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### Title

Can the Whole World Become Democratic? Democracy, Development, and International Policies

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I want to begin by thanking the UC Irvine Center for Democracy, for asking me to present this lecture. Harry Eckstein was one of the great contributors to the social science literature on the conditions for democracy and on political culture. And this Center is one of the most active, creative, and resourceful academic centers on democracy. I know that no small measure of the credit for that goes to the intellectual inspiration that Harry Eckstein gave his colleagues here at UC Irvine, and also to the leadership of Professor Russ Dalton.

My subject tonight is a difficult one. It would be hard enough to address it in normal circumstances. But these are far from normal times. We are in the midst of a major war whose primary purpose, in the minds of many of the Administration officials who have pressed for it relentlessly, is to spread democracy in the most unlikely of places. I will briefly address this challenge near the end of my lecture, and will welcome your comments and questions. But mainly, I want to address a broader question: Can any country become a democracy. Which is to ask as well, can *every* country become a democracy?

Let me begin by talking about the stunning trend of the past three decades. As Samuel Huntington has documented in his seminal work, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, a powerful wave of democratic transitions began in April 1974, when the Portuguese dictatorship was overthrown in a military coup. It was far from clear then (28 years ago this month) that Portugal would become a democracy. It had never been one before. It had just been through half a century of quasi-fascist rule. The Spanish dictator, Francisco Franco, held on to power over the border. Both countries were steeped in a Latin, Catholic culture that was dismissed by many political scientists and commentators as being unsuited to democracy. That logic was also used to explain the virtual absence of democracy in Latin America at the time as well. The Portuguese armed forces movement was split into conservative, moderate, and Marxist factions, and the country was plagued for eighteen months by coups, counter-coups, and a succession of fragile provisional governments. I was privileged to spend a month there in October 1974. I remember vividly the sense of struggle, threat, and possibility; the huge poster of Joseph Stalin bearing down forbiddingly over the shoulder of the hard-line Communist party leader I interviewed; and the democratic conviction, tenacity, and organization of the Christian Democratic, Social Democratic, and Socialist party leaders who battled through this tense uncertainty and intrigue. Fortunately, the most capable and tactically brilliant military officer turned out to be with them, and he finally suppressed the Marxist anti-democrats in the military in November 1975.

The triumph of democracy in Portugal was the beginning of a long wave of democratic expansion in the world that continues to this day, almost three decades later. Huntington defines a “wave of democratization” as “a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period.” He adds that in such waves, some other

authoritarian regimes that do not democratize nevertheless become liberalized—more open and competitive, and less repressive.<sup>1</sup> And as we will see, liberalization may also occur within democracies themselves, improving the rule of law, protections for civil liberties, and so on.

When the third wave of democratization began in 1974, there were only about 40 democracies in the world, and these were mainly in the advanced industrial countries: Western Europe, the Anglophone states (the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), and Japan. There were a few other democracies scattered through Africa, Asia, and Latin America—such as India, Sri Lanka, Botswana, Costa Rica, and Venezuela—but only a few. There were several Caribbean democracies, steeped in the British rule-of-law tradition, and as more of these island states became independent, they, too, became democracies. But military and one-party dictatorships held sway in most of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. And of course, all of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were under communist rule.

Since 1974, democracy—which I define simply as a system of government in which the people choose their leaders at regular intervals through free, fair, and competitive elections—has expanded dramatically in the world. As we can see in Table 1, the number and percentage of democracies in the world expanded gradually after April 1974. In Greece, a transition to democracy began in July 1974 after military rule collapsed from mismanagement at home and on Cyprus. General Franco died in November 1975, just days before the anti-democratic forces were decisively turned back in Portugal, and a transition to democracy ensued in Spain. While the Spanish transition to democracy was unfolding with great political skill and vision in the late 1970s—in what would come to be seen as a model of a negotiated or “pacted” arrangement among mutually suspicious and hostile political forces—military rule began to unravel in Latin America. Between 1979 and 1985, the military withdrew in favor of elected civilian governments in Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and several Central American countries. Where military rule was more economically successful, in Chile, the transition was delayed, but it came in 1989, after a heroic effort of peaceful political mobilization to defeat the 1988 referendum by which General Pinochet sought to extend and legitimize his rule.

By then, the third wave of democratization had spread to Asia, first toppling the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in February 1986, then forcing the complete withdrawal of the Korean military in 1987. That same year, martial law was lifted in Taiwan, and a more gradual transition to democracy began there, not to be completed until the first direct elections for president in 1996. But by 1991, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal had all become democracies. That same year, Thailand suffered what I believe will prove to have been its last military coup, followed by its shortest period of military rule. The generals’ project to institutionalize their rule was defeated by massive, peaceful civil resistance, and within 18 months Thailand returned to democracy.

By 1987, the third wave had spread to the point where about two of every five states in the world were democracies (Table 1). All of Western Europe, much of Asia, and most of Latin America were democratic. But that still left gaping holes in Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Democracy, in other words, was still a regional, not a global, phenomenon. This changed dramatically with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and then the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. By 1990, most of the states of Eastern Europe—and even poor and isolated Mongolia—held competitive elections and began to institutionalize democracy.

**Table 1**  
**The Growth of Electoral Democracy, 1974, 1990-2002**

<b>YEAR</b>	<b>Number of Democracies</b>	<b>Number of Countries</b>	<b>Democracies as a Percent of all Countries</b>	<b>Annual Rate of Increase in Democracies</b>
<b>1974</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>27.3%</b>	
<b>1987</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>43.3%</b>	
<b>1990</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>46.1%</b>	<b>n.a.</b>
<b>1991</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>49.7%</b>	<b>19.7%</b>
<b>1992</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>186</b>	<b>53.2%</b>	<b>8.1%</b>
<b>1993</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>56.8%</b>	<b>8.3%</b>
<b>1994</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>59.7%</b>	<b>5.3%</b>
<b>1995</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>61.3%</b>	<b>2.6%</b>
<b>1996</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>61.8%</b>	<b>0.9%</b>
<b>1997</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>61.3%</b>	<b>-0.9%</b>
<b>1998</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>61.3%</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>1999</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>62.5%</b>	<b>2.6%</b>
<b>2000</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>62.5%</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>2001</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>62.5%</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>2002</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>193</b>	<b>62.7%</b>	<b>0</b>

*Sources:* Data from Freedom House, *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, 1990-91, 1991-92, etc. (New York: Freedom House, 1991 and years following); and *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 1, January 2003.

*Note:* Figures for 1990-2002 are for the end of the calendar year, from the Freedom House survey for that year. Figures for 1974 reflect my estimate of the number of democracies in the world in April 1974, at the inception of the third wave. Figures for 1987 are also my estimate. In contrast to Freedom House, Russia is here scored as a non-democracy in 2001 and 2002, and Kenya as a democracy at the end of 2002.

The collapse of communism, and thus the end of the Cold War, brought profound changes to Africa as well. Freed from the prism of the two superpowers' struggle for geopolitical dominance, and reeling from desperate fiscal crises, African countries began to liberate themselves. In February 1990, just a few months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, two seminal events launched a new wave of democratic transitions in Africa. In Benin, a coalition of forces in civil society, organized in a national conference that declared itself as "sovereign," seized governing power from the military Marxist who had ruled for eighteen years and launched a transition to democracy. In South Africa, the apartheid regime seized upon the now less threatening international climate to release Nelson Mandela from almost three decades of imprisonment and begin a process of political dialogue and normalization that led to the birth of democracy in 1994. At the time of these two seminal events in 1990, there were only three democracies in Africa—the Gambia, Botswana, and Mauritius (an island hundreds of miles from the African coast). Earlier in the third wave, democracy had been attempted in Ghana, in Nigeria, and in Sudan, and in each case it had broken down. From 1990, however, Africa experienced a rolling tide of democratic change that came to be known as the "second liberation." Under heavy pressure from international donors as well as their own peoples, most African states felt pressure at least to legalize opposition parties and open space in civil society. A continent that had been mainly composed of military and one-party regimes suddenly witnessed a florescence of democratic politics. Many of these openings were largely a façade, marred by continued repression and blatant rigging of the vote. Nevertheless, by 1997, only four of sub-Saharan Africa's 48 states had not held a competitive multiparty election at the national level since 1990, and the number of democracies had grown to well over a dozen<sup>2</sup>.

To appreciate the depth and breadth of the third wave of democratization, consider this. In 1974, there were 41 democracies among the existing 150 states. Of the remaining 109 states, 56 of them subsequently made a transition to democracy, and of those 56, only Pakistan, Sudan, and arguably Russia are not democracies today. Twenty-six states since 1974 have become independent of European (or American or Australian) colonial rule. Of these 26, 15 became democracies upon independence and have remained so, and another six have since become democratic, after some period of authoritarian rule. In all, *four of every five states that gained independence from Europe, the US or Australia since 1974 are democracies today*. Of the 19 new post-communist states, born mainly from the old Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, 11 (58%) are democracies (Table 2). Overall, of the 45 new states created since the third wave began, almost three-quarters (71%) are democracies, though in the case of the former Soviet Union, some of them (such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia) are only ambiguously democratic.

As democracy spread to Eastern Europe, a few states in the former Soviet Union, and a number in Africa, while extending deeper into Asia and Latin America, it came during the 1990s to be a *global* phenomenon, the predominant form of government, and the only broadly legitimate form of government in the world. Today, about three-fifths of all the world's states are democracies, and the global predominance of democracy has stabilized at this level over the past half-decade (see Table 1). Today, there are no global rivals to democracy as a broad model of government. Communism is dead. Military rule everywhere lacks appeal and normative justification. One-party states have largely disappeared. For what single party, in this day and age, can credibly claim the wisdom and moral righteousness to rule indefinitely and without criticism or challenge? Only the vague model of an Islamic state has any moral and ideological appeal as an alternative form of government—and then only for a small portion of the world's societies. Moreover, the only actual example of such as Islamic state is the increasingly corrupt,

discredited, and illegitimate Islamic Republic in Iran, whose own people overwhelmingly desire to see it replaced by a more truly democratic form of government.

