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Author
Marom, Roy

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Hadera: Transnational Migrations from Eastern Europe to Ottoman Palestine and the Glocal Origins of the Zionist-Arab Conflict

Roy Marom; Department of History, UC Berkeley

Abstract

The article explores the interplay between transnational migration, cultural patrimony and political conflict, tying together the former realms of the Russian and Ottoman Empires. It discusses the role played by Russian Jews in the development of the Zionist-Arab conflict in Palestine until 1948. It focuses on the Northern Sharon, where three distinct immigrant groups – Circassians, Bosnians and Russian Jews – settled in the 1870s–1890s. Methodologically, it adopts a new, twofold, approach to the genesis of the conflict, by tracing its roots within the broader setting of Eurasian transnational migrations to Palestine, and the stricter context of ‘locality expressing glocality’, that is, of specific colonies and their development under internal pressures and outside interactions. In 1948, prior actions aimed at achieving ethnic homogeneity through coerced population transfers during the disintegration Eurasian imperial polities served as a blueprint for some of the same Zionist immigrants for achieving plurality in their new Jewish State.

This article explores the interplay between transnational migrations, cultural patrimony and political conflict, tying together the former realms of the Russian and Ottoman Empires, in the genesis of the Zionist-Arab conflict in Palestine (henceforth the conflict).

Most scholars discuss the origins of the conflict from a national-territorial perspective.¹ The post-colonial turn in Middle Eastern Studies and Palestine Studies inspired other scholars to regard the conflict as a colonial dispute between Zionist ‘settler-colonists’ and Arab-Palestinian ‘natives’.² In the current article, I suggest that reading the pre-national past in light of national spatial and ideological notions is both constrictive and anachronistic. Transnational and local factors influenced the relations between Jews and their non-Jewish neighbors long before Palestine’s borders were charted. Therefore, I argue for the need to look at the evolution of the conflict beyond the national arena. In structuralist terms, I call on scholars to study the conflict from two hierarchical, thematically contradictory, but narratively
complementary, perspectives: the transnational and the local ones. Global studies define this dual perspective as a ‘glocal’ one (see ‘the creation of glocality’ section below).³

My approach draws on a growing body of scholarship on the role that transnational migrations and ethno-religious conflict played in ethnogenesis and national conflict in disintegrating imperial, and evolving post-imperial, spaces.⁴ A decade ago, Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz showed that the ‘shutter zones’ between the multi-ethnic, Eurasian empires, functioned as crucibles of identities for new communities of belonging.⁵ By applying a glocal perspective to Bartov’s and Weitz’s work, I propose that Russian Jewish immigrants formulated Zionist policy with respect to Palestine’s Arab residents in light of lessons learned from life in the Russian empire and prior cases of forced transnational migration. In doing so, they precipitated the Palestinian Exodus, and turned it into a fait accompli.

In recent years, Israeli historian Yuval Ben-Bassat demonstrated the centrality of Jewish-Arab relations in the first Jewish colonies, the moshavot, to the development of the conflict.⁶ Jewish-Arab relations alone, however, do not tell the whole story, as other Eurasian immigrant communities played significant roles in the conflict’s development. The history of Hadera, midway between Haifa and Jaffa, reflects these roles well.

In the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century, the region of Hadera became home to three immigrant groups – Circassians, Bosnians and Russian Jews. The relational history of Hadera exemplifies wider trends also evidenced in other areas of early Jewish settlement.⁷ The choice of these specific communities, one Jewish and two Muslim, is justified by the role they played in importing transnationalism to Ottoman Palestine. Demographically, Hadera is typical of the late Ottoman moshavot. However, the encounters between Hadera’s Russian Jews and their non-Jewish neighbours were more intensive than in other moshavot. Records reveal how these encounters sharpened, early on, dilemmas of identity, loyalty and belonging with respect to people of similar life experiences and common social, political and cultural background.
Hadera’s case also provides important insights into the way foreign conceptions affected local communities of both national collectives in Palestine/Israel. In time, the region’s Circassians and Bosnians adopted a Palestinian national identity, while Hadera’s Jewish residents played leading roles in shaping Zionist policy towards Arab Palestinians. Thus, studying Hadera enables us to recover the local imprints that these transnational migrations have left upon the evolution of the conflict. The article’s structure highlights this convergence of local and transregional trends by presenting Hadera’s in-depth, local micro-history, according to the broader, national, chronological considerations.
Figure 1: General location map for places mentioned in the text (author’s work)
Eastern European, and Eastern European-induced Migrations to Ottoman Palestine

The Jewish exodus from the Russian Empire, which precipitated the Zionist colonization of Palestine, was to a certain extent the product of particular socio-political transformations among the Jewish community. However, it was also influenced by more general changes in the life of non-Christian minorities and non-Russian ethnicities in the Empire, and along the borderlands between the Ottoman Empire and its European neighbors. This section sets out the relevant background to the article’s main argument, namely that the Jewish migrations to Ottoman Palestine should be assessed in a broader, comparative context, against other contemporary migrations to the Ottoman Empire, the Levant, and Palestine in particular.

The colonization of Ottoman Palestine by Russian Jews was neither the first, nor the sole presence of Russians in the Holy Land. For many centuries, the Russian Empire claimed guardianship over the Greek Orthodox Church, its places of worship and its faithful, already forming a recognized millet (autonomous religious community) within the Ottoman Empire's confessional system. The protection of Orthodox interests in Palestine was a major pretext for Russian expansionism during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828-1829, the Crimean War, and Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878. The Russian Empire forced the Ottomans to grant it preferential status with respect to the Orthodox Churches in the Holy Land. Russian Tsars and clergymen intervened in the affairs of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem. They financed the purchase of land and established schools and monasteries in Nazareth, Haifa, Jaffa, Bethlehem and Jerusalem.

