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groups to "Listen! Study! Discuss! Act!" and supplied them with information on how to solve their problems. Coady, a powerful orator, inspired people by telling them that they could do "ten times what you think you can." He urged consumers to use their buying power to make merchants responsive and accountable to their needs. Since 1959, the Coady International Institute has taught over 5,000 learners from developing nations how to tackle problems of poverty and exclusion.

Cross-References

- ► Cooperatives and Employee Ownership
- ► Credit Unions
- ► Tompkins, James John, Rev.

References/Further Readings

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Coalitions and Networks

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Introduction

Coalitions are partnerships among distinct actors that coordinate action in pursuit of shared goals. But what distinguishes them from other kinds of partnerships? The term is widely used to describe joint ventures in a wide range of arenas, most notably in international geopolitics or political party competition and governance. The literature on coalitions is dominated by discussions of war and peace, election campaigns, and parliamentary dynamics. Just as in war or politics, successful collective action in civil society often depends on the formation and survival of coalitions – insofar as the whole is often greater than the sum of the parts.

Definition

In a review of the political science literature on "coalition theory and government formation," Strøm and Nyblade define coalitions more broadly as "a team of individuals or groups that unites for a common purpose" (2007: 782). Yet this formulation is so broad that it could describe most forms of collective action – and hence fall prey to "conceptual stretching" (Sartori, 1984). Clearly, coalitions involve collective action, but they involve collaboration between actors that remain distinct in some way (in contrast, for example, to fusion or a merger). Downs offers a more precise definition of coalition: "when two or more political groups or actors agree to pursue some common objective(s), pool resources . . . and actively communicate during joint action" (2008). He suggests that one of the most challenging questions involve the conditions under which adversaries sometimes cooperate.

Many approaches to coalitions refer to interest-based collaboration involving instrumental behavior, often within a limited time horizon, in pursuit of tangible goals (e.g., to win a war, an election, or to pass legislation). From the viewpoint of civil society analysis, however, many actors that form coalitions are also value-based in their orientation. These values may well conflict with some of the instrumental behaviors and power imbalances that often characterize, for example, short-term campaigns. This latter view of coalition does not resonate with the verb to coalesce, which implies growing together – but it raises one of the main issues that arises when considering coalitions and alliances (a widely used synonym).

One of the main challenges involved in defining coalitions is how to distinguish them from networks. Among the many definitions of network, few are tailored to civil society actors. Keck and Sikkink's classic study offers a succinct formulation: "[N]etworks are forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange" (1998: 8). Both coalitions and networks vary empirically in terms of their respective degrees of centralization or decentralization. For organizational theorists, who distinguish networks from markets and hierarchies, coalitions would refer to a form of network. For civil society actors, coalitions refer to networks that are engaged in joint action. As Keck put it, "coalitions are networks in action mode" (cited in Fox, 2002).

Key Issues

Coalitions Are Distinct from Networks and Movements

In practice, civil society discussions often use the term coalition interchangeably with movements and networks. Yet the three terms are not synonyms, and for analytical purposes it is useful to distinguish between them. Movements are always grounded in social networks,

though only some networks generate movements (Diani & McAdam, 2003). In the process, labels can be confusing – some dense coalitions refer to themselves as networks. Some thin networks refer to themselves as coalitions. Some coalitions of disparate actors describe themselves as movements, overstating their degree of cohesion and shared collective identity; on the other hand, some movements may express themselves as coalitions of organizations. Meanwhile, the global justice movement has been described as a "movement of movements" (e.g., Sen et al., 2004).

One way to frame the distinction between networks, coalitions, and movements is to consider each term as referring to a different point along a continuum of varying degrees of organizational density and social cohesion. This approach provides a useful lens for disentangling the various strands that come together in the "thickening" of civil society (Fox, 1996). Moreover, transnational coalitions face challenges that are similar to those faced by domestic coalitions – especially insofar as they cross class, gender, or racial boundaries (Bandy & Smith, 2005: 7).

