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## Logos

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Neither the etymology of the word *logos* nor a survey of the variety of its usage in the period under investigation (the sixth to fourth centuries B.C.) can take us very far towards understanding what is most important for Greek culture in the various appeals that the Greeks made to this term. Tracing the word back to its root-meaning leaves us with something too simple; surveying the canopy of branches that grew from this root tangles us in something too complex. It will be better to allow the Greeks themselves to guide us in pruning the growth back to its scaffold limbs by studying cases where their use of the term is especially self-conscious.

Let us begin, nevertheless, with a brief investigation of the root and the branches, so that we can better understand what needs cutting back. The ambiguity of the Italian '(rac)conto' between 'enumeration' or 'reckoning', on the one hand, and 'story', on the other (cf. French 'compte/ conte'; English 'account'), reproduces at least part of the polymorphousness of the Greek *logos*. (English also offers a Germanic equivalent in 'tally/tale', cf. German 'Zahl/ Erzählung'). The verbal root \**leg-* from which it derives has the broad meaning 'to group', 'to assemble'.<sup>1</sup> Hence the ambiguity: to group items in a *logos* may be to count them

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<sup>1</sup> H.Fournier, *Les Verbes 'Dire' en Grec Ancien* (Paris, 1946), p.54; P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire Etymologique de la Langue Grecque* (Paris, 1974), p.625; H. Boeder, *Der Frühgriechische Wortgebrauch von Logos und Aletheia*, in *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 4 (1959): 82-112 (esp. pp. 82-91).

or otherwise assess their value, or it may be to link them in a narrative or account or argument. The common thread that binds the various meanings of *logos* — the *logos* of *logos*, we might say — is the concept of evaluation, of taking the measure of something. A *logos* is what results from taking the measure of something — although by a further ambiguity frequent with Greek abstract nouns the word may in some of its senses refer to the activity itself rather than the result, and thus *logos* can be the activity of calculating, evaluating, reasoning as well as the calculation or evaluation or argument that is arrived at. Now, to take the measure of something is to make sense of it to yourself in some way, or as the Greeks say, to 'give (a) *logos*' of it (*logon didonai*). So too, you yourself may be the object of others' estimation, and hope that your behaviour makes sense to them, 'has (a) *logos*' (*logon ekhei*). But the most efficient way to make sense of yourself to others (make sense of your beliefs, plans, motives, demands) is to communicate with them, or as the Greeks say, to 'produce (a) *logos*', 'to give and receive (a) *logos*' (*logon poieisthai, logon didonai kai dekhesthai*). There is a natural connection, then, between the enunciative meanings of the word ('utterance', 'story', 'language', 'speech', 'talk', 'claim', etc.) and the non-enunciative ('sense', 'reason(ing)', 'principle', 'explanation', 'measure', 'proportion', etc.).<sup>2</sup> In all cases, a *logos* is what makes sense.

For this reason, an uttered *logos* is never just words in a row (for which the Greek is *epea* or *onomata*); rather, it is language that stakes a claim on the attention of the addressee, a claim of relevance. If something is 'worth a *logos*', 'worth mentioning' (*axion logou*), its value is, at least in part, determined by that claim. Implicit in any uttered *logos*, then, is a question as to the authority by which the speaker or writer claims the attention of the audience. In this the term seems to have taken over the role that Homer gave to the word *mythos*.<sup>3</sup> This in

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<sup>2</sup> The connection will seem more natural to a modern audience if it accepts a model of communication according to which our communicative behaviour is not *sui generis* (as in Saussurian semiotics) but is one kind of intentional human behaviour among others (as in theories inspired by H.P. Grice).

<sup>3</sup> On the Homeric usage of *mythos* see R.P. Martin, *The Language of Heroes* (Ithaca, 1989), p.12.

turn suggests a different approach to the old topic of a development from *mythos* to *logos*, analyzed by an earlier generation of scholars as the emergence of rationality from traditional modes of thought.<sup>4</sup> A subsequent generation of scholars has reminded us that rational thinking is basic to human beings of all periods, and has taught us to treat the developments of this period not as the emergence of a new mentality but as an increasing self-consciousness about the boundaries of intellectual disciplines, marked by the asking of second-order questions about the foundations of those disciplines.<sup>5</sup> This approach may be complemented by one which is less concerned with the boundaries between emerging disciplines but inquires primarily into the effects of ever-shifting social, especially professional, contexts of communication on the culture as a whole.<sup>6</sup> Something of both approaches will be attempted here. If uttered *logos* always implies a question as to the authority of the utterer, we can investigate how the basis of that authority is distributed between utterer, audience, and the sense that the utterance makes (which engages with *logos* in its non-enunciative meaning), as well as how that distribution changes over time.

