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## Policy Papers

### Title

Policy Paper 48: Conventional Arms Control in the Middle East: Conceptual Challenges and An Illustrative Framework

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# CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES AND AN ILLUSTRATIVE FRAMEWORK

**Michael Moodie**

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## **Introduction**

Discussion of Middle East arms control has centered on weapons of mass destruction and confidence building measures, ignoring the possibility of a conventional arms control arrangement. Although the potential for such an agreement may be distant, the author argues that the changing environment in the Middle East requires that this issue be given new consideration. The exploration of conventional arms control also may focus Washington's attention on what such an agreement should include, thus enabling policymakers to avoid wasting time and political capital when the prospects for such an agreement emerge. The author explores the requirements for such an agreement and outlines them in an illustrative framework.

In order to manage the complexity of such an agreement Moodie designates four methodological assumptions. An arms control agreement can only be considered when the peace process has advanced beyond its present state. Consideration of an agreement must exclude both weapons of mass destruction and naval forces since these issues would cloud the discussion. Finally, the framework must include the interests and requirements of all parties, whether logical or not, or practical application will not be achieved.

Attempts to define requirements, however, face a number of conceptual challenges which are explored in this paper. Those challenges include multiple threats, the question of participation, geography, missiles, the problem of asymmetry, and the impact of modernization. All of these issues apply to the security of any region, but have particular importance in the Middle East and in the formulation of any lasting arms control agreement.

To overcome these challenges, any arms control package must address five requirements. The first is to maintain the ability of states to defend themselves, either through their own efforts or in combination with others. It must decrease the feasibility of a state taking offensive action, particularly without warning. It must be directed at preventing precipitation of conflict through miscalculation. It must limit the ability of any state to assert regional hegemony. Finally, it should moderate, if not reverse, the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of military arsenals of regional states.

Given these guidelines, the author creates an illustrative framework agreement based on four categories. The first is Limitations and Reductions, which specifies the maximum and minimum level of equipment and the rate of arms reduction. The second section,

Deployment Limitations, outlines the requirements for the demilitarization of disputed territories of the Golan Heights and the West Bank. The Verification and Monitoring section of the Framework specifies which groups and organizations have the authority to inspect the reduction process and calls for the creation of a Treaty Monitoring Center to oversee it. Finally, the Associated Measures outlines the transparency requirements of each party's military.

This framework can lead the discussion for conventional arms control in Washington and serve as the foundation for an agreement in the Middle East.

### **Slide Accompaniment**

The framework for an arms control agreement, in the Middle East or elsewhere, calls for three very important conditions to be met. First, all participants must see some advantage in any proposed agreement. At the very least states must not feel that this agreement has the potential to make their security situation worse. For this reason, it is also important that the current, relatively fragile military balance is maintained. Finally, the agreement must be realistic, that politically and operationally, it can be executed.

In order to meet these conditions the author considers the needs of a conventional arms agreement in terms of four categories. The first, and most detailed aspect of the study are the requirements for Limitations and Reductions of military equipment, what the author terms "building down". The central tenets of the reductions include both maximum and minimum levels of holdings for critical equipment holdings. The specific limits, as well as each state's current holdings can be found in the corresponding slide presentation. The agreement also calls for the reductions to take place by 3% each year over a five year period. Finally there is to be no increase commitment for force levels above the minimum. This section of the framework also takes into consideration more specific problems such as issues of missiles, modernization, and militias.

Given the importance of geography in the Middle East, especially in the Arab-Israeli theater, the location of armed forces will be as important as overall equipment levels. For this reason the author allows for a number of deployment limitations and full demilitarization for especially sensitive or highly disputed territories. The most important of these, the Golan Heights and the West Bank, are very specifically outlined in the Deployment Limitations section of the framework, as well as in the slide presentation.

Each of these aims of limiting capabilities can only be successful if there is parallel verification and monitoring in order to maintain the stability of the agreement. According to the conventional arms control framework the process must begin with an initial exchange of information regarding the capabilities of each state, followed by a period of verification by inspectors. The framework then sets out a three phase program designed to maximize the legitimacy of the inspections by each side.

Finally, the author designates a number of measures to both build confidence in the region and to create a degree of transparency. This is essential to prevent a war by miscalculation, what the author considers the greatest concern of all states in the Middle East. The guidelines include information exchanges, notification and observation of military activities, and the requirement of annual military doctrine seminars.