**Table 2**  
**Transitions to and from Democracy During the Third Wave (1974 to present, 2002)**

<b>Type of State</b>	<b>Number of States Making Democratic Transitions</b>	<b>Percent of States Making Democratic Transition</b>	<b>Total Number of States</b>
<b>All States in 1974<sup>1</sup></b>	56	37%	150*
<b>Non-Democracies in 1974</b>		(51%) <sup>2</sup>	109
<b>Post-(European) colonial states</b>	15	58% (continuous)	26
	6	23% (later) <sup>3</sup>	
<b>New post-communist states<sup>4</sup></b>	11	58%	19
<b>Total new states since 1974</b>	32	71%	45

<sup>1</sup>Includes two states each for Germany, Yemen, and Vietnam, and includes the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as single states.

<sup>2</sup>Percentage of the 109 non-democratic states in 1974 that experienced a transition to democracy at some point between 1974 and 2002.

<sup>3</sup>Countries that became authoritarian upon independence (or in the case of Seychelles and Suriname, very soon thereafter) but later made transitions to democracy.

<sup>4</sup>Does not include Russia and Yugoslavia, which are considered the core successor states.

We have already begun to answer the question, “Can the whole world become democratic?” Clearly, most states can become democratic, because most states already are. Moreover—and this is perhaps the most stunning and unexpected aspect of the third wave of democratization—the overwhelming bulk of the states that have become democratic during the third wave have remained so, even in countries lacking virtually all of the supposed “conditions” for democracy. If we set aside the three military coups that occurred in Africa before the third wave actually reached the continent in 1990, then only four democracies have been overthrown by the military in a conventional coup. Two of those (Turkey and Thailand) returned fairly quickly to democracy, and the other two (Pakistan and the Gambia) have felt compelled at least to institute civilian multiparty elections. Several democracies have been suspended in *autogolpes* (“self-coups) by elected civilian leaders themselves (from India’s Indira Gandhi in 1975 to Peru’s Alberto Fujimori in 1992), while other elected rulers have more subtly strangled democracy (such as Frederick Chiluba in Zambia and arguably, Vladimir Putin in Russia and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela today). Overall, however, since the third wave began in 1974, only

14 of the 125 democracies that have existed during the third wave have become authoritarian, and in nine of these fourteen countries, democracy has been restored by the present time (Table 3). Moreover, three of the four large countries among these nine that experienced temporary breakdowns or suspensions of democracy are unlikely to do so again. These three are India, where the suspension of democracy by Indira Gandhi in 1975 was broadly resisted and lasted less than two years (of the country's more than half-century of democracy), Turkey (where the fiercely secularist military did not intervene in 2002, despite the landslide victory of a political party with Islamist roots), and Thailand (where the society would not tolerate a new military coup and a new generation of more professional officers is very unlikely to attempt it). Unfortunately, Nigeria—one of the most corrupt and ethnically fractious countries in the world, a state continually on the precipice of collapse—remains in grave danger of renewed democratic breakdown. Of the five states that have lost democracy, Pakistan has seen at least a partial restoration, and Russia is a disputable classification (which I base on the judgment that Vladimir Putin has so constrained the press and intimidated opposition in the parties and civil society that the next national election is not likely to be free and fair).

**Table 3**  
**Breakdowns of Democracy During the Third Wave (1974-Present, 2002)**

<b>Type of Breakdown</b>	<b>Number of Such Breakdowns</b>	<b>Percent of all Democracies (125) during Third Wave</b>	<b>Countries</b>
<b>Breakdown with subsequent return to democracy by 2002</b>	9	7.2%	Fiji, Ghana, India, Lesotho, Nigeria, Peru, Thailand, Turkey, Zambia
<b>Breakdown with no return to democracy by 2002</b>	5	4%	Gambia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Russia, Sudan
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>11.2%</b>	(see above)

If democracy can emerge and persist (now so far for a decade) in an extremely poor, landlocked, overwhelmingly Muslim country like Mali—in which the majority of adults are illiterate and live in absolute poverty, and the life expectancy is 44 years—then there is no reason in principle why democracy cannot develop in most other very poor countries. In fact, if we examine the 36 countries that the United Nations Development Program classifies as having “Low Human Development,” 11 of these 36 least developed countries are democracies today. If we widen our scope to look at the bottom third of states classified by the UNDP, the percentage of democracies rises from nearly a third to 41 percent (24 of 58). About a dozen of these have been democracies for a decade or longer (Table 4). That there should be so many democracies among the world's least developed countries is a development at least as noteworthy as the

overall predominance of democracy in the world, and one profoundly in defiance of established social science theories. It deserves more attention, and I will try to give it some tonight.

**Table 4**  
**Regime Types among the Least Developed States, 2002**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Human Development Index, 2000 (rank)</b>	<b>Regime Type</b>	<b>Freedom House Average Score (1 is most free)</b>
<b>Low HDI</b>			
Sierra Leone	0.275 (173)	Democracy (since 1998)	4.5
Niger	0.277 (172)	Democracy (since 1999)	4
Burundi	0.313 (171)	Authoritarian	6
Mozambique	0.322 (170)	Democracy (since 1994)	3.5
Burkina Faso	0.325 (169)	Authoritarian	4
Ethiopia	0.327 (168)	Authoritarian competitive	5
Guinea-Bissau	0.349 (167)	Authoritarian competitive	4
Chad	0.365 (166)	Authoritarian	5.5
Central African Rep	0.375 (165)	Authoritarian competitive	5
Mali	0.386 (164)	Democracy (since 1992)	2.5
Malawi	0.400 (163)	Democracy (since 1994)	4
Rwanda	0.403 (162)	Authoritarian	6
Angola	0.403 (161)	Authoritarian	5.5
Gambia	0.405 (160)	Authoritarian competitive	5
Guinea	0.414 (159)	Authoritarian	5.5
Benin	0.420 (158)	Democracy (since 1991)	2.5
Eritrea	0.421 (157)	Authoritarian	6.5
Cote d'Ivoire	0.428 (156)	Authoritarian competitive	6
Congo, Dem Rep of	0.431 (155)	Authoritarian	6
Senegal	0.431 (154)	Democracy (since 2000)	2.5
Zambia	0.433 (153)	Democracy (since 2002)	4
Mauritania	0.438 (152)	Authoritarian	5
Tanzania	0.440 (151)	Authoritarian competitive	3.5
Uganda	0.444 (150)	Authoritarian competitive	5.5
Djibouti	0.445 (149)	Authoritarian competitive	4.5
Nigeria	0.462 (148)	Democracy (since 1999)	4.5
Madagascar	0.469 (147)	Democracy (since 1993)	3.5
Haiti	0.471 (146)	Authoritarian competitive	6
Bangladesh	0.478 (145)	Democracy (since 1991)	4
Yemen	0.479 (144)	Authoritarian competitive	5.5
Laos	0.485 (143)	Authoritarian	6.5
Nepal	0.490 (142)	Democracy (since 1991)	4
Togo	0.493 (141)	Authoritarian competitive	5



Bhutan	0.494	(140)	Authoritarian	5.5
Sudan	0.499	(139)	Authoritarian	7
Pakistan	0.499	(138)	Authoritarian competitive	5.5
<b>Low-Medium HDI</b>				
Comoros	0.511	(137)	Authoritarian	4.5
Congo	0.512	(136)	Authoritarian	5
Cameroon	0.512	(135)	Authoritarian	6
Kenya	0.513	(134)	Democracy (since 2003)	4.5
Papua New Guinea	0.535	(133)	Democracy (since 1975)	2.5
Lesotho	0.535	(132)	Democracy (since 2002)	2.5
Vanuatu	0.542	(131)	Democracy (since 1980)	1.5
Cambodia	0.543	(130)	Authoritarian	5.5
Ghana	0.548	(129)	Democracy (since 2000)	2.5
Zimbabwe	0.551	(128)	Authoritarian	6
Burma	0.552	(127)	Authoritarian	7
Botswana	0.572	(126)	Democracy (since 1966)	2
Swaziland	0.577	(125)	Authoritarian	5.5
India	0.577	(124)	Democracy (since 1977)	2.5
Morocco	0.602	(123)	Authoritarian	5
Namibia	0.610	(122)	Democracy (since 1990)	2.5
Solomon Islands	0.622	(121)	Democracy (since 1978)	3
Guatemala	0.631	(120)	Democracy (since 1986)	4
Sao Tome & Principe	0.632	(119)	Democracy (since 1991)	1.5
Nicaragua	0.635	(118)	Democracy (since 1990)	3
Gabon	0.637	(117)	Authoritarian competitive	4.5
Honduras	0.638	(116)	Democracy (since 1980)	3

### Conceptualizing Democracy

At this point, I think we need to pause and define more closely what we are talking about and how we can measure it. Let us conceive of democracy in terms of two thresholds. Countries above the first threshold are, in the most minimal sense, electoral democracies, because the principal positions of political power are filled through regular, free, fair, and competitive (and therefore, multiparty) elections. Electoral democracy can exist in countries with significant violations of human rights, massive corruption, and a weak rule of law. But in order for a country to be a democracy, these defects must be sufficiently contained so that, in elections at least, the will of the voters can be reflected in the outcome, and in particular, unpopular incumbents can be booted from office. This requires an open electoral arena, with substantial freedom for parties and candidates to campaign and solicit votes, and thus to speak, publish, assemble, organize, and move about the country peacefully for that purpose. It also requires neutral and fair administration of the voting and vote counting, with universal suffrage, secrecy of the ballot, reasonable access to the mass media, and established legal procedures for resolving electoral disputes.<sup>3</sup> To be sure, these requirements do not always easily permit an “either/or” judgment. India is clearly a democracy, but in some of its localities and states, violence and fraud mar the electoral process. Even in our supposedly “model” democracy in the United

States, we could not choose a president in 2000 without bitter dispute about who really won. In the world today, more than a dozen regimes are “ambiguous;” many people consider them democracies, but it is far from clear that elections are sufficiently free and fair, or that those elected to government office have the real power to rule in the country (see the Appendix for a comprehensive classification).