An important piece of evidence for this investigation is the system of the Athenian court of law. Let us first consider, as a foil, the early Greek system of arbitration.<sup>7</sup> Here the judge — a king or elder rather than a special functionary, but in any case a figure of authority — is a principal speaker in the proceedings, for he must negotiate a compromise between the parties to the dispute. It is to the judging king and not to the litigants that Hesiod attributes an eloquence derived from the Muses (*Theogony* 79-97), and it is the king's crooked speaking (not simply crooked judgment) that he blames for current perversions of justice (*Works and Days* 260-62) In the arbitration-scene pictured on the shield of

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<sup>4</sup> As e.g. by W. Nestle, *Vom Mythos zum Logos* (2<sup>nd</sup>. ed. Stuttgart, 1942).

<sup>5</sup> P. Vidal-Naquet, 'La raison grecque et la cité', in *Le chasseur noir* (Paris, 1981) [trans. A. Szegedy-Maszak, *The Black Hunter* (Baltimore, 1986)]; G.E.R. Lloyd, *Demystifying Mentalities* (Cambridge, 1990).

<sup>6</sup> D. Lanza, *Lingua e discorso nell'Atene delle professioni* (Napoli, 1979).

<sup>7</sup> See M. Gagarin, *Early Greek Law* (Berkeley, 1986), esp. ch. 2.

Achilles in Homer's *Iliad* (18.497-508), in which the judges are the elders of the town, the participants in the contest of speeches are, remarkably, the judges themselves, with a prize to be awarded to whoever of them proposes the settlement found acceptable by all.

The situation is quite different in the formalized Athenian lawcourt of the fifth to fourth centuries. The function of judging is entrusted to juries of ordinary citizens numbering in the hundreds, and these jurymen never speak or pronounce judgment (although we know they could be a noisy audience), but deliver their silent vote without public deliberation. The speaking now comes exclusively in the form of a contest, in which the competitors are the parties to the dispute. Thus the speaking-position and the position of authority (that of the judges) have become separated.

The lawcourts offer the starkest demonstration of this development, but something similar develops also in the more strictly political context. Although in theory any Athenian citizen could take the platform and speak at a meeting of the democratic Assembly, in practice those who spoke were mostly figures of political stature, the principals of the policy-making drama. As in the lawcourts, then, most citizens were in the position of judges rather than speakers; and as in the lawcourts, the ultimate authority rested with the judges and their power to vote. Aristotle calls both the forensic and the political audience indifferently 'judges', and sets them in contrast to the audience of an epideictic oration — a ceremonial speech such as a funeral oration, or a speech intended primarily to display the speaker's art — which is an audience of 'spectators' (*Rhetoric* 1358b: *kritai* vs. *theôroi*). The contrast is the more remarkable because epideictic speeches too, like the poetic performances which they resembled and upon the domain of which they encroached, were often submitted to the verdict of judges, in their case at festival competitions; and indeed Aristotle in this passage has no difficulty labelling the epideictic audience also 'judges' in a sense, namely of the speaker's ability, while maintaining the fundamental distinction between judges

and spectators. Similarly, Cleon in Thucydides berates the Athenians at the Assembly for being 'spectators of speeches (*logoi*), listeners to deeds' (3.38.4). They listen to others' narrations of deeds when they should be acting themselves; they savour the speakers' rhetorical ability when they should instead be engaging in the appropriate action for Assemblymen: political judgment.

The crucial relation here is that between *logos* and civic power. When authority rests with the judges, but the judges are audience rather than speakers, speaking becomes a means, indeed the principal means, of influencing civic policy and maintaining one's status. Matters no longer stand as they did when Homer (*Odyssey* 8.167-77) and Hesiod (*Theogony* 81-84) could treat speaking as a desirable but not inevitable qualification of kingship or of superior social standing in general. (Note how Hesiod puts the matter: whomever among kings the Muses favour, he speaks honeyed words.) With ultimate civic authority now diffused among the citizens, aristocratic rank does not alone make for the power that comes from social prominence (however much it may still help). Such prominence must instead be earned in the Assembly and (given Athenian litigiousness) the lawcourts, and earned through *logos*. A standard word for 'politician' in the fifth century was simply 'speaker' (*rhêtôr*), and had by the time of Demosthenes in the mid-fourth century become potentially a term of opprobrium, precisely because the politician-speaker was thought to use his speaking power to wrest from the final arbiters of policy, the Athenian people, what was properly theirs (*Against Meidias* 189; *Against Timocrates* 142).

