The 2018 elections in Brazil caused profound disturbance to political scientists, political analysts, jurists, and activists.¹ The electoral outcome shocked the establishment. The winner was an anti-system politician, an irrelevant (and burlesque) representative, with no significant party, no experience in positions in the Executive Branch, and with a frankly pro-military authoritarianism against minorities discourse. Bolsonaro reached strong popular support and was elected President. Politicians, scholars, and part of the voters immediately ran out for an explanation for such an electoral outcome.

There were many hypotheses, explanations, suspicions, theories, accusations. It was a very peculiar election, indeed. The former-president first in the polls was sent to jail in a particular situation, raising complaints of lawfare (Zanin et alli 2019; Carvalho et alli 2019; Proner et alli 2016). Company money in electoral campaigns is forbidden in Brazil; nevertheless, some businessmen hired massive messages on WhatsApp, motivating objections based on abuse of economic power (Evangelista & Bruno 2019; Abdin 2019). With almost no time for electoral advertising in the media, Bolsonaro suffered an attack and became the main news of all channels for weeks. Some doubt the veracity of the assault and say it was a ploy to escape the debates, claiming that it was electoral fraud (Oliveira 2019).² Still, others hold that the will of the electorate has been diverted - again in a fraudulent expedient - by the mass dissemination of fake news.

¹ This study was financed in part by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - Brasil (CAPES) - Finance Code 001.
(Chagas-Bastos 2019; Ferreira 2018). Other blame the #elenão ("not him") women’s movement, which brought together thousands of women in several Brazilian cities a week before the first round of elections: this movement that fought the then-candidate’s misogynistic discourse would have caused a backlash in the undecided electorate. 3

Political polarization seemed to reach anti-civilizational levels during and after the campaign. Hate speech, physical violence, threats, and family breakups were the aftermath of an election that still looks like a nightmare for democratic spirits. Vestiges of the authoritarian mindset, however, were within reach of the vigilant observer. The keywords of Brazilian institutional ruptures were already on discourses, judicial decisions, parties’ manifestos, leaders’ pronunciations, and social media comments. 4 The demonization of politics, the defense of public morality, the moralist posture of institutions, and the old ghost of communism, served to justify for the constitutional ruptures in 1937 and 1964, with wide-ranging coups d’état. Nowadays, there seems to be a tendency for democratic decay, with the rise of the right and left populists (Mounk 2019; Levstky & Ziblatt 2018; Balkin 2017; Bermeo 2016; Inglehart & Norris 2016).

In this text, we claim that the Brazilian electorate did not start worshipping an authoritarian leader suddenly, due to the short-term factors described above. Rather, a significant part of the voters supported the winning electoral option because it represented part of their thinking, such as the appeal to religious sentiment, conservative values, and an anti-establishment discourse. His victory was due conservative thought in terms of cultural issues that, driven by the conquests of minorities and the liberalization of customs, finds echo in an electoral alternative. To demonstrate this assumption, we will discuss the composition of the Brazilian Congress resulting from the election since the re-democratization in 1985-1988, the division of electoral preference between the various political parties since 1998, and the results of Latinobarometro’s surveys in Brazil since 1995.

Hence, we intend to demonstrate that the 2018 election was not an accident or a gross change in

political alignment. In essence, it was a reflection of a political culture that needs to be recognized and faced with constitutional values. Our purpose is to point out, in the wake of other scholars, that the recent growth of popular support for the right and the emergence of extreme right parties are not reactions to specific events, but stem from cleavages present in society (Dalton 2018; Norris & Inglehart 2019; Sides, Tesler & Vavreck 2019). This does not mean we are ignoring the idiosyncrasies of politics in Brazil or the phenomenon of populism, but presenting an alternative way of reading electoral results and the composition of political bodies.

**Some explanatory notes about a very peculiar political system**

For almost nine decades, the Brazilian electoral system has been based on the defense of minority representation, with some gaps during authoritarian regimes (Salgado 2015). The keynote is the proportional representation system, with political parties controlling the nomination of candidates since 1945. This design resulted in a multiparty system, with a high impact on the national scene because of the prohibition on local and regional parties. The voter can choose the political party or vote for a candidate from an unordered party-list. During the period we analyze - from the end of the military dictatorship until the 2018 elections - coalitions were allowed to compete in parliamentary and executive elections.

