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Author
Gilliam, Franklin D., Jr.

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by

Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr.

University of California
Los Angeles

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., Assistant Professor of Political Science at UCLA, specializes in the areas of mass political attitudes and behavior. His published work appears in such journals as Social Science Quarterly, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Public Opinion, and Government and Policy. His most recent research focuses on race and socio-political participation.

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THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY:
RACIAL AND ETHNIC MASS ATTITUDES IN CALIFORNIA

FRANKLIN D. GILLIAM, JR.
University of California, Los Angeles

It is hardly debatable that race and ethnicity play a critical role in American society and politics (Myrdal 1944; Dahl 1972). Even in the face of myriad civil rights laws at the state, local, and federal levels, racial and ethnic inequalities persist (Wilson 1987). This condition is compounded by the fact that America is undergoing significant changes in terms of its ethnic and racial composition (Glazer 1985; Kitano and Daniels 1988). Recent estimates suggest that non-Hispanic Whites will cease to be a numerical majority sometime in the early 21st century and that the state of California is at the forefront of this trend (Bouvier and Gardener 1986).

One of the more fundamental questions about the dynamics of ethnic diversity concerns its impact on American politics. Social scientists have tended to concentrate on the behavioral aspects between and among the various American racial and ethnic groups. Thus there is ample literature on Black political participation (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1984; Danigelis 1978; 1982; Gilliam and Bobo 1988; Gutterbock and London 1983; Jackson 1987; London and Hearn 1977; Miller 1982; Olsen 1970; Shingles 1981; and Verba and Nie 1972). There has also been work done comparing the participation levels and styles of Blacks and Mexican-Americans (Antunes and Gaitz 1975; Lovrich and Marenin 1976). Moreover, in the last ten or so years some research has focused solely on Mexican-American participatory behavior (Buehler 1977; Flores 1986; MacManus and Cassel 1982; Welch 1977; Welch, Comer and Steinman 1975). Most recently, studies have begun to emerge which examine participatory behavior among Asian-Americans (Nakanishi 1986) and which analyze differential participation rates and styles among several racial and ethnic minorities (Uhlaner, Cain and Kiewiet 1987). The social science literature on race and ethnicity, however, has been conspicuously silent on the consequences of ethnic diversity for mass orientations toward politics.[1]

The central focus of this paper is on the extent to which racial and ethnic differences account for variations in mass political attitudes. In other words, are group differences manifest as differential policy preferences both between and within groups? To answer this question, I analyze attitudinal divergence among Whites, Blacks, Mexican-Americans, and several Asian-American groups in the state of California. I begin by reviewing three theoretical perspectives on cultural integration in the United States. After a brief discussion of data and methodological issues, I utilize multivariate regression models to test hypotheses generated by the literature.

'There is a rich literature, of course, on racial attitudes (see Schuman, Steeh and Bobo 1985; Sears 1988); Black public opinion (see Gilliam and Whitby 1987); as well as some new work on Mexican-Americans and public opinion (see de la Garza 1987). These studies, however, do not focus on differences among the various American minority groups.

PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN CULTURAL INTEGRATION

Given that America is a country primarily populated by immigrants, a great deal of attention has been afforded to the ways in which racial and ethnic groups become "Americanized." One commonly held view is associated with the terms assimilation, linear acculturation, and the "melting pot" (Glazer 1985). The basic premise of this perspective is that over time minority group members take on the values, attitudes, and behaviors of the "host" culture. Gordon (1964) maintains that the temporal element of the model is characterized by different stages in the assimilative process. Our interest is in cultural assimilation which stresses the importance of taking on the lifestyle features of the "host" culture (e.g., dress, food, music, attitudes, beliefs, etc.). In terms of political attitudes, cultural assimilation predicts that if group differences exist at all they will be rather small. Factors such as social class, therefore, are believed to represent the most significant cleavages in American society (Cox 1948; Ransford 1977; Wilson 1978).

A second paradigm, used to account for cultural integration, focuses upon the rich ethnic and racial heterogeneity of the United States. Reacting to the shortcomings of structural-functional approaches scholars turned their attention to understanding the critical qualities of "plural societies" (Furnival 1948). The starting point of this perspective is that significant aspects of racial or ethnic culture remain discrete although there is some acceptance of the basic laws and structures of the host culture. In other words, a common culture exists at base but individual cultural groups maintain their own primary relationships and social, political and economic institutions. Cultural pluralism occurs when groups maintain distinctive attitudes, values, and beliefs while sharing some basic concerns with the wider society. Politically, the attitudinal manifestation of cultural pluralism should be observably distinct group differences.