Both networks and coalitions involve interconnected systems of communication, grounding the emergence of a transnational public sphere. Yet while many networks involve shared *goals* among their participants, they do not necessarily involve joint *action*. Whether networks are face-to-face or virtual, they involve exchanges of information, experiences, and expressions of solidarity. *Sometimes* these exchanges generate networks of ongoing relationships. *Sometimes* these networks generate the shared goals, mutual trust, and understanding needed to form coalitions capable of collaborating on specific campaigns. But networks do not necessarily coordinate their actions, nor do they necessarily come to agreement on specific joint actions (as implied by the concept of coalition).

Transnational movements are, in turn, distinct from both networks and coalitions. Movements imply a high degree of shared collective identity, for example, yet neither networks nor coalitions necessarily involve significant horizontal exchange between participants. Indeed, many rely on a handful of interlocutors to manage relationships between broad-based social organizations that may have relatively little awareness of the nature and actions of their counterparts. At the same time, some transnational movements achieve such a high degree of shared symbolism and collective identity that active members can identify strongly with each other in spite of very limited actual contact – as in the emblematic case of the anti-apartheid movement of in the 1970s and 1980s. For a paradigmatic contemporary coalition of transnational social movements, in which NGOs play a strictly support role, consider the Via Campesina experience (e.g., Borras et al., 2008; Desmarias, 2007).

The concept of transnational social movements suggest a much higher degree of density and much more cohesion than is involved in networks or coalitions. The more precise term "transnational movement organization" suggests an organized membership base that is present in more than one country, as in the case of diasporic movements of organized migrants, or transnational federations that have organized affiliates (not just employees) in multiple countries, such as Amnesty International, Catholics for Choice, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and Oxfam. The term transnational is stressed here to avoid confusion with the term "international NGO," which is often misapplied to NGOs that are fundamentally national but are involved in international activities.

Note that underscoring these distinctions between various degrees of density does not imply any judgment that more cooperation is necessarily better. On the contrary, realistic expectations about what is possible are critical to sustain any kind of collective action. Indeed, cross-border cooperation involves significant costs and risks that must be taken into account, depends heavily on finding both appropriate counterparts with whom to cooperate, and needs shared targets to inspire joint action (Fox, 2002; Khagram et al., 2002). As Table 1 suggests, transnational civil society exchanges *can* produce networks, which *can* produce coalitions, which *can* produce movements.

Distinguishing between networks, coalitions, and movements helps to avoid blurring political differences and power imbalances *within* what may appear from the outside to be implicitly more homogeneous transnational movements. As Keck and Sikkink point out, transnational networks face the challenge of developing a "common frame of meaning" in spite of cross-cultural differences (1998: 7). In practice, such shared meanings are socially constructed through joint action and mutual understanding rather than merely through professed values and goals. Political differences within transnational networks are also not to be underestimated, in spite of apparently shared goals. Even those transnational networks that *appear* to share basic political-cultural values, such as environmental, feminist, indigenous, or human rights movements, often consist of actors who have very different, quite nationally distinct political visions, goals, and cultures. At the same time, national borders are not the only ones. For example, ecologists or feminists from different countries who share systemic critiques may have

Coalitions and Networks. Table 1 Transnational civil society networks, coalitions, and movements

Shared characteristics	Transnational networks	Transnational coalitions	Transnational movement organizations
Exchange of information and experiences	Shared	Shared	Shared
Organized social base	Some have bases, others do not	Some have bases, others do not	Counterparts have bases
Mutual support	Sometimes shared, from afar and sometimes strictly discursive	Shared	Shared
Material interests	Not necessarily shared	Sometimes shared	Sometimes shared
Joint actions & campaigns	Sometimes loose coordination	Shared, based on mutually agreed goals, often short-term, tactical	Shared, based on shared long-term strategy
Ideologies	Not necessarily shared	Not necessarily shared	Usually shared
Collective identities and political cultures	Often not shared	Often not shared	Shared political values, repertoires, and identities

Shading illustrates suggested degree of relationship density and cohesion

more in common with their cross-border counterparts than they do with the more moderate wings of their respective national movements.

