A Transnational Temperance Discourse?  
William Wells Brown, Creole Civilization, and Temperate Manners

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And when the victory shall be complete—when there shall be neither a slave nor a drunkard on the earth—how proud the title of that Land, which may truly claim to be the birthplace and the cradle of both those revolutionaries, that shall have ended in that victory.

—Abraham Lincoln, “An Address Delivered before the Springfield Washingtonian Temperance Society”

In the mid-nineteenth century, temperance movements throughout Britain and the United States strove for universalist and international goals of individual sovereignty, restraint, and enlightened freedom. As with many international movements of civil societies emerging from the formation of modern states, they expressed themselves in strongly nationalistic forms of identity. American temperance movements often assumed many of the middle-class, domestic, and individualistic values associated with the Protestant work ethic and its inner-worldly asceticism. Temperance in general became prominent in the United States in the period that corresponded with the Second Great Awakening in the early 1800s, though examples of temperance organizations predate this surge of social movements in the revivalistic atmosphere. American temperance movements were simultaneously concerned with defining the purity of self and establishing a coherent national identity. The notion and practice of temperance has also been a salient orientation of many religions; however, in the colonial period, not even the New England Puritans were temperance activists. On the one hand, the birth of American temperance seemed to initially appear as a result of the nationalist revolutionary ethos, expressing the desire for widespread civil
societies: “temperate” behavior suggested a type of rational, restrained, and public character. On the other hand, temperance movements acquired an evangelical character in the context of the affected and enthusiastic social spaces of “awakening.”

The opening epigraph from Abraham Lincoln captures the contiguity between concepts of slavery and intemperance, as well as the exceptionalist ethos prominent in the United States and brought to bear on issues of individual freedom of the “land.” Indeed, many temperance groups were nativist and virulently racist even when temperance was linked to antislavery. Notably, beyond popular goals of moderation, total abstinence, and prohibition, temperance also expressed different promises and civil ideals for many African American abolitionists who conjoined temperance and antislavery. For the former enslaved, temperance seemed to promote and encompass national values like the Protestant work ethic, self-reliance, and individual restraint, particularly for the poor and those who were striving for social elevation by inculcating the values of the middle class.

This point is made by Robert S. Levine in his paper on William Wells Brown and temperance, in which he interprets a letter from Brown to Frederick Douglass as follows: “Brown’s rhetoric initially suggests that the ‘laboring classes,’ like the slaves of the West Indies, are victims of brute exploitation and arbitrary authority, but . . . [he] places the burden for the ‘elevation’ of the working poor on the poor themselves, whom he portrays less as ‘wage slaves’ than as ‘slaves’ of the bottle.”3 After focusing on Clotel, or, The President’s Daughter (1853), Levine concludes, “Temperance would remain central to Brown’s antebellum and postbellum writings, both as a metaphor for unrestrained patriarchal power and as a program for black elevation” (107). Levine also points out that Brown’s My Southern Home (1880) “extends temperance beyond the literal act of drinking to encompass various aspects of corporeal self-control [and] ‘all intoxicants’ are desires for vengeance, inordinate wealth, power, and sexual gratification” (108).

Moreover, Brown’s international involvement with discourses of temperance characterizes a desire for the foundation of a “civilization” situated in between the democratic and aristocratic, as he interrogates the ambiguities in political structures of empire and the modern nation-state. It is this ambivalence that perhaps leads him to explore an alternate form of revolutionary structure prefiguring current positive imaginings of transnationalism and expressed in novel corporeal forms of “civilized” manners, speech, and cultural exchange.4 This is not meant to imply that empires are aristocratic and nation-states democratic. Indeed, the ambiguities Brown faces in his promotion of temperance in international valencies can be interpreted as resulting from the necessity of founding transnational structures of freedom for the enslaved Africans in the United States—he could not uncritically support American exceptionalism, nor uncritically endorse the universalism of empire. Brown’s use of temperance as a corporeal regimen complemented his experience of a creole identity
involved in continuous passages characterizing the diasporic situation of those emerging from new-world chattel slavery.

Brown’s notion of civilization also differed from that expressed at the founding of the United States, and from the one supported in mythic accounts of New England origins transposing the ideology of free labor and the work ethic—though it can at times appear that he offers a “mythic account of [national] origins” in Clotel. American “democratic” foundations supported individualistic orientations and an abstract “law of nature” that implied various racial hierarchies. Democratic values were obviously important to Brown throughout his abolitionist career, but his continuous eliding of the foundation of “home” through movement, escape, travel, and pilgrimage clarifies a meaning of civilization and restraint contrary to American values of individual self-control and work ethic that encouraged viewing the land as a commodity subject to the resources of the human will. Even though bodily reform of diet, alcohol, and the dynamics of domestic relationships were popular among Northern antebellum reformers in the United States, they often held aleatory relations to the land and did not situate restraint as correlative to a tempered view of the land as a material and “cultured” sacred space.

Indeed, while it can be argued that many abolitionists promoted class and social elevation, often somewhat simplistic laissez-faire freedom associated with the Protestant work ethic, to do so evades examining more nuanced uses of temperance that can enact communal meanings of sobriety, civil exchanges, freedom, and spatiality. Space is thus not only the constructed civil space for associations but equally a larger receptacle for transcultural exchange to establish communal identity and value. For Brown, in his travels and final return “home,” the experience of space, the land itself, becomes a resource and limit to the self—a restraint—that allows him to garner meanings of culture and exchange as he attempts to instill the customs of a well-tempered public character.

The word “civilization” does not grow out of American democracy and its revolutionary founding, but rather from modern European imperialism and its emerging structures of civil society. The word is particularly Eurocentric and was not in frequent use until the eighteenth century, first in France and then in England. Historian of religions Charles H. Long observed in his paper “Primitive/Civilized: The Locus of a Problem” that “the meaning of this term cannot be understood apart from the geographies and cultures of the New World that are both ‘other’ and empirical.” While an empirical other—recognized negatively as an enslaved person—Brown consistently wrote of such figures as the “tragic mulatta” and the predicament of one-drop racism in the United States, with positive views of the eventual “amalgamation” of the “races.” Moreover, discussions of Brown’s work commonly allude to the self-consciously constructed aspects of his identity—from the lack of a fixed identity, his biracial, nearly outwardly “white” identity that made it possible to almost pass, to Brown’s multiple roles in actual life and his writing. These roles begin with his name William as a child on the plantation being changed to
Sandford because another white child had the same name, and his eventual renaming as William Wells Brown.¹¹ The name was “bestowed upon” him from the Quaker, Wells Brown, who helped him escape.¹² From that fluid and uncertain position, he assumed various vocational and activist roles as a steamboat operator, a barber, a banker, a husband and father, a gentleman among the ladies, a radical abolitionist and republican revolutionary, an anglophile, a temperance activist, a consummate man of letters, a historian, a playwright, a novelist, and, in the 1870s, a medical doctor of uncertain qualifications.

