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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO

Blood of the Nation:
Medical Eugenics, Bio-Nationalism, and Identity Formation in Cold War South Korea

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

by

Inga Kim Diederich

Committee in charge:

Professor Todd Andrew Henry, Chair
Professor Claire Ellen Edington
Professor Jin-Kyung Lee
Professor Simeon S. Man
Professor Wendy Y. Matsumura
Professor Daniel L. Widener

2021

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University of California San Diego

2021

DEDICATION

To Mom and Dion

EPIGRAPH

“The Korean *minjok* is doubtlessly biologically and culturally homogeneous...even God cannot change the innate and hereditary nature of the Korean characteristics that is in the Koreans’ blood.”

Yi Kwang-su 李光洙

“All of you who are one...You carry at center the mark of the red above and the mark of blue below, heaven and earth, tai-geuk; t’ai-chi. It is the mark. The mark of belonging. Mark of cause. Mark of retrieval. By birth. By death. By blood.”

Theresa Hak Kyung Cha

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Chapter 3, in part, is currently being prepared for submission for publication of the material. This dissertation author, Inga Kim Diederich, was the primary investigator and author of this material.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Blood of the Nation:
Medical Eugenics, Bio-Nationalism, and Identity Formation in Cold War South Korea

by

Inga Kim Diederich

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California San Diego, 2021

Professor Todd Henry, Chair

In the decades after the 1948 founding of the Republic of Korea, blood emerged as a powerful coherent for South Korean identity, working across law and science, race and economics, war and peace to produce a biological definition and political concept of Koreanness—in short, a bionational South Korean identity. Despite the centrality of blood to modern Korean identity, the historical processes by which Cold War geopolitics, (post)colonial racisms, and socio-scientific serology were collapsed into the powerful collective symbol of a singular ethno-national blood remain under-examined. Korean Studies scholars have noted the

persistence of a blood-based discourse of Korean identity, but there has been little investigation into the impact of this pure-blood paradigm on the regulation of Korean bodies.

By contrast, “Blood of the Nation” explicitly links symbolic blood discourses to material blood regulations, tracing the development of blood management in Cold War South Korea to illuminate the convergence of local medical need, global scientific exchange, and postcolonial biogovernance in the construction of national identity. Beginning with the introduction of transfusion technologies during the Korean War, South Korean scientists appropriated hematological advances to re-instate colonial-era eugenics policies and define Koreanness in biomedical terms. The Cold War concept of Korean blood that emerged was consequently defined in hierarchical and exclusionary raced, gendered, and classed terms of relative purity based on postcolonial anxieties, military imperatives, and developmental aims.

This study tracks the biomedicalization of Korean blood from the Korean War through the authoritarian Yusin system (1950-80), concentrating on the convergence of medico-scientific and state interests in establishing so-called “blood independence” and safe-guarding this national resource from contamination or dilution. Based on diverse archives, it argues that blood functioned as a crucial bridge for reconfiguring the Korean nation from a community imagined through anticolonial cultural symbolism to a bionational body defined through the biological sciences. This historical interrogation of blood-based bionationalism in Cold War South Korea intervenes in Korean Studies scholarship on the discursive colonial origins of modern Korean nationalism and contributes to broader discussions on the intersection of science, technology, and medicine in nation-building and the formation of national identity.

Chapter 1

Introduction: The Politics of Blood in Cold War Korea

Other nations...cannot know. Unfathomable the words, the terminology...Not physical enough. Not to the very flesh and bone, to the core, to the mark, to the point where it is necessary to intervene, even if to invent anew...

—Theresa Hak Kyung Cha, *Dictée*

The Mark of Koreanness

Korean American author Theresa Hak Kyung Cha's seminal work *Dictée* has most often been analyzed for Cha's subversion of literary forms to propose an identity predicated on difference, rather than assimilation.¹ While *Dictée* is rightly celebrated for its ability to undermine the hegemonic norms of American identity politics, such analyses often overlook its expression of another dominant identity narrative—namely, a blood-based, bionational form of South Korean ethnic identity.² Cha's insistence on “the stain of difference which resists absorption by an American identity” also rests on and reproduces a profoundly biologicistic understanding of Korean identity.³ As stated in the opening epigraph, this understanding of Koreanness is a “physical” knowledge that embeds the self in individual bodies bound not only to the national body of today but also, and importantly, to generations of Korean bodies of the past by tunneling in “to the very flesh and bone, to the core, to the mark.”⁴ What is this mark,

¹ Lisa Lowe, “Unfaithful to the Original: The Subject of *Dictée*,” in *Writing Self, Writing Nation: A Collection of Essays on Dictée by Theresa Hak Kyung Cha*, ed. Elaine H. Kim and Norma Alarcón (Berkeley: Third Woman Press, 1994); Shelley Sunn Wong, “Unnaming the Same: Theresa Hak Kyung Cha's *Dictée*,” in Kim and Alarcón, *Writing Self, Writing Nation*; Kandice Chuh, *Imagine Otherwise: On Asian Americanist Critique* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); Timothy Yu, *Race and the Avant-Garde: Experimental and Asian American Poetry since 1965* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).

² Richard Snyder, “The Politics of Blood in Theresa Hak Kyung Cha's *Dictée*,” *Occasion* 12 (2018): 1-13.

³ Wong, “Unnaming the Same,” 136.

⁴ Theresa Hak Kyung Cha, *Dictée* (1982; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 32.

deeper than the core? It is “the mark of the red above and the mark of blue below...The mark of belonging,” the subject defined “by blood.”⁵

Although it may seem counter-intuitive to begin a history of Cold War Korea in the 1980s Korean diaspora, Cha’s expression of blood as the central *telos* of Koreanness culminates decades of efforts to elevate blood as the core of Korean identity. Although the ideology of blood-belonging evoked a shared, timeless lineage, the discourse of national blood unity was actually a defensive response to the threat of colonization in the first half of the twentieth century, and the biologization of this sanguinary symbol following the even more recent development of medico-scientific capacities to define and separate blood types and components during the Cold War. In the face of the upheavals, dislocations, and traumas Koreans endured in the twentieth century, blood emerged as a powerful cohering force that worked simultaneously across several registers—social, cultural, political, medical, scientific, racial, classed, gendered, and many others.