Networks Often Need Shared Targets to Become Coalitions

As Edelman notes, "networks beget networks" (2004). Yet one of the distinctive characteristics of network activity is "its dual quality as both a means to an end and an end in itself" (Riles, 2001: 51, cited in Edelman, 2004). Coalitions, in contrast, are much more likely to be means to an end. This distinction raises the question of the conditions under which networks become coalitions, in the sense of sustaining joint action among members. The interest-based principle of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" may be enough to account for coalition formation among nation-states or political parties, but is often not sufficient to account for collaboration between civil society actors.

Shared political ideologies certainly facilitate coalition formation, but are not a precondition – indeed, coordination between actors of differing ideologies distinguishes coalitions from movements, which involve shared worldviews and collective identities. What role, then, does ideology play in bringing together otherwise diverse actors? The menu of civil society ideologies shared across borders has changed over time, from the primary role played by religious, Cold War, and anticolonial worldviews in the mid and late twentieth century to now also include environmentalism, feminism, indigenous rights, and human rights, among others. Arguably, epistemic communities – transnational networks that share technical scientific, or professional worldviews – might also be seen as being grounded in shared ideologies (Haas, 1992). Like other transnationally shared worldviews, their adherents include policy makers as well as civil society actors.

In practice, apparently global ideologies are locally appropriated in distinct ways. As a result, few ideologies are shared homogeneously by social actors in different countries. Political Islam would be one of the most prominent contemporary examples. The notion of shared ideology goes far beyond shared goals, to include comprehensive visions of desirable futures, based on political cultures and values. In short, since ideologies are rooted in political cultures, few are shared across borders. Sometimes collaborative experiences can generate shared political values, cultures, and ideologies, but that level of unity is the result of the process of joint action, not the starting point. To explain most cross-border civil society partnerships, therefore, one must look beyond shared ideologies.

Shared targets are key, though not all shared targets are either obvious or predetermined. Shared threats are the clearest candidate, as in the notable case of emblematic bearers of economic globalization, such as the WTO, the World Bank or NAFTA (e.g., Bandy & Smith, 2005; Edwards & Gaventa, 2001; Fox & Brown, 1998; Fox, 2002, 2005; Khagram et al., 2002). Shared targets can also be "politically constructed" – as in the case of efforts to build cross-border partnerships for fair trade. Shared targets are especially relevant for coalition building because they create opportunities for joint action – thus transcending expressions of solidarity to actively pursue shared goals. Yet shared targets do not necessarily provoke coalition formation. For a notable example, the US war in Indochina provoked protest in countries all over the world, yet

there was little coordination between national antiwar movements.

Civil Society Networks and Coalitions Are Based on Interests as Well as Ideas

Transnational advocacy networks are defined "largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation" (Keck & Sikkink, 1998: 1). Indeed, many cross-border civil society relationships are motivated by shared worldviews. Other analysts claim that interests predominate, and characterize North–South civil society relationships as driven by competition in a "global morality market" (Bob, 2005: 4). In this view, well-endowed international NGOs provide the supply of support, while a myriad of local causes constitute the demand. In the context of this power imbalance, Bob argues that principles are insufficient to account for international NGOs' choice of "clients," and that they have "strong incentives to devote themselves to the challenger whose profile most closely matches their own requirements" (2005: 5). Bob's framework is undermined by its assumption that the global marketplace of civil society issues is inherently fixed – if it could grow, then competition for support would not be a zero-sum conflict, as he suggests.

