E.H. Carr, International Relations Theory, and the Societal Origins of International Legal Norms

This article explores an important as peel of peace movements· impact on international relations. It focuses in particular on the anicula1ion and promotion of inlemational legal norins by Anglo-American peace movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Social forces, in 1he fonn of peace movements, have, since the post-Napoleonic period, attempled with great energy and consideriible success to influence noirns underpinning international law. Nonns promoted by these movements include constraints on stales' right IO wage war and the requirement that slates attempt lo resolve conflict' peacefully before using force, which over time have been embodied in trea1ies and agreemenls such as the Hague Conventions, the Covenant of the League of Nations, the 1928 Pact of Paris and the UN Charter. Additional nonns promoted by peace movements include the constitutive principles or universalism (lhe notion that all political actors should participate in decisions about peace, security, and the improvement of international life 1) and equality of status (the notion that they should do so on an equal basis, and that rights should be granted 10 and obligations binding· upon all) that provide the foundation for twentieth century global international organisa1ions such as the League or Na1ions and 1he United Nations. Social movements have made these auempls as part of a much Jess successful endeavour to promo1e Jaw as a means of ensuring international peace. The tenn social movemen1s, as used in 1his article,.denotes loose associations of actors who work for their goals (out of necessity or choice) al leas! in pan outside of 'traditional' poli1ical channels, and within the arena of 'civil society'. They are thus relatfrely tiutonomous from traditional political institutions, although individual movement members, being generally middle-class and frequently well-educated, often share ditect experience in such institutions (e.g., government, political parties, labour unions).~ h is almost always inaccurate to I would like 10 Audie Kloll, Friedrich Kratochwil, Michael Loriaux. Thomas Warnke reviewers and astute comments.


