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Social Hierarchy as Moral Question: Male Reasoning about Gender in Rural Lebanon

By

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Committee in charge:

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Abstract

Social Hierarchy as Moral Question: Male Reasoning about Gender in Rural Lebanon

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in Education

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To a greater or lesser extent, human societies are organized around systems of social hierarchy, structures which place individuals in relations of inequality, of social dominance and subordination. The differentiation of various groups of humanity has often been conceptualized as natural or ordained, acting to produce superordinate and subordinate social statuses which maintain the privilege and advantage of those in higher positions. Psychological research, however, shows that understandings of equality and fairness are universally held and that individuals, including very young children, assess events involving unfairness and inequality as wrong, even when authority, rules, or custom deem otherwise. Systemic social inequality may be seen, thus, to contradict values of fairness, rights, and equality, and the psychological question arises, how do those in positions of higher social status reason about and justify their advantage? How do members of superordinate social groups accept and justify social privilege? While it has been suggested that the perspectives of such individuals may be based on self-interest alone, this question has remained open from a cognitive perspective and requires further investigation.

In this study, the social system under investigation is gender hierarchy, with a focus on male evaluation of and justification for equality or inequality between females and males. The study was conducted with adult males in rural Lebanon, a site with demographic and sociological evidence of continuing traditions of gender hierarchy, particularly in rural areas. The participants ($N = 60$; mean age 43.6 years) were presented with five everyday situations in family and work life and asked to evaluate and reason about decision-making power and opportunities between females and males. A sixth situation involving two males was also posed in order to assess similarities and differences in assessments of relations between two males.

Results from the study show a tenuous form of gender equality in family contexts—as assessed by Lebanese men—an asserted parity but mutable rights for females (not males), justified with a mix of moral, relationship, and pragmatic reasoning. In work contexts, results show evidence of both gender equality *and* inequality—equality justified with moral reasoning and inequality justified with male/female social role difference and/or biological difference reasoning. Results further show robust equality between two males, justified with moral reasoning. Overall, there is evidence of emerging norms of greater equity between males and

females in Lebanon, but male status continues to be elevated in many contexts due to conceptions of prescriptive male roles and traits and expectations of female deference to family needs.

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Social Hierarchy as Moral Question: Male Reasoning about Gender in Rural Lebanon

For many, the capacity for moral choice is considered a fundamental element of human nature. Reflections on this capacity, foundational to philosophical, ethical, and religious traditions worldwide, ascribe to the individual power in selecting right from wrong, emphasizing human rationality and the ability to choose, and ultimately extending such reflections to conceptions of equality and the universality of the human condition. From 5th century Chinese Mohists to Aristotle and the Greek and Roman Stoics, from medieval Muslim proponents of tolerance to African Sage philosophers, 17th/18th century Latin American feminists, and Enlightenment scholars and present-day philosophers, thinkers have linked ideas about reason and moral choice to understandings of universal human equality (Gonzalez, 2014; Graham, 2015; Kant, 1784; Letzring, 1986; Locke, 1689/1988; Mill, 1869/1997; Nussbaum, 1997, 2015; Oruka, 1990; Rawls, 1971/1999; Sen, 1997, 1998). Judgments regarding right and wrong and fairness and unfairness in social relations may be conceived as moral choices, decisions framed by considerations of justice, considerations of common entitlement to welfare and rights. A large body of psychological research supports such contentions showing that people, including very young children, think about and assess moral events such as unfairness and injustice, and that these understandings develop to include conceptions of rights and equality as individuals age (for reviews see Nucci, 2001; Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983a, 2002, 2015).

The question then arises, how does such capacity for moral choice align with historical conditions of human equality? In truth, an account of the human experience is largely a story of inequality; social hierarchies, founded on characteristics of race, gender, sexuality, class, and caste, separate human beings into those who are granted rights, entitlements, and opportunities, and those who are not. Such separations, often conceptualized in religious, cultural, social, and epistemological systems as “natural” or ordained by deity, act to produce superordinate and subordinate social statuses which maintain the privilege and advantage of those in higher positions. One might also ask, how is it the case that individuals who develop understandings of fairness and equality, especially those in higher positions in social hierarchies, accept such inequalities? What forms of social knowledge, what informational assumptions, what theories of others are used to justify this inequity? What reasoning underlies participation in social dominance?

The current study investigates these questions by focusing on gender hierarchy and the reasoning of males who may participate in such practices. The research was conducted in rural Lebanon, a cultural context with customary norms of gender hierarchy (Joseph, 2000; Lattouf, 2004; Thomas, 2013).

Philosophical Framework of Research

The philosopher John Rawls designates equality a *natural right* founded on the human “capacity for moral personality”, the capacity to have “a conception of good” and “a sense of justice” (1971/1999, p. 442). For Rawls, all humans are understood to reason about that which is beneficial and that which is fair. As thinking agents, individuals evaluate their social environment and their status, opportunities, and well-being within it. When core factors are assessed as unfair, people are understood to be conscious of the injustice and concerned with redressing it – a universal reasoning capacity engendering equality as a “natural right”. In concert with reason then is a conception of justice, a conception of fairness. For Rawls, justice is

the essential principle of society; no individual has claim to preemptive right on the basis of quality, attribute, or advantage, and “laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust” (1971/1999, p. 3).

The philosophical perspective within which Rawls worked, and which most comprehensively captures such conceptions of equality, although historically not fully enacted, is *liberalism*. Philosophical and political liberalism, originating in ideas of tolerance and equity found in both non-Western and Western historical traditions, has been most fully elaborated within the past four centuries in the work of theorists such as Locke, Kant, Mill, and Rawls. Fundamental to liberalism is the idea that freedom and equality are the normative conditions of human existence—a normativity resting on the human capacity to reason and obliging formal justification for limitation. Anti-feudal and anti-hierarchical in its philosophical and political tenets, liberalism positions the individual as primary, as holding inalienable rights against coercive public ideology. For the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, “Liberalism is the supreme form of generosity; it is the right which the majority concedes to minorities and hence it is the noblest cry that has ever resounded on this planet” (cited in Farha, 2019, p. 2).

A conception of morality based on principles of justice reiterates the call of liberalism, calling for equal rights due every human being. In theorizing an adequate *psychological* explanation of morality, the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg argues that the explanation must rest on an equally adequate *philosophical* explanation, one that is universally prescriptive and viable “throughout humanity” (1971). Kohlberg concludes that only *justice* can suffice, that only justice is a “substantive moral principle which can define the choices of any man without conflict or inconsistency”; only justice can “defin[e] the right for anyone in any situation” (1971, p. 208, p. 185). For Kohlberg, morality is “justice as equity...as a treatment of persons as morally equal” (1971, p. 221).

It is in this light that many scholars argue for the rights of women. Pointing to “the empirical fact of bodily separateness”, the philosopher Martha Nussbaum maintains that no efficiencies or orderings of the broader social group can take precedence over a woman’s entitlement to liberty (2000, p. 60) and, furthermore, that the “contingencies of where one is born, whose power one is afraid of, and what habits shape one’s daily thought are chance events that should not be permitted to play the role they now play in pervasively shaping women’s life chances” (1999, p. 54). The anthropologist Unni Wikan makes a similar argument in her discussion of tensions surrounding respect for ‘cultural values’ in immigrant/refugee integration in Norway asking, “But what is that which I am now respecting doing to the welfare of a *particular* [emphasis added] person?” (2002, p. 77). Wikan asks, what is the material consequence for a specific individual if this cultural practice or belief is enacted? In light of Kohlberg’s argument, one might ask, would this practice or belief meet the “ground...of individual justice, the right of every person to an equal consideration of his claims in every situation” (respondent cited in Kohlberg, 1971, p. 209). Wikan contends that the answer is often no, that without core protections, females will continue to be subordinated to the coercions of family, culture, community, religion, and state (2002).

As noted earlier, history records the struggle of marginalized groups for inclusion in philosophical accounts and material manifestations of equality. An egalitarian conception of human relations runs into conflict with systems of thought, social practices, customary ways of thinking and acting, and institutional and traditional structures of power that place individuals in hierarchical relation to each other, relations of dominance and subordination. Within such

systems, females continue to be a significantly marginalized group—a marginalization ranging from diminishment of life possibilities to full exclusion from rights and resources.

Gender Hierarchy: Historical and Contemporary Factor

Gender, the categorization of humans into girls and boys, women and men, has multiple historical and social meanings. Historians Elizabeth Jameson and Susan Armitage define the term as follows:

“Gender is fundamentally a concept of relationship...relationships between the sexes. It involves different systems of family and kinship and how men and women operate within these structures; it defines acceptable sexual behavior, appropriate work roles, and differential access to authority and power” (1997, p. 8).

Gender can be understood as a network of beliefs, values, and relationships that affect how people are defined, what they do, what advantages and disadvantages they are afforded, and what social positions they hold (Enloe, 2017; Ramazanoğlu & Holland, 2011). Gender and its relationship to social status has a profound effect on women; women are born into particular cultures and communities, and the norms of that community affect the life opportunities they are afforded.

Despite contestations over evidentiary histories, theories, and terminology, scholars attest to the universality of male dominance in human social life. Cultural anthropologists Rosaldo and Lamphere state that while there may, in specific historical and cultural circumstances, be evidence of female participation in political, economic, and religious activities, no anthropologist “has observed a society in which women have publicly recognized power and authority surpassing that of men...sexual asymmetry is presently a universal fact of human social life” (1974, p. 3). Legal scholar and human rights jurist Hilary Charlesworth states “patriarchy and the devaluing of women, although manifested differently within different societies, are almost universal” (2012, p. 62). In 2020, Secretary-General António Guterres reports “progress towards equal power and equal rights for women remains elusive. No country has achieved gender equality” (UN, *The World’s Women 2020*, p. 1).

Perspectives on the Historical Origins of Gender

Many scholars have explored the origins of gender and offer differing conceptions of its source (e.g., see Kandiyoti, 1988; Lerner, 1986; Pateman, 1988; Walby, 1989). Historian and religious scholar Leila Ahmed argues that male dominance arose with the emerging urbanization and state institutions of the ancient Middle East for purposes of property inheritance and control of reproduction (1992). Historians point to Hittite and Hebraic law, the Code of Hammurabi, and Middle Assyrian Law as evidence of early encoding of male/female difference (Moghadam, 1992). Laws from the Middle Assyrian Empire (~14th to 10th c BCE) detail veiling requirements for women, marking both class distinctions and female “respectability”, and evidence from 4th c BCE substantiates the seclusion and devaluation of women (Ahmed, 1992). Ahmed asserts the development of “a fierce misogyny” in the early Mediterranean Middle East, a fusion of Hellenic, Mesopotamian, Persian, Christian, and later Islamic cultures (1992, p. 35). Pointing to forms of gender parity in Egypt in the three millennia BCE (which later declined under Greek and Roman acculturation), Ahmed argues that male predominance in public life need not have

been accompanied by systemic and misogynistic subordination of women, but that, in fact, this is what occurred, the reasons for which, she states, remain largely unexplained (1992).

Early statements of equality among *men* often focused on the importance of regarding individuals as equal citizens in a global community. The early Hellenistic thinker Diogenes states, “I am a citizen of the world” and defines himself in universal rather than localized terms (Diogenes as cited in Nussbaum, 1997, p. 5). The Stoic philosopher Seneca pursues this idea also, stating that the community “which is truly great and truly common, embracing gods and men, [is that] in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our state by the sun” (Seneca, *De Otio*, as cited in Nussbaum, 1997, p. 1). For the Stoics, “the basis for human community is the worth of reason in each and every human being...[and] reason is above all a faculty of moral choice” (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 7). Aristotle, too, honors human reason and a universal form of justice as that which “has the same validity everywhere and is unaffected by any view we may take of the justice of it” (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, as cited in Turiel, 1983). Such understandings of universal equity were not, however, extended to *women*; for example, Aristotle, despite philosophical commitments to equality and justice, excludes women (along with foreigners and slaves) from such rights because of a presumed diminishment in the capacity to reason, a capacity ‘without authority’ (Aristotle, *Pol. I.13* as cited in Deslauriers, 2003, p. 213; see also Okin, 1996).

Western Traditions of Gender

In the 2nd century CE, the Greek physician Galen asserted that “just as mankind is the most perfect of all animals, so within mankind, the man is more perfect than the woman” (Galen, *On the usefulness of the parts of the body*, cited in Schiebinger, 1986, p. 74). Profoundly influential in medieval thought, Galen and Aristotle largely defined Western philosophical and medical conceptions of the world through the end of the Middle Ages. During this time, prominent Christian thinkers such as Tertullian (2nd c CE) and Augustine (5th c CE) also advanced theories of female inferiority and natural subordination to males, to greater or lesser degrees of vehemence. In the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries CE, the Renaissance and Reformation in Europe brought radical changes to conceptions of the self and relations with God, but no egalitarian reconstruction of male/female relations followed. Seventeenth century European theologians and political thinkers such as Hobbes, Filmer, and Knox continued to position women in inferior social roles based on assertions of diminished intellectual capacity and the decrees of Biblical scripture, perhaps none more vigorously than John Calvin:

“there is none other shift but women must needs stoop, and understand that the ruin and confusion of mankind came in on their side, and that through them we be all forlorn, and accursed, and banished [from] the kingdom of heaven” (Calvin, *The Sermons of N. John Calvin* as cited in Adcock, Read, & Ziomek, 2014, p. 8)

The advent of liberalism (17th c CE) brought radical new philosophical and political perspectives on human equality, but key articulators of the theory continued to conceptualize females as different and lesser than, consigned to inferior roles. In *Two Treatises of Government*, Locke asserts a male authority based on the ‘Foundation in Nature’ and the inborn traits of males as ‘the abler and the stronger’ (Locke, 1689, as cited in Pateman, 1989, p. 121). Kant, in an explication of enlightenment, argues that “the overwhelming majority of mankind – *among them the entire fair sex* [emphasis added] – should consider the step to maturity [enlightenment], not

only as hard, but as extremely dangerous” (1784). Kant’s writings also limit women’s political rights, subordinate them to men under the marriage contract, and ascribe differential traits and capacities to males and females (Okin, 1982). The subordinate status of women, assumed by these and later theorists, was bolstered not only by reference to religious scripture and assumptions of biological difference, but also by natural law arguments, paradoxically, also used contemporaneously to justify the equality of all “persons” (Cassirer, 1951; Bloch & Bloch, 1980; Pateman, 1983). Even J. S. Mill, the committed proponent of women’s rights, leaves women economically dependent upon men through consignment to the domestic sphere as natural to their nature and role.

Conspicuous discrepancies between liberal theories of equality and the social position of women and other subordinated classes led to calls for the “neutral” arbitration of science. In response, scientific investigation of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries produced “evidence” of the biological inferiority of females and non-white races, primarily through anatomical and anthropological studies (for reviews see Painter, 2010; Schiebinger, 1999, 1986; Somerville, 1998). Scientific data, defined by the historian Thomas Laqueur (1990) as observation informed by social, cultural, and aesthetic ideas, was thus presented as evidence of women’s biological difference and of women’s rightful exclusion from political, economic, and legal affairs (Schiebinger, 1999). A theory of *sexual complementarity* was advanced defining males and females as ideally differentiated by nature to inhabit different realms of social life (males in the public sphere of politics, business, and law and females in the private sphere of the home and domestic matters) (Laqueur, 1990; Schiebinger, 1989, 1999).

Juridical doctrine, court rulings, and social conventions further embedded male ascendancy. The legal doctrine of *coverture* subsumed a woman’s legal rights to that of her husband, such that “the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage” (18th c. British jurist Blackstone as cited in Zaher, 2002, p. 460). The principle of *coverture* remained in effect in Britain and various states of the U.S. until the late 1800’s (Zaher, 2002). Court decrees also upheld women’s relegation to the home, as in the following 1873 U. S. Supreme Court ruling: “[t]he constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood” (*Bradwell v. Illinois* as cited in Nussbaum, 1999, p. 30). Similarly, social convention concerning the “higher” moral nature of women and the feminine “capacity” for emotion (but not reason) worked to preclude women from the practical business of politics and business and, hence, access to resources or control of their environment. Popular attitudes held that “soft phrases, susceptibility of heart, delicacy of sentiment, and refinement of taste” were the model of femininity (Wollstonecraft, 1792) and valorizations of motherhood and household affairs, well into the twentieth century in Europe and the U.S., worked to constrain women’s aspirations to those of “piety, purity, submissiveness and domesticity” (Welter, 1966, p. 152).

Non-Western Traditions of Gender: Focus on Mediterranean Middle East

As noted above, the early Mediterranean Middle East was the site of multiple overlapping patriarchal cultures, a social context upon which later cultures of the region were constructed. Ahmed holds that Islamic male privilege was instituted during the Abbasid period (750-1258 CE) by “interpretive decision” of religious texts by those holding political, religious, and legal power and that the subordination of females was a product of power relations, not religion

(1992). From the 10th to the early 19th century, four principal factors governed women's lives in the region: male-privileged marriage rights including polygamy, concubines, and one-sided divorce; female right to property ownership but customary male financial control; norms of female seclusion; and class difference effects (Ahmed, 1992). All of these factors placed females under the legal and customary control of males.

The nineteenth century brought significant change to the Mediterranean Middle East, including intrusion from the West. Early advocates for women's rights include Rifa'ah Rafi'al-Tahtawi, a proponent of educational and social reforms for women in the 1830's; Muhammad 'Abdu, a late 19th century supporter of increased rights for women who asserted that Islamic gender equality preceded that in the West in reference to the Qur'anic verse of equal reward for male and female labor; and Qassim Amin, author of *Tahrir al-Mar'a (The Liberation of Women)* published in 1899 and exponent of a reinterpretation of women's roles as founded on custom not religion and thus capable of being changed (Ahmed, 1992; Thomas, 2013). Feminist scholars and historians maintain that the evolution of gender norms in the region at this time became inextricably intertwined with relations of power, nationalism, and culture (e.g., see Abu-Lughod, 1998; Ahmed, 1992, 2011; Salem, 2018; Thomas, 2013). Local proponents of women's rights were frequently critiqued for aligning with Western interests, and in their turn, Western discourses of cultural superiority and support for women's rights were often used as a pretext for expansionist designs.

Many anthropologists and sociologists today point to kinship as the primary foundation of patriarchal social organization in the Mediterranean Middle East, and to patrilineality (ancestral descent and inheritance following paternal lines) and endogamy (marrying within extended family) as critical elements of the kinship 'care/control' system (Joseph, 2000; also see Abu-Lughod, 1999; Moghadam, 1992). Such scholars position kinship patriarchy, as opposed to religious or other form, as the primary source of male hegemony in the region, constituting a 'care/control' structure "in which kin members have received nurturance in a system that simultaneously has required their internalization and embracement of patriarchal moralities, structures of authority, and codes of behavior" (Joseph, 2000, p. 135). In the West, in contrast, Joseph proposes that greater norms of exogamy (marriage outside the extended family) and nucleation (single family household) created a patriarchal model centered more on the husband/wife relationship than on kinship relations (2000).

Current Status of Females Worldwide Today

The marginalizing consequences for women of ideologies of differentiated feminine and masculine natures, duties, and roles remains pervasive globally. The reality of this asymmetry is borne out by statistics. Worldwide, one third of all women have experienced domestic and/or sexual violence, and an estimated 137 women are killed daily by a family member or partner (UN, 2020). 200 million females globally have experienced female genital mutilation, most commonly in Africa and the Middle East (UN, 2020). In Northern Africa, Western Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, 30-40% of countries have no laws against domestic violence (UN, 2020). In countries with recent data, more than 40% of abused women did not seek help from any source, (OECD, 2019a). Changing beliefs, however, show progress in the decreasing acceptance among women of domestic violence; in 2012, 50% of women surveyed considered intimate violence acceptable under certain circumstances; in 2018 the percentage had dropped to 27% (OECD 2019a).

Worldwide, women spend almost 3 times as long on unpaid work daily as men (4.2 hours versus 1.7 hours); the difference grows to more than 7 times in North Africa and Western Asia (UN, 2020). Globally, 47% of women compared to 74% of men participate in the paid labor market and the figure drops to under 30% for women in North Africa and Southern and Western Asia (UN, 2020). Women remain significantly underrepresented globally in corporate and political leadership: only 28% of management positions worldwide are held by women and less than 25% of legislative seats and cabinet minister positions are held by women (UN, 2020). In education there has been more success, with equal access to primary education for girls and boys in almost all regions of the world and even more women than men in post-secondary education, although less in science and technology disciplines (35%) (UN, 2020).

Four areas of social life are noted as key in perpetuating female inequality within the family: child marriage (160 countries provide legal loopholes for child marriage); unequal household duties, unequal divorce rights (e.g., customary or religious laws in 45 countries allow males, but not females, to divorce extra-judicially), and unequal inheritance rights (customary or religious laws in 55 countries result in traditions of less inheritance to females than males) (OECD 2019a). In many regions of the world, women still do not have equal legal status to men; in 41 countries a male must be the legal head of household; and in 27 countries women are legally required to obey their husbands (OECD, 2019a).

With respect to economic rights, women continue to face significant discrimination—88 countries prohibit women from engaging in certain types of employment; in 34 countries, only husbands can manage family property; and globally, women own less than 15% of land and 21% of homes (OECD, 2019a). Politically, women have the right to vote and hold office in almost all countries, but percentages of female leadership are low as noted above (OECD, 2019a). Tradition in many regions continues to differentially restrict women's rights to visit family and choose where they live; in some countries women's rights to travel abroad remain legally abridged, and 49 countries limit women's right to confer citizenship to children or spouses (OECD, 2019a).

In summary, females continue today to be less protected legally, politically, economically, and socially than males. In many countries, conditions for women remain seriously impaired, encompassing reduced (or no) access to employment, secondary education, mobility, political voice, ownership of land, healthcare, and sufficient nutrition. These conditions are often further compounded by norms of accepted violence, genital cutting, and early marriage. The advancement of rights for women, even in countries with formal legal and political equality, has largely occurred only recently, within the past 150 years, to include basic rights of enfranchisement, legal equality, control of reproduction, equal educational opportunity, protections against domestic violence and rape, and evolution of more egalitarian social norms.

Psychological Theories of Morality and Equality

Psychological theories of morality can be traced to the turn of the 20th century and the early juncture of philosophy and psychology in the works of John Dewey (1909, 1923), William James (1896/1907), George Herbert Mead (1934), and James Mark Baldwin (1897, 1911). The first decades of the 20th century saw the publication of Émile Durkheim's sociological explanation of moral development (Durkheim, 1906/1974, 1925/1961; also see Benedict, 1934, 1938), Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic theory (1905/1962, 1923, 1925/1959, 1930), and Jean

Piaget’s constructivist approach outlined in *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (1932/1965) and followed by the work of Lawrence Kohlberg and Elliot Turiel (Kohlberg, 1963, 1971, 1976; Turiel, 1977, 1983a, 1983b, 2002, 2008, 2015, 2021). Other psychologists have continued to study morality, the range of theories including social learning (Skinner, 1971/2002; Bandura, 1977, 1991; Dunn et al., 1995; Grusec et al., 2006); cultural psychology (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shweder et al., 1997; Triandis, 1990); and biology, intuition, and post-rationalization conceptions (Greene et al, 2001; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Jost, 2019; Lerner, 1980; Tomasello, 2015).

In addition to the breadth of theories of morality, there has been variance in other key aspects of the subject. Two of these are discussed below, one relating to the definition of morality, and one relating to conceptions and methodologies for investigation.

