

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Modes of Difference and Connection:

Language, Education and Religion in Migrant Families

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Philosophy in Sociology

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Modes of Difference and Connection:

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Professor Roger Waldinger, Chair

This dissertation examines how home country language and religion are transmitted in migrant families. In a set of four essays I examine how these transmission processes are tied to processes of assimilation/acculturation, the maintenance of home-country ties and perceptions of discrimination of the children of immigrants in schools. The starting point of my analysis is that both language and religion, in important and similar ways, function as modes of connection in migrant families with family members and friends who remain in the place of origin. At the same time vis-à-vis in the destination country, language and religion are two key cultural practices that can categorically differentiate immigrants and their children from the national majority populations. Drawing on a recently collected nationally representative survey of immigrants and the children of immigrants in France, the Trajectories and Origins (TeO) project, the first two chapters of this dissertation focus on the processes of intergenerational transmission of language and religion. The third chapter, uses data about the schooling experiences of the second-generation in the TeO to develop

and test a set of hypotheses about the incentive structures that migrant parents face when deciding to transmit different cultural practices to their destination-country-born children. A final essay examines how religion and language factor in the continuity of social attitudes in immigrants and their children by analyzing attitudes of immigrant and second-generation respondents from 83 countries around the world living in 23 European countries.

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to Lena Ping Soehl who would have turned three years old just as I write these words.

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Introduction

Modes of Difference and Connection: Religion, Education and Language in Immigrant Families

Language and religion in the immigrant context

We called for workers but it was human beings who came - as the Swiss playwright and novelist Max Frisch famously summarized the gap between the fantasy of the early European guest-worker migration policies and the social reality and unfolded over the next decades. As human beings migrants brought their cultural practices with them. For the immigrant receiving countries, the realization that many of the guest-workers and ex-colonial migrants that arrived, would not return home, but instead bring their families and settle brought questions about cultural pluralism to the forefront. For the migrants settlement raises questions of how they can maintain cultural repertoires and pass them on to the next generation.

This dissertation focusses on two cultural practices, language and religion and examines how are they are transmitted in migrant families. Although language and religion and language are not the only cultural practices that migrants bring with them and that are transmitted primarily within the family across generations, they are certainly the two most salient modes of cultural pluralism today (Brubaker 2013a). Also, language and religion are key instruments of socialization - ensuring connection across generations and for maintaining

values across generations. Parental language (or one of the parental languages) is an indispensable part of family life. Similarly the family is one of the key sites of religious socialization (Myers 1996) and at the same time religion can play an important role in maintaining continuity, linking parents and children (Pearce and Axinn 1998). Specifically religion can be an important part of the intergenerational transmission of values.

These of course applies to all families - migrant or not. Yet the socialization context is very different for migrant families. For families that part of the native majority socialization is often mirrored and supported by the larger social and institutional context. For example for a Muslim family living in a majority Muslim country speaking the local language, the family is not the only locus for the practice and intergenerational transmission of the family's language and religion. Rather they are virtually inescapable features of everyday life. Socialization within and outside the family work in tandem. Yet once that family migrates and moves to France (or any other European country for that matter), these same practices can no longer be taken for granted. Practices that were commonplace back home become "marked" in the immigrant context (Brubaker 2013b). Practice and socialization within the family may even be in tension with the cues of the social context. For example while within the family religiosity and home-country language practice may be valued - the host context will likely send different signals, rewarding mainstream practices and norms (Alba and Nee 2003). Thus in the immigrant context family and outside socialization no longer work in tandem, but may be at working at cross-purposes, potentially complicating social reproduction of these cultural practices.

The immigrant context is also different from the situation of native ethnic minorities. In most liberal democratic states, the cultural practices of native minorities are afforded special

protections from the state. This is most clearly visible in the case of language. In many instances states actively support the maintenance of native minority languages (with varying degrees of success to be sure) by providing many states services, most importantly schooling in these languages. In general no such support exists, nor is it expected for immigrant languages.

Thus while immigrant incorporation in principle is an interactive process that may involve change on both sides, immigrants and mainstream, in practice the relationship is highly unequal. As Zolberg succinctly stated, immigrants change themselves in conditions under which the cultural practices of nationals hold the upper hand (Zolberg and Long 1999).

Language and religion as modes of connection across generations and to the home-country

Given these challenges it is not surprising that not all migrant families are successful in maintaining intergenerational continuity in cultural practices such as language and religion. Children of migrants may shift cultural practices much faster towards host society patterns than their parents. Segmented assimilation theory has pointed to the negative effects that these unequal cultural shifts, or what is also called “dissonant acculturation” can have (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Especially linguistic separation, where the second-generation is not sufficiently proficient in the parental-home country language and parents can not fully communicate in the host-country language, has significant negative effects on family life and the upbringing of the second generation (Tseng and Fuligni 2000; Tannenbaum and Howie 2002; Mouw and Xie 1999). Similarly in many families religion plays

an important role in maintaining continuity and providing a cultural basis for transmission of values (Nauck 2000; Nauck 2007). Especially for migrants living in challenging neighborhoods maintaining a cultural distance to the immediate context can also be a mobility strategy. Especially religion can be a tool for parents to buffer their children from the undesirable aspects of the host society (Bankston and Zhou 1995).

In migrant families maintaining intrafamily continuity and connections also means maintaining long distance ties to the places of origin. These connections are part and parcel of the family strategies that propel migration in the first place. As the “new economics of migration” theories emphasize, rather than an individualistic process of income maximization migration decisions are more often based on family level decision making (Stark and Bloom 1985; Massey 1998; Massey 1999). Family ties facilitate and stimulate the migration process itself; those who are more established provide resources for those who make the journey, contacts for jobs housing and survival know-how for the newly arrived. Religion and language in many families play a central role in maintaining these ties and are key in transmitting home country attachments across generations.

Language is the key to communication across generations and with friends and family back home. Without means of communication, connections will have a short half-life. Just as language shift towards the host country language blurs the boundary to the mainstream, at the same time it may sharpen the boundary vis-à-vis those who stayed at home especially for respondents who do not retain fluency in the home country language (Louie 2006). Or as Rumbaut (2002) summarizes analysis of CILS data: “... language emerges [...] as central to the maintenance of transnational ties, both attitudinally and behaviorally” (p.90). But language is not purely instrumental - it can have powerful emotional connotations. Advocates of

minority languages argue that language has an intrinsic relationship to culture and belonging (May 2001; Ignatieff 1994) and a long line of research emphasizes that more than mere ability to communicate, shared language and the full range of understandings that come with it can provide a sense of being at home (Schuetz 1944; Brubaker 2006). Applying this to an analysis of cross-border ties in migrant families in the United States I find that indeed the transmission of home country language does predict emotional connections to the parental home country in the second generation (Soehl and Waldinger 2012).

Similarly, religion can provide a cognitive and emotional framework for transmitting concrete home country ties. Religious practice in childhood and adolescence may be both part of a larger social learning process by which parents (try to) impress a wide variety of values and preferences on their children (Bandura 1977; 2002). Moreover, the organizational and ideological dimension of religion can provide a powerful resource for homeland connection or even truly transnational orientations. Religious communities and institutions routinely extend beyond nation-state borders in a variety of ways (Wuthnow and Offutt 2008). And as transnational scholars argue, churches can provide an infrastructure for migrants' cross border activities and religion can be a central aspect of a set of emotional ties that in the truest sense of the word transcend the boundaries of the state and can support enduring cross-border connections.

Chapters 1 & 2

These are the broader themes I engage in the first two chapters of my dissertation where I focus on the intergenerational transmission of language and religion in migrant families - specifically the role of socialization in the family and exposure to the parental home country.

The first chapter presents an analysis of intergenerational transmission of parental home-country languages in immigrant families in France. This work builds on an established research program on language acculturation and in accord with this work I find a dramatic drop-off in home-country language ability and language use from the immigrant to the French-born second generation. However, the extraordinary detail and quality of the TeO data allows me to go beyond the state of current work in several respects. First, rather than examining youth or young adults, I can trace the effects of parental language practices on home-country language ability as well as language use for the second-generation once they reach adulthood. Secondly, disaggregating different aspects of language proficiency and domains of language use I can show that the effects of parental influence and characteristics vary substantially across these outcomes.

The second chapter presents an analysis of intergenerational continuity in religion and is in many ways parallel to the first one using a similar set of independent variables. In contrast to the relatively settled literature on linguistic change however, in the case of religion the state of current research is much more tenuous. As I argue in the literature review section of that chapter, there is no coherent theoretical framework and the interpretation of the (scant) empirical evidence is at times contradictory. Although my chapter will hardly solve all these theoretical and empirical issues, I do hope it presents a step forward in this research agenda.

Overall I find that religiosity is quite persistent across generations - certainly compared to language. However, this varies substantially across religions. Whereas in Christian families I find significant drop in religiosity from parents to children, in Muslim families there is an extraordinary high level of continuity. A noteworthy finding is that migrant status is not the centrally important variable, and that rather a combination of the religious social field and

reception context may matter. The change in religiosity between parents and children varies substantially between Christian and Muslim families but *within* religions does not vary between those with migrant parents, migrants and their pre-migrant parents, or those with native born parents. One aspect where the migrant context *is* important is the probability of religious homogamy. Looking at the second-generation Muslims in France I find a pronounced drop-off in religious homogamous relationships as compared to their parents where religious homogamy is virtually universal. When it comes to couple-formation the fact that Muslims in France are a *quantitative* minority clearly matters. In turn I show that the offspring of religiously non-homogamous families are on average much less religious. Thus this analysis points to a long-term demographic process by which the religiosity of Muslim immigrant population in France may decline.

Religion and language as modes and markers of difference

While connecting migrant families and migrants to those who stay at home, vis-à-vis the host society religion and language can be clear, categorical markers of difference. From the viewpoint of the receiving society religion and language are aspects in which immigrants are (at least initially) different in ways that nationals regard as significant. Although their salience varies across time and place, in contemporary nation states language and religion are probably the two most important modes of cultural difference (Brubaker 2013b).

Certainly the salience of religion as a boundary marker varies, but significant inflows of migrants that are religiously different from the mainstream, whether in denomination or in the level of religiosity, generally arise suspicion on the part of many natives. This is certainly the case in contemporary Europe where Islam has become the critical dividing line between

natives and newcomers (Casanova 2006). In the case of religion the difference to the host society can have two distinct dimensions. First, migrants religious practice can be marked because it is denominationally different than the religion(s) that are considered part of the national religious canopy. But immigrants may also be 'marked' if they are more religious than the nationals. As a number of students of the situation of Muslim immigrants in Europe have pointed out, immigrants' cultural "otherness" may be as much a consequence of them being perceived as too religious to fit into a secular mainstream as due to religious difference per se.

In virtually all receiving countries acquisition of the host-country language, or one of the host country languages, is expected. In many countries passing a language test is a relatively uncontroversial part of immigration requirement and they are widespread requirements for the acquisition of permanent residency or citizenship. The symbolic importance of migrants' home-country languages as a mode of difference varies. However, in many contexts immigrants' languages are important indicators of socio-cultural difference and language is a critical domain in which researchers assess assimilation (Alba et al. 2002). However, in some cases language becomes *the* defining characteristic for newcomers. For example as some researchers have argued, in the United States language - especially Spanish - is a dominant boundary marker vis-à-vis immigrants (Schildkraut 2001; Paxton and Mughan 2006; Hopkins et al. 2010; Zolberg and Long 1999).

It is this potential to become diacritical markers, closely tied to ethnicity, that differentiate language and religion from other variables such cultural or value differences. For example, migrants may well differ from the mainstream in political opinions or values; say about the proper role of women, family relations or the importance of economic success. And these

values may, as in the case of language and religion, be modes of connection within families and to the country left behind. Yet in these domains variation across groups will not provide similarly categorical differentiation.

Chapter 3

The third chapter of this dissertation engages how cultural difference relates to the intergenerational transmission of cultural practices. I show how the specific “shape” by which cultural difference relates to social difference can matter for the incentives parents have to transmit cultural practices to the next generation. Using a rational-choice framework I argue that when a cultural practice is a marker of *categorical* difference as is the case with Islam in France (or Europe more generally), the incentives to transmit the practice to the next generation will be qualitatively different than when the association between cultural difference and social distance is gradual - as is the case with Christian religiosity and the use of home-country language.

To evaluate these hypotheses this chapter analyzes data on the schooling experiences of the children of immigrants in France. I examine how the transmission of parental home-country language and religion shapes perceptions of discrimination in school, and reactions to (perceived) experiences of discrimination. The findings support the expectations derived from my theoretical model. Muslims are much more likely than other groups to report experiences of discrimination even with a host of other variables controlled. At the same time I find that among Muslims the degree of religiosity when growing up does not predict perceptions of discrimination. However, those growing up in more religious Muslim households report fewer adverse reactions to experiences of discrimination. Thus for the

majority of Muslim immigrants maintaining a high level of religiosity would be a rational strategy. In contrast among those in Christian families and in respect to home-country language I do not find these categorical differences in reports of discrimination, but a continuous increase with higher degrees of parental transmission. In these cases the incentives to maintain cultural practices are much lower.

Chapter 4

The final chapter takes a somewhat different approach. Here home-country language and religion are independent variables that among others help explain variance in the continuity or change in social attitudes among immigrants - in the specific case attitudes towards homosexual persons. The starting point of the chapter is that many migrants in Western liberal states hail from countries where attitudes towards gender relations and sexual norms are considerably more conservative than in the host countries they eventually settle in. Although there is considerable public and academic debate over the consequences and the politicization of these differences, we don't know much about whether or how migrants' attitudes change within and across generations, and what factors shape this process. This chapter sets out to explore these issues. Using a cross-classified hierarchical regression model and a newly assembled dataset on attitudes towards homosexuality in 83 countries of origin and 23 destination countries I model the relative influence of origin and destination contexts on the attitudes of 15,000 immigrants and children of immigrants in Europe. I find considerable evidence for change across, but also within generations: As immigrants settle, country of origin influences lessen and country of destination characteristics matter more, but this process takes place over the medium to long run. Migrants' cultural practices and economic integration matter as well. Respondents who maintain home-country language, are

religious or economically marginalized are more anchored in the country of origin distributions though these effects vary between immigrants and the second generation.

Summary

Driven from the comparison of language and religion as modes of cultural difference and cultural connection, this dissertation clearly is written as four distinct papers and each engages a specific debate and makes a distinct contribution to that debate. Yet taken together these papers inform a larger research agenda that is concerned with intergenerational processes in migrant families more broadly. In this work I take the migrant family as the nexus of the social and political transformations that accompany migration. This includes research on the intergenerational transmission of home-country attachments (Soehl and Waldinger 2012), the persistence of educational characteristics in migrant families (Luthra and Soehl 2014) as well as recently begun work on the role of family dynamics in naturalization decisions.

In my view this larger research agenda makes two main contributions to the field of migration research. First, it complements the overwhelming focus on socio-economic outcomes that, some recent developments notwithstanding, characterizes especially quantitative research in the field, and takes seriously the political and cultural transitions that international migration involves and the multiple and shifting socio-political attachments of migrants.

Secondly, the migrant family centered perspective provides a balance to approaches that only emphasize the perspective of the host society: how “they” are different from “us” and how through processes of acculturation, assimilation etc. this difference narrows and

eventually disappears. While this perspective is certainly legitimate and also drives some questions I pursue in this dissertation, it represents only perspective. To return to the title of this dissertation - what are markers of difference from one point of view are practices that maintain continuity from the other.

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Chapter 1

Intergenerational transmission of home-country language in migrant families

Introduction:

The inter-generational maintenance of the parental home-country language has become a focus of recent research, and researchers have pointed to the central role of the family as the key locus for transmission of home-country language (Lopez 1996; Portes and Hao 1998; Arriagada 2005). Yet, we know little about the long term “payoff” of these parental investments in home-country cultural practices. Due to data limitations, current research either lacks measures of parental language practices or examines immigrant offspring only when they are children (Alba et al. 2002; Lutz 2006) or very young adults (Arriagada 2005; Tran 2010). But while parents may be able to foster their children’s acquisition of the home-country language, as these children become independent and establish their own households the *maintenance* and continued *use* of home-country language is largely out of the parents’ hands. Instead, other social environments will likely matter more. For example for those married or in unions the linguistic characteristics of partners will play a key role.

Drawing on a recently completed national representative survey of immigrants and their children in France – the Trajectories and Origins (TeO) project – I examine the influence of the language practices of immigrant parents on the language practices of their offspring born and raised in France. The uniquely large sample size and detailed nature of the

data allow me to go beyond existing analysis and to draw a very nuanced picture of language transmission processes.

First, whereas existing research examines language facility, I also analyze measures of language use in a variety of private and public settings, including the language practices of the second-generation with their own children. The first contribution of this paper, therefore, is to expand the time horizon of current work and examine how the linguistic environment immigrant parents provide their offspring shapes the language practices of those same offspring when they are adults.

Second, while linguistic practices in the home are certainly a key factor in language transmission, extra-familial influences matter as well. Current research shows that the community context can provide opportunities and incentives to maintain home-country language. Replenishment of the stock of native speakers through continued immigration may create a new context for home-country language retention (Linton and Jimenez 2009; Jiménez 2010) and in areas of high concentrations of co-ethnics (or co-linguals) migrants' home-country languages may indeed survive into later generations (Alba et al. 2002). But migrant families can also actively shape the social context of their children in ways that influence and invest in their offspring's home-country language facilities. Maintaining cross-border connections is one way of doing this. Many migrants remain connected to their places of origin and engage in a variety of homeland-oriented activities. Their children will grow up in a context that, besides the local and national context, includes a "transnational social field" (Fouron and Glick-Schiller 2002; Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004). Specifically, engagements such as family visits to the home country or schooling abroad are a way for migrants to give their children the opportunity and incentives to acquire and maintain proficiency in the

home-country language (Levitt 2001). This paper will provide (to the best of my knowledge) the first quantitative empirical evaluation of these processes.

Third, parental capacity and investments will not matter uniformly but instead vary across different aspects of language transmission. Parental educational background, for example, is likely to matter more for literacy in the home-country language than for oral proficiency. I develop and test similar hypotheses about variation in transmission for other characteristics including religiosity and the experience of schooling abroad.

Finally, by examining immigrant families from a variety of countries in France, this paper expands the geographic scope of current research, which is almost completely focussed on the US and especially the case of Spanish speakers.

Immigrant assimilation and language

Before proceeding to my analysis it is worth considering how home-country language practices in immigrant families fit into the larger theme of immigrant assimilation and acculturation.

Analyzing the experiences of European immigrant cohorts of the early 20th century in the United States, sociologists have developed a three-generation model of language change (Veltman 1983; Veltman 1990; Fishman 1966). The foreign-born migrant generation acquires some proficiency in the host-country language, but prefers to speak the native language, especially at home. Their children born and raised in the host country may retain facility in their parents' language but are generally fluent in the host-country language and often prefer it to their parents' language, with some even conversing with parents in the host-country

language (Lopez 1996). By the third generation monolingualism is the prevalent pattern and knowledge of the ancestral mother tongue is fragmentary at best.

Underlying this model are two related though in principle distinct processes: the acquisition of the host-country language and the “loss” of the parental mother tongue. Since language acquisition is additive, acquisition of the host-country language does not necessarily imply loss of the parental home-country language or prohibit its acquisition.¹

Acquisition of the host-country language is part and parcel of the larger assimilation process. It fits neatly into the neo-classical assimilation theory whereby immigrants (and their children), in striving for the “good life” and taking advantage of the opportunities that the host society offers, acculturate and leave behind ethnic and home country attachments (Alba and Nee 2003). And host societies provide clear and powerful incentives for acquisition of the dominant language. Ethnic economies and self-employment notwithstanding, proficiency in the host-country language is a critical prerequisite for participation in the mainstream economy. Thus, acquisition of the dominant language in a host country can be thought of as an investment in human capital akin to investment in education (Breton 1978); indeed, such acquisition brings higher earnings and lower unemployment, even after controlling for other dimensions of human capital (Grenier 1984a; Chiswick and Miller 2002; Bleakley and Chin 2004).² Given the strength of these incentives and the fact that the second generation grows

¹ Since the time we can spend practicing languages (talking, writing, reading etc.) is finite there may be a tradeoff or zero-sum aspect especially if we were to examine detailed measures of proficiency. The “time-on-task” hypothesis points to this possibility in the context of bilingual education: since classroom time is limited, the acquisition of one language is only possible at the expense of another Porter (1990). This hypothesis has been thoroughly critiqued for lack of empirical support (Cummins 1999; Gutierrez-Clellen 1999). Moreover, it is unclear how it would apply to language acquisition more broadly as exposure time is less limited. Clearly established, however, is the phenomenon that children who arrive in the host country at older ages are, other factors held constant, less fluent in the host-country language (Birdsong 2006; Chiswick and Miller 2007).

² Context can matter as well. Where returns to host-country language fluency are higher and costs of acquisition are lower, rates of host language acquisition increase (Chiswick and Miller 1995).

up in a context where host-country language is ubiquitous, it is unsurprising that fluency in the host-country language is nearly universal in the second generation.

In contrast, the host society provides little rewards for proficiency in the home-country language. The incentives for maintaining home-country language are instead chiefly located within the migrant family. For migrant families in which parents have only limited host-country language fluency, transmitting home-country language to the next generation is crucial for maintaining the ability to communicate across generations and thereby family cohesiveness. As research in the segmented assimilation paradigm argues, linguistic separation of families (i.e., when parents' acquisition of English is slower than children's loss of home-country language) can lead to family conflicts and dissonant acculturation, while second generation bilingualism may be beneficial for family relations, psychological outcomes, and the educational aspirations of the second generation (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Hao 2002). Yet, these benefits of bilingualism aside, even though early twentieth-century research associating bilingualism with delays in cognitive development has been thoroughly debunked, there is also no evidence that bilingualism has lasting positive effects on academic achievement (Mouw and Xie 1999) or labor market outcomes (Esser 2009).³

Thus, the incentives for maintenance of the parental mother tongue are first and foremost situated in the family, and the learning of home-country language across generations is clearly dependent on parental investment and motivations. The home-country language is instrumental for the maintenance of ethnic identities and other home country

³ As Mouw and Xie (1999) show, native language use in the second-generation shows positive effects for educational outcomes only when parental knowledge of English is lacking.

cultural ties (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Rumbaut 2002; Kasinitz et al. 2008). Facility in the home-country language is also critical for maintaining ties to people and places “left behind” in the home country (Soehl and Waldinger 2012).

Data and Variables

The following analysis draws on data from a recently collected nationally representative study of immigrants in France - the Trajectories and Origins (TeO) survey. The TeO has a sample size of over 20,000 including more than 8,000 second-generation and 8,000 immigrant respondents (not from the same households), as well as a comparison sample of native parentage. The TeO provides extensive information on the second generation as well as characteristics of their immigrant parents. Since the TeO survey asks both immigrant and second-generation respondents not just questions about current linguistic practices in the respondent’s family but also about these practices when the respondent was growing up, I can trace change within families across at least two generations. To the extent that linguistic practices in the second generation (for example, the language(s) spoken with children) set the context for the next generation, these data also provide insight into transmission to the third generation - the grand-children of immigrants. Figure 1.1 below gives a schematic illustration of the information in the data.




Figure 1.1: Generational linkages in TeO Data

Dependent Variables: Facility in and use of the home-country language

The TeO provides two types of variables to assess the vitality of home-country languages across immigrant generations. A self-assessed ability measure and indicators of language use in a variety of contexts.

- Ability in language other than French: The TeO asked respondents to assess their facility in the non-French language they use most. Answers were coded into 5 categories ranging from none to a few words, understanding, speaking, and full literacy.

- Language spoken with spouse and children: Respondents who had a spouse and/or children were asked which languages they speak with them and recorded two answers. I re-coded these answers into four categories ordered in increasing presence of home-country language: (1) French only, (2) French mentioned first and other language, (3) other language mentioned first, and (4) only other language(s) mentioned.
- Languages spoken with other family, and in public: Respondents who speak a language other than French were asked how often they use that language with their family (excluding spouse and children) and outside the family - for example when shopping. Answers were collected in four categories ranging from never to mainly. I coded those who do not speak another language into the “never” category.

Independent Variables

To explain variation in these language practices I use two sets of factors that drive maintenance of the home-country language. A first set of five variables reflects characteristics of the childhood environment. A second set provides indication of the current social context of the second-generation respondents in terms of their neighborhood and their spouse. Descriptive statistics for these variables can be found in the appendix.

- *Linguistic environment growing up:* Parental language practices will be a central factor for the transmission of home-country language. The TeO survey asked respondents about the languages each of their parents spoke with them when growing up. For each parent I coded these answers into a 3-point scale of increasing exposure to the home-country language: 0 if only French was mentioned, 1 if both French and another

language were mentioned, and 2 if only another language was mentioned. I then added both scales to get an overall measure of the linguistic environment, which ranges from 0 (only French) to 4 (only other language).

- *Parental education:* Immigrants with higher education may have more resources to transmit cultural practices to the second generation. Consequently as Portes and Rumbaut (1996) argue, bilingualism may be more likely in more educated families. At the same time migrants with higher socioeconomic standing may be less reliant on ethnic networks and thus have less access to the social resources that help transmission of home-country language. More educated parents may also be more likely to emphasize fluency in the host-country language (Alba et al. 2002). To test these hypotheses I include a measure of parental education (highest of both parents) that distinguishes six categories of parental education, from those with less than a primary education all the way to those with advanced degrees.
- *Role of religion when growing up:* Besides language, religion is another key cultural practice that parents can use to transmit ethnic or home-country identity to their children. By strengthening family and co-ethnic ties, religious practice can have positive effects on psychological outcomes, aspirations, and academic outcomes (Warner 2007; Bankston and Zhou 1995; Zhou and Bankston 1998). Thus, as part of a segmented assimilation strategy, religion could positively affect also the intergenerational transmission of home-country language. The TeO survey asked respondents how important religion was in their home when they were growing up and provides answers in four categories: not important (omitted), a bit important, somewhat important, and very important.

- *Exposure to the parental home country:* Parents who take their offspring on visits to the home country provide children with both the opportunity and incentives for learning and maintaining the home-country language. The survey asked respondents about visits to their parents' home country and distinguishes those who went frequently, sometimes, and never. Going to school in the home country represents an even more immersive experience. The TeO data allow me to distinguish those who received any of their schooling abroad from those who received all their schooling in France.
- *School context:* Respondents who grew up around many co-ethnics will have had more incentives and opportunities to learn the parental home-country language than those who came of age in French dominated contexts. As a measure of this influence, I include the share of foreign born in the respondent's school. Answers in the TeO are coded into five categories: almost all, more than half, about half, less than half, and almost none.
- *Generational status of spouse/partner:* As a number of papers have shown, those marrying within their ethnic group are much more likely to maintain and use the home-country language (Stevens 1985; Grenier 1984b; Stevens 1992). As a proxy, I include a variable indicating the generational status of the partner/spouse. For the subset who is married or living in a union I code the origin status of their spouse/partner, distinguishing those who have a French partner without a migration background, those whose partner is second-generation French, and those with foreign born partners.
- *Characteristics of current neighborhood:* Just as partner choice matters for home-country language use, the density of co-linguals in the neighborhood context is a factor in

maintaining home-country language (Alba et al. 2002). Continued influx of immigrants refreshes the stock of native speakers, increasing the local utility and possibly also the status of home-country languages (Jiménez 2010; Linton and Jimenez 2009). As a measure for these factors I include respondents' assessment of the immigrant density in their neighborhood. As in the case of school context, the answers are coded into five categories: almost all, more than half, about half, less than half, and almost none.

While I expect that all these variables will shape the vitality of home-country language in the second generation, the effects will vary across the different aspects of home-country language use and facility. For example, parental investments in home-country language will clearly matter for language ability. But given some level of language ability, when it comes to language use in adulthood, parental characteristics may fade in relative importance. In contrast, once parental language use is controlled, other factors may not do much to improve language competence - for example Lutz (2006) does not find an effect of religion on ability to speak Spanish. Yet, as part of a segmented assimilation strategy the presence of religion may improve the chances of home-country language *use* in adulthood.