Crucially, blood smoothed the paradox at the heart of Korea’s post-colonial, Cold War nation-building mission: to unite a people divided into two peninsular regimes and scattered across far-flung diasporas on the one hand, while also defending authentically “pure” Korean identity against dilution or diminishment on the other. Mediating the seemingly opposed imperatives of postcolonialism and globalization, blood smoothed over the jagged and incommensurate edges of these projects.⁶ What we see in *Dictée*, then, is not just a keen rejection of American assimilative politics but also the inculcation of a relatively new politics of Korean identity. In its meta-political biologism, blood-based identity became the final arbiter—the

⁵ *Ibid.*, 46.

⁶ Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994).

mark—of Koreanness, claiming and claimed by the diasporic Cha as she wrote from the country to which Cold War Korean social engineers banished “mixed-blood” children beyond the pale of blood purity.⁷

Disentangling the layers of meaning collapsed in the biological, blood-based concept of Korean identity requires working across multiple registers to account for the historical evolution from a symbolic discourse of blood to the scientific manufacturing of a distinct strain of Korean blood. This examination calls for equal attention to the cultures of national science and medicine and to the scientization of national culture. By keeping an eye to the social discourses that developed valuative scales of blood-belonging while monitoring the pulse of the material deployments of blood, this study unfolds how blood was transformed from an anti-colonial nationalist symbol into a post-colonial national resource over the first three decades of authoritarian rule in Cold War South Korea. At its core, it asks, “What is Korean blood?” and, in so doing, interrogates, “What does it mean to be “Korean?”” tracing the histories of division, war, imperialism, and development that produce both question and answer.

In the decades after the 1948 founding of the Republic of Korea, blood emerged as a powerful coherent for South Korean identity, working across law and science, race and economics, war and peace to produce a biological definition and political concept of Koreanness—in short, a bionational South Korean identity. Beginning with the military introduction of transfusion technologies during the Korean War, South Korean scientists appropriated hematological advances—particularly the proliferation of identifiable human blood group systems like the Rhesus factor, Diego antigen, and Lewis system—to define Koreanness in

⁷ Arissa Oh, “Solving the GI Baby Problem,” in *To Save the Children of Korea: The Cold War Origins of International Adoption* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2015), 48-75.

biomedical terms.⁸ In doing so, they drew on new hematological tools, militarized medical practices, and public health regulations to re-instate colonial-era eugenics policies.⁹ The Cold War concept of Korean blood that emerged was consequently defined in hierarchical and exclusionary raced, gendered, and classed terms of relative purity based on postcolonial anxieties, military imperatives, and developmental aims.

Despite the centrality of blood to modern Korean identity, however, the historical processes by which Cold War geopolitics, colonial and postcolonial racisms, and socio-scientific serology were collapsed into the powerful collective symbol of a singular ethno-national blood remain under-examined. Korean Studies scholars have noted the persistence of a blood-based notion of Korean identity in defiance of development models that predict a converse relationship between globalization and ethnonationalism, but there has been little investigation into the causes for and consequences of this discrepancy.¹⁰ The reduction of Korea's "blood-bound" national community to its discursive terms obscures how the local appropriation of global scientific apparatuses contributed to the Cold War endurance of biological determinism, particularly in the developing world.

⁸ Hyun, Jaehwan 현재환. "Yujönjök minjok mandülgi: Han'guk üi illyu yujön yön'gu, minjok chöngch'esöng, kūrigo ch'ogukjök kwahak kyoryu, 1926-2009" 유전적 민족 만들기: 한국의 인류 유전 연구, 민족 정체성, 그리고 초국적 과학 교류, 1926-2009 ("The making of a genetic nation: human heredity, national identity, and transnational scientific exchange in South Korea, 1926-2009") (PhD diss., Seoul National University, 2018), 178-189; Joanna Radin, *Life on Ice: A History of New Uses for Cold Blood* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017).

⁹ Eunjung Kim, *Curative Violence: Rehabilitating Disability, Gender, and Sexuality in Modern Korea* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017).

¹⁰ Gi-Wook Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006); Herbert Gottweis and Byoungsoo Kim, "Bionationalism, Stem Cells, BSE, and Web 2.0 in South Korea: Toward the Reconfiguration of Biopolitics," *New Genetics and Society* 28, no. 3 (August 2009): 223-239; Jenny Heijun Wills, "Paradoxical Essentialism: Reading Race and Origins in Jane Jeong Trenka's Asian Adoption Memoirs," *Canadian Review of American Studies* 46, no. 2 (2016): 202-22.

In response, “Blood of the Nation” explicitly links symbolic blood discourses to material blood regulations, tracing the development of an independent and communal blood paradigm in Cold War South Korea to illuminate the convergence of local medical need, globalized scientific exchange, and postcolonial biogovernance in the construction of national identity. Tracking the biomedicalization of Korean blood from the Korean War (1950-53) through the authoritarian Yusin system (1972-79), it concentrates on the convergence of medico-scientific and state interests in establishing so-called “blood independence” and safe-guarding this national resource from contamination or dilution.¹¹ Based on sources drawn from state archives, medical institutions, and private estates, this study argues that blood functioned as a crucial bridge for reconfiguring the Korean nation from a community imagined through anticolonial cultural symbolism to a bionational body defined through the biological sciences. This historical interrogation of blood-based bionationalism in Cold War South Korea intervenes in Korean Studies scholarship on the discursive colonial origins of modern Korean nationalism and contributes to broader discussions on the intersection of science, technology, and medicine in forging a bionational form of South Korean identity.