Universalism and Relativism

In the context of differing psychological theories about morality, a primary tension exists between *universal* and *relative* definitions of morality. From a universalist perspective, moral values are the same everywhere – all humans share core needs and wishes and are thus due the same core entitlements; from a relativist perspective, moral values are variable, dependent upon the beliefs and practices of distinctive social groups and rights may be supplanted by other values such as duty and obligation. Embedded in these differing views of morality are divergent theories of “culture” itself: culture conceived as a bounded entity, a unitary social whole, coherent and homogeneous, the members of which share uniformities of thought and behavior (e.g. Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shweder, 1990, 2017; Triandis, 1990), and culture conceived as a descriptor, a signifier of collectivity, but a collectivity acknowledged as complex, unbounded, dynamic, and heterogeneous, the members of which exhibit heterogeneity of thought and behavior (e.g. Turiel & Gingo, 2017; Turiel & Wainryb, 1994; Gjerde, 2004). Theorists who view morality as a relativist proposition call upon “culture” as a determinative social force, a force inscribing roles, behaviors, and psyches on its members and creating distinctive belief systems which may include asymmetric rights and statuses for its members. Many such theorists conceptualize societal groups as divided into two primary types – *individualistic* and *collectivistic*. In this framework, social groups across broad geographic areas are seen as having distinctive forms of cognition, emotion, and motivation. Societies such as those found in the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Australia are conceived as individualistic, and societies such as those found in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America are seen as collectivistic (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shweder et al., 1997; Triandis, 1990). In such conceptions, members of individualistic societies are focused on personal rights, self-determination, and adherence to a morality of fairness, rights, and welfare, while members of collectivistic societies are focused on interpersonal relations, social roles, respect for authority, and adherence to a “morality” of duties, roles, and social obligation. The current study is based on a universalist conception of morality and a heterogeneous, non-determinative conception of culture such that cultural variation is conceived as complementary to, but not formative of, human behavior.

Social Psychology Research on Social Inequality

A prominent form of psychological research on matters of social equality and inequality is research conducted by social psychologists, work which has generated key theories such as

System Justification Theory, Social Dominance Theory, Belief in a Just World Theory, and Dehumanization/Infrahumanization Theory. A synopsis of each theory is summarized below.

System Justification Theory

System Justification Theory proposes that individuals in lower social status groups support and rationalize social structures that subordinate them, to the effect that such individuals “defend, bolster, and justify” non-egalitarian social, economic, political, and religious ideologies and structures (Jost, 2019, p. 263). In this conceptualization, individuals rationalize inequality for goal-oriented reasons—reduction of uncertainty, risk, and threat; maintenance of social relations and a “sense of shared reality”; and the ‘palliative’ effect of justifying the status quo (Jost, 2019, p. 274-275, p 266). This rationalization is seen as supported by various psychological processes including self-deception, false consciousness, and selective information processing (Jost, 2019). Methodological approaches used in system justification research include techniques such as online surveys, structured laboratory conditions such as the influence of “cognitive load, time pressure, distraction, and alcohol intoxication” (Jost, 2019, p. 275), and priming techniques such as exposure to “justice-related words” prior to assessments of system-justifying-statements (Kay & Jost, 2003, p. 831).

Social Dominance Theory

In Social Dominance Theory, human group behavior is conceptualized as reflecting an equilibrated state between “hierarchy-enhancing” and “hierarchy-attenuating” forces, the final state depending on the circumstances of a particular group (Sidanius et al, 2016). On an individual level, the psychological trait which supports this process is Social Dominance Orientation, a disposition toward maintaining hierarchical social relations regardless of one’s position in the hierarchy. Social Dominance theorists maintain the historical presence of three primary forms of dominance—*age* (older generation over younger generation), *gender* (males over females), and “*arbitrary-set*” (hierarchy based on the specific social and historic conditions of a group). With respect to gender dominance, the theory proposes an evolutionary explanation in which females, for reproductive reasons, are attracted to males who control material and social resources, thereby engendering the evolution of aggressive and dominant behaviors in males. The research on Social Dominance focuses on the presence of social behaviors and beliefs which support social hierarchy, but there has been limited study of the underlying psychological processes. Research methodologies include online surveys (e.g., through Amazon Mechanical Turk) and undergraduate student surveys with various scaled survey protocols for social dominance orientation, moral “intuitions”, authoritarianism, outgroup hostility, etc. (e.g., see Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi’s 2014 study of morality).

Belief in a Just World Theory

In the Belief in a Just World Theory, individuals are theorized as being engaged in self-delusion that the world is just, a delusion “crucial for individual functioning”, but yet “untrue and motivationally defended” (Sutton, Stoeber, & Kamble, 2017, p. 115; Lerner, 1980). The delusion has been explained in terms of goal-oriented motivation and psychological needs to see the world as stable and ordered in order to permit long-term plans. Pursuing the formulation that Belief in a Just World (BJW) has two orientations—BJW *for the self* and BJW *for others*—researchers provide data indicating that the two are correlated but produce different results.

Assessments of higher BJW *for the self* align with a greater sense of well-being and pro-social behavior, while assessments of higher BJW *for others* results in harsh and retributive responses to others. Research methodologies involve pre-structured surveys given to undergraduate psychology students or online through Amazon Turk (e.g., see Strelan & Van Prooijen, 2014; Sutton, Stoeber, & Kamble, 2017).

Dehumanization/Infrahumanization Theory

Dehumanization theory, originating in studies of mass violence, proposes that perpetrators “dehumanize” victims by viewing them as lacking in human qualities of ‘identity’ and ‘community’, thereby removing natural controls on violent acts (Kelman, 1976 ; Staub, 1989). In the 2000’s, infrahumanization theory (defined as a “subtler” form of dehumanization) developed to answer perceptions that members of ingroups regard members of outgroups as having reduced capacity for “secondary emotions” (sentiments such as joy and embarrassment) (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Studies show relationships between sexualized depictions of others and decreased recognition of human characteristics, as well as correlations to Social Dominance Orientation. Among the range of reasons offered for dehumanization behavior are emotion (e.g., disgust), motives (sociality, sexuality, moral rationalization, group protection), cognitive factors (with the caveat that “relatively little research” has been conducted in this area), threat, and power related to higher social status (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014, p. 413). Cognitive research in this area has primarily involved pre-structured surveys with Likert-scale measures given to undergraduate students (Haslam et al., 2005; Haslam & Bain, 2007).

The psychological studies of human equality and inequality discussed above have brought important attention to issues of social hierarchy. It may be argued, however, that much of the research relies on stimulus-response associations without investigation of the underlying cognitive processes or explanation of the epistemological basis for participant understanding and behavior. The current study offers an alternative approach.

Constructivist Perspective

In the constructivist approach, morality is conceptualized as the product of reflection and active judgment on the use, meaning, and reason for justice and its manifestation in specific circumstances. As opposed to post-rational or stimulus-controlled relationship between situational factors and human behavior, a constructivist takes the position that individuals are reasoning beings who think about the world, assessing, evaluating, weighing alternatives, coordinating information, and making judgments about the environment and their actions in it. Thus, the current study offers an alternative approach, both theoretically and methodologically, to the studies discussed above, based on three primary differences: 1) foundational premise regarding psychological processes, 2) epistemological stance, and 3) methodological approach.

Foundational Premise

The proposed research approach is based on a constructivist view of human thought and behavior. As noted earlier, in this view, individuals are not conceived as being engaged in non-rational, irrational, post-rational, or subconscious motivation, or as being activated by single environmental stimulus (see Kihlstrom, 2004; Turiel, 2010). Individuals are seen, first and foremost, as rational beings who think about their interactions with the world and through a process of abstraction, reflection, and equilibrating organization construct systems of knowledge,

systems for understanding the world. As opposed to a stimulus-response relationship between situational factors and human behavior, a constructivist takes the position that there are two intervening steps between the stimulus and the response—(1) “the meaning [the external conditions] have for the actor” and (2) “the evaluations and requirements that available knowledge and understanding produce” for the actor (Asch, 1952, p. 376). The proposed research study focuses on these intermediary steps as the core foundation for understanding social inequality.

Epistemological Stance

With respect to epistemology, the proposed study will offer a different perspective, both in 1) the epistemological stance of the research and 2) theorization regarding the epistemological basis of participant responses. Briefly, from the perspective of the researcher, the study is intended to be an investigation of the thoughts/meanings/understandings underlying assertions of social dominance, an effort to acquire a “factual grasp of...[a] penetration into” the problem, as opposed to a focus on cataloguing and systematizing or naming and “decreeing” explanations for social behavior (Wertheimer, 1944, p. 82, 83). With respect to theorization regarding participant responses, the constructivist perspective is that morality is a product of cognitive construction; a product of reflection and active judgment; a product of active evaluation of the use, meaning, and reason for rules. Morality is not conceived as a passive reflection of external facts, internal emotions, psychological need, or goal-oriented motivation. Thus, analysis of research results in the current study will reflect this understanding and will propose an epistemological basis for participant judgments about social hierarchies.

Methodological Approach

The proposed study will use a semi-structured interview methodology (discussed in the Methodology section) in order to support direct investigation of gender and sexism as systems of thought related to other aspects of social knowledge. It will offer a different contribution to understanding social inequality than can be provided by the use of controlled settings and standardized measures. In the studies discussed above, the perceptions, evaluations, and decisions of study participants are, in most cases, assumed to conform to pre-set categories and are treated as discrete units rather than components of integrated systems of understanding the world. From a constructivist point of view, exposure to trigger words followed by Likert-scale assessments of statements cannot provide useful information for understanding human judgment about complex social issues.

In summary, a constructivist approach to morality rests on liberalism’s conception of equal and rational human beings. As discussed earlier, constructivist theorists argue that justice is the only philosophically adequate explanation for *moral choice* among equals, thus positioning the theory in contrast to conceptions proposing genetic pre-determination, authoritarian disposition, delusion, ‘palliative’ rationalization, or ideas of disgust, group protection, or sexuality.

Psychological Research on Morality: Constructivist Approach

The psychological study of morality from a constructivist perspective is founded on the work of J. M. Baldwin in the late 19th/early 20th centuries, followed by Jean Piaget’s

investigation and theorization of children's understandings of fairness and justice playing marble games in the Neuchâtel cantons of Switzerland in the early 1930's. Further study in the field was pursued by developmental psychologists Kohlberg, Turiel, and others. In the constructivist model, knowledge is understood as constructed by individuals through reflection upon reciprocal interaction with the world (Baldwin, 1897; Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1952, 1971, 1975/1985; Turiel, 1977, 1983a), and then organized into cognitive *structures* formed through the "abstraction of the features common to a wide variety of acts which differ in detail" (Ginsburg & Opper, 1988, p. 21). Cognitive structures are "organizational wholes or systems of internal relations", marked by features of transformation, self-regulation, and coherency, as opposed to simple aggregations of units of data accumulated through replication, proximity, or conditioning (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1971).

For constructivists, research interests focus on the underlying processes of thinking, on the forms of social knowledge and informational assumptions, ideas, and beliefs that individuals draw upon in making judgments. The research emphasis is on *how* people think versus simply *what* they think. In the case of social inequality, research interests involve the categories of knowledge individuals may use in assessing relationships between different people and in the theories of others and the theories of society, religion, tradition, and so forth that individuals may hold.

Social Domain Theory

A large body of psychological research within the constructivist framework, *social domain theory*, provides evidence that individuals in early childhood organize social knowledge into three primary domains or structures of knowledge—*moral* (universally generalizable values of welfare, fairness, and rights), *conventional* (rules and coordinations specific to an organization, group, or community), and *personal* (private choice, e.g., in friendships and activities) (for reviews, see Turiel 1983, 2002, 2015; Killen & Smetana, 2006; Nucci, 2001; Smetana, 2006). With respect to morality, social domain theory proposes that individuals are continually involved in acts and events which evoke moral considerations, whether through daily concerns such as sharing or not sharing, helping or not helping, or through systemic practices of inequality and exclusion such as social hierarchies. Studies, both within social domain theory and outside, show that people consider and make judgments about issues of fairness and rights (Helwig, 1995, 1997; Helwig et al., 2014; Kohlberg, 1963, 1971; McClosky & Brill, 1983; Piaget, 1932/1965; Turiel, 1983a, 2002, 2015). Studies also show that individuals, as young as 4 to 6 years of age, assess moral events such as lying, stealing, hitting, and selfishness as wrong, even when authority, rules, or custom deem otherwise (Nucci, 2001; Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983a, 1998, 2002). These studies provide evidence that individuals, from a young age, form moral judgments about relations with other people and about welfare, justice, and rights. Research also shows that in complex social situations individuals make assessments encompassing all three domains of social knowledge (moral, conventional, and personal) and weigh, balance, and coordinate multiple considerations of social context, situational demands, and informational assumptions. Constructivist research aims to capture the complexity of this reasoning.

In light of the above, constructivist research uses semi-structured clinical interviews to facilitate direct investigation of participant systems of thought. The research, thus, offers a

different contribution to understanding social inequality than that provided by the use of the controlled settings and standardized measures of the social psychology studies discussed above.

While a question of self-presentation bias (Schlenker & Leary, 1982) may arise, the following points are offered in response: 1) from a constructivist perspective, research participants are conceptualized as individuals directly reflecting on their social context as opposed to individuals activated by non-rational or subconscious motivation or single stimulus and, as such, are not theorized as primarily activated by such a bias, and 2) constructivist research methods (semi-structured clinical interviews) support direct investigation of participant thought in that participants are asked to provide the reasons for their judgments, thus providing data for understanding the reasoning underlying participant statements/decisions.

Additionally, in the present research, the demographic studied (males in rural Lebanon) may provide data more deeply tied to circumstances of gender inequality than undergraduate participant pools and may thus provide important perspectives on social inequality.

Psychological Research on Gender

Developmental Research

Developmental research shows that children are aware of gender at an early age and think about this facet of social life in complex ways. By age 2 ½, children are conscious of gender norms in such areas as clothing, toys, and activities (Ruble et al., 2006). Gender is regarded primarily in fixed terms up to ages 4-5 years (Levy et al., 1995; Ruble et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2009; Trautner et al., 2005), although there is evidence for some flexibility of thought in these earlier years (Ruble et al., 2006). By ages 6 and 7 years, children begin to assess gender in more flexible ways and regard gender norms as non-obligatory under a variety of conditions such as personal preference in activities, toys, and clothing (Conry-Murray & Turiel, 2012, Conry-Murray, 2013) and in pursuit of helping others (Conry-Murray et al., 2015). There is some evidence that in societies with more hierarchical gender norms, flexibility of thought about gender appears later, e.g., age 9 in Korea (Conry-Murray et al., 2015). As children reach late childhood and adolescence, they consider gender in relation to increasingly complex social concerns such as inclusion/exclusion and group unity and success (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016; Hitti et al., 2021, Hitti et al., 2014; Hitti & Killen, 2015; Killen et al., 2013), gendered roles within the family (Brose et al., 2013), and the social consequences of norm deviation (Conry-Murray et al., 2015; Stoddard & Turiel, 1985).

An additional line of recent interdisciplinary research by developmental psychologists, neuroscientists, and feminist scholars challenges the gender binary itself, proposing *gender similarity* based on meta-analyses of psychological trait studies, mosaic vs dimorphic brain imaging, and neuroendocrine commonalities. These researchers theorize gender and its social manifestations as the developmental product of social practices not biological mechanisms (Bigler, 2013; Bigler & Liben, 2006; Blakemore et al., 2013; Hyde, 2005, 2014; Hyde et al., 2019; Joel, 2011; Joel et al., 2015; Liben, 2017). Recent research with transgender children further contributes to understandings of gender development (Olson & Gülgöz, 2018; Olson & Enright, 2018; Rubin et al., 2020).

Social Domain Research: Gender Hierarchy in Cultural Contexts

Psychological studies within the social domain framework have investigated reasoning about gender hierarchy in a range of cultural contexts. These studies include assessments of personal entitlement and social hierarchy in an Arab Druze community (Wainryb & Turiel, 1994); investigations of inequality in marriage and inheritance norms in Benin, West Africa (Conry-Murray, 2009a, 2009b); child, adolescent, and young adult evaluations of hierarchical marriage practices in Mysore, India (Neff, 2001); and judgments regarding family relationships and individual rights in Bogotá, Colombia (Mensing, 2002).

In the Druze study, investigations were conducted regarding family decision-making about everyday activities such as work, education, recreation, and chores (Wainryb & Turiel, 1994). The study provided evidence that individuals assess their social conditions in complex ways and evaluations of community practices of gender hierarchy often vary depending upon social position. Both men and women judged that males have autonomous decision-making rights (95% and 90% respectively) and females do not (68% and 95% respectively). The percentage difference in assessments of female non-autonomy (68% of men, 95% of women) suggests that those in the dominant class may not assess their dominance to be as pervasive as those in the subordinate class assess it to be (also see Conry-Murray, 2006; Harding, 2004; Melki & Mallat, 2019; Mikula, 1994). The study also reported that 78% of women deemed the gender inequalities unfair, providing evidence that those with lower social status may not be as accepting of hierarchizing practices in “collectivistic” societies as is often claimed.

The studies in Benin investigated conceptions held by males and females with respect to everyday decision-making between spouses (Conry-Murray, 2009a) and assessments of polygamy, arranged marriage, and male-privileged inheritance practices (Conry-Murray, 2009b). In Conry-Murray’s 2009a study, participants (male and female) were asked about family matters such as money, education, childcare, and housework, and 80% assessed that husbands held the final decision-making authority in such matters. The male prerogative was justified with references to *authority* and *tradition* in 68% of the responses. Although both women and men acknowledged pragmatic concerns over relationship conflict, if a compromise could not be reached, wives were expected to defer. Wives were also assessed as more vulnerable to severe consequences (violence or divorce) than husbands. In the Conry-Murray 2009b study of differential privileges for males and females in inheritance and marriage practices, 63% of men and 100% of women evaluated males as the decision-maker with respect to such practices. Again, the difference in percentages between male and female assessments suggests that members of the dominant class (males) assess their privilege as less pervasive than members of the subordinate class (females) assess it to be. Participants gave conventional justifications (authority, tradition, roles) and personal justifications (male entitlement) as reasons for the gender hierarchy. Participants were also asked to consider a hypothetical matriarchal society. For this scenario, 83% of men continued to designate women as *non*-decision-makers, whereas only 2% of women did. In contrast to the claims of cultural relativists, both studies showed gender inequality as justified predominantly with conventional reasons (authority, tradition) as opposed to moral reasons, and females evidenced greater critique of non-egalitarian practices than males.

In Mysore, India, research investigated reasoning about marital relations in a Hindu community (Neff, 2001). Participants were presented with situations in which a husband (or wife) wanted to pursue a personal interest, e.g., visit a friend or take a class, and the spouse preferred that he (or she) not do so. Study results showed evidence of male entitlement and female obligation with participants choosing the right to pursue personal goals more frequently

for husbands than for wives and justifying male *right* with *authority* and female *obligation* with *duty*. Young respondents, especially male boys, evaluated husband-wife relations in a more hierarchical manner than older respondents of both sexes. Neff concluded that cultural norms privileging males played a partial role in the participants' understandings of female-male relations, and she drew attention to evidence of varied, complex, and "individualistic" thinking about such relations.

Mensing's (2002) study showed a mix of results for gender relations in Bogotá, Colombia. While a scenario considering where a family should go on vacation produced a 50/50 split by both male and female participants between male choice of vacation or family choice, a second scenario asked whether a wife should take lunch to her husband or stay home to help a daughter. Lunch to the husband was the priority for 83% of the males versus 33% of the females. In both situations, when male prerogative was chosen, the primary justification given by both males and females was male entitlement. The lack of female support for male entitlement in the lunch situation provides evidence of female disagreement with unequal practices.

The studies discussed above provide data showing that gender inequalities exist, that these inequalities place males in positions of greater privilege, and that norms of male autonomy and female obligation work to maintain such inequalities. The studies, furthermore, indicate that women are aware of their lower social status and consider it unjust. Additional evidence for the conclusions of these studies is provided below in anthropological and sociological studies of women's experiences in a range of cultural contexts.

Anthropological and Sociological Research on Gender

A number of ethnographic and sociological studies have been conducted by researchers focusing particular attention on the experiences of women in relation to the gender norms of their communities. Studies in Lebanon (Joseph, 2000; Khatib, 2008; Lattouf, 2004; Melki & Mallat, 2019; Thomas, 2013), Oman (al-Talei, 2010, 2017; Wikan, 1976/1980, 1982, 1996), Egypt (Keo et al, 2019; Wikan, 1976/1980, 1996), and in Bedouin communities (Abu-Lughod, 1986/1999, 1993; Abu-Rabia-Queder, 2007, 2008; Harel-Shalev et al., 2020) provide analyses of the character of such experiences and women's assessments of their social position. Through extended contact with women in these communities, many of the researchers draw on personal experiences and observations in developing their analyses of social relations.

In their accounts, researchers note the differences in life possibilities for males and females. In Lebanon, Thomas recorded the limitations females face early in life, encountering "a cultural and societal reality that a young woman can question only with difficulty. Regardless of religious affiliation, a girl's every act is calculated and her questions are stifled from the age of five" (2013, p. 40). In 2013, Thomas estimated that "approximately 30 percent of the population [in Lebanon]...allow their girls to live in relative openness to the outside world...[and be raised] as individuals in line with the rights of liberty, autonomy, and personal development" (2013, p. 38). For the other 70%, Thomas states, "they [girls] must deny themselves their goals since their future depends on the decisions of men...Catching a husband becomes an urgent matter. An enormous social pressure pushes her to find a social place and purpose in her marriage" (2013, p. 38). For those women who enter the work force in Lebanon, there are significant competing tensions to perform at a higher level than male colleagues while maintaining unequal home obligations. A study of gender relations in Lebanese media cited a female journalist: "Being a

woman is always stigmatized. You have to prove yourself, make double or triple the effort to show your higher ups that you have the same capabilities or deserve the same salaries [as men]" (Melki & Mallat, 2019, p. 36). The same study noted that 47% of female journalists compared to 7% of male journalists reported being the primary childcare provider (Melki & Mallat, 2019).

In other countries and social groupings, researchers also reported on expectations of obligation and duty for females and entitlements of "Western individualism" in the activities of males. In her seminal study of life in a Bedouin community in Egypt, Abu-Lughod reported a "code of honor, in which the supreme value is autonomy" – a code toward which, however, only men may aspire (1986/1999, p. 79). Women must follow a different path – a path of "propriety", modesty, and deference. Arranged marriages, whether motivated by kinship and tribal relationships, money, prestige, or resolution of conflict, maintained the power of males by subordinating the rights of females. "'She's your chance. This one I'll give to you. That's done'" (Abu-Lughod, 1993, p. 91-92); thus, did a Bedouin man, within minutes of his newborn daughter's birth, promise her in marriage to his fifteen-year-old nephew. In another example, Abu-Lughod stated, "Men would arrive at our camp and request 'one of your girls' in marriage, apparently caring little which one, since they had chosen the family to ...create an affinal relationship with" (Abu-Lughod, 1986/1999, p. 66).

Later research with Bedouin women in the Negev in Israel offers similar perspectives. Referencing on-going community expectations of female procreation and maintenance of tradition, Abu-Rabia-Queder stated, "Male domination is legitimized in Bedouin society by two cultural codes primarily affecting the lives of women: the sexual and the collective." (2007, p. 163). Abu-Rabia-Queder further noted that any female overture toward advanced education or employment must always be carefully navigated so as not to disrupt customary standards of female behavior and to maintain acceptance by the community (2008). Similar sentiments are reported in Harel-Shalev et al.'s 2020 research with Bedouin women from the Negev and surrounding regions. One participant stated:

"Let's say – I have all kinds of diplomas – but they will always look and ask – who is my father? Who is the man who is responsible for you...They give you the feeling that you are free and work and all that, but in the end you return home and the husband says: I am the one who has the power, I hold you" (2020, p. 502).

Harel-Shalev et al. concluded, "Bedouin communities continue to be characterized by a deepening of the existent patriarchal control over women", pointing to "the ambivalent and partial incorporation of modern norms and practices...entrenchment of deep patriarchal control over women...[and] the persistence of traditional practices such as polygamy and honor killings" (2020, p. 488, p. 491).

Wikan's ethnographic study in Sohar, Oman revealed similar examples of relations between females and males; Wikan reported, "The male is considered superior, physically, morally, and intellectually", and it is assumed that women "must be constrained and protected by men" (1982, pp. 55, 56). At the time of the study (1982), Wikan related that women remained legal minors throughout their lives and, excepting visits to parents, were largely restricted to their households and those of close neighbors. These limitations were justified with assertions about female characteristics; Wikan quoted an Omani man, "Yes, that is the way here, you cannot trust a woman, her judgment and reliability" (1982, p. 61). In 2008 in Oman, women gained certain legal equalities to men through the equalization of court testimony, but enforcement is not

uniform particularly in family courts (Al-Talei, 2010). In 2017, Al-Talei reported that women continue to face pervasive discrimination in civil and personal rights in Oman, “Personal freedom is granted by the law, yet the conservative social norms make it difficult for women to practice this right...cultural tradition is much stronger than the laws that guarantee personal freedom” (p. 41).