But there are also reasons to expect different effects on language ability across different types of parental inputs. Formal schooling, for example, is generally a requirement to acquire writing and reading skills in a language; thus,, parental provision of schooling abroad may have a disproportionate effect on the next generation's writing ability. Similarly, the effects of parental education may vary. As discussed above, current research makes contradictory claims about the effects of parental education on home-country language use in the second generation. A more disaggregated view helps resolve some of these contradictions. More

highly educated parents may be more focussed on host-country language abilities and be less likely to invest in the transmission of their mother tongue. At the same time, those more educated parents who do invest may be more successful in transmitting language ability - especially when it comes to literacy.

When it comes to the variables indicating the current social context, influences most likely go both ways. Those who are more versatile in the home-country language and more keen on maintaining it will be more likely to live in neighborhoods with co-ethnics and be more likely to choose a spouse that speaks the same language. On the other hand, these factors probably have a smaller impact, if any, on the acquisition of language, which largely takes place in childhood and adolescence.

Analysis and Results

I present my analysis in three steps. First, in order to establish overall trends, I provide a descriptive summary of language ability and use, distinguishing immigrants, the second generation, and a comparison sample of respondents with native parents. In a next step bivariate cross-tabulations of parental language use and linguistic practice in the second generation provide a first summary of the intergenerational linkages in language use. Third, I use ordered logistic regression models to compare the effects of different parental inputs and social context on the five different measures of home-country language

Language across generations: Descriptive data summary

Section (a) of Table 1.1 summarizes language ability and practice for the foreign born, second generation, and those with French parents. The next four sections (b through e) summarize

language use in different contexts: with the partner, with children, with other family members, and outside the family.

The first section shows a drastic decline in home-country language, which is consistent with the expectations of the three-generation language succession model. While 90% of the immigrants are fluent or literate in a language other than French, this figure declines to about 44% in the second generation. Yet a substantial share, about one fifth, of second-generation respondents is literate in a home-country language.⁴ Moving to statistics on language use, the declines are even more dramatic. In terms of language use with children, with spouses, and in public settings, the second generation is much closer to the “native” population than to the migrant generation.

The sphere where home-country language does seem to have some persistence is in communication with the family - about half of the second-generation respondents report using the home-country language at least occasionally. This supports a hypothesis whereby home-country language is a (transitory) bridge between generations, but otherwise is rapidly abandoned.

The data are also generally consistent with Fishman’s language change model, which holds that the host-country language dominates in the public sphere, with home-country languages restricted to use with family and close (co-lingual) friends (Fishman 1972). In the immigrant generation almost two-thirds report speaking a home-country language often or

⁴ For those who answered that none of their parents used a language other than French with them when they were growing up, the TeO did not ask the follow up questions about language ability and language use with family and in the neighborhood. In the tables these censored cases are tabulated in the “none” or “French only” category. As I show in the next section, only a very small proportion, about 5 percent, of those who did not have any exposure to home-country language when growing up, use a language other than French with their spouse or children (all respondents were asked this set of questions). Thus, the overwhelming majority of these censored cases likely falls in the lowest category of home-country language ability and use.

mainly with their family, while the same share *never* use the home-country language in neighborhood settings. Yet, it is also worth pointing out that a substantial proportion of immigrant parents do not expose their children to their home-country language: about 36% of immigrant parents report speaking only French with their children (section e).

Yet, the relevance of the public/private distinction does not apply to the second generation, for whom the dominance of French is unequivocal even within the household. Almost 80% report speaking only French with their partners and only 8% mentioned a non-French language first. Among those with children a somewhat lower percentage (72%) speaks exclusively French and at least 23% try to pass on their heritage by exposing the third generation to the ancestral language a bit. But for only a very small minority (5%) does French come in second place after the home-country language.

Parental investments and language outcomes: Bivariate relationships

Because the TeO did not ask questions about home-country language ability to those who had no exposure during childhood, we have data on language ability and use in the family/neighborhood only for respondents for whom home-country language had at least a minimal presence (see also footnote 4) when they were children. As section (a) of Table 1.2 shows, among those who had minimal exposure when growing up, only half can speak (or write) the home-country language. This share jumps to almost three-quarters in the case of those who had moderate exposure and to almost 90 percent for those who grew up in households where the home-country language dominated.

Table 1.1: Summary statistics for language use.

a) Ability in language other than french

	Migrant	2nd Gen.	Native
none (*)	4%	39%	84%
few words	1	5	4
understand	5	12	3
speak	27	23	5
read/write	63	21	4
N	8426	8154	3779

b) Language other than French spoken with family (not spouse or children)

	Migrant	2nd Gen.	Native
never/none (*)	14%	50%	90%
sometimes	22	23	6
often	29	19	3
mainly	35	9	2
N	8427	8158	3779

c) Language oth than French spoken outside the family (e.g. when shopping)

	Migrant	2nd Gen.	Native
	64%	81%	95%
	25	14	3
	9	4	1
	3	1	0
N	8427	8158	3779

d) Language spoken with spouse

	Migrant	2nd Gen.	Native
French only	33%	79%	93%
French and other	19	13	4
Other and French	28	6	2
Other only	20	2	1
N	6453	4016	2506

e) Language spoken with children

	Migrant	2nd Gen.	Native
	36%	72%	92%
	33	23	6
	22	4	1
	9	1	1
N	6429	3556	2373

When it comes to language use, we see a relatively continuous and strong effect of parental language practices looking at language used when communicating with the family - the polychoric correlation coefficient is 0.79 (Table 1.2, section b). In the other domains the relationship is somewhat weaker with correlations around 0.6.

As for those who grew up in households where French was exclusively or mostly spoken, only a small minority use a language other than French with their partner, children, or in public (Table 1.2, sections c through e). Yet even among those respondents who grew up in homes where only the home-country language was spoken, half use exclusively French with

their partner, and less than 10 percent mention only a non-French language. In the public sphere, the presence of home-country languages is even lower. When it comes to the transmission of the home-country language from the second generation to the third generation, we see a similar picture. Even among those most “steeped” in the heritage language, about 40 percent make no attempt to pass this language on to their children; for an equal share French is predominant, and less than 20 percent mention the home-country language first or exclusively.

Exposure to home-country language when growing up is effective in transmitting language ability, and the linguistic practices of the family persist even after the children of immigrants become adults. Yet for the continued viability of the home-country language in the sphere of the households of the second generation and in public, parental influence, while necessary, is not sufficient.

Multivariate Analysis

Table 1.3 summarizes the results of two sets of ordered logistic regression models that take the language outcomes of the second generation as the dependent variable. Because many outcomes are completely determined for respondents with no exposure to the home-country language when growing up, I use only the subset of respondents who had at least some parental input and who were asked all follow up questions. The first set (Model I) includes covariates that reflect the context when growing up. A second model (II) adds indicators for current context, namely, characteristics of spouse and neighborhood. Because only a subset of the sample have a partner, this inclusion of current context reduces the sample size.

Table 1.2: Exposure to language during childhood and language practices when adult

a) Home country language ability						
	none	few words	understand	speak	read/write	N
0 (French Only)	100%	0	0	0	0	3,176
1	0%	26	25	23	26	920
2	0%	6	22	40	33	2,512
3	0%	3	17	43	37	512
4 (Only other language)	0%	1	10	43	45	1,034
N	3,176	412	966	1,882	1,718	8,154

b) Home country language use with family					
	never/non	sometimes	often	mainly	N
0 (French Only)	100%	0	0	0	3,176
1	38%	39	17	5	924
2	16%	41	32	11	2,512
3	11%	36	33	20	512
4 (Only other language)	7%	26	39	28	1,034
N	4,065	1,836	1,541	716	8,158

c) Home country language use in neighborhood					
	never/none	sometimes	often	mainly	N
0 (French Only)	100%	0	0	0	3,176
1	85%	12	3	0	924
2	70%	24	5	1	2,512
3	60%	30	9	1	512
4 (Only other language)	58%	28	12	3	1,034
N	6,626	1,153	324	55	8,158

d) Language spoken with spouse/partner					
	French only	French and other	Other and French	Other only	N
0 (French Only)	95%	4	0	0	1,673
1	90%	8	1	1	445
2	70%	22	7	2	1,148
3	56%	23	16	5	229
4 (Only other language)	49%	22	19	9	521
N	3,183	514	229	90	4,016

e) Language spoken with own children					
	French only	French and other	Other and French	Other only	N
0 (French Only)	93%	6	0	0	1472
1	75%	23	1	2	382
2	57%	36	5	1	998
3	55%	36	9	1	214
4 (Only other language)	42%	40	15	4	490
N	2282	2145	1411	591	3556

A standard assumption when estimating ordered logistic regression models is that the effect of an independent variable is the same across all categories of the dependent variable - the so-called proportional odds assumption. Although allowing for a much more concise statistical model, this assumption in some cases may not hold and imposing parallel odds for each pair of outcomes may obscure substantively interesting relationships. For the language ability variable I find deviations from the proportional odds model that are substantively consequential. In order to address this, I present an additional analysis that models the outcome as a series of logistic regressions.⁵

Parental language practice: As shown in the previous section, I find strong positive effects on both language ability and language use across a variety of domains, even after controlling for other inputs. Yet, when one examines the effect on language ability using the logistic regression models, some interesting differences become evident: while parental language practice has very large effects in raising the likelihood of the second generation being proficient in speaking the home-country language, the effects on literacy are much smaller. This indicates that when it comes to full literacy in the home-country language, extra-familial factors play a more important role as compared to basic understanding or oral fluency.

Parental education: Here I find two countervailing effects. Once parental language practice is controlled, parental education has positive effects on language ability. This is consistent with the hypothesis of Portes and Hao that bilingualism will be more prevalent among the immigrant elite. At the same time, more educated immigrants are significantly more likely to

refrain altogether from exposing their children to the home-country language. Tabulations of parental education and language use (not shown but available on request) show that more than half of the second-generation respondents whose parents had at least a secondary education report being exposed only to French when growing up. In contrast, just 14 percent of those respondents whose immigrant parents had less than a primary education heard only French as children; the same was true for just a third of those whose parents had primary and lower secondary educations. These odds are substantively unchanged once country of origin effects are controlled.

A similar bi-modal effect of parental education on language ability is visible when we relax the proportional odds assumption of the ordered logistic regression and run a series of logistic regressions instead. As Table 1.4 shows, higher parental education is consistently associated with a lower likelihood to at least fully understand the home-country language (as opposed to knowing only a few words), but it is strongly and positively associated with the likelihood of being literate.

The effects of parental education on measures of language use vary across domains. There is some indication that the offspring of more educated immigrants are less likely to use the home-country language in public interactions, but they may be somewhat more likely to consistently use it with family members.

Presence of religion when growing up: As the ordered logistic models show, once other variables are controlled the presence of religion in the home does not increase facility in the home-country language, but it does significantly increase the use of that language later in life

⁵ There are statistically significant differences in the proportionality assumption for all other variables as well, except for language use in the neighborhood, but in these cases a set of logistic regressions does not produce

in a variety of settings (though not language use with one's spouse). Yet as in the case of parental education and parental language use, the proportional odds restriction obscures differential effects when looking at the effects of religiosity on language ability: while those growing up in more religious households are more likely to at least speak and understand the home-country language, they are less likely to be literate in it than those growing up in more secular households.

Visits to home country and schooling abroad: Children of immigrants who had frequent first-hand exposure to the home country consistently score higher on language ability and use. Among those who visited only once or occasionally, however, the effects are not statistically significant for language use in the neighborhood and with their own children. Transnational education experience has narrower effects: It has a clear and large impact on mastery of the home-country language; however, except for a moderate positive effect on the language spoken with one's spouse, transnational education does not increase the chance of using the home-country language in adulthood.

Proportion immigrant in childhood school: While family characteristics clearly matter, the effects of extra-familial influences during childhood is less clear. The school context seems to have only a small effect on language ability. Contrasts are statistically significant only between the two most extreme categories, namely, those who attended schools with almost no immigrants and those who attended schools in which the majority of students were of non-French origins. Moreover, the direction of the effect runs counter to the expectations: higher immigrant density is associated with lower ancestral language ability.

substantively different results.

With respect to language use with the family, higher immigrant density in schools has moderate positive effects. In the case of language use in public settings and in the respondents' own household (children and spouse), the decline in coefficients, and the loss of statistical significance when moving from Model I to Model II in some cases, indicate that any effects of school context are at least partially mediated through the current characteristics of the respondent's household and neighborhood.

Proportion immigrant in current neighborhood: As one would expect, current neighborhood characteristics are not associated with language ability, which is after all largely determined when growing up. There are, however, significant associations with language use in all domains that I assess. Those living in more integrated neighborhoods are less likely to use ancestral language, an association that is strongest with language use in the neighborhood: holding other factors constant, moving from a neighborhood with almost no immigrants to one where more than half are immigrants decreases the probability of speaking only French from 80 percent to 52 percent.

Nativity of spouse: Respondents whose partners have a migration background score somewhat higher on language ability. This association may reflect more opportunities to practice the language, but it certainly also reflects partner choice whereby those with higher language ability and/or concern for linguistic heritage will be more likely to choose co-ethnic (or co-lingual) partners. Much more pronounced are effects on language use, especially in the households of the second generation. For example, having an immigrant partner rather than someone with no migration background decreases considerably the predicted probability of speaking exclusively French with one's children (from 65 to 38 percent) and partner (from 88 to 32 percent).

Table 1.3: Ordered logistic regression models for language ability and language use in different spheres of life.

	Language Ability				Language use in public/neighborhood				Language use with family				Language use with Children				Language use with Spouse				
	I		II		I		II		I		II		I		II		I		II		
	Coef.	z	Coef.	z	Coef.	z	Coef.	z	Coef.	z	Coef.	z	Coef.	z	Coef.	z	Coef.	z	Coef.	z	
Parental ed: primary	0.41	5.16	0.43	4.14	-0.21	-2.23	-0.14	-1.13	0.01	0.14	0.10	0.93	0.01	0.10	0.11	0.78	-0.10	-0.79	0.18	1.23	
lower secondary	0.41	4.43	0.47	3.79	-0.07	-0.64	-0.07	-0.46	0.12	1.32	0.22	1.77	0.35	2.10	0.37	2.02	0.05	0.28	0.26	1.42	
upper secondary	0.47	5.34	0.53	4.42	-0.19	-1.81	-0.31	-2.07	0.14	1.55	0.22	1.81	0.19	1.25	0.23	1.35	-0.33	-2.00	0.12	0.63	
tertiary I	0.81	4.91	1.26	5.19	-0.65	-2.96	-0.24	-0.80	0.10	0.63	0.25	1.10	0.46	1.19	0.55	1.37	0.21	0.60	0.37	0.88	
tertiary II	0.71	4.47	1.10	4.83	-0.55	-2.67	-0.52	-1.85	0.33	2.20	0.50	2.43	0.14	0.40	0.25	0.66	-0.27	-0.77	0.37	0.94	
Imp of rel growing up: a bit	0.13	1.38	0.15	1.24	0.33	2.65	0.32	1.94	0.25	2.76	0.23	1.97	0.02	0.14	0.04	0.22	-0.05	-0.29	-0.04	-0.19	
some	0.17	1.88	0.19	1.55	0.70	5.80	0.72	4.43	0.43	4.80	0.34	2.84	0.39	2.55	0.35	2.03	0.19	1.16	0.05	0.28	
a lot	0.06	0.64	0.10	0.81	0.95	8.17	0.86	5.37	0.73	8.20	0.67	5.63	0.45	2.98	0.34	1.98	0.59	3.66	0.24	1.33	
Lang. growing up: Both	1.04	12.49	1.08	10.11	0.50	4.50	0.24	1.71	0.87	10.79	0.87	8.31	0.66	4.50	0.47	2.84	1.29	6.58	1.14	5.19	
Mostly other	1.36	11.92	1.24	8.25	0.93	6.76	0.54	2.90	1.34	11.89	1.34	8.99	0.82	4.20	0.59	2.69	1.99	8.64	1.77	6.90	
Other only	1.85	18.35	1.80	13.78	1.01	8.24	0.69	4.31	1.86	18.87	1.76	13.77	1.37	8.23	1.00	5.37	2.20	10.57	1.96	8.43	
Visited P Hc when young	0.90	10.86	0.86	7.56	0.17	1.53	0.07	0.47	0.41	4.77	0.35	3.03	0.20	1.25	0.02	0.09	1.02	5.52	0.58	2.66	
...frequently	1.71	20.30	1.73	15.40	0.60	5.72	0.53	3.64	0.79	9.41	0.84	7.47	0.43	2.86	0.44	2.51	0.91	5.00	0.75	3.60	
Went to school abroad	0.85	5.64	0.65	3.56	0.06	0.37	0.00	0.00	0.13	1.03	0.05	0.28	0.35	1.73	0.23	1.06	0.40	2.02	0.47	2.15	
Imm. in school: > 50%	0.14	1.13	0.29	1.71	-0.36	-2.59	-0.37	-1.90	-0.21	-1.74	-0.11	-0.62	-0.16	-0.68	-0.13	-0.51	-0.06	-0.24	-0.26	-1.03	
about 50%	0.00	-0.04	0.09	0.54	-0.36	-2.68	-0.32	-1.65	-0.28	-2.33	-0.31	-1.85	-0.20	-0.89	-0.18	-0.76	-0.15	-0.70	-0.31	-1.26	
< 50 %	0.08	0.64	0.26	1.59	-0.60	-4.43	-0.42	-2.19	-0.38	-3.16	-0.36	-2.18	-0.47	-2.15	-0.30	-1.23	-0.39	-1.83	-0.35	-1.46	
almost none	0.13	1.00	0.36	2.04	-0.67	-4.60	-0.33	-1.60	-0.47	-3.67	-0.45	-2.53	-0.49	-2.14	-0.27	-1.09	-0.46	-2.04	-0.26	-1.00	
Imm. in neighborhood: > 50%			-0.07	-0.42			-0.72	-4.06				-0.68	-4.14			-0.45	-1.89			-0.33	-1.38
about 50%			-0.17	-1.03			-0.82	-4.58				-0.47	-2.84			-0.53	-2.25			-0.40	-1.71
< 50 %			0.02	0.13			-0.96	-5.46				-0.67	-4.15			-0.67	-2.92			-0.73	-3.12
almost none			0.01	0.06			-1.38	-7.42				-0.60	-3.66			-0.60	-2.56			-0.73	-3.03
Partner second generation			0.18	1.87			0.38	3.31				0.28	2.97			0.28	1.97			1.25	8.12
immigrant			0.34	3.56			0.51	4.53				0.53	5.61			1.17	8.99			3.08	20.99
Constant/Cutpoint	0.05		0.34		1.74		0.96		-0.03		-0.41		1.34		1.01		2.93		3.40		
	1.69		2.00		3.51		2.78		1.91		1.62		3.58		3.35		4.30		5.25		
	3.56		3.76		5.57		4.88		3.67		3.45		5.32		5.05		5.77		6.97		
N	4511		2650		4515		2653		4515		2653		1877		1573		2134		2036		

Table 4: Separate logistic regression models for different degrees of language ability and Brant test for equality of coefficients.

	Logistic regression coefficient for language ability...			chi2	p>chi2
	≥ understand	≥ speak	read/write		
Parental ed: primary	-0.16	0.15	0.85	20	0.00
lower secondary	-0.12	0.27	0.86	12	0.00
upper secondary	-0.26	0.27	1.03	24	0.00
tertiary I	-0.27	0.70	1.91	32	0.00
tertiary II	-0.34	0.50	1.70	31	0.00
Imp of rel growing up: a bit	0.43	0.23	-0.09	8	0.02
some	0.86	0.31	-0.10	17	0.00
a lot	0.92	0.40	-0.28	28	0.00
Lang. growing up: Both	1.46	0.97	0.66	17	0.00
Mostly other	1.80	1.26	0.75	10	0.01
Other only	3.20	2.06	1.37	21	0.00
Visited P Hc when young	0.64	0.71	1.10	6	0.06
...frequently	2.13	1.65	1.90	7	0.04
Went to school abroad	0.17	0.40	0.71	3	0.27
Imm. in school: > 50%	1.07	0.39	0.16	5	0.08
about 50%	0.32	0.20	0.11	0	0.83
< 50 %	0.63	0.28	0.32	1	0.52
almost none	0.56	0.25	0.45	1	0.49
Imm. in neighborhood: > 50%	0.50	-0.13	-0.11	3	0.23
about 50%	-0.17	-0.41	-0.08	2	0.35
< 50 %	0.37	-0.20	0.07	4	0.15
almost none	0.02	-0.26	0.18	4	0.16
Partner second generation	0.40	0.36	0.04	6	0.05
immigrant	0.54	0.69	0.16	14	0.00
Constant/Cutpoint	-0.92	-1.69	-3.70		
Chi Square test of all coefficients (48 degrees of freedom)				302.83	0.00

Discussion and Conclusion

Navigating a social world that is dominated by a foreign language is a key experience and challenge for most migrants. Over time most learn enough of the host-country language to get by and many become fluent, but (virtually) all remain fluent in their mother tongue. And

not only do they remain fluent, for the large majority of migrants the mother tongue figures prominently in communications with the core and extended family. But only one generation later, the situation is reversed. Fluency in the host-country language is universal, and the question becomes whether and how much of the parental home-country language is retained, and if retained, how it is used.

The immigrant context poses some particular challenges for the social reproduction of the ancestral language. Whereas “at home” familial and extra-familial language socialization work hand in hand, in the immigrant context the incentives of the extra-familial context overwhelmingly favor the host-country language. For the second generation, incentives to learn and maintain ancestral language are mostly confined to the family context. And thus, not surprisingly, language socialization in the family is a necessary condition for transmission of the ancestral language to the children of immigrants. Without parental inputs home-country language does not survive. However, while necessary, parental socialization is not sufficient for continued vitality of the language, which becomes clear when one examines language use in the households of the adult second generation. More than 40 percent speak only French with their children, and another 40 percent mention the home-country language, but in second place. Similarly, almost 60 percent in that category report never using a language other than French in their neighborhood context.

What emerges is a picture in which immigrants’ home-country language is not only confined to the private sphere as Fishman predicted, but for most of the second generation it is confined to a small aspect of the private sphere. The one domain where the home-country language is used with a non-trivial frequency by the second generation, and where parental influence is considerable, is in communication with their parents and extended family.

Home-country language is a bridge between the foreign born and second generation. But if language practice is largely tied to contact with the migrant generation, this also means that the social base for the native language is dependent on continued immigration.

And so the shift away from the ancestral language and towards the host-country language is unmistakable. Less than half of the second-generation respondents can fully communicate (that is, both understand and speak) in their parents' language, while for almost 40 percent of respondents their parents' language is incomprehensible. If the nearly universal acquisition of the host-country language in the second generation is both an indicator and mechanism of assimilation into the host society, then the loss of the home-country language is indicator and cause of dissimilation from places of origin. As means of communication are lost, connections are harder to maintain; and from the other direction, as ties to native speakers are lost, incentives and opportunities to maintain the ancestral language disappear.

Exposing their offspring to the home country is one way that migrants invest in cultural continuity and pass on their linguistic heritage. Home country visits in particular can create powerful incentives to master the language in order to be able to communicate there. Indeed, given at least some parental exposure to the home-country language and holding all other values constant, a large majority (82%) of those in the second generation who did return frequently to their parent's country of origin are able to communicate (at least speak) the home-country language; among those who never visited, in contrast, less than half have this level of proficiency.

Yet as my analysis also shows, once the second generation reaches adulthood and establishes their own households, the domestic context takes precedence. For example while those who frequently visited are somewhat less likely than those who never did (52% vs

61%) to exclusively speak French with their children, this margin is significantly smaller than the gap between those with an immigrant partner and those married to a “native” (38% vs 65%). Yet, these visits do strengthen bonds with the extended family, parts of which are often still living in the home country, and thereby significantly increase the use of the home-country language in that realm.

This points to another conundrum of language transmission in immigrant families. Investments in the full transmission of homeland cultural practices like language often require significant resources. Yet, those immigrants who have more resources are also more likely to be better integrated into the host society and thus on average to be more distant from the ethnic networks and resources that help to maintain these practices. This is also reflected in the effects of parental education in my analysis. On the one hand immigrant parents with higher socioeconomic status are much more likely to drop the home-country language altogether than their lower educated counterparts. But those that *do* make a point to transmit their mother tongue are more likely to be successful, especially when it comes to full fluency and literacy.

As the core of the Alba and Nee assimilation model emphasizes, orientation towards the host society is what yields the greatest economic rewards - rewards that in most cases are the motivation for migration in the first place. And while many migrants may want to avoid acculturation and maintain homeland cultural practices across generations, in the case of language the deck is stacked against immigrants. For immigrant families maintenance and social reproduction of homeland ties and cultural practices demands resources - but the very process by which most migrants and their children attain these resources draws them away from the home country and into the orbit of the host society.

Appendix Table A1.1: Summary statistics for independent variables

	N	%
<i>Visits to parental HC</i>		
never	1,887	23.12
sometimes	3,138	38.45
often	3,136	38.43
<i>Attended school outside France</i>		
Yes	525	6.44
Missing	7	0.09
<i>Share of immigrants in school</i>		
Almost all	413	5.1
Over Half	1,307	16.0
Half	1,820	22.3
Less than Half	2,447	30.0
Almost None	1,820	22.3
Missing	354	4.3
<i>Highest Education level of parents</i>		
no formal ed	1,074	14.0
primary	2,326	30.3
lower second (2)	1,163	15.1
upper secondary	2,141	27.9
Tertiary (5A)	457	6.0
Tertiary II (5B/6)	520	6.8
<i>Share immigrants in neighborhood</i>		
Almost all	621	7.6
Over Half	1,379	16.9
Half	1,462	17.9
Less than Half	2,143	26.3
Almost None	2,220	27.2
Missing	336	4.1

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Chapter 2

Intergenerational transmission of religion in migrant families

Introduction

In Europe, migrants' religion has become a central issue in the debate about cultural pluralism (Zolberg and Long 1999; Foner and Alba 2008). Populations that had been labeled based on national origin (Turks, Algerians, etc.), legal status (foreigners), ethnicity, or race are now increasingly grouped under the term "Muslim" (Allevi 2005), and Islam is now a key social boundary delineating a variety of dimensions of "otherness" (Cesari 2004; Casanova 2006). In France, the religious practices of Muslim migrants and their religious adaptation to the French context have become the primary focus of the integration debate and assessment, displacing "classic" markers such as language proficiency, intermarriage, or socio-economic mobility (Tiberj 2012; Tiberj and Michon 2013).¹

At the same time, European countries have significantly expanded institutional and legal accommodations for Islam (Koenig 2005; Joppke and Torpey 2013). This expansion is uneven, and at times it has been highly contested (Statham et al. 2005; Joppke 2009; Brubaker 2013b) – in fact many expansions were forced by courts (Koenig 2010).

Yet, Muslim immigrants in Europe are not only of a different religion; they also are, on average, significantly more religious than the largely secular mainstream populations. For

¹ For a similar critique of the "Muslim turn" in German migration policy and discourse see Tezcan (2003). For a broader argument about the rise of "Muslim" as a category in social science research see Brubaker (2013a).

both issues - the debate about the social integration of Muslim migrants as well as the ongoing struggles around the institutional accommodation of Islam - the degree to which this higher religiosity persists will be an important variable. If Muslim immigrant populations over time and generations were to become as secular as the mainstream populations in Europe, the accommodation of Islam arguably would be much less challenging than if Muslim populations in Europe remain very religious as compared to the nominally Christian, but largely non-religious, mainstream.

Yet, we know relatively little about broader shifts (or stability) in the religiosity of migrant populations. To what extent do religious migrant families who settle in largely secular societies maintain their religion? More specifically, to what degree do migrants pass their religion on to the next generation, and what are the social processes that influence this process?