In the context of the previous focus on shared targets as grounding the joint action associated with coalitions, one question is whether those targets are chosen based on ideas or interests. Moreover, coalition partners may share targets but bring different motivations, especially when coalitions reach across borders, classes, ideologies, or cultures (Rose, 2000). The 1999 labor–environmental coalition that protested the WTO in Seattle was a classic case. Further probing suggests that the "ideas vs. interests" frame for explaining the motivations of collective action is often a false dichotomy. For example, while human rights activists are certainly driven by strongly held values, many frontline rights defenders are also acting in *self*-defense – in the immediate interest of themselves and their communities. Conversely, the defense of worker rights – which for exploited workers is clearly grounded in self-interest, is also a value-based cause, often for those same workers. Consider a classic slogan from the early twentieth-century US labor movement: "An injury to one is an injury to all." This idea is intended to convince people that self-interest is broadly defined, thereby challenging the dichotomy between ideas and interests. One of the main characteristics of sustained coalitions is that each party's *self-interest* comes to be redefined through collective action, reciprocity, and deepened mutual understanding to create a broader sense of shared, *common interests.*

Both Keck and Sikkink, and Bob concur that the different parties to cross-border civil society relationships are strategic in the framing, the content, and the targeting of their campaigns. Both approaches recognize power imbalances within North–South coalitions. Indeed, studies of domestic civil society campaigns would find analogous imbalances between national capitals and the provinces. Hertel's study takes the discussion one step further in her study of the North–South tensions within transnational coalitions (2006). Her study of two human rights campaigns underscores the different repertoires that "receiving-end activists" use to either block or modulate Northern-led campaigns that are ostensibly on their behalf.

Another approach to disentangling ideas and interests within coalitions involves distinguishing between coalitions that are issue-based, versus those that are constituency-based. In other words, some coalitions are driven by campaigning for or against a specific goal (or target), while others are based on the recognition that different actors share similar interests – without necessarily assuming a predetermined shared goal. The latter approach involves a coming together of *counterparts*, which are defined as actors that share similar social locations and political challenges in their respective societies (Fox, 2002). For example, while indigenous rights activists from around the world come from unique cultures, with their own distinctive histories of struggle, many face analogous dynamics of social and political exclusion.

Sustainable Coalitions Require Clear Terms of Engagement

Coalitions, insofar as they involve coordinated action in pursuit of shared goals, are most sustainable when grounded in shared *terms of engagement* – such as the principle that each party should "agree to disagree" about a wide range of issues outside the scope of the coalition's goals. More generally, realistic expectations are key. Yet many dimensions of mutual engagement often receive little explicit attention. For example, it is often a challenge to develop mechanisms for mutual accountability and transparency. Indeed, to the degree that civil society coalitions bring together disparate actors, they will have different expectations and definitions of mutual accountability (e.g., Jordan & Van Tuijl, 2006).

Balanced decision-making processes are especially difficult to construct, especially across cultural and organizational divides. Who decides how representative each actor is? In a single membership organization, a one person, one vote principle is straightforward, but how is representation to be allocated in coalitions that include membership organizations of different sizes? If a simple majority rule were to

always prevail, then organizations with smaller memberships and different ideas would feel excluded and have little incentive to participate. If the larger organizations see a need to keep the smaller ones onboard, for example, to ensure more ideological breadth or ethnic diversity, then they may well accept a one organization–one vote principle (e.g., the Congress for a People's Agrarian Reform in the Philippines in the late 1980s). Similarly, how is decision-making power to be allocated in coalitions that are composed of NGOs, which may be of varying sizes, or have degrees of commitment to the campaign? Multi-sectoral coalitions also face this challenge, especially if they combine NGOs and broad-based membership organizations – each with very different political cultures and concepts of representation (e.g., the Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras, on the US–Mexican border). The terms of engagement underlying coalitions are also complicated by the role of money. Access to resources often shapes an organization's capacity to sustain participation in coalitions – especially across distances. In some cases, under the influence of external funders, coalitions only exist because of access to resources.