A third perspective on cultural integration begins from the premise that the existence of group differences in mass attitudes is a function of the type of issue under consideration. For lack of a better term I label this model the group content approach. This idea begins with the assumption that the historical treatment of American racial and ethnic minorities and the persistence of inequality sets their experience apart from the wider culture. Therefore, there are some issues which are inherently connected to minority group interests. From this perspective we should expect group differences when the policies in question have "group content."[2] The basic notion here is that the more group interests are impinged by public policies, the more likely cultural pluralism will exist. Conversely, the less public policies are related to group interests, the more likely group members are to exhibit characteristics of cultural assimilation.

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2. I have more carefully laid out the theoretical elements of the group content model elsewhere (Gilliam 1988). In that paper I analyze Blacks and try to demonstrate that some issues have direct bearing on the group, some have an indirect effect, and some are independent of group referents. I argue that the critical factor has to do with the nature of the differential costs to the group members.

DATA

A welcome addition to the data on race and ethnicity has been compiled by Cain and Kiewiet (1986) of the California Institute of Technology. These data focus on the political behavior and attitudes of racial and ethnic minorities in California (they also provide a wealth of socio-demographic information). In 1984, telephone interviews were administered to a sample of 1646 respondents utilizing random digital dialing.3 For the purpose of this study I extracted the following groups: Whites (317); Blacks (335); Mexican-Americans (513); and Asian-Americans (270 -- 50 Filipinos; 65 Chinese; 66 Japanese; and 89 Koreans). Excluded from the analysis due to a small number of cases were Vietnamese, other Asians, and American Indians. The great boon of this survey is that (as far as I can tell) it is the only contemporary data set to draw such a racially and ethnically diverse sample.

ANALYSIS

To test hypotheses generated from perspectives on cultural integration I culled three broad issue areas from the Cal Tech data. In as much as was possible I tried to choose issues that had relevance to the groups in question and issues that we would not expect to cut along cultural lines. The first set of issues I label "reform liberalism." These items ask respondents if they identify themselves as Democrats; favor or oppose increased spending on health, education and welfare; and if they favor or oppose a decrease in arms spending. It is assumed that these issues have at least an indirect effect on the interests of American minorities with the impact being greatest for Blacks. The second set of issues refer to "Americanization." Respondents are asked whether or not they favor amnesty programs for illegal aliens; sanctions against employers who use illegals; and bilingual education. I assume that these issues have the most group relevance for immigrant cultures (Asian-Americans and Mexican-Americans) but also have some indirect consequences for Black interests. The final issue area that I examine is comprised of what are generally considered 'social" concerns. To operationalize these issues I utilized items which ask respondents whether or not they favor gun control; the death penalty; and an equal rights amendment.

Table 1 presents a simple bivariate analysis of the percentage of individuals who respond in the indicated manner by racial and ethnic groups (see Table 1). The most basic finding of the table is consistent with a wealth of evidence suggesting that Black-Americans are a decidedly liberal lot. For example, Blacks are significantly more likely to be Democrats and favor increases in social welfare spending; moreover, they are also more likely to favor an equal rights amendment and oppose the death penalty. Even on Americanization issues, Blacks maintain a clearly liberal profile. Another finding of note is that Mexican-Americans are generally more liberal than either Asian-Americans or Whites across all three issue areas.

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3. The problems with random digital dialing for this sample are discussed in Appendix B of Uhlaner et al. (1987). As is generally the case reaching minority respondents over the telephone proves problematic. The basic bias of the sample, therefore, is that minority respondents are of a higher average social standing than they are in the general population. Further, Black women and Asian men tend to be disproportionately represented,

As might be expected, they are most liberal, relatively, on the Americanization issues. Conversely, the pattern for Asian-Americans is much more similar to the pattern for Whites. That is, they are less likely to be Democrats and to favor decreased military spending and more likely to oppose gun control and favor the death penalty.