## **Additional Notes to Selected Slides**

### ***Slide 15***

Unlike the CFE Treaty, any agreement on conventional arms control in the Middle East must address the problems of missiles. A total ban on surface-to-surface missiles is unrealistic, so provision are offered in this package that require states to make trade-offs between missiles and other important capabilities.

Current missile inventories would be frozen until the end of the destruction period. After completion of the five year reduction period, the introduction of new missile systems would require a reduction of more than one-to-one in another weapons category such as artillery or aircraft.

### ***Slide 17***

Armed militias that are not a part of a state's regular armed forces cannot be left outside any regional agreement. They could represent a major loophole that could be exploited to circumvent equipment constraints. Their continued operation could also undermine the objectives of the deployment limitations in particularly sensitive areas.

For these reasons any militias or other irregular forces not fully integrated in the state party will be disarmed and disbanded.

In cases where this would be difficult to implement, in order to comply with this provision, a state may seek the assistance of members of the international community.

### ***Slide 19***

- The Golan Heights will be demilitarized
- The area to be encompassed will extend beyond the Golan Heights to include Syrian territory to the military camps at Katana as well as into the "finger of Galilee" in Israel.
- A buffer zone of 20km will be created immediately
- Israeli withdrawal will be phased over a period of several years
- Israel would have the right to maintain monitoring stations on Mount Hermon and in a very limited number of places on the Heights
- After an agreed period Syria will also have the right to establish such a facility on Mount Hermon

### ***Slide 20***

- The West Bank will be completely demilitarized
- Limited defensive Israeli military deployments would be allowed in well defined areas on the less populated eastern slopes of the West Bank with adequate access from Israeli territory
- Early warning stations will be established on the central hills of the West Bank, to be manned initially by international representatives

*presented by: Michael Moodie*


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## **Conventional Arms Control in the Middle East: Conceptual Challenges and An Illustrative Framework**

### **Michael Moodie**



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
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## Limitations & Reductions: *Building Down*

- Counting rules per CFE
- Each state would be required to reduce armament levels by 3% per year for 5 years in order to meet maximum and minimum equipment holdings.



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
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**Limitations & Reductions: Building Down**

## **Maximum Conventional Levels**

Tanks	3500
ACV's	7000
Artillery	4000
Combat Aircraft	575
Attack Helicopters	100



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
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Limitations & Reductions: *Building Down*

## *Minimum Conventional Levels*

Tanks	300
ACV's	700
Artillery	200
Combat Aircraft	30
Attack Helicopters	10



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## Limitations & Reductions: Building Down

## Current vs. Post-Reduction Holdings:

	Current	Reduction	Post-Reduction
Bahrain	81	0	81
Egypt	3090	419	2671
Iran	700	60	640
Iraq	2300	300	2000
Israel	3890	539	3351
Jordan	1131	125	1006
Kuwait	200	0	200
Lebanon	240	0	240
Libya	2150	278	182
Oman	78	0	78
Qatar	24	0	24
Saudi Arabia	700	60	640
Syria	4600	645	3955
UAE	131	0	131
Yemen	1275	146	1129

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
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Limitations & Reductions:  
Building Down

Current vs.  
Post-Reduction  
Holdings:

## Tanks



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
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## Limitations & Reductions: Building Down

## Current vs. Post-Reduction Holdings:

	Current	Reduction	Post-Reduction
Bahrain			
Egypt	3360	399	2961
Iran	790	14	776
Iraq	2900	330	2570
Israel	8000	1095	6905
Jordan	1149	67	1082
Kuwait	120	0	120
Lebanon	252	0	252
Libya	2090	209	1881
Oman	51	0	51
Qatar	190	0	190
Saudi Arabia	2580	282	2298
Syria	3750	458	3292
UAE	481	0	481
Yemen	1570	131	1439

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
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## Limitations & Reductions: Building Down

## Current vs. Post-Reduction Holdings:

## Armored Combat Vehicles



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
## Limitations & Reductions: Building Down

## Current vs. Post-Reduction Holdings:

	Current	Reduction	Post-Reduction
Bahrain	31	0	31
Egypt	2653	368	2285
Iran	2605	361	2244
Iraq	1500	195	1305
Israel	7020	1023	5997
Jordan	1018	123	895
Kuwait	35	0	35
Lebanon	270	11	259
Libya	1720	228	1492
Oman	78	0	78
Qatar	22	0	22
Saudi Arabia	860	99	761
Syria	3125	439	2686
UAE	285	13	272
Yemen	1492	194	1298