The electoral authority is located in the Judiciary and brings together the administration and the electoral jurisdiction in one body. Their decisions can be challenged before the Federal Supreme Court, which shares three members with the Superior Electoral Court (Salgado 2016).

We will describe the Brazilian parties in left/right terms. However, the label as applied to political positions, parties, and politicians are slightly different than those used in USA or affluent established democracies. Brazilian parties and politicians who might call themselves liberals are located on the right-wing, because many of them are economic conservatives and cultural conservatives. Those who call themselves progressives are located on the left-wing. They generally stress issues as the defense of welfare state’s policies and government intervention on the market. On the cultural sphere, they advocate for gender equality, minorities’ rights and environment issues. The center brings together a considerable number of parties with a great deal of ideological mobility, and most of them act markedly with physiological pragmatism. Many parties “rebranded”, merged, were incorporated, or divided over the 1986-2018 period (Salgado & Dantas 2013). The names of political parties do not mean much. For instance, the party that was the mainstay of the military regime (then called Aliança Renovadora Nacional - National Renovating Alliance) was renamed the Social Democratic Party with the party opening in 1980; part of it became the Liberal Front Party (PFL) in 1985, which since 2007 has been called Democrats (DEM). Consequently,
Brazil is widely known for its high level of electoral volatility in comparison to 46 other democratic party systems (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007).

Emphasizing the fragmentation of the party system, Codato, Berlatto, and Bolognesi (2018) indicate the existence of "35 nominal parties, 13.22 effective legislative parties and electoral 14.06 effective parties with an average age of 17.71 years" in 2018.

The method and the databases

To determine the support of the Brazilian electorate in left-right terms, we consider the composition of the Chamber of Deputies (Lower House) in the elections following the 1988 Constitution. The analysis will not be made by the ideological profile of the members of parliament, but by their party. We use the party identification shortcut, recognizing, however, this implies a simplification of the electoral response, even more so in a very personalist model like that of Brazil. The fluidity of the Brazilian parties must also be highlighted, which could lead to different classifications of each party association depending on the historical and political moment.

Despite the difficulty derived from a system of highly fluid parties, several studies have dedicated themselves to classifying of Brazilian political parties, using the right-left orientation (Fleischer, 1987; Rodrigues, 1987; Lima, 2009; Power and Zucco, 2009; Freitas, Moura, and Medeiros, 2009; Tarouco and Madeira, 2013; Codato, Berlatto, and Bolognesi, 2018). Although the criteria used are different across authors, only one of the classifications showed a discrepancy in the ideological location of the parties. Tarouco and Madeira (2013), inspired by the Manifestos Research Group, use the content analysis of programmatic documents. At the end of their study, however, the authors recognized that one of the explanations for the divergence in the application of this criterion is that the programmatic documents of the parties do not contain elements of their ideological position. Therefore, we use the ideological separation of political parties resulting from the adoption of other standards, as shown in Table 1.

5 Survey responses of the federal legislators (Power and Zucco, 2019); “classifications of each party current in the specialized literature” (Codato, Berlatto, and Bolognesi, 2018); “by ideological agglutination poles” (Lima, 2009); analysis of constituent parliamentarians by affinity with political parties pre-1964 (Fleisher, 1987); by self-definition of constituent representatives (Rodrigues, 1987); and relationship with previous parties combined with votes in the National Constituent Assembly (Freitas, Moura and Medeiros, 2009).
Table 1. Brazilian Political Parties (1986-2018) according to left-right orientation