Recognizing that noticeable differences likely exist among the various Asian-American ethnic groups, I perform the same bivariate analysis for each of the four groups. As Table 2 shows, there does not appear to be an appreciable pattern in these data (see Table 2). Relatively speaking, Japanese-Americans appear more liberal on military spending and gun control but more conservative on the death penalty and employer sanctions; Filipino-Americans are more likely to call themselves Democrats and support an equal rights amendment; Korean-Americans tend to favor bilingual education and oppose the death penalty; and Chinese-Americans tend to be right around the overall Asian-American group means. In any event, there is no clear or consistent pattern of inter-group differences.

The apparent existence of between group differences in political attitudes and the lack of a pattern across the various Asian-American ethnic groups may be accounted for by between group differences in socio-demographic factors. It is entirely possible that within groups differences on such factors as the level of socio-economic stratification, immigrant status, and distribution of age and sex account for the majority of between group variance in mass political attitudes. To test this hypothesis, I performed a multivariate regression analysis to measure the effect of ethnic identification on mass political attitudes controlling for socio-demographic differences.4 The results of this test are found in Table 3.

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4 From the items reported in Table 1, I constructed three simple additive scales. Party identification is recoded with strong and weak Democrats coded as 3; independent Democrats, Independents and independent Republicans coded as 2; and weak and strong Republicans coded as 1. Similarly, liberal responses on the other reform liberalism issues, and the Americanization and social issues items are coded as 3; no opinion responses are coded as 2; and conservative responses are coded as 1. Each scale, therefore, runs from 3 (most conservative) to 9 (most liberal).

I constructed dummy variables for each of the various groups with a value of one assigned for group membership and zero assigned to everyone else. This procedure yields four dummy variables, one each for Whites, Blacks, Asian-Americans, and Mexican-Americans (I also constructed a set of dummies for each of the four Asian-American groups that I will use in the next stage of the analysis). In the regression equations, Whites serve as the baseline group and are omitted from the model. The unstandardized coefficients, then, represented the degree to which respective minority groups differed from the Whites.

To control for socio-demographic differences, several control variables are entered into the models. Education is simply the level of education completed (there are seven categories in the data set). Income is the respondents income level coded into eight categories. Home ownership is a dummy with 1 equal to renters and non-homeowners and 2 equal to homeowners. Sex is coded as 1 for women and 2 for men. Age is operationalized as the year of birth. I would prefer to operationalize the effect of religion as the degree of religious intensity but such an item was not included in the survey. I simply recoded the religion variable such that 1 is equal to non-Catholics and 2 is equal to those identifying as Catholics. The generation of immigration is coded as 1 if the respondent was non-U.S. born; 2 if

This results suggest that the group content approach has some merit (See Table 3). On the issues felt to have minority group content (reform liberalism and Americanization) group differences (especially among Blacks and Mexican-Americans) are statistically different from Whites in the face of controls for socio-demographic factors. This effect is most pronounced for the reform liberalism issues.

Substantively, Blacks are almost a standard deviation more liberal than Whites (standard deviation for the reform liberalism scale is 1.671). Similarly, Mexican-Americans are about a third of a standard deviation more liberal than Whites, other things being equal. Asian-Americans, on the other hand, are not statistically different than Whites. On issues of Americanization (standard deviation equals 1.749), Mexican-Americans are about one-half of a standard deviation more liberal than Whites, and Blacks are little more than a third of a standard deviation more liberal than Whites. Somewhat surprisingly, Asian-Americans are not significantly different from Whites once controls are introduced. On social issues (standard deviation equals 1.465) group differences are less pronounced. While Blacks are still statistically different from Whites (about one-third of a standard deviation), the effect is not nearly as large as on reform liberalism. Further, Mexican-Americans and Asian-Americans do not hold significantly different attitudes than Whites. The lack of large group differences on social issues is also reflected in the relative inability of the model to pick up group differences (witness the relative size of the r-squares and F-statistics across the models).

There appear to be some socio-demographic factors that cut across group lines. Regardless of group affiliation, higher income is associated with more conservative views (particularly on reform liberalism and Americanization). Gender differences also exhibit consistent signs and play a large role in accounting for variation in social policy preferences. As one might expect, education has a liberalizing effect on social attitudes and reform liberalism.

