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SEARCHING FOR WORK WITH A CRIMINAL RECORD[*]

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SEARCHING FOR WORK WITH A CRIMINAL RECORD

ABSTRACT

To date, researchers have been very attentive to how the stigma of criminality informs employers' hiring decisions, and, in the process, diminishes the employment opportunities afforded to jobseekers so stigmatized. Few researchers, however, have investigated the extent to which criminal records also shape jobseekers' search strategies in ways that either attenuate or amplify the effects of their negative credentials. We fill this gap in the literature by investigating how arrest, conviction, and incarceration affect the scope of jobseekers' search efforts as well as the specific methods they deploy. We then examine the extent to which gaps in job search success can be attributed to stigmatized jobseekers' search strategies. Analysis of the NLSY97 reveals that arrestees and former prisoners (but not ex-convicts) are disadvantaged both by the scope of their search efforts and by the specific methods they use. Arrestees are less likely than non-offenders to find work during the search process because they use fewer search methods, and because they over-invest in ineffective methods while under-investing in more effective methods. Although former prisoners are also disadvantaged by over- and under-investing, we primarily attribute their lower odds of search success to the differential impacts of their search strategies. Even when the scope and nature of their searches mirror those of non-offenders, their searches are less likely to end successfully. By bringing "search" into debates on punishment and inequality, we provide a new and complementary way to understand how a criminal record negatively affects jobseekers' chances of finding work.

INTRODUCTION

Recent research indicates that contact with the penal system depresses individuals' employment outcomes. Arrest, conviction, and incarceration reduce the odds of getting a job, and, once a job is found, reduce the number of weeks worked annually (Freeman 1991; Grogger 1992; Waldfogel 1994a, 1994b; Nagin and Waldfogel 1995; and Western 2006; but for exceptions see Kling 1999; Pettit and Lyons 2007; Sabol 2007). To explain these relationships, some scholars contend that the problems faced by jobseekers with a criminal record (JCRs) are largely the result of pre-offense, individual-level attributes; i.e., the characteristics that predict criminal behavior also explain poor employment outcomes, post-offense (Grogger 1995). Other scholars locate ex-offenders' post-offense employment disadvantage in the loss of valuable human and social capital, which erodes with incarceration (Waldfogel 1994b; Western, Lopoo, and McLanahan 2004; Lopoo and Western 2005). Most researchers, however, highlight the mechanisms by which the stigma of a criminal record diminishes ex-offenders' odds of getting work. Specifically, they point to legal barriers to ex-offenders' employment (Dale 1976; Hahn 1991; May 1995; Olivares et al., 1996; Petersilia 2003); employers' fears that they will be found liable for negligent hiring if "marked" employees act criminally on the job (Bushway 1998; Glynn 1998; Connerley et al., 2001); and employers' general distrust of a pool of applicants who essentially have been certified untrustworthy by the penal system (Schwartz and Skolnick 1964; Boshier and Johnson 1974; Pager 2003, 2007a; Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2007).

Despite this extensive body of research, few studies have done a systematic examination of just how JCRs search for work and what affect their search strategies have on job-finding success.[1] Because search decisions are not without consequence (Holzer 1987a, 1987b; Wielgosz and Carpenter 1987; Blau and Robins 1990; Osberg 1993), this omission is important. Methods vary

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[1] In this paper, we use the three-letter acronym, "JCR," to refer to jobseekers with criminal records. Unlike many studies that focus solely on the experiences of former prisoners and to a lesser degree ex-convicts, we are interested as well in the experiences of arrestees who have not been convicted of crimes, since previous research indicates that arrest without conviction also stigmatizes and negatively affects jobseekers' outcomes (Boshier and Johnson 1974). Because arrestees (and even some former prisoners) who have not been convicted are not technically ex-offenders, throughout the paper we tend to opt for the acronym "JCR" instead of the popularly used term, "ex-offender."

significantly in terms of the amount and quality of information and influence they provide to employers and jobseekers, and so they differ, too, in their ability to buffer applicants from the stigma of criminality. Thus, how JCRs search for work—the scope of their search and the specific methods they deploy—should affect whether or not they find work. To date, however, researchers have neglected to investigate this possibility, and so we contribute to current debates in the field by bringing job search into the discussion. Specifically, our study is motivated by two central research questions: First, do arrest, conviction, and incarceration shape the scope of jobseekers' search and the specific methods they deploy, and if so, how? Second, to what extent can we attribute gaps in job search success between non-offenders and JCRs to jobseekers' search strategies?

To address these questions, we analyzed the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97). Analysis of the NLSY97 reveals that arrestees and former prisoners are disadvantaged both by the scope of their search efforts and by the specific methods they use. Arrestees are less likely than non-offenders to end search successfully because they both engage in searches with narrower scopes and their search efforts are less likely than those of non-offenders to yield jobs. Moreover, arrestees also over-invest in ineffective search methods ("other") and under-invest in methods that would likely yield more job offers (labor market intermediaries and going-it-alone). Former prisoners are disadvantaged by over- ("other") and under-investing (going-it-alone), but they are primarily disadvantaged relative to non-offenders by the differential impacts of their deployment of two search strategies—labor market intermediaries and going-it-alone. Even when the scope and nature of their searches mirror those of non-offenders, their searches are less likely to end successfully. Drawing from previous research, we speculate about why, implicating employer reluctance to hire JCRs and the quality of jobseekers' own search activities. But by focusing on the role of job search in studies of punishment and inequality, we provide a new and complementary way to understand how a criminal record can negatively shape jobseekers' chances of finding work.

BRINGING "SEARCH" BACK IN

Barriers to employment abound for jobseekers with a criminal record. Federal and state laws restrict ex-offenders' access to government employment, and there are numerous provisions against extending licenses to ex-offenders for government-regulated, private occupations (Dale 1976; Hahn 1991; May 1995; Olivares et al 1996; Petersilia 2003). In addition to legal blockages, ex-offenders' employment prospects are dimmed by employers' fears that they may be found liable for negligent hiring if "marked" employees act criminally on the job (Bushway 1998; Glynn 1998; Connerley et al., 2001).

Most employers, however, are disinclined to hire ex-offenders because they generally perceive them to be too risky to trust with business operations and assets (Schwartz and Skolnick 1964; Boshier and Johnson 1974; Holzer 1996; Pager 2003, 2007a; Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2007). In an audit study designed to examine the effect of having a criminal record on hiring, Pager (2003) shows that employers are twice as likely to call back non-offenders as they are to call equally qualified ex-offenders. Furthermore, findings from employer surveys indicate that two-thirds of employers would not knowingly hire ex-offenders, and over 40 percent indicated that they probably would not or definitely would not (Holzer 1996; Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2007). Indeed, fewer than six percent report that they would *definitely* hire ex-offenders (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2007).[2] It probably does not help that employers, like most people, are clueless about how long ex-offenders must remain crime-free before they represent a negligible risk of re-offending (Blumstein and Nakamura 2009).[3]

To increase employers' willingness to hire applicants with a criminal record, employers would want assurances that the jobseeker is no more likely than non-offenders to cause harm to the

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[2] In "Walking the Talk? What Employers Say Versus What They Do," Devah Pager and Lincoln Quillian (2005) examine the relationship between employers' attitudes toward hiring ex-offenders and their actual hiring behavior. They also use employers' self-reports and actual hiring data to determine employers' willingness to hire black and white ex-offenders. They find that employers who say that they are willing to hire ex-offenders are no more likely to do so than employers who say they are not willing. In addition, although employers claimed to have no racial bias, analysis of actual hiring behavior revealed quite the contrary. Hiring decisions were strongly associated with the race of the job candidate, to black men's noteworthy disadvantage.

[3] Recent research indicates that after roughly 4.5 to 8.5 years, the risk of an ex-offender committing another crime is no greater than that of individuals who had never been arrested and *less* than the risk of arrest for those of the same age in the general population. The younger the offender at first offense, the longer it generally takes to achieve a "clean" record and average risk of re-offending (Blumstein and Nakamura 2009).

physical, financial, and/or reputational well-being of the workplace (Blumstein and Nakamura 2009). We posit that how ex-offenders initially present themselves to employers through the job search methods they deploy could shape employers' impressions and affect their hiring decisions. Job search methods generally fall into three major categories.[4] Jobseekers search for work through their networks of friends, family members, and acquaintances; through labor market intermediaries, such as private and public employment agencies, college placement offices, or union halls; and through their own efforts, such as checking with employers directly and placing or answering ads in newspapers or on the Internet. In terms of efficiency, these methods vary considerably (Holzer 1987a, 1987b; Wielgosz and Carpenter 1987; Blau and Robins 1990; Osberg 1993).

Network Search. Network search is pervasive, exceeding 80% among some populations, such as Latinos and the poor (see, for instance, Corcoran, Datcher, and Duncan 1980a, 1980b; Holzer 1987a, 1987b; Marsden and Campbell 1990; Granovetter 1995; Green, Tigges, and Diaz 1999; Falcon and Melendez 2001). This appears to be for good reason. Previous research suggests that searching for work through friends and relatives is more efficient than using other methods of job search. First, network search is relatively costless. It generally takes little effort or time to learn about job opportunities from those with whom we already have relations because we are close to them and/or we see them with some regularity. Second, jobseekers who search through friends and relatives tend to have more successful searches—not only are they more likely to receive an interview, they are also more likely to receive and accept offers, and their search duration tends to be shorter (Holzer 1987a, 1987b; Wielgosz and Carpenter 1987; Blau and Robins 1990; Fernandez and Weinberg 1997; Petersen, Saporta and Seidel 2000; but see Mouw 2003 and Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo 2006). And finally, finding work through friends and relatives also increases the likelihood of *keeping* the job

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[4] Search methods are often categorized as either formal or informal. Formal methods are methods linked to efforts by institutions or organizations, such as employment agencies, placement offices, and newspapers, to inform and recruit potential applicants for job openings. Informal methods are linked to efforts individual jobseekers initiate, such as searching through friends, relatives, and acquaintances and applying directly to employers (Granovetter 1974; Drentea 1998). However, because we are interested in how the stigma of arrest affects jobseekers' deployment of social capital (network search), institutional capital (LMIs), or neither (go-it-alone strategies), this distinction is not very useful, since it would cause us to collapse into one category methods of search that, for our purposes, are analytically quite distinct.

(Fernandez and Weinberg 1997; Neckerman and Fernandez 2003; but see Fernandez, Castillo, and Moore 2000).