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<th>LEFT</th>
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<td>Partido Comunista do Brasil (PC do B)</td>
<td>Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMBD) / Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB)</td>
<td>Partido dos Aposentados da Nação (PAN)</td>
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<td>Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB)</td>
<td>Partido da Mobilização Nacional (PMN)</td>
<td>Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL) / Democratas (DEM)</td>
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<td>Partido da Causa Operária (PCO)</td>
<td>Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB)</td>
<td>Partido da Reconstrução da Ordem Nacional (PRONA)</td>
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<td>Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT)</td>
<td>Partido Humanista da Solidariedade (PHS)</td>
<td>Partido da Reconstrução Nacional (PRN)</td>
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<td>Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)</td>
<td>Partido da Mulher Brasileira (PMB)</td>
<td>Partido da República (PR)</td>
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<td>Partido Pátria Livre (PPL)</td>
<td>Partido Popular Socialista (PPS)</td>
<td>Partido Social Democrata Cristão (PSDC) / Democracia Cristã (DC)</td>
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<td>Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL)</td>
<td>Partido Republicano da Ordem Social (PROS)</td>
<td>Partido da Solidariedade Nacional (PSN)</td>
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<td>Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB)</td>
<td>Partido Verde (PV)</td>
<td>Partido das Reformas Sociais (PRS)</td>
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<td>Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado (PSTU)</td>
<td>Rede Sustentabilidade (REDE)</td>
<td>Partido Democrático Social (PDS)</td>
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Partido Democrático Social (PDS)

Partido Ecológico Nacional (PEN) / Patriotas (PATRI)

Partido Geral dos Trabalhadores (PGT)

Partido Liberal (PL)

Partido Novo (NOVO)

Partido Progressista (PP) (from 1993 to 1995)

Partido Progressista Brasileiro (PPB) / Partido Progressista (PP)

Partido Progressista Reformador (PPR)
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<th>Party Name</th>
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<td>Partido Municipalista Renovador (PMR) / Partido Republicano Brasileiro (PRB)</td>
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<td>Partido Social Cristão (PSC)</td>
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<td>Partido Social Democrático (PSD*) - from 1987 to 2003</td>
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<td>Partido Social Democrático (PSD**) - from 2011</td>
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<td>Partido Trabalhista Cristão (PTC)</td>
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<td>Partido Trabalhista do Brasil (PT do B) / AVANTE</td>
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<td>Partido Trabalhista Nacional (PTN) / Podemos</td>
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<td>Partido Trabalhista Renovador (PTR)</td>
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Note: all Brazilian parties from 1986 to 2018 (data from tse.jus.br).

Given the availability of official data, we focus on parties in the Chamber of Deputies resulting from the 1986 until 2018 elections. From the 1998 elections, in addition to the composition of the parliament, we will also evaluate the votes of the parties and their candidates, given the distortion caused electoral quotient and coalitions. All this data is from the website of the Superior Electoral Court. Moreover, in order to refine the analysis and avoid summarizing the position of citizenship only by their

6 www.tse.jus.br
electoral decision, starting in 1995, we will consider the surveys conducted by Latinobarometro in Brazil. We will also use other surveys ran by IBOPE, CSES, and CESOP to present some hints of the electoral outcome.

In the tedious life of Brazilian politics, some episodes are relevant in the interpretation of results. The first legislature (1986-1900) was responsible for the promulgation of the Constitution in 1988. The second one faced massive popular demonstrations and impeached President Collor in 1992. The third legislature approved an amendment to the Constitution, allowing for re-election to the Executive Branch in 1997. In 2002, a leftist party (Workers’ Party - PT) won the Presidency, with Lula, reelected in 2006. His vice-president was an important businessman from the Liberal Party (PL), a rightist party. In 2005, a lawsuit removed several relevant politicians from office based on the purchase of political support from parliamentarians by the Executive Branch (known as "Mensalão").

After the 2006 election, the judicial branch imposed a rule of partisan fidelity preventing the change of party during the legislature. This was a common pattern in the Brazilian Parliament, and about 28% percent of the representatives changed parties in the three legislatures before the jurisdictional rule. Most of them migrated to the winner party or coalition (Freitas 2008). Melo (2000) pointed out that since 1985 this is the average percentage of migration in the Lower House. The legislative approval of a highly restrictive electoral law political rights in 2010, the "Clean Record Law” (Salgado & Araujo 2013).

The Workers’ Party (PT) won the 2010 election with Dilma Rousseff, who had a politician from the biggest centrist party (PMDB) as her vice president. Her first term was marked by massive popular demonstrations in 2013s and the following years (against the price of public transportation, the World Cup, and the Summer Olympic Games in Brazil). To Leonardo Avritzer (2019), it is the moment when “the pendulum of democracy” went to the authoritarian side.