In her ethnographic research in Egypt, Wikan investigated the lives of women in the tenements of Cairo, particularly the extended family of one woman, Umm Ali (1976/1980, 1996). While acknowledging the significant economic and social pressures faced by both men and women in this community, Wikan documented women’s awareness of the unfairness of their subordinated status. Umm Ali stated, “Of course, the man should have his freedom, but not at the woman’s expense!” (1996, p. 31). Wikan also concluded that the man “holds the trump card in his hand: the sole right to dissolve the marriage, thereby also separating the mother from her children” (1976/1980, p. 103). Discriminatory conditions continue today in Egypt; a recent review of the status of Egyptian women reports that a woman is legally required to obey her husband and religious personal status codes continue to regulate family matters, including unilateral divorce rights for many males and automatic legal male guardianship of children, although a 2005 law now permits women to have physical custody until age 15 (OECD 2019b). A 2019 study of rural women in Egypt further delineates the conditions of female life: ~ 20% of rural females marry before the age of 18, married women spend 36 hours weekly on domestic tasks compared to 2-6 hours for men, 38% of rural men assessed that a husband can hit or otherwise punish his wife for an infraction such as talking to other men or ‘wasting his money’, and only ~10% of rural women reported that they “Go alone without permission” to everyday activities like the market, doctor, or to visit relatives and friends (Keo et al., 2019).

Summary

Both the psychological and anthropological studies discussed above provide evidence of gender inequality. While prior constructivist research about gender relations provided important information about key themes in thought regarding issues of social equality and inequality – justifications such as *authority, custom, religion, tradition, role-related competence; personal choice* (in support of male dominance) and *rights, welfare, relationship harmony* (in support of equality) (e.g. Wainryb & Turiel, 1994; Conry-Murray, 2006, 2009a, 2009b), the current study is the first to directly investigate the question of male reasoning about gender and to investigate it specifically as a question of social fairness, as a question of morality. The current study focused on the reasoning of members of the dominant group (males) about relations with the subordinate group (females). The study was, thus, concerned with both male evaluations of relations between males and females in family and work contexts and the beliefs and understandings males hold in reasoning about such evaluations, e.g., conceptions of males and females, as well as conceptions of personal choice, authority, custom, religion, etc. that underlie such evaluations.

Setting of Research

A Brief Account of Lebanese History and Political and Social Structures

History

The historian Philip Hitti once stated of Lebanon: “Perhaps no other area of comparable size...can match it in the volume of historical events squeezed into it and in their meaningfulness and relevance to world progress” (1965, p. 1). Evidence of human habitation in modern Lebanon traces back to the Paleolithic Period, followed by the establishment of the ancient city of Byblos during the Neolithic Period (~ 8,000 BCE) (Barnett et al., 2020). Approximately 3000 BCE, the Canaanites (later called the Phoenicians by the Greeks) arrived in the region and established settlements. The Hyksos invaded in the 18th century BCE followed by Egyptian rule from the mid-1500’s BCE to ~ 1100 BCE (Barnett et al., 2020; Sorenson, 2010).

The Phoenicians were traders, establishing routes and outposts in Africa, including Carthage. Later invasions of the region included the Assyrians in the 9th century BCE, followed by the Babylonians, the Persian Achaemenians, and Alexander the Great in 332 BCE (Barnett et al., 2020, Sorenson, 2010). Phoenicia/early Lebanon was a cultural crossroads, occupying a place of centrality in the religions of the region and producing the earliest Western alphabet, contributions to Greek philosophy and Islamic and Roman law, and advances in navigation and mercantilism (Barnett et al., 2020; Hitti, 1965). The Romans established rule in the first century BCE, followed by the Christian Byzantine Empire in the late 4th c CE, and then largely Muslim rule from 750 CE until the invasion and rule of the Ottomans (1518-1918) (Barnett et al., 2020; Barnett & Ochsenwald, 2020).

Fakhr ad-Dīn II (1585-1635), a Lebanese governor under Ottoman suzerainty who is often accorded the status of *pater patriae* (Father of the Country), is credited with setting the groundwork for a pluralist, secular form of governance in Lebanon. According to the historian Mark Farha, this emergence of modernizing reforms in Lebanon continued through the 18th and 19th centuries (e.g., the *Tanzimat* Ottoman reforms of 1839-76) and resulted in a “meandering, back-and-forth contest over authority” responding to multiple and conflicting influences from regional and European powers, increasing capitalist commerce, and social and demographic changes (2019, p. 71). When Ottoman rule ended after World War I, Lebanon became a French Mandate by order of the League of Nations and ultimately an independent nation in 1944. Despite recurring foreign invasions, historians note the persevering independence of Lebanon, attesting to a land that has “enjoyed almost always a measure of autonomy” (Hitti, 1965, p. 6), and “a pattern of ...independence that persists to this day” (Sorenson, 2010, p. 8).

Political and Social Structures

Lebanon today is a parliamentary democratic republic within a *confessional* framework of governance by religious groups. Political power is divided among sects on the basis of institutional and traditional arrangements, including 15 personal status codes delegating family law matters to religious courts, and the unwritten agreement that the President must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shi‘i Muslim (Human Rights Watch, 2015; Khalaf et al., 2020). Proponents of the confessional framework argue that despite its difficulties, the system has prevented the rise of authoritarianism and avoided military coups, while critics point to its discriminatory effects, particularly for women, as well as its entanglement with problems of economic inequality, nepotism, corruption, and mismanagement (e.g., see Farha, 2019, Joseph, 2000).

A 1926 parliamentary debate during the writing of the Lebanese Constitution lays out the early tensions:

‘Let us not adopt a [confessional] system no nation on earth does.’ (Ibrāhīm al Manthar)

‘The honorable gentleman Dammūs has said that our situation is without comparison in Europe. I beg to differ. Europe has paid dearly in blood and money to rid itself of this malady [of *Tā’iftya*/confessionalism].’ (Jurj Zawīn)

‘The honorable gentlemen claims that Europe has advanced due to its extrication of confessionalism. That is incorrect. Rather, they progressed because they distributed justice ... We have adopted [political] confessionalism in order to implement justice, so as not to deprive one against the another.’ (Jamīl Talhūq) (*al-Tā’iftya fī Lubnān Min Khilāl Munāqashāt Majlis al-Nuwwāb*, 15–16 as cited in Farha, 2019, p. 145)

Today, in Lebanon, a citizen’s relationship to the state is mediated by the religious sect of their birth. There are 18 recognized religious groups in Lebanon: 12 Christian, 4 Muslim, 1 Druze, and 1 Jewish (Human Rights Watch, 2015), and individuals must be registered with a religious sect in order to access most rights of citizenship, including voting, marriage, and inheritance (Farha, 2019). Many scholars, however, argue that simple religious sectarianism is not the underlying social construct in Lebanon but rather, it is a sociological complex of class/kinship relations and religious identity (see Farha, 2019; Hamzeh, 2001; Joseph, 1997, 2000, 2010; Joseph & Slyomovics, 2001). The anthropologist Suad Joseph writes, “The state assimilated the rules of extended patrilineal kinship codified by sectarian family laws into the codes and practices of Lebanese citizenship” (2000, p. 132). In her assertion, Joseph makes a direct link between the institutions of state governance and patriarchal kinship norms. Referencing endogamous ‘clientistic interest groups’ (*tawā’if*), the journalist and historian Arnold Hottinger states, “The *tawā’if* are the actual institutions of Lebanon. Secularism is merely a perfunctory matter of etiquette and showcased acculturation” (Farha, 2019, p. 15; Hottinger, personal communication as cited in Farha, 2019, p. 15-16). Other scholars note the sociological effects of this complex, pointing to significant social constraints, economic limitations, and suppression of individualism (sociologist Saffiya Sa’āda and social anthropologist Nur Yalman as cited in Farha, 2019, p. 14).

The Lebanese constitution, established in 1926, reflects tensions regarding the rights of the individual; Article 7 states: ‘all Lebanese...without distinction are equal before the law’, yet Articles 9 and 95 use language subordinating the individual to the authority of their religious sect (Farha, 2019, p. 166-167). The 1989 Tā’if Accord ending the Lebanese civil war provides a further example. While the original draft denotes Lebanon a ‘parliamentary democratic republic’ founded on respect for public and ‘private (*individual*) freedoms’, the final draft references only ‘public freedoms’ (al-‘Abd, *Lubnān wa al-Tā’if*, p. 370 as cited in Farha, 2019, p. 165; UN, Taif Agreement, 1989, p. 1).

Many scholars argue that a historically weak centralized state in conjunction with sociohistorical sectarianism has undermined the emergence of a secular state in Lebanon, and that the state, in essence, has used kinship practices as “an institution of governance” (Joseph, 2000, also see Khalaf et al., 2020; Farha, 2019). It is in such circumstances that women are particularly vulnerable and unprotected by the state.

Social Conditions

Literacy in Lebanon is high, 96% of males and 92% of females, and the average level of education is 12 years for males and 11 years for females (CIA World Factbook, 2019). Female and male access to education and health in Lebanon are close to parity (0.96 female/male access to education; 0.97 female/male access to health care) (World Economic Forum, 2016). Female economic participation and political representation are significantly lower (0.44 female/male economic participation; 0.02 female/male political representation (World Economic Forum, 2016). The Lebanese economy is free-market and was ranked 92nd internationally in GDP in 2019 (CIA World Factbook, 2019). Conditions in Lebanon have severely deteriorated since 2019, however, due to economic and political issues; the present situation for most Lebanese citizens is acute (for recent reports, see Hubbard, 2021; Mounzer, 2021).

Lebanon also hosts more refugees per capita than any other nation in the world, ~ 1.5 million refugees from the Syrian conflict, 17,000 refugees from Iraq, Sudan, and other countries, and 200,000 Palestinian refugees under UNRWA Mandate (UNHCR, 2020).

Status of Women. Inequalities embedded in social and institutional practices continue to have a significant effect on the status of women in Lebanon. Describing the state of women's rights, Joseph writes, "It is the mobilization of patriarchal extended kinship, as a venue of social control, and the state's mobilization of religion to sanctify extended kinship that has been the most significant deterrent to citizenship equality for women in Lebanon" (2000, p. 110). A major contributor to this inequality in Lebanon is the absence of a uniform civil personal code. There are, instead, 15 personal status codes which assign family law matters, such as marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance, to religious courts. A study by Human Rights Watch of divorce rights under the codes reports their "discriminatory impact on women" and details inequitable divorce and financial arrangements, and non-welfare-based custody rulings (2015).

The Social Institutions and Gender Index, 2019 Lebanon (OECD, 2019c) reports further data. Polygamy is allowed in Muslim communities in Lebanon (except Druze); males can divorce at will and change their mind within 3 months without the consent of the ex-wife; and custody automatically goes to males when children reach a certain age (dependent upon religion). Under most personal status codes, women can lose maternal custodial rights for multiple reasons including re-marrying, being of a different religion than the child, or "unfitness" (not formally defined). There is no minimum age for marriage, and child marriage has increased due to the Syrian refugee crisis for economic and social reasons. With respect to adultery, males are culpable only if adultery is committed in the marital home; women are culpable wherever the adultery is committed. Gender-based violence is governed by religious courts where there is a strong stigma against interfering in home life; there is no law against marital rape; and in a 2014 study by American University's Beirut Medical Center, 41% of women reported physical abuse. There have been some recent efforts to establish laws against "honor" killings of women. Muslim females generally inherit half of the male inheritance, and there is low female ownership of property or land across religious sects due to customs of male inheritance and control of money and property. Males and females have different citizenship rights (e.g., citizenship may only be transmitted through the paternal line), and women have minimal political representation (3.1% of Parliament). In light of these facts, women's rights in Lebanon remain tenuous and often unprotected in the face of male privilege embedded in both Lebanese custom and institution.

Summary and View to the Future

In his 2019 analysis of the sectarian and secular threads of Lebanese political history over the past five centuries, Farha states that there have been three instances of “genuinely transconfessional, truly national alliances”: during Fakhr ad-Dīn II’s reign at the turn of the 17th century; the 1840 rebellion against Egypt and Bashīr II, and the 1943 resistance to French interference in the independence movement (p. 152). Farha links all three alliances to response to foreign interference. While a final analysis of recent events remains unfinished, one might argue that a fourth instance, a homegrown alliance of Lebanese citizens, occurred in the nationwide protests beginning in October 2019. The protests, which started during data collection for the current study, originated in response to a proposed increase in telecom/internet taxes but quickly transformed into dissent against government corruption, mismanagement, and financial manipulations, as well as calls for broader social, political, and economic reforms, including women’s rights (e.g., see Yee, 2109a, 2019b; *Al Jazeera*, 2019; Caramazza, 2019; Akour, 2019).

The struggle for due entitlement for Lebanese women, as equal citizens of the state and equal persons in familial/kin relations and social, economic, and political affairs, is ongoing. In the recent protests which continue to the present (*Reuters*, 2021), discourses of unity and rights may have gained new currency in contemporary Lebanon; these discourses may translate into concrete institutional and cultural change.

Statement of the Research Problem

Judgments regarding fairness and unfairness in social hierarchies may be conceived as questions of morality, and this perspective underlies the present study. Evidence shows that women are aware of the unjustness of subordinated social positions and lack of freedoms, opportunities, and rights, and that they assess such statuses to be unequal and unfair. If, as developmental research shows, understandings of equality and fairness are universally held, how is it that men do not also assess practices of gender hierarchy as unjust? What ideas and theories underlie male judgments about gender-differentiated roles and opportunities? To the best of my knowledge, no studies have been conducted from the standpoint of cognitive-constructivism on this topic. It was expected that the results of the current study would yield new evidence for understanding and theorizing about male conceptions of equality and inequality between females and males.

Research Questions

The research aimed to identify 1) male assessments of equality or inequality between males and females, 2) forms of social reasoning used by males to justify social positions of equality or inequality relative to that of females, 3) male theories about the characteristics and roles of females and males, and 4) male application of conceptions of equality or inequality to females and to males.

Equality or Inequality between Males and Females

The following general research questions were posed: *What evaluations do men make regarding decision-making power and access to opportunity between females and males? How do men reason about (provide justifications for) such evaluations? Do men’s evaluations and*

justifications of decision-making power and access to opportunity between females and males differ depending on the type of situation (e.g., money, work, social) or judgment category (personal choice, authority directive, generalizability), or on the age or educational level of the participant?

We hypothesized that adult males, living in rural villages in Lebanon, as members of a cultural group with customary privilege, would grant males higher social status and greater decision-making power in many social situations. We considered it likely that the participants would not extend equality to females and would exclude females from many of the rights accorded to males. On the basis of pilot work, the expected justifications were assertions of obligatory role or biological differences between males and females and ideas of cultural or religious requirements or needs. Lebanon was originally selected as a site for research due to statistical data and sociological evidence of continuing and marked traditions of gender hierarchy, particularly in rural areas (OECD 2019c; and Joseph, 2000; Lattouf, 2004; Melki & Hitti, 2020; Melki & Mallat, 2016, 2019; Thomas, 2013). Local informants also attested to ongoing cultural norms of male preference and female submission. Although Lebanon's legal and constitutional structures offer women rights and protections, cultural norms have historically maintained significant gender difference.

Our hypotheses were tempered, however, with the knowledge that several factors, including Lebanon's high level of literacy and education, complex mix of political groups and religious sects, and recent social protests might produce a more complicated picture than anticipated. We also considered that contemporary forms of technology, of media and information-exchange across borders and communities, might impact sociohistorical change in unexpected and perhaps accelerated ways, and there was thus the possibility of evolving ideas and discourses surrounding gender in Lebanon. In such cases, we considered the possibility of expanded ideas of rights and equality.

Equality or Inequality between Two Males and Applications of Conceptions of Equality

The interview design also included a situation involving two male cousins. The goal was to propose a family situation in which two males face a similar conflict to that faced by a male and a female. Asking participants to consider decision-making power and opportunity between two males, i.e., members of the same social group as the participant, allowed investigation of participant *understanding* of equality as a general theoretical concept, as well as participant *application* of that understanding to different groups of people. The research question was whether sociohistorical differences in the application of rights and entitlements across social groups rest on varying interpretations and *understandings* of the concept of equality or, rather, on varying *applications* of an, in fact, well-understood conception of equality itself?

Although considerable research has been invested in studying whether individuals understand ideas of rights, equality, and justice (e.g., Helwig, 1995, 1997), less is known about the application of such understandings, particularly to subordinated social groups. Historical experience shows that equality has *not* been applied to all human beings, but the question remains why this is so. The lack of theory regarding this issue can be partially attributed to infrequent attention to questions of social equality and inequality in psychological research (Turiel, Chung, & Carr, 2016). Another reason may stem from the fact that the complexity of social decision-making, the coordination of complex and often competing goals and environmental factors, is frequently unaddressed (Turiel, 2010; Kihlstrom, 2004), despite the fact

that studies show that it clearly exists (Helwig, Ruck, & Peterson-Badali, 2014; McClosky & Brill, 1983; and Ruck, Abramovitch, & Keating, 1998).

In light of pursuing the above goals, there were several additional general research questions: *What evaluations do men make regarding decision-making power and access to opportunity between two males? How do men reason about (provide justifications for) such evaluations? Do men's evaluations and justifications of decision-making power and access to opportunity between two males differ depending on the judgment category (personal choice, authority directive, generalizability), or on the age or educational level of the participant? Do men's evaluations of decision-making power and access to opportunity differ when applied to females and males engaged in the same situation, and do they differ depending on the age or level of education of the participant?*

We hypothesized that rural Lebanese adult males would grant equal decision-making rights and opportunities between two males, that these judgments would be supported with assertions of rights and the equality of persons, and that judgment category, age, or education would not affect judgments of male equality. We also hypothesized that males would understand and articulate ideas of equality but might yet apply them differentially to two males versus to a male and a female.

As a final note, despite expectations that males would show evidence of inequality in assessments of male/female relations, it was not expected that those assessments would be reducible to uniform predictions of thought or behavior. Evidence shows that social reasoning is complex, and individuals exhibit heterogeneity of thought based on personal experience, characteristics, and perception of environmental features (e.g., see Turiel, 2002). Thus, the data were expected to show a range of conceptions of female/male relations.

Additional hypotheses, specific to social domain interview protocols, are addressed following Study Design (see below).

Method

Participants

Sixty adult males participated in the study. Participants were drawn from rural Lebanese villages in the Beqaa Valley, Mount Lebanon, and other farming communities in northern and southern Lebanon. The sample was chosen to represent the religious diversity of Lebanon, ~60% Muslim, 35% Christian, and 5% other (U.S. Department of State, 2018) by recruiting participants from appropriate villages, largely segregated in Lebanon according to religion. The sample size ($N = 60$) was chosen based on similar social domain studies of reasoning about gender (Brose, Conry-Murray, & Turiel, 2013; Conry-Murray, 2013; Wainryb & Turiel, 1994), as well as power analysis, which indicated a power of more than 95% for egalitarian/non-egalitarian judgments. Power was lower for other analyses but data point to key group differences and patterns in reasoning (VanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007). Participant age range was 20-76 years ($M = 43.6$, $SD = 16.0$) and level of education range was 2-18 years ($M = 13.4$, $SD = 4.3$). The protocol design was also supported by earlier pilot work in an Afghan immigrant community in the United States.

Procedure

Participants were interviewed in Arabic by one of two trained male research assistants (graduate students at Lebanese American University) in a quiet setting in the village where the participant resided. Participants gave informed consent prior to each interview. Six hypothetical

situations were presented to the participants during the interview. Each situation was read to the participant and then several questions about the situation were asked. All participants received the same six situations and were asked the same questions. Randomization of situation order was not conducted due to significant variation in situational features and later addition of work context situations to the interview protocol. Participants were able to ask clarification questions at any time and could decline to answer any question or decide to end the interview at any point. All interviews were audio-recorded and then translated into English and transcribed by the interviewer. The interview protocols (see Appendix) are translations of the protocols used in the interviews conducted in Arabic. All research procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Boards of the University of California, Berkeley; University of San Francisco; and Lebanese American University. Interviews were conducted between September 2019 and February 2020.

Study Design

Participants were interviewed using a semi-structured clinical interview methodology (Piaget, 1929; Turiel, 1983). Each participant was presented with six hypothetical situations (see Appendix) related to equality or inequality between males and females in decision-making or opportunity. The situations were chosen to represent everyday salient aspects of male/female relations in Lebanon, both within the family (four situations) and within the professional work environment (two situations). The context of each situation was developed in consultation with Lebanese informants and informed by pilot work with Afghan immigrant adult males in the U.S. and prior studies on gender in the Lebanese work environment (Melki & Hitti, 2020; Melki & Mallat, 2016, 2019). The pilot work in the U.S. indicated that husband/wife dilemmas regarding money, family business decisions, and social arrangements for children were the most generative for investigating male judgments and reasoning about male/female relations within the family. The specifics of these situations were designed to reflect features of daily life in a rural Lebanese village. The work situations were based on earlier research by a project collaborator, Jad Melki, on gender bias in Lebanese journalism (Melki & Hitti, 2020; Melki & Mallat, 2016, 2019). A within-subject design, in which all participants evaluated all six situations, was employed.

Situation Types

Male/Female Equality or Inequality Within a Family Context. Three situations pertained to male/female relations within the family. Two situations involved disagreements between a husband and wife over money or business. In the *money* situation, a husband and wife are given a gift of money and disagree over who should have access to the money. In the *business* situation, a husband and wife work together in a family business (small grocery store) and disagree over who should be able to make decisions about the business. A third situation involves children's social opportunities (appeal of a son and appeal of a daughter to *date*) and husband and wife disagreement over who should have these opportunities.

Male/Male Equality or Inequality Within a Family Context. One situation pertained to male/male relations within the family. In this situation, two male cousins who share an apartment are given a gift of money and disagree over who should have access to the money. The male cousin/male cousin *money* situation was designed to parallel the husband/wife money situation, in order to investigate conceptions of equality or inequality as applied to two males versus a male and a female.

Male/Female Equality or Inequality Within a Professional Work Context. Two situations involved a choice between a male or a female employee (journalist) for career opportunities. In one situation, a supervisor must decide whether to send a male or a female journalist to cover a conflict in a *war zone*. In the second situation, a supervisor must decide whether to promote a male or a female journalist to be chief news editor of the *night shift*.

After each hypothetical situation was read, the participant was asked a series of questions to assess their judgments and reasoning about equality or inequality between the two protagonists in the situation. The participant was first asked for their *Evaluation* regarding who should make the decision or have the opportunity. The evaluation was followed by “Why?” in order to prompt *Justifications* for the evaluations. After these queries, the participant was posed with a *Counter-Probe*, i.e., one of the protagonists in the situation proposes the opposite of the participant’s evaluation (see examples below), in order to test the participant’s original assessment. Then, *Criterion Judgment* questions (see examples below) were asked, presenting the participant with questions portraying actors making statements opposite to the original evaluation made by the participant. For example, if the participant assessed that both the husband and wife should have equal decision-making rights regarding a gift of money, the participant would be asked to evaluate 1) a husband and wife deciding that only the husband should have access to the money, 2) a religious authority decreeing that only the husband should have access to the money, and 3) another country’s social norm that only the husband should have access to the money. Alternatively, if the participant originally assessed that only the husband should have decision-making rights, the participant would be asked to evaluate actors asserting equality between a husband and wife (please see examples below).

The *Criterion Judgment* questions were posed to assess the influence of three factors on a participant’s evaluation: an opposing personal choice, an opposing authority dictate, and an opposing social norm in another country. Research has shown that such criterion judgment questions delineate participant conception of the social domain of the situation as *personal* (judgments rest solely on individual choice), *conventional* (judgments are subject to authority), or *moral* (judgments are generalizable to all contexts) (Turiel, 1983). On the basis of sociological studies in Lebanon (Joseph, 2000; Lattouf, 2004; Thomas, 2013), the confessional form of state governance, and the advice of Lebanese informants, conventional authority for a rural Lebanese village was presented as a religious authority. Criterion questions were also followed by “Why” in order to prompt reasoning about the assessment.

Due to the time constraints of maintaining an approximate one-hour interview protocol, criterion questions were only asked for the four family situations.

Family Context Interview Protocols

Husband/Wife Money

The following is the Husband/Wife Money situation:

Mr. and Mrs. Hashem received L.L. 150,000 (~\$100 USD in 2019) as a gift from a friend. Mr. and Mrs. Hashem have enough money to pay for their regular expenses, and they don’t have children. Mr. and Mrs. Hashem both agree that they want to save the money for the future. Mr. Hashem says that he has chosen a safe place to put the money and that he should be the only one able to have access to this money.