E.H. Carr, International Relations· Theory, and the Societal Origins of International Legal Norms Cecelia Lynch
This article explores an important as peel of peace movements· impact on international relations. It focuses in particular on the anicula1ion and promotion of inlemational legal norins by Anglo-American peace movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Social forces, in 1he fonn of peace movements, have, since the post-Napoleonic period, attempled with great energy and consideriible success to influence noirns underpinning international law. Nonns promoted by these movements include constraints on stales' right IO wage war and the requirement that slates attempt lo resolve conflict' peacefully before using force, which over time have been embodied in trea1ies and agreemenls such as the Hague Conventions, the Covenant of the League of Nations, the 1928 Pact of Paris and the UN Charter. Additional nonns promoted by peace movements include the constitutive principles or universalism (lhe notion that all political actors should participate in decisions about peace, security, and the improvement of international life 1 ) and equality of status (the notion that they should do so on an equal basis, and that rights should be granted 10 and obligations binding· upon all) that provide the foundation for twentieth century global international organisa1ions such as the League or Na1ions and 1he United Nations. Social movements have made these auempls as part of a much Jess successful endeavour to promo1e Jaw as a means of ensuring international peace.
The tenn social movemen1s, as used in 1his article,.denotes loose associations of actors who work for their goals (out of necessity or choice) al leas! in pan outside of 'traditional' poli1ical channels, and within the arena of 'civil society'. They are thus relatfrely tiutonomous from traditional political institutions, although individual movement members, being generally middle-class and frequently well-educated, often share ditect experience in such institutions (e.g., government, political parties, labour unions).~ h is almost always inaccurate to Origins o~ lrytemationaJ LegaJ Nonns of law and institutions. 6 Depending on the tradition of intemalional law that one adheres to, rule-following may be seen as desirable merely to achieve some type of 'practic~ associa1ion' of actors, or it may be promoted for the purpose of achieving some other perceived good, for example, status quo s1abili1y, a jus1 distribution of resources, economic prosperity (for the few or for aJI), or an international peace that may be based on one or a combination of other goods. 7 The tradi1iona1 'sources' of international law are generally said 10 be cus1om and treaties, without ·regard for the agents who push for panicular types of behaviour to be encoded within treaties or standardised as customary practice.! · Yet JegaJ nonns do not arise in a vacuum. but are socially contested, promoted and legitimised. Peace movements have consistently promoted a vision of international life based on inculcating particular standards of stale behaviour into international practice. These standards have been conceptualised in elhical tenns by pacifists and religious activists who believe in the sanctity of human life 9 , and by socialists who give priority to the promotion of justice and equity in international relations. They have been conceptualised in lega1 tenns by interna1ionalists, many of whom have been professionally trained lawyers and who have promoted the 'rule of law' in international, as well as national. affairs. All of lhese societal elements-religious, pacifist, socialist, internationalist, and liberal-traditionally comprise peace movements in both Britain and the United Stales and, although they differ in their motives and some of their goals, they have come together over the past two centuries 10 advocate common programs and minimum intemationaJ legal nonns as a means of achieving international peace.m 9. This type of belief, howe~er, should be dis1inguished rrom·the contemporary 'pro-life' stance. JO. This lype or social activity is becoming incrwingly recognised by international legal experts. For example, W. Michael Riesman.and Chris T. Antoniou, in introducing a recent compilation of documents on the laws of war, credit lhe 'Peace Movement' with seeking to 'condemn war, to temper its severily when it occurred and, even more ambitiously, to create interna1ional dispute mechanisms that might obviate it entirely', and also with beginning 'to press lheir governments to conclude agreements wilh olher governments and even to establish permanent international organiz.ations to accomplish lheir objectives'. Reisman and Anloniou, The laws of War (New York, NY: Random House, 1994), p. xviii.
Nevertheless, although elements of these programs have remained conslanl through lhe nineleenth and early twen1ielh cenluries, lhey have also been moulded and recast in reaclion to new social and political circumsrances. In order 10 appreciate lhe relationship between peace movements, slandards ·of state behaviour, and the evolution of inlernational relations lherefore, it is crucial to undersland bolh lhe continuities and changes in social movements' aniculalion of international legal nonns.
There are a number of ways of concepiualising, and critiquing, lhe means by which social movements attempt to wield influence in lhe international realm. One IR 'tradition' that has attempted to explain the effects of 'unofficial' social forces on lhe central issues of peace and security in international life, and their implications for the role of law and ethics, is the classical realist tradition as aniculated by E.H. Carr in his short but seminal tome, The Twenty Years' Crisis. 11 Classical realism is distinguished here from neorealism and structural realism, in that lhe fonner at least impliciliy and often explicitly addresses ques1ions of the possibilities of elhical action in international life, and the role of various levels of actors in achieving order, peace an~ security. 12 Indeed, Carr in particular and classical realism in general have enjoyed a renaissance of interest on the pan of many critics of structural realism who see in classical realism both a more holistic analysis and a more sophisticated method of 11 Origins of Intemationa1 Legal Nonns theorising than those demonstrated by their successors. u Almos! a11 theorists of the classica1 rea1isl tradition (including Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr) attempted to come to grips with the problem of the place of ethical action in foreign affairs; most a1so based their understandings of the workings of international politics on a profoundly historical perspective. Nevertheless. despite their critical and historical stance vis·ii-vis in1ema1ional politics, classica1 realists should not be exempt from criticism on a number of fronts, including their dichotomisation of in1ematiOna1 politics into overly simplistic categories such as rea1ism/idealism (or, in the case of Carr, utopianism) 14 , or their possible confusion and misinterpretation of historical categories. Where social forces in particular are concerned, although only Carr treated them with any degree of specificity (as opposed to Niebuhr's concern with the evil present on the level of human nature or Morgenthau's assenions of the impossibili1y of 'moral' action by the stale), much of the work of the classica1 realists pointed to an indictment' of 'utopian' or 'idealis1' trends in international politics as inevitably dangerous and nefarious. Carr sought 10 outline the nonnative histol)' of utopianism in international politics; he a1so spelled out in some detail who the 'utopians' were, although his definition was sweeping and often contradictol) ' 15. For example, a1 times utopianism comprises intellec1uals as opposed to the masses; . al others ii includes mass public opinion against governments; at still others it consists primarily of the British and French governments (the 'satisfied powers') against Gennany and Italy; and ye! at still others it seems 10 be mainly the Lef1 against both governments and the masses. Carr, op.cit., in note 11, pp. 15·18, and passim.
Throughout The Twenty Years' Crisis, however, sociaJ agents are placed in the category of utopianism'primarily when they are viewed as supponing the League of Na1ions, or internationaJ law and organisation more genera1ly. Although Carr does not use lhe tenn 'peace movement', he does enumerate movement groups (the Union of Democratic Control, the League of Nations Union, the New Commonwealth Society) in his indicunent of utopianism, as well as 'campaigrys' and 'agitations' that were inevitably led by movements (e.g., campaigns for the popularisation of in1ema1ionaJ politics, the Geneva Protocol, the Pennanent Coun of International Justice, the World Disarmament Conference; agitations against secret treaties). For this reason and because most eleinents of pre-World War I and interwar peace movefllents were strong supponers of globaJ intemationaJ organisation, it is appropriate to relate his criticisms 10 what has since become known as the 'peace movement'. The labelling of movement groups and campaigns as 'utopian' as opposed to 'realist', I argue, has created a sligma around attempts by social forces 10 innuence the course of peace and security affairs. This stigma has endured in both popular and lheoreticaJ parlance over the past fifty years and should be re-examined.
Carr viewed members of groups that supponed these causes as agents who act inappropriately in the international arena by attempting 10 institutionalise legaJ and ethical principles designed (and only suitable) for the domestic reaJm. Movement agents are motivated by 'utopianism', which Carr opposes 10 the 'realism' he believes necessary 10 act effectively in international politics. MOreover, Carr implicates peace movemencs in his trenchant cri1ique of nineteenth and 1wentieth century liberalism and sees them as 'principal advocates of what he labels the 'hannony of interests', i.e., the notion thal what is good for the individual is good for the collectivity, even when the 'individuals' who define the collective good happen 10 be those who are mos! powerful and prosperous. This false belief in 'hannony', for Carr, takes two fonns: faith in the liberal economic doctrine of laisse:-faire, and the belief that global peace can be attained through Jaw and the force of reason. Most nefarious. for him, is the attempt 10 institutionalise such notions in the fonn of global international organisation.
In this anicle, I take issue with both the substance and the implications of Carr's argument. First, if one looks carefully at the character and goals of pe<ice activism ris·0-1·is international legal standards, one sees that not only has Carr vastly oversimplified complex historical phenomena in creating the realisl/idealisl dichotomy, but also that his critique of thi: hannony of interests, and his linkage of that notion lo peace activism, in facl applies primarily to the height of Cobdenism in the middle of the nineteenth century, somewhat less to tum of the \ 594 Origins of International Legal Noons century progressivism, and little to other periods covered in his broad his1orical sweep. 16 Second, if Carr's cri1ique Of law and social forces in The Twenty Years' Crisis is thus time-bound, then his cri1icisms of the role or peace movements as well as his dismissal or lhe applicability or law, e1hics and international organisa1ion to international life must also be quesiioned. 17 Finally, we must recognise that the anempt to paint particular kinds or social activi1y as inappropriate to inlemational life tends to close down inquiry into the significant ways in which movements can effect change al the international level: ii also lends to moot the exploration of what type of pUrposeful ac1ions by such movements might facilitate the creation and maintenance or international peace. This anicle proceeds first by reviewing 1he 'realist 1radilion' as articulaled by Carr. II then assesses the role of peace movements in articulating and promoting internationaJ legal noons during five periods in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, beginning wilh movement foundations in lhe post-Napoleonic era and ending with the institutionalisation of some (bul not all) movemen1 programmes in 1he form or the League of Nations. Carr covers much of lhe same historical ground in The Twenty Years' Crisis, bul my contention is that, in treating lhis 16. In fact, the nOtion of a false 'hannony' founded upon the interests of the powerful probably applies best to the US-led international order after World War II. Although much of Carr's advice regarding the need to found state relationships on an acknowledgment of power was, arguably. more rigorously followed during this period than in previous ones, the post-World War II period was also the one most marked by the belief that 'realism' concerning power relationships goes. hand-in-hand with securing liberal prosperity and international hannony.
17. In other works including The Moral Faundations for World Order (Denver, CO: Social Science Foundation, University of Denver, 1948), and Conditions of Peace (London: Macmillan, 1942), Carr appears lo modera.te some of his views regarding the possibilities of moralily and law expressed in The Tll'eno· Years' Crisis. Although I am using Carr's Tll'enty Years' Crisis as a prototype and forerunner of an extremely influential tendency in international relations theory. I must note several points regarding his other work that,.! believe, do not negate this stance. First, Carr's conceptions of law, morality and purposeful social agency remain, in my view. underdeveloped in his other works. Moreover, Carr, in The Moral Foundations for World Order, anicula1ed a laudable notion of international morality that would eliminate 'discrimination of individuals on grounds of race, colour. or national allegiance' (p. 22) and would be founded upon 'satisfying those primitive human needs of food and clothing and shelter' (through 'an international coordination, if not an international pooling, of resources' rather than by 'an indiscriminate opening or international markets', pp. 25-26). Yet, it is unclear how such an order (which most peace advocates also favoured) can be based on an international consensus that does not emanate from some type of notion of equality of status. a normative principle that Carr continued to excoriate (p. 11). It is also unclear how such a moral order can be founded on the type of 'realistic' assessment of power that docs no1 auempl to transcend given power relationships, since powerful states, as Carr himself emphasises so well, have linle interest in promoting the authority or prosperity of those who challenge their position. Finally, Carr'those to restate his crilicisms of peace activists, groups and international law and organization in 1946, after many of his other works had appeared, in a second edition to The Tweno· Years' Crisis. II is interesting that Carr was seen as no friend of international law and organization by at least some of his· contemporaries: Philip Noel-Baker, a lifelong advocate or international organization aiid a fellow Labour pany activist, once termed Carr 'utterly pernicious' (Noel-Baker to Lord Robert Cecil, 7 September, 1943, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood papers,-#51109, British Library, London). Millenniwn historical ground in a sweeping manner. Carr glosses over social, economic and political changes that had important implications for peace movements' composition and activities, and that his overly general treannent of peace activism makes his argument vulnerable to crilique. 11 Third, it identifies three insights missed by Carr in his analysis of socia1 forces, law and morality, and the harmony of interests, insights that, once recognised, better enable us to understand the significant ways in which social movements might effect change in internationa1 life. These insights are I) 'idealism' is neither an unchanging nor a monolithic strand of belief and activism in international affairs; 2) the notion of a 'harmony of interests' is based on both economic and political foundations and practices which Carr conflates in a mann.er that confuses the stance of movements vis-tl-i·is each; these must be disentangled if we are to see more clearly what movements represent regarding change in international relations; and 3) the persistence of socie1a1 auempts 10 create legaVethical standards of behaviour, the fact that standards have been created, and the fact that such standards evolve with changing international circumstances indicates 1hat, at a minimum, they are phenomena worthy of serious analysis. If we dismiss such auempts as irrelevant 10 polilical necessities, dangerous or both, we facilitate the dichotomisation of inlernatioilal practices in ways that encourage simplis1ic understandings of what is possible in international life, and thal tend to foreclose • a more nuanced analysis of the possibili1ies provided by both 1he continuities and changes in such standards in different historical periods. It is interesting that Carr, who prided himself on his abilities to perceive. identify and explain great historical trends and ideological movements, appears to have missed the significance and dynamism of social forces' promotion of international legal nonns within the conlext of global international organisa1ion.