The foregoing analysis suggests that group differences are greatest on issues where there is "group content" of some sort or another and are least observable when issues have little to do with group interests. The obvious question becomes, what are the correlates of within group differences? In other words, if group differences persist in the face of socio-demographic controls, what factors drive the differences? In Tables 4 through 6, I explore the correlates of within group differences across the three issue areas.5 As indicated earlier, I have controlled for variations in Asian ethnicity with dummy variables representing the respective groups (Chinese-

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their parents were non-U.S. born; and 3 if they have U.S. born parents. Respondents were coded as 1 if the interview was conducted in a non-English primary language and 2 if it was conducted in English.

5Given that we might expect within group differences in the extent to which individuals identify with the group (Shingles 1981; Tate 1986), I have added a variable which is measured as 2 if the respondent named a problem (or problems) that were of special concern to their group and 1 if no such problem was mentioned.

Let me also note that I will withhold detailed explanations for the findings in this portion of the analysis until the discussion section of the paper. I have taken this route because within group differences are perhaps best understood in the more general context of cultural integration.

Americans are omitted and serve as the baseline in the Asian-American models).

Table 4 presents the results of multivariate regressions relative to reform liberalism for each of the four groups (See Table 4). The pattern in the findings is quite apparent. Blacks and Mexican-Americans have very similar correlates of attitudes toward reform liberalism policies. Higher levels of income are associated with less liberal views but higher levels of education and group consciousness are associated with more liberal views. For both groups the sign of the coefficient for age is in the same direction (older people ar more conservative) but the effect is not statistically significant for Blacks. For Whites and Asian-Americans the models for reform liberalism perform rather dismally. With the exception of a mild class effect for Asian-Americans, none of the correlates for either group register statistically significant coefficients (also note the F-statistic for the equations). Additionally, it is of note that the dummy variables for the Asian ethnics could not attract significant coefficients indicating that there is not much inter-group difference in attitudes toward reform liberalism among Asian-Americans as was suggested in the bivariate analysis.

The regression analysis for Americanization issues is found in Table 5. Perhaps the most interesting finding is the similar patterns for Mexican-Americans and Asian-Americans (See Table 5). For both groups, being of a less recent immigrant wave is associated with more conservative views while the presence of group identification produces more liberal views. It is also interesting to note that for both groups, the more established in the U.S. individuals are, the less likely they are to be liberal. This effect is particularly pronounced for Mexican-Americans as the signs for immigrant generation, income, home ownership, and English language skills are all in a negative direction. Two interesting points emerge for Asian-Americans. The first is that Japanese-Americans appear to be significantly more liberal than Chinese-Americans (as well as Koreans and Filipinos). The second is the strong effect for age. The coefficient suggests that younger Asians are significantly more liberal than older Asians. Finally, the findings for Blacks are interesting in that attitudes toward Americanization are shaped by education and group consciousness. Blacks who identify with the group and who have higher levels of education tend to be less liberal on these issues. It is noteworthy that this pattern is somewhat distinct from the other groups. I will return to a discussion of these findings toward the end of this paper.

The multivariate analysis of the within group correlates of variations in social policy preferences are found in Table 6. The most striking feature of these data is the profound effect of gender on social issues regardless of group membership. For each of the racial and ethnic groups the gender coefficient is statistically robust. Moreover, with the exception of the influence of education on Whites and immigrant generation on Whites and Mexican-Americans, it is striking that across the groups none of the other variables could attract statistically significant coefficients. This is consistent with the group content approach which stresses factors other than race and ethnicity as explanations for variations in social policy preferences.

DISCUSSION

This paper focuses upon the degree to which cultural diversity in the state of California is related to distinctive mass policy preferences among

Blacks, Whites, Mexican-Americans, and several Asian-American ethnic groups. Theoretically, the paper seeks to provide a means to determine the extent to which cultural integration is likely to occur among American minorities. The basic premise of my approach (loosely labeled the group content model) is that the degree to which American minorities share policy preferences with the wider society is a function of the nature of the issue under consideration. Between group differences are hypothesized to exist when the issue in question has an observable (if not direct) bearing on group interests. When issues have some relation to group interests, cultural pluralism is hypothesized to be evident. When issues have little, if no group content, cultural assimilation is thought to occur.

Inasmuch as these data are not systematically biased, and to the extent that one can generalize from analysis of one state there are three basic findings which bear discussion. The first concerns general propositions about the nexus of the theoretical frameworks examined in this study. Although the evidence is certainly not incontrovertible, the pattern in these data suggest that the group content approach is a viable framework with which to move from cultural pluralism to cultural assimilation. Both between group and within group differences were related to the type of issue under consideration. The model for social issues fits much looser than the models for reform liberalism and Americanization. In other words, between group differences are most distinct on these later issues.

