing to imitate the strategy of the US hoping that they would in turn achieve equivalent status to the US and equivalent deference. Scholars have argued that states often pursue status recognition predominantly because they want to be treated with a degree of respect in accordance with their perceived identity. The focus on the influence that accompanies greater prestige and respect is secondary in these conceptions. Ringmar (2002) addresses the role that a desire for great power recognition drove Soviet policy throughout the USSR's existence. He notes that Soviets perceived that simple nuclear advantage

that equality in weaponry would mean equality of influence and voice in world affairs mainly because they believed that the US believed this to be the source of great power prestige.

This connection between strategic parity and political influence can be gleaned both as interpolated from Soviet comments about equality in the 60s as well as from statements after parity had been reached. The Soviets had indicated repeatedly throughout the 60s their expectation that equal force should equal treatment and deference. Khruschev made this clear in his 1961 speech to the military graduates, saying that "Where there are equal forces there must also be equal right and opportunities."[60] He challenged Kennedy directly with a similar question in 1962, asking "How then does the admission of our equal military capabilities tally with such unequal relations between our great states? They cannot be made to tally in any way."[61] The inequality Khruschev referred to most often was the different degrees to which each state influenced events and debate within international agencies as well as within third-world countries. Of course, the equality he referred to in 1961 was the equal ability to hurt and to launch a successful second strike. But the expectation of equal say for equal capabilities carried over to guide the Soviet pursuit of nuclear parity later in the decade. Foreign Minister Gromyko announced in 1977, after parity had been reached in virtually all categories of weapons, that "the present marked

---

were no longer perceived as symbols of superpower status - the focus instead became on parity. Also see Murray (2010) on the German drive for great power recognition at the turn of the 20th century.

[60]Quoted inAdomeit (1982, p. 251).

[61]Quoted in Wohlforth (1993, pp.177-178).

preponderance of the forces of peace and progress gives them the opportunity to *lay down the direction of international politics*."[62] Thus, it wasn't simply a desire for recognition or a desire for security that drove the Soviets to pursue parity. They primarily pursued the symbols they believed the US would respect because of the 'privilege of an equal voice' they expected it to afford them in international affairs.[63]

Finally, the Soviets were also motivated in their push for strategic parity by concerns not just about American perceptions but about those of third party countries about what characteristics should garner respect in the international system. Again, the Soviets were not driven by their own belief that strategic parity was politically advantageous because of some objective military reality but by the belief that other states believed parity to be an important measure of international prestige. The primary idea here, trumpeted to an even greater degree on the American side, was that few observing states had a

[62]Quoted in Lambeth (1979, p.38). Emphasis added.

[63]This desire was perceived by the US State Department which noted that "Moscow's primary objective in demanding parity is to enhance the prestige of the bloc by presenting an image of a powerful and monolithic bloc... which is at least equal... and which must be dealt with on equal terms." Quoted in Wohlforth (1993, p. 173). American leaders in the 70s also perceived the desire for equality to be driving Soviet policy. Nixon remarked about the Soviets in his memoirs that "They still crave to be respected as equals." See Nixon (1978, p.619). Kissinger noted similarly that "equality seems to mean a great deal to Brezhnev... it was central." The Americans in fact focused on ways to convey parity at the first summit under Nixon. See Kissinger (1979, p.1141).

true understanding of nuclear reality and the mechanisms of deterrence. They lacked the detailed knowledge that would enable them to draw accurate conclusions about how the two sides of the Cold War actually measured up. The leaders of those states, therefore, cued off of visible measures of power, such as actual weapons counts, in determining who was 'ahead' in the Cold War even though such relative numbers were not terribly informative.[64] This is not to say that third party leaders actually thought this way about the Cold War balance of power, but that the Soviets believed that they did.[65] When questioned about the rationale for the Soviet focus on strategic parity, Soviet diplomats and retired military officers among others noted that their need to match the US was driven by the fact that "third parties have been impressed by numbers" and that they in fact assign the state with greater numbers more respect.[66] Failure to match if not exceed American numbers then left the Soviet Union vulnerable to downgraded estimations in the eyes of others and a

[64]A focus on simply numerical comparisons ignores differences in accuracy, efficiency, deployability and often times payloads. Also, the destructive capability of certain weapons is often difficult to compare without technical knowledge.

[65]Surveys of people in Europe, Japan, the Middle East, the USSR and the US in 1978 asked if "perceivers tend to think in terms of numerical comparisons of superpower military strength." The basic response summarized by researchers was that both sides had sufficient weaponry and that parity was a concept of little value. See Daniel (1978).

[66]Interviews were conducted by Steven Kull. The fascinating results are reported in his book Kull (1988). As Kull notes, obtaining interviews with Soviet officials to talk about Soviet nuclear policy was no easy task. See pp. 282-283.

consequent decline of influence.

In short, a desire for equality motivated the Soviet policy of strategic parity with the United States;[67] the desired equality involved both respect and influence in accordance with Soviet understandings that they held largely equivalent military power with the United States. When the relative ability to hurt did not translate into equivalent international influence, the Soviets turned to the acquisition of symbols of prestige in hopes of shaping others views of their prestige. While they at times attempted to obtain influence through coercive techniques, especially with those states within the Soviet bloc, they also pursued strategies they thought would be respected by others in hopes that this respect would translate into say over international affairs. They chose to pursue influence through strategic parity not because they believed the concept had an underlying objective basis, but because they believed that other states believed parity to be prestigious. Soviet policy was therefore largely shaped by a new reality founded on second-order beliefs rather than on Soviet analysts' understanding of the military reality of the Cold War.

American Policy During the 1970s

The US leadership did not always care about strategic parity. The US maintained an eco-

[67]References to a policy of strategic parity here and elsewhere within the chapter refer to their push for weapons above and beyond those required for survivable second strike capabilities and for flexibility of response.

nomic, political, and strategic advantage over the Soviet Union for much of the 50s and early 60s.[68] During this time, they did worry upon occasion about the Soviet Union 'catching up' militarily with the Americans, not so much because of the security implications but because they feared a subsequent decline in American influence. Kennedy acknowledged, for instance, when confronted with possible signs of Soviet convergence, including a supposed missile gap, that such decline could not be allowed to continue without the US risking becoming irrelevant. Once the gap proved to be nonexistent and the military became convinced of their ability to survive and flexibly respond to a Soviet strike, the idea that maintaining US strategic superiority at all costs was a worthless endeavor more or less prevailed among American political and military leaders. Leaders maintained these views throughout the late 60s, when the Soviets were working hard to match American strategic stockpiles. It was only once the SALT I agreement brought the existing and growing asymmetries in to stark perspective that American focus turned to the concept of strategic parity. The debates surrounding the call for strategic parity in all future arms control agreements with the Soviets, a call eventually codified in the Jackson Amendment in 1972, played a significant role in both shaping concerns about relative arsenal numbers and in making these concerns common knowledge to all spectators both at home and abroad.[69]

[68]See Rosenberg (1983) on the causes of the massive US strategic buildup from 1945-1960s. Quester (2000) addresses why the US did not use its nuclear monopoly to extract concessions from the Soviets during this time. Also see Trachtenberg (1988).