Zionism as a modern political thought has its roots in the disintegration of the fabric of traditional Jewish life in the Pale of Settlement during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Following the 1772, 1791 and 1793 Partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, many Jews found themselves living under Tsarist rule. Jews formed up to 15 per cent of the total population within the Pale of Settlement. The Jewish Reformation and the haskala (the Jewish
Enlightenment) on the one hand, and the promises for political emancipation of the Jews in the Russian Empire on the other, encouraged Jewish integration and assimilation into the general society. The tension between modern, secular culture, and traditional Jewish values and religious observances, polarized Jewish society inside and outside the Pale of Settlement. Many Jews attended state-sponsored schools (gimnazi), adopting Russian secular culture and forming an elite group known as the Jewish Intelligentsia. Other Jews joined conservative Orthodox communities of haredim, or fostered nativist tendencies by writing and consuming literature in Hebrew and Yiddish. Jewish participation in the public life of the Empire made them full, yet distinctly alien, partners to the political agitation against the Tsar's autocratic rule. Many Jews joined secret revolutionary societies and labor unions, most famously the Bund.

Following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II (r. 1855-1881) on 13 March 1881, pogroms in many Russian cities took place. In response to the Russian authorities’ tepid reaction to the pogroms, which oscillated between approval and indifference, many Jews became disillusioned about the prospects of full integration into Russian society. They developed a national consciousness and sought to achieve, in Leon Pinsker's words, their auto-emancipation. Millions immigrated to Western Europe and the United States. Thousands more organized into mutual-aid organizations collectively known as Hovevey Tsion and headed to the Levant. There, they established Russian, Romanian and Hungarian Jewish colonies as part of an immigration wave known in Zionist historiography as the ‘First Aliyah’. These Jews increasingly turned to Ottoman Palestine as their new homeland in light of its lasting religious significance in Judaism.

The territorial encroachment and political violence that disrupted the Balkan and Caucus borderlands, Bartov’s and Weitz's ‘Shatterzone of Empires’ between the Ottoman Empire and its imperial neighbors to the north, led to other, more numerically significant
transnational population movements. The Russian pacification of the North Caucasus (1856-1864) displaced many Circassians (native name, Adyghe) into the Ottoman Empire, some of whom settled in Syria and Ottoman Palestine. The Circassian Exodus was followed in 1870-1882 by the immigration of Serbo-Croat-speaking Muslim Bosnians, escaping the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, within a relatively short span of time, several confessionally and ethnically distinct minorities of Russian or Slavonic origin settled side by side in Palestine (figure 1).

1878-1904 Hadera, Qisarya and Mez (Khirbat al-Sarkas): the creation of glocality

The places in which these transnational immigrants settled were not random, but rather reflect glocality, that is – the interaction between global factors and local conditions. A glocal analysis is essential for any discussion of Jewish and non-Jewish colonies in Palestine or the Levant. The location and demography of such colonies are the by-product of the distribution of pre-existing populations, the availability of land, the fate of displaced communities/future colonists in other Eurasian empires, Ottoman policy, capitulations granted to European subjects, and the availability of foreign direct investments (by German Templars, Jews’ societies like Hovevey Tsion and philanthropists like Baron Edmund de Rothschild).

The Tanzimat reforms of the nineteenth century sought to increase the Ottoman Empire’s control over its agrarian resources. The passing of the 1858 Land Law ushered in large-scale cadastral surveys. In time of need, the Ottoman authorities settled Muslim refugees, like Bosnians, Circassians and Algerian on vacant state domains. Land speculators purchased other lands, and later sold them to pioneering Jewish, German Templar, and other foreign colonists. This section will discuss the glocal imprints that these transnational migrations have left upon the evolution of Palestine's cultural landscape and the Zionist-Arab conflict.

When the Palestine Exploration Fund undertook the monumental Survey of Western Palestine (SWP) in the Sharon (1873-1875), its surveyors charted a sparsely populated coastal
plain inhabited by Arabic-speaking highland peasants and nomads of Turkmen, Nubian, Egyptian and of Arabian-Peninsular descent. Sheet VII of the SWP map portrays the traces of the ancient city of Caesarea Maritima; the vast sand dunes surrounding it; the oak woodlands to the east of it, and swamps to the south of it. The SWP's Memoirs mention Khirbet Khudeira as an ancient ruin about 7.8 kms southeast of the Crusader town. Khudeira was also inspected in 1288AH (1871) by Ottoman authorities, which found it ‘empty of inhabitants and lacking resident peasants who are eligible to purchase it in return for the payment of bedel misl [land registration fees]’.

Figure 2: Mostar, a general view (user: Ramirez HUN, Wikipedia Commons, 2007)

In 1880, fifty families of Bosnian refugees, mostly from Mostar, the main urban center of Bosnia and Herzegovina (figure 2), settled among the ruins of Caesarea, renaming it with the Arabic name of Qisarya. Using the ancient masonry found on site, the settlers constructed
a modern town with spacious accommodations and broad intersecting streets, according to traditional Bosnian town-plans. The town had two mosques, a caravanserai, a marketplace, a residence for the mudir, a harbor and customs offices (figure 3). Qisarya attracted high-ranking Bosnian functionaries who established estates near Qisarya. The town was declared the seat of a mudirieh (a minor administrative division).  

Figure 3: An early plan of the Bosnian town of Qisarya, 1888 (Gottlieb Schumacher, PEFQS, 1888)

Between 1878 and 1880, Circassian refugees belonging to the Shapsegh, Abadzekh, and Kabardian clans established the village of Mez (Adyghe: Мэз, 'forest'). Mez, the Adyghe rendition of the synonymous Arabic toponym Ghabe, was called Gabet-ül Çerkes in Ottoman Turkish and Khirbet al-Sarkas in Arabic. The modest adobe hamlet stood next to a swamp on the southern edge of the oak woodlands. Nabulsi historian Ihsan al-Nimr wrote that following the ‘complaints of [the Circassian refugees], the [Ottoman] State acceded to their demands, and appointed Darwish Bek Tuqan to be responsible for their resettlement and he settled them in the woodlands (ghabat) of Bani Sa‘b’. In 1328AH (1910) the Ottoman
authorities conducted a census and land registration operations in Gabet-ül Çerkes and Qisarya.\textsuperscript{27} The Ottoman census testifies to Circassian settlement also in Qisarya (figure 4).