In terms of cultural integration these data indicate that Blacks exhibit the attitudinal characteristics associated with cultural pluralism. Mexican-Americans are also fairly distinct on issues with some group content. Somewhat surprisingly, Asian-Americans were not statistically different from Whites on issues of Americanization. The obvious question is what accounts for the rank ordering of the racial and ethnic groups along the continuum of cultural integration?

The literature on the schooling of language minorities informs us on this question. Ogbu and Matute-Bianchi (1986) categorize language minorities into three types: autonomous; immigrant; and caste-like. For our purposes, this typology is applied to non-language minorities. Autonomous minorities are groups such as Mormons or Jews. Immigrant minorities are those who have essentially come to the host culture voluntarily such as Japanese-Americans, Cuban-Americans, and West Indians. Caste-like minorities are those groups who have been absorbed into the host culture through slavery, colonialization, or conquest. Blacks, Native Americans and some Mexican-Americans fall into this third category.

Our interest, of course, is in the attitudinal dynamics of caste-like and immigrant minorities. The language of minority literature instructs us that the distinctions between minority types also have attitudinal and behavioral consequences (Ogbu 1986). The main distinction is that immigrant minorities are likely to have their main reference groups in their homeland whereas indigenous minorities are forced to create an alternative perspective to rationalize their subordination. This notion fits nicely with the data presented in this paper. From this perspective, the distinctiveness of Black attitudes is related to their response to differential treatment by the dominant group. In other words, to the extent that Blacks perceive it is a "White man's system" or that the views and behaviors that serve White interests do not apply to them, they develop their own belief system and norms of behavior.[6] This leads to the development of their own social, political, and economic institutions. Impressionistic evidence such as the existence of Black colleges and universities, Black-owned financial institutions, Black-owned television and radio stations, as well as Black newspapers, magazines and even churches lend credence to this view. These remarks should be tempered, however, with the acknowledgement that social class (as represented by income) is the one factor which belies Black similarities to the host culture.

Distinguished by minority status is equally valid in discussing the relative distinctiveness (or lack thereof) of Mexican-Americans and Asian-Americans. As to the former group, it is relatively straightforward why they fall in between Blacks and Asian-Americans: their group has both caste-like minorities and immigrants. On the one hand, the Mexican-American community has carved out a noticeable political niche in the last twenty or so years. Politicization as it is associated with concepts like Chicanoism serves to make Mexican-Americans politically distinct. Indeed, some observers have noted the similarities to the model of Black empowerment (Browning et al. 1984). On the other hand, large waves of immigrants are crossing the border and bringing their own interpretation of the American dream with them (Moore 1976).

The literature on language minorities suggests that immigrants orient themselves to the host country in significantly different ways than caste-like minorities. For many Asian-Americans, their existence in America is but instrumental to their social and political links to the homeland. This "visitor's mentality" explains how such groups can belong to two different cultures with two different languages. Although by no means necessarily wanting to take on the main aspects of the White middle class, these groups adapt their behavior to the host culture to maximize their potential for success. This hypothesis comes together nicely with the data reported in this study indicating that Asian-Americans are the least attitudinally distinct of the racial and ethnic minorities. The political consequences of immigrant ties to their homeland is a promising line of research. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this study.

The second major finding of this study concerns the correlates of within group differences. The strongest finding here is the apparent tension between more established immigrants and less established immigrants. The conflict among immigrants is similar to the within group tensions that occurred during Black in-migration between the 1940s and the 1960s. As Cotton Belt Blacks began flooding the cities of the north, they upset whatever equilibrium had been established between northern Blacks and Whites. Not only did the newcomers intensify the competition for jobs but they also altered the norms and values of the communities (Lukas 1986; Wilson 1987). Additionally, there is some evidence documenting similar tensions among Mexican-Americans (de la Garza 1986). An interesting twist to this dynamic is reflected in the within-group findings on Americanization issues. For Blacks, higher educational levels and higher levels of group consciousness are associated with more conservative views. For both of these Black subgroups, liberal immigration policies ostensibly represent economic, social and political competition. This is consistent with the split-labor market paradigm (Bonacich 1972).