[69]See Kull (1985) for more information on the Jackson Amendment and its impact on military thinking.

After 1972, the language of 'equivalence' that had been used by advocates of the amendment during these debates found its way into reports to Congress made by numerous subsequent Secretaries of Defense. This included Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger's demand in 1974 that "there must be essential equivalence between the strategic forces of the United States and the USSR."[70] The emphasis here, and within much of Schlesinger's analysis of the concept of strategic parity, is on 'essential' equivalence rather than on exact equivalence of each type of strategic weapon. When pressed by Congress to define in greater detail what 'essential' equivalence entailed, Schlesinger stated that establishing that others 'perceived equality' was the primary objective, not ensuring that the US matched the Soviets in the arsenal sizes of all categories of strategic weaponry.[71] Schlesinger's successor Donald Rumsfeld similarly maintained in his 1977 Report to Congress that the US

The fact that American leaders were willing to institutionalize significant asymmetries in the numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs is another important indicator that leaders were not motivated by security concerns. If they had believed that strategic superiority jeopardized American security, it is unlikely they would have allowed their legal sanctioning within the SALT I agreement. Another clue that security was not the primary concerns is that American military leaders had allowed such asymmetries to arise in the first place without trying to balance them.

[70]Schlesinger (1974). Throughout the report, Schlesinger emphasizes 'perceived' balances rather than actual tactical advantages.

[71]Again, leaders who were concerned about asymmetry for reasons of security concerns would likely have wanted to balance Soviet capacities in the number of all types of weapons rather than just to create 'perceptions' of balance.

should take all "actions to create the necessary perception of equivalence."[72] Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense under President Carter, clarified that the concern about superiority was about *perceptions* and not about any security threat that Soviet superiority might pose, stating that "Insistence on essential equivalence guards against any danger that the Soviets might be seen as superior - *even if the perception is not technically justified.*"[73]

But whose perceptions were they worried about? Similar to the Soviets, American leaders were concerned about how the Soviets perceived nuclear superiority. While they had little direct knowledge about Soviet perceptions, US leaders were able to draw tentative conclusions from Soviet actions and statements to others. Caspar Weinberger concluded from the fact that the Soviet investment in strategic forces had been two to three times the size of the American investment that the Soviet leadership "did not share the judgement that additional capabilities are pointless."[74] Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in his 1975 Congressional Report indicated that, while US analysts weren't sure exactly how the Soviets perceived the importance of superiority, they could conclude from rapid Soviet arming that the Soviet leadership did perceive some value in it. Schlesinger also noted that this belief was bolstered by the fact that the Soviets had touted their strategic superiority to leaders of other states, suggesting to the US that the Soviets at least believed that superiority

[72]See Rumsfeld (1978).

[73]Brown (1978). Emphasis added.

[74]See Annual Report to Congress FY 1988 (1987).

would provide some diplomatic advantage.[75] American leaders also feared that the Soviets would potentially behave more aggressively if Soviet leaders believed that superiority did provide some advantage, political or military.

As Luttwak has noted, however, it was not Soviet perceptions that most preoccupied American leaders.[76] As Schlesinger stated, it was important that equivalence was perceived "not only by the Soviet Union, but by *third audiences* as well."[77] American leaders and analysts were of the belief that leaders of other countries, not just allied or rival countries, and "informed public opinion the world over" paid attention to which state had more strategic weapons.[78] Schlesinger believed that "many leaders" kept note of and reacted to numerical comparisons of the number of warheads, megatonnage, and relative force size and suggested that "to the degree that we wish to influence the perception of others, we must

[75]See Schlesinger (1974).

[76]See Luttwak (1972), Part II.

[77]See Schlesinger (1974). Emphasis added. The report expresses concerns about the general perceptions of other states in the international system about the status of the numerical balance.

[78]Luttwak (1972) argued that nuclear weapons were "psychologically by far the most impressive of all instruments of power," which ensured that other states would certainly have a definite awareness of which side had more than the other.

take appropriate steps (by their lights) in the design of the strategic forces."[79] The emphasis the Secretary of Defense placed on the importance of managing perceptions suggests that he must have believed he was taking the "appropriate steps" to do so within his force and budget requests he annually made of Congress.

Above all, managing these perceptions was deemed important because, the Americans believed, perceptions of superiority were tied directly to estimations of prestige and influence in the international system. While 'more' was generally regarded as implying greater 'power,' the nature of this power was typically political. Again, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's statements provide insight into US thinking on the matter. He indicated that equality was important for symbolic purposes "in large part because the strategic offensive forces for us have come to be seen by many however regrettably as important to the status and stature of a major power."[80] The desire to achieve a particular stature in the eyes of others, and not to balance security threats, most often guided American and Soviet decisions to pursue strategic balance. This was indicated within one Former Joint Chief's comment about US military leaders' efforts to achieve parity: "I think they are wise enough to know that theres no threat... There's a prestige item associated with this,

[79]Schlesinger (1974). Also see Schlesinger (1975) and Kull (1985). This belief that other states attached importance to the count of strategic forces was echoed by many American leaders and analysis, as will be discussed further below.

[80]Schlesinger (1975). Also see Luttwak (1972).

where the Soviets want to be considered image wise as being on an equal with the US."[81]

Enhanced prestige and stature were also not only prized in and of themselves. Their importance laid in how perceptions of prestige would affect the hierarchy of influence in the system and the amount that third party countries and allies would be willing to defer to the great powers in international affairs.[82] American leaders in particular feared the loss of relevance the US might experience if it allowed observer states to perceive it as inferior in any important way to the Soviet Union. As a result, American leaders were hoping to manage these perceptions so that "the world - the third world particularly, and everybody else, even our own allies - perceive that the Soviets are inferior to us" and that they, as a result, become "more likely to acquiesce to us."[83] Leaders believed that obtaining such acquiescence from third parties provided political influence which indirectly provided the best path to security within a nuclear context. Admiral Stansfield Turner suggested as such with his comment that, "Whatever we do, it must not only correct the actual imbalance

[81]The quote is taken from a private interview in which the respondent was pressed to provide a rationale for American policy on strategic parity. See Kull (1988, p. 229).

[82]How and why leaders expected prestige symbols to translate into actual influence over political outcomes will be explored in more detail in the next section of the paper.