Carr and lhe Realist Tradilion
Historical analyses of nineteenth and early twenlieth-cemury peace movements generally focus on their gradual broadening from a small Quaker and Non-Confonnist base 10 include a growing cadre of middle-class secular internationalists, picking up adherents of free trade, socia1ism and domestic refonns such as the abolition of slavery along the way. They also focus on nineteenth century peace groups' emphasis on arbitra1ion and international adjudication of disputes, and the culmination of this work in the decision by governments to take sleps towards codifying international law and creating 18. Carr actually harks back to the changes in ideas brought about by the Enlightenment (lhe idea of rational-progress). the French revolution (lhe participation or lhe masses), and lhe publication of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations (laissez{aire liberalism).

596
Origins of International Legal Nonns rudimentary judicial machinery through establishing first a World Coun and second a 'congress of nations'. 19 International relations theory has challenged this benign interpretation of events by categorising peace refonners through history as 'utopians' or 'idealists'. First developed by Carr who wrote immediately before and after World War II, this view juggled the relative value of 'realism' and 'idealism' in providing uSeful guides to foreign policy behaviour. 20 Carr carefully constructed a potent argument in favour of realism, based on the reasoning that one cannot legislate, or provide useful principles for, prudent behaviour by states. Moreover, Carr labelled those who advanced principles of international law and attempted to institutionalise their observance by states as members of the 'utopian' tradition. He disparaged, for example, 1he campaign for 'the popularisation or international politics' in the 1920s and 1930s as an overly emo1ional reaction to the breakdown or international order during the pre-war years. 21 He painted utopianism with a broad brush, as encompassing vinually all auempts to 'refonn' foreign policy so that it confonned to given rules of behaviour and/or moral principles.
· · This was the basis for Carr's interpretation of the notion or a 'harmony of interests'. Anglo-American political and economic liberalism rested, for Carr, on the false assumption that that which promoted the welfare or the individual also advanced the well-being or the collectivily. Liberals clung unfailingly to the belier in a natural hannony between individual and collective interests, and in their ability to define the boundaries of both. In practice, however, Bri1ish (and later American) liberals" consistently failed to recognise the irony in the fact that where 'hannony' was said to exist-for example in Par Britannica and Par Americana-it invariably benefited those who promoted it at the expense of those who were subjected 10 it. Carr's analysis of this notion provided a compelling explanation and critique of neoclassical economic/laisse:Jaire policies during both of these historical periods; it also ou11ined a potentially trenchant critique of treaty-based international law as promoting the status quo interests or the powerful. Carr did provide a useful reminder that what is legal is no! necessarily moral, and that legal codes often benefit hegemons. Yet he took the concept of the hannony of interests even funher to describe the . 20. When discussing the dichotomy used in international relations iheol)', I will follow convention and use the tenns 'idealism' and 'idealists'; when citing Carr in panicular I will follow his usage and employ the lenns 'utopianism' and 'utopians'. 21. Carr, op.cit., in note I I, p. 2. 597 Millennium imprudent lack of dis1inction between principles appropriate as a Foundation For Jaw in the domestic realm and those appropriale to statecraft in the international realm. Foreign policy decisions were never made on principle alone; politics and power always inuuded. Because or this fact, it became Futile, and even dangerous, 10 pretend that such principles could be applied (without benefiting the powerful) in the domain or international politics.
In Fonnulating this ~gument, Carr adroitly acknowledged the 'limita1ions or realism' and the beneficial elements or 'utopianism': Most or all, consistent realism breaks down because it fails to proVide any ground for purp:>sive or meaningful action. If the sequence of cause and effect is sufficiently rigid to permit of the 'scientific prediction' of events, if our thought is irrevocably condirioned by our status and our inlerests, then both action and lhought become devoid of purp:>se. [ ... ] Such a conclusion is plainly repugnant to' the most deep-seated belief of man about himself. Thal human affairs can be directed and modified by human aclion and human thought is a postulate so Fundamental that its rejection seems scarcely compatible wilh existence as a human being. Nor is it in fact rejected by those realists who have lefl their mark on history. 22 Yet, ultimately, ethical considera1ions must give way to wise policy based on power considerations rather than principle: What confroilis us in international politics today is. therefore, nothing less than the complete bankruptcy of the conception of morality which has domina1ed political and economic thought for a century and a half. ( ... J The inner meaning of the modem international crisis is the collapse of the whole suucture of utopianism based on the concept of the harmony of intereslS.n Because of this conclusion, Carr saw thlllinfluence of peace movement actors as, al best, an anachronistic attempt to graft nineteenth centu'ry liberal notions or harmony onto twentieth century political reality and, at worst, a trend thal promoted dangerous illusions about what was possible in inlemational life. 'Slogans like peace and disarmament', for Carr, encouraged the 'fallacy of the 22. Ibid., p. 92. Many students of Carr see more ambivalence in his defense of realpolitik than my interpretation of The Twenty Years' Crisis grants, including Howe, op.cit., in note 13, and Jack Donnelly, 'Twentieth-Century Realism', in Nardin and Mapel, foe.cit., in note 7, pp. 104-105. My position on Carr's fit with the realist tradition is obviously closer to tha1 of Bull, op.cil., in note 14, or Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), Chapier 4. Although 1he call for understanding the full body of Carr's work by contemporary lheorislS has merit, it is dirficull, in my view, lo in1erprc1 Carr's conclusions in his best known and most often used work as other than a defense of the necessity, sony as it may be, of realpolitik. This is because Carr provides cri1eria for incorporating realism, but not utopianism, into political action. 23. Carr, op.cit., in note 11, p. 62.

598
Origins of International Legal Norms power of in1ema1ional opinion'; 2 ' campaigns for arbitraJ tribunals were examples of an erroneous tendency 10 'dissolve politics inlo Jaw'. :tS Carr's perspective, theii, views idealism largely as incapable of transfonning utopian principles into action. He explicitly criticised atlempts 10 found stale behaviour on a legal or ethical basis as pan and parcel of the belief in a hannony of interests. False notions of harmony cause most principles 10 be skewed toward l~e interests of the powerful; the necessity of addressing questions of power makes moral considerations impossible lo follow in international politics. Specific ethical principles such as 'equality of status' can thus have Huie meaning when applied to relations between stales.~ The problem of designing a moral code is compounded when dealing with the anarchic nature of international politics. According 10 Carr, .'Its defects are due, not 10 any technical shoncomings, bul to the embryonic character of the community in which it functions'. 27 Likewise, Jaw runs into the same obstacles as morality: 'Rules, however general in fonn, will be constantly found 10 be aimed at a panicular stale or group of states; and for this reason ... the power element is more predominant and more obvious in international lhan in municipal law' . 2 ! Carr thus categorised attempts to develop an ethical or legal basis for foreign policy, including effons to codify acceptable reasons and means for lhe reson to force by stales, as inappropriate extensions of principles design~d for the domeslic arena into the international arena. Moreover, he pigeon-holed those who advocated such views during the nineleenth and early twentieth centuries-both individuals and social movements-as aiders and abettors of a false, and outmoded, hannony of interests.
Looking at the history. of the development of peace movements. in the societies on which Carr was focused--Greal Britain and the Uniled States-during the nine1eenth and early twentieth centuries, one sees tha1 Carr has skilfully pointed out what lheorists of social movements who focus on the relationship between movements and policy neglect: that social forces may have real political effects through aniculating and promoting standards of behaviour, be they legal or ethical nonns. Yel a closer look al the history of ninetCenth and early 1wentie1h century movements indicates that Carr's broad-brush rreatm'en1 mischaracterised this strand of social activism in significant ways-ways that hinder, rather than help, our understanding of the impact of such movements on international politics.
24. Ibid., p. 140. 25. Ibid., pp. 203-205. 26. 'The trouble is not that Guatemala's rights and privileges are only proponionately. not absolutely, equal 10 those of the United States, but that such rights and privileges as Guatemala has are enjoyed only by the good-will of the United States. The constanl intrusion, or potentiaJ intrusion, of power renders almos1 meaningless any concep1ion of equality between members of the international community'. Ibid., p. 166.