Labor Market Intermediaries. Labor market intermediation represents another category of job search used by a significant minority of jobseekers. According to Benner, Leete, and Pastor, labor market intermediaries (LMIs) are "organizations—public, private, nonprofit, or membership-based— that help broker the employment relationship through some combination of job matching, training, and career support services" (2007: 10). A number of organizations, very different in form and function, fall into this category. While some LMIs have been shown to increase the likelihood of search success, others are associated with lower odds of re-employment (Wielgosz and Carpenter 1987; Blau and Robins 1990; Bishop and Abraham 1993; Osberg 1993). *Temporary help services*, which, as sources of employment, have grown exponentially over the past two decades, provide benefits to both employers and jobseekers.[5] Although they do not appear to be as efficient as network search strategies—temp services yield similar rates of offers but lower acceptance rates (Blau and Robin 1990)—they yield superior results compared to other forms of search. *Public employment agencies* are often determined to be one of the least efficient and effective approaches to job-matching (Holzer 1987a; Wielgosz and Carpenter 1987; Blau and Robins 1991; Bishop and Abraham 1993; but see Thomas 1997). Employers avoid them because they often fail to screen applicants well and thus often provide poor-quality referrals (Van Ours 1994; Thomas 1997), and jobseekers are averse to using them because they infrequently provide access to information about *good* jobs for which jobseekers might be qualified (Van Ours 1994; Thomas 1997).[6] Finally, just as friends and relatives

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[5] For employers, temporary work has a lot to recommend it—it increases employers' flexibility in hiring, firing, and scheduling; it helps to reduce labor costs; it minimizes administrative work; and it allows for the screening of workers for permanent positions (Nollen 1996; Houseman 1997; Segal and Sullivan 1997; Blank 1998; Houseman and Polivka 2000; Houseman et al. 2003). But from a supply-side perspective, temporary employment also has a number of benefits. While more affluent workers appreciate temp work for the extra income, diversity of work experiences, and the flexibility it provides, disadvantaged workers often see temp work as a means to gain entree into the labor market, to get free general skills training, to develop valuable work experience and skills, and as a stepping-stone to regular, full-time employment (Nollen 1996; Segal and Sullivan 1997; Blank 1998; Houseman and Polivka 2000; Autor 2001; Houseman et al. 2003). For the many downsides for workers to finding work through temporary help services, see the following: Nollen 1996; Segal and Sullivan 1997; Heinrich et al. 2005; and Autor and Houseman 2009; Kalleberg 2011.

[6] Relatively recent research, however, calls into question conventional wisdom that public employment agencies delay transitions to employment relative to other search strategies. In an attempt to reconcile contradictory findings from non-experimental studies, which report longer unemployment spells among jobseekers matched to jobs by public agencies, and

can vouch for the trustworthiness and skill set of their job-seeking relations, *agents of community-based organizations and institutions*, such as school placement offices, community organizations, urban leagues, welfare agencies, and local CETA or WIN jobs programs, who are often very familiar with jobseekers' positive and negative attributes, can too, thus substantially improving jobseekers' odds of finding work (Holzer 1987b; Wielgosz and Carpenter 1987; Blau and Robin 1990).

Going It Alone. In the search for work, jobseekers can also search without the aid of personal or institutional intermediaries. Included in this category are those who, unsolicited, contact employers directly (also known as walk-ins) and those who respond to help wanted or classified ads placed in newspapers and, increasingly, the Internet (Kuhn and Skirtend 2000). The walk-in strategy of job search is one of the most widely used and effect search methods (Holzer 1987a, 1987b; Blau and Robins 1990; Osberg 1993). As with network search, the costs associated with walk-ins are relatively low (Bishop and Abraham 1993), and compared to other methods, it is relatively efficient at matching jobseekers to jobs (Holzer 1987a; Wielgosz and Carpenter 1987; Blau and Robins 1990; Osberg 1993).

Jobseekers who search by placing and responding to ads in newspapers, however, have lower rates of reemployment. Although searching through classified ads is a low-cost approach to learning about job vacancies, any one job announcement can garner the interest of thousands of jobseekers, dramatically increasing the pool of applicants and the level of competition for positions. Thus, while this approach leads to a great deal of contact with employers, because contact tends to be rather superficial, rates of offers and acceptances per employer contact are relatively low (Blau and Robins 1990), making it one of the least efficient and effective approaches to job matching (Holzer 1987a; Wielgosz and Carpenter 1987; but see Thomas 1997).

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studies based on experimental designs, which report significantly shorter unemployment spells among those job-matched by public agencies, Thomas (1997) examined the effect on unemployment spells of initial search method and actual job-finding method. He proposed that many jobseekers who eventually found jobs through public employment agencies actually began their job search by deploying other strategies that jobseekers tend to favor. As these alternative approaches proved unsuccessful, jobseekers eventually switched to public agencies, which in time ended their unemployment spells. Findings from Thomas's analysis of income survey data confirmed his hypotheses. Jobseekers who sought assistance from public agencies soon after job loss actually experienced faster transitions into employment. Furthermore, long spells of unemployment that ended with public agency use were, in fact, searches that began with other search strategies.

"Other". It is not unusual for jobseekers to take part in active search by adopting approaches that do not fit one of the common categories of search. When this happens, jobseekers' search methods are categorized as "other." Rarely, if ever, do investigators reveal what these approaches consist of, however, and so we are unable to describe the contents of this category in any greater detail. Previous research does give us some insight, however, into the prevalence of this amalgamation of approaches and to some extent its level of effectiveness. From an analysis of trends in the use of traditional search methods, "other" among them, Kuhn and Skuterud (2000) indicate that from the mid to late 1990s, roughly four percent of jobseekers adopted this approach, with the percentage growing steadily over time—from 3.5% in 1994 to 5.7% in 1999. Bortnick and Ports (1992) find relatively high rates of search success, second only to private employment agencies in securing employment the next month, among those deploying strategies that are labeled "other."

But how jobseekers search for and find work differs significantly by race, gender, and industry of employment. Although use of networks for job search is pervasive across demographic categories—roughly three-quarters have been found to network search and about half of these jobseekers are matched to jobs by a personal contact—Latinos are significantly more likely to search and find work through friends and relatives than are blacks and whites (Corcoran, Datcher and Duncan 1980a, 1980b; Green, Tigges, and Diaz 1999; Falcon and Melendez 2001), men are more likely to rely on personal connections than are women (Campbell and Rosenfeld 1985; Hanson and Pratt 1991; Drentea 1998), and employers of manual or blue-collar workers are more likely to recruit and hire through informal networks (Corcoran, Datcher, and Duncan 1980b; Holzer 1996).

A substantial minority of jobseekers also searches through LMIs, and trends indicate that LMI use is on the rise across categories of workers (Benner, Leete, and Pastor 2007; Smith and Neuwirth 2008). That said, blacks rely more heavily on public employment agencies, whites rely more heavily on private employment agencies, and men slightly outpace women in seeking LMI services. Compared to men, however, women are more likely to be placed when they deploy this method of job search (Bortnick and Ports 1992).

Most jobseekers also undertake search methods that do not require help from personal and institutional intermediaries. For instance, upwards of two-thirds have been found to contact employers directly (walk-in), and a slightly lower percentage place and answer classified ads, but whites and women are more likely to place and answer ads than are blacks and men, and men are more likely to contact employers directly than are women (Bortnick and Ports 1992).

HOW DO JOBSEEKERS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS FIND JOBS?

Despite over two decades of research on JCRs' labor market experiences, we know relatively little about how they search for work; nor is there yet a rich literature about what search methods are more likely to produce job offers (and thus jobs). This is because few studies systematically address these questions, and given the research designs and/or small sample sizes of those that do, it is difficult to generalize about the JCR population from the patterns of job finding observed in these studies.

What we do know from previous research, however, suggests that under certain conditions, each of the major search methods can greatly facilitate access to employment opportunities. Several studies, for instance, highlight the central role that JCRs' networks of friends and relatives play. For example, researchers from the Vera Institute of Justice conducted a study of former prisoners' re-integration experiences up to one month post-incarceration (Nelson, Deess, and Allen 1999). Of the 49 former prisoners they followed, roughly one-third (18) found work within the first month of release. Twelve of those making quick transitions had been hired even before release from prison—eight were rehired by their former employers and four found new jobs through the help of family members and friends.[7] If we consider rehired ex-offenders among those job-matched by their networks—by contacting former employers and/or coworkers, jobseekers were mobilizing their established networks—then the overwhelming majority—roughly two-thirds—were matched

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[7] Roughly two-thirds of former prisoners held jobs before arrest and incarceration (Lynch and Sabol 2001). The overwhelming majority of these workers do not return to the jobs they held before contact with the penal system, but among the relatively few ex-offenders who do find work immediately post-release, this is one of the two ways quick employment occurs (Nelson, Deess, and Allen 1999; Visher and Kachnowski 2007). Presumably, drawing from their direct experiences with ex-offenders, employers who rehire believe their ex-offending employees to be of negligible risk.

immediately post-release using network search.[8] Thus, as with other such studies (Visher and

Kachnowski 2007; Cobbina 2009), the Vera Institute Study highlights the role of friends and relatives

in helping former prisoners, male and female, to make quick transitions into employment, post-

incarceration.

Recent research also suggests that labor market intermediation positively effects the

employment outcomes of ex-offenders, at least in the short term (Pettit and Lyons 2007; Sabol 2007).

Drawing from administrative data of ex-offenders released from a Washington State prison, Pettit

and Lyons (2007) analyze the effect of incarceration on post-incarceration employment and wages.

Similarly, Sabol (2007) analyzed administrative data of men recently released from Ohio State prisons

(also see Kling 2002). Their results are surprising: Compared to pre-incarceration levels of

employment, incarceration is associated with *increased* odds of employment immediately post-release.

But in both studies, the employment gains found immediately after release are eventually lost, falling

below pre-incarceration levels within thirty months.

To explain their counterintuitive findings, the authors from both studies point to post-prison

supervisory programs, but they could only speculate about the precise mechanisms producing these

results. In each case, however, speculations implicated labor market intermediation *practices*. Pettit and

Lyons suggest that "Supervisory personnel may engage in positive labeling of ex-convicts, and

employers may be encouraged by supervisory personnel to employ recently released inmates. In

addition, ex-inmates assigned to community supervision also have access to a network of potential

employers and employment contacts through the supervisory program" (2007: 214). Depending on

the terms of prisoners' release, participation in post-prison supervisory (or reentry programs) is

mandatory (Sabol 2007). What this means in terms of the percentage of former prisoners who find

work through labor market intermediation, much less JCRs who have not served time in jail or

prison, remains unclear. Because this was not a central focus of their studies, neither Pettit and

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[8] It should be noted, however, that the authors do not make it clear whether ex-offenders found work through an active search through networks, or whether without search, networks aided ex-offenders in finding work. This is an important distinction that Granovetter highlights (1995 [1974]). To the extent that researchers do not systematically study the job-matching process of those who find jobs without active search, we underestimate the role that social networks play because job matches made without search are overwhelmingly made through informal contacts.

Lyons (2007) nor Sabol (2007) are clear on this point. Drawing from the Vera Institute Study, however, less than one-fifth of former prisoners (3 out of 18) found work through LMIs in the first month post-incarceration. But this figure might be an underestimate. Indeed, the authors speculate that for former prisoners, search through LMIs takes time because jobseekers must take part in orientation and skill assessment exercises, and in some cases job training, before search actually begins. As a result, jobseekers who found work *after* their first month of freedom may have been more likely to have done so through LMIs (Nelson, Deess, and Allen 1999). Furthermore, the number of compulsory reentry or reintegration programs has grown since the Vera Institute's study (1999), in part to facilitate job-finding and to remedy disturbingly high rates of recidivism (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2007; Nunez-Neto 2008),[9] and so this, too, suggests higher rates of job search and job-finding through LMI over time.[10] Finally, the tremendous growth in temporary employment agencies (Segal and Sullivan 1997; Houseman et al. 2003), some of which also specialize in providing services for difficult-to-place jobseekers, also suggests that at least a substantial minority of ex-offending jobseekers search for and find jobs through institutional intermediaries.

According to Nelson, Deess, and Allen, searching alone "takes time, effort, and perseverance" (1999: 15). Among the 18 former prisoners who found work within one month of prison release, only three (or roughly 17%) found jobs by searching alone. The authors intimate that although many more adopted this approach, they were unsuccessful, owing in part to their own labor market inexperience, which produced "uninformed" and "haphazard" searches. In contrast, the authors note that successful jobseekers had prior work experience and marketable skills, which, according to the authors, they combined with "sensible and productive" go-it-alone strategies.