[83]This quote was taken from an interview with a senior military official. See Kull (1988, p.117). It was thought, more generally, that third party behavior would be impacted by their judgment about who was 'doing the most to retain or acquire a relative advantage." Taken from an interview with a senior official from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *Ibid.*, p. 229.

of (nuclear) capability; it must also correct the perception of imbalance... Changing the world's perception that we are falling behind the Soviet Union is as important as not falling behind in fact."[84] As this quote suggests, the pursuit of security was seen as best accomplished more indirectly through the pursuit of greater prestige rather than through the pursuit of actual strength.[85]

The emphasis here on the prestige motivations for the focus on strategic parity does not imply that this focus was not also driven by the US' desire to demonstrate resolve to their allies. As Schlesinger stated in the 1975 report to Congress, "Friends may believe that willingness on our part to accept less than equality indicates a lack of resolve to uphold our end of the competition and a certain deficiency in staying power."[86] Yet even buildup motivated by a desire to convey resolve was rooted in perceptions of perceptions that rather than nuclear reality. While matching the arms of the Soviet Union could be in part a costly signal to allies that the US was willing to do whatever necessary to protect itself and its allies, as shown above in the case of the MX Missiles, much of the added strategic force provided no additional ability for the US to do so. While Schlesinger and his successors did highlight to some extent their concerns about properly managing the perceptions of allies,

[84]Turner (1981). Caspar Weinberger also viewed "the political advantages of being seen as the superior strategic power" as "more real and more useful than the military advantages of in fact being superior in one measure or another." Quoted in Jervis (1989, p. 197).

[85]Frank (1983, p. 399).

[86]See Schlesinger (1974).

the greater number of references to the perceptions of 'third-parties' and 'the world' more generally about the strategic balance indicates that resolve was not the primary driver behind the desire to keep up with the Soviet Union's arsenal buildup.

Finally, while numerous leaders of the American military in the 70s and 80s emphasized the importance of strategic parity, this does not tell us the extent to which these concerns actually impacted the size of American strategic arsenals. In fact, given that 'perceptions' of parity were deemed more important than actual parity, leaders might have engaged in maneuvers, much as Khruschev did in the 60s, to draw attention to highly visible elements of American superiority while ignoring those areas where the US had fallen behind or while failing to engage in actual weapons buildup. Instead of focusing on buildup to match the Soviet numbers, however, the Americans focused their efforts on arms reduction and freezing the total strategic delivery forces of both sides to an equal number. While SALT I had institutionalized asymmetries in arsenal sizes in 1972, the US worked hard to repair that asymmetry by negotiating an overall reduction in strategic force sizes, getting the Soviets to agree to an aggregate strategic delivery arsenal of 2400 in SALT II seven years later.[87] That the two sides agreed on a single, easily digestible and highly visible number to institutionalize the two sides strategic parity rather than on an agreement that focused

[87]While SALT II was not submitted for ratification by Carter following the invasion of Afghanistan, Carter and Reagan complied with its tenets until 1986 when Reagan abandoned the agreement because of possible Soviet violations. See Newhouse and Newhouse (1989) on SALT accords.

on ensuring actual military balance of the number of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers indicates the priority placed on managing the perceptions of others and on controlling the costs of any future competition aimed at shaping these perceptions.[88]

In short, the US shifted its policy towards one of strategic equality in the 1970s after the Soviets had been allowed to catch and even surpass American stockpiles of some strategic weapons. This policy shift was rooted in a desire to manage the perceptions of the Soviets, US allies, and most importantly, the international system more generally about who which state had more prestige. American leaders had become convinced throughout the late 60s and early 70s that observing countries perceived the numerical balance to represent a running tally of prestige. Failure then to balance the numbers would risk a loss of prestige and a subsequent loss of influence. As with the Soviets, American policy regarding the balance of forces was guided far less by concerns the US had than by what they perceived the concerns of others to be. And as with the case of Britain and the Scramble for Africa, the Americans, as the dominant state in the system, were reluctant to engage in the competition for prestige, waiting until it became clear that observer states

[88]The US during this time also chose not to keep up with Soviet production of actual nuclear warheads, with the Soviet arsenal continuing to grow until 1986 and the US arsenal topping out in 1973. That the number of warheads wasn't a focus of the SAL talks suggests that attention wasn't drawn to the relative comparison and thus that the US had less incentive to correct the imbalance. One can imagine that if more attention had been drawn to the warhead asymmetry, American policy about warhead arsenals would have been different.

might be using the balance of forces as an important measure. The US waited long past the point at which security concerns would have suggested they act to balance Soviet forces.

Strategic Parity and the Balance of Political Influence

This chapter, to this point, has focused primarily on establishing that concerns about perceptions drove US and Soviet behavior more so than did concerns about the military threats weapons posed and on the belief of the two states, especially the United States, that others' perceptions of superiority would have an impact on the hierarchy of influence in the international system. This section of the paper explores in more detail how exactly the states thought that superiority would translate into political influence. Given that the states could not credibly threaten to use the weapons for purposes of coercion, it is not clear why such a symbolic advantage would shape the nature of international influence. In this section, I build on the following answers initially presented in the previous sections: states often base their policy not on their own assessments of what is important but on their second-order beliefs, or perceptions of others' perceptions, about what is important. These perceptions are particularly important to a state competing for influence when it perceives that other states attach some measure of prestige to their assessment which will affect who they defer to. Observer states prefer to be on the side of the more influential state and therefore base their perceptions in part on their beliefs about other states' perceptions of what is prestigious.

As the sections showed above, second-order beliefs were key in shaping American and Soviet armament policy. Each side was both motivated by their beliefs about their adversary's beliefs about what the important focal points of the competition were. That the Soviets themselves announced to other powers that superiority should amount to some political advantage and that they in turn invested in superiority signaled to the US that the Soviets viewed superiority as a focal point and that superiority might dictate important aspects of Soviet behavior.[89] Additionally, as was described about the race for colonies in the Scramble for Africa, the value of the thing being competed over was endogenous to the competition itself - the more the other side appeared to want superiority, the more incentive the other side had to work to maintain parity. That Soviet and American assessments were intersubjectively constructed is suggested by a statement about the appropriate size of strategic arsenals taken from a high level American military official that "The Soviets regard these calculations in about the same way that I think US decision makers regard them, which is to say that you take these calculations very seriously because these are the established ways of answering the question of how much is enough."[90]

Both sides, but particularly the Americans, were also significantly motivated by their

[89]The fact that Kennedy had campaigned on the need to close the 'missile gap' and that the US had fretted over the 'bomber gap' even though the US maintained significant strategic superiority during that time similarly conveyed to the Soviets that the US perceived parity to be valuable. See Wohlforth (1993, pp. 162-170).