Many people have criticized my emphasis on free, fair, meaningful and competitive elections as the litmus test of democracy (in a minimal sense). They say that this may not amount to much. What is the point of having such an “electoral” democracy if the rights of women, minorities, and the poor are extensively violated; if those who are elected take turns plundering the national treasury and abusing power, as happened in Pakistan before the October 1999 coup; if elections merely crown a temporary presidential monarch who can use and abuse power without constraint for his term of office (what O’Donnell calls “delegative democracy”<sup>4</sup>)? Indeed, in his new book, *The Future of Freedom*, Fareed Zakaria questions whether we might not do better with less democracy and more rule of law.<sup>5</sup>

My answer to this is twofold. Normatively, I do not argue that we should rest content with such an illiberal and hollowed-out democracy as our goal. The goal for every country should be a political system that combines democracy on the one hand with freedom, the rule of law, and good government on the other. As Guillermo O’Donnell has incisively argued, a truly accountable political system requires three components. One is *democratic*, enabling citizens to choose their rulers in free and fair elections and to participate and express themselves in other political processes. The second is *liberal*, limiting the power of the state to encroach on the basic rights of the person, and thus affirming civil liberties and minority rights. The third is *republican*, providing a rule of law and good government through institutions of horizontal accountability that check and balance executive (and other forms of) power, while holding all actors, public and private, equal before the law.<sup>6</sup> When these three normative goals are combined, we have the second, higher threshold of democracy, what I call *liberal democracy*. Beyond the electoral arena, it features a vigorous rule of law, with an independent and nondiscriminatory judiciary; extensive individual freedoms of belief, speech, publication, association, assembly, and so on; strong protections for the rights of ethnic, cultural, religious, and other minorities; a pluralistic civil society, which affords citizens multiple channels outside of the electoral arena through which to participate and express their interests and values; and civilian control over the military.<sup>7</sup>

There is also an empirical response to the complaint against electoral democracy. The implication of some critics, including Zakaria, is that authoritarian and transitional or conflict-ridden states should put less emphasis on democracy and instead try to develop the republican dimension of independent courts and other rule-of-law institutions. As I explain in conclusion, I don’t dispute this as a transitional strategy. Indeed, I think it has great promise, both for China and the Middle East. But it can only take us so far. In reality, democracy and freedom are closely related in the world. Even if we forget about the wealthy countries of the West—all liberal democracies—and examine only the developing and post-communist countries, we find that the countries where civil liberties and the rule of law are best respected are democracies, and the human rights (and humanitarian) emergencies are invariably to be found in non-democracies.

I will make much use tonight of the annual ratings of freedom in the world by Freedom House (an independent think tank and democracy organization based in New York). Each year Freedom House rates each country from 1 to 7 along two scales, political rights (basically to participate and compete democratically) and civil liberties, with 1 being most free and 7 most

repressive, and 4 the mid-point on each scale. There are only two countries in the world that are not democracies and yet have a civil-liberties score below the mid-point on the 7-point scale (in each case, 3, or just below): Tonga, and Antigua and Barbuda. I don't think anyone is going to propose a theory of political development based on the example of these two microstates (each with a population of about 100,000). Even Singapore—the much-vaunted example of a “liberal autocracy”—is in fact not very liberal in the scope it gives its citizens to dissent and organize. To be sure, there are some pretty illiberal democracies in the world, with serious problems of human rights and the rule of law (although once these abuses descend to the level of, say, Hugo Chavez's regime in Venezuela today, it is legitimate to question whether we can call them democracies any longer, in the sense that power can still be filled through truly free and fair electoral contestation). But the only countries that give their citizens extensive civic freedom and a thorough rule of law are all democracies.

### **The Regional Distribution of Democracies and Freedom**

I said a few minutes ago that democracy has become, in the past decade or so, a global phenomenon. That is true in the sense that it has spread around the globe, but in one respect it is still not true. At least a third of the states can be said to be democracies in every region of the world—except for one. As we see in Table 5, 30 of the 33 states in Latin America and the Caribbean are democracies, and about half of them are now fairly liberal in terms of their levels of freedom (as measured by Freedom House). Two-thirds of the former communist countries are now democracies, half of the Asian states, and even about two-fifths of the African states. Only in the Middle East is democracy virtually absent. In fact, among the sixteen Arab countries, there is not a single democracy, and with the exception of Lebanon, there never has been.

The exceptionalism of the Middle East becomes even more striking when we examine trends in freedom in the world. Again, every region of the world has seen a rather striking improvement in the level of freedom (keeping in mind that a lower freedom score means a more democratic and open society). Most of the regions that had been strongholds of authoritarianism have seen their average freedom score on the combined seven-point scale improve by at least a point (in Asia, it was only half a point). This is even more striking when we consider that the scoring is more rigorous now, and thus it is somewhat more difficult for a country to get a good freedom score. There is only one region of the world where the average level of freedom has declined, by almost half a point—again the Middle East.

Some skeptics believe that democracy is largely a Western, Judeo-Christian phenomenon that is not well suited to other regions, cultures, and religious traditions. They have a ready answer for this freedom gap: Islam. I believe this answer is wrong on substantive grounds that I will come to shortly. But it is also questionable empirically. There are 43 countries in the world that pretty clearly have a Muslim majority. The 27 of these outside the Arab world have an average freedom score (5.04) appreciably better than the Arab states (5.81). A quarter (seven) of these 27 non-Arab Muslim-majority states are democracies. Moreover, as Alfred Stepan shows, when one examines the level of democracy in the non-Arab Muslim world in relation to level of economic development, one finds an unusual number of “great electoral over-achievers,” that is, political systems that have at least a minimal electoral democracy despite being much poorer than the presumed minimal economic development level necessary to sustain democracy. Further, Stepan shows, non-Arab Muslim countries have some considerable cumulative experience over the last thirty years with political freedom.<sup>8</sup>

**Table 5**  
**Democracy and Freedom by Region, 2002**

Region	Number of Countries	Number of Democracies (percent of total)*	Number (Percent) of Liberal Democracies FH score < 2.5	Average Freedom Score for Region	
				1974	2002
<b>W. Europe, &amp; Anglophone states</b>	28	28 (100%)	28 (100%)	1.58	1.04
<b>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</b>	33	30 (91%)	17 (52%)	3.81	2.49
<b>Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union</b>	27	18 (67%)	11 (41%)	6.50	3.39
<b>Asia (E, SE, and S)</b>	25	12 (48%)	4 (16%)	4.84	4.38
<b>Pacific Island</b>	12	11 (91%)	8 (67%)	2.75	2.00
<b>Africa (Sub-Saharan)</b>	48	19 (40%)	5 (10%)	5.51	4.33
<b>Middle East- North Africa</b>	19	2 (11%)	1 (5%)	5.15	5.53
<b>Total</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>120 (63%)</b>	<b>73 (38%)</b>	<b>4.39</b>	<b>3.38</b>
<b>Arab Countries</b>	16	0	0	5.59	5.81
<b>Predominantly Muslim Countries</b>	43	7**	0	5.29	5.33

Source: Adrian Karatnycky, "The 2002 Freedom House Survey" *Journal of Democracy* 14, 1 (January 2003).

\* The current number of democracies as classified by Freedom House, with the exception that Russia is classified as a non-democracy.

\*\* Counted among this group are Bangladesh, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Indonesia, Turkey, and Albania.

So I think you can see where I am heading. We have established that democracy now exists in virtually all types of states in the world. It is significantly present in almost every region of the world. It is present in countries evincing every major religious or philosophical tradition: Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, and Muslim. It is much more common in developed countries (all of the top 20 countries in Human Development are liberal democracies), but it is now significantly present among very poor countries as well. It is much more common—and much more liberal—in small states of under one million. (Part of that has to do with the legacy of British rule in the Caribbean and American in the Pacific). But most of

the biggest countries—specifically, eight of the eleven countries with populations over 100 million—are democracies.<sup>9</sup> By any category I can imagine that is meaningful in the world today, there is only one set of countries that is completely undemocratic: the Arab world.

### **Is Democracy a Universal Value?**

There is a possible retort to the argument that I am building, that democracy is present in virtually every major region of the world, and thus is nearly a universal phenomenon. It is possible to dismiss this as a fad, or a contemporary concession to international pressure or diffusion. Here, the argument would be that democracy might exist in far reaches of the globe, but only temporarily and superficially. It is not really valued by the people, and it will not last.

Let's take the issue of persistence again first. Forty years ago Seymour Martin Lipset argued that the richer the country the greater the chance that it would sustain democracy.<sup>10</sup> In a seminal and methodologically sophisticated study, Adam Przeworski and his colleagues found that there was in fact a striking and monotonic relationship between development level and the probability of sustaining democracy. During the period 1950-90, the poorest countries had a 12 percent chance of dying in any particular year, or an average life expectancy of eight years. Several third-wave democracies in his lowest income category have now outlived that expected life span, including Benin, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, and Nepal.<sup>11</sup> Even among the poorest countries, there have been few breakdowns of democracy. We will need much more time to see whether democracies in the various lower income groups that Przeworski et al. examined will survive considerably longer in the current era than they did between 1950 and 1990. I believe they will, or at least they can, because the contemporary world is so different than that of the Cold war (which is precisely the period they studied).

In fact, a strong case has been made that democracy is not an extravagance for the poor, but very nearly a necessity. Amartya Sen won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1998 in part for showing that democracies do not have famines. "People in economic need," he argues, "also need a political voice. Democracy is not a luxury that can await the arrival of general prosperity." Moreover, "there is very little evidence that poor people, given the choice, prefer to reject democracy."<sup>12</sup> He notes the vigor with which Indians defended their freedom and democracy in the 1977 election, tossing from office the Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, who had suspended political and civil rights. But there have been countless other instances—from Burma and Bangladesh to Senegal and South Africa—where poor people have mobilized passionately for (and in defense of) democratic change. The fact that they have sometimes, as in Burma, been crushed by sheer force, while a timid world watched and protested ineffectually, does not negate the overwhelming expression of their sentiment.

