

# UC Santa Cruz

## Reprint Series

### Title

Assessing Binational Civil Society Coalitions

### Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/84h6283g>

### Author

Fox, Jonathan A

### Publication Date

2004

Peer reviewed

15

## Assessing Binational Civil Society Coalitions: Lessons from the Mexico–U.S. Experience

Jonathan Fox

Is globalization producing a transnational civil society? Are the transnational economic, social, and cultural forces that are ostensibly weakening nation-states also empowering civic and social movements that come together across borders? If there is more to this trend than internationalist dreams, then clear evidence should be emerging from the accelerating process of Mexico–U.S. integration. This binational relationship is the broadest and deepest example of global integration between North and South, and therefore it offers a clear “paradigm case” for assessing the dynamics and impact of cross-border civil society interaction. Assessments of impact are especially important if one is to avoid assuming that when international actors get involved, their role automatically becomes determinative.

The transnational civil society hypothesis can be framed in hard or soft terms, each with quite different political implications. In the hard version, international economic integration is generating qualitative changes in the balance of power between nation-states and private capital because of the latter’s increased mobility. On the civil society side, some analysts suggest that, due to increasingly accepted international political norms and greater ease of communications and travel, public interest advocacy networking has advanced to such a degree that a “transnational civil society” is emerging. Some use the even more ambitious terms “global social movements” or “global civil society.” In the soft version, the international economy has always reconfigured itself, and the current phase is not unprecedented. Most industrial activity remains national, and nation-states retain significant policy levers. From this perspective, “fully” transnational social or civic movements

This study draws upon papers presented at a conference that was held at the University of California, Santa Cruz in July 1998, with the support of a timely grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (see Brooks and Fox 2002). The chapter was made possible by a decade of conversations and collaboration with David Brooks, director of the Mexico–U.S. Diálogos Project and U.S. correspondent for *La Jornada*. The study also benefited enormously from conversations with Luis Hernández Navarro, also of *La Jornada*. In addition, the author thanks Tani Adams, Sonia Álvarez, Maylei Blackwell, Jennifer Johnson, Margaret Keck, Kevin J. Middlebrook, Debra Rose, and Heather Williams for very useful comments on earlier drafts. Earlier versions of this essay appeared as Fox 2000a and (in Spanish) 2001.

are still few and far between, with very limited capacity to go beyond internationalist discourse to influence state or corporate action in practice.

The U.S.–Mexico relationship offers a vast array of experiences with which to assess the “hard” versus the “soft” way of framing the globalization process.<sup>1</sup> This chapter supports the soft rather than the hard version, finding that most Mexico–U.S. civil society relationships involve networking between fundamentally *national* social and civic organizations. Moreover, relatively few networks have consolidated into dense, balanced partnerships.

Assessments of transnational linkages between social and civic actors require clearly defined criteria. Measuring the density and impact of political linkages implies specifying a standard for comparison (dense compared to what? influential compared to what?).<sup>2</sup> Compared to where U.S.–Mexico civil society relations stood in the early 1990s, there is no question that a wide range of networks, coalitions, and alliances has emerged that would once have been hard to imagine. However, compared to the pace of binational integration among *other* actors – including automobile manufacturers, investment bankers, toxic waste producers, drug dealers, television magnates, immigrant families, and national policy makers – both the degree and the impact of binational civil society collaboration have been quite limited (with the notable exception of partnerships actually *on* the border).

Cross-border conversations between national civil society actors have certainly multiplied enormously, encouraging much deeper mutual understanding. But mutual understanding between civil society counterparts does not necessarily lead to actual collaboration. For example, sympathetic journalistic coverage very often

1 Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Tarrow (1998, 2000) are among the analysts who clearly distinguish between these two approaches. For stronger versions of the transnational social movements approach, see, among others, Brecher, Costello, and Smith 2000; R. Cohen and Rai 2000; J. Smith, Charfield, and Pagnucco 1997; and Wapner 1996. Keck and Sikkink (1998), like Hanagan (1998), discuss transnational societal linkages in long-term historical context. For a recent overview of the literature, see Florini 2000. For recent conference papers that specifically examine the local impacts of transnational civil society networks, see [www2.ucsc.edu/cjirs/conferences/humanrights](http://www2.ucsc.edu/cjirs/conferences/humanrights).

2 In response to the assertion that labor unions need to “catch up” in the integration process, senior American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO) strategist Ron Blackwell pointed out at a July 1998 conference at the University of California, Santa Cruz: “Why are we lagging behind [corporations and states]? They make the rules. Not only is it their game, and not only do they take an aggressive posture towards the rest of us, but their activities in organizing people are also self-financing. Business is a masterful and massive organizer of people. So are governments. We don’t have that advantage. Moreover, our interests are social interests; they are particular among us, and it takes a while to find each other ... Workers have differences of interest. They often overlap, but they are not identical and they do contradict each other in some areas. The whole project of building a union, of building any organization, is to be able to map the areas of overlapping interests, and to be able to build a working relationship or the capacity for collective action based on what we share.”

features headlines like “hudding cross-border resistance” (see, for instance, Rosen 1999), yet we have been reading similar headlines about relations between social movements in Mexico and the United States for more than a decade. For reasons not yet fully understood, these “buds” have had considerable difficulty flowering.<sup>3</sup> Consolidating cross-border partnerships turns out to be easier said than done. Their impact, moreover, has often been overestimated. The involvement of international actors in the national arena does not in itself demonstrate that they exercise substantial influence in that arena. There is, for example, a widespread tendency to assume that the international concern provoked by the rebellion led by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) translated into significant international civil society impact upon the course of events in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. Yet an alternative hypothesis is quite plausible: in practice, international civil society actors engaged in the Chiapas conflict may have been marginal to what has been primarily a nationally determined political process.

This chapter is comprised of four sections. The first part frames society-to-society relationships in terms of the broader U.S.–Mexico context, which involves state and elite actors as well. The second part makes conceptual distinctions among transnational networks, coalitions, and movements, and it then assesses in those terms varying degrees of density of key U.S.–Mexico civil society partnerships. This section synthesizes the patterns in specific sectors, including labor rights, environmental concerns, trade policy advocacy, democracy and human rights, women’s rights, and immigrant rights. The third part of the chapter turns from coalition dynamics to impact, building upon Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) framework for assessing the impact of transnational advocacy networks. This section focuses upon binational societal partnerships in three sectors: environment, labor, and human rights.<sup>4</sup> The conclusion includes a synthesis of the main analytic findings, presented in terms of a series of propositions for discussion.

3 On the late 1980s and early 1990s period of cross-border organizing, see Brooks 1992; Barry, Browne, and Sims 1994; Fox 1989, 1992; Thorup 1991; Heredia and Hernández 1995; and Totres 1997. For comprehensive listings of the organizations involved, see Hernández and Sánchez 1992 and Browne 1996a, 1996b.

4 Keck and Sikkink’s book presents an overview of the different kinds of political tools and strategies that transnational civil society advocacy networks use: “(1) *information politics*, or the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically usable information and move it to where it will have the most impact; (2) *symbolic politics*, or the ability to call upon symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience that is frequently far away; (3) *leverage politics*, or the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have an influence; and (4) *accountability politics*, or the effort to hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies or principles” (1998: 16).

Keck and Sikkink’s agenda-setting study goes on to evaluate transnational networks in terms of various “stages” of impact: agenda setting, encouraging discursive policy commitments from states and other actors, causing international or national procedural change, affecting policy, and influencing actual behavioral change in target actors (p. 201).

## Situating Society-to-Society Relationships

The full array of binational social, civic, and political coalitions involves a wide range of state and social actors. This chapter focuses primarily upon civil society-to-civil society relationships, concentrating in turn upon those actors that pursue broader social participation and public accountability in each country. However, these relations should be understood in the broader context of the many *other* partnerships that link states and societies in Mexico and the United States (not to mention the two countries’ private sectors, which have been studied extensively elsewhere). One can situate society-to-society relationships in terms of one of four quadrants in a simple two-by-two table that depicts the U.S. state and civil society on one side, and the Mexican state and civil society on the other. Table 15.1 illustrates the wide array of state-to-state coalitions that exist, ranging from those focusing upon keeping Mexico safe for U.S. investors (such as the financial rescue package that the U.S. government provided to help resolve Mexico’s 1994–1995 economic crisis), to the increasing degree of military and anti-drug cooperation, to regular, institutionalized exchanges between federal cabinet officials and governors of border states.

### *State-to-State links*

The wide range of state-to-state links between the United States and Mexico is well known and need not be detailed here. These partnerships reach across the many sectoral agencies in both federal governments, as well as from congress to congress. Subnational governments are also increasingly relating to one another – most notably in the case of regular meetings among the governors of border states, but also including frequent visits from state governors to regions linked by migration across the border. Although some of these cross-border relationships are largely ceremonial, others are quite substantial (as in the U.S. Treasury and White House role in the 1995 financial rescue package for Mexico, and in the increasing levels of cooperation between the two countries’ armed forces).<sup>5</sup> Castañeda (1996) highlighted the political implications of these state-to-state partnerships when he argued that the U.S. government’s repeated financial bailouts bolstered the Mexican regime and postponed national democratization.

### *Links between the U.S. State and Mexican Civil Society*

Linkages between the U.S. state and Mexican civil society are relatively recent. U.S. development assistance to private Mexican organizations historically focused upon family planning, health, and scientific, agricultural, and educational cooperation, rather than upon civil society capacity-building (even in the aforementioned sectors). Since the late 1980s, however, the U.S. Agency for International Development

5 The United States also played an important role in encouraging the multilateral development banks to invest heavily in Mexico, especially during the debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Fox 2000b).

Table 15.1: Examples of Mexico–U.S. Partnerships

	<i>U.S. State</i>	<i>U.S. Civil Society</i>
<i>Mexican State</i>	Treasury ministries National cabinet meetings Border governors' conferences Anti-narcotics aid NAFTA trilateral institutions Military sales and training U.S. support for Mexico from multilateral development banks Exchanges between judicial authorities	Policy think tanks Private lobbyists Universities Latino NGOs Conservation NGOs Elite cultural institutions (museums, for example) Mexican immigrant civil society in the United States (hometown clubs and federations)
<i>Mexican Civil Society</i>	USAID (and its U.S. contractors) National Endowment for Democracy Inter-American Foundation	Religious institutions Private foundations Media elites Environmental coalitions Trade union coalitions Democracy networks Human rights networks Women's rights networks Migrant voting rights advocacy networks Indigenous peoples networks Small farmer networks

(USAID) has invested heavily in Mexican conservation organizations, aiming to bolster their capacity to protect biodiversity and, in some cases, to improve the management of what USAID called Mexico's "paper parks." By the late 1990s, environmental projects constituted the largest category of USAID funding to Mexico.<sup>6</sup> Some fraction of this conservation funding probably reached Mexican environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). USAID has also funded the Mexican Red Cross in times of disaster.

When analysts think of U.S. policy toward civil society in other countries, much of the discussion focuses upon so-called democracy promotion. Yet a recent comprehensive overview of the 1980–1995 period found that democracy promotion was never a major U.S. policy goal in Mexico (Mazza 2001). With very few exceptions, the U.S. executive and legislative branches both sustained a strong consensus to leave that issue off the bilateral agenda. By the late 1990s, however, the democracy issue had inched up the agenda. USAID's donations under its category of "more democratic processes" included US\$3.725 million for several Mexican civic organizations in fiscal year 2000, complementing the support provided by the

National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Some of this USAID funding was for judicial education, municipal development, and legislative institution-building, and it therefore belongs in the state-to-state category. Nevertheless, USAID's democracy funding also reached the Citizens' Movement for Democracy, the Mexican Center for Victims of Crimes, and the Mexican Society for Women's Rights. The US\$1.2 million that USAID proposed for fiscal year 2000 to deal with HIV/AIDS was also mainly targeted to NGOs (international, national, and local).<sup>7</sup>

The National Endowment for Democracy has played a more prominent role in grant-making to Mexican civic and human rights organizations.<sup>8</sup> In the 1997 election year, NED granted approximately US\$1.1 million to Mexican civic institutions and democratic processes, including \$371,000 to Civic Alliance (AC); \$278,000 through the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations' (AFL–CIO) refurbished international arm; and \$274,000 via NED's Republican Party affiliate to the Centro Cívico (Civic Center) and its women's organization.<sup>9</sup> Even though these funding levels were significant from the recipient organizations' point of view, Mexico was not an especially high priority within NED's portfolio, especially during the early 1990s when civic funding might have made more of a difference.

The Inter-American Foundation (IAF), a small federal agency responsible to the U.S. Congress and mandated to be independent of short-term U.S. foreign policy goals, has maintained a long-term, low-profile, but public involvement with Mexican civil society organizations. The IAF has provided grant funding to a wide range of Mexican NGOs, and in the late 1980s it shifted to more direct funding for community-based rural social organizations, including many autonomous indigenous producer groups.<sup>10</sup> The IAF's levels of funding to Mexico were higher than the NED's, averaging approximately US\$2.3 million per year over the 1990s.<sup>11</sup>

6 This category accounted for US\$6 million (the majority of proposed USAID funding) during fiscal year 2000. See [www.info.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/lac/mexico.html](http://www.info.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/lac/mexico.html) and, for details, USAID/Mexico 1999.

7 There has been very little informed public discussion of USAID's Mexico program in either the United States or Mexico. This absence is both cause and effect of the lack of independent assessments of the program.

8 On the Mexican debate over the implications of National Endowment for Democracy (NED) funding of Mexican pro-democracy organizations, see Aguayo Quezada 2001 and P. Rodríguez 2001. For context, see Dresser 1996, Mazza 2001, and Sabatini 2002.

9 By 1999 funding for Mexico had dropped below US\$300,000. See the annual reports at [www.ned.org](http://www.ned.org) for public data that are more detailed and precise than USAID's information.

10 Since the late 1980s, the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) has made extensive, strategic grant contributions to numerous regional peasant and indigenous movement organizations and networks, including the sustainable coffee and community-based forestry movements.

11 Author's communication with David Bray, the IAF's former Mexico representative, September 1999.

*The Mexican State's Ties to Civil Society in the United States*

The political opposition's surprisingly vigorous electoral challenge to the legitimacy of the established Mexican regime in 1988 spilled over into the United States, including open campaigning by the leftist opposition among Mexicans in the United States. The possibility of change in Mexico resonated with Mexicans in the United States to an unexpected degree, even though most of the migrant population lacked political rights in both the U.S. and Mexican political systems. In the aftermath of Mexico's fraud-riddled 1988 presidential vote, post-electoral mobilizations by Mexican immigrants in the United States probably exceeded in size those staged during the campaign.<sup>12</sup>

In response, the Mexican state launched a multi-pronged strategy to reach out to Mexican civil society in the United States.<sup>13</sup> The term "civil society in the United States" (rather than "U.S. civil society") is employed here in order to include the Mexican state's strategy for reincorporating Mexican nationals. One could argue that this is only formally a cross-border relationship, given that the state's outreach to the national diaspora is a cross-border extension of its national efforts to organize and reincorporate Mexican civil society actors more generally. However, the task of outreach to emigrants falls to Mexico's Ministry of Foreign Relations (SRE) and its network of consulates; by definition, therefore, it is a cross-border relationship. Some state governments have also developed their own outreach strategies, most notably in the case of Guanajuato.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, one could argue that the Televisa broadcast network's long-standing dominance over U.S. Spanish-language television also constituted a prominent example of the (de facto) Mexican state's linkage to Latino civil society in the United States (A. Rodríguez 1999).<sup>15</sup>

Most instances of Mexican migrant organization in the United States can be understood as either state-led or migrant-led, with Mexican state actors playing an especially prominent role in inducing the formation of hometown clubs and their statewide federations (Goldring 1998, 2002).<sup>16</sup> In the process, the Mexican state

sought to keep most organized emigrants in the civic, rather than the political, arena. At the same time, a new civic network of emigrant voting-rights advocates began to lobby the Mexican state and the country's major political parties for the first time (Martínez and Ross 2002, Ross 1999). Only in the late 1990s did Mexican immigrants, their leaders, and their organizations begin to influence national politics and gain a voice in the national media. This process is, however, best understood as a relationship within Mexican civil society (see below).

Although the Mexican state's efforts to reach out to its diaspora have been largely invisible outside the Mexican community, its partnerships with more established U.S. civil society actors have received extensive attention.<sup>17</sup> The Mexican state's attempts to woo U.S. opinion makers reached unprecedented levels during the administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994), and a wide range of U.S. civic and political elites responded eagerly. The most influential U.S. private universities, think tanks, and large, moderate environmental organizations rushed to see which one could offer Salinas their most public platform and their most distinguished honors. The Mexican state made significant financial as well as political investments in efforts to influence U.S. public opinion through think tanks and lobbyists (Dresser 1991a, 1996; Eisenstadt 1997; Velasco 1997). Mexican American civil rights and business organizations also received significant official attention.<sup>18</sup> Mexican government strategists realized that influencing the U.S. government required influencing U.S. civil society, especially because the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) overflowed the usual narrow boundaries of conventional bilateral policy making. In the 1990s, then, both the U.S. and Mexican governments increased their efforts to use non-state actors in the other country to influence the other state.

*Civil Society-to-Civil Society Links*

The importance and density of binational societal relationships ebbed and flowed throughout the twentieth century, as Knight (1997) has suggested. Some of that history continues to resonate. Ricardo Flores Magón remains a hero to radical democratic movements in both societies, especially among Chicanos and southern

<sup>17</sup> This was not the first wave of Mexican state–U.S. civil society relationships. For an overview of Mexican relations with the U.S. political system early in this century, see Knight's comprehensive discussion (1997). On U.S. civil society's cultural engagements with Mexico during this period, see Delpar 1992. On the Mexican state's efforts to work with U.S. authorities to repress exiled Mexican radicals (as well as their alliances with the U.S. Left), see MacLachlan 1991. In the past, some ties in this category also involved Mexican government invitations to U.S. nongovernmental organizations to engage with Mexico. Examples include the Rockefeller Foundation's public health (1930s) and agricultural research work (1940s) and the Summer Institute of Linguistics, which was invited by President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940) to promote literacy in indigenous regions in the 1930s.

<sup>18</sup> The Mexican state used elite cultural outreach in an attempt to improve Mexico's image in the eyes of U.S. opinion makers with the 1991 "The Splendor of Thirty Centuries" art exhibit in New York, San Antonio, and Los Angeles.

<sup>12</sup> These protests reverberated within the Mexican state. Dresser (1993: 94) quotes José Ángel Pescador, then Mexican consul in Los Angeles: "One of the greatest protest marches against the outcome of the elections took place in Los Angeles.... The Mexican government realized that there are many anti-PRI Mexicans living in California who return periodically to their communities and have influence in Mexico."

<sup>13</sup> For details, see Dresser 1991a, 1993; González Gutiérrez 1993, 1997; De la Garza et al. 1998; Leiken 2000; and Martínez and Ross 2002.

<sup>14</sup> More than thirty Casas Guanajuato are organized into a national network. Author's communication with Laura González, University of Texas at Dallas, August 1999.

<sup>15</sup> Televisa was for many years closely aligned politically with the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Its hegemony in the Spanish-language market in the United States was particularly notable in televised news, an area in which it lost its lead position in the late 1990s.

<sup>16</sup> Research, primarily by sociologists, is beginning to catch up with the 1990s wave of Mexican immigrant social and civic organization. See Espinosa 1999; Goldring 1998, 2002; Rivera Salgado 1999a, 1999b, 2002; R. Smith 1999; and Zabin and Escala Rabadán 1998. For conceptual context, see M. Smith and Guatnizo 1998.