Sustainable Multi-sectoral Coalitions Depend on Cross-Cultural Interlocutors

Shared goals and targets are often not enough to sustain coalitions. Given the limitless possibilities for misunderstanding and conflict in coalitions which bring diverse actors together, cross-cultural interlocutors that can bridge the gaps between them are key. They are the "synapses" and "relays" that make communication possible. Tarrow calls them "rooted cosmopolitans" (2005). They must play the role of translator, both in the linguistic and the conceptual sense – in order to help each actor understand where the others are coming from. These communication skills are also crucial for establishing trust, insofar as by entering into a coalition, actors must trust their new partners to avoid actions that would put them at risk through guilt by association. To play this linking role, these interlocutors require both cultural capital and social capital. In the language of social capital, coalitions embody bridging social capital. In this context, the cross-cultural interlocutors are actors that play this bridging role. These interlocutors apply the glue that undergirds the "strength of weak ties" (Granovetter, 1973).

Transnational Coalitions Are Long-Term Investments with Uncertain Payoffs

Networks that do more than exchange information from afar require human and material resources. Coalitions, because of their higher levels of coordination and joint action, require even more resources to sustain (Fox, 2002). Less well-endowed groups must carefully weigh the trade-offs involved in transnational engagement. Aside from the travel costs and carbon footprint, every week that an activist spends in another country is a week not spent organizing on the ground at home. Yet private foundations are often more willing to fund international travel than grassroots organizing.

Coalitions can also involve certain risks, insofar as one set of partners may or may not consult before making decisions that could be politically costly for the other. Local struggles that overestimate their international allies' clout can pay a high price, as in the Ogoni case in the mid-1990s (Bob, 2005). On the positive side, investments in networks and coalitions often generate social capital, which can produce often unpredictable multiplier effects. But precisely because the empowering effects are difficult to assess, investments in coalitions compete with much more pressing demands, and with alternative investments that promise more immediate results. This calculus underscores the political economy foundations of coalitional engagement that can keep grassroots movements and NGOs apart. Grassroots movements are under pressure to deliver tangible results to their bases in the near term, while large NGOs can afford to make longer-term investments with uncertain results.

International Perspectives

The resonance of terms like coalition and network differ across social and linguistic contexts. Their meanings often must be politically constructed, especially in societies with strong legacies of centralized, vertical forms of social organization. In the history of Mexican civil society, for example, long before electoral democratization, grassroots movements challenged the dominant corporatist form of aggregating membership organizations (literally called *centrales*). In response, local movements of the urban poor, peasants, teachers, and other workers forged linkages across regions permitting joint action without sacrificing their autonomy. These coalitions were called *coordinadoras* – literally "coordinating bodies" (Fox & Hernández, 1992). Meanwhile, NGO activists in Mexico were adopting the term "*red*" – a term that not only means network, but also net. As civil society strategist Gustavo Esteva pointed out, however – before the Internet – nets can be used to capture things (1987). Those zealous of defending their autonomy were wary of being ensnared – even in relationships that were supposedly horizontal. In response, in an effort to describe the kind of flexible mutual support, joint action and horizontal relationships that respect the autonomy of

each participant, Esteva proposed the alternative term: hammock. Hammocks are flexible, they adapt to each participant's particulars, they are portable, and are available as needed.

Future Directions

Much of the literature on coalitions in general is relevant to understanding the dynamics that are specific to civil society actors. Yet the broader discussion tends to focus on coalition formation and maintenance – and much less on the question of under what conditions coalitions reach their goals. For political party coalitions, for example, the goal is straightforward – retaining institutional power. Civil society coalition goals are often quite different – for example, their strategies often attempt to influence the behavior of other actors, such as states, international organizations or private firms, whose actions in turn would either do less harm or more good. The various links in this causal chain complicate efforts to explain the impacts of civil society campaigns.

Coalition partners may also differ over what kinds of impact count. For some, changing the terms of debate or official policies in national or international arenas may be the key battles, yet such victories often translate with great difficulty into tangible improvements on the ground. In some cases, local–global coalitions may win policy victories that only apply to future decisions, leaving the local partners still subjected to the results of past decisions that are not reopened (e.g., Clark et al., 2003). Coalition partners may also assess partial victories differently, depending on whether they have minimalist or maximalist expectations – and on whom they represent. International campaigners may declare victory and move on, while local organizers still face the task of making limited concessions meaningful at the community level.