Figure 4: An Excerpt from the Ottoman Census of 1328AH enumerating the residents of the Circassian and Bosnian colonies (Israel State Archives, adapted by the author)

Around this time, Selim al-Khoury, a Christian merchant from Haifa, purchased Kh. al-Khudeira, together with 3000 hectares of land, and established an agricultural estate among the ruins. In 1890, al-Khoury sold al-Khudeira to Yehoshua Hankin (1864-1945). Hankin, an avid Zionist land entrepreneur, was born at Kremenchuk in the Russian Empire (modern
Ukraine), and immigrated to Rishon le-Tzion colony near Ramleh in 1882. Hankin acquired the land on behalf of the Hovevey Tsion associations in Vilnius and Kaunas (in modern Lithuania). This purchase was the largest land acquisition operation for Jewish settlement to date.  

Thus, in 1891, one could visit the Russian Jewish colony of Hadera, the Muslim Bosnian town of Caesarea and the Circassian village of Mez, lying within a few kilometers' distance from one another.

Figure 5: Schneerson in his youth (family photo).
The Jews in Hadera maintained their Russian way of life. A prime source to understanding the early history of Hadera is found in *Mepi Rishonim* (loosely translated as ‘According to the Founders’), a volume of interviews conducted by Levi Isaac Schneerson (1888-1975, figure 5) with the founding members of Hadera, narrating daily life in the early years of the colony's existence. Schneerson compiled early drafts of the book in the 1930s and 1940s, but only published it in 1963. The interviewees devoted considerable place to pre-immigration stories about their life in the Russian Empire, revealing the importance they attached to this formative period in their life. Many colonists were elderly or adults with families at the time of their settlement in Hadera. They cherished their Russian acculturation; sipping tea in the evenings from the samovar, reading imported Russian literature, enjoying Russian cuisine. The immigrants used Russian agricultural implements, which proved ill-suited to the conditions in Palestine (figure 6). In the published edition of the book, recollections of the persecution in Russia before immigration are commonly conflated with the colonists’ interactions with their non-Jewish neighbors in Palestine. This fact suggests that the persecutions in the Russian Empire were a key prism by which the colonists perceived their interactions with neighboring populations.
Shortly after their arrival in Hadera, the Russian colonists evicted the Arab tenants from the Khoury estate. Following a promising start, malaria inflicted heavy casualties among the colonists, as it has afflicted the Circassian and Bosnian refugees before them. Finding itself in dire straits, Hadera turned to Baron Edmund de Rothschild for help. The baron's French experts directed drainage operations aimed at ameliorating the situation, but their efforts were frustrated with refusal and acts of resistance on the part of Hadera's non-Jewish neighbors.³²

The Jews of Hadera maintained cordial relations with the Bosnians of Qisarya, and, early on, many conflicts were resolved on amicable terms.³³ David Lavotchkin testified that the colonists preferred to export their watermelons through Qisarya, as it was under the ‘influence of the [Bosnian] Beks… [who] were Europeans immigrants, and were somewhat polite’ (figure 7).³⁴
1903-1914: From the glocal to the national and the international

Many of Hadera’s residents migrated back and forth between the Russian and Ottoman Empires and were influenced by the political and social developments in both realms. Schneerson provides an illustrative example. Born to a wealthy family in a small estate near the town of Pskov, Schneerson’s parents immigrated to Hadera when he was still a child. According to Yair Auron, Schneerson ‘had literary ambitions even in his youth and wrote poetry and essays in Russian’. As an adolescent, Schneerson returned to Russia to face the official matriculation examinations in Petrograd. Schneerson became embroiled with the
‘anarchist-individualist movement’, and had to hide with relatives in Dvinsk. After falling ill, Schneerson’s doctor advised him to seek reprieve in hot countries, for which purpose ‘no better place existed than Hadera’. On his return voyage, Schneerson attended the Zionist Congress in Hamburg. As Auron shows, Schneerson’s ‘spiritual and linguistic affinity for the Russian culture continued even after he [re]settled in Eretz Israel’.36

Schneerson was one of many returnees escaping the political unrest in the Russian Empire. Hadera’s population expanded in the aftermath of the Kishinev pogrom (1903), and of rising antisemitism after the 1905 Revolution in Russia. This ‘Second Aliyah’ included significant numbers of Socialist pioneers, veterans of Russian-Jewish trade unions and radicalized political parties such as Po’alei Tsion (Workers of Zion).37

To counter the rising threat of anti-Semitic pogroms, Jews in Russia organized self-defense militias.38 Concomitantly, the Jews who fled to safety in Palestine started equating local acts of resistance by neighboring Arab communities with Russia's familiar pra’ot (pogroms). Members of the Second Aliyah and sons of the immigrants of the First Aliyah founded similar self-defense organizations, like Bar Giora (1907-1909). Bar Giora, which was named after a prominent commander of the Great Jewish Revolt (66-73 CE), set about taking over (likhbosh, literally, ‘to conquer’) guard duty from the local Circassians, Algerian and Arab villagers. Bar Giora's members elected the young and charismatic Israel Shochat (1886-1961), a recent arrival from Grodno (in modern Belarus), as their leader. Shochat made a solemn oath that ‘in fire and blood Judea fell, and in fire and blood it shall rise again’.39