Mexican indigenous movements. John Reed continues to inspire contemporary alternative journalists in the United States.<sup>19</sup> In contrast, other chapters in this history have been largely forgotten, including the mutual identification between the two national labor movements in the late 1930s (Paterson 1998). The oldest sustained binational collaborative effort for social justice and mutual understanding dates back to that period.<sup>20</sup>

This study deals with one subset of the larger universe of civil society actors. The focus is on binational relationships between nongovernmental actors in each country that see themselves as promoting social equality and more accountable public and private institutions. Delimiting the specific set of actors in this way underscores the fact that many groups within both civil societies act primarily to *reinforce* institutional arrangements that limit public accountability and reproduce elitist political-cultural legacies. This characterization would apply, for example, to the dominant broadcast media in both societies, as well as to the dominant tendencies within some religious hierarchies or the Red Cross.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, there are in both societies elements that *oppose* the extension or consolidation of rights won by other social movements, most notably women's rights. Looking at civil society in this broad sense, including its powerful pro-status quo elements, reminds us that civil society is a force of inertia as well as a force for change. This study's focus, however, is on those actors within civil society that share some degree of commitment to democratization and social change.<sup>22</sup>

### Disentangling Binational Networks, Coalitions, and Movements

The 1990s witnessed an upsurge of binational civil society discussion in Mexico and the United States, beginning before the NAFTA debate but then rapidly expanding. These interactions often took the form of exchanges of information, practical experiences, and expressions of solidarity. Sometimes exchanges generated *networks* of ongoing relationships; at other times they produced the shared goals, mutual trust, and understanding needed to form *coalitions* that could collaborate

19 See, for example, John Ross's regular email news bulletin "Mexico Bárbaro" at [wnu@igc.apc.org](mailto:wnu@igc.apc.org).

20 Since 1939 the Quaker-inspired American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) has organized annual summer community development programs in Mexico to bring together youth from both countries. AFSC's main Mexican partner organization is Servicio, Desarrollo y Paz (Service, Development, and Peace, SEDEPAZ).

21 For example, the U.S. Red Cross has been governed by conservative Republican political leaders such as Elizabeth Dole. In contrast, the Mexican Red Cross is corrupt and ineffective at providing disaster relief; it had to return a US\$300,000 Hurricane Paulina donation from the U.S. Agency for International Development (Zúñiga and Olayo 1999). In Chiapas, moreover, pro-Zapatista indigenous communities identified the Mexican Red Cross with the Mexican government.

22 The concept of *counterparts* is also relevant here, a notion that does not imply similarity or agreement but rather suggests analogous roles in their respective societies (Brooks 1992).

on specific campaigns. Networks do not necessarily coordinate their actions or come to agreement on specific joint actions (as implied by the concept of coalition). In contrast, "coalitions are networks in action mode."<sup>23</sup> Neither networks nor coalitions necessarily imply significant horizontal exchanges among participants. Indeed, many rely upon a handful of interlocutors to manage relationships between broad-based social organizations that have relatively little awareness of the nature and actions of their counterparts. However, the concept of transnational social *movement* organizations implies a much higher degree of density and much more cohesion than in either networks or coalitions (see table 15.2). The term "transnational movement organizations" suggests a social subject that is present in more than one country, as in the paradigmatic case of the Binational Indigenous Oaxacan Front (BIOB) and other indigenous organizations that literally cross the Mexico-U.S. border (Rivera Salgado 1999a, 1999b, 2002).

The terms "network," "coalition," and "movement" are often used interchangeably in practice. However, for the sake of developing tools for a more precise assessment of the nature of binational relationships, these three concepts will be treated here as analytically distinct, and then applied to a series of cross-border relationships between social and civic actors. In short, transnational civil society exchanges *can* produce networks, which *can* produce coalitions, which *can* produce movements.<sup>24</sup> Note that underscoring these distinctions does not imply any judgment that more cooperation is necessarily better. On the contrary, realistic expectations about what is possible are critical to sustaining any kind of collective action. Indeed, one of the main conclusions of the cross-sectoral comparative analysis that follows is that cross-border cooperation involves significant costs and risks that must be taken into account, depends heavily upon finding appropriate counterparts with whom to cooperate, and needs shared targets to inspire joint action.

It is relevant to bear in mind that, independent of the recent pace of binational integration, numerous civil society actors in Mexico and the United States – including diverse currents within religious, environmental, feminist, human rights, and trade union communities – have long considered themselves to be internationalist. Although many local and national groups see themselves as part of a global movement (for feminism, for human rights, in defense of the environment, and so forth), this chapter focuses upon *sustained cross-border relationships between organized constituencies* (as distinct from groups that share broad goals). As a result, this study employs the relatively tangible category of transnational movement *organization* (as distinct from the more amorphous concept of global civil society, for example).<sup>25</sup>

Distinguishing among networks, coalitions, and movements helps avoid blurring political differences and imbalances *within* what may appear from the outside

23 Author's communication with Margaret Keck, Johns Hopkins University, March 2000.

24 The use of the term "transnational" rather than "binational" suggests that this framework can be applied more broadly.

25 The author is grateful to Sonia Álvarez for highlighting this distinction.



Table 15.2: Transnational Networks, Coalitions, and Movements

<i>Shared characteristics</i>	<i>Transnational networks</i>	<i>Transnational coalitions</i>	<i>Transnational movement organizations</i>
Exchange of information and experiences	Yes	Yes	Yes
Organized social base	Sometimes more, sometimes less or none	Sometimes more, sometimes less or none	Yes
Mutual support	Sometimes from afar, and possibly strictly discursive	Yes	Yes
Joint actions and campaigns	Sometimes loose coordination	Yes, based upon mutually agreed minimum goals that are often short-term and tactical	Yes, based upon long-term strategy
Shared ideologies	Not necessarily	Not necessarily	Generally yes
Shared political cultures	Often not	Often not	Shared political values, styles, and identities

Note: The ordering of transnational networks, coalitions, and movement organizations (from left to right) reflects the progressively greater density and cohesion of these relationships.

to be “transnational movements.”<sup>26</sup> As Keck and Sikkink’s pioneering study notes, transnational networks face the hard challenge of developing a common frame of meaning despite cross-cultural differences (1998: 7). In practice, such shared meanings are socially constructed through joint action rather than shared intentions. Political differences within transnational networks are also not to be underestimated, in spite of ostensibly shared goals. Even those transnational networks that *appear* to share basic political-cultural values (including environmental, feminist, or human rights movements) often consist of actors that have very different, nationally distinct political visions, goals, and styles.<sup>27</sup> As Keck and Sikkink point out, “transnational advocacy networks must also be understood as political spaces, in which

26 For a parallel approach to distinguishing among networks, coalitions, and movements, see Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002.

27 National borders may not be the most important ones in this context. For example, ecologists or feminists from different countries who share systematic critiques may have more in common with their cross-border counterparts than they do with the more moderate wings of their respective national movements.

differently situated actors negotiate – formally or informally – the social, cultural, and political meanings of their joint enterprise” (1998: 3).

This essay builds upon Keck and Sikkink’s work by exploring the dynamics of these political spaces. However, because the U.S.–Mexico transnational political sphere includes broad-based social organizations as well as nongovernmental organizations, this analysis covers a broader array of transnational actors than does Keck and Sikkink’s study.<sup>28</sup> Keck and Sikkink focus upon the subset of civil society actors that are motivated by what they call “principled ideas or values,” in contrast to those transnational actors driven mainly by “instrumental goals” (such as corporations) or “shared causal ideas” (such as scientists) (1998: 1, 30). This definition fits many classic transnational advocacy campaigns quite well, but when broad-based social constituencies became involved in transnational campaigns, shared normative values are not the only motivation. Both material interests and shared causal ideas also become very relevant. For example, the U.S. trade unionists and Mexican human rights campaigners who collaborated in a coalition to criticize the NAFTA shared a limited political goal, but they did not necessarily share political values. Because the U.S.–Mexico relationship is characterized precisely by the unusual degree to which “foreign” concerns become “local,” with the integration process directly affecting people organized around *interests* as well as values, this chapter employs a definition of “network” that differs from Keck and Sikkink’s. The approach used here defines network participants in terms of their actions, not their motivations and values.<sup>29</sup> Keck and Sikkink’s reliance upon political values as a *defining* characteristic of transnational advocacy networks is unable to account for the involvement of broad-based membership organizations that perceive their material interests to be directly affected by transnational processes.

### Relationships between Social/Civic Counterparts

The following section assesses the degree of density and cohesion among a diverse set of binational society-to-society relationships. Sectors reviewed include labor unions, environmentalists, trade policy advocacy groups, democracy and human rights activists, women’s rights activists, and Latino immigrant and civil rights organizations.

28 On the related notion of “transnational public spheres,” see Yúdice 1998 and Guidry, Kennedy, and Zald 2000.

29 Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) use of the term “network” encompasses both “network” and “coalition” as these terms are employed here. In this study’s framework, when networks engage in joint campaigns, they are considered to be coalitions – taking into account that ostensibly transnational networks may well carry out campaigns that are not jointly determined. In instances in which balanced relationships with partners on the ground are lacking, they are more appropriately viewed as international rather than transnational campaigns.

*Labor Unions*

Mexico–U.S. labor partnerships have been among the most difficult cross-border relationships to construct. There are four main reasons for this.<sup>30</sup> First, the political cultures of the two countries' labor movements are dominated by powerful nationalist ideological legacies. Second, sometimes workers in certain sectors – especially in industries characterized by high degrees of North American production sharing, such as automobiles, textiles, and garments – have directly conflicting short-term interests. Third, counterpart productive sectors often have very different union structures. Specific industries may be unionized in one country but not in the other, or unions may be centralized in one country but decentralized in the other, creating asymmetries that make it difficult to identify appropriate counterparts.<sup>31</sup> Fourth, some unions have preferred the diplomatic stability of working with politically compatible counterparts and have been unwilling to explore relationships with a broader range of potential partners. Until the late 1990s, the dominant pattern of binational relations between union leaders was to avoid conflict by limiting their diplomatic ties to official counterparts.<sup>32</sup> This sometimes made direct ties between Mexican and U.S. unions difficult, especially in sectors (such as the automotive and textile industries) in which forms of representation differed between the two countries.

A very limited number of cross-border solidarity efforts involving workers predate the NAFTA debate of the early 1990s. One pioneering case involved the American Friends Service Committee's efforts along the Texas border to support discreet community-based organizing of workers in *maquiladora* (in-bond processing) plants, leading to the formation of the now broad-based Border Committee of

30 For background on the international politics of U.S. labor unions, see Sims 1992, Shorrock 1999, and McGinn and Moody 1992. On the history of U.S. economic nationalism and unions, see Frank 1999. On variations in trade union responses to the NAFTA in the United States and Canada, see Dreiling and Robinson 1998. On U.S.–Mexican union relations, see Armbruster 1998; Babson 2000; Bandy 1998, 2000; Brooks 1992; Carr 1996, 1998; Cook 1997; García Urrutia 2002; Harhaway 2000a; Kidder and McGinn 1995; La Botz 1992; E. Williams 1997; and H. Williams 1999, 2002. On union relations with immigrants, see Milkman 2000, among others.

31 Such asymmetries are particularly notable in the automotive sector.

32 For example, in the early 1990s the United Auto Workers (UAW) did not pursue relationships with union democracy movements in Mexico (such as the Ford-Cuautitlán movement) in order to avoid alienating PRI union bosses. This permitted a rank-and-file dissident movement within the UAW – New Directions – to gain the moral high ground by leading U.S. solidarity efforts with Mexican Ford workers (La Botz 1992: 148–59, Armbruster 1998). When things from the government-aligned Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) killed a worker at the Cuautitlán plant, thousands of New Directions UAW workers in the Midwest wore black armbands. Yet that solidarity breakthrough may also have been a weakness, given that associations with New Directions probably made the Ford-Cuautitlán rank-and-file movement anathema to the UAW national leadership.

Women Workers (CFO).<sup>33</sup> Another early effort was *Mujer a Mujer* (Woman to Woman), which led feminist support for the independent “19th of September” Seamstresses’ Union following the 1985 earthquakes in Mexico City.<sup>34</sup> In the first binational U.S.–Mexican union-to-union effort since the beginning of the Cold War, the midwestern Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC) coordinated in the late 1980s with an agricultural workers’ union in Sinaloa (an affiliate of the “official” Confederation of Mexican Workers, CTM) to counter Campbell Soup Company’s efforts to divide and conquer unions in the United States and Mexico (Neuman 1993, Barger and Reza 1994).

The multisectoral Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras (CJM) was founded in 1989, before the NAFTA debate began. It brought together religious, environmental, labor, community, and women’s rights organizers who had been working on binational integration issues.<sup>35</sup> Initially led by U.S. religious activists based on the border, over the years the CJM has become increasingly trinational, with Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. members. In fact, in 1996 it began to require 50 percent Mexican representation on its board of directors.

Williams’s comprehensive comparative examination of a decade of diverse CJM campaigns found that transborder labor-centered initiatives can generate pressure upon both governments and private-sector interests to reform practices and uphold laws in a manner that they otherwise would not do (Williams 1999, 2002). The CJM has taken up the long-term challenge of bringing labor unions together with community-based worker organizations and NGOs. This is especially important in the maquiladora sector, where many Mexican workers do not see formal unions as organizations that will represent their interests. After all, through “protection contracts” signed without rank-and-file involvement, many of these workers are already nominally members of unions – albeit corrupt and largely invisible ones. Williams’s systematic comparison of a large number of solidarity actions shows that the more cross-border they were, the more impact they had on their targets. This suggests that the logic of binational approaches to workers’ rights campaigns is driven by its greater practical impact, not simply by ideology.

However, some kinds of cross-border actions create tensions between U.S. and

33 See Kamel and Hoffman 1999. The Border Committee of Women Workers is reportedly active in Ciudad Victoria, Río Bravo, Piedras Negras, Ciudad Acuña, and Agua Prieta.

34 See Carrillo 1990 and 1998 on efforts to build cross-border solidarity with the “19th of September” Seamstresses’ Union. In the late 1980s, these ties included contacts with the major U.S. counterpart unions, as well as a relationship with Texas-based Fuerza Unida (United Force). International support for the “19th of September” Seamstresses’ Union waned following a disputed leadership transition in 1988. See also *Mujer a Mujer’s* (Woman to Woman) innovative binational bulletin “Correspondencia,” which linked supporters of female labor organizing in both countries from 1984 to 1992. For further discussion of *Mujer a Mujer*, see Waterman 1998: 168–72, and Carrillo 1998.

35 For further discussion, see Kamel 1988, 1989; Kamel and Hoffman 1999; Peña 1997; and Ruiz and Tiano 1987.



Mexican labor organizers. According to Martha Ojeda, a former maquiladora worker and now executive director of the CJM, most Mexican maquiladora organizers concentrate upon long-term shop floor and community-based organizing rather than upon U.S.-focused political and corporate campaigns.<sup>36</sup> U.S. initiatives often give priority to short-term media impact, especially during key national political moments such as trade policy debates in Congress. The emphasis upon media impact sometimes conflicts with more subtle shop floor organizing. Mexican maquiladora organizers report cases in which U.S. union delegations standing outside the factory gates televised their denunciations of the factory's terrible conditions, and workers who were organizing on the inside were fired as a result.<sup>37</sup>

Until the late 1990s, Mexican maquiladora organizers had been quite isolated from one another. It was only after several years of participating jointly in cross-border coalitions (such as the Southwest Network for Economic and Environmental Justice and the CJM) that Mexican organizers convened their first border-wide networking meetings in late 1998 in Tijuana. Although U.S.-led cross-border initiatives encouraged networking among Mexican organizers, some Mexican activists grew wary of importing the internal rivalries that existed within U.S. organizations. The second worker-organizing meeting was, therefore, pointedly called "Maquiladora Organizing In and From Mexico."<sup>38</sup> This broad-based gathering sought to further borderwide coalition-building within Mexico by airing concerns, forging shared political goals, and elaborating a series of "ethical principles," point 9 of which read:

I will accept no support, national or international, that is conditional, that foments divisions and competition among Mexican worker organizations, that subordinates my organization to outside interests, or that undervalues, endangers, or negatively affects Mexican workers.<sup>39</sup>

By the late 1990s, Mexican organizers had begun to speak for the first time of an incipient *movement* of maquiladora workers – a result of both cross-border efforts

and organizing initiatives undertaken within Mexico. By this time, increased Mexican (and Canadian) participation in the CJM had transformed the coalition into a much more balanced venue for forging joint strategies and processing very different campaign styles. Most notably, the relationship within the CJM between the AFL-CIO and autonomous Mexican worker-organizing initiatives had become a persistent source of internal debate. Thus, in terms of the conceptual framework presented in this study, the CJM is indeed aptly named – a *coalition*, more coordinated than a network but less unified than a movement.

One very high-profile maquiladora organizing experience involved Tijuana's Han Young automotive component factory. The Han Young union worked very closely with the San Diego Workers' Support Committee. Through its influential labor and political allies, the San Diego Workers' Support Committee generated widespread U.S. union and congressional concern about the blatant violations of freedom of association at the Han Young plant. Within Mexico, the Han Young union had affiliated with the national Authentic Labor Front (FAT) in order to gain sufficient political leverage to demand an open union election. However, it later left the FAT, giving priority to cross-border solidarity over Mexican coalition partners.<sup>40</sup> The cross-border Han Young campaign won important court and media victories, but the factory's workers lost on the ground. Their victories in court were ignored by government authorities in Baja California, and all the pro-union workers were permanently replaced.

The Han Young case tested the limits of cross-border leverage. In this stance at least, U.S. media coverage, plus access to Representative Richard Gephardt and then Vice President Al Gore, seem to have had little effect upon the defense of Mexican workers' rights.<sup>41</sup> The Han Young case led to a claim filed through the U.S. National Administrative Office (one of the national offices established under the NAFTA's so-called labor side agreement to investigate worker rights grievances), but the main outcome was a fatigued public hearing on freedom of association in which dissident workers were publicly beaten in a Tijuana hotel (Bacon 2000). The Han Young experience is, then, a cautionary tale that warns against assuming that broad-based, high-level, and high-profile international pressure will be sufficient to influence political decisions within Mexico.

More generally, U.S. and Mexican labor unions have held numerous discussions, exchanges, and conferences, which have yielded frequent internationalist proclamations but relatively few consolidated partnerships. Some important U.S. unions have been divided over whether to pursue nationalist versus internationalist strategies. This was, for example, the case with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

40 Han Young organizers did not participate in the new Mexican maquiladora organizing network.

41 For details on the Han Young campaign, see H. Williams 2000; Hathaway 2000a, 2000b; and the "Coalition for Labor Rights" ([www.summersault.com/~agj/clt/](http://www.summersault.com/~agj/clt/)) and the "Working Together" and "Mexican Labor News and Analysis" bulletins ([www.igc.apc.org/nntedelect/alert.html](http://www.igc.apc.org/nntedelect/alert.html)). For overviews of border labor politics, see Bandy 1998, 2000.

36 Discussant's remarks at the conference "Lessons from Mexico-U.S. Binational Civil Society Coalitions," University of California, Santa Cruz, July 1998.

37 Author's interview with Carmen Valadez, Casa de la Mujer: Factor X, September 1999, Santa Cruz, California. Note, for example, the case of Custom Trim in Matamoros, where leaders of the visiting delegation reportedly ignored warnings that organizers would likely be fired.

38 It was held in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua on August 20–21, 1999; about one hundred organizers (mostly women) participated. Of 65 participants who registered, 23 were active workers and 15 were recently fired workers, a much higher proportion than in any other border network. Of the Mexican organizations that signed the final political declaration, 11 were affiliated with the Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras, 6 with Southwest Network for Economic and Environmental Justice, 2 with both, and 3 with neither cross-border network (author's interview with Carmen Valadez, Casa de la Mujer: Factor X, September 1999, Santa Cruz, California).