[90]See Kull (1988, p. 142).

second-order beliefs about third-party observer states. It is somewhat unclear how American leaders developed the belief that observer states perceived superiority to be an important measure of prestige, especially given the evidence that individuals and leaders in third-party countries did not in fact hold such beliefs.[91] We can assume that the US assigned some positive probability that other states paid attention to Soviet emphasis on superiority's importance.[92] It is also possible that the Americans expected other states to use more visible and easily understood measures of comparison as focal points in the competition for prestige, given that such comparisons required less demanding cognitive tasks than more detailed weapons comparisons.Either way, their reliance on second-order beliefs supports the notion that many policy decisions are made based on the beliefs of others rather than on a state's own assessments about what is militarily optimal.[93]

Other states' beliefs are important however primarily in the extent to which they

[91]Again, see Daniel (1978).

[92]In the sense that the Soviets focused on the importance of parity or superiority once it became their strength in the 70s, we can say that the Soviets were engaging in social creativity in their attempt to enhance their prestige. The Soviets had of course imitated the US buildup of strategic forces, but then worked harder to claim its importance to others. See Larson and Shevchenko (2011) on the different means by which states may attempt to gain status. The process also suggests something about why certain things are deemed to be prestigious at certain times - they are promoted by a power competing for prestige and they successfully manage to convince other states that second-order beliefs exist about its importance.

[93]This suggests a different framework of political decision-making than that proposed by realists who argue that policy's are based on current strategic calculations.

impact who that observer state defers to. This raises the important question of when and why states choose to defer to other states. In part, the US might have feared that observer states did in fact perceive superiority to as an indicator of power and therefore degree of possible threat. There is evidence of such fears in the statement of a Former Joint Chiefs of Staff who responded, when asked about what motivated his concerns about strategic parity, that "I'm not concerned about the military aspect of the nuclear balance... But the other nations are sitting there watching this balance. The impact of this being that the other states think 'The Soviets must be more powerful and maybe we'd better not oppose them in any way'."[94] It is difficult to determine what 'powerful' means here however, given that there was little evidence that leaders of observer states perceived the threat to preemptively use nuclear weapons to be at all credible.While it could refer to the Soviet's enhanced ability to hurt and therefore coerce, it is also possible that 'power' here refers to the ability of the Soviets to impact affairs in ways that do not rely directly on their ability to hurt.[95] Instead, strategic superiority may be valued by other states not for the fear that they induce but for the respect they engender. They are signals of a state's competitive ability, of its technological and economical prowess, and importantly of a state's own determination to emerge as or to remain a superpower, each of which can be viewed as

[94]See interview described in Kull (1988, p. 115).

[95]Scholars and leaders have frequently used the terms 'power,' 'influence' and 'prestige' interchangeably, making it difficult to get at the different ways the concepts function in the international system and impact state behavior.

prestigious characteristics by the world community. As Colin Gray has said, that "weapons don't only serve for defense and deterrence, but also serve (in the eyes of others) to identify the state's estimate of its relative standing in the world."[96]

The interesting question then is why would observer states be willing to defer because to such those who they perceive to have prestige? Between individuals, the answer is more clear. Actors will defer to individuals they perceive to be prestigious because, at least in one convincing model, they believe that the prestigious member will have something valuable to teach them. Individuals will want to be close to prestigious members of society because they believe they will provide a beneficial model. How this model translates in to the realm of international relations is less clear. It is possible that states desire 'proximity' or alliance with other states because they believe that the state offers a valuable model of how to do things which the observing state wishes to learn.[97] It is also likely however that states choose to defer to prestigious actors because they believe that other states will bestow deference to the prestigious and because they prefer to be on the side of the state who has more influence in the international system. These states are therefore "trying to estimate the power relationship in part based on things like relative nuclear forces" because they "want to be sure they pick the winner" and because they believe that other states will

[96]Gray (1974).

[97]See Resende-Santos (1996). South American countries desired proximity to Prussian officials in order to imitate their military model.

also be using relative nuclear forces as a measure of who the winner should be.[98] Thus, in competitions for prestige, it is not only the second-order beliefs of those competing for prestige that matter but also the second-order beliefs that observer states have about what other states believe to be prestigious.[99]

What was the nature of the political influence that states perceived was at stake at the time? For the observers, it would seem clear in their desire to 'pick a winner' that they believed siding with the state with more influence meant that the observer states were likely to indirectly have more influence over other states in the system than they would if they sided with the politically weaker state. For the Soviets and the US, the political stakes were slightly different. The US maintained influence over most domains throughout the Cold War and they feared that their say over important issues might dwindle. Both sides seemed less concerned about losing allies than they were about subtle shifts in allegiance. For instance, American leaders feared that "the Soviets will think of themselves as very much in the ascendant... that the new imbalance will perhaps cause allies to become *unduly responsive* to Soviet diplomatic pressures and initiatives."[100] In particular, the US feared that shifting perceptions of prestige might make other states more likely to vote with the

[98]Quote taken from interview with Arms Control and Disarmament Agency official. See Kull (1988, p. 119). Such concerns about 'picking the winner' have little to do with resolve or credibility of those in competition.

[99]See O'Neill (2006) for a global games model that demonstrates this mechanism.

[100]Taken from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1972) (1972) hearings on SALT I.

USSR in the United Nations or might reduce the likelihood that others would be willing to back up unfriendly moves towards the USSR. They might also more likely engage in favorable trade relations with the Soviets or be more willing to accept Soviet ships in their ports. In regards to their allies more specifically, they feared decreased NATO ties and less unity within the Western alliance bloc.[101]

The Americans, in other words, feared that shifts in perceptions of the strategic balance would translate into shifts in the hierarchy of prestige and as a result the distribution of the influence in the system. Influence here is not based on the distribution of actual capabilities in the system but on the second-order beliefs by states about who has influence. The desire for states to side with the more influential makes this a largely tautological notion of influence - a state is influential as long as others believe that others are convinced it is influential. This leads states desiring more influence to engage in competitions over issues that they then try to convince observer states, through actions that generate common knowledge, that all other states believe these issues to be prominent measures of prestige. The competing states appear to fear most of all is that a failure to respond to challenges to prestige will lead the balance of hierarchy to tip precipitously against them, rendering them irrelevant in the international system.

[101]See Wohlforth (1993).