But Mrs. Hashem says that they should both choose this safe place and that both of them should have access to this money.

The following questions were posed to assess participants' evaluations and criterion judgments:

(Evaluation) *Should Mr. Hashem be the only one able to have access to the money, or should Mr. and Mrs. Hashem both be able to have access to the money?*

(Counter-Probe) *Suppose that Mrs. Hashem says that women should be treated the same as men, that it is not fair that the husband makes these decisions. What do you think about what Mrs. Hashem said?*

Or alternatively: *Suppose that Mr. Hashem says that women are unable to make good decisions about money like men, so he believes that he should be the only one able to have access to the money. What do you think about what Mr. Hashem said?*

(Criterion Judgments)

Personal Choice. *Suppose that in another family, the husband and wife decided that they both want to be able to have access to the money. Is that OK or Not OK?*

Or alternatively: *Suppose that in another family, the husband and wife decide that they want only the husband to be able to have access to the money. Is that OK or Not OK?*

Religious Authority. *Suppose that in the community of the other family, the religious leader said that both husbands and wives should be able to have access to the money. Is it OK or Not OK for the religious leader to say that?*

Or alternatively: *Suppose that in the community of the other family, the religious leader said that only husbands should have access to the money. Is it OK or Not OK for the religious leader to say that?*

Generalizability. *Suppose that there is another country where it is generally accepted that both the husband and wife are able to have access to the money. Is that OK or Not OK?*

Or alternatively: *Suppose that there is another country where it is generally accepted that only the husband can have access to the money. Is that OK or Not OK?*

All the assessment questions (Evaluation, Counter-Probe, Criterion Judgments) were followed by the question, "Why?", in order to assess Justifications for the assessments.

Husband/Wife Business

The Husband/Wife Business situation (see Appendix) pertains to decision-making regarding a family business (small grocery store). The situation and questions follow a similar format to the Husband/Wife Money situation depicted above.

Son/Daughter Dating

To investigate judgments and reasoning about equality or inequality in social opportunities for a son and a daughter (appeals to date), these situations were designed to ask separately about judgments and justifications regarding a son's wish to date and a daughter's wish to date. These initial assessments were followed by counter-probes and criterion judgment questions regarding a husband and wife's decision-making about a son and a daughter's entitlements to this opportunity.

Male dating situation:

Mr. and Mrs. Sukar's son is 18. He lives at home while he attends the local university. He is a good student and a respectful son. He is also very friendly and likes meeting new people. He intends to get married someday, but first he wants to date different people before getting married.

(Evaluation) *Is it OK for the son to date before he gets married?*

Female dating situation:

Mr. and Mrs. Rizk's daughter is 18. She lives at home while she attends the local university. She is a good student and a respectful daughter. She is also very friendly and likes meeting new people. She intends to get married someday, but first she wants to date different people.

(Evaluation) *Is it OK for the daughter to date before she gets married?*

(Counter-Probe) *Let's assume that Mrs. Rizk said that daughters should go out and date before marriage and that it is unfair that only sons can. What do you think about what Mrs. Rizk said?*

Or alternatively: *Suppose that Mr. Rizk considers that girls are not allowed to have relationships before marriage and he only gives permission for boys to do that. What do you think about that?*

(Criterion Judgments)

Personal Choice. *Let's assume that in another family, the husband and wife decided that both their son and daughter should be able to date before marriage. Is that OK or not OK?*

Or alternatively: *Suppose that in another family, both the husband and wife decided that only their son is allowed to date before marriage. Is that OK or Not OK?*

Religious Authority. *Let's assume that in the community of the other family, the religious leader said that both sons and daughters should be able to date before marriage. Is it OK or not OK for the religious leader to say that?*

Or alternatively: *Let's assume that in the community of the other family, the religious leader said that only sons are allowed to date before marriage. Is that OK or Not OK?*

Generalizability. *Let's assume that in another country, it is generally acceptable that both sons and daughters should be able to date before marriage. Is that OK or Not OK?*

Or alternatively: *Let's assume that in another country, it is generally acceptable that only sons should be able to date before marriage. Is that OK or Not OK?*

Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money

The Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money situation was designed to parallel the Husband/Wife Money situation in order to investigate male reasoning about equality or inequality between two males. In this situation, two male cousins share an apartment together while searching for work in Beirut, and they are also given a gift of L.L. 150,000 (~\$100 USD). The questions follow the same format as in Husband/Wife Money depicted above except that one male cousin (Tamer) says that he should be the only one to have access to the money while the other male cousin (Karim) disagrees.

Work Context Interview Protocols

Male/female relations have historically included expectations and prescriptions about participation and competencies in separate social spheres—private (family and home) versus public (labor/business, politics, law, etc.). To investigate reasoning about equality or inequality between males and females in the professional work environment, two situations were presented. As noted above, criterion judgment questions were not posed for these situations. Also, for the work context situations, counter-probes were only asked if the participant made an inequality evaluation of the situation. The situations are presented below.

Journalist in War Zone Situation:

Mr. Saab is the head of a newspaper and he just received a call about a possible conflict breaking out between two warring factions in Tripoli. He has two journalists that he can send to cover this story, Mr. Samir and Ms. Hala. Both are equally qualified journalists and want to take on the task. Neither Mr. Samir nor Ms. Hala are married or have children. Mr. Saab must choose one of them.

(Evaluation) *Should Mr. Saab send Mr. Samir or Ms. Hala to cover the story?*

(Counter-Probe) *Suppose that Ms. Hala says that she should do this job and it is not fair to send Mr. Samir to cover this event. What do you think about what Ms. Hala said?*

Journalist in Night Shift Situation:

Mr. Tabbib is the head of a news agency and he is in need of a new chief news editor for the night shift (from 8 pm till 6 am). He has two equally qualified journalists that he can promote into this position, Ms. Alia and Mr. Nadim. Both are married with children and want this new promotion. He must choose one.

(Evaluation) *Should Mr. Tabbib promote Mr. Nadim or Mrs. Alia to be the new chief news editor?*

(Counter-Probe) *Suppose that Ms. Alia said that she should be the chief news editor, and that it is not fair that Mr. Nadim was chosen. What do you think about what Ms. Alia said?*

All assessment questions were followed by “Why?”, in order to assess Justifications.

Additional Hypotheses

In reference to earlier constructivist studies on gender relations in other cultural contexts, we hypothesized that there would be differences in judgments and justifications due to variations in *situation type* (Conry-Murray, 2009a, 2009b; Neff, 2001). No *a priori* hypotheses regarding *age, education, or criterion judgment category* were made. With respect to criterion judgments (assessments in the face of opposing personal choice, religious authority, or social norm of another country), it was possible that participants might not change their original evaluation in the face of opposing contexts. However, depending on the participant's reasoning underlying an evaluation of equality or inequality, the participant might, in fact, change their judgment when faced with an opposing feature.

With respect to age, most earlier studies reported either no age effect or age effect only between children and adults, but the question of age was still considered an open question for the current study (Conry-Murray, 2009a; Wainryb & Turiel, 1994). With respect to highest level of education of participant, as well as judgment category, earlier studies did not investigate these factors, so these questions also remained open.

Coding

Codes were developed from a review of all transcripts, as well as reference to earlier pilot work and social domain research on gender relations in cultural contexts (Conry-Murray, 2006, 2009a, 2009b; Neff, 2001; Wainryb & Turiel, 1994). The codes are detailed in Table 1.

Evaluations and Counter-Probes

Evaluations and counter-probes were coded as *Both Male and Female*, *Male Only*, *Female Only*, and *Depends* (ambiguous judgments). For the Dating situations, the original evaluations for the Son and for the Daughter were coded as *OK*, *Not OK*, and *Depends*. A combined Son/Daughter Dating category then was coded as *Both Male and Female* (Both Son and Daughter can Date or Neither Son nor Daughter can Date) and *Male Only* (Son Only).

The criterion questions were coded as *OK*, *Not OK*, *Depends*.

Justifications

Categories. Justifications, the reasoning participants provided for their judgments, were coded according to the justification categories listed in Table 1. The coding scheme includes the general domain categories of Moral, Conventional, Personal, and Pragmatic (prudential) reasoning (e.g., see Nucci, 2001; Smetana, 1997; Tisak & Turiel, 1984; Turiel, 1983), as well as additional categories that emerged from responses in this study, such as Labor, Relationship, Sociohistorical Change, Male/Female Role Difference, Male/Female Biological Difference, and Religion. Certain categories (Moral, Conventional, Relationship, and Religion) were further categorized into sub-categories as described below.

Sub-categories. A number of the broader justification categories were divided into sub-categories. The Moral justifications included eight sub-categories: *Equality of Persons* (appeal to equality of human beings, such as "I stand here with equality. This is a human and the other is a human."); *Equality of Opportunity* (references to equal opportunities for all, such as "If he is allowed to love, then she is too. If he is allowed to date, then she is too."); *Equality of Capabilities* (references to females and males having similar capabilities, such as "Both of them are qualified... Both of them are the same"); *General Rights* (general appeal to rights, such as "women have rights, and men should respect them"); *Right to Freedom from Coercion* (right to freedom from coercive interference or authority when making personal decisions, such as "This is a private thing and has nothing to do with religions, so it can't be controlled by religion.");

Right to Property (appeal to individual right over one's property, such as "they got the money as a gift so each one should have half of this then, it is not allowed for one person to keep this money."); *Fairness* (appeal to fairness/justice, such as "In order to have a fair and organized society, they have to share everything."); and *Welfare* (reference to the well-being of others and avoiding harm, such as "[He] would be doing wrong to his daughter.")

The Conventional justifications were categorized into two sub-categories: *Culture* (references to custom or tradition, such as "It depends on the country and society. In our country, this is not acceptable."); *Society* (references to benefit to society or avoidance of harm to society, such as "Because this will destroy society. I agree with my daughter to go out and study with her friend but other than that I disagree.")

The Relationship justifications were categorized into two sub-categories: *Mutual Agreement* (reasoning that decisions in an interpersonal relationship should be made by both of the parties involved, such as "I am with them discussing it and one decision, a unified one, should be made at the end."); *Relationship Benefit/Concern* (reference to the benefits or concerns of a relationship, such as "When someone wants to live with another person in the same house they should feel comfortable with each other and these things should be shared").

The Religion justifications were categorized into three sub-categories: *Religious Mandate* (references to the prescriptive nature of a religious authority or God's will, such as "Because a religious leader says that. And if a religious leader is saying that then we can't change it."); *Religious Fallibility* (references to religious leaders being corrupt, wrong, or making arbitrary choices, such as "We should see if their [religious leaders'] sayings or opinions are suitable for us or not...their opinions are not sacred and always right."), and *Religious Misrepresentation* (references to beliefs that religion/religious leader would not make such an assertion or promote such an idea, such as "There is no religious leader who would say that").

Reliability. Reliability was assessed by a second judge on a randomly selected 25% of the interviews. Cohen's kappa was .86 for judgments and .83 for justifications.

Table 1
Justification Categories

Category/Sub-Category	Descriptions
Moral	
<i>Equality of persons</i>	Appeal to the equality of human beings or the equality of females and males in worth and merit
<i>Equality of opportunity</i>	References to maintaining equal opportunities, equal chances for all
<i>Equality of capabilities</i>	Reference to females and males having similar capabilities; references to women who know more/are more educated
<i>General Rights</i>	General appeal to rights; reference to equal rights due every human being
<i>Right to Freedom from Coercion</i>	References to the right to freedom from coercive interference or authority when making personal decisions
<i>Right to property</i>	Appeal to individual right over one's property
<i>Fairness</i>	Appeal to fairness/justice
<i>Welfare</i>	Reference to the well-being of others/avoidance of harm to others
Convention	
<i>Culture</i>	Custom, tradition, social opprobrium/shame for breaking norms; different cultures may have different values
<i>Society</i>	Benefit to society, avoidance of harm to society, avoidance of social diseases/vice (AIDS, STDs, drugs, tobacco)
Personal Choice	Appeal to legitimacy of individual choice, priorities, desires, needs
Pragmatism	Reference to financial benefit, efficiency, help in emergency; benefit of general experience
Labor	Reference to entitlement, voice, or responsibility due to labor or participation in work or business
Relationship	
<i>Mutual Agreement</i>	Decisions in an interpersonal relationship should be made by, and based upon, the mutual agreements and meeting of the reciprocal concerns and desires of the parties involved. It is up to the ones in the relationship to decide the arrangements.
<i>Relationship Benefit/Concern</i>	Reference to the benefits or concerns of a relationship, e.g., partnership, working together; communication; avoiding conflict; reference to experiences as being beneficial or harmful to future marriage
Sociohistorical Change	General appeal to social change over time, e.g., society is now more educated/cultured/developed; reference to social conditions in the present as opposed to the past. Reference to change in the status of women, e.g., women are more educated now, women have a public status/leadership roles in business/politics
Male/Female Role Difference	Differentiated female/male social roles, i.e., females are responsible for children/household; males are responsible for financial support of

	family/protection of females
Male/Female Biological Difference	References to female/male genetic differences, “natural” differences, i.e., females are more emotional/weaker/more promiscuous; males are rational/stronger
Religion	
<i>Mandate</i>	Prescriptive nature of religious decree/authority of religious leader/God’s will
<i>Fallibility</i>	Reference to religious leaders being corrupt/wrong/making arbitrary choices
<i>Misrepresentation</i>	Reference to belief that religion/religious leader would not make such an assertion or promote such an idea
Illogical	Reference to illogical situation, e.g., who would males date if females could not date?
Disapproval	Simple disapproval without further elaboration
Approval	Simple approval without further elaboration

Analysis

Logistic regressions were conducted on the original evaluations for each situation, given that these produced binary outcomes (*Both Male and Female* or *Male Only*), to test whether Equality judgments (*Both Male and Female*) were significantly different from Inequality judgments (*Male Only*). Generalized estimating equations (GEEs) with a logit link function were used to assess differences in Equality vs Inequality evaluations across situations. GEE, an analytic method similar to repeated-measures ANOVA and part of the regression framework, is used for binary outcomes when focused on population estimates (Hox, 2010; Zeger, Liang, & Albert, 1988). Because type of situation is a within-participant variable, logistic GEE analysis regressed the binary outcome (Equality or Inequality) across situation types. GEEs were further used to assess differences in Equality vs Inequality evaluations across situations for the three criterion questions asked of each participant (opposing Personal Choice, Religious Authority, and Generalizability).

For an initial summary comparison of the differences in Equality judgments between the aggregated family and aggregated work situations, a paired samples *t* test was also conducted.

McNemar tests were run to compare within-situation original evaluations with counter-probe judgments and criterion question judgments.

Repeated measures ANOVAs, 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Education Group) x 4 (Situation Type) with repeated measures on the last factor, were conducted for each justification category. Each participant answer was coded for up to three justifications; the use of a specific reasoning category was coded as 1 = only one category used; .66 for two uses out of three, .33 for one use out of three, 0 = no use of category. (If only two justifications were offered, 0.5 = one use). When sphericity was violated, Greenhouse-Geisser correction is reported. Follow-up Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons were conducted to assess significant interaction effects. Fisher exact tests (two-sided) were run to compare the use of justification *sub-categories*. Use of sub-categories was coded as 1 = use and 0 = no use. All justification categories used by participants \geq 10% were analyzed. Analysis of reasoning was conducted for all situations and criterion judgments.

Analysis of justifications for Equality judgments are presented first. Analysis of justifications for Inequality judgments are presented second.

Note: As referenced in the Coding section above, for the Son/Daughter Dating situation, participants could assess equality in one of two distinct ways, either a) Both Can Date (59% of participants) or b) Neither Can Date (27% of participants). The two groups were combined into one group for purposes of analysis of equality judgments and reasoning. Analyses of the distinctive reasoning differences used by members of each group (Both Can Date and Neither Can Date), as well as by those participants who assessed inequality (Only Son Can Date, 14% of participants), are presented separately.

Results

Research Questions: *What assessments do men make regarding decision-making power and access to opportunity between females and males, and between two males?*

Hypotheses: *Between females and males, we hypothesized that men would assess inequality and grant males greater decision-making power and opportunity.*

Between two males, we hypothesized that men would assess equality and grant both males equal decision-making power and opportunity.

Between Females and Males

In order to test our hypothesis that men in rural Lebanon would grant males higher social status and greater decision-making power than females in many social situations, we first tested each male/female situation by logistic regression to see whether evaluations of equality or inequality were statistically significant. See Table 2 for percentages of evaluations that endorsed equality. *Depends* and *Female Only* judgments were both rare; *Depends* judgments (1.5%) were excluded from the analysis, and *Female only* judgments ($\leq 1\%$) were pooled with *Both Male and Female* judgments for analysis.

Family Context

In contrast to our hypothesis, all three male/female situations in the *family* context showed greater assessments of *equality* than *inequality*. Table 2 shows that large majorities of participants, in their evaluations of the Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, and Son/Daughter Dating situations, judged that there should be equality between the male and female protagonists (98% in Husband/Wife Money, 93% in Husband/Wife Business, and 86% in Son/Daughter Dating). Logistic regression showed that these differences were statistically significant: Husband/Wife Money ($OR = .02$, Wald $X^2(1) = 16.35$, $p < .001$; Husband/Wife Business ($OR = .12$, Wald $X^2(1) = 25.09$, $p < .001$; Son/Daughter Dating ($OR = .15$, Wald $X^2(1) = 24.29$, $p < .001$). Interpreting with respect to equality, the odds of an *equality* judgment for Husband/Wife Money were 50.00 times those of an *inequality* judgment, the odds for Husband/Wife Business were 8.33 times, and the odds for Son/Daughter Dating were 6.67 times. Odds are the ratio of the probability of x and the probability of not- x ; an *odds ratio* (OR) is a ratio of two odds, for example the odds of equality compared to the odds of inequality (e.g., $OR = 50.00$) or the odds of inequality compared to the odds of equality (e.g., $OR = .02$) (UCLA, Statistical Consulting Group).

Work Context

In the male/female *work* context situations, however, there was no statistical difference between assessments of equality and inequality. For the Journalist in War Zone situation, Table 2 shows that only 55% of participants evaluated that the male and the female journalists should have equal opportunity to cover the conflict. For the Journalist in Night Shift situation, the percentage was lower; only 39% of participants evaluated that the male and the female journalists should have equal opportunity to be the chief news editor of the night shift. Logistic regression showed no significant difference in assessments of equality and inequality for both work situations: War Zone ($OR = .90$, Wald $X^2(1) = .16$, $p = .691$), Night Shift ($OR = 1.57$, Wald $X^2(1) = 2.82$, $p = .093$).

Paired Samples t Test

In order to provide a comparison of average equality judgments for male/female relations in the two contexts (family and work), a paired samples t test was conducted. Equality judgments were averaged across stories to create an equality judgment score for the male/female family situations and an equality judgment score for the male/female work situations. The two scores were compared showing a statistically significant difference in average equality judgments for the family context and for the work context ($t_{60} = 8.97$, $p < .001$). On average, equality

judgments occurred twice as frequently in the family situations as in the work situations ($M = .92$, $SD = .16$ and $M = .48$, $SD = .34$, respectively).

Between Two Males

In order to test our hypothesis that men in rural Lebanon would grant two males equal decision-making power and opportunity, we tested the male/male situation by logistic regression to see whether evaluations of equality or inequality were statistically significant.

For the *male/male situation* (Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), 100% of participants assessed that the two protagonists were equal. See Table 2.

Table 2
EVALUATIONS OF EQUALITY (percentages)

	FAMILY CONTEXT				WORK CONTEXT	
	H/W Money	H/W Business	S/D Dating	M/M Money	M/F War Zone	M/F Night Shift
Original Judgment	98	93	86	100	55	39
Criterion Q's						
Assertion of personal choice	48	52	83	30		
Religious authority directive	83	88	83	97		
Generalizability	75	75	78	88		

Research Questions: *Do men's evaluations of decision-making power and access to opportunity between females and males differ depending on the type of situation (e.g., money, work, social)? Do men's evaluations of decision-making power and access to opportunity between females and males, or between two males, differ depending on the age or educational level of the participant?*

Hypotheses: *Between females and males, we hypothesized that situation type would affect men's judgments; we made no a priori hypotheses regarding the effect of age or education. Between two males, we hypothesized that neither age nor education would affect judgments.*

Effect of Situation Type, Age, and Education on Evaluations of Equality or Inequality

GEEs were conducted to examine the effect of age, education, and situation type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Son/Daughter Dating, Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money, Male/Female Journalist in War Zone, Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift) on judgments of equality across the six situations. Initial tests were run comparing all situations to Husband/Wife Money as this was the male/female situation with the highest percentage of equality judgments (98%). Follow-up Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons were also conducted.

Within Family Context

The initial test showed a significant difference in judgments of equality between Husband/Wife Money (98%) and Son/Daughter Dating (86%) ($OR = .11$, 95% [.01, .90], Wald $X^2(1) = 4.21$, $p = .040$), indicating that the odds of an equality judgment for Husband/Wife Money were 9.09 times those for Son/Daughter Dating. There were no significant differences between Husband/Wife Money and Husband/Wife Business (93%) or Husband/Wife Money and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (100%).

Follow-up Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparison, however, showed no significant difference between Husband/Wife Money (98%) and Son/Daughter Dating (86%), $p = .209$. Pairwise comparison did show a significant difference between Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (100%) and Son/Daughter Dating (86%), $p = .035$.

Within Work Context

Follow-up pairwise comparison showed no significant difference in judgments of equality between the two work situations: Male/Female Journalist in War Zone (55% equality) and Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift (39% equality).

Family Context Compared to Work Context

There were significant differences in judgments of equality between all family context situations and work context situations. The initial test showed significant differences in judgments of equality between Husband/Wife Money and the work context situations: Husband/Wife Money (98% equality) and Male/Female Journalist in War Zone (55% equality) ($OR = .02$, 95% [.00, .15], Wald $X^2(1) = 14.90$, $p < .001$); Husband/Wife Money and Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift (39% equality) ($OR = .01$, 95% CI [.00, .08], Wald $X^2(1) = 19.51$, $p < .001$). The odds of an equality judgment for the Husband/Wife Money situation were 50.00 times those for the Male/Female Journalist in War Zone situation, and the odds of an equality judgment for the Husband/Wife Money situation were 100.00 times those for the Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift situation.

Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons showed further significant differences in judgments of equality: Husband/Wife Business (93%) and Male/Female Journalist in War Zone (55%), $p < .001$; Husband/Wife Business and Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift (39%), $p <$

.001; Son/Daughter Dating (86%) and Male/Female Journalist in War Zone (55%), $p = .002$; Son/Daughter Dating (86%) and Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift (39%), $p < .001$; Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (100%) and Male/Female Journalist in War Zone (55%), $p < .001$; Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money and Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift (39%), $p < .001$.

Age and Education. Tests were run assessing age and education as two-level categorical predictors and no effects were found (Age ≤ 42 years (N = 30, M = 29.33, SD = 6.86); Age ≥ 43 years (N = 30, M = 57.37, SD = 8.24); Education ≤ 12 years (N = 23, M = 8.74, SD = 3.06); Education ≥ 13 years (N = 37, M = 16.24, SD = 1.48). [No effects were found for age or education as continuous predictors for equality judgments across situations either.]

The above results comparing equality judgments for family context situations to equality judgments for work context situations suggest increased conceptions of *inequality* for males and females in the work environment.

Counter-Probes

Counter-probes, proposing the opposite of the participant's original evaluation (see Study Design), were posed in order to test the stability of the participant's assessment. McNemar tests (exact, two-sided) were conducted to compare the original evaluations to counter-probe judgments.

For the family situations, counter-probes were asked after both equality and inequality evaluations. For the work situations, counter-probes were asked only after inequality evaluations.

Family Context Situations

There were no significant differences in judgments of equality for the original evaluation and for the counter-probe in any family situation. For Husband/Wife Money, the judgments were 98% equality for the original evaluation and 97% equality for the counter-probe. For Husband/Wife Business the judgments were 93% equality for the original evaluation and 89% equality for the counter-probe. For Son/Daughter Dating, the judgments were 86% equality and 80% equality respectively, and for Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money, the judgments were 100% equality and 98% equality respectively. These results indicate that judgments of equality for the family context situations did not significantly change when inequality perspectives were presented to the participants.

Work Context Situations

In contrast to the family situations, in the work situations there were significant differences in judgments of equality for the original evaluations and for the counter-probes. Both of the work situations showed significant changes from inequality to equality after the counter-probe, $ps < .001$. For the War Zone situation, evaluations of equality rose from 55% to 74%, and for the Night Shift situation, evaluations of equality rose from 39% to 65%. These results indicate that judgments of inequality for the work context situations were alterable when participants were presented with opposing equality perspectives.

Research Questions: *Do men's evaluations of decision-making power and access to opportunity between females and males, or between two males, differ depending on the judgment category (personal choice, authority directive, generalizability)?*

Hypotheses: *Between females and males, we made no a priori hypotheses; we considered participants might or might not change their evaluation in the face of opposing social pressure, depending on the participant's reasoning underlying their evaluation of equality or inequality.*

Between two males, we hypothesized that opposing social pressure would not affect judgments of equality.

Criterion Judgments *Within* Situations (Family Context)

For all family context situations, participants were asked criterion judgment questions in order to assess the alterability of their original evaluations in the face of opposing *personal choice*, *religious authority*, or *generalizability* (accepted social norm of another country) (see Study Design). McNemar tests (exact, two-sided) were conducted to compare original evaluations to opposing criterion judgments within the same situation.

Husband/Wife Money

Judgments of equality were significantly different for the original judgment (98%) and each of the three criterion judgment questions: *personal choice* (48%), $p < .001$; *religious authority* (81%), $p = .004$; and *generalizability* (75%), $p = .002$. These results indicate that judgments of equality for the husband and wife were alterable to “only the husband has access to the money” for all three criterion judgment alternatives, i.e., due to the personal choice of the husband and wife, the decree of a religious authority, and the accepted social norm of another country.

Husband/Wife Business

Judgments of equality were significantly different only for the original judgment (93%) and the personal choice question (52%), $p < .001$. Judgments of equality were not significantly different for the religious authority (81%) or generalizability (75%) criterion judgment questions. These results indicate less alterability for husband/wife equality when they are working in a family business together on a daily basis. However, this equality is again alterable based on the personal choice of the husband and wife themselves.

Son/Daughter Dating

There were no significant differences in judgments of equality in Son/Daughter Dating between the original evaluation (86%) and any criterion judgment question: personal choice (83%), religious authority (83%), or generalizability (78%).

Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money

Judgments of equality were significantly different only for the original evaluation (100%) and the personal choice criterion judgment (30%), $p < .001$. Judgments of equality were not significantly different for the original evaluation (100%) and religious authority (97%) or generalizability (88%). These results indicate that conceptions of equality between two males are robust in the face of proposed inequality. The one exception is due to the personal choice of the male protagonists themselves.

Criterion Judgments *Across* Situations (Family Context)

GEEs were conducted to examine the effect of age group (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs), education group (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs), and situation type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Son/Daughter Dating, Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money) on judgments of equality for each criterion judgment *across* the four family situations. Initial tests were again run comparing situations to Husband/Wife Money. Follow-up Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons were also conducted.

Personal Choice

There were significant differences in judgments of equality in the face of opposing personal choice across the four family context situations (e.g., *Suppose that in another family, the husband and wife decide that they want only the husband to be able to have access to the money. Is that OK or Not OK?*) (see Table 2 for reference). The initial test showed significant differences in judgments of equality for Husband/Wife Money and both Son/Daughter Dating and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money: Husband/Wife Money (48%) and Son/Daughter Dating (83%) ($OR = 5.28$, 95% CI [2.21, 12.61], Wald $X^2(1) = 14.05$, $p < .001$); Husband/Wife Money and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (30%) ($OR = .44$, 95% CI [.25, .79], Wald $X^2(1) = 7.67$, $p = .006$). The odds of an equality judgment for the personal choice criterion judgment for Husband/Wife Money were .19 times those for Son/Daughter Dating; the odds of an equality judgment for Husband/Wife Money were 2.27 times those for Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money. There was no significant difference between Husband/Wife Money (48%) and Husband/Wife Business (52%). There were no main or interaction effects of Age group or Education group. Follow-up pairwise comparisons showed further significant differences in judgments of equality for the personal choice criterion judgment: Son/Daughter Dating (83%) and Husband/Wife Business (52%), $p = .001$; Son/Daughter Dating (83%) and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (30%), $p < .001$.

Summary. The results provide evidence that participants assessed that inequality by agreement of two male protagonists was more acceptable than inequality by agreement of a male and a female protagonist in the same situation (i.e., Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money and Husband/Wife Money). These results may suggest that participants conceived of two males as having greater agency to make their own choices, an attribute typically granted to members of the dominant social class. And participants may have conceived of relations between a male (potentially dominant) and a female (potentially subordinate) as necessarily less alterable due to personal choice. The results also provide evidence that participants considered the equality of a son and a daughter's ability to date as significantly *less* alterable than the equality of two protagonists making money or business arrangements.

Religious Authority

The initial test showed a significant difference in judgments of equality for the religious authority criterion judgment (e.g., *Suppose that in the community of the other family, the religious leader said that only husbands should have access to the money. Is it OK or Not OK for the religious leader to say that?*) between Husband/Wife Money and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money: Husband/Wife Money (81%) and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (97%) ($OR = 6.12$, 95% CI [1.68, 22.38], Wald $X^2(1) = 7.51$, $p = .006$). The odds of an equality judgment in the face of opposing religious authority for Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money were 6.12 times those for Husband/Wife Money. There were no significant differences between Husband/Wife Money and either Husband/Wife Business (88%) or Son/Daughter Dating (83%). There were no main or interaction effects of Age group or Education group. Follow-up pairwise comparisons also showed significant difference between Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (97%) and Son/Daughter Dating (83%), $p = .049$.

Summary. The results show that participants assessed that equality between two males was less alterable than equality between a male and a female in the same situation (Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money and Husband/Wife Money), when faced with an opposing religious authority. Results also show that participants assessed greater equality for two male protagonists in the face of opposing religious authority than for the equality of a son and daughter dating. This

may reflect the fact that participants who judged Neither Can Date may be less likely to defy religious authority. There was no evidence of difference between the equality of two males in a situation pertaining to money and the equality of husband and wife in a situation pertaining to business, when faced with opposing religious authority.

Generalizability

The initial test showed a significant difference in judgments of equality for the generalizability criterion judgment (e.g., *Suppose that there is another country where it is generally accepted that only the husband can have access to the money. Is that OK or Not OK?*) between Husband/Wife Money and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money: Husband/Wife Money (75%) and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (88%) ($OR = 3.11$, 95% CI [1.21, 8.01], Wald $X^2(1) = 5.53$, $p = .019$). The odds of an equality judgment for Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money were 3.11 times those for Husband/Wife Money, in the face of an opposing social norm in another country. There were no significant differences between Husband/Wife Money and either Husband/Wife Business (75%) or Son/Daughter Dating (78%). There were no main or interaction effects of Age group or Education group. Follow-up pairwise comparison showed no significant differences between any pairs.

Summary, Thus, while the more stringent pairwise test showed no significant difference between Husband/Wife Money and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money, there is a possible trend indicating that equality in the husband/wife money situation may be less generalizable than that in the male/male money situation. Further research would be needed to examine this possibility.

JUSTIFICATIONS

Research Questions: *How do men reason about (justify) evaluations of equality or inequality between males and females, and between two males? Do justifications differ depending on the type of situation or age or educational level of the participant?*

Hypotheses: *Between males and females, we expected justifications of obligatory role or biological difference between males and females and ideas of cultural or religious requirements or needs in support of inequality evaluations. We expected that justifications might differ depending on the situation. We made no a priori hypotheses regarding the effect of age or educational level on justifications.*

Between two males, we expected justifications of rights and the equality of persons in support of equality evaluations; we hypothesized that neither age nor education would affect justifications.

Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for each justification category. Participant answers were coded for three justifications (reasoning category); the use of a specific reasoning category was coded as 1 = only category used; .66 for two uses out of three, .33 for one use out of three, 0 = no use of category. (If two justifications were offered, 0.5 = one use) (See Table 3). When sphericity was violated, Greenhouse-Geisser correction is reported.

Fisher exact tests (two-sided) were run to compare the use of justification *sub-categories*. Use of sub-categories was coded as 1 = use and 0 = no use.

All justification categories used by participants $\geq 10\%$ were analyzed. Justifications for Equality judgments are presented first, followed by justifications for Inequality judgments.

EQUALITY JUSTIFICATIONS

Family Context Justifications – Moral, Relationship, Pragmatic

Comparing across the family context situations, three primary justifications for equality evaluations were identified – *Moral, Relationship, and Pragmatic*.

Moral Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 4 Situation Type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Son/Daughter Dating, Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on use of Moral justification. There was a significant main effect of situation type ($F(2.32, 92.68) = 27.43, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .41$). Although participants used Moral justification for all the situations, the use was significantly greater for Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (63%) than for the other three situations, Husband/Wife Money (30%), Husband/Wife Business (25%), and Son/Daughter Dating (10%), $ps < .001$. The use of Moral justification was also significantly lower for Son/Daughter Dating compared to the other situations (Husband/Wife Money, $p = .002$; Husband/Wife Business, $p < .001$; Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money, $p < .001$). There was no interaction effect for situation type and no main effect of Age group or Education group. There was a significant interaction between Age group and Education group ($F(1,40) = 4.93, p = .032, \eta_p^2 = .11$) such that participants with less education (≤ 12 years) showed greater use of Moral justification in the older age group ($M = .36, SE = .05$) than in the younger age group ($M = .26, SE = .06$), and participants with more education (≥ 13 years) showed less use of Moral justification in the older age group ($M = .25, SE = .05$) than in the younger age group ($M = .37, SE = .04$).

Moral Sub-categories. Analysis for Moral justification sub-categories was conducted using Fisher exact tests (two-sided). Comparing across the family context situations, two primary Moral sub-categories were identified - *Equality of Capabilities* and *Right to Property*.

Equality of Capabilities. Participants used *Equality of Capabilities* as justification for Husband/Wife Money (18%) and Husband/Wife Business (19%); participants did not use *Equality of Capabilities* as justification for Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (0%) or Son/Daughter Dating (0%). Pairwise comparisons showed significant differences in the use of Equality of Capabilities for Husband/Wife Money and both Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money and Son/Daughter Dating, $ps < .001$; and for Husband/Wife Business and both Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money and Son/Daughter Dating, $ps < .001$.

Right to Property. Participants used *Right to Property* for all situations involving money or business (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), but use was significantly greater for Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (47%) than for any of the other situations, Husband/Wife Money (6%), Husband/Wife Business (<1%), Son/Daughter Dating (0%), $ps < .001$.

Relationship Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 4 Situation Type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Son/Daughter Dating, and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on use of Relationship justification. There were no significant main or interaction effects of situation type on the use of Relationship justification for equality evaluations for Husband/Wife Money (37%), Husband/Wife Business (33%), Son/Daughter Dating (49%), and Male Cousin/Male Cousin (29%). There were no main effects of Age group or Education group on the use of Relationship justification. There was a significant interaction between Age group and Education group ($F(1,40) = 6.66, p = .014, \eta_p^2 = .14$) such that

participants with more education (≥ 13 years) showed greater use of Relationship justification in the older age group ($M = .54, SE = .06$) than in the younger age group ($M = .31, SE = .05$).

Relationship Sub-categories. Analysis for Relationship justification sub-categories was conducted using Fisher exact tests (two-sided). Comparing across the family context situations, use of both Relationship sub-categories was identified—*Mutual Agreement* and *Relationship Benefit/Concern*.

Mutual Agreement. Participants used *Mutual Agreement* significantly more for Husband/Wife Business (25%) than for other situations: Husband/Wife Money (6%), Son/Daughter Dating (0%), Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (4%), $ps < .001$. This result may indicate participants' attention to the contextual features of business and labor arrangements in Husband/Wife Business.

Relationship Benefit/Concern. There was no significant difference in the use of *Relationship Benefit/Concern* between Husband/Wife Money (31%) and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (25%). All other pairwise comparisons showed significant differences (Son/Daughter Dating, 49%; Husband/Wife Business, 8%), $ps < .001$. Results show the greatest use of *Relationship Benefit/Concern* for the Son/Daughter Dating situation, pointing to participant attention to the contextual features of this situation (opportunity for interpersonal relationship), while the use of this reasoning is less for other situations, particularly Husband/Wife Business.

Table 3
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EQUALITY JUDGMENTS (percentages)¹

	H/W Money				H/W Business				S/D Dating ²				M/M Money				War Zone Orig Eval	Night Shift Orig Eval
	Orig Eval	Pers Ch	Relig Auth	Gen	Orig Eval	Pers Ch	Relig Auth	Gen	Orig Eval	Pers Ch	Relig Auth	Gen	Orig Eval	Pers Ch	Relig Auth	Gen		
Moral	30	16	36	31	25	13	35	32	10	49	41	50	63	24	51	52	81	83
Relationship	37	32	9	32	33	47	13	38	49	15	4	6	29	13	17	28		
Pragmatism	26	46	6	19	13	10	5	5	5	1			6	63	5	8	12	
Sociohist Change	4	3	6	2	5		6	8	<1	4	1	1			1	1	4	2
Personal Choice	<1	1	10	<1	1		6		11	6	2	1			5	2	2	4
Convention ³	1			4			1	4	7	7	3	22						
Misc ⁴			3	8		3		3	7	13	16	16			7	8		4
Justifications specific to context																		
Labor					22	27	5	9										2
Religion	<1	2	30	3	1		28		8	4	30	3	<1		14			

1 Percentages may not equal 100 due to rounding

2 Both Can Date + Neither Can Date

3 Culture or Society

4 Illogical, Simple Disapproval, Simple Approval

Pragmatic Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 4 Situation Type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Son/Daughter Dating, and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on use of Pragmatic justification. There was a significant main effect of situation type on the use of Pragmatic justification for original judgments ($F(3, 120) = 6.77, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .15$). The use was significantly greater for Husband/Wife Money (26%) than both Son/Daughter Dating (5%), $p = .002$; and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (6%), $p = .011$. No other pairwise comparisons showed significant difference (Husband/Wife Business, 13%). There were no interaction effects for situation type and no main or interaction effects for Age group or Education group.

Summary. These results indicate that while similar justifications were used in reasoning about all the family context situations, the use of Moral justification was significantly higher for the male/male situation than for the female/male situations. Furthermore, the primary Moral sub-category used for the male/male situation, *Right to Property*, may be considered an individual entitlement right, whereas the primary Moral sub-category used for the male/female situations, *Equality of Capabilities*, may be considered more as an acknowledgment of equal human capacities as opposed to a right to the specific resource in the situation.

With respect to reasoning related to Relationship concerns, there were no significant differences in use across situations, however, investigation of Relationship sub-categories (*Mutual Agreement* and *Relationship Benefit/Concern*) showed significantly greater use of Mutual Agreement for the Husband/Wife Business situation than the other family situations, suggesting a focus on decision-making processes when the context is a family business. And there was significantly greater use of Relationship Benefit/Concern for Son/Daughter Dating, suggesting assessment of particular situational features.

The frequency of Pragmatic reasoning was significantly greater when the situation involved a male and a female versus two males in the same context (Husband/Wife Money, Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money).

How do males justify assessments of equality in the work context?

Work Context Justifications – Moral

Comparing the work context situations, one primary justification was identified for equality evaluations—*Moral*.

Moral Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 2 Situation Type (Male/Female Journalist in War Zone, Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift), with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on use of Moral justification. There were no significant main or interaction effects of situation type on the use of Moral justification for equality evaluations for the work context situations: Male/Female Journalist in War Zone (81%) and Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift (83%).

There was a significant main effect of Age group ($F(1,6) = 15.42, p = .008, \eta_p^2 = .72$), such that older participants ($M = .89, SE = .06$) used Moral justification significantly more than younger participants ($M = .5, SE = .08$). There was a significant main effect of Education group ($F(1,6) = 26.97, p = .002, \eta_p^2 = .82$), such that those with more education ($M = .95, SE = .06$) used Moral justification significantly more than those with less education ($M = .44, SE = .08$). There was also a significant interaction between Age group and Education group ($F(1,6) = 24.40, p = .003, \eta_p^2 = .80$) such that participants with less education (≤ 12 years) showed significantly

greater use of Moral justification in the older age group ($M = .88$, $SE = .09$) than in the younger age group ($M = 0$, $SE = .13$), $p = .002$.

Moral Sub-categories. Analysis for Moral justification sub-categories was conducted using Fisher exact tests (two-sided). For the work context situations, two primary Moral sub-categories were identified - *Equality of Persons* and *Equality of Capabilities*.

Equality of Persons. There was no significant difference in the use of *Equality of Persons* for Male/Female Journalist in War Zone (59%) and Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift (62%).

Equality of Capabilities. There was no significant difference in the use of *Equality of Capabilities* for Male/Female Journalist in War Zone (12%) and Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift (15%).

[*Pragmatic* justifications were also referenced, but only for the Journalist in War Zone situation (12%).]

Summary. Appeals to Morality were the predominant justifications offered by participants who assessed equality between a male and a female in the work context situations. There were no significant differences in the use of Moral reasoning between the two situations (Journalist in War Zone and Journalist in Night Shift). The primary Moral sub-categories were *Equality of Persons* and *Equality of Capabilities*, categories which can be seen as addressing the contextual features of the situation – equal access to career opportunities. There were significant main effects of both Age and Education on equality evaluations for the work situations. *Older* participants used Moral justifications significantly more than younger participants, and participants with *more education* used Moral justifications significantly more than those with less education. These results provide evidence of increasingly egalitarian conceptions of male/female relations in work contexts with increasing participant age and increasing participant education. Additionally, there was an interaction effect such that older participants with less education used Moral reasoning more than younger participants with less education.

Research Questions: *Do justifications for evaluations between females and males, and between two males, differ depending on the criterion judgment category (personal choice, authority directive, generalizability)?*

Hypotheses: *Between females and males, we made no a priori hypotheses; we considered justifications might or might not vary depending on the participant's reasoning. Between two males, we hypothesized that justifications would not be significantly affected by the criterion judgment category.*

How do males justify equality when a husband and wife choose inequality?

Personal Choice Criterion Judgment Justifications – Moral, Relationship, Pragmatic

Comparing across the family context situations, three primary justifications for equality judgments in the face of an opposing personal choice (e.g., *Suppose that in another family, the husband and wife decide that they want only the husband to be able to have access to the money. Is that OK or Not OK?*) were identified – *Moral*, *Relationship*, and *Pragmatic*.

Moral Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, **2** Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x **2** Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x **4** Situation Type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Son/Daughter Dating, Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), with repeated measures on

the last factor, was conducted on use of Moral justification. There were no significant main or interaction effects of situation type, Age group, or Education group on the use of Moral justification for the personal choice criterion judgment.

Moral Sub-categories. Analysis for Moral justification sub-categories was conducted using Fisher exact tests (two-sided). Comparing across the family context situations, three primary Moral sub-categories for personal choice criterion judgments were identified—*Equality of Persons*, *Equality of Opportunity*, and *Right to Property*.

Equality of Persons. Participants used *Equality of Persons* significantly more for Son/Daughter Dating (15%) than for the other situations: Husband/Wife Money (1%), $p < .001$; Husband/Wife Business (5%), $p = .021$, and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (5%), $p = .025$.

Equality of Opportunity. *Equality of Opportunity* was only used as a justification for Son/Daughter Dating (19%) and not for the other situations: Husband/Wife Money (0%), Husband/Wife Business (0%), and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (0%), $ps < .001$.

Right to Property. *Right to Property* was used significantly more for Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (16%) than for the other situations: Husband/Wife Money (3%), $p < .029$; Husband/Wife Business (0%), $p < .001$ and Son/Daughter Dating (0%), $p < .001$.

Relationship Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 4 Situation Type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Son/Daughter Dating, and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on use of Relationship justification. There were no significant main or interaction effects of situation type, Age group, or Education group on the use of Relationship justifications for the personal choice criterion judgment.

Relationship Sub-categories. Analysis for Relationship justification sub-categories was conducted using Fisher exact tests (two-sided). Comparing across the family context situations, both Relationship sub-categories were identified—*Mutual Agreement* and *Relationship Benefit/Concern*.

Mutual Agreement. The use of *Mutual Agreement* was significantly higher for Husband/Wife Business (23%) than for the other situations: Husband/Wife Money (5%), Son/Daughter Dating (0%), and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (2%), $ps < .001$.

Relationship Benefit/Concern. There was a significantly greater use of *Relationship Benefit/Concern* for Husband/Wife Money (27%) than for either Son/Daughter Dating (15%), $p = .028$ or Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (11%), $p = .021$. There was no significant difference with Husband/Wife Business (24%).

Pragmatic Justifications. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 4 Situation Type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Son/Daughter Dating, and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on use of Pragmatic justification. There were no significant main or interaction effects of situation type, Age group, or Education group on the use of Pragmatic justification.

Summary. For almost all situations, assessments of equality in the face of an inequality personal choice were significantly less than for the original evaluation (see earlier discussion of Criterion Judgments *Within* Situations). For those participants who continued to assert equality, however, the primary justification categories remained the same as for the original evaluation: Moral, Relationship, and Pragmatic.

Analysis of Moral reasoning sub-categories ($\geq 10\%$) showed that *Equality of Persons* and *Equality of Opportunity* were used significantly more for Son/Daughter Dating than for the other

situations, suggesting participant reasoning about situational differences (equal access/exclusion from a desired activity as opposed to money or business concerns). Also, *Right to Property* was again used significantly more for the male/male situation (Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money) than for the similar male/female situation (Husband/Wife Money).

With respect to Relationship justification sub-categories, there was again an increased concern with *Mutual Agreement* for the Husband/Wife Business situation. And the frequency of Relationship Benefit/Concern reasoning was significantly higher when the situation involved a male and a female versus two males in the same context (Husband/Wife Money, Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money).

How do males justify equality when a religious authority decrees inequality?

Religious Authority Criterion Judgment Justifications – Moral, Relationship, Religion, Personal Choice

Comparing across the family context situations, four primary justifications for equality judgments in the face of an opposing religious authority (e.g., *Suppose that in the community of the other family, the religious leader said that only husbands should have access to the money. Is it OK or Not OK for the religious leader to say that?*) were identified—*Moral, Relationship, Religion, and Personal Choice*.

Moral Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 4 Situation Type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Son/Daughter Dating, Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on use of Moral justification. There were no significant main or interaction effects of situation type, Age group, or Education group on the use of Moral justification for the religious authority criterion judgment.

Moral Sub-categories. Analysis for Moral justification sub-categories was conducted using Fisher exact tests (two-sided). Comparing across the family context situations, three primary Moral sub-categories for religious authority criterion judgments were identified—*Equality of Persons, Equality of Opportunity, and Right to Freedom from Coercion*.

Equality of Persons. There was no significant difference in the use of *Equality of Persons* across the four situations: Husband/Wife Money (7%), Husband/Wife Business (5%), Son/Daughter Dating (10%), and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (7%).

Equality of Opportunity. *Equality of Opportunity* was used significantly more for Son/Daughter Dating (11%) than for the other situations: Husband/Wife Money (0%), Husband/Wife Business (<1%), Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (2%), $ps < .001$.

Right to Freedom from Coercion. There was no significant difference in the use of *Right to Freedom from Coercion* across Husband/Wife Money (14%), Husband/Wife Business (17%), and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (24%). Use was less for Son/Daughter Dating (7%) producing significant differences in comparison with Husband/Wife Business, $p = .007$ and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money, $p < .001$.

Relationship Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 4 Situation Type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Son/Daughter Dating, Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on use of Relationship justification. There were no significant main or interaction effects of situation type, Age group, or Education group on the use of Relationship justification for the religious authority criterion judgment.

Relationship Sub-categories. Analysis for Relationship justification sub-categories was conducted using Fisher exact tests (two-sided). Comparing across the family context situations, both Relationship sub-categories were identified—*Mutual Agreement* and *Relationship Benefit/Concern*.

Mutual Agreement. The use of *Mutual Agreement* was significantly less for Son/Daughter Dating (0%) compared to the other situations: Husband/Wife Money (5%), $p = .007$, Husband/Wife Business (7%), $p < .001$, Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (14%), $p < .001$.

Relationship Benefit/Concern. There was no significant difference in the use of *Relationship Benefit/Concern* across the four situations: Husband/Wife Money (4%), Husband/Wife Business (6%), Son/Daughter Dating (4%), and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (3%).

