UC San Diego

This dissertation concerns the ways to detect electoral manipulation, even when we are not able to rely on the observable characteristics of a particular election. Chapter 1 provides the motivation of the project and the literature if builds on. Chapter 2 models the allocation of resources for corruption in competitive elections. The results of the model illustrate the conditions for parties to engage in corruption and the situations in which electoral manipulation does define the outcome. Chapter 3 discusses the limitations of the most common forensic tools. Given the growing use of these techniques to evaluate the quality of the elections, I propose a way to analyze when and how each technique is found beneficial. Chapter 4 introduces a novel technique to detect electoral irregularities while analyzing the 2010 gubernatorial elections in Mexico. I propose a novel empirical strategy to detect electoral fraud, which exploits a feature of the country's electoral code: within each electoral precinct, voters are assigned to polling stations according to their childhood surnames; consequently, the only difference between the voters at contiguous polling stations should be their last names. Chapter 5 extends the analysis of chapters 3 and 4 to evaluate both the 2008 recall referendum in Bolivia and the 2012 presidential elections in Mexico and Venezuela. These elections have been surrounded by suspicion of electoral fraud, yet the existing evidence supporting those beliefs has been inconclusive. The findings for Mexico and Venezuela show no strong evidence of electoral manipulation. Meanwhile, the results in Bolivia confirm what both the media reports and the political opposition claim