,• The History or Anglo-American Peace Movements in the Nineteenth and Early Twentielh Cenluries
Peace movement activism in nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain and the United Stales can be categorised into five periods: the foundational period in the post-Napoleonic and War of 1812 era; the period of radical/institulionaJist debates in the 1830s and 184-0s; the era of mid-century conflicts (during and after the Crimean and Civil wars) that resulled in the temporary decimation of peace movements; late nineteenth and early twentieth-century progressivism; and the post-progressive era of the panial institutionaJisation of movement goals in the fonn of the League of Nations. 29 Despite this periodisarion, which is done for heuristic clarity, these phases of peace movement activity should be viewed as only panially discre1e. Peace movements grew, refonned and transfonned themselves, and declined in response to varying nationa1 and international developments. They were affec1ed by sociologica1 developments in each period and by their consequerit interaction with other types of domestic issues and movements; their goals and composition were often transfonned by wars and intemarional economic rivalries, and they were spurred on by nascent anempts at institutionalised international cooperation.
Movements broadened in their sociological composition 1hroughou1 the nineteenth ceniury, gradually expanding from their base in Protestant non- conformism to include secular, radical and internationalist elements. National and international security concerns also affected the movements in both countries, influencing their growth, decline, abili1y and desire to promote specific kinds of normative standards and institutional mechanisms for the maintenance of peace. If one situates the developmenl of movements in the mids1 of domestic and international influences of their times, it is evident that movements should not be typecast solely as static representatives of panicular interests or 'pie-in-thesky' utopians incapable of evolution or reflexivity regarding the political and economic practices of their times. Many mo~ement elements did not ignore power considerations in international politics: although they auempled to formulate norms and mechanisms that might, in their view, enable slates to transcend power politics, their evolving programs and goals were an explicit response to their understan~ing or the na1ure and effects or stales' use of power. JO This understanding remained nascent in the first, foundational period of movement activity, when newly fo011ed peace groups focused on 1he renunciation of aggressive war. In the middle of the century, movement groups aniculated more forcefully norms or arbitration and adjudication of disputes, while simultaneously p"romoting the idea that peace and prosperity lhrough free trade went hand-in-hand. During the !alter pan of the century. movements continued to push arbitration, now promoted through the mechanism of a World Coun characterised by universal membership. For late nine1eenth cen1ury inlemationalists, this was to be complemented by the codification of intemalional Jaw, which would impose concomitant rights and obligations upon all states and !hereby reinforce th~ boundaries of acceptable slate behaviour. The early twentieth century, and panicularly the interwar period, was marked by lhe continuation of altempts 10 increase the effec1iveness of the World Coun and inlemational arbitration machinery, efforts to expand the meaning of universalism and equality of status through constructing and main1aining a League of Nations (after World War I in particular, the League was seen by peace movements as the primary means of restraining Grea1 Powers from promo1ing 1heir interests a1 the expense of smaller slates as well as of 'peoples': this, by extension, was seen as key 10 the prevention of war), and lhe move toward altempts to create new lypes of control of state war-making powers, particularly in the form of disarmament conventions and treaties. The following sec1ion delineates these continuities and changes in the nonns promoted by movements.
30. As Baylis and Rengger point our, those in the interwar period who emphasised the role of 'collective decision-making, the rule of international law and collective security achieved through the League of Nations ... were very far from being stany-eyed idealists if by that 1enn is meant a wilful refusal 10 face unpleasant reali1ics. Rather they asserted that the reality was that certain fonns of in1ema1ional behaviour had led to the outbreak of the most horrific war in human history ... and therefore they must be changed'. Op.di., in note II, pp. 12-13.

Movemenl Foundations
In the United States, three peace societies were founded separately in New York, Massachusetts and Ohio between August and December, 1815. All lhree fused into the American Peace Society under the leadership of William Ladd in 1827. In Britain, William Allen founded the London Peace Society (technically, the Society for the Promotion of Pennanenl and Universal Peace) in June, 1816. 11 Although ostensibly non-sectarian in orientation and membership, they promulgated ovenly Christian ethics and were supponed primarily by clergy.n Their historical imponance lies in the fact that they represented the first solid anempl by ovenly pacifist (Quaker) or pacifist-leaning churches to organise a political expression of their anti-war beliefs. As Peter Brock points out, this endeavour 10 engage in the political expression of anti-war beliefs, rather than the fonner practice of rejecting the political realm altogether, marked a new phase for nonconfonnists and other Protestant churches in the nineteenth cenlury. 11 Thus, the origin of organised peace ac1ivi1y was direclly related 10 the occurrence of major international conflict: the original peace societies sprang up almost simultaneously in the United States and Britain as a direct reaction 10 the war of 1812 and the Napoleonic wirs.J.1 These first peace societies grew ou1 of what was, before 1815, scanered disaffection in Brirain with war policies toward revolutionary and then Napoleonic France, and disapproval in the United States of persistent fearmongering against Britain. They coalesced in response to these conflicts to propagate their opposi1ion in public circles. They also were 'surprised and delighted' 10 learn of each 01hers' existence and, afler a time, began 10 initiate mutual conlacts. 1 ' The efforts of the British and American peace societies between 1814 and 1816 represented then, the first organised non-institutional expression of anti-war sentiment. 36 There appears to be no evidence to suggest these societies influenced, or gained much encouragement from, 1he simultaneous official auempts to control hegemonic war exercised by leaders of the Great Powers in  37 Peace society activism, modest, mainstteam and middle-class, did not yet seek lo lobby or innuence officialdom directly bul. rather concentrated on education and the propagation of anti-war ideas in first 1 Chris1ian, and later wider public circles. This in and of itself, nevenheless, still embodied a new type of politicisation of security issues and state policies of war and peace, since the anempt by Social forces to innuence citizen acquiescence in such policies was heretofore unknown.
The primary questions first debated by early nineteenth cen1ury movements included thal of whether opposition 10 all war was required by Christian ethics. The debate over opposition to particular versus all wars brought into the open a fundamental division that would plague all Anglo-Am.erican peace movements thereafter. Pacifist opposition to war look the fonn of ethical opposition to all killing, while many who opposed war on a more selective basis, later to~ called 'pacificists' and some to become 'internationalists', promoted a Whiggish-func1iona1ist belief in international progress and refonn." The London group expended a considerable amount of energy and resources in anempts 10 spread its ideas on the Continent, while the US society concentra1ed on proselytising and disseminating tracts to religious congregations. During this period and until the middle of the century, peace activists' me1hods in both countries did nol include direct political pressure on govemmenls. 19 They did nol anempl to promote large projects for creating panicipatory institutions for resolving conflict on the international level, nor did they champion free trade as part and parcel of a peace program. However, despile the fac1 that movements tended not to target political_ instilutions, 1hey did begin discussing and debating melhods of reversing and transcending 1he 'custom of war•.-40 Both pacifists and other anti-war society members agreed even at this stage on lhe need 10 renounce wars of 'aggression'; their joim call of opposilion to lhe 'customary' character of war represented a nascent aspiration and the beginnings of action to influence inlemational legal nonns.
During !his initial period, movemen1 leaders had linle connection 10 elites, and movement goals were neilher representative of, nor strongly opposed 10, slate interests. Ahhough lhe movements in both countries had begun 10 discuss and debate nascent projects of international law and organisation. their ideas were vaguely fonned. They also had no developed economic programme or crilique.
Consequently, it is difficult to categorise the movements of lhis era as abenors of a hannony based on panicularistic political or economic notions.
37. Cooper argues that lhe end of the Napoleonic wars spawned three unrelated groups seeking ways of controlling future wars in Europe: 'the international political and diplomatic elites, individual writers and intellcctuals ... aad, finally, citizen activists'. Ibid