In 2014, a police operation that reached the peak of the Brazilian political class, Operation Lava Jato (Car Wash Operation), was deflagrated, and caused turbulences on the 2018 elections. The Workers’ Party (PT) got its fourth mandate in 2014, again with Dilma Rousseff, but with an extremely narrow victory. The Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) (who ruled from 1995 to 2002) did not accept the defeat.

President Dilma suffered a very controversial impeachment in August 2016; her vice, Michael Temer, allegedly involved in political corruption, ruled until 2018. In April 2018, the popular former

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7 www.latinobarometro.org
8 There is a dispute over the interpretation of these 2013 manifestations (Pinheiro-Machado, 2019; Messagi Jr, 2019; Savazoni, 2014), but since then, the right has ceased to be ashamed. Political movements, such as the Free Brazil Movement (MBL), Endireita Brasil, and Change Brasil, start to articulate actions and dispute space in the party system.
president Lula from the Workers’ Party - front-runner in the polls - was arrested on corruption conviction. The electoral campaign started in August, the knife assault was in September, the election was in October.

The electoral results: the signs of electoral behavior

We describe the partisan landscape in Brazil first in terms of the party composition of the Chamber of Deputies. After most elections, the rightist parties had the larger share of deputies. On only two occasions since 1986 has the Chamber of Deputies had more deputies from centrist parties than those from the right. Left-wing parties were often in third place; only in 2018 did the left elect more deputies than centrists. The election, moreover, led to an absolute right-wing dominance in political representation (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Number of Low House's representatives from each political spectrum, 1986 to 2018. Source: tse.jus.br.

The decline of the dictatorial regime was followed by presidential election through the Electoral College. After 21 years and six military governments, the Democratic Alliance's victorious program contained the promise of calling a National Constituent Assembly. After a debate on the nature of the assembly, the winning thesis was a constituent congress, composed of senators and deputies. Thus, the
electorate elected constituent parliamentarians in 1986 to replace the legal order established after the 1964 military coup (Salgado 2007), with new political principles (Salgado 2017).

The overall left-right vote shares aggregate a diverse set of parties, and the challenge facing the Chamber was to create a new government from this mixture. At the start of the new constitutional era in 1986, the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), which opposed to the military dictatorship but was considered a center party (the only one then), took 260 out of 487 seats (53.39%). The right parties, including the dictatorship's support party (PDS) and its division (PFL), took 180 seats (36.96%), which was one of its lowest totals over the next three decades. The left did even worst, garnering only 47 parliamentarians (9.65%).

The next legislature was elected in 1990, a year after the direct election for president of the Republic. The right parties rebounded and reached more than half of the Lower House (50.89%), winning 256 of the 503 seats. The center parties won 147 seats (29.23%), and 100 seats (19.88%) were assigned to the left.

In the next two legislatures, the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), a center party formed out of dissidents from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), exercised the leadership of the Executive Branch. As of the 1998 election onwards, we also checked the wasted electoral preference, by votes in very minority options, and without the transfer of votes in coalitions and the effects of malapportionment.

In 1994, Figure 1 shows that the center parties won 177 seats (34.50%); the left, 109 (21.25%); and 227 parliamentarians (44.25%) were from parties classified on the right side of the ideological spectrum. In 1998, the left maintained its 109 seats. The center won 11 seats on the right, rising to 188 seats (26.64%), and the right remained the largest group, with 216 seats (42.11%). Taking into account all valid votes cast by the electorate in the 1998 election and not just those converted into representation, the division of the electoral option in the left-right orientation is 21.70% votes for left parties and candidates, 34.67% for the center, and 43.63% votes to the right.

In 1995 the Latinobarometro started surveying the Brazilian public which allows us to describe the mood of the citizenry over time. From 1995 to 1997, there was an increase in support for democracy, from 41.0% to 49.9% and then to 50% of the interviewees. In the following years, the index started to fall, first subtly (47.6% in 1998), then sharply (38.2% in 2000), reaching 30.3% in 2001 and rising to 36.8% in 2002. Those who responded to prefer an authoritarian government was 21.1% in 1995, 24.1% in 1996, 19.2% in 1997, 17.9% in 1998, 25.2% in 2000, 18% in 2001, and 14.6% in 2002.
Another measure shows that the share of the public that was not at all satisfied with Brazilian democracy was 29.8% in 1995, 30.8% in 1996, 34.4% in 1997, then 21.7% in 1998, 33.4% in 1999, 23.7% in 2001 and 21.3% in 2002 (Figure 2).

