2024-03-29T08:36:06Zhttps://escholarship.org/oaioai:escholarship.org:ark:/13030/qt75j1b2cg2020-12-24T15:42:32Zqt75j1b2cgThe Development and Implementation of Tobacco-Free Movie Rules In IndiaYadav, Amit, PhDGlantz, Stanton A, PhD2020-12-01application/pdfpubliceScholarship, University of Californiahttps://escholarship.org/uc/item/75j1b2cgarticleoai:escholarship.org:ark:/13030/qt5t06910t2013-10-21T19:34:11Zqt5t06910tWHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC, 2013WHO World Health Organization2013-07-31This report, WHO's fourth in the series, provides a country-level examination of the global tobacco epidemic and identifies countries that have applied selected measures for reducing tobacco use. Five years ago, WHO introduced the MPOWER measures as a practical, cost-effective way to scale up implementation of specific provisions of the WHO FCTC on the ground.This report focuses on enforcing bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship (TAPS). TAPS bans are one of the most powerful tools that countries can put in place to protect their populations. In the past two years, impressive progress has been made. The population covered by a TAPS ban has more than doubled, increasing by almost 400 million people. Demonstrating that such measures are not limited to high-income countries, 99% of the people newly covered live in low- and middle-income countries.This and future editions of this report are key components of the global tobacco control fight, measuring how much has been achieved and identifying places where more work must be done.application/pdfpubliceScholarship, University of Californiahttps://escholarship.org/uc/item/5t06910tmonographoai:escholarship.org:ark:/13030/qt8029s7xw2012-05-30T00:11:52Zqt8029s7xwTobacco Control Legislation in Costa Rica (1971-2012): After 40 Years of Tobacco Industry Dominance, Tobacco Control Advocacy SucceedsCrosbie, Eric, MASebrie, Ernesto M., MD MPHGlantz, Stanton A., PhD2012-05-29 The tobacco industry successfully blocked or displaced strong tobacco control legislation in Costa Rica for nearly 40 years using similar strategies used in the U.S. and the rest of the world, until the country successfully passed a strong tobacco control law in March 2012. During the 1970s and 1980s, the tobacco companies displaced strong tobacco control legislation on tobacco advertising by endorsing weaker executive decrees. In response to increased tobacco control pressure, the industry successfully weakened the 1995 law by secretly hiring scientific consultants to counter the SHS threat and using the hospitality industry to rollout the Courtesy of Choice program in Costa Rica (then Latin America). Tobacco companies then used Costa Rica as a model to rollout industry youth smoking prevention programs and corporate social responsibility campaigns throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. The industry continued its dominance in Costa Rica during the 2000s by developing a cooperative relationship with the Ministry of Health. Although theNational Anti-Tobacco Network(RENATA), a new coalition ofgovernmental health institutions and nongovernmental tobacco control associationsformed in 2007, generated enough public pressure on Legislative Assembly to ratify the World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2008 and secure Bill 17.371’s introduction in 2009 to implement the treaty, the industry once again worked through the Ministry of Health to delay the bill’s passage. However, RENATA’s abilityto alert the media and mobilize a coalition of international health advocates to effectivelyinform lawmakers on the importance of the FCTCbetween 2010 and 2012 helped pass a strong tobacco control law in March 2012. Costa Ricatobacco control legislationtobacco industry dominanceapplication/pdfCC-BY-NC-NDeScholarship, University of Californiahttps://escholarship.org/uc/item/8029s7xwmonographoai:escholarship.org:ark:/13030/qt5sk6n6qv2012-02-08T20:06:58Zqt5sk6n6qvEl éxito de la industria tabacalera en Costa Rica:Crosbie, EricSebrie, Ernesto M.Glantz, Stanton A.2012-02-06Objetivo. Analizar cómo la industria tabacalera influyó en la formulación de las políticas de control del tabaco en Costa Rica. Materiales y métodos. Revision de documentos de la industria tabacalera, de la legislación costarricense de control del tabaco y de periódicos y entrevistas con informates clave. Resultados. Durante los años ochenta, el Ministerio de Salud aprobó varios decretos para restringir el consumo de tabaco, lo que causó que British American Tobacco y Philip Morris International fortalecieran su presencia politica, cuyo resultado fue la promulgación de una ley débil en 1995 todavia vigente. Desde 1995 la industria tabacalera ha ultizado a Costa Rica como piloto para los programas latinoamericanos y ha dominado la formulación de politicas influenciando al Ministerio de Salud, incluyendo negociaciones privadas con la industria tabacalera en violación de las directrices del Articulo 5.3 del Convenio Marco para el Control de Tabaco (CMCT) de la Organización Mundial de la Salud. Conclusión. La experiencia de Costa Rica demustra la gran importancia que tiene la implementación del Articulo 5.3 del CMCT para proteger las políticas de la salud pública de la interferencia de la industria tabacalera.Objective. To analyze how the tobacco industry influenced tobacco control policymaking in Costa Rica. Materials and Methods. Review of tobacco industry documents, tobacco control legislation, newspaper articles, and interviewing of key informants. Results. During the mid-to-late 1980s, Health Ministry issued several advanced (for their time) smoking restriction decrees causing British American Tobacco (BAT) and Philip Morris International (PMI) to strengthen their political presence there, resulting in passage of a weak 1995 law, which as of August 2011, remained in effect. Since 1995 the industry has used Costa Rica as a pilot site for Latin American programs and has dominated policymaking by influencing the Health Ministry, including direct private negotiations with the tobacco industry which violate Article 5.3’s implementing guidelines of the World Health Organization Frameowrk Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC).Conclusions. The Costa Rica experience demonstrates the importance of vigirous implmentation of FCTC Article 5.3 which insulates public health policymaking from industry interference. application/pdfpubliceScholarship, University of Californiahttps://escholarship.org/uc/item/5sk6n6qvarticleoai:escholarship.org:ark:/13030/qt2wp8h92p2012-01-11T23:29:06Zqt2wp8h92pAttempts to undermine tobacco control: tobacco industry "youth smoking prevention" programs to undermine meaningful tobacco control in Latin AmericaErnesto M SebrieStanton A Glantz2012-01-11We sought to understand how the tobacco industry uses "youth smoking prevention" programs in Latin America. We analyzed tobacco industry documents, so-called "social reports," media reports, and material provided by Latin American public health advocates. Since the early 1990s, multinational tobacco companies have promoted "youth smoking prevention" programs as part of their "Corporate Social Responsibility" campaigns. The companies also partnered with third-party allies in Latin America, most notably nonprofit educational organizations and education and health ministries. Even though there is no evidence that these programs reduce smoking among youths, they have met the industry's goal of portraying the companies as concerned corporate citizens and undermining effective tobacco control interventions that are required by the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.youthsmoking preventionLatin Americaapplication/pdfpubliceScholarship, University of Californiahttps://escholarship.org/uc/item/2wp8h92particleoai:escholarship.org:ark:/13030/qt7ks4s9js2011-07-04T03:05:24Zqt7ks4s9jsSocial disruption caused by tobacco growingMarty Otanez2008-06-02Communities and countries experiencing poverty, high unemployment, and economic reliance on tobacco growing are