HOW ARE JOBSEEKERS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS DISADVANTAGED BY SEARCH?

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[9] According to a study conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, roughly two-thirds of former prisoners are re-arrested within three years of release (see Nunez-Neto 2008).

[10] Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll (2007) identify a number of private, non-profits that attempt to link ex-offenders to jobs, such as the Delancey Street Foundation in San Francisco, Safer Foundation in Chicago, and the Center for Employment Opportunities in New York City. The authors advocate for an even greater role for labor market intermediaries, however, to the extent that these organizations are best able to broker relationships between employers willing to hire ex-offenders and ex-offenders capable and willing to work by developing relationships of trust built on successfully matches.

We imagine two ways in which JCRs' chances of finding work are diminished, relative to non-offenders, by the search strategies they deploy. First, JCRs might be more likely to participate in search methods that are less effective at linking jobseekers to jobs and less likely to search using methods that are more efficient and effective at yielding job offers. Here the assumption is that search methods will yield similar rates of search success, but to the extent that JCRs use search methods at different rates, their chances of finding work are worsened. Alternatively, JCRs might deploy search methods at roughly similar rates, but there might be a differential effect, by offender status, of using these methods, which disadvantages them. There is, of course, a third option: JCRs might forsake some methods because these are less likely to produce job offers.

Compositional Effects. Previous research indicates that, at the very least, a significant minority of ex-offenders find work through their personal networks (Nelson, Deess, Allen 1999; Visher and Kachkowski 2007; Cobbina 2009). It could be, however, that despite the central role that networks play during the job-matching process, JCRs do not network search as much as their non-offending counterparts. JCRs often lack job relevant social capital, either because they never had such contacts (Sullivan 1989) or because these eroded with incarceration (Lopoo and Western 2004). But even if job-seeking JCRs have access to relatives and friends who could help, there is no guarantee that they will seek the help they so desperately need. Indeed, drawing from a sample of young, low-income black jobseekers, Smith (2007) discovered that some of her most disadvantaged jobseekers were reluctant to seek job search help because they feared their requests would be rejected and that rejection would inspire questions among others about their trustworthiness and competence. Reluctant personal contact users also expressed concern about their ability to fulfill the obligations associated with receiving help. When faced with these fears of losing face, jobseekers were more likely to forsake help from friends and relatives and instead chose to go-it-alone. Thus, the potential costs of using friends and relatives complicate what might otherwise appear to be a straightforward calculus (Smith 2007).

Despite the emergence of LMIs that specialize in providing bridges between ex-offenders and employers, it is also possible that JCRs do not seek these services to the extent that non-offenders do. Some scholars point to ex-offenders' general ignorance about the availability of these services (Nelson, Deess, and Allen 1999). Others highlight ex-offenders' unwillingness to seek services from for-profit employment agencies, like temporary help services, because they perceive that such services do more to exploit than uplift, with exorbitant fees for every type of help they provide (Smith 2007). And prior research also indicates that jobseekers often avoid searching for work through public employment agencies because these have a reputation of providing information about bad jobs (Van Ours 1994; Thomas 1997). Drawing from these studies, we have reason to speculate that JCRs might not seek the services that LMIs provide.

Finally, relative to non-offenders, JCRs might also be less inclined to adopt go-it-alone approaches to job search. Research by David Harding (2003) suggests that ex-offenders who successfully search alone adopt different impression management strategies in an effort to either completely eliminate the negative consequences for employment of having a criminal record or to blunt its negative effect. Among the former prisoners he studied, those who sought to eliminate the effect of the criminal record chose not to disclose their negative credential to employers at all. Others fully disclosed their status, but tried, in the process, to counterbalance negative impressions by extolling their own personal and professional virtues. A third set took the route of *conditional* disclosure, informing employers only after getting hired and establishing their value to the workplace.

Harding linked impression management strategies to ex-offenders' employment outcomes. Jobseekers who refused to disclose their status experienced short-term employment gains. They were more likely to find jobs, but these were short-lived. Full disclosure produced few employment opportunities, but the few gains made tended to be long-term. But because they married the best of both approaches, conditional disclosures were most successful at gaining access to stable employment opportunities.

Not everyone, however, can so easily manipulate employers' impressions for their own benefit. The ability to manage the stigma of criminality is shaped, in part, by the stigma of race (and likely gender). Pager's (2007b) audit study reveals that white auditors who were able to explain to hiring personnel the circumstances that led to their contact with the penal system had significantly greater odds of getting callbacks. This was not the case, however, for black auditors, who experienced no employment benefit from personal contact with employers. Combined with the stigma of criminality, the stigma of blackness limited the effectiveness of black auditors' efforts to manage employers' impressions while deploying go-it-alone approaches to job search.

Increasingly, too, JCRs have little control over the impressions they make. As access to criminal history records has become cheap and widespread (Bushway et al. 2007), employers have come to rely more heavily on these services to determine if applicants have had contact with the penal system. In 1996, 51% of employers performed criminal background checks on prospective employees. Since then, that figure has increased to 80% (SEARCH 2005). In this context, it would seem that attempts to manage impressions by not disclosing one's contact with the penal system will fail to achieve its intended goal, since most employers now conduct these checks and will uncover applicants' deceit. Sensing that most employers are both loath to hire JCRs and strongly inclined to verify offender status, JCRs might be discouraged from searching alone, since this method is less effective than in the past at allowing JCRs to manage employers' impressions.

Just as we have reason to speculate that JCRs are less likely to use each major search method, it could be as well that they deploy fewer methods overall to search for work. Their relative ignorance about effective search approaches, lack of access to important social and institutional resources, and/or their unwillingness to adopt certain search activities suggests that JCRs might have relatively narrow search scope. In the process, they are disadvantaged vis-à-vis non-offenders in search, since, as previous research indicates, search effort is positively associated with job search success (Wanberg et al. 2005; Wanberg et al. 2010).

Differential Impacts. JCRs might also be disadvantaged in search to the extent that similar search methods have differential effects on their chances of finding work. In terms of network search, it is possible that JCRs do so at similar rates as non-offenders, but doing so might not yield similar rates of offers. There are at least three reasons for this speculation. First, it is likely that, relative to non-offenders, JCRs' lack access to contacts who can provide quality job information as well as influence hires (Sullivan 1989). Their friends and relatives might also be less inclined to assist, even if they could, fearing the effect that a bad match might have on their own reputations with employers (Smith 2005, 2007, 2010). And intermediation by personal contacts may not produce the intended results if employers cannot be persuaded that JCRs can be trusted.

LMIs that specialize in linking ex-offenders to employers offer hope (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2004), but the success of such programs is often contingent on LMIs creaming from the top. To develop relationships of trust with employers, LMIs must refer workers who have few barriers to employment, because these are the characteristics that portend well for long-term employment success (O'Shea and King 2004; Smith 2007). Relatively few ex-offending jobseekers, however, can be so characterized. This leaves many, if not most, difficult-to-place ex-offenders without great chances of finding employment through this search method.

Under the assumption that third-party trusted intermediaries are better positioned to successfully manage employers' impressions of JCRs, reducing or eliminating employers' concerns about the risks that specific JCRs might pose, intermediary-based approaches to search should be more efficient at job-finding than going-it-alone. Specifically, by explaining the circumstances that led to penal system contact, highlighting the ex-offenders' process of redemption, and giving prominence to ex-offenders' positive qualities, intermediaries, personal and institutional, can attenuate the negative effects of the criminal record. Without this potentially crucial intervention, however, the chances that JCRs will be hired, relative to their non-offending counterparts, seem poor. Thus, JCRs who go-it-alone are likely significantly disadvantaged by doing so, relative to non-offenders who do the same, as strongly indicated by Pager's work (2003).

Finally, although JCRs might expend as much effort to find work as their non-offending counterpart, they might not reap the benefits of doing so. The stigma associated with criminality (and race) might be so great as to nullify the effect of search effort.

DATA AND METHODS

This study is motivated by two central questions: First, do arrest, conviction, and incarceration shape the scope of jobseekers' search efforts as well as the specific methods they deploy? Second, to what extent can we attribute gaps in job search success between non-offenders and offenders to jobseekers' strategies? To address these questions, we use the 2003-2008 panels of the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97). The NLSY97 is an ongoing panel study following individuals who were age 12 to 16 at the end of calendar year 1996. The dataset has a couple of properties that recommend it for our purposes. It includes both a nationally representative sample containing 6,748 youths, as well as an over-sample of 2,236 Hispanics and non-Hispanic blacks born in the same time period.[11] The NLSY97 is also uniquely structured for longitudinal analysis of life outcomes, because it focuses specifically on transitions, such as those from school to work, from marriage to divorce, or, as in our case, one state of employment to another. Furthermore, the nature of the data collection schedule allows researchers to pinpoint exact moments, down to the week, that transitions occur.

Our unit of analysis is the job search, not the individual, and so we structure the data accordingly. Our revised format produces a dataset that includes a record (or row of data) that corresponds to an individual job search period. Within our six-year period, then, the number of respondents' job searches corresponds to the number of records they have in the dataset. Despite structuring the data around job searches, we do generalize our results at the level of the individual. To the extent that some individuals have more searches than others, however, we would first have to

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[11] Because we control for race in our regression models, we do not use weights to correct for over-sampling.

cluster our job search observations by person to correct standard errors for repeated individuals in our analysis. And so we do.

In the NLSY, job search start and stop dates are identified based on respondents' reports of weekly search activities. If a respondent reports search activity for eight consecutive weeks, pauses for one week, and then starts again for another two weeks, these are identified in the dataset as two searches. In jobseekers' minds, however, we doubt that pauses as short as one or even two weeks represent an end to one search period and the beginning of another. Given this, we redefine search stops as those where the respondent stopped search activity for four weeks or more. This also means that search starts follow four weeks or more of non-search activity. This revised data structure includes 23,505 observations of job searches from a sample of 6,024 unemployed and employed jobseekers between the ages of 18 and 24 in 2003. By choosing job searches as our unit of analysis, we eliminate from our sample respondents who had not searched for work during this period.

Dependent Variables. We first examine the effect of a criminal record on the methods of search that jobseekers deploy. Each year respondents are asked to report, down to the week, whether or not they are employed. Employed jobseekers are asked, "During the time you [worked/have worked] for [employer's name], [have/had] you done anything to look for work?" Respondents are identified as unemployed if they indicate gaps in employment and also report searching for work during that time. Both unemployed and employed jobseekers are then asked to examine a list of ten job search activities and to select all methods they used. These include the following: contacted employer (directly), employment agency, and/or school placement center; checked union or professional organizations' job registers; attended job fairs; searched through friends or relatives; sent out resumes or filled out applications; and placed an ad, looked at ads, and used the internet.

To measure the effect of an arrest, conviction, and incarceration on how jobseekers search for work, we created four categorical measures. *Network searches* include searching for work through

friends and relatives. We categorized job searches that include contact with an agency and/or school

placement office, signing up with a union or professional register, and/or attending job fairs as *LMI*

use. If job searches entailed sending out resumes or filling out applications, and /or placing or looking

at ads, we categorized them as *going-it-alone*. "*Other*" is the fourth category and, though unspecified by

the NLSY97, includes those approaches that their principal investigators identify as substantively

different from traditional categories of search.[12] We operationalized each of these methods as

dummy variables, where a score of one signifies category membership and zero signifies non-

membership. There are no reference categories for these dummy variables because any one search

could be associated with one or more search methods.