Ha-Shomer (‘the sentry’, 1909-1920), Bar Giora's successor organization, took over responsibility for Hadera's security in 1911. Emboldened by the young and confident members of ha-Shomer, Hadera's Jewish ikarim (farmers) took the initiative in longstanding land disputes with their neighbors. Jewish attempts to plow contested land in Bass al-Sarkas sparked a violent incident. The fighting resulted in casualties, and necessitated the intervention
of the Bosnian officials in Qisarya. Following an Arab assault on Nadav Tsivi, an *ikar* from Hadera, five *shomrim* raided the neighboring tribe of `Arab al-Damayra. The raid backfired, and the assaulting party found itself ensnared by hundreds of angry Arabs, Circassian and Bosnian villagers. Ha-Shomer's actions raised fears of mass retaliation against the unprepared *moshava*, and Hadera called on reinforcements from Petah Tikva.\(^{40}\)

These and similar incidents that took place in Hadera and in other colonies, escalated internal tensions in the *moshavot*, and between Jews and Arabs as collectives. The lion's share of the radical *shomrim* belonged to the working class *po‘alim* (proletariat), while most *ikarim* were members of the Jewish rural land-owning class. The *po‘alim* demanded that the *ikarim* dismiss their non-Jewish workers and replace them with less experienced but higher-waged *halutsim* (pioneers). A fully-fledged class struggle erupted in the Yishuv. In Hadera, the dissension led to the expulsion of ha-Shomer in 1913. Thus, the polarization of Jewish rural society in Palestine mirrored much of the social unrest that disturbed public order among Jews and non-Jews alike in the Russian Empire. New ideologies and organizations imported from Russia transformed the Yishuv, as well as its relations with its non-Jewish neighbors.\(^{41}\)

During the intervening years, the demographic composition of the area changed as malaria took its toll on the immigrants and local Arabs replaced the immigrants. By 1914 most Circassians left Kh. al-Sarkas and resettled in Amman and Suwayla (in modern Jordan).\(^{42}\) They were replaced by Arab villagers from Baqa al-Gharbiyya, whose lands bordered Kh. al-Sarkas on the south-west.\(^ {43}\) Similarly, the Bosnian population in Qisarya dwindled after many Bosnians moved to Haifa and Nablus (figure 8).\(^ {44}\) Before departing, the Bosnian residents of Qisarya sold their lands to the Ge’ula Company and the Jewish Colonization Association.\(^ {45}\)
1914-1921: the First World War and the start of the national struggle in Palestine

According to Rachel Iflah, early disputes between Hadera and the original Arab-speaking populations around Hadera arose out of cultural misunderstandings, of a ‘clash of civilizations’ or of the Jews’ attempted imposition of foreign norms of land tenure and ownership ‘accepted in their countries of origin’. During the age of nationalism that followed the First World War, these local communities backed different sides of the national divide. The political discourse in Haifa, Nablus and Jaffa, as well as in the provincial center of Tulkarm, shows that the Greek Orthodox Russians, the-by-now Arabized Circassians and Bosnian *muhajirin* were accepted as legitimate, though racially distinct, members of the Arab national collective in Palestine. In the same time, the Eastern European Jews, who formed the core of the Hebrew Yishuv, came to be viewed as the national antithesis and nemesis of the Arab national identity.
The Ottoman and Russian Empires were traditionally multi-ethnic realms governed by religiously-minded ethnic elites (Sunni Muslim Ottoman Turks, Christian Orthodox Russians). The long nineteenth century witnessed the rise of centralist and nationalist tendencies in the Russian and Ottoman Empires. Their governments demanded a clear delimitation of national affiliation and political allegiance within their ever-changing borders. During the First World War, and in its aftermath, these demands were coupled with actions aimed at achieving ethnic spatial homogeneity through coerced population transfers in tandem with the disintegration of both imperial polities.48

In the summer of 1914 hostilities erupted in Europe, and the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of the Axis on 29 October 1914. With a looming threat of British invasion to Palestine and ongoing Russian invasions in the Balkans and the Caucasus, the Young Turk regime revoked the Capitulations Agreements governing the legal status of enemy subjects. The Young Turks decreed that all Russian Jews residing in Palestine must either leave the country or adopt Ottoman citizenship and contribute to the war effort. Hankin and many of Hadera's residents decided to leave the country (Hankin returned after the war). Those who remained were conscripted into the Ottoman army or sent into forced labor service in the seferberlik [mobilisation]. The moshavot and neighboring villages endured tribulations, including a plague of locusts and confiscation of property for the war effort.49

In 1917, after three years of relative stalemate on the Palestine front, the Allied Egyptian Expeditionary Corps broke through the Ottoman lines in Beersheba and Gaza. The front line advanced to less than 30 kilometers from Hadera. The Ottoman army evicted the general civilian population from Jaffa and Tel Aviv, including hundreds of Jews, due to the proximity of the cities to the front lines. Hadera remained safely in the rear, but faced an inflow of refugees. Kfar Saba, another moshava, was not as lucky. It was pulverized between the Allied and Ottoman front lines and hosted thousands of malnourished Jewish refugees, mostly
of Russian descent. Hundreds perished from typhoid and cholera. The arrival of Jewish survivors from Kfar Saba in the spring of 1918 traumatized the residents of Hadera.\textsuperscript{50}

During this time, NILI, the British operated a Jewish espionage ring centered in Zikhron Ya‘akov with branches in Hadera and other \textit{moshavot}. After a year, the Bosnian \textit{mudir} of Qisarya, Ahmad Bek Kat-huda Ćehajić, exposed NILI when he intercepted one of its carrier pigeons. The leaders of Zikhron Ya‘akov and Hadera were imprisoned in Damascus, and the conspirators were caught and executed. The NILI affair exposed the link between members of the Yishuv and the Allied cause, tainting Ottoman-Jewish relations.\textsuperscript{51} Many residents of Hadera, too, objected to NILI's actions, and viewed its members as mere \textit{meraglim} (spies). Years later, Schneerson, a former NILI affiliate himself, wrote to the authors of \textit{Sefer ha-Hagana}, an official history of armed resistance in the Yishuv, in defense of NILI's reputation.\textsuperscript{52} In his letter, Schneerson wove together the threads of his family life in Tsarist Russia with the national struggle in Palestine. He dwelled on the theme of loyalty: loyalty to the Tsar, to freedom, to the Land of Israel, to the Jewish People, and no less importantly, to David Ben Gurion's ruling party Mapai, with which the authors of the book were politically affiliated.\textsuperscript{53}

The Allies defeated the Ottomans in September 1918 in the Battle of Megiddo. The Arab-speaking, non-Jewish majority of Palestine’s inhabitants perceived the Balfour Declaration, professing that His Majesty’s Government views ‘with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people’, as the poisoned fruit of the Yishuv’s betrayal during the First World War. Bolshevik exposure of the Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916), a secret plan to carve up the territories of the Ottoman Empire among the colonial powers, reinforced the widespread belief in a Jewish conspiracy to undermine Arab national aspirations in the Middle East. The essence of the Agreement materialized with the establishment of the Mandated Territories of the League of Nations in the early 1920s. Some
Arabs regarded the Bolsheviks, self-declared anti-imperialists and enemies of the British-supported White Russians, as possible liberators.\textsuperscript{54}

Secret reports, compiled by both British intelligence and by Schneerson, now working for the Information Bureau of the Zionist Commission for Palestine, demonstrate the escalating sense of the Arabs’ nationalistic resentment towards the British occupation and the continued Jewish colonization of the county. These reports also reveal the participation of Circassians and Bosnians in the new arena of Arab national politics. For example, one report from Tulkarm dated between 20 November and 29 November 1917, claims that one ‘Daud al-Cherkes left [Tulkarm] for Nablus carrying a \textit{mazbata} [petition] signed by all of the \textit{mukhtars} [village headmen] in the districts. The \textit{mazbata} protests against the British Occupation, and demands Arab autonomy and the abandonment of the Balfour Declaration’ (presumably in the spirit of Woodrow Wilson's call for self-determination, mentioned elsewhere in the reports). Another report, dated 5 December–15 December 1919, informs us that al-Cherkes travelled around the Tulkarm sub-district collecting signatures for another \textit{mazbata} expressing objection to the expected separation of Palestine from Syria.\textsuperscript{55}

1921-1936: Bolsheviks, Zionists and Arab Nationalists

On 1 May 1921 riots erupted in Jaffa, and spread as acts of pillage, rape and murder to other regions of the country. Hundreds of Arabs attacked the Jewish \textit{moshavot} of Petah Tikva and Rehovot. On the eve of 6 May, hundreds of \textit{fellahin} (peasants) gathered in Tulkarm with the aim of attacking Hadera. Hadera's 600 residents sought help from the British and fortified the outskirts of the colony. They fired upon the assailants, and together with British air cover and the intervention of Indian colonial troops, they fended off the attackers. Fourteen houses were looted, but there were no Jewish casualties. On the Arab side, scores were killed. The residents
of Qisarya and Kh. al-Sarkas did not participate in the attack. Rather, Arab villages to the south of Hadera headed the onslaught: Qaqun, Zeita and Tulkarm, and the tribes of ’Arab al-Nufay‘at, ’Arab al-Fuqara, and ’Arab al-Damayra, all old adversaries of the moshava.56

According to Sir Thomas Haycraft's official report on the May Disturbances, one reason for the attacks was that Hadera's ‘Jews were supposed to be generally Bolshevik, and Bolsheviks were understood to be against property and Government, marriage and religion. There were rumours that rifles and ammunition had been sent from Khedera to Petach-Tikvah (Mulebbis) and Jaffa to arm the Jews, and that the Arab workmen of Khedera had been imprisoned in the colony.57 Furthermore, according to Haycraft, the Arabs feared Bolshevik propaganda.58 Hadera’s Jews associated with the Bolsheviks because of their shared place of origin. This assumption was reinforced by the antagonistic stance members of the Second Aliyah adopted with respect to Arab national aspirations, and against their Arab employment in the Jewish colonies.

The 1921 Disturbances shook both the Yishuv and Arab society in Palestine. The Jews demanded arms for self-defense, and Britain's refusal to arm them on a large scale led to the formation of a Jewish underground militia, the Haganah, from the remnants of ha-Shomer. The Haganah had branches in every settlement, including Hadera. According to intercepted petitions, the Arabs objected to British arming of the Jews, and complained about the deaths that the 1921 attackers incurred from illicit Jewish firearms. Leaders of the Arab Club in Tulkarm, including its mayor, blamed Bolshevik propaganda, in the aftermath of the October Revolution, for upsetting the delicate relations between Jews and Arabs in the country:

We believe that not all the Jews residing in the country belong to the Bolshevik Party. Only those who have immigrated after the War, and are mostly located in the cities, and a part of them who went to the Jewish colonies and influence everything. Your Excellency said that the people of Zikhron Yaakov, Hadera and their environs are the minority amongst us and have been our neighbors for 35 years. […] there is no doubt that amongst this minority there are also Bolsheviks…
His Excellency said that the reason for the Disturbances is a misunderstanding, but we say that the reason for that is the Balfour Declaration and the actions of the Zionist leaders in high offices in Palestine, and we say that during the time of the Turks, our rights were preserved […]

We demand compensation [for our spilt blood...] and the return of the wares belonging to the Arab families which worked in Hadera […]

The disarming of all of the Jews in Palestine, as was done with the natives [...] and the expulsion of the Bolsheviks amongst them […]

The Prevention of Zionist Immigration, and the immediate recantation of the Balfour Declaration.59