This intermixture of roles and identities also disrupted the familiar binary of primitive/civilized. Brown conceived of the inherently Eurocentric concept of civilization in creolized ways—living an intermixture that opposed the opposition of terms. Indeed, rather than necessarily leading to the situation of the empirical other, what some have understood as Brown’s liminal “trickster” identity could be viewed as a restrained orientation characterizing a basic revolutionary structure out of which Brown saw a modern civilization emerging.¹³ This notion of civilization not only came to fruition through Brown’s European travels (1849–1854) and direct reflections on the harbingers of “civilization,” but through his postbellum reflections on African civilizations and his pilgrimage for “home” to establish a dignified relation to the land in My Southern Home (1880). In Brown’s travels, temperance remained the locus for a new, creolized civilization, expressing a manner and style of behavior that resembles a sociogenetic and psychogenetic meaning of restraint forged in light of the history of transatlantic slavery and an imagined revolutionary founding, as well as countering the excesses inherent in modern “civilized” exchanged.

The creolized civilizational mode can be seen as an expression of the stratagem of the “passivity of power”—a strategy in which the lack of dominating power is turned to creative ends. The most obvious example of Brown’s creolized style appears as diversion rather than direct or impassioned polemics, as well as in his discursive combinations of folktale and “civilized” Europeanisms. According to Edouard Glissant, “diversion is the ultimate resort of a population whose domination by an Other is concealed: it then must search elsewhere for the principle of domination, which is not evident in the country itself: because the system of domination (which is not only exploitation, which is not only misery, which is not only underdevelopment, but actually the complete eradication of an economic entity) is not directly tangible. Diversion is the parallactic displacement of this strategy.”¹⁴ Diversion bears resemblance to what John Ernest has clarified as Brown’s use of the “incidental” and anecdotal. Oftentimes Brown diverts, as in Three Years in Europe (1852) when, for example, he tells and retells a seemingly inconsequential anecdote about the British landlady who left him wet sheets that he threw out the window. Ernest notes that some incidents—as when Brown describes outwitting members of the Klan who are planning to lynch him—are really not light asides. In the Klan incident, “Dr. Brown had with him a syringe and a supply of ‘a solution of the acetate of morphia,’ which he injected into the ailing man while pretending to perform a kind
of conjuring ritual.”15 This “incident” or “diversion” occurs in the introduction to Brown’s The Rising Son (1874), presumably written by Alonzo D. Moore, but the book then proceeds, ironically, to leave conjuring and wit and seriously outline the history of African civilizations and African heroes.

While practicing wit and irony, diversion, camouflage and subterfuge, Brown shows restrained and “civilized” manners at both “psychogenetic” and “sociogenetic” levels. These are Norbert Elias’s terms from his study The Civilizing Process, in which he outlined the changes from the medieval period forward in the “West” that cohered in the development of modern civilization.16 To be sure, as Long argues, the concept of civilization was not only an “internal development in Western Europe,” but rather intimately tied to the “discovery of the new World” and “primitive” others against whom Western society could pose its superiority.17 What Elias discussed as psychogenetic aspects of affect control and restraint corresponded to sociogenetic manners, customs, traditions, and ultimately, economic value in modes of exchange. Commonly in white American temperance societies, emphasis was placed on a reformation of the inner and psychogenetic aspects through greater stress on controlling the will, rather than understanding “affect control” as linked to the foundation of civilization or culture. For Brown, temperance presented a covalence of the inner and outer bound to emerging and intermingling conceptions of civilizations, the folk, culture, and finally, value in its broadest terms of exchange and tempering consumption. These terms have many possible valences. For my purposes, modern civilization, as Elias points out, “plays down the national differences between peoples; it emphasizes what is common to all human beings or—in the view of its bearers—should be.”18 Culture, in discussions of the “West,” took a different form in German considerations of national character in which Kultur is tied to the question of what constitutes a particular national identity (7). German considerations of the Volk are useful, without the connotations of natural racial hierarchies, in reflecting on how Brown desired to found a local yet transnational identity that would be able to acknowledge the former slaves’ identity in relation to the land, while establishing a broader sense of modern civilization.

**Brown’s Temperate Civilization: Habitus of Restraint and Exchanges**

Benjamin Quarles early observed the links between antislavery and temperance and noted that African American leaders recognized the problems that alcohol posed for the poor who might “turn to drink as an anodyne, an escape,” and “abstinence” was linked with “abolition.”19 The link between the newly freed, poverty, and potential alcoholism was a main reason Brown became involved in temperance after his escape from Missouri slavery in 1834. When he moved to Buffalo in 1836, according to William Farrison, “among the Negroes in Buffalo, Brown discovered many who, like himself, had freed themselves from chattel slavery; but among them he also found many who were being victimized by servitude to intoxicating drinks. In order to
abolish this kind of slavery, Brown organized a temperance society—one of the first to be organized in western New York—and served as its president for three terms.”20 This society gained about three hundred members, but Brown stepped down from presidency as he became more involved with abolitionism (72). After the “legal” end of chattel slavery in the United States, Brown resumed a more activist role in temperance, though he never abandoned his temperance associations while an abolitionist.

Farrison uses the metaphor of “slavery” to indicate the slavery of intemperance, a familiar metaphor at the time. Whereas the metaphor of “slave to the bottle” was common for white temperance reformers as well, African Americans were often alert to radical and conflicting differences in meanings of reform, revolution, and freedom in discourses of temperance and abolition. For example, in a speech for the Paisley Temperance Society in Scotland in 1840, while noting that, “in the United States, the antislavery cause and the temperance cause were almost synonymous,” Charles Lennox Remond clarifies that “it was true that many supported the temperance cause who were not abolitionists, but there were no abolitionists who were not likewise friends of the cause of temperance.”21 Furthermore, Remond conjoins intemperance with slavery and the transatlantic slave trade itself, remarking that “intemperance had been one of the chief supports of slavery in that country.” Moreover, “the slave trade on the coast of Africa was sustained by ardent spirits.... Where could they find a man even for filthy lucre who would be disposed to throw into the sea an entire cargo of human beings when pursued by British cruisers, if they not indulged in the use of ardent spirits, and were thus rendered reckless in the commission of the most atrocious crimes?” (2). Though Remond does not here connect the traffic of rum to the traffic of human beings, the “filthy lucre” and recklessness of the passions insinuate the transatlantic traffic as a mercantile movement concerning the question of value, exchange, and commodity culture. To be sure, rum from the West Indies and slaves were among the more valuable commodities in the transatlantic trade.