We then examine the effect of a criminal record on the scope of jobseekers' search. To

measure *search scope,* we summed the number of search methods (out of 10 possible approaches) that

jobseekers deployed during a given search period. Finally, we investigate the effect of search

methods and search scope on job search success. We measure *search success* with a dummy variable

that indicates whether or not a job search ended in new employment.

Independent Predictors. The NLSY97 allows us to determine how arrest, conviction, and

incarceration shape job search strategies, by race and gender. Each year, respondents are asked if they

have been arrested for and convicted of a crime. Respondents are also asked to specify their places

of residence, by week, and correctional facilities represent one of their response options. Jobseekers

who began their job search within one year of arrest (but not convicted), conviction (but not

incarceration), and/or residence in a correctional facility (arrest and incarceration, but not necessarily

conviction)[13] are so coded. We distinguish JCRs by the nature of penal contact because previous

research suggests that their labor market experiences might differ substantially. In addition, we code

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[12] From the principal investigators at the NLSY97, the authors have requested information about the types of responses that get coded as "other". We have been informed that the PIs are preparing something on our behalf, but no specifics have been offered.

[13] In our sample, 127 individuals had been detained without a conviction. This represents roughly 12% of the former prisoners in our sample. According to the Department of Justice, on average, individuals who are detained by the courts are held for four months. The length of detention is somewhat shorter for those held because of immigration offenses and parole violations but longer for those held on charges related to drugs, violence, or weapons (http://www.justice.gov/ofdt/statistics.htm).

race as a set of dummies for non-Hispanic *black*, non-Hispanic *white*, and *Hispanic,* where white is the reference category. We code gender as a dummy variable; females are the reference category.

Controls. Because it could be argued that the stigma of a criminal record derives specifically from the criminal activity that leads to penal contact and not arrest, conviction, and incarceration, we include three dichotomous variables intended to control for respondent's involvement in criminal activity. The NLSY97 asks whether the respondent engaged in each of the following activities in 2004 or 2005: stealing an item over $50 in value (*steal*), attacking someone with the intent to hurt them (*attack*), and dealing drugs (*deal*). Affirmative responses were coded as 1, 0 otherwise.

Whether job searches are conducted through personal networks, LMIs, or go-it-alone strategies might also be a function of access to job relevant social capital (Sullivan 1989; Nelson, Deess, and Allen 1999). To control for this possibility, we include a social capital measure based on responses to the question, "How many people do you turn to for advice about employment, education, or training?" Because the social capital access variable has a long tail, we use and report on its natural log transformation.

Job search methods vary by industry, and employers from some industries are more willing to hire JCRs than are those from other industries. Specifically, according to Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll (2007), employers in manufacturing, construction, and transportation industries are more likely to hire ex-offenders. Given this, we included in our models a dummy variable where 1 represented "willing" industries and 0 represented other industries.

Finally, that JCRs deploy different job search methods and have poorer outcomes than non-offenders could be attributed to other factors, such as age, educational attainment, number of dependent children, citizenship status, employment status, and previous work experience. To account for these possibilities, we include a set of control variables. We introduce three dummy variables to control for educational attainment—*dropout* and *college degree,* with *high school graduate* as the reference category. We control for having dependent *children*, since this variable has been shown to affect job-finding success (Wanberg 2012). "Children" is operationalized as a continuous measure

representing respondents' total number of dependents. Citizenship is included as a dummy. Unemployment and work experience have both been shown to affect search strategies and job search success (Wanberg 2012). Unemployed searchers are coded "1", and employed searchers are coded "0". Work experience is operationalized as the number of weeks of prior, full-time employment. Finally, to account for unobservables, we include a control for "year," a continuous variable with six values, each corresponding to one year in the study period.

To estimate the effect of arrest, conviction, and incarceration on search methods and job search success, we run a series of logistic regression models (logits). These models provide estimates of the odds that JCRs will use friends and relatives, LMIs, go-it-alone, and "other" methods of job search. They also predict the odds that a search will end with a job (success). To estimate the effect of JCR status on search effort, we run Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models. Because we anticipate that the direction and magnitude of the effects of search methods on search success will differ by race and gender, for each set of analyses, we run models separately by race/ethnicity and gender rather than include gender and race as controls.

SAMPLE DESCRIPTION

Displayed in Table 1 are descriptive statistics of variables in our analysis, by JCR status. In general, compared to non-offenders, JCRs are slightly younger, male, dropouts, and unemployed, and they have more children and less work experience. Not surprisingly, a higher percentage also engages in criminal activity—stealing, assault, and drug dealing.

[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]

In terms of our variables of interest, a lower percentage of JCRs search through networks, LMIs, and go-it-alone methods, but a higher percentage deploys methods categorized as "other." In addition, JCRs also take part in search with less scope—they deploy fewer methods for job search than their non-offending counterparts, significantly so in the case of previously arrested and convicted jobseekers. Finally, JCRs are also less likely to succeed at job search. Roughly 1 in 5

searches among non-offenders end with employment. Among JCRs, that figure is closer to 1 in 7. In what follows, we investigate the extent to which gaps in search success are at least in part attributable to search methods and search scope. We do so first by estimating the effect of a criminal record on the odds of using different search methods.

SEARCHING FOR WORK WITH A CRIMINAL RECORD

Search Methods. Relative to non-offenders, what methods of search do JCRs deploy, and to what extent does their scope of search differ? Table 2 displays the results of our logistic regression analysis of the effect of arrest, conviction, and incarceration on search methods deployed. The general patterns closely match those revealed in descriptive statistics. Jobseekers with a criminal record are less likely to search through networks, LMIs, and go-it-alone approaches, but they are more likely to deploy "other" strategies of search.

 Networks. In general, the odds of network search are greater for males, blacks, college graduates, experienced workers, and jobseekers with social capital. But, despite controls for social capital, dropouts and the unemployed have lower odds of network search. Almost without exception, arrest, conviction, and incarceration are also associated with lower odds of network search, relative to non-offenders. Odds are reduced by between 4 and 40 percent, depending on the race, gender, and offender status of the job-seeking group in question. Only among white ex-convicts are the odds of network search greater. In all instances, however, results are statistically insignificant.

 LMI. The odds of LMI are positively associated with being black and Hispanic, college graduates, having work experience and social capital, and working in manufacturing, construction, and transportation industries. Odds, however, are reduced for the unemployed and for arrestees, regardless of gender or race. In the full sample, odds of LMI use are reduced by 37 percent, but they range from between 30 and 46 percent among each of the race and gender subgroups. Conviction, however, is not significantly associated with LMI use. Furthermore, the direction of the relationship differs depending on the subgroup in question. In the full sample and among males and whites,

conviction increases the odds of LMI use, but among females, blacks, and Hispanics, conviction is associated with reduced odds. Only among blacks does incarceration significantly affect the odds of labor market intermediation. Relative to non-offenders, black former prisoners have 53 percent greater odds of LMI use, a finding of marginal significance.

[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]

Going-It-Alone. In general, older, college educated jobseekers, and jobseekers with work experience are more likely to go-it-alone. But having more children, dropping out of high school, and unemployment are associated with reduced odds of going-it-alone. JCRs are also less likely to search alone. In the full sample and among males and blacks, arrestees are significantly less likely to search alone, though marginally so in the case of blacks. Former prisoners in the full sample and among males also have significantly reduced odds of going-it-alone. Although the remaining subgroups have effects of similar magnitude and direction, none are significant.

"Other". Jobseekers who use "other" methods are less likely to be Hispanic, college educated, and experienced, but they have citizenship and more dependents, and they are more likely to be dropouts and unemployed. Those who deploy "other" methods are also more likely to have assaulted someone in the past. JCRs are generally less likely to undertake network, LMI, and go-it-alone strategies of search, but they are more likely to adopt strategies that get categorized as "other". In the full sample and among male, black, and Hispanic arrestees, the odds of "other" search are significantly increased by between 22 and 59 percent, although the effects for Hispanics and the full sample are marginal. Among whites, conviction increases the odds of "other" search by 29 percent, an effect that is also of marginal significance. And among males and whites, incarceration is associated with 26 and 30 percent increased odds of "other" search. JCR status does not significantly affect the odds of "other" search among females, although the direction of the relationship is consistent with the other subgroups.

Scope of Job Search. In general, JCRs are less likely to search through networks, LMIs, and go-it-alone strategies, although they are more likely to undertake "other" strategies. This suggests that

the scope of JCR's search—the number of search methods they deploy to find work during a given search period—is circumscribed, relative to their non-offending counterparts. We test this possibility in our OLS regression analysis by regressing search scope on offender status. Findings are displayed in Table 3. Indeed, JCR status is associated with a narrower range of search methods adopted, but only among arrestees are the effects significant. Effects for blacks and Hispanics are not significant, but within the full sample and among males, females, and whites, search scope is significantly narrower by roughly one-fifth to one-quarter of a unit compared to non-offenders.

[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]

FINDING WORK WITH A CRIMINAL RECORD

Thus far our findings reveal that when compared to non-offending jobseekers, JCRs search less exhaustively. They are less likely to use each of the three major search methods, and overall their scope of search is narrower. To what extent can these differences in search strategies help to explain JCRs' lower odds of job search success? We address this question in this section.

Search Methods and Search Success. Displayed in Table 4 are the odds ratios of search success for arrestees, ex-convicts, and former prisoners, relative to non-offenders, for the full sample and by gender and race (see Tables A1-A6 in the Appendix for full reporting of our results). We present the odds ratios associated with arrest, conviction, and incarceration for six models. The first includes only offender status. The second adds to the first our controls. The third model includes our four search methods. The fourth model adds to the third arrest*search interactions. The fifth model replaces the arrest*search interactions with the conviction*search interactions. And the sixth model replaces the conviction*search interactions with the incarceration*search interactions.

Our findings support our contention that the search methods JCRs deploy help to explain gaps in search success between non-offenders and JCRs. In the first models, arrest is associated with significantly reduced odds of search success, between 27 and 41 percent, among all subgroups. Among females, Hispanics, and whites, controls nullify the effect of arrest. But in the full sample

and among males and blacks, the effect of the arrest, though somewhat modified, remains large in magnitude and statistically significant—arrest is associated with 26 percent reduced odds of search success for the full sample, 35 percent reduced odds among males, and 49 percent reduced odds among blacks. For each of these groups, the magnitude and significance of the effect of arrest is nullified in the third model with the introduction of our search methods dummies. With the inclusion of search methods measures, changes in effects indicate that, in part, arrestees' lower odds of search success can be attributed to their adoption of some search methods and non-deployment of others. Specifically, in results not shown here for the full sample and among males, while the inclusion of LMI and go-it-alone methods each reduces to marginality the significance of the effect of arrest, the inclusion of "other" nullifies the effect of arrest on search success. Among blacks, including going-it-alone in the model reduces the significance of the effect of arrest to marginality, but again, including "other" nullifies the effect of arrest on search success. Thus, in part we can explain the lower odds of search success male and black arrestees by the fact that they are *less* likely than non-offenders to search through LMIs and go-it-alone approaches, which are more effective at matching jobseekers to jobs, and more importantly because they are *more* likely than non-offenders to search through "other" approaches, which significantly disadvantages jobseekers during the matching process.

[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]

By and large, conviction is not significantly associated with search success. The magnitudes of these effects for most groups are small, close to zero, and insignificant. Only among blacks is the magnitude moderately large—23 percent reduced odds—but here, too, the effect is insignificant.