Blood and Bionationalism

Part of the mythos of blood lies in its evocation of transcendent universality and timelessness. The conceptual power of blood, as religious studies scholar Gil Anidjar notes, derives from its function as “the potent sign of politics at its recalcitrant limits...that which, from

¹¹ Although the Yusin constitution was continued after Park Chung Hee’s assassination until the 1981 promulgation of a new constitution for the Fifth Republic of Korea, I use “Yusin period” to refer to years of high authoritarianism under Park. Future work will consider how the science and politics of blood evolved in post-Park decades, but this dissertation concludes with the end of the Park regime in 1979 and marks the Yusin period accordingly. See Youngju Ryu, ed., *Cultures of Yusin: South Korea in the 1970s* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2018).

past to present, female to male, and status to contract, politics transcends, manages, or excludes.”¹² In the face of the social reshufflings and population dislocations that accompanied modernization, consanguineous collectives have historically offered respite against the uncertainties of a changing world. Blood-bonds promised a community lodged in “the pertinacity of kinship” that could not be rent by cultural or geographic movement because it maintained its physical form across counties and continents, connecting displaced bodies to ancient homelands and ancestral lineages.¹³ This sense of the “always already” nature of blood works to both conceal and cement it in communal consciousnesses.¹⁴ The understanding that Koreans are a people bound by a distinct and shared national bloodline is persistent precisely because it operates at the level of common sense on a “different order, a different register” than self-conscious politics—that which is almost too obvious to remark upon, has always been known, and has always been.¹⁵

This impression of timelessness, however, belies a radical shift in the conceptualization of blood in relation to ethnic communities that took place in the twentieth century. Whereas blood had long been a repository for a diversity of meanings across cultures—ranging from taboos against menstrual bloods to totemizations of sacrificial blood—the rise of new technologies to medically treat and scientifically examine blood in the late-nineteenth century

¹² Gil Anidjar, “Blood” in *Political Concepts: A Critical Lexicon*, eds. J. M. Bernstein, Adi Ophir, and Ann Laura Stoler (New York: Fordham University Press, 2018), 25.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁴ Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001).

¹⁵ Anidjar, “Blood,” 26. In addition to Korean biology, a similar sense of timelessness is also attached to a kind of nationalized Korean affect represented by putatively unique Korean emotions like “han” and “chǒng.” As with the notion of “Korean blood,” scholars have shown that “han” and “chǒng” are also the products of modern reinvention in response to colonialism, division, and traumatic development. See Sandra So Hee Chi Kim, “Korean Hand and the Postcolonial Afterlives of “The Beauty of Sorrow,”” *Korean Studies* 41, no. 1 (2017): 253-279.

revolutionized the ways in which a modern lexicon of blood concepts could take shape.¹⁶ The biologization of blood reinscribed its possible social significance in new and not always consistent ways. On the one hand, the discovery of blood types in 1901 was quickly appropriated by the racial sciences to further consolidate racial divisions, while on the other, the advancement of transfusion in the first half of the twentieth century unsettled what might be meant by “sharing blood” within a community.¹⁷ In Korea, as elsewhere, longstanding conceptions of blood were indelibly altered by the introduction of new sciences and medical procedures under (post)colonial conditions, transforming blood from a class prerogative in late-Chosŏn to a bionational property by the end of the Cold War.¹⁸

In using “bionationalism” to describe the intersection of biology and nationalism in modern Korean identity, I follow but reorient a key concept from Science and Technology Studies (STS), while using it to innovate debates about the historical place of ethno-nationalism in the field of modern Korean Studies. To be sure, Korean nationalism has been expressed in

¹⁶ On conceptualizations of menstrual and sacrificial blood in various cultural contexts, see Chris Knight, *Blood Relations: Menstruation and the Origins of Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Thomas C. T. Buckley and Alma Gottlieb, *Blood Magic: The Anthropology of Menstruation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Peggy McCracken, *The Curse of Eve, the Wound of the Hero: Blood, Gender, and Medieval Literature* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003); Emily Martin, “The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance Based on Stereotypical Male-Female Roles,” in *Beyond the Body Proper: Reading the Anthropology of Material Life*, eds. Margaret Lock and Judith Farquhar (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 417-427.

¹⁷ Keith Wailoo, *Drawing Blood: Technology and Disease Identity in Twentieth-Century America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Douglas Starr, *Blood: An Epic History of Medicine and Commerce* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998); Kara Swanson, *Banking on the Body: The Market in Blood, Milk, and Sperm in Modern America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014); and Jenny Bangham, *Blood Relations: Transfusion and the Making of Human Genetics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2020).

¹⁸ Jung, Joon Young 정준영, “P’i ūi injongjuŭi wa singminji ūihak: Kyŏnsŏng chedae pŏbŭihakkyosilŭi hyŏlaekhyŏng illyuhak 피의 인종주의와 식민지 의학: 경성제대 법의학교실의 혈액형 인류학 (“Blood” and Colonial Medicine: Blood Group Anthropology Studies at Keijo Imperial University Department of Forensic Medicine), *Ŭisahak* 의사학 (Korean Journal of Medical History) 21, no. 3 (2012): 513-550; Jaehwan Hyun, “Blood Purity and Scientific Independence: Blood Science and Postcolonial Struggles in Korea, 1926-1975,” *Science in Context* 32, no. 3 (2019), 239-260.

terms of race since the colonial period.¹⁹ However, the introduction of new sciences and technologies in postcolonial South Korea, such as blood transfusions and banking, transformed earlier expressions of ethno-nationalism into new practices of bionationalism, but did not completely displace the former.

In the field of STS, Herbert Gottweis and Byoungsoo Kim have defined bionationalism as the reconfiguration of political identity around the biological sciences.²⁰ In contrast to ethnic nationalism, which defines the nation according to a defined set of ethnic qualities, Gottweis and Kim assert that the public response to stem cell research and epidemics in twenty-first century South Korea demonstrate a new political mobilization around the promise of bodily intervention to “optimize the [Korean race] through novel, technoscientific strategies, but also to “defend” the nation against microbial menace from the outside.”²¹ Their concept adopts the argument of historians such as Bob Simpson, who identified a scientific turn in modern nationalisms toward communities imagined in terms of genetic features, rather than cultural metaphors.²² While Simpson, Gottweis and Kim contend that the nation remains the focus of biopolitics in spite of globalization, they nonetheless agree that the new era of bionationalism pivots on genetic optimization to the exclusion of blood. In Korea specifically, Gottweis and Kim claim that “the country’s emerging bionationalism eclipsed traditional ethnic nationalism as the traditional ethnicity marker of “blood” became increasingly displaced by genetics.”²³ In this, they adapt to

¹⁹ Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism*; Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

²⁰ Gottweis and Kim, “Bionationalism, Stem Cells, BSE, and Web 2.0,” 223-239.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 227.