![Figure 2. Satisfaction with the performance of democracy in Brazil, 1995 to 2018.](image)

Source: Latinobarometro.org

The Workers’ Party won the presidential election in 2002. In the simultaneous parliamentary election, however, the rightist parties got more votes (37.06%) than the centrist parties (33.07%), and the leftist ones (29.86%). Lula reached 39,454,692 votes in the first round; for the Lower House, 29,629,521 voters preferred to vote in a right party or candidate. In 2006, two presidential candidates split the electorate: Lula got 48.61%, and Alckmin (from PSDB, Brazilian Social Democracy Party, considered a centrist party) reached 41.63% of the electoral preference. For the Parliament, however, 32.75% of the elected deputies were linked to right-wing parties. For the second and last time in the analyzed period, the centrist parties are the more significant force, with 38.01% of Lower House seats.
Under the Lula administration, social programs initiated with PSDB were intensified, minority groups found space to present demands, and they have made progress in recognizing their rights (Irineu 2014). For example, Latinobarometro 2002 survey found that 55.8% of the public was severely negative against homosexuality; this share of opinions reduced in 2004 to 38.7%; and half of that responded in the same way by 2008 (17.2%). In the following year, however, there was a slight increase in this answer, to 22.2%, which could indicate an upward trend. Unfortunately, later surveys do not repeat the question. Another example, but of a more modest evolution, concerns the autonomy of women and the right to choose. The opinion that abortion is never justified reached 79.8% support in 2002, 70% in 2004, and 60.3% in 2007.

The results of the 2010 general elections brought a reduction in support for centrist parties. The left won 16 more seats, and the right got 18 more representatives compared to 2006. This legislature is the most ideologically balanced in the Lower House (32.36%, 31.77%, and 35.87%), and it is exactly during its period that Brazil had the most significant political manifestations.

Dilma was elected in 2010 as Brazil’s first female president. Some say she was not Lula’s first choice, but corruption scandals had ruled out other options. In addition to a misogynist mentality (Geraldi et alii 2016), Dilma also faced a global economic crisis. If, on the one hand, the President was brave in addressing issues such as transitional justice and the right to information and truth, on the other hand, she had little ability to respond to protests. The level of satisfaction with the performance of democracy in Brazil (29.5% adding the answers very satisfied and somewhat satisfied in 1995, 26.8% in 1998, 20.7% in 2002, 36.3% in 2002, a surprising 48.5% in 2010), returned to 26% in 2013 and 20.9% in 2015. In 2018, always according to data from Latinobarometro, the level of very and fairly satisfied was only 8.7% (Figure 2).

While the 2014 presidential elections were quite fierce, the right-wing parties won 45.27% of the votes and 44.83% of the seats (230 representatives) in the Chamber of Deputies. The center and left parties had a smaller vote shares (27.50% and 27.23% respectively), with 145 and 138 seats.

In this new legislature, the Lower House Speaker was a deputy linked to the evangelical bench. With an unsubstantiated denunciation, he proceeded with a request for impeachment (Pivetta 2017). In accepting the complaint by the Chamber, the representatives’ votes aligned with authoritarian thinking and a conservative religious right (Rebechi 2019; Santos 2019; Duarte 2017) versus constitutional provisions. The vice president, linked to the PMDB (a center party), imposed a government plan contrary to the one that won the elections. The sharp polarization of society was revealed in hate speech and demonization of politicians. The space for right-wing populism was wide open.
The 2018 elections occurred in this tumultuous political context. The leader of a hitherto very minor party won the presidency of the Republic. The Social Liberal Party (PSL) won 1 seat in the Chamber of Deputies in 1998 and repeated this performance in 2002, 2010 and 2014. It did not elect any representative in 2006. In 2018, it was the party chosen to launch a presidential campaign with the slogan "Brazil above everything, God above everyone." In addition to the Executive Branch, it has the highest popular support for the Chamber, with 10,543,744 votes. Due to the electoral legislation that started to demand a minimum individual performance to win the vacancy, PSL has got 52 seats, against 54 of the Workers' Party (PT). Thirty parties were then represented in the Brazilian Parliament. The composition of the Chamber was dominated by the right-wing parties (57.31% of the seats). Evidence of political polarization, the center parties lose space, with only 85 of the 513 seats. The left loses four seats compared to 2014, with 26.12% of the Lower House.