Like arrest, incarceration is also associated with reduced odds of search success, significantly so for the full sample, males, Hispanics and whites. Among Hispanics, the effect of incarceration on search success is nullified with the introduction of controls in the second model. Left to be explained, then, is the effect of incarceration in the full sample and among males and whites. Among these three groups, the introduction of search methods in Model 3 modifies the effect of

incarceration on search success. In general, the magnitude of the effect declines slightly, and the effect becomes marginally significant. Specifically, in the full sample and among males, going-it-alone and "other" each reduces the significance of the effect of incarceration to marginality. This suggests that at least in part, former prisoners are disadvantaged because they are less likely to deploy go-it-alone strategies (despite its relative effectiveness), and they are more likely to use "other" methods (despite its relative ineffectiveness).

For each of these groups, however, it is the introduction of our incarceration*search interactions, specifically interactions with LMI use and going-it-alone that nullifies the incarceration effect. In other words, the differential impacts of LMI use and going-it-alone on JCRs compared to non-offenders is what primarily disadvantages former prisoners. We interpret this to mean that former prisoners are not only disadvantaged by the methods they choose or are forced to use, but primarily because the effects of LMI use and going-it-alone are less beneficial to them than they are for non-offenders.

Search Scope and Search Success. To what extent do differences in search scope help to explain JCRs' lower odds of job search success? Displayed in Table 5 are the results from our logistic regression analysis. The first two models for arrest, conviction, and incarceration mirror those for the analysis of the effect of search methods on success. In the full sample and among males, the introduction of our measure of search scope in the third model diminishes the magnitude and the level of significance of the arrest effect. We interpret this to mean that part of the disadvantage that arrestees face is that they deploy fewer search methods; their search scope is narrower. In model 4, the inclusion of the arrest*scope interaction term nullifies the effects of arrest on search success, indicating both that differences in the level of search scope but especially the differential impacts of search scope helps to explain why arrest status is associated with lower odds of search success. Among blacks, the magnitude of the effect of arrest on search success is also diminished with the inclusion of search scope in Model 3, although the level of significance remains. With the inclusion of arrest*scope interactions, this effect is further moderated, but it is never nullified. Thus, search

scope has limited explanatory power in terms of making sense of black, non-offender/JCR search success gaps.

      As shown in Table 5, conviction is not significantly associated with search success, but like arrest, incarceration is, specifically for the full sample, males, Hispanics, and whites. As before, among Hispanics the effect of incarceration on search success is nullified with the inclusion of our control measures. This leaves unexplained the effect of incarceration on search scope in the full sample and among males and whites. Among males, scope does little to modify the effects of incarceration on success. Male former prisoners do not appear to have lower odds of search success because they are not using as many search methods as their non-offending counterparts. But to some extent, lower odds of success in the full sample and among whites can be attributed to the differential effects of search scope on search success. In both the full sample and among whites, the inclusion of incarceration*scope interaction terms reduces the significance and the magnitude of the effect of incarceration on search success. They do not, however, nullify the effects. We interpret these findings to mean that although former prisoners search as widely or with as many methods as do their non-offending counterparts, they are less likely to meet with job search success. In what follows, we speculate about why.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Arrest, conviction, and incarceration depress individuals' employment outcomes (Western 2006). In this paper, we sought to determine whether and to what extent JCRs' poorer outcomes can also be attributed at least in part to their search methods. For two groups—women and Hispanics—differences between non-offenders and JCRs are attributable to differences in demographic, human capital, and social capital characteristics. But for males, blacks, and whites search mattered. Our evidence indicates that for these groups, differences between non-offenders and JCRs in the scope and nature of search does help to explain JCR's poorer chances of search success. But how search methods and search scope matter depends on whether jobseekers had been arrested (without

conviction), convicted (without imprisonment), or imprisoned (whether convicted or not). We take each in turn.

Arrestees' search problems are one of nature and scope. Although arrestees are not significantly less likely than non-offenders to network search, they are less likely to use LMIs and to search alone, and they are more likely to adopt "other" search methods. These differences in the nature of search matter. Gaps between black arrestees and non-arrestees, for instance, can be explained, in part, by the fact that black arrestees do not search alone to the extent that non-arrestees do. But their disadvantage is attributable even more to the fact that they are much more likely to use "other" search methods, which are relatively ineffective at matching these jobseekers to jobs, regardless of offender status. Similarly, among males, gaps between non-arrestees and arrestees are in part explained by noting that arrestees are less likely to search alone and to seek help from LMIs, but it is mostly explained by noting that male arrestees are significantly more likely to search using "other" methods.

Arrestees' disadvantage is also attributable to the scope of their job search, particularly for males and whites. Arrestees' search scope is narrower than that of non-offenders. Our findings suggest that if they increased their search scope, they could improve their chances of finding work. But among male arrestees, disadvantage is also rooted in the differential impact of search scope. The effort male arrestees expend deploying multiple methods does not pay off in the way that it does for non-offenders. Drawing from previous research, we propose two reasons for this. The first is employers' reluctance to hire arrestees. Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll (2007) report that most employers are disinclined to hire JCRs. Given this, it is very likely that arrestees have to expend much more effort at job search than their non-offending counterparts to achieve the same results. There is also a second plausible and complementary explanation. Nelson, Deess, and Allen (1999) contend that some of their respondents found it difficult to find work, despite expending a great deal of effort, because the effort they put forward was poorly spent—"uninformed" and "haphazard." To the extent that arrestees lack insight into how to search effectively, this could make successful job search

much more difficult to achieve. Future research should attempt to identify the mechanisms that help to produce arrestees' poorer search outcomes.

Former prisoners are also disadvantaged by the nature and scope of their job search. In part, they have greater difficulty because they are less likely to go-it-alone and more likely to search using "other" methods. More important, however, is the differential impact of search scope and search methods deployed. Former prisoners who search through LMIs and go-it-alone approaches are less likely than non-offenders to find work. We propose that although LMIs that specialize in linking ex-offenders to employers offer hope (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2004), the success of such programs is often contingent on LMIs creaming from the top. To develop relationships of trust with employers, LMIs must refer workers who have few barriers to employment, because these are the characteristics that portend well for long-term employment success (O'Shea and King 2004; Smith 2007). Relatively few ex-offending jobseekers, however, can be so characterized, since many have multiple barriers to employment, including some that we were not able to account for in our analysis, such as the lack of transportation, familial obligations, and physical and mental health problems. This leaves many, if not most, difficult-to-place former prisoners without great chances of finding employment through labor market intermediation. Former prisoners are also less likely to meet with search success when they search alone. We speculate that lacking third party intermediaries, particularly personal contacts, former prisoners are less able to manage employers' impressions, and so they are less likely to end searches successfully. Drawing from Nelson, Deess, and Allen (1999), we also suspect that former prisoners have less insight about how to undertake search strategies effectively. Only through future research, however, will the sources of this differential impact be revealed.

Similarities in search scope also produce different outcomes, to former prisoners' disadvantage. As with arrestees, we speculate that the differential impacts might be related to employers' continued reluctance to hire former prisoners and jobseekers' relative lack of insight into the effective deployment of search methods.

Interestingly, those who have been convicted of a crime but have not been incarcerated look little different than non-offenders in terms of their search experiences. Almost without exception, they are no less or more likely to search through networks, LMIs, go-it-alone, or "other" approaches. Nor is their scope of search significantly different. And they are no less likely to experience job search success. Why conviction without incarceration results in such different search experiences relative to arrestees and former prisoners deserves further research attention. It also calls into question the current tendency to assume that the experiences of those who have been incarcerated are little different from those whose contact with the penal system has been somewhat different.

With this study, we contribute to the literature on punishment and inequality by highlighting the role of job search. Our results indicate that how some groups of JCRs search—the specific methods that they use and the scope of their search—helps to explain why JCRs' searches are less likely than those of non-offenders to end successfully. But there is more that we can learn about the job matching process that might bear on questions of punishment and inequality. We have already called for future research to investigate the mechanisms that produce differential outcomes for non-offenders and JCRs who adopt similar strategies of search. We offered two hypotheses—employers' continued reluctance and jobseekers' poorly informed search efforts—but other factors might also be at work, such as how intensively jobseekers search.

Future research should also examine why JCRs are less likely to search through networks, LMIs, and go-it-alone strategies. Previous research locates lower search effort to a lower commitment to employment (Wanberg, Zhu, and Van Hooft 2010), to discouragement (Wanberg et al 2005), and to mental and physical health problems (Wanberg 2012). Relative to non-offenders, JCRs may lack commitment to work and so invest less effort in finding jobs. To the extent that JCRs fail in their effort to find work, they might begin to lose hope in their ability to get a job and reduce their search effort accordingly. We might also attribute JCRs' lower odds of search through these three major search methods to mental and physical health deficiencies. To the extent that JCRs, especially former prisoners, are more likely to suffer from illnesses that interfere with job search and

job finding, this is another potentially fruitful avenue of research. What seems clear, however, is that we can no longer ignore the role that the job search process plays in shaping opportunities for these stigmatized jobseekers.

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Table 1. One-Way Analysis of Variance for Measures of Interest by Offender Status

	No Arrest	Arrest	Conviction	Incarceration	Range	N
Age	23.61	23.40*	23.35*	23.08*^#	19-28	23505
Male	.45	.68*	.76*^	.74*^	0-1	23505
Female	.55	.32*	.24*^	.26*^	0-1	23505
Black	.30	.39*	.29^	.38*#	0-1	23505
Hispanic	.20	.18*	.21^	.22	0-1	23505
White	.49	.42*	.50^	.40*#	0-1	23505
Urban	.80	.80	.76*^	.81#	0-1	23388
Children	.51	.71*	.69*	.76*	0-7	23505
Citizen	.81	.83	.78*^	.80	0-1	23505
Dropout	.09	.25*	.26*	.27*	0-1	23505
High School Diploma	.56	.48*	.44*^	.45*	0-1	23505
College	.18	.06*	.03*^	.04*	0-1	23505
Unemployed	.81	.92*	.93*	.94*	0-1	23505
Work Experience	9.29	89.87	85.23*	76.98*^#	0-400	23497
Social Capital (ln)	1.36	1.27*	1.31*	1.35	0-4.60	18870
Industry	.38	.55*	.64*^	.68*^	0-1	23505
Steal	.01	.02	.05*^	.05*^	0-1	23505
Attack	.03	.07*	.12*^	.13*^	0-1	23505
Deal	.02	.07*	.16*^	.14*^	0-1	23505
Networks	.23	.21*	.15*^	.20	0-1	23505
LMIs	.19	.16*	.14*	.15*	0-1	23505
Going-It-Alone	.53	.42*	.34*^	.35*^	0-1	23505
"Other"	.33	.44*	.41*^	.60*^	0-1	23505
Search Scope	1.97	1.75*	1.58*^	2.01*^	1-10	23505
Success	.21	.14*	.13*	.13*	0-1	23505

*Significant different at the p<=.05 level based on one-way analysis of variance F statistic and post hoc tests (v. no arrest).
^Significant difference at the p<=.05 level based on one-way analysis of variance F statistic and post hoc tests (v. arrest).
#Significant difference at the p<=.05 level based on one-way analysis of variance F statistics and post hoc tests (v. conviction).