²² Bob Simpson, “Imagined Genetic Communities: Ethnicity and Essentialism in the Twenty-First Century,” *Anthropology Today* 16 (2000): 3-6.

²³ Gottweis and Kim, “Bionationalism, Stem Cells, BSE, and Web 2.0,” 227.

the twenty-first century Michel Foucault's elaboration of political governance in the twentieth as the transition from a "symbolics of blood" in juridico-sovereign regimes to the "symbolics of sexuality" that ostensibly distinguishes modern biopolitical regimes.²⁴ According to this formulation, the nation—although it adheres to the terms of territorialism and ethnicity—has evolved beyond "the primal and the archaic" signifier of blood.²⁵ Blood as a marker of identity is conceived of as a relic of rule by violence and tribalism.

The clean posited break between pre-modern blood-based regimes and modern biopolitical governance, however, perhaps underestimates the adaptability of blood to political circumstances and agendas. By suggesting that blood receded before modern biopolitics, this narrative assumes that blood's utility for governance lay only in the threat of violence (bloodshed) and tradition of tribalism (to be of the same blood).²⁶ Thus understood, blood is extraneous to biopolitics, which classically works by the disciplinary individuation of communities into self-governing units.²⁷ But the Foucauldian model of biopolitics overlooks the ways in which blood, as an intimate bodily fluid, has itself become part of the disciplinary regimes of modern bio-medicine, as well as the continued significance of violence (bloodshed) and tribalism (blood bonds) for national, ethnic, and racial orders. By bridging symbolic and biological political modes, blood problematizes what African American cultural theorist

²⁴ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (1976; New York: Vintage, 1978), 136.

²⁵ Anidjar, *Blood: A Critique*, 44.

²⁶ Specifically, Foucault categorizes blood's value to juridico-sovereign regimes into three functions: "its instrumental role (the ability to shed blood)," "the order of signs (to have a certain blood, to be of the same blood, to be prepared to risk one's blood)," and "its precariousness (easily spilled, subject to drying up, too readily mixed, capable of being corrupted." Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, 147.

²⁷ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

Alexander Weheliye describes as the aspiration of biopolitical discourse “to transcend racialization via recourse to absolute biological matter that no longer allows for portioning of humanity or locating certain forms of racism in an unidentified elsewhere.”²⁸ The “corrective” issued to the consideration of race in Foucauldian biopolitics by Black studies models this study’s conception of blood, particularly different iterations of national blood (raced, gendered, sexualized, classed). Substituting “blood” for “race” in Weheliye’s synthesis of the intervention of Black feminist theorists like Sylvia Wynter and Hortense Spillers in biopolitical discourse: “Rather than using biopolitics as a modality of analysis that supersedes or sidelines blood, I stress that blood be placed front and center...as a set of sociopolitical processes of differentiation and hierarchization, which are projected onto the putatively biological human [Korean] body.”²⁹ The elastic expansion of blood to embrace the resonances and ameliorate the dissonances between juridico-sovereign and biopolitical regimes is readily apparent in embattled postcolonial ethnic nations like South Korea, where Korean bodies and bloods have necessarily been construed as simultaneously symbolic, physical, and racialized resources.

The condition of postcolonialism, marked by the uneasy alliance of nationalist anxieties with developmental desires, sets into stark relief the ways in which “archaic” bloodshed and blood bonds have coexisted and set the conditions for the biological uses of blood. It is no accident that outside of Korea—where Gottweis and Kim originated the term—the concept of bionationalism has most prominently been taken up in the field of South Asian studies, where scholars like Jacob Copeman, Dwaipayana Banerjee, and Banu Subramaniam argue that far from

²⁸ Alexander G. Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014).

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 13.

being displaced by a bionational emphasis on genetic modification, blood has also become the subject of “optimization and defense” in the name of the ethnic nation.³⁰ In postcolonial India, Copeman and Banerjee posit a “political hematology” that operates at both the overt level of political contestations “*through* the use of extracted blood” and the covert level of “contestations *about* blood and its use.” In this inquiry into “hematology as a sort of political style,” blood is explained not as a static symbol but as a highly dynamic political vessel.³¹ Reconsidering the Korean case, I draw on such reinterpretations of the concept of bionationalism to interrogate the proposal that the ethno-national emphasis on collective symbols like “blood” was displaced by biological markers after the Korean War. Instead, the following historical analysis shows that scientific studies and medical practices to type, screen, and enhance Korean blood constituted a crucial bridge that linked ethno-nationalist ideologies developed during the colonial period and bionational forms of governance gradually implemented after liberation.

This study interrogates this process by assessing the historical development of South Korean blood sciences, which, I posit, developed out of the intersection of anticolonial ethno-nationalism and Cold War bionationalism. My research builds on previous studies of Korean ethno-nationalism conducted by Gi-Wook Shin, Hyung Il Pai, and Andre Schmid, all of whom have used discourse analysis to show that anticolonial nationalists reproduced the racializing and eugenicist frameworks of Japanese imperialism to strengthen the national body.³² For these

³⁰ Jacob Copeman and Dwaipayan Banerjee, *Hematologies: The Political Life of Blood in India* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019); Banu Subramaniam, *Holy Science: The Biopolitics of Hindu Nationalism* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2019).

³¹ Copeman and Banerjee, *Hematologies*, 3.

³² Gi-Wook Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006); Hyung Il Pai, *Constructing “Korean” Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000); Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

scholars, blood functions as a discursive social construct used to essentialize a legible modern category of “Korean” by colonizers and nationalists alike. Drawing on Benedict Anderson’s characterization of the modern nation as a community imagined in print media, Schmid shows how turn-of-the-century Korean intellectuals sought to reconstruct a national genealogy based on a five-thousand-year-old bloodline (*hyölt’ong*) dating back to the mythical progenitor Tan’gun.³³ Both Shin and Pai’s studies demonstrate the colonial roots of Korean ethnonationalism, engaging the question of why ethnicity emerged as the definitive marker of Korean identity over alternatives like class. Gi-Wook Shin expands on the tension between “universalistic” and “particularistic” concepts of the nation by addressing how it ultimately produced a blood-based form of ethnic nationalism that dominated other alternatives.³⁴ Hyung-Il Pai likewise historicizes the ethnic concept of the Korean nation by demonstrating that it is rooted in Japanese scholarly paradigms—particularly in the fields of archaeology and anthropology—that propounded a theory that Japanese and Koreans shared blood and, in turn, provoked the nationalist insistence on the distinctiveness and purity of Korean blood.³⁵ Altogether, these studies denaturalized blood-based Korean ethnic identity by demonstrating its discursive construction and historicizing its colonial origins. The portrait of Korean blood that emerges, however, is purely symbolic and fixed in its colonial form even in the postcolonial era, by which time national identity is presumed to be relatively stable.