Conclusion

As the evidence above illustrates, the primary motivation behind the focus on strategic parity and arsenal sizes in the late 1960s and 1970s wasn't military or strategic. While shifts in strategic doctrine from a policy of massive retaliation in the 1950s to one of flexible response in the 60s likely did drive policies about arsenal sizes during those periods, by the time that the concept of "essential equivalence" entered the American leadership's lexicon, the size of the US strategic stockpiles had plateaued and in some cases started to decline.[102] There was also fear in the late 1970s that US strategic forces had been made more vulnerable by the increasing accuracy of Soviet ICBMs which could by 1979 be effectively loaded with MIRVs.[103] But any increased vulnerability the US might have faced at this time resulted from the improvements in Soviet ICBM accuracy rather than from any aspect related to the size of the Soviet arsenal. At any rate, these concerns about primarily arose after the focus on "essential parity" emphasized within the SALT II and this emphasis on "general" numerical equality had little basis within existing military frameworks.

Instead, the primary motivation for the Soviets appears to have been the desire for enhanced influence. Soviet leaders however did not believe that nuclear weapons could be

[102]See Freedman (1989) for a history.

[103]See Glaser (1989). Glaser notes that there was never really any fear about the vulnerability of US cities or about the ability of the US to deter an all-out attack.

used effectively to coerce others into doing its bidding.[104] Thus, they turned to pursue influence through the less conflictual quest for prestige - through the pursuit of characteristics they believed that others in the system either already held to be valuable or which they could be convinced to find valuable and worthy of respect. Strategic parity offered an easy, visible comparison on which the Soviets could be measured and to which they could draw attention. The degree to which this pursuit of prestige actually translated into more favorable political outcomes and enhanced influence for the Soviets is yet undetermined. Parity did lead Brezhnev to declare at the time that "After evaluating the general correlation of forces in the world, we came to this conclusion: A real possibility exists for achieving a fundamental breakthrough in international affairs."[105] While the Soviet achievement of strategic parity did coincide with a general increase in Soviet influence, especially in the third world, and with more favorable relations with European countries, the degree to which the accomplishment of strategic parity contributed to this shift remains a topic of future research.[106]

Prestige concerns also motivated the US' focus on strategic parity after 1972, but in

[104]The Soviets did of course employ bullying in order to obtain influence over members of the Soviet bloc however.

[105]Quoted in Wohlforth (1993, p.185).

[106]Wohlforth (1993) describes that the US following parity attempted to emphasize other bases of prestige in the international system, including economic and political preeminence as well as the degree of centrality a state held within the international network of states. See pp. 212-215.

slightly different ways. The United States had maintained significant prestige and influence throughout the first two decades of the Cold War. As the dominant power, they feared most the degradation of their influence. That this fear became attached to strategic parity took time. McNamara in the 1960s had in fact announced that strategic superiority could not be translated into either military or political advantages.[107] Yet, as the Soviets drew increasing attention to the importance of parity in shaping international affairs and as increasing attention was brought to the concept by domestic leaders like Senator Jackson, potential disparities in arsenal sizes became more visible to international actors. It was then that the US began to fear that numbers would come to be viewed as prestigious and that they might shape the distribution of influence to some degree. Wanting to undermine the potential damage that perceived inferiority might have, the US focused on institutionalizing general numerical parity within SALT II.

Additionally, prestige concerns similar to those described above likely played a role in other aspects of Cold War behavior as well. The domino theory in effect embodies the notion that influence is self-reinforcing. Both sides feared that the fall of one state to the influence of the other side would generate a dramatic cascade of declining influence as states desiring to be on the side of the "winner" switched allegiances. Additionally, the development of new and modern weapons was often at times likely pursued for reasons of prestige, given the ease with which such weapons draw attention and could easily serve

[107]Quoted in Trachtenberg (1985, p. 137).

as prestige symbols. As CSIS Executive Director Ray Cline concluded, "a growing and innovative arsenal will be perceived as more powerful than one which is static - even if the latter still retains an advantage in purely technical terms."[108] Given that power in his notion does not rest on technical or military advantage, the 'power' associated with innovative arsenals likely equates with the influence that derives from prestige.

Finally, that many leaders believed that nuclear weapons actually reduced the likelihood of direct conflict increased the role and importance of symbols in the Cold War. As the reality of secure second-strike capabilities sunk in, issues like parity and fancy weaponry took on new and largely symbolic importance. Since the Cold War, the prestige offered by nuclear weapons has arguably declined.[109] Those states now in pursuit of nuclear weapons are deemed to be 'rogue states' in noncompliance with international nonproliferation preferences. Given the low likelihood of direct conflict in the system, prestige still offers an attractive avenue to enhanced international influence. Rather than pursuing prestige through the nuclear weapons, states hoping to enhance their prestige are likely now exerting themselves more within international organizations than they would otherwise, are taking the helm of international interventions, and are hosting prominent international events. That the same prestige mechanisms described above of how such symbolic actions translate into actual political gains is likely functioning in these increasingly prestigious

[108]Quoted in Kull (1985, p.33).

[109]See O'Neill (2006).

domains is a rich topic of future research.

References

Adomeit, H. (1982). *Soviet Risk-taking and Crisis Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis*. Allen & Unwin.

Annual Report to Congress FY 1988 (1987). *Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 1988*. U.S. Department of Defense, GPO.

Ball, D. (1980). *Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration*. University of California Press.

Beardsley, K. and Asal, V. (2009). Winning with the bomb. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(2):278–301.

Betts, R. (1987). *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance*. Brookings Institution Press.

Bohlen, C. and Phelps, R. (1973). *Witness to History, 1929-1969*. Norton New York.

Brodie, B., Dunn, F., Wolfers, A., Corbett, P., and Fox, W. (1946). *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order*. Harcourt, Brace New York.

Brown, H. (1978). Report of the secretary of defense to the congress.

Bundy, M., Kennan, G., McNamara, R., and Smith, G. (1981). Nuclear weapons and the atlantic alliance. *Foreign Affairs*, 60:753.

Burr, W. (2001). Launch on warning: The development of u.s. capabilities, 1959-1979. *National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 43*.

Clearwater, J. (1996). *Johnson, McNamara, and the Birth of SALT and the ABM Treaty 1963-1969*. Dissertation. Com.

Daniel, D. (1978). *International Perceptions of the Superpower Military Balance*. Praeger Publishers.

Diehl, P. (1983). Arms races and escalation: A closer look. *Journal of Peace Research*, 20(3):205–212.

Diehl, P. and Kingston, J. (1987). Messenger or message? military buildups and the initiation of conflict. *Journal of Politics*, 49(3):801–813.

Downs, G., Rocke, D., and Siverson, R. (1985). Arms races and cooperation. *World Politics*, 38(01):118–146.

Enthoven, A. and Smith, K. (2005). *How Much is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969*. Rand Corporation.

Evangelista, M. (1988). *Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies*. Cornell University Press Ithaca.

Eyre, D. and Suchman, M. (1996). Status, norms, and the proliferation of conventional weapons: An institutional theory approach. In Katzenstein, P. J., editor, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, pages 79–113. Columbia University Press.