Table 2. Odds Ratios Predicting Network Search, LMI Use, Going-It-Alone & "Other" for Full Sample and by Gender and Race

	Networks						Labor Market Intermediaries					
	Full Sample	Males	Females	Blacks	Hispanics	Whites	Full Sample	Males	Females	Blacks	Hispanics	Whites
Year	.64***	.65***	.62***	.66***	.64***	.64***	1.36***	1.40***	1.27**	1.25*	1.42**	1.41***
Age	1.01	.99	1.06	1.07	.98	.95	1.04	.98	1.16**	1.12^	1.05	.98
Male	1.30**	--	--	1.41^	1.40	1.24	1.07	--	--	1.28	1.06	.94
Black	1.25*	1.23	1.21	--	--	--	1.58***	1.53***	1.65**	--	--	--
Hispanic	1.20	1.15	1.27	--	--	--	1.39**	1.41*	1.30	--	--	--
Urban	.95	.85	1.19	1.20	.84	.92	.97	.86	1.22	.99	1.54	.91
Children	.94	1.04	.76**	.98	1.07	.83^	.94	1.05	.78*	.92	.97	.96
Citizen	1.03	.87	1.43*	.93	1.06	1.08	1.11	1.23	.94	.79	1.12	1.60*
Dropout	.71*	.76	.52*	.54*	1.04	.83	.85	.87	.65	.69	1.18	.86
College	1.67***	1.84***	1.35^	1.49	.88	1.99***	1.23^	1.19	1.18	1.62**	.99	1.23
Unemployed	.48***	.45***	.56***	.64^	.38***	.42***	.50***	.47***	.56***	.65^	.49**	.45***
Work Experience	1.01***	1.00***	1.01***	1.01***	1.01***	1.00***	1.00***	1.00**	1.00***	1.00***	1.00**	1.00**
Social Capital (ln)	1.20**	1.22**	1.13	1.19^	1.70**	1.10	1.19**	1.18*	1.19	1.08	1.50*	1.21^
Industry	1.09	1.16	.93	1.03	.75	1.31^	1.52***	1.58***	1.31	1.15	1.93*	1.81***
Steal	.51*	.54^	.31	.73	.64	.32*	1.16	1.01	1.64	.93	2.70	.85
Attack	.85	.90	.75	1.16	.59	.69	.68^	.68	.69	.83	.84	.45*
Deal	.91	1.07	.42	1.01	.55	.89	.83	.83	.81	.89	.56	.88
Arrest	.84	.91	.84	.82	.90	.87	.63***	.60***	.70*	.60**	.54*	.71*
Conviction	.93	.96	.76	.88	.60	1.06	1.03	1.07	.84	.77	.86	1.21
Incarceration	.86	.87	.75	.90	.77	.86	1.01	1.05	.85	1.53^	.74	.95
N	4705	2912	1793	1506	871	2280	4705	2912	1793	1506	871	2280
Design df	1934	1170	763	541	391	982	1934	1170	763	541	391	982
Prob>F	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000

***Significant at p<=.001 level; ** significant at p<=.01 level; * significant at p<=.05 level; ^ significant at p<=.10 level.

Table 2. Odds Ratios Predicting Network Search, LMI Use, Going-It-Alone & "Other" by Gender and Race (Continued)

	Going-It-Alone						"Other"					
	Full Sample	Males	Females	Blacks	Hispanics	Whites	Full Sample	Males	Females	Blacks	Hispanics	Whites
Year	.92*	.92^	.89^	.86*	.95	.94	.75***	.78***	.74***	.82**	.72***	.72***
Age	1.06*	1.08^	1.06	1.12*	1.08	1.02	.98	.97	.98	.91^	1.02	1.02
Male	.98	--	--	1.10	1.13	.87	.90	--	--	.74^	.87	1.02
Black	1.02	1.00	.99	--	--	--	1.02	1.09	.98	--	--	--
Hispanic	1.13	1.14	1.07	--	--	--	.77*	.83	.73^	--	--	--
Urban	.99	.89	1.21	1.04	1.40	.93	1.07	1.21	.86	1.02	.92	1.10
Children	.91*	.96	.86*	.88*	.94	.95	1.10*	1.01	1.20**	1.15*	1.03	1.06
Citizen	1.14	1.02	1.43*	1.15	1.13	1.15	1.49***	1.59***	1.33^	1.58*	1.18	1.59***
Dropout	.60***	.68**	.43***	.50***	.67^	.61*	1.58***	1.42*	2.15***	2.01***	1.34	1.46^
College	1.84***	1.95***	1.62*	2.28**	1.30	1.98***	.75*	.78	.78	.65	.97	.69*
Unemployed	.30***	.31***	.30***	.31***	.51***	.24***	7.60***	7.43***	7.98***	7.81***	8.04***	7.79***
Work Experience	1.01***	1.01***	1.01***	1.01***	1.01***	1.01***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	1.00***
Social Capital (ln)	1.10^	1.10	1.11	1.05	1.08	1.15	.93	.97	.85	1.00	.85	.89
Industry	1.04	1.12	.89	.89	.90	1.24^	.92	.81^	1.17	1.19	1.06	.72*
Steal	.80	.90	.56	1.00	1.12	.51*	.84	.83	.89	.55	.77	1.14
Attack	.74^	.83	.56^	.97	1.07	.46*	1.50**	1.50*	1.83***	1.31	1.22	2.12**
Deal	.91	.91	1.03	.89	.62	1.07	1.23	1.22	1.20	1.63	1.80	.99
Arrest	.81*	.73*	.92	.72^	.73	.97	1.22^	1.42*	1.04	1.59**	1.46^	.91
Conviction	.85	.86	.76	.79	.94	.81	1.14	1.16	1.21	1.14	1.06	1.29^
Incarceration	.85^	.86^	.85	.76	.83	.86	1.25**	1.26*	1.19	1.06	1.34	1.30*
N	4705	2912	1793	1506	871	2280	4705	2912	1793	1506	871	2280
Design df	1934	1170	763	541	391	982	1934	1170	763	541	391	982
Prob>F	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000

***Significant at p<=.001 level; ** significant at p<=.01 level; * significant at p<=.05 level; ^ significant at p<=.10 level.

Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Coefficients Predicting Search Scope as a Function of Arrest, Conviction, and Incarceration for Full Sample and by Gender and Race

	Full Sample	Males	Females	Blacks	Hispanics	Whites
Year	-.19***	-.17***	-.22***	-.19***	-.18***	-.18***
Age	.04*	.01	.09**	.07^	.06^	.01
Male	-.02	--	--	.03	.11	-.09
Black	.18**	.19*	.15	--	--	--
Hispanic	.02	.07	-.06	--	--	--
Urban	.03	-.02	.10	.06	.19	-.01
Children	-.04*	.02	-.12***	-.05	-.01	-.05
Citizen	.15*	.10	.22*	.07	.05	.24*
Dropout	-.27***	-.28***	-.28***	-.35***	-.15	-.26**
College	.58***	.66***	.44***	.79***	.21	.58***
Work Experience	.01***	.01***	.01***	.01***	.01***	.01***
Social Capital (ln)	.11**	.10*	.11*	.10	.18*	.08
Industry	.10^	.11	.07	.02	.01	.18*
Steal	-.21	-.24	-.19	.03	-.18	-.41*
Attack	-.03	-.01	-.07	.16	-.09	-.21
Deal	-.02	.01	-.16	.12	-.16	-.09
Arrest	-.24***	-.26**	-.19*	-.19	-.17	-.27**
Conviction	-.04	-.03	-.12	-.18	-.16	.04
Incarceration	.01	.03	-.03	.08	-.05	.01
N	4705	2912	1793	1506	871	2280
R-Squared	.1025	.1871	.1402	.1157	.0880	.1095

***Significant at p<=.001 level; ** significant at p<=.01 level; * significant at p<=.05 level; ^ significant at p<=.10 level.

Table 4. Odds Ratios Predicting Success with Strategy*Offense Interactions for Full Sample and by Gender and Race

	Arrest						Conviction					
	Full Sample	Males	Females	Blacks	Hispanics	Whites	Full Sample	Males	Females	Blacks	Hispanics	Whites
Model 1	.62***	.59***	.59***	.60***	.73**	.62***	.98	.97	.96	.77	1.00	1.04
Model 2	.75*	65*	.83	.51*	1.09	.84	1.17	1.12	1.34	.77	1.36	1.24
Model 3	.79	.74	.85	.64	1.25	.80	1.23	1.17	1.44	.78	1.41	1.37
Model 4	1.47	1.06	1.14	.95	6.22^	1.05	1.23	1.16	1.47	.78	1.35	1.37
Model 5	.79	.73	.84	.64	1.25	.80	2.23^	1.37	5.34	3.55	1.71	2.43
Model 6	.80	.74	.86	.63	1.27	.79	1.25	1.18	1.56	.75	1.46	1.43^

	Incarceration					
	Full Sample	Males	Females	Blacks	Hispanics	Whites
Model 1	.80**	.78**	.89	.96	.72*	.79*
Model 2	.77*	.74*	.83	.97	.74	.70*
Model 3	.79^	.76^	.87	1.02	.74	.71^
Model 4	.79^	.76^	.85	.99	.77	.71^
Model 5	.79^	.77^	.87	.91	.75	.71^
Model 6	1.31	.82	.18***	6.53	5.97	1.06

***Significant at p<=.001 level; ** significant at p<=.01 level; * significant at p<=.05 level; ^ significant at p<=.10 level.
NOTE: The odds ratios reported for arrest, conviction and incarceration are taken from logistic regression models that contain other independent variables. The models are specified as follows: Model 1: arrest, conviction, incarceration. Model 2: Model 1 plus year, age, male, black, Hispanic, urban, dependent children, citizen, dropout, college, unemployed, work experience, social capital (ln), industry, steal, attack, deal. Model 3: Model 2 plus network search, LMIs, going-it-alone, "other". Model 4: Model 3 plus arrest*search interactions. Model 5: Model 3 plus conviction*search interactions. Model 6: Model 3 plus incarceration*search interactions. Complete odds ratios are available upon request.

Table 5. Odds Ratios Predicting Success with Search Scope*Offense Interactions for Full Sample and by Gender and Race

	Arrest						Conviction					
	Full Sample	Males	Females	Blacks	Hispanics	Whites	Full Sample	Males	Females	Blacks	Hispanics	Whites
Model 1	.62***	.59***	.59***	.60***	.73**	.62***	.98	.97	.96	.77	1.00	1.04
Model 2	.75*	.65*	.83	.51*	1.09	.84	1.17	1.12	1.34	.77	1.36	1.24
Model 3	.79^	.69^	.88	.54*	1.13	.87	1.18	1.13	1.38	.78	1.42	1.25
Model 4	.78	.63	.85	.53^	1.55	.78	1.18	1.13	1.38	.78	1.40	1.25
Model 5	.78^	.68^	.87	.54*	1.12	.86	1.05	.98	1.17	.83	1.14	1.07
Model 6	.79	.69^	.88	.54*	1.16	.87	1.19	1.13	1.49	.78	1.48	1.26

	Incarceration					
	Full Sample	Males	Females	Blacks	Hispanics	Whites
Model 1	.80**	.78**	.89	.96	.72*	.79*
Model 2	.77*	.74*	.83	.97	.74	.70*
Model 3	.77*	.74*	.85	1.00	.73	.69*
Model 4	.77*	.74*	.85	1.00	.74	.69*
Model 5	.77*	.74*	.85	.99	.71	.68*
Model 6	.82^	.75*	1.02	.96	1.12	.73^

***Significant at p<=.001 level; ** significant at p<=.01 level; * significant at p<=.05 level; ^ significant at p<=.10 level.
NOTE: The odds ratios reported for arrest, conviction and incarceration are taken from logistic regression models that contain other independent variables. The models are specified as follows: Model 1: arrest, conviction, incarceration. Model 2: Model 1 plus year, age, male, black, Hispanic, urban, dependent children, citizen, dropout, college, unemployed, work experience, social capital (ln), industry, steal, attack, deal. Model 3: Model 2 plus search scope. Model 4: Model 3 plus arrest*search scope. Model 5: Model 3 plus conviction*search scope. Model 6: Model 3 plus incarceration*search scope. Complete odds ratios are available upon request.