Fortunately, we also have more precise evidence from public opinion survey data as to what ordinary people really think. As we develop standardized survey instruments that are administered in different regions of the world, we can begin to see how people from widely divergent cultural backgrounds and national income levels compare in their attitudes toward democracy. The early evidence indicates that the understanding and valuing of democracy is widely shared across cultures. The Afrobarometer has recently examined how people view democracy in twelve (mainly poor) African countries. Two-thirds of Africans surveyed associate democracy with civil liberties, popular sovereignty, or electoral choice. About two-thirds of Africans surveyed (69 percent) also say democracy is "always preferable" to authoritarian rule. The same proportion rejects one-party rule, and four in five reject military or

one-man rule. Even many who are not satisfied with democracy believe it is the best form of government, and most Africans who live in democracies recognize there are serious institutional problems that must be addressed.<sup>13</sup> Latin Americans—who have had more time than Africans to become disillusioned with how democracy actually performs in their countries—are more ambivalent. But overall, 57 percent still believe democracy is always preferable, and only about 15 percent might prefer an authoritarian regime. In East Asia, only a quarter in Taiwan and Korea, about a fifth in Hong Kong and the Philippines, but less than a tenth in Thailand believe that democracy is not really suitable for their country. In all five of these systems, consistently strong majorities (usually upwards of two-thirds) reject authoritarian alternatives to democracy.<sup>14</sup> So do strong majorities (about seven in ten overall) in the ten post-communist countries now negotiating membership in the European Union.<sup>15</sup>

Although much has been made of the “clash of civilizations,” especially since September 11, 2001, the Afrobarometer survey evidence indicates, “Muslims are as supportive of democracy as non-Muslims.” In four African countries with substantial Muslim populations (Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda) the Afrobarometer has found that large majorities of Muslims as well as non-Muslims support democracy, and any hesitancy in supporting democracy among African Muslims “is due more to deficits of formal education and other attributes of modernization than to religious attachments.”<sup>16</sup> Data from Central Asia and the Middle East point in a similar direction.<sup>17</sup> The Middle Eastern data are somewhat dated (from the 1990s), and severely limited by what could be asked, but they indicate that in two of the four country contexts (Egypt and Palestine) a majority attached at least some importance to the value of democracy. Weighing the evidence, Tessler concludes, “Islam appears to have less influence on political attitudes than is frequently suggested.” Indeed, “support for democracy is not necessarily lower among those individuals with the strongest Islamic attachments.”<sup>18</sup> In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Rose finds that there is little difference among religious groups in support for democracy. “The most observant Muslims are almost as democratic as those who are nonobservant,” and in each countries, majorities of all religious groups—Muslim and Orthodox, observant and non-observant, as well as those with no religion—believe “democracy is better than any other form of government.”<sup>19</sup>

These popular orientations among Muslims in the world correspond with the thinking of increasingly outspoken moderate Muslim intellectuals, who are making the case either for a liberal interpretation of Islam or for a broader liberal view that de-emphasizes the literal meaning of sacred Islamic texts while stressing the larger compatibility between the overall moral teachings of Islam and the nature of democracy as a system of government based on such principles as accountability, freedom of expression, and the rule of law.<sup>20</sup> Islam is undergoing a kind of reformation now, and there is growing momentum among Muslim religious thinkers for a separation of mosque and state.

Significantly, Arab thinkers, scholars, and civil society activists are themselves challenging the democracy and freedom deficit that pervades the Arab world. The Arab authors of the *Arab Human Development Report*—an extraordinary document published by the UNDP last year—recognize that the global wave of democratization “has barely reached the Arab states. This freedom deficit undermines human development and is one of the most painful manifestations of lagging political development.”<sup>21</sup> It was this same broad team of Arab specialists who wrote these words about the reform imperative:

There can be no real prospects for reforming the system of governance, or for truly liberating human capabilities, in the absence of comprehensive political representation in effective legislatures based on free, honest, efficient and regular elections. If the people's preferences are to be properly expressed and their interests properly protected, governance must become truly representative and fully accountable.<sup>22</sup>

Amartya Sen argues that the mark of a universal value is not that it has the consent of everyone, but that "people anywhere may have reason to see it as valuable."<sup>23</sup> By this measure, there is growing evidence of all kinds that democracy is becoming a truly universal value.

### **Contemporary Drivers of Democratization**

To assess whether vastly more countries, and some day, potentially, *all* countries, can become democratic, we must answer four more questions. First, what has been driving democratization in the third wave? *Why* have so many more countries become democratic during this period? Second, why have so few of these new democracies broken down in the last quarter century? Third, why do the remaining non-democracies hold out? Logically, the answers to these questions will then provide essential insights with which to answer the most important question: can the countries that are not now democratic become so? And how would they do so?

I will have time tonight to do no more than sketch the answers to each of these four questions. Let me begin, then, with the causes of democratization.

#### **Economic Development**

In his book, Huntington identifies several major explanations for the third wave. One factor was economic development. Przeworski and his colleagues find no evidence that transitions to democracy are more likely to occur at higher levels of economic development, but their findings are distorted by the inclusion of the oil-rich countries of the Persian Gulf, in particular. Increases in national wealth bring about pressures for democratization only to the extent that they have several other intervening effects: raising levels of education; changing state-society relations so as to create a complex and diverse middle class that is independent of the state; generating a more pluralistic, active, and resourceful civil society, in part because of the first two economic and social changes; and as a result of all of these changes, bringing about a more questioning, assertive, pro-democratic political culture—or to use Eckstein's historic insight, bringing about a culture and social structure that would be more broadly congruent with democracy at the national level.<sup>24</sup>

These broad societal transformations have accompanied economic development in a number of countries in recent decades. South Korea and Taiwan stand as the classic examples of economic growth bringing about diffuse social, economic, and cultural change that then generates diffuse societal pressure for democracy. At a somewhat lower level of economic development, this has also been the story of Thailand, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa. However, where states have managed successfully to control and co-opt civil society, and to manipulate cultural symbols and belief systems in a way that legitimizes (at least partially) semi-authoritarian rule, the internal pressure for democratization has been preempted or deflected. This has been the case with Malaysia and especially Singapore, the richest authoritarian state in the history of the world. Alternatively, some states that look economically developed in terms of

their per capita income are much less so when we examine their levels of education, status of women, civic life, and state-society relations. These are the oil-rich states, whose economic and class structures are grossly distorted by the fact of centralized state control of the oil sector. As Huntington writes:

Oil revenues [and other forms of mineral wealth] accrue to the state: they therefore increase the power of the state bureaucracy and, because they reduce or eliminate the need for taxation, they also reduce the need for the government to solicit the acquiescence of its subjects to taxation. The lower the level of taxation, the less reason for publics to demand representation.<sup>25</sup>

I contend, then, that economic development that seeps broadly into the social structure and culture of a society will, in most cases, generate powerful pressures for democratization. The authoritarian rulers capable of managing this process of social and economic change as adeptly as Lee Kwan Yew and his successors in Singapore are few and far between.

### **(Economic) Performance**

The second factor that has driven democratic change during the third wave has also been economic, but in the inverse direction of economic crisis, or poor governance performance in general. To the extent that they make much effort to justify their rule on moral and political grounds, conventional authoritarian regimes (as opposed to ones that appeal to higher ideological or theological principles) do so on the basis of performance achievements and imperatives. They claim that their rule is necessary to clean up corruption, fight subversion, unify the country, and/or generate economic growth. This puts authoritarian regimes in a dilemma. If they fail to deliver on these promises (exhibiting instead the same corruption, cronyism, and ineffectuality for which they overthrew their democratic predecessors), authoritarian rulers forfeit their moral entitlement to rule. Unlike democracy, which many people regard as a value in itself, or as worth valuing for the political and civil freedom it provides, these run-of-the-mill dictatorships have no other grounds on which to justify their rule except what they can deliver practically. However, if they succeed in overcoming the crises of political instability or insecurity that brought them to power, then after some time, people may feel they have served their purpose (perhaps at great cost to other values) and should go. If they deliver rapid economic development, as in Taiwan and South Korea, they may become victims of their own success. Or if they deliver rapid development for a time, and then it implodes, as with the East Asian financial crisis that devastated Indonesia at the end of 1997, then citizens may set aside the long record of growth and punish the regime for its immediate failure.

However one frames it, performance-based legitimacy is a delicate and perilous strategy for sustaining authoritarian rule indefinitely. In fact, if it is mainly its own survival that a dictatorship cares about, its best strategy would seem to be to seal off the country, limit international influences, and divert the country's wealth to a narrow segment of military and ruling party loyalists who ruthlessly uphold the regime. In other words: North Korea, Burma, Iraq, and Cuba. This strategy runs the risk that the regime will simply run out of resources, bringing about overthrow or, as in the case of Zaire, Liberia, and many other African countries, state decay and collapse into violent conflict. But if they have oil, or even some more limited



sources of export earnings (whether it is tropical timber, sugar, or weapons of mass destruction) such regimes may survive for quite some time.

### **The Reorientation of the Catholic Church**

International changes also have driven the third wave of democratization. One of these noted by Huntington was the reorientation in the doctrine, political alignment, and leadership of the Catholic Church. Within individual Latin American countries in particular (as well as the Philippines), the Church, which had historically been closely associated with (and even supportive of) ruling establishments, swung into active opposition against authoritarian rule and social oppression and injustice. Globally, particularly with the accession of John Paul II to the papacy in 1979, the Vatican became a moral and institutional advocate of social justice and human rights (and thus, by strong implication, of democracy), and a defender of the struggles of national churches against authoritarian rule. Now, with the transitions first in Southern Europe, then Latin America, then Eastern Europe, most of the predominantly Catholic countries in the world are democracies.

### **International Actions and Pressures**

Globally, however, the most powerful change came in the policies, actions, and expectations of the established democracies, particularly the United States, as well as regional and international organizations. Beginning under Jimmy Carter, with his new emphasis on human rights in American foreign policy, and then, after a false and regressive start, continuing with the new emphasis on democracy promotion under Ronald Reagan, U.S. presidential administrations became active in pressing for democratic change. New US institutions, such as the National Endowment for Democracy, were created to provide practical assistance and encouragement to democratic movements, civic organizations, interest groups, parties, and institutions. By the late 1990s, the United States was spending over half a billion dollars a year (most of it through a new stream of specialized political assistance efforts within the U.S. Agency for International Development) to foster and support democratic development abroad. Direct and indirect diplomatic pressure was exerted, first on the Latin American military dictatorships, then on the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines, the South Korean military, the KMT regime in Taiwan, and the apartheid regime in South Africa to yield to peaceful movements for democratic change. With the end of the Cold War, these pressures widened, and a number of African states that had been pawns on a superpower chessboard were suddenly viewed on their own terms. Pressure for democracy and better governance dramatically increased, and many African governments who had been lavishly financed and repeatedly bailed out from their misrule suddenly found themselves in acute fiscal crisis. Out of cash and global political support, most of these African dictatorships felt compelled to legalize political opposition and hold new, more competitive elections. In a number of instances, the old rulers lost and a new democracy ensued.