Religion Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 4 Situation Type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Son/Daughter Dating, Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on the use of Religion justification. There was a significant main effect of situation type on the use of Religion justification for the religious authority criterion judgments ($F(3, 108) = 4.83, p = .003, \eta_p^2 = .12$). Although participants used Religion justifications for all situations, the use was significantly less for Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (14%) than for the other three situations, Husband/Wife Money (30%), $p = .042$; Husband/Wife Business (28%), $p = .032$; and Son/Daughter Dating (30%), $p = .005$. There were no significant main or interaction effects of Age group or Education group.

Religion Sub-categories. Analysis for Religion justification sub-categories was conducted using Fisher exact tests (two-sided). Comparing across the family context situations, two Religion sub-categories were identified - *Fallibility of Religious Leader* and *Misrepresentation of Religion*.

Fallibility of Religious Leader. The frequency of use of *Fallibility of Religious Leader* was significantly different for Husband/Wife Business (16%) and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (5%), $p = .006$, but not for other situations (Husband/Wife Money (9%) and Son/Daughter Dating (10%)).

Misrepresentation of Religion. There were significant pairwise differences in the use of *Misrepresentation of Religion*: Husband/Wife Money (20%) and both Husband/Wife Business (9%), $p = .009$ and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (8%), $p = .002$; and also between Son/Daughter Dating (20%) and both Husband/Wife Business, $p = .031$ and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money, $p = .008$.

Personal Choice Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 4 Situation Type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Son/Daughter Dating, Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on use of *Personal Choice* justification. There were no significant differences in the use of the Personal Choice justification across the four situations: Husband/Wife Money (10%), Husband/Wife Business (6%), Son/Daughter Dating (2%), and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (5%).

Summary. Participants who maintained equality when a religious authority decreed inequality continued to assert Moral and Relationship justifications to support their equality judgments and two additional justifications were added: Religion and Personal Choice.

Analysis of Moral sub-categories showed the use of *Equality of Persons*, *Equality of Opportunity*, and the addition of a new Moral sub-category: *Right to Freedom from Coercion*. In

disagreeing with religious authority, participants referred to *Equality of Persons* and *Right to Freedom from Coercion* to support their equality judgments across all situations (except Son/Daughter Dating) which may be more a reflection of participant response to assertions of religious authority in general than to the specific content of the decree itself. The lower use of *Right to Freedom from Coercion* for the Son/Daughter Dating situation may reflect the fact that participants who judged Neither Can Date may be less likely to defy religious authority. *Equality of Opportunity* continued to be used significantly more for Son/Daughter Dating than other situations which again may be due to reasoning about situational features (participation in activity versus money or business concerns).

For Relationship sub-categories, there was no significant difference in the use of *Relationship Benefit/Concern* across situations, and there was no use of *Mutual Agreement* for Son/Daughter Dating suggesting that equality in this situation was not alterable by mutual agreement of the protagonists.

Analysis of Religion sub-categories showed the use of *Fallibility of Religious Leader* (religious leaders being corrupt, wrong, or making arbitrary choices) and *Misrepresentation of Religion* (religion or a religious leader would not make such an assertion or promote such an idea). Use of reasoning based on these justifications varied in different ways across situations, but, in all cases, use of religion justifications was less for Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money than for other situations, suggesting less concern about religious rulings for contexts involving two males as opposed to those involving a male and a female.

How do males justify equality with regard to another country's social norm of inequality?

Generalizability Criterion Judgment Justifications – Moral, Relationship, Pragmatic

Comparing across the family context situations, three primary justifications for equality judgments in the face of an opposing social norm of another country (e.g., *Suppose that there is another country where it is generally accepted that only the husband can have access to the money. Is that OK or Not OK?*) were identified—*Moral*, *Relationship*, and *Pragmatic*.

Moral Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 4 Situation Type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Son/Daughter Dating, Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on use of Moral justification. There were no significant main or interaction effects of situation type, Age group, or Education group on the use of Moral justification for the generalizability judgment.

Moral Sub-categories. Analysis for Moral justification sub-categories was conducted using Fisher exact tests (two-sided). Comparing across the family context situations, four primary Moral sub-categories for generalizability criterion judgments were identified - *Equality of Persons*, *Equality of Opportunity*, *General Appeal to Rights*, and *Right to Property*.

Equality of Persons. There was a significantly greater use of *Equality of Persons* as a justification for Son/Daughter Dating (19%) than for the other situations: Husband/Wife Money (6%), $p = .009$; Husband/Wife Business (8%), $p = .037$; and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money, $p = .001$.

Equality of Opportunity. *Equality of Opportunity* was used significantly more for Son/Daughter Dating (16%) than for Husband/Wife Money (1%), $p < .001$ and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (3%), $p = .003$. There was no significant difference with Husband/Wife Business (8%).

General Appeal to Rights. There was a significantly lower use of *General Appeal to Rights* for Husband/Wife Business (1%) than for the other situations: Husband/Wife Money (11%), $p = .001$; Son/Daughter Dating (9%), $p = .013$; Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (8%), $p = .016$.

Right to Property. There was a significantly greater use of *Right to Property* as a justification for Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (21%) than for the other situations: Husband/Wife Money (2%), Husband/Wife Business (0%), Son/Daughter Dating (0%), $ps < .001$.

Relationship Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 4 Situation Type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Son/Daughter Dating, Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on use of Relationship justification. There was a significant main effect of situation type on the use of Relationship justification across the four situations ($F(2.41, 62.73) = 3.76, p = .022, \eta_p^2 = .13$). The use was significantly less for Son/Daughter Dating (6%) than for the other three situations: Husband/Wife Money (32%), $p = .002$; Husband/Wife Business (38%), $p = .011$; and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (28%), $p = .014$. There were no significant differences among Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money. There was no significant interaction effect of situation type and no main or interaction effects of Age group or Education group.

Relationship Sub-categories. Analysis for Relationship justification sub-categories was conducted using Fisher exact tests (two-sided). Comparing across the family context situations, both Relationship sub-categories were identified—*Mutual Agreement* and *Relationship Benefit/Concern*.

Mutual Agreement. The use of Mutual Agreement was significantly greater for Husband/Wife Business (23%) than for the other situations: Husband/Wife Money (5%), Son/Daughter Dating (0%), and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (6%), $ps < .001$.

Relationship Benefit/Concern. There was significantly less use of *Relationship Benefit/Concern* for Son/Daughter Dating (6%) than for the other situations: Husband/Wife Money (27%), $p < .001$; Husband/Wife Business (15%), $p = .010$; and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (22%), $p < .001$.

Pragmatic Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 4 Situation Type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Son/Daughter Dating, Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on the use of Pragmatic justification. There was a significant effect of situation type on the use of Pragmatic justification for the Generalizability judgment ($F(2.16, 60.38) = 3.96, p = .015, \eta_p^2 = .124$). Pairwise comparison showed a significantly greater use for Husband/Wife Money (19%) than for Son/Daughter Dating (0%), $p = .002$. There were no other significant pairwise differences (Husband/Wife Business, 5%; Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money, 8%). There were no significant main or interaction effects of Age group or Education group.

Summary. Participants who assessed equality regarding another country's social norm of inequality used Moral, Relationship, and Pragmatic reasoning, similar to general reasoning for other evaluation and criterion judgments. Further analysis of Moral sub-categories showed the use of *Equality of Persons*, *Equality of Opportunity*, *General Appeal to Rights*, and *Right to Property*. *Equality of Persons* and *Equality of Opportunity* were used significantly more for Son/Daughter Dating than for the other situations, suggesting reasoning about situational factors

(access to desired activity versus money or business concerns). *Right to Property* was used significantly more for Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money than for the other situations, similar to patterns seen for original evaluations and personal choice judgments. An additional Moral sub-category, *General Appeal to Rights*, was also referenced for all situations (although significantly less for Husband/Wife Business).

For Relationship sub-categories, *Mutual Agreement* was again used significantly more in justifying equality for Husband/Wife Business than for other situations. And *Relationship Benefit/Concern* was used for all situations (although significantly less for Son/Daughter Dating).

Additional Analysis

How do males justify equality for Son/Daughter Dating? – Comparing justifications for Both Can Date to justifications for Neither Can Date

Son/Daughter Dating Equality Justifications – Moral, Relationship, Pragmatic, Convention, Religion, and Personal Choice

Participants assessing that a son and a daughter were equal for the Son/Daughter Dating situation made one of two distinct types of evaluations, either a) Both Can Date (59% of participants) or b) Neither Can Date (27% of participants). Six primary reasoning categories were used to support these evaluations – *Moral, Relationship, Pragmatic, Convention, Religion, and Personal Choice*. Some of the justifications were used by both groups of participants, and other justifications were used by only one group or the other. Fisher tests (exact, two-sided) showed both similarities and differences in the use of these categories.

Both Can Date and Neither Can Date – Moral Justification and Pragmatic Justification. Participants in both groups (Both Can Date and Neither Can Date) used reasoning involving Moral justification and Pragmatic justification.

Moral Justification. There was no significant difference in the use of Moral justification between those who assessed Both Can Date (12%) and those who assessed Neither Can Date (5%).

Pragmatic Justification. There was no significant difference in the use of Pragmatic justification between those who assessed Both Can Date (5%) and Neither Can Date (6%).

Both Can Date – Relationship Justification and Personal Choice Justification.

Participants in the Both Can Date group used Relationship and Personal Choice justifications.

Relationship Justification. There was significantly greater use of Relationship justification by those who assessed Both Can Date (64%) than by those who assessed Neither Can Date (22%), $p < .001$. *Relationship Benefit/Concern* was the only Relationship sub-category used by either group.

Personal Choice Justification. There was significantly greater use of Personal Choice justification by those who assessed Both Can Date (8%) than by those who assessed Neither Can Date (0%), $p = .002$.

Neither Can Date – Religion and Convention Justification.

Participants in the Neither Can Date group used Religion and Convention justifications.

Religion Justification. There was significantly greater use of Religion justification by those who assessed Neither Can Date (25%) than by those who assessed Both Can Date (0%), $p < .001$. *Religious Mandate* was the only Religion sub-category used.

Convention Justification. There was significantly greater use of Convention justification by those who assessed Neither Can Date (22%) than by those who assessed Both Can Date (0%), $p < .001$. There was no significant difference in the use of the two sub-categories, *Culture* and *Society*.

Summary. The above results show that the reasoning underlying participant judgments of equality, both in support of and in denial of, a son and a daughter's wish to date, involved conceptions of Morality and Pragmatism. However, further reasoning by members of the two groups (Both Can Date and Neither Can Date) followed divergent paths. Those who assessed that *both* the son and the daughter could date referenced justifications of Relationship and Personal Choice, indicating consideration of the individual choices and interpersonal relations of the protagonists involved. Those who assessed that *neither* the son nor the daughter could date referenced justifications of Religion (mandate) and Convention, indicating consideration of authority decree or community norm rather than the preferences of the protagonists themselves.

INEQUALITY JUSTIFICATIONS

While the data discussed above shows participant conceptions of male/female equality in multiple situational contexts, the study also revealed contexts in which participants made *inequality* assessments of ~ 50% or greater. These assessments of *inequality* occurred in the following cases:

- **Work context:** Male/Female Journalist in War Zone (45% inequality) and Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift (61% inequality)
- **Personal Choice:** Husband/Wife Money (52% inequality), Husband/Wife Business (48% inequality), and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (70% inequality).
[Son/Daughter Dating is not included; only 17% assessed inequality for the personal choice criterion judgment for S/D Dating.]

Results for *inequality* justifications for these cases are presented below.

How do males justify inequality in the work context?

Inequality Justifications in the Work Context – Male/Female Role Difference and Male/Female Biological Difference

The primary justifications for inequality judgments for the work context situations were Male/Female Role Difference and Male/Female Biological Difference. For the Male/Female Journalist in War Zone situation, 24% of the inequality justifications referenced Male/Female Role Difference and 69% of the inequality justifications referenced Male/Female Biological Difference. For the Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift situation, 65% of the inequality justifications referenced Male/Female Role Difference and 27% of the inequality justifications referenced Male/Female Biological Difference. (See Table 4)

Male/Female Role Difference Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 2 Situation Type (Male/Female Journalist in War Zone, Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift), with repeated measures on the last factor, was

conducted on the use of Male/Female Role Difference justification. There was a significant main effect of situation type ($F(1, 11) = 13.75, p = .003, \eta_p^2 = .56$). Use of Male/Female Role Difference was significantly greater for the Journalist in Night Shift situation (65%) than for the Journalist in War Zone situation (24%). There was also a significant interaction between situation type and Age group ($F(1, 11) = 5.14, p = .044, \eta_p^2 = .32$) such that older participants used the Male/Female Role Difference justification significantly more for the Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift situation ($M = .75, SE = .12$) than the Male/Female Journalist in War Zone situation ($M = .08, SE = .1$).

There were no significant main or interaction effects of Age group or Education group.

Male/Female Biological Difference Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 2 Situation Type (Male/Female Journalist in War Zone, Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift), with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on the use of Male/Female Biological Difference justification. There was a significant main effect of situation type ($F(1, 11) = 12.39, p = .005, \eta_p^2 = .53$). Use of the Male/Female Biological Difference justification was significantly greater for Male/Female Journalist in War Zone (69%) than for Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift (27%). There was also a significant interaction between situation type, Age group, and Education group such that all participants except younger participants with less education showed a significantly greater use of Male/Female Biological Difference for the War Zone situation than for the Night Shift situation: younger participants with more education (War Zone: $M = .79, SE = .12$; Night Shift: $M = .14, SE = .10$); older participants with less education (War Zone: $M = 1, SE = .18$; Night Shift: $M = .33, SE = .16$); and older participants with more education (War Zone: $M = .67, SE = .18$; Night Shift: $M = .17, SE = .16$). Younger participants with less education did not show a significant difference in the use of Male/Female Biological Difference for the two situations (War Zone: $M = .50, SE = .22$; Night Shift: $M = .75, SE = .19$). There were no significant main or interaction effects of Age group or Education group.

Summary. The reasoning underlying assessments of inequality between males and females in work contexts rested on two primary conceptions: 1) Male/Female Role Difference—references to males and females having differentiated social roles such that males are responsible for the financial support of the family and the protection of females, and females are responsible for children and the household (e.g. “*Because they have kids so she has to take care of the kids and he can go to work...At night she has to stay with her kids.*”) and 2) Male/Female Biological Difference – references to males and females having genetic or “natural” differences such that males are more courageous, stronger, and more rational, and females are more fearful, weaker, and more emotional (e.g. “*A man is braver and a woman is more emotional.*”). These conceptions were applied differentially depending on the situational features. Participants made greater reference to Male/Female Biological Difference when reasoning that only the male journalist should be sent to cover the conflict in the war zone. Males were assessed as being naturally more capable in a situation involving conflict and potential violence; females were assessed as being biologically less capable. Participants made greater reference to Male/Female Role Difference when reasoning that only the male journalist should be promoted to the night shift position. Males were assessed as the appropriate choice because females (specifically mothers) were seen as the primary caretakers for children and household matters and thus must be home at night, such that many participants directly stated that the presence of the father in the home at night was not sufficient.

The interaction effect of situation type, Age group, and Education group showed that almost all participants called upon the two justifications (Male/Female Role Difference and Male/Female Biological Difference) differentially depending on the features of the particular situation. The only exception was younger participants with less education who used the justifications similarly across the two situations.

Additional research with specific situational variations in work contexts would provide further data on the patterns shown in our results.

How do males justify inequality when a husband and wife choose inequality?

Inequality Justifications for Personal Choice Criterion Judgment – Relationship and Personal Choice

Judgments of inequality were also high (~ 50% or greater) for the personal choice criterion judgment for three of the family situations (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money) (e.g., *Suppose that in another family, the husband and wife decide that they want only the husband to be able to have access to the money. Is that OK or Not OK?*). The primary justifications for these inequality assessments were Relationship and Personal Choice. (See Table 5)

Relationship Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 3 Situation Type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on the use of Relationship justification. There were no significant main or interaction effects of situation type on the use of Relationship justification for *inequality* judgments across the three situations: Husband/Wife Money (69%), Husband/Wife Business (60%), and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (92%). There were no significant main or interaction effects of Age group. There was a significant main effect of Education group such that participants with more education ($M = .92$, $SE = .05$) used Relationship justifications more frequently than those with less education ($M = .66$, $SE = .08$), ($F(1, 8) = 6.96$, $p = .030$, $\eta_p^2 = .47$). There was no interaction effect of Education group.

Mutual Agreement. Comparing across the three situations, only use of the *Mutual Agreement* sub-category was identified: Husband/Wife Money (66%), Husband/Wife Business (60%); and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (82%).

Personal Choice Justification. Repeated measures ANOVA, 2 Age (≤ 42 yrs; ≥ 43 yrs) x 2 Education (≤ 12 yrs; ≥ 13 yrs) x 3 Situation Type (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money), with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on the use of Personal Choice justification. There were no significant main or interaction effects of situation type on the use of Personal Choice justification across the three situations: Husband/Wife Money (16%), Husband/Wife Business (24%), Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money (6%). There were no significant main or interaction effects of Age group. There was a significant main effect of Education group ($F(1, 6) = 29.04$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .83$) such that Personal Choice justification was used more by participants with less education ($M = .25$, $SE = .04$) than those with more education ($M = .02$, $SE = .02$). There was no interaction effect of Education group.

Summary. The justifications used in reasoning about the personal choice criterion judgment focus on individual choice and mutual agreement between the parties involved, providing evidence of support for individual agency, even if the choice is non-egalitarian. This is

in contrast to the justifications (Male/Female Role Difference and Male/Female Biological Difference) used in reasoning about the work situations discussed above which focus on obligatory duty (role difference) and inborn traits (biological difference), providing evidence of participant conceptions of inflexibility in behavior, constraints on agency, and required adherence to pre-determined standards.

Additional Analysis

How do males justify inequality in dating?

Although only 14% of the participant sample assessed that Only Son Can Date (i.e., Son Can Date, Daughter Cannot Date), comparison of the justifications for these assessments was also conducted (Fisher exact, two-sided). The results are provided below.

Justifications for Son Can Date. Participants assessing that only a son can date used Relationship and Personal Choice justifications for this evaluation.

Relationship Justification. There was a significantly greater use of Relationship justification for Son (50%) than for Daughter (0%), $p < .001$. The Relationship sub-category *Relationship Benefit/Concern* was used exclusively.

Personal Choice Justifications. There was a significantly greater use of Personal Choice justification for Son (33%) than for Daughter (0%), $p = .004$.

Justifications for Daughter Cannot Date. Participants assessing that a daughter cannot date (while a son can) used Conventional and Male/Female Role Difference justifications for this evaluation.

Conventional Justifications. There was a significantly greater use of Conventional justification for Daughter (58%) than for Son (13%), $p = .002$. The Conventional sub-category *Culture* was used exclusively.

Male/Female Role Difference Justifications. There was a significantly greater use of Male/Female Role Difference justification for Daughter (25%) than for Son (0%), $p = .022$.

Comparison of the reasoning used to justify inequality in Son/Daughter Dating provides evidence that participants assessed males as having individual entitlement rights to Relationship and Personal Choice opportunities, while females were seen as constrained by Convention and Role Differences.

Table 4
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INEQUALITY JUDGMENTS—WORK CONTEXT (percentages)

	M/F Journalist in Warzone Evaluation	M/F Journalist in Night Shift Evaluation
Moral		
Relationship		4
Pragmatism	6	3
Conventional	2	1
Sociohistorical Change		
Religion		
Personal Choice		
Labor		
F/M Role Difference	24	65
F/M Biological Difference	69	27
Misc.		

Table 5
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INEQUALITY JUDGMENTS—PERSONAL CHOICE (percentages)

	H/W Gift of Money Personal Choice	H/W Business Personal Choice	M/M Gift of Money Personal Choice
Moral		1	
Relationship	69	60	92
Pragmatism	2	11	2
Conventional	3		
Sociohistorical Change			
Religion			
Personal Choice	16	24	6
Labor			
F/M Role Difference	5	2	
F/M Biological Difference	2	2	
Misc.	3		

Discussion

In a justice-based morality, all persons are accorded basic rights, unrelated to circumstances of gender, race, class, caste, sexuality, national origin, or other “morally irrelevant” characteristic (Nussbaum, 1997). Moral relevance is humanness itself, the universal capacity to *think*, the capacity to understand what is good and what is just. In Nussbaum’s conception, “The first form of moral affiliation for the citizen should be her affiliation with rational humanity” (1997, p. 5). It is our common heredity alone which engenders moral rights and protections. In this conception of morality, social hierarchies, systems of inclusion and exclusion based on predestined attributes, may be viewed as moral transgressions. One of the oldest forms of social discrimination is gender hierarchy, the slotting of individuals by sex at birth into categories of advantage and disadvantage. Thus, the psychological question remains how individuals, conceived as reasoning beings concerned with matters of moral choice, understand social inequality. The current study was designed to investigate how individuals in the higher status group (males), assess and justify gender equality or inequality in everyday family and work situations.

Prior psychological studies on *social equality and inequality* have focused on proposed general orientations toward dominance or subordination (e.g., Jost, 2019; Sidanius et al., 2016; Sutton, Stoeber, & Kamble, 2017; Lerner, 1980; Kelman, 1976; Staub, 1989; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014) or cognitive-developmental studies of inclusion and exclusion (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016; Hitti et al., 2021, Hitti & Killen, 2015; Killen, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2013). Psychological studies on *gender* have focused on gender identity (see Wood & Eagly, 2015 for review), gender development (Blakemore, Berenbaum, & Liben, 2013; Liben, 2017; Ruble, Martin, & Berenbaum, 2006), gender violence and prejudice (e.g., Akhter & Wilson, 2016; Ellsberg et al, 2015; Fulu et al, 2013; Glick & Fiske, 2001; Glick et al., 2004), and emerging studies on gender similarity (Hyde et al, 2019). Several developmental studies have investigated gender hierarchy and been instrumental in establishing gender as a concern of social justice (Wainryb & Turiel, 1994; Conry-Murray, 2009a, 2009b; Neff, 2001; Mensing, 2002). The current study continues this work by focusing on the cognition underlying assessments of gender equality or inequality, on the conceptions and ideas that inform those assessments.

In today’s world, discourses of equality are increasingly widespread, not limited by geographic boundary; “the ideas of every culture turn up inside every other...ideas of feminism, of democracy...are now ‘inside’ every known society” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 49). Lebanon, like all regions of the world, is faced with complex political, religious, and social pressures both to move toward a more egalitarian future for females and males and to remain embedded in traditional patterns of difference, of social, political, economic, and legal advantage and disadvantage. The study examined rural Lebanese adult male reasoning about everyday circumstances of gender relations in family and work contexts. The research design incorporated the theory that social circumstances have particular “meanings” to individuals and that these meanings are informed by the knowledge individuals hold; in essence, “...the situation is as that person defines it” (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 370; also see Asch, 1952). From a theoretical point of view, the question of male participation in systems of gender inequality cannot be fully conceptualized unless the reasons, held by the participants themselves, are known.

As outlined in the discussion below, the study results show the presence of significant and competing conceptions of gender in rural Lebanon—conceptions of both equality *and* inequality. There is evidence of male ideas of prescriptive gender equality. There is also

evidence of non-prescriptive equality, in that assertions of equality are alterable under varying social pressures and often justified with pragmatic or relationship concerns, which may be more mutable than moral reasons. Comparison of the justifications offered for male/female versus male/male equality shows, at times, divergent patterns of reasoning for the two dyads, and a direct comparison of male/female versus male/male relations in the same social context shows that equality is understood and applied to other males, but not always to females. Finally, there is evidence of inequality, most significantly in assessments and justifications for male advantage in the work environment. Thus, in Lebanon, we see evidence of equity between males and females justified with prescriptive reasoning of equality and fairness, in conjunction with more tenuous forms of asserted parity but mutable rights, as well as explicit inequality.

Male/Female Relations in Family and Work Contexts

Family Context—Non-prescriptive Equality

Within the family, we find significant evaluations of male/female equality. Participants were presented with everyday situations related to money, business, and children's social activities. In all cases, the majority of participants assessed equality between males and females in terms of decision-making rights and access to opportunity. These results were unexpected in that we hypothesized that Lebanese men would grant higher social status and decision-making rights to males over females, but we found instead that participants assessed males and females as having equal capacities and rights in the situations presented. As such we see evidence of endorsements of male/female equality within the family. The evidence for equality is complicated however by data showing that a) evaluations of equality were alterable under varying situational factors and b) the reasoning underlying equality evaluations for male/female relations was a complex mixture of moral, relationship, and pragmatic justifications. These factors suggest a nuanced understanding of the evidence for equality is necessary.