vulnerable to predatory tobacco industry behaviour. This analysis presents a cross-national survey of social disruption in tobacco farming to illustrate the association between tobacco companies and tobacco-related child labor, poverty and environmental destruction. The health risks of tobacco farming are beyond the scope of the study. Data on social disruption in tobacco farming was obtained through newspaper stories, published and unpublished reports, scholarly literature, documentary films, and tobacco industry publications such as annual reports and websites. The analysis shows that in all World Health Organization regions (Eastern Mediterranean, Africa, Europe, the Americas, South East Asia and Western Pacific) tobacco farming involves child labor and deforestation as well as tobacco industry behaviour promoting disruption in social and environmental life in tobacco farming communities. Tobacco companies generate huge externalities forcing farmers and consumers to pay the costs and concealing the actual cost of tobacco leaf and other tobacco products.application/pdfpubliceScholarship, University of Californiahttps://escholarship.org/uc/item/7ks4s9jsarticleoai:escholarship.org:ark:/13030/qt1gf170sf2011-07-03T17:37:47Zqt1gf170sfLa Industria Tabacalera y su Dominio en la Formulación de las Políticas Nacionales sobre el Control del Tabaco en Argentina, 1966- 2005Sebrie, Ernesto M, MD, MPHBarnoya, JoaquinPerez-Stable, EliseoGlantz, Stanton2005-12-01application/pdfpubliceScholarship, University of Californiahttps://escholarship.org/uc/item/1gf170sfarticleoai:escholarship.org:ark:/13030/qt09t535s72011-07-03T10:23:16Zqt09t535s7The Tobacco Industry's Successful Efforts to Control Tobacco Policy Making in SwitzerlandLee, Chung-Yol, MD, MPHGlantz, Stanton A., Ph.D.2001-01-01Cigarette consumption among people 15 years or older peaked in Switzerland in the early 1970’s with 3,700 cigarettes per capita and per year, followed by a decline to 2,800 cigarettes per capita and per year in 1994. After a decline of the proportion of smokers from 37% in 1980 to 31% in 1992, this proportion has increased again to 33% in 1997. Women, particularly the young, and children and adolescents, have shown a continued increase in smoking prevalence, despite the focus of tobacco prevention efforts on children and adolescents.Every year, over 10,000 people die from tobacco use in Switzerland, about a sixth of all annual deaths in Switzerland, making smoking the leading preventable cause of death in Switzerland. This number is more than 20 times higher than the number of deaths caused by illegal drugs.The tobacco excise tax in Switzerland is the lowest in Western Europe. The laws governing tobacco products, their marketing and sales, are weak and have little practical effect on the tobacco industry.There is no meaningful protection of nonsmokers from the toxic chemicals in secondhand tobacco smoke, in public places or work places.A ten-country survey on people’s experiences and attitudes concerning tobacco and smoking in 1989, commissioned by Philip Morris International, showed that Swiss people were aware of secondhand smoke’s adverse effects on health, but only a minority favored government regulations for smoking in restaurants and workplaces.A first comprehensive 5-year tobacco prevention program, 1996 to 1999, issued by the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health lacked adequate financial resources, focus on specific interventions, cooperation between partners for tobacco prevention, and program coordination and management. It ignored the role of the tobacco industry.As a result of recent events in the US and WHO’s active engagement of the tobacco industry, the draft five-year plan for tobacco prevention in Switzerland for 2001 to 2005 identifies the tobacco industry as a major obstacle to tobacco prevention.Until the recent merger of British American Tobacco (BAT) with Burrus-Rothmans in 1999, the single most important tobacco company in Switzerland was Philip Morris (PM), with a market share of close to 50% (and close to 25% for Marlboro alone). Since the merger, the tobacco market is dominated by PM and BAT, each with a market share of cigarette sales between 45% and 50%.As was the case in the US, in the early 1960’s, the scientists in Swiss tobacco industry research laboratories (in this case, FTR (Fabriques de Tabac Réunies) / Philip Morris) accepted and discussed the dangerous effects of smoking on health in internal company communications. At that time, these scientists earnestly tried to find ways to reduce the carcinogenic effects of cigarettes through elimination of carcinogenic components.Contrary to privately expressed views, tobacco industry’s public position in Switzerland was that there was ongoing controversy in the issue whether smoking caused diseases or not.The “controversy” was nurtured through regular media briefings and scientific meetings with carefully chosen scientists who would publicly support the industry’s position, but without declaring their liaisons with the tobacco industry. Relationships with these industry “consultants” or “witnesses” were maintained through direct payments and indirectly through funding of their research.By late 1980’s the tobacco industry had identified the decline of social acceptability of smoking in Europe as a major threat to its viability. This recognition led to the development of a comprehensive strategy to fight the secondhand smoke issue. “Courtesy and tolerance” and economic arguments were used to divert the public’s and policy makers’ attention from the health issue. The resulting strategies were often devised in consultation with executives of other Philip Morris subsidiaries and Philip Morris International headquarters in New York. Well aware of its low credibility with the public, journalists were given interviews and told not to mention the tobacco company’s name in the newspaper article.Official publications, such as “Smoking and Mortality in Switzerland” by the Federal Office of Public Health, the report on the respiratory effects of secondhand smoke by the US Environmental Protection Agency, as well as original scientific publications, such as an article in the American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine, dealing with secondhand smoke and respiratory symptoms in Switzerland (SAPALDIA study) written by a group of Swiss scientists, were massively attacked by the tobacco industry. The tobacco industry employed “consultants” and politicians with industry ties, who used standard industry arguments.One of the most active industry consultants in Switzerland was Peter Atteslander, a Swiss citizen and professor at the University of Augsburg in Germany. He wrote white papers for the tobacco industry and reported from meetings worldwide. Atteslander appeared to be the essence only member of the Switzerland-based “Arbeitsgruppe für Gesundheitsforschung (AGEF) (“Working Group on Health Research”), which published his work without disclosing the ties to the tobacco industry.To fight smoking restrictions in restaurants and hotels, the tobacco industry developed a strong ally in the hospitality association, the International HoReCa. The secretary general of International HoReCa at the time was Dr. Xavier Frei, also president of the SCRA (most likely the Swiss Café and Restaurant Association). The hospitality association made extensive use of tobacco industry resources and repeatedly printed tobacco industry positions in hospitality industry newsletters, without the members of International HoReCa or SCRA being informed about the close ties between their organization and the tobacco industry.The “accommodation program,” a well-known tobacco industry strategy to preempt regulatory measures against smoking in restaurants and workplaces first developed in the United States, was used in Switzerland. The fact that even the logo was the same as the one used in the US is another illustration of tobacco industry’s recycling of strategies and tactics worldwide.The shift of focus from the problem