Fearon, J. (1998). Domestic politics, foreign policy, and theories of international relations. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1(1):289–313.

Frank, J. (1983). Nuclear arms and prenuclear leaders: Sociopsychological aspects of the nuclear arms race. *Political Psychology*, pages 393–408.

Freedman, L. (1989). *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*. New York, NY: St. Martins Press.

Gaddis, J. (1982). *Strategies of containment: a critical appraisal of American national security policy during the Cold War*. Oxford University Press, USA.

Gilady, L. (2006). *Conspicuous waste in international relations*. PhD thesis, Yale University.

Glaser, C. (1989). Why do strategists disagree about the requirements of strategic nuclear deterrence? In Eden, L. and Miller, S., editors, *Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates*. Cornell Univ Press.

Glaser, C. (1992). Political consequences of military strategy: Expanding and refining the spiral and deterrence models. *World Politics*, 44(04):497–538.

Glaser, C. (2000). The causes and consequences of arms races. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3(1):251–276.

Glaser, C. (2004). When are arms races dangerous? rational versus suboptimal arming. *International Security*, 28(4):44–84.

Gray, C. (1974). The urge to compete: Rationales for arms racing. *World Politics*, 26(02):207–233.

Halperin, M. (1987). *Nuclear Fallacy: Dispelling the Myth of Nuclear Strategy*. Ballinger Publishing Co., Cambridge, MA.

Jervis, R. (1976). *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton University Press.

Jervis, R. (1984). *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*. Cornell University Press Ithaca, NY.

Jervis, R. (1989). *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon*. Cornell University Press.

Johnston, A. (1995). China's new" old thinking": The concept of limited deterrence. *International Security*, 20(3):5–42.

Kahan, J. (1975). *Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing US Strategic Arms Policy*. Brookings institution Washington, DC.

Kahn, H. (1960). The ams race and some of its hazards. *Daedalus*, 89(4):744–780.

Kinsella, D. and Chima, J. (2001). Symbols of statehood: military industrialization and public discourse in India. *Review of International Studies*, 27(03):353–373.

Kissinger, H. (1979). *White House Years*. Simon & Schuster.

Kroenig, M. (2012). Nuclear superiority and the balance of resolve: Explaining nuclear crisis outcomes. *International Organization, Forthcoming*.

Kugler, R. (1975). *The politics of restraint: Robert McNamara and the strategic nuclear forces, l963-l968*. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Kull, S. (1985). Nuclear nonsense. *Foreign Policy*, pages 28–52.

Kull, S. (1988). *Minds at War: Nuclear Reality and the Inner Conflicts of Defense Policymakers*. Basic Books.

Kydd, A. (2000). Arms races and arms control: Modeling the hawk perspective. *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(2):228.

Lambeth, B. (1979). The political potential of soviet equivalence. *International Security*, 4(2):22–39.

Larson, D. and Shevchenko, A. (2001). Bringing russia into the club. In Rosecrance, R., editor, *The New Great Power Coalition: Toward a World Concert of Nations*, pages 311–326. Rowman & Littlefield Pub Incorporated.

Larson, D. and Shevchenko, A. (2011). Managing Rising Power: The Role of Status Concerns. unpublished.

Luttwak, E. (1972). *The Strategic Balance, 1972*. Library Press.

Luttwak, E. (1976). *Strategic Power: Military Capabilities and Political Utility*. Sage Publications.

McNamara, R. (1964). Fiscal year 1964 posture statement. *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, Hearings Before the Subcomittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, eighty-eight Congress*.

McNamara, R. (1967). Mcnamara statement regarding military authorizations and defense appropriations for fy 1968 before the senate appropriations committee. *Hearings on Military Posture by the House Armed Services Committee*.

McNamara, R. (1983). The military role of nuclear weapons: Perceptions and misperceptions. *Survival*, 25(6):261–271.

Morgenthau, H. (1960). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Knopf.

Murray, M. (2010). Identity, insecurity, and great power politics: The tragedy of german naval ambition before the first world war. *Security Studies*, 19(4):656–688.

Newhouse, J. and Newhouse, J. (1989). *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT*. Pergamon-Brassey's.

Nixon, R. (1978). *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*. " New York, NY: Grosset & Dunlap.".

Norris, R. and Kristensen, H. (2006). Global nuclear stockpiles, 1945-2006. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 62(4):64–66.

O'Neill, B. (2001). *Honor, Symbols, and War*. University of Michigan Press.

O'Neill, B. (2006). Nuclear weapons and national prestige. Unpublished manuscript.

Powell, R. (1990). *Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility*. Cambridge University Press.

Powell, R. (1999). *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics*. Princeton University Press.

Quester, G. (2000). *Nuclear Monopoly*. Transaction Publishing.

Resende-Santos, J. (1996). Anarchy and the emulation of military systems: Military organization and technology in south america, 1870–1930. *Security Studies*, 5(3):193–260.

Ringmar, E. (2002). The recognition game soviet russia against the west. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37(2):115–136.

Rosenberg, D. (1983). The origins of overkill: Nuclear weapons and american strategy, 1945-1960. *International Security*, 7(4):3–71.

Rumsfeld, D. (1978). Report of Secretary of Defense Donald H Rumsfeld. In *Rumsfeld to the Congress on the FY 1978 Budget, FY 1979 Authorization Request and FY 1978-1982 Defense Programs*.

Sagan, S. (1996). Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb. *International Security*, 21(3):54–86.

Sakharov, A. (1990). Memoirs.

Schelling, T. (1966). *Arms and Influence*. New Haven, Yale University Press.

Schlesinger, J. (1974). Annual defense department report, fy 1975. *Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office*, 1975.

Schlesinger, J. (1975). Annual defense department report, fy 1976. *Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office*, 1976.

Scowcroft Commission (1983). *Excerpts from "Report of the Commission on Strategic Forces"*.

Sechser, T. and Fuhrmann, M. (2012). Crisis bargaining and nuclear blackmail. *International Organization, Forthcoming*.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1975) (1975). *Analyses of Effects of Limited Nuclear Warfare*. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, GPO.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1972) (1972). *Hearings on Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons*. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 87(3):355–374.

The Military Balance (1969) (1969). *The Military Balance, 1969-1970*. International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: IISS.

The Military Balance (1971) (1972). *The Military Balance, 1971-1972*. International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: IISS.

Trachtenberg, M. (1985). The influence of nuclear weapons in the cuban missile crisis. *International Security*, pages 137–163.

Trachtenberg, M. (1988). A "wasting asset": American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance, 1949-1954. *International Security*, pages 5–49.

Turner, A. S. (March 29, 1981). Why we should build the mx missile. *The New York Times*.