The 1830s and 1840s: Radical Justice versus Free Trade Harmony
This period was characterised initially by radical challenges to the 'respectable' religious domination of peace societies in both countries. These challenges, however, did nor succeed as working-class and radical movement elements were eventually coop1ed by the free-trade liberalism of the 1840s. As a result, ii is this period which ended by providing the best evidence for Carr's critique. Nevertheless~ the 1840s were also marked by a series of 'international peace congresses' which provided a forum for the anicula1ion and debate of a wide range of nonnative projects (including the idea of a 'congress of nations'), some of whlch would endure beyond the era of belief in the unity of free trade and peace.
Membership in peace societies declined in the 1820s after the initial post-war spurt of organisation. Bui new fonns of radicalism in the 1830s and 1840s, arising primarily out of the Garrisonian wing of the abolitionist movement in the United Stales and Jabour organising in Britain, began to permeate movements in both countries. Just as the original American and London Peace Socielies were aware of each other's work and look steps to communicate with each other, William Lloyd Garrison's New England Non-Resistance· Society, founded in 1838, senl emissaries to Britain to recruit working-class Chartists to the methods of non-resistance, although with only limited success. 41 Likewise, labour activism for peace began to spread to the United States: in 1846 Elihu Burrill founded the League of Human Brotherhood, an international organisation that attempted to attract a working class membership.~2 The League enjoyed considerable organising success on both sides of the Atlantic. However, the natural conservatism of the older peace societies' leadership and the difference in methods between their temperate proselytising and the radical rejection o{ government by the Garrisonians, on the one hand, and the overt political organising of the British workers' movement, on the other, limited cooperation between the older societies and the new movements in both countries.' 3 Moreover, the changing economics of agriculture in Britain increasingly forced working-class radicals to compete with free traders for legitimacy on peace issues. The Quaker John Brighi became the first persuasive proponent of the liberal creed within the movement; this liberaJ perspective was soon adopted by another prominenl peace activist, Richard Colxlen. This creed rested on three assumptions: that peace and prosperity were indissolubly linked, that both were possible to attain for all levels of the citizenry, and that both could only be anained by eliminating barriers to rransnalional (and especially commercial) 41

604
Origins of International Legal Nonns exchange."' After repeal of the com laws in 1846, which had previously, protected domestic agricultural producers against foreign expons, ii was clear that 'Cobdenism' had won in Britain. The explicit linkage of free trade and peace provided the peace ac1ivism of the 1840s with a new focus, a new lease on life and a secular tone.•' This linkage, however, also entailed the ccroptation of Bri1ish working-class radicalism by lhe middle class concern wi1h prosperily lhrough tariff reduciion, 46 which in tum affec1ed the course of peace activity by mooting demands for peace based on economic equali1y in favour of the promise of peace based on a belief in future prosperity. After 1840 the peace and free trade movemenis in Britain became explicitly linked and Cobden himself began 10 speak of both issues as one and the same cause, providing grist for the mill of Carr's critique of the 'harmony of interesis' notion.
The coalition of mid-cenlury ~ace forces on both sides of the Atlantic, however, also began 10 organise 'international' peace congresses in the 1840s. These congresses were designed to spread the faith more widely and, in panicular, encourage continental Europeans 10 engage more actively in the discussion of how to attain a pacific world. Jn effecr, their significance lies in lhe fact lhat they deba1ed and aniculated, over a six.year period. plans fOr international institutions that embodied nonns of arbi1ra1ion, adjudicati~n and, to a lesser extent, universalism.
At the first Iniemationa1 Peace Congress, held in London in 1843. delegates primarily from England and the United States agreed on resolutions advocating arbitration clauses as a means of settling international dispu1es and a 'high coun of nations' to keep the peace in Europe. 47 The Brussels Congress of 1848 and the Paris Congress of 1849 resulted in continued emphasis-On the need for intemalional arbitration mechanisms and lhe creation of some type of international court. Other proposals, however, such as the argument for a 44. For a though1ful treatment of Cobden within lhe uadition of Intemalional Relations that also reprints a number of his speeches on free trade and peace, see Arnold Wolfers and Laurence W. Martin (eds.), 'Richard Cobden', in The Anglo-American Tradirion in Foreign Affairs ( 'congress of nations' (a projec1 conlinually pushed by Burritt, who was originally inspired by William Ladd's wrilings of lhe 1820s), were opposed by lhe Europeans:'* Likewise, delega1es easily agreed upon lhe need for disannament and reductions of weapons expenditures al the 1843 Congress, but by 1848 and 1849 'disannamenl' held differenl meanings for Anglo-Americans, revolulionary sympathisers and advoca1es of the European stalUs quo. Although the majori1y of British and US delegates could not sanc1ion attempts to change oppressive domes1ic regimes through (violenl) revolution, they regis1ered 'ringing denunciations· of Brilish and French foreign policy in Tahi1i, China and Afghanistan for engaging in bloody repressions of non-European peoples.' 9 The peace congresses did no1 receive much, if any, official notice, and their proceedings and plans were ridiculed by those segments of the press who did pay atten1ion. 50 Still, they represen1ed the first public discussions of and agreemenl by various movement fac1ions (religious pacifists, members of Burritt's League, and centrisl peace society members) on incipient instilutionalised expressions of 1he intema1ional legal norm of conflict resolution through arbitration. In addition, lhe discussion (without agreement) of disannamenl obligations attendant upon all states and the condemna1ion of the control and repression of 1erritories and peoples outside of Europe represen1ed a further step toward the recognition of the responsibilily of all states in ensuring peace (an aspect of the norm of universalism) and the rights of peoples to determine their own fa1e in international society (an aspect of the norm of equalily of status).
Ye1 1he belief that peace and hannony could be attained through prosperity brought about by liberal economic policies gained the upper hand with those newly called 'internationalists', who convinced many pacifists in both countries of their logic. The second international peace congress in particular was shaped by a liberal polilical-economic agenda, with Richard Cobden in attendance.s 1 Free trade rhetoric increasingly suffused the British movement, particularly after 1846, and Cobden strengthened the explicit link between no1ions of liberal hannony and peace activism by publicly crediting the nonconformist peace tes1imony with influencing the broader repudiation of war that he himself did much to popularise.ii A major component of the link between liberalism and peace al tjlis time, justifying Carr's critique of the libera1 hannony of interests, was peace groups' tendency to suppon the international sta/Us quo agains1 revolutionary movements. Cobden and other liberals in the movement, for example, 'had little sympathy ... with the contemporary movements for national liberation on 1he 48 continenl', because they feared that the break-up of states into smaller political units would worsen rationalism and hamper free trade.~1 However, neither strict pacifism nor Cobden's brand of free trade liberalism were able to survive the mid-century wars fought by. Britain and the United States intact These tendencies would be supplemented by yet new sociological-intellectual currents in the latter part of the century, currents which nonetheless continued to engage in discussion and debate of international legal/institutional mechanisms 10 ensure peace. These new currents would demonstrate that agreement on nonns of arbitration and the observance of legally-sanctioned rules of state conduct did not automatically go hand-in-hand with free trade notions of hannony.