of secondhand smoke to one of indoor air quality in general was (and remains) a major strategy used by the tobacco industry worldwide to dilute the problem of secondhand smoke with other indoor air pollutants and ventilation of buildings. To this end, an indoor air quality control company with close ties to the tobacco industry, ACVA Atlantic Inc., USA, later renamed Healthy Buildings International, HBI, collected data which was used extensively by the tobacco industry to further their goal of downplaying the role of secondhand smoke as a major component of indoor air pollutant. Employees of HBI were sent to Switzerland to collect data on Swiss office buildings, and the data were used in the newsletters of HoReCa to support the accommodation program and against non-smoking regulations. HBI has been discredited in the US.The tobacco industry tried to influence smoking policy in airplanes through partial funding of IFAA’s (International Flight Attendants Association) world congresses. This influence was established through close relationship with the president of the association, a common industry strategy in influencing organizations. When, in the wake of smoke-free flights in the US and other countries, Swissair finally introduced smoke-free flights, it was heavily criticized in newspaper articles by the Swiss “Smokers Club,” and later the Swiss “Club of Tobacco Friends,” whose president and founder is a former public relations official for the tobacco industry.The Swiss Cigarette Manufacturers Association successfully influenced smoking policy in railway trains through letters to the publishers of newspapers and direct lobbying toward cantonal authorities and the head of the national railways.Two referendums on tobacco and alcohol advertising bans in 1979 and 1993 were rejected by Swiss voters despite pre-referendum polls favoring advertising bans through a strong and lasting alliance of the tobacco industry with the advertising agencies and the print media. The tobacco industry successfully kept itself behind the scenes in order to avoid negative publicity while financing the anti-advertising ban campaigns and supplying the alliance against advertising bans with well-crafted arguments by tobacco industry public relations and law firms through the International Tobacco Information Center, INFOTAB. The tobacco industry and its allies used economic and political arguments, such as purported effects on employment, state tax revenues, and individual and corporate freedom to fight the advertising bans.Close relationships with officials and politicians were emphasized and maintained through regular meetings with the head of the political parties and briefings of the “tobacco caucus” in the parliament. This caucus gave the tobacco industry the means to stay well informed about the political agenda and to easily influence the political process in their favor.While Switzerland has some of the most progressive and innovative public health promotion programs, most public health advocates underestimate the power of, and driving forces behind, a tobacco industry, and only few of them have confronted the industry directly.application/pdfpubliceScholarship, University of Californiahttps://escholarship.org/uc/item/09t535s7articleoai:escholarship.org:ark:/13030/qt6162v0tj2011-07-03T10:22:36Zqt6162v0tjHealth, Nutrition and Population (NHP) Discussion Paper. Progression of Tobacco Control Policies: Lessons from the United States and Implications for Global ActionNovotny, Thomas EMamudu, Hadii M2008-05-01This paper examines the historical experience of tobacco control in the last five decades and shares important lessons of public health interventions to inform current and future tobacco control programs in other countries. The paper is divided into four parts. The first part gives an overview of the political economy, principal influences and interventions in tobacco control in the United States. It stresses the importance of information shocks and the role played by grassroots organizations. The current situation of tobacco control in the United States is further discussed in the second part, with emphasis on the economic case that led to litigation, as well as the response of the industry and the States. The third part focuses on the present efforts of multilaterals like the World Bank, technical UN agencies such as the World Health Organization, in the context of the new global governance structure: the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). The last section discusses lessons learned and provides recommendations for comprehensive tobacco control programs.The paper suggests five major policy drivers that constitute components of a comprehensive tobacco control program: – science to inform policy, information strategies to educate consumers, advocacy to stimulate interventions, legal actions to develop regulations, and international collaboration through the FCTC. The paper concludes that while government has the responsibility for funding and implementing these activities; these can be most effective when supported by civil society.tobaccopublic policyinternational agenciesinternational historyinternantional agenciesinternational legislationapplication/pdfpubliceScholarship, University of Californiahttps://escholarship.org/uc/item/6162v0tjarticleoai:escholarship.org:ark:/13030/qt4xb2w81r2011-07-03T10:22:04Zqt4xb2w81rReferences for "Civil Society and the Negotiation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control"Mamudu, Hadii MGlantz, Stanton A., Ph.D.2009-02-13References which constitute the “data” for the paper “Civil Society and the Negotiation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control” by H.M. Mamudu and S.A. Glantz, published in Global Public Health, that are cited with numbers in the paper.application/pdfpubliceScholarship, University of Californiahttps://escholarship.org/uc/item/4xb2w81rarticleoai:escholarship.org:ark:/13030/qt9g88j0j02011-07-03T10:21:58Zqt9g88j0j0Tobacco Industry Dominating National Tobacco Policy Making in Argentina, 1966-2005Sebrie, Ernesto M.Barnoya, JoaquinPerez-Stable, EliseoGlantz, Stanton A.2005-09-01EXECUTIVE SUMMARYArgentina accounts for 15% of total tobacco consumption in Latin America and has made the epidemiological transition to an advanced stage in the tobacco epidemic. The Southern Cone region of the Americas leads the hemisphere in tobacco attributable mortality. Argentina is a developing country with economic interests in tobacco growing and rapidly increasing tobacco use in urban areas. In 2000, smoking prevalence was 40.4% among adults- 46.8% of men and 34% of women- and Buenos Aires urban youth (13 to 15 years old) had a 30.2% 30-day smoking prevalence (27.8% male; 31.8% female) compared to 17.7% (17.8% male; 17.7% female) in the United States. Argentina also has a high smoking prevalence among health professionals (30.3% of physicians, and 36.3% of nurses currently smoke).Given the limited smoking restrictions in indoor environments the general population is highly exposed to secondhand smoke both in public and private places. In 2000, the percentage of young people aged 13 to 15 years exposed to secondhand smoke in Buenos Aires was 69.6% at home, 87.6%, in public places, and 27.6% from their friends. A multi-country study carried out in seven Latin American cities in 2004 showed that the city of Buenos Aires had the highest airborne nicotine levels inside hospitals, schools, government buildings, airports, and restaurants observed.According to the National Program on Tobacco Control of the Ministry of Health and Environment of Argentina, tobacco use causes 40,000 deaths per year, including 6,000 due to secondhand smoke. The cost of the treatment of tobacco-related diseases is more than 4,330 million pesos per year, which represents 15.5 % of the total public expenditure on health care. Meanwhile, the tobacco excise taxes collected by the government are only 3,500 million pesos per year.The transnational tobacco companies working through their local affiliates dominate