Wallace, M. (1982). Armaments and escalation: two competing hypotheses. *International Studies Quarterly*, pages 37–56.

Wohlforth, W. (1993). *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War*. Cornell University Press.

Wohlstetter, A. (1958). The delicate balance of terror. *Foreign Affairs*, 37:211.

Chapter Seven : Conclusion

Social hierarchies built upon the admiration rather than the fear of others are deeply embedded within international relations. As has been shown, states devote significant energy, resources and care to managing their image in the eyes of others, allowing concerns about their image to shape their interests in ways that are often at odds with their immediate material and security goals. These interests have translated into key episodes of heightened international competition over the last 200 years, episodes involving aspects of international behavior, such as the acquisition of territory and weapons, which have often been attributed to concerns about relative power, existential security or greed. The prevalence of prestige concerns within international politics demands a rethinking of theories of international relations. Much of what states do is not motivated by concerns about annihilation and state death. States are not perpetually burdened with the task of defeating others in endless power competitions, lest they leave themselves open to conquest. Instead, states are often motivated by the simple desire for prestige and the respect of their peers, just as are humans at all other levels of social activity. We should therefore not jump to conclusions about underlying state motivations even in domains of international behavior that have historically been viewed through the lens of power politics. That states can be motivated to acquire territory and weapons by their desire for prestige suggests that a large spectrum of state behaviors might share similar explanations.

Colonial holdings and large nuclear arsenals have held prestige in the past but do not any longer. While the ability to conquer vast swaths of territory might have been admirable in the 19th century, international society in the 20th century has deemed such aggression to be worthy of sanction. Norms of territorial integrity have emerged which proscribed treading upon the sovereignty of other states.[1] Colonies remained sources of national prestige until after World War II. In 1930, French Parliamentarians were still declaring that "France will be a great colonizing power, or it will cease to be France."[2] By the late 1960s, however, under the urging of the Soviets and Americans, colonies came to be viewed as relics of an overly-aggressive imperial age. By 1970, the vast majority of colonies had been granted independence. The prestige associated with nuclear weapons has also declined. The acquisition of nuclear weapons, once viewed as the key to technical prestige and great power status in the post-war period, now faces strong social sanctioning and potential military opposition.

This demands the following questions then: To what degree do prestige concerns shape current international behavior? What characteristics and goods currently hold international prestige? Concern about social hierarchy is deeply embedded within our biology and psychology. These concerns have shaped individual and state interests throughout the

[1] See Zacher (2001).

[2] Albertini (1971, p. 265). See also Brogi (2006) for a description of the Italian and French competition for prestige in North Africa in the early 1950s.

known past. There is no reason to think that such concerns have subsided or become obsolete in the current day. The social hierarchies which emerge out of such concerns provide states with less costly ways of establishing how influence is distributed among actors than relying on the ability to hurt. The more costly potential conflict is, the more incentive states have to rely upon social hierarchies and strategies aimed at bolstering their social position rather than on relying on their competitive ability alone. It is safe to assume that international conflict has never had greater potential costs than it does in the present day. We therefore have reason to believe that prestige concerns may play an even more prominent role in shaping state behavior than they have in times past.

Admirable and prestigious characteristics within the international system rarely change over time. Economic strength, technological prowess and the degree of modernization, for instance, have long held international prestige and will likely continue to be so long into the future. The goods or achievements that convey prestige however are more subject to frequent change. This is in part because prestige attaches to technological advances and discoveries. The prestige associated with the capacity to strike a target 100 miles away is eventually superseded by the capacity to hit a target 1000 miles away. The prestige of a good also declines with the number of others who are in possession of it. The fifth state to acquire nuclear weapons will certainly obtain less prestige than will the first. Finally, as changing attitudes towards colonies and nuclear weapons convey, what is viewed to be prestigious also shifts as a function of changing international norms. What is met with

admiration in one era may be met with contempt in another.

Among the goods and achievements that convey technical prestige in the contemporary international system, many relate to manned space flight and space exploration. China and Indian, for instance, are demonstrating their scientific and technical prowess as well as their economic capabilities through advances in their space programs. While their space program remains behind those of the US and Russia, the Chinese have committed extensive resources to sending a man in to space by 2020 despite the lack of obvious strategic benefits of doing so. They are also on course to join the small two-power club of nations with independently-run manned space stations. Both initiatives appear to be motivated by a desire to garner the prestige associated with demonstrating their ability to match American and Russian achievements in space. Such accomplishments clearly and visibly distinguish them from less prestigious powers without the sufficient ability or resources to pull them off.[3] The recent inclusion of the first Chinese woman on a manned space flight has even been presented as a symbol of prestige, with the Chinese space agency deeming it a "landmark event" which indicates that the Chinese have passed the technological hurdle of providing complex infrastructure for the crew.[4] Possibly spurred on by Chinese investments, India has committed $90 million to being among the first nations to send an

[3]Anonymous (2012); Watts (2011).

[4]Guan (2012).

independent mission to Mars, primarily for the sake of increasing Indian prestige.[5]

While wealth and technical prowess have long held prestige, the ability to demonstrate leadership abilities on the international and multilateral stage has become increasingly admirable, possibly more so than at any other time in international history. Heading multilateral military operations and humanitarian interventions signals not only a state's ability to lead but also that the state has sufficient existing prestige to be assigned the position by a collection of other states. Such acts create common knowledge amongst those in the international community that the state is perceived as influential at least by some and this common knowledge serves as the basis of international prominence. Recent endeavors by France to lead the multilateral intervention in Libya in 2011 provide an example of international prestige acquired through multilateral leadership. France was a primary advocate for Libyan intervention. This was a surprise to many given their opposition to intervention in both Iraq and Afghanistan. That the French pushed hard to lead the intervention was likely aimed at reasserting French prestige through a demonstration of leadership and through the extension of French influence in North Africa. There is also a case to made that the French felt the need to assert themselves following a loss of prestige the year before resulting from prolonged French support of the corrupt and eventually overthrown Tunisian dictator.[6]

[5]Chandrashekhar (2012).

[6]Anonymous (2011).

International organizations also provide a domain in which states can exert their independence in hope of establishing international prestige. Strong Russian opposition to the American intervention in Iraq, for instance, provides an interesting example of exertion in international affairs prompted by a desire for prestige. Given the renewed spirit of friendship between Russia and the US which had arisen since the September 11th attacks and the start of the war on terror, President Bush had fully expected ally Putin to stand behind the US decision to intervene in Iraq.[7] The war at some point clearly became inevitable and Russia's material interests in Iraq were arguably best served by regime change in Baghdad.[8] Nevertheless, Russia joined the vocal opposition in calling for the US to allow UN inspectors to restart their work. In Putin's thinking, Russia had two options: "either Russia will be great, or it will not exist."[9] Such greatness could not be achieved within a unipolar system of unchallenged US prominence. By joining France, Germany and China in opposition to the US, Russia hoped to establish a more multipolar world in which it would have the room to reclaim its former position of social prominence. There is also evidence that the Russians felt humiliated by the fact that the Americans had refused to listen to them, despite their recent renewed alliance.[10] As the chairman of the upper

[7] See Ambrosio (2005). Also see Ambrosio (2001).