A man's *logos*, then — his ability to make sense to his fellows, and to make them share his sense of events — had become in Athens the most important component of his civic worth, because it was by its means that he drew authority from the audience, in whom authority ultimately resided. No longer an accompaniment to a political function (kingship) empowered independently of it, *logos* has to make its own way in the world and become politically powerful in itself, regardless of the social position of the speaker.

When the poet Hesiod in the eighth century describes the eloquence of kings, he does so by extending to them the patronage of the Muses, normally reserved for poets, because skill in speaking is conceived by him in terms of a profession with its own social standing and power, that of poetry. The rhetorician Gorgias in the late fifth century, however, uses a political metaphor to describe *logos* as powerful in itself, a 'great lord' (*dynastês megas*), and brings in only as examples rather than as the essence of its power some of the professions and disciplines and contexts in which it is manifested (*Helen* 8-14). They are, moreover, a more motley bunch than Hesiod could have associated with each other: cosmology, philosophy, forensic speaking, magical spells, lies, and indeed poetry itself. Nor is Gorgias' concern with the stature of these practices in society but exclusively with their effects on the audience. Contrast a traditionalist such as Pindar, who speaks of the 'honour' that poetry transmits even to matters unworthy of belief (*Olympian Odes* 1.28-32), or of 'something solemn' that attaches to Homer's words even when they are false (*Nemean Odes* 7.20-3), thereby isolating the dignity of the practice and its practitioners. Gorgias treats similar examples of deception through words rather as coordinate with examples not involving deception, and all of them as illustrative of the multiple effects of *logos* on an audience, a topic which he sums up by comparing the effects of *logos* on the soul to that of drugs on the body. The analogy suggests professionalism in the use of *logos*, to be sure — for just as there is a professional expert in the use of drugs, the doctor, so (we are to understand) Gorgias in this speech displaying his talents claims general expertise in the use of *logos* — but not the least significant aspect of the analogy is the fact that this point remains only implicit. Gorgias, whom we call a practitioner of rhetoric, does not receive this christening until a generation later, in the Platonic dialogue in which he is one of the characters; and the discussion there revolves around the oddness of a profession that claims mastery of what seems to be the common property of many better established disciplines and practices, namely the use of *logos* and of persuasive argument, leaving no zone of expertise for itself in particular (Plato, *Gorgias* 449a, 449e-451d, 453e-

454a).<sup>8</sup> Isocrates, Plato's contemporary and a seminal figure in the development of rhetoric, called his own practice not rhetoric but 'philosophy' (*philosophia*). Thus friendly and hostile witnesses alike agree that the structures and boundaries of this discipline of *logos*-mastery are fluid, far more so than those of the equally novel discipline of medicine to which Plato follows Gorgias in comparing it (*Phaedrus* 270b).

This fluidity is further testimony to the new relation between *logos* and civic power. If a man's *logos* is no longer spoken from various positions of inherited or professional authority which determine its power but is rather the all-purpose tool by which he will make something of himself among his fellows, then the general mastery of *logos* is too basic an achievement to be confined to the limits of a single profession, or indeed to the limits of professionalism. It is now too close to the centre of a man's virtue. Plato's Callicles is allowed to voice this feeling on behalf of all men of political ambition when he describes Socrates' failure to grow up, to attain true manhood, as an inability to handle *logos* correctly in the political arena, and imagines his impotence in the face of legal challenge as an inability to speak in response (*Gorgias* 485e-486b; Callicles' political ambition is made explicit at 513a-c). Nor should we underestimate the significance of the obvious fact that the technically accomplished discourse of political life, being prose, was far more like one's commonplace language than the earlier model for technically accomplished discourse, poetry. When Gorgias designates poetry as '*logos plus metre*' (*logon ekhonta metron*) he becomes the first to make prose the default category of discourse (*Helen* 9; followed by Plato, *Gorgias* 502c-d). The new genres of prose-*logos* were everywhere complementing and to a considerable degree displacing the traditional genres of poetry,<sup>9</sup> and this development put Athenians in the position of Molière's M. Jourdain, who had been speaking prose all his life without knowing it. Skillful public speaking was no longer primarily a

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. T. Cole, *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore, 1991), p.2.