By contrast, I take a wider historical lens that considers the relation between the colonial and post-colonial periods, while focusing on how the genetic contents of South Korean bodies

³³ Schmid, *Korea Between Empires*, 181.

³⁴ Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea*, 133-153.

³⁵ Pai, *Constructing “Korean” Origins*, 23-96.

informed charged debates about the national polity. In the past decade, the history of science and medicine has emerged as a growing subfield in Korean studies. Historians of science and medicine in Korea have explored the regulation of colonized, militarized, gendered, and sexualized bodies to create different subjectivities in Korea.³⁶ However, the constitution of the nation itself as addressed in previous discursive analyses largely remains an implicit corollary, rather than the explicit subject, of Science Studies in Korea. Expanding on the new wave of STS research, this study explicitly connects this new focus on subsets of Korean bodies to discursive analyses of normative Korean subjectivity. By doing so, it articulates how the graduated regulation of different Korean bodies created levels of Koreanness, on the one hand, while encoding a platonic ideal of authentic Korean identity with biological markers, on the other.

Meanwhile, I also ask how anticolonial imperatives to strengthen and liberate the colonized nation endured through and informed postcolonial policies and practices that came to focus on biological standards of blood purity. By studying subpopulations marginalized from the “pure” South Korean polity on the basis of race, gender, class, and sexuality, I aim to assess how the threat of “polluted” blood was defined and quarantined.

To examine the inclusionary and exclusionary functions of the blood sciences, I also draw on historians of Cold War medicine such as David Serlin and John DiMoia, who have argued that medical technology constituted the “other arms race” in state-led projects of

³⁶ Sonja M. Kim, *Imperatives of Care: Women and Medicine in Colonial Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2019); John P. DiMoia, *Reconstructing Bodies: Biomedicine, Health, and Nation-building in South Korea since 1945* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2013); Theodore Jun Yoo, *It's Madness: The Politics of Mental Health in Colonial Korea* (Oakland, Calif.: University of California Press, 2016); Jin-kyung Park, “Corporeal Colonialism: Medicine, Reproduction, and Race in Colonial Korea” (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008); Sujin Lee, “Problematizing Population: Politics of Birth Control and Eugenics in Interwar Japan” (PhD diss., Cornell University, 2017).

economic development and population management.³⁷ Drawing on their insights, I explore how the biological substance of blood became a new way of marking national identity, and how modern technologies for storage and transfusion were mobilized to maintain the health of Korean bodies in the service of specific national goals.

Beyond the fields of STS and Korean Studies, an examination of blood-based governance in this post-colonial, Cold War state also offers a valuable case study to interrogate the emergence of what disabilities studies scholar Eunjung Kim has called a “second wave of eugenics” in the developing world.³⁸ This historical trajectory calls into question the position of social theorists of globalization such as Nikolas Rose, John Urry, and Scott Lash, who have argued that the growth of modern bio-politics after 1945 worked to transcend race-based understandings of national communities.³⁹ Such scholarship propounds a neoliberalized model of biopolitics that foregrounds the individual pursuit of self-knowledge and improvement. For Rose, even efforts to forge connections with families and familial communities express an “aesthetics of the self,” rather than the persistence of biological ethnic solidarity.⁴⁰ In contrast, Gil Anidjar, in his political consideration of blood, rebuts that blood did not disappear before what Kojin Karatani called the modern “trinity of the Capital-Nation-State,” but rather “suffuses these concepts, regions, and more; it constitutes each as a clotted version of its currents.”⁴¹ The

³⁷ DiMoia, *Reconstructing Bodies*; David Serlin, *Replaceable You: Engineering the Body in Postwar America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

³⁸ Eunjung Kim, *Curative Violence: Rehabilitating Disability, Gender, and Sexuality in Modern Korea* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017).

³⁹ Nikolas Rose, *The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-first Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); John Urry, “The Complexity Turn,” *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 22, no. 5 (2005); Scott Lash and John Urry, *The End of Organized Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity, 1987).

⁴⁰ Nikolas Rose, “The Politics of Life Itself,” *Theory, Culture and Society* 18, no. 6 (2001): 1-30.

⁴¹ Gil Anidjar, *Blood: A Critique of Christianity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), viii.

endurance of eugenics in the latter half of the twentieth century is underwritten by a new biologism that indicates the limits of the multicultural aspirations of Rose and Urry's model of globalization. As literary scholar Richard Snyder notes of the significance of lineage for diasporic transplants seeking biological roots puts it, the broad appeal of blood across different nations and races demonstrates "the ways in which ostensibly "postracial" Western societies still enforce hegemonic norms and expectations, based largely on race, while contending, at the same time, that essentialism of any stripe is taboo."⁴²

The operation of bionationalism in South Korea, which employed scientific apparatuses for nationalist ends, offers a critical case study that can reveal the endurance of doctrines of biological determination, particularly as they flourished outside the West. Precisely because the development of a blood-based identity in South Korea has been interconnected with transnational flows of knowledge and technology, my project speaks beyond the borders of Korea to examine how the symbol and substance of blood is imbricated with modern understandings of the body's place in relation to notions of nation and citizenship.

In my historical study of blood-based bionationalism in Cold War South Korea, I disentangle discourses of ethno-nationalist ideology from the bodily objects of postcolonial governance. It is the first study of its kind to explicitly link symbolic blood discourses to material blood regulations. In particular, I ask how a network of blood regulators – scientific researchers, medical practitioners, and government agents – produced an ideology of pure bloodedness and how that ideology worked to marginalize "impure" bloods from the South Korean national body – a designation used in blood diagnoses of military personnel, sex workers, industrial laborers, and "mixed-blood" persons. Through research into public health policy papers at the National

⁴² Snyder, "The Politics of Blood," 2.