It was not just the United States that was pressing for democracy. The European Union became increasingly active and outspoken toward the same ends, particularly in its financial and organizational efforts to promote democracy in post-communist Europe. The driving wedge of Western Europe's democratizing impact, first on the South and then on the East of Europe, was a simple and unyielding condition that all states seeking entry into the European Union had to manifest (in the words of the European Community at the time) "truly democratic practices and

respect for fundamental rights and freedoms.” This conditionality provided “an important incentive for the consolidation of democratic processes in the Iberian peninsula,” and Greece.<sup>26</sup> Much European Union technical and political assistance over the past 12 years has gone into helping the candidate states for entry meet these political (and other economic) conditions.<sup>27</sup> But nothing—absolutely nothing—is more important in developing and sustaining democracy than sincere will on the part of a country’s rulers to govern in this way. In the case first of Spain, Portugal, and Greece in the late 1970s and 1980s, and now of Central and Eastern Europe as well as Turkey, a regression away from democracy has become unthinkable, because of the enormous economic and political costs it would impose in isolation from the community of European states and free trade. When we think about the prospects for democratic expansion in the world, this means by which the political will *for* democracy is generated and entrenched must be borne in mind.

More recently, regional pressure for democracy has begun to take hold in the Americas. The Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the “Santiago Commitment to Democracy” in June 1991, which required immediate consultation if democracy was overthrown. Unfortunately, it left unclear exactly what the OAS should do in this situation. Shortly after it was adopted, the Santiago resolution was put to the test by a military coup in Haiti and an *autogolpe* (executive coup) in Peru. OAS action was ineffectual in Haiti and difficult to discern in Peru. But subsequently, concerted action by the OAS and by the U.S. and other member states did deter a planned *autogolpe* in Guatemala in 1993, and a rumored military coup in Paraguay later in the decade.<sup>28</sup> And the OAS effectively monitored transitional or controversial elections in a number of its emerging or transitional democratic states.

In fact, international election observation (concluding with explicit judgments about the freeness and fairness, and hence legitimacy, of a national election) has become one of the most common means by which international actors—the United Nations, regional organizations, other governments, and NGOs—intrude without apology, and typically by invitation, into the internal politics of sovereign countries. These kinds of political intrusions are reshaping the very idea of Westphalian sovereignty, negating the longstanding presumption that states are free to do what they like within their own borders.

## **Changing International Norms and Conventions**

Finally, then, what has changed during the third wave is the normative weight given to human rights—and to democracy *as* a human right—in international discourse, treaties, law, and collective actions. The old conception of sovereignty is groaning under the weight of international scrutiny of domestic governance. The world community is increasingly embracing a shared normative expectation that all states seeking international legitimacy should manifestly “govern with the consent of the governed”—in essence, a “right to democratic governance” is seen as a legal entitlement.<sup>29</sup> Already effectively implied by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, this right to democratic governance has been articulated more and more explicitly in the documents of regional organizations like the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the OAS and affirmed by the growing number of interventions by those organizations and by the UN. During the 1990s, the UN Human Rights Committee (of experts) and then the Human Rights Commission (of member states) expanded interpretations of existing human rights conventions to incorporate democracy in various ways; in 2000, the Commission

acknowledged as a human right the right to vote “in a free and fair process open to multiple parties.”<sup>30</sup> In June of 2000, 106 states, gathered in the conference “Toward a Community of Democracies,” agreed to “respect and uphold” a detailed list of “core democratic principles and practices”—including individual liberties, the rule of law enforced by “a competent, independent and impartial judiciary,” and freedom of association and political party organization. The states (some of them, like Egypt, far from democracies themselves) acknowledged among these principles the most explicit international endorsement of democracy ever, namely that:

The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government, as expressed by the exercise of the right and civic duties of citizens to choose their representatives through regular, free and fair elections with universal and equal suffrage, open to multiple parties, conducted by secret ballot, and monitored by independent electoral authorities, and free of fraud and intimidation.<sup>31</sup>

For some observers, these various trends suggest the world is moving (and *should* move) toward establishing a global guarantee of constitutional democracy to every nation (similar to the clause in the U.S. Constitution that requires the federal government to “guarantee to every State a Republican form of government”).<sup>32</sup> Such a universal guarantee (in anything more than principle) is no doubt years away, at least. But significant erosion of the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of a country is already discernible. At a minimum, this evolution has done two things. First, it has lowered the political threshold for intervention, not only for the multilateral actors but for states and NGOs as well; and second, it has emboldened domestic advocates of democracy and human rights. No factor has been more important in driving and sustaining the third wave of democratization than this cluster of international normative and legal trends.

### **Why Have So Few Democracies Broken Down during the Third Wave?**

Drawing from the causal factors above, we can identify three factors that have provided a strong degree of immunity to democratic breakdown during the third wave. First, some countries became democracies after they had become relatively rich—or more precisely, richer than any country that has ever suffered a breakdown of democracy. Przeworski and his colleagues found that between 1950 and 1990, no country with a per capita income higher than \$6055 (in 1985 Purchasing Power Parity dollars) had ever suffered a breakdown of democracy.<sup>33</sup> The equivalent level of economic development in 2000 dollars is \$8773. Taiwan and Korea became democracies at levels of economic development richer than this, and are now much richer than this. Several post-communist democracies in Europe are also beyond this development level already—but they benefit from the double immunity of also seeking admission into the EU, with its unyielding democratic conditionality. In Latin America, Mexico and Uruguay approach this development level, and Argentina and Chile have passed it. South Africa is the one African democracy to have progressed beyond this development level.

Second is the phenomenon of public opinion and normative change within countries. In many of the democracies that have emerged over the past two decades, citizens are broadly dissatisfied with the performance of the political system, and distrustful of many of its institutions (most of all parties and politicians). Yet they do not see an alternative to democracy. No finding in the new wave of public opinion research on democracy is more powerful than this. Even in Brazil, where active support for democracy (the response “democracy is always

preferable”) stood at only 37 percent last year, people do not prefer authoritarian rule (only 15 percent could imagine wanting it).<sup>34</sup> The alternative, rather, is apathy and withdrawal. This is bad for democracy, but not as bad as people actively clamoring for an authoritarian alternative. Overall in Latin America, support for democracy has declined by five percentage points since 1996, but the bigger drift has been to apathy (“it doesn’t matter,” or no response) rather than to authoritarianism. In the ten candidate states for EU accession within post-communist Europe, 61 percent are dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their country, yet overall, 72 percent would not approve of its suspension (and no more than one in six even in the most skeptical country, Estonia, thinks it could happen). Even in the states where more people approve of the old communist regime than the new democratic one—Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania—substantial majorities disapprove of all imaginable authoritarian alternatives.<sup>35</sup>

Belief in the legitimacy—the moral rightness—of a political system is always a relative judgment, as embodied in Winston Churchill’s famous remark in the House of Commons (in 1947):

Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.<sup>36</sup>

In the past several decades, almost every form of non-democratic government imaginable has been tried: absolute monarchy, personal dictatorship, military rule, colonial rule, Fascism, Communism, Ba’athism, the socialist one-party state, other forms of one-party rule, the Islamic Republic, pseudo-democracy, semi-democracy, and numerous other permutations of these models. At an accelerating rate, people have opted for democracy. “As democracy has spread, its adherents have grown, not shrunk,” Amartya Sen observes.<sup>37</sup> I think the evidence is mounting that—whatever their naïve assumptions at the beginning—people are sticking with democracy without illusions. They remember in their lifetime one or more of these other forms of rule. And they do not want to go back.

Of course it is possible that some new form of non-democratic rule will be conjured up and capture the passions and imagination of some peoples. But at this point, more than a decade after the collapse of communism, there is no sign on the horizon of an antidemocratic ideology that could even begin to generate universal claims. Most likely, where authoritarian rule reasserts itself in the coming years, it will do so apologetically, wrapping itself in the moral purpose of democratic restoration, and insisting—as General Musharraf did when he seized power in Pakistan in 1999—that the suspension of democracy would be temporary. Or elected rulers will gradually whittle down the quality and competitiveness of democratic institutions, or violent insurgencies will grind down the scope of their actual authority, to the point where it is just very difficult to determine whether the country meets the minimal test of democracy. I judge this is the case today for slightly more than a dozen countries, not including Russia, which I categorize as semi-authoritarian.<sup>38</sup>

I have already described the third factor that has suppressed potential reversions to authoritarian rule. This is the unfavorable climate for such reversals at the regional and international levels. Most of all in Europe, but to some considerable extent in Latin America as well, political and military leaders know that they will pay a high price in terms of economic and political standing within their regions if they reverse democracy. On specific occasions, some

such leaders who have been tempted to reverse democracy—in Guatemala, in Paraguay, perhaps in Venezuela, and probably in Turkey—have been deterred from doing so by explicit interventions from neighboring countries, and from the United States. In short, there is a growing perception of a price to be paid for abandoning democracy, not only domestically but internationally as well.

But the international environment is a discordant one. There are conflicting signals and incentives. If we can create a more coherent and vigorous international environment supporting democracy and democratization, we can bolster the existing democracies against reversion and induce more transitions to democracy, both gradual and rapid. As I will argue shortly in conclusion, that is the overriding challenge of the moment.

### **Why Do the Non-Democracies Hold Out?**

Several factors explain the tenacious resistance to the democratic trend on the part of roughly seventy countries. The least common explanation is authoritarian success. This can account for Singapore and Malaysia, and perhaps to some extent China with its recent rapid economic growth. But China remains a lower-middle-income country, and it is not at all clear that it will be able to sustain its phenomenal growth rates of the past two decades. Indeed, some economic observers believe its economic growth has pretty much stalled already. Then there are the oil-rich states—the ones with staggering revenue and relatively small populations—which have been able to maintain authoritarian rule because they have had the wealth to buy off their peoples while lavishly financing structures of internal security and control. Even so, their peoples—in Kuwait, in Qatar, in Bahrain, and now in Saudi Arabia—are restive and want more self-determination. With the exceptions of Singapore, Malaysia, possibly for a while China, and these oil-rich states, there are no dictatorships in the world that survive today because they have brought prosperity to their people.