1921 was indeed a time of organizational growth for the communists in Palestine. The Palestine Communist Party (PCP) was formed from the merger of scions of Po’alei Tsion, which differed in their attitude towards Zionism. In 1924, Moscow recognized the PCP as the Palestinian branch in the Comintern, and the party became a major vehicle for Soviet-inspired propaganda and political activism in Palestine.60 Among Arab nationalist circles in Tulkarm, at least, the former perception of the Bolsheviks as a promised savior changed into that of staunch enemies of Arab nationalism, who were furthermore associated with the Jewish menace. This association is somewhat ironic, given that the PCP was ‘opposed to British imperialism and denounced Zionism as a movement of the Jewish bourgeoisie allied to British imperialism’.61 As the PCP spread across Palestine, including Hadera, it attracted the attention of the Palestine Police's Criminal Investigations Department (CID).62

Surviving CID files mention the communist activity of one ‘Ben Tsvi’ of Hadera. Confiscated copies of his personal correspondence reveal contacts with fellow Trotskyites in Palestine, Russia, Egypt and other lands of the communist ecomene (figure 9).63 In contrast to the socialist separatism of the Second Aliyah, the embracing communism of Ben Tsvi and his colleagues held the promise to forestall and mitigate the national conflict in Palestine. One letter, for example, mentions Ben Tsi’s efforts to teach Arabic to fellow Russian communists,
trace Russian-speaking Arabs, organize Arab labor in the moshava, and distribute communist leaflets. Ben Tsvi's initiatives proved threatening from a nationalist perspective for undermining the social boundaries between Jews and Arabs. In later years, many Arabs indeed joined the PCP, and the party became a major force on the Palestinian political stage.

Figure 9: Ben Tzvi narrating his ecumenical communist activities (confiscated personal papers, Hagana Archives, 1924)
During the Mandate Period, Russian Jews continued to play a leading role in the Yishuv. Russian expatriates dominated most political parties, civic society organizations and popular militias in the Yishuv. Such immigrants as David Ben-Gurion (1886-1973), Vladimir Yevgenyevich Zhabotinsky (Jabotinsky; 1880-1940), Berl Katznelson (1887-1944) and Golda Meirson (Meir; 1898-1978) constructed, maintained, and propagated national narratives on the Jewish side. New Zionist ideologies such as capitalist liberalism, Marxist communism, Jewish socialism and Zionist nationalism, were imported over from the Russian Empire and its successor states. These ideologies defined much of the public discourse in the Yishuv, and refined the borders between economic classes, social figurations and political alliances. The 1921 Disturbances reflected the formation of two dichotomous national collectives in Palestine. The rising national tensions in Palestine erupted again in the 1929, but Hadera was spared during the ensuing violence.

**1936-1948: Arab National mobilization, armed resistance and the Zionist deportation of the Palestinians**

The Great Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936-1939) was an anti-colonial uprising, and part of the national struggle for self-determination between well-distinguished Jewish-Zionist, and Muslim-Christian Arab, national collectives. Arab paramilitary militias sabotaged infrastructure, attacked Jewish settlements, and formed a lasting insurgency against British rule. Qisarya and Kh. al-Sarkas served as logistical shelters and front positions from which insurgents from other villages carried out attacks. The Revolt fragmented the Arab society, as political violence inflicted by the Husseini camp on their ‘Jewish-affiliated’ mu’arada (‘opposition’), led to the severance of communal ties within the national leadership. In order to deal with the deteriorated security situation, and provide intelligence for reprisals, Jewish watchmen recruited local Arab informants. During the Great Arab Revolt, these rings coalesced to form the SHAI, the Haganah's national intelligence branch.
resident Ezra Danin (1903-1984) played a key role in this process, and he is widely regarded as a father of the Yishuv's secret services (figure 10). Ezra Danin's father, Yehezqel Danin (Sokhovolski, 1868-1945), was an entrepreneur from Bialystok (in modern Poland), who immigrated to Palestine during the First Aliyah. Yehezqel became active in Zionist circles and eventually settled in Jaffa, where Ezra was born.71 Fluent in colloquial Arabic from childhood, and versed in Arabic culture and lore, Ezra Danin had no difficulty communicating with Arabs. During the Revolt, Ezra used his family's extensive connections in order to recruit, train and operate dozens of informants.72 Danin’s intelligence enabled British troops to locate and expel the rebel commander Fawzi al-Qawuqji from Samaria.73

Figure 10. ‘Ezra Danin (middle) and Jewish companions in an unidentified Arab town, 1930s (family photo, Wikipedia).
Danin’s intelligence was carefully catalogued and circulated among Haganah field commanders. Among the targets of Danin’s intelligence collection effort was Ali bek Bekovitch (Bushnaq), a Bosnian leader from Qisarya. A footnote in Danin’s intelligence booklet presents Bekovitch’s biography, family relations, political affiliations, and land holdings. It gives a complex picture of his dealings with Arab nationalist figures in tandem with land sales to Jews. Jewish National Fund (JNF) exploited such information to acquire Arab land in circumvention of the Land Transfer Ordinances of 1939. Increasing Jewish land acquisitions aggravated the legal disputes over land ownership and possession between Hadera’s ikarim and the Arabs of Qisarya, Kh. al-Sarkas, and other neighboring villages.

The inner circles of Zionist leadership valued Danin. His experience and thought, gleaned from decades of work in Hadera, proved highly influential in shaping Zionist policy concerning Palestine’s Arab residents. Illan Pappé claims that Danin played ‘a leading role in the ethnic cleansing of Palestine’. During the 1948 Arab–Israeli War (henceforth, the War), Danin served concomitantly as a consultant to the SHAI, a member of the Committee of Advisors for Arab Affairs (Va’adat ha-Yoa’tim le-‘Inyanei ‘Aravim) of the Alexandroni Brigade and a member of the Committee Concerning Enemy Property (ha-Va’ada le-‘Inyanei ha-Rekhush ha-Oyev, sic). Danin also profited privately from the unrest as a land speculator and agriculturalist.