Though some recent work has to begun to explore these issues, results thus far have been inconsistent partly due to data limitations, but also due to variation in the framing and interpretation of the data. For example, Diehl and Koenig (2009) compare the religiosity of a sample of first and second-generation Turkish immigrants in Germany and find a high degree of stability and no consistent evidence for either a symbolic religiosity or a “reactive” religiosity. However, because their data do not permit an analysis of parent-child dyads, they cannot examine processes of intergenerational transmission. In contrast, Maliepaard et al. (2010) find a weakening of religious identities and decline in practice in their analysis of a sample of Turkish first and second-generation migrants in the Netherlands. Phalet et al. (2008) come to a similar conclusion in an analysis of Dutch immigrants. Taking a different approach and comparing determinants of religiosity among second-generation Turks in the

Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels, and Stockholm, Fleischmann and Phalet (2012) find that parental Mosque visits matter, but they do not assess the degree of continuity between the migrant and second generation.² Maybe indicative of the contradictions in this line of inquiry is that Fleischmann and Phalet (2012) cite Maliepaard et al. (2010) as a study that demonstrates “sustained religiosity across generations of Turkish Muslims” (p.335), whereas Maliepaard and colleagues emphasize the decline in religiosity and argue that the “second generation reports weaker ethnic and religious identities, and engages less in ethno-cultural and religious practices” (p.451).

Using the Trajectories and Origins (TeO) survey ,this paper contributes to this body of research with an analysis of religious transmission in migrant families in France. This high quality, nationally representative survey of about 16,000 immigrants and children of immigrants provides a number of questions concerning religious practice. Most importantly for this paper, it asked respondents about the importance of religion when they were growing up and the importance of religion in their life now as adults. These data also permit a broader empirical approach than one finds in previous studies. In particular, this paper compares religious transmission in families from both Christian and Muslims backgrounds as well as across different types migration status.

Based on this approach to the TeO data, this paper makes several arguments. First, I argue that religion does not fit easily into the “assimilation/acculturation paradigm”. Although many European nationals may well harbor expectations that the newcomers acculturate and eventually conform to mainstream practices (Coenders et al. 2005), these

² Because the data used in their analysis come from a sample of people living only in these cities, the authors note concerns about the generalizability of their findings.

expectations are misplaced in the realm of religion. Instead, I argue that macro-level variables such as the religious field and the socio-political situation of the religion in question shape intergenerational change or persistence, as do family-level transmission processes and demographic variables such as marriage markets.

Comparing continuity in religiosity within parent-child dyads, I find that migrant status matters little for intergenerational transmission within religions. That is, within all Christian families the degree of religiosity change between childhood home and adult practice is virtually identical, whether the dyad contains pre-migrant parents and migrant children, migrant parents and second-generation children, or even native origin parents and their children. This is true for Muslim families as well, but there is also one major contrast: intergenerational continuity is significantly greater in Muslim families.

The high degree of continuity in religiosity in Muslim families is indeed striking, and my data do not provide support for hypotheses that this continuity masks a shift towards a purely symbolic religiosity. But my analysis does identify a different mechanism of intergenerational decline in religiosity in Muslim families. Although there is little shift in religiosity from the migrant to the second generation, there is a substantial decline in religious homogamy in the second generation, which matters for intergenerational transmission of religiosity. As I show in a final set of analyses, the offspring of religiously non-homogamous families are on average much less religious. Thus, due to the changing religious composition of the second-generation families, one can expect to see some decline in religiosity by the third generation. It is in this respect that the immigrant context matters for intergenerational transmission of religiosity. The children of Muslim immigrants in France (as in other European countries) are a *quantitative* minority; as such, they face a very different “marriage

market” than did their migrant parents, most of whom found spouses in contexts where they belonged to the majority religion.

In the next section I provide some background on the immigrant population in France, including aspects of their origin and reception context that inform their religious characteristics. I then review key arguments in the existing research on migrants’ religious practices, specifically the religious socialization of the children of migrants. I then briefly introduce the dataset and analytical strategy before summarizing and discussing my findings.

Migration to France, contexts of reception and origin

France, probably more so than other European countries, has long been a country of immigration - going back to the nineteenth century when it attracted immigrants from neighboring countries during its first wave of industrialization. Today, about 10% of the population are foreign-born and another 12% have at least one parent born abroad – numbers that are on par with the United States (Tiberj 2012).

The origins of this post-war migrant origin population are diverse. One major stream consisted of southern Europeans (Portugal, Italy Spain) who came in the 1950s and 1960s as France along with many other western European countries used immigration to address labor shortages (Tapinos 1975). These migrants and their children are generally regarded as unproblematic and well-integrated into the labor market, and even those with limited educational attainment generally can find jobs in ethnic niches (Tribalat 1995). In terms of religion, these migrants are overwhelmingly Christian or non-religious.

The majority of Muslim migrants are part of a post-colonial migration from the Maghreb. Some of these came as political migrants - having fought alongside the French in the

Algerian war for example. The large majority, however, were, like their European counterparts, labor migrants searching for manual jobs. Unlike the European labor migrants, however, their societal reception was much more fraught (Lucassen 2005), and in many cases their integration in the labor market remains tenuous.

Sub-Saharan African countries that were part of the French empire are another significant source of immigration, as are countries in southeastern Asia. These migrant streams are diverse in terms of class and legal status. Whereas some come from middle-class origins and arrived as students, others are either undocumented or seeking asylum. These migrants are also diverse in terms of religion, but especially among the Sub-Saharan migrants a significant share are Muslim. Based on their religion, these migrant streams also encountered very different reception contexts. Although the principle of *laïcité* means that the French state is officially neutral towards all religions, Muslim migrants in fact enter a society profoundly shaped by centuries of Roman Catholicism. In effect, as some scholars argue, the strict neutrality principle relegates religions to a marginal position (Alba 2005). Major figures in public debate and public policy approach Islam with great suspicion – even prominent sociologists such as Michele Tribalat identify Islam as a threat to French values (Tribalat 2011).³ Because of these concerns, integration tends to be viewed, as Tiberj (2012) argues, through the “Muslim Prism”. For example, the stance immigrants and their children take toward their religion and toward putatively associated attitudes concerning family norms and gender equality have become an informal measure through which their integration is assessed.

³ This concern is part of larger European trend in which liberalism is “hardening” into a prescriptive set of values (Joppke 2007).

But not only do Christian migrants and Muslim migrants face a different reception context - the religious fields in their origin countries differ dramatically as well. In the European countries that are generally the source of France's Christian immigrants, religion has steadily receded from the public sphere and religiosity has declined substantially over the past decades. In contrast, religiosity is high in the home countries of Muslim migrants, and although Islam is undergoing significant transformations in these locales as well (Roy 2004), it remains a vibrant and central part of the public sphere.

Religion across generations in migrant families

Religion and immigrant adaptation

Students of the early twentieth-century migrations to the United States emphasized religion's role in providing migrants psychological comfort (Handlin 1951; Herberg 1955). Having undergone the trauma of being "uprooted" (Handlin 1951) from their home and having moved to places where even the most mundane activities can be alienating experiences, migrants would turn to religion for solace. Researchers since have emphasized another dimension, the socio-economic role of religion in migrants' lives. In addition to providing social services for migrants, religious organizations also allow them to build social ties, find allies, and achieve economic mobility (Hirschman 2004).

These two functions of religion are likely to be less relevant for the second generation, which generally relies neither on the types of social services provided by religious organizations nor on ethnic social networks as strategies for socioeconomic advancement

(Kasinitz et al. 2008). While this implies that unlike their migrant parents, the second generation has few incentives to *turn towards* religion, it does not follow that they would turn away from religion. After all, motivations for religious participation are multifarious and by no means reducible to instrumental reasons.

Another hypothesis is that religion serves as a compensatory strategy for those children of migrants that are, or feel, excluded from mainstream society and are not sufficiently upwardly mobile (Diehl and Koenig 2009). Thus, “blocked assimilation” may lead to an increase in religiosity in the second-generation—a “reactive religiosity” akin to “reactive ethnicity” (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Diehl and colleagues, however, do not find any evidence for this process in their analysis of samples of first and second-generation Turks in Germany.

It is tempting to simply extend the assimilation framework and hypothesize that religion follows the trajectory outlined for other cultural differences, such that over time and generations religiosity will converge with that of the mainstream population. In a largely secular environment such as France this would mean that the second generation becomes less religious on average than their parents. Yet, it is unlikely that the key mechanism that drives acculturation in other domains, the “aspiration to improve the material and social circumstances of their lives” (Alba, et al 2012: 47), also applies in the case of religion. Struggles for public recognition and political claims notwithstanding, because religion is largely a private matter in liberal democracies that (absent systematic discrimination) has little bearing on economic advancement, the host country opportunity structure as such provides few incentives for assimilation. On the contrary, it may even be that religious practice provides social and psychological resources that advance socio-economic mobility (Bankston

and Zhou 1995; Bankston and Zhou 2000). In this respect, the finding of Fleischmann and Phalet (2012) that high degrees of religiosity in the second generation are compatible with “structural integration” in socio-economic domains is not all that surprising.

But even if religion does not directly enter the social mobility and assimilation calculus, a decrease in religiosity could still be the consequence of assimilation in these domains. Drawing on a crude version of secularization theory, the argument is that higher levels of education and occupational mobility ultimately decrease religiosity in the second generation as may their better socio-structural integration into the host society (Fleischmann and Phalet 2012); in other words, religion is something that will be attractive to the uneducated and underachieving. Following a similar argument but emphasizing the social integration hypotheses, van Tubergen (2007) finds that immigrants in the Netherlands who have more contacts in the mainstream population are on average less religious. Yet, causality may very well run in the opposite direction here. After all, for those who are religious - including, and perhaps especially, immigrants who are religious - the social networks that religious life provides significantly shape social life.

Religious socialization in the immigrant context:

For majority populations and immigrants alike, the family is the primary locus of intergenerational transmission of religious behavior (Hoge and Petrillo 1978; Francis and Brown 1991; Myers 1996). However, the family plays an especially central role for the transmission of religion in the immigrant context, in particular for those that are, like Muslims in France, members of a minority religion. For Muslim migrants who growing up

were part of the religious majority in their home country, the family was only one among many sources of religious socialization: religious identifications and practices, being often ubiquitous and unproblematic, can have a taken-for-granted quality. This is not so for their children born in France. As Rogers Brubaker puts it, "... children and grandchildren of Muslim immigrants do not grow up in a world in which Islam is a taken-for-granted medium of social and cultural as well as religious life; they grow up in a world in which Islam is a chronic object of discussion and debate, a world that is thick with self-conscious and explicit discussions about Islam" (Brubaker 2013a: 4). Although immigrant neighborhoods in France may provide some religious infrastructure and extra-familial religious influence, this will always be weaker and more contested than the socio-religious environment in the parental place of origin. Thus, for the European-born children of migrants, the family takes on a disproportionate importance in the transmission of religion.

And parents do have a significant influence on the religious socialization of their offspring, for when it comes to religion, parents can shape the social and cultural environment of their children. Parents can foster the integration of their offspring into religious communities and expose them to their religious doctrine. At the same time, they can minimize non-religious or conflicting religion's influences (Kelley and De Graaf 1997). Extreme examples include religious sects that manage to maintain a large degree of intergenerational continuity. Struggles to exempt children from public schooling or non-religious curricula are one example of these efforts by religious traditionalists - mostly of the fundamentalist Christian kind. To be sure, very few immigrant families fall on this end of the spectrum. Nevertheless, supplementary religious schooling, religiously focused summer-activities, and/or return visits to the home-country, are fairly common ways for parents to

invest in the religious upbringing of their offspring. Similarly, the continuing contestations about exemptions for children of Muslim immigrants from certain parts of public education in Germany, or the wearing of veils in schools in France and Britain, highlight parental efforts to create an environment that is supportive of intergenerational transmission of religious practice.

The structuring of children's religious environment relates to another role that religion can play in migrant families: as a means to keep unwanted influences of the new context at bay - a strategy that Portes and colleagues call "selective acculturation" (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Religious practice, participation in religious organizations, and the social life associated with both, can help to maintain intergenerational continuity in value orientations or political preferences more broadly. In the case of migrants this can include the transfer of homeland attachments to the next generation as well as orientations towards the family (Nauck 2000; Nauck 2007).

Because the family plays such an important role for the religiosity of the second generation, the religious composition of the family will be an important variable shaping religious practice of the offspring. Inheritance of religiosity for subsequent generations will be lower in religiously non-homogamous families. Even different levels of religiosity can have this effect. As Myers (1996) shows, families in which parents differ in their levels of religiosity are less able to transmit religion to the next generation. For immigrants in a largely secular society, even if transmission rates between parents and children are high, religious exogamy (including unions with less or non-religious partners) may in the long run lead to intergenerational decline in religiosity.

Conversion, symbolic religiosity, transnationalism and fundamentalism: Qualitative change in religious attachments.

The level of religiosity is only one dimension of potential change. A more dramatic change is converting from one religion to another. While in the US this is a non-trivial phenomenon - especially among Latin American immigrants - in France this seems a fringe phenomenon: less than 1 percent of the sample converted to a different religion as compared to their pre-adulthood religion.

Another, more subtle possibility is that one's religion remains nominally the same but the understanding or interpretation of that religion changes in non-trivial ways. It could be that stability in stated religiosity may be masking changes in the meaning and actual practice of religion. Analogous to the phenomenon of symbolic ethnicity (Waters 1990), religion may become a largely symbolic matter in the second generation. According to Herbert Gans, in the case of migrants' religion this would entail a religiosity that is based on "the consumption of religious symbols apart from regular participation in a religious culture or in religious organizations [...] in such a way as to create no complications or barriers for dominant secular lifestyles" (Gans 1994:585). For example, though claiming to be religious, the second generation may not be engaging in regular practice or adhering to religious guidelines such as dietary rules.

Another harder-to-capture aspect of religious change is what one might call a turn towards fundamental principles of religion in the second generation. Whereas for many immigrants religious belief is heavily layered with national and regional cultural practices,

over time and in the second generation these influences may fade, stripping religion down to more basic or “fundamental” principles. On the one hand, this can result from a “nationalizing” of religious fields - such as the making of a “French Islam” as opposed to an “Islam in France” (Bowen 2002). On the other hand, transnational social and religious fields may have more influence in the immigrant context, again re-shaping religious understandings and practices (Bowen 2004a; Bowen 2004b).

Data and Variables

The empirical contribution of this paper draws on a recently collected nationally representative study of immigrants in France - the Trajectories and Origins (TeO) project. Conducted in 2008/2009, the TeO surveyed 20,000 respondents, of which more than 8,000 were immigrants and another 8,000 were the children of immigrants (not from the same households). The remainder is a comparison sample of native parentage.

Religious characteristics of respondent and household

Because the TeO survey asks both immigrants and second generation not only questions about religious practices in their family, but also about these practices when the respondent was growing up, I can trace change within families across at least two generations. To the extent that the religious characteristics of the family in the second generation set the context for the next generation, it is also possible to make inferences about transmission into the third generation - the grandchildren of immigrants.

- *Religious denomination:* The TeO asked respondents both the religious memberships of their parents and the religion to which they now belong. I classify the responses into four categories: Muslim; Christian; a third category that captures “other religions”; and a fourth category for those who are “not religious.”⁴
- *Religiosity:* As a general assessment of the importance of religious belief, the TeO survey asked all respondents if they belong to a distinct religion and how important religion currently is in their lives. Answers are on a four-point scale ranging from “not important at all” to “very important.”
- *Religious practice:* For those respondents who belong to a religion, the survey asked whether they attend services “never,” “only for family events,” “for religious events/holidays,” “monthly,” or “weekly.”
- *Following dietary rules:* Finally, the survey asked those who belong to a religion whether they follow any religious dietary restrictions. Answer categories were: “there are none,” “never follow them,” “sometimes,” or “always.”
- *Religious configuration of household:* The religious configuration of the household reflects the importance of religion to an individual, but it in turn will also influence their religious commitment. More importantly, it is a central factor shaping the religious socialization of the next generation. The survey asked the subset of respondents who have a partner (married or cohabitating) whether their partner belongs to a religion and if so which one. I use this response to calculate a variable that distinguishes couples that consist of two non-religious spouses, couples that are religiously

⁴ In the case of “other religions,” there are too few cases to analyze each religion separately.

homogamous, couples where one spouse is religious but the other one is not, and those couples that are of different religions. A residual category captures those who have a partner but where information on the spouse is missing.

Religious environment growing up

The following variables measure the context in which respondents were raised, which may shape their religiosity in adulthood.

- *Religion growing up*: Because transmission processes vary across religions, I stratify the analysis by major religious denominations. I use the same groupings as in the categorization of respondent's religion, assigning a respondent to a category if at least one parent was of that religion, provided that the respondent did not grow up in a mixed religion household. Thus, a respondent is defined as growing up in a Christian household if one parent was Christian and the other parent was either Christian or not religious. About 5 percent of respondents grew up in households where parents were of different religions - a number that is too small to analyze further. And because less than 1 percent of respondents belong to a religion different than the household in which they were raised, I also do not analyze conversion. Instead, I focus on changes in religiosity, which includes dropping out of religion.
- *Importance of religion*: Based on my earlier discussion, I expect this to be a centrally important variable. Analogous to the question about the current importance of religion, the TeO survey used the same 4-point scale to ask respondents about the importance of religion growing up.

- *Parental education:* Parents with more education may have more resources to transmit cultural practices to the second generation. At the same time, as indicators of assimilation, higher socioeconomic standing may also mean greater distance from ethnic networks and thus diminished ethnic resources that aid in the transmission of religious practice. I coded parental education (highest of both parents) according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), distinguishing six categories of parental education from those with less than a primary education all the way to those with advanced degrees.
- *Exposure to parental home-country language:* The transmission of religion may be part of a larger effort on the part of immigrant parents to transmit their culture into the next generation. The home-country language in particular may be a critical skill. For example, to the extent that religious services are conducted in the home-country language, transmission of the one may reinforce transmission of the other. The TeO asked respondents about the languages their parents spoke with them when growing up. For each parent I coded these answers into a 3-point scale of increasing exposure to the home-country language: 0 if only French was mentioned, 1 if both French and another language were mentioned, and 2 if only another language was mentioned. I then added both parental scales to get an overall measure of the pre-adulthood linguistic environment which ranges from 0 (only French) to 4 (only other language). For respondents that mention only one parent, I enter that parent's scale twice.
- *Visits to the parental home country:* As with the case of home-country language, the transmission of home-country ties more broadly may be interwoven with the

transmission of religion. Thus, parents who invest in transmission of home-country connections to their children—e.g., by taking them to visit the country—may raise more religious offspring. Home-country ties may also be part of an exposure of the second-generation to “transnational social fields” (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004; Fouron and Glick-Schiller 2002). If hypotheses about the transnational nature of contemporary Islam (Bowen 2004a; Bowen 2004b) are correct, then one would expect this to be especially important for the children of Muslim immigrants. The survey asked respondents about visits to their parents’ home country, providing response choices of frequently, sometimes, and never.

- *Received schooling abroad:* An even more immersive experience is going to school in the home country. The TeO data allow me to distinguish those who received any of their schooling abroad from those who received their schooling exclusively in France.
- *School context:* Yet even those families who do not maintain connections to the home country themselves may be part of a “transnational social field” - meaning they will be the neighbors, friends, and colleagues of those who do maintain cross-border connections and whose activities create a web of connectivity that may link even those with no or little cross-border ties of their own. As an indicator for this influence during the respondent’s adolescence, I include the share of foreign born in the respondent’s school. Answers in the TeO are coded into five categories: almost all (omitted category), more than half, about half, less than half, and almost none.

A second set of variables provides measures of the socio-economic standing of the respondent (educational attainment) and the religious characteristics of their current social

context: the share of friends of the same religion; and for those who have a partner, whether their partner is of the same religion. While these variables may influence religious characteristics - having friends of the same religion may certainly increase a person's religiosity and adherence to religious practices - they are likely also to reflect respondents' religiosity. Those for whom religion is more important will seek out more co-religious friends and will be more likely to emphasize religion in their partner choice. In the analysis below, I enter these into the model in a second step.

- *Respondent's level of education:* The compensatory religiosity hypothesis predicts that respondents with low education will be more religious. As with parental education, I coded this variable into the ISCED categories. Because there are no second-generation respondents with less than a primary education, there are five different categories from primary education to advanced degrees.
- *Share of friends of the same religion:* Social influences matter not only in childhood, but also for the religious lives of adults. People whose religion is reflected and valued by their peers will likely be more religious. These social ties may be especially important for followers of minority religions that are not universally accepted by mainstream society. The TeO used three categories to ask respondents about the share of friends that are of the same religion: more than half, about half, and less than half. I include a fourth category for those who answered "don't know" and thereby indicated that this is not an important dimension of their social life.

- *Partner is of same religion*: As a measure of the religious composition of respondents' households, I include an indicator variable for those respondents who are in religiously homogamous relationships.

Analysis and Findings

I present results of my analysis in three steps: The next section, along with tables 2.1 through 2.3, summarizes and compares measures of religiosity for immigrants, the second generation, and the native comparison population. The next step probes whether there are significant changes in the *quality* of religiosity, specifically a move towards a symbolic religiosity. To do so, I compare the correlation between self-assessed religiosity (how important is religion in my life) and measures of religious practice across generations and religions. In a third step, I use multivariate regressions to model the effects of a variety of parental characteristics on second-generation religiosity, stratifying the sample by the religious denomination of the immigrant family.

Comparing generations: Descriptive statistics of religiosity and religious configurations of households

The first section of Table 2.1 breaks down the nationally representative samples of immigrant, second-generation, and native comparison groups into four religious denominations. The last column, for example, shows that almost half of those with native parents are non-religious; half identify as Christian (overwhelmingly Catholic); just 2% are Muslim or belong to some other religion; and for 1% information is missing. Less than one

in five immigrants are non-religious, a share that rises to about one-third in the second generation. Muslims make up 38% of immigrants and 29% of the second generation.

Table 2.2 summarizes the degree of respondents' religiosity as well as the importance of religion when they were growing up. I stratify the data both by immigrant status and by parental religion, comparing those who grew up in Christian households, those who grew up in Muslim households, and those who grew up in households with no formal religion. I omit those in the "other" category and those growing up in mixed religion households because their numbers are too small for reliable analysis. I also calculate the change in religiosity, which is defined as the negative of the difference between the importance of religion growing up and its importance now, using the 4-point scales. For example, a respondent who grew up in a home where religion was scored "4 - very important" - and states that in his own life religion is "3 - quite important" would be assigned -1. These differences are then averaged for each category. The last line in each section provides the number of respondents in each category and their share of the respective category. For example looking that the last row of the first section, the 3,266 migrants that grew up in Christian households represent 39% of the total migrant sample of 8,456 respondents.

In terms of religiosity, those growing up in Christian households clearly converge towards the "mainstream" population in the passage from the immigrant to the second generation. Whereas roughly a quarter of migrants say that religion is very important and another 20% state that it is quite important, only about a quarter of the second generation falls into these two categories combined. While these second-generation respondents are a bit more religious than the native comparison group, the difference is small. It is also worth noting that in the native population religion was more important in the households they grew

up in than it is now in their own lives. In fact, among those with Christian backgrounds, the second generation and those with native parents look remarkably similar not only in their current religiosity but also in the role of religion when they were growing up. Looking at the row that summarizes intergenerational trends, one can see that there is significant decline from parents to children – about a half point on the 4 point scale – and that this decline does not vary substantially between migrant, second-generation, and native samples.

The trajectories are quite different in Muslim immigrant families. Not only is the religiosity far higher in both the first and second generation, there is also very little decline across generations: 48% of Muslim immigrants state that religion is very important in their lives and this number declines by just 3 points to 45% in the second generation. The row that summarizes intergenerational change reveals comparatively small declines in religiosity across generations: migrants on average score just 0.14 points lower on the 4-point religiosity scale than their non-migrant parents, and the decline is a mere 0.11 points from the migrant to the second generation.

Finally looking at those who grew up with non-religious parents we see - not surprisingly - generally low levels of religiosity. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that even here the share of those whose lives are completely secular, that is religion plays no role whatsoever, increases across generations.

Table 2.3 presents a similar analysis but looks at the religious household configuration of those respondents who have a partner. Because I omit respondents that grew up in mixed religion households, these cells along with missing category are empty in the parental column. A large majority (84%) of the Christian households in which the second-generation respondents were raised, are religiously homogamous in the sense that both parents identify

with that religion. In contrast, only slightly more than half of the second-generation respondents who have a partner are in religiously homogamous unions. Almost a quarter have a non-religious partner, and another 18% themselves abandoned religion and live in non-religious households. A mere 2% have partners of a different religion, and for 3% information is missing. These numbers are almost identical for those with native parents.

As for the Muslim immigrants, their parents (the pre-migrant generation) were overwhelmingly homogamous in terms of religion, while among migrants the share declines to about 80%. The relatively large share of migrants that arrived as children or young adults certainly explains part of this picture. Turning to the French-born children of the migrants, there is a significant drop across generations: whereas in 94% of the families in which they were raised both parents were Muslim, 69% of their children are in homogamous families. While this is still the large majority, it does represent a significant drop across generations. At the same time, 8% drop out of religion altogether and 20% have a partner that is either of a different religion or non-religious.

Finally, those who grew up in non-religious households overwhelmingly chose non-religious partners: about two-thirds of migrants and about three-quarters of second-generation and native respondents who grew up in non-religious households went on to choose non-religious partners. Among the second generation and natives, less than 5% end up in religiously homogamous relationships, presumably by converting to their partners' religion. Interestingly, this number is more than twice as large among migrants - a non-trivial 10% of those growing up non-religious takes this trajectory.

Before proceeding to the next section, it is worth emphasizing the contrast between the changes in religiosity and religious household composition. When looking at religiosity,

migration status/generation barely matters. The degree of intergenerational decline in religiosity varies across religions, but *within* any given religion it is very similar between migrants and their pre-migrant parents, the second generation and their migrant parents, and the natives and their children. In contrast, migrant status clearly matters for the religious configuration of households. Though the levels vary across religions, in all cases the second generation and the native born are much more likely to be in religiously non-homogamous relationships than the migrants. This clearly speaks to the very different “marriage markets” that the second generation faces as compared to their migrant parents, who mostly found their spouses in comparatively homogenous religious environments.

Table 2.1: Summary statistics for religious denomination

	Migrants	2nd Gen	Natives
none	18	33	45
Christian	35	32	50
Muslim	38	29	2
Other	7	4	2
Missing	2	1	1
N	8,456	8,161	3,781

Table 2.2: Religiosity: How important is religion

	Migrant sample (n=8456)		2nd Gen. sample (n=8161)		Native sample (n=3781)	
	Growing up	Now	Growing up	Now	Growing up	Now
<i>Those growing up Christian</i>						
none	12	25	20	42	24	47
a bit	25	29	37	34	41	35
quite	25	20	25	16	21	12
a lot	38	26	19	9	14	6
Average change in score:	-0.43		-0.51		-0.50	
N (Pct of sample)	3266 (39%)		3445(42%)		2526(67%)	
<i>Those growing up Muslim</i>						
none	7	13	8	14		
a bit	17	16	17	14		
quite	24	24	28	27		
a lot	52	48	47	45		
Change in score:	-0.14		-0.11			
N	3437 (41%)		2540 (31%)		94 (2.5%)	
<i>Those growing up in non-religious households</i>						
none	78	86	80	94	82	94
a bit	15	6	18	3	16	3
quite	3	3	2	2	1	1
a lot	4	5	1	2	2	1
Average change in score:	-0.07		-0.12		-0.13	
N (Pct of sample)	515(6%)		960(12%)		840(22%)	

Table 2.3: Religious configurations of households

	Migrant sample		2nd Gen. sample		Native sample	
	Parents	Respondent	Parents	Respondent	Parents	Respondent
<i>Those growing up Christian</i>						
non-religious		10		18		17
consistent	93	70	84	53	85	58
one non-relig	7	15	16	23	15	21
different rel		2		3		1
one missing		3		3		3
<i>Those growing up Muslim</i>						
non-religious		4		8		
consistent	98	80	94	69		
one non-relig	2	8	6	14		
different rel		6		6		
one missing		2		3		
<i>Those growing up in non-religious households</i>						
non-religious	100	66	100	75	100	76
consistent		10		4		4
one non-relig		19		18		16
different rel		0		0		0
one missing		5		2		3

Religion across Generations

Assessing potential changes in the more fine-grained practices and understandings of religion is notoriously difficult in survey-based research. The TeO does, however, provide some information for making at least an initial assessment of the degree to which both religious practices change over generations and religiosity is enacted in daily life. These data speak to Herbert Gans' symbolic religiosity hypothesis, which predicts that the relationship between stated religiosity and religious practice will "loosen" with the passage of generational time.