[8] See *Ibid.* p. 1198.

[9] Ambrosio (2005, p. 1200).

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 1202 - 1205.

house of the Russian parliament said at the time, in language strikingly similar to that used by French leaders upon the invasion of Tunisia, "We are witnesses to the emergence of a new Russia in the international community. Russia is a great power and talk that Russia belongs to the 'third world' is slowly stepping aside: Russia is taking an active part in all international events."[11]

Distinguishing whether behavior is driven primarily by security concerns or by social concerns and concerns about prestige has important implications for the practice of international relations. Concerns about prestige can often be addressed in ways which security concerns cannot. Because prestige-seeking is motivated by a desire for social recognition, it is possible for other, often more prestigious states to provide recognition before competitions for prestige and prestige-driven conflict emerge. Prestige rewards may be applicable for both emerging powers that are hoping to acquire a new level of respect and for powers that face decline and desire to reclaim the levels of respect they held in the past.

Bismarck recognized the need to accommodate state identities and state desires for prestige. His policy for maintaining international peace was to 'satisfy the ambitions' of each state by giving each their expected due whenever possible. Often in the case of 19th century politics, due was granted through the proportional division of spheres of influence in colonial territories abroad. Such strategies were possible amongst imperial powers when

[11]Quoted in *Ibid*, p. 1201. From 'Federation Council Head on Role of Russian Diplomacy in Iraqi Crisis,' *RosBusiness Consulting Database*, February 19. 2003.

the norms of behavior allowed for vast quantities of 'unclaimed' territory to be divvied up. Today, such forms of accommodation are unacceptable. Rather, prestige recognition in the current day usually takes place within the confines of international institutions.[12] Such institutions often possess flexible organizational structures with multiple opportunities for leadership. More prestigious states can assign states with prestige concerns leadership roles as a sign of recognition and respect. Such leadership roles might be assumed at the helm of multilateral military operations, as was the case with the French-led intervention in Libya, or may be held within the institutions themselves. The United States, for instance, used such a strategy with the French and Italians after the Second World War. The Americans acknowledged the French need for a "great national ambition" in order to mask its decline in prestige and self-confidence.[13] The Italians meanwhile sought to acquire prestige equivalent to that of the French after unsuccessful efforts to do so throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. In hopes of avoiding another competition for prestige in North Africa between the French and the Italians, the United States sought to channel their ambitions into leadership

[12]Paul and Shankar (2011) address the institutional accommodation of an emergent India in the modern era. Larson and Shevchenko (2010) addresses the status accommodation of China and Russia.

[13]The words of General De Gaulle. Quoted in Vaïsse (1998). See Brogi (2006, p. 753). As Brogi states, the French feared being demoted to the level of Italy. French prestige, at the time already in question, faced another blow with American pressures to renounce claims to Algeria, the basis in French minds of the state's remaining claims to great power status. US diplomats feared that such ambition might lead the French to opt for a military dictatorship in an attempt to maintain state grandeur

roles within the newly integrated structure of European states.[14]

Even if states are not provided official leadership roles, state ambitions may be recognized through their inclusion in decision-making fora. A seat at the table provides a state the opportunity to feel as though it has a voice in international affairs, even if the decisions of the group do not correspond to their preferences. Just as with individuals, states like to feel like they have been listened to – like they have been respected enough to voice their opinions and have then considered. A failure to do so sends a signal of disrespect that is likely to prompt acts of prestige-seeking. Additionally, recognition may take a more symbolic form. State visits and other high level diplomatic meetings are shows of respect which might sate a country's desire for prestige. Allowing, or even encouraging, acts of autonomy or anti-hegemonic sentiment among those with prestige concerns may provide the feeling of independence and esteem. The United States also employed this strategy in the case of post-war France. US diplomats acknowledged that a dose of anti-Americanism could boost the confidence of the French and help them overcome their sense of inferiority.[15]

The benefits of recognizing and accommodating prestige concerns are substantial. The costs of avoiding direct conflict prompted by state desires for social esteem are clear. The benefits of avoiding prestige competitions are also significant. While competitions for

[14]See Brogi (2006) for a detailed account of this period. As Brogi puts it, the Americans focused more on making sure the French and Italians believe they had prominence through leadership more than did on acquiring them actual influence over outcomes.

[15]Brogi (2006, p. 761).

prestige may be more benign than are arms races rooted in security concerns which can not so easily be accommodated, races for prestige are costly and often involve the spread of weapons that can present significant threats to international security long into the future.

References

Albertini, R. v. (1971). *Decolonization: The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919-1960*. Africana Pub. Co.(New York).

Ambrosio, T. (2001). Russia's quest for multipolarity: A response to us foreign policy in the post-cold war era. *European Security*, 10(1):45–67.

Ambrosio, T. (2005). The Russo–American dispute over the invasion of Iraq: international status and the role of positional goods. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 57(8):1189–1210.

Anonymous (2011). Discord among allies. *The New York Times*.

Anonymous (2012). China's space missions getting more ambitious. *The Nation (Thailand)*.

Brogi, A. (2006). competing missions: France, italy, and the rise of american hegemony in the mediterranean. *Diplomatic History*, 30(4):741–770.

Chandrashekhar, V. (2012). India launches 101st space mission, and looks to Mars; The mission will be carried out without international help, highlighting the growth and ambition of India's home-grown space program, which plans to launch a mission to Mars. *The Christian Science Monitor*.

Guan, N. H. (2012). China to send first woman into space to test module. *The Independent*.

Larson, D. and Shevchenko, A. (2010). Status seekers: Chinese and russian responses to us primacy. *International Security*, 34(4):63–95.

Paul, T. and Shankar, M. (2011). "Status Accommodation Through Institutional Means: India's Rise and Global Order". Unpublished manuscript.

Vaïsse, M. (1998). *La Grandeur: politique étrangère du général De Gaulle (1958-1969)*. Fayard.

Watts, J. (2011). Space: With rivals earthbound, china takes great leap towards superpower status: Launch of heavenly palace space station test module docking vessel scheduled to follow later this year. *The Guardian*.

Zacher, M. W. (2001). The territorial integrity norm: International boundaries and the use of force. *International Organization*, 55(2):215–250.