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ENDOGENIZING POLICY IN MODELS OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETS

by

Gordon C. Rausser and Harry de Gorter

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By Gordon C. Rausser* and Harry de Gorter**[†]

I. Introduction

Three major sets of forces dictating the dynamic path of agricultural markets can be characterized as (i) the internal system of commodity demand and supply; (ii) the linkages with other sectors, the macro and international economies; and (iii) the linkages with governmental policy intervention. Linkages can be forward (influences flowing from these sets of forces to agricultural markets) or backward (influence flowing from agricultural markets) or both. If only forward linkages matter with respect to (ii) and (iii), then conventional modeling approaches will suffice for most purposes. Conventional modeling focuses on internal supply and demand conditioned by governmental policy instruments, economic growth, interest rates, exchange rates, etc.; however, if backward linkages exist, then such frameworks are no longer sufficient. The ubiquitous nature of governmental intervention in agriculture, and the dominant role it plays in market dynamics, argue for a serious examination of the linkages, both forward and backward, between economic markets and the formation of public policy.

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The view expressed in this paper is that political and economic markets are both forward and backward linked. The nature of this bicausal integration contradicts conventional treatments of agricultural markets and governmental policy; it is not possible to use conventional econometric models for output and price forecasting. Differences between various short-term economic forecasts often depend less on the internal functioning of the private sector than on different assumptions of future policies. Even for the short run, forecasting, conditional on particular settings of policy instruments, is not possible if these policy instruments, in turn, depend upon the performance of economic markets.

When using models for decision, or prescriptive, purposes to evaluate alternative solutions to presumed market failure, one must also recognize the imperfection of policy implementation. Empirical evidence exists on both market and government failures. Policy serving the public interest must minimize the adverse effects of both types of failure. This perspective is especially important in evaluating policy reform. Given the bicausal relation between political and economic markets, models making transparent the effects of current distortionary policies are not sufficient for reform. In particular, it has been shown elsewhere (Rausser and Irwin) that quantification of the feedback linkages between markets and policy formation can facilitate reform through the design of partial compensation schemes and new institutional rules.

This paper employs an approach admitting both market and government failure, distinguishing between PERT and PEST policies (Rausser). PERT policies are those forms of intervention which correct market failures by reducing transaction costs of the private economic system. The net effect of these political economy resource transaction policies is to increase the size of the

pie. In contrast, PEST policies reflect political economic-seeking transfers, which lead to government failure. In the formation of these policies, interest groups compete by spending time, energy, and money on the production of pressure to influence both the design and tactical implementation of policies. Most governments employ a portfolio or mixture of PERT and PEST policies. There is a wide scope of possibilities to interchange the use of PESTs and PERTs so as to acquire and maintain political power. Moreover, a government desire to maximize political support in democratic societies means that Becker's efficient redistribution hypothesis must be rejected.

A framework for endogenizing PERT and PEST policies is developed in Rausser. It emphasizes transaction costs in an internally consistent formulation; admits a number of alternative paradigms (including the theory of state, the theory of economic regulation, the efficient government redistribution hypothesis, and the theory of interest group rent seeking and conflict resolution); and allows for the possibility of degrees of government autonomy. This paper simplifies the earlier formulation by focusing on a tractable partial equilibrium analysis. Once empirical evidence has been accumulated on the formulation advanced here, a natural generalization will be to move toward a general equilibrium framework with multiple sector and macroeconomic policies.

2. Conceptual Framework

The framework developed here has three major dimensions: the level of PEST intervention, the level of PERT intervention, and the choice of the policy instrument mix. PEST policies are formally defined as those interventions that decrease social welfare and transfer income; PERT policies increase social welfare, also having some income distribution effects. The selection

of the type of PEST and PERT policies is a discrete choice problem. Each selection from the set of discrete alternatives has a mixture of efficiency and equity consequences.

A number of stylized facts regarding intervention in agricultural markets have emerged. In the case of PESTs, the transfer of income to agriculture is greater the richer (or more industrialized) the country; the higher the cost of production; the fewer the number of farmers, absolutely and relative to the total population; the more price inelastic the supply or demand function; the lower the proportion of total consumer budgets spent on food; and the "smaller" the exporting country or the "larger" the importing country. The striking feature of PERT policies has been the overwhelming evidence of underinvestment in public goods that impinge directly upon the agricultural sector.

Highly distortionary, commodity-specific policies are widely used to achieve income transfers in developed countries. Economists generally are critical of these policies and recommend their replacement by "decoupled" transfers or by what are historically referred to as "lump sum," distortion-free income transfers. The possibility of this change, along with the styl-ized facts noted above, should be formally incorporated into any framework endogenizing government behavior.

Consider a democratic government in which politicians or political parties compete for support, defined as votes, popularity ratings in polls, or the like. In order to achieve and maintain power in a pluralist democracy, poli-ticians seek to maximize popular support. This is accomplished by choosing the level of PEST and PERT expenditure policies (represented by the vector; $G = [G_S \ G_R]$), the levels of PEST and PERT regulatory policies (represented by the vector $P = [P_S \ P_R]$), and the mix of instruments represented by m. The regulatory policies are subsumed in the price equivalent variable, P, which

may differ from the price path generated in the absence of regulatory inter-
vention. Note that G and P can be jointly determined, e.g., deficiency pay-
ments in the United States change the dynamic price path and place a burden on
taxpayers via G_s.

For simplicity, initially assume two interest groups,[1] composed of n_f
producers and n_c consumers/taxpayers. The groups' economic well-being is
described by specific performance measures. The government has M policy in-
strument mixes from which to make a discrete choice, i.e., m = 1, ..., M.
Each policy mix results in a different level of support and group welfare.
Policy instrument mixes, which include regulatory and expenditure policies,
result in alternative levels of efficiency, or social deadweight loss.

The probability of an individual member from an interest group supporting
the government is given by S_f and S_c. As in the formulations advanced by
Olson and Becker, each group engages in lobbying or pressure activities, de-
noted by L_f and L_c for the agriculture and consuming sectors. Accordingly,
the government is presumed to select P, G, and m so as to maximize its utility:

(1)
$$\underset{P,G,m}{\text{Max}} \quad U = U(S; s)$$

where S is a measure of total political support and s is a vector of socio-
political characteristics of the government in power. Total support, in turn,
is given by:

(2)
$$S = S(n_f \cdot S_f, n_c \cdot S_c)$$

where support from group members is generated by

(3)
$$S_f = S_f\{F[(P|m), w, G], L_f, L_c\},$$

and

(4) $$S_c = S_c\{C[(P|m), Y, G], L_f, L_c\}.$$

The function $F(\cdot)$ represents the agricultural sector's performance measure, $C(\cdot)$ represents the consumers' performance or welfare measures, and L_f and L_c are the political pressures exerted by each group. Under risk neutrality, $F(\cdot)$ could be the profit function of an individual farmer:

(5) $$F = \Pi[P|m, w, G] - (1 - \lambda)G/n_f - e_f$$

with w representing a vector of input costs, $(1 - \lambda)$ is the cost share vector borne by the agricultural sector for any "expenditure" PEST or PERT policies contained in vector G, and e_f is the per capita expenditure on organizing and maintaining lobbying efforts by producers. $C(\cdot)$ can be represented by the indirect utility function:

(6) $$C = V_1[P|m, G] + V_2[I - \lambda G/n_c - e_c],$$

where I is per capita income, λ is the cost share vector borne by taxpayers of any PEST or PERT expenditure policies, and e_c is the consumer counterpart to e_f. The usual properties of the functions U, S_f, and S_c are assumed, yielding choices fulfilling well-known axioms of consistent decision making. Moreover, a noncooperative equilibrium between the government and the interest groups is assumed, where each of the three groups takes the reactions of others as given (a Nash equilibrium).

Lobbying corresponds to rent-seeking activities, taking the form of organizing support, mitigating opposition, and pressuring politicians. Part of the resources in L are allocated directly to politicians; part to campaigns,

advertising, and the like; and part to organization and the control of free riding. As a result, individual members' support in equations (3) and (4) are functions of aggregate lobbying pressure, L. Individual functions can be represented by:

$$(7) \qquad\qquad L_f = L_f(e_f \cdot n_f, \; n_f, \; x_f, \; m),$$

and

$$(8) \qquad\qquad L_c = L_c(e_c \cdot n_c, \; n_c, \; x_c, \; m)$$

where the vectors x_f and x_c represent factors affecting the ability of groups to pressure each other and politicians. In the literature, factors that have been isolated include group heterogeneity, firm/household size, geographic dispersion, and communication costs.[2] Organization and enforcement costs are presumed to rise with a number of members in a particular group; i.e., dL_f/dn_f, $dL_c/dn_c < 0$ (Becker).

Equations (1) through (8) can be examined from a number of perspectives. Endogenous government behavior can be investigated in <u>structural</u> form by equations (1) through (8); in <u>constraint structure</u> form (typically represented by the performance measure transformation frontier) by equations (5) and (6); in <u>instrument behavioral equations</u> form (often defined as the <u>policy reaction functions</u>) by the derived decision rules for P and G for a given m; and in <u>reduced form</u> of equations (1) through (8), which specify a <u>governing criterion function</u> of the group performance measures and a politician's performance measure, conditional upon lobbying efforts.

The relationship between the political objective function and interest group performance measures may be found in Rausser <u>et al.</u>, Peltzman (1976), and Brock and Magee, among others. The response of voters through popularity

and election studies are used to analyze support functions. Popularity rat-
ings measure the electorates' attitudes (Hibbs, and Frey and Schneider).
Election functions measure the responses to the current policy through voting
(Kramer, Arcelus and Meltzer, Tufte, Stigler, and Bloom and Price). The role
of ideology, party, and personality in the political utility function has been
investigated by Kalt and Zupan, and Peltzman (1984). Legislative procedures,
agenda setting, and the role of geography along with the distribution of costs
and benefits have been examined by Weingast et al., Wilson, Downs, Kau and
Rubin, and Kau et al. Legislative voting behavior of the U. S. Congress on
dairy price supports have been investigated by de Gorter and on successive
farm bills by Lee and Tkachyke.

The influence of lobbying and relative group pressure have been studied by
numerous authors, principally Olson and Becker. Olson emphasizes factors
affecting the ability of interest groups to organize and control free riding.
In his framework, group size, geographic dispersion, and the asymmetry of eco-
nomic gains and losses across members (along with sanctions and selective in-
centives) explain pressure and, hence, the selection of policy. Becker has
extended Olson's framework by analyzing factors that affect the relative
influence of groups: comparative lobbying efficiency, deadweight loss of
redistribution, and group size. Voters and politicians in his framework are
assumed to be passive. Lobbying activities have also been studied extensively
in the United States by Jacobson and Adamany.

In U. S. agriculture policy, Gardner has analyzed the Becker framework
extensively, while lobbying has been investigated by de Gorter. Empirical
frameworks advanced include those of Chappel, and Rausser et al. Studies have
also focused on the reaction functions (Lindbeck, Rausser and Stonehouse, and
Reed and Ladd). The reduced form, or governing criterion function,

specification has been used with revealed preference methodology to infer trade-off weights among performance measures (Rausser and Freebairn, Zusman, Sarris and Freebairn, Paarlberg and Abbott, and Beghin and Karp). For all of these perspectives, the decision rules for the choice variables (P, G, and m) are critical. The following discussion gives a sketch of the determination for these choice variables.

2.1. The Determination of PESTs (P_s, G_s)

To determine the optimal level of direct income transfer subsumed in P_s, for a given level of regulatory PERT policy P_R, expenditure PERT policy G_R, expenditure PEST policy G_S, lobbying pressure L, and policy instrument type m, the necessary conditions for a maximum of political utility is

$$(9) \qquad \frac{U_{S_f}}{U_{S_c}} \frac{n_f}{n_c} \frac{S_{f\Pi}}{S_{cv}} = \frac{-(V_{1P_s} + V_{2Y}Y_G \, G_{P_s}/n_c)}{\Pi_{P_s} - (1 - \lambda_s) \, G_{P_s}/n_f} \, ,$$

where Y is the after-tax and lobbying expenditure per capita income. The left-hand side of (9) represents the marginal rate of political substitution between the two performance measures (profits and indirect utility). It is the ratio of marginal contributions of welfare change on each group's political support weighted by the marginal evaluation of political utility of changes in support. This value is reflected in the shape and position of the political indifference curve.

The shape and position of the transformation frontier for a given policy instrument mix are represented by the right-hand side of expression (9). This is the ratio of the marginal contribution of a change in P_s to the performance measures F and C. Equilibrium is ensured by convexity of the political indifference curve (political support increases as a function of each group's economic welfare at a decreasing rate) and concavity of the transformation

function over the relevant range (i.e., PEST-imposed deadweight losses increase at an increasing rate with the distance from the competitive equilibrium in the absence of market failure).

The decision rule for P_s depends on four major groups of influences:

1. <u>Interest group size</u>.--The greater the relative membership of a group, the greater is the potential political support it has to offer. Although organizing and other costs may grow, the larger the group, the greater the influence in obtaining favorable outcomes through either voting or popularity polls.

2. <u>Government's preference structure</u>.--The preference across the interest groups, summarized in U_{s_f}/U_{s_c}, reflects the sociopolitical characteristics of the politicians (seniority, ideology, party affiliation, etc.) and the structure of the political process (bureaucracy's role, legislature versus executive agenda-setting rules, etc.).

3. <u>Economic well-being and political support</u>.--The relationship between the economic performance for each interest group and its corresponding political support is affected by geographical representation and the distribution of the burden and the benefits of alternative policy settings. A rural bias often develops with pluralism because the distribution (i.e., geographic concentration or diffuseness) of cost and benefits corresponds to the distribution of influence (Ferejohn and Rundquist, and Weingast <u>et al</u>.). Geographical representation in some nondemocratic, developing societies results in an urban bias. Lipton argues that the urban population is often strategically located to affect political support for authoritative regimes. In many instances, a wide dispersion of the cost burden and the concentration of benefits results in greater political response from the group to which PEST transfers are

made. This group receives greater per capita benefits and, hence, has more incentive to exercise influence and to be well informed on the effects of alternative policy settings (Downs).

4. <u>Transformation frontier among performance measures</u>.--The economic characteristics of supply and demand for the commodity or sector under examination is reflected in the transformation frontier. For example, in the context of raising producer prices, a higher Π_{P_s} (i.e., a more inelastic supply function) will result in a higher level of P_s. A lower food share in consumer's aggregate expenditure results in a lower V_{P_s} and, hence, a higher P_s. Higher consumer incomes lead to higher prices, the extent depending on the shape of the consumer utility function, the marginal utility of income, and the sensitivity of budget cost (reflected by G_{P_s}). Similarly, input cost increases affect positively the setting on PEST regulatory policies, the degree depending on the input substitution possibilities and the share of fixed costs.

The right-hand side of expression (9) also reflects the marginal deadweight loss of redistribution. In terms of a particular commodity market (where consumers bear the entire expenditure cost burden, $\lambda = 1$), if $n_f \Pi_{P_s} = 1$ and $Y_G G_{P_s} = -1$, then the deadweight loss is zero and a lump-sum, or decoupled income transfer, scheme is in place. The marginal excess burden (deadweight loss) of taxation is given by the term Y_G and depends on the <u>method</u> of taxation. From (9), the higher the deadweight loss for consumers/ taxpayers (producers), the lower (higher) the level of intervention P_s.

Several factors affecting redistribution's deadweight loss can be identified. A more elastic demand or supply results in a larger deadweight loss per unit of income transferred. Hence, a testable hypothesis is that products with inelastic demands, such as wheat and fluid milk, obtain more intervention

than more elastic products, such as beef or speciality crops. Furthermore, the domestic loss of transfer is higher for an exporter than for an importer. This differential is magnified if a country is "large" on world markets because exporters subsidizing production will reduce world prices, thereby exacerbating transfer costs. Large importers, on the other hand, may even improve their terms of trade. Hence, being an importer can facilitate the "efficiency" of redistribution. One expects, therefore, that levels of intervention will vary according to import versus export status of a commodity and according to whether the country is large or small in markets for a particular commodity. Note that the level of deadweight loss is affected by the policy instrument m. In fact, each of the terms on the right-hand side of (9) is conditional on the choice of instrument.

2.2. The Determination of PERTs (P_R, G_R)

A PERT policy shifts the opportunity set outward by reducing transactions costs and correcting for market failures. The new equilibrium's position depends on the source of the market failure, the characteristics of supply and demand, and the level and type of instruments used. Over some range of its provision, however, the welfare of both interest groups improve. Nonetheless, under some conditions, one group may lose as a result of P_R and/or G_R. One hypothesis regarding R&D underinvestment in agriculture is the following: an inelastic demand with $\lambda_R = 1$ (i.e., taxpayers financing G_R) results in a producer welfare loss compared to no intervention. Given that the political weight for the agriculture sector is greater than that for the consumer/taxpayers, public policy provides less R&D than is socially optimal. Nevertheless, the provision of some R&D still may harm farmers and benefit consumers/taxpayers. The latter group gains less than they would have obtained in the absence of political opposition and less than would be best for

society. When PESTs are introduced which benefit producers, however, they are more willing to allow more public investment in R&D. In essence, this mixture of PERTs and PESTs puts consumers in the position of compromising on the level of R&D (underinvesting) and bribing farmers through compensation schemes such as price supports so that the degree of underinvestment in R&D will be lessened.

Another example of such compensation is found with pesticide regulations that increase the cost of production. Government compensates with price-support payments. It chooses the level of pesticide regulation such that the marginal political benefit from consumers/taxpayers plus the marginal benefit from the agricultural sector in increasing price supports equals the marginal political cost from agriculture of regulation plus the marginal cost from the consumer/taxpayers in increasing price supports.

There are many possibilities for politically optimal mixtures of PEST and PERT policies. Unequal political weightings between interest groups plus the substitutability of policy types may well explain both the existence of PESTs and the underinvestment in PERTs.

2.3. The Determination of Policy Instrument Mix (m)

Governments face a joint discrete choice on the policy instrument mix (m). The formulation advanced here allows for political support to be conditional on the type of instrument employed. Define

$$\frac{dS_f}{dF} = \beta_{1m} \text{ and } \frac{dS_c}{dC} = \beta_{2m}$$

for $m = 1, \ldots, M$ instrument mixes. The common case in industrial countries is where $\beta_{1m} > \beta_{2m}$; hence, it follows that transfers are made to producers.

For example, consider a binary choice, $m = 1, 2$, where $\beta_{11} > \beta_{12}$, $\beta_{21} \lesseqgtr \beta_{22}$. It is quite possible in this case that an inefficient instrument will be chosen by the government. The transformation of economic welfare into political supportvaries across policy instrument types as does the deadweight loss per unit of income transferred from one sector to another. Government will choose the instrument mix, m, that corresponds to the optimal trade-off in political support; i.e., the trade-off between the loss in support due to the production inefficiency of the instrument and the gain in support due to the political efficiency of the instrument.

The β's may vary across instrument types because of voter ignorance or the concealment of policy effects. Politicians do not necessarily choose the efficient policy instrument just as they do not necessarily choose the social optimum level of P_R. This formulation on instrument choice does not assume a dichotomy between "means" and "ends." The transfer of income is often viewed as an objective or end. Here, however, it is the means to the ultimate objective, namely, maximizing the probability of reelection. Therefore, choosing the optimal setting on a PEST policy is not a separable process from choosing the instrument mix.

Characteristics of differing instruments include their visibility, their effect on marginal versus inframarginal voters, imperfect information (for both voters and politicians) regarding the distribution of social costs and differential information (between competing interest groups and/or the government). Many economically inefficient instruments sustain political power. An example of such a strategy in agriculture would be the choice of price supports over lump-sum transfers. Producer groups (and government) have emphasized food self-sufficiency, which appeals to the public's nationalistic or patriotic sentiments. Furthermore, direct income transfers would appear to be

a "welfare" payment and so would dramatically decrease political support from producers. Accordingly, farms and politicians provide selective information on the virtues of commodity policy to reach their objectives cooperatively.

In general, maximization of political support can result in greater dead-weight loss for a given level of income transfer. Even if $\beta_{21} > \beta_{22}$, it is not necessarily the case that politicians choose the most efficient instrument (m = 2) on its corresponding transformation frontier, depending on the relative size of β_{11} to β_{12}.

2.4. The Impact of Political Pressure L

The political support function is also affected by the level of pressure brought by each group. The level of pressure exerted is affected by the ability of a group to organize and control free-riding (Olson) as well as the relative efficiency of providing pressure (Becker). Becker's competition among pressure groups and relative influence model is captured by the impact of L_f and L_c in expressions (3) and (4). Pressure influences the outcome of PERT and PEST policies and the choice of instrument, m, independent of the other factors discussed affecting political support. Many authors argue that smaller groups result in more pressure (i.e., they may be more effective in L) but also note groups can lose in effectiveness through voting (or popularity poll) where small numbers are a detriment.

3. Extensions and Modification

Many countries' agricultural policies maintain distinctly different pro-ducer and consumer prices (Byerlee and Sain). In the foregoing framework, the number of interest groups may be expanded to include taxpayers as a separate group from consumers. Consider the case where the producer price P_1 is greater than the consumer price P_2, both of which are greater than the world

price P_w. Incorporating this into the foregoing model generates the following reaction functions:

$$(10) \qquad P_1^* = P_1^* (\overset{(-)}{P_2^*}, \overset{(+)}{Y}, \overset{(+)}{w}, \overset{(+)}{P_w})$$

$$(11) \qquad P_2^* = P_2^* (\overset{(-)}{P_1^*}, \overset{(+)}{Y}, \overset{(+)}{P_w}).$$

where the arithmetic signs above the variables represent their effects on prices. In equation (11) an increase in the producer price P_1^* increases profits and taxpayer budget costs such that P_2^* declines to compensate consumers. In this fashion, the marginal conditions for a political equilibrium is maintained in the balancing of producer, consumer, and taxpayer economic welfare.

If substitutes in supply and demand are prevalent, then the reaction functions (10) and (11) must be expanded to include substitute-supply prices and substitute-demand prices, respectively. In the case of supply, changes in the substitute price has a positive effect on the government-controlled price because an increase in opportunity cost is similar to an increase in input costs. An increase in the substitute price in demand will harm consumers, and a lower controlled consumer price will compensate.

Assuming a "small" country, the above analysis is symmetric for an importer and exporter with $P_w \gtreqless P_2 \gtreqless P_1$. The relaxation of this assumption, where policies affect the terms of trade (i.e., P_w is endogenous), will change the level and distributions of welfare benefits. For example, a large importer can manipulate prices such that domestic welfare improves with much, or all, of the budget costs recovered through tariff revenue or quota rents. This

facilitates domestic income transfer schemes. On the other hand, an exporter's price policies that affect world price will transfer welfare to the rest of the world.[3]

In some countries, transaction costs are quite different for distinct groups (e.g., larger farmers, smaller farmers, processors, exporters, high-income consumers, low-income consumers, taxpayers as distinct from consumers, etc.). Much insight can be gained by extending the framework to multiple interest groups. The generalization to N interest groups and any number of external shocks, and including multiple supply and demand substitutes, can be formalized using game theory (Harsanyi, Zusman). Using the axiomatic framework advanced by Thomson and Friedman, a formal model of the bargaining process among interest groups, including an autonomous government, can be shown to lead to the governing criterion function. In essence, the weighted objective function of the revealed preference model is a corollary of the co-operative game solution in which the weights express the bargaining power of alternative interest groups.[4]

4. Concluding Remarks

The dynamic path of agricultural markets is often highly distorted by governmental intervention. Internal country distortions, as well as their spillover effects on world markets, are driven by the implementation of PEST policies. These PEST policies are combined with PERT policies, and the resulting mix reflects the "governing criterion" function and the equilibrium conditions in political economic markets of each country. The selection and implementation of various policy instruments may be represented as rational decision rules which form the basis for endogenous policy determination.

Numerous research hypotheses can be derived from the simple partial framework advanced in this paper. Many perspectives can be taken in analyzing endogenous government behavior, including the structural form, the constraint structure form, the policy reaction function form, and the governing criterion function form. For each of these perspectives, we as a profession have a long road to travel. This road will be full of detours--some contrived, some wasteful, some unanticipated, some insightful. If we fail to travel this path, the opportunities for institutional reform of agricultural policies throughout the world will be dramatically diminished. The current pressures for agricultural reform will prove insufficient unless political economic considerations are squarely addressed. If these considerations are confronted explicitly, the probability of significant reform will be enhanced. Political economic conditions in various countries can be effectively altered through (i) transparency and the reduction of information cost related to current policy; (ii) partial compensation schemes of those who lose from the transition to a new policy and are based on the governing criterion function; and (iii) the introduction of new institutions that will enhance the credibility of government reform actions and facilitate the maintenance of reforms once they have occurred.

Footnotes

[1]Benchley's Law of Distinction is relevant in determining the appropriate number of economic interest groups: "There are two kinds of people in this world; those who believe the world can be divided into two kinds of people and those who don't."

[2]Note that L_f and L_c are not functions of the regulatory policies. In particular, optimality requires (dF/dP) $(dP/dL_f) = 1$; (dC/dP) $(dP/dL_c) = -1$.

[3]Hence, it should be no surprise that the levels of intervention are higher, ceteris paribus, in Japan versus the United States, or that the degree of intervention in the EC has moderated somewhat in the 1980s as they switched from being an importer to that of an exporter.

[4]The game theoretic formulation seeks the solution that maximizes the Nash product modified to include some reference point g, i.e.,

$$\prod_{i=1}^{n} [V_i - g(\cdot)_i]$$

where $V = (V_1, V_2, \ldots, V_n)$ is an element of the payoff set and one agrument of $g(\cdot)$ is the conflict point. Following Thomson, the solutions to this problem may be based on reference points where each interest group is presumed to compare the proposed payoff not only to the conflict payoffs but also to other potential payoffs called reference points. Specifically, if the payoff set is compact and convex, the following conditions are necessary and sufficient for defining a solution:

$$H(V_1^*, V_2^*, \ldots, V_n^*, Z) = 0$$

$$a(Z)_i [V_i^* - g(\cdot)_i] = a(Z)_j [V_j^* - g(\cdot)_j], \text{ for all } i, j$$

where $a(Z)_i$ is the derivative of H with respect to V_i evaluated at V*; H is the frontier of the payoff set. The $a(Z)_i$ represent the bargaining power coefficients of the n interest groups. They are normalized such that they sum to one. It can be shown that maximizing the above Nash product is equivalent to maximizing the following weighted sum of performance measures

$$\text{Max}[a(Z)_1 \ V_1 + a(Z)_2 \ V_2 + \ldots a(Z)_n \ V_n]$$

which is nothing more than the governing criterion function.

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