production and marketing of cigarettes in Argentina. Philip Morris International and British American Tobacco, as well as other transnational tobacco companies such as Liggett, Reemtsma, Lorillard, and RJ Reynolds International- through their local subsidiaries Massalín-Particulares and Nobleza-Piccardo- have been actively influencing public health policy-making in Argentina since the early 1970s. These transnational tobacco companies have used the same strategies in Argentina as in the United States to block meaningful tobacco control.MethodsThis report uses three main sources to describe the interference of the tobacco industry in tobacco control efforts in Argentina. First, we examined the tobacco industry documents in the University of California San Francisco Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu) and British American Tobacco Documents Archive (http://bat.library.ucsf.edu) and in Tobacco Documents Online (www.tobaccodocuments.org). We also used internet resources, major Argentinean newspapers (Clarín, La Nación, Página 12, La Prensa), local magazines (Muy Interesante, Revista 23, Somos, Humor, VEA), and the Argentinean National Congress Library for complete texts of the laws, bills and other tobacco control measures. Finally, we conducted face-to-face interviews with congressmen, public health officials, and tobacco control advocates in Buenos Aires during December 2003.Results• In 1966, the first bill on tobacco regulation was introduced in the Argentinean Congress to adopt a mandatory warning label on cigarette packs, but did not pass. In 1970 the government promulgated Law 18.604 that ended cigarette advertising on radio, television, and in movie theaters, and established fines for violators. This law was in effect only for one year.• In 1973 and 1974, two bills were introduced that would have placed a health warning label on tobacco products and advertisements, but these bills were not approved due to the intervention of the Cámara de la Industria del Tabaco (Chamber of Tobacco Industry), the tobacco industry’s national manufacturers’ association.• In 1977, as in the USA and other countries, the Chamber of Tobacco Industry created a weak and ineffective voluntary self-regulating code to avoid strong legislated restrictions on cigarette advertising.• In 1976 and 1979, the Ministry of Social Welfare drafted two bills to regulate the content of tobacco and alcohol advertisements and to require a warning label on cigarette packages. Tobacco Industry representatives lobbied government officials claiming that the established voluntary industry code was adequate and both bills died.• In the early 1980s, the Chamber of Tobacco Industry created the “Smoking Controversy Department” to counteract and undermine potential legislation. This department organized “Information Seminars” intended for selective community groups to promote the industry’s position that the causal links between smoking and disease had not been proven. Seminars were aimed at the managers of tobacco production associations, agricultural technicians, physicians, scientists, journalists, tobacco advertising agencies, tobacco products distributors, elected officials, and Ministers of Health. The Smoking Controversy Department also produced and promoted literature arguing the industry’s position.• During the 1980s, efforts to pass comprehensive tobacco control legislation intensified. These attempts were neutralized by a much better-organized tobacco industry that implemented a public campaign to lobby health authorities and convince journalists and the public that there was a “controversy” about the links between smoking and disease.• In 1986, the National Congress passed Law 23.344 that essentially codified the tobacco industry’s ineffective voluntary advertising code and placed the weak health warning label “Fumar es perjudicial para la Salud” (Smoking is harmful to health) print on cigarette packs. Industry representatives had meetings with selected influential federal and provincial ministers, governors, and federal senators to water down the original proposal introduced by Representative Lorenzo Pepe in 1984.• In 1992, the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health was held in Buenos Aires. Local tobacco control advocates tried to push for the approval of a new comprehensive tobacco control bill in the Congress introduced by Representative Aldo Neri in 1990. At the same time, Philip Morris International and British American Tobacco worked together to divert the attention of the conference by organizing briefings with friendly journalists to create controversy about secondhand smoke.• In September 1992, the Neri Bill was approved in the Congress. The tobacco industry rapidly organized and orchestrated a major lobbying and public relations campaign to defeat it with the help of front groups (e.g., the International Advertising Association, the Inter-American Press Association, the Inter-American Society for Freedom of Commercial Speech, and the Argentine Association of Advertising Agencies), “scientific” consultants secretly hired and managed by industry lawyers based in the US, and Congressmen from the tobacco growing provinces. Ten days later, on October 10, President Carlos Menem vetoed the law.• Between 1992 and 2000, the tobacco industry supported alternative legislation to write the industry’s ineffective voluntary marketing code into law. Even though they were not approved, these bills distracted political and public attention so that all efforts at meaningful tobacco control legislation were neutralized.• Since the mid-1990s, the tobacco industry has been promoting its “accommodation” program “La Cortesía de Elegir” (The Courtesy of Choice), to avoid legislation to end secondhand smoke exposure in restaurants and bars and to maintain the social acceptability of smoking.• Since 1997, the tobacco industry has been promoting ineffective “youth smoking prevention” programs (such as “Yo Tengo P.O.D.E.R.” [I Have Power] and “Yo NO Vendo Cigarrillos a Menores de 18 Años” [I DO NOT Sell Cigarettes to Minors under 18]) to preempt meaningful anti-tobacco education by the government and to shift the focus away from the industry’s responsibility for increasing youth smoking through its advertising and marketing.• In 2003, the Lower House Public Health Committee drafted a version that consolidated 18 tobacco control bills (including one from Representative Neri) but again, the tobacco industry succeeded in burying the bills.• In September 2003, President Néstor Kirchner signed the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the first international public health treaty negotiated by the 192 countries under the auspices of the World Health Organization. The ratification process in the Argentinean Senate remained bogged down as of September 2005, with limited efforts to ratify it. It appears that the industry is effectively lobbying Argentinean legislators not to ratify the treaty.• In August 2005, the Ministry of Health and Environment introduced in the Senate a new comprehensive tobacco control bill that follows the minimum standards required by the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, including the creation of smokefree public places (including bars and restaurants) and workplaces, the end of all types of tobacco advertising (except point-of-sale) and sponsorship, and the placement of rotating health warning labels and images in cigarette packages. It also bans misleading descriptors (such as “light”) and requires the placement of maximum levels of nicotine and tar print on packages.Recommendations1. The journalists from print and electronic media, public health advocates, politicians and institutional leaders need to become more aware of how the transnational tobacco industry has manipulated and influenced policy making in Argentina, which affects the health of the public, and report this information to the public.2. The national government, through the Ministry of Health and Environment, should implement a comprehensive educational campaign to enhance awareness about the health dangers of secondhand smoke and to promote the enactment of city-wide, provincial and national ordinances that prohibit indoor exposure to secondhand smoke.3. Argentina should implement the principal provisions of the Framework Convention such as increased taxes, a complete advertising ban, and graphic pictorial warning labels on cigarette packages.4. The federal government and health care industry need to support effective smoking cessation services, such as quit-lines, at minimal cost to all smokers.RESUMENArgentina representa el 15% del consumo total de tabaco en América Latina y se encuentra en una fase avanzada de la transición epidemiológica en la epidemia del tabaquismo. La región del Cono Sur de las Américas lidera el hemisferio en mortalidad atribuible por tabaco. Argentina es un país en desarrollo con intereses económicos en el cultivo de tabaco y un alto consumo de tabaco en áreas urbanas. En 2000, la prevalencia del consumo de tabaco en adultos fue del 40.4% (46.8% en varones; 34% en mujeres). El mismo año, la prevalencia del consumo de tabaco en los últimos 30 días, en jóvenes de 13 a 15 años de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, fue del 30.2% (27.8 % en varones; 31.8% en mujeres) comparada con 17.7% (17.8% en varones; 17.7% en mujeres) en los Estados Unidos. Argentina posee también una alta prevalencia de consumo de tabaco entre los profesionales de la salud (30% de los médicos y 36.6% de los enfermeros actualmente fuman).Debido a las escasas restricciones al consumo de tabaco en ambientes cerrados, la población general está altamente expuesta al huno de tabaco ajeno, tanto en lugares públicos como en privados. En 2000, el porcentaje de jóvenes de 13 a 15 años expuestos al humo de tabaco ajeno en Buenos Aires, fue del 69,6% en sus casas, 87,6% en lugares públicos y 27,6% de sus amigos. Un estudio multicéntrico llevado a cabo en siete ciudades latinoamericanas en 2004, mostró que la ciudad de Buenos Aires tenía la mayor concentración de nicotina ambiental en hospitales, escuelas, edificios gubernamentales, aeropuertos y restaurantes observados.De acuerdo al Programa Nacional de Control del Tabaco del Ministerio de Salud y Ambiente de la Argentina, el uso de tabaco causa 40.000 muertes anuales, incluyendo 6.000 debido a la exposición al humo de tabaco ajeno. El costo del tratamiento de la enfermedades relacionadas al tabaco es de más de 4.330 millones de pesos por año, el cual representa el 15,5% del gasto público total en salud. Mientras tanto, los impuestos al tabaco recaudados por el gobierno son sólo 3.500 millones de pesos al año.Las compañías transnacionales de tabaco, trabajando a través de sus filiales locales, dominan la producción y la comercialización de los cigarrillos en la Argentina. Philip Morris International y British American Tobacco, así como otras compañías transnacionales de tabaco tales como Liggett, Reemtsma, Lorillard y RJ Reynolds International, a través de sus subsidiarias locales Massalín-Particulares y Nobleza-Piccardo, han influenciando activamente las políticas de salud pública en Argentina desde comienzo de los años 1970s. Estas compañías transnacionales de tabaco han utilizado las mismas estrategias en Argentina que en Estados Unidos para bloquear políticas de control del tabaco significativas.MétodosEl siguiente reporte utiliza tres fuentes principales para describir la interferencia de la industria del tabaco en los esfuerzos por controlar el tabaco en Argentina. Primero, examinamos los documentos de la industria del tabaco que se encuentran disponibles en la internet en las bibliotecas Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu) y British American Tobacco Documents Archive (http://bat.library.ucsf.edu) de la Universidad de California en San Francisco, y en Tobacco Documents Online (www.tobaccodocuments.org). También utilizamos otras fuentes de información de la internet, los principales periódicos argentinos (Clarín, La Nación, Página 12, La Prensa), revistas locales (Muy Interesante, Revista 23, Somos, Humor, VEA), y la Biblioteca del Congreso de la Nación de la Argentina para ubicar y analizar los textos completos de leyes, proyectos de ley, y otras medidas de control del tabaco. Finalmente, en diciembre de 2003, realizamos entrevistas cara a cara en la ciudad de Buenos Aires, con legisladores, funcionarios de salud pública y activistas para el control del tabaco.Resultados• En 1966 fue introducido en el Congreso Nacional argentino el primer proyecto de ley para la regulación del tabaco. El proyecto, que no fue aprobado, requería la colocación obligatoria de una etiqueta de advertencia sanitaria en todos los paquetes de cigarrillos. En 1970, el gobierno promulgó la Ley 18.604 que ponía fin a la publicidad de los cigarrillos en la radio, la televisión y los cines, y establecía multas para los infractores. Sin embargo, esta ley estuvo en vigencia sólo durante un año.• En 1973 y 1974 dos proyectos de ley ingresados en el Congreso Nacional requerían la colocación de una etiqueta de advertencia sanitaria en los envases de los productos de tabaco y en su publicidad. Sin embargo, estos proyectos no fueron aprobados debido a la intervención de la Cámara de la Industria del Tabaco, la asociación nacional de productores de la industria del tabaco.• En 1977, de la misma manera que en los Estados Unidos y otros países del mundo, la Cámara de la Industria del Tabaco creó voluntariamente un Código de Autorregulación Publicitaria débil e inefectivo para evitar la aprobación de legislación que contemplara fuertes restricciones a la publicidad del tabaco.• En 1976 y 1979 el Ministerio de Bienestar Social de la Nación preparó dos proyectos de ley para regular el contenido de la publicidad del tabaco y el alcohol y para requerir una etiqueta de advertencia sanitaria en los paquetes de cigarrillos. Representantes de la industria del tabaco ejercieron presión política sobre funcionarios del gobierno reclamando que el ya voluntariamente establecido Código de Autorregulación Publicitaria de la industria era suficiente. Finalmente, ambos proyectos fueron archivados.• A principios de los años 1980s la Cámara de la Industria del Tabaco creó el “Departamento sobre la Controversia del Tabaco” como una herramienta para contrarrestar y menoscabar una posible futura legislación anti-tabaco. Este departmento organizó “Seminarios de Información” dirigidos a grupos específicos de la comunidad para promocionar la posición de la industria por la cual la relación causal entre tabaco y enfermedad no estaba comprobada. Los seminarios estuvieron dirigidos a gerentes de asociaciones de productores de tabaco, técnicos agricultures, médicos, científicos, periodistas, agencias de publicidad del tabaco, distribuidores de productos del tabaco, Ministros de Salud y otros funcionarios gubernamentales. El “Departamento sobre la Controversia del Tabaco” también editó y promocionó publicaciones exponiendo la posición de la industria del tabaco.• Durante los años 1980s se intensificaron los esfuerzos para aprobar una legislación amplia para el control del tabaco. Estos intentos fueron neutralizados por una industria del tabaco mucho mejor organizada que orquestó una campaña pública para ejercer presión sobre las autoridades de salud, y convencer a periodistas y al público en general sobre lo que la industria llamó la “controversia” sobre tabaco y salud.• En 1986 el Congreso Nacional aprobó la Ley 23.344 que esencialmente codificó el inefectivo y voluntario Código de Autorregulación Publicitaria de la industria del tabaco y requirió la colocación de la débil etiqueta de advertencia sanitaria “Fumar es perjudicial para la Salud” en los paquetes de cigarrillos. Representantes de la industria del tabaco tuvieron reuniones con influyentes ministros nacionales y provinciales, gobernadores y senadores nacionales para “suavizar” el proyecto de ley original introducido en 1984 por el Diputado Nacional Lorenzo Pepe.• En 1992 la 8va Conferencia Mundial sobre Tabaco o Salud se llevó a cabo en la ciudad de Buenos Aires. Activistas locales para el control del tabaco intentaron presionar para la aprobación en el Congreso de una ley amplia la cual había sido introducida en 1990 por el Diputado Nacional Aldo Neri. Al mismo tiempo, Philip Morris International y British American Tobacco trabajaron juntas para desviar la atención de la conferencia, organizando sesiones informativas con periodistas “amigos” para crear controversia sobre los efectos de la exposición pasiva al humo de tabaco.• El 30 de septiembre de 1992, la Ley Neri fue aprobada en el Congreso Nacional. Sin embargo, la industria del tabaco rápidamente organizó y orquestó un exitoso plan para derrotarla con la ayuda de grupos de fachada (por ej. la Asociación Internacional de Publicidad, la Asociación de Prensa InterAmericana, la Sociedad InterAmericana para la Libertad de Expresión Comercial, y la Asociación Argentina de Agencias de Publicidad), consultores “científicos” contratados y orientados por la industria y legisladores de las provincias tabacaleras, y montó una gran campaña de relaciones públicas y de presión política. Diez días más tarde, el 10 de octubre, la ley fue vetada por el Presidente Carlos Menem. • Entre 1992 y 2000, la industria del tabaco apoyó proyectos de ley “alternativos” que estaban en consonancia con su Código de Autorregulación Publicitaria. A pesar de no haber sido aprobados, estos proyectos sirvieron para distraer la atención política y pública y de esa manera, todos los esfuerzos para el control del tabaco fueron neutralizados.• Desde mediados de los años 1990s la industria del tabaco ha estado promoviendo su programa de “acomodación” conocido como “La Cortesía de Elegir” o “Convivencia en Armonía”, para evitar legislación que ponga fin a la exposición pasiva al humo de tabaco ajeno en restaurantes y bares, y para mantener la aceptación social del consumo de tabaco.• Desde 1997 la industria del tabaco ha estado promoviendo programas de “prevención del uso de tabaco en jóvenes” inefectivos (tales como “Yo Tengo P.O.D.E.R.” y “Yo NO Vendo Cigarrillos a Menores de 18 Años”) para evitar campañas educativas anti-tabaco por parte del gobierno y para desplazar el foco de atanción por la responsabilidad que la industria tiene, a través de la publicidad y comercialización de sus productos, en el incremento del uso de tabaco entre los jóvenes.• En 2003, la Comisión de Acción Social y Salud Pública de la Cámara de Diputados de la Nación escribió un Dictamen Final que consolidaba 18 proyectos de ley para el control del tabaco (uno de ellos del Diputado Aldo Neri) pero una vez más, la industria del tabaco tuvo éxito en cajonear los mismos.• En septiembre de 2003, el Presidente Néstor Kirchner firmó el Convenio Marco para el Control del Tabaco, el primer tratado internacional sobre salud pública negociado por 192 países bajo los auspicios de la Organización Mundial de la Salud. Al mes de septiembre de 2005, el proceso de ratificación en el Senado argentino permanece estancado con pocos esfuerzos para ratificarlo. En vista de los acontecimientos pasados parecería que la industria ha estado ejerciendo presión exitosamente sobre los lesgisladores argentinos para que no ratifiquen el convenio.• En agosto de 2005, el Ministerio de Salud y Medio Ambiente introdujo en el Senado de la Nación un nuevo proyecto de ley amplio para el control del tabaco que está en sintonía con los estándares mínimos requeridos por el Convenio Marco para el Control del Tabaco. El proyecto contempla la creación de ambientes públicos y lugares de trabajo libres de humo de tabaco (incluyendo bares y restaurantes), la prohibición de la publicidad (excepto en los lugares de venta) y el patrocinio y la colocación de etiquetas de advertencias sanitarias rotatorias con imágenes, en los paquetes de cigarrillos. También prohibe la colocación de descriptores engañosos (tales como “suaves”) y requiere los niveles máximos de nicotina y alquitrán impresos en los en los envases de tabaco.Recomendaciones1. Periodistas tanto de los medios gráficos como electrónicos, activistas de la salud pública y líderes institucionales, deberían tomar conocimiento sobre como las compañías transnacionales del tabaco han manipulado e influenciado las políticas de control del tabaco en la Argentina lo cual afecta la salud de la población, y comunicar esta infomación a la población general.2. El gobierno nacional, a través del Ministerio de Salud y Ambiente, debería implementar una amplia campaña educativa para aumentar la conciencia sobre los daños a la salud provocados por la exposicion pasiva al humo de tabaco ajeno, y promover la aprobación de legislación local, provincial y nacional que impida la exposicion pasiva al humo de tabaco ajeno en lugares cerrados.3. Argentina debería implementar los estándares principales del Convenio Marco para el Control del Tabaco, tales como el aumento de los impuestos al tabaco, la prohibición total de la publicidad, y la colocación de etiquetas de advertencia sanitarias con imágenes en los paquetes de cigarrillos.4. El gobierno nacional y el sector privado de la atención de la salud deben apoyar servicios de cesación tabáquica efectivos, tales como las líneas telefónicas de ayuda para dejar de fumar, a un bajo costo para todos los fumadores.Latin AmericaAdvertisingwarning labelssmokefree environmentstobacco control legislationapplication/pdfpubliceScholarship, University of Californiahttps://escholarship.org/uc/item/9g88j0j0articleoai:escholarship.org:ark:/13030/qt3r1334mz2011-07-03T05:30:50Zqt3r1334mzTobacco Industry Attempts to Subvert European Union Tobacco Advertising LegislationBitton, AsafNeuman, Mark D.Glantz, Stanton A., Ph.D.2002-04-01Beginning with the Europe Against Cancer Action Program in 1985, the European Economic Community (EEC), which was later renamed the European Community (EC) with its incorporation into the new European Union (EU) in 1992, began to seriously consider tobacco product regulation to fight tobacco-related illness on a pan-European scale.A key element of the EC’s policy was a directive intended initially to restrict, and later to end, tobacco advertising and sponsorship in the Community.The Directive was introduced by the European Commission in 1989, and was adopted nine years later, in 1998.In 2001, the directive was annulled following litigation brought by the Republic of Germany in the European Court of Justice (ECJ).Previously secret tobacco industry documents indicate that the tobacco industry lobbied politicians and used third party organizations in an organized attempt to weaken or defeat the Advertising Directive.The tobacco industry efforts involved figures at the highest levels of European politics, including former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, former British Secretary of State Kenneth Clarke, and former European Commissioner Martin Bangemann.A large degree of the industry’s effort to influence EC policy focused on lobbying government officials and industrial groups within a number of key EC member states, including Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark. The tobacco industry viewed Germany as a strong and consistent ally of the tobacco industry in its attempts to defeat the Advertising Directive within the EC and through litigation at the level of the European Court of Justice.The tobacco industry engaged in a number of practices to conceal its role, particularly the formulation and introduction of an industry-authored minimum harmonization proposal intended to replace the EC Draft Directive without disclosing the industry’s role in preparing the draft.. The documents suggest the involvement of Martin Bangemann and the German delegation to the European Commission in introducing the tobacco industry’s proposal without disclosing its source.The fight for an effective pan-European advertising ban continued with the EC Draft Directive on Advertising and Sponsorship proposed in Spring 2001. The new draft seeks to eliminate provisions that rendered the earlier Advertising Directive inconsistent with EC jurisdiction. A thorough knowledge of previous industry tactics and strategies can help advocates of strong EC public health legislation overcome obstacles that have so far hindered the implementation of an effective EC Tobacco Advertising Directive.application/pdfpubliceScholarship, University of Californiahttps://escholarship.org/uc/item/3r1334mzarticleoai:escholarship.org:ark:/13030/qt76v5f4b52011-07-02T12:19:46Zqt76v5f4b5The Ministry of Health's Effort to Regulate Tobacco Use in Movies in India, 2005-6Polansky, JonathanGlantz, Stanton A., Ph.D.2006-07-03Bans on traditional tobacco advertising highlight the strongly promotional role of tobacco imagery in films and video programs. On World No-Tobacco Day 2005, less than a year after India implemented its universal ban on tobacco advertising, its Minister of Health and Family Welfare announced a ban on tobacco imagery in the nation’s films and broadcast programs.Opposition, including from the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, which quickly announced the proposed ban was unworkable and advocated entertainment industry self-regulation, succeeded in delaying limits for on-screen tobacco for more than a year despite NGO advocacy efforts.Elements of a policy compromise disclosed in June 2006 risk undermining the Ministry of Health’s intention: permanently to reduce adolescent exposure to tobacco imagery of major benefit the tobacco industry, particularly as Philip Morris International enters the Indian market to expand the market for premium cigarettes and battle for share British American Tobacco’s Indian affiliate, ITC.Recommendations for an effective policy in India’s constitutional and policy environment include:• In place of the subjective terminology favored by the tobacco industry and its film industry proxies around the world, a categorical standard of zero tobacco imagery except for (a) portrayals of actual historical figures documented to have used tobacco and (b) the unambiguous depiction of the dire health consequences of tobacco use, with no brand display in any case;• An independent review committee, with no conflicts of interest, mandated to safeguard the public health by transparently applying the policy standards to the relatively few media productions that propose to include tobacco imagery despite the new policy;• Identical treatment for films imported from overseas and Indian films released before the policy, namely strong anti-tobacco spots vetted by experts in tobacco prevention showing before and after the film or program in any and all distribution channels;• Public certification, under penalty of perjury, by credited producers of any Indian film or video program with tobacco imagery released after the policy and all imported films and video programs with tobacco imagery that no one associated with the production accepted any consideration to include tobacco.motion picturesmoviesBollywoodIndiapublic healthratingspublic policytobaccosmokingMarlboroapplication/pdfpubliceScholarship, University of Californiahttps://escholarship.org/uc/item/76v5f4b5articleoai:escholarship.org:ark:/13030/qt5ds4w4f52011-07-02T07:44:28Zqt5ds4w4f5German Tobacco Industry’s Successful Efforts to Maintain Scientific and Political Respectability to Prevent Regulation of Secondhand SmokeBornhäuser, AnnetteMcCarthy,, JenniferGlantz, Stanton A., Ph.D.2006-03-21EXECUTIVE SUMMARYGermany is one of the few industrialized nations in which the tobacco industry remains a legitimate force in business, government, science and society at large.Though Germany has been an international leader in environmental protection, the German tobacco industry has been successful in preventing the translation of knowledge of the dangers of pollution from secondhand smoke into effective public health policy through a carefully planned collaboration with scientists and policymakers and a sophisticated public relations program which it initiated in the 1970’s and has been quietly running ever since.The tobacco industry in Germany founded the Verband der Cigarettenindustrie, a trade association, in 1948. Located in Germany’s capital cities in order to as best as possible influence political decisions, the Verband includes all the multinational and national tobacco companies doing businessin Germany (7 in 2006).In Germany, secondhand smoke emerged as a political issue in the early 1970s, but the federal government failed to enact a proposed statutory law on protection from tobacco smoke. To date, there has been no passage of effective legislation for the protection against tobacco in public places. Understanding that secondhand smoke was the crucial issue for the tobacco industry’s viability, the Verband engaged the issue long before the German government and the main voluntary health agencies, leading to the industry’s continuing success in preventing government action to protect citizens from the toxic chemicals in secondhand smoke.The Verband influenced science and policy by challenging the scientific evidence linking secondhand smoke to disease by conducting or financing research, recruiting independent scientists, influencing high-level working groups and commissions, and by coordinating, sponsoring and participating in scientific conferences.In 1975, the “Research Council Smoking & Health” was created as an advisory body to the scientific department of the Verband to convey the impression that the tobacco industry was committed to objective exploration and further development of its product. Research that was deemed to be too sensitive to be contracted to outside researchers was conducted in a laboratory in Munich, headed by Franz Adlkofer. In 1992, the Research Council was replaced when the Verband created the VERUM foundation with Adlkofer as Scientific and Executive Director.The Medical Action Group on Smoking or Health, a small nongovernmental organization active in the protection of nonsmokers since the 1970s founded by medical scientist Ferdinand Schmidt, made numerous attempts to influence governmental health policy in Germany. The tobacco industry successfully responded by framing the Medical Action Group and Schmidt as out of the mainstream.Probably the most important health authority allied with the tobacco industry from the 1980s onwards was Karl Überla, President of the German Federal Health Office until 1985 and simultaneously head of a private research institute, the GIS, in Munich. In 1982, the Verband contracted with Überla’s GIS for a study on “passive smoking and lung cancer.”In 1983, a working group on smoking-related cancer risks was set up by the Federal Ministry of Health as part of Germany’s contribution to the EU “Europe Against Cancer” program. Of the 24 members the Ministry invited to comprise this working group, at least five individuals, Franz Adlkofer, Dietrich Schmähl, Gerhard Lehnert, Klaus Thurau and Jürgen v. Troschke, had worked for or received funds from the Verband.Overall, the tobacco industry in Germany has been able to maintain a level of respectability that allowed it access to high-level authorities and scientists who either themselves held a policy-relevant office or served on political advisory bodies, including Karl Überla, President of the Federal Health Office, Dietrich Henschler, Chairman of the MAK-commission, and Helmut Valentin, President of the Bavarian Academy for Industrial and Social Medicine.Despite the fact that public attitudes in Germany were very supportive of government action to restrict smoking, the industry worked to cast tobacco control as a serious threat to the European culture that was portrayed as too open, modern and enlightened for such action.Secret tobacco industry polling showed even higher levels of support for smoking restrictions in Germany than in the United States; still, the German tobacco industry portrayed policies protecting workers from secondhand smoke as examples of US extremism. Several unsuccessful efforts to pass non-smoker protection legislation followed in subsequent years, and on October 3, 2002, a revised workplace ordinance