There are a few other holdout communist states in Asia (Vietnam, Laos, North Korea) and Cuba as well. Here, the insular, repressive logic of communist control persists. However, Vietnam is learning from China's model of opening, and what is true for China is true for these states as well. The more they open to the outside world in terms of trade, investment, foreign study, foreign travel, and all the others aspects of globalization, the more their people become exposed to education and global culture, the more the insular, repressive logic will weaken. At some unpredictable point—probably well into the future in the case of Vietnam and China, but in the *foreseeable* future—a regime crisis, an economic downturn, a split within the elite, could ignite a transition to democracy. There is of course an alternative strategy to bring about regime change. Isolate them from the world. Make it hard for the regime. Then wait for it to collapse. We have tried this strategy for forty years in Cuba, and all it has done is impoverish the people and entrench their repressive rulers. Precisely in order to generate the social and economic changes that will finally undermine Communist rule in Cuba, we should lift the embargo and promote as much exchange and interaction with that country as possible.

Most dictatorships in the world survive for a simple reason. Their leaders enjoy having unchallenged power, and having as well the ability that power confers to accumulate substantial or even truly massive personal wealth. One can look at the authoritarian states of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East and say that their peoples don't want or understand democracy, aren't ready for responsible self-government, and so on. If nothing else, I hope I have exposed tonight the profound fallacy of this way of thinking. I do not pretend that the majority of people in every

country want a fully democratic system, or even, frankly, that all peoples understand what it is. But most people do want freedom. Given the choice, they would like to be able to constrain the arbitrary power of government, to replace bad and corrupt leaders, to have a predictable and secure life under some kind of rule of law. When one assembles these basic political preferences, it begins to look an awful lot like democracy, even if the word may have different (or unsure) meanings in many places.

There is a lot of work to be done around the world to build the culture of democracy—the understanding of its rules, possibilities, obligations, and limits, the norms of tolerance, civility, participation, and mutual respect. Some of this cultural change happens with economic development, increasing education, and exposure to the global environment. Much of it can and should happen through deliberate programs of civic education and civil society construction. External democracy promotion programs and domestic civil society efforts have made some progress toward these goals. Much more remains to be done.

But it is just not sensible to argue that the principle obstacle to the expansion of democracy in the world is the people of these authoritarian states. The problem is the ruling elites who have hijacked the structures of state power and barricaded themselves inside. In most of these authoritarian regimes, the logic of rule is not to generate public goods that can generate growth and broadly improve human well-being. It is to generate private goods that buy the loyalty of the army, the secret police, and the cronies and ruling party hacks that sustain the regime in power.<sup>39</sup> As long as these rulers can corner a sufficient flow of resources to feed their apparatus of political predation and domination, they can survive.

That is where the international environment enters in. More or less predatory authoritarian regimes are not adept at generating resources organically from their own societies. They inhibit domestic investment, innovation, entrepreneurship, and hence economic growth by violating property rights and other individual freedoms. They discourage foreign investment—except in the enclave economy of oil or other natural resource extraction—for the same reason. If they do not have natural resources, they become heavily in need of foreign loans and aid. This makes them vulnerable, if the sources of those loans start insisting on responsible government.

Finally, let me say an additional word about the Arab states. For the most part, they are either oil states or internationally dependent dictatorships. But there has been another entirely unique factor in their political survival. All of these dictatorships have been able to summon up a grand excuse for the failures and disappointments of their systems. First, it was the so-called “colonial” existence of the state of Israel. For some it is still that, but now in particular it is the plight of the Palestinians, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Over the past several decades, this conflict has generated a heavy fog over Arab politics, diminishing political visibility and transparency. Arab governments have used it relentlessly to legitimate their rule—by stressing the authenticity of their commitment to something larger than themselves—and have relied on it more and more as the older forms of nationalism and pan-Arab nationalism have lost their luster. Much of the energy and emotion of Arab intellectuals and political activists has been drawn away from national political failings into protest over this larger political struggle. The debate about the true failings of Arab development—so eloquently expressed in last year’s *Arab Development Report*—has been distorted and deflected by this powerful symbolic struggle over Arab identity and dignity.

Until the fog of this struggle is lifted, so that the peoples of the Arab world can see and debate more clearly the real nature of the obstacles to national progress, and so that radical

Islamists will be deprived of one of their most emotive instruments for mobilizing political support, genuine and lasting democratization will be unlikely in the region.

### **What Is To Be Done?**

Permit me to conclude with the classic question that Lenin asked as he sought his own version of revolutionary transformation: What is to be done? Because time has grown short, I will need to be cryptic here, but I think my points have already largely been made. First, with respect to the Arab world, it is simply essential that we pursue—vigorously and relentlessly—a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of the only broadly viable solution. There can be many debates and adjustments, but in its general contours, this must involve the permanent co-existence and mutual recognition of two separate states, one an Israel that withdraws from most of its settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, the other an essentially demilitarized Palestine. Only the settlement of this conflict can create a political climate in which Arab dictatorships have no more political cover for their abuses and Arab societies can focus on the real sources of their misery and frustration.

Second, we need to open up the closed societies of the world. I do not propose to shower them with aid, far from it. But we should promote trade, travel, and exchanges of all kinds with countries like Cuba, Vietnam, Burma, and, yes, North Korea. If you will permit the mixed metaphor, the North Korean dictatorship is built like a house of cards on a tissue of lies. Its people, the most physically and intellectually isolated and totally brutalized of any in the world today, do not have a clue as to how the rest of the world lives. Once they find out, I believe the regime will crumble, or else change very rapidly.

Third, we need a new deal in foreign aid and debt relief. Even after the end of the Cold War, even with the new standards and pressures on dictatorships, the resources to sustain them have largely continued to flow. Part of this has simply been inertia. Part of this has been the utterly perverse structural logic of aid agencies and especially the World Bank. Their regional and country officials are given portfolios of money to lend and projects to initiate, and their careers suffer if they do not push the money out the door. Part of the reason has been fear that if we lean too heavily on weak, oppressive, rotten states, they will collapse altogether into new humanitarian emergencies. Instead, we watch and fund them while they disintegrate more slowly, and millions of their people live shorter, more brutish lives because of abusive governance. Finally, part of the problem has been the conflicting priorities of bilateral donors (including the United States) that still want to maintain friendly client states around the world. Some thought this dualism—a polite word for hypocrisy—would come to end with the demise of the Cold War. And indeed, it did subside for a time. But with the inception of the new War on Terrorism since September 11, the problem of selling short our principles in order to nurture our authoritarian clients has been reborn with a vengeance.

A new deal on aid would radically accelerate and institutionalize the tentative trends toward encouraging and expecting good governance in exchange for foreign aid. The Bush Administration took an important step forward last year when it announced the creation of a Millennium Challenge Account, which will award a new \$5 billion dollar increment in development assistance (about a 50% increase over the current US foreign aid budget) to a select number of low- and lower-middle-income countries that compete for it on the basis of three criteria: ruling justly (including democratically and accountably), investing in people, and

promoting economic freedom. Hopefully, countries that qualify will start receiving substantial new amounts of aid in the next year.

This is an important departure—indeed, a conceptual revolution—in foreign aid. But it does not go nearly far enough. First, we still need to question what we are doing with the rest of our foreign aid budget. Much of it goes to countries ruled by corrupt, authoritarian regimes. If that aid is delivered to and through civil society, rather than the corrupt state itself, it may do some good. But too much is wasted, and there is too little effort to generate leverage for real political change. The big problem is the other donors: the World Bank, the regional development banks, the Japanese, and many of the European aid agencies.

Democratic change is possible in the remaining corrupt dictatorships of the world, but it will require a radical manipulation of the incentives their leaders confront. They must know that the party is over, that they cannot any longer play one powerful donor off against another, or one country promoting its own oil industry over another. During the previous year, I worked as a consultant for our aid agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development to help develop a new strategy for our foreign aid. This January our report, *Foreign Aid in the National Interest*, was released (and is available at [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)). Here are some of the recommendations from that report, which, if enacted, could transform the international context in which dictatorships now maneuver to survive:

1. *Overall levels of foreign assistance must be linked more clearly to a country's development performance, and to demonstrations of political will for reform and good governance.*
2. *Good performers must be tangibly rewarded.* When political leaders demonstrate respect for democratic procedures and freedoms, and a willingness to undertake and see through difficult political and economic reforms, they should benefit with steady increases in U.S. foreign assistance and in aid levels from other donors. In addition, good performers should be rewarded in other tangible ways: with debt relief, incentives for foreign investment, and trade liberalization.
3. *Rewards must be granted for demonstrated performance, not for promises that may be repeatedly made and broken.* The only way to exit from the chronic “cat and mouse” game of international conditionality is to make increases in development assistance and other economic rewards contingent on what governments actually do, not what they say they will do.
4. *If there is no political commitment to democratic and good governance reforms, the United States should suspend governmental assistance and work only with non-governmental actors.* US assistance is typically only a small portion of overall foreign assistance received by a government, but it is a highly visible portion. When the United States ceases assistance to a government, other donors and various political and societal actors in the country take notice (and should be lobbied to follow suit). Political leaders must learn that they will pay a heavy international price for their bad governance.
5. *The United States should use its voice and vote, and the full force of its influence, within the executive bodies of the World Bank and other multilateral development banks to reduce assistance to bad governments.* We



- should carry the principles of our own foreign policy into the realm of international development, and we should continue to press for greater accountability in international lending. In the absence of any demonstration of commitment to reform, assistance should be channeled through and to non-governmental actors.
6. *The United States must work more closely with other bilateral donors to coordinate pressure on truly bad, recalcitrant governments.* Reductions in U.S. aid will not have much impact in changing the calculations of political leaders if their governments continue to receive levels of funding from other donors far greater than the U.S. aid. Leadership calculations will be most likely to change, and to be translated into action, when those leaders perceive a relatively coherent message from the universe of international donors.
  7. *Where committed reformers can be identified within the state, donors should work with them.* We should identify and try to strengthen the hand of reform-oriented ministers, agency heads, and provincial governors through specific programs of political assistance and institution building.
  8. *State capacity must be generally enhanced, but it makes no sense to try to strengthen the technical capacity and administrative ability of state structures that lack the political will to govern responsibly.* Building effective state structures must become a major strategic objective of assistance, but it cannot be pursued until state leaders are serious about governance. Expensive investments to strengthen the technical capacity of judiciaries and legislatures may be largely wasted if there is no political will to use enhanced capabilities for better governance.
  9. *Donors should encourage the global private sector to accelerate efforts to incorporate judgments about the quality and transparency of governance into its decisions on private capital flows.* An important priority in this regard is to improve comparative measures of the quality of governance and then widely publicize them.
  10. *International donors must strengthen the global rule of law, particularly the capacity to track down and close off corrupt flows of money in the international banking system.*

In addition, *a greater proportion of total U.S. foreign assistance should be devoted to political assistance to build democracy and improve the quality of governance.* In truly intractable cases, helping to generate the demand for democracy and better governance, by strengthening the capacity and reform understanding of independent organizations, interest groups, social movements, mass media, universities, and think tanks in civil society, may be the main thing the United States can do to aid development. For in the absence of minimally decent governance, efforts to work with state institutions to improve health, education, or agricultural productivity are likely to be enervated by corruption, waste, and incompetence. In struggling democracies, and more generally, improvements in the governance climate enhance reform efforts, and investments in better governance are likely to yield more numerous, immediate and powerful multiplier effects. Whatever progress is made on governance will almost certainly have a positive impact on other sectors. Probably no other dimension of foreign assistance yields so many synergies.

