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Publication Date

2011-03-30

Peer reviewed

Gender Bias in Negotiators' Ethical Decision Making

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Key words: Gender, bias, stereotypes, discrimination, negotiation, ethical decision making, deception, person perception, strategic interaction

Abstract

What is the relationship between gender and the likelihood of being deceived in negotiations? In strategic interactions, the decision to deceive is based in part on the expected consequences (Gneezy, 2005). Because gender stereotypes suggest that women are more easily misled than men, the expected consequences of deception were predicted to be more positive with negotiators described in stereotypically feminine as opposed to masculine terms. Studies 1A and 1B confirmed that gender stereotypes affect the expected consequences of deception. An archival analysis of MBA classroom data ($N = 298$) was then conducted to explore the implications of this relationship in a naturalistic setting. Consistent with gender stereotypes, female negotiators were deceived more frequently than male negotiators, though female negotiators perceived no less honesty in their counterparts than did male negotiators. Economic and psychological consequences of deception were also examined, including agreement rates, sale price, and negotiator subjective experience. When believed by their target, lies facilitated deal making. However, psychologically, lying impaired both negotiators' subjective experience by reducing perceptions of negotiator honesty. By linking gender stereotypes to the expected and actual consequences of deception, the current research extends our understanding of the role of gender in strategic interactions. Finally, how gender shapes experiences in the MBA classroom is discussed.

Gender Bias in Negotiators' Ethical Decision Making

“... Salesmen ... categorize people into "typical" buyer categories. During my time as a salesman I termed the most common of these the "typically uninformed buyer" [In addition to their lack of information, these] buyers tended to display other common weaknesses. As a rule they were indecisive, wary, impulsive and, as a result, were easily misled. Now take a guess as to which gender of the species placed at the top of this "typically easy to mislead" category? You guessed it-women.”

(Parrish, 1985 p. 3, as quoted by Ayres & Siegelman, 1995)

The reformed car salesman's quote above reveals a truth about social perception: expectations about the vulnerabilities and strengths of interaction partners are shaped in part by their gender. Shared, category-based expectations, or stereotypes, exist about one gender versus another (Fiske, 1998). Though the activation of stereotypes is automatic and unavoidable (Devine, 1989), how stereotypes are applied to guide behavior in particular situations is often at the discretion of social actors. In competitive negotiations like car purchases, one party's gain is another's loss. As such, self-interested negotiators seeking to secure attractive deals may rely on gender stereotypes to make strategic decisions. The current research examines the relationship between gender stereotypes, the expected ease of being misled, and the decision to deceive men versus women in negotiations.

Gender stereotypes create a broad set of challenges for women negotiators.

Because effective negotiators are thought to possess stereotypically masculine traits such

as assertiveness and rationality (Kray & Thompson, 2005), negotiating often means acting counterstereotypically for women. Burdened with unflattering stereotypes, women negotiators profess more anxiety, less knowledge about the process, and less confidence in their ability (Babcock, Gelfand, Small, & Stayn, 2006; Kray & Gelfand, 2009) compared to their male counterparts. As a result, women are vulnerable to the debilitating performance effects of negative stereotypes (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001), typically performing worse than men at the bargaining table (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999).

In addition to producing differences in how men and women approach negotiations, gender stereotypes also affect the manner in which women and men are treated. Stereotypes create a set of expectations about how individuals *should* behave and those who fail to live up to them often experience social repercussions (Rudman, 1998). Indeed, prescriptive gender stereotypes dictating that women be agreeable may lead female negotiators to be judged more harshly for the identical behaviors of male negotiators (Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007). Using a vignette, Bowles and colleagues manipulated both whether a job candidate attempted to negotiate a job offer and the candidate's gender. Attempting to negotiate reduced perceivers' willingness to work with female candidates relative to male candidates who engaged in identical negotiation attempts.

The effect of gender stereotypes on negotiator behavior has also been shown in naturalistic settings, including the car dealership. In a striking field study, Ayres and Siegelman (1995) had women and men actors follow a standardized script inquiring about a new car purchase at various auto dealerships. They found that price quotes were

significantly higher for women than for men. Because this discrimination occurred irrespective of salesperson gender, the researchers argued it was not simply a result of prejudice against women (which would presumably be more evident by male salespersons than female salespersons). Instead, they argued, discrimination resulted from a “statistical inference” being drawn by salespeople whereby gender-based cues determined the expected profitability of deals and resulted in disparate price quotes between the sexes (Phelps, 1972). Because the trained actors adopted identical bargaining strategies, it is likely that gender stereotypes, rather than behavioral differences, led salespeople to expect women were more likely than men to pay a high markup. In the words of the researchers (p. 317), “If sellers believe, for example, that women are on average more averse to bargaining than men, it may be profitable to quote higher prices to women customers.”

The current research extends this work on gender discrimination, or behavior aimed at denying particular social groups positive outcomes (Allport, 1954), and bargaining to the domain of deception. By examining whether feminine stereotypes imply that women are easier to mislead and, if so, whether women negotiators are especially likely to be misled, theory and research are extended on multiple fronts. First, the relationship between deception and counterpart gender in negotiations is examined for the first time. In his groundbreaking research on deception in strategic interactions, Gneezy (2005) did not study gender differences and subsequent work has only examined gender from the perspective of the liar (Dreber & Johannesson, 2008). Second, the current work extends our understanding of gender stereotypes relevant to behavior at the bargaining table to examine assumptions about negotiators’ ease of being misled. Third,

by utilizing a fully crossed design with respect to dyad gender composition, this research overcomes methodological limitations of previous work in this domain. In so doing, a more comprehensive picture of the role of gender in negotiations emerges. Finally, by exploring negotiation behavior in a naturalistic environment, the MBA classroom, the applied implications of gender in negotiations are explored.

Deception in Negotiation

Deception, or communication aimed at intentionally misleading another person, is often driven by self-interest (DePaulo et al., 1996). Because self-interest is a guiding force in negotiations, it is not surprising that deception is prevalent (Lewicki, 1983; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999). Though men are more willing to engage in unethical negotiating tactics than women (Dreber & Johannesson, 2008; Lewicki & Robinson, 1998; Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000), whether gender influences the likelihood of being deceived in negotiations remains largely unexamined.

Beyond the negotiation domain, DePaulo et al.'s (1996) study of lying in everyday life sheds light on the role of interaction partner sex. Using a diary methodology recording spontaneous lies, interactions involving women were found to involve more "white lies" (i.e. meant to protect their feelings). Yet because a wide range of interaction and relationship types was included in this analysis, this finding may not fully reflect women's avoidance of competition (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). In situations with an inherently competitive element, such as negotiations, it remains an open question whether lies aimed at providing a strategic advantage are told more frequently to one gender versus the other. By holding constant the context involving a

decision of whether to lie, the current research is able to examine whether highly competitive, strategic interactions invite gender bias.

Gender Stereotypes and the Decision to Deceive

Why would negotiators conclude that the risks associated with lying are lower with female negotiators? To address this question, let us consider the ethical decision making process. In strategic interactions, expectations about consequences guide the decision to deceive (Gneezy, 2005). In other words, rational actors consider both the subjective probability of getting caught and the cost of punishment. Viewed through the lens of gender stereotypes, both considerations put women at a disadvantage relative to men. With respect to lie discovery, feminine stereotypes involving gullibility and agreeableness suggest women are less likely than men to recognize and to challenge a lie. With respect to punishment, masculine stereotypes involving aggressiveness suggest men are more likely than women to retaliate against a discovered lie. If women are deemed less “risky” targets of deception than men, as the introductory quote suggests, then they become vulnerable to being deceived.

Gender stereotypes suggest, first and foremost, that women must be warm and nice (Bem, 1974; Prentice & Carranza, 2002). This feminine imperative to be agreeable conflicts with the simple act of negotiating, leading women negotiators to appear pushy and demanding (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles et al., 2007; Small et al., 2007). In general, attempting to negotiate can be considered impolite. Because conforming to politeness norms is particularly important for low status individuals such as women (Brown & Levinson, 1987), women demonstrate reluctance to initiate negotiations (Small et al., 2007).

Prescriptive feminine stereotypes demanding niceness may also render women reluctant to accuse another of lying or, minimally, to lead their interaction partners to expect this reluctance. Accusatory reluctance is characterized by a discomfort in labeling others as deceptive (Ekman, Friesen, O'Sullivan, & Scherer, 1980; O'Sullivan, Ekman, Friesen, & Scherer, 1985). Almost by definition, the warmth and kindness expected of women mandates hesitancy in accusing others of foul play. Doing so is unpleasant, uncomfortable, and potentially aggressive, all of which violate prescriptive feminine stereotypes.

In addition to the mandate that women be agreeable, the fact that women are *allowed* to possess certain undesirable traits, such as being gullible, impressionable, and naïve (Prentice & Carranza, 2002), may increase women's likelihood of being deceived. These relaxed proscriptions for women provide a means of avoiding the uncomfortable task of accusing another of lying. As in the case of whistleblowers, accusing others of wrongdoing often carries penalties that people are motivated to avoid (Johnson, 2002). Furthermore, to the degree that women are presumed to possess these undesirable characteristics, a rational actor might conclude women are also more likely to believe a lie. Indeed, women's own admission of their lack of knowledge about negotiating (Kray & Gelfand, 2009) likely lowers the subjective probability of their catching a lie at the bargaining table. Overall, the subjective risks of getting caught in a lie appear to be lower with female negotiators.

Another potential consequence of deception is the threat of retaliation should the lie be discovered. Examined from this angle, women remain disadvantaged relative to men. Masculinity is associated with agency and aggression (Williams & Best, 1982);

these masculine stereotypes suggest men are more likely than women to retaliate against a discovered lie. Once again, aside from any *actual* behavioral differences between men and women in retaliation, awareness of gender stereotypes may affect *expectations* about retaliation, thus influencing a rational actor's decision to deceive. Likewise, even if women were as likely as men to retaliate, their ability to do so effectively may be limited. Women's ability to punish a liar may be relatively constrained because women have lower status than men (Jackman, 1994) and status predicts the amount of attention granted by others (Fiske, 1993; Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003). Each of these considerations leads to the prediction that women are more likely than men to be deceived in strategic interactions.

Overview of studies. Three studies were conducted to determine the relationship between gender, gender stereotypes, and deception in negotiations. Studies 1A and 1B sought to establish a link between gender stereotypes and expected consequences of deception in negotiations. It was hypothesized that feminine stereotypes would be associated with positive consequences of deception (i.e. ease of reaching agreement) whereas negative stereotypes would be associated with negative consequences of deception (i.e. threat of retaliation). The final study was designed to examine the relationship between gender and deceptive behavior in a naturalistic setting, the MBA classroom. Consistent with the consequences of deception implied by gender stereotypes, negotiators were hypothesized to deceive women more often than men in competitive negotiations.

Before proceeding to the experiments, it is important to clarify the methodological approach. Though gender stereotypes can clearly affect the behavior of both stereotyped

actors and their interaction partners, the current research is focused on the latter phenomenon. This means that, regardless of whether a stereotype *actually* predicts behavior of a focal actor, it may lead his or her interaction partners to *expect* certain behavior. In Studies 1A and 1B, I first examine the expected consequences of deception as a function of gender stereotypes. Then, consistent with the relationship established between gender stereotypes and expected consequences, Study 2 explores whether negotiators disproportionately deceive women negotiators in the naturalistic context of the classroom. The central question is whether women are deceived more often than men and, if so, what are the actual consequences of doing so?

Study 1A

The current experiment examines the relationship between gender stereotypes and expected reactions to deception in negotiations. Past research has established that women are thought to possess traits associated with greater ease in being misled than men, such as agreeableness and gullibility. The current study builds on this work by exploring the expected downstream consequences of these gender stereotypes on negotiating processes. Specifically, a negotiation scenario was created involving the sale of a car wherein the seller blatantly lied about the condition of the vehicle to a prospective buyer. I hypothesized that participants would expect less resistance to the lie by a stereotypically feminine buyer than a stereotypically masculine buyer. In turn, differences in resistance to the lie were expected to predict expectations about a deal occurring under false pretenses, a positive consequence for the seller. Participants were expected to predict a greater likelihood of a deal when the buyer was described in feminine as opposed to masculine terms.

Another goal of the current experiment was to confirm the correspondence between gender stereotypes and gender. Gender is an observable variable used to make inferences about unobservable variables, such as car buyers' "knowledge, search, and bargaining costs" (Phelps, 1972). For gender stereotypes to drive differences in how women and men are treated, they must strongly connote gender. In the current research, buyers' gender was not identified. Nonetheless, given the strong correspondence between gender stereotypes and gender, I expected negotiators described in stereotypically feminine (masculine) terms would be presumed female (male). Finally, I examined lay intuitions about which gender was more likely to mislead versus be misleading. I expected women would be judged as more likely to be misled than men, whereas men would be judged to be more likely to be misleading than women.

Method

Participants and design. Participants were 107 (39.3% male) workers from an online marketing research website who were paid \$2. The experiment included two between-subject gender stereotype conditions (feminine, masculine).

Procedure. Participants read the following scenario, adapted from Gneezy (2005): "Imagine you are selling your used car, which is worth about \$1200. After posting an ad on a community bulletin board, you were contacted by an interested buyer." Next came the gender stereotype manipulation¹. The *feminine stereotype condition* read: "This person is a community member whom you have never met, but whom mutual acquaintances say is quite warm and kind, yet also somewhat naïve and gullible." The *masculine stereotype condition* read: "This person is a community member whom you

have never met, but whom mutual acquaintances say is quite ambitious and has good business sense, yet also somewhat arrogant and stubborn.”

The scenario continued as follows: “The engine’s oil pump does not work well, and you know that if the buyer learns about this, you will have to reduce the price by \$250 (the cost of fixing the pump). If you don’t tell the buyer, the engine will overheat on the first hot day, resulting in damages of \$250. Being winter, the only way the buyer can learn about this now is if you were to tell. Otherwise, the buyer will learn about it only on the next hot day. Before delivering payment for the car, the buyer asks you to confirm that the car is in good working order. You respond, “The car works great. No issues whatsoever.””

Dependent variables. To assess the extent to which the buyer was perceived to be easily misled, participants indicated how likely it was that the buyer would believe them and how much the buyer trusted them ($\alpha = .76$). To gauge expected persistence, participants then indicated how likely it was that the buyer would continue to ask questions about the condition of the car. Participants also indicated the likelihood that a deal would occur in which they received full payment for the car. All items were on 7-point scales. The trust item had endpoints of “not at all” and “completely.” The remaining items had endpoints of “very unlikely” and “very likely.” Participants then indicated the likely gender of the buyer and reported their own gender. Finally, participants indicated which gender they thought was more likely to be misled versus to mislead in this scenario.

Results

The following analyses were conducted using ANOVAs including gender stereotype condition as a between-subject factor. Participant gender did not affect the results so it was not included in the analyses.

Feminine stereotypes were hypothesized to produce positive expected consequences of deception, including greater lie belief, less lie resistance, and, ultimately, more attractive deals for liars. Results are consistent with this hypothesis. First, the stereotypically feminine buyer ($M = 4.84$, $SD = .92$) was expected to believe the lie more than the stereotypically masculine buyer ($M = 4.22$, $SD = .98$), $F(1, 103) = 10.12$, $p = .002$, $\eta = .09$. Second, the stereotypically feminine buyer ($M = 4.56$, $SD = 1.60$) was expected to be less persistent in questioning than the stereotypically masculine buyer ($M = 5.28$, $SD = 1.14$), $F(1, 103) = 10.12$, $p = .01$, $\eta = .06$. Finally, a deal resulting in full payment to the seller was deemed more likely with a stereotypically feminine buyer ($M = 5.64$, $SD = 1.01$) than a stereotypically masculine buyer ($M = 5.13$, $SD = 1.31$), $F(1, 105) = 4.95$, $p = .03$, $\eta = .05$.

Mediation Analyses

To gain a better understanding of the process by which gender stereotypes increased expected agreements, two sets of mediation analyses were conducted. First, I examined whether the relationship between gender stereotypes and expected persistence was mediated by perceptions of being easily misled. Bootstrapping procedures were used to establish a 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of a predictor on an outcome (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Because the CI did not contain zero (95% CI = .10, .59), mediation was confirmed. Second, I examined whether the relationship between

perceptions of being easily misled and expected agreements was mediated by expected persistence. Once again, mediation was confirmed (95% CI = .04, .26). Gender stereotypes affected the degree to which the lie was expected to be believed, further impacting expected persistence in questioning the lie and, ultimately, whether a deal was expected to occur under false pretenses.

Gender Expectations

Buyer inferred gender. A log-linear analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between buyers' inferred gender, participant gender, and gender stereotypes. Three effects emerged as statistically significant. First, 71% of participants inferred that the buyer was male, a proportion significantly greater than chance, $\chi^2(1, 107) = 19.53, p < .001$. Second, participant gender affected inferences about the buyer's gender. Whereas 85.7% of male participants inferred a male buyer, only 61.5% of female participants did so, $\chi^2(1, 107) = 9.04, p = .003$. Third, inferences about buyer gender varied on the basis of gender stereotypes. Buyers described in stereotypically masculine terms ($M = 86.5%$) were more likely to be presumed to be male than buyers described in stereotypically feminine terms ($M = 56.4%$), $\chi^2(1, 107) = 13.67, p < .001$. No other effects were significant.

Likelihood of being misled versus misleading. Assumptions about gender and being misled versus being misleading were significantly negatively correlated, $r(107) = -.28, p = .004$. Separate log-linear analyses were conducted to examine perceptions of the relationship between gender and being misled versus misleading. As expected, women ($M = 92.5%$) were overwhelmingly expected to be more likely to be misled, $\chi^2(1, 107) = 91.45, p < .001$. In contrast, men ($M = 90.7%$) were overwhelming regarded as more

likely to be misleading, $\chi^2(1, 107) = 81.89, p < .001$. No other effects emerged as statistically significant.

Discussion

In strategic interactions, lies are told when the expected consequences are positive (Gneezy, 2005). The current research suggests that gender stereotypes influence the expected payoff of telling a lie. Feminine stereotypes concerning gullibility and agreeableness suggest greater ease in being misled relative to masculine stereotypes suggesting business acumen and interpersonal assertiveness. By reducing the odds that a lie will be resisted, feminine stereotypes increase the perceived likelihood of securing a deal based on false pretenses relative to masculine stereotypes. Just like feminine stereotypes reduce *actual* willingness to negotiate (Small et al, 2007), feminine stereotypes also reduce *expected* persistence in questioning a falsehood at the bargaining table.

In addition to establishing a causal link between gender stereotypes and the expected consequences of deception, the perceived correspondence between gender and gender stereotypes was also demonstrated. Three assumptions about gender emerged. First, participants demonstrated a tendency to perceive the buyer as sharing their own gender. Second, buyers were presumed to be male more so than female, perhaps reflecting men's greater presence at the bargaining table. Third, and most important for linking gender stereotypes to action, is the observed correspondence between gender stereotypes and gender. Though no mention was made of buyer gender, buyers described in stereotypically feminine terms were presumed to be female and buyers described in

stereotypically masculine terms were presumed to be male. Gender stereotypes and gender clearly go hand-in-hand.

Study 1B

Using the identical scenario as the previous study, the current experiment offers three extensions. First, in addition to measuring positive consequences of deception, the expected negative consequences of deception were also gauged. It was hypothesized that masculine stereotypes would imply a greater likelihood of retaliating against a liar whose misdeed is revealed. Second, whereas the previous experiment simply measured the expected likelihood of a full price deal occurring, the current experiment included an open-ended measure of expected sale price, thus providing a more precise measure of expected consequences. Third, the current experiment included a control condition in which no information was provided about the buyer's reputation. In so doing, the relative impact of feminine and masculine stereotypes could be assessed.

Method

Participants and design. Participants were users of an online market research website ($N = 132$) who were paid \$1. No demographic information was collected. The experimental design included three between-subject gender stereotype conditions (feminine, masculine, control).

Procedure. The same scenario described in Study 1A was used. In addition to the feminine and masculine stereotype conditions, a control condition was added that simply described the potential buyer as follows: "This person is a community member whom you have never met."

Dependent variables. To measure expected price, participants indicated what they expected the final price would be, given the car's worth of approximately \$1200. To measure perceived threat of retaliation, two questions were presented on 7-point scales (endpoints: "not at all" and "very"): "How likely is it that the buyer will demand compensation when the oil pump breaks next summer?" and "How likely is it that the buyer will seek to damage your reputation when the oil pump breaks next summer?" Because reliability was high ($\alpha = .77$), the two items were combined into a perceived threat of retaliation scale.

Results and Discussion

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. A one-way ANOVA determined that expected price was impacted by the gender stereotype manipulation, $F(2, 130) = 4.05$, $p = .02$, $\eta = .06$. Negotiators described in stereotypically feminine terms were expected to pay more than negotiators described in stereotypically masculine terms. The expected price in the control condition fell in the middle.

An ANOVA was also conducted on perceived threat of retaliation. As expected, gender stereotypes affected the expected negative consequences of lying, $F(2, 130) = 10.53$, $p < .001$, $\eta = .14$. In particular, negotiators described in stereotypically masculine terms were perceived to pose a greater threat of retaliation after being deceived, both relative to the stereotypically feminine negotiator and the control condition.

Expected price and perceived threat of retaliation were negatively correlated, $r(133) = -.22$, $p < .01$. Somewhat ironically, buyers who paid less for the car were expected to be the most likely to retaliate upon discovering the car's deficiency.

However, an ANCOVA in which price was controlled demonstrated that the effect of

gender stereotypes remained significant, $F(2, 129) = 8.58, p < .01$. Therefore, the effect of gender stereotypes on perceived threat of retaliation appears to occur independently of the buyer's expected negotiating effectiveness.

The current experiment demonstrates that the negative consequences of engaging in deception are expected to be greater when the lie is told to negotiators described in masculine as opposed to feminine terms. Consistent with Study 1A's finding that feminine stereotypes imply a greater likelihood of a lie about a car's condition going undetected and resulting in a full-priced deal, the current experiment demonstrates that feminine stereotypes imply paying a higher price for the car. Finally, by including a control condition, the current experiment clarifies that feminine stereotypes increase the expected position consequences of deception whereas masculine stereotypes increase the expected negative consequences of deception, both relative to baseline conditions.

Study 2: A Naturalistic Investigation in the Classroom

The previous experiments established a relationship between gender stereotypes and the expected consequences of deception. The current study examines whether the pattern of deceptive behavior observed in a naturalistic negotiation context is consistent with this established relationship. If gender stereotypes lead negotiators to expect women to be more easily misled than men and these expectations shape ethical decision making, then women negotiators should be deceived more often than their male counterparts.

To test this hypothesis, an archival dataset was created using existing measures from an MBA negotiation courseⁱⁱ. In this course, students completed face-to-face negotiation role playing exercises followed by post-negotiation online surveys on a weekly basis. Though the economic terms of deals were not graded, preparation and

effort in the exercises were. In addition to this performance incentive, students were also highly motivated to reach attractive deals due to their reputational consequences. After each exercise, the precise terms of each negotiating pair's agreement were summarized in written form and shared with the entire class, thus providing clear and immediate reputational incentives to do well. As a result of this debriefing process, students could be virtually assured that any deception occurring during negotiations would ultimately be revealed to their negotiating partners.

One exercise in particular was designed to introduce the concept of ethics, thus providing an ideal context for testing the hypothesized relationship between gender and deception. The negotiation task (described in detail below) involved a buyer-seller real estate transaction designed to pose the following ethical dilemma to buyers: do they lie about their intended use of the property to facilitate a deal that might not otherwise occur?ⁱⁱⁱ Prior to debriefing the exercise (i.e. revealing the buyers' true intentions), participants completed a post-negotiation survey including all dependent variables.

The primary measure of ethical decision making was buyer self-reported lying, a common method for assessing various forms of dishonesty (cf. DePaulo et al., 1996; McCabe, Butterfield, & Trevino, 2006). Because this self-report measure may have been influenced by the perceived consequences of lying, it was supplemented by open-ended descriptions of the buyer's tale (i.e. their stated intentions), provided by both buyers and sellers. Two independent judges coded these descriptions for deception. A subset of the sample (due to pedagogical reasons) also assessed the buyer's degree of honesty, which provided both a finer-grained sense of buyer behavior and a measure of whether sellers detected buyer deception.

Finally, consequences of deception were examined to assess whether the expectations derived from gender stereotypes predicted negotiation processes and outcomes. Economic consequences included agreement rate and sale price. Psychological consequences included dyad ratings of their negotiating experience. In contrast to the hypothesized positive economic consequences of deception for buyers, it was expected that lies would impair both negotiators' psychological experience. Because women sellers were expected to be deceived more than male sellers, two consequences were hypothesized: 1) more positive economic terms were expected for buyers negotiating with female sellers; 2) more negative negotiating experiences were expected for dyads including women sellers.

Method

Participants

Participants were 298 full-time M.B.A. students at a public west coast business school (221 male, or 74.2%) who were enrolled in one of six sections of a negotiation course, comprising 149 dyads (65 male-male, 23 female buy-male sell, 48 male buy-female sell, 13 female-female)^{iv}. Both male and female students were randomly assigned to negotiation roles. Given that men comprised approximately 75% of MBA enrollment, data from 6 sections of negotiation classes across 2 years were combined to enable the analysis of a full factorial design. The negotiation exercise occurred in approximately the 4th week of a 15-week course.

Procedure

Participants were given one hour to negotiate the "Bullard Houses" role playing exercise (DRRC version, 1995). Participants were randomly assigned to negotiate as the

buyer's agent ("buyer") or the seller's agent ("seller") in a real estate negotiation. As in past research examining ethical decision making (Kern & Chugh, 2008), this simulation was chosen because it provides negotiators with a range of options for responding to an ethical dilemma posed to buyers. Sellers were instructed only to sell the property to a known, reputable buyer for "tasteful" and preferably residential purposes. Buyers were prohibited from revealing under any circumstances that their client intended to build a commercial high-rise hotel on the property catering to tourists and convention visitors, a use inconsistent with the sellers' interests. However, at no point were buyers instructed to lie.

Buyers were faced with the decision of whether to be truthful versus dishonest to sellers about their client's intended use of the property. Buyers exhibiting total honesty could inform the seller that they were prohibited from revealing the intended use of the property, though doing so may raise suspicion and thereby potentially increase the risk of reaching an impasse. Alternatively, various degrees of dishonesty could be employed: buyers could claim that they were unaware of their client's intended use, focus on ambiguous terms like "residential" (though a hotel "houses" people, it is short-term and requires different zoning than long-term residences), or blatantly lie by claiming that their clients intended to put the property to a use consistent with the seller's interests (i.e. brownstones).

Dependent Measures

Lie admissions. Lie admissions were measured by asking buyers if they lied to sellers about the intended use of the property, coding no as "0" and yes as "1."

Buyer intentions (coded for deception). Buyers' deceptiveness was independently assessed in two ways: 1) buyers' open-ended responses to: "What did you tell the seller about the intended use of the property?" and 2) sellers' open-ended responses to: "What is your understanding of the intended use of the property by the buyer?" Both buyer and seller descriptions were coded for deception by two independent judges on the following 6-point scale: 0 (truth, i.e. "high-rise commercial" or "buyer said he was not authorized to reveal"), 1 (truth but violated client's orders, i.e. "hotel"), 2 (vague and subjective, emphasis on "tasteful" use), 3 (claimed ignorance or uncertainty about purpose, i.e. "undecided"), 4 (misleading, emphasis on "residential" use), 5 (blatant lie, i.e. "condominiums"). Coder reliability was adequate for both buyer ($\kappa = .69$) and seller ($\kappa = .65$) descriptions, so judges' ratings were combined.

Buyer honesty: Buyer versus seller assessment. Because data were collected over multiple semesters for pedagogical reasons, some questions varied over time. For purposes of the current investigation, the only relevant dependent variable to be added midway through the data collection process concerned buyer honesty. For a portion of the sample ($n = 175$), buyers' actual honesty (rated by buyer) and perceived honesty (rated by seller) were assessed. The response scale ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).

Economic consequences. First, agreement rates were examined, coding impasse as "0" and agreement as "1." Second, if an agreement was reached, sale price was examined ($M = \$19.36M$, $SD = 2.92$).

Psychological consequences. Participants' ratings of their negotiation experience were assessed with a 5-item modified version of the Subjective Value Inventory (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006). Items included: "How satisfied are you with the ease of reaching

agreement?”, “Did the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relationship?”, “Did you behave according to your own principles and values?”, “How satisfied are you with your own outcome?”, and “Would you characterize the process as fair?” Response scales ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). As the reliability of the items was adequate for both buyers ($\alpha = .79$) and sellers ($\alpha = .77$), separate negotiation experience indices were created for buyers and sellers.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

Descriptive statistics for all study variables are provided in Table 1. Several initial findings provide assurance of the validity of the deception measures. First, within dyads, buyers and sellers agreed on buyer intentions, buyer honesty, and subjective experience. Second, buyers’ multiple measures of deception (lie admission, buyer intentions, and honesty) were significantly correlated. Third, the deception revealed in sellers’ report of buyer intentions was significantly correlated with sellers’ ratings of buyer honesty.

Lie Admissions

A log-linear analysis was conducted with buyer sex and seller sex included as between-dyad factors. Table 2 provides the proportion of lie admissions across conditions. As hypothesized, buyers were significantly more likely to lie to female sellers than to male sellers, $\chi^2(1, 134) = 5.86, p = .02$. In fact, the ratio of lies experienced by female versus male sellers was 3:1. The interaction between buyer sex and seller sex was marginally significant, $\chi^2(1, 134) = 2.76, p = .10$. Male buyers’ ethical decision making was particularly sensitive to seller sex, with lie admissions six times more frequent when

partnered with female sellers compared to male sellers, $\chi^2(1, 96) = 9.64, p = .002$. No other effects were significant.

Buyer Intentions (Coded for Deception)

To determine whether independent assessments of buyer deception converged with the pattern of lie admissions, a mixed-model ANOVA was conducted on both buyers' and sellers' descriptions of what buyers told sellers about the intended use of the property, including buyer sex and seller sex as between dyad factors. Three effects emerged. First, replicating the pattern of buyers' lie admissions, a main effect for seller sex emerged whereby reports were more deceptive with female sellers ($M = 2.73, SD = 1.29$) than male sellers ($M = 1.96, SD = 1.30$), $F(1, 121) = 5.93, p = .02, \eta = .05$. Second, a main effect for negotiator emerged such that sellers' descriptions ($M = 2.54, SD = 1.61$) revealed more buyer deception than buyers' descriptions ($M = 2.04, SD = 1.52$), $F(1, 121) = 10.41, p = .001, \eta = .08$. The greater deception apparent in sellers' reports suggests buyers were motivated to minimize their admission of lies.

Third, a Negotiator X Seller Sex interaction effect emerged (see Figure 1), $F(1, 121) = 3.99, p = .05, \eta = .03$. Sellers' descriptions revealed more deception with female sellers ($M = 3.12, SD = 1.54$) than male sellers ($M = 2.11, SD = 1.54$), $F(1, 121) = 9.47, p = .003, \eta = .07$; however, buyers' descriptions of their reported intentions did not significantly vary between female ($M = 2.34, SD = 1.40$) and male sellers ($M = 1.81, SD = 1.58$), $F(1, 121) = 1.12, p = .29, \eta = .01$. Though sellers' reported understanding of the buyers' intentions revealed more deception with female sellers than male sellers, buyers'

reports of what they told sellers did not acknowledge this gender bias, perhaps reflecting a motivation of buyers to recall their stated intentions in a less deceptive light.

To better illustrate the gender bias apparent in sellers' understanding of buyer intentions, the frequency of lie type by seller sex is displayed in Figure 3. Notably, the effect of seller sex was not driven by "gray zone" lies. Instead, what distinguished female versus male sellers was whether they were told blatant lies versus the truth. Whereas 26.2% of female sellers' reports revealed blatant lies (coded as 5), only 6.8% of male sellers' reports did so, $\chi^2(1, 149) = 10.08, p = .001$. In contrast, complete honesty (coded as 0 or 1), including honesty that violated buyers' instructions by their clients not to reveal their intentions, was communicated to 34.1% of male sellers compared to 16.4% of female sellers, $\chi^2(1, 149) = 5.75, p = .02$.

Buyer and Seller Assessments of Buyer Honesty

Buyer honesty was analyzed with a mixed-model ANOVA, including negotiator as a within-dyad factor, and buyer sex and seller sex as between-dyad factors. Two statistically significant effects emerged. First, as depicted in Figure 2, a Negotiator X Seller Sex interaction effect emerged, $F(1, 75) = 9.41, p = .003, \eta = .11$. Buyers admitted to significantly less honesty with female sellers ($M = 4.68, SD = 2.03$) than male sellers ($M = 5.91, SD = 1.31$), $F(1, 75) = 10.26, p = .002, \eta = .12$; however, sellers' assessment of buyer honesty did not significantly differ between female sellers ($M = 4.92, SD = 1.84$) and male sellers ($M = 4.85, SD = 1.86$), $F(1, 75) = .94, p = .74$. Although female sellers were disproportionately deceived, their assessment of buyers' honesty did not reflect this reality.

Second, this interaction was further qualified by buyer sex, $F(1, 75) = 5.08, p = .03, \eta = .06$. For dyads with male buyers, a main effect emerged for seller sex, $F(1, 60) = 5.54, p = .02, \eta = .09$. Dyads comprised of male buyers/female sellers ($M = 4.81, SD = 1.58$) rated the buyer as less honest than dyads comprised of male buyers/male sellers ($M = 5.42, SD = 1.42$). For dyads with female buyers, the interaction between seller sex and negotiator role was significant, $F(1, 15) = 8.37, p = .01, \eta = .36$. Female buyers acknowledged being less honest to female sellers ($M = 4.00, SD = 2.27$) than male sellers ($M = 6.00, SD = 1.61$), $F(1, 16) = 4.90, p = .04, \eta = .24$. Yet a marginally significant effect emerged whereby female sellers ($M = 5.44, SD = 1.51$) perceived female buyers to be more honest than did male sellers ($M = 4.23, SD = 1.48$), $F(1, 20) = 3.52, p = .08, \eta = .15$. This interaction pattern suggests female sellers recognized the dishonesty acknowledged by male buyers but not female buyers.

Economic Consequences

Agreement rates. Overall, 74.5% of dyads reached agreement. First, I examined whether agreement rate differed by buyer sex and seller sex. A marginally significant effect emerged for seller sex whereby dyads with female sellers (81.97%) reached more deals than dyads with male sellers (70.12%), $\chi^2(1, 148) = 2.69, p = .10$. Second, I examined the relationship between deception and agreement rates. The only measure of deception that significantly predicted agreement rates was the coded deception revealed in sellers' reports of buyer intentions. Not surprisingly, less accuracy in sellers' understanding of the intended use of the property translated into more deals being struck, $r(136) = .32, p < .001$.

Sale price. First, I examined whether, for dyads reaching agreement, sale price varied by buyer sex and seller sex. The only marginally significant effect was a main effect for buyer sex, $F(1, 107) = 2.89, p = .09, \eta = .03$. Consistent with prior research, male buyers ($M = \$19.09M, SD = 2.98$) paid less than female buyers ($M = \$20.26M, SD = 2.56$). Second, I examined whether sale price was predicted by any of the deception measures. The only marginally significant effect to emerge was a positive relationship with buyers' self-assessed honesty, $r(66) = .21, p = .09$. Buyers who paid higher prices reported having been more honest during the negotiation.

Psychological Consequences

First, participants' evaluation of their negotiation experience was examined with a mixed-model ANOVA, including negotiator as a within-dyad factor and buyer sex and seller sex as between subject factors. The only effect to emerge as statistically significant was a main effect for seller sex, $F(1, 132) = 3.98, p = .05, \eta = .02$. Buyers and sellers alike reported a less positive negotiating experience in dyads with female sellers ($M = 3.68, SD = .82$) than in dyads with male sellers ($M = 4.00, SD = .66$).

Why did dyads with female sellers have a relatively negative negotiating experience? The greater dishonesty in these dyads' interactions was hypothesized to negatively affect the negotiation experience. To test this hypothesis, dyad-level measures were created of buyer honesty and negotiation experience by averaging buyer and seller ratings. Then a mediation model was tested. As expected, the relationship between seller sex and negotiation experience was fully mediated by buyer honesty ratings, (95% CI = .04, .43). In other words, negotiating dyads with women sellers reported more negative experiences because they perceived more dishonesty by buyers.

Discussion

An archival analysis of negotiator behavior in the MBA classroom reveals for the first time that women are disproportionately deceived at the bargaining table. Across multiple measures of deception, negotiators faced with an ethical dilemma about whether to lie were more likely to do so when their negotiating partner was female rather than male. First, buyers admitted to lying more when their partner was female rather than male. Lest this pattern of confessions simply reflect different thresholds for admitting to lies based on counterpart gender, independent judges confirmed that what buyers told sellers about the intended use of the property was more deceitful with female sellers compared to male sellers. Buyers also rated themselves as less honest with female sellers than male sellers. In combination, these findings suggest a robust gender bias in ethical decision making in strategic interactions.

Each measure of deception supports the central hypothesis, in addition to shedding light on further aspects of the relationship between gender and deception. With respect to lie admissions, the main effect for seller sex was qualified by a marginal interaction with buyer sex. A pronounced tendency emerged for men to admit to lies told to women but not other men, at a ratio of 6:1. On its own, this finding complements recent work showing that high status actors are more lenient in judging the ethical lapses of other high status actors (Bowles & Gelfand, 2010). It may be that high status actors are also more stringent in their own ethical standards with other high status actors. However, because the classroom context limited the degree to which negotiation behavior could be measured objectively, caution must be exercised in interpreting this interaction. The fact that the coding of buyer intentions revealed more deception in sellers' reports than in

buyers' reports suggests buyers were reluctant to admit outright deception, possibly even more so for counterparts posing a greater threat of retaliation.

In contrast to possible distortions in buyers' reports, sellers' descriptions of what they were told by buyers were unlikely to be influenced by self-presentational concerns. In their descriptions of what they were told by buyers, a pronounced difference was revealed in the tale told to women sellers versus male sellers. Whereas women were told outright lies more often than men, men were told the whole truth more often than women. Remarkably, this tendency for buyers to reveal the truth to men even included violating instructions explicitly prohibiting them from revealing their clients' intentions to build a hotel. The consequences of revealing the truth were purely hypothetical and contained within the role play, whereas the potential consequences of lying to a male classmate, even in the context of a role play, may have been very real and far reaching.

The final measure tapping deception involved buyer honesty ratings by both buyers and sellers. Here an interesting finding emerged whereby female sellers failed to recognize the dishonesty of buyers. Though buyers uniformly acknowledged being less honest to female sellers, female sellers judged their counterparts to be as honest as male sellers did. This finding was particularly true when female sellers' negotiating partners were also female. Though women behave in a more trustworthy fashion than men in strategic interactions (Buchan, Croson, & Solnick, 2008), here women experienced more undetected deception by other women.

The previous studies explored *expected* consequences of deception; the current study examined deception's *actual* consequences, both economic and psychological. Interestingly enough, lying in and of itself had no impact on reaching a deal. That is,

looking at deception from buyers' self-reports did not predict more agreements. Instead, erroneous understandings of buyer intentions revealed in sellers' reports positively impacted agreement rates. Simply telling a lie was not enough to affect economic terms, but rather the lie had to be believed by its target to facilitate deal making. With respect to sale price, little evidence exists to suggest that lying helped buyers to secure a better deal. Though buyers who paid a high price subsequently reported being more honest, this pattern may have simply been an attempt to compensate for or justify their high economic costs. Overall, the positive economic consequences of lying were tenuous and must be balanced with the negative psychological consequences resulting from the lies told.

Buyers and sellers alike were negatively impacted by buyers' lying, as evidenced by subjective ratings of their negotiation experience. Across the board, negotiations involving female sellers were rated as more negative experiences than those involving male sellers. Importantly for connecting this pattern to deception was the mediation analysis demonstrating the underlying process. The negative experiences of dyads comprised of women sellers were driven by shared perceptions that buyers had been relatively dishonest. Given that this study occurred in a classroom setting in a graduate degree program wherein classmates have ongoing interactions beyond the simulation, it highlights very real differences in psychological consequences for coming to the bargaining table (i.e. enrolling in a negotiation course) by gender. This study makes clear that the negotiating experiences of male versus female sellers were very different, with the former walking away with a firmer foundation in place for future interactions with their negotiating partners than the latter.

General Discussion

The current research was guided by two interrelated questions. First, how do gender stereotypes affect the expected consequences of deception? Prescriptive and proscriptive gender stereotypes were hypothesized to affect the perceived ease of being misled, influencing both the positive and negative expected consequences of deception. Gender stereotypes linking agreeableness and gullibility to femininity may reduce the subjective probability of getting caught in lies told to women compared to men. Likewise, stereotypes about masculine aggression may have increased the subjective threat of retaliation upon getting caught in a lie, thereby promoting the decision to deceive women at a greater frequency than men. Studies 1A and 1B confirmed that feminine stereotypes produce positive expectations of deception and masculine stereotypes produce negative expectations of deception. Gender stereotypes influenced the expected ease of settling by both influencing the amount of resistance anticipated upon uttering a lie and the threat of retaliation for a discovered lie.

Because of this relationship between gender stereotypes and the expected consequences of deception, the question of its downstream effects on ethical decision making arises. Specifically, in strategic interactions where expectations guide the decision of whether to lie, does a gender bias exist in the extent to which women versus men are deceived? To answer this question, behavior was examined in a high stakes, competitive negotiation in the MBA classroom. Rational negotiators motivated to maximize their individual gains may use gender stereotypes to make “statistical inferences” of both the likelihood of getting caught in a lie and, if so, the resulting punishment. Because gender triggers gender stereotypes (Fiske, 1998), women were

hypothesized to be deceived more so than men. Consistent with this hypothesis, Study 2 found evidence of a gender bias in ethical decision making.

The current research shows that economically rational calculations of expected payoffs for engaging in deception must be considered in light of the psychological costs of doing so. In contrast to its expected positive economic return, Study 2 demonstrated that deception adversely impacted negotiators' experiences at the bargaining table. In their seminal work on ethics in negotiations, Lax and Sebenius (1986) advised that honesty is the best policy, in part because "a lie always leaves a drop of poison behind" (deCallières, 1716, 1919). In the current research, the poison left behind was a tainted experience for both negotiators via the lie's negative impact on perceptions of buyer honesty. By telling a convincing lie, the buyer may have secured a deal, but the awareness of his or her own compromised ethics bled into the negotiation experience of both negotiators. Given that subjective negotiation experiences can have lasting effects (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Eisenkraft, 2010; Curhan, Elfenbein, & Kilduff, 2009), the psychological consequences of telling lies should be considered by both rational actors and scholars developing ethical decision making theory.

The archival analysis had methodological strengths and weaknesses. Though psychologists have mainly employed diary methodologies to understand lying in everyday life, in the current research behavior was measured from a role playing exercise in the classroom. Each approach enjoys a high degree of external validity by examining behavior outside the confines of the laboratory, where stakes are often low without ongoing relationships involved. Here the decision to deceive was embedded within a network of students likely to interact repeatedly, thus potentially impacting relationships

and reputations. Despite these strengths, neither the diary nor classroom approaches allow for the experimental manipulation of lies or the measurement of behavior pertaining to lying. As a result of these limitations, stereotypes were not directly measured in Study 2 and the role of gender stereotypes in driving the effects must be inferred. To do so convincingly, alternative explanations for the data must be addressed.

In their field study examining gender discrimination in bargaining, Ayres and Siegelman (1995) considered two potential underlying factors. In addition to the statistical inference mechanism that they favored in interpreting their data, they also acknowledged that bigotry (i.e. prejudice) towards women may have led car salespeople to demand compensation for the displeasure of interacting with women (Becker, 1957). Perhaps by offering them bad deals, dealers hoped to deter women from entering their neighborhood to shop again. To test this proposition, Ayres and Siegelman examined whether male salespersons exhibited more bias than female salespersons towards female buyers, but no evidence was found of this pattern. Likewise, in the current data set, the only evidence that gender bias was stronger for men than women was the self-reported lie admission measure. Because this variable was the most likely of the deception measures to be influenced by self-presentational concerns, it must be interpreted cautiously. Overall, the data do not clearly support a prejudiced-based argument. The reliance on gender stereotypes to set expectations is the most plausible explanation for the findings.

Rather than being a product of *expected* differences derived from stereotypes, might gender bias in deception have resulted from *actual* behavioral differences between female and male sellers? In other words, might women have signaled that they were in fact less resistant to lies, thus paving the way for the deception they experienced? Caution

about not blaming the victim aside, it is certainly true that women profess less confidence, more anxiety, and less knowledge about negotiating compared to men (Kray & Gelfand, 2009). However, even these differences derive from the press of negative stereotypes about women negotiators. When stereotypically feminine traits are linked to negotiating effectiveness, women actually outperform men at the bargaining table (Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002), thus diminishing the plausibility of the argument that women are simply inferior negotiators. Instead, gender stereotypes undermine women's negotiation performance (Kray & Thompson, 2005). Future research that explores whether deception to women negotiators is triggered by actual behavioral signals women send to their counterparts would be desirable.

Past work has established that women are better at decoding nonverbal cues than men (Hall, 1978), though no better at catching a liar (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991). At first blush, the buyer honesty ratings in Study 2 may suggest women negotiators were gullible. Despite the fact that women were deceived more than men, women and men did not significantly differ in rating their counterparts' honesty. However, because gullibility is defined as trust in the presence of clear reasons to distrust (Gurtman, 1992; Rotter, 1980), these data do not speak to gullibility per se. In other words, sellers did not have clear *a priori* reasons for distrusting buyers' assurances about the intended use of the property (i.e. they had not negotiated previously). The current research simply shows that women negotiators perceived their counterpart as more honest than was warranted, particularly in same sex dyads. Though beyond the scope of the current investigation, future research is needed that examines whether gender differences emerge in the likelihood of updating one's honesty judgments after being deceived.

Rather than being gullible, *accusatory reluctance* may have limited women's labeling of their counterparts as dishonest. In line with this interpretation is the observation that women seller's ratings of the negotiation experience reflected a sense that something was "off" about the interaction, perhaps as a result of experiencing greater social distance from their interaction partner. Along these lines, DePaulo (1988) noted that asking observers about the degree to which their interaction partner was relaxed and comfortable better predicted lying than simply asking observers whether they'd been deceived. A reluctance to accuse their partner of being dishonest may have masked women's sense of foul play.

Several features of the current work may have contributed to the observed gender bias by enhancing the salience of gender stereotypes. First, women's numerical minority status in the MBA classroom likely enhanced the degree to which they were seen in stereotypical terms (Kanter, 1977). Furthermore, the face-to-face nature of the interaction likely magnified both the salience of gender stereotypes and deception's expected consequences. The realization that a classroom debriefing would follow the negotiation, wherein lies were likely to be revealed, made the threat of retaliation real. Just like gender differences in pricing for car purchases diminishes over the internet (Fiona, Zetzmeyer, & Silva-Russon, 2003), situations with greater anonymity may reduce the salience of stereotypes about women's ease of being misled, level the playing field of expected consequences, and produce less gender bias.

By considering counterpart gender as a determining factor in whether individuals behave ethically, this research expands our understanding of gender's role in ethics beyond the perspective of the individual actor. Though past work on lying in everyday

life failed to turn up strong effects for counterpart gender, it is unlikely that many of the documented observations of lying involved competitive interactions, where one party's gain was another's loss. In addition to gender differences in the propensity to lie in strategic interactions (Dreber & Johannesson, 2008), the current work shows that counterpart gender also factors into the equation. Moreover, by utilizing a full factorial design with respect to gender composition in dyadic negotiations (Kray & Thompson, 2005), a more comprehensive picture emerges of gender's role in strategic interactions.

A key strength of the current research is that it was conducted in the MBA classroom, where students are highly motivated to perform and to maintain positive reputations with their peers. Though the realism of the context enhances external validity, questions of generalizability beyond this participant population are worth considering. First, graduate students studying business cheat more than their non-business peers (McCabe, Butterfield, & Trevino, 2006). Although self-selection may lead more competitive people to pursue business degrees, the economic models emphasized in business education may reinforce a self-interest perspective (Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 1993). Would these results generalize to graduate training not based on economic principles of rationality and self-interest such as social work? Just like framing a negotiation as a Community versus Wall Street game significantly alters competitiveness (Lieberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004), those individuals inclined to construe strategic interactions cooperatively would be expected to demonstrate less gender bias in their ethical decision making.

Finally, it is worth considering whether the documented results are a buyer-driven effect versus a phenomenon that generalizes across negotiator roles. The negotiation

simulation in the current research concerned a decision of whether buyers disclose information about future intentions to sellers. Would parallel findings emerge in contexts examining sellers' decisions of whether to disclose material information about a property being sold? The absence of a strong theoretical argument for a role-based asymmetry, combined with Ayres and Siegelman's documentation of gender discrimination by sellers, instills confidence that the current findings generalize across roles and negotiation contexts.

Conclusion

A growing body of literature highlights the unique obstacles facing women negotiators. The current research contributes to this literature by identifying a strong gender bias in negotiators' ethical decision making, resulting in women negotiators being deceived more so than their male peers. Underlying decisions to deceive women are pernicious gender stereotypes about their ease of being misled. As stereotypes drive gender differences in bargaining (Kray & Thompson, 2005), the current work suggests removing women from the "typically easy to mislead" category in negotiators' minds is an important challenge in the quest to level the playing field.

Footnote

ⁱ To construct negotiator descriptions that varied in gender stereotypical traits, both prescriptive and proscriptive traits were selected from Prentice and Carranza (2002). In addition to selecting traits for their relevance to the research question, selected traits also varied in their desirability across gender. The feminine description included traits deemed more desirable for women; the masculine description included traits deemed more desirable for men. Comparatively, the two descriptions were matched in desirability for the relevant gender.

ⁱⁱ Human subject approval for analyzing the archival dataset was obtained post-hoc.

ⁱⁱⁱ Although theoretically it is also possible that the seller would lie to the buyer, historical data suggests this behavior was extremely uncommon in this particular simulation. As such, only buyer lying behavior was measured.

^{iv} The sample includes 80.11% of students enrolled in the course. Lack of response may be due to absence (in which case students did not participate in the negotiation) or lack of completion of post-negotiation survey. Dyads were included if at least one member of the dyad submitted a post-negotiation survey. Because some dyads only had one respondent, degrees of freedom vary across analyses.

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Table 1.

Study 1B: Means and Standard Deviations by Gender Stereotypes.

	Feminine ($n = 45$)	Masculine ($n = 37$)	Control ($n = 51$)
Expected Price	\$1135.56 _a (124.14)	\$1074.19 _b (90.35)	\$1096.08 _{ab} (80.53)
Threat of Retaliation	3.53 _a (1.46)	4.93 _b (1.38)	3.84 _a (1.44)

Note. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at $p < .05$

Table 2.

Study 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations between Variables.

Variable	Mean (sd)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Buyer Lie Admission	0.13 (0.33)	--								
2. Buyer Deception (B)	2.05 (1.50)	.38**	--							
3. Buyer Deception (S)	2.50 (1.63)	.37**	.48**	--						
4. Buyer Honesty (B)	5.43 (1.72)	-.69**	-.50**	-.56**	--					
5. Buyer Honesty (S)	4.91 (1.74)	-.22	-.20	-.34**	.33**	--				
6. Subjective Exp. (B)	3.73 (0.85)	-.35**	-.09	-.13	.50**	.22*	--			
7. Subjective Exp. (S)	3.83 (0.76)	-.11	-.07	-.14	.31**	.63*	.29**	--		
8. Agreement	0.75 (0.43)	.05	.15	.28**	.00	-.05	.23**	-.06	--	
9. Sale Price (in millions)	19.37 (2.92)	-.04	-.15	-.15	.21	.04	-.12	.09	#	--

Notes. Variables with a (B) in parenthesis indicate responses from the buyer; variables with an (S) indicate responses from the seller. Buyer Deception variable represents independent coding of buyer and seller descriptions of buyers' intended use of the property. # signifies a relationship that could not be computed.

Table 2.

Study 2: Buyer Lie Admissions by Buyer Sex and Seller Sex

	Female Seller	Male Seller	Overall
Female Buyer	10.00% (<i>n</i> =10)	11.76% (<i>n</i> =17)	11.10%
Male Buyer	25.60% (<i>n</i> =43)	3.77% (<i>n</i> =52)	11.50%
Overall	20.70%	6.58%	

Figure Captions

Figure 1: Study 2: Coded Buyer Deceptiveness by Negotiator and Seller Sex

Figure 2: Study 2: Buyer Honesty by Negotiator and Seller Sex

Figure 3: Study 2: Distribution of Type of Buyer Lies in Seller's Reports by Seller Sex