<sup>9</sup> B. Gentili, *Poesia e pubblico nella Grecia Antica* (Roma, 1985) [trans. T. Cole, *Poetry and its Public in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore, 1988)].



professional calling with a special group definition and social place, rather it was the very water in which the citizen swam, and a means to quite general stature within society.

This pervasiveness made *logos* a new source of danger to the community. The old poets too had recognized that a master of speaking must know how to tell lies as well as truth, as Hesiod's Muses boasted to him on Helicon (*Theogony* 27-28). But if poets sometimes twisted, say, genealogical facts to suit their patrons and audiences,<sup>10</sup> this was a deviousness strictly limited by the occasion of professional performance. Similarly, the fact that Homer's Odysseus is a trickster-figure makes him distinctive among heroes. But if a man's *logos* has become, quite generally, his virtue, and *logos* has nevertheless maintained its affiliation with deception, then virtue risks confusion with vice.

When Aristophanes stages a debate between two personified *Logoi*, Right and Wrong, and has them contend for the prize of educating the young Pheidippides, he allows Wrong to introduce himself to the audience simply as *logos*, without qualification, and to claim the skill of speaking, again without qualification; and indeed the educational program that Right proposes has no provision for training in the use of *logos* (*Clouds* 889-1114; esp. 894, 1077). Wrong takes Right's insulting name for him, *hêttôn logos* — which means both 'worse *logos*' and 'weaker *logos*' — and turns it to praise: he has earned the title by cleverly devising how to argue in defiance of traditional moral and social values, to choose the weaker, because counter-intuitive, line of argument, and still win the debate (893, 1038-42). This is what Gorgias is doing in the *Helen* when he engages to defend the woman who could be thought of as the most notorious adulteress of Greek lore, and in general it was by arguing the counter-intuitive that teachers of rhetoric advertised their abilities (cf. Plato, *Symposium* 177b-c), since this constituted *a fortiori* proof that they could argue in conformity with traditional values when needed — which is to say, when facing the people in

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<sup>10</sup> J. Svenbro, *La parole et le marbre* (Lund, 1976).

Assembly or lawcourt.

Thus the practice by which a man gained virtue and status in the eyes of its arbiters seemed itself dangerously amoral. A person whose training teaches him to toy with values, and whose training is the source of his self-worth, might turn the game into reality and conduct a revaluation of all values by renaming them — as Plato imagines demagogues doing when they call anarchy 'freedom', prodigality 'magnificence', shamelessness 'courage' (*Republic* 560e-561a). (We have already seen Aristophanes' *Wrong take Right's* insult as a compliment; and there are further examples at *Clouds* 908-13.) The fear was that in breaking loose from its moorings in poetic discipline *logos* had broken loose also from social containment.

A contrast of vocabulary may serve to sum up the point. 'Story-maker' (*mythopoiios*) or 'story-writer' (*mythographos*) was a designation by which later writers referred to tellers of what had now become mythical tales; if the label was sometimes used polemically, the polemic was intellectual rather than moral. But the term '*logos*-maker' (*logopoiios*) acquired in addition to the meaning 'prose-writer' an ethically pejorative sense, 'one who spreads baseless or malicious rumour', and '*logos*-writer' (*logographos*), the title for those who made their living writing speeches for delivery by others (which at Athens included the speeches heard in court), could be used just by itself as a reproach;<sup>11</sup> for the speech-writer incarnated Athenian anxiety at the looseness of *logos*, both from the side of the writer himself, who could take the *logos* that supposedly made a man what he was and ventriloquize it for each customer at will, and from the side of the customer, who acquired a stature that was not truly his.

To be thought the teacher of a practice dangerous to society could be uncomfortable, and it is from one who evidently felt the discomfort in his position as founder of a school of *logos*-mastery, Isocrates, that we get in the course of the

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<sup>11</sup> See A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford, 1945), vol. 1, p.138.