Some caveats of this analysis

The predominance of rightist parties in number of votes and representation has been constant in recent years. If “in electoral politics, three decades or more counts as permanence” (Dalton 2018:229), and since 1990 the right was the most significant parliamentary force but in 2006, there is constant leadership of the parties of that ideological spectrum.

Another way to describe ideological orientation of Brazilians is through data from the Latinobarometro. The survey asked for a self-identification on a 0 to 10 left/right scale. Zero was on the left and 10 on the right. We consider positions 0, 1, 2, and 3 as left; positions 4, 5, and 6 for the center; and options 7, 8, 9, and 10 on the right (Zechmeister 2015; Carreirão 2007).

The distribution of ideological preferences, according to Latinobarometro, has the center as its main space. The right appears with the greatest support in three editions: 1995, 2001, and 2003. In 1998 there is almost a tie with the center. In 2017 and 2018, however, the right appears only with 12.1% and 18.9% in self-identification by ideological orientation.
Another perspective on political dispositions comes from tracking Brazilians’ Left right positions. When asked for self-identification on the left-right orientation (from 0 for left and 10 for right), most people choose 5, in the center. The zero position (far-left) got a maximum of 10% in 1996 and 2002. The far-right position got from 4.1% in 1997 to 16.1% in 1995 and 16.9% in 2001 (Figure 3).

![Figure 3. Self-identification on the ideological spectrum, Brazil 1995-2018](#)

Source: Latinobarometer.

If we consider only the electoral years (and taking into account the 2013 survey, considering that in 2014 there was no questionnaire), there is a strong difference between the support declared and the support given to the right. While only 14.1% claim to support the right in 2013, rightist parties had 45.27% of the vote. The same is true in 2018, but even more sharply: 18.9% self-identification, 57.61% of votes obtained by right-wing parties.

The 2018 LAPOP survey data show this discrepancy (Figure 4). Crossing the answers about the voting decision and about the ideological self-identification (on a scale from 1 to 10, from left to right), 33.7% of those who identified in position 1 voted for the winning candidate in 2018. Considering the first

three positions, by analogy to the division made for the analysis of the survey of Latinobarometro, the average of voters who declared themselves to be left and who voted for an extreme-right candidate was 41.6%. The Workers Party candidate had a 17.4% vote from those who declared themselves in position 10 (right).

Figure 4. Self-identification ideological orientation and parties’ voting in Brazil, 1998-2018.

Source: tse.jus.br (voting) and latinobarometro.org (self-identification ideological orientation)

We do not believe the electorate is ashamed to affirm itself on the right, as happened with parliamentarians in the first years of the analyzed period, given the recent memory of the military dictatorship. Maybe, while party identification is linked to economic cleavage, cultural cleavage rules the electoral decision. With the reduction of economic inequality in the first decade of the 21st century, public policies for income redistribution have strong support in Brazil, at least in the discourse field. The electorate may understand the ideological identification without considering the post-materialist issues, but the
hypothesis demands proof with specific research.

Another issue not addressed by our study is party polarization according to the reading made by the electorate. Russell Dalton (2008) mentions, based on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), that the Brazilian electorate does not sharply distinguish political parties. Despite party fragmentation in the Brazilian system, with a high number of effective parties, the author points out a low polarization among the main parties (2.0, from a scale of 0 to 10, from less polarized to more polarized).

Moreover, a point challenging the analysis of the electoral choice of Brazilian citizenship is the self-declared ideological position of voters in the face of the citizens' perception of political parties in the right-left orientation. Of the years analyzed according to CSES Modules I-IV, it was only in 2002 that the voter's average position was at the center of the scale, with parties on the left and right. In 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2018 the voter's average position is to the right of all parties. In 2018, the party closest to the voter is the Social Liberal Party, which could explain Bolsonaro's election. However, in previous elections, the Workers' Party (four-time winner) is further away from the average voter than the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (its direct opponent).