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6. The literature on the relationship of Black consciousness to political attitudes and behavior also supports such a view (see Dillingham 1983; Gilliam and Bobo 1988; Shingles 1981; Tate 1986).

The third main finding of this study concerns the pattern of within group differences between groups on social issues. It is most interesting that gender differences are pervasive across all groups with women being decidedly more liberal than men. That women are more liberal than men is nothing new; what is interesting however is how fundamental this difference is given the inclusion of controls for socio-demographic, social-psychological, and cultural variables. This final finding leads to some concluding remarks about the implications of my findings for coalition politics.

It appears evident that there has been a surge in the politicization, hence political involvement among American women (Mansbridge 1986; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). Although there is evidence suggesting that in the wider society women have yet to form a cohesive and potent political bloc (Sears and Huddy 1987), the data in this study point to the possibility that women of color may be at the forefront of establishing such a bloc. There is data on Black women indicating that they are an increasingly active and distinct subgroup (Shingles 1986) and although I am unaware at this point of work being done on other women of color, it would not be surprising to discover a similar dynamic at work.

The findings also suggest that Blacks and Mexican-Americans have some common ground in terms of policy preferences. If allowed to speculate, it would seem Blacks have an ally on reform liberalism issues whereas Mexican-Americans have an ally on Americanization. At any rate, these two groups have supported each other electorally in the past (i.e. in Chicago and Los Angeles) and will likely to do so in the future. The findings in this paper suggest that in the main, Asian-Americans are not as likely to engage in such coalition politics in large numbers. This, of course, does not preclude the possibility that this will change in the near future nor does it suggest that there are no lines of communications between the groups. It is to say that to the degree that these data are accurate, and to the extent that there is a relationship between attitudes and behavior, we should not expect a tripartite coalition on a mass scale.

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TABLE 1

Race, Ethnicity and Mass Political Attitudes

	All	Mexican American	Black	White	Asian American
Reform Liberalization					
Welfare	79.0	70.0	93.4	67.2	72.6
Decrease Arms $	63.8	46.8	74.3	63.6	52.9
Democrats	60.1	54.2	81.8	41.6	34.1
Americanization					
Amnesty (favor)	61.5	74.2	54.0	52.5	56.5
Employer Sanctions (oppose)	40.9	50.6	38.4	30.1	40.3
Bilingual Educ (favor)	63.9	75.5	71.2	45.5	56.1
Social Issues					
Gun Control (favor)	46.5	45.2	50.2	49.5	37.2
Death Penalty (oppose)	24.4	27.1	38.9	17.3	15.9
E.R.A. (favor)	86.0	88.4	93.2	78.0	84.2
Total N	1501	504	330	433	258

TABLE 2

Asian Americans and Mass Political Attitudes

	Filipino American	Chinese American	Japanese American	Korean American	Asian American
Reform Liberalism					
Welfare	71.8	69.2	69.0	73.6	72.6
Decrease Arms $	42.9	53.1	66.1	49.2	52.9
Democrats	47.5	34.6	44.1	39.1	34.1
Americanization Issues					
Amnesty (favor)	54.5	49.0	59.1	59.3	56.5
Employer Sanctions (oppose)	35.9	40.4	29.6	44.4	40.3
Bilingual Educ (favor)	55.0	44.6	48.2	67.1	56.1
Social Issues					
Gun Control (favor)	45.9	34.0	50.0	30.1	37.2
Death Penalty (oppose)	15.4	13.8	7.1	26.2	15.9
E.R.A. (favor)	94.4	85.2	80.0	76.9	84.2
Total N	50	65	66	89	270

TABLE 3

Multivariate Analysis of Race and Ethnicity
on Mass Political Attitudes

	Reform Liberalism		Americanization		Social Concerns	
	b	B	b	B	b	B
Constant	5.094*		7.139*		6.878*	
Black	1.217*	.301	.636*	150	.711*	.116
Mex. Amer.	.514*	.149	.773*	.214	.260	,036
Asian Amer.	.057	.014	-.022	-.005	-.023	-.027
Income	-.099*	-.132	-.041+	-.052	-.025	-.012
Education	.101*	.096	-.029	-.026	.064*	.104
Sex	-.141	-.042	-.091	-.026	-.426*	-.122
Age	-.004	-.040	.006*	.065	.00l	.0l0
Home Own.	.017	.005	-.171+	-.048	-.067	-.035
Catholic	.297	.088	.037	.0ll	-.026	-.024
Immigration	.080	.041	-.291*	-.143	-.281*	-.153
Non Eng.	.150	,042	-.244	-.065	-.128	-.041
N	1192		1274		1274	
R2	.119*		.120*		.073*	
F	14.456		14.398		8.316	