Equality

Results showed statistically significant evaluations of equality for the three male/female family situations (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, and Son/Daughter Dating), and the equality evaluations were stable in the face of counter-probes. Comparing across the three situation types, there were no significant differences in judgments of equality. We find, therefore, evidence of judgments of equality within the family in matters pertaining to husband/wife money and business arrangements and children's ability to date.

Criterion judgments, however, provide evidence that the stability of these equality assessments may vary according to situational factors. While the majority of participants continued to assess equality when faced with opposing social influences (opposing personal choice, religious authority, social norm of another country), there was a significant decrease in equality assessments under certain conditions. For the Husband/Wife Money situation, equality judgments for all the criterion judgment questions were significantly less than the equality judgments for the original situation. For the Husband/Wife Business situation, equality judgments were significantly less only for the personal choice question, suggesting more stability in the context of labor and family business arrangements. For the Son/Daughter Dating situation, equality judgments for all the criterion questions were *not* significantly different from the equality judgments for the original situation, reflecting stability in male/female equality in access/non-access to this social activity/interpersonal relationship.

The non-alterability of equality judgments for the Son/Daughter Dating situation, as compared to the other family situations, was unexpected. Results for the Son/Daughter Dating situation suggest that participants assessed this situation differently than the situations related to money and business. Participants ascribed an inviolability to the equality of the son and the daughter in this situation, an inviolability that was not affected by personal choice, authority decree, or social norm of another country. As such, the results suggest that participants assessed the situation as a solely moral event, not coordinated with conventional or personal considerations, and thus defined by impersonality, generalizability, and non-contingency upon authority.

Complex Mixture of Moral, Relationship, and Pragmatic Reasoning

Three primary justifications were identified for evaluations of male/female equality within the family—*Moral, Relationship, and Pragmatic*. For all situations, participant reasoning reflected the contextual features of the situation. Reasoning in the moral domain about male/female equality primarily referenced the equality of male and female capabilities. Examples are as follows:

“...men and women are the same when it comes to money management and it has nothing to do with gender.” [29-year-old, single male]

"It depends on the person if he is able to control [money], it has nothing to do if it's a woman or a man." [20-year-old, single male]

“...there is a lot of women who can manage work at companies and factories. Women could rule the world nowadays.” [64-year-old, married male]

The family situations also evoked reasoning about relationships, both between a husband and wife and in consideration of a son or daughter's future relationship with a spouse. Relationship reasoning referenced both the benefits and concerns of a relationship and the need for mutual agreement between the parties in a relationship. Examples are as follows:

“Both of them can date in a respectful way because this will benefit them later on...” [49-year-old married male]

“The man chose this woman to be his wife. The minimum is for him to trust her.” [29-year-old single male]

“They're partners in everything in life...they should discuss this decision, and both of them should take the decision.” [54-year-old married male]

Participants also used reasoning based on pragmatic considerations, referencing financial or business benefit, efficiency, help in an emergency, or addressing general needs. Examples of pragmatic reasoning are as follows:

“You are living with your wife every day; she should be able to know about them [bank accounts] in case something happens to you....” [33-year-old, married male]

“...this money is kept for our black days...For instance, if I had an accident, she can go get the money and take me to the hospital for treatment. If she didn’t know where the money is, I would die at the hospital entrance.” [38-year-old, married male]

“If a woman has her own ambitions [about the family business], then this is very good, they have to expand their business.” [60-year-old married male]

In summary of the reasoning for the family situations, moral justifications referencing the equal capabilities of males and females were used for the male/female situations pertaining to money and business. These justifications point to participant assessment of equal male and female capacities in family financial and business matters. [The reduced use of Moral reasoning for initial evaluations of equality for Son/Daughter Dating may be an artifact of the interview design in that participants were presented with separate Son and Daughter questions; later criterion judgments showed significantly greater use of Moral reasoning for Son/Daughter Dating]. Relationship reasoning was used in varying ways across the three situations with the sub-category *Mutual Agreement* used significantly more for Husband/Wife Business and the sub-category *Relationship Benefit/Concern* used significantly more for Son/Daughter Dating. These results point to participant attention to varying contextual features including an assessed need for mutuality in labor and business arrangements and attention to relationship matters in activities pertaining to interpersonal relations. Results also show that participants used Pragmatic justifications significantly more for the Husband/Wife Money situation, suggesting a focus on the efficiencies and needs of daily shared life in justifying equal male/female access to money.

For the criterion judgments for the male/female situations, participants used the same primary justifications—*Moral*, *Relationship*, and *Pragmatic*—in reasoning about equality judgments (one exception: Religion and Personal Choice replaced Pragmatism for the religious authority criterion judgment).

For the personal choice criterion judgment, there were no significant main effect differences in the use of Moral, Relationship, and Pragmatic reasoning across the situations. Further analysis identified two Moral sub-categories, *Equality of Persons* and *Equality of Opportunity*, each used significantly more for the dating situation than for the money and business situations. Both Relationship sub-categories were identified, *Mutual Agreement* and *Relationship Benefit/Concern*, with *Mutual Agreement* used significantly more for Husband/Wife Business than all other situations, and *Relationship Benefit/Concern* used significantly more in the personal choice criterion judgment for Husband/Wife Money than for Son/Daughter Dating (and no significant difference between Husband/Wife Money and Husband/Wife Business). These results suggest that, in opposing inequality due to personal choice, participants assessed relationship reasoning as salient for money and business situations, but moral reasoning was more appropriate for son/daughter dating.

For the religious authority criterion judgment, four primary justifications were identified – *Moral*, *Relationship*, *Religion*, and *Personal Choice*. There were no significant main effect

differences in the use of the justifications across the situations. Three sub-categories of Moral reasoning were identified – *Equality of Persons* (no significant difference across situations), *Equality of Opportunity* (used significantly more for Son/Daughter Dating), and *Right to Freedom from Coercion* (no significant difference across situations). Two sub-categories of Relationship reasoning were identified – *Mutual Agreement* (used significantly less for Son/Daughter Dating) and *Relationship Benefit/Concern* (no significant difference across situations). Two sub-categories of Religion reasoning were used—*Fallibility of Religious Leader* (no significant difference across situations) and *Misrepresentation of Religion* (used significantly less for Husband/Wife Business). For the religious authority criterion judgment, there was evidence of a wide range of justifications used in response to an inequality decree by a religious leader, including reasoning specifically opposing the authority of the leader himself (i.e., Right to Freedom from Coercion, and Fallibility of Religious Leader), and significant use of Personal Choice in opposition to the leader. This data suggests that religious leaders have an attenuated influence on structures of gender in Lebanon.

For the generalizability criterion judgment, there were no significant differences in the use of Moral justifications across the situations. There were significant differences in the use of Relationship (less for Son/Daughter Dating than the other two situations) and Pragmatism (more for Husband/Wife Money than Son/Daughter Dating). Further examination of reasoning showed three Moral sub-categories – *Equality of Persons*, *Equality of Opportunity*, and *General Appeal to Rights*. Equality of Persons and Equality of Opportunity were used significantly more for Son/Daughter Dating, and General Appeal to Rights was used significantly less for Husband/Wife Business. Two Relationship sub-categories were identified—*Mutual Agreement and Relationship Benefit/Concern*. Similar to situations already discussed, Mutual Agreement was used significantly more for Husband/Wife Business, and Relationship Benefit/Concern was used significantly less for Son/Daughter Dating. These results provide further evidence that participants turned to Moral reasoning to oppose inequality for Son/Daughter Dating and relied on Relationship reasoning for money and business matters.

Family Alliance vs Individual Entitlement

Patterns in the data suggest that the family situations can be separated into two types: *Family Alliance* and *Individual Entitlement*. The Family Alliance type includes Husband/Wife Money and Husband/Wife Business; the Individual Entitlement type includes Son/Daughter Dating (and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money, to be discussed below).

Family Alliance. The situations in Family Alliance show evidence of a more circumscribed “equality” for females, an equality that may be based on family needs and efficiencies rather than on inviolable rights. For Husband/Wife Money, equality was significantly alterable under all opposing influences presented (personal choice, religious authority, social norm of another country). While a majority of participants continued to assess equality in the face of opposing religious authority and opposing social norm of another country, there was a statistically significant drop from the original judgment. And a minority of participants assessed equality in the face of opposing personal choice (husband and wife decide only the husband should have access to the money). For Husband/Wife Business, equality was more stable in that there was no significant difference between the original equality judgment and equality in the face of opposing religious authority and opposing social norm of another country. Again, a minority of participants assessed equality in the face of opposing personal choice. Other points of difference, as compared to Son/Daughter Dating (Individual Entitlement),

are significantly greater uses of Pragmatism and Mutual Agreement for the money/business situations, as well as the use of *relationship* reasoning to oppose inequality in the Family Alliance situations, as compared to the more prescriptive *moral* reasoning used to oppose inequality for the dating situation.

Individual Entitlement. Son/Daughter Dating showed evidence of a more robust equality, providing evidence that participants held conceptions of fundamental individual entitlement for the protagonists in the dating situation that did not apply to the protagonists in the money or business situations. Equality judgments were not alterable for Son/Daughter Dating under any of the opposing influences posed (criterion judgments). With respect to reasoning for criterion judgments, participants typically used moral reasoning to oppose inequality for the Son/Daughter Dating situation.

Work Context—Mix of Prescriptive Equality and Inequality

Within the work context we find no statistical difference in evaluations of equality and inequality for the two situations (Male/Female Journalist in War Zone, Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift). There were also significant differences in judgments of equality between all work situations and all family situations. There was evidence of flexibility in evaluations of inequality for both work situations in that counter-probing showed significant changes from inequality to equality. Reasoning for inequality and equality showed distinct differences.

Prescriptive Equality

Within the work context, we see some evidence of equality: 55% of participants assessed equality for the Male/Female Journalist in War Zone situation, and 39% of participants assessed equality for the Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift situation. There was no significant difference in judgments of equality due to situation type.

Moral Reasoning. For those participants who assessed equality, reasoning rested on one primary justification—*Moral*. There was no significant difference in the use of Moral reasoning for the two situations. Further examination of the Moral reasoning identified two sub-categories—*Equality of Persons* and *Equality of Capabilities*. Both sub-categories point to participant assessment that the male and female protagonists are inherently equal, have equal capacities, and are due equal access to career opportunities. There was no significant difference in the use of the sub-categories for either situation. The types of moral reasoning evident are illustrated by the following responses to the work context situations:

“...I don’t differentiate between the genders. Either of them can be picked. It depends on the person.” [40-year-old, married male]

“In my opinion, he can send either Mr. Samir or Ms. Hala. Both of them are qualified...Both of them are the same.” [31-year-old, single male]

“Anyone...he can choose the man or the woman...they have the same qualifications and it is their job.” [64-year-old, married male]

“He can choose whoever he wants...There’s no problem with both of them, whether it was in Tripoli [war zone] or not, it’s not a big

deal. I believe that she's the same as him...They're equal in everything. I don't see a difference." [54-year-old, married male]

Inequality

Within the work context, we also see evidence of inequality: 45% of participants assessed inequality for Male/Female Journalist in War Zone, and 61% of participants assessed inequality for Male/Female Journalist in Night Shift. There were two primary justifications for inequality—*Male/Female Role Difference* and *Male/Female Biological Difference*. Participants assessed males as entitled to greater access to work opportunities because of conceptions that females and males have different social roles (females are responsible for children and household matters and males are responsible for financial support of the family and protection of females). Participants also assessed males as entitled to greater access to work opportunities because of conceptions that females and males have genetic differences (females are more emotional and weaker and males are more rational and stronger). Participants used the Male/Female Biological Difference reasoning significantly more for the War Zone situation and the Male/Female Role Difference reasoning significantly more for the Night Shift situation.

First, consider some examples of reasons based on role differences for inequality regarding the work context situations:

"...she cannot remove her role and obligations towards her family...This is the role she is obliged to play. If the woman today will leave this role, there will be a crisis." [29-year-old, single male]

"Why do they call the man the head of the family and not the woman? It's true...A man is a man and a woman is a woman and everyone plays a role." [49-year-old, married male]

Women have responsibilities at home...If she works at night and has to go to work at 8 pm...This would lead to negligence from the woman in her house...These are not men's responsibilities." [29-year-old, married male]

And the following are examples of reasoning based on male/female biological difference:

"...in the case of struggles [in a war zone], the man can be more responsible, while the woman is weaker, is afraid, and her heart is weak. The man is stronger in this case...He can bear more." [49-year-old, married male]

"Because it is a scientific thing that a man is tougher than a woman and a woman is more emotional than a man." [52-year-old, married male]

“Women by nature, do not leave their children during the night...Because she, by nature, prioritizes her children...This is her nature.” [55-year-old, married male]

“Women were born for the house [to do household work] while men weren’t...This exists since the beginning of times.” [29-year-old, married male]

The Male and Male Situation

Prescriptive Equality

In the study, there was one male/male situation—Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money. In this situation, two adult male cousins of similar age share an apartment together in Beirut as they search for new jobs. All participants (100%) assessed that the two male protagonists were equal, and these judgments were stable under counter-probing. For the criterion judgments for the male/male situation, there were no statistically significant changes in assessments of equality in the face of opposing religious authority and opposing social norm of another country. The personal choice criterion judgment showed significant change (a decrease to 30% equality).

Comparing assessments for the male/male and male/female family situations, we find evidence of both similarity and difference.

Equality Judgments

For original evaluations of equality, there were similar results for the male/male situation (Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money) and the male/female money and business situations (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business). There was a difference, however, between the male/male situation and Son/Daughter Dating (significantly less equality for the dating situation).

With respect to reasoning for equality evaluations for two males, we again find similarities and differences with reasoning for equality evaluations for a male and a female. The two primary justifications for the male/male situation were *Moral* and *Relationship*. We see similarity in the use of Moral and Relationship reasoning for both the male/male and the male/female situations, but difference in the significantly higher use of Moral justifications for the male/male situation. We also see difference in the lack of Pragmatic reasoning for the male/male situation. Further, results show a difference in the primary sub-categories of Moral reasoning used: *Right to Property* for the male/male situation and *Equality of Capabilities* for the male/female situations. Examples of moral reasoning regarding property rights for the male/male situation are as follows:

“...the money was given for both of them...both of them received the money...the money is for both of them and not for Tamer only.” [39-year-old, married male]

“Both of them should have access to the money because they both received the money and there shouldn’t [be] someone special over the other...This is a right because the money belongs to both of them.” [49-year-old, married male]

“...both of them should have access to it [money] especially for this case where they got the money as a gift so each one should have half of this then, it is not allowed for one person to keep this money.”
[22-year-old, single male]

As noted earlier in the Results section, *Right to Property*, might be considered an individual entitlement right, whereas the primary Moral sub-category used for the male/female situations, *Equality of Capabilities*, might be considered an acknowledgment of equal human capacities as opposed to a right to the specific resource in the situation. This difference suggests an inalienable right for males to access a resource versus a general (and perhaps less enforceable) endorsement of equality for females in comparison to males. Such an interpretation is supported by certain phrasing in the quotes above, e.g., the phrases “this is a right” and “it is not allowed” both evoke a certainty, an enforceability arguably not present in the reasoning quoted earlier in support of male/female equality, e.g., “men and women are the same when it comes to money management” and “it depends on the person if he is able to control [money], it has nothing to do if it’s a woman or a man”.

Criterion Judgments

For criterion judgments, there are also similarities and differences. We see similarities in the criterion judgments for Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money and Husband/Wife Business, although the underlying justifications are different, i.e., Right to Property for Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money and Mutual Agreement for Husband/Wife Business (also see “Mutuality” discussion below). And we see differences between Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money and both Husband/Wife Money and Son/Daughter Dating for the personal choice criterion judgment (significantly *less* equality for the male/male situation) and the religious authority criterion judgment (significantly *more* equality for the male/male situation). No significant differences were seen for the generalizability criterion judgment, although there was evidence of approaching significance between Husband/Wife Money and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money.

With respect to reasoning for criterion judgments, we find three primary justifications for male/male equality in the face of opposing social influence—*Moral*, *Relationship*, and *Pragmatism* (exception: *Religion* and *Personal Choice* replace Pragmatism for the religious authority question). While these reasoning categories are the same as those used for the male/female criterion judgments, there are differences in their use. For the personal choice criterion question, there were differences in the type of Moral reasoning used to oppose an inequality personal choice. Right to Property was used significantly more for the male/male situation, whereas Equality of Persons and/or Equality of Opportunity were used for the male/female situations. For the religious authority criterion question, Religion justifications were used significantly less for the male/male situation than for the male/female situations.

We see evidence, therefore, that males hold conceptions of equality between two males that are not alterable under external pressure unless the two male protagonists themselves choose to make inequality arrangements. Results also show that participants assessed two males as having greater latitude to make non-egalitarian arrangements than a male and female (except for the business situation), suggesting that participants may conceive of two males as having greater agency to make their own choices, entitlement granted to members of the dominant social class. It may also be that participants assessed arrangements between a male (member of the dominant class) and a female (member of the subordinate class) as less open to overt alteration.

Individual Entitlement

Results provide evidence that judgments about decisions between male cousins regarding the money are based on stable assessments of equality, entailing conceptions of fundamental individual entitlement. As such, the protagonists perceive each other as entitled to core rights, freedoms, and opportunities, obligations that cannot be abridged. The inalienability of these obligations rests on the reciprocity of equal parties; duties to the other are identical to duties expected for the self. In the study, judgments of equality for two males were not alterable under opposing external influence, only by personal choice of the two protagonists themselves. There were also variations in the reasoning used to support equality evaluations for the male/male situation. For the original evaluations of equality, there was a significantly greater use of moral reasoning for the male/male situation than for the male/female situations, and the sub-category of moral reasoning was different (greater use of Right to Property for the male/male situation and less use of Equality of Persons and Equality of Opportunity). Also, the use of Religion justifications was less in opposing inequitable religious authority. These variances in reasoning suggest several possibilities, i.e., that males may not reference Equality of Persons or Equality of Capabilities for two males because male equality is “naturally” assumed, and reasoning, thus, focuses on entitlement to the specific resource in the situation (Right to Property) rather than on establishment of the participants’ equality; and also, that males do not reference Religion in opposing religious authority because religious interference with male equality has minimal historical basis and therefore does not contribute to reasoning.

Females and Males in the Same Social Context

Rights are Understood but Applied Differentially

Two of the situations in the study were designed to be parallel, varying primarily in the gender of the protagonists. In one situation, a husband and wife are given a gift of money and must decide who has access to the money (Husband/Wife Money); in another situation, two male cousins who live together are given a gift of money and must decide who has access to the money (Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money). The situations were designed to be similar in contextual features in order to allow investigation of participant understandings and applications of equality to two males versus a male and a female.

Comparison of results for the two situations shows differences in judgments and reasoning regarding two males versus a male and a female in the same social context. While evaluations of equality for the male/male and male/female situation were statistically similar, there were differences in the underlying reasoning. Participants used significantly more Moral reasoning (Right to Property) and significantly less Pragmatic reasoning for the male/male situation than for the male/female situation. With respect to criterion judgments, male/male equality was stable, alterable only by personal choice of the protagonists. Male/female equality was not stable, alterable by all the opposing influences posed (personal choice, religious authority, and social norm of another country). Further, for the personal choice criterion judgment, evaluations of inequality due to the personal choice of two males was significantly greater than for a male and a female. There were also variations in criterion judgment reasoning: for personal choice, there was significantly greater use of Relationship Benefit/Concern for the male/female dyad than for the male/male dyad; for religious authority, there was significantly less use of Religion for the male/male dyad; and for generalizability, there was significantly greater use of Right to Property for the male/male dyad.

In summary, the evaluations and justifications for the male/male situation show that male participants *understand* equality, protect it for other males, and justify it with prescriptive reasoning. Evaluations and justifications for the male/female situation show that male participants understand equality, but do not protect it from opposing influence and often use non-prescriptive reasoning to justify it. We see, thus, evidence for the conclusion that the male participants in our study understood conceptions of equality but applied it differentially to different groups of people. While there were initial judgments of equality for both the male/male and male/female dyads, further questioning showed multiple differences in both the mutability of the equality and in the reasoning underlying the equality. These results point to participant understanding of equality as a concept (and attested for both males and females) but application as an *obligation* only to males.

Why is the concept applied differentially? One explanation may be that, for males, a) the “object of judgment” (money) changes, in a male/male versus a male/female situation, and b) the “informational assumptions” held about other males are different than those held about females (Turiel & Wainryb, 1994; Asch, 1952; Lewin, 1935). “Object of judgment” refers to the *cognitive content* of a situational feature, as determined by the gestalt relationship between part (feature) and whole (situation) (Asch, 1952). One may propose that the object of judgment in the Husband/Wife Money situation is *money in relation to family needs*, while the object of judgment in the Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money situation is *money in relation to individual property rights*. The meaning, the cognitive content, of the money is different in the two situations and produces different reasoning by participants.

There may also be differences in the informational assumptions (beliefs, ideas, conceptions of reality) held by males about males and about females. We see evidence of this in the reasoning underlying inequality assessments for males and females in the workplace—assumptions that females and males have different social roles and assumptions that females and males are genetically different, in core ways that impact access to opportunity and rights. We also see evidence in the mutability of female equality in the Husband/Wife Money situation in the face of opposing religious authority and opposing social norm of another country (and reduced mutability in the face of opposing personal choice).

Age and Education

Neither age nor education were found to affect evaluations of equality for males and females (or males and males) within the family and work contexts, for both initial evaluations and criterion judgments. With respect to reasoning, there were a few significant main and interaction effects of age and education. In the work situations, there was a main effect of age in that older participants used Moral justification significantly more than younger participants. There was also a main effect of education in that participants with more education used Moral justification significantly more than those with less education. There was also an interaction effect such that participants with less education showed greater use of Moral justification in the older age group than in the younger age group. These effects suggest greater attention to Moral concerns in reasoning about workplace equality with both increased age and increased education. However, while these results point to possible patterns in Lebanese male judgment and reasoning, the study is likely underpowered, due to sample size and variability in the age and educational level of participants, to find general effects.

In the family situations, while there were no main effects of age or education, there were several age and education interaction effects. Participants with less education showed increased use of Moral justification with increased age while participants with more education showed decreased use of Moral justification with increased age; participants with more education showed greater use of Relationship justification with increased age. These effects may reflect greater attention to either Moral or Relationship concerns with increased age.

Note: With respect to *inequality* reasoning, while there were no main effects of age or education in the work context, there were several interaction effects. Older participants used Male/Female Role Difference reasoning significantly more for the Night Shift situation than for the War Zone situation. And all participants, except younger participants with less education, used Male/Female Biological Difference reasoning more for the War Zone situation.

Additional Observations

Personal Choice

Participants made *inequality* evaluations of ~ 50% or greater for the personal choice criterion judgments for the money and business family situations, i.e., protagonists decide that only the husband or one of the male cousins should have access to the money or business decision-making rights (Husband/Wife Money, 52% inequality; Husband/Wife Business, 48% inequality; and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money, 70% inequality). Two primary justifications were offered by participants—*Relationship* and *Personal Choice*. There were no significant differences in the use of either justification across the situations. For Relationship reasoning, only one sub-category was identified—*Mutual Agreement*. There was a main effect of Education on the use of both justifications such that participants with more education used Relationship justifications more frequently than those with less education, and participants with less education used Personal Choice justifications more frequently than those with more education.

The justifications used in reasoning about the personal choice criterion judgment focus on individual choice and mutual agreement between the parties involved, providing evidence of support for individual agency, even if the choice is non-egalitarian. The results may also suggest that participants conceived of two males as having greater agency to make their own choices, an attribute typically granted to members of the dominant social class. In contrast, participants may have conceived of equal relations between a male and a female as less alterable on the basis of personal choice, but thereby also distinguishing this dyad as different from the male/male dyad.