Like the genesis of the Zionist-Arab conflict, the War, too, should be studied in relation to its transnational and local dimensions. The War was a transnational engagement with international ramifications. American and European Jewish recruits, Yugoslav Muslim volunteers, and detachments from six Arab armies all participated in the fighting. The forces operated in the shadow of the nascent Cold War in a power vacuum left by the British and French withdrawal from the former Ottoman realms. The changing international situation
influenced Zionist policy about specific military operations, and shaped ad-hoc decisions with regard to the fate of Israel’s Arab-Palestinian subjects.

Danin was a prime instigator of the Nakba, the Palestinian Exodus, around Hadera. Even before official orders had been given, Jewish troops expelled Arabs on local initiative. The occupation of Qisarya on the 19 and 20 February 1948 was one such case of ‘authorized expulsion’. Following a deadly Jewish attack on an Arab bus, the Arab Higher Committee of Tulkarm called on civilians to temporarily leave Kh. al-Sarkas, but the residents refused to leave the village. On 6 April 1948, however, Danin's committee ordered the evacuation (pinuy) of all Arabs in the Jewish zone of control. Accordingly, the Haganah occupied Kh. Sarkas on 15 April. Danin’s order resulted in the eviction and demolition of all but two Palestinian villages along the country's coastal plain between Haifa and Jaffa. A few refugees, who maintained cordial relations with the Yishuv, or aided Danin's SHAI, were allowed to remain in the country, and some even settled in Hadera. Israeli authorities appropriated Arab lands, and partitioned them among Jewish settlements. Danin was responsible for allocating Arab properties around Hadera.

In the summer of 1948, the Foreign Ministry appointed a three-member committee to formulate a final ‘Settlement of the Arab Refugee Problem’. The first member was Danin, in his capacity as spymaster and land entrepreneur. The second member was Volhynian-native Yosef Weitz (1890-1972), director of the JNF’s Land Department, and an ardent proponent of the Zionist Transfer Ideology. The third member was Belarussian-born Zalman Lifshits (1900-1950), JNF chief surveyor, who was appointed to aid Danin and Weitz because of his considerable experience in planning the displacement of Arabs for Jewish settlement.

The committee decided to prevent the return of the Arab refugees, and formulated strict criteria for the spatial and demographic marginalization of Israel’s Arab population. The successful implementation of previous population transfers, including those of the Balkans
and the Caucasus, served as legal precedents for Israel's advantage. Eurasian population transfers supplied the blueprints and justifications for formalizing the mass expulsions of Palestinians in the Nakba. Danin and his colleagues deemed population transfers as a normal, legitimate and acceptable solution to national conflicts. Using the authority vested in them, they worked to turn the Palestinian Exodus into a *fait accompli*. They rationalized their actions by drawing on lessons learned from Jewish life in the Russian Empire and decades of dealing with non-Jewish populations in Ottoman and British Mandate Palestine.

Danin’s report demonstrates how the interplay between transnational migration, cultural patrimony and political conflict, shaped the post-imperial states in the former realms of the Russian and Ottoman Empires. The new nation states in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Israel, discussed in Danin’s report, were all products of contesting cultural figurations within colonial and transregional contexts of Russian-Ottoman relations. These states sought to establish political stability through acts aimed at achieving religious, national or ethnic homogeneity. The origins of the conflict in Palestine/Israel were not different from, but rather exemplary of, this transnational trend.

**Conclusion**

This article explored how transnational and local factors contributed to the formation of the Zionist-Palestinian conflict. While the Zionist colonization is often viewed through the national prism of the conflict over Palestine, this article suggested that Zionist colonization be examined within two other frameworks. The first one is the broader, comparative setting, of other Eurasian trans-regional migrations in Palestine. The second one is the stricter context of ‘locality expressing glocality’, that is, of specific colonies and their interactions and development under internal pressures and outside interactions.
While the Russian-Orthodox, Bosnian and Circassian settlement projects in Palestine were imperially sponsored, or at least imperially sanctioned endeavors, the Zionist project was the product of community-affiliated or personally-funded colonization efforts. The Russian-Orthodox immigrants maintained their allegiances to Christ's Church and the Tsar, the Circassians and the Bosnians were loyal servants of the Ottoman Sultan, yet a growing number of the Zionist Jews strove to establish their own national homeland in Palestine. When the Russian and Ottoman empires collapsed in the aftermath of the First World War, Zionists turned to the victorious British Empire in order to realize their colonial project in Palestine. However, the Zionists’ alliance with the British occupier made them bitter enemies in the eyes of the burgeoning national Arab liberation movements in the Middle East.92

The cultural landscape of the northern Sharon, like other regions of the Levant, was the product of the interactions of three populations undergoing crisis: Jews in the Russian Empire, Circassians undergoing genocide by the Russians in the Northern Caucasus, and Bosnia and Herzegovina's Muslim population under Austro-Hungarian occupation. The transnational migration of members of these groups reflects the fracturing of the multiethnic empires, ushering in an era of national conflicts. The breakup of empires, and the resulting creation of new colonial and post-colonial polities, led to the formation of new identities, political ideologies, cultural affinities and organizational blueprints in Palestine. Though admittedly not the sole agents of mediation, I showed that the transmigration of Russian Jews was a main vector for the transmission and reception of these developments in Palestine.

Hadera’s Jews interpreted cases of banditry and local violence, which characterized Levantine life for centuries, in light of their life experiences in the Gola (lit. ‘the Exile’, referring to the Jewish Diaspora). Non-Jews presented territorial (e.g., land ownership), and economic (e.g., Arab labor) challenges to Zionist colonization. Bar Giora’s actions in Hadera show how the equation of Arab violence with European pogroms radicalized Zionist reactions.
Jewish retribution, driven by fear of renewed Russian-style persecutions, resulted in Arab backlash and aggravated local skirmishes into national waves of violence (1921). In 1948, previous Eurasian actions aimed at achieving ethnic homogeneity through coerced population transfers provided a blueprint for Russian Zionist immigrants to achieve plurality in their new ethnocratic Jewish State. The residents of Hadera were not different from the residents of other Jewish settlements who wished to dispose of their Arab neighbors. However, personal ambition and political circumstances placed some of them, like Danin, in positions of power to realize their vision.