The Crimean and Civil Wars
The effect of mid-century wars was 10 shatter the fragile unity between the original religious peace groups. the small radical components and the thendominant free trade leadership. For Britons, the Crimean War, which broke out' in 1854 and involved Britain in a major European war for the first time in 40 years, roused patriotic fervour, while some peace activists' anempts 10 stop the war once ii had begun discredited the movement.s.i After 1857,_with nationalism and imperialism On the rise, both Cobden and the Quaker liberal John Bright, the leaders of the then more or less fused free trade and peace movements, lost their se3.ts in Parliament." In the United States, the war with Mexico seemed 10 improve 1he peace movement's status during the 1840s, but the Civil War fifteen years later, like the Crimean War for the British, had the effect of seriously curtailing peace activism and decimating_ the membership of peace societies. The American Peace Society, fearful of losing its raison d' itre, refused to take a position for or against slavery, while the conflict itself mad:e many who had previously believed war to be an unmitigated evil conclude that force provided the best means of eliminating slavery and the danger of breaking apart the Union. Moreover, in addition to the negative effects that involvement in war produced for the individual movements in each country, the Civil War caused a breech of the heretofore amicable communications between the British and American peace societies: the British could not approve of the majori1y of US peace workers· endorsement of the war. 56 Consequen1ly, peace activity remained meagre for a1 least two decades. 53

Millennium
This period 'cleansed' the movements of their early faith in the power of Christian values and public opinion to achieve nalional and international peace. II forced many, in the United Stales especially, 10 rethink the boundaries of whal they previously considered to be absolute pacifism, a dilemma that would arise anew during the 1930s. The experience of devastating wars also compelled movement activists who began to reorganise peace efforts in the latter part of the cen1ury either 10 replace or augment their faith in the power of public opinion and free trade with more insistent demands for legal and institutiona1 supports for peace.

The Progressfre Era
Peace ac1ivi1y was again infused in the 1890s by new domestic refonn movements, who began once again 10 broaden the issue-base as well as the social base of the peace movement. The lasl decade of the 1800s and the first two decades of the 1900s are often referred 10 as the 'progressive' era, one characterised by a 'search for order',s 7 when 'the gospel of expenise a,ld efficiency merged with economic regulation, social control, and humanitarian refonn 10 become a conspicuous part of the public life of both counuies'.s 1 Many progressive refonners joined forces with older, bourgeois peace groups to work for arbitration, and increasingly added disarmament and 1he development of international organisation to their peace programs. 39 The most significant new push during the late nineteenth century, however, was the mOve by in1ema1ional legal specialists in favour of the codification of international law. During this period. movements began 10 have a more direct impact on the state policies regarding accepting and instilutionalising two legal noons: connict resolution through arbitration, as demonstrated with the creation of the World Coun; and universaJ participation in and responsibility for decisions about peace and security, as demonstrated by debates over plans for a league of nations.
In 1he last decades of the' cenrury. peace activism first appeared to lake up where it had left off in the 1850s: the decline of the quasi-pacifist and radicaJ 57. Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order. 1877-1920 (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1%7\. 58. Although some view progressivism as a distinctly US phenomenon, with liberalism as its British counterpart and both opposed 10 toryism and socialism, others point to its amorphous transatlantic nature. pointing ou1 tha1 'British Fabians, Social Imperialists, Liberal Imperialists, and some Socialists, as well as American progressives of various ideological slripes. were auracted to this new creed of social instrumemalism'. Morton Origins of In1ema1ional Legal Norms wings of the two movements {begun in the 1840s with their cooptation into free. trade liberalism), combined with the fact that both Britain and the United States were major players on the world stage, gave a greater voice to the growing number of Establishment business internationalists who emerged as leaders of the movement, especially in the United Stales.llll This revival of peace activism also appears at firsl glance to confirm lhe hold that liberal economic norms, including free trade, held over peace activism. Yel the fact tha1 both Britain and the United Stales were also caught up in a new competition that affec1ed security relations-the imperialist rivalries of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a1tes1ed to by Britain's participation in the scramble for Africa and 1he Boer War, and the Spanish-American War·waged by the United Stales-again split peace activists. Peace groups coexisted uneasily with nationalist claims, although a number of internationalists in both countries resolved the dilemma by justifying their own country's imperialism in the name of a 'civilising mission' of spreading liberalism and democracy 10 'backward' peoples. 61 Consequently, renewed imperialist policies during the late nineteemh and early 1wen1ieth cenlUry split Progressives, and caused components of the Left in both coun1ries 10 cullivate an increasingly anti-war stance. 62 Progressivism and its impact on politics, including foreign affairs, is open 10 a wide variety of assessments and interpre1a1i0ns. 63 In one in1erpreta1ion. lhe focus on reform by virtually all types of US activists-Eastern liberals, Republican Jegalists. other assorted internationalists, and those who lied domestic reform issues 10 international peace--demons1ra1ed a strong belief in internationalising domestic economic practices in a way that stijl very often fil with the notion of a harmony of interests.M Patterson, for example. points out that for elite leaders of the movements in lhis era, the equation of peace wi1h 60. Cooper, op.cit., in note 19, pp. 13-14. 61. In the United States in particular, advocating in1ema1ionalis1 solutions 10 conflict provided, for some, a way to plan for increasing the American presence in world affairs, engineering the growth of US power and influence in what they believed to be a free trade was al iis apex. 65 The trends 1oward professionalisa1ion of many occupalions (e.g., leaching, medicine, Jaw, and social world did little at first to negate the growing elite Establishment influence on the movements-indeed, well-connecled spokespersons were most often seen as a boon 10 the cause. In Britain, Establishment activists who fell that the traditional peace societies were '100 closely identified with Nonconfonnist pressure groups' joined the Americanled International Law Association to further projecis for international arbitration among elite classes of lawyers and public officials. 66 Nevertheless, many progressive refonners made new connections between peace and economic and social needs, boih al home and abroad, connections which engendered a dis1inc1 unease with liberal notions of harmony. Indeed, a number of progressives came 10 peace ac1ivi1y-because of their efforts 10 refonn domestic economic and political practices. and their concerns about the exclusionary aspects of tum-of-1he-century liberaJ society (the concern with 1he unemployed and marginalised by the settlement house movement imponed inlo the United Stales from Britain by lane Addams; suffragists' efforts to end the exclusion of women from political panicipation in both countries). Addams advocated state controls on faissez1aire capitalism and the Woman's Peace Pany worked for the democra1isation of securi1y decision's and foreign policy. 67 Moreover, a left-wing critique of war was also slowly developing during lhe Progressive era. Although socialists were nol consistently concerned with foreign policy issues during lhe latter half of the nineteenth century, the birth of lhe Labour Party in Britain and the ac1ivism of the Independent Labour Pany (lLP) engendered debates over the fonn that a socialist cri1ique of war should take. At the same lime, some union members and radical pacifists developed a less nationalis1 an1i-militarism across the Allantic. 61 Despite the differences in the analysis of economic practices on the pan of Establishment liberaJs, progressive refonners, and the socialist Left, all movement components, however different their analyses of the causes of war, worked to legitimise nonns thal consirained stales' right to wage war and 10 institulionalise mechanisms for engendering interstate cooperation.~ Through the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries then, peace groups gained adherents in fits and stans, broadening their sociological base as 65