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## Artillery/Mortars



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
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Limitations & Reductions:  
Building Down

Current vs.  
Post-Reduction  
Holdings:

## Artillery/Mortars



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## Limitations & Reductions: Building Down

## Current vs. Post-Reduction Holdings:

	Current	Reduction	Post-Reduction
Bahrain	24	0	24
Egypt	492	69	423
Iran	262	35	227
Iraq	316	43	273
Israel	662	95	567
Jordan	113	12	101
Kuwait	45	2	43
Lebanon	3	0	3
Libya	380	53	327
Oman	33	0	33
Qatar	18	0	18
Saudi Arabia	293	39	254
Syria	639	91	548
UAE	99	10	89
Yemen	101	11	90

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## Combat Aircraft



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

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Limitations & Reductions:  
Building Down

Current vs.  
Post-Reduction  
Holdings:

## Combat Aircraft



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
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## Limitations & Reductions: Building Down

## Current vs. Post-Reduction Holdings:

	Current	Reduction	Post-Reduction
Bahrain	12	0	12
Egypt	74	10	64
Iran	100	14	86
Iraq	120	17	103
Israel	93	12	81
Jordan	24	2	22
Kuwait	20	2	18
Lebanon	5	0	5
Libya	45	5	40
Oman	0	0	0
Qatar	20	2	18
Saudi Arabia	0	0	0
Syria	100	14	86
UAE	19	1	18
Yemen	20	2	18

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
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Limitations & Reductions:  
Building Down

Current vs.  
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Holdings:

## Combat Helicopters



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
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Limitations & Reductions: Building Down

*Other Concerns: Missiles*

- Ban unrealistic
- Must trade-off for artillery
- New systems trade-off for artillery or aircraft



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
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Limitations & Reductions: Building Down

Other Concerns: *Modernization*

- Allowances for modernization must be included
- Qualitative improvements must be monitored quantitatively
- “New types” require greater than one-to-one trade-offs



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
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Limitations & Reductions: Building Down

Other Concerns: *Militias*

- Must be part of any conventional agreement
- Complete disarmament and disbandment required
- International assistance may be necessary



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
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## **Deployment Limitations: Restrictions & Demilitarization**

Given the importance of geography in the Middle East the location of armed forces will be as important as overall equipment levels.



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Tuesday, February 29, 2000

# Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation

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## Deployment Limitations: Restrictions & Demilitarization

### The Golan Heights

- Demilitarization
- Deployments limitations to extend beyond the Golan Heights
- 20km buffer zone



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

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Deployment Limitations: Restrictions & Demilitarization

## The West Bank

- Demilitarization
- Limited defense
- Early warning stations



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
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# **Verification & Monitoring: A Gradual Approach**

- On-Site & Challenge Inspections
- Open skies
- Treaty Monitoring Center



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
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Verification & Monitoring: A Gradual Approach

## ***On-Site & Challenge Inspections***

- Initial exchange of information and verification
- Three inspection phases to be carried out by:
  - (1) Non-party representatives
  - (2) Joint inspection teams
  - (3) National teams
- Phases last a previously agreed upon length of time



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
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### **Verification & Monitoring: A Gradual Approach Open Skies**

- The agreement will be monitored by a third party-operated “open skies”
- This includes satellite information and possible aerial flights
- Nature of information to be shared between parties must be restricted



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
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Verification & Monitoring: A Gradual Approach

## ***A Treaty Monitoring Center***

- The Center will coordinate data exchanges and the sharing of information generated from monitoring activities
- Third parties should be initial operators, with inclusion of party representatives at a later date



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
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### **Associated Measures: *Avoiding War by Miscalculation***

Confidence Building Measures will include advanced notification of military exercises, observation of exercises, explanations of unusual military activity, and annual military doctrine seminars



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
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Associated Measures: Avoiding War by Miscalculation

### ***Notification and observation of military exercises***

- Parties to provide Treaty Implementation Center advanced notification of any military exercises above an agreed level of forces
- Other parties would have the opportunity to provide observers for these exercises



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
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Associated Measures: Avoiding War by Miscalculation

### ***Unusual military activities measure***

- A procedure by which one party can request an explanation of unusual military activity would be established
- This will include agreed measures for observation of those activities if an adequate explanation is not forthcoming



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
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Associated Measures: Avoiding War by Miscalculation

### ***Annual military doctrine seminars***

- To eliminate misunderstandings regarding the military thinking of regional neighbors
- To bring national military representatives together



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