39 "Principios éticos," August 20–21, 1999, Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua; distributed by electronic mail.

which ended up undertaking both strategies at once during their mid-1990s period of reform leadership. The Teamsters' high-profile campaign against the implementation of the NAFTA's cross-border trucking provisions was remarkably successful; indeed, it was the only case in which a bottom-up U.S. protest blocked implementation of a NAFTA article. Working together with leading politicians from U.S. border states (including Texas Attorney General Dan Morales), the Teamsters managed to frame the issue in terms of public safety and the threat of illegal drug trafficking (rather than the promotion of the union's special interests). In the process, they used media campaigns that many Mexican critics of free trade considered to be anti-Mexican in tone.<sup>42</sup> Yet at the same time, the Teamsters' internationalist wing pursued an organizing campaign in the state of Washington's apple industry that was sensitive to the concerns of Mexican immigrants, coordinated with the United Farm Workers (UFW), and eventually involved Mexican unions.<sup>43</sup> Although seemingly contradictory, these two approaches reflect both the political diversity that exists within the largest U.S. union and the pragmatic, short-term political calculations made by anti-NAFTA forces in the United States more generally.

The most notable binational union partnerships have been between relatively small, progressive unions, including alliances between the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America (UE) and the FAT and between the Communications Workers of America (CWA) and the Mexican Telephone Workers' Union (STRM).<sup>44</sup> The FAT-UE alliance was sustained by shared ideological commitments to internationalism and worker empowerment. This partnership helped to launch perhaps the most ambitious trilateral North American union coalition so far, the Dana Workers' Alliance, which brought together many industrial unions to defend freedom of association in a Mexican auto parts plant. However, as the case slowly wended its way through the NAFTA labor grievance procedures, the two U.S. unions most involved withdrew from leadership of the initiative. The UE-represented auto parts factory was closed, and the Teamsters' reform leadership lost power.<sup>45</sup>

42 Author's interviews and plenary discussion at the conference "Trilateral Exchange: Popular Perspectives on Mexico-U.S.-Canada Relations," Cuernavaca, Mexico, February 1996. For a recent U.S. critique of opening cross-border truck transportation, see Public Citizen 2001. Kourous (2001) argues convincingly that the U.S. groups opposed to the North American Free Trade Agreement's trucking provisions continue to reflect nationalist biases.

43 In contrast to the Farm Labor Organizing Committee, as of the year 2000 the United Farm Workers (UFW) had not ventured beyond tentative gestures toward potential Mexican counterparts. According to local observers, the absence of a binational approach contributed to the failure of the UFW's three-year campaign to organize Mexican strawberry workers in the Pajaro Valley of Central California.

44 See Alexander 1998, Alexander and Gilmore 1994, L. Cohen and Early 1999, García Urrutia 2002, Rosen 1999, and Sepúlveda 1998.

45 Author's communication with United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America (UE) representative Robin Alexander, September 1999.

The STRM-CWA alliance was especially significant because the unions came together to seek common ground despite their different positions regarding the NAFTA. They formed a coalition to meet long-term challenges, while "agreeing to disagree" over various short-term political questions. The STRM-CWA partnership initiated two cases under NAFTA labor grievance procedures alleging violations of the right to freedom of association. In the first case, the STRM filed a complaint on behalf of U.S. workers - Latina employees at a Sprint telecommunications facility who were fired for union organizing.<sup>46</sup>

Remarkably few organizations have followed the example set by the Farm Labor Organizing Committee when it pioneered the strategy of bringing together unions representing workers employed by the same company in Mexico and the United States. One important exception involved the airline industry, which is increasingly binationally integrated. Delta Airlines and Aeroméxico have one of the most extensive corporate partnerships in the sector; in response, the pilots' organizations representing both companies formed an alliance "to protect wage structures and work distribution ... the first of its kind in Latin America" (Millman 2000).

In summary, cross-border union collaboration has brought to public attention some blatant violations of freedom of association - but thus far without any tangible effect in terms of practical developments in the workplace. Indeed, some U.S. workers who supported their Mexican counterparts saw their own plant shut down, allegedly in retaliation for their solidarity actions (Bacon 1998). Perhaps the most interesting departure is for Mexican unions to pursue trilateral claims involving violations of freedom of association of workers (often Mexico-origin workers, as in the cases of Sprint and Washington apple growers) in the United States. These efforts have contributed to more balanced coalitions by showing that the right to freedom of association is also systematically violated in the United States, not just in Mexico.<sup>47</sup>

The national administrative offices created under the North American Agreement

46 Communications Workers of America (CWA) leaders note that the second case, involving the border maquiladora Maxi Switch, led to "more success working together," including active rank-and-file participation at the border (especially by the CWA's Tucson local). Nevertheless, U.S. union support was still not sufficient to protect Mexican organizers from being assaulted by factory supervisors (L. Cohen and Early 1999: 158-59).

47 The Sprint grievance led to public hearings and extensive studies on the subject (McKinnitey et al. 1997). CWA leaders claimed that the official Commission on North American Labor Cooperation study of threats of plant closings as a violation of freedom of association was first delayed and then watered down (L. Cohen and Early 1999). They further charged that the final study downplayed the findings of one of the project's key researchers, Kate Bronfenbrenner of Cornell University, who found that "plant closing threats and plant closings have become an integral part of employer anti-union strategies" and that the rate of plant closings after U.S. union foundation elections "has more than doubled in the years since NAFTA was ratified" (L. Cohen and Early 1999: 157). Bronfenbrenner's surveys report that U.S. "managers at 70 percent of factories involved in organizing drives threaten to close if workers decide to unionize" (Greenhouse 2001: A10).

on Labor Cooperation have been one of the most tangible institutional results of binational NAFTA union campaigning, and coordinated grievance initiation has constituted one of the most important ways in which unions have sought to sustain and deepen their cross-border coalitions. Having a shared institutional target clearly helped to focus coalition-building efforts. Nevertheless, in the 23 complaints initiated over the 1994–2001 period, the labor side agreement produced very few tangible results in terms of influencing either government policies or private employers, and there were many more complete defeats than partial victories (Human Rights Watch 2001). More generally, the dominant pattern is that the right to organize remains tenuous in both countries, and cross-national ties have been unable to offset labor's weak bargaining power within national political institutions.<sup>48</sup>

### *Environmentalists*

As in the case of organized labor, binational environmental networking and advocacy have been marked by very significant differences within, as well as between, the Mexican and U.S. movements. Both national environmental movements are characterized by high levels of internal diversity, including both groups that see corporate-led economic growth as the answer to meeting environmental needs and elements that view unregulated economic growth as the problem (Hogenboom 1998, Bejarano 2002). Moreover, in both countries the experiences and priorities of groups working directly on the Mexico–U.S. border are often quite distinct from the larger national environmental organizations that have more ample access to the media and policy makers.

There have also been important differences over time in networking effectiveness. The high-profile pre-NAFTA debate was more the exception than the rule in binational environmental politics. Indeed, despite the central role that U.S. environmental organizations played on both sides of the pre-NAFTA debate, none of the major national environmental organizations in the United States devoted serious sustained attention to Mexico or to potential Mexican partners *after* the

vote on the NAFTA in the U.S. Congress.<sup>49</sup> This generalization holds true for the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, and Greenpeace, which were the only large membership-based U.S. environmental organization to oppose NAFTA. When Washington's short-term agenda moved away from Mexico, so did theirs.<sup>50</sup>

It is not surprising that the major U.S. conservation organizations chose to follow the official logic that Mexico needed trade-led economic growth to generate the resources needed for (hypothetical) environmental investments. These U.S. organizations espoused "free-market environmentalism," and the boards of directors of the most powerful pro-NAFTA U.S. conservation organizations included several prominent corporate representatives, some of whom were simultaneously active within the pro-NAFTA corporate lobby (Dreiling 1997, 2001). Beginning also in the early 1990s, some large U.S. conservation organizations received major grants from the U.S. government to promote the park approach to biodiversity conservation in Mexico.<sup>51</sup>

Despite the high public profile of the biodiversity issue, rare indeed are binational partnerships with established Mexican social counterparts involved in rural natural resource management (with, for example, the vast community forestry movement or the densely organized smallholder coffee cooperative movement, both of which are primarily indigenous). One network began to emerge when the Natural Resources Defense Council, together with the Smithsonian Institution's Center for Migratory Birds, convened a major conference on sustainable coffee in 1996 (Rice, Hattis, and MacLean 1997). Since then, however, the U.S. promoters of "bird-friendly" coffee have yet to form many close partnerships with the "fair trade" coffee traders, who focus more on balanced coalitions with Mexican

49 The exception was the pro-whale campaign against Mitsubishi Corporation's salt works in Baja California, as discussed below.

50 One important exception to this trend emerged in the late 1990s when the Sierra Club began to take up issues of environmental human rights, including a Guerrero case involving a peasant anti-corporate logging activist ([www.sierraclub.org/human-rights/Mexico](http://www.sierraclub.org/human-rights/Mexico); Eaton 1999). This campaign contributed to the peasant winning the high-profile Goldman award for environmental activism (Dillon 2000).

In contrast, the Sierra Club's 1998 internal referendum over whether to consider immigration to be an environmental problem attracted high levels of public attention (Clifford 1998). Although the membership decisively defeated the proposition, neither the internal nor the public debate had any immigrant or binational participation.

51 These organizations included the Nature Conservancy, World Wildlife Fund, and Conservation International. Independent evaluations are lacking of the degree to which these large U.S. conservation organizations have forged balanced partnerships with the communities residing in protected areas. One case worthy of further examination is Conservation International's operation of the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve, which began in the early 1990s with USAID funds. According to one biologist from Chiapas with extensive field experience in the region, the reserve was managed without community-based civil society partners and to little tangible environmental effect (author's interview, September 1999, Santa Cruz, California).

48 In Mexico, workers seeking independent representation at the huge Duro Bag factory in Tamaulipas found that the secret ballot remains an elusive goal, despite support from the National Union of Workers (UNT) in Mexico City and from the CJM. After watching automatic weapons being brought into the factory, workers were forced by federal arbitration board officials to declare their votes in front of company foremen and PRI-affiliated union leaders. This decision by Carlos Abascal, minister of labor and social welfare in the administration of President Vicente Fox (2000–2006), violated an agreement negotiated between his predecessor and then-U.S. labor secretary Alexis Herman, an agreement that grew out of the Han Young and ITAPSA cases filed under the NAFTA labor side agreement (Bacon 2001). For Abascal, U.S. union support for Mexican labor groups was officially to be considered a threat to national security (Aponte and Pérez Silva 2001). Meanwhile, north of the border, Human Rights Watch (2000) has also recognized that systematic violations of U.S. workers' freedom of association violate international human rights standards.

grassroots coffee producers.<sup>52</sup> The sustainable coffee campaign has had some success at penetrating the U.S. media, but coverage often focuses upon protecting birds rather than forest dwellers' livelihoods, organizations, or human rights. Moreover, the supply of fair-trade and sustainable coffee continues to be much larger than the demand from "conscious" consumers. One common U.S. subtext is occasionally made explicit: the assumption that birds that migrate between the two countries are "American" – as though birds have national identities (Silver 1999).<sup>53</sup> Overall, the alternative coffee issue has produced many meetings and networks but few coalitions.

Greenpeace, with its broad ecological critique, developed one of the very few binational partnerships among the large international environmental membership organizations. In principle, this organization would appear to be a case of a transnational social movement organization, but in practice the "fit" with this concept has been uneven. As part of Greenpeace's effort in the early 1990s to seek greater internal North-South balance, its international leadership sided with its Latin American branches on the controversial tuna-dolphin issue, on the grounds that the Mexican tuna fishing industry had reportedly changed its practices in order to protect dolphins.<sup>54</sup> Southern environmentalists perceived Greenpeace's heterodox stance as a blow against eco-imperialism, but nationalist U.S. ecological groups such as the Earth Island Institute (which lacked strong Mexican partnerships) responded vigorously. Earth Island – a Greenpeace competitor in the direct-mail fund-raising market – seized the opportunity to denounce its rival as anti-dolphin. Greenpeace-International had long been divided over whether to pursue more North-South balance within the organization, and by the mid-1990s the pro-Southern faction within Greenpeace had been defeated.<sup>55</sup> One lesson here is that balanced transnational partnerships can be politically charged when charismatic mega-fauna are involved.<sup>56</sup>

Middle-of-the-road U.S. environmental NGOs appear to have bolstered the Mexican environment ministry's prestige and budgetary resources for dealing with biodiversity protection, but they have had less influence upon border politics. In

contrast, the border's transnational public sphere has been occupied by a civil society that has been gradually thickening from below. Notable NGO coalitions that predated the NAFTA debate include the Environmental Health Coalition (Tijuana–San Diego), the International Sonoran Desert Alliance and other binational tribal initiatives, the CJM's anti-toxics efforts, the Border Ecology Project, and the successful partnership between Chihuahua's Commission for Solidarity and Defense of Human Rights and the Texas Center for Policy Studies to stop a World Bank logging loan in the Sierra Madre's indigenous territories in 1991–1992.<sup>57</sup> Subsequent initiatives have included a broad-based binational coalition bringing together environmentalists throughout the Rio Grande/Río Bravo basin, among others.<sup>58</sup>

Not only have the pace and intensity of binational civil society collaboration on the border increased significantly since NAFTA, but they have also had some very tangible successes. Border environmental coalitions have blocked several controversial proposed projects, including the Tamaulipas canal waterway and, most notably, the Sierra Blanca nuclear waste dump in Texas.<sup>59</sup> Ironically, the fact that the proposed Sierra Blanca dump was designed to receive waste generated at the United States' *northern* border, in New York and Vermont, bolstered critics' charges of environmental racism.

The Sierra Blanca anti-dump campaign was followed by the defeat of the proposed joint venture between Mitsubishi Corporation and the Mexican government to expand an industrial salt works in Baja California. The project threatened to affect the breeding grounds of the California gray whales that migrate between Mexico's coastal waters and the Bering Straits, past the United States. In this case, binational pressure forced project proponents to meet unusually rigorous environmental assessment standards, and both mainstream and radical U.S. environmental organizations engaged in successful mass media campaigns that raised the project's political cost to both the Mexican government and Mitsubishi.<sup>60</sup>

Both the Sierra Blanca and Baja California projects had unusually media-worthy protagonists – nuclear waste in one case, charismatic mega-mammals in the

52 In one notable fair-trade partnership, Equal Exchange and Cultural Survival both launched a support campaign for the Majomut organic coffee cooperative, which had been hit hard by the December 1997 massacre of peasant families in Acteal, Chiapas (see [www.equalexchange.org](http://www.equalexchange.org) and [www.cs.org](http://www.cs.org)).

53 For a comprehensive and insightful analysis of sustainable coffee marketing issues, see Rice, Harris, and MacLean 1997. This report provides extraordinary insight into the obstacles that have slowed the emergence of credible coffee labeling and consumer education efforts in the United States, but it does not highlight the role of independent producer organizations as actors. See also Bray 1999.

54 On the tuna conflict, see Bonanno and Coustance 1996, Rose 1993, Restrepo 1995, BRIDGES 2000, and Wright 2000.

55 Author's interview with former Greenpeace International leader, December 1998, Santa Cruz, California.

56 Tani Adams (1999) has developed this last point.

57 On the Environmental Health Coalition, see [www.environmentalhealth.org](http://www.environmentalhealth.org). On the path-breaking cross-border campaign against the World Bank forestry project, see Lowerre 1994.

58 The Rio Grande/Río Bravo Basin Coalition, for example, includes more than fifty organizations and defines itself as "a multi-national, multi-cultural organization with leadership from the United States, Mexico, and the Pueblo nations whose purpose is to help local communities restore and sustain the environment, economies, and social well-being of the Rio Grande/Río Bravo Basin" (see [www.rioweb.org](http://www.rioweb.org)). Note that not all cross-border environmental collaboration is sustained over time. The Red Fronteriza de Salud y Medio Ambiente (Border Network for Health and the Environment), for example, did not consolidate ongoing cross-border partnerships.

59 On the Sierra Blanca campaign, see Abraham and Cone 1999, LaFranchi 1998, Paterson 1999, Robbins 2000, and Walker 1998. On the Tamaulipas canal project, see Texas Center for Policy Studies 1994.

60 See Preston 2000, Dedina 2000, and [www.wavebajawhales.com](http://www.wavebajawhales.com).

other – that enhanced the campaigners' leverage. These two campaigns show that, given sufficient lead time, environmental NGOs can influence or block *new*, high-profile, high-risk policy decisions. Both initiatives involved balanced coalitions with clear, tangible, shared goals. One could argue, however, that these goals were relatively "winnable" because they did not challenge the dominant pattern of maquiladora industrialization. In contrast, it is difficult to find significant victories in the area of toxic industrial waste disposal despite the issue's high public profile.<sup>61</sup>

In addition to defeating specific proposed projects, border environmental campaigns have also set precedents for constructive public participation in local and binational policy processes. Mainstream U.S. national environmental organizations played a central role in extracting promises of limited procedural reforms for dealing with border environmental threats (Audley 1997, Hogenhoom 1998). These concessions – made by the U.S. government and imposed upon Mexico – provided middle-of-the-road environmental NGOs with the political cover they needed to avoid conflict with the administration of President Bill Clinton, which they supported on other, often higher priority, issues. Following the NAFTA vote in 1993, when U.S. national environmental NGO agendas moved on to other topics, it fell primarily to border groups to encourage the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the North American Development Bank (NADBank) to fulfill their mandates (BIOS Action Kit 1999, Mumme 1999). Most independent environmental policy observers see the BECC and NADBank as setting higher standards for public participation in the policy process, even though they have yet to produce significant tangible impacts upon the border environment.<sup>62</sup>

The sensitivity of many border environmental organizations to interlocking human health and natural resource concerns facilitated cross-border coalition-building. U.S. and Mexican border groups also share their distance – and, to some degree, alienation – from their respective national elites. Moreover, border groups have been willing to take on the difficult challenge of recognizing and overcoming cultural differences (Kelly 2002). This commitment is crucial because, as the history of the border shows, proximity does not necessarily generate mutual understanding.

#### *Trade Advocacy Networks*

In the United States, the NAFTA debate of the early 1990s focused upon the domestic implications of the North-South relationship – especially upon the nature of U.S. relations with the developing world in general and with Mexico in particular. In Mexico, early opposition to the NAFTA was more limited than in

the United States, but there, too, it generated a very wide-ranging debate about relations with "the North."

The trade debates in both countries had transnational and multisectoral dimensions. Domestic constituency organizations met with their counterparts in the other country (often for the first time) in order to understand each other's perspective and, in some instances, to engage in joint activities and contribute to each other's efforts. At the same time, because diverse actors perceived that their interests were directly affected by the NAFTA, unusual "citizen" coalitions brought together local, regional, and national organizations representing organized workers, farmers, environmentalists, and consumer, immigrant, Latino, and human rights activists. Many of these organizations had never worked together, and some of them had long histories of mistrust, if not outright antipathy.<sup>63</sup> Suddenly, social constituency organizations that once considered themselves as solely "domestic" and conceptually remote from international economic policy entered the transnational arena as they responded to the NAFTA proposal.

In the United States, the NAFTA opposition became a movement with somewhat disjointed nationalist and internationalist wings (Cavanagh, Anderson, and Hansen-Kuhn 2002). Some of the anti-NAFTA forces perceived economic integration as a process that threatened U.S. sovereignty. Ralph Nader's Public Citizen organization stressed this nationalist approach, as did those environmentalists and trade unionists who argued that the NAFTA would supersede the authority of local and national labor, consumer, and environmental laws and standards (Nader et al. 1993). These leftist populists were joined, and then overshadowed, by conservative nationalist populists led by Ross Perot, Jr. and Patrick J. Buchanan.

The NAFTA's proponents were caught off guard by the broad public challenge, and they became increasingly alarmed as the popular debate came to threaten the legislative survival of their project. The U.S. opposition was strong enough to oblige then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton to acknowledge, for the first time in U.S. history, the legitimacy of embedding labor and environmental standards in trade policy. The so-called environmental and labor side agreements designed by the Clinton administration managed to divide the major environmental organizations and provided some political cover for labor leaders, who differed privately over how intensely to oppose their ostensible ally Clinton on the NAFTA (Mayer 1998, Audley 1997, Dreiling 1997). At the same time, an unusual Latino advocacy-environmentalist coalition also led to the creation of new binational institutions (the BECC and the NADBank) to buffer the NAFTA's environmental and social costs on the Mexico-U.S. border (Hinojosa-Ojeda 2002).