* p < .00l
\+ p < .0l

TABLE 4

Reform Liberalism

	White	Black	Mexican American	Asian American
	b	b	b	b
Constant	7.146*	6.899	6.521*	5.753*
Income	-.086 (-.103)#	-.904* (-.189)	-.126* (-.163)	-.104+ (-.133)
Education	.090 (.078)	.101* (. 133)	.101+ (.093)	.059 (.052)
Sex	-.323 (-.088)	-. 184 (-.079)	-.019 (-.006)	-. 138 (-.039)
Age	.000 (.OlO)	.002 (-.031)	-.013* (-.133)	.007 (.060)
Home Own.	.049 (.012)	.214 (.091)	,070 (.022)	-. 180 (.050)
Catholic	——	——	.129 (.033)	.278 (.072)
Group Con.	----	.425* (.175)	.354+ (.113)	.378 (.107)
Imm. Gen.	-.177 (058)	-.004 (-.OOl)	.127+ (.068)	.388 (.166)
Non Eng.	----	——	.254 (.080)	-.201 (-.058)
Korean	——	----	——	-.056 (-,015)
Japanese	----	----	——	.347 (.086)
Filipino	——	----	——	.079 (.018)
	242	261	413	200
	.026	.075*	.065	.062
F	1.057	2.954	3.103*	1.029

* p < .00l
\+ p <.01
= standardized coefficients in parentheses

TABLE 5

Americanization Issues

	White	Black	Mexican American	Asian American
	b	b	b	b
Constant	6.982	7.519	7.853	4.272
Income	-.019 (-.022)#	.000 (.000)	-.027 (-.034)	-.071 (.090)
Education	.012 (.009)	-.134* (-.127)	-.055 (-.059)	.000 (.000)
Sex	-.056 (-.015)	-.035 (-.035)	.089 (.028)	-.081 (-.023)
Age	.007 (.076)	-.001 (-.018)	.005 (.049)	.031* (.281)
Catholic	----	----	,047 .012	-.003 (.000)
Group Con.	----	-.424* (-.126)	.299* ,093	.479* .134
Imm. Gen.	-.552* (-.182)	.154 (.031)	-.229 (-.119)	-.312 (.131)
Non Eng.	----	----	-.254 (-.078)	-.465 (-.132)
Korean	----	----	----	.449 (.119)
Japanese	----	----	----	.971 (.235)
Filipino	----	----	----	.500 (.109)
	261	269	457	212
	.036	.052	.087	,139,
F	1.572	2.036+	4.722*	2.692

* P < .001
\+ P < .01
\# standardized coefficients in parentheses

TABLE 6

Social Issues

	White	Black	Mexican American	Asian American
	b	b	b	b
Constant	6.958	8.095	6.958	6.184
Income	-.017 (-.024)+	-.054 (-.077)	-.040 (-.058)	-.073 (-.110)
Education	.205* (.211)	-.072 (-.077)	-.004 (-.004)	.038 (-.039)
Sex	-.418+ (-.135)	-.386* (-.135)	-.274* (-.099)	-.701* (-.234)
Age	-.002 (-.030)	.002 (.021)	.002 (.021)	,011 (.119)
Home Own.	-.280 (-.086)	-.211 (-.013)	.030 (.011)	.157 (.051)
Catholic	-.013 (.004)	-.241 (-.062)	.004 (.001)	-.005 (-.002)
Group Con.	----	.058 (.019)	.023 (.008)	.361 (.121)
Imm. Gen.	-.421* (-.167)	-.376 (-.086)	-.152* (-.092)	-.086 (-,044)
Non Eng.	----	----	-.133 (-,047)	-.362 (.123)
Korean	----	----	——	.022 (.007)
Japanese	----	----	——	-.095 (-.028)
Filipino	----	----	——	-.018 (-.005)
	263	269	457	212
	.086	,036	,032	.133
F	3.421*	1.204	1.623	2.563

* p < .001
\+ p < .01
\# standardized coefficients in parentheses