Table A1. Odds Ratios Predicting Success with Strategy*Offense Interactions for Full Sample

	Full Sample					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Arrest	.62***	.75*	.79	1.47	.79	.80
Conviction	.98	1.17	1.23	1.23	2.23^	1.25
Incarceration	.80**	.77*	.79^	.79^	.79^	1.31
Year	--	4.81***	4.47***	4.49***	4.46***	4.48***
Age	--	1.15***	1.16***	1.16***	1.16***	1.16***
Male	--	1.25^	1.22	1.22	1.23	1.22
Black	--	1.23	1.27^	1.26^	1.27^	1.27^
Hispanic	--	1.34^	1.25	1.26	1.24	1.26
Urban	--	.88	.89	.89	.89	.89
Children	--	.89*	.92	.92	.92	.92
Citizen	--	.76^	.79	.77	.78	.79
Dropout	--	.76^	.87	.86	.87	.88
College	--	1.26	1.20	1.19	1.20	1.19
Unemployed	--	.14***	.19***	.20***	.19***	.20***
Work Exp.	--	1.00***	1.00**	1.00**	1.00***	1.00**
Social Capital (ln)	--	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03
Industry	--	.77*	.74*	.74*	.74	.74*
Steal	--	.61	.63	.63	1.02	.62
Attack	--	.62^	.73	.74	.58**	.74
Deal	--	.89	1.06	1.06	1.02	1.07
Networks	--	--	.63**	.69	.58**	.62**
LMIs	--	--	1.09	1.14	1.22	1.11
Go-It-Alone	--	--	.96	1.57	1.07	1.02
Other	--	--	.28***	.35**	.34***	.29***
Network*Arrest	--	--	--	.88	--	--
LMIs*Arrest	--	--	--	.89	--	--
Alone*Arrest	--	--	--	.48^	--	--
Other*Arrest	--	--	--	.69	--	--
Network*Conviction	--	--	--	--	1.43	--
LMIs*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.59	--
Alone*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.63	--
Other*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.49	--
Network*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	1.42
LMIs*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.74
Alone*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.47
Other*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.70
N	23505	4705	4705	4705	4705	4705
Design df	7635	1934	1934	1934	1934	1934
Prob > F	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000

Table A2. Odds Ratios Predicting Success with Strategy*Offense Interactions for Male Sample

	Males					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Arrest	.59***	.65*	.74	1.06	.73	74
Conviction	.97	1.12	1.17	1.16	1.37	1.18
Incarceration	.78**	.74*	.76^	.76^	.77^	.82
Year	--	5.27***	4.66***	4.65***	4.63***	4.65***
Age	--	1.12*	1.13*	1.14**	1.14**	1.14*
Male	--	--	--	--	--	--
Black	--	1.20	1.29	1.24	1.29	1.29
Hispanic	--	1.35	1.25	1.22	1.24	1.26
Urban	--	.85	.88	.88	.88	.88
Children	--	.84*	.85	.85*	.85*	.85*
Citizen	--	1.06	1.25	1.24	1.23	1.24
Dropout	--	.78	.86	.85	.85	.88
College	--	1.17	1.14	1.14	1.13	1.15
Unemployed	--	.13***	.18***	.18***	.18***	.18***
Work Exp.	--	1.00***	1.00**	1.00**	1.00**	1.00**
Social Capital (ln)	--	1.00	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.05
Industry	--	.85	.79	.78	.78	.78
Steal	--	.56	.60	.61	.62	.59
Attack	--	.71	.81	.82	.79	.81
Deal	--	.75	.92	.93	.88	.94
Networks	--	--	.59**	.38*	.52*	.56**
LMIs	--	--	.97	1.14	1.11	.97
Go-It-Alone	--	--	.66^	1.12	.64^	.68^
Other	--	--	.19***	.14**	.20***	.19***
Network*Arrest	--	--	--	1.80	--	--
LMIs*Arrest	--	--	--	.80	--	--
Alone*Arrest	--	--	--	.50	--	--
Other*Arrest	--	--	--	1.32	--	--
Network*Conviction	--	--	--	--	1.45	--
LMIs*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.62	--
Alone*Conviction	--	--	--	--	1.05	--
Other*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.76	--
Network*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	1.73
LMIs*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.89
Alone*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.75
Other*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	1.04
N	11927	2912	2912	2912	2912	2912
Design df	3872	1170	1170	1170	1170	1170
Prob > F	.0000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Table A3. Odds Ratios Predicting Success with Strategy*Offense Interactions for Female Sample

	Females					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Arrest	.59***	.83	.85	1.14	.84	.86
Conviction	.96	1.34	1.44	1.47	5.34*	1.56
Incarceration	.89	.83	.87	.85	.87	.18***
Year	--	4.27***	4.42***	4.47***	4.48***	4.49***
Age	--	1.22**	1.20**	1.20**	1.19**	1.20**
Male	--	--	--	--	--	--
Black	--	1.34	1.34	1.35	1.33	1.33
Hispanic	--	1.31	1.31	1.35	1.31	1.33
Urban	--	.92	.91	.90	.89	.91
Children	--	.96	1.02	1.03	1.04	1.02
Citizen	--	.50^	.44	.44*	.41*	.43*
Dropout	--	.66	.83	.81	.85	.81
College	--	1.49	1.37	1.37	1.39	1.33
Unemployed	--	.16***	.20***	.21***	.20***	.20***
Work Exp.	--	1.00*	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Social Capital (ln)	--	1.07	1.01	1.01	1.02	1.01
Industry	--	.63*	.67^	.67^	.68^	.66^
Steal	--	.69	.70	.77	.71	.63
Attack	--	.49	.58	.59	.59	.58
Deal	--	1.50	1.45	1.45	1.43	1.43
Networks	--	--	.75	1.06	.68	.78
LMIs	--	--	1.25	1.16	1.34	1.27
Go-It-Alone	--	--	2.01*	2.30^	2.52*	2.28*
Other	--	--	.59	.66	.74	.63
Network*Arrest	--	--	--	.41^	--	--
LMIs*Arrest	--	--	--	.1.14	--	--
Alone*Arrest	--	--	--	.81	--	--
Other*Arrest	--	--	--	.79	--	--
Network*Conviction	--	--	--	--	1.94	--
LMIs*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.65	--
Alone*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.24*	--
Other*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.25	--
Network*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	1.00
LMIs*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.21
Alone*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.00***
Other*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.00***
N	11578	1793	1793	1793	1793	1793
Design df	3762	763	763	763	763	763
Prob > F	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000

Table A4. Odds Ratios Predicting Success with Strategy*Offense Interactions for Black Sample

	Blacks					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Arrest	.60***	.51*	.64	.95	.64	.63
Conviction	.77	.77	.78	.78	3.55	.75
Incarceration	.96	.97	1.02	.99	.91	6.53
Year	--	3.79***	3.46***	3.48***	3.48***	3.49***
Age	--	1.28**	1.26**	1.25**	1.25**	1.26**
Male	--	1.47	1.36	1.37	1.37	1.39
Black	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hispanic	--	--	--	--	--	--
Urban	--	1.33	1.32	1.27	1.31	1.32
Children	--	.89	.95	.96	.95	.95
Citizen	--	.79	.98	.96	1.00	.98
Dropout	--	.93	1.01	.99	.97	1.02
College	--	1.04	.99	.97	.97	.99
Unemployed	--	.08***	.11***	.11***	.11***	.10***
Work Exp.	--	1.00*	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Social Capital(ln)	--	.82	.83	.82	.84	.83
Industry	--	.77	.82	.82	.83	.83
Steal	--	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Attack	--	.71	.82	.83	.85	.81
Deal	--	.65	.78	.79	.79	.79
Networks	--	--	.48*	.58	.57^	.52*
LMIs	--	--	.75	.67	.75	.77
Go-It-Alone	--	--	.68	1.09	.82	.75
Other	--	--	.16***	.16*	.20**	.19***
Network*Arrest	--	--	--	.76	--	--
LMIs*Arrest	--	--	--	1.22	--	--
Alone*Arrest	--	--	--	.52	--	--
Other*Arrest	--	--	--	1.02	--	--
Network*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.24	--
LMIs*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.81	--
Alone*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.29	--
Other*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.23	--
Network*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.11^
LMIs*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.54
Alone*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.28
Other*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.13
N	7394	1465	1465	1465	1465	1465
Design df	2071	538	538	538	538	538
Prob > F	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000

Table A5. Odds Ratios Predicting Success with Strategy*Offense Interactions for Hispanic Sample

	Hispanics					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Arrest	.73**	1.09	1.25	6.22^	1.25	1.27
Conviction	1.00	1.36	1.41	1.35	1.71	1.46
Incarceration	.72*	.74	.74	.77	.75	5.98
Year	--	6.17***	5.82***	6.01***	5.84***	5.96***
Age	--	1.02	1.02	1.03	1.03	1.02
Male	--	1.26	1.20	1.11	1.25	1.19
Black	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hispanic	--	--	--	--	--	--
Urban	--	1.37	1.34	1.45	1.28	1.33
Children	--	.88	.88	.88	.87	.85
Citizen	--	.86	.88	.82	.83	.90
Dropout	--	.56^	.61	.57	.64	.62
College	--	1.31	1.28	1.32	1.22	1.29
Unemployed	--	.12***	.16***	.15***	.16***	.17***
Work Exp.	--	1.01***	1.01**	1.01**	1.01**	1.01**
Social Capital(ln)	--	.99	.98	.96	.97	.95
Industry	--	.55^	.49*	.49*	.46*	.48*
Steal	--	.57	.55	.58	.49	.44
Attack	--	.21	1.35	1.51	1.33	1.55
Deal	--	.72	.85	.82	.80	.87
Networks	--	--	.81	1.39	.56	.90
LMIs	--	--	1.24	1.48	1.54	1.37
Go-It-Alone	--	--	1.07	2.84	1.18	1.25
Other	--	--	.42^	.94	.50	.43
Network*Arrest	--	--	--	.41	--	--
LMIs*Arrest	--	--	--	.71	--	--
Alone*Arrest	--	--	--	.19*	--	--
Other*Arrest	--	--	--	.26	--	--
Network*Conviction	--	--	--	--	4.39	--
LMIs*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.43	--
Alone*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.85	--
Other*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.69	--
Network*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.37
LMIs*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.34
Alone*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.10
Other*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.20
N	4686	871	871	871	871	871
Design df	1632	391	391	391	391	391
Prob > F	.0001	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000

Table A6. Odds Ratios Predicting Success with Strategy*Offense Interactions for White Sample