The common campaign practice of building broad, often contradictory short-term coalitions around specific legislative conflicts dominated the U.S. process. U.S.-based critics of the NAFTA found relatively few like-minded counterparts in

63 See Lehman 2002 and Hernández Navarro 2002 on the many binational exchanges between farmers and campesino organizations.

61 For comprehensive overviews of border toxic waste issues, see, for example, Red Mexicana de Acción Frente al Libre Comercio et al. 2000 [<http://www.texascenter.org/pubs/pubs.htm>] and Varady, Romero Lankao, and Hawkins 2001. The most recent data from the National Institute for Statistics, Geography, and Informatics (INEGI) indicate that, of the estimated 8 million tons of toxic waste generated annually, only 12 percent receive some kind of treatment (Enciso 2001).

62 See diverse critiques in "Borderlines Updater" and Public Citizen 1997, among others.



Mexico, where unilateral trade opening had already occurred and even NAFTA critics limited their political investment because closer economic integration between Mexico and the United States was perceived as inevitable. The nationalist wing of the U.S. NAFTA opposition also used insensitive rhetoric that discouraged binational collaboration. Nationalist U.S. critics of the NAFTA found that their message of "Blame the foreigners" was well received by important mass publics. Economic restructuring had generated widespread insecurity among industrial workers, and many U.S. employers systematically used the threat of flight abroad to weaken union organizing efforts and undermine workers' position in their efforts to negotiate contracts (Greenhouse 2000, Human Rights Watch 2000, McKennirey et al. 1997). Some U.S. environmental and food safety campaigns also sought to play upon images of Mexico as a foreign threat, resonating with inherited popular cultural stereotypes of "dirty Mexicans" – even though the most dangerous food safety threat to U.S. public health is clearly the domestic meatpacking industry (Perl 2000).

The internationalist wing of the U.S. NAFTA opposition recognized that some kind of economic integration was inevitable. Nevertheless, by the time of the NAFTA vote in the Congress, its first slogan, "Not this NAFTA," had been replaced by "No to NAFTA." Although U.S. internationalists worked closely with their Mexican counterparts and with anti-racist social movements in the United States, their ambitious goal of mass economic literacy required sustained political investments, whereas the legislative campaign momentum imposed a short-term political logic that privileged nationalist discourses.

Mexican critics coalesced around the Free Trade Action Network, led by the FAT, human rights groups, environmentalists, and other NGOs (Arroyo and Monroy 1996, Luján 2002, Peñaloza Méndez and Arroyo Picard 1997, RMALC 1994). Despite significant domestic political constraints, this activist network obliged senior governmental officials and even cabinet ministers to engage in an ongoing dialogue with them during the NAFTA negotiation process, a previously unimaginable possibility.

The Mexican Action Network Against Free Trade (RMALC) was bolstered by its partnerships with the Action Canada Network and, in the United States, the Alliance for Responsible Trade.<sup>64</sup> In spite of the pressures created by the final "yes or no" NAFTA vote, these national networks tried to change the terms of the debate by engaging in an unusual process of trilateral civil society negotiations to produce a shared alternative policy stance. The most important proposal of this kind, "A Just and Sustainable Trade and Development Initiative for North America," was developed by three NGO trade coalitions: Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART), RMALC, and a group within Action Canada Network. This initiative was overshadowed publicly by the highly polarized final phase of the NAFTA debate in the United States, but its innovative trinational consensus-building approach set a historic precedent (ART/CTC/RMALC 1994; Cavanagh, Anderson,

and Hansen-Kuhn 2001). Even the more nationalist U.S. network eventually supported it. The networks worked from drafts that bracketed their points of difference, in conscious imitation of the treaty negotiation process itself. One of the most important points of contention was the issue of whether (implicitly Mexican) failure to meet minimum environmental and social standards should provoke trade sanctions.

The overall pattern that emerged from a decade of trade policy debate was not a secular trend of ever-increasing levels of binational partnership and coalition-building. Instead, there were ebbs and flows in which both nationalist and internationalist trade advocacy efforts peaked during the debate preceding the NAFTA vote. The NAFTA again appeared on the U.S. policy agenda because of Mexico's December 1994 financial crisis, when U.S. advocacy groups took a disriucively nationalist position. One noted left-liberal advocacy economist even compared the United States' subsequent financial rescue of Mexico to its involvement in the Vietnam war, suggesting that the United States was entering a dangerous quagmire and thereby reinforcing the "Mexico as threat" NAFTA critique (Faux 1995). Similarly, domestic opposition to the 1997 renewal of so-called fast-track U.S. trade legislation involved much less coordination with Mexican counterparts than existed during the NAFTA debate. Sustained U.S. labor and consumer opposition to the implementation of the NAFTA's cross-border trucking provisions also relied upon nationalist approaches. Meanwhile, RMALC continued to monitor the NAFTA's effects, but it focused its advocacy work upon Mexico's free-trade agreement with the European Union, managing to incorporate a significant democracy clause into the agreement (Arroyo and Peñaloza 2000). In short, balanced cross-border civil society coordination is far from an inevitable dimension of increasing international concern about economic globalization.

#### *Democracy and Human Rights*

If one had looked ahead from 1988 or 1994, it would have been difficult to predict that the U.S. presidential race of 2000 would suffer from much more serious procedural flaws than the Mexican presidential election held earlier that same year. During the most contested phase of Mexico's transition to electoral democracy, the main pattern of U.S.–Mexico societal relations involving democracy and human rights issues took the form of networks. As Dresser (1996) has shown, Mexico's "democracy network" provides an excellent illustration of the concept of transnational advocacy networks.<sup>65</sup> In terms of the framework proposed in this study, a few organizations went further to sustain coalitions, involving coordinated agreements to pursue joint campaigns.

<sup>65</sup> Dresser (1996: 325) notes that "The Mexican democracy network includes domestic and international electoral observer organizations, international NGOs, private foundations, groups of scholars, international secretariats of political parties, and some sectors of the national and international media ... Mexican prodemocracy social movements are key parts of this nascent network."

<sup>64</sup> See Ayres 1998 on the Canadian trade movement.



U.S. civil society organizations concerned with democracy and human rights abroad were slow to focus upon Mexico. Though influential international human rights reports began to appear in the mid-1980s, even Mexico's 1988 electoral conflict did not lead to a sustained strategy of binational pro-democracy or human rights coalition-building.<sup>66</sup> The NAFTA debate created a major opportunity to strengthen these civil society ties, but it was constrained by the narrow confines of the official policy agenda. Although most Mexican civil society organizations were wary of imposing direct pro-democracy or human rights conditionality upon the trade agreement,<sup>67</sup> the NAFTA debate made these issues more visible in the United States. However, with the exception of those organizations involved with election monitoring, this political moment did not produce a major convergence between U.S. and Mexican human rights groups.

Although human rights groups were important actors in the Mexican coalitions dealing with trade issues, democracy and human rights had little relevance for most U.S. trade advocacy groups. According to one of Mexico's leading human rights activists, the issue was a low priority within the trinational coalition-building process (Acosta 2002). Moreover, human rights groups in Canada, Mexico, and the United States had different views about the relationships among economic, social, and political rights.<sup>68</sup> Independently of the trade debate, Mexican national human rights organizations also pursued claims through multilateral legal channels, such as the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. They were successful insofar as the Mexican government was issued several critical decisions, but only in one case did the government actually respond by complying with international law.<sup>69</sup>

It took the 1994 Chiapas rebellion to make human rights in Mexico a priority on the binational civil society agenda. A wide range of U.S. groups responded quickly, contributing to the international pressure for a political solution to the conflict. By 1999, four different national U.S. organizations and networks, as well as many smaller local groups, had made Chiapas a priority (Stephen 2002). Lack of coordination among indigenous rights support groups within the United States reflected

66 Amnesty International published the first significant report (1986). The timing of its release coincided with the peak of Republican political criticism of Mexico from Washington, D.C. This association significantly undermined the report's political impact because the Mexican government could write it off as foreign intervention in the country's internal affairs.

67 For one exception (a Mexican effort to create a link in the U.S. debate over the NAFTA between the trade agreement and democratization in Mexico), see Castañeda and Heredia 1993. For a trinational overview, see MacDonald 1999.

68 Note the thematic change in the more recent reports from Human Rights Watch (1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996b, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2000a). Over time, the scope of the organization's definition of human rights broadened, eventually including gendered human rights among maquiladora workers.

69 Author's interview with Emma Maza Calviño, international relations director of the Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez, April 2001, Mexico City. For details on Mexico's international human rights legal decisions, see Centro de Derechos Humanos 2000.

different political cultures and constituencies, as well as different approaches among Mexican counterpart groups. Most U.S. support initiatives drew heavily upon the legacy of Central American peace movements in the 1980s, including both faith-based and secular leftist political cultures and strategies (Gosse 1988, 1995; C. Smith 1996). This legacy bolstered Chiapas solidarity work in the short term, but it carried medium-term weaknesses (including the strategic limitations associated with interpreting Mexico through a Central American lens). This pattern began to change with the founding of the Mexico Solidarity Network in 1999. Some 75 organizations participate in this group, which has organized several labor and human rights delegations to Mexico.<sup>70</sup>

Many observers have pointed to the increased volume and velocity of the international information flow from Chiapas as strong evidence of "globalization from below" and an indication of the power of international solidarity. The flow of information to international sympathizers has irritated Mexican government officials, who have referred disparagingly to the Chiapas conflict as a (mere) "war of ink and Internet."<sup>71</sup> However, the conflict on the ground has remained stalemated for years, information flow and international solidarity notwithstanding. Thus the degree to which the Zapatista supporters' able use of the Internet has contributed to their cause remains an open question. Stephen (2002), for example, aptly questions the widespread assumption that more and faster activist access to information necessarily leads to greater policy impact.<sup>72</sup> According to one key U.S. strategist (Lewis 2002), solidarity groups' focus upon Chiapas to the exclusion of other militarized regions and national-level democratization in Mexico has also limited the impact of U.S. peace support efforts. Although U.S. civil society efforts to achieve peace in Chiapas gained widespread legitimacy in the United States, they did not penetrate and mobilize major U.S. civil society institutions. This outcome contrasts with what was achieved by the movement against U.S. intervention in Central America in the 1980s, which generated broad-based mainstream participation in religious, civic, and trade union arenas, leading to significant influence in the U.S. Congress. In the 1980s, Central American opposition and peace movements themselves made winning U.S. civil society allies a strategic priority, whereas neither the EZLN nor the National Indigenous Congress (CNI) has given primacy to network-building.<sup>73</sup>

70 See [www.mexicosolidarity.org](http://www.mexicosolidarity.org).

71 See Ronfeldt and Arquilla 1998 for a U.S. military-sponsored analysis of this issue.

72 The widely assumed direct Internet linkage between the EZLN and the outside world has been overdrawn. In the early years, the principal communication process involved two stages – first between the EZLN and *La Jornada*, and then between *La Jornada's* website and the rest of the world. For subsequent debate over the role of international solidarity with Chiapas, see Hellman 2000 and Cleaver 2000.

73 For an analysis of why certain radical movements gain international visibility and others do not, including a comparison of the EZLN and the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP), see Bob 2000.

The Chiapas rebellion focused the attention of U.S. pro-democracy groups – and the U.S. government – upon Mexico's 1994 presidential election. This was the high point of U.S. civil society interest in working with Mexican election observers, although some groups (including Global Exchange and the Washington Office on Latin America) continued to work closely with Mexico's Civic Alliance in their efforts to monitor controversial state-level elections.<sup>74</sup> Mexican independent election observer efforts only began in 1991 (Aguayo Quezada 1998, Álvarez Icaza 2002, McConnell 1996). U.S. observer groups (including participants from traditional human rights organizations, universities, peace groups, Latino rights advocacy groups, and trade unions) became involved in 1994 and together accounted for a large fraction of international observers. However, the entire international contingent during the peak period of foreign concern numbered only about 500 individuals, compared to as many as 25,000 Mexican observers (Álvarez Icaza 2002). In contrast, U.S. citizens' organizations alone sent 700 official representatives to observe El Salvador's 1994 elections (Gosse 1995).

The largest single U.S. citizen contingent in 1994 was organized by Global Exchange, an NGO whose numerous "reality tours" to Chiapas later provoked Mexican government hostility.<sup>75</sup> Unlike most international observers, Global Exchange delegates traveled to remote rural hotspots where electoral violations were most probable. On the night of the 1994 election, however, under media pressure to make a public statement, the logic of the organization's mission led its representatives to take a position even before its Mexican host, Civic Alliance, had decided how to respond to the exclusionary practices that surfaced during the election (practices that were as unexpected as they were difficult to document).<sup>76</sup> At that moment, Global Exchange's exercise of its autonomy caused tension within the binational partnership, reinforcing an image of the organization as a reckless seeker of media attention. Global Exchange subsequently made a long-term, sustained political investment in working with its Mexican partners, and it has since been one of the Mexican pro-democracy movement's most consistent U.S. civil society allies. For example, Global Exchange (in partnership with regional human rights organizations) subsequently organized experienced U.S. observer

74 See WOLA 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1995a, 1995b, 1997. For additional information, see [www.wola.org](http://www.wola.org).

75 Paraphrasing Dresser (1991b), one might call this a "neo-nationalist reaction to a neoliberal problem."

The Central American movement experience suggests that internationalist visits to conflict zones can be crucially important for turning sympathy into activist commitment. As many as several thousand U.S. citizens may have visited Chiapas since 1994 (Ross 1999, Sandoval 1999, Stephen 2002).

76 Author's observation and interviews, August 1994, Mexico City. After processing their data for several weeks, Civic Alliance came to the conclusion that, in effect, two different elections had taken place – one relatively clean, the other marked by systematic pressures upon voters and violations of ballot secrecy. For a discussion of the data, see Fox 1996.

delegations for relatively less fashionable missions such as observation of Guerrero's municipal elections.<sup>77</sup>

Several human rights organizations and Chiapas support initiatives formed sustained networks, and some of the campaigns with an on-the-ground presence could clearly be considered coalitions (including, for example, International Service for Peace in Chiapas and the Schools for Chiapas project). The Global Exchange–Civic Alliance partnership was the clearest instance of a sustained pro-democracy coalition that addressed issues beyond Chiapas. Aside from these few cases, however, one could argue that both U.S. and Mexican pro-democracy actors have lacked a sustained strategy for building partnerships that reach deeply into their respective civil societies.

### *Women's Rights Networks*

Binational women's rights networks have been extensive, but they generally have had a lower profile than networks in other sectors because activists have brought gender perspectives to other social movements – most notably supporting the empowerment of women workers and indigenous women. *Mujer a Mujer* and the American Friends Service Committee's maquiladora support program both played pioneering roles. Sometimes the links between women's rights concerns and binational integration reached deeply into U.S. civil society. For example, the United Methodist Women, a progressive membership organization with more than one million members, was the first women's organization publicly to oppose the NAFTA (Dougherty 1999).

Many experiences of the binational women's movement are remarkably similar to those in other sectors in terms of the distinction between mutual learning and exchanges, on the one hand, and sustaining coalitions and campaigns, on the other. As Carrillo (1998: 394) observed in relation to Mexicana/Chicana movement relations, "the majority of contacts across the border have not yet reached a point of collaborative action, remaining instead in a beginning step of establishing contact and discussing common ground." Carrillo further noted that lack of resources is not the only obstacle to binational coalition-building. "Differences in central focus and agenda" are also important; "Chicanas and Latinas in the United States have focused on questions of race and ethnicity, while Mexicanas have focused on class issues and survival." After reviewing a wide range of cross-border initiatives dating from the mid-1980s, Carrillo concluded that:

Time and again women showed a strong interest in making connections and taking a more active role in establishing the rules and regulations of the process of regional integration. The frustration voiced by both Chicana/Latina and Mexicana women was that no one knew exactly how to take the next step in transnational network building after establishing initial contact. Women's movements lack a unifying focus or initiative around which groups can find a common ground and take collaborative action. On every front, the move from communication and contact to collaborative action was not clearly defined (1998: 407).

77 For more on Global Exchange's Mexico work, see Lewis 2002 and [www.globalexchange.org](http://www.globalexchange.org). On the Civic Alliance, see [www.lanera.apc.org/alianza/](http://www.lanera.apc.org/alianza/).

U.S. and Mexican women's rights activists have also worked together to reframe policy discourse for women's organizing in terms of the broader concept of human rights. According to Maylei Blackwell, an analyst of U.S.–Mexican women's movement relations, because of the United Nations conferences on women, "human rights discourse has replaced discrimination as the principal coalition-building element in international women's politics.... For the fiftieth anniversary of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, there was a major campaign in Mexico called "Sin mujeres, los derechos no son humanos" ("Without women, rights are not human").<sup>78</sup>

Two converging trends made reproductive rights the highest-impact area of binational women's movement collaboration. First, feminist activists in the United States expanded the framework for understanding reproductive rights to the broader concept of access to reproductive health rights more generally, a shift driven largely by the mobilization of U.S. women of color.<sup>79</sup> Second, several large private U.S. foundations involved in Mexico became increasingly sensitive to feminist approaches to reproductive issues. As a result, since the 1980s U.S. foundations involved in reproductive issues in Mexico have invested millions of dollars to bolster the capacities of civil society organizations that defend women's health rights, contributing significantly to the infrastructure of the Mexican women's movement more generally.

One of the most important instances of binational feminist coalition-building has emerged from the reproductive rights movement. It involves the very close relationship forged between the U.S. and Mexican branches of *Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir* (Catholics for a Free Choice).<sup>80</sup> Though each is an independent NGO, each also sees itself as the voice of a very large, underrepresented constituency. Both branches of the organization emerged from, and are extensively linked to, diverse feminist movements in their respective country. The Mexican branch is also deeply involved in national movements for human rights, Chiapas solidarity, and liberation theology. The U.S. and Mexican groups share a common mission and values, and both view themselves as part of a larger pro-choice Catholic movement. Both combine policy advocacy with efforts to influence broader public opinion. Finally, they have worked together in joint campaigns, including an initiative to persuade the United Nations to withdraw the Vatican's nation-state status in the interest of separating church and state and efforts to insert pro-choice Catholic perspectives into the ongoing international debates on population and

78 Author's communication with Blackwell, February 2000. See also Blackwell 2000.

U.S. rights advocates also increasingly recognize gender-specific human rights violations; see, for example, Human Rights Watch 1996a, 1998a, 1998b.

79 The author thanks Maylei Blackwell for relating this observation.

80 This paragraph is based upon the author's interview (March 2000, Sanra Cruz, California) with Kathy Toner, an activist with several years' experience working with the Mexican chapter of U.S. Catholics for a Free Choice. The origins of the Latin American branches of this organization can be traced back to the late 1980s, when the founding U.S. organization set up a regional office in Uruguay. Sister organizations are currently active in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. The Latin American partner NGOs have their own autonomous regional boards.

development.

U.S. and Mexican pro-choice Catholic groups clearly constitute a binational coalition. They also share many of the characteristics of a transnational movement – including, notably, a perception of themselves as constituting a movement.<sup>81</sup> As with many other cross-border partnerships, the density of this coalition rests upon the combination of a deeply shared ideology (feminism within the Catholic faith) and a strongly shared campaign target (the Catholic Church itself, perhaps the transnational civil society institution par excellence).

### *Chicano/Latino Civil and Immigrant Rights*

Chicano/Latino leaders and activists have played crucial roles in several cross-border movements discussed under other "sector" rubrics, most notably those promoting labor rights and women's rights.<sup>82</sup> This section, however, focuses specifically upon relationships between civil and immigrant rights movements in the United States and Mexico.

Since the 1980s, domestic U.S. public interest organizations have built broad and deep advocacy institutions and coalitions to defend immigrant rights in the United States. For many years, however, these efforts developed largely without sustained exchange or collaboration with Mexican counterparts. Even some of the most consolidated, regionally based and nationally networked immigrant rights coalitions had relatively little contact with either organized migrants or Mexico. Indeed, in the early 1990s some major national immigrant rights advocacy leaders, after years of being on the defensive, pursued a "pragmatic" strategy of attempting to "de-mexicanize" the U.S. policy debate.<sup>83</sup> Joint U.S.–Mexican efforts to develop binational civil society approaches to immigration issues came together organizationally only in the late 1990s, with the formation of the broad-based Mexico–U.S. Advocates Network (Gzesh 2002).

Binational constituency-based organizing among immigrants, often marked by the difficult choice of whether to participate primarily in the United States or in the Mexican arena, has followed diverse paths. Since the late 1990s, however, organized immigrants have transcended this dichotomy by participating simultaneously in social and political movements in both countries. There is evidence that many Mexican citizens in the United States remain engaged with Mexican civic life. Despite immigrants' lack of voting rights, Mexican political candidates

81 The case of U.S. and Mexican pro-choice Catholic groups thus raises questions about this chapter's effort to distinguish between binational coalitions and movements.

82 For example, the AFL–CIO leadership's decision in the late 1990s to support amnesty for undocumented workers was not simply structurally determined by a tight labor market and the need to organize immigrants; it was also the result of Chicano and Latino trade unionists' years of political work with the AFL–CIO.

83 This conclusion is based upon statements by Washington, D.C.–based immigrant rights advocacy groups at the "Mexico–U.S. Advocates Network Seminar," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., February 1999.

have since the late 1980s carried out open electoral campaigns in the United States (Dresser 1991a, 1993, 1996). In contrast to the expectations created by the wave of immigrant sympathy for opposition presidential candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in 1988, Mexican opposition political parties did not sink deep roots into immigrant communities in the United States. Nevertheless, many immigrants remain engaged with Mexican politics from afar.<sup>84</sup>

In response, the Mexican government has paid a great deal of attention to Mexican immigrant associations, using its extensive network of consular offices to create semi-official channels for growing cross-border participation (González Gutiérrez 1993, 1997, 1999). Some immigrant organizations have responded enthusiastically to opportunities to collaborate with Mexican governmental authorities, while some have preferred to follow more autonomous paths (Goldring 1998, 2002; Fitzgerald 2000; Leiken 2000; Rivera Salgado 1999a, 1999b, 2002; R. Smith 1999). Most so-called hometown associations engage in "translocal" Mexican politics but remain relatively disengaged from U.S. politics – even during major moments of public debate, such as the furor surrounding California's anti-immigrant Proposition 187 in 1994 (Zabin and Escala Rabadán 1998).

Among U.S. citizens, Mexican American organizations have long grappled with the dilemma of how to gain full and equal rights while defending their right to ethnic self-expression.<sup>85</sup> Because of persistent U.S. perceptions of "foreign-ness," Latinos' struggles to be perceived as legitimate actors in the process of formulating U.S. foreign policy have been especially challenging.<sup>86</sup> Latino civil rights leaders are divided over the implications of Mexican electoral politics in the United States.<sup>87</sup> As Latino civil rights activists continue to debate whether and how immigrants and

U.S. Latinos should forge coalitions for social change, increasing Latino political empowerment in the United States has created new political space for cross-border coalitions.<sup>88</sup>

The effects of the dramatic increase in immigrant participation in U.S. politics are only beginning to be understood. In 1996 more than two-thirds of Mexicans in the United States were potentially eligible for U.S. citizenship, yet less than 7 percent had become U.S. citizens (Mexico–United States Binational Commission 1997). Since then, Mexico-born immigrants have become U.S. citizens at much higher rates, and on average these newly naturalized citizens vote at higher rates than U.S.-born Latinos.<sup>89</sup> At the same time, many Mexicans in the United States continue to identify more with Mexican than with U.S. politics. U.S. immigration reforms of the late 1980s legalized millions of Mexicans, who were then able to reinforce their home ties via more frequent back-and-forth travel than had been possible as long as they lived in the United States in undocumented status (Espinosa 1999).<sup>90</sup>

In 1996 the Mexican Congress granted Mexican citizens abroad the right to vote – in principle. Since then, Mexicans residing legally in the United States have mobilized new advocacy networks to encourage the Mexican government to comply with its commitment. In the process, they have constituted the first transnational advocacy network organized by immigrants to influence Mexican government policy toward them (Ross 1999; Martínez and Ross 2002; Santamaría Gómez 2001).<sup>91</sup> The emigrant advocacy network has found relatively few allies within the Mexican political system; all the major parties have been internally divided on the issue.<sup>92</sup> In 1999 the key voting rights reform provision passed Mexico's federal Chamber of Deputies before stalling in the Senate. Nevertheless, the fact that Mexicans abroad won their political rights, even if only in principle, has permanently redrawn the boundaries of the Mexican immigrant civic arena, with quite open-ended consequences.

The emigrant transnational advocacy network has had its greatest impact at the

84 An independent Mexican commission convened to inform the national policy debate over the absentee ballot issue found that an estimated 83 percent of Mexican citizens in the United States would have liked to vote in the 2000 elections if they could have done so from the United States. The commission also estimated that between 1.3 and 1.5 million emigrants in the United States already held valid Mexican electoral registration cards (IFE 1998).

85 There is a rich, diverse literature on relations between Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans. See, for example, Flores and Benmayor 1997; García Acevedo 1996; Gómez Quiñones 1990; D. Gutiérrez 1995, 1996; Maciel and Herrera-Sobek 1998; Santamaría Gómez 1988; Sierra 1999; Vila 2000; and Weber 1998.

86 On Latinos and U.S. foreign policy, see De la Garza et al. 1998, González 1999, and Public Agenda/Tomás Rivera Policy Institute 1998.

87 For example, influential University of Texas political scientist Rodolfo O. de la Garza has expressed concern about the threat that Mexican absentee voting might pose to Mexican Americans: "An extended display of Mexican politicking on U.S. soil would provoke a narivist fury in the United States directed not only at migrants but also at Mexican-Americans" (Dillon 1998). However, leading voting rights activist Antonio González, director of the William Velásquez Research Institute, has stated that he "just [did not] see any kind of competition or negative effect in terms of U.S. Latino political empowerment, versus Mexican political empowerment. They're complementary" (remarks at the conference "Lessons from Binational Civil Society Coalitions," University of California, Santa Cruz, July 1998).

88 This change was quite visible in 1999 when Antonio Villaraigosa, then speaker of the California General Assembly, visited Mexico, where he promoted U.S. support for Mexican immigrant-led community development initiatives as an alternative to Proposition 187-style policies (Romney 1999). As an indicator of the "localization" of transnational politics, the *Los Angeles Times* placed this article about a major state political leader's international visit in the metropolitan news section. See also Villaraigosa and Hinojosa-Ojeda 1999.

89 On naturalization and political attitudes, see Pachon and DeSipio 1994 and DeSipio and De la Garza 1998. On Latino voter turnout, see DeSipio 1996 and Arvizu and García 1996.

90 The many immigrants who remain undocumented are not eligible for naturalization in the United States.

91 The Mexican state's strategy, in contrast, has been to encourage emigrants to become U.S. citizens and participate in U.S. politics, rather than to extend the boundaries of the polity to include the entire national diaspora.

92 Author's interview with Raúl Ross, American Friends Service Committee, May 1999, Chicago, Illinois.

level of the public agenda and the ways in which issues are framed. At the very least, immigrant civic leaders now have access for the first time to the national media in Mexico. A March 1999 nongovernmental referendum in Mexico provided a revealing illustration of the resulting shifts in the terrain of political culture. The EZLN called the referendum as part of its effort to break the political stalemate that followed the Mexican government's withdrawal from the San Andrés agreements for peace in Chiapas. One of the leaders of the principal emigrant advocacy network, the "Coalition of Mexicans Abroad – Our Vote in 2000," took advantage of his new access to the national press to appeal directly to EZLN leader Subcomandante Marcos, noting parallels in the ways in which both emigrants and indigenous peoples are excluded from full citizenship rights (Martínez Saldaña 1999). Apparently in response, the EZLN called for a fifth question (on the emigrant voting rights issue) to be added to the referendum at U.S. polling places, where approximately 50,000 votes were tallied.<sup>93</sup> At least 8,000 of these votes came from the Binational Indigenous Oaxacan Front in the Fresno area. The FIOB is one of the few binational social organizations that can be considered a fully transnational social *movement*; its participants are part of a cohesive social subject – politicized paisanos – whether they are in the Mixteca (Northwest Oaxaca), Baja California, Los Angeles, or the central valleys of California (Riviera Salgado 1999a, 1999b, 2002).<sup>94</sup>

Late 1999 witnessed the most tangible evidence thus far of organized emigrants' growing political influence. In its effort to protect the "national" (U.S.-dominated) automobile production industry, Mexico's Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP) unilaterally decided to crack down upon emigrants' widespread practice of returning to Mexico with used cars, which are much less expensive than automobiles produced by trade-protected Mexico-based manufacturers. To discourage the importation of what are officially illegal vehicles, the ministry announced that all drivers entering Mexico – tourists and returning migrants alike – would be required to leave a substantial financial deposit for each vehicle they brought with them (the deposit would be returned when the vehicle exited the country). The policy – which was to have been implemented shortly before the Christmas holidays, when millions of emigrants would be returning home – provoked a broad wave of protests by the increasingly politicized Mexican community in the United States. Emigrant leaders convinced the Mexican Senate to pass a resolution, supported by both the political opposition and the leaders of the then-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), to end the program after only two days in operation. Even the Ministry of Foreign Relations was reportedly critical of the program; ministry personnel apparently were not consulted in advance, yet they had to bear the brunt of emigrant protests.

93 More than two million people voted in Mexico on the original four questions.

94 On the FIOB, see [www.lancta.apc.org/fiob/](http://www.lancta.apc.org/fiob/). See Nagengast and Kearney 1990 on the interaction between the immigration process and ethnic identity formation.

The vehicle deposit controversy revealed the extraordinary separation between the worldviews of economic policy makers in Mexico City and the binational reality of as many as one in ten Mexican families. As the *New York Times* observed, "The plan apparently arose from some confusion within the government when officials failed to calculate the impact on Mexicans living north of the border. As many as two million are expected to come home for the holidays, many in their own cars" (Preston 1999). Even though the deposit was to be returned to vehicle owners upon their departure from Mexico, SHCP officials clearly overestimated the credibility of the official promise to refund the money.

The media and legislative lobbying campaign victory against the vehicle deposit is the most clear-cut success to date in binational immigrant organizing.<sup>95</sup> It appears to have built directly upon the previous unsuccessful effort to gain the right for emigrants to vote in Mexico's 2000 elections.<sup>96</sup> As the president of the Concilio Hispano (Hispanic Council), a Mexican group based in Chicago put it, "This is the first time the Mexican community here managed to bring this kind of pressure on Mexico. It shows that we can use our power and make changes" (Preston 1999).

The issue of immigrant rights has catalyzed the formation of several binational networks and coalitions. Some have cross-border targets, as in the cases of the vehicle deposit, absentee voting rights, and immigrant rights policy advocacy issues. Other partnerships have cross-border constituencies, as in the case of immigrant hometown associations. Among hometown associations, the degree to which these U.S.-based groups have actual hometown partner organizations varies significantly. In terms of the distinctions among networks, coalitions, and movements, different

95 Another binational immigrant organizing campaign involved the mobilization of thousands of elderly former participants in the Bracero Program (the Mexico–U.S. contract labor program in effect between 1942 and 1964) now living in Mexico. Immigrant rights activists discovered through archival research that the Mexican government received from the U.S. government and then retained 10 percent of Bracero workers' wages, ostensibly as a contribution to a domestic crop loan program. This program was conceived as an innovative cross-border community investment program, but the government apparently simply kept the money. The organizations involved included the 20,000-member International Network for the Defense of the Full Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families, the Mexican Emigrant and Peasant Union, and the Union Without Borders. For details, see Salinas 1999.

96 This campaign also led the opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) to nominate a Mexican immigrant voting rights activist (Raúl Ross) to its proportional representation list of congressional candidates. This nomination was not, however, an unequivocal reflection of a new awareness within the PRD of immigrants as participants with political rights as Mexicans. First, the decision was internally controversial. Ross appears to have been included as PRD founder Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas's only personal nomination (Cárdenas's son coordinated PRD liaison in the United States). Second, it is very revealing that when he reported this decision, national PRD leader Jesús Ortega referred to Ross as the "*compañero chicano*" (Cano and Aguirre 2000). Ross is from Veracruz and emigrated to the United States as an adult. For Ortega to refer to him as a Chicano – an identification that implies having been raised in the United States – underscores the degree to which even leftist Mexico City politicians see emigrants as "not quite Mexican" once they cross the border.



hometown associations would range across the spectrum, with the FIOB being the most clear-cut instance of a transnational social movement organization.

### Assessing the Impact of Binational Networks and Coalitions

This section returns to Keck and Sikkink's conceptual framework, applying their categories for assessing different kinds of network impact to three of the most active binational sectors. This process involves addressing in combination two distinct questions. First, was there some kind of civil society impact in these different cases? Second, was that impact due largely to the specifically binational dimensions of each civil society?

Keck and Sikkink's impact categories start with "issue creation and agenda setting," followed by "influence on official discourse (of states and international organizations)," "influence on national and international institutions and procedures," "influence on policy change in 'target actors,' which can be public or private," and finally "impact on state behavior" (1998: 25, 201ff). These authors argue that the different kinds of impact actually constitute stages of impact, because establishing discursive legitimacy and benchmark standards can bolster leverage in the future.<sup>97</sup> It is also possible, however, that in some instances discursive reforms and weak institutional commitments serve to divide or distract civil society actors, weakening pressures for accountability (which, critics might argue, was what happened with the NAFTA environmental side agreement). To "give a centavo [cent] to keep a peso" is an old story in Mexico. The propositions to be presented here constitute, then, a preliminary empirical test of this part of Keck and Sikkink's hypothesis about NGO impact – with the proviso that this study of Mexico–U.S. cases includes organized social constituencies as well as NGOs.

Table 15.3 assesses the impact of binational civil society networks in the Mexico–U.S. context, framing this issue in terms of Keck and Sikkink's categories and focusing upon the environment, labor rights, and human rights issue areas. The table not only synthesizes this chapter's empirical findings in terms of Keck and Sikkink's different dimensions of potential network impact, but it also summarizes the author's analytic assessment of the degree to which binational politics contributed to observed change in distinct issue areas (judged in terms of low, medium, and high impact). These causal assessments are subject to the usual caveats in terms of the difficulty of making counterfactual claims (for instance, how much policy change would one have found in the absence of cross-border campaigning?). It should also be noted that, because impact is defined here in terms of such categories as influence upon official discourse and policy, this exercise does not consider the consequences of binational networks for civil society actors themselves or for political cultures (see Brooks and Fox 2002).

97 See Fox and Brown 1998 for a comparative study of transnational advocacy network efforts to reform the World Bank – leading to the setting of new environmental and social standards, followed by further campaigns to meet those benchmarks.

In the three issue areas considered here, cross-border civil society activism has had the highest degree of impact upon environmental policy. It was especially consequential in Mexico, and it held the potential to block approval of the NAFTA in the United States. The Mexican state responded to cross-border initiatives by making major, sustained policy and discursive commitments, including the creation of Mexico's first environmental policy ministry (led by a credible, nonpartisan expert). The power of U.S. and Mexican environmental NGOs clearly led to the adoption of the NAFTA side agreement on environmental issues and to the creation of new border investment institutions. Although the side agreement has had little impact in practice, and even though the U.S. and Mexican policy makers who have directed the NADBank so far have not fully pursued its potential of innovation (Boudreau and Hinojosa-Ojeda 1998, Koutous 2000), by the late 1990s the BECC and the NADBank had begun to increase their levels of activity.

Mexico–U.S. NGO partnerships have had notable impacts upon biodiversity-related projects and policies in Mexico, ranging from removing the threat to whales in the San Ignacio Biosphere to sustained support for increased funding and improved management for protected natural areas. In contrast, cross-border campaigns against the industrial pollution associated with the maquiladora industry have had little impact. Moreover, free trade has posed major challenges for Mexico's most consolidated sustainable rural development initiatives (the organic coffee and community forestry movements), where strong cross-border partnerships have been lacking. In summary, cross-border environmental coalitions have produced some of the most dramatic breakthroughs in terms of civil society leverage, but also some of the most clear-cut defeats.

In the area of labor rights, there has been a more consistent pattern of failure. Labor rights briefly gained public prominence as an issue during the NAFTA debate, although it never had as much legitimacy or held as much attention as the environment. The most significant examples of labor's political leverage were the 1997 defeat of U.S. fast-track authority for approving trade agreements (Shóch 2000) and President Bill Clinton's (1992–1996, 1996–2000) electorally driven discursive support for labor rights during the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle. Neither case, however, involved significant cross-border partnerships. Mexican organized labor continues to lose ground, and it has yet to win a significant foothold in the maquiladora industry. The Han Young campaign – a clear test of the limits of cross-border leverage – revealed that solidarity from the highest levels of the U.S. political system could not compel Mexican authorities to enforce basic court decisions. The enforcement of Mexican labor law continues to be determined almost exclusively by local and national politics.<sup>98</sup>

Many analysts assume that international human rights campaigns have an impact. Keck and Sikkink, for example, claim that "from 1988 to 1994, the international

98 One exception was the student anti-sweatshop campaign for workers' rights at Nike's Puebla subcontractor, Kukdong (Campaign for Labor Rights 2001).



network in collaboration with recently formed domestic human rights groups provoked a *relatively rapid and forceful* response from the Mexican government, contributing to a *decline* in human rights violations and a strengthening of democratic institutions" (1998: 116, emphasis added). Yet in reality, the human rights record in Mexico is actually quite mixed.

Sustaining the case for international impact upon the human rights situation in Mexico requires stronger evidence in two areas. First, it is far from clear that human rights violations dropped during the period Keck and Sikkink discuss, and their indicators of change are very limited. Even though a lack of consistent baseline data makes systematic analysis of change over time difficult, the opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) alleged that more than 600 of its activists were assassinated during this same period.<sup>99</sup> Second, Keck and Sikkink's conclusion assumes that international factors were of primary importance in shaping the government's (largely symbolic) response. This may hold for the creation of the official National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), which Keck and Sikkink offer as a principal indicator of impact.<sup>100</sup> But whether the CNDH made a significant contribution to the prevention of human rights abuses is widely questioned. The clearest way to assess its impact is to review government responses to its official recommendations (that is, official CNDH findings that government agencies violated human rights). Here, according to a top CNDH appointee, the general pattern was one of impunity (Ballinas 2001); government agencies nominally accepted CNDH recommendations but then did little in practice to prevent future human rights violations. Even in the very clear-cut case of peasant-ecologist political prisoners in the state of Guerrero, strong national and international campaigns (led by Amnesty International and the Sierra Club) did not prevent the Mexican legal system from sentencing individuals to long jail terms on trumped-up charges. They were finally released well into the presidency of Vicente Fox – and only after their lawyer was killed in her downtown Mexico City office.<sup>101</sup>

99 The situation appeared to improve somewhat in the late 1990s, although whether that was because of international pressure or a post-1994 decline in the electoral threat from the left was not clear. What is clear is that serious and systematic human rights violations persisted – and not only in Chiapas. On the case of Guerrero, see M. Gutiérrez 1998. During the 1996–1998 period alone, the Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez documented 115 disappearances (Centro de Derechos Humanos 1999).

100 Not all Mexican human rights analysts agree on this point. For example, the analysis of the CNDH's creation in Sierra Guzmán, Ruiz Hartell, and Barragán 1992 barely refers to international factors.

101 This case is very revealing of how the "boomerang effect" described in Keck and Sikkink (1998) operates in practice. The two political prisoners, Rodolfo Montiel and Teodoro Cabrera, were first arrested in May 1999. In August 1999, a local human rights organization in Guerrero, The Voice of the Voiceless, brought their case to a major national human rights NGO, the Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez (author's interview with Emma Maza Calviño, international relations director of the Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel

The impact of cross-border civil society partnerships upon Mexico's gradual democratization process is also easily overstated. Mexico's pro-democracy movement received remarkably little international support, and there is scant evidence that such support made a qualitative difference (for example, in ensuring that the 1994 elections were as clean as they were). The turning point in favor of electoral reform was a January 1994 agreement among Mexico's major political parties, and many Mexican observers concur that the government was pushed to the bargaining table by the delegitimizing effect of the Chiapas rebellion.

The Chiapas rebellion itself is probably the clearest example of the importance of international factors, which contributed directly to blocking a full-scale military response to the EZLN in mid-January 1994. For the U.S. mass media, hitherto entranced by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994), the rebellion revealed that the "emperor had no clothes" and led to the immediate rejection of Salinas's claim that the rebels were illegitimate and foreign-inspired. International human rights protests certainly helped, although they were effective largely because both the U.S. government and the U.S. private sector were unenthusiastic about the prospect of their new NAFTA partner becoming engaged in a televised bloodbath. In this regard, the NAFTA had contradictory effects in January 1994 – contributing to the outbreak of the Chiapas rebellion, and then helping to stay Salinas's initial military response.

National factors are often downplayed in discussions of the Chiapas conflict. Yet Mexican civil society mobilized very quickly for peace, and key national political elites – most notably, then-foreign minister and one-time presidential "pre-candidate" Manuel Camacho Solís – threatened to break with Salinas if the government did not cease fire in January 1994. Disentangling the relative weights of national and international factors is always a challenge, but many analysts simply assume that the international (and, specifically, civil society) factors were primary, rather than consider them in national context.

Among the various international factors surrounding the Chiapas conflict, it is also important to consider the growing weight of European civil society and government human rights protests. The Zapatista support movement appears to be significantly broader and deeper in Europe than in the United States. President Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) signed the San Andrés peace accords in 1996, just before he was about to travel to Europe to promote Mexico's free-trade agreement

Agustín Pro Juárez, April 2001, Mexico City). The Center, in turn, took the case to Amnesty International, which in March 2000 finally decided to consider Montiel and Cabrera prisoners of conscience. The international campaign began there, leading to strong Sierra Club support, the Goldman Prize, and high-profile endorsements from Ethel Kennedy and Hilary Clinton. However, even after the inauguration of President Vicente Fox Quesada (2000–2006) the prisoners remained in jail (along with 67 other political prisoners remaining in Guerrero). See [www.sierraclub.org/human-rights/](http://www.sierraclub.org/human-rights/) and [www.sjsocial.org/PRODH/](http://www.sjsocial.org/PRODH/).

with the European Union. European concerns did not, however, prevent him from later backing out of the peace agreement. This sequence of events reflects a more general pattern in which international protests about human rights violations in Mexico are sufficient to prompt partial and symbolic concessions, but not enough to break the political stalemate on indigenous rights and peace in Chiapas.

### Concluding Propositions

This final section steps back from the specific cases examined in the course of this chapter to draw out several propositions for discussion, involving both the dynamics of networks and coalitions and their impact. As noted in the introduction, these propositions refer only to the subset of civil society actors that seek increased participation and public accountability.

- *Networks often need shared targets to become coalitions.* Mutual sympathy or shared concerns are usually not enough for networks to become coalitions, in the sense of agreeing to sustain joint campaigns. Jointly held political ideologies help, but they are not necessary; if they were, the list of binational coalitions would be much shorter. Shared targets can certainly be politically constructed, but it helps to have some tangible political opportunity structure that can make collective action seem potentially effective. Shared targets include: policy makers poised to make policy decisions that affect both Mexico and the United States (such as congressional trade votes); transnational corporations operating in both countries (such as Campbell's Soup Company and Delta Airlines/Aeroméxico); entire economic sectors (maquiladoras); specific products (organic coffee, for example); shared watersheds (the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo); migrating whales, butterflies, or birds; and international institutions such as the BECC, NADBANK, the trilateral labor or environmental commissions, the World Bank, or even the Catholic Church.
- *National and Mexico-U.S. border trends in binational relations have followed two different paths since 1994.* Binational networks and coalitions have not followed any one single trend over the past decade. Rather, border and national trends appear to have diverged along two different paths. Environmental and labor coalitions grouped along the Mexico-U.S. border have gradually increased their density as. In contrast, national-level networks and coalitions have displayed less consistent patterns. In the case of some environmental, human rights, and labor organizations, the pace of non-border binational social and civic relationship-building slowed after 1994. The 1997 fast-track debate over U.S. trade policy revealed significant backsliding compared to the 1994 high point. In retrospect, the NAFTA vote and the initial phase of the Chiapas rebellion sparked upsurges of binational political action and created a certain sense of a "war of movement," producing the hope that binational coalition-building might be broadened and deepened. Instead, the handful of binational coalitions that have managed to sustain

coordinated relationships have pursued more of a "war of position." Perhaps this should not be surprising given the extensive investments in within-organization and general public education that binational coalitions require.

- *Broad-based organizations that have sustained cohesive partnerships tend to "think locally to act binationally."* The classic formulation of global environmental philosophy ("think globally, act locally") does not help to explain why relatively few broad-based social organizations sustain cohesive binational partnerships. Accountability may be more important than ideology in this regard. Mass-based social organizations governed by their members are under more pressure than NGOs to be accountable to organized constituencies. They must allocate resources based upon perceived tangible benefits for their members. To justify investing resources in binational coalition-building, social organizations usually need to be able to demonstrate that these initiatives have local results. For example, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters reached out to Mexican immigrants and worked with Mexican unions to protect the rights of workers in the state of Washington's apple industry because such efforts promised to increase the union's bargaining power. Mexican trade-advocacy networks tolerated a degree of nationalist rhetoric on the part of U.S. NAFTA critics because those relationships increased their leverage. Similarly, the U.S. and Mexican telephone workers' unions joined forces in 1992 (despite deep differences over the upcoming NAFTA vote) because they perceived that such an exchange would reinforce their bargaining power over the longer term, with or without the NAFTA. In the same way, both U.S. and Mexican environmental organizations on the border appear willing to make serious investments in the difficult process of overcoming cultural differences because they increasingly share the view that the local is binational, and vice versa. Binational ideological convergence, though rare, can help sustain "think locally, act binationally" perspectives because it establishes a longer time horizon for assessing local benefits. Shared ideological visions can also sustain long-term alliances (such as that between the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America and the Authentic Labor Front) whose tangible victories so far have been limited.
- *Binational networks and coalitions have had significant impact upon official policy discourse, but they have only rarely won tangible increases in public or private accountability.* The experiences of human rights, labor, and environmental coalitions suggest that there is a very large gap between their influence upon public discourse and more tangible kinds of impact. Assessing impact is often methodologically problematic, especially when some of the most important forms of impact involve counterfactual assumptions ("the situation would be even worse if not for..."). One might plausibly argue that binational networks and coalitions have indeed been important in some such circumstances (helping to prevent a full-scale military assault in Chiapas or the downfall of Mexico's reformist environmental policy makers). But even in counterfactual scenarios

Table 15.3: Assessing the Impact of Mexico-U.S. Civil Society Networks and Coalitions

<i>Impact</i>	<i>Environmental standards</i>	<i>Labor rights</i>	<i>Human rights</i>
<i>Issue creation and agenda setting</i>	<i>High</i> This became a key public issue in the NAFTA debate. It remains on the binational public agenda and receives regular media attention.	<i>Medium</i> This became a key public issue in the NAFTA debate. It occasionally returns to the binational agenda, and it influenced the defeat of fast-track U.S. trade legislation in 1997. Binational coalitions engendered incipient Mexican-side <i>maquiladora</i> organizing network.	<i>Low-Medium</i> This became a secondary issue in the NAFTA debate, but it then fell from the U.S. public agenda (except for the 1994-1995 Chiapas period).
<i>Influence upon official discourse (states and international organizations)</i>	<i>High</i> Both states and the NAFTA institutions continue to make strong discursive commitments to environmental concerns.	<i>Low-Medium</i> Both states continue to recognize some labor rights, but both also ignore systematic violations of the right to organize. Trinational NAFTA labor institutions occasionally raise the issue, but with little impact upon broader public discourse.	<i>Medium</i> Both governments are obliged to recognize and condemn violations when the media and binational coalitions make them difficult to ignore. U.S. Department of State reports and incipient congressional resolutions raise human rights concerns. The Mexican state expresses concern over migrant rights.
<i>Influence upon national and international institutional procedures</i>	<i>Medium</i> The trinational NAFTA side agreement remains weak, but the binational BECC and NADBank created new practices and standards for public participation on the border. Lack of progress institutionalizing and broadening	<i>Low</i> The NAFTA labor side agreement is extremely weak, with a very limited mandate and no authority over violations of the right to organize. However, public hearings and ministerial-level consultations have been held.	<i>Medium</i> The NAFTA debate contributed to the launching of the National Human Rights Commission. Mexican human rights organizations have prioritized multilateral (United Nations, Organization of American States) over binational fora.

	NADBank contributed to the 1997 defeat of fast-track trade legislation in the United States.		
<i>Influence upon policy change in target actors, public or private</i>	<i>Medium</i> There has been increased external funding for Mexican environmental protection from the World Bank, USAID, U.S. private foundations, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Binational environmental coalitions have successfully blocked large, controversial projects in both countries.	<i>Low</i> Despite the labor side agreement's limitations, several coalitions have tried to use its procedures - though so far with no policy impact. The main labor union impact upon integration policy (the U.S. Teamsters' trucking campaign) was not binational. However, several binational <i>maquiladora</i> worker-defense campaigns have led to modest, plant-specific concessions.	<i>Low-Medium</i> To the degree that Mexican laws and institutions have recognized human rights since the NAFTA debate, there is little evidence that binational coalitions were important. International concern did contribute to the government's decision to pursue a combination of negotiations and low-intensity conflict in Chiapas (rather than a full military assault), but it has been too weak to break the national stalemate.
<i>Influence upon the behavior of target actors</i>	<i>Low-Medium</i> Mexican environmental reform authorities have had uneven effectiveness, but at least they remain in power, indirectly bolstered by persistent international (mainly U.S.) concerns. Environmental policymakers' room for maneuver, however, has been economically and politically limited. Basic environmental laws continue to be violated often and with impunity.	<i>None</i> There is no evidence of tangible progress in terms of the right to organize, wages, or working conditions in either country (especially in the <i>maquiladoras</i> ). The Han Young case showed that even a binational campaign that generated extensive, high-level U.S. concern had little or no effect upon Mexican legal processes and respect for labor rights in practice.	<i>Unclear</i> Because of the lack of consistent, independent, nationwide data, changes in levels of impunity over time are difficult to assess. Even if improvements were documented, the role of binational civil society remains uncertain. The clearest impact has been in Chiapas, where the military usually limits easily televisable abuses. Binational coalitions may have contributed to limited prosecutions of the perpetrators of the 1997 Acteal massacre.

such as these, it is difficult to establish conclusively that transnational factors or binational relationships were of primary importance. In terms of bolstering more reformist policies or inducing qualitative changes in actual state behavior (for example, increased authority for Mexican environmental reformers, significantly greater opportunities for Mexican and U.S. unions to organize, or indigenous rights reforms that could begin to resolve the Chiapas conflict), binational partnerships have not had much impact thus far. The NAFTA-origin border environmental institutions are the main exception to this generalization, and their impact so far has been quite limited compared to their mandate. The environmental campaign defeats of the Sierra Blanca and Mitsubishi projects were significant, but each had unusual features (they involved, respectively, nuclear waste and whales) that limit their generalizability. In summary, binational networks appear to have much more influence over public agendas and official discourse than on what their target actors actually do in practice.<sup>102</sup> This should not be surprising; where the main points of leverage used against them are informational and symbolic politics, targeted actors can respond with symbolic concessions and arrangements such as a trinational commission that produces information.

- *Binational coalitions are long-term investments with uncertain payoffs.* Networks that do more than exchange information from afar require human and material resources. Coalitions, because they involve higher levels of coordination, require even more resources to endure. Although some organizations can afford to invest such resources without short-to-medium-term payoffs, organizations that are less well endowed must carefully weigh the tradeoffs involved. Transportation costs and other financial considerations aside, every week that an activist spends in another country is a week not spent organizing on home ground. Moreover, coalitions can involve certain risks, insofar as one set of partners may or may not consult before making decisions that could be politically costly for the other. On the positive side, investments in networks and coalitions often generate social capital (understood as resources for collective action embodied in horizontal relationships), and social capital can produce often unpredictable multiplier effects. But precisely because the empowering effects are difficult to assess, political investments in coalitions compete with much more pressing demands and with alternative investments that promise more immediate results.<sup>103</sup>

102 This hypothesis resonates with the World Bank campaign experience. In that case, transnational networks were a crucial reason why the World Bank decided to make environmental and social reform commitments, but national factors primarily determined the degree to which states met those commitments in practice (Fox and Brown 1998).

103 For many organizations, networks – with their lower levels of commitment – may make much more sense than coalitions. Relatively few binational interlocutors can draw “strength from weak ties” (Granovetter 1973), serving as resources when their organizations need them. In this scenario, relatively low-cost binational networks can exercise leverage at key turning points, as long as they link organizations that have some degree of influence in their respective societies. For an application of this argument to transnational advocacy networks, see Fox and Brown 1998.

In sum, binational civil society networks and coalitions have had much more impact upon *themselves* than on the broader processes and targets that provoked their emergence.<sup>104</sup> Organized constituencies in each civil society have become better acquainted with their counterparts. Greater mutual understanding is likely to have empowering effects, at least in the long term. Broad-based actors in both civil societies are qualitatively more open to, and experienced with, binational cooperation than ever before. This accumulated social capital constitutes a potential political resource for the future. Whether and how national civil society actors will choose to draw upon it remains to be seen.

## References

- Abraham, Lotri, with Kathy Cone. 1999. “Cross-Cultural Organizing: How It Stopped a Nuclear Waste Dump,” *The Workbook* (Spring): 4–11.
- Acosta, Mariclaire. 2002. “Lessons Learned from the Bilateral Relations between Mexican and U.S. Human Rights Organizations.” In *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.–Mexico Social Movement Networking*, edited by David Brooks and Jonathan Fox. La Jolla: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- Adams, Tani. 1999. “Whose Environment Are We Trying to Save Here? The Consequences of ‘Occidental’ Notions of Civilization and Nature in International Environmentalism.” Paper presented at the conference “Transnational Organizing in the Americas,” Chicano/Latino Research Center and Latin American and Latino Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz, December.
- Aguayo Quezada, Sergio. 1998. “Electoral Observation and Democracy in Mexico.” In *Electoral Observation and Democratic Transitions in Latin America*, edited by Kevin J. Middlebrook. La Jolla: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- . 2001. “El financiamiento extranjero y la transición democrática mexicana: el caso de Alianza Cívica.” Paper presented at Casa Lamm, Mexico City, August [www.alianzaviciva.org.mx/Conferencia%20%20Sergio.htm].
- Alexander, Robin. 1998. “The UE–FAT Strategic Organizing Alliance.” In *Enfrentando el cambio: obreros del automóvil y producción esbelta en América del Norte/Confronting Change: Auto Labor and Lean Production in North America*, edited by Huberto Juárez Núñez and Steve Babson. Puebla, Mexico: Benemérita Autónoma Universidad de Puebla / Wayne State University.
- Alexander, Robin, and Peter Gilmore. 1994. “The Emergence of Cross-Border Labor Solidarity,” *NACLA Report on the Americas* 28 (1): 42–48.
- Álvarez, Sonia. 1997. “Reweaving the Fabric of Collective Action: Social Movements and Challenges of ‘Actually Existing Democracy’ in Brazil.” In *Between Resistance and Revolution: Cultural Politics and Social Protest*, edited by Richard Fox and Orin Starn. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.
- Álvarez Icaza, Emilio. 2002. “Mexico–U.S. Collaboration with Alianza Cívica.” In *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.–Mexico Social Movement Networking*, edited by David Brooks and Jonathan Fox. La Jolla: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.

104 For a related effort to broaden the criteria and scope for assessing social movement impact, see Álvarez 1997.

- Amnesty International. 1986. *Mexico – Human Rights in Rural Areas*. London: Amnesty International.
- Aponte, David, and Ciro Pérez Silva. 2001. "Sindicalistas de EU pretenden desestabilizar en Mexico: Abascal," *La Jornada*, February 23.
- Armbruster, Ralph. 1998. "Cross-Border Labor Organizing in the Garment and Automobile Industries: The Phillips Van-Heusen and Ford Cuautitlán Cases," *Journal of World-Systems Research* 4 (1) [www.csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/jwsr.html].
- Arroyo, Alberto, and Mario Montoy. 1996. *Red Mexicana de Acción frente al Libre Comercio: 5 años de lucha (1991–1996)*. Mexico City: Red Mexicana de Acción frente al Libre Comercio.
- Arroyo, Alberto, and Andrés Peñalosa, eds. 2000. *Derechos humanos y Tratado de Libre Comercio México-Unión Europea*. Mexico City: Red Mexicana de Acción frente al Libre Comercio.
- ART/CTC/RMALC (Alliance for Responsible Trade / Citizen Trade Campaign / Red Mexicana de Acción frente al Libre Comercio). 1994. "A Just and Sustainable Trade and Development Initiative for the Western Hemisphere." Washington, D.C., December.
- Arvizu, John R., and Chris F. Garcia. 1996. "Latino Voting Participation: Explaining and Differentiating Latino Voting Turnout," *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 18 (2): 104–29.
- Audley, John J. 1997. *Green Politics and Global Trade: NAFTA and the Future of Environmental Politics*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Ayres, Jeffrey M. 1998. *Defying Conventional Wisdom: Political Movements and Popular Contention against North American Free Trade*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Babson, Steve. 2000. "Cross-Border Trade with Mexico and the Prospects for Worker Solidarity: The Case of Mexico," *Critical Sociology* 26 (1/2): 13–35.
- Bacon, David. 1998. "A Plant Closes in Revenge for Cross-Border Organizing," *Mexican Labor News and Analysis*, 3 (22), December 16 [www.igc.apc.org/unitedelect/vol3no22.html].
- . 2000. "Tijuana Troubles," *In These Times*, August 21.
- . 2001. "Secret Ballot Denied in Mexican Factory Vote," Internet Bulletin, March 12 [www.igc.org/igc/gateway/pnindex.html].
- Ballinas, Victor. 2001. "Impunidad, sello en 10 años de labor de la CNDH: visitantes," *La Jornada*, March 19.
- Bandy, Joe. 1998. "Border Crossings: Transnational Movements for Alternative Development and Radical Democracy in the U.S.–Mexico Border Region." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Santa Barbara.
- . 2000. "Border the Future: Resisting Neoliberalism in the Borderlands," *Critical Sociology* 26 (3): 232–67.
- Barger, W.K., and Ernesto M. Reza. 1994. *The Farm Labor Movement in the Midwest: Social Change and Adaptation among Migrant Farmworkers*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Barry, Tom, Harry Browne, and Beth Sims. 1994. *The Great Divide: The Challenge of U.S.–Mexico Relations in the 1990s*. New York: Grove / Interhemispheric Resource Center.
- Bejarano, Fernando. 2002. "Mexico–U.S. Environmental Partnerships." In *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.–Mexico Social Movement Networking*, edited by David Brooks and Jonathan Fox. La Jolla: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- BIOS Action Kit. 1999. "Effectiveness of NAFTA Side Accords," *Borderlines* 7 (9), October [www.itc-online.org/bios/].
- Blackwell, Maylei. 2000. "Geographies of Difference: Mapping Multiple Feminist Insurgencies and Transnational Public Cultures in the Americas." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Santa Cruz.
- Bob, Clifford. 2000. "The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgent Groups, Global Media, and the Growth of International Support." Manuscript.

- Bonanno, Alessandro, and Douglas Constance. 1996. *Caught in the Net: The Global Tuna Industry, Environmentalism, and the State*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Boudreau, Julie-Anne, and Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda, eds. 1998. "Las nuevas instituciones del Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte: integración económica regional y cooperación. Procedimientos de una conferencia, 19–20 junio 1998." Los Angeles: UCLA North American Integration and Development Center / U.S. Department of Labor.
- Bray, David. 1999. "Coffee That Eases the Conscience," *New York Times*, July 5.
- Brecher, Jeremy, Tim Costello, and Brendan Smith. 2000. *Globalization from Below: The Power of Solidarity*. Boston: South End Press.
- BRIDGES. 2000. "The Battle between Environmental Co-operation and Trade Embargoes Flares Up with Possibility of Tuna Dolphin III," *BRIDGES between Trade and Sustainable Development*, July–August [www.ictsd.org/html/arct\_sd.htm#Bridges].
- Brooks, David. 1992. "The Search for Counterparts," *Labor Research Review* 19 (Fall): 83–96.
- Brooks, David, and Jonathan Fox, eds. 2002. *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.–Mexico Social Movement Networking*. La Jolla: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- Browne, Harry, ed. 1996a. *Cross-Border Links: A Directory of Organizations in Canada, Mexico, and the United States – 1997 Labor Directory*. Silver City, N.M.: Interhemispheric Resource Center.
- . 1996b. *Cross-Border Links: A Directory of Organizations in Canada, Mexico, and the United States – 1997 Environmental Directory*. Silver City, N.M.: Interhemispheric Resource Center.
- Campaign for Labor Rights. 2001. "Update on Kuk Dong Struggle, Mexico," *Campaign for Labor Rights' Labor Alert*, June 20 [www.summersault.com/~agj/clr].
- Cano, Arturo, and Alberto Aguirre. 2000. "Los enredos de las listas," *Masiosure* (supplement to *La Jornada*), April 2.
- Carr, Barry. 1996. "Crossing Borders: Labor Internationalism in the Era of NAFTA." In *Neoliberalism Revisited: Economic Restructuring and Mexico's Political Future*, edited by Gerardo Otero. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
- . 1998. "Globalisation from Below? Reflections on the Experience of Labor Internationalism under NAFTA, 1994–1998." Paper presented at the international congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago, September.
- Carrillo, Teresa. 1990. "Women and Independent Unionism in the Garment Industry." In *Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico*, edited by Joe Foweraker and Ann L. Craig. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.
- . 1998. "Cross-Border Talk: Transnational Perspectives on Labor, Race, and Sexuality." In *Talking Visions: Multicultural Feminism in a Transnational Age*, edited by Ella Shohat. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Castañeda, Jorge G. 1996. "Mexico's Circle of Misery," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (4): 92–105.
- Castañeda, Jorge G., and Carlos Heredia. 1993. "Another NAFTA: What a Good Agreement Should Offer." In *The Case Against "Free Trade"*, edited by Ralph Nader et al. San Francisco: Earth Island Press.
- Cavanagh, John, Sarah Anderson, and Karen Hansen-Kuhn. 2001. "Crossborder Organizing Around Alternatives to Free Trade: Lessons from the NAFTA–FTAA Experience." In *Global Citizen Action*, edited by Michael Edwards and John Gaventa. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.
- . 2002. "Trinational Organizing for Just and Sustainable Trade and Development." In *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.–Mexico Social Movement Networking*, edited by David Brooks and Jonathan Fox. La Jolla: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.

- Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez. 1999. *Images of Repression: A Critical Time for Human Rights in Mexico, 1996–1998*. Mexico City: Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez.
- . 2000. *Recomendaciones sobre derechos humanos al gobierno mexicano, 1997–2000*. Mexico City: Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez.
- Cleaver, Harty. 2000. "The Virtual and Real Chiapas Support Network: A Review and Critique of Judith Adler Hellman's 'Real and Virtual Chiapas: Magical Realism and the Left,' *Socialist Register, 2000*," July [www.eco.urexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/anri-hellman.html].
- Clifford, Frank. 1998. "Immigration Vote Divides Sierra Club," *Los Angeles Times*, March 16.
- Cohen, Larry, and Steve Farly. 1999. "Defending Workers' Rights in the Global Economy: The CWA Experience." In *Which Direction for Organized Labor? Essays on Organizing, Outreach, and Internal Transformations*, edited by Bruce Nissen. Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press.
- Cohen, Robin, and Shirin M. Rai, eds. 2000. *Global Social Movements*. London: Athlone.
- Cook, Maria Lorena. 1997. "Regional Integration and Transnational Politics: Popular Sector Strategies in the NAFTA Era." In *The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America*, edited by Douglas A. Chalmers et al. New York: Oxford University Press.
- De la Garza, Rodolfo O., et al. 1998. "Family Ties and Ethnic Lobbies: Latino Relations with Latin America." Policy Brief. Claremont, Calif.: Tomás Rivera Policy Institute.
- Dedina, Serge. 2000. *Saving the Grey Whale*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Delpar, Helen. 1992. *The Enormous Vogue of Things Mexican: Cultural Relations between the United States and Mexico, 1920–1935*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- DeSipio, Louis. 1996. *Counting on the Latino Vote: Latinos as a New Electorate*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
- DeSipio, Louis, and Rodolfo O. de la Garza. 1998. *Making Americans, Remaking America: Immigration and Immigrant Policy*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
- Dillon, Sam. 1998. "Mexico Weighs Voting by Its Emigrants in U.S.," *New York Times*, December 7.
- . 2000. "Jailed Mexican Wins Environmental Prize," *New York Times*, April 5.
- Dongherty, Laurie. 1999. "Active Culture: Profile – The Methodist Women's Active Faith," *Dollars and Sense* 223 (May–June): 6.
- Dreiling, Michael. 1997. "Remapping North American Environmentalism: Contending Visions and Divergent Practices in the Fight over NAFTA," *Capitalism, Nature, and Socialism* 8 (4): 65–98.
- . 2001. *Solidarity and Contention: The Politics of Security and Sustainability in the NAFTA Conflict*. New York: Garland.
- Dreiling, Michael, and Ian Robinson. 1998. "Union Responses to NAFTA in the U.S. and Canada: Explaining Intra- and International Variation," *Mobilization* 3 (2): 163–84.
- Dresser, Denise. 1991a. "La nueva política mexicana en Estados Unidos," *Estados Unidos: Informe Trimestral* 1 (4): 15–31.
- . 1991b. *Neopopulist Solutions to Neoliberal Problems: Mexico's National Solidarity Program*. Current Issue Briefs, no. 3. La Jolla: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- . 1993. "Exporting Conflict: Transboundary Consequences of Mexican Politics." In *The California-Mexico Connection*, edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal and Katrina Burgess. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- . 1996. "Treading Lightly and Without a Stick: International Actors and the Promotion of Democracy in Mexico." In *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas*, edited by Tom Farer. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Eaton, Tracy. 1999. "Jailed Timber-Cutting Foe Seen as Guerrilla by Mexican Officials," *Dallas Morning News*, August 27.

- Eisenstadt, Todd. 1997. "The Rise of the Mexico Lobby in Washington: Even Further from God, and Even Closer to the United States." In *Bridging the Border: Transforming Mexico–U.S. Relations*, edited by Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Jesús Velasco. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Enciso, Angélica. 2001. "Sólo 12% de los residuos peligrosos que generan industrias reciben tratamiento," *La Jornada*, March 26.
- Espinosa, Víctor. 1999. *The Illinois Federation of Michoacán Clubs: The Chicago-Michoacán Project Report*. Chicago, Ill.: Heartland Alliance for Human Needs and Human Rights.
- Faux, Jeff. 1995. "Mexico and Vietnam," *Dissent* 42 (2): 169–74.
- Fitzgerald, David. 2000. *Negotiating Extra-Territorial Citizenship: Mexican Migration and the Transnational Politics of Community*. Monograph Series, no. 1. La Jolla: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- Flores, William, and Rina Benmayor, eds. 1997. *Latino Cultural Citizenship: Claiming Identity, Space, and Rights*. Boston, Mass.: Beacon.
- Florini, Ann, ed. 2000. *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*. Washington, D.C. and Tokyo: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace / Japan Center for International Exchange.
- Fox, Jonathan. 1989. "Time to Cross the Border: Paying Attention to Mexico," *Radical America* 22 (4): 53–62.
- . 1992. "Agriculture and the Politics of the North American Trade Debate," *LASA Forum* 23 (1): 3–9.
- . 1996. "National Electoral Choices in Rural Mexico." In *Reforming Mexico's Agrarian Reform*, edited by Laura Randall. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
- . 2000a. "Assessing Binational Civil Society Coalitions: Lessons from the Mexico–U.S. Experience," Working Paper no. 26, Chicano-Latino Research Center, University of California, Santa Cruz, April [www.irc-online.org/bios/pdf/index\_docs.html].
- . 2000b. "Los flujos y reflujos de préstamos sociales y ambientales del Banco Mundial en México." In *Las nuevas fronteras del Siglo XXI: dimensiones culturales, políticas y socioeconómicas de las relaciones México–Estados Unidos*, edited by Norma Klahn, Pedro Castillo, Alejandro Álvarez, and Federico Manchón. Mexico City: La Jornada Ediciones / Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México / Chicano-Latino Research Center / Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana.
- . 2001. "Evaluación de las coaliciones binacionales de la sociedad civil a partir de la experiencia México–Estados Unidos," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 63 (3): 211–68.
- Fox, Jonathan, and L. David Brown, eds. 1998. *The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Frank, Dana. 1999. *Buy American*. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press.
- García Acevedo, María Rosa. 1996. "Return to Aztlán: Mexico's Policies towards Chicano/as." In *Chicanas/Chicanos at the Crossroads: Social, Economic, and Political Change*, edited by David Maciel and Isidro D. Ortiz. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- García Urrutia, Manuel. 2002. "The Authentic Labor Front in the Process of Regional Integration in the NAFTA Era." In *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.–Mexico Social Movement Networking*, edited by David Brooks and Jonathan Fox. La Jolla: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- Goldring, Luin. 1998. "From Marker Membership to Transnational Citizenship? The Changing Politicization of Transnational Social Spaces," *L'Ordinaire Latino-Américain* 173–174 (July–December): 167–72.
- . 2002. "The Mexican State and Transmigrant Organizations: Negotiating the Boundaries of Membership and Participation," *Latin American Research Review* 37 (3): 55–99.



- Gómez Quiñones, Juan. 1990. *Chicano Politics: Reality and Promise, 1940–1990*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- González, Antonio. 1999. "Chicano Politics and U.S. Policy in Central America." In *Chicano Politics and Society in the Late Twentieth Century*, edited by David Montejano. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- González Guriérrez, Carlos. 1993. "The Mexican Diaspora in California: The Limits and Possibilities of the Mexican Government." In *The California–Mexico Connection*, edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal and Katrina Burgess. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- . 1997. "Decentralized Diplomacy: The Role of Consular Offices in Mexico's Relations with its Diaspora." In *Bridging the Border: Transforming Mexico–U.S. Relations*, edited by Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Jesús Velasco. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
- . 1999. "Fostering Identities: Mexico's Relations with its Diaspora." *Journal of American History* 86 (2): 545–67.
- Gosse, Van. 1988. "The North American Front: Central American Solidarity in the Reagan Era." In *Reshaping the U.S. Left: Popular Struggles of the 1980s*, edited by Mike Davis and Michael Sprinker. London: Verso.
- . 1995. "Active Engagement: The Legacy of Central America Solidarity." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 28 (5): 22–30.
- Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. "The Strength of Weak Ties." *American Journal of Sociology* 78 (6): 1360–80.
- Greenhouse, Steven. 2001. "Labor Leader Sounds Do-or-Die Warning." *New York Times*, February 19.
- Guidry, Jon, Michael Kennedy, and Mayer Zald, eds. 2000. *Globalizations and Social Movements: Culture, Power, and the Transnational Public Sphere*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Guriérrez, David. 1995. *Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gutiérrez, David, ed. 1996. *Between Two Worlds: Mexican Immigrants in the United States*. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources.
- Gutiérrez, Maribel. 1998. *Violencia en Guerrero*. Mexico City: La Jornada Ediciones.
- Gzesh, Susan. 2002. "Mexico–U.S. Immigration and Cross-Border Organizing." In *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.–Mexico Social Movement Networking*, edited by David Brooks and Jonathan Fox. La Jolla: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- Hanagan, Michael. 1998. "Irish Transnational Social Movements, Deterritorialized Migrants, and the State System: The Last One Hundred and Forty Years." *Mobilization* 3 (1): 107–26.
- Hathaway, Dale. 2000a. *Allies across the Border: Mexico's "Authentic Labor Front" and Global Solidarity*. Boston, Mass.: South End Press.
- . 2000b. "Transnational Support of Labor Organizing in Mexico: Comparative Cases." Paper presented at the international congress of the Latin American Studies Association, March.
- Hellman, Judith Adler. 2000. "Real and Virtual Chiapas: Magical Realism and the Left." In *Socialist Register, 2000*, edited by Leo Panitch. New York: Monthly Review Press [www.yorku.ca/socreg/].
- Heredia, Carlos, and Ricardo Hernández. 1995. *Citizen Diplomacy in the Age of Globalization: The Case of Mexico*. Mexico City: Equipo Pueblo.
- Hernández, Ricardo, and Edith Sánchez, eds. 1992. *Cross-Border Links: A Directory of Organizations in Canada, Mexico, and the United States*. Albuquerque, N.M.: Interhemispheric Resource Center.
- Hernández Navarro, Luis. 2002. "Globalization and Transnational Coalitions in the Rural Sector." In *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.–Mexico Social Movement Networking*, edited by David

- Brooks and Jonathan Fox. La Jolla: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- Hinojosa-Ojeda, Raúl. 2002. "North American Integration Policy Formation from the Grassroots Up: Transnational Implications of Latino, Labor, and Environmental NGO Strategies." In *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.–Mexico Social Movement Networking*, edited by David Brooks and Jonathan Fox. La Jolla: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- Hogenboom, Barbara. 1998. *Mexico and the NAFTA Environmental Debate*. Utrecht, The Netherlands: International Books.
- Human Rights Watch. 1990. *Human Rights in Mexico: A Policy of Impunity*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- . 1991a. "Prison Conditions in Mexico." New York: Human Rights Watch.
- . 1991b. "Unceasing Abuses – Human Rights in Mexico One Year after the Introduction of Reform." New York: Human Rights Watch.
- . 1993. "Human Rights Watch Writes to President Clinton Urging NAFTA Summit on Human Rights." New York: Human Rights Watch.
- . 1994a. "The New Year's Rebellion: Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law during the Armed Revolt in Chiapas, Mexico." New York: Human Rights Watch.
- . 1994b. "Mexico at the Crossroads: Political Rights and the 1994 Presidential and Congressional Elections." New York: Human Rights Watch.
- . 1995. "Army Officer 'Held Responsible' for Chiapas Massacre." New York: Human Rights Watch.
- . 1996a. "No Guarantees – Sex Discrimination in Mexico's Maquiladora Sector." New York: Human Rights Watch.
- . 1996b. "Torture and Other Abuses during the 1995 Crackdown on Alleged Zapatistas." New York: Human Rights Watch.
- . 1997. "Implausible Deniability: State Responsibility for Rural Violence in Mexico." Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch.
- . 1998a. "Mexico – A Job or Your Rights: Continued Sex Discrimination in Mexico's Maquiladora Sector." New York: Human Rights Watch.
- . 1998b. "Discrimination in Mexico's Maquiladora Sector." New York: Human Rights Watch.
- . 1999. "Systemic Injustice: Torture, 'Disappearance,' and Extrajudicial Execution in Mexico." New York: Human Rights Watch.
- . 2000. "Unfair Advantage: Workers' Freedom of Association in the United States under International Human Rights Standards." New York: Human Rights Watch [www.hrw.org/reports/2000/uslabor/].
- . 2001. "Trading Away Rights: The Unfulfilled Promise of NAFTA's Labor Side Agreement" [www.hrw.org/press/2001/nafta0416/html].
- IFE (Instituto Federal Electoral). 1998. "Informe final que presenta la comisión de especialistas que estudia las modalidades del voto de los mexicanos residentes en el extranjero." *Perfil de la Jornada*, November 16.
- Kamel, Rachel. 1988. "'This Is How It Starts': Women Maquila Workers in Mexico." *Labor Research Review* 7 (1): 15–26.
- . 1989. *The Global Factory: An Organizing Guide for a New Economic Era*. Philadelphia, Penn.: American Friends Service Committee.
- Kamel, Rachel, and Anya Hoffman, eds. 1999. *The Maquiladora Reader: Cross-Border Organizing since NAFTA*. Philadelphia, Penn.: American Friends Service Committee.
- Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

- Kelly, Mary. 2002. "Cross-Border Work on the Environment: Evolution, Success, Problems, and Future Outlook." In *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.-Mexico Social Movement Networking*, edited by David Brooks and Jonathan Fox. La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. 2002. *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kidder, Thalia, and Maty McGinn. 1995. "In the Wake of NAFTA: Transnational Workers' Networks," *Social Policy* 25 (4): 14-21.
- Knight, Alan. 1997. "Dealing with the American Political System: An Historical Overview." In *Bridging the Border: Transforming Mexico-U.S. Relations*, edited by Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Jesús Velasco. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Kourous, George. 2000. "The Great NADBank Debate," *Borderlines Updater*, September 1 [www.irc-online.org/bios/].
- . 2001. "NAFTA Trucking Dispute: Still Talking Trash," *Borderlines Updater*, February 12 [www.irc-online.org/bios/].
- La Botz, Dan. 1992. *Mask of Democracy: Labor Suppression in Mexico Today*. Boston, Mass.: South End Press / International Labor Rights and Education Research Fund.
- LaFranchi, Howard. 1998. "Mexico on Nuclear Dump: Not on Our Border," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 18.
- Lehman, Karen. 2002. "Farmers and Regional Integrarinn in North America." In *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.-Mexico Social Movement Networking*, edited by David Brooks and Jonathan Fox. La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- Leiken, Robert S. 2000. *The Melting Border: Mexico and Mexican Communities in the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Equal Oppottunity.
- Lewis, Ted. 2002. "U.S.-Mexico Grasstoots Challenges: Looking for a Winning Strategy." In *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.-Mexico Social Movement Networking*, edited by David Brooks and Jonathan Fox. La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- Lowerte, Richard. 1994. "Update on World Bank Forestry Loan to Mexico." Austin: Texas Center for Policy Studies.
- Luján, Bertha. 2002. "Citizen Network Action in the NAFTA Region." In *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.-Mexico Social Movement Networking*, edited by David Brooks and Jonathan Fox. La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- MacDonald, Laura. 1999. "Democracy, Human Rights, and the Transformation of Civil Society: The Case of the New North America." In *Racing to Regionalize*, edited by Kenneth P. Thomas and Mary Ann Tétreault. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.
- Maciel, David, and María Herrera-Sobek, eds. 1998. *Culture across Borders: Mexican Immigration and Popular Culture*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- MacLachlan, Colin. 1991. *Anarchism and the Mexican Revolution: The Political Trials of Ricardo Flores Magón in the United States*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Martínez, Jesús, and Raúl Ross. 2002. "Suffrage for Mexicans Residing Abroad." In *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.-Mexico Social Movement Networking*, edited by David Brooks and Jonathan Fox. La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- Martínez Saldafía, Jesús. 1999. "Propuesta a Marcos," *La Jornada*, January 23.
- Mayer, Frederick. 1998. *Interpreting NAFTA: The Science and Art of Political Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Mazza, Jacqueline. 2001. *Don't Disturb the Neighbors: The United States and Democracy in Mexico, 1980-1995*. New York: Routledge.