6!0
Origins of In1erna1ional Legal Norms olher domes1ic social movements grew and found com~on ground in the goal of promoting peace through arbitration. In 1he I 840s-50s, the dominant theme in peace group ac1ivism encouraged the notion of a hannony of interest between the promotion of individual prosperity and international peace, and 1he concomitant profllOtion of both 'civic rights' among states and rights to private property, with trade on the international level occurring among property owners according 10 a free-market regulation of supply and demand .. The linkage between free trade and peace also encouraged a srarus quo conception of international order, with· movemen1 leaders arguing against intervention in suppon of revolu1ionary movements pn the continent The decimation of the mid-century movements. however. made the notion of 'harmony' a_ moot point for effec1ive peace activism; the tum-of-the-century infusion of Progressive reformers and the marriage of peace with social concerns ultimately made the recons1itution of 1he idea of a harmony of interests problem~tic.
Thus, as a result of both the changing sociological composition of groups interested in 'peace' and the new competilion between stales for colonies and prestige, the mix of norms and institutions that peace activists anempted 10 internationalise evolved away from the nolion of a hannony of interests. As new actors struggling for addilional rights on the domestic level became interested in the peace issue (aboli1ionists, Jabour unions, se1tlemen1 house workers. and suffragists), peace groups increasingly reflected a concern with 'humanising' interna1ional relations and with ensuring the participation of all peoples and political entities in decisions affecling their welfare. 70 Rather than equating the promo1ion of 'hannony' with the promotion of universal participation in international institutions, peace activity should be seen as an evolutionary process 1ha1 moved from an emphasis on the former in the middle of the century 10 an emphasis on the latter at the cenlury's end. This evolution was related to both the change in the balance of social groups composing peace movemenls over lime, and the domeslic and international political crises with which they had 10 contend. At the lllrn of the century, the Darwinian struggle among the Powers for colonies and influence left a great number of these new peace activists uneasy with, and many openly cri1ical of. founding international harmony on rights to ownership and conlrol of resources, people and territory. As a result, some began to question the 'civilising effec1s' of Empire, and mos1 concentrated their 'peace' efforts on the promotion of intemalional order through universalis1 civic rights and lhe creation of an in1erna1ional judiciary and 'legislature' for 70. It is important to note that, ahhough peace activis!rl broadened from a small refonnist religious base to include abolitioni~ts. suffragis1s, business interests and socialists. it remained very much a type of activism rooted primarily in the middle-classes, and its rank-and-file membership was drawn largely from the service professions: teaching. !he Clergy, medicine, law and social work. This sociological profile fits with tho. discussing and resolving disputes. 11 Many saw the two international congresses at the Hague of 1899 and 1907, which resulted in the creation of the World Court, as the first tangible institutional fruits of their effons; some new critics of old notions of harmony also saw in these mechanisms the means by which imperialism might be delegitimised, 'subject peoples' granted rights as panicipants in international society, and peaceful change made possible.

Connections Between Pre-World \Var I and lmenrar Moi·ements
Until recently, peace movements have nOI been given much direct credit for influencing states 10 create international institutions to facilitate arbi1ra1ion and help ensure peace. Now, however, historians are revising their analyses of Wilsonianism and the foundation of the League of Nations 10 grant peace movements a greater and potentially determinative role. 12 Indeed, it appears to be the case that important components of early twentieth century movements-including the Fabians in Britain and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom in lhe United States-did wield more influence on the development of schemes for global international organisation than previously though1. 1 -1 Even more significant, perhaps, is the role that peace movements during and after World War I played in ensuring that the nonnative foundations of !heir projects would provide new 'standards' of diplomacy and 'guides' for state foreign policy practice. standards that would be debated throughout the twentieth century.
lnterwar movements differed from their nineteenth and early twentieth century predecessors in their direct experience of world-wide, calaclysmic war. conducted with enormously destructive weapons such as submarines, poison gas, and airplanes 1hat for the first time direclly targeted civilians. Consequently, interwar movements no longer expressed qualms aboul disarmament: anns reduction. either unilateral or multilateral, became the primary focus of many in the movements on both sides of the Atlantic for more than a decade. Disarmament supplanted even the progressive-era push for codification of international law in the eyes of many activists, because mere codification of existing practices in international law-particularly the foundational respect for slates' sovereign Origins of International Legal Nonns rights and the concomitant disregard for the 'self-detenninalion of peoples '-was seen by lhe end of World War I to assist in perpetuating an unjus1 status quo. Movement groups' willingness to challenge the international status quo, including their own governments' policies toward lhe League, mandatory arbitration, and disannamenl, renders inaccurate Carr's altempt 10 conflate the interests of League supponers wilh those of Britain and France. After World War I, faith io state security practices and traditional fonns of diplomacy was at a low never before seen, resul!ing in a widespread willingness to criticise government policies and put fonh detailed alternatives that were based on principles of international law and organisation. The League, in1erna1ional law, and principles of universal participation and equality of status were advanced by movements not to further the particularistic slate interests of Britain, France or even lhe United States, but rather to restrain them and 'enable' the discussion of how collective interests mighl be detennined lhat were not based on false notions of hannony. Pe ace movements made an impact during lhe period because many groups could legilimately claim 10 represent thousands (and in the case of the British League of Nations Union or the US National Council for the Prevention of War, tens or even hundreds of thousands) of adherents which served to increase their chances of being heard in 1he Press. Parliament, Congress, and Cabinets in both countries. 74 Their activity constitutes what Carr labelled the 'popularisation of international politics' in the interwar period. But far frotn a continuation of midnineteenlh cenlury notions of 'hannony', or even the continuation of ideas favouring the internationalisation of liberal standards on lhe part of Progressiveera eliles, interwar peace movements and their supporters by-and-large believed that international legal nonns an~ institutions had 10 possess the capacity to control, in addition to refonn, stares' war-prone tendencies. Both the experience of imperialism and that of the pre-World War I alliance system had convinced many peace activists that Great Power concordats needed 10 be replaced by universal panicipaticin in decisions regarding international security, universal responsibili1y for mainlaining peace, and equality of treatment at the international level.
Peace movements emphasised these nonns in a number of ways. First, peace activists expected 1he newly created League of Nations to represent all states, and if possible all peoples, and toward this end worked for self·detennination and in some cases independence of colonies as well as the inclusion of both lhe Soviet Union and Gennany in the League. Secondly, they differed from pre-World War I activists in their concentrated and relatively unified stance in favour of the principles that all states should disann and that trade in anns should not be 74 allowed 10 continue unfenered. 7 s Arbitrating conflict had been the leitmotif of the nineteenth century peace movements, and although peace groups in the immediate pre-World War I era agitated against the Anglo-Gennan arms race, disannamenl as a movement goal finally gained an equal footing wi1h arbitration in lhe aflennalh of the Great War. The continuing development of weapons of mass destruction during the interwar period, panicularly the bomber and various chemical weapons, encouraged the perception that civilisation could nol survive another war and fuelled the fire for disarmament. Finally. post-World War I movements put international social issues such as lhe 'traffic in women and children', the opium trade, the effects of reparations and the blockade of fonnerly enemy countries, at the forefront of inlemalional concems. 76 Historians have recognised the implications of these developments on movement activism. Pe1er Brock, for example, assens that 'the new pacifism' of the post-1914 era 'came to possess a social concern' not present earlier. in that both pacifists and other sec1ions of the wider post-World War I peace movement became 'acutely aware of the need for social change in effetting lhe elimination of war and violence from 1he world' .n Although still vaguely defined, 1he new willingness 10 challenge the 'institutions of war' (including secret diplomacy among the Great Powers, rearmament and 1he anns trade), for both pacifists and internationalists, would entail a wider change in consciousness and 1he beginnings of a deeper critique of stale and international practices than that provided by either the idea of a 'hannony of inlerests' which dominated the mid-nine1eenth century or 1he refonnist spirit prevalent in the Progressive era. For Charles DeBenedeui, 'the modem American peace movement that arose during 1914-20 was radically different from its prewar counterpans in its methods of understanding and analysis, its transnational humanism. its left-wing political orientation, and its explicit lines of alternative action'. 7~ As James Hinton succinctly describes this transfonnation in his study of British movements, 'Nine1eenth-cen1Ury peace movements set out to improve the world: twentiethcentury ones struggle to save it'. 79 Mid-nineteenth century 'idealism· and one component of its late nineteenth century successor were products of liberal political institutions. a belief in a British and/or American mission cil'i/isatrice, and faith in the unit)' of the free trade ethic and peace. The fundamental Origins .of In1ema._1ional Legal Norms difference between the pre and posl-1914 eras was lhe final disintegration of precisely these assumptions about how 'peace' could be attained and maintained.