took effect that nominally puts the duty on employers to protect their employees from secondhand smoke in the (non-hospitality) workplace; still, the ordinance overall failed to guarantee smokefree workplaces and as of January 2006, the German government had not established any meaningful program to promote implementation and enforcement of the ordinance.In 2003, approximately one-third (32.5%) of Germans were smokers. Recent data shows at least 9 persons die from passive smoking each day in Germany. As this calculation only takes into account frequent domestic exposure of nonsmokers, the actual death toll is likely to be much higher. Still, as of 2006, with few smokefree laws in place, none of the major voluntary health agencies in Germany had continuously made secondhand smoke a major topic.Public health policymaking in Germany remains dominated by tobacco interests.KURZFASSUNGDeutschland ist eines der wenigen industrialisierten Länder in denen die Tabakindustrie heute in derGeschäftswelt sowie vonseiten der Regierung, der Wissenschaft und der Gesellschaft im Allgemeinen noch als eine legitime Größe angesehen wird.Obgleich Deutschland im Umweltschutz international eine Führungsrolle einnimmt, hat es dieTabakindustrie in Deutschland erfolgreich verstanden, die Umsetzung der Erkenntnisse über die Schädlichkeit des Passivrauchens in wirksame Gesundheitspolitiken zu verhindern. Sie bediente sich hierzu einer sorgfältig geplanten Kollaboration mit Wissenschaftlern und politischen Entscheidungsträgern, und eines ausgeklügelten PR-Programms das in den 1970er Jahren eingeleitet wurde und seitdem still betrieben wird.Die Branchenorganisation, der Verband der Cigarettenindustrie (VdC, kurz „Verband“) wurde im Jahr 1948 von der Tabakindustrie in Deutschland gegründet. Der Verband vertritt sowohl nationale als auch multinationale Tabakkonzerne, die in Deutschland ihre Geschäfte treiben und war bzw. ist in der bundesdeutschen Hauptstadt (Bonn, Berlin) ansässig, um politische Entscheidungen bestmöglich zu beeinflussen.Bereits in den frühen Siebzigerjahren wurde das Thema Passivrauchen in Deutschland zum Politikum, doch die Bundesregierung schaffte es nicht, einen damals existierenden Gesetzesvorschlag für eine Rechtsvorschrift zum Schutz vor Passivrauchen zu erlassen. Vielmehr hat die Bundesregierung es bis heute versäumt, eine wirksame Gesetzgebung zum Schutz vor Tabakrauch im öffentlichen Raum zu erlassen.Aufgrund der Einsicht dass Passivrauchen der entscheidende Faktor für Lebensfähigkeit der Tabakindustrie ist, hat sich der Verband bereits lange vor der Bundesregierung und den wichtigsten Organisationen im Gesundheitswesen und Interessengemeinschaften dieses Thema zu eigen gemacht. Dies hatte zur Folge, dass die Tabakindustrie Regierungshandeln zum Schutz der Bürger vor den giftigen Inhaltsstoffen des Tabakrauchs erfolgreich verhindert hat.Der Verband hat Einfluss auf Wissenschaft und Politik genommen indem er die wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse über den Zusammenhang von Passivrauchen und Krankheit bestritten hat, Forschungsarbeiten durchgeführt oder finanziert hat, unabhängige Wissenschaftler rekrutiert hat, Einfluss auf hochrangige Arbeitsgruppen und Kommissionen genommen hat sowie an wissenschaftlichen Tagungen teilgenommen, diese koordiniert oder finanziell gefördert hat.Im Jahr 1975 wurde der „Forschungsrat Rauchen und Gesundheit“ gegründet. Er diente der Wissenschaftlichen Abteilung des Verbandes als Beratungsorgan und sollte den Eindruck vermitteln, dass die Tabakindustrie sich der objektiven Erforschung und Weiterentwicklung seines Produktes verschrieben hat. Untersuchungen die als zu heikel galten, um sie an externe Wissenschaftler zu vergeben wurden in einem Labor in München durchgeführt das von Franz Adlkofer geleitet wurde. Im Jahr 1992 wurde der Forschungsrat Rauchen und Gesundheit ersetzt durch die vom Verband gegründete Stiftung VERUM, deren Wissenschaftlicher und Geschäftsführender Direktor wiederum Adlkofer wurde.Der Ärztliche Arbeitskreis Rauchen und Gesundheit, eine kleine Nichtregierungsorganisation, die seit den 1970er Jahren im Bereich Nichtraucherschutz aktiv ist und von Ferdinand Schmidt gegründet wurde, machte zahllose Versuche, die Regierungspolitik Deutschlands zu beeinflussen. Die Tabakindustrie reagierte darauf- erfolgreich - damit, dass sie den Ärztlichen Arbeitskreis Rauchen und Gesundheit und Schmidt als jenseits der politischen Mitte darstellte.Vermutlich die wichtigste Autorität im Gesundheitsbereich, die mit der Tabakindustrie seit den 1980er Jahren verbündet war ist Karl Überla, bis 1985 Präsident des Bundesamtes für Gesundheit und zugleich Leiter einer privaten Forschungseinrichtung in München, der Gesellschaft für Information und Statistik in der Medizin (GIS). Im Jahr 1982 nahm der Verband Überla’s GIS unter Vertrag für eine Untersuchung über „Passivrauchen und Lungenkrebs“.Im Jahr 1983 stellte das Bundesgesundheitsministerium eine Arbeitsgruppe über „Krebsgefährdung durch Rauchen“zusammen, als ein Beitrag vonseiten Deutschlands zum EU-Aktionsprogramm „Europa gegen den Krebs“. Von den 24 Mitgliedern, die das Ministerium geladen hatte, hatten zumindest fünf Personen, Franz Adlkofer, Dietrich Schmähl, Gerhard Lehnert, Klaus Thurau und Jürgen v. Troschke für den Verband gearbeitet oder von diesem Finanzmittel erhalten.Im Großen und Ganzen ist es der Tabakindustrie in Deutschland gelungen, einen Grad der Angesehenheit aufrechtzuerhalten, die ihr Zugang zu hochrangigen Autoritäten und Wissenschaftlern verschaffte, die entweder selbst politikrelevante Ämter innehatten oder die als Sachverständige oder Mitglieder von wissenschaftlichen Beiräten direkten Zugang zur Politik hatten. Beispiele hierfür sind Karl Überla, Präsident des Bundesgesundheitsamtes, Dietrich Henschler, Vorsitzender der MAK-Kommission, und Helmut Valentin, Präsidentder Deutschen Gesellschaft für Arbeitsmedizin sowie der Bayrischen Akademie für Arbeits- und Sozialmedizin. Trotz der Tatsache, dass die Einstellung der deutschen Bevölkerung Einschränkungen des Rauchens deutlich unterstützt, war die Tabakindustrie bemüht, die Tabakkontrolle als eine ernsthafte Bedrohung für die Europäische Kultur darzustellen, indem diese als zu offen, modern und aufgeklärt für derartige Aktivitätenporträtiert wurde.Ungeachtet der Tatsache, dass Umfragen die von der Tabakindustrie durchgeführt und geheim gehalten wurdenfür Deutschland sogar eine stärkere Befürwortung von Einschränkungen des Rauchens zeigten als in den Vereinigten Staaten, karikierte die Tabakindustrie in Deutschland Maßnahmen zum Schutz der arbeitenden Bevölkerung vor Passivrauch als US-amerikanischen Extremismus.Etliche erfolglose Anläufe zur Verabschiedung eines Nichtraucherschutzgesetzes folgten in den Jahren darauf und am 3. Oktober 2003 trat die novellierte Arbeitsstättenverordnung in Kraft, die die Arbeitgeber nominelldazu verpflichtet, ihre Angestellten am Arbeitsplatz vor dem Tabakrauch zu schützen (ausgenommen sind Arbeitsstätten mit Publikumsverkehr). Durch diese Verordnung werden jedoch übergreifend keine rauchfreien Arbeitsplätze geschaffen und bis Januar 2006 hatte die Bundesregierung noch kein bedeutsames Programm aufgelegt um die Umsetzung und Vollzug der Verordnung zu fördern.Im Jahr 2003 waren nahezu ein Drittel (32,5%) der deutschen Bevölkerung Raucher, neueste Daten zeigen, dass in Deutschland täglich mindestens neun Menschen an den Folgen des Passivrauchens sterben. Da dieser Berechnung lediglich die häufige Exposition von Nichtrauchern zu Hause zugrunde liegt, ist die wirkliche Zahl der Todesopfer wahrscheinlich deutlich höher. Dennoch garantieren bisher nur wenige Gesetze Rauchfreiheit und auch sonst hat bis heute keine der wichtigsten Gesundheitsorganisation in Deutschland sich kontinuierlich dem Passivrauchen angenommen bzw. dieses zu einem Hauptthema gemacht.Die Gesundheitspolitik wird in Deutschland bis zum heutigen Tag von Tabakindustrieinteressen dominiert.application/pdfpubliceScholarship, University of Californiahttps://escholarship.org/uc/item/5ds4w4f5article