The above amounts to a truly radical new strategy, moving from the current exhausted approach of conditionality to a strategy of selectivity that rewards political freedom and accountability. As much as possible, rewards should be structured to lock into place the institutions and practices of democracy and good governance. As we seek to expand NAFTA into a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, we should adopt a requirement similar to the European Union, that all members uphold democracy and human rights. In the case of debt relief for highly indebted poor countries, future relief should only be granted to countries that have demonstrated a basic commitment to good governance, by allowing a free press and civil society, an independent judiciary, and a serious counter-corruption commission. Even in these cases, the debt should not be relieved in one fell swoop, but should be suspended and retired incrementally (for example, at ten percent per year), generating ongoing incentives for adhering to good governance.

If the United States, and the other major bilateral and multilateral donors, were to move together toward such a comprehensive strategy affirming democracy and good governance as the basis of development (and hence development assistance), it would generate very powerful new pressures for democratic reform. Not all non-democratic states would be immediately affected, because not all of them depend on these flows of assistance. But the overall global climate would shift emphatically in favor of democratic change, generating potent demonstration effects even on the stand-pat regimes.

Of course, this would still leave open the question of *how* democratic change could be accomplished in countries that have never been democracies before. If there is one thing we have learned in the course of the third wave, it is that there is no one formula for getting to democracy, or for structuring it institutionally so that it will work reasonably well. Different countries need different sequences, strategies, and structures for democratic change. In some cases, the transition to democracy could and should proceed fairly rapidly, since governance is such a mess and viable democratic forces wait in the wings. In other cases—and I believe this includes many of the Arab states—the transition to democracy may need to proceed more cautiously and incrementally.

The Arab world is distinct in some respects. I have already mentioned the explosive context of regional conflict. Another distinction is that for several decades, the formal political arena has been closed off to all but a relatively narrow circle of establishment parties and interest groups, while in the underground, radical Islamist parties and groups have mobilized a considerable network of affection and support, but with an anti-democratic, and even neo-totalitarian agenda. The more moderate and pro-democratic groups—both Islamist and secular—have been squeezed between the iron fist of the state and the subterranean pressure of radical Islam. If they are to be given a fair chance to compete in electoral politics, these moderates will need time to surface, organize, advocate, and campaign. In the meantime, an interim period of political liberalization must be used to build the independent structures of horizontal accountability—the judiciary, audit agency, counter-corruption commission, human rights commission, ombudsman, and electoral administration—that can ensure free and fair electoral competition and constrain whoever wins election in the new system.

I do not have time to address it in depth here, but the challenge in post-war Iraq will be unique. There, the state and political system must be thoroughly reconstructed, at the same time as we rebuild an economy devastated by three major wars and two decades of colossal misrule. The one thing we absolutely must not do is to impose a leader or solution of our choosing. Iraqis—both those within the country and returning from exile—must be given the time and

space to assemble in local groups, select representatives to interim councils, and deliberate through those councils to form a broad-based interim government. Then they must begin to take responsibility for administering and rebuilding the country, while organizing a smaller and more professional new army, debating and drafting a new constitution, then submitting it to a referendum, forming political parties and civic associations, constructing new independent media, electing new municipal and provincial governments, operating these new governments, and only some years later, holding national elections for a new constitutional government. During this period of political reconstruction and nation-building, possibly lasting five years, some international authority will need to provide initial supervision of the process, gradually withdrawing as the Iraqi authority is able to assume greater and greater responsibility. It is important that the leadership of that international administration not be American, and we will probably all be better off if the United Nations has a prominent role in it.

### **Can It Be Done?**

I have laid out a bold agenda. Perhaps it is too bold. No doubt it contains flaws of its own. In any case, the notions of academics are never wholly (or even much at all) realized in history. Unfortunately, we will probably fall short of the courage, imagination, and nerve to really transform the global political climate. Part of this challenge is deeply political, even in terms of our own national debate. It is important to realize how the current war has further altered the international climate. Increasingly, the United States is seen as an imperial power, imposing its will largely unilaterally on the rest of the world. That may serve our short-term interests in any one conflict or dispute, but it will not facilitate our deeper, long-term interest in building a world of democracies and good governance. We cannot invade and conquer every dictatorship in the world. In fact, I think our national appetite for forcible regime change will quickly become exhausted in Iraq. Unless we learn to work with and through international partners and institutions, while seeking to energize, transform, and—not least—democratize global institutions, our scope to affect further democratic change in the world will shrink.

Whatever may happen in Iraq, I find it difficult to be sanguine about the near-term future. We confront serious challenges of international terrorism and big-power division. Our moral prestige in the world has suffered in the past few months, even as respect for our sheer military power has increased. It will be a difficult, volatile time diplomatically.

We should also not take the existing democracies for granted. I have said that there is a new sobriety even among the democracies that are not performing well. People know the alternatives and do not like them. They still embrace democracy. But will they continue to do so a decade or two hence, if a new generation—with no direct experience of the costs and illusions of authoritarian rule—finds itself without education, without jobs, without justice, and pretty much without hope? We can only travel so far on democracy as the least bad system. If it turns out to govern badly for a long period of time, some new alternative will eventually come along.

Let me conclude, however, on the hopeful note that has largely permeated my remarks tonight. If we can manage more or less to sustain the process of global economic integration and growth, while making freedom at least an important priority in our diplomacy, aid, and other international engagements, I think democracy will continue to expand in the world. History has proven that it is the best form of government. And gradually—probably not in my lifetime, but maybe in that of someone sitting in this audience—virtually every country in the world may be democratic.

**Appendix Classification of Regimes at the End of 2002**  
*(Figures in Italics are Per Capita Gross National Income in PPP, 2001)*

<b>Western Europe (24 states)</b>					
<b>Liberal Democracy FH 1-2.0</b>	<b>Electoral Democracy FH&gt;2.0</b>	<b>Ambiguous Regimes</b>	<b>Competitive Authoritarian</b>	<b>Electoral, Uncompetitive Authoritarian</b>	<b>Politically Closed Authoritarian</b>
United States (1,1)					
Canada (1,1)					
Australia (1,1)					
New Zealand (1,1) <i>PC GNI High Income: \$27,680</i>					

<b>Postcommunist (CEU &amp; FSU) (27)</b>					
<b>Liberal Democracy</b>	<b>Electoral Democracy FH&gt;2.0</b>	<b>Ambiguous Regimes</b>	<b>Competitive Authoritarian</b>	<b>Electoral, Uncompetitive Authoritarian</b>	<b>Politically Closed Authoritarian</b>
Czech Republic (1,2) <i>\$14,550</i>	Moldova (3,4) <i>\$2,420</i>	Armenia (4,4) <i>\$2,880</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina (4,4)*	Azerbaijan (6,5) <i>\$3,020</i>	Turkmenistan (7,7) <i>\$4580</i>
Hungary (1,2) <i>\$12,570</i>	Yugoslavia (3,2)	Georgia (4,4) <i>\$2,860</i>	Russia (5,5) <i>\$8,660</i>	Belarus (6,6) <i>\$8,030</i>	Uzbekistan (7,6) <i>\$2470</i>
Poland (1,2) <i>\$9,280</i>	Albania (3,3) <i>\$3,880</i>	Ukraine (4,4) <i>\$4,150</i>		Kazakhstan (6,5) <i>\$6370</i>	
Slovakia (1,2) <i>\$11,160</i>	Macedonia (3,3) <i>\$4,860</i>			Kyrgyzstan (6,5) <i>\$2710</i>	
Slovenia (1,2) <i>\$18,160</i>				Tajikistan (6,6) <i>\$1150</i>	
Estonia (1,2) <i>\$10,020</i>					
Latvia (1,2) <i>\$4,870</i>					
Lithuania (1,2) <i>\$7,610</i>					
Bulgaria (1,2) <i>\$5950</i>					
Croatia (2,2) <i>\$8440</i>					
Romania (2,2) <i>\$6980</i>					

<b>Latin America and the Caribbean (33)</b>					
<b>Liberal Democracy</b>	<b>Electoral Democracy FH&gt;2.0</b>	<b>Ambiguous Regimes</b>	<b>Competitive Authoritarian</b>	<b>Electoral, Uncompetitive Authoritarian</b>	<b>Politically Closed Authoritarian</b>
8 Caribbean States <sup>40</sup> with pop<1 million	Argentina (2,3) \$11,690	Venezuela (3,4) \$5980	Antigua & Barbuda (4,2) \$9,870		Cuba (7,7)
Uruguay (1,1) \$8710	El Salvador (2,3) \$4500	Paraguay (4,3) \$4400	Haiti (6,6) \$1450		
Costa Rica (1,2) \$8080	Jamaica (2,3) \$3650	Colombia (4,4) \$5980			
Panama (1,2) \$5720	Peru (2,3) \$4680				
Suriname (1,2) \$3,310	Brazil (3,3) \$7450				
Bolivia (1,3) \$2380	Ecuador (3,3) \$3070				
Chile (2,1) \$9420	Honduras (3,3) \$2450				
Dominican Republic (2,2) \$5870	Nicaragua (3,3)				
Mexico (2,2) \$8770	Trinidad & Tobago (3,3) \$9,080				
Guyana (2,2)	Guatemala (4,4) \$3850				