Assembly Archive, medical exam records of South Korean soldiers and military sex workers at the ROK Department of Defense and US Forces in Korea Records Offices, and scientific surveys of the children institutionalized in so-called “mixed blood” orphanages and schools, this study reconstructs how state agents, medical professionals, and elite scientists conspired to sequester “impure” blooded populations from the normative national body. The resulting narrative reveals how, within a decade of Park Chung Hee’s 1961 military junta, South Korea moved from complete reliance on foreign blood supplies during the Korean War to a robust domestic blood-based biometric registration industry that included the Korean Red Cross Center, mandatory premarital and prenatal blood tests, VD blood screenings, the pathologization of “mixed blood,” and military blood fitness evaluations. This dissertation traces the consolidation of a national blood industry through four major focal points for biologizing and nationalizing Korean blood – battlefield transfusion in the Korean War, women donors in the April 1960 Uprising, scientific studies of “mixed blood” Koreans, and the rise of a blood donation movement out of blood markets in the 1970s – in order to grasp how postcolonial South Korea’s imbrication in Cold War military contests informed the diagnostic terms (e.g., anemia for infertile women) and pathological models (e.g., racial hybridity as disability) deployed by medical practitioners and experienced by patients.

This study reveals that the bionational imperatives of the South Korean state required infrastructures and sets of disciplinary knowledge that mediated entry into the national community based on gendered, raced, and classed values purportedly expressed in the physical substance of blood. In illuminating this history, *Blood of the Nation* addresses not only its enormous consequences for the South Korean body politic today, but also for governance of and through medico-science across the Pacific region.

Structure of the Dissertation

This study has begun with an introductory chapter, “The Politics of Blood in Cold War Korea,” presenting the motivating problem, scholarly aims, and historiographic contribution of this study. In South Korea, blood is a powerful linchpin that coheres biological and political concepts of Koreanness into a bionational identity. Despite the centrality of blood to modern Korean identity, the historical processes by which postcolonial nation-building and scientific development converged in the collective symbol of a singular ethno-national blood remain under-examined. “Blood of the Nation” interrogates the links between symbolic blood discourses and material blood regulations, tracing the development of a blood paradigm in Cold War South Korea to illuminate the convergence of local medical need, globalized scientific exchange, and postcolonial bio-governance in the construction of national identity. It investigates the collusion of scientists and bureaucrats through three-decades of military authoritarianism for a eugenics program to manufacture “pure blood” by eliminating “impure bloods” from the national body, arguing that blood functioned as a crucial bridge for reconfiguring Korea from a community imagined through anticolonialism to a nation defined through biology.

The following section, Chapter 2, “Conscripting Blood: The Korean War Origins of the Quest for Blood Independence,” begins this study’s historical examination by reassessing the Korean War as the formative crucible for the Cold War pursuit of “blood independence” in South Korea, exploring battlefield laboratories as sites where blood classifications, treatments, and markets worked to re-establish, rather than dispel, colonial configurations of medical, economic, and military power. Beginning with the colonial-era mobilization of bloodline as a symbol by Korean nationalists and a substance by Japanese assimilation and wartime

policymakers, it examines how blood collection and administration practices developed during American military occupation, the Korean War, and the immediate post-Armistice years. By focusing on the sustained relationship between (post)colonial governance, military mobilization, and medical blood work on the Korean peninsula, it exposes how transfusion technologies and hematological epistemes were far from “liberatory,” instead providing novel means of using blood to define and control the Korean population by invigorating a triangular flow of blood and capital between Japan, the US, and South Korea.

Chapter 3, “Domesticating Blood: Gendered Bloodshed and Blood Donation in Postwar South Korea,” tracks women’s role in changing blood collection practices from the stigmatized blood markets that dominated the post-Korean War decade through the emergence of a voluntary blood donation movement in the anti-authoritarian April Uprising of 1960. Highlighting the untold fact that women were the primary contributors to South Korea’s blood supply during the first decades of mass collection, this chapter analyzes the economic conditions and social narratives that incentivized a disproportionate level of female blood donation. Meanwhile, it unpacks how the same fiscal incentives and social expectations that encouraged women to give blood also worked to erase their contributions from an androcentric revolutionary narrative of patriotic bloodshed in service of the nation.

Chapter 4, “Purifying Blood: Scientific Surveys and Medical Definitions of “Mixed Blood” Koreans,” turns to the “mixed blood (*honhyŏl*)” Amerasians born in Korean camptowns abutting US military bases in the 1970s to articulate how social discourses and medical systems of blood management combined to create a normative “pure blood” national subject on the one hand, while marginalizing racially and sexually “impure bloods” on the other. Concentrating on medico-scientific experiments and surveys conducted on Amerasian children at orphanages,

segregated “mixed blood” schools, and criminal detention centers, this chapter explores how serological, physiognomic, and pathological studies worked in concert with legal rubrics of citizenship and national belonging to define and exclude these proximate racial others from the putatively homogenous national body.

The final substantive study in this dissertation, Chapter 5, “Disciplining Blood: State Regulations of Blood Under the Yusin Constitution,” connects the militarization of South Korea under the rule of General Park Chung Hee and the Yusin constitution to a turn towards coercive militarized systems for blood solicitation and registration in disciplinary institutions ranging from the military to prisons to schools. Attending to the coterminous rise of mandatory blood testing and monitoring among Korean combat troops in the Vietnam Conflict, incarcerated populations, and school children, it examines how the infusion of blood surveillance into hyper-disciplined state institutions marked a turning point in the understanding of who Korean blood belonged to, transforming it from an individual or family-bound inheritance to a national property.

Finally, the last chapter, ““Blood Independence” and Bionationalism,” concludes this dissertation by surveying the persistence of blood-based Korean identity through the post-Yusin system decades to the present, as well as promising future research into the impact of 1980s democratization and 1990s globalization on social and scientific approaches to Korean blood. In parting, it reflects on the urgent need for continued examination into the historical development of blood-based nationalism to better understand and respond to enduring strains of exclusionary politics around the world.