These differences over how to assess impacts reflect the broader challenge of addressing cultural, ideological, and interest-based differences within coalitions. In this context, leadership certainly plays a key role in encouraging the shared vision, mutual understanding, and respect for difference that are all required to keep disparate actors working together. Deep down, however, where one stands depends on where one sits.

Cross-References

- ▶ Accountability
- ▶ Amnesty International
- ▶ Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice
- ▶ Collective Action
- ▶ Friends of the Earth
- ▶ Global Civil Society
- ▶ Greenpeace
- ▶ International Campaign to Ban Landmines
- ▶ Jubilee 2000
- ▶ Oxfam International
- ▶ Shack/Slum-dwellers International
- ▶ World Social Forum
- ▶ World Trade Organization

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Codes of Ethics and Codes of Practice

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Introduction

Codes of ethics and codes of practice are found everywhere from nonprofit organizations, to professional and trade associations and to large multinationals (Wood & Rimmer, 2003). These have inspired worldwide an extensive body of research, mainly in business ethics literature. Most studies focus on American codes, but in the last two decades, a steady increase of literature on codes in other countries can be observed. In the course of history, a wide range of publicized scandals in government, business, social work agencies, universities, and other types of organizations have raised concerns about ethical behavior. The scandals each time have invoked a rise in popularity of codes, with the intention to visibly express corporate values and, as such, to guide the ethical behavior of employees, companies, or professions. The use of codes assists corporate and professional organizations in their ongoing relationship with society and helps them to balance their pursuit of autonomy and the public's demand for accountability (Frankel, 1989; Higgs-Kleyn & Kapelianis, 1999). Modern organizations are allowed to pursue their mission and goals in return for accountability to shareholders/stakeholders and, in a lesser extent, to the wider public. The nonprofit sector generally is conceived of as a "do-good sector"; without civil society organizations, many important social issues would go unaddressed. Despite its better reputation with regard to its ethics, in recent years, this sector is found to be no different from the public and private sectors (Ethics Resource Center, 2008). In part, this might be explained by the observation that in confronting with resource scarcity and as they age, nonprofit organizations become more bureaucratic and tend to adopt practices and goals that follow the fashions of their institutional fields rather than the logical dictates of their mission and core values (Rothschild & Milofsky, 2006, p. 138). Interestingly enough, this has not inspired a thread of research on codes of ethics and codes of practice from a civil society perspective.

Definition

Codes of ethics and codes of practice are often used as synonyms, referring to their shared purported purpose, i.e., to articulate behavioral standards valued by an organization (c.f. Canary & Jennings, 2008, p. 265). They also appear under a variety of other names, such as codes of conduct, business codes, integrity codes, codes of honor, voluntary agreements, guidelines, and recommendations (Kaptein, 2004; Kaptein & Schwartz, 2007). For the purposes of this entry code, definitions are derived from the Dictionary of Civil Society, Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector. A code of ethics is defined as

- a statement of principles established by an organization and used to influence the professional conduct of its staff and members. Such a code of ethics is typically developed by a professional body or trade association, monitored by that body, and enforced by it, especially in field for which little or no governmental regulation is in place. In general, members must adhere to these rules and regulations in order to remain in good standing with the organization. (Anheier & List, 2005, p. 57)

A code of practice is

- an agreement among members of a professional association, umbrella group, or a single organization, in which they agree to act in a certain way. Such codes are typically developed in professions or trades that are not regulated by a governmental institution. (Anheier & List, 2005, p. 58)

Some scholars distinguish a code of practice from a code of conduct. A code of conduct is defined as a practical document of standards governing client relationship, and a code of practice, as a technical document setting standards for the members of a profession. The definition of a code of practice used in this entry encompasses both types of documents.

Both definitions of Anheier and List refer to the involvement of a professional or trade association, which