Religious Authority—Attenuated Influence

Results from the study suggest that religious leaders do not have significant influence on male decision-making regarding gender equality in Lebanon. Assessments of equality were not altered when participants (~ 60 % Muslim, 35% Christian, and 5% other) were faced with a religious authority decreeing inequality (except in the case of Husband/Wife Money). And participants referenced moral concepts, not religious concepts, in all prescriptive reasoning about male/female relations, pointing to participant attention to the intrinsic merits of the act (equality vs inequality) rather than the requirements of a religious rule. References to religion were only invoked as disputations of religious authority—coded as Fallibility of Religious Leader and Misrepresentation of Religion. [Religious Mandate never rose above 4% across all situations and question types except as justification by participants who assessed Neither Can Date or Only Son Can Date (Son/Daughter Dating situation), in which case, Religious Mandate comprised 33% of their justifications.] These results align with prior developmental studies on the influence of

religious authority on moral issues, with Christian, Jewish, and Amish children in the U. S. (Nucci & Turiel, 1993), Hindu and Muslim children in India (Srinivasan et al., 2019), and Mormon young adults (Robinson & Smetana, 2019).

The data also showed further indications of a reduced influence for religious authority in that participants used justifications referencing personal agency (Personal Choice and Right to Freedom from Coercion) more when opposing religious authority than when opposing other social influences. And for the male/male situation, participants used significantly less reference to religious justifications in any form when opposing religious authority, when compared to other situations, indicating a possible lack of concern with religious authority for the arrangements of two males.

Sociohistorical Change

Potential markers of movement toward greater equality exist in participants' references to social and historical change. Although such references did not rise to 10% for any situation, they remained a continuing thread throughout participant responses. The following are examples of justifications referencing Sociohistorical Change:

“Because nowadays we are not having this masculine mentality anymore and the man is not the only one who is controlling the family...” [30-year-old, single male]

“His point of view is very patriarchal and primitive... We live in the 21st century today and not the Stone Age.” [57-year-old, married male]

“Culture develops and humans develop...The driving code in Lebanon in 1800 used to talk about donkeys. Today, there are no donkeys. Roads in 1800 were made for donkeys and horses. We cannot apply the 1800 driving code today.” [29-year-old, single male]

“...maybe religious [leader] nowadays is still sticking to the old mentality and is not taking into consideration all this evolution, so the religious leader is still having the mentality that was spread at the time of the prophet or Jesus, and for sure all this have changed nowadays” [27-year-old, single male]

Such references to conceptions of social change over time show both participants' awareness of such changes and their acknowledgment of these changes as legitimate and meaningful.

Connections to Scholarship on Lebanon and Social Equality

The present study contributes to the current scholarship on social conditions for women in Lebanon and on the psychological study of social inequality as a moral question, both areas that are relatively understudied. These two areas of research are intertwined, as historically, and

contemporaneously, women remain a subordinated class globally and their status in Lebanon is no exception. Lebanese women's access to political, legal, economic, and social power remains constrained, and recent anthropological, sociological, legal, and labor studies attest to this status (Human Rights Watch, 2015; Joseph, 2000, 2010, 2019; Lattouf, 2004; Melki & Hitti, 2020; Melki & Mallat, 2016; Thomas, 2013). Psychological study of gender in Lebanon is sparse and what exists is focused on violence (domestic and war) (Sarieddine, 2016; Usta et al., 2008; Usta et al., 2016). The present psychological study contributes detailed information regarding male conceptions of male/female relations in Lebanon, providing data on conditions of both gender equality and inequality, pointing to foundational causes of inequality not provided by the more general perspectives and analyses of effects and consequences referenced in current literature on women's status in Lebanon.

With respect to psychological studies of social inequality within the constructivist framework, prior research has largely focused on children's developmental understandings of equity and inequity, and on issues of distributive justice (e.g., Arsenio, 2015; Arsenio & Gold, 2006; Elenbaas et al., 2020; Rizzo & Killen, 2016). We believe the present study is the first constructivist study investigating reasoning about social privilege by members of a dominant class, from the perspective of moral question. The study provides new information about the psychological underpinnings of social inequality.

Limitations and Future Directions

Several limitations of the study can be noted. The relatively small sample size and location in rural Lebanon may limit the extension of results to broader patterns of male thinking. Further studies with larger sample sizes and other cultural settings are needed to continue investigating the reasoning of those in positions of higher social status about issues of social equality and inequality. Additional limitations are discussed below.

Overlap of Moral and Personal Domains

Results showed that the equality judgments participants made for the Son/Daughter Dating situation were not alterable for any criterion judgment, indicating that participants assessed the situation as an event in the moral domain, defined by impersonality, generalizability, and non-contingency upon authority. In contrast, results showed that the equality judgments participants made for the money and business situations (Husband/Wife Money, Husband/Wife Business, and Male Cousin/Male Cousin Money) were all alterable under at least one condition—personal choice—suggesting participant assessment of these situations as having both moral and personal domain criteria. In this respect, evaluations of equality and inequality for the money and business situations may have been complicated by participant coordinations of both the moral and personal domains. As such, further research on male conceptions of gender equality and inequality would benefit from clear distinction between situations in the moral domain and situations in the personal domain.

Mutual Agreement

The male participants in the study often referenced ideas of mutual agreement, particularly in situations pertaining to the husband and wife. For our study, Mutual Agreement as a justification was defined as follows:

Decisions in an interpersonal relationship should be made by, and based upon, the mutual agreements and meetings of the reciprocal

concerns and desires of the parties involved. It is up to the ones in the relationship to decide the arrangements.

We point out that mutuality is a complex idea that may be conceptualized differently depending upon one's position in the social hierarchy. Members of subordinated groups often regard mutuality as an entitlement that must be protected in both the family and the workplace. Members of the dominant group, on the other hand, often conceptualize mutuality as a "natural" aspect of relationships, thus obscuring when it is not. If the two parties do not have equal social status, both in the home and at work, then mutuality is a vulnerable concept. One of the male participants in the study explicitly referenced this issue:

"If they [husband and wife] agreed on that because the woman is not knowledgeable or has ideas or is creative, then no problem. But if they agreed just because she is a woman, then no. It happens here in Lebanon. You are a woman, stay outside this and take care of the house." [29-year-old, single male]

The question of mutuality can only be answered by including women's voices in future research. Would women assess (to the extent of 50% inequality) that the personal choice of a husband and wife should/could be that only the husband has the opportunity or decision-making right? And if women make these assessments, what is their underlying reasoning? Would it be Mutual Agreement? Or would it be another reason such as Relationship Benefit/Concern (concern), or Pragmatism, Convention, Religion, or Personal Choice (of the husband)? These are questions that may be addressed in future studies.

Conclusion

The study shows conceptions of equality *and* inequality for males and females in Lebanon. Equality is attested to within the family context, but the equality is alterable under certain conditions, justified with pragmatic and relationship reasoning over moral reasoning, and for at least one situation, comprised partially of participants who affirm a non-agentic equality (Neither Can Date). In the workplace, equality evaluations are supported by moral reasoning, but equality does not rise to a statistically significant level.

Conceptions of inequality thus remain significant, most explicitly articulated in judgments and reasoning pertaining to the work context, but implicit within the family context. In the work context, participants justified greater male opportunity with ideas about segregated social roles and differentiated biological traits for males and females. Such conceptions inform the *meanings* males impart to social situations, meanings that have consequential effects on relations of equality and inequality. As seen in the stability and justification of male/male equality, participants judged that *other males* were due rights, rights not always available to females. Direct comparison of male/male and male/female equality in the same context showed differences in applications of equality. As such, males are distinguishing between different groups of human beings, those who are members of the "sanctified universe of obligation", "toward whom obligations are owed, to whom the rules apply, and whose injuries call for expiation", and those who are outside the 'universe of obligation', vulnerable to diminished or absent rights (Fein, 1979, pp. 4, 33).

In the family context, male/female equality may be constrained by assumptions of family alliance, of obligations that fundamentally limit autonomy, particularly for women. As such,

females may be attested to as equal, and may even have “conative power”, legal rights as outlined in the Lebanese constitution, but may still not have “achievemental powers”, that is, “the effective power to succeed in [one’s] aims” (Gewirth, 1982, p. 36). Equality attested to in family contexts may have more to do with alignment with family/kin goals and normative roles for women, than with ‘achievemental’ equality.

Studies show greater support for gender equality in *education* than in *politics* in the Middle East/North Africa region, attributed by researchers to education’s alignment with normative ‘motherhood’ roles (Glas et al., 2019; Price, 2014). Equality as such is not conceived then as a prescriptive right. Relations within the family are the most intimate of human relations and may be the most intractable form of social discrimination due to economic dependency and emotional connections. Family relations are core to the lives of almost all human beings, through both physical and emotional sustenance. Such relations, in many instances, may be considered a “transaction...for survival itself, for love and family and connection...a contract of primal dimensions” (Williams, 1991, p. 23). In this light, future investigation of equality within the family will require the voices of women, as well as men, to document the perspectives of all parties to this ‘contract’.

What was abundantly clear throughout the study was the evidence of individual reasoning. Participant judgments and justifications reflected the particular contextual factors of each situation that was posed. At times, the participants themselves referenced their thinking processes, e.g., “...we have the capability to analyze and make decisions that are good for us” [40-year-old, married male]. On another occasion, a participant carefully worked out his thoughts on the dating situation (interpreting it in terms of his wife and himself):

“I am worried that they [researchers] might be talking about sexual relationships...[interviewer: No, here they have not specified that.]...They haven’t specified that but it seems like it is from the questions...The thing that I would need to analyze [is allowing it] for myself and deprive my wife from it, I would prefer depriving us both from it. I think that is the right idea.” [70-year-old, married male]

As the data also show, while participants reasoned about their ideas and made evaluations for the situations presented to them, general patterns of thinking became clear. The ideas in these patterns and the narratives built around these ideas, are profoundly instrumental in systems of social organization—“Embedded in cultural practices are multiple and mixed messages for people in different positions in the society—especially for people in dominant or subordinate positions” (Turiel & Wainryb, 2000, p. 254). These different messages, produced and reproduced in daily social interaction, help to support exclusionary social systems. We see evidence of these messages in this study.

Signs of progress toward increasing gender equality in Lebanon were seen in repeated references to sociohistorical change in the status of women, in the moral justifications offered by those who assessed equality in the workplace, and in the significant shifts to equality judgments after counter-probing for the workplace situations. As one participant stated in reasoning about his change to equality from a prior inequality evaluation, “She has a point [that greater male career opportunity is unfair] ...She has the right to take the decision...She can take the decision and work the night shift” [55-year-old, married male]. However, the data overall point to continuing conceptions of male privilege in rural Lebanon supported by informational

assumptions of male/female difference and non-prescriptive male commitments to equality. In conclusion, we do not yet see evidence that women have—

“secure[d]...a certain fundamental moral status...rational autonomy in the sense of being a self-controlling, self-developing agent who can relate to other persons on a basis of mutual respect and cooperation, in contrast to being a dependent, passive recipient of the agency of others” (Gewirth, 1982, p. 5).

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Appendix

Interview Protocols

Family and Work Relations Study – Interview Guide

Thank you for participating in this study. Please let me know at any time if you have any questions or concerns.

I will read you some stories and ask you some questions about them. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. Please tell me what you think.

Now, I will read you the first story.

[MONEY]

Mr. and Mrs. Hashem received a gift of 150,000 LL from a friend. Mr. and Mrs. Hashem have enough money right now to pay for their regular needs and they do not have any children. Mr. and Mrs. Hashem both agree that they would like to save the money for the future. Mr. Hashem says that he will choose a safe place for keeping the money and that only he should be able to access the money. Mrs. Hashem says that they should choose a safe place together and that they should both have access to the money.

Question:

Should only Mr. Hashem have access to the money or should both Mr. Hashem and Mrs. Hashem have access to the money?

Follow-up questions and probing:

Why do you think that (only Mr. Hashem) (both Mr. and Mrs. Hashem) should be able to have access to the money?

Please probe each idea participant mentions, using the words/terms used by the participant.

For each idea:

<p>WHY do you think _____ is so?</p>	<p>OR Alternative versions: Why do you think _____ is that way? Why do you think _____ is set up that way? Why do you think _____ says that?</p>
<p>Do you think _____ SHOULD be that way?</p>	<p>OR Alternative version: Do you think _____ is a good practice?</p>

<p>WHY do you think _____ should be that way?</p>	

COUNTER-PROBES:

For unequal: Suppose Mrs. Hashem said that women should be treated the same as men, that it is not fair that the husband makes these decisions.

- What do you think about what she said?
- Why?

For equal: Suppose Mr. Hashem said that women are not able to make as good decisions about money as men, so he should be the only one who can take money from the account.

- What do you think about what he said?
- Why?

CRITERION JUDGMENTS:

For unequal:

(Personal Decision) Suppose that in another family, the husband and wife decided that they both want to be able to have access to the money.

- Is that OK or not OK?
- Why?

(Authority) Let's suppose that in the community of the other family the religious leader said that husbands and wives should both be able to have access to the money.

- Is it OK or not OK for the religious leader to say that?
- Why?
- Would that make it OK for both to have access to the money?
- Why?

(Generalizability) Suppose that there is another country where it is generally accepted that both the husband and wife are able to have access to the money.

- Is that OK or not OK?

- Why?
- Would that make it OK for both the husband and wife to have access to the money?
- Why?

For equal:

(Personal decision) Suppose that in another family, the husband and wife decide that they want only the husband to be able to have access to the money.

- Is that OK or not OK?
- Why?

(Authority) Let's suppose that in the community of the other family the religious leader said that only husbands should have access to the money.

- Is it OK or not OK for the religious leader to say that?
- Why?
- Would that make it OK for only the husband to be able to have access to the money?
- Why?

(Generalizability) Suppose that there is another country where it is generally accepted that only the husband can have access to the money.

- Is that OK or not OK?
- Why?
- Would that make it OK for only the husband to have access to the money?
- Why?

[BUSINESS]

Mr. and Mrs. Assaf are married and have no children. Mr. Assaf owns a small grocery store in town and Mrs. Assaf has worked with him in the store from the day it opened. She has an idea to grow the business and wants to invest some money in purchasing new products to sell in the store. She thinks that she and her husband should both share in the decision to expand their business but Mr. Assaf does not think so.

Question:

Should Mr. and Mrs. Assaf make the decision to grow their business together or should Mr. Assaf be the only one to make the decision?

Follow-up questions and probing:

Why do you think that (only Mr. Assaf) (both Mr. and Mrs. Assaf) should make the decision to grow their business?

Please probe each idea participant mentions, using the words/terms used by the participant.

For each idea:

<p>WHY do you think _____ is so?</p>	<p>OR Alternative versions: Why do you think _____ is that way? Why do you think _____ is set up that way? Why do you think _____ says that?</p>
<p>Do you think _____ SHOULD be that way?</p>	<p>OR Alternative version: Do you think _____ is a good practice?</p>
<p>WHY do you think _____ should be that way?</p>	

COUNTER-PROBES:

For unequal: Suppose Mrs. Assaf said that women should be treated the same as men, that it is not fair that the husband makes these decisions.

- What do you think about what she said?
- Why?

For equal: Suppose Mr. Assaf said that women are not able to make as good decisions about business as men, so he should be the only one who can make these decisions.

- What do you think about what he said?
- Why?

CRITERION JUDGMENTS:

For unequal:

(Personal Decision) Suppose that in another family, the husband and wife decided that they both want to be able to make decisions about their business.

- Is that OK or not OK?
- Why?

(Authority) Let's suppose that in the community of the other family the religious leader said that both husbands and wives should be able to make decisions about their business.

- Is it OK or not OK for the religious leader to say that?
- Why?
- Would that make it OK for both the husband and wife to make decisions about their business?
- Why?

(Generalizability) Suppose that there is another country where it is generally accepted that both the husband and wife can make decisions about their business.

- Is that OK or not OK?
- Why?
- Would that make it OK for both the husband and wife to make decisions about their business?
- Why?

For equal:

(Personal decision) Suppose that in another family, the husband and wife decide that they want only the husband to be able to make decisions about their business.

- Is that OK or not OK?
- Why?

(Authority) Let's suppose that in the community of the other family the religious leader said that only husbands should be able to make decisions about their business.

- Is it OK or not OK for the religious leader to say that?
- Why?
- Would that make it OK for only the husband to make decisions about their business?
- Why?

(Generalizability) Suppose that there is another country where it is generally accepted that only the husband can make decisions about their business.

- Is that OK or not OK?
- Why?
- Would that make it OK for only the husband to make decisions about their business?
- Why?

[CHILDREN'S DATING –SON]

Mr. and Mrs. Sukar's son is 18. He lives at home while he attends the local university. He is a good student and a respectful son. He is also very friendly and likes meeting new people. He intends to get married someday, but first he wants to date.

Question:

Is it OK for the son to date before he gets married?

Follow-up questions and probing:

Why do you think it is OK (not OK) for the son to date before he gets married?

Please probe each idea participant mentions, using the words/terms used by the participant.

For each idea:

WHY do you think _____ is so?	OR Alternative versions: Why do you think _____ is that way? Why do you think _____ is set up that way? Why do you think _____ says that?
Do you think _____ SHOULD be that way?	OR Alternative version: Do you think _____ is a good practice?
WHY do you think _____ should be that way?	

[CHILDREN'S DATING – DAUGHTER]

Mr. and Mrs. Rizk's daughter is 18. She lives at home while she attends the local university. She is a good student and a respectful daughter. She is also very friendly and likes meeting new people. She intends to get married someday, but first she wants to date.

Question:

Is it OK for the daughter to date before she gets married?

Follow-up questions and probing:

Why do you think it is OK (not OK) for the daughter to date before she gets married?

Please probe each idea participant mentions, using the words/terms used by the participant.

For each idea:

<p>WHY do you think _____ is so?</p>	<p>OR Alternative versions: Why do you think _____ is that way? Why do you think _____ is set up that way? Why do you think _____ says that?</p>
<p>Do you think _____ SHOULD be that way?</p>	<p>OR Alternative version: Do you think _____ is a good practice?</p>
<p>WHY do you think _____ should be that way?</p>	

*Ask the following questions based on the response
 for the DAUGHTER*

COUNTER-PROBES:

For unequal: Suppose that Mrs. Rizk said that daughters should be treated the same as sons, that it is not fair that the son gets to date but the daughter does not.

- What do you think about what she said?
- Why?

For equal: Suppose Mr. Rizk said that it is not important for daughters to be able to date and that only the son should be able to do so.

- What do you think about what he said?
- Why?

CRITERION JUDGMENTS:

For unequal:

(Personal Decision) Suppose that in another family, the husband and wife decided that both the son and the daughter should be able to date.

- Is that OK or not OK?
- Why?

(Authority) Let's suppose that in the community of the other family the religious leader said that both sons and daughters should be able to date.

- Is it OK or not OK for the religious leader to say that?
- Why?
- Would that make it OK for both the son and the daughter to be able to date?
- Why?

(Generalizability) Suppose that there is another country where it is generally accepted that both sons and daughters are able to date.

- Is that OK or not OK?
- Why?
- Would that make it OK for both the son and the daughter to be able to date?
- Why?

For equal:

(Personal decision) Suppose that in another family, the husband and wife decide that they want only the son to be able to date.

- Is that OK or not OK?
- Why?

(Authority) Let's suppose that in the community of the other family the religious leader said that only sons should be able to date.

- Is it OK or not OK for the religious leader to say that?
- Why?
- Would that make it OK for only the son to be able to date?
- Why?

(Generalizability) Suppose that there is another country where it is generally accepted that only sons are able to date.

- Is that OK or not OK?
- Why?
- Would that make it OK for only the son to be able to date?
- Why?

MALE-MALE SITUATION

[MONEY]

Tamer and Karim are cousins. They are both adults about the same age, and they recently moved to Beirut looking for new jobs and decided to rent an apartment together. They received a gift of 150,000 LL from a relative. Tamer and Karim have enough money right now to pay for their regular needs. Tamer and Karim both agree that they would like to save the money to buy something for the apartment in the future. Tamer says that he will choose a safe place for keeping the money and that only he should be able to access the money. Karim says that they should choose a safe place together and that they should both have access to the money.

Question:

Should only Tamer have access to the money or should both Tamer and Karim have access to it?

Follow-up questions and probing:

Why do you think that (only Tamer) (both Tamer and Karim) should have access to the money?

Please probe each idea participant mentions, using the words/terms used by the participant.

For each idea:

WHY do you think _____ is so?	OR Alternative versions: Why do you think _____ is that way? Why do you think _____ is set up that way? Why do you think _____ says that?
Do you think _____ SHOULD be that way?	OR Alternative version: Do you think _____ is a good practice?
WHY do you think _____ should be that way?	

COUNTER-PROBES:

For unequal: Suppose Karim said that he should be treated the same as Tamer, that it is not fair that Tamer makes these decisions.

- What do you think about what he said?
- Why?

For equal: Suppose Tamer said that other men are not able to make as good decisions about money as he can, so he should be the only one to have access to the money.

- What do you think about what he said?
- Why?

Criterion Judgments:

For unequal:

(Personal Decision) Suppose that two other male cousins decide that they both should be able to have access to the money.

- Is that OK or not OK?
- Why?

(Authority) Let's suppose that in the community of the two other male cousins the religious leader said that both of them should be able to have access to the money.

- Is it OK or not OK for the religious leader to say that?
- Why?
- Would that make it OK for both of them to have access to the money?
- Why?

(Generalizability) Suppose that there is another country where it is generally accepted that both male cousins should be able to have access to the money.

- Is that OK or not OK?
- Why?
- Would that make it OK for both of them to have access to the money?
- Why?

For equal:

(Personal decision) Suppose that two other male cousins decide that they want only one of them to be able to have access to the money.

- Is that OK or not OK?
- Why?

(Authority) Let's suppose that in the community of the two other male cousins the religious leader said that only one of them should be able to have access to the money.

- Is it OK or not OK for the religious leader to say that?
- Why?
- Would that make it OK for only one of them to have access to the money?
- Why?

(Generalizability) Suppose that there is another country where it is generally accepted that only one of the male cousins should be able to have access to the money.

- Is that OK or not OK?
- Why?
- Would that make it OK for only one of them to have access to the money?
- Why?

MEDIA SITUATIONS

[MEDIA: DANGEROUS ASSIGNMENT]

Mr. Saab is the head of a newspaper and he just gets a call about a possible conflict breaking out between two warring factions in Tripoli. He has two journalists that he can deploy to cover this story, Mr. Samir and Ms. Hala. Both are equally qualified journalists and want to take on the task. Neither Mr. Samir nor Ms. Hala are married or have children. Mr. Saab must choose one of them.

Question:

Should Mr. Saab send Mr. Samir or Ms. Hala to cover the story?

Follow-up questions and probing:

Why do you think that Mr. Saab should send Mr. Samir (Ms. Hala)?

Please probe each idea participant mentions, using the words/terms used by the participant.

For each idea:

WHY do you think _____ is so?	OR Alternative versions: Why do you think _____ is that way?
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	Why do you think _____ is set up that way? Why do you think _____ says that?
Do you think _____ SHOULD be that way?	OR Alternative version: Do you think _____ is a good practice?
WHY do you think _____ should be that way?	

COUNTER-PROBES:

If male journalist is chosen: Suppose Ms. Hala says that she should be sent on the assignment, that it is not fair that Mr. Samir gets to go.

- What do you think about what she said?
- Why?

If female journalist is chosen: Suppose Mr. Samir said that only he should be able to go, that Ms. Hala should not go.

- What do you think about what he said?
- Why?

[MEDIA: PROMOTION]

Mr. Tabbib is the head of a news agency and he is in need of a new chief news editor for the night shift. He has two equally capable journalists that he can promote into this position, Ms. Alia and Mr. Karim. Both are married with children and want this new promotion. He must choose one.

Question:

Should Mr. Tabbib promote Mr. Karim or Ms. Alia to be the new chief news editor?

Follow-up questions and probing:

Why do you think that Mr. Tabbib should send Mr. Karim (Ms. Alia)?

Please probe each idea participant mentions, using the words/terms used by the participant.

For each idea:

WHY do you think _____ is so?	OR Alternative versions: Why do you think _____ is that way? Why do you think _____ is set up that way? Why do you think _____ says that?
Do you think _____ SHOULD be that way?	OR Alternative version: Do you think _____ is a good practice?
WHY do you think _____ should be that way?	

COUNTER-PROBES:

If male journalist is chosen: Suppose Ms. Alia says that she should be the chief news editor, that it is not fair that Mr. Karim was chosen.

- What do you think about what she said?
- Why?

If female journalist is chosen: Suppose Mr. Samir said that only he should be the chief news editor and not Ms. Hala.

- What do you think about what he said?
- Why?

[DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS]

Now, I would like to ask you a few questions.

What is your age?

What is the highest level of schooling you attended?

Are you married or single?

Do you have children?

Thank you.