Fractionating and reconstituting the various relational meanings of Korean blood is an intimate process, as personal as the substance itself. Re-telling embedded historical and

biological narratives, as historian Monica Kim says, “requires not simply the offering of a narrative but an examination of the mechanics of our own attachments, repulsion, and investments in the narrative themselves.”⁴³ The historical value of this study lies in its interrogation of the relationship between blood and nation, which speaks directly to the anxieties over protecting the national body exacerbated by the rise of populist politics and the global pandemic. In doing so, it reflects the historical context and present stakes of blood-based governance in South Korea, the Asian diaspora, and beyond. Meanwhile, the personal value of this work grows from the effort to come to terms with a national identity crisis that has “haunted the Korean diaspora,”⁴⁴ pitting Koreans at-home against Koreans abroad, first generation against one-point-five generation against second generation, “full” Koreans against “part” Koreans, and so on, in a divisive jostling for position on a ladder of authentic belonging. The motivating question, “What is Korean blood?” is by no means an end, but it is an invitation to a collective dialogue that asks, rather than assumes, “What does it mean to be “Korean”?”

⁴³ Monica Kim, *The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War: The Untold History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 27.

⁴⁴ Grace M. Cho, *Haunting the Korean Diaspora: Shame, Secrecy, and the Forgotten War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).




Figure 1.1 Medical illustration reproduced in Theresa Hak Kyung Cha's *Dictée*.

Chapter 2

Conscripting Blood: The Korean War Origins of the Quest for “Blood Independence”

We have to achieve independence in blood transfusion, otherwise the pure blood of our nation will become mixed with transfused foreign blood if we import blood from other countries due to the total lack of Korean blood supplies.

Wŏn Chongdŏk,
Director of the Korean Red Cross Center

Introduction

At the height of the Korean War, South Korean and American military planners faced a strange administrative conundrum: how to correctly categorize the supplies of whole blood that were being sourced from United Nations force countries and shipped to Korean hospitals and forward-operating medical units. Was blood a material that simply served medical purposes, as some administrators maintained?⁴⁵ Was it more properly classed as a military munition that, like conventional weaponry and armaments, worked to optimize and maintain effective tactical forces?⁴⁶ Or did the true measure of blood lie in its political utility as a symbol of an alliance bound by the blood shed by Koreans and Americans, allowing US President Eisenhower to tell South Korean President Syngman Rhee, “The blood of your youth and our youth has been poured out on the altar of common sacrifice”?⁴⁷ The debate demonstrates the multivalent meanings and purposes blood served during the Korean War. As a necessary wartime material

⁴⁵ House Committee on Government Activities, “Insulated Shipping Containers for Whole Blood,” 1954, HRG-1954-OPH-0024.

⁴⁶ House Committee on Appropriations, “Department of the Army Appropriations for 1953, Part 2,” February 28, 1952, HRG-1952-HAP-0029.

⁴⁷ President Eisenhower to President Rhee, June 6, 1953, Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1953, 835-836.

and a potent symbol, blood was both literally and metonymically imbued with value as a form of economic, medical, military, and political capital. It is telling that Korean discussions of blood during and immediately after the war fixated on the importance of “blood independence,” and that this phrase persisted as a staple goal of the South Korean blood management establishment throughout the following Cold War decades.⁴⁸ The aim of “blood independence” pithily marked the convergence of economic, military, and political investments in the Korean War that produced a potent wartime infrastructure for blood-based biopolitical governance that, like the war itself, persists to this day.

This chapter explores how military-led effort to establish a self-sufficient blood supply for defense purposes (re)established a paradigm of “blood independence” that laid the foundations for the following Cold War decades of Korean blood administration. In doing so, it interrogates the role of the Korean War in transforming modern medico-scientific blood programs on a local and global scale, particularly in terms of collapsing biological and ideological investment in the collection and preservation of a national blood supply into the shared drive for blood independence. By reassessing the battlefield laboratories of the Korean War as sites where defense imperatives, race classifications, and market pressures worked to re-establish, rather than dispel, colonial configurations of medical and military power, it seeks to insert the history of postcolonial blood management into the Western dominated field of the history of blood administration.

While mainstream histories of Western blood administration are conceived of between two poles—the gift system and exchange system—non-Western sites like Korea demonstrate

⁴⁸ House Committee on Veterans Affairs, “Provision of Federal Benefits for Veterans. Historical Analysis of Major Veterans’ Legislation, 1862-1954,” December 28, 1955, 108; Ted Maris-Wolf, “‘Of Blood and Treasure’: Recaptive Africans and the Politics of Slave Trade Suppression,” *Journal of the Civil War Era* 4, no. 1 (March 2014), 53-83.

reveal alternative formations for blood infrastructure that emerged at the intersection of postwar imperatives for blood independence and postcolonial desires for blood purity.⁴⁹ In Korea, the immediate post-liberation experiences of division and war constituted the formative crucible for conceiving and administering South Korean blood going forward. In the context of division, blood became a marker of political difference between the two Koreas while also carrying the hopes for reunification on the basis of ethnic homogeneity. Meanwhile the wartime demand for medical blood supplies bound Korean medical practitioners to international technology and biomaterials networks even as the influx of international supplies into Korean hospitals and bodies incited new anxieties about maintaining the purity of Korean blood against foreign pollutants. Both politically and medically, the Korean War set the conditions for the insular, militarized blood infrastructure that would coalesce in the following decades. In contrast, then, to the parochial assumption that the Western gift-commodity dichotomy constitutes a universal norm, the history of blood collection in the Korean War demonstrates instead that postcolonial sites like Korea, conditioned by colonization and wartime mobilization, present a third model of blood management: the conscription system. This chapter explores the overlapping and mutually informed contours of blood conscription and the hunt for blood independence in Korea by addressing the pre-war background, wartime system, and postwar military administration for blood programming.