Zechmeister (2015) pointed out that in Brazil, self-identification on the left-right orientation scale is not strongly related to electoral choice. For the author, the lack of association stems from poorly polarized systems, low programmatic party structuration, a high level of fragmentation, and clientelism. Polarization, considering the 2018 elections, after the author's analysis, would be the only question present in the Brazilian scenario, and that could suggest a different answer. In 2018, the Latinobarometro survey showed 6.6% of non-respondents, and 7.5% say they do not identify with any ideological position. Considering the Chamber of Deputies election, there is proximity in the percentage of people identified on the left and votes for candidates on the left. There is a big difference, however, between the amount declared to be right-wing (18.9%) and the votes received by candidates from right-wing parties (57.61%).

Lucas and Samuel (2010) correctly point out that coherence has never been a feature of the Brazilian party system and that there is some mobility in the large parties, except for the Workers' Party but during the Lula governments. If this can weaken the distinction in voters' minds, the increasingly frequent use of the terms right and left in political discourse brings the sense of this orientation to the average voter.

Furthermore, the decreasing number of party affiliations, the absence of party-line voting (with the possible exception of historical left-wing parties) and the lack of marked position in relation to economic cleavage in most relevant parties, can make the electorate decide its vote for compatibility with a leader, who determines the behavior of the party. The phenomena of "Lulism" (Singer 2009) and, more recently, "Bolsonarism" (Cesarino 2019), are clues to indicate the split between the citizen understanding of the party
system (and even its ideological self-identification) and the electoral decision.

The lack of strong support for democratic principles and process and the low level of confidence in political authorities and institutions can suggest a crisis on Brazilian democracy.

The 2018 election and the 2018 electorate

Although the Brazilian electorate was voting for candidates from the right-wing parties for the composition of the Chamber of Deputies, the center and left-wing parties occupied the presidency of the republic in previous years. The 2018 election thus appears to be a point outside the curve. The rise of a new right, with a more powerful speech and closer to the Pentecostals, however, was already foreseen.

There are "new right" parties in the 21st century, with political proposals that combine neoliberalism with neo-conservationism, according to Solano (2019). The defense of a minimal state and a meritocratic philosophy is combined with the praise of tradition and the heterosexual and Christian white man as the standard to be protected and promoted. This alternative right, according to the author, uses the rhetoric of the enemy, and whoever is on the other side of politics must be annihilated, not just defeated. There is a denial of the legitimacy of divergent thinking, which would always pose a threat to a united nation. In this context, Bolsonaro rises as an option.

Bolognesi and Codato (2016) point to the growth of a new right and the shrinkage of the old right. The two groups align in defense of a market economy and moral principles, but the new right "recognizes and accepts the political advantages of social policies implemented by the left". Thus, it is the Democrats who go to the Federal Supreme Court to ask for the overturn of the affirmative action law in public universities. At the same time, the Social Democratic Party and the Progressive Party (which comes from the base of the military dictatorship), for example, were members of the governments of the Workers' Party.

Furthermore, there is growing incorporation of religious representatives (Tadvald 2015) and public security professionals (Berlatto et al. 2016) in the Chamber of Deputies. The Evangelical Parliamentary Front and the number of "sheriffs" grew from 1986 to 2018, spreading their representatives in several parties. In 2018 elections, the evangelical doctrine elected 67 representatives (Tadvald 2015). There are more than 100 deputies in the "bullet bench" in the Chamber. In April 2020, 19 federal deputies have in their political names references to their activity on the public security. We have one policewoman and five police chiefs (from the civil policy); two Sargents (one of them "Pastor Sargent"), one Major, one Lieutenant, four Captains, three Colonels, and two Generals. They can be from military policy or the Army. In response to the demand for the defense of family values threatened by the recognition of gender identities
and for law and order sharp policies against crime and, especially, corruption, speeches reactive to an inclusive democracy gradually gained the support of voters.