Table 2.4 summarizes the information on attendance in religious services and the degree to which respondents follow religious dietary restrictions. In order to assess the relationship between religiosity and practice, I calculate the polychoric correlations (Olsson 1979)

between these measures of practice and respondents' stated religiosity. Once again, I disaggregate the data by migrant status and religion.

The first part of the table summarizes frequency of religious attendance. Among the Muslim respondents, for example, a significant share - 36% of migrants and 28% of the second generation - *never* go to Mosque. Another 22% and 24% respectively go only for family events. Thus, more than half of Muslim respondents seem not to participate in communal religious life to any meaningful degree. At the other end of the spectrum only 14% of migrants and 11% of the second generation participate in weekly services. Comparing the columns overall, one sees only minor shifts in the distribution, with somewhat higher emphasis on family and religious events in the second generation as compared to the first, and with fewer regular participants but also fewer respondents who never set foot in a mosque. The correlation of this measure of practice with stated religiosity is equal across generations (0.39 and 0.40 respectively), which contradicts the hypothesis that the consistently high levels of religiosity among Muslims documented above in fact mask an underlying shift towards a symbolic religiosity.

Moving to an individual aspect of religious practice, the observance of dietary restrictions, the picture looks quite different. The large majority (83% and 87% respectively) of Muslim immigrant and second-generation respondents say they always observe dietary restrictions. Although there is some decline in the correlation with religiosity (0.63 to 0.50), the magnitude is too small to signal a shift towards symbolic religiosity.

Among Christian respondents there are significant declines in religious practice from the migrant to the second generation. For example, attendance of Sunday services declines by two thirds from 19% to just 6%. A majority of those who identify as Christian in the second

generation attend religious services only in the context of family gatherings. Not surprisingly, dietary restrictions play a much smaller role among Christian respondents, with about one-third stating there are none and just 20% following them sometimes or always.

Table 2.4: Religious practice and correlation with religiosity

	Muslim Respondents		Christian Respondents	
	Migrant	2nd gen	Migrant	2nd gen
<i>Attending religious services</i>				
never	36	28	10	9
Family events	22	24	38	61
Religious events	21	29	19	19
Monthly	7	8	13	6
Weekly	14	11	19	6
Correlation(*)	0.39	0.40	0.64	0.57
N	3225	2350	2957	2643
<i>Obeying dietary restrictions</i>				
there are none	0	0	36	32
never	9	4	44	49
sometimes	8	9	10	10
always	83	87	11	9
Correlation (*)	0.63	0.50	0.07	0.11
N	3223	2355	2947	2633
Notes: (*) Polychoric correlation coefficient				

Multivariate analysis: Religious socialization

The final step of the analysis concerns the religious socialization of the second-generation. What variables explain variation in the degree of religiosity among the children of immigrants? The dependent variable is the respondent's assessment of how important religion is in their lives. Given the 4-point scale of the responses, I use ordered logistic regression models. I stratify the data according to the religion of the household in which the second-generation respondent grew up and compare those from Muslim, Christian and non-

religious households. For each group I present two models: the first enters variables that pertain only to parental characteristics or the environment when growing up, thus maintaining strict time-order; the second model also enters respondents' socioeconomic status as well as the religious characteristics of their social networks.

The first set of coefficients show the impact of parental education, with migrants having less than a primary education as the omitted reference category. In both Muslim and Christian families, parents' religion has no consistent effect, with the possible exception of Christians with a primary education, whose children are somewhat less religious. Among those from non-religious families, those whose parents have less than a primary education may in fact be somewhat more religious than the rest (in a context of low levels overall).

By far the most important determinant of respondents' religiosity is the importance of religion in the parental household. This holds for Christians, Muslims, and those in households not identified with a particular religion. Figure 2.1 summarizes marginal effects on the predicted probability of a second-generation respondent falling into the "religion is not at all important" or "religion is very important" categories. For example, *ceteris paribus*, 53% of Muslims who grew up in a home where religion was not important state that religion has no importance in their lives; only 2% of those growing up in very religious homes fall into that same category. While the level of religiosity is overall lower among the children of Christian immigrants, the magnitude of the effect is similar: 80% from non-religious households are themselves non-religious, as opposed to 12% of those from very religious households. But even with the importance of religion controlled, the religious composition of the parental household still matters. Those who grow up with only one religious parent are significantly less religious. Here the effect is larger in Muslim families, with a marginal effect

on the probability of being non-religious of 12 percentage points (24% to 12%), as opposed to 6 points in Christian families (46% to 40%).

The presence of home-country language, on the other hand, has no systematic effect on religiosity in the second generation. Home-country visits increase religiosity only for the Muslim second generation. However, the contrast is statistically significant only between those who never visited and those who went frequently, and even in that case the effect is comparatively small. The density of immigrants in the school, on the other hand, matters only for those from non-religious families, where those with the most heavily immigrant schools (the omitted category) are somewhat more religious than the rest. Among only those where religious socialization in the family is non-existent or very weak do extra-familial factors play a role. Contrary to hypotheses that predict a turning towards religion among those who are not upwardly mobile, I find no association whatsoever between respondents' educational attainment and their religiosity – in no case do coefficients approach conventional levels of statistical significance. Not surprisingly, I do find a strong association between the religiosity and the religious makeup of respondents' social circles. Those who are more religious have more co-religious friends, while those who are unaware of the religious composition of their social circles are less religious. This relationship is significantly stronger among Muslims as compared to the non-religious and Christians. With other variables held constant, the marginal difference in the probability of being non-religious between those with the highest share of co-religious friends to those who don't know their friends' religion is 20 points among Muslims (10% vs 30%) but just 9 points (41% vs 50%) among Christians.

Table 2.5: Ordered logistic regression models of religiosity in the second generation

	Muslim parent(s)				Christian parent(s)				Non-religious parent(s)			
	Coef.	z	Coef.	z	Coef.	z	Coef.	z	Coef.	z	Coef.	z
Parental education: (a)												
primary	0.02	0.16	0.07	0.56	-0.47	-2.79	-0.51	-2.70	-0.26	-0.92	-0.77	-2.30
lower secondary	0.21	1.67	0.26	1.89	-0.28	-1.49	-0.27	-1.32	-0.65	-2.03	-0.92	-2.47
upper secondary	0.05	0.43	0.06	0.45	-0.37	-2.15	-0.34	-1.77	-0.36	-1.29	-0.51	-1.59
tertiary I	0.28	0.75	0.38	0.96	-0.07	-0.37	0.13	0.57	-0.49	-1.37	-0.88	-2.07
tertiary II	0.01	0.03	0.27	0.85	-0.21	-1.05	-0.07	-0.31	-0.59	-1.64	-0.75	-1.83
Religion growing up: (b)												
a bit	1.20	6.03	1.30	5.98	1.78	14.03	1.73	12.76	1.38	7.47	1.37	6.38
some	2.35	11.80	2.36	10.86	2.86	20.90	2.84	19.48	2.71	12.03	2.33	8.91
a lot	4.24	20.52	4.30	19.11	3.70	24.37	3.72	22.81	3.66	14.26	4.27	13.68
One pt non-religious	-1.15	-4.99	-1.17	-4.81	-0.59	-5.17	-0.37	-3.04				
HC lang. growing up (c)												
little	-0.23	-1.18	-0.32	-1.49	-0.07	-0.63	-0.02	-0.17	-0.03	-0.13	-0.10	-0.36
some	-0.13	-0.92	-0.23	-1.59	0.28	2.96	0.33	3.28	-0.27	-1.25	-0.49	-1.93
mostly	-0.02	-0.12	-0.26	-1.40	0.15	0.79	0.20	1.02	-0.23	-0.51	-0.41	-0.67
exclusively	0.15	0.95	-0.06	-0.34	0.11	0.83	0.17	1.12	-0.15	-0.46	-0.34	-0.83
Visited p HC when young (d)												
.... Yes	0.14	0.98	0.07	0.47	0.13	1.23	0.10	0.93	0.15	0.84	-0.16	-0.79
....frequently	0.43	2.86	0.32	2.00	0.10	0.96	0.00	0.01	0.19	0.95	0.00	0.02
Went to school abroad	0.03	0.14	0.01	0.03	-0.08	-0.53	0.06	0.36	-0.06	-0.17	0.26	0.67
Imm. in school: (e)												
> 50%	-0.03	-0.15	-0.01	-0.07	-0.09	-0.43	-0.11	-0.47	-0.65	-1.94	-0.60	-1.65
about 50%	0.10	0.61	0.15	0.84	-0.15	-0.77	-0.09	-0.41	-0.65	-2.05	-0.90	-2.60
< 50 %	-0.19	-1.14	-0.18	-0.96	-0.36	-1.86	-0.29	-1.40	-1.16	-3.71	-1.32	-3.83
almost none	-0.12	-0.61	-0.03	-0.15	-0.29	-1.49	-0.28	-1.34	-0.90	-2.89	-1.17	-3.38
Respondents Education: (f)												
lower secondary			-0.02	-0.04			-0.38	-0.64			-0.72	-0.84
upper secondary			-0.02	-0.03			-0.35	-0.58			-0.52	-0.62
tertiary I			-0.05	-0.09			-0.60	-0.99			-0.95	-1.10
tertiary II			0.05	0.09			-0.46	-0.77			-1.03	-1.17
Friends of same religion (g)												
about half			-0.30	-2.54			0.14	1.34			-0.34	-1.31
lt. half			-0.71	-6.57			0.21	2.03			0.26	1.23
dk			-1.97	-6.50			-0.53	-4.52			-1.38	-4.49
Partner of same religion			0.80	8.09			1.05	12.94			3.08	12.80
Cutpoints												
	0.43		0.05		1.08		1.07		1.41		0.26	
	1.65		1.38		3.04		3.19		2.18		1.26	
	3.40		3.23		4.56		4.76		3.29		2.73	
N	2323		2131		3057		2787		1425		1279	

Notes: The omitted reference categories are:

- a) less than primary education
- b) religion not important growing up
- c) only French spoken when growing up
- d) Did not visit parental home-country when young
- e) almost all students in school of immigrant background
- f) primary education only
- g) more than half of friends of same religion




Figure 2.1: Effect of parental religiosity on religiosity in the second-generation

Discussion and Conclusion

As the preceding analysis shows, the family is the central locus for the intergenerational transmission of religion in migrant families. Intergenerational inheritance is key for the social reproduction of religion generally (Myers 1996), and this is all the more true for the children of immigrants that grow up in a secular environment where non-familial religious influences are weak. At the same time, there are no incentives to abandon religion. As I argued in the introductory section, change in religion does not fit neatly into the rational choice driven assimilation framework. The incentives that drive the acquisition of skills and behaviors that will advance socio-economic objectives but, as an unintended side effect, pull immigrants and especially their children into the “mainstream,” do not apply in the case of religion. Correspondingly, I find no evidence for a “reactive religiosity” theory that would predict a

turning towards religion among those who are not upwardly mobile. Once parental characteristics are controlled, even those members of the second generation that fail to move beyond primary education are no more religious than those who obtain professional degrees or doctorates. More generally, my findings put in doubt the more crude applications of “secularization theory” that link socio-economic mobility to the adoption of non-religious lifestyles.

Indeed, examining the intergenerational trajectory of religiosity, I find little evidence that the immigrant context poses any specific challenges to the intergenerational inheritance of religion. For example, in Christian families there is significant decline in religiosity from immigrant parents to their native born children; but this decline is no greater than the decline from the parents to children among French natives and only somewhat larger than the intergenerational decline from the pre-migrant to the migrant generation. In contrast, differences between religions are significant. Especially striking is the very high degree of intergenerational stability in religiosity in Muslim families. And as the second part of my analysis demonstrated, this stability does not mask an underlying shift towards a symbolic religiosity, *pace* Gans (1994). One could argue that for a larger part of French Muslims religion is mostly an individual (or family) matter, but again the differences between generations are small - only a minority of the first and second generation alike regularly attend religious services.

Although a comprehensive explanation for these remarkable differences in intergenerational stability between Christian and Muslim families is beyond the scope of this paper, some possible mechanisms are worth noting here. First, there likely are qualitative differences in the religious fields: The different experiences of secularization - understood as

the re-alignment of the relationship between religious and political spheres - in majority Christian versus majority Muslim countries likely has profound implications for the social reproduction of religion. This is especially significant for the majority of Christian immigrants in France who, coming from other European countries, were socialized in a Christianity that has become increasingly marginalized in the public sphere and is less vibrant more generally. Thus, the steeper decline in the religiosity of Christians as compared to that of Muslims may be rooted in dynamics beyond the national immigrant reception context, transnational factors in the true sense of the word. Yet there could also be distinct domestic, immigrant specific, factors that create these different trajectories. The status of Islam as a politicized minority religion may keep at bay social forces that otherwise would lead to a decline in religiosity. Precisely because Islam is a key identity marker for migrants and thus entangled with ethnic identities, attachment to religion and social pressures for adherence may be greater for Muslim as compared to Christians immigrants, for whom religious identity does not overlap with minority status or ethnicity.

While consistency and continuity in Muslim migrants' religiosity are the central finding for the first and second generation, this paper also points to factors that may spell decline in the third and later generations. Although in Muslim immigrant families religious socialization in the family is largely sufficient for the social reproduction of religion into the next generation, the religious composition of families *does* change and with it the basis for religious socialization of the subsequent generation. Moreover, this is one aspect in which the situation of the second generation *is* different from that of their immigrant parents. Coming of age in religiously pluralist (and largely secular) societies, the pool of potential partners is much more heterogeneous in terms of religion and religiosity. And indeed, on this indicator

we do see significant change from the migrant to the native born second generation. Whereas religious homogamy is overwhelming among Muslim migrants, a significant share (about 30%) of their offspring has a non-religious partner or a partner from a different religion. And as shown in the regression analysis, the children of religiously non-homogamous parents are significantly less religious - even controlling for the religiosity of their parents. Thus, shifts in religiosity among Muslim immigrant populations may follow what Gordon (1964) called structural assimilation. While there is relatively little change in religiosity from parents to children, the fact that the children are more likely to form non-homogamous couples, and the fact that the children of non-homogamous couples are more likely to be much less religious, means that non-trivial declines in religiosity by the third generation would be an unsurprising development.

European states over the last decades have made increasing accommodation for religious diversity and specifically for Islam. This process is by no means finished, and the degree to which it will be challenging arguably will depend on the religiosity of future Muslim populations. If the offspring of Muslim immigrants were to be nominally religious like the nominally Christian mainstream populations, contestations around the accommodation of religion most likely would be comparatively low-key. However, this paper suggests that at least in the near future demographic developments will not “solve” the problem of religious diversity. The medium to long-run may well bring some decline in religiosity among the grandchildren of the original immigrants. But by then continued immigration may well replenish the stock of highly religious newcomers - and as Keynes famously said, in the long run we are all dead. Thus, the French, and Europeans more generally, would do well to grow

comfortable not only with people of a different religion but also with people for whom religion is much more important than it is for the “mainstream” populations of Europe.

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Chapter 3

Language, religion and the schooling experiences of the children of immigrants

Introduction

Cultural practices such as home-country language or religion play a dual role in migrant families. Besides providing access to resources in ethnic social networks, such practices can be an important resource for maintaining family cohesion, ties to the home country, and a positive sense of identity. At the same time, segments of the host society often politicize these cultural practices as markers of difference, which in turn can produce the negative consequences of social distance such as experiences or perceptions of discrimination.

Drawing on questions about the schooling experiences of the children of immigrants sampled as part of a recent nationally representative survey in France, this paper explores this tension. I examine how the presence of two key cultural practices - home-country language and religion - in immigrant households influences the degree to which the children of migrants perceive being discriminated against and how they react to such discrimination.

I find that the second generation growing up in Muslim families reports significantly more experiences of discrimination than those in Christian or non-religious families. Though the degree of religiosity in the family does not explain variation in the degree of discrimination reported by the children of Muslim immigrants, those who grow up in more

religious households are less likely to report adverse reactions to the discrimination that they do report; for these children, discrimination is less likely to lead to diminished confidence or motivation to succeed in school. For those in Christian families, on the other hand, religiosity is associated with increased reports of discrimination, as is greater exposure to the parental home-country language when growing up. At the same time, for the children of Christian immigrants, religion does not dampen their negative reactions to reported experiences of discrimination. Similarly, transmission of the parental home-country language does not seem to have protective effects against perceived discrimination.

The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, it adds to research on the educational experiences of the second generation. A growing concern about ethnic stratification has generated a vast literature examining potential links between minority status and socio-economic disadvantage (Heath et al. 2008). The second generation's educational attainment is a central part of this larger question, and their schooling experiences, in turn, are one key element in explaining the link between immigrant background and educational outcomes. While there is a fair amount of qualitative research on the schooling experiences of immigrants' children in Europe, quantitative work on the question has been scant thus far, particularly for the French case (Heath et al. 2008).¹

Second, this paper also engages the broader literature on ethnicity by examining the interplay between the role of cultural practices as resources and modes of connection, and their role as markers of distinction vis-a-vis the majority population. Building on Barth's (1969) seminal work, the focus in this literature has been on the configurations and dynamics of ethnic boundaries rather than on what Barth dismissively called the "cultural stuff". In its

most orthodox form, this focus on the boundary treats as epiphenomenal whatever ethno-cultural differences may exist between two populations. Rather than being in any way related to cultural practices, in this view, ethnicity is made *at* the boundary - in the interaction with the ethnic “other”. A large literature in turn has examined the socio-political factors that shape the exact location and salience of ethnic boundaries (Wimmer 2008b; Bail 2008).

However, some recent work does consider the cultural content of ethnicity - the practices that members of an ethnic “group” share (Cornell 1996; Jenkins 1997; Brubaker 2013). To be sure, rather than disputing the relevance of theories that highlight the role of socio-political forces in making ethnic boundaries, this perspective seeks to complement these theories based on the following insight: even if cultural characteristics in-and-of themselves are not at the root of ethnic boundaries, the cultural content can very well matter for subsequent ethnic boundary dynamics (Joppke 2013).

Building on this line of work, this paper argues that in some cases there will be an asymmetry between, on the one hand, the way that cultural practices map onto the dynamics of ethno-cultural differentiation, and, on the other, the way that they provide resources and social bonds. Depending on the exact shape of these relationships, this asymmetry can create different incentives with different consequences: some of these incentives will tend to stabilize, and others to de-stabilize, cultural differences over time and across generations.

First, I argue that the degree of participation in the shared culture will matter for “internal” dynamics – the sense of belonging and the degree to which an individual can profit from psychological and other resources. Individuals who are more fluent in their minority language will have more access to the ethnic social networks and resources than those who

¹ I review exceptions in the following sections, which discuss the literature in more detail.

have only minimal command. Similarly, people who are very religious will profit more from the three Rs - “refuge, resources and respectability” (Hirschman 2004) - that religion can provide. The strength of this relationship and the overall “payoff” will likely vary, with some cultural practices providing more access than others to resources and comfort.

As for how cultural differences map onto social distance, there are two qualitatively different possibilities. First, home-country culture can be a marker (or indicator) of social distance. This implies a *continuous* relationship between the degree of involvement in home-country culture and migrants’ social distance from the mainstream. Though not explicitly stated, this is the model that underlies Alba and Nee’s (2003) neo-classic assimilation theory. As migrants learn the ropes of the host society they loose ethnic attachments and practices, and the social distance from the mainstream decreases. The degree to which home-country culture is associated with social distance can vary, and of course one possibility is that there is no such tradeoff. For example, use of home-country language in principle is perfectly compatible with fluency in the host-country language, and thus in some cases it may not contribute to social distance from the “mainstream”.

A second option is that a cultural trait is the marker of *categorical* differences, making the “how much” question for such a trait largely superfluous. In these cases, “[t]he degree of shared culture may indeed be minimal; furthermore, beyond this symbolizing threshold, the extent of shared culture is irrelevant to whether or not a given identity is, in fact, ethnic.” (Cornell 1996: 269).

In the language of rational choice, the diagrams in figure 3.1 illustrate the tradeoffs between these two sides of cultural membership. Consider an immigrant family (i) and a cultural membership or practice (C). As shown in panel 1 in the leftmost column of figure

3.1, insofar as a cultural practice is a resource for migrants, the utility U that they derive from it will, up to a point, increase with practice/membership in C . The exact degree of resources will vary depending on the context and the practice in question - as indicated by the arrows in the diagram. At the same time, vis-a-vis the host society home-country culture may be a source of difference and thus impose costs on migrants. As shown in panel 2.1, one possibility is that a cultural practice also marks a salient social *category*, in which case a migrant (or migrant family) who has a level of cultural membership/practice $c_i > c^*$ will likely face a discrete “cost” Δu of being part of the the minority group. Alternatively, the cultural practice can reflect a continuous process of social distancing (panel 2.2). As indicated by the arrows, the extent to which these costs are imposed will again be specific to the context and cultural practice in question.

When overlaying these two relationships (see the third column of figure 3.1), one can see that the immigrant family in the first case – i.e., a family that has a level of cultural practice c_i that is (significantly) higher than c^* - faces a situation where a decrease in cultural practice would mean a lower utility, even though acculturation and exit from the minority category eventually might be beneficial. But if a degree of acculturation permissive of boundary crossing is not feasible (or if it is uncertain), then maintaining the degree of practice, even increasing it, will be the rational strategy. In the case of a continuous cost function, the incentive to maintain the cultural practice will depend on the relative steepness of the cost and benefit functions. But even if, as indicated in the schematic representation of the diagram, the overall difference in utility Δu is the same, the resulting incentive structures will be quite different.

To give an example from the domain of religion (one of the practices examined in this paper): identifying as Muslim in Europe, and being identified as such, means being more likely to experience or at least perceive discrimination, regardless of one's degree of religiosity. Thus as depicted in panel 2.1, above a certain, threshold, indeed a very low one, a Muslim identity imposes a cost. At the same time, however, being more religious may provide more resources (social, psychic, etc.), and such benefits likely increase in some continuous fashion, with declining returns at high levels (panel 1). The foregoing describes a consequential asymmetry: the costs of belonging to the category Muslim do not significantly change with the degree of religiosity, but, given membership in the category, more religious individuals accrue more of the benefits of being religious and being part of a religious community. Taken together, this asymmetry creates a dynamic whereby maintaining a high level of religiosity within and across generations may in fact be a rational strategy for immigrant families (see panel 3.2). Given the perceived costs (e.g., discrimination) of simple membership in the category Muslim, any decrease in religiosity would impose a "negative return" all the way and up until one crosses the final threshold into the "mainstream"; only then would a decline in membership (religiosity) imply a positive return. In contrast, as the following sections will show, in the case of migrants' home-country languages regardless of religion, and in the case of religiosity differences in Christian families, the "cost curve" is continuous, resulting in a relationship where, as qualitatively summarized in panel 3.2, there is no incentive to maintain high levels of practice.

I will return to the implications of these dynamics and how contextual factors may alter them in the concluding section of the paper. I now turn to an analysis of the case at hand: reports of discrimination of the second generation in the school context and their reactions

to these experiences. The following section summarizes the relationships I will analyze, and reviews the relevant literature. I then introduce the data and provide background information about the case before presenting the analysis and summarizing results.




Figure 3.1: Schematic summary of cost-benefit in a case where cultural practice is the basis of a social categorization or distance but at the same time provides socio-psychological benefits.

The schooling experiences of the second generation

The socio-economic integration of the children of migrants will critically determine the long-term consequences of recent and continuing immigration. And in the knowledge-centered economies of Western-Europe, where manufacturing jobs are exceedingly scarce, education

is a key prerequisite for economic mobility. Thus, if immigrant offspring disproportionately struggle in school, leaving with only basic credentials, then persistent ethnic stratification could be a worrisome long term consequence of labor migration.

Not surprisingly, researchers have given much attention to the schooling outcomes of the immigrant second generation. Because the large majority of labor migrants came with little formal education, one important issue is the extent to which second-generation educational outcomes result from the socio-economic position of their parents rather than from their migrant status per se. In other words, are differences in educational attainment (or other socioeconomic differences) between migrants and natives based on the same sorting and tracking processes that also apply to natives but that may disproportionately affect certain migrant populations due to their low socio-economic standing? Or do they tend to reflect processes that are specific to their immigrant or minority status? Regarding sorting and tracking processes, comparisons across European countries emphasize the importance of educational systems: when and how students are sorted into educational tracks; how many second chances are offered; and how young adults transition into the labor market. As some researchers have argued, these factors are much more important in determining education and labor market outcomes than are official integration policies (Crul and Vermeulen 2003). And these 'generic' institutional arrangements of course affect both natives and immigrants.

Indeed, research on different immigrant groups reveals that the educational differences between youth of native and immigrant origin disappear in many cases once socio-economic background is properly controlled (Marks 2005). Though the findings of individual studies differ, this is generally the case for immigrant groups of (southern) European ancestry such as Portuguese, Italian, Greek and Ex-Yugoslavians, including those in France (Brinbaum and

Cebolla-Boado 2007). In some cases, such as some southeast Asian groups, immigrant offspring even outperform their native origin peers (Rothon 2007). For other immigrant populations, however, mostly those from (formerly) less-developed, majority-Muslim countries such as Turkey, Morocco or Pakistan, significant disadvantages remain even after controlling for parental background (Heath et al. 2008).

What, then, are the factors affecting educational outcomes that are specific to migrant families? Language barriers, especially lack of parental knowledge of the host country language, are one plausible immigrant-specific mechanism. Though the vast majority of the children of immigrants that are born and raised in the destination country are fluent in the host country language (Esser 2006; Diehl and Schnell 2006), it is reasonable to expect that limited *parental* knowledge of the host country language could create a disadvantage in the educational sphere (Van De Werfhorst and Van Tubergen 2007; Heath et al. 2008). On the other hand, the comparative view cited above would suggest that these effects are limited in their magnitude, because most immigrant groups where socio-economic status accounts for differences in educational outcomes have a linguistic barrier to overcome.

But immigrants' cultural characteristics such as language and religion can be categorical markers that increase one's chances of experiencing discrimination. The clearest evidence for discrimination based on cultural markers comes from audit studies of the labor market where identical resumes bearing different "ethnic" names are sent out; those that purportedly belong to migrant minorities elicit a lower call-back rate (Fibbi et al. 2006). The expectation of discrimination in the labor market may influence decisions about investments in education – why continue school if it will be impossible to find a job anyway? But this hypothesis does not have much empirical support. There is no evidence for lower returns to education for the

second generation, and ethnographic research suggests that these issues do not factor into decisions about whether to continue school (Heath et al. 2008; Modood 2004).

However, differential treatment in school may well affect educational outcomes. Research suggests that teachers stereotype minority youth—e.g., Black youth as less able and prone to discipline problems, Asian youth as model students (Mac an Ghail 1988). Other work shows that teachers have lower expectations towards immigrant offspring in general, which may account for a non-trivial share of the performance gap between natives and immigrant-origin students (Rangvid 2007).

In most surveys minority children report a higher incidence of discrimination than do those of native origin. As I will discuss in more detail in subsequent sections, it is hard to determine the extent to which higher perceptions of discrimination reflect actual incidence of discrimination. But whether the discrimination is real or perceived may in the end not matter all that much; rather, what matters is how minority individuals react. As Tariq Modood put it: “An appeal to racism by itself may have little explanatory value without considering how a target group reacts to exclusion” (2004, 94).