	Whites					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Arrest	.62***	.84	.80	1.05	.80	.79
Conviction	1.04	1.24	1.37	1.37	2.43	1.43^
Incarceration	.79*	.70*	.71^	.71^	.71^	1.06
Year	--	5.68***	5.40***	5.42***	5.40***	5.50***
Age	--	1.15*	1.18**	1.18**	1.18**	1.18**
Male	--	1.16	1.21	1.20	1.20	1.21
Black	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hispanic	--	--	--	--	--	--
Urban	--	.71*	.74^	.73^	.73^	.72^
Children	--	.92	.94	.94	.95	.94
Citizen	--	.62	.55	.54	.54	.53
Dropout	--	.71	.88	.86	.88	.89
College	--	1.39	1.24	1.22	1.27	1.23
Unemployed	--	.16***	.23***	.23***	.23***	.23***
Work Exp.	--	1.00*	1.00^	1.00^	1.00^	1.00^
Social Capital (ln)	--	1.26*	1.25*	1.26*	1.26*	1.26*
Industry	--	.90	.83	.82	.83	.82
Steal	--	1.04	1.29	1.26	1.28	1.27
Attack	--	.47^	.57	.57	.57	.57
Deal	--	1.35	1.53	1.54	1.52	1.58
Networks	--	--	.75	.70	.62^	.70
LMIs	--	--	1.24	1.61	1.43	1.25
Go-It-Alone	--	--	1.14	1.30	1.26	1.22
Other	--	--	.32***	.31*	.38**	.31***
Network*Arrest	--	--	--	1.10	--	--
LMIs*Arrest	--	--	--	.66	--	--
Alone*Arrest	--	--	--	.77	--	--
Other*Arrest	--	--	--	.94	--	--
Network*Conviction	--	--	--	--	1.94	--
LMIs*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.54	--
Alone*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.62	--
Other*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.50	--
Network*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	2.85*
LMIs*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.72
Alone*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.37
Other*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.83
N	11220	2280	2280	2280	2280	2280
Design df	3866	982	982	982	982	982
Prob > F	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000

Table A7. Odds Ratios Predicting Success with Search Scope*Offense Interactions for Full Sample

	Full Sample					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Arrest	.62***	.75*	.79	.78	.78^	.79
Conviction	.98	1.17	1.18	1.18	1.05	1.19
Incarceration	.80**	.77*	.77*	.77*	.77*	.82^
Year	--	4.81***	5.28***	5.28***	5.27***	5.29***
Age	--	1.15***	1.15***	1.15***	1.15***	1.15***
Male	--	1.25^	1.26^	1.26^	1.25^	1.26^
Black	--	1.23	1.19	1.19	1.20	1.19
Hispanic	--	1.34^	1.32^	1.32^	1.32^	1.32^
Urban	--	.88	.88	.88	.88	.88
Children	--	.89*	.90^	.90	.90^	.90^
Citizen	--	.76^	.69	.70	.69	.70
Dropout	--	.76^	.82	.82	.82	.82
College	--	1.26	1.12	1.13	1.14	1.12
Unemployed	--	.14***	.15***	.15***	.15***	.15***
Work Exp.	--	1.00***	1.00***	1.00***	1.00***	1.00***
Social Capital (ln)	--	1.03	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.02
Industry	--	.77*	.76*	.76*	.76*	.76*
Steal	--	.61	.60	.60	.59	.60
Attack	--	.62^	.63^	.63^	.63^	.63^
Deal	--	.89	.93	.93	.92	.92
Search Scope	--	--	1.21***	1.20**	1.19***	1.22***
Search Scope*Arrest	--	--	--	1.01	--	--
Search Scope*Conviction	--	--	--	--	1.10	--
Search Scope*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.93
N	23505	4705	4705	4705	4705	4705
Design df	7635	1934	1934	1934	1934	1934
Prob > F	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000

Table A8. Odds Ratios Predicting Success with Search Scope*Offense Interactions for Male Sample

	Males					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Arrest	.59***	.65*	.69^	.63	.68^	.69^
Conviction	.97	1.12	1.13	1.13	.98	1.13
Incarceration	.78**	.74*	.74*	.74*	.74*	.75*
Year	--	5.27***	5.68***	5.67***	5.67***	5.68***
Age	--	1.12*	1.13*	1.13*	1.13*	1.13*
Male	--	--	--	--	--	--
Black	--	1.20	1.16	1.17	1.17	1.16
Hispanic	--	1.35	1.30	1.31	1.31	1.30
Urban	--	.85	.85	.85	.85	.85
Children	--	.84*	.84*	.84*	.85*	.84*
Citizen	--	1.06	1.00	1.00	.98	1.00
Dropout	--	.78	.83	.83	.84	.83
College	--	1.17	1.05	1.05	1.06	1.05
Unemployed	--	.13***	.14***	.14***	.14***	.14***
Work Exp.	--	1.00***	1.00***	1.00***	1.00***	1.00***
Social Capital (ln)	--	1.00	.99	.99	.99	.99
Industry	--	.85	.84	.84	.84	.84
Steal	--	.56	.58	.58	.59	.58
Attack	--	.71	.72	.72	.71	.72
Deal	--	.75	.78	.78	.77	.78
Search Scope	--	--	1.18***	1.14	1.15**	1.19***
Search Scope*Arrest	--	--	--	1.05	--	--
Search Scope*Conviction	--	--	--	--	1.11	--
Search Scope*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.99
N	11927	2912	2912	2912	2912	2912
Design df	3872	1170	1170	1170	1170	1170
Prob > F	.0000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Table A9. Odds Ratios Predicting Success with Search Scope*Offense Interactions for Female Sample

	Females					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Arrest	.59***	.83	.88	.85	.87	.88
Conviction	.96	1.34	1.38	1.38	1.17	1.49
Incarceration	.89	.83	.85	.85	.85	1.02
Year	--	4.27***	4.84***	4.84***	4.83***	4.89***
Age	--	1.22**	1.19**	1.19**	1.19**	1.18*
Male	--	--	--	--	--	--
Black	--	1.34	1.28	1.29	1.29	1.28
Hispanic	--	1.31	1.35	1.34	1.34	1.37
Urban	--	.92	.91	.91	.92	.93
Children	--	.96	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Citizen	--	.50^	.44^	.44^	.44^	.43^
Dropout	--	.66	.74	.74	.75	.72
College	--	1.49	1.33	1.33	1.35	1.30
Unemployed	--	.16***	.17***	.17***	.17***	.17***
Work Exp.	--	1.00*	1.00	1.00	1.00***	1.00***
Social Capital (ln)	--	1.07	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04
Industry	--	.63*	.65^	.65^	.65^	.64*
Steal	--	.69	.57	.57	.53	.52
Attack	--	.49	.49^	.49^	.50	.49
Deal	--	1.50	1.49	1.49	1.41	1.45
Search Scope	--	--	1.26***	1.25**	1.24***	1.28***
Search Scope*Arrest	--	--	--	1.02	--	--
Search Scope*Conviction	--	--	--	--	1.15	--
Search Scope*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.70^
N	11578	1793	1793	1793	1793	1793
Design df	3762	763	763	763	763	763
Prob > F	.0000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Table A10. Odds Ratios Predicting Success with Search Scope*Interactions for Black Sample

	Blacks					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Arrest	.60***	.51*	.54*	.53^	.54*	.54*
Conviction	.77	.77	.78	.78	.83	.78
Incarceration	.96	.97	1.00	1.00	.99	.96
Year	--	3.79***	4.05***	4.05***	4.05***	4.06***
Age	--	1.28**	1.26**	1.26**	1.26**	1.26**
Male	--	1.47	1.46	1.46	1.46	1.46
Black	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hispanic	--	--	--	--	--	--
Urban	--	1.33	1.32	1.32	1.33	.931.32
Children	--	.89	.91	.91	.91	.91
Citizen	--	.79	.72	.72	.72	.72
Dropout	--	.93	.99	.99	.98	.99
College	--	1.04	.94	.94	.93	.94
Unemployed	--	.08***	.08***	.08***	.08***	.08***
Work Exp.	--	1.00*	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Social Capital (ln)	--	.82	.81^	.81^	.81^	.81^
Industry	--	.77	.78	.78	.78	.78
Steal	--	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Attack	--	.71	.72	.72	.72	.72
Deal	--	.65	.68	.68	.68	.68
Search Scope	--	--	1.14***	1.14	1.15*	1.14*
Search Scope*Arrest	--	--	--	1.01	--	--
Search Scope*Conviction	--	--	--	--	.95	--
Search Scope*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	1.05
N	7394	1465	1465	1465	1465	1465
Design df	2071	538	538	538	538	538
Prob > F	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000

Table A11. Odds Ratios Predicting Success with Search Scope*Offense Interactions for Hispanic Sample

	Hispanics					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Arrest	.73**	1.09	1.13	1.55	1.12	1.16
Conviction	1.00	1.36	1.42	1.40	1.14	1.48
Incarceration	.72*	.74	.73	.74	.71	1.12
Year	--	6.17***	6.57***	6.64***	6.57***	6.82***
Age	--	1.02	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.01
Male	--	1.26	1.20	1.15	1.24	1.16
Black	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hispanic	--	--	--	--	--	--
Urban	--	1.37	1.31	1.30	1.33	1.28
Children	--	.88	.87	.87	.88	.85
Citizen	--	.86	.84	.84	.83	.82
Dropout	--	.56^	.61	.59	.60	.61
College	--	1.31	1.28	1.28	1.29	1.28
Unemployed	--	.12***	.13***	.13***	.13***	.13***
Work Exp.	--	1.01***	1.01***	1.00***	1.01***	1.01***
Social Capital (ln)	--	.99	.98	.97	.97	.97
Industry	--	.55^	.54^	.54^	.53^	.53^
Steal	--	.57	.55	.55	.58	.44
Attack	--	.21	1.22	1.26	1.20	1.44
Deal	--	.72	.76	.74	.74	.73
Search Scope	--	--	1.17^	1.33*	1.13	1.24*
Search Scope*Arrest	--	--	--	.82	--	--
Search Scope*Conviction	--	--	--	--	1.22	--
Search Scope*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.65*
N	4686	871	871	871	871	871
Design df	1632	391	391	391	391	391
Prob > F	.0001	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000

Table A12. Odds Ratios Predicting Success with Search Scope*Offense Interactions White Sample

	Whites					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Arrest	.62***	.84	.87	.78	.86	.87
Conviction	1.04	1.24	1.25	1.25	1.07	1.26
Incarceration	.79*	.70*	.69*	.69*	.68*	.73^
Year	--	5.68***	6.40***	6.38***	6.38***	6.41***
Age	--	1.15*	1.15**	1.16*	1.16**	1.15*
Male	--	1.16	1.22	1.22	1.21	1.23
Black	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hispanic	--	--	--	--	--	--
Urban	--	.71*	.72*	.72^	.72^	.72*
Children	--	.92	.94	.94	.94	.94
Citizen	--	.62	.51	.52	.51	.52
Dropout	--	.71	.78	.79	.79	.78
College	--	1.39	1.18	1.19	1.20	1.17
Unemployed	--	.16***	.18***	.18***	.18***	.18***
Work Exp.	--	1.00*	1.00*	1.00*	1.00*	1.00*
Social Capital (ln)	--	1.26*	1.24*	1.23^	1.24^	1.24*
Industry	--	.90	.86	.86	.87	.86
Steal	--	1.04	1.08	1.09	1.08	1.08
Attack	--	.47^	.48^	.48^	.48^	.48^
Deal	--	1.35	1.38	1.38	1.36	1.37
Search Scope	--	--	1.27***	1.22*	1.23***	1.29***
Search Scope*Arrest	--	--	--	1.07	--	--
Search Scope*Conviction	--	--	--	--	1.13	--
Search Scope*Incarceration	--	--	--	--	--	.94
N	11220	2280	2280	2280	2280	2280
Design df	3866	982	982	982	982	982
Prob > F	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000