Preexisting Conditions: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Eugenics

The need for medical blood supplies in the Korean War set in motion a collaboration between military and medical establishments for an independent, self-sufficient blood supply

⁴⁹ Cathy Waldby and Robert Mitchell, *Tissue Economies: Blood, Organs, and Cell Lines in Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

system in South Korea. The pursuit of “blood independence,” however, was informed not only by biomedical necessity, but also by concerns about Korean self-sufficiency and racial distinctiveness that grew out of pre-war experiences of colonial rule, wartime mobilization, and American military governance. The introduction of modern means of blood management to the Korean peninsula under Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) coincided with the rise of anti-colonial ethnic nationalism and colonial eugenics, so that the nascent pursuit of blood science became deeply intertwined with racial ontology, national identity, and independence. During the Asia Pacific War, new technologies that enabled blood to be collected more broadly and stored more stably facilitated the mobilization of Korean blood—alongside other resources ranging from bodies to labor to materials—for the imperial war effort, transforming it into an object of conscription. Meanwhile, the Pacific War and subsequent exposure to American blood administration under the US Military Government in Korea baptized the formative generation of Korean medical professionals—doctors like Yi Samyöl, Kim Kihong, and Kang Tükkyong who would become the future engineers of Korea’s blood system. When the medical blood crisis of the Korean War came, the response was built on these foundational preoccupations with blood as a means of surveillance and discipline, as well as a potential platform for Korean independence.

Biomedical approaches to blood developed hand-in-hand with the rise of modern biopolitics, buoyed by new means of categorizing and disciplining populations. Between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, rapid advances in scientific understanding and medical treatment of blood were stimulated through a series of military conflicts that encouraged reckless experimentation, an increased degree of institutional investment, and new modes of mobilization and organization.⁵⁰ Over several centuries, the Western world had transitioned from a medieval

⁵⁰ Douglas Starr, *Blood: An Epic History of Medicine and Commerce* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).

blood-letting model, which treated illness by bleeding patients, to a modern blood-getting model, which introduced new blood into patients, accelerating in the 1800s after the first successful human-to-human transfusion.⁵¹ Karl Landsteiner’s 1901 discovery of human blood groups made transfusions far safer, and was followed by the development of anticoagulating agents that facilitated indirect transfusions.⁵² However, advances in the scientific understanding of blood developed alongside the rise of eugenicist doctrines that appropriated the discovery of blood types for the so-called “racial sciences,” alleging that the ratio of blood types within a population reflected its relative racial superiority or inferiority.⁵³ The proliferation of the means to type and transfuse blood consequently went hand-in-hand with pseudo-scientific philosophies linking blood to theories of racial development and logics of colonialism—potent tools for colonizing powers, and complicated carriers of modernity for colonized countries like Korea.⁵⁴

In colonial Korea, blood work took place on two planes—biomedical treatment and ethnic nationalism—that grew increasingly inseparable as the eugenics movement dissolved distinctions between the scientific and political concepts of blood. As a result of global developments and local colonial conditioning, the introduction and evolution of blood science

⁵¹ The discovery of the blood circulation system in the seventeenth century caused a craze in animal-to-animal and animal-to-human blood transfusions among British and French scientists, but real and imagined ill effects from these experiments provoked a continent-wide ban that effectively halted further research for 150 years. Rose George, *Nine Pints: A Journey through the Money, Medicine, and Mysteries of Blood* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2018).

⁵² Peter S. Harper, ed., *Landmarks in Medical Genetics: Classic Papers with Commentaries* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Walter Briedigkeit, *Karl Landsteiner: Arzt-Forscher-Entdecker der menschlichen Blutgruppen* (Berlin: Hentrich & Hentrich, 2012).

⁵³ For example, it was alleged that Westerners were mostly the superior type A blood, while Easterners were the inferior type B—a false assertion that persists today in stereotypes about “Type B Blood” personalities. Rachel Boaz, *In Search of “Aryan Blood”: Serology in Interwar and National Socialist Germany* (Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2012); Daniel Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985).

⁵⁴ Chloe Campbell, *Race and Empire: Eugenics in Colonial Kenya* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012); Yuehtsen Juliette Chung, *Struggle for National Survival: Eugenics in Sino-Japanese Contexts, 1896-1945* (Psychology Press, 2002).

and medical treatment to Korea in the first half of the twentieth century fell into three categories: juridical, medical, and ideological.

The first reported uses of blood tests in Korea were largely juridical, rather than clinical. Courts adopted the practice of blood smears and tests for disease and paternity to police the structures of class order, racial hierarchy, and colonial rule. As early as 1901, Horace Underwood recommended testing blood smears to conclusively indict a Korean mineworker charged with murdering an Irish overseer, in 1922 a blood-test was entered in evidence in a paternity case in a Pyongyang court, while in 1929 a highly publicized blood screening for venereal disease was imposed on the registered *kisaeng* population.⁵⁵ The results of most such tests were inconclusive, so these early uses of blood-science in Korean courtrooms seem to have been demonstrations of the power to access such new technology, rather than practical measures.

In terms of medical applications, blood technology was much more common in the farmhouse than the family domicile, and farmers were among the most fluent in the methods of drawing, testing, and diagnosing blood to assess their domesticated animals' health conditions. Colonial era newspapers regularly published guides updating farmers on the latest methods of drawing, storing, fractionating, and testing livestock blood for disease strains and health indicators.⁵⁶ These guides presume a striking level of familiarity with recent technology and novel hematology in the rural sphere, but in the urban realm the opposite seems to have been the

⁵⁵ “Methods of Determining Blood Stains,” in RG 84, 84.2 Records of Diplomatic Posts, 1788-1962, Korea, 1882-1955, Miscellaneous Records, Box 34, Bland Murder Case; “Hyöraek kamjōngdo muhyoin’ga” 血液鑑定도無効인가 (Are even blood exams of no use), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), June 19, 1922; “Hwaryubyōng ūisim ch’ilbun imsinja nūn ibun” 花柳病疑心七分 妊娠者는二分 (Seven cases of suspected venereal disease, two pregnant) *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), June 22, 1929.

⁵⁶ “Sōngp’ae rūl chwauhanūn ch’ubyōng yebang yobōp k’allōm” 성패를 좌우하는 추병예방요법 칼럼 (Disease prevention treatment that determine success), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보, May 17, 1931.

norm. Like most medical professionals around the world prior to the discovery of strategies and technologies for long-term, stable blood storage, however, colonial-era Korean doctors solicited blood as needed, rather than in anticipation of demand.⁵⁷ Although doctors were performing transfusions by the 1930s, they were reliant on family members or paid donors and were limited to direct transfusions. Moreover, unlike well-versed farmers, city-dwellers seem to have been unfamiliar with and anