UC Berkeley

Despite being illegal, prostitution is rampant in China today. Millions of women work in the sex industry, responding to high demand from the male population. Sex workers and clients span all social classes, from poor migrants to college students and elite officials. The phenomenon is ubiquitous throughout rural and urban areas. In acknowledging the disconnect between the legal status of prostitution and its prevalence, thoughtful experts on China generally assume that the state turns a blind eye to prostitution. They note the economic advantages of a vibrant sex industry, and underscore the extent to which individual officials and local agencies actually participate in the business of prostitution. These observers are correct to note the financial benefits of prostitution to the Chinese economy. Yet they fail in assuming state complacency vis-à-vis prostitution. Instead, my research uncovers the existence of an active and complex regulatory dynamic both between, and amongst, various Chinese authorities and actors within the sex industry.

In this study of state control of the market for sex in China, I uncover the state’s three approaches to prostitution: law enforcement, public health, and as a source of economic development. This detailed depiction of the state’s multifaceted regulatory interventions into the sex industry highlights the question of how these frequently conflicting policies coexist in practice. More specifically, how does the state simultaneously uphold policing policies that lead sex workers to shy away from the state and hide their involvement in prostitution for fear of arrest, and health policies that, to work effectively, require sex workers to openly disclose to state actors that they sell sex? How does it reconcile commercial policies whose goal is to allow the state to benefit from a thriving sex industry, with law enforcement regulations aimed at abolishing prostitution? Through an observation of actual enforcement patterns, I show that the answer to these questions varies based on tier of prostitution, and whether the state is targeting the low-tier (“whores”), middle-tier (“hostesses”), or elite (“honeys”) parts of the sex industry.

By uncovering these tier-based enforcement patterns, I find that the Chinese authorities are not actually implementing policies to best achieve their stated goals surrounding prostitution: reducing both its occurrence, and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS. Instead, they make enforcement decisions around prostitution that prioritize both economic growth and social stability—the cornerstones of the Chinese Communist Party’s strategy for maintaining power. They prioritize economic growth by taxing the entertainment venues that harbor prostitution activities, and the women who work in them. They also refrain from aggressive policing of those venues, instead channeling their law enforcement efforts towards the lowest class of sex workers, who contribute minimally to the overall economy of the sex industry. They prioritize social stability by allowing for the existence of a thriving sex industry, rather than aggressively enforcing anti-prostitution laws in ways that would significantly reduce the availability of sex for purchase. They further address public order concerns tied to prostitution by funneling it off of the streets and into venues, where it becomes less visible. This strategy also facilitates the control of prostitution’s negative externalities, which the police can efficiently access and control when prostitution occurs in one space surrounded by numerous third parties who can report violence and other issues. The decision to prioritize economic growth and social stability comes at the expense of effectively carrying out the state’s official policing and public health goals around prostitution.