The Peace Movement, Agency and Change
This historical overview of Anglo-American peace activity during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suggests three insights either missed or glossed over by Carr: I) the no1ion of a 'harmony of interests' and its relation to peace movement activity must be unpacked 10 reveal both its economic and its political foundations ,if we are to see more clearly what movements represent regarding change in international relations; 2) doing so demonstrates that 'idealism' is neither an unchanging nor monolithic strand of belief and activism in international affairs; and 3) the attempt to dismiss ethical/legal standards of state behaviour as irrelevant to political necessities, dangerous or both misses imponant questions resulting from persistence of societal attempts 10 create such ' standards., the fact that standards have been created, and the fact that such standards evolve with changing international circumstances.
The above brief history of the auempts by social movements 10 influence inlemationaJ legal norms in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries indicates that. for peace movements, Carr's construction and critique of the 'harmony of interests' is too sweeping and 100 lied to liberalism's economic foundations, i.e., the ethic of free trade determined by market notions of supply and demand, 10 aid our understanding of how and why movements attempted to internationalise principles embedded in domestic beliefs and practices.
Students of liberal 'harmony' genera1ly recognise both its economic and . political components. Carr equated liberalism with utopianism, and refused to see how the lauer might include categories tha1 could be differentiated from the fonner. If liberalism is founded on 'a shared commitment to four essential inslilutions',w two economic and two political. Ca:rr's error in conflating the liberal economic doctrine of harmony with moves IOward international problemsolving mechanisms becomes clearer. Peace groups gradually developed a program founded on agreement to internationalise two of the four liberal institutions: I) juridical equality of members, and 2) representative legislatures 'deriving their authority from the consent of the electorate' (in the international realm, the gradual move toward global international organisalion).~1 The first provided the foundation for peace groups' primary focus during 1he 1900s: the 80. Vinually all students of liberalism analyse and debate the relative weight and wonh of its political and economic components. The breakdown used here, relating liberalism's legacy to international politics, is taken from Michael Doyle, 'Kan!, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs', Philosophy and Public Affairs (Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer 1983), pp. 207-208, 81. Again, many peace groups would have preferred that a method be found 10 construct global intemationaJ organisation in such a way as to represent 'peoples' ralher lhan 'states'. but most agreed to support !he League's st.ale-centred structure anyway, allhough some did so as a temporary measure.
• Millennium institutionalisation of arbitration procedures to prevent conflict and proposals for the codification of international law. 12 Indeed, throughoul the century peace activism focused on arbitration, through promoting bilateral arbitration treaties and clauses in lrealies. Over time, nineteenth cen1ury peace activisls also demonstrated an increasing in1eres1 in the second type of ins1i1ution by drawing up plans for an International Tribunal or Congress of some 1ype.
The third and fourth 'liberal institutions' -an etonomy res ling on a recognition of the rights of private property and agreement that economic decisions be regulated by the forces of supply and demand-were mauers of some contention for the various groups working for 'peace'. During lhe middle of 1he cenlury, peace and free 1rade became rightly linked, and many prominent peace workers and groups adhered to the 'harmony of interests', in this case the belief 1hat free trade and the right to ownership of private propeny increased both the prosperity of the individual and lhe prospects for peace in lhe intema1ional polity. However, allhough belief in lhis tene1 remained strong amongst many upper middJe.cJass activis1s throughoul the century, accord on issues of economic organisation and dis1ribu1ion within peace movements as a whole often proved problematic. Crises and wars (the US Civil War, lhe Crimean War, 3nd 1he second wave of imperialism) as well as overlapping membership with other movements (labour, abolitionism, feminism). al.so tended to disrupt peace movement accord on a 'harmony of interests' in the laner half of the century. Consequently, by the outbreak of lhe First World War. peace group agreement was limited to intemalionalising norms and methods of political conflict resolution.
Nineteenth century peace activism can be seen as a struggle between !hose who would priorilise universalist legal norms and their inslitutionalisation, and those who would stress founding peace on rights to private propeny-and free trade. By the end of World War I, peace groups' focus had coalesced around plans to internationalise panicipatory instilutions (and their concomilant rights) in the belief that ·peace' required uni\'ersal panicipation and equality of stalus-norms that, it was believed, would allow for peaceful change rather than legitimate an unjust status qun. Peace movements believed lhat these norms, when institutionalised lhrough a league of nations, would also replace the management of conflict by either unstable alliances or Great Power machinations. By the interwar period, agreement on the use of liberal economic institulions to foster peace had disintegra1ed, bu! accord on whal mighl be called the 'republican compromise', i.e., institutionalising norms of universalism, both in terms of rights to panicipation and in lerms of obligations, was quite strong. Thus, in addi1ion to working for recognition of lhe righ1s of Germany and the Soviet Union to full membership in the League and the principle of equality of status in armaments. interwar peace movements promoted the recogni1ion of pari1y in !he naval arms race between 1he US and Britain, and obligatory arbitralion of conflict on a basis of juridical equality. 82. Brock, Twenrielh·Century Pacifism, op.cil., in nole 29, p. 7.

616
Origins of International Legal Norms Peace movement activism and goals, 1herefore, have evolved over lime. In assessing movemenlS' influence on lhe promotion and legitimisation of inlemalional legaJ norms-from arbi1ra1ion to free trade liberalism to disarmament and universal participation and equality in a congress of nations-Carr begins with lhe inlerwar period and, criticising the failure of legal and moral standards and !heir ins1i1u1ionalisation ·in League mechanisms to keep peace, works backward 10 assen that effons to ensure peace through ins1i1utionalising principles of conduct are misleading, often dangerous, and inevitably are conducive to funhering the interests of the powerful. However. if we begin with early nineteenth century peace movement activity and work forward, we see that dismissing such activism as irrelevant to political necessities misses the fact of iis persistence and the facets of its evolving character. When we see lhe ways in which movements have reacted to and interacted wilh the structures and evenis of their times-the Napoleonic wars, protectionism, imperialist competition, the social dislocations brought about by both /aisse:{aire policies and neo-mercantilism, World War I. arms ra~es-their goals and actions become understa'ndable, somelimes logical, and even perhaps 'realistic'. Such a perspective should encourage a re-evaluation of the dichotomisation of intemalionaJ politics begu'1 by Carr. ii also opens up the possibility of a more thorough, contextualised assessment of movemenlS' aitemplS to transcend the chaos and destruction wrought by these structures and events through creating new 'rules' of conduct and means of con1rol, on( that might find more promise or 'emancipatory polential' in some eras than others. Such an assessment, then, must pose 1he .question of whether some international orders based on legal/ethicaJ considerations might not be better than others, at_least for a given historical time. More imponantly, perhaps, Carr's dichotomisati~n and his indictment of 1he instilutionalisation of norms through the League masks the fact that the Great Powers have very often not been able lo use global international organisation to further their own intereslS. Neither 1he French,. British or US govemmenlS were enthusiastic about the World Disarmament Conference of 1932, held under League auspices, precisely because they did not wish to be held 10 standards of parity in armamenls, and ii took the British movement ten years 10 convince ilS government to sign the Optional Clause, which committed Britain 10 'obligatory arbitration' in the event of conflic1. 8 -1 Norms such as universal panicipa1ion and equality of slatus, despite the fact 1hat they have been only panially institulionalised in twentieth century global intemaiional organisations. can do more than mask the intereslS of the powerful in maintaining 1he status 83. This was because Britain refused to be put in the position of having claims brought against i1 by its current or fonner colonies; the United States likewise opposed mandatory arbitra1ion-and refused to join the World Court-in order to maintain its 'freedom of action' \'is-d-1·is Latin American states. On lhe role of interwar peace movements in promoling diwmament and arbitration over and against governments' conceptions of their in1eres1s, see Cecelia Lynch, Beyond Appeasement: The Role of lntenrar Peace Mm·ements in Peace, Security and the £1'o/ution of International Organi:ation, forthcoming.