fourth century an attempt to re-connect the position of speaker with that of moral authority, as when the Hesiodic king delivers himself of straight judgments. First, Isocrates insists that no amount of training can make a good speaker of one who lacks the appropriate natural talent. The point is banal, but what is interesting is that Isocrates should see fit in that case to make it at all, and with such emphasis (*Against the Sophists* 10, 14, 17; *Antidosis* 187, 200). The reason is that he thereby takes the initial step in transferring some of the power attributed to *logos* as such back to the speaker. But this is not yet to specify that power as moral. A second step is taken when, in the prologue to his *Helen* (1-3), Isocrates rejects the exercise of arguing counter-intuitive cases in order to demonstrate one's ability to argue according to conventional civic values, instead contending that the latter is the more difficult task and requires more of its practitioner. (We cannot pause here over the complexity of the fact that Isocrates has issued this challenge within a speech in praise of Helen, the very topic that Gorgias made his exercise in the counter-intuitive). The goal is reached when the talent for discovering appropriate arguments and the ambition to argue about the worthiest of matters together have the effect of ennobling the speaker, whose practice of contemplating and evaluating the most decorous considerations to employ in speaking on such topics cannot but become engrained in him for the conduct of his life as a whole (*Antidosis* 276-77). Yet this is not, after all, a complete return to the archaic pattern. The proper use of *logos* for Isocrates is not, as good speaking is in Hesiod or in Homeric arbitration, the accompaniment of a moral authority that is independently grounded; rather, it is itself the ground of that authority. Nevertheless, it is no surprise that in his political projects Isocrates was a friend to kings and princes.

A different type of response in the fourth century to the disconnection of *logos* from the authority of the speaker made appeal to a technological issue, the contrast between speaking one's *logos* and writing it. Alcidamas of Elea lamented the loss of ability to speak extempore that was apparent among those who worked primarily or exclusively in writing and made publication of books their means of

self-advertisement (*On the Sophists*, 1). (The description fits Isocrates perfectly). He is no longer prepared to accord power to *logos* without qualification, but only to the 'living' *logos* (*logos empsykhos*), which lives by virtue of issuing from a human being who is thinking on the spot (28), and who has the talent and training to cope with the exigencies of each occasion as it arises, however unexpected it may be, understanding as he does both the requirements of the argument and the desires of his audience (3, 9-10). The idea is of a man in complete control of the situation. The writer, on the other hand, is a cutter-and-paster of others' written logoi (4), and when delivering a script from memory — for the Greeks did not tolerate reading aloud from their public speakers — was liable to lose credibility in the face of his audience in various ways, such as by the literariness of his language (12), the anomalousness of his occasional improvisations (14), or by forgetting his lines (21). Thus it is extemporization rather than just oral delivery that Alcidamas extolls, and the effect is to emphasize the authority of the speaker (the active extemporizer) as distinct from that of his *logos* (whether delivered from a script or published as a book). Again, as with Isocrates, this effect falls short of archaism. The authority of the speaker, his 'being honoured by others for possessing godlike judgment' (9), is not grounded in anything other than his speaking.<sup>12</sup>

Unlike Isocrates, however, Alcidamas does not emphasize the idea that the authority of the master of *logos* is a moral authority — the immediately preceding quotation represents his closest approach to such a claim. It is in Plato's *Phaedrus* that the technology of writing is given a moral value, although the morality is that of a philosopher, with knowledge as its determinant. Plato's aim is to make the activity and the products of writing the scapegoat for the dangers of *logos*. Written texts lose connection with the authority of their creators and circulate with a power of their own, a dangerous power because they wander

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<sup>12</sup> Alcidamas' phrase is an echo of Homer, *Odyssey* 8.173; but whereas the Homeric passage treats the ability to speak well as one endowment among others that win admiration, Alcidamas here declares it essential for all human interactions, private and public.

indiscriminately among those who do and those who do not understand them (275d-e) — the Platonic version of Gorgias' drug-like *logos*, with its power both to heal and to harm. In contrast to writing stands, not spoken language as such, for like Alcidas Plato sees no advantage to oral delivery from a memorized text (277e), nor even Alcidas' extemporization, but rather (and the correspondence of metaphor between the two authors is striking) 'the living, animate *logos* of one who knows' (276a8: *logon ... zônta kai empsykhon*). From its location in the soul (276a5-6), from the vastly greater length of time that it takes to develop fully by comparison with the production of a written work (276b), and from its origins within oneself primarily, and only secondarily by contact with others (278a5-b2),<sup>13</sup> we can see that Plato means by this *logos* the philosopher's thoughts, considered both as moments in a process and as the understanding that develops over a lifetime.<sup>14</sup> For the immediate presence, and hence authority, of Alcidas' improviser before his audience Plato has substituted the immediate presence, and hence authority, of the thinker before himself. *Logos* is here the sense that one makes not to others but to oneself, and is given an ethical value: it is what will make us truly happy, and as we should wish ourselves to be, for we will have the control over ourselves that derives from self-knowledge (*Phaedrus* 277a, 278b, 279b-c, with 229e-230a).