- McConnell, Sharon Lean. 1996. "Alianza Cívica: nn nuevo actor no-gubernamental en el ámbito político mexicano." Master's thesis, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales-México.
- McGinn, Maty, and Kim Moody. 1992. *Unions and Free Trade: Solidarity vs. Competition*. Detroit, Mich.: Labor Notes.
- McKennirey, John, Lance Compa, Leoncio Lara, and Eric Griego. 1997. *Plant Closings and Labor Rights: A Report to the Council of Ministers by the Secretariat of the Commission for Labor Cooperation on the Effects of Sudden Plant Closings on Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize in Canada, Mexico, and the United States*. Dallas, Tex.: Bernan Press / North American Commission for Labor Cooperation.
- Mexico-United States Binational Commission. 1997. *Mexico-U.S. Binational Study on Migration*. Mexico City: Commission on Immigration Reform / Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores.
- Milkman, Ruth, ed. 2000. *Organizing Immigrants: The Challenge for Unions in Contemporary California*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Millman, Joel. 1999. "U.S. Airlines Expand Service to Destinations within Mexico," *Wall St. Journal*, December 20.
- . 2000. "Aeroméxico Union Forges Alliance with Delta Pilots," *Wall St. Journal*, February 28.
- Mumme, Stephen. 1999. "NAFTA's Environmental Side Agreement: Almost Green?" *Borderlines* 7 (9) [www.irc-online.org/bios/pdf/index\_docs.html].
- Nader, Ralph, et al. 1993. *The Case against "Free Trade": GATT, NAFTA, and the Globalization of Corporate Power*. San Francisco: Earth Island Press.
- Nagengast, Carole, and Michael Kearney. 1990. "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Conscionsness, and Political Activism," *Latin American Research Review* 25 (2): 61-91.
- Neuman, Talli. 1993. "Labor Solidarity Crosses the Border," *El Financiero International*, August 9-15.
- Pachon, Harry, and Lonis DeSipio. 1994. *New Americans by Choice: Political Perspectives of Latin Immigrants*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
- Paterson, Kent. 1998. "Sierra Blanca Protests Sweep Both Sides of the Border: TNRCC Decision Set for October 22," *Borderlines Updater*, October 20 [www.irc-online.org/bios/].
- . 1999. "Indigenous and Environmental Groups Unite to Stop Ward Valley Dump," *Borderlines Updater*, February 3 [www.irc-online.org/bios/].
- Peña, Devon Gerardo. 1997. *The Terror of the Machine: Technology, Work, Gender, and Ecology on the U.S.-Mexico Border*. Austin: Center for Mexican American Studies, University of Texas at Austin.
- Peñalosa Méndez, Andrés, and Alberto Arroyo Picard. 1997. *Espejismo y realidad: el TLCAN tres años después - análisis y propuesta desde la sociedad civil*. Mexico City: Red Mexicana de Acción frente al Libre Comercio.
- Perl, Peter. 2000. "Packaged Poison," *Washington Post*, National Weekly Edition, January 24.
- Preston, Julia. 1999. "Mexico Suspends Plan for Hefty Deposit on Cars," *New York Times*, December 4.
- . 2000. "In Mexico, Nature Lovers Merit a Kiss from a Whale," *New York Times*, March 5.
- Public Agenda / Tomás Rivera Policy Institute. 1998. "Here to Stay: The Domestic and International Priorities of Latino Leaders." Claremont, Calif.: Tomás Rivera Policy Institute.
- Public Citizen. 1997. "Deals for NAFTA Votes II: Bait and Switch 97." Washington, D.C.: Public Citizen / Global Trade Watch [www.tradewatch.org/nafta/reports/baitnswt.html].
- . 2001. "The Coming NAFTA Crash: The Deadly Impact of a Secret NAFTA Tribunal's Decision to Open U.S. Highways to Unsafe Mexican Trucks." Washington, D.C.: Public Citizen / Global Trade Watch, February 6 [www.tradewatch.org].
- Restrepo, Iván. 1995. "Salvar a los delfines o los intereses de EU?" *La Jornada*, October 9.
- Rice, Robert, Ashley Harris, and Jennifer MacLean, eds. 1997. *Proceedings: First Sustainable Coffee Congress, September 1996*. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Migratory Bird Center.

- Rivera Salgado, Gaspar. 1999a. "Migration and Political Activism: Mexican Transnational Indigenous Communities in a Comparative Perspective." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Santa Cruz.
- . 1999b. "Welcome to Oaxacalifornia," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 32 (1): 59–61.
- . 2002. "Binational Grassroots Organizations and the Experience of Indigenous Migrants." In *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.–Mexico Social Movement Networking*, edited by David Brooks and Jonathan Fox. La Jolla: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- RMALC (Red Mexicana de Acción frente al Libro Comercio). 1994. "Memoria del Encuentro Nacional: 'Integración, Democracia y Desarrollo.' Hacia una agenda social continental." Mexico City: RMALC.
- Robbins, Carla Anne. 2000. "Border Lines: How Would Bush Fare with Foreign Policy? Check Our Mexico," *Wall St. Journal*, February 29.
- Rodríguez, América. 1999. *Making Latino News*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.
- Rodríguez, Primitivo. 2001. "La conexión ONG mexicanas-EU," *Masiosare* (supplement to *La Jornada*), May 1.
- Romney, Lec. 1999. "Fledgling Programs Used to Create Economic Opportunities Back Home Could Stem the Migration to California," *Los Angeles Times*, August 6.
- Ronfeldt, David, and John Arquilla. 1998. *The Zapatista Social Network in Mexico*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Arroyo Center.
- Rose, Debra. 1993. "The Politics of Mexican Wildlife: Conservation, Development, and the International System." Ph.D. diss., University of Florida.
- Rosen, Fred. 1999. "The Underside of NAFTA: A Budding Cross-Border Resistance," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 32 (4): 37–39.
- Ross, Raúl. 1999. *Los mexicanos y el voto sin fronteras*. Chicago, Ill.: Salsedo Press / Universidad Autónoma de Sinaloa / Centro de Estudios del Movimiento Obrero y Socialista.
- Ruiz, Vicki, and Susan Tiano, eds. 1987. *Women on the U.S.–Mexico Border: Responses to Change*. Boston, Mass.: Allen and Unwin.
- Sabatini, Chris. 2002. "Whom Do International Donors Support in the Name of Civil Society?" *Development in Practice* [www.developmentinpractice.org].
- Salinas, Eleázat. 1999. "Detectan fondos 'perdidos' de los braceros; son millones de dólares descontados de sus salarios," *El Rincón Latino* (Long Beach), December.
- Sandoval, Ricardo. 1999. "Sightseers Amid the Struggle," *San Jose Mercury News*, June 24.
- Santamaría Gómez, Arturo. 1988. *La izquierda norteamericana y los trabajadores indocumentados*. Culiacán, Mexico: Universidad Autónoma de Sinaloa.
- Santamaría Gómez, Arturo, with Nayamín Martínez Cosío, Alejandra Castañeda Gómez, and José Jaime Sañz Santamaría. 2001. *Mexicanos en Estados Unidos: la nación, la política y el voto sin fronteras*. Culiacán, Mexico: Universidad Autónoma de Sinaloa / Partido de la Revolución Democrática.
- Sepúlveda, Alicia. 1998. "El caso de SPRINT y el estudio sobre el cierre repentino de empresas y la libertad de asociación." Paper presented at the conference "Las nuevas instituciones del Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte: integración económica regional y cooperación," North American Integration and Development Center, University of California, Los Angeles, May.
- Shoch, James. 2000. "Contesting Globalization: Organized Labor, NAFTA, and the 1997 and 1998 Fast Track Fights," *Politics and Society* 28 (1): 119–50.
- Shorrock, Tim. 1999. "Creating a New Internationalism for Labor," *Dollars and Sense* 225 (September–October): 36–40.
- Sierra, Christine Marie. 1999. "In Search of National Power: Chicanos Working the System on

- Immigration Reform, 1976–1986." In *Chicano Politics and Society in the Late Twentieth Century*, edited by David Monrejo. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Sierra Guzmán, Jorge Luis, Rafael Ruiz Harrell, and José Barragán. 1992. *La Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos: una visión no gubernamental*. Mexico City: Comisión Mexicana de Promoción y Defensa de los Derechos Humanos.
- Silver, Sara. 1999. "Made in the Shade: Environmentalists Tout New Breed of 'Bird Friendly' Coffee Plants," *Santa Cruz Sentinel*, December 27.
- Sims, Beth. 1992. *Workers of the World Undermined: American Labor's Role in U.S. Foreign Policy*. Albuquerque, N.M.: Interhemispheric Resource Center.
- Smith, Christian. 1996. *Resisting Reagan: The U.S.–Central American Peace Movement*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Smith, Jackie, Charles Charfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds. 1997. *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity beyond the State*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press.
- Smith, Michael Peter, and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo, eds. 1998. *Transnationalism From Below*. New Brunswick: Transaction.
- Smith, Robert. 1999. "Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process: Transnationalization, the State, and the Extra-Territorial Conduct of Mexican Politics." Manuscript.
- Stephen, Lynn. 2002. "In the Wake of the Zapatistas: U.S. Solidarity Work Focused on Militarization, Human Rights, and Democratization in Chiapas." In *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.–Mexico Social Movement Networking*, edited by David Brooks and Jonathan Fox. La Jolla: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. 2d ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2000. "Beyond Globalization: Why Creating Transnational Social Movements Is So Hard and When It Is Most Likely to Happen," posted at Global Solidarity Dialogue [www.antenna.nl/~waterman/tarrow.html].
- Texas Center for Policy Studies. 1994. "Preliminary Report on the Proposed Extension of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and the Laguna Madre." Austin: Texas Center for Policy Studies.
- Thorup, Cathryn L. 1991. "The Politics of Free Trade and the Dynamics of Cross-Border Coalitions in U.S.–Mexico Relations," *Columbia Journal of World Business* 26 (2): 12–27.
- Torres, Blanca. 1997. "La participación de actores nuevos y tradicionales en las relaciones internacionales de México." In *La política exterior de México: enfoques para su análisis*. Mexico City: El Colegio de México / Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores.
- USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development)/Mexico. 1999. "FY 2001 Results Review and Resource Request." Arlington, Va.: USAID, May.
- Varady, Robert, Patricia Romero Lankao, and Katherine Hawkins. 2001. "Managing Hazardous Material along the U.S.–Mexican Border," *Environment* 43 (10): 22–36.
- Velasco, Jesús. 1997. "Selling Ideas, Buying Influence: Mexico and American Think Tanks in the Promotion of NAFTA." In *Bridging the Border: Transforming Mexico–U.S. Relations*, edited by Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Jesús Velasco. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Vila, Pablo. 2000. *Crossing Borders, Reinforcing Borders: Social Categories, Metaphors, and Narrative Identities on the U.S.–Mexico Frontier*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Villaraigosa, Antonio, and Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda. 1999. "Oportunidad para estrechar lazos," *Perfil de La Jornada*, May 18.
- Walker, Tony. 1998. "Sierra Blanca (population 700) Goes Ballistic over Plans for Big Nuclear Waste Dump Site: Texas Community Is Environmental Battleground Whose Ripples Could Spread to the Presidential Campaign," *Financial Times*, August 4.
- Wapner, Paul Kevin. 1996. *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

- Waterman, Peter. 1998. *Globalization, Social Movements, and the New Internationalism*. Washington, D.C.: Mansell.
- Weber, Devra. 1998. "Historical Perspectives on Transnational Mexican Workers in California." In *Border Crossings: Mexican and Mexican-American Workers*, edited by John Mason Hart. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources.
- Williams, Edward J. 1997. "Discord in U.S.-Mexican Labor Relations and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation." In *Bridging the Border: Transforming Mexican-U.S. Relations*, edited by Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Jesús Velasco. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Williams, Heather. 1999. "Mobile Capital and Transborder Labor Rights Mobilization," *Politics and Society* 27 (1): 139-66.
- . 2000. "Of Labor Tragedy and Legal Farce: The Han Young Factory Struggle in Tijuana, Mexico." Paper presented at the conference "Human Rights and Globalization: When Transnational Civil Society Networks Hit the Ground," Center for Global, International, and Regional Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz, December [www2.ucsc.edu/cgirs/conferences/humanrights/index.html].
- . 2002. "Lessons from the Labor Front: The Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras." In *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.-Mexico Social Movement Networking*, edited by David Brooks and Jonathan Fox. La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- WOLA (Washington Office on Latin America). 1993. "The Elections in Yucatán, Mexico: Summary and Conclusions of Citizen Observers." Washington, D.C.: WOLA.
- . 1994a. "The Media and the 1994 Federal Election in Mexico: A Content Analysis of Television Coverage of the Political Parties and Presidential Candidates." Washington, D.C.: WOLA / Mexican Academy of Human Rights, in collaboration with Civic Alliance / Observation 94.
- . 1994b. "The 1994 Mexican Election: A Question of Credibility." Washington, D.C.: WOLA / Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos.
- . 1994c. "The Clinton Administration and the Mexican Elections." Washington, D.C.: WOLA / Interhemispheric Resource Center Press.
- . 1995a. "Peace and Democratization in Mexico: Challenges Facing the Zedillo Government." Washington, D.C.: WOLA.
- . 1995b. "Mexican Insights: Mexican Civil Society Speaks to the United States." Washington, D.C.: WOLA.
- . 1997. "So Close and Yet So Far: Mexico's Mid-Term Elections and the Struggle for Democracy." Washington, D.C.: WOLA.
- Wright, Brian. 2000. "Environmental NGOs and the Dolphin-Tuna Case," *Environmental Politics* 9 (4): 82-103.
- Yúdice, George. 1998. "The Globalization of Culture and the New Civil Society." In *Cultures of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Re-visioning Latin American Social Movements*, edited by Sonia E. Álvarez, Evelina Dagnino, and Arturo Escobar. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
- Zabin, Carol, and Luis Escala Rabadán. 1998. "Mexican Hometown Associations and Mexican Immigrant Political Empowerment in Los Angeles." Aspen Institute Working Paper Series. Aspen, Colo.: Aspen Institute.
- Zúñiga, Juan Antonio, and Ricardo Olayo. 1999. "Con Barroso, desfalso por \$7.5 millones a Cruz Roja," *La Jornada*, September 11.

## "For 118 Million Mexicans": Emigrants and Chicanos in Mexican Politics

David Fitzgerald

When Vicente Fox Quesada won the Mexican presidency in July 2000, he pledged to govern on behalf of "118 million Mexicans," including the 18 million people of Mexican origin living in the United States (J. Smith 2000).<sup>1</sup> His expanded constituency included the new leader of El Granjenal, a village in the Mexican state of Michoacán, who shortly after his election flew north to his construction job in Santa Ana, California. His deputy stayed behind to attend to village affairs. Every few months, the leader returns and the deputy migrates, as they take turns governing El Granjenal on behalf of a community whose members mostly live in Santa Ana (Fitzgerald 2000). Yet the participation of Mexican emigrants in Mexican politics remains contested, as Andrés Bermúdez found when he was elected mayor of Jerez, Zacatecas in 2001 – twenty-eight years after leaving Zacatecas to make his fortune in tomato farming in California. Bermúdez's election was later overturned because of his California residency (Garrison 2002).

These vignettes illustrate the ways that relations between the U.S.-resident population of Mexican origin and political institutions in Mexico are enacted on multiple levels. Boundaries of national and hometown communities – and the rights of members absent from these communities – are subject to negotiation. This chapter discusses various aspects of such transborder politics, including Mexican hometown associations and their relationship with Mexican federal, state, and local governments; negotiations of dual nationality; the right to vote abroad; the proposed creation of an extra-territorial electoral district in the Mexican Congress; and U.S.-resident Mexicans' and Chicanos' interest in participating in Mexican politics.

---

The author is grateful to Wayne Cornelius, James Holston, David López, and Kevin J. Middlebrook for their comments and suggestions.

<sup>1</sup> Fox was not the first opposition presidential candidate to campaign among the Mexican population in the United States, but he was the first to win.

DILEMMAS OF  
POLITICAL CHANGE  
IN MEXICO

*Edited by*  
KEVIN J. MIDDLEBROOK

Institute of Latin American Studies  
University of London

Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies  
University of California, San Diego

First published 2004 by  
Institute of Latin American Studies  
31 Tavistock Square  
London  
WC1H 9HA

Copyright © 2004 Institute of Latin American Studies

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers.

*British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data*  
A British Library CIP record is available.

ISBN 1-900039-45-1 *limp*

Typeset in Garamond by  
Koinonia, Bury, Lancashire

## Contents

List of Figures and Tables	vii
Acknowledgments	x
List of Acronyms	xi
INTRODUCTION	
1 Mexico's Democratic Transitions: Dynamics and Prospects <i>Kevin J. Middlebrook</i>	1
PART I: PARTIES, ELECTIONS, AND THE MEXICAN VOTER	
2 Party Competition in Mexico: Evolution and Prospects <i>José Antonio Crespo</i>	57
3 Public Institutions and Electoral Transparency in Mexico <i>Silvia Gómez Tagle</i>	82
4 The Changing Mexican Voter, 1991–2000 <i>Jorge Buendía</i>	108
PART II: PARAMETERS OF A NEW INSTITUTIONAL ORDER	
5 Changing Patterns of Executive-Legislative Relations in Mexico <i>Jeffrey A. Weldon</i>	133
6 Democratization, Judicial and Law Enforcement Institutions, and the Rule of Law in Mexico <i>Beatriz Magaloni and Guillermo Zepeda</i>	168
7 Decentralization, Democratization, and Federalism in Mexico <i>Alberto Díaz-Cayeros</i>	198



PART III: KEY POLITICAL ACTORS: PILLARS OF THE OLD REGIME— FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEW?		
8	A New Scenario for Mexican Trade Unions: Changes in the Structure of Political and Economic Opportunities <i>Graciela Bensusán</i>	237
9	Rural Producers' Organizations and the State in Mexico: The Political Consequences of Economic Restructuring <i>Horacio Mackinlay</i>	286
10	Business and Politics in Mexico <i>Matilde Luna</i>	332
11	Mexico's Armed Forces: Marching to a Democratic Tune? <i>Roderic Ai Camp</i>	353
12	Building the Fourth Estate: Media Opening and Democratization in Mexico <i>Chappell H. Lawson</i>	373
PART IV: CHALLENGES OF RIGHTS AND REPRESENTATION		
13	Civil Society in Mexico at Century's End <i>Alberto J. Olvera</i>	403
14	Indigenous Rights: The Battle for Constitutional Reform in Mexico <i>Luis Hernández Navarro and Laura Carlsen</i>	440
15	Assessing Binational Civil Society Coalitions: Lessons from the Mexico-U.S. Experience <i>Jonathan Fox</i>	466
16	"For 118 Million Mexicans": Emigrants and Chicanos in Mexican Politics <i>David Fitzgerald</i>	523
	Contributors	549
	Index	554

## List of Figures and Tables

### Figures

4.1	Educational Level and Electoral Support for Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party, 1991-2000	111
4.2	Electoral Support for Mexico's National Action Party in Urban and Rural Areas, 1991 and 2000	113
4.3	Retrospective Evaluations of the National Economy and Electoral Support for Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party, 1991-2000	115
4.4	Prospective Evaluations of Personal Economic Circumstances and Electoral Support for Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party, 1991-2000	116
6.1	Crimes Reported to State-Level Public Prosecutors' Offices in Mexico, 1991-2000	177
6.2	Crimes Under Investigation at the State Level in Mexico, 2000	183
6.3	The Simulated Effect of Institutional Performance on the Incidence of Crime in Mexico, by Level of Urbanization, 1996-2000	192
6.4	The Simulated Effect of Economic Growth and Poverty on the Incidence of Crime in Mexico, 1996-2000	193
7.1	The Relationship between Regional Disparities and the Level of Economic Development in Selected Countries, 1980s-1990s	203
7.2	Divergence in Economic Performance in Mexico's States, 1990s	205
7.3	The Relationship Between Mexican States' Self-Generated Revenue and Poverty, 1999	218
7.4	The Changing Competitiveness of Mexican Federal Elections, 1979-1997	220
7.5	Electoral Competitiveness and Support for the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico's 2000 Federal Elections	222
7.6	The Simulated Effect of Support for Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party on Municipal Revenue Collection	229
10.1	Membership in Mexico's Private Sector Coordinating Council	336