Insofar as cultural difference is associated with membership in a marginalized category, it has generally negative consequences on educational attainment. However, migrants’ culture and the belonging it affords can also be a resource for migrant families. As researchers working within the segmented assimilation paradigm have pointed out, some groups pursue selective acculturation strategies that maintain home-country cultural practices and that keep negative influences at bay. These strategies tend to compensate for experiences of exclusion and even provide advantages in socio-economic mobility over native families (Gibson 1988;

Bankston and Zhou 2000; Bankston and Zhou 1995; Zhou and Bankston 1998; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Hao 2002).

This argument is most broadly developed in the concept of “second-generation advantage” in the Kasinitz et al. (2008) study of second-generation immigrants in New York City. Comparing immigrant populations to their “proximal neighbors” - populations that are similarly classified in ethnic terms in the US - Kasinitz and his colleagues argue that migration background confers advantages in terms of socio-economic mobility. Dominicans (the immigrant origin group) do better in terms of education and labor market outcomes than their Puerto Rican peers (the native origin group in the same ethno-racial category); the children of West-Indian immigrants do better than native born Blacks; and the children of both Russian-Jewish and Chinese immigrants have higher achievement than native born Whites once parental socioeconomic variable are controlled. Similarly, Ogbu (2003) finds that native Black students do less well in school than the children of Black immigrants. These studies essentially “control” - on a group level - for any effects that may come from different ethnic categorization. The second-generation advantage then is rooted in the ability of migrants’ children to “combine aspects of their parents’ and American culture in ways that can contribute to success” (Alba et al. 2010). One source of the second-generation advantage is access to resources in the ethnic social networks that are an integral part of the migration process itself (Massey 1998). Other factors include the maintenance of cultural values that foster academic achievement as well as a greater degree of resource pooling within families

Maintaining homeland-oriented cultural identities can also protect against hostile social environments. For example, Waters (1999) in her seminal study of the children of Caribbean immigrants in New York City finds that maintaining a distinct origin-country identity is a

strategy to keep at bay negative stereotypes that Black youth face. More recent quantitative research on second-generation adults in Belgium by Baysu et al. (2011) speaks directly to this phenomenon. In contrast to Kasinitiz et al. (2008), Baysu and colleagues find a mixed picture with regard to “dual” identity strategies. They compare educational performance among three categories of second-generation students: those who are “assimilated”, those who maintain separate identities from the mainstream, and those who pursue “dual identity” strategies. While dual identifiers do better in contexts with low perceived discrimination, they do significantly worse than the other two when faced with discrimination. In contrast, those respondents who are “assimilated” and consider themselves part of the mainstream fare well regardless of the context. Those who maintain a distinct ethnic/migrant identity fare less well in higher education institutions (where discrimination is generally low) but are more resilient in contexts where identity threat is prevalent.²

Building on these arguments, this paper evaluates the consequences that the family cultural context and the intergenerational transmission of migrant cultural practices have for perceptions of discrimination and the reactions to perceived discrimination. However, rather than analyzing ‘identities’ or ‘identity strategies’, I follow the perspective developed in Soehl and Waldinger (2012) and examine the transmission of distinct skills or practices. As I will elaborate in the concluding section, each cultural practice can present a distinct set of tradeoffs. Focussing on the transmission of cultural practices also has the advantage of establishing a clear temporal sequence and thus helps to avoid the reverse causation problem: do identities (or cultural repertoires) affect schooling outcomes, or do those who embrace

² Early work by Child (1943) on Italian-American youth in New Haven similarly argues that those with a dual identity are most vulnerable.

certain identities and cultural practices do so as a consequence of schooling experiences (Baysu et al. 2011)?

This paper argues that parents make choices about the degree to which they will invest in the transmission of home-country cultural practices to their children. If immigrant parents anticipate that their children – barring an unlikely traversal of the boundary into the mainstream³ - will face discrimination, then imbuing their offspring with home-country cultural heritage to buffer against experiences of discrimination is a rational strategy. If, on the other hand, the tradeoff is such that higher degrees of cultural transmission are associated with greater social distance, as shown in panel 3.2 of figure 3.1, then there is less incentive for parents to transmit their cultural practice to the next generation.

To test these hypotheses, this paper will examine two sets of relationships (see figure 3.2). First, how does exposure to the parental home-country language and religion when growing up shape the degree to which the children of migrants perceive being discriminated against in school? Secondly, for those who do report experiences of discrimination, how does exposure to these cultural practices when growing up channel their reactions – do they withdraw academically or possibly re-double their efforts?

³ See Zolberg and Long (1999) and Alba (2005) for a typology of boundary changes whereby “boundary crossing” reflects individuals moving across social boundaries and become part of the “mainstream”




Figure 3.2: Summary of relationships examined in the empirical analysis

Perceptions and experiences of discrimination

Experiences and perceptions of discrimination - the topic of this paper - are key examples of the everyday enactment of ethnicity (Brubaker 2006). As mentioned, it is important to note that the key variable recorded in survey data - reports of discrimination - entail both the acts of others and the interpretation of those acts by the respondent. Thus, discrimination can occur but not be perceived as such by the respondent. At the same time, an act that was not discriminatory can be interpreted and perceived as such (Phinney et al. 1998). Although the distinction between perceptions and the actual level of discrimination is important for many inquiries, for research on the psychological consequences of discrimination this distinction is

irrelevant - what matters is the perception of discrimination, as this constitutes the “psychological reality” that shapes the actions of the children of immigrants (Dion and Kawakami 1996).

But how does cultural difference shape perceptions of discrimination? First, it is likely that cultural difference (from the majority group) does increase the chances of being discriminated against. Notwithstanding a significant expansion of minority cultural rights, and notwithstanding an increasingly powerful discourse about tolerance and the virtues of diversity, ethno-cultural minorities are still exposed to plenty of instances of unequal treatment, from informal discrimination in everyday encounters to unequal treatment in government institutions or socio-economic domains such as the labor market. Researchers in Europe have amply documented discrimination against Muslims in particular (Fibbi et al. 2006), but other culturally marked groups are likely to experience disadvantage as well.

At the same time, ethno-cultural identities also shape perceptions of discrimination. As Brubaker and colleagues note, ethnicity is a principle of “vision and division of the social world” (Brubaker et al. 2004). Both mechanisms imply that the location of symbolic boundaries should predict perceptions of discrimination. Individuals who are members of a socially salient ethnic category will be more likely to experience actual discrimination, but they may also be more likely (justifiably so) to interpret the actions of others as discriminatory.

What, then, are the salient categories in Europe, and France in particular? Looking at the religious characteristics of migrant families, there are two boundary dynamics in place. As numerous observers have noted, Islam is a central symbolic boundary in Europe (Zolberg and Long 1999; Casanova 2006; Foner and Alba 2008). Given the diversity of immigrants in

Europe, Islam stands out as the unifying mode of cultural difference, at times becoming a synonym for “problematic” migrants that are seen as incompatible with the secular, liberal-democratic self-image of Western Europe (Cesari 2004).

However, there is another dimension to religion as a social boundary marker. France, just like the rest of Europe, is an increasingly secular society. Thus not only Islam but the higher religiosity of migrants *in general* may provide a social boundary. In the case of Muslim migrants, who are on average significantly more religious than the French majority population, these two dimensions of religious difference overlap. For Christian migrants, who do not face a denominational religious boundary, being very religious may nevertheless be a salient mode of social difference.

In Europe the overwhelming focus is on religion as a politicized mode of cultural difference, with language receiving much less attention. However, this does not mean that the parental home-country language could not also be a salient aspect of identity and thus a correlate of social distance. For example, recent work by Beier and Kroneberg (2013) shows that migrants’ and second-generation respondents’ life-satisfaction is lower when they have limited host-country language ability in a context where language is a salient social boundary marker. Given the near universal fluency in French and the low rates of parental home-country language retention in the second generation (see Chapter 1), however, this is likely to be a less salient social identity and relevant only for those who do not fit religious cleavages.

Summarizing the preceding discussion, family cultural practices are likely to predict the likelihood of reporting instances of discrimination in school but will do so in different ways. Given the configuration of symbolic boundaries in France (and Europe more generally), I expect that those children of immigrants who grow up in Muslim families will be more likely

to report experiences of discrimination (H1). At the same time I expect that among Muslims the degree of religiosity in the family growing up will not strongly predict the likelihood of reporting discrimination (H2). Other religions and non-French languages may also demarcate distance to the host society. However, boundaries will likely not be categorical but rather depend on the degree to which the practice is salient in the family. Other factors held constant, I expect that only those most immersed in home-country language or religion (excluding Islam) will report more discrimination (H3).

Reactions to Discrimination

Discrimination (its absence or presence) is a central factor in both the neo-classic assimilation paradigm (Alba and Nee 2003) as well as the segmented assimilation approach (Portes and Zhou 1993). In the Alba and Nee model the absence of systematic discrimination is a prerequisite for the rational choice driven process whereby immigrants in the pursuit of socio-economic opportunities adopt mainstream strategies, and, over time and generations, lose ethnic attachments and cultural practices. The segmented assimilation approach takes a broader view, explicitly including informal discrimination or hostile reception on the part of the host society in its purview. The effects of what is one aspect of a larger “context of reception” depend on the resources available in the ethnic community as well as other contextual factors. For some groups social and cultural capital within the ethnic networks can offset the negative effects of discrimination; in other cases, discrimination by the majority group can lead to the adoption of alternative, non-mainstream attitudes and life

strategies including dropping out of school (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

Other work has linked perceptions of discrimination to low self-esteem as well as decreased school attachment and performance (Rumbaut 1994; Ogbu 2003; Fisher et al. 2000). For example, Stone and Han (2005) show that perceptions of unfair treatment in school are consistently associated with lower grades, a higher likelihood of dropping out, and the need for remedial education. Longitudinal studies among African-American and Chinese-American students alike show that experiences of discrimination predict negative schooling outcomes (Benner and Kim 2009; Massey and Fischer 2005; Mendoza-Denton et al. 2002). Experimental evidence from social psychology research shows how stereotype threat (the fear of confirming negative stereotypes about a group) negatively affects academic performance (Steele 1997; Steele et al. 2002).

A related line of research emphasizes the protective effects of ethnic and cultural identities. A number of studies point to the association between ethnic identity and psychological well-being across a variety of ethno-cultural and racial identities (Tsai et al. 2001; Umana-Taylor et al. 2002; Sellers et al. 2003). More recent work specifically shows that ethno-cultural identities can buffer against stressful experiences (Kiang et al. 2006) and decrease negative reactions to discrimination (Phelan et al. 1991; Mossakowski 2003; Sellers et al. 2003; Scott 2003). As these findings show, home-culture-oriented socialization can be an effective parental strategy to provide the second generation with socio-psychological resources for coping with experiences of discrimination and achieving upward mobility.

Religion in particular is likely to produce these protective effects. Early research on immigrants' religion emphasized the importance of socio-psychological resources (Herberg

1955). As Foner and Alba summarize: “Because religious organizations provide an all encompassing system of belief, as well as a community where immigrants gather and form networks of mutual support with co-ethnics, they provide a psychological ballast helping to ameliorate the traumas of early settlement and frequent encounter with discrimination.” (Foner and Alba 2008). Looking specifically at the children of migrants, Bankston and Zhou (1995) find positive effects of participation in ethnic churches on academic outcomes, aspirations, and protection against destructive behaviors.

Thus, I expect that among those who report experiences of discrimination in school, higher degrees of parental socialization in the home-country language or religion buffer against negative reactions to these experiences (H4). In particular, I expect the degree of religion when growing up to provide a buffering effect.

Data and Variables

The data for this paper are part of the Trajectories et Origins (TeO) project carried out by the French national demographic institute (INED) in 2009. The TeO is a nationally representative survey of about 20,000 respondents, of which about 8,000 were immigrants and another 8,000 were the children of immigrants - the focus of this paper. The survey asked respondents a long list of questions about socio-economic characteristics including their school trajectories and experiences in school. Important for the present analysis, respondents were also asked about the religious and linguistic practices in their homes when they were growing up. A table with summary statistics for all variables can be found in the appendix.

Dependent variables: Experiences of and reactions to discrimination in school.

The TeO asked respondents whether they were treated better or worse (or the same) than other students when they went to school in France. Questions focused on four types of school interactions: grading, career orientation, discipline or punishment, and the way students were addressed. Those who reported being treated differently in at least one way were then asked against which of the following characteristics they thought the discrimination was directed: sex, health or disability, skin color, origins or nationality, way of dressing, age, and any other. Because I am interested in discrimination related to putative ethnic characteristics, I code as perceiving ethnic discrimination only those variables that unambiguously pertain to ethnicity: skin color and national origin.⁴

According to this definition about 13% of respondents state that they have been treated differently due to their ethnic background. In contrast only 3% report discrimination on any of the other “non-ethnic” characteristics (not including the “other” category). Of those reporting differential treatment due to their ethnic background, 96% report only negative discrimination (i.e., that they were treated worse than other students).

Another set of items, asked only of those respondents who report experiences of discrimination, probed what their reactions to these experiences were – did the respondent lose confidence, become disinterested, or gain extra motivation? I combined answers to

⁴ Dropping this restriction and defining as discriminated anyone who experienced differential treatment does not alter the substantive conclusions of this paper. Also, analyzing only discrimination related to national origin provides substantively similar results, though the variation is less overall and thus some coefficient to standard error ratios are lower.

these three items into a single scale that, ranging from zero to three, counts the number of negative reactions a respondent had.⁵ Respondents who experienced discrimination were about evenly distributed on this scale: 29% reported no negative reaction, 30% reported one negative reaction, 22% two negative reactions, and just under 20% reported all three types of disengagement from school.

Independent variables:

The key independent variables in my analysis pertain to the transmission of home-country cultural practices in the family.

- *Parental religion when growing up:* The TeO survey asked respondents about the religious affiliation of their parents when they were growing up. The raw data distinguish 13 different categories that I collapse into four indicators: Christian, Muslim, non-religious, and all other religions. If only one of the parents had a religion, I placed the respondent in the category of the religious parent. Thus, a respondent growing up with a Christian mother and a non-religious father is categorized as growing up in a Christian household. A separate variable captures the presumably lower importance that religion had in this family as compared to a family where both parents are religious (see below). I omit the small share of respondents who grew up in families where parents are from different religions.

⁵ I reverse-coded the answer to the question about extra motivation. I did not use a fourth item “motivated you to look for work” as there is some ambiguity whether this indicates a motivating or dispirited reaction.

- *Importance of religion growing up:* The TeO survey asked respondents how important religion was when they were growing up. Answers were recorded on a 4-point scale from “not important at all” to “very important”. I enter this variable as a series of indicators with the least religious comprising the omitted reference category.
- *Exposure to parental home-country language:* The TeO survey asked respondents about the languages their parents spoke with them when growing up. For each parent I coded these answers into a 3 point scale of increasing exposure to the home-country language: 0 if only French was mentioned, 1 if both French and another language were mentioned and 2 if only another language was mentioned. I then added both parental scales to get an overall measure of the respondent’s childhood linguistic environment, which ranges from 0 (only French) to 4 (only other language).

Control Variables:

I include the following control variables in my analysis.

- *Parental Education:* Parental education may shape experiences and reactions to discrimination in a variety of ways. Offspring of more highly educated parents may be more sensitized to slights; on the other hand, they may also go to better schools where discrimination is less tolerated and less likely to happen in the first place. For those who do experience discrimination the effects are probably less severe among the privileged who are more likely to have resources and coping strategies to prevent negative outcomes. To control for these influences, I include a measure of parental education (highest of both parents) that distinguishes six categories of parental

education, from those with less than a primary education (omitted category) all the way to those with advanced degrees.

- *Exposure to the parental home country:* Just like exposure to the home-country cultural practices that are the center of this inquiry, exposure to the parental home country may shape experiences and perceptions of discrimination. To control for this possibility I include two measures. First, the TeO survey asked respondents whether they visited their parents' home country "frequently," "sometimes," or "never" (omitted reference category). Second, an even more immersive experience is going to school in the home country, and the TeO data allow me to distinguish those who received any of their schooling abroad from those who received schooling only in France.
- *Share of immigrants in the school:* I include the share of foreign born in the respondents' school. The TeO distinguished five categories: almost all (omitted category), more than half, about half, less than half and almost none.

Analysis and Results

The analysis is based on two sets of logistic regression models. A first set predicts whether a respondent reports an experience of discrimination. A second set examines the subset who did experience discrimination, treating their reaction as the dependent variable. Each set presents three models. The first model includes all second-generation respondents (omitting, as noted, those from mixed religious families) and includes a set of dummy variables to differentiate by religious category. Models 2 and 3 then stratify the sample, estimating the

same model for only those growing up in Muslim families and only those with a Christian upbringing respectively. In addition, I estimate model 1 for the subset of respondents with origins in Africa and Northern Africa respectively. Tables A3.2 and A3.3 (see appendix) summarize these results, along with the original model 1 for comparison..

Reports of discrimination in school

Table 3.1 summarizes the results of a logistic regression model predicting whether a second-generation respondent experienced discrimination by teachers during their time in school.

As the first model shows, by far the largest differences are between religious categories. To illustrate, when one holds all other variables at their observed values, the difference in the predicted probability of someone from a Muslim family reporting discrimination is 15 percentage points higher than and more than triple the predicted probability for someone from a Christian background (21% vs. 6%). Turning to the indicators for religious and linguistic socialization, one sees that growing up in a religious family is indeed associated with a higher probability of reporting discrimination. However, the effects are much smaller than they are for the Muslim-Christian difference. The difference between growing up in a monolingual French setting and being immersed in the home-country language is a modest 5 points: 10% versus 15%. The effect of religious socialization is of a similar magnitude: the model predicts a 10% probability of reporting discrimination for those growing up in families where religion is not important, as compared to 14% for those in the most religious families.

Disaggregating the analysis by parental religion reveals that the level of religion present when growing up does not matter for those in Muslim families, but it does for Christians

(though the coefficient is significant only at the 0.1 level). Exposure to the parental home-country language shows the same pattern. In the overall sample those with greater exposure to the parental language were more likely to report discrimination, but there is no effect for those from Muslim families and a significant effect for Christian families.

As for control variables, parental educational background does not have a consistent effect on experiences of discrimination. Only the coefficients of the two highest education categories approach statistical significance at conventional levels, and their effects are contradictory. Those with parents who have a secondary education are somewhat more likely to report experiences of discrimination while those in the highest category are less likely to do so. Based on the sub-sample analyses in models 2 and 3, it appears that the former result is driven by an association in Christian families and the latter by an association in Muslim families. The variables indicating exposure to the parental home-country do not show any significant association with discrimination.

The results support the hypotheses about qualitatively different associations between cultural characteristics and social difference as reflected in reports of discrimination. Islam's status as a marker of categorical social difference in France is reflected in the fact that those growing up in Muslim families are more than three times as likely to report experiences of discrimination than all other respondents. At the same time, the degree of religious socialization among Muslims does not matter nor does the childhood linguistic environment. For those from Muslim families, experiences and perceptions of discrimination in school are foremost a matter of *categorical membership* - and not of the degree of cultural membership (or practice). In contrast, among non-Muslims religiosity and home-country language do signal a *gradual* social distance. My results show that for those who were raised in Christian immigrant

families the degree of cultural socialization matters: the presence of home-country language when growing up does predict reports of discrimination in school, and there is some indication that the most religious are also more likely to feel discriminated against.

Table 3.1: Logistic regression predicting reports of discrimination by teachers

	All respondents			Muslim Families			Christian Families		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	Coef.	Std. Err.	z
Parental Educ									
primary	-0.16	0.11	-1.42	-0.21	0.13	-1.68	0.02	0.31	0.08
lower secondary	-0.13	0.13	-1.04	-0.11	0.14	-0.77	-0.26	0.37	-0.72
upper secondary	-0.07	0.12	-0.58	-0.06	0.15	-0.39	0.05	0.33	0.14
tertiary I	0.33	0.20	1.65	-0.59	0.47	-1.27	1.00	0.36	2.81
tertiary II	-0.46	0.23	-1.95	-0.99	0.45	-2.19	-0.10	0.41	-0.24
Importance of Relig									
a bit	0.14	0.14	0.96	0.05	0.22	0.23	-0.30	0.22	-1.38
some	0.28	0.15	1.90	-0.02	0.21	-0.09	0.21	0.22	0.98
a lot	0.38	0.14	2.67	0.16	0.21	0.79	0.41	0.22	1.85
Language (French only)									
1 (mostly French)	0.24	0.15	1.57	0.09	0.24	0.35	0.29	0.23	1.29
2 (both)	0.45	0.11	3.91	0.16	0.17	0.99	0.63	0.19	3.37
3 (mostly other)	0.42	0.16	2.61	0.14	0.21	0.68	0.63	0.35	1.80
4 (other only)	0.53	0.14	3.90	0.22	0.19	1.16	0.88	0.25	3.53
Visit to par. HC									
yes	0.07	0.12	0.56	0.19	0.18	1.08	-0.12	0.20	-0.62
frequently	0.05	0.12	0.45	0.33	0.18	1.81	-0.35	0.20	-1.79
Attend school abroad	0.26	0.18	1.48	0.37	0.25	1.44	0.20	0.28	0.69
Share immigrants in school									
> 50%	-0.18	0.17	-1.06	-0.29	0.20	-1.46	0.13	0.36	0.36
about 50%	-0.15	0.16	-0.92	-0.29	0.19	-1.47	0.15	0.35	0.43
< 50 %	-0.17	0.16	-1.06	-0.04	0.19	-0.18	-0.32	0.35	-0.92
almost none	-0.03	0.17	-0.18	0.32	0.21	1.52	-0.42	0.36	-1.19
Religion growing up: (Christian)									
None	-0.22	0.19	-1.12						
Muslim	1.19	0.10	11.98						
Other	-0.16	0.22	-0.75						
Constant	-2.85	0.23	-12.16	-1.39	0.31	-4.49	-2.73	0.48	-5.70
N	6748			2357			3115		

Reactions to discrimination

The next set of models, summarized in Table 3.2, deals with the subset of the sample that reported discrimination. These models examine how the same group of variables shape this subset's reactions to discrimination. Because the dependent variable is a summary score of the number of adverse academic reactions that ranges from 0 to 3, I employ an ordered logistic regression model.

Focusing on the key independent variables, language and religion, one can see that religious socialization has a very large protective effect for those from Muslim families, but not for those from Christian ones. Immersion in the home-country language, on the other hand, has no effect. Holding all other variables at their observed values, the probability of respondents from Muslim families reporting no adverse reaction to discrimination was two times as great for those from families where religion is very important as compared to those from families where religion plays no role: 38% versus 19%. Similarly the predicted probability of reporting all three negative reactions is just 15% for those from Muslim families where religion is very important, but 31% for those from families where religion plays no role.

Examining the overall sample, those in Muslim families react somewhat less negatively to perceived discrimination: *ceteris paribus*, 22% of Christians (omitted category) reported three adverse reactions while only 18% of those from Muslim families did. However, highly educated immigrant parents do seem to be able to protect their offspring from the negative consequences of experiencing discrimination. Holding other factors constant, the child of immigrant parents with no formal education has a 25% chance of reporting three adverse

reactions to discrimination, while the child of parents with a tertiary degree has just a 10% chance of doing so. However, this relationship seems mostly driven by Muslim families and does not apply for Christian immigrants. Among Christian immigrants, in contrast, we do see fewer adverse reactions among those who visit the parental home country.

Table 3.2: Ordered logistic regression predicting number of negative reactions to experiences of discrimination

	All respondents			Muslim Families			Christian Families		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	Coef.	Std. Err.	z
Parental Educ									
primary	-0.22	0.15	-1.41	-0.48	0.18	-2.72	1.09	0.48	2.27
lower secondary	-0.55	0.18	-3.12	-0.51	0.20	-2.62	0.46	0.56	0.82
upper secondary	-0.52	0.17	-3.14	-0.51	0.19	-2.62	0.70	0.51	1.39
tertiary I	-1.11	0.29	-3.87	-1.22	0.61	-2.02	0.10	0.57	0.18
tertiary II	-0.45	0.31	-1.46	-0.79	0.64	-1.24	0.78	0.59	1.33
Importance of Relig									
a bit	-0.43	0.19	-2.32	-0.70	0.30	-2.31	0.04	0.29	0.13
some	-0.36	0.19	-1.92	-0.62	0.29	-2.14	0.06	0.30	0.22
a lot	-0.70	0.18	-3.81	-0.99	0.28	-3.53	-0.24	0.30	-0.79
Language (French only)									
1 (mostly French)	0.27	0.20	1.33	-0.03	0.32	-0.10	0.44	0.32	1.40
2 (both)	-0.02	0.15	-0.16	-0.16	0.23	-0.69	0.11	0.26	0.41
3 (mostly other)	0.06	0.22	0.27	-0.04	0.29	-0.15	0.07	0.54	0.14
4 (other only)	-0.01	0.18	-0.04	-0.13	0.26	-0.50	0.29	0.35	0.82
Visit to par. HC									
yes	-0.46	0.16	-2.95	-0.17	0.23	-0.76	-0.75	0.28	-2.71
frequently	-0.29	0.16	-1.82	-0.03	0.23	-0.14	-0.44	0.28	-1.57
Attend school abroad	-0.37	0.26	-1.45	-0.32	0.35	-0.89	-0.66	0.48	-1.39
Share immigrants in school									
> 50%	-0.25	0.22	-1.12	-0.26	0.26	-0.98	-0.77	0.47	-1.64
about 50%	-0.28	0.22	-1.30	-0.29	0.26	-1.13	-0.44	0.46	-0.96
< 50 %	-0.27	0.21	-1.28	-0.27	0.26	-1.05	-0.65	0.44	-1.47
almost none	-0.24	0.23	-1.05	-0.05	0.28	-0.18	-0.83	0.45	-1.82
Religion growing up: (Christian)									
None	-0.05	0.23	-0.20						
Muslim	-0.28	0.13	-2.12						
Other	-0.18	0.30	-0.61						
Cutpoint 1									
	-2.43	0.32		-2.27	0.43		-1.51	0.67	
Cutpoint 2									
	-1.16	0.31		-1.11	0.43		-0.03	0.67	
Cutpoint 3									
	-0.07	0.31		0.00	0.43		1.11	0.67	
N									
	1247			764			353		

Sub-Sample from Africa

The distinction between Muslim and Christian migrants largely, though not completely, overlaps with the different origins of migrant streams to France. Muslim migrants are almost exclusively from northern and central Africa in addition to Turkey, while Christian migrants come from both various parts of Europe as well as African countries. To ascertain whether regional origin and associated ethno-racial categories may be really driving the findings described above, I stratified the data. The sample of migrants from European countries does not contain a large enough number of Muslim origin respondents to estimate these contrasts. However, among migrants from Africa there is enough religious variety to estimate the models for the predictors of both discrimination reporting and discrimination reactions. The results for these analyses are summarized in the appendix tables A3.2 and A3.3. To facilitate comparisons, the first section repeats the full sample model – the first column of table 3.1 and 2 respectively - while the second and third set of columns show the sub-sample analysis. Although some control variables show different results or fail to reach statistical significance, the central findings of my analysis are intact and in some cases actually larger in magnitude than in the overall sample.

Discussion and Conclusion

Based on the schooling experiences of the second generation in France, this paper has examined how parental socialization with regard to home-country language and religion affects the schooling experiences of the second generation. Drawing together what are generally distinct strands in this research, this paper analyzed how parental socialization affects perceptions of discrimination on the one hand, and how it affects the reactions to

perceived discrimination on the other. Doing so, I argue, gives a more complete picture of the countervailing effects that the familial transmission of home-country cultural repertoires has on the educational experiences of the second-generation.

Referring to figure 3.2, the left side of the triangle represents the determinants of discrimination in school. Those growing up in families where home country culture is present are more likely to report experiences of discrimination. Yet, there are two qualitatively different types of associations: For immigrant origin youth from Muslim families, there is a categorical difference; no matter what the level of religious socialization when growing up, they report much higher levels of discrimination in school. But in increasingly secular European countries, not only religious difference, but a high level of religiosity in itself can be a mode of social distance. Indeed, among those growing up in Christian families I find that the very religious are more likely to perceive unfair treatment in school. Transmission of the parental home-country language when growing up shows a similar relationship - with those being most immersed reporting more discrimination.

Regarding the protective effects of culture, which the right side of the triangle in figure 3.2 represents, my analysis conforms with sociological and psychological research suggesting that ethno-cultural practices and identities can provide significant socio-psychological resources for immigrants and minorities more generally. However, it also shows that the protective effects vary significantly across cultural practices. While some, like religion, especially in the case of Muslim migrants in France, provide significant coping resources, others such as the home-country language appear not to provide these benefits.

Taken together, the 'net effect' of parental transmission of home-country culture therefore depends on the relative magnitude of these two dynamics, posing a set of tradeoffs

for immigrant parents. In cases where both functions are continuous, the net result will depend on the relative strength of the costs of social difference on the one hand, and the benefits of cultural membership on the other. If the socio-psychological benefits outweigh the costs potentially associated with social differentiation, then the incentive is to maintain the practice across generations. If the reverse is true, then the incentive is to abandon the practice.

However, in cases where cultural practice is associated with a categorical social difference, the combined cost-benefit function will show a discontinuity that in itself will increase incentives to maintain or abandon home-country cultural practices. As illustrated in the top right panel of figure 3.1, even if acculturation would eventually be beneficial in terms of this cost-benefit calculation, any movement towards acculturation that does not cross the threshold c^* would mean a decrease in overall utility. Stated in more familiar sociological terms, unless intergenerational acculturation can lead to “boundary crossing” (Zolberg and Long 1999; Alba 2005), the rational strategy is to maintain home-country culture. Further increasing the anti-acculturation incentive in these contexts is the fact that migrant families do not know the location of the cutoff c^* at which a person becomes classified in a social category (in this case Muslims). And reinforcing the incentives entailed by this uncertainty is the possibility that maintaining a cultural practice which delineates a socially salient and negatively stereotyped category (e.g., Muslims in Europe) can serve as a “transvaluation strategy” (Wimmer 2008b; Wimmer 2008a) whereby a discriminated minority tries to re-order the hierarchy of social categories by asserting the special virtues of their group.

The case of Muslim migrants in France, and probably other Western European countries as well, exhibits this dynamic. If Muslim parents and their children expect that they will encounter discrimination no matter how religious they are, and if they also notice that religion protects against the negative consequences of these experiences, then maintaining high levels of religiosity can be a rational strategy for them. Following this logic, a more inclusive context where Muslims face less discrimination could actually make a decrease in religiosity more likely. If the “cost” of being categorized as Muslim is lower, then so, too, would be the protective benefit of religious practice.

But in many cases the aggregate utility curve will be downward sloping, meaning that maintaining cultural practices and membership would entail a net cost. In my analysis, the transmission (or lack thereof) of home-country language is an example that would fit this pattern. Those who grow up in families where the home-country language is prevalent are more likely to perceive unfair treatment. Yet, the home-country language does not seem to provide a buffer against experiences of discrimination. This pattern is also evident for religious practice in Christian migrant families. Other factors held constant, those growing up in Christian families are no more likely to perceive discrimination than those in non-religious families. But among those growing up in Christian homes, higher religiosity is associated with higher degrees of perceived discrimination. Unlike for Muslims, however, higher religiosity does not assist second-generation Christians in terms of their reactions to this discrimination.

The pattern found in the case of language and Christian religion is the configuration that underlies Alba and Nee’s neo-classic assimilation model. Over time and generations immigrants abandon their ethnic ties and cultural characteristics not out of a desire to assimilate; they do so because they want to take advantage of host country opportunity

structures, and because maintaining home-country customs no longer provides a benefit and may in fact impose costs in this journey. But this paper also clearly shows that this configuration does not apply to all cultural practices in all contexts. It does not apply when a cultural characteristic becomes a marker of a salient social category and thus introduces a discontinuity in the utility curve.

Thus, this paper also contributes to a line of work that draws on rational choice approaches to study the micro-level dynamics of ethno-cultural distinctions (Kuran 1998; Akerlof and Kranton 2000). I highlight how the different roles of cultural practices, as moments of continuity and connection on the one hand and as modes of difference vis-a-vis the host society on the other, shape the incentive structure to maintain or to relinquish these practices over generations. To be sure, these approaches capture at best one dimension of a much more complex process. The maintenance of religion and home-country language surely entails many dynamics that elude the cost-benefit calculations assumed in my analysis. But all these simplifications notwithstanding, this approach allows me to make straightforward predictions about the incentives to maintain or abandon cultural practices, depending on the configuration of socio-psychological costs and benefits associated with certain practices.

Based on the incentive structures identified in this paper, one would expect a high degree of religious continuity in Muslim immigrant families but not in Christian ones. Because my model implies little incentive for maintaining the home-country language, we would expect a significant decrease in use across generations. As I show elsewhere (Chapters 1 and 2), this is indeed the pattern for immigrant families in France. In the passage from the immigrant generation to the native-born second generation, there is a steep decline in home-country language ability and especially in use, and only a very small percentage of the children of

immigrants make any effort to pass their ancestral language on to the third generation. In contrast, among Muslim immigrants there is considerable continuity in terms of religiosity and religious practice between the immigrant and the French-born second generation.

Further research could examine these dynamics in different contexts. The case of immigrants' religion in the contemporary United States could provide one interesting example. As underscored by several prominent scholars on the topic, in the contemporary US religious difference is generally not a line of exclusion (Foner and Alba 2008). Moreover, unlike in largely secular Western Europe, higher levels of religiosity are not likely to distance immigrants from the mainstream population. In the language of the figure 3.1 diagrams, the "cost" curve is flat and thus the combined utility curve probably would be upward sloping (as in the French case); but it would not contain the discontinuity evident in the TeO data.

This approach also might help unify the comparative analysis of the social boundaries that immigrants face in Europe and the US. For example, sociologists who study the US tend to interpret the role of religion in immigrant families as a positive force in their adaptation (Bankston and Zhou 1995; Hirschman 2004; Foner and Alba 2008). European research, in contrast, and certainly public opinion, construes migrants' religion as one of the main hurdles to their integration. My work suggests that in principle the same processes are at play in both contexts. In Europe, like the US, migrants' religion can be an important social-psychological resource in the adaptation processes of migrant families, but it is one that is overshadowed by the salience of Islam as a line of social exclusion.

Table A2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Sample

	All	Christian Families	Muslim Families
Report Discrimination	12	7	24
Adverse Reactions to Discrimination			
None	29	24	33
One	29	32	27
Two	21	22	21
Three	20	21	19
Parental Education			
No formal education	14	5	29
Primary Only	31	34	30
lower second (2)	15	12	19
upper secondary	28	32	19
Tertiary (5A)	6	8	1
Tertiary II (5B/6)	6	9	2
Importance of religion growing up			
no importance	23	20	8
a bit	27	37	17
some	23	25	28
very important	27	19	47
Presence of home country language growing up			
None (French only)	37	48	14
Mostly French	10	13	6
Both about equally	33	26	47
Mostly HC language	7	4	12
HC language exclusively	14	9	21
Visits to parental home country when growing up			
No	21	21	11
Yes	39	35	47
Frequently	40	45	43
Went to school abroad	6	7	6
Share of school with immigrant background			
Almost all	5	4	8
Over Half	17	12	23
Half	23	20	29
lt Half	31	34	27
Almost None	23	30	13
N	7428	3451	2553

Table A2.2: Sub-sample analysis: Logistic regression predicting reports of discrimination by teachers

	All respondents			Only Northern Africa			Africa only		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	Coef.	Std. Err.	z
Parental Educ									
primary	-0.16	0.11	-1.42	-0.11	0.15	-0.77	-0.10	0.13	-0.75
lower secondary	-0.13	0.13	-1.04	-0.22	0.17	-1.25	-0.04	0.15	-0.24
upper secondary	-0.07	0.12	-0.58	-0.14	0.17	-0.87	-0.12	0.15	-0.85
tertiary I	0.33	0.20	1.65	-0.42	0.51	-0.82	0.03	0.28	0.09
tertiary II	-0.46	0.23	-1.95	-0.87	0.46	-1.91	-0.47	0.29	-1.61
Importance of Relig									
a bit	0.14	0.14	0.96	0.02	0.23	0.08	0.00	0.19	-0.01
some	0.28	0.15	1.90	0.04	0.23	0.17	0.02	0.19	0.09
a lot	0.38	0.14	2.67	0.18	0.22	0.80	0.13	0.19	0.68
Language (French only)									
1 (mostly French)	0.24	0.15	1.57	0.28	0.24	1.18	0.26	0.19	1.32
2 (both)	0.45	0.11	3.91	0.22	0.18	1.28	0.23	0.15	1.57
3 (mostly other)	0.42	0.16	2.61	0.23	0.24	0.95	0.29	0.21	1.40
4 (other only)	0.53	0.14	3.90	0.42	0.22	1.89	0.38	0.19	1.99
Visit to par. HC									
yes	0.07	0.12	0.56	0.14	0.19	0.72	0.31	0.15	2.13
frequently	0.05	0.12	0.45	0.20	0.19	1.01	0.35	0.16	2.24
Attend school abroad	0.26	0.18	1.48	-0.17	0.36	-0.48	0.16	0.23	0.71
Share immigrants in school									
> 50%	-0.18	0.17	-1.06	-0.20	0.25	-0.80	-0.18	0.20	-0.88
about 50%	-0.15	0.16	-0.92	-0.22	0.25	-0.89	-0.26	0.20	-1.32
< 50 %	-0.17	0.16	-1.06	-0.03	0.24	-0.13	-0.03	0.19	-0.14
almost none	-0.03	0.17	-0.18	0.33	0.26	1.29	0.23	0.21	1.13
Religion growing up: (Christian)									
None	-0.22	0.19	-1.12	0.08	0.42	0.19	-0.35	0.29	-1.23
Muslim	1.19	0.10	11.98	1.02	0.34	3.02	0.48	0.18	2.69
Other	-0.16	0.22	-0.75	-1.19	0.78	-1.52	-1.05	0.48	-2.19
Constant	-2.85	0.23	-12.16	-2.41	0.43	-5.53	-2.02	0.30	-6.80
N	6748								

Table A2.3: Sub-sample analysis: Ordered logistic regression predicting number of negative reactions to experiences of discrimination

	All respondents			Only Northern Africa			Africa only		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	Coef.	Std. Err.	z
Parental Educ									
primary	-0.22	0.15	-1.41	-0.50	0.21	-2.34	-0.33	0.19	-1.79
lower secondary	-0.55	0.18	-3.12	-0.79	0.24	-3.31	-0.66	0.21	-3.20
upper secondary	-0.52	0.17	-3.14	-0.46	0.22	-2.06	-0.43	0.20	-2.20
tertiary I	-1.11	0.29	-3.87	-0.78	0.68	-1.16	-0.93	0.40	-2.31
tertiary II	-0.45	0.31	-1.46	-1.66	0.69	-2.41	-0.73	0.43	-1.71
Importance of Relig									
a bit	-0.43	0.19	-2.32	-0.98	0.31	-3.17	-0.75	0.26	-2.87
some	-0.36	0.19	-1.92	-0.73	0.31	-2.39	-0.70	0.26	-2.70
a lot	-0.70	0.18	-3.81	-1.27	0.30	-4.17	-0.98	0.25	-3.92
Language (French only)									
1 (mostly French)	0.27	0.20	1.33	0.16	0.32	0.48	0.26	0.27	0.96
2 (both)	-0.02	0.15	-0.16	-0.03	0.24	-0.14	-0.15	0.20	-0.72
3 (mostly other)	0.06	0.22	0.27	-0.10	0.34	-0.31	-0.21	0.29	-0.73
4 (other only)	-0.01	0.18	-0.04	-0.18	0.31	-0.58	-0.04	0.26	-0.15
Visit to par. HC									
yes	-0.46	0.16	-2.95	-0.53	0.26	-2.06	-0.43	0.19	-2.22
frequently	-0.29	0.16	-1.82	-0.24	0.26	-0.90	-0.25	0.21	-1.20
Attend school abroad	-0.37	0.26	-1.45	-0.29	0.52	-0.55	-0.40	0.32	-1.26
Share immigrants in school									
> 50%	-0.25	0.22	-1.12	-0.27	0.35	-0.75	-0.28	0.26	-1.07
about 50%	-0.28	0.22	-1.30	-0.30	0.35	-0.85	-0.33	0.26	-1.26
< 50 %	-0.27	0.21	-1.28	-0.14	0.34	-0.40	-0.16	0.26	-0.61
almost none	-0.24	0.23	-1.05	-0.25	0.36	-0.69	-0.23	0.28	-0.81
Religion growing up: (Christian)									
None	-0.05	0.23	-0.20	0.63	0.56	1.12	0.57	0.38	1.51
Muslim	-0.28	0.13	-2.12	0.18	0.48	0.38	0.27	0.24	1.09
Other	-0.18	0.30	-0.61	0.13	0.88	0.15	0.02	0.60	0.03
Cutpoint 1									
	-2.43	0.32		-2.48	0.59		-2.20	0.40	
Cutpoint 2									
	-1.16	0.31		-1.31	0.58		-1.00	0.40	
Cutpoint 3									
	-0.07	0.31		-0.12	0.58		0.17	0.40	
N									
	1247			582			791		

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Chapter 4

Change and Continuity in Immigrants' Attitudes towards Homosexuality

Intolerable Intolerants

The (perceived) social conservatism of immigrants in Europe, especially traditional attitudes about gender roles and intolerance for homosexuality,¹ is a focal point in debates about immigration, assimilation and cultural diversity. Confronted with what they deem to be illiberal attitudes, especially among Muslim immigrants, those who espouse liberal values of tolerance and individual rights increasingly treat these values as a marker of belonging—an identity that delineates those who belong and those who do not—rather than as a set of principles that guide the coexistence of individuals with different conceptions of the good (procedural liberalism) (Joppke 2008; Mepschen et al. 2010). Somewhat ironically, in

¹ Scholars contest the proper nomenclature for these phenomena, variously labeling them as attitudes, values, or norms. For example Hitlin and Piliavin (2004) distinguish values from attitudes on the basis of higher degrees of both durability and abstractness; attitudes, in their view, pertain to more concrete objects of valuation and are more subject to change. On the other hand, Inglehart (1977) argues that “outlook on sexual behavior,” being a part of “basic character structure,” is more durable than the values he studies (p.101). In this paper, I will refer to beliefs about the legitimacy of same-sex relationships as attitudes, though they arguably also could be classified as values. They certainly are closely related to larger values about the proper role and functioning of the family and gender relations.

countries that trumpet their tolerance for diverse lifestyles, perceived intolerance has become intolerable.

This has led to some questionable policies. The Dutch government infamously issued an information DVD for prospective migrants that featured kissing men and topless women on Dutch beaches. In Germany, some government officials during naturalization procedures posed to Muslim applicants questions designed to ascertain whether the “inner disposition” of applicants was congruent with their declarations of loyalty to the constitution (Joppke 2008).² The transitive (*assimilationist*) conception of assimilation (Brubaker 2001) expressed in these policies, is problematic in many ways: conditioning membership on specific attitudes, for example, contradicts the liberal self-understanding of European states. Nevertheless, these issues have significant currency in public discourse and informal social boundary making processes. Whether perceived or real, differences in value orientations, especially those concerned with the family and gender relations, often become salient boundary markers (Lamont 2000; Korteweg 2008; Duemmler et al. 2010).

This considerable public and academic interest notwithstanding, there is little research on change and continuity in immigrants’ attitudes. To what extent are these differences immutable? Do immigrants come to adopt attitudes of their new surroundings, or do they remain firmly anchored in their ‘old ways’?

As the summary of data from the World Values Survey (WVS) in figure 4.1 illustrates, immigrant-native differences on attitudes toward sexual norms could be substantial. For example, 80 percent of Romanian, more than 90 percent of Chinese, and

² These interview guidelines have since been found unconstitutional by the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht).

almost 100 percent of Egyptian respondents state that homosexuality is never justifiable, while fewer than 20 percent in Germany and fewer than 10 percent of respondents in Sweden and the Netherlands fall into that category. And in many Western European countries a quarter to half of respondents answer on the very tolerant end of the 10-point scale.




Figure 4.1: Distributions of responses to the question “is homosexuality justifiable” in select countries. Black bars indicate the mean response. Source: World Values Survey Association (2009)

A shift in the focus of migration research in part explains this lack of empirical work. Early approaches to immigrant assimilation prominently featured the issue of values, attitudes and norms. Park and Burgess, for example, defined assimilation as a process in which “groups acquire the memories, sentiments and attitudes of other persons and groups” and thereby become incorporated into a “common cultural life” (Park and Burgess 1969:735). Possibly reflecting the above-discussed normative concern that in liberal states “inner dispositions” are not a legitimate dimension with which to assess membership, the topic has moved to the margins of sociological research on immigrants. Indeed contemporary models of assimilation such as the neo-classic assimilation model proposed by Alba and Nee (2003) or the segmented assimilation hypothesis advanced by Portes and colleagues (1993; 2001), largely eschew the topic and focus instead on the socio-economic and socio-structural aspects of migrants’ adaptations and ethnic identifications.

Thus, conceptually speaking, this paper extends existing frameworks of immigrant assimilation/incorporation into the realm of attitudes. In order to stay clear of the earlier work’s problematic assumptions about homogenous cultural units, I adopt a broader and more neutral definition of “acculturation in attitudes”. This is crucial, because in the realm of political attitudes there is no such thing as a clear mainstream – conflict and disagreement are the rule rather than the exception (Pearson and Citrin 2006:220), a fact nicely illustrated in figure 4.1 by the extremely broad attitude distributions in places like Germany and Great Britain. Thus, taking the diminution of differences in mean as the yardstick, as is usually done in assimilation research, is misguided. The same reasoning would render non-migrant populations that deviate from the mean (e.g. Evangelical Christians in the US, or

conservative rural populations in parts of Europe) as non-acculturated.³ To avoid these pitfalls, I define ‘acculturation’ in attitudes as a state in which knowing the country of origin of an individual would not provide any additional information about the expected attitude of an individual, but knowing the country of destination would. Thus, I examine how migrants shift from one pole of influence to another, from the origin country to the destination country as the main axis of variation (see also Brubaker 2001).

This requires a cross-comparative approach that allows one to clearly distinguish the relative influence of origin and host country attitude patterns from that of individual level characteristics such as education or religiosity. With this in mind, I assembled a multilevel dataset that includes information on attitudes towards homosexuality in 83 countries of origin across the globe and 23 immigrant-receiving countries in Europe. Employing a cross-classified hierarchical model, I use this information to predict the relative influence of origin and destination country patterns on about 8,150 migrants and 7,100 children of migrants in these European countries. In terms of its empirical reach, therefore, this approach goes well beyond current work, which looks at only one (or very few) national origin groups and/or destination countries at a time.⁴

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section summarizes research on key processes of attitude formation and change with a special focus on attitudes towards homosexuality and connects them with key theories from the migration literature to develop a set of hypotheses. I then introduce the data and variables used, present the results,

³ For more critiques of these assumptions underlying much migration research, see for example: Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002); Wimmer (2009); and Favell (2001).

⁴ An exception is a recent paper by Norris and Inglehart (2012) that analyzes migrants from a variety of countries to Europe, but singles out migrants from “Islamic countries”.

and discuss the limitations. The final section explores the relevance of my findings for migration research and policy.

What shapes attitudes towards homosexuality?

As mentioned, because contemporary research on immigrant adaptation largely excludes questions about values and attitudes, existing theories do not provide clear hypotheses about change and continuity in immigrants' attitudes. Thus, while existing frameworks for studying immigrant adaptation can be extended to provide insight into attitudinal change, this requires some triangulation with other literature. This section focuses on the mechanisms that are of central theoretical interest and discusses further individual-level correlates of attitudes when I introduce the independent variables in my analysis.

Macro-Economic Context and Migration

The relatively liberal attitudes towards homosexuality and gender relations now evident in Western democracies are a relatively recent phenomenon – the result of a larger cultural shift beginning after WWII that included a decline in the authority of traditional religious orientations and traditional elites, as well as a re-alignment of political cleavages. Building on Marx's idea that living conditions shape people's values, modernization theorists identify a changing occupational structure towards a post-industrial economy (Bell 1973), increasing economic security, and expansion of secondary and higher education systems as the key drivers of this shift (Inglehart 1977, 1990; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Other scholars, building on Weber, emphasize the cultural and especially religious heritage of countries as important moderating factors. Analyzing country level variation in attitudes towards

homosexuality, Gerhards (2010) finds support for both the materialist and cultural heritage explanations.

Whatever the relative contributions of each of these factors, when looking across the globe the gradient in each case parallels the flow of major labor migration streams of the last decades: people move from poor and insecure places that tend to be socially conservative to richer and more secure countries that provide opportunity. But these destinations also tend to be countries where social attitudes are on average significantly more liberal. Although more liberal social norms may attract some migrants, for the large majority of migrants moving is a strategy for economic mobility; more liberal attitudes factor little in their decision. Nonetheless, once in the destination country migrants may be subject to a radically different value landscape. And since in many cases migration does dramatically improve economic and political security, one could argue that migrant families in a sense undergo on an individual level a similar set of processes that precipitated the shift towards tolerance in western democracies after WWII. But whether and to what extent this new social context and migrant economic mobility shape migrants' attitudes depends on a number of factors that I discuss in the next sections.

Change within and across generations

One consideration is to what extent attitudes are malleable over the life course and over generations. For example, if attitudes are largely fixed after a certain age, then for migrants (who generally arrive in early adulthood) the new context will have little influence, though we may see a shift in the second generation.

Looking across generations, research in developmental psychology suggests that although in families there is some intergenerational transmission in cultural repertoires such as attitudes, this process is usually incomplete (e.g. Boyd and Richardson 1985). Drawing on cross-cultural psychology research, Berry and colleagues (2002) provide a useful typology: “vertical transmission” (parental influence) is complemented by “oblique transmission” (influence by other adults) and “horizontal transmission” (influence by peers). For the children of immigrants, both the oblique and horizontal socialization vectors will be sources of host-country influence. Spending their whole life and, more importantly, their formative years in the host society context, the children of immigrants gain significant exposure to the prevailing attitude landscape. In addition, host-state institutions such as the public school system provide socialization in host-country values and norms.

For the children of immigrants, therefore, the only source of (potential) origin country influence is parental socialization (“vertical transmission”). Though evidence on the transmission of attitudes towards sexual norms in migrant families is limited, a number of researchers have examined continuity in family values more broadly. The tenor of this work is that while there is some intergenerational continuity (Delgado-Gaitan 1994; Fuligni et al. 1999), the children of labor migrants generally hold less traditional attitudes on family relations than their parents (Phinney et al. 2000; Rosenthal et al. 1996), though the degree of intergenerational change can vary with gender and assimilation trajectories (Idema and Phalet 2007). In short, *I expect the host country attitudinal context to have a significant influence on the second generation, and the origin country context to have only a limited impact.*

What about change *within* the migrant generation? While immigrants may have spent more years in the host country than their children, this represents only a share of their life

and most migrants move after their formative years. A significant literature in social and political psychology has developed and tested theories about the malleability of attitudes over the life-course (for summaries see: Sears 1981, 1983; Krosnick and Alwin 1989). Although most of this research focuses on political attitudes and party identification, attitudes that relate to groups or “kinds of people” arguably are psychological equivalents, and therefore one might also expect that such attitudes are formed in early adulthood and remain stable across the life course (Sears 1983, 1993; Sears and Funk 1999; Hirschfeld 1996). A modified version of this is the increasing persistence hypothesis whereby attitudes are in principle malleable, but this malleability declines sharply after early adulthood (Jennings and Niemi 1981). Similar to Mannheim’s “problem of generations” hypothesis (Mannheim 1970[1952]), these approaches emphasize the lasting effects of common political experiences in early adulthood. In contrast, the lifelong openness hypothesis states that “individuals are highly flexible throughout their lives and constantly alter their attitudes in response to changing life circumstances” (Krosnick and Alwin 1989:417).

These hypotheses from the political psychology literature have parallels in the sociology of culture, which conceptualizes attitudes as one distinct subset of a cultural repertoire. The analog to a lifelong openness hypothesis would be a very adaptable conception of culture. An example is the ‘culture as a toolkit’ hypothesis (Swidler 1986) according to which people do not have consistent orientations, but pick and choose from a repertoire according to the situation at hand. In contrast, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus implies a high degree of persistence of early influences and a significant degree of consistency over time and across situations. While formed in a specific context, these

“durable dispositions [...] can outlive the economic and social conditions in which they were produced” (Bourdieu 1990:62).

For the immigrant generation this review suggests two competing hypotheses:

- *Persistence: Since the large majority of migrants move after they reach early adulthood, their attitudes will not converge towards destination country patterns. Any change will happen across but not within generations.*
- *Malleability: Attitudes and cultural orientations are malleable across the lifespan and thus over time migrants may be increasingly influenced by prevalent attitudes in the destination country.*

Assimilation, home country attachments, and change in attitudes

Even if attitudes are malleable how does a new social context shape them? A long line of research across the social sciences has examined this question.⁵ While approaches differ in their assumptions about the nature of opinion formation and change, social interaction and communication are the central variables across the board. Inglehart, for example, emphasizes how changes in informal communication patterns—especially how the emergence of modern mass communication nationalized debates—contributed to value shifts (Inglehart 1977:75,89). This in turn echoes earlier work on the emergence of nation-states, which highlights the importance of communication across different population strata (Gellner 1983, Anderson 2006, Deutsch 1953).⁶ From a different angle, formal models of norm formation (e.g., Coleman 1990; 1998) identify social influence as a key process in establishing

⁵ Some recent examples include: Axelrod (1997), Huckfeldt et al. (2004), Friedkin and Johnsen (1990), Friedkin (1999), Watts and Dodds (2007), Baldassarri and Bearman (2007).

⁶ Using a formal modeling approach Axelrod (1997) comes to similar conclusions and specifies some variables that shape the final opinion “landscape”.

behavioral norms in networks. Dense networks of social interaction provide the ability to effectively sanction those who violate norms.

Again based on similar mechanisms but emphasizing the absence of ties, a number of theories focus on social closure as a key process in the creation of cultural difference. Building on Weberian ideas of ethnicity as a process of social organization (Weber 1976[1922]) and Barth's boundary-making focus (Barth 1969), this literature argues that dispositional differentiation follows social closure and that, at the same time, differences in values may further solidify social boundaries (e.g. Wimmer 2002:Ch. 2). Some scholars have argued that high poverty African-American neighborhoods in the US present an extreme case of this social closure. The joint forces of concentrated poverty and racial isolation create a situation where "...ghetto values, attitudes, and ideals have become progressively less connected to those prevailing elsewhere in the United States," so that increasingly "...the culture of the ghetto has become an entity unto itself, remote from the rest of American society and its institutions ..." (Massey and Denton 1993:172).

If social communication plays an important role in structuring values, attitudes and norms, then for immigrants attitudinal shifts would follow what in Gordon's (1964) canonical theory was called "structural assimilation": the development of widespread primary relations with members of the majority and entry into mainstream social spaces. This shift has been clearly documented across generations (Brown 2006), but even within the migrant generation, changes in social relations can follow from other aspects of assimilation. For example, acquisition of the host-country language, a key to any host-country integration, creates opportunities in the mainstream labor market, but also makes possible social contacts with the majority population (Esser 2006), and the consumption of mainstream media (Wei-

Na and Tse 1994). Another well-documented aspect is residential assimilation. As immigrants advance economically, they are able leave ethnic neighborhoods (Alba, Logan, and Crowder 1997; Massey 1985). Spatial proximity to native populations again opens up the possibility for entry into mainstream social spaces (Park and Burgess 1969). Residential assimilation generally increases with years of settlement and is also associated with other markers of assimilation such as host-country language ability (South et al 2005).

But destination country influences are only one side of the coin. Scholars working within the transnational paradigm have pointed to the fact that migrants remit not only money to their home countries but also ideas and values – “social remittances” (Levitt 1998; Pérez-Armendéiz and Crow 2010). But of course the influence is likely to go both ways: home country connections will mean continued influence of those “there” on those “here” in regard to attitudes, values, and norms. For the large majority of migrants, however, these ties decline over time (Soehl and Waldinger 2010), and among the children of migrants only a minority have significant ties to the parental home country (Morawska 2003; Soehl and Waldinger 2012). Taken together this suggests:

- *Convergence towards destination country attitudes: As settlement progresses, immigrants and especially their children will become increasingly representative of the host country attitude landscape and less representative of origin country patterns.*

However, this process may not apply to all migrants equally. For example the segmented assimilation approach advanced by Portes and colleagues (1993; 2001) suggests alternative possibilities. This approach holds that a non-trivial share of the children of immigrants are not be able to achieve the kind of upward mobility that would make them part of the mainstream. Drawing on the oppositional culture hypothesis, it then argues that

as a consequence of economic marginalization and frustrated expectations, these immigrants, and especially their children, may develop orientations that are distinct from the mainstream. A related concern is that, to borrow a term from public debates in Europe (e.g. Bukow et al. 2007), “parallel societies” will develop: that immigrants lacking socio-economic mobility will remain confined to immigrant enclaves and maintain distinct outlooks from the mainstream society. This leads to the expectation of:

- *Uneven convergence – or the partial persistence of origin country attitudes: Those who are economically marginal will be less drawn into host society attitude patterns and remain more anchored in origin country ways. The segmented assimilation hypothesis implies that this will be especially true for the second generation.*

Migrants’ cultural practices and attitude change

Cultural practices may also shape the relative importance of host and home country influence on attitudes. Home-country cultural practices may foster the maintenance of attitudes and norms of the ‘old country’, and acculturation may go hand in hand with adoption of mainstream outlooks in attitudes and values. This analysis focuses on two such practices: home country language and religion.

Religion: In the public sphere, many are not shy about linking migrants’ religious characteristics to their attitudes about family norms and gender relations. Contemporary European public debate singles out Islam as being especially problematic in this respect.

Claims about the incompatibility of Islamic doctrine with liberal Western values are a mainstay of conservative and right wing populists.⁷

The connection between religiosity, values and attitudes is broadly established (Schwartz and Huisman 1995) especially in regards to social issues such as gender relations and sexuality. Since most religions provide norms and rituals on issues that concern the family, it is no surprise that those who are more religious often hold more conservative attitudes on gender relations and sexuality (e.g. Brinkerhoff and MacKie 1985). Thus it is plausible that the higher religiosity of immigrants may be one reason for their more socially conservative attitudes on sexual and gender relations. For example, Diehl and colleagues (2009) find that among Turkish immigrants in Germany, religiosity is associated with both traditional attitudes and behaviors in regard to gender roles. Yet Diehl et al. also find that these differences in religiosity account for only a small part of the differences in gender-related attitudes between natives and immigrants.

There may also be a substantive contribution of religious doctrine, with some religions providing a more conservative outlook on gender relations than others. A transnational Islamic discourse, for example, may provide normative models and prescriptions that are largely independent of the host context but may also be distinct from country of origin influences (see, e.g., Bowen 2004a,b).

These kinds of approaches focus on characteristics of religion (and Islam in particular), but they do not consider an alternative — that religion may shape attitudes and values by *conserving* traditional attitude patterns. That is, religion per se may not only shape

⁷ Critics have correctly pointed out that this “defense” of liberal values is often opportunistic in that it is coming from the conservative end of the political spectrum where egalitarian gender norms or

immigrants' attitudes (via religious norms for example), but also do so by structuring migrants' exposure to the host society and the degree of contact they maintain with the home country.⁸ Thus, to the extent that more religious migrants hold a more conservative set of attitudes, this at least in part may be due to a longer lasting imprint of home country value orientations that are tied more to cultural practices than to any specific norms (e.g. about gender). In this respect, as a set of practices and institutions that structure social communication, religion is arguably not so different from other cultural practices such as language. For example Inglehart (1977:75,89) notes that by structuring social relations and communication patterns, religion may insulate practitioners from cultural shifts in the social environment, delaying the emergence of attitude shifts in more religious populations. Similarly Gellner (1983) in his treatise on nationalism points to the enduring "counter-entropic" characteristics of some religions.

One concrete mechanism is religion's role in transmitting values and attitudes from parents to children. In many families religion plays an important role in maintaining continuity in attitudes and values by providing a mechanism for intergenerational transmission of dispositions across a variety of domains (for examples from Germany see Nauck 2000, 2007). This transmission can be a way to maintain socio-cultural capital in migrant families, as for example the segmented assimilation literature argues. In these approaches home country cultural practice, especially religion, can be a powerful tool for

progressive attitudes towards sexual relations are often novel and "situational."

⁸ A significant literature addresses the relationship between religious practice and homeland engagement of migrants. Some examples are: Levitt (2007); Wuthnow and Offutt (2008); Grillo (2004); Levitt (2003).

parents to buffer their children from the undesirable aspects of the host society (Bankston and Zhou 1995).

On a larger scale, religiosity and especially membership in a particular religion can also be a salient social boundary characteristic that produces effects quite apart from religious doctrines or practices. In Europe for example, Islam marks what has been called a “bright boundary,” a clear and unambiguous division between the mainstream and immigrant minorities (Zolberg and Long 1999; Alba 2005). Given the diversity of contemporary migration to Europe, Islam in many ways stands out as the synonym for visible “problematic” migrants from poor countries, a cleavage along which multiple dimensions of “otherness” collapse (Cesari 2004; Casanova 2006). As a consequence Muslims, being a socially marked group, may find it harder to gain access to mainstream institutions and social circles. At the same time, maintaining home country cultural values may be a part of a boundary making strategy of the excluded minority itself (for a general model see Wimmer 2008). In either case, rather than an intrinsic *difference* in attitudes due to the content of religious doctrine, these processes of social closure imply a *limited or delayed convergence* of Muslims towards host society attitude patterns and a relatively higher persistence of home country orientations.

Language: The focus of much contemporary research on the role of religion (and Islam in particular) in explaining differentiation in attitudes and values may also obscure the importance of other cultural practices. If social communication plays a central role for attitudes, arguably one of the more important domains of cultural practice (and acculturation) is language. From the perspective of the receiving societies, acquisition of the host country language is both a sign of assimilation as well as a critical tool for social and

economic integration (e.g. Esser 2006). While maintenance of home country language has received some attention, this research has largely focused on the host-country consequences of bilingualism (e.g. Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Esser 2006; Mouw and Xie 1999; Tran 2010; Esser 2009). From the perspective of the migrant, however, facility in the home-country language is central for communication across generations and with those who stay at home. For the question of attitude stability and change, this implies that loss of home country language will go hand in hand with a distancing from home country attitudes. Where linguistic ties weaken, attitudes will be de-synchronized. For example, examining transmission of attitudes in migrant families across generations, Idema and Phalet (2007) show that among Turkish families in Germany, those who are more linguistically assimilated report more egalitarian gender attitudes.

But while cross-cultural psychology research focuses on ties within the family “here,” these ties may in fact extend to the home country – especially for the first generation. Without a common language and shared understandings, however, connections will have a short half-life. Just as a shift towards the host country language blurs the boundary with the mainstream, it may also sharpen the boundary between migrants and those who stayed at home, an outcome especially likely to prevail among those who are not fluent in the home country language. Moreover, language is not purely instrumental; it can have powerful emotional content, particularly insofar as it is intrinsically tied to cultural identity and belonging (May 2001; Ignatieff 1994). More than providing a tool for communication, shared language and the full range of understandings that come with it can provide a sense of being at home (Schuetz 1944). Thus, as language preference and familiarity shift, this

sense of belonging may be lost, in turn fostering a dis-integration from the norms, values and attitude patterns of the home country.

To summarize, existing research suggests that migrants' cultural practices have multiple effects on their attitudes:

- *Religious difference: Members of some religions may be more conservative than others. Current debate and research singles out Muslims in particular.*
- *Culture and connectivity: Cultural practices such as religion and home-country language can conserve the attitudes of the home country and keep the influence of the host society context at bay.*
- *Muslim exclusion: Muslims as an excluded population in Europe find it harder to get access to mainstream society and thus remain more anchored in the country of origin and less influenced by the social context of the destination country.*

Going beyond current research on the topic, I differentiate direct links between cultural characteristics and attitudes (first item) from mechanisms that emphasize the role of cultural practices in creating (or inhibiting) links to social contexts (items 2 and 3).

Data and Analysis

The key data source for this analysis is the European Social Survey (ESS). I include all EU member countries that are part of the ESS as well as Iceland, Norway and Switzerland for a total of 23 countries. I pool five waves (2002 to 2010) resulting in a dataset with about 8,150 respondents who were born outside of their country of residence and about 7,100 children of migrants with origins in 83 countries around the world. This includes a significant number of intra-European migrants (and their children). For example, there are 776 French, 361 Austrian and 852 Polish origin respondents in my data, as well as 764 Turkish origin

respondents, 213 Brazilians and 194 respondents with roots in Pakistan. For information on sending country attitude distributions I rely on two additional surveys: the World Values Survey and the Pew Global Attitude Project.

These data are unique in that they provide variation in both the sending and the receiving contexts and thus allow me to disentangle a variety of social processes that are usually lumped together. There are, however, two critical limitations that deserve some discussion. First, the data are cross-sectional, providing a snapshot of respondents who have spent varying amounts of time in their destination countries, while the theories I engage make predictions about changes over time. This mismatch introduces a variety of problems for inference. Most notably, any observed patterns could be the result of selective migration or selective return migration.

I will address this issue in more detail in a later summary of my analysis, where I provide some indicators that give confidence that selection issues are not driving the findings. For now, it is worth noting that while longitudinal data are the gold standard in principle, the time lags necessary to meaningfully capture settlement processes, and the difficulty in tracking a mobile population such as migrants make this a difficult (and very expensive) proposition in practice. Even longitudinal studies with much shorter follow up times and populations that are relatively easier to track such as students in schools (see, e.g., Portes and Rumbaut 2006 for the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey) have large attrition rates. Not surprisingly, a lot of well-established migration research relies on cohort data to draw inferences about immigrant adaptation processes, whether such research examines change in transnational engagement with settlement (Portes, Guarnizo & Haller

2002; Soehl & Waldinger 2010), the acquisition of host country language skills (Dustmann 1994) or voting of naturalized immigrants (Jones-Correa 2001).

The second limitation of the ESS is that interviews are conducted in a limited number of languages; thus, migrants who have no host country proficiency will be underrepresented in the sample. Though most of those excluded from the sample for this reason will be recent arrivals, this limitation also will tend to exclude populations that are very isolated. Thus my results are not representative of all migrants in Europe, especially hard-to-reach and very non-acculturated populations. Nevertheless, my sample contains a wide variety of migrants with respect to socioeconomic status and cultural practices. Moreover, concerns that especially migrant women in some countries may be especially linguistically isolated are not borne out. For example, my sample of Turkish migrants in Germany (as in the ESS sample overall) is evenly balanced in respect to gender.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is a respondent's response to the statement "Gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish." The responses are recorded on a 5-point Likert scale that ranges from "Agree Strongly" to "Disagree Strongly." To facilitate a straightforward interpretation of coefficients, I reverse-code the categories such that higher values correspond to higher levels of tolerance. The majority of respondents are fairly tolerant, with 36 percent answering "agree strongly" and another 39 percent "agree". A small but non-trivial minority of about 14 percent either disagrees or disagrees strongly. A more detailed individual level summary of this variable can be found in table 4.1 and country level statistics in table 4.2.

Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of immigrant sample in the European Social Survey waves 1 to 5. Source European Social Survey (2002-2010).

	Overall	1st gen	2nd gen
<i>Dependent Variable:</i>			
Gays and lesbians should be free to live as they wish:			
agree strongly	0.36	0.33	0.39
agree	0.39	0.29	0.38
neither agree nor disagree	0.12	0.13	0.11
disagree	0.08	0.09	0.07
disagree strongly	0.05	0.06	0.04
<i>Independent Variables: Discrete</i>			
Religion			
Catholic	0.35	0.34	0.35
Eastern Orthodox	0.07	0.08	0.06
Muslim	0.09	0.12	0.05
None	0.30	0.26	0.34
Other	0.07	0.08	0.05
Protestant	0.13	0.12	0.15
Linguistic Assimilation / Mention of Host Country Language			
second	0.22	0.32	0.09
first	0.18	0.22	0.14
exclusively	0.60	0.46	0.77
Time in country			
lt. one year		0.02	
1 to 5 years		0.15	
6 to 10		0.13	
11 to 20		0.22	
20+		0.48	
Fathers Education			
primary or less	0.29	0.31	0.27
secondary	0.38	0.35	0.41
post secondary	0.22	0.23	0.21
missing	0.11	0.11	0.11
Male	0.46	0.45	0.47
Married (ever married)	0.71	0.76	0.65
Economically precarious	0.17	0.19	0.16
<i>Independent Variables: Continuous</i>			
Religiosity			
Mean	4.85	5.14	4.51
Std. Dev	3.08	3.07	3.06
Min	0	0	0
Max	10	10	10
Age			
Mean	44	45	44
Std Dev	18	17	18
Min	15	15	15
Max	98	96	98
Education (years)			
Mean	12.8	12.8	12.7
Std Dev	4.2	4.4	3.9
Min	0	0	0
Max	30	30	30
N	15265	8169	7096

The model

To model these responses I use a cross-classified hierarchical regression model that nests migrants simultaneously in countries of origin o and countries of destination d . The level 1 equation decomposes a migrant's attitude (y) into the effects of a set of individual level variables X (which includes a vector for the intercept term) whose magnitude is indicated by a vector of coefficients β . In addition, a set of country of origin effects γ and a set of country of destination effects δ interact with a subset of individual level variables (X^*). The attitudinal means in the country of origin (a_o) and destination country (a_d) enter the model on the second level, which predicts the magnitude of these cross-level interactions, θ_o and θ_d respectively. Take the example of settlement. Whether the temporal length of migrant settlement shapes attitudes is captured in the “main effect,” the β coefficient. However, for each migrant there are two additional variable or “random” influences: settlement will moderate the influences of a respondent's country of origin and destination contexts – γ and δ . This influence in turn depends on the attitude distribution in these places a_o and a_d , the average magnitude of which is indicated by the θ_o and θ_d parameters: the larger the θ parameter the stronger the influence of the origin/destination context. The posterior distributions of these θ parameters and β coefficients are reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.

$$y_{ido} = \beta X_i + \gamma_{o(i)} X_i^* + \delta_{d(i)} X_i^* + \epsilon_{ido}$$

$$\gamma_o \sim N(\theta_o a_o, \Sigma_\theta)$$

$$\delta_d \sim N(\theta_d a_d, \Sigma_\theta)$$

Due to the many varying slope parameters in my model, maximum likelihood approaches cannot generate reliable parameter estimates. I use a Bayesian approach and estimate this model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation / Gibbs sampling as implemented in WinBUGS (Lunn et al. 2000).⁹

Measurement model: Country attitude patterns a for each country c are measured by three surveys. The country level response on survey g is the mean of individuals in that country weighted for survey design effects. Since all surveys I use have large sample sizes of 1000 or more respondents per country, I ignore sampling variance of country level variables. Taking the value patterns in countries as a normally distributed latent variable with mean 0 and variance 1, the survey mean of country c in survey g is given by a survey specific intercept τ and vector of factor loadings λ . I calculate these scores using robust full information maximum likelihood confirmatory factor analysis for categorical dependent variables as implemented in the software package M-plus (Muthén and Muthén 2007).

$$s_{gc} = \tau_g + \lambda_g a_c$$

Independent Variables

Value distributions in country of origin and host country: In addition to the European Social Survey, I rely on the World Values Survey, and the Pew Global Attitudes Survey to construct measures of the value distributions in sending and receiving countries.

⁹ Since the dependent variable is observed only as ordered categorical outcomes, one may argue that an ordered logistic measurement model whereby the underlying latent variable is mapped onto discrete response categories would be warranted. However, implementing such a model proved computationally infeasible. As I show in the appendix, treating the variable as continuous does not affect substantive conclusions. In addition, comparing coefficients across models is problematic in discrete regression models (Mood 2010); thus, when ignoring the discreteness of the data has no substantive consequences, a linear specification is actually preferable.

- The World Values Survey (WVS) has the widest coverage and provides the most detailed information. Pooling all available waves of the data, the WVS asked the question in 68 countries with a sample size between about 700 and 2000 individuals per country. Respondents were asked whether they think a series of behaviors, including homosexuality, are justifiable. The answer options ranged from 1 – “never justifiable” to 10 “always justifiable.”
- The Pew Global Attitude Survey asked respondents in 45 countries to respond “yes” or “no” to the statement that “homosexuality is a way of life that should be accepted by society.” Because a substantial number of respondents, in some countries more than 20%, responded “I don’t know,” I recoded the answers into three categories: -1 and +1 correspond to “not accepting” and “accepting” respectively, and 0 is a neutral category for those who answer “don’t know”.
- Finally, I use the previously described ESS data, which provide a total sample of 30 countries.

Table 4.2 displays summary statistics from all three surveys, which cover a total of 83 countries. There is significant variation across countries both in the mean and variance. In some countries there is virtually no societal acceptance of homosexuality with very little variation: for example, the *mean* response in Egypt and China is at or very near the minimum of the response scale. Conversely, there are countries like the Netherlands and Denmark where the mean is close to the high end of the scale. All western European countries are above average in the distribution. Although countries with a Muslim majority account for many of the cases with low scores on tolerance (and very narrow distributions), there are a

number of non-Islamic countries at this end of the spectrum as well, including China and many countries in eastern Europe and Africa.

Table 4.2: Summary statistics of measures for tolerance for homosexuality in 83 countries of origin and 23 countries of destination. Higher scores indicate higher levels of tolerance. Sources: European Social Survey (2002-2010), World Values Survey Association (2009), Pew Global Attitudes Project (2007).

	Min	Max	Mean	Std dev	Obs.
<i>World Values Survey (a)</i>					
mean score	1.00	7.80	3.26	1.82	68
variance	0.15	3.69	2.38	0.97	
<i>European Social Survey (b)</i>					
mean score	2.47	4.33	3.63	0.51	30
variance	0.72	1.98	1.27	0.35	
<i>Pew Global Attitudes Project c)</i>					
mean score	-0.98	0.78	-0.24	0.61	45
variance	0.03	0.98	0.52	0.29	
<i>Summary scores</i>					
Countries of origin	-1.23	2.35	0.46	0.95	83
Countries of destination	-0.62	2.35	1.26	0.52	23

Note: Question wording:

- a) Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card:
Homosexuality. Answers scored on a 10 point scale.
- b) Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish: Agree strongly to Disagree strongly. Answers scored on a 5 point scale
- c) Homosexuality is a way of life that should be: accepted by society; not be accepted by society; don't know

Settlement, religiosity, and use of home-country language

- Settlement and generational status: For migrants, the ESS provides a five category variable distinguishing the newly arrived (less than one year, omitted category) from those with 1 to 5 years of residence, 6 to 10 years, 11 to 20 years and long-term residents who have lived for 20 or more years in the host country. As discussed, the second-generation, being born and raised in the destination country, will have had a

much more significant exposure to that country's society and institutions. I therefore code them as a distinct category.

- Economic marginalization: To test whether immigrants and those from the second generation who are economically marginalized remain more anchored in the country of origin distribution, I include a variable that identifies those respondents who either find it “very difficult” to get by on their household income (asked on a four-point scale from “very comfortable” to “very difficult”) or who had a spell of unemployment lasting at least 12 months. About 20 percent of immigrants and 15 percent of second-generation respondents fall into this category.
- Religiosity: The ESS provides a self-assessed measure of religiosity, scaled from 0 to 10, which I include as a linear predictor.
- Religious denomination: The ESS provides information on whether or not the respondent belongs to an organized religion and, if so, which denomination. I recoded that variable to distinguish Catholics (the omitted category), Protestants, Eastern Orthodox, Muslims, and all other religions; this ‘other’ category groups Jewish respondents as well as those from Eastern Religions and other Christian denominations. The final category captures respondents without a religious affiliation (“the non-religious”).
- Use of home-country language: The ESS asks respondents which languages they speak at home and records as many as two. I recoded these variables to differentiate three groups: those who mention only the host country language (60.4%), those who mention the host country language first and the language of their country of origin/parents

country of origin second (17.2%), and those who mention the host country language second to the home country language (22.4% -omitted category).¹⁰

Summary statistics for these variables are provided in table 4.1. The indicators for settlement, economic marginalization, religiosity and home country language-use enter the model both as main effects and as interaction terms with the country of origin and host country value measures respectively. Of the variables indexing religious domination, only the indicator for Muslims is modeled at the country level; adding random effects for all indicators would have introduced too many variance components for reliable estimation, and the indicator for Muslims is theoretically most interesting.

If my extensions of assimilation theory apply, I expect that with increasing settlement the importance of origin country attitude patterns will diminish and the importance of receiving country attitudes will increase. That is, I expect a negative interaction effect of settlement with origin attitude means and a positive interaction effect with host country attitude means. Moreover, if the predictions of segmented assimilation theory apply to attitudes, those who are economically marginalized will be more influenced by their country of origin distributions and less assimilated, and this effect will be especially strong in the second generation.

Given the generally conservative teachings of religions on sexual norms and gender relations, I expect religiosity to have a negative effect on tolerance towards homosexuality, i.e., to be a negative main effect. If some religions indeed provide more conservative templates on social norms than others, this would yield significant coefficients on some of

¹⁰ In countries with more than one official language such as Belgium or Switzerland, any official

the dummy variables for religious membership. Specifically, if concerns about value incompatibility of Muslims in Europe are warranted, then there will be a significant coefficient on the dummy variable identifying Muslims.

But religious practice may also be a way for migrants to preserve home country ties and orientations over time and across generations. Thus, other things being equal, for more religious migrants the association with origin country attitude patterns will be stronger and the association with destination country means will be weaker. Similarly, a social boundary approach and the Islam-as-barrier-to-integration hypothesis suggest that the interaction between being Muslim and host/origin distributions will indicate a relatively slower convergence in attitudes towards the host country.

Consistent with my discussion on the role of language as a central medium of social communication, I expect those who no longer practice their home country language to be more rooted to their country of destination distributions and less so in the country of origin patterns.

Control Variables

The following control variables help to account for any possible compositional differences in migration streams, and also provide a benchmark against which to compare the magnitude of other coefficients.

- Age: Because existing research consistently finds that older respondents have more traditional attitudes including on same sex relations (Hellevik 2002; Gerhards 2010), I enter age in years as a linear predictor to control for these differences.

language counted as the host country language.

- **Education:** Education may increase exposure to liberal ideas and increase the likelihood that respondents reject traditional views on legitimate sexualities. And indeed research finds a strong association between education and attitudes towards homosexuality (Loftus 2001). The ESS provides a variable indicating the years of education completed for each respondent, which I enter as a linear predictor. Similarly more highly educated parents may provide their offspring with a more tolerant worldview. To control for these possible effects of parental education, I use a three-level indicator variable for father's education that distinguishes between those with a primary education or less (36%, omitted category), those with a secondary education (41%) and those with any post secondary education (23%).
- **Gender:** Men consistently express more negative attitudes toward homosexual persons and homosexual behavior (Kite and Whitley 1996; Loftus 2001; Herek 2002). Although the immigrant sample I analyze is fairly balanced between men and women, I add a dummy variable to my regression model.
- **Marital Status:** Those who are or have been married tend to express more traditional views on the rights of same-sex couples (Herek & Glunt 1993). To capture any possible differences, I enter a dummy variable for those who are or have been married.

Results

Summary of regression analysis

Table 4.3 presents two basic models with settlement and generation as the independent variables, entered in two different specifications. Model 1 uses a series of dummy variables, with those most recently arrived (less than one year) as the omitted category. The second

model provides a more parsimonious linear specification. The set of coefficients summarized in the section “Country of Origin mean” describe the influence of the origin country attitude landscape on the respondents’ orientation.¹¹ The first row in this section reveals that among the newly arrived (the omitted reference category), for every unit change in the country of origin we expect a corresponding half point (0.48) change in the orientation of these newcomers. That is, a new arrival from a country that is one unit (\sim one standard deviation) below the mean in tolerance will rank on average half a point lower in tolerance on the 5 point scale as compared to a newly arrived migrant from the average country in my sample. Moving one line down, this association is reduced by 0.13 for those who are in the country 1 to 5 years – and thus a migrant from the such a country would score about third of a point ($0.48 - 0.13 = 0.35$) lower than someone from the same country who had been settled for 1 to 5 years. Turning to the second generation, the interaction term, which is -0.44, virtually cancels out the ‘main effect’ ($0.48 - 0.44 = 0.04$); thus, for the second generation the attitude patterns of the parental home country are not at all predictive of attitudes.

Moving to the next section, which details the influence of the destination country,, the mirror image comes into view: for new arrivals there is no influence (0.06, not significant), though this increases with settlement. In contrast, the destination country attitude pattern substantially predicts second-generation respondents’ attitudes; for every unit in host-country change we expect about a half point corresponding change in second-generation attitudes ($0.06 + 0.41 = 0.47$).

¹¹ The main effect of settlement is theoretically less interesting – it would give the expected change in an individual’s attitude if both the country of origin and the country of destination attitudes are zero (Braumoeller 2004). Since these scores are calculated from latent variables that are centered at zero,

Figure 4.2 provides a graphic summary of these two models. Grey indicates the influence of the destination country and black the country of origin influence. Dots represent the estimates of the dummy variables (Model 1) and the lines derive from the continuous specification of settlement (Model 2). We can see a ‘cross-fading’, a shift in the relative association with the origin and destination attitude distributions. With increasing settlement the association with the home-country declines (black line and dots) and association with the destination country increases (grey line and dots), so that for the long-settled migrants the influences are about equal and for the children of migrants it is reversed: the (parental) origin country distribution matters little and the destination country distribution has substantial influence.¹² To put it differently, for the newly arrived where you come from matters, but after a (long) while, and for your children, it matters where you are. While some shift across generations can be expected, the complete reversal of influence is striking. Moreover, the shift I find even within the migrant generation contradicts the hypothesis that attitudes are largely fixed after a certain age.

this would represent a migrant from an “average” country to an average country. Not surprisingly, there is no significant effect.

¹² While the slopes of these lines are estimated quite precisely, the estimates of the intercepts have considerable variance and thus the point at which the lines intersect should not be over-interpreted.




Figure 4.2: Estimates of the effect of country of origin and host country attitude mean by time of residence in the host country. Dots indicate estimates using discrete categories, lines from a linear specification.

Since the coefficients of the indicator variables for settlement in model 1 increase in almost linear fashion, model 2 enters these variables as a linear predictor ranging from 0 for newly arrived immigrants to 5 for the second generation who lived all their life in the host country. I use this more parsimonious specification in the models summarized in table 4.4: model 3 builds on model 2 but includes individual level variables, whereas model 4 adds interactions of origin and destination attitudes with religious and linguistic characteristics, as well as the measure for economic exclusion. Models 5 and 6 present the analysis for the first- and second-generation sub-samples respectively.

Table 4.3: Cross classified mixed model of respondents tolerance towards homosexual relations estimated using Gibbs sampling.

	Model 1			Model 2		
	mean	95% Credible Int.		mean	95% Credible Int.	
		lower	upper		lower	upper
(Intercept)	3.60	3.35	3.86	3.64	3.40	3.81
Arrived 1 to 5 yrs ago	0.21	0.00	0.52			
6 to 10 yrs ago	0.10	-0.09	0.34			
11 to 20 yrs ago	-0.08	-0.29	0.17			
20+ yrs ago	-0.12	-0.31	0.12			
second generation	-0.07	-0.35	0.28			
Settlement (linear)				-0.04	-0.12	0.02
Country of Origin mean	0.44	0.36	0.53	0.52	0.43	0.58
x arrived 1 to 5 yrs ago (*)	-0.08	-0.13	-0.01			
x arrived 6 to 10 years ago	-0.09	-0.19	0.00			
x arrived 11 to 20 years ago	-0.12	-0.21	-0.03			
x arrived 20+ years ago	-0.28	-0.37	-0.20			
x second generation	-0.38	-0.45	-0.30			
x settlement (linear)				-0.08	-0.10	-0.07
Country of Destination mean	-0.01	-0.04	0.04	-0.09	-0.21	0.10
x arrived 1 to 5 yrs ago	0.01	-0.08	0.10			
x arrived 6 to 10 years ago	0.11	0.03	0.20			
x arrived 11 to 20 years ago	0.21	0.11	0.31			
x arrived 20+ years ago	0.26	0.12	0.36			
x second generation	0.40	0.32	0.54			
x settlement (linear)				0.09	0.05	0.14

Note: Table displays means and 95 % Credible Intervals of posterior distributions. Coefficients that would traditionally be considered significant at the 0.05 level are in bold. (*) The omitted category is those who arrived less than one year ago.

Looking at the coefficients for religious denominations in model 3 we can see a distinctly more conservative outlook among Muslims (mean = -0.38) as compared to migrants from other religious backgrounds. Eastern-Orthodox migrants and those grouped in the category “other” are also somewhat more conservative (mean = -0.13 and -0.12 respectively) than the reference group (Catholics). Unlike in previous research, these differences are *net* of controls for the country of origin and destination country attitude

influence. Also, more religious individuals unsurprisingly have more conservative views on same sex relationships, as do men and those with less education. With respondents' education controlled, parental human capital as indexed by father's education has no significant effect. As predicted by life cycle and cohort change hypotheses, older individuals have more conservative views.

Interpreting the results of models 4 through 6, we can evaluate the more detailed hypotheses concerning whether and in how far certain variables shape persistence of home country attitudes and convergence with destination country distributions. While the findings about convergence over time and generation remain, several more nuanced processes emerge.

Cultural practices indeed shape the relative influence of origin and destination country attitudes. As indicated by the positive interaction between origin country attitudes and religion, more religious individuals remain relatively more 'anchored' in the home country attitude distribution. This supports my hypothesis that religion can have a *conserving* effect in the literal meaning of the word – it preserves the influence of “old country” attitudes. Contrary to expectations I do not see a statistically significant corresponding “isolating” effect from destination country attitude patterns.¹³ Similarly, as predicted by hypotheses that emphasize the importance of home country connections, retention of home country language is associated with continued influence of origin country value patterns. Again there is no corresponding effect on the association with country of destination means.

¹³ This could be due to the fact that I have far fewer destination country observations (N = 23) as compared to origin countries (N = 83) and thus much less statistical power.

The first two panels in figure 4.3 illustrate these results. Holding other interaction terms at their average values, the solid lines represent a respondent with the lowest degree of cultural connection to the origin country (not at all religious or only speaking the host-country language at home) and the dashed lines those with the maximum connection.




Figure 4.3: Influence of origin- and destination country attitudes over time at different levels of religiosity, with variation in language use and for those economically marginal.

Table 4.4: Cross-Classified hierarchical regression model of respondents' attitudes towards homosexuality estimated using Gibbs sampling. Table displays means and 95% Credible Intervals of posterior distributions. Coefficients where this interval does not include 0 are in bold.

	Model 3			Model 3			Model 5 Immigrants only			Model 6 Second Generation		
	95% Credible Intvl.			95% Credible Intvl.			95% Credible Intvl.			95% Credible Intvl.		
	mean	lower	upper	mean	lower	upper	mean	lower	upper	mean	lower	upper
Intercept	3.87	3.62	4.11	3.88	3.60	4.15	3.95	3.68	4.23	3.86	3.54	4.24
Age	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Male	-0.25	-0.28	-0.22	-0.24	-0.28	-0.21	-0.22	-0.26	-0.17	-0.28	-0.33	-0.23
Married	0.00	-0.05	0.04	0.00	-0.04	0.04	-0.04	-0.10	0.02	0.05	-0.02	0.11
Education	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04
Fathers education: secondary	-0.01	-0.06	0.04	-0.01	-0.06	0.03	-0.03	-0.09	0.04	0.00	-0.06	0.07
tertiary	0.04	-0.01	0.10	0.04	-0.02	0.09	0.04	-0.03	0.11	0.03	-0.05	0.11
missing	-0.01	-0.07	0.05	-0.01	-0.07	0.05	-0.04	-0.12	0.04	0.02	-0.06	0.10
Religion: Protestant	-0.06	-0.11	0.00	-0.05	-0.11	0.00	-0.05	-0.13	0.03	-0.07	-0.14	0.01
Eastern Orthodox	-0.13	-0.22	-0.03	-0.11	-0.21	-0.01	-0.04	-0.16	0.08	-0.22	-0.41	-0.04
Other	-0.12	-0.20	-0.05	-0.11	-0.19	-0.03	-0.11	-0.21	-0.02	-0.12	-0.25	0.00
None	0.03	-0.01	0.08	0.04	0.00	0.09	0.02	-0.05	0.09	0.06	0.00	0.12
Muslim	-0.38	-0.47	-0.29	-0.41	-0.71	-0.12	-0.41	-0.84	-0.02	-0.21	-0.82	0.46
Settlement/Generation	-0.03	-0.08	0.02	-0.02	-0.07	0.03	-0.03	-0.11	0.04			
Economic Precarious	-0.01	-0.06	0.03	0.08	-0.03	0.19	0.07	-0.10	0.25	0.07	-0.07	0.21
Language use: Host Lang first	0.12	0.06	0.17	0.01	-0.15	0.12	0.07	-0.14	0.28	-0.01	-0.38	0.28
Host Lang only	0.17	0.12	0.22	0.11	-0.06	0.27	0.19	0.00	0.38	-0.05	-0.35	0.17
Religiosity	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05	-0.06	-0.08	-0.04	-0.06	-0.09	-0.04	-0.06	-0.08	-0.03
Country of Destination Mean	0.06	-0.10	0.22	0.06	-0.13	0.26	0.07	-0.12	0.25	0.27	0.00	0.48
x Settlement/Generation	0.07	0.03	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.10	0.07	0.02	0.13			
x Economic. Prec.				-0.08	-0.17	-0.01	-0.11	-0.25	0.01	-0.02	-0.14	0.07
x host lang. first				0.06	0.00	0.18	0.02	-0.13	0.17	0.09	-0.11	0.35
x host lang. only				0.06	-0.05	0.19	0.01	-0.12	0.15	0.15	0.01	0.37
x religiosity				0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.02	0.02
x Muslim				0.10	-0.06	0.27	0.14	-0.08	0.40	-0.22	-0.63	0.13
Country of Origin Mean	0.33	0.27	0.40	0.26	0.18	0.34	0.26	0.17	0.35	0.01	-0.06	0.09
x Settlement/Generation	-0.06	-0.08	-0.05	-0.05	-0.07	-0.03	-0.05	-0.07	-0.02			
x Economic. Prec.				0.05	0.00	0.11	0.07	0.00	0.14	0.00	-0.06	0.06
x host lang. first				0.01	-0.01	0.05	0.01	-0.06	0.07	-0.02	-0.12	0.06
x host lang. only				-0.08	-0.12	-0.03	-0.07	-0.14	-0.01	-0.08	-0.16	-0.01
x religiosity				0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03
x Muslim				0.04	-0.18	0.25	0.13	-0.13	0.40	-0.26	-0.66	0.00

Note: Omitted categories are: Catholics (religion), Host country language second (Language use), primary education or less (Fathers education).

Turning to the interaction effect on economic marginalization (see also panel 3 in figure 4.3), in the sample overall we see that those who are economically marginalized are on average less associated with the destination country attitude distributions (mean = -0.8) and somewhat more so by the origin country attitude patterns (mean = +0.05). The effect is larger in the immigrant sample, but due to smaller sample size only the 90% confidence interval does not include zero (equivalent to $p < 0.1$). I find no significant difference among the second-generation respondents. These findings contradict the implications of the segmented assimilation hypothesis, which emphasizes the potential for ‘oppositional’ value orientations among those children of immigrants whose economic expectations are frustrated. However, my findings do give support to hypotheses that emphasize distinct attitude orientations among marginalized immigrants.

Finally I don’t find that Muslim immigrants have a different association to origin and destination country attitude patterns. The interaction coefficients are far from significant in all cases. This contradicts strong expectations from current research that emphasize the social isolation of Muslim populations throughout Europe.

How much? Relative magnitude of effects

Going beyond qualitative differences and comparing magnitudes of coefficients provides a sense of the relative importance of different variables by taking into account the variances of the independent variables. To illustrate, figure 4.4 provides the predicted answer scores of hypothetical migrants with select characteristics. The top bar represents a reference migrant from a country with an average (in my sample of countries) attitude score (e.g. Poland comes close with a score of 0.08) to a country with a score of +2, which is representative of many

western and northern European countries (Denmark is 1.95, Sweden is 2.03, and France is a bit more conservative with 1.41). This reference migrant is a newly arrived and married 30-year-old Catholic woman of average religiosity and education who predominantly uses her origin country language at home and whose father has a primary education. The predicted answer score is 3.84, just below the overall average of migrants (3.92).

Holding everything else constant we see that men or Muslim migrants are significantly less tolerant. Although the difference to the reference migrant is somewhat larger for Muslims the difference for men is of a roughly similar magnitude. Since the host country is more tolerant than the sending country, predicted scores increase with settlement and across generations. Those who are in the country for 20 years, or the children of migrants, are not only significantly more tolerant, but the magnitude of this difference introduced through settlement is larger than the difference between Muslims and Catholics or the difference between men and women for that matter.

The importance of sending country context for the attitudes of the newly arrived becomes clearer still if we compare a newly arrived migrant from a country with a score that is 1 unit (~ 1 standard deviation) above the mean and an otherwise identical migrant from a country with a score that is 1 unit below the mean: the difference in expected attitude is 0.67, significantly larger than the difference between Muslims and Catholics, or the equivalent of 23 years of schooling. However, these differences diminish over time and across generations. Between two (otherwise identical) children of these migrants the expected difference is 0.15, less than a quarter of the expected difference between their newly arrived parents.




Figure 4.4: Predicted response scores based on model 4 (scale from 1 to 5) for select combinations of key variables. Notes: (a) The reference migrant is a new arrival from an “average” country (attitude score = 0). All scenarios are for a destination country with a score of 2. Individual level characteristics are: age 30, 13 years of education, religiosity of 5, not economically precarious, married, female, Catholic, and home country language as first mention. (b) Based on model 3.

Data limitations and alternative interpretations

Before discussing the implications of these findings it is worth addressing possible alternative interpretations of my findings. The cross-sectional nature of my data might raise the objection that selection effects, not gradual change, are what drive these patterns. And migrants certainly are a select set of individuals, including with respect to social attitudes. But my analysis is not primarily concerned with the specific attitudes of migrants or whether they are more or less conservative. Rather I examine how representative a migrant (or child of a migrant) is of the country of origin and the destination country respectively, and how that changes. Selection notwithstanding, as my analysis clearly shows, for newly arrived migrants origin country attitudes have strong predictive value, while for migrants who migrated more

than two decades ago this predictive value is much less. If a selection process produced the trend depicted in Figure 4.2, this would entail a gradually changing migrant selection such that earlier migrants were less typical of their country of origin and more typical of their receiving countries, with the reverse true for those who migrated later. Although it is possible that migration streams with this pattern exist, it is extremely unlikely that a significant number would exhibit this peculiar pattern. On the contrary, in many cases the selection will be the other way round. Looking at the main (labor) migration to western Europe from 1960 onwards, for example, early migrants came from the rural and least developed parts of the sending countries, hardly a context selected to fit the attitude distributions of their new home countries. In contrast, we might expect some degree of “attitude matching” among more recent intra-European migrants, which would attenuate the estimates of my analysis.

Another challenge to my interpretation is selective return migration. It is conceivable that those migrants who are most uncomfortable and most reluctant to adapt to a host country return home at a disproportional rate, such that over time the migrants who remain are more representative of the host-country distribution. However, since a good number of migrant sending countries have very narrow attitude distributions (see figure 4.1), there will be little opportunity for selection in the first place. As a more formal test for these issues, I estimated an additional version of model 3 that includes a measure of origin country variance (see table 4.4). The larger the variance in the origin country distribution, the more potential there is for selective migration and selective return migration. If selective return migration was a significant factor in the explanation, then we would expect that the larger the origin country variance, the lower would be the influence of the origin country attitudes and the

better would be the "fit" with the host country attitude pattern—because migrants with attitudes more in line with their origin country would have returned home. Regression analysis does not show such a pattern. Point estimates of the interaction between origin country variance and the influence of origin country means are near zero and far from any level of statistical significance. These tests give confidence that the patterns I observe, which are consistent with my hypotheses about migrant adaptation, are *not* driven by selection effects.

Discussion and conclusion

While some social science research has begun to examine to what extent and why immigrants' attitudes and values change, these efforts lack the systematic comparative approach needed to distinguish the influence of individual level characteristics from the influence of context – the persistence of home country attitude patterns versus the imprint of the receiving society. This paper provides an empirical basis for distinguishing these processes and for making some assessment of their relative importance.

I find not only that contexts are important predictors of attitudes but also that for migrants there is a clear shift, both within and across generations. As migrants settle, the “home country” context loses importance while the host society becomes more influential. Whereas for the newcomers the country of origin distribution is highly predictive of their attitudes and host country distribution matters little, this influence declines gradually with settlement, and by the second generation the relationship is reversed: for the second generation, the origin country distribution matters little while the destination country distribution is highly predictive. While the intergenerational shift is unsurprising, the shifts

within a generation are inconsistent with theories in political psychology and sociology that predict persistence of dispositions after early adulthood. At the same time this change is slow and gradual. After 10 years migrants' attitudes are still significantly associated with the country of origin pattern.¹⁴

My findings have a number of implications for the study of migrants and of cultural change processes more generally. First, while most research in the assimilation paradigm has focused on socio-economic outcomes and provides neither explicit expectations nor empirical analysis about post-migration changes in attitudes, I argue that the assimilation paradigm can in a relatively straightforward fashion be extended to the domain of attitudes. Both the canonical framework as summarized by Gordon (1964) and the neo-classical assimilation theory as laid out by Alba and Nee emphasize the shifting of social ties as migrants settle, whether due to structural assimilation (Gordon) or to the unintended consequences of migrants' pursuit of economic opportunities (Alba and Nee).

In turn, a various theories of attitude formation emphasize the importance of social communication. It is through networks of interaction, influence, and social control that people adopt (or change) attitudes. Or looking at it the other way, it is through processes of social closure that groups develop different dispositions. In fact one of the explanations for the persistence of attitudes is that people shift their communication patterns to match their ideological dispositions: we surround ourselves with people who think like us (e.g. McPherson et al. 2001). But migrants, almost by definition, don't follow this prescription. By

¹⁴ It is possible that there are exceptions to this general trend – that certain migrant flows such as refugees will show slower or no processes of attitude convergence. My data unfortunately do not allow to reliably identify these sub-populations and the data is too sparse to reliably compare individual migration streams.

leaving their home in order to seek opportunity in a new place, they leave the political and social context they grew up in. And the places they move to, and eventually settle in, may present them with a quite different set of dominant norms and attitudes. For some immigrants, ethnic neighborhoods may provide some continuity at first – a familiar context and neighbors who share similar experiences and upbringings. However, these ethnic ties lose importance over time, and certainly over generations. And thus eventually immigrants and their children engage a social context where a very different set of attitudes prevails.

Segmented assimilation theories in contrast emphasize another possible outcome: that those who are marginalized will not find entry into mainstream social life. Especially for the second generation, thwarted upward mobility may lead to assimilation towards an “urban underclass” and the adoption of a distinct worldview and set of values. To what extent this specific prediction, which is rooted in the specific urban context of the US, can be directly applied to European settings is debatable. But the more general implication, that blocked economic mobility will delay assimilation and be especially consequential for the second-generation, should hold. These expectations, however, are only partially borne out in my analysis. On the one hand, I do find overall that among migrants and their children those who are economically precarious are more heavily anchored in the origin country distributions. Yet, contrary to the predictions of segmented assimilation theory, these effects are not stronger for the second-generation; in fact, they are stronger for the immigrant generation. One explanation may be that for the second-generation, which has extensive exposure to a wide variety of host country institutions, economic marginalization does not disrupt the networks and contacts that drive assimilation in the realm of social attitudes and values. In contrast, for the first generation where co-ethnic networks are much more salient,

exclusion from labor markets or mainstream economic life has greater consequences in the realm of attitudes and value orientations. Similarly, the “bright boundary” (Alba 2005) that Islam supposedly constitutes in Europe and that impedes assimilation is not borne out in my findings. With other variables controlled, Muslim migrants are no more closely tied to home country value patterns than those from other religions.

Thus, my findings also cast some doubt on the explanatory power of migrant religious characteristics, which is a focus that underpins much contemporary research on matters of attitudes and values in Europe. As my results show, at least part of the association between migrants’ religiosity and more conservative judgments on issues around sexuality and gender norms that have been emphasized in previous work is due to the “longer life” that home country orientations have among the religious. Rather than a consequence of religiosity per se, it is a *conserving* effect that religion has on traditional world-views. And as a set of practices that shape continuity with the home country, religious characteristics are by no means the only, or even the most central variable. Linguistic acculturation seems at least as important in this regard. If anything, the greater importance of religious characteristics may stem from the greater intergenerational stability of religion as compared to home country language. Immigrants, and especially Muslims, are quite successful in passing on their religion to the next generation (see also Diehl and Koenig 2009), while migrants’ home country languages are transferred only incompletely to the second-generation (see also Alba et al. 2002)

But by focusing solely on how immigrants fit into the host society, both the neo-classical as well as the segmented assimilation approaches see but half the picture. Rather than being “the uprooted”, most migrants at least initially maintain some ties to friends and

family back home (e.g., visiting, sending money, making phone calls). Thus it also matters how migrants fit into the world of their origin country. And cultural practices help maintain this fit. My data allow me to assess the importance of two domains: the continued use of home country language and religion. Indeed, I find that for those who maintain these practices, the home country worldview has more influence. On the flip-side, longer settled migrants, and most of their children, become out of sync with the dispositions dominant in the “old country.”

Thus, this paper also points to a broader set of political transformations of migrants that remain poorly understood. When migrants move from a poorer to a richer country and at the same time move from one political context to another, how do these changes affect their worldview? This paper covers only one small part of a large and multidimensional field of attitudes, values, and norms. Nevertheless, this analysis suggests that migrants, by moving, embark on a journey that will change more than their material condition. Knowingly or not, they also embark on a journey that may change their view of the world in unanticipated ways. If we look at these changes through the materialist vs. post-materialist lens advanced by Inglehart, most migration decisions are motivated by material reasoning – the goal is to provide a stable income for those who stay home or opportunities for a better life and a safer environment for those who follow in the journey. Yet, as sojourners turn into immigrants, changes inevitably follow: many migrants (and certainly their children) adopt attitudes that are more in tune with the post-material contexts of their new homes. This may not only set them apart from those who stayed at home but also represent a shift from the person they used to be.

Appendix

In order to test whether my results are sensitive to the modeling approach chosen, specifically whether treating the dependent variable as linear affects the results, I calculated my models using two alternate approaches: an ordered logistic regression as well as a linear regression using clustering to adjust standard errors. Since these approaches can accommodate only one dimension of clustering, they are unable to correctly represent the cross-nested structure of the data. As an approximation, I define the country of origin by country of destination cells as the clustering unit. For example, using the full sample yields a total of about 900 clusters. Since the scale of the ordered logistic regression is different from the linear specifications, coefficients and standard errors can't be meaningfully compared. Yet the ratio of coefficient to standard error can be used as a measure to compare across models. Figure A4.1 plots these statistics from both types of estimates against each other. As the graph shows the two sets of estimates line up well and there are no systematic deviations. Detailed analysis shows that especially among the key coefficients of interest there are no significant differences.




Figure A4.1: Comparison of t/z-statistics from ordered logistic model and linear model

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Chapter 5

Memorandum outlining the contribution of this dissertation to education research, policy and practice

This dissertation makes a substantive contribution as well as a methodological contribution to education research and policy. The key substantive contribution of this dissertation points to the importance of home-country cultural practices for the educational experience and success of the children of immigrants. The methodological contribution presents a cross-nested model to estimate the “legacies” of context effects for individuals that transition from one context (e.g. schools, neighborhoods, countries, classrooms) to another and presents an approach that can help narrow the confidence intervals for the estimates of context level coefficients.

Substantive contribution

In the US one in five students in pre-kindergarten to 12th grade is a child of immigrants (Capps et al. 2005) and in urban centers like New York, Los Angeles, Chicago or Boston the share is much higher still. The schooling experiences and educational success of this population will be critically important not only for the composition of the labor force but also for the future of ethnic stratification in the United States.

One shortcoming of most current research is that it looks at the children of migrants solely as *immigrants* as foreigners *here* but does not consider that they may, to some extent at

least, be members *there* the country that their parents left. Only recently has scholarship in sociology as well as education research begun to take seriously the fact that migrant families are also embedded in social, cultural, political and economic fields that extend beyond the society of the receiving state. And it has become clear that if we study these young people only from the perspective of “here” we miss half the picture.

This dissertation focuses on the transmission of cultural practices as one central aspect of these connections and relates these processes to the *schooling experiences of the children of immigrants*. A large literature in the US has shown the detrimental effect of discrimination in school on the educational aspirations and attainment of minority students. A separate literature has examined the protective effects of ethnic cultural practices against discrimination. In this dissertation I bring these two strands together and provide a framework for examining the tradeoffs between cultural practices as modes of difference on the one side and as resources that can provide connection and resilience on the other.

In chapter three I show that the presence of cultural practices in the family on the one hand increases the likelihood of reporting discrimination by teachers in school, but at the same time decreases the likelihood of adverse reactions to discrimination. I show how the “net cost/benefit” depends on the specific “shape” by which the costs of cultural difference are imposed. As I argue for some families maintaining a high level of cultural distinctness may indeed be preferable to a strategy of acculturation. For example I show that among those who do feel discriminated against by their teachers, those who grow up in religious households are much less likely to report negative reactions such as losing confidence, or academic motivation. At the same time for this group higher religiosity is not substantially associated with higher reports of discrimination.

And the effect sizes are substantial. Among those who are most likely to report discrimination in school, those growing up in the most religious families are only half as likely to report adverse reactions such as losing interest in school or losing confidence than those who grow up non-religious or only weakly religious.

I believe these findings are straightforwardly relevant to current debates in US education research and policy specifically in regards to the education of the children of immigrants and ethnic minorities. The debate around bilingual education in California for example in no small part hinged on the question whether the separateness that bilingual education entailed would ultimately be detrimental for the aspirations of the children of immigrants. More recently debates in Arizona about a Mexican-American studies curriculum entailed similar questions. Does providing home-country oriented teaching activities foster a sense of victimhood as has been alleged by opponents of these curricula or do they provide a resource for students that can make them more resilient vis-à-vis the obstacles they will no doubt encounter in their school careers?

An approach like the one I present in this dissertation could provide a way to empirically engage these debates taking into consideration both types of arguments and assess their relative importance. One prerequisite for such an analysis would probably be an effort to collect better data on some of the key variables: specifically data on perceptions of discrimination and the reactions of students to these experiences. A very worthwhile complement would be data that includes measures of classroom climate as it relates to cultural diversity either aggregate measures based on student surveys or data based on teacher assessments.

Methodological contribution

My dissertation also presents a methodological contribution that can be useful in education research more broadly: a special type of cross-nested hierarchical model and an innovation that in some cases can increase the efficiency of the estimates considerably.

Cross-nested data structures are very common in educational research. These types of analysis arise when researchers want to consider the influence of two contexts (nesting dimensions) but these contexts do not overlap perfectly. For example students are nested in neighborhoods as well as schools, but neighborhoods send students to multiple schools and school in turn have students from multiple neighborhoods. A different type of cross nesting occurs where researchers consider the same type of context (or level 2 unit) but research subjects change contexts (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 389ff). School transitions are a classic case in education research. For example students who move from primary school to secondary school are influenced by both school contexts. A recent example of such an analysis is a paper by Friedel and colleagues (2010) who look at the effects of teacher goal emphasis in the transition to middle school. One interesting question in these types of analysis might be the relative importance of the original versus the new context. That is how long is the “shadow” of the initial school context is and when the characteristics of the new school context become more important predictors of educational outcomes.

It is this type of model that my dissertation uses and contributes to. In chapter four I use a hierarchical cross-nested research design whereby a key 2nd level independent variable represents a measure of a key sending and receiving context characteristic. I then examine for individuals who move from one context to another what the relative weight of the

sending versus the receiving context is on the outcome of interest. To do so I include an interaction term of these context measures with the time since migration.

I also develop additional statistical feature that could be implemented to make these kinds of estimates more efficient. If the researcher has reason to believe that the effect of time on the influence of the sending and receiving context is symmetric the effective number of parameters estimated in the model can be reduced significantly. If as the influence of the origin context fades the influence of the destination context increases by the same amount, then we can impose a symmetry restriction on the interaction coefficients. In a Bayesian modeling framework this can be done probabilistically in the form of an informative prior, taking into account the confidence the researcher has in this prior knowledge. Since in this type of research the number of level two units (schools, neighborhoods, classrooms etc.) is generally limited this strategy could in some instances provide non-trivial efficiency gains.

To give the example of the model I estimate in chapter 4. Here the key coefficients are represented by two vectors θ_o and θ_d - indicating how select independent variables (e.g. time since moving) moderate the relative influence of origin and destination context. If the relative influence changes in a symmetric fashion then the corresponding elements j of these θ vectors would be symmetric with respect to 0. That is $\theta_o[j] = -\theta_d[j]$.

In the chapter I do not implement this strategy as it would not change any of my substantive conclusions, but would make the methodological section more complex than it already is. Since this chapter is also under review as a paper at a journal geared towards a generalist sociological audience I decided to keep the methodological portion as simple as possible.

However, table 5.1 illustrates this approach and compares the estimates of the most basic model in chapter four with estimates from a version that includes this symmetry restriction. The slope parameters represent how the time since moving shapes the influence of origin/destination context. The first part of the table replicates the information presented in chapter four: the country of origin mean declines by a rate of -0.08 with a 95% Credible Interval from -0.10 to -0.06 whereas the country of destination influence increases at a rate of 0.09 with a credible interval from 0.06 to 0.13. As one can see the coefficients even when not imposing any informative prior are essentially symmetric, that is over time the influence of the origin context declines at about the same rate as the influence of the destination context increases. As summarized in the second part of table 5.1, when I impose a relatively modestly informative prior whereby a symmetry coefficient (-1) with a standard deviation of 1, the Credible Intervals become indeed smaller. Whereas the range without the restriction is 0.082 for the country of destination and 0.036 for the country of destination respectively, it is 0.075 and 0.0356 once I apply the informative prior. This represents a narrowing of the Credible Interval by 9% for the destination dimension and 2% for the origin dimension.

Table 5.1: Comparing slope estimates with and without probabilistic symmetry restriction

	Without symmetry prior (Table 4.3)				With symmetry prior			
	Coefficient	95% Credible Intvl.			Coefficient	95% Credible Intvl.		
		lower	upper	Range		lower	upper	Range
Country of destination x settlement	0.09	0.053	0.135	0.0823	0.08	0.047	0.122	0.0752
Country of origin x settlement	-0.08	-0.105	-0.068	0.0364	-0.08	-0.110	-0.074	0.0356

In my case the efficiency gain is substantively of no consequence, but one can easily imagine research contexts where these improvements could be larger and become decisive to the success of an analysis. Also the prior I specified has a relatively large variance. In many

instances where researchers have sufficient substantive prior knowledge much narrower priors may be justifiable yielding even larger improvements in efficiency.

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