Plato's conception of *logos* here builds upon its place in a tradition of speculative thought, of the sort that he himself called philosophical.<sup>15</sup> Its key feature is to treat the sense that the philosopher makes to himself, when thinking about the way things are, as not essentially different from the sense that things

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<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Republic* 528a; *Theaetetus* 189e; *Sophist* 263e.

<sup>14</sup> Isocrates too makes use of the idea that thought is a kind of internal *logos* with which the thinker addresses himself; but he does so in a context where his highest praise is reserved for the power of *logos* to bring about sociality between human beings (*Antidosis* 254-56).

<sup>15</sup> Studies of *logos* that focus more intensely on this tradition than does the present article include H. Leisegang, s.v. 'Logos', in *RE* 13 (1942), col. 1035-1081; G. Kerferd, s.v. 'Logos', in P. Edwards, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York, 1967), vol. 5, p.83-4; M. Fattal, *Pour un nouveau langage de la raison* (Paris, 1988).

make in themselves, the *logos* of the world. In a passage that resembles yet crucially differs from Isocrates' description of the ennobling effects on the orator of pondering arguments to present about the worthiest political issues, Plato describes the ennobling effects on the philosopher of contemplating objects of pure thought which are all arranged 'according to *logos*' (*kata logon*), i.e. which make perfect sense to the mind, and whose orderliness the philosopher himself will inevitably come to resemble and model his life upon (*Republic* 500c). There is a correspondence here between the thinking philosopher and the objects of his thought (not to mention a greater breadth in the objects of thought) that is absent in the passage of Isocrates. It is here also that we should locate various Aristotelian usages, most especially a tendency in his *Metaphysics* to treat *logos* both as a term for the account of a thing's form or essence and as synonymous with that form or essence (e.g. 1029b20 vs. 1035b29). A similar ambiguity occurs in the ethical works, in which the 'correct *logos*' that governs virtuous actions and is expressed by them can refer both to the activity of understanding in the virtuous person and to the principles, revealed by reasoning, on which that person acts.

The inaugurator of this tradition was the speculative thinker Heraclitus of Ephesus, who lived around the turn of the sixth to the fifth centuries. It is the basis of his notorious contempt for his own audience. 'Listen not to me, but to the *logos*', he writes (fr. 50, Diels-Kranz); but the *logos* which he presents to them is one which, he claims, they not only fail to understand when they have heard him deliver it but even before he has delivered it (fr. 1). For it is the *logos* of the cosmos, which they do not grasp because, unlike Heraclitus (and unlike Plato's Socrates) they do not search inside themselves, examining the grounds of their conventional beliefs by talking with their own eyes and ears, that is, conducting an internal dialogue by questioning the evidence of their senses (fr. 101, 107). This, truly, is how to hear and to speak, for it establishes contact with the cosmic *logos* that is constantly going on around them, though they miss its meaning; this is how to enlarge the soul's boundaries to encompass the cosmos itself (fr. 19, 45,

72, 115). Thus Heraclitus does not communicate with his audience, but gives them instead a sign (fr. 93), provoking each to communicate with himself and so with the cosmos.

Heraclitus' *logos* is provocative because it is counter-intuitive, a property it has in common not only with most speculative thought but also, as we saw, with the exercises and display-pieces of the rhetoricians. But whereas the latter play with the counter-intuitive in order to be able to manipulate more deftly the conventional thinking of the audience, philosophic and cosmological speculators take the counter-intuitive for truth.<sup>16</sup> They free themselves from convention entirely, by virtue of their internal *logos*, which permits them to occupy both the speaking and the audience position. The philosopher Parmenides of Elea in the mid-fifth century represents this situation by writing a poem in which an unnamed goddess, like the poetic Muse, provides him with his material and with his authority to speak, but, quite unlike the poetic Muse, directly speaks the entirety of his poem after the prologue, and invites him to 'judge by *logos*' (fr. 7, Diels-Kranz), by using his sense, the extraordinary arguments she goes on to produce concerning the limits of thought. Parmenides is the authority here both as the direct voice of his goddess, who legislates for what can be thought, and as her judging audience. Thus philosophers and cosmologists position themselves outside the development that we have traced from speaker as judge to audience as judge, for as speaker and audience both, they are their own judges.

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<sup>16</sup> This was a distinction that could be glossed over for polemical purposes, as in Aristophanes' portrayal of Socrates in the *Clouds*, or in Isocrates' critical survey of paradox-mongers in the prologue to his *Helen*.