UC Riverside

Among the main tenets of American democracy are liberty, popular sovereignty, and equality. While each has seen expansion over the course of American history, the recent growth in economic inequality could threaten each of these core democratic features. As political equality is a prerequisite central to each of these values, I investigate the question: where does political inequality come from? In order to research the sources of political inequality, I examine the nature of inequality in each of three aspects of the American governmental system: institutions (e.g. Congress), individuals (e.g. voters), and the

interaction between the two (e.g. responsiveness).

At its founding, the American government was set up to be a republican democracy. In this light, I focus on the role of representation in the U.S. political system and the degree

to which certain groups receive higher levels of responsiveness, defined as the level of correspondence between constituency preferences and a legislator's behavior (e.g. Miller and

Stokes 1963; Achen 1978), and other groups do not. Because modern democratic theory assumes the continued responsiveness of the government to all citizens (considered as

political equals) my primary focus is to examine the degree to which this equal responsiveness is broken, which can be a source of political inequality (Dahl 1971). The argument that I make throughout the dissertation is that economic inequality greatly affects

political inequality. While this thesis may not seem novel, recent studies that have uncovered evidence of unequal governmental responsiveness have been unable to provide an account

of why this occurs (Gilens 2005; Bartels 2008).

In the dissertation I explore three questions. First, how pervasive is political inequality? In order to answer this question I examine the behavior of members of Congress and the degree to which they respond to different economic classes. As Congress is the

main body designed to represent the people's voice, I focus intensely on this institution.

The second question, which focuses on the role of the people, is: Does the public view inequality as a problem? In researching this question, I will examine individual preferences

from the mass public in order to understand people's attitudes toward inequality. Individual indifference to economic inequality and an inability to hold elected officials accountable could be a main source of political inequality. Finally, I examine the interaction between individual (and group) preferences and political institutions and ask the question: What accounts for legislator bias toward different groups? To this end, I examine the influences

on legislator behavior such as member personal wealth, party, competitiveness, constituent preference (majority and subconstituency), constituent participatory factors (e.g. voting,

volunteering, donating, etc.), and political knowledge.