Danin and his colleagues justified the depopulation of Hadera's neighboring Arab villages and hundreds of other villages throughout Palestine because they considered it a Eurasian normality. These Arab villages were the ‘locality’, that is, the physical space, in which global patterns of political agency, power and violence came to pass. Hence, the Palestinian Nakba should not be viewed just in the particular Zionist-Arab context, but also in the broader framework of transnational migrations induced by conflicts in Eurasia starting in the long nineteenth century. Those migrations formed, in turn, new political identities such as Zionism and Palestinian nationalism in post-Ottoman Palestine.

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over the years.

Notes

1 See, for example, some works about the moshavot: I. Ro’i, ‘Jewish-Arab Relations in the
Colonies of the First Aliyah’, in E. Eliav and Y. Rozental (eds), Sefer ha-‘Aliyah ha-
Rishonah [Book of the First ‘Aliyah] (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1981), pp.245-68; Aryeh
L. Avineri, The Claim of Dispossession: Jewish Land-Settlement and the Arabs 1878-1948
(New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1984); A.S. Al-Qatshan, ‘Harakat al-Istitan al-
Sahyunni fi al-Rif al-Filastini 1882-1948’ [The Zionist Settlement Movement in the
Palestinian Countryside 1882-1948], Al-Aqsa University Journal (Humanities Series) 10, no.

2 O.J. Salamanca, M. Qato, K. Rabie. and S. Samour, ‘Past is Present: Settler Colonialism in
Palestine’, Settler Colonial Studies 2, no. 1 (2012), pp.1-8; D. Lloyd, ‘Settler Colonialism and
the State of Exception: The Example of Palestine/Israel’, Settler Colonial Studies 2, no. 1
(2012), pp.59-80; Lorenzo Veracini, ‘The other shift: Settler colonialism, Israel, and the
Hundred Years’ War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917–

3 See, for example, Joshua Meyrowitz, ‘The Rise of Glocality: New Senses of Place and
Identity in the Global Village’, in János Kristóf Nyíri (ed.), A Sense of Place: The Global and
the Local in Mobile Communication (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004), pp.21-30; Victor


In the Late Ottoman period, Jews also interacted with Circassian and Maghrebi-Algerian immigrants in the Hula Valley and Ramat Yavniel/al-Shafa al-Gharbi, west of Tiberias.


17 Avineri, *Claim of Dispossession*; Musa A. Abu Bakr, A.M. *Milkiyyat al-Aradi fi Mutasarrifiyyat al-Quds, 1858-1918* [Land Ownership in The Mutasarrifiyya of Jerusalem,


27 Israel State Archives (ISA), file nun-pey-1/389.


34 Schneerson, *Mepi*, p.158.


For recent Israeli scholarship about the First World War in the Sharon, see Eran Tirosh (ed.), *The Sharon and the Launch of the Megiddo Campaign in the First World War* (Jerusalem: Ariel and the Society for the Heritage of World War One in Israel, 2015).


About Schneerson’s espionage career, see L.Y. Schneerson, *Mi-Yomano shel Ish NILI* [From the Diary of a NILI Member] (Haifa: Renaissance, 1967); Auron, *Banality*, pp.178-79.


Jabotinsky Institute's Archive, Personal archive no. 281, file 8/1; 8 November – 11 November 1919, and a similar report in CZA, file L4/767.

CZA, file L4/767.


Haycraft, *Disturbances*, p.6.

Ibid., p. 54.

A petition submitted to the Chief Secretary on the occasion of his visit to Tulkarm in October 1921 (report dated 2 October 1921), Haganah Archives, 80/pey-145/6.


63 Haganah Archives, CID files 47/465; 47/481: documents no. 296-299; 47-482: document nos 304-337.

64 ‘Khaderah, 23-4-24’, Haganah Archives, file 47/465. Ben Tsvi was active in al-Zughraniyya, a former Bosnian estate that was sold to the Jewish Colonisation Association (JCA). It became a Jewish settlement inhabited by *ikarim* and their Arab workers:


67 Rabinovitch, *Jewish Rights*.

68 Kokhavi and Elyashiv, *The Haganah*, p.35.

70 Yoav Gelber, *Growing a Fleur-de-Lis: The Intelligence Services of the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine 1918–1947* (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1992), pp.161-214. See also oral testimony of Ahron Sela’, one of the heads of the SHAI, Haganah Archive, no. 140.04,


Wadi al-Hawarith (Suwaed, ‘Wadi al-Hawarith’). For Kh. al-Sarkas, see ISA, file pey15/339, ‘Ajjaj vs. PICA [1947], PICA vs. residents of Kh. al-Sarkas, 1944.

77 See, for example, the minutes of a meeting involving David Ben Gurion, Gad Machnes, Yosef Weitz and Ezra Danin, 1939, file 80/pey58/23.


79 Danin's personal papers, Haganah Archive, file 80/pey58/5,6.


83 ‘Summary of the Meeting of the Advisors for Arab Affairs’, 6 April 1948, IDF Archives (Tel ha-Shomer), file 125 – 4663/1949.

84 Morris, *Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, p.126; From Tiroshi (Eitan) to Tene (‘A), ‘Sherkes’, 19 February 1948, Haganah Archives, file 105/72. For previous Arab
demands to evacuate, see, Un-authored, Undated, ‘Sherkes’; From 01112 (Mada’) to Tene (‘A), ‘the Village of Sherkes’, 19 January 1948, Haganah Archives, file 105/215.


89 Lif (Lifshitz), Zalman’s personal archive, CZA/A402.

90 Haganah Archive, file 80/pey58/13.

91 Danin, Weitz and Lifshits report, pp.2-4. The twentieth century cases of the Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, Turks, Bulgarians, and Germans were discussed in greater detail: appendices 1, 2, and 3.