There were other candidates in the presidential election race in 2018, in addition to those from the Workers' Party and the Social Liberal Party. The Brazilian Social Democracy Party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement, the Democratic Labor Party, the New Party (a minimum right-state bank-owner party), and seven other alternatives were made available to the electorate. The run-off outcome showed a polarized choice of voters.

We can present some explanations. One is that "hate was on the ballot", to paraphrase Rachel Bitecofer (2020). The demonization of politics, driven by a movement against politicians and Car Wash Operation, and accusations of corruption against the Workers' Party, presented the opportunity for someone who was both an opponent of the party and the system. Hunter and Power (2019) claim that Bolsonaro's victory was possible thanks to a combination of a specific context ("economic recession, corruption, and crime"), with the weakening of opponents, and the use of social media as a campaign strategy. The authors, only Bolsonaro responded satisfactorily to "antiestablishment cleavage" and "anti-PT cleavage".

Using data from the survey applied by CESOP at the end of 2018, it is possible to present some characteristics of Bolsonaro's electorate and infer determinants for the electoral decision.10 Bolsonaro has more significant support for those with high school education (66.9%) and for those with higher education (60.5% incomplete or technical education and 59.9% of those who have completed undergraduate studies).

Concerning the preference for the political regime, those who stated that "in some situations, a dictatorship is better than a democracy," 22% voted for Haddad, and 78% voted for the elected president. Among those who are indifferent to the political regime form, 64.3% voted for Bolsonaro. The correlation is also significant to the evaluation of the improvement of the country's economic situation. A year and a half after President Dilma's removal and the reduction of social policies by the Temer government, this post-election study shows that Bolsonaro's electorate had a much more positive view of the economy. Among those who responded that the economy was better than in the past twelve months (adding the "much better" and "slightly better" alternatives), 31% voted for the Workers' Party, while 69% preferred the winning candidate (Figure 5).

Among those who consider corruption in Brazil to be a very serious problem, 60.2% chose Bolsonaro. The relationship is also intense in the perception if Car Wash Operation fights corruption (Figure 5). Finally, in contrast to past patterns, it is possible to verify a significant correlation regarding the self-

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10 The 2018 Brazilian Electoral Study (BES), a post-electoral national survey, has been undertaken by CESOP since 2002, under the coordination of Prof. Rachel Meneguello. https://www.cesop.unicamp.br/eng/eseb
definition in the left-right orientation and Bolsonaro’s support in 2018. Surprisingly, several measures of political trust or alienation were virtually unrelated to the vote in 2018 (not shown).

Figure 5. Correlates of Bolsonaro Vote in 2018
Source: 2018 Brazilian Electoral Study (BES)

Conclusion: a bad beginning and a penultimate peril

The so-called Brazilian New Republic, born with the re-democratization in 1985, preserved old actors and political forces. The performance of these players marked the constitutional configuration and the first legislatures. The appearance of public policies for minority groups ends up giving rise to a new polarization, more linked to cultural cleavage, which triggers the growth of an alternative right, identified less by an alternative view of the state and more by the rejection of fundamental freedoms.

The far-right rise does not happen, however, without the explicit support of the electorate, an expanding number of votes for candidates and parties that, clearly, defend the devaluation of minorities and the approach to a religious reading of the functioning of society. There was a “democratic coup” (Schwarcz, 2019). The electoral option in 2018 may have come in response to an "antipetism" (a thought contrary to the Workers' Party), inflated by the demonization of the policy carried out by moralism and the anti-corruption discourse. Or, as a cultural backlash against cultural change, the reaction to the erosion of the
predominance, and the privilege of older white men with traditional values (Inglehart & Norris 2016). Nevertheless, there were other alternatives (on the left, on the center, and on the right ideological position) in the presidential and parliamentary dispute.

If, on the one hand, the desire to interpret the 2018 election as a point outside the curve allows us to imagine that in 2022 everything will be back on track, an analysis of the electoral results shows that that result is only - at best - the penultimate peril. Maybe 2018 only brought to the surface our civilizational gap. Like the Baudelaire orphans, we will have to save ourselves. And, through democratic ways, with tolerance and respect. As Dalton (2018:19) states, “democracy exists to resolve conflicting issue preferences and not to demonize people with whom you disagree”.

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