Remond’s connection between alcohol, the slave trade, and slavery also corresponds to what Donald Yacovone has viewed as the “second phase” of black temperance. In the first phase, before the 1830s, “black temperance advocates joined in the larger white effort to control the nation’s drinking through a universal appeal based on moral reform principles.”22 During the second phase in the 1840s and 1850s, black temperance departed from association with many of the white reform movements and also promoted “total abstinence” rather than moderation. Temperance became associated with the black community and antislavery, “offering practical and symbolic resistance to the forces of racism and slavery” (288). J. W. C. Pennington even argued in 1836 that temperance “should adopt total abstinence as part of its obligation to the slaves” (quoted in 288). The “third phase” entailed a less evangelical fervor and had a “practical” outlook, focusing on “fraternity and equality” (282).
Brown’s life spans most of these phases and, as a result, his thoughts on temperance express elements of each. Brown shared Frederick Douglass’s view, expressed in the latter’s speech at a temperance rally in 1846 in Paisley, Scotland, that abolition and temperance were intertwined movements—“I am a temperance man because I am an antislavery man,” Douglass remarked (quoted in 290). But even as late as The Rising Son (1874), Brown would echo Remond’s earlier equation of drink with the slave trade: “Fired with ardent spirits and armed with old muskets, these people [traders] would travel from district to district, leaving behind them smoldering ruins, heart-stricken friends, and bearing with them victims whose market value was to influence the avaricious passions of the inhabitants of the new world.”

The “passions” seem part of a generalized disorder connoting an inferior disposition and level of humanity. Brown’s depiction of the general sobriety of the majority of African cultures, on the other hand, counters the descriptions of those who are driven by passions. At this late postbellum date, Brown has not merely adapted to a more pragmatic orientation of temperance to promote “fraternity and equality,” even if those goals are present.

Neither did Brown locate the mode of restraining the passions in a Protestant-derived asceticism, an American domestic space, or even a generalized civil form of fraternity. On the contrary, Brown inserts temperance as one of the key virtues in his historical revision of the founding of ancient civilizations. Perhaps surprisingly, in The Rising Son, Brown even praises Islam for having a positive influence in providing restraint to the passions. He writes, “Mungo Park, in his travels seventy years ago, everywhere remarked the contrast between the pagan and Mohammedan tribes of interior Africa. One very important improvement noticed by him was abstinence from intoxicating drinks” (91). According to Brown, “throughout Central Africa there has been established a vast total abstinence society; and such is the influence of this society that where there are Moslem inhabitants, even in pagan towns, it is a very rare thing to see a person intoxicated.” Traders from Europe and America, however, bring “ardent spirits” to the “coast at Caboon” (92). While Mungo Park did not characterize the “pagans” or “kaffirs” as a sober bunch, Brown plays on a statement Mungo Park made in his Travels in the Interior of Districts of Africa: “‘The beverage of the pagan Negroes,’ he says, ‘is beer and mead, of which they often drink to excess; the Mohammedan converts drink nothing but water’” (quoted in 92).

Perhaps extrapolating from Park’s comments on Islam, Brown follows the general sense that Islam is one step toward Christianity, and finally to “progress in civilization,” the title of Brown’s chapter eleven. All of the trappings of civilization seem present in various parts of Africa: the Veys use “written language” (102), and the “Abyssinians” “have fine schools and colleges,” while familiar with “agriculture, that great civilizer of man” (100). Following the path of western civilization, Liberia “will yet be developed” with technological advances such as the “locomotive.” The “African news,” according to Brown, will be preoccupied with such topics as the “Corn Exchange, London and Wall Street, New York,” and move out of the “moral
wilderness” (134). Nonetheless, if the book at times reads like a celebration of the advent of a meaning of freedom as American commerce, Brown’s locus of “civilization” is in Ethiopia: “So it is that we trace the light of Ethiopian civilization first into Egypt, thence into Greece, and Rome, whence, gathering new splendor on its way, it hath been diffusing itself all the world over.”

These African origins of temperance speak to Brown’s continuous attempt to reform transatlantic history and culture through reinterpretations of ancient traditions and character. Moreover, Brown as an escaped slave shared a vision of civil culture, society, and tradition that seems to draw on Southern imaginations of agrarian republicanism and tradition, as much as he expressed attachment to Northern laissez-faire ideals. In his reflections on African heroes of the Atlantic world, such as Toussaint L’Ouverture, for instance, and in his repeated focus on restraining passions, Brown may be responding to Southern proslavery uses of Aristotelian, or ancient, legitimations of “natural slavery” of “barbarians.” Of course, there are vast differences between these forms of “slavery,” but Brown was aware that Southerners commonly used classical examples of slavery to obfuscate the legal complexities of modern chattel slavery. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene Genovese have outlined some of the ideological Southern uses of Greek and Roman examples, as well as arguments over the racial character of ancient slavery and disputes of other arguments over the Egyptian association with “black” Africa, or Ethiopia. One of the assumptions in racialist thinking was to consider Africans as “natural slaves,” even if race was not the qualifying factor in ancient slavery. In theorizing the difference between natural slaves and civil slaves, Anthony Pagden notes, Aristotle had pointed to the dual aspects of the “intellect (nous) and the subordinate one the passions (orexis), for the intellect is the logical and the passions are the alogical parts of man’s bipartite soul (psyche).” According to ancient thought, and many who continued to draw on Aristotle to justify enslavement, “the passions are, by definition, unable to govern themselves; but the intellect of the fully grown male will, unless of course his mind has been impaired, be able to master this part of the whole character and direct it toward the good. It is, indeed, man’s ability to use reason in this way, together with his capacity for speech, which distinguishes him from all other animals” (42). Pagden continues to explain that though the “natural slave is clearly a man,” his “intellect has, for some reason, failed to achieve proper mastery over his passions” (42). Differentiating further, Aristotle has claimed that while the natural slave might exercise understanding, he was “incapable of practical wisdom,” giving commands versus understanding or judging (43). These two foci on restraint of the passions and the proper “capacity for speech” merge together and echo the concerns of Brown’s general temperance orientation.