<b>Asia (E, SE, &amp; S) (25)</b>					
<b>Liberal Democracy</b>	<b>Electoral Democracy FH&gt;2.0</b>	<b>Ambiguous Regimes</b>	<b>Competitive Authoritarian</b>	<b>Electoral, Uncompetitive Authoritarian</b>	<b>Politically Closed Authoritarian</b>
Japan (1,2) \$27,430	India (2,3) \$2450	Indonesia (3,4) \$2940	Malaysia (5,5) \$8340	Singapore (5,4) \$24,910	Brunei (5,5)
Taiwan (1,2)	Philippines (2,3) \$4360	Nepal (4,4) \$1450		Maldives (6,5) \$4,520	Bhutan (6,5) \$1,530
S. Korea (2,2) \$18,110	Thailand (2,3) \$6550			Cambodia (6,5) \$1520	Afghanistan (7,7)
Mongolia (2,2) \$1800	Bangladesh (3,4) \$1680			Pakistan (6,5) \$1920	China (7,6) \$4260
	Sri Lanka (3,4) \$3560				Laos (7,6) \$1610
	East Timor (3,3)				Vietnam (7,6) \$2130
					Burma (7,7)
					N Korea (7,7)
<b>Pacific Island (12)</b>					
8 Pacific Island States <sup>41</sup>	Papua New Guinea (2,3) \$2,150	Fiji (4,3) \$5,140			
	Solomon Island (4,4) \$1,680	Tonga (5,3) <sup>#</sup>			

<b>Africa (Sub-Sahara) (48)</b>					
<b>Liberal Democracy</b>	<b>Electoral Democracy FH&gt;2.0</b>	<b>Ambiguous Regimes</b>	<b>Competitive Authoritarian</b>	<b>Electoral, Uncompetitive Authoritarian</b>	<b>Politically Closed Authoritarian</b>
Cape Verde (1,2) \$4,870	Ghana (2,3) \$1980	Mozambique (3,4) \$1,000	Guinea-Bissau (4,4) \$710	Burkina Faso (4,4) \$1020	Swaziland (6,5) <sup>#</sup> \$4,690
Mauritius (1,2) \$10,410	Mali (2,3) \$810	Tanzania (4,3) \$540	Djibouti (4,5) \$2,120	Comoros (5,4) \$1,610	Burundi (6,6) \$590
Sao Tome & Principe (1,2) \$1960	Namibia (2,3) \$1960	Nigeria (4,5) \$830	Gabon (5,4) \$5,460	Mauritania (5,5) \$1,680	Congo, Dem Rep (6,6)
South Africa (1,2) \$9510	Lesotho (2,3) \$2,670	Sierra Leone (4,5) \$480	Central African Rep (5,5) \$1,180	Congo, People Rep (6,4) \$580	Equatorial Guinea (6,7) \$5,640
Botswana (2,2) \$8810	Senegal (2,3) \$1,560	Zambia (4,4) \$790	Gambia (5,5) \$1,730	Chad (6,5) <sup>42</sup> \$930	Eritrea (7,6) \$970
	Benin (3,2) \$1030		Ethiopia (5,5) (\$710)	Guinea (6,5) \$1,980	Rwanda (7,5) \$1,000
	Seychelles (3,3) \$7,050		Togo (5,5) \$1,420	Uganda (6,5) \$1,250	Somalia (6,7)
	Madagascar (3,4) \$870		Cote d'Ivoire (6,6) \$1,470	Angola (6,6) \$1550	Sudan (7,7) \$1610
	Malawi (4,4) \$620		Cameroon (6,6) \$1,670	Liberia (6,6)	
	Niger (4,4) \$770		Zimbabwe (6,6) \$2,340		
	Kenya { ??5,4) \$1,020				

<b>Middle East-North Africa (19)</b>					
<b>Liberal Democracy</b>	<b>Electoral Democracy FH&gt;2.0</b>	<b>Ambiguous Regimes</b>	<b>Competitive Authoritarian</b>	<b>Electoral, Uncompetitive Authoritarian</b>	<b>Politically Closed Authoritarian</b>
Israel (1,3) \$19,330	Turkey (4,4) \$6,640		Kuwait <sup>#</sup> (4,5) \$18,690	Bahrain <sup>#</sup> (5,5) <sup>43</sup> \$14,410	Oman <sup>#</sup> (6,5)
			Morocco <sup>#</sup> (5,5) \$3690	Jordan <sup>#</sup> (6,5) \$4080	United Arab Emirates <sup>#</sup> (6,5)
			Lebanon (6,5) \$4640	Algeria (5,6) \$5150	Qatar <sup>#</sup> (6,6)
			Yemen (6,5) \$770	Tunisia (6,5) \$6450	Iraq (7,7)
			Iran (6,6) \$6230	Egypt (6,6) \$3790	Libya (7,7)
					Saudi Arabia <sup>#</sup> (7,7) \$11,390
					Syria (7,7) \$3,440

\* International Protectorate.

# Traditional Monarchy. Tonga is a liberal autocracy, with only partial elective authority.



## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Michael Bratton, "Second Elections in Africa," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *Democratization in Africa* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999): 18-33.

<sup>3</sup> For a fuller consideration of these dimensions of electoral democracy, see Larry Diamond, "Elections without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes," *Journal of Democracy* 13 (April 2002): 28-29.

<sup>4</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (January 1994): 55-69.

<sup>5</sup> Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).

<sup>6</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell, "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies," in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999): 29-51.

<sup>7</sup> Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999): 10-12.

<sup>8</sup> Alfred Stepan, *Journal of Democracy* 14 (July 2003), forthcoming.

<sup>9</sup> The democracies in this set are Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, and the U.S. The non-democracies are China, Pakistan and Russia—and many observers judge Russia to be a democracy (of sorts).

<sup>10</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). The first edition of this book was published in 1960, and in fact Lipset's essay on this theme, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," was published in the *American Political Science Review* in 1959.

<sup>11</sup> Their poorest category was under \$1000 in 1985 Purchasing Power Parity dollars, which is equivalent to \$1449 in year 2000 dollars. See Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well Being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 92-103.

<sup>12</sup> Amartya Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *The Global Divergence of Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001): 13.

<sup>13</sup> "Key Findings about Public Opinion in Africa," *Afrobarometer Briefing Paper Number 1* (April 2002), <http://www.afrobarometer.org/papers/AfrobriefNo1.pdf>. See also Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, "How People View Democracy: Africans' Surprising Universalism," *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 1 (January 2001): 107-121.

<sup>14</sup> Data from the East Asia Barometer, collected in 2001. More abstract support for democracy—as indicated by agreement with the standard item "Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government," is weaker however: 40 percent in Taiwan and also in Hong Kong, 47% in Korea, 64 % in the Philippines, and 84% in Thailand (which evinces the strongest support for democracy on many measures).

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<sup>15</sup> *A Bottom-Up Evaluation of Enlargement Countries*, New Europe Barometer 1, Studies in Public Policy 364, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 2002. The proportion rejecting the suspension of parties and parliament in favor of a strong leader ranges from 87% in the Czech Republic to 60 percent in Lithuania and Estonia. Overall, 71 percent reject a dictator, 94% reject Army rule, and 82 percent reject a return to Communist rule. In Russia, the percentage favoring a return to Communism is much higher, 47%.

<sup>16</sup> "Islam, Democracy, and Public Opinion in Africa," Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 3, September 2002, <http://www.afrobarometer.org/papers/AfrobriefNo3.pdf>.

<sup>17</sup> Richard Rose, "How Muslims View Democracy: Evidence from Central Asia," *Journal of Democracy* 13 (October 2002): 102-111; Mark Tessler, "Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries," *Comparative Politics* 34 (April 2002):337-354.

<sup>18</sup> Tessler, "Islam and Democracy," 348.

<sup>19</sup> Rose, "How Muslims View Democracy," 107.

<sup>20</sup> See the essays on Islam and democracy in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Daniel Brumberg, eds., *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, forthcoming).

<sup>21</sup> *The Arab Human Development Report 2002* (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2002): 2.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, p. 114.

<sup>23</sup> Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value," p. 12.

<sup>24</sup> Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," in Gary Marks and Larry Diamond, eds., *Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992): 93-139.

<sup>25</sup> Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 65.

<sup>26</sup> Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 21-23; see also Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 87-89.

<sup>27</sup> For an early summary of these and other international democratic assistance efforts, see Larry Diamond, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Issues and Actors, Instruments and Imperatives* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1996), available at <http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm>.

<sup>28</sup> Arturo Valenzuela, "Paraguay: The Coup that Didn't Happen," *Journal of Democracy* 8 (January 1997): 43-55.

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<sup>29</sup> Thomas Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," *The American Journal of International Law* 86, no. 46 (1992), p. 50.

<sup>30</sup> Roland Rich, "Bringing Democracy into International Law," *Journal of Democracy* 12 (July 2001): 20-34.

<sup>31</sup> For this and other excerpts of the "Warsaw Declaration," and a list of signatory countries, see *Journal of Democracy* 11 (October 2000): 184-187.

<sup>32</sup> Morton H. Halperin and Kristen Lomasney, "Toward a Global 'Guarantee Clause,'" *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 3, July 1993, pp. 60-69; and Morton H. Halperin, "Guaranteeing Democracy," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1993, pp. 105-122.

<sup>33</sup> This was the per capita income of Argentina in 1975, the richest country ever to have suffered a coup against democracy. Przeworski et al, *Democracy and Development*, p. 98.

<sup>34</sup> See the extensive data in Marta Lagos, "Latin America's Lost Illusions: A Road with No Return?" *Journal of Democracy* 14 (April 2003).

<sup>35</sup> *A Bottom Up Evaluation of Enlargement Countries*, pp. 6-13.

<sup>36</sup> Quoted in Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998): 11.

<sup>37</sup> Amartya Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value," p. 12.

<sup>38</sup> For a more fine-grained classification of all the world's regimes along these lines, see the tables in the Appendix. These update my analysis in "Elections without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes."

<sup>39</sup> Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alistair Smith, "Political Competition and Economic Growth," *Journal of Democracy* 12 (January 2001): 158-72.

<sup>40</sup> Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines

<sup>41</sup> Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

<sup>42</sup> Technically a no-party regime, but with competitive and partially free elections.

<sup>43</sup> In transition to a more open and competitive political system.