Examples of restraint of passions abound throughout Brown’s works. When Brown praises Toussaint’s L’Ouverture’s character, he makes sure to stress, “Touissant was entirely master of his own appetites and passions,” a man of “great sobriety.” Levine points out that Brown’s temperance orientation also leads him to
propose alternate forms of less violent revolutionary activity. In Levine’s words, “commenting on the French revolutions of the 1790s and 1840s in *The American Fugitive in Europe*, for example, Brown attacks Marat . . . and praises Lamartine as a more temperate leader who, ‘by the power of his eloquence, succeeded in keeping the people quiet’ and under control.” Brown commends “Toussaint L’Ouverture and Madison Washington as models of self-restraint,” praising Toussaint’s “humanity.”

While the registers of these comments on the restrained passions of great men can be viewed as supporting a reserved and often mildly conservative view of political and social change, as well as the virtues of self-control and ascetic work ethic, they can also be situated as part of Brown’s argument over the meaning of restrained “humanity” to counter common stereotypes of Africans by many proslavery advocates. Brown seemed to slyly adopt these Southern misplaced discourses of ancient thought in efforts to counter many common white Northern notions of temperance that located restraint in the individual will. In doing so, Brown tended to locate restraint at the foundation of transculturation and custom, and expressed direct concern for the restrained traditions of his “southern home,” the eventual title of his late and final autobiography.

For Douglass and Brown, as Levine has also shown, the connection between slaveholding and drunkenness was common—slaveholders being depicted as inebriates, themselves intoxicated with their power. Most African Americans were also well aware of the racism in white American temperance associations, through the violent attacks that many black societies experienced after the 1840s. Brown was also cognizant of the different meanings of civilization, civil space, and free expression inherent in temperance. These alternate meanings arise in his travel narratives on his “sojourn” in Europe from 1849 to 1854.

Unlike Frederick Douglass, who highlights his “manhood” and self-control in his autobiographical descriptions of his transition from slave to Freeman when he overpowers the overseer Edward Covey, Brown does not fit neatly within the individualistic or representative man paradigms. William L. Andrews notes that, compared to Douglass’s oratorical flourishes, “Brown’s decidedly understated, restrained, almost deadpan manner of recounting his life seems artless” (5). Some of his work does, nonetheless, find its home among much of the domestic and sentimental literature of the time. To be sure, he also celebrated the possibility of “manhood” on British soil—“no sooner was I on British soil, than I was recognized as a man, and an equal. The very dogs in the streets appeared conscious of my manhood.”

Yet this boasting, made somewhat tongue-in-check, is a consequence of the fact that manhood was denied to African American men who were enslaved and could not commonly adopt the patriarchal gender roles that shaped European American society. As Andrews comments, “Brown seems to have almost deliberately refused to identify himself according to Douglass’s myth of the heroic resister” and rather comes across “nonheroic” or “antiheroic” in his *Narrative* and elsewhere. Neither his ambiguous identity nor the trickster is as “lofty” as the folk
“culture hero,” and to pay homage to the antiheroic, in the midst of enumerating the black heroes in his book The Black Man, Brown diverts to account for “A Man Without a Name.”

Experiencing the situational irony as an escaped slave in Europe, Brown thought the United States appeared very uncivilized and barbaric. His early celebrations of “civilization,” or at least “civility,” in Europe did not indicate a burgeoning Yankee pietism, though he champions some of the democratic virtues of his fellow abolitionists. Brown is anything but a typical American tourist, and he looks to the promises of European civilization (including those articulated by earlier “Americans” and revolutionaries) for his sense of identity in Europe. On his trip from “Bolougne to Amiens,” he remarks, “Sparkling hamlets spring up as the steam horse speeds his way, at almost every point—showing the progress of civilization, and the refinement of the nineteenth century.” And most of his asides on civil behavior and manners are reserved for Europeans: “There is a lack of good manners among Americans that is scarcely known or understood in Europe” (38), “Few nations are more courteous than the French” (67), and so on. Seemingly Eurocentric comments of this sort abound throughout the book.

While reflecting on the nature of civilization and civility, Brown also observes various problems with inabilities to restrain the passions. In Three Years in Europe (1852) and in the American version, The American Fugitive in Europe (1854), Brown regularly notes the lack of restraint in speech as a gauge for a potentially troubled or untrustworthy character. At the Paris Peace Congress, he observes about Henry Vincent that “his speech was one continuous flow of rapid, fervid eloquence, that seemed to fire every heart; and although I disliked his style, I was prepossessed in his favor” (46). He saves his expanded criticism of British Hartley Coleridge for the American edition of his travel narrative. Hartley “early became the slave of intemperate habits, from which no aspirations of his own heart, no struggle with the enslaving appetite, and no efforts of sympathizing and sorrowful friends, could ever deliver him.” Brown suggests that signs of this disposition might also be present in excessive speech: “It is equally dangerous, we think, to be known as a good talker. The gift of rapid, brilliant, mirth-moving speech, is a perilous possession. The drollards, for whose amusement this gift is so often invoked, know well that to ply its possessor with wine is the readiest way to bring out its power. But in the end the wine destroys the intellect, and the man of wit degenerates into a buffoon, and dies a drunkard” (160). Indeed, temperance for Brown addressed an entire mode of civil behavior that contrasted the sentimentalized affected performances of reformers who appeared to Brown as mere confidence men, rather than evincing an open, refined, and cosmopolitan character.

In a characteristic turn, Brown did not shy away from implying that others were common, and while expressing disdain for lowbrow Americans in their lack of restraint, he could not, however, easily be classified as highbrow. In keeping with his praise of restrained speech and eloquence, Brown’s most forceful criticism of
unrestrained speech and confidence man techniques is reserved for American temperance reformer, the most famous Washingtonian, John B. Gough. Brown’s criticism appears in the British rather than the American edition. Brown writes, “this gentleman was at one time an actor on the stage, and subsequently became an inebriate of the most degraded kind.” Calling him an “orator” with “dramatic powers of address,” Brown undercuts his faint praise, noting, “While speaking, he acts the drunkard, and does it in a style which could not be equalled on the boards of the Lyceum or Adelphi.” Acknowledging that Gough has surpassed all in attracting members to the “temperance pledge” (165), and noting that Gough regularly breaks his pledge, Brown then questions the people who follow Gough, making note of his “water upon the brain” and “that Mr. Gough’s cranium contained a greater quantity than that of any other living man” (166). This example of unrestrained passion in speech, the “weep[ing] when he pleases,” fails to impress Brown, who concludes, “no one can sit for an hour and hear John. B. Gough, without coming to the conclusion that he is nothing more than a theatrical mountebank” (166).

Brown criticizes Gough’s lowbrow exploitation of emotion and sympathy, which he uses to move the audience to tears with him and thereby convert them to the pledge. This specific use of “sympathy,” as Glenn Hendler discusses, was essential to the Washingtonian effort to attract converts from “crowds of ethnic and working-class drinkers into the movement, thereby alienating many of the ministers and middle-class men who made up the core of earlier temperance drives.”39 The Washingtonians, however, as Hendler notes, “constructed whiteness and masculinity as part of a structure of feeling constitutive both of the public sphere in which they took place and of the embodied subjects who populated that sphere” (32). Hendler shows how the Washingtonians formed a sentimental and affective as well as nationalist public that challenged the presumed feminine structure of sentimentality in the nineteenth century, but nevertheless centered on the restoration of the American white middle-class family. Hendler also argues that the “structure of feeling” was in slight tension with, and formed a “counterpublic” to, the dominant bourgeois public for rational-critical debate articulated by Habermas (47). But whereas the Washingtonians often backslid from their pledges, of which Brown is most critical, in 1842 the Sons of Temperance was formed out of the Washingtonians to address this problem and “adopted a policy of secrecy to remove the liability of public exposure from both the organization and its individual members.”40 Though Brown would share this criticism of excessive publicity, backsliding, and affective theatricality evinced by Gough, he would later in 1866 become involved with the Sons of Temperance, who during the years of slavery did not admit blacks to their secret fraternal society.41

Indeed, in his early work, Three Years in Europe, in a letter to Frederick Douglass, Brown comments on the warm reception he and William and Ellen Craft had received at a soiree with the Edinburgh Temperance Society, particularly noting, “This should cause the pro-slavery whites, and especially negro-hating Sons of
Temperance, who refuse the coloured man a place in their midst, to feel ashamed of their unchristian conduct.”  

Brown was in 1866 “a black representative of the virtually all-white host Grand Division of Massachusetts, and ‘after considerable discussion’ a delegate from a new all-black Grand Division of Maryland.”  

Although arguments were made to promote desegregation and equal rights, many white Southern members opposed them. Tensions increased and Brown eventually in 1875 tired of the struggle within the Sons of Temperance and “thereafter pinned his hopes upon another fraternal temperance order—the Independent Order of Good Templars” (59).

**Universalism and the Land: Aristocratic Creolizations of “Democratic” Civilization**

Brown’s early criticism of the uncouth and racist Sons of Temperance and his later disillusionment indicate a form of “universalism” that I want to distinguish from the American emphasis on reforming the self through restraint and purging of emotions by acts of individual willpower. Fahey notes that “their evolving universalist ideology” was the main characteristic that separated the Good Templars “from other late nineteenth-century organizations” (30). The Templars grew out of dissatisfaction with other movements and opened their organization to women, though they shared much of the masculinist ideology and rhetoric associated with drink and reform (11). Men were the drinkers who needed to regain self-control (manhood) to function as men in the circle of domesticity, though, as noted, Brown did not always share the same masculinist paradigms. Nonetheless, the Templars’ universalism—even though race eventually seems to have been a factor in their demise—led them to spread their moral reform throughout the world, in Canada, the West Indies, Britain, including Scotland and Ireland. Brown would travel again to Great Britain as a delegate for the Good Templars in July 1877 to attend a convention in Glasgow, Scotland.  

It should be noted that in the postbellum period, as in the antebellum, Brown continued to experience equality and inclusion in Britain more than he did with whites in the United States. In 1851 he was critical of the “negro-hating Sons of Temperance” in Edinburgh, but in the 1870s he would experience a similar problem because racial equality that was consistent with universalism and internationalism were foundations of the Good Templars that “had to be advocated by foreigners.”

In 1851 while on his “sojourn” in Great Britain, the very seat of the monarchy, Brown’s recounting of the soiree for the Edinburgh Total Abstinence Society focuses on a speech from the president of the society that was published in the Christian News. The president wasted no time in criticizing the “Yankees” and “the immaculate laws of immaculate Yankeedom,” but the speech was antislavery under the aegis of temperance. While honing in on the “aristocratic platform” of “educated Edinburgh” and “educated Scotland,” the president exclaimed, “Down with the aristocracy of the skin!” Notably, the dignified and honorable “aristocratic platform” was one associated with temperance reform “in the name of universal Scotland”
(117). Although there was a strong direct modeling of the structure of civil temperance societies like the Washingtonians in the founding acts of constituting the Republic, and in the name of these revolutionary acts and heroes, such linkages between an authentic local civil character and a national identity as put forth “in the name of universal Scotland” would hardly come to mind in white American temperance groups like the Washingtonians. Brown seems to have found the broadly conceived “universalism” of the Good Templars more promising but still problematic, based as it might have been in more abstract Enlightenment-derived understandings of Protestant moralism. Generally, however, reformers in the United States did not appeal to a local identity or the land, partly because too many local American situations involved slavery and/or the conquest of aboriginal populations. The analog to the concreteness of “universal Scotland” or the tradition bestowed by the monarchy or the land was often covered by the more abstract rhetoric of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” and the raising up of an American way of life. Brown’s search for a tempered space and civilization in his travels addresses this problematic hiatus in the constitution of American civil societies and the national identity directly.

Later in life, in his final autobiography, My Southern Home (1880), Brown, sometime proponent of American democracy and equality, also reveals a shared sense of the value of “aristocratic” dignity. Toward the end, he writes that social equality in Southern Reconstruction could not be achieved for a number of reasons—particularly because, in his words, the South had nurtured “a shoddy aristocracy, or an uneducated class, more afraid of the negro’s ability and industry than of his color rubbing off against them.” In contrast, “the true nobleman fears not that his reputation will be compromised by any association he may choose to form.”47 This passage is ambiguous, but it is clear that Brown appeals to a higher form of aristocratic culture, rather than overly simplistic meanings of racial uplift and civil society. In Three Years in Europe, written thirty years before this, Brown had also shown his appreciation of the monarchy, the land, the traditions, and the cultures that stemmed from nobility. Nevertheless, perhaps ironically, he felt somewhat too restrained in this context. During the Peace Congress of 1849, which he attended in Paris as a delegate, he noted that speeches were shut down by Congress, and he exclaimed, “Oh! how I wished for a Massachusetts atmosphere, a New England Convention platform, with Wendell Phillips as the speaker, before that assembled multitude from all parts of the world.”48 Whereas Elisa Tamarkin draws attention to Brown’s (and other black abolitionist) attachments to “English English” models of culture and aristocracy,49 I would argue that Brown’s attachment to aristocracy concerns an effort to reform a temperate type of democracy that maintains ties to tradition and the local experience of the land. Clearly by 1880, Brown’s ambiguity toward European democratic values and aristocratic civilization and culture had not resolved itself.
Other African Americans in Brown’s late temperance cohort seemed to share the ambiguity toward Protestant-derived democracy, even if the American temperance origins seemed more prominently connected to the Protestant goals of American gender roles, middle-class self-reliance, family, and work ethic. For example, S. C. Goosley was sent by the AME Church to South Carolina but “was unable to get the white Templars there to allow blacks to join the IOGT.” Goosley had commented, “These sanctified whites . . . would refuse to enter heaven if they thought a ‘nigger’ could get there.” Goosley seems to have made this statement in 1876. Notably, Brown echoes these sentiments in 1880, along with others who earlier made such comments, like Alexis de Tocqueville. Indeed, Brown turns to Catholicism in My Southern Home to praise a Bishop Kean who had been preaching at a cathedral in Richmond. The bishop wins Brown’s approval for saying to the people, “My dearly beloved,” while the Protestant minister at an African Baptist Church, though “noted for his eloquence . . . could not rise higher in his appeals to the blacks than to say ‘men and women’ to them.” The people noticed and Brown says he asked an “intelligent colored man” what he thought. That man replied, “Before he can make an impression on us, he must go to the Catholic Church and learn the spirit of brotherly love.” Finally, he ends this assessment by commending the Bishop’s appeal to the passage “God is no respecter of persons” and concludes, “The blacks have been so badly treated in the past that kind words and social recognition will do much to win them in the future, for success will not depend so much upon their matter as upon their manner; not so much upon their faith as upon the more potent direct influence of their practice. In this the Catholics of the South have the inside track, for the prejudice of the Protestants seems in a fair way to let the negro go anywhere except to heaven if they have to go the same way” (263). This emphasis on the “manner” rather than the “matter” recurs two pages later in My Southern Home when Brown comments on a female vendor in Norfolk, Virginia, who is singing to help sell her strawberries. She is apparently successful with her strategy, and her song:

I live fore miles out of town,
    I am gwine to glory.
My strawberries are sweet an’ soun’,
    I am gwine to glory.
My chile is sick, an’ husban’ dead,
    I am gwine to glory.
Now’s de time to get ’em cheap,
    I am gwine to glory.

But preceding the excerpt of the song, Brown contends that “the interest” in the song “centered more upon the manner than the matter” (265). Following the song, he wryly comments, “Upon the whole, the colored man of Virginia is a very favorable
physical specimen of his race; and he has peculiarly fine, urbane manners” (266). Brown suggests that private beliefs or pragmatic goals are less important than the overall form or manner of civilization—the style, ceremonies, and symbols that will shape new forms of intermingled, miscegenated, and amalgamated communities, conferred by law and land.

The crux of the matter was also that American individualism and its form of democracy were not inherently antislavery—neither were aristocracies inherently supportive of slavery—and the more Brown reflected on the nature of democratic “civilization” in the United States, the more he saw the need to salvage a relationship to the land that echoed the ambiguously aristocratic thoughts of thinkers like Tocqueville. As Margaret Kohn shows in her discussion of Tocqueville and Beaumont on race and slavery, Tocqueville also saw Protestantism as central to democracy, and he also implied that the tradition of liberal individualism was not inherently antislavery. She offers a quote from Tocqueville’s notes for Democracy in America, in which he comments, “in general negroes are received in the Catholic churches. Catholicism is, in general, the religion that unlike Protestantism never [illegible] inequality. Protestantism established in the religious order the government of the middle classes and one knows the haughtiness of the middle classes towards the people.” And, as political leaders are dependent upon popular success in a democracy—“as long as the American democracy remains at the head of affairs, no one will undertake so difficult a task [as emancipation of slaves].”52 Certainly this seemed to be Brown’s conclusion when faced with the failed attempts to achieve social equality for the former slaves on the part of primarily Protestant sects during Reconstruction. Protestants, politicians and American individuals alike, seemed more concerned with the “matter” than their manners.

Thus, though Brown’s focus on “restraint” or “manners” might resemble an elitist “anglophilia,” to use Elisa Tamarkin’s characterization, his constructions of civilization and civility often depart from Enlightenment abstractions about European civilization and its disinterested goals, while sharing the desire for custom and tradition. The issue of custom helps us understand Brown’s reserved mannerism and championing of restraint. According to Anthony Pagden, Montesquieu “had remarked . . . , most of Europe (he was a little uncertain about Spain) is ruled by ‘custom’ (les moeurs); Asia, and the still darker regions of Africa and America, by despots. The rule of law, restraint through custom rather than will, was responsible for the fashioning of societies that provided a space for individual human action, while at the same time ensuring that such action was rarely capable of reducing society to a state of simple anarchy.”53 This ideal image of Europe was problematically positioned against previous despotism, including Africa, and the United States would position itself against Britain in a similar appeal to the rule of law. Yet the lack of actual societies or “custom” to restrain, or spaces for human action, led to a meaning of civil freedom more centered on the individual will in the United States than in Europe.
To be sure, Brown promotes an enlarged and seemingly cosmopolitan consciousness, common to British cosmopolitanism during the nineteenth century. Yet Brown is also consistent about the need for local and rural communities, along with the development of indigenous customs, in which the cultivation of the land would be supported and nurtured by the cultivation of the arts, an argument resonating more with Southern agrarians than Northerners. Brown recommends, “Whether the blacks emigrate or not, I say to them, keep away from the cities and towns. Go into the country. Go to work on the farms. If you stop in the city, get a profession or a trade, but keep in mind that a good trade is better than a poor profession.”

This longing for a connection to the land was evident in Three Years in Europe (1852), when, after visiting Tocqueville’s for a soiree as a delegate to the International Peace Congress, he recommended founding reformed civil societies that would refract the past and give birth to a new sense of temporality and democratic freedom in the United States. Brown echoed Tocqueville’s criticism that “the American” was rootless, without monuments or ancestors. For entirely different but related reasons, the American slave for Brown is also a stranger in a strange land—not included in the ceremonies to consecrate the land or confer a new identity and sacred stories, contrary to the British peasant. In Europe, Brown draws attention to this homogeneity and inertia: “The past is to him as yesterday, and the future scarcely more than to-morrow. Ancestral monuments, he has none; written documents fraught with cogitations of other times, he has none; and any instrumentality calculated to awaken and expound the intellectual activity and comprehension of a present or approaching generation, he has none. His condition is that of the leopard of his own native Africa.”

While Brown everywhere speaks of “civilization,” his form of civilization bears more in common with one that would evoke a sacred relation to the land and encourage the communitas, the openness and intermingling of a variety of cultures and traditions. Communitas, a term that Victor Turner used to differentiate from homogeneous communities, can address this sacred sense of memory and ancestry that both Tocqueville and Brown seem to require for communal foundations—it evokes the issue of cultural symbols, myth, art, and the “human bond” of the former slaves in a land that can never quite be “home.” Searching for this mode of communitas found in the midst of “civilization,” Brown ends My Southern Home (1880) appealing not simply to self-reliance on the part of the former slave but also the necessity to nurture a form of “inward culture”: “we should give our principal encouragement to literature, bringing before our associations the importance of original essays, selected readings, and the cultivations of the musical talent,” and “the last great struggle for our rights; the battle for our own civilization, is entirely with ourselves, and the problem is to be solved by us.” Without doubt, Brown’s mode of culture and “civilization” harked back to his contemplations of ceremonies, poetry, and tradition recorded while in Europe during the years 1849–1854, but the
most considered account of music in My Southern Home, comes from the dance at Congo Square that is the backdrop of Brown's recommendation for developing civilization, if primarily mimicking European models. It seemed natural to Brown that all culture would be founded on the principles of “total abstinence from all intoxications” (287), and custom would help restrain the passions from the growing danger of consumerism, from which he witnessed the former slaves suffering. While Brown often disparages the “superstitions” inherent in much of slave culture and in the South, this does not stop him from using much of the folklore to shape his own character. The coexistence of these modes of being—elite civilization and the folk—suggests a form of situational reversals and irony again that has been attributed to the trickster or liminal figure.

My Southern Home situates his ironic “home” “ten miles north of the city of St. Louis, in the State of Missouri, forty years ago, on a pleasant plain,” a magnificence and dignity thwarted by “the killing effects of the tobacco plant upon the lands of ‘Poplar Farm’” along with the “want of taste so commonly witnessed in the sunny South” (119). As Brown leads us through customs, superstitions, and problematic but still promising traditions emerging from chattel slavery that point to a world beyond the servile and submissive, his main concerns develop, first, through coming to terms with a meaning of the land as home, consecrated and settled by the slaves, and second, through acknowledging the possibilities of founding sacred spaces and building cultural institutions and associations, spaces to signify the manner of renewed and revolutionary democracy to be achieved by the former slaves.

For he ends My Southern Home with an appeal to a seemingly black national character, noting that “no race ever did or ever will prosper or make respectable history which has no confidence in its own nationality,” and “those who do not appreciate their own people will not be appreciated by other people.” He gives the example of the “Jews,” who though “scattered throughout the world, are still Jews”—because they have a “religion” (184). In the same vein, the Jewish people depended on a homeland for their identity. Brown envied this identification with a land that was coeval with the founding of an identity. Thus, he praises the former slaves in Richmond for building a new church and establishing societies. The appeal to build a local yet transcultural character expressed in his attunement to intermixtures and manners of folk culture will also depend on the development of “inward culture” and the “imagination”—“spare hours [spent] in study and form[ing] associations for moral, social, and literary influence” (288). He continues, “God will reward us. . . . The best way to have a public character is to have a private one” (289).

A fundamental tragedy, of course, intrudes on his ability to conceive of the South as conferring an identity or home. Brown notes that the “South is the black man’s home” because “he cleared up the lands, built the cities, fed and clothed the whites, nursed their children, earned the money to educate their sons and daughters;
by the negro’s labor churches were built and clergymen paid.” Even so, “if he cannot be protected in his rights he should leave” (290). Brown wants to claim the relation to Southern soil as sacred but is pulled into ironic and tragic liminalities. He will end this chapter with the simple command—“Black men, emigrate” (292), for he noted earlier that blacks could only be accepted by whites by continuing in servility. Therefore, the need to claim the land and the particular cultural consciousness associated with it are crucial to moving on to a more open and cosmopolitan public character that was capable of a rooted yet transnational exchange.

While Brown attempts to sound hopeful about the construction of a regional character, ending My Southern Home with an appeal to racial and cultural dignity—“Black men, don’t be ashamed to show your colors, and to own them” (296), the book ends on a tragically ironic note. The efforts to redeem space have been inserted into the realm of consciousness at the end, given the “reign of terror” in the South, thus making it necessary for Brown to make a transition into a different form of culture than one that could come to terms with the dependence on, and the morality and sacredness of, the land. Americans had, in general, ignored this meaning of the land and situated freedom in the realm of privacy and individual consciousness, refracting the conquest and domestication of space. The Fugitive Slave Law was a striking example of this tragedy, and in My Southern Home Brown referred to the 1850 compromise in an abrupt transition from reflecting on the manners of celebration in the enslaved community (216). In that case, even in the North, which did not legitimize slavery, with the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act, freedom of the land carried no efficacy for a slave-owner who could violate the land and enslave a person in a “free land.” Rootless forms of democracy and racism had overshadowed Brown’s meaning of a free land and the promise of “universal emancipation.” This was a promise that Brown narrated in his “Original Panoramic Views,” displayed in London in 1850. He quotes Curran, “I speak in the spirit of British law, which makes liberty commensurate with, and inseparable from, the British soil—which proclaims, ever to the stranger and sojourner, the moment he sets foot upon British earth that the ground he treads is holy, and consecrated by the genius of Universal Emancipation.” Without the consecration of freedom in the soil, the monuments, and the sacred space and time of civilization, American freedom can only be an individualized and limitless parody of the possibility for communitas presented in a revolutionary identity. This fact seemed to be truer in Brown’s last post-Reconstruction work, which was more expressive of his activist work on temperance, showing Brown’s fullest confrontation with the limits of a sacred manner in the futural forms of modern democracy and its individualistic Protestant variants. Temperance, for Brown, was consistent with legitimizing a restrained relation to the land—a land that was not designed to be consumed in intemperate acts of slavery, but rather to be undergone with restraint. In Brown’s movements, temperance became an indigenous and disciplined program that could open up spaces for new body politics in light of transatlantic contact, not limited by race or creed, but
nevertheless able to legitimate a regard for and exchange of local customs and manners.

Notes

1 Jack S. Blocker Jr. discusses the development of temperance in the revolutionary period, to the first organized society in Massachusetts that surpassed the “local scale.” See Jack S. Blocker Jr., American Temperance Movements: Cycles of Reform (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989), 8, 11. The desire for reform was aided by “the perfectionist impulse that emerged from the revivals of the Second Great Awakening (1800–35), a belief that, with God’s grace, human beings could speed the coming of the millennium by improving themselves and their society on earth” (22). Most discussions of temperance address revolutionaries like Benjamin Rush, moving to consider the development of societies such as the Washingtonians, and evangelical and revivalist manifestations of temperance.

2 American temperance corresponded to evangelism in many respects, though one should recall that the “Puritans,” even with their asceticism, did not exclude alcohol from their diet. Drinking was placed in a more “primitive” context, however, the context of the family or small social group, and was fairly controlled. For example, in so-called primitive societies, alcohol and drugs might be used in ceremonies or religious practices, but the widespread individualized context of consumption would not occur until the further development of mercantilism (ibid., 4).


4 For a reassessment of the “hemispheric” histories of transcultural and creole identities that have been excluded in stories of American nationhood, see Caroline F. Levander and Robert S. Levine, eds., Hemispheric American Studies (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008).

5 Levine, “‘Whiskey, Blacking, and All,’” 101.

6 The analysis of Brown and “movement” has recently been a topic of focus. See Stephan Lucasi, “William Wells Brown’s Narrative & Traveling Subjectivity,” African American Review 41, no. 3 (2007): 521–39. This paper reassesses Brown’s use of the travel narrative and the fugitive slave narrative to destabilize common perceptions of slave identities.

7 Oftentimes, women were able to begin reimagining relations to home, work, and their bodies, though they seemed to model this independence on masculine constructions of self-reliance. See, for instance, Carol Mattingly’s discussion of women’s temperance fiction, Well-Tempered Women: Nineteenth-Century Temperance Rhetoric (Carbondale:


9 Amalgamation was a term used by Brown in some of his work, rather than “miscegenation.” As he writes in My Southern Home, “all history demonstrates the truth that amalgamation is the great civilizer of the races of men. Wherever a race, clan, or community have kept themselves together, prohibiting by law, usage, or common consent, intermarriage with others, they have made little or no progress.” See William Wells Brown, My Southern Home, in From Fugitive Slave to Free Man: The Autobiographies of William Wells Brown, ed. William L. Andrews (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003), 293.


11 Ibid., 13. Also, the account of Brown’s name change occurs in Brown’s 1848 Narrative of William W. Brown, A Fugitive Slave, in Brown, From Fugitive Slave to Free Man, 40, 74.

12 See Brown, Narrative of William W. Brown, 17, 78.


15 Ernest, Liberation Historiography, 339.


17 Long, “Primitive/Civilized,” 94.

18 Elias, Civilizing Process, 7.


20 Farrison, William Wells Brown, 72.


24 This observation is taken from E. H. Sears, “The Christian Examiner,” July 1846, in Brown, Rising Son, 44.


27 Brown, Rising Son, 171.


29 Levine, “‘Whiskey, Blacking, and All,’” 104.


31 This point is made by William L. Andrews in his introduction to Brown’s autobiographies. See Brown, From Fugitive Slave to Free Man, 6.


34 Andrews, introduction to From Fugitive Slave to Free Man, 6, 7.

35 Brown, Black Man, 278–84. This tale seems to be autobiographical. In regard to what many have viewed as the trickster-like aspects of Brown’s antiheroism, Robert D. Pelton explains that the Ashanti trickster Ananse is “neither a mythic nor a social entrepreneur whose self-determination determines the world under the guidance of some invisible hand [and is] far more ambiguous.” See Robert D. Pelton, The Trickster in West Africa: A Study of Mythic Irony and Sacred Delight (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 225. But whereas most tricksters revel in the excesses in the anomic betwixt and
between the foundations of culture and civilization, Brown’s performance of cultured restraint is aptly ironic for his ambiguous identity as a chattel slave who could almost pass as white.


38 In literature and art, according to Lawrence Levine, many nineteenth-century reformers turned to “highbrow” modes of culture to counter the feeling of prevailing mass culture and counterfeit cultural identities: “The very word ‘highbrow,’ used to describe the lofty activities of elite culture, came from attempts to establish racial differences in skull shape and size: European high brows against ostensibly low-browed Africans and Asians.” See Michael O’Malley, “Specie and Species: Race and the Money Question in Nineteenth-Century America,” *American Historical Review* 99, no. 2 (1994): 390.


42 Brown, *Three Years in Europe*, 117.


48 Brown, *Three Years in Europe*, 50.

49 Elisa Tamarkin, *Anglophilia: Deference, Devotion, and Antebellum America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 178. Tamarkin is referring to Alexander Crummell’s use of this phrase in arguing for the superiority of British education. She extends the phrase to claim a generalized idealization of English culture by black abolitionists, as “anglophilia.” In her words, “anglophilia lurks in the interstices of black journals and black speeches: between fears of Anglo-Saxon racialism and British ‘neutrality,’ it is uncannily transmitted, like the spirit of Byron in William Wells Brown, even (and this is the heart of it) when British economic interests meant closer sympathy with the South”
While Brown does devote a chapter to Byron, among other poets, this can be viewed as part of Brown’s reflections on what it means to found modern “civilization,” rather than an uncritical Eurocentrism.

50 Quoted in Fahey, Temperance and Racism, 120.

51 Brown, My Southern Home, 263.


54 Brown, My Southern Home, 292.

55 Brown, Three Years in Europe, 96.


57 Brown, My Southern Home, 288, 282.

58 William Wells Brown, A Description of William Wells Brown’s Original Panoramic Views of the Scenes in the Life of an American Slave, from His Birth in Slavery to His Death or His Escape to His First Home of Freedom on British Soil (London: Charles Gilpin, 1852), 38. Accessed through the Cornell University Library Digital Collections, and available through the Samuel J. May Anti-Slavery Collection, Cornell University Library, Division of Rare & Manuscript Collections, http://dlxs2.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=mayantislavery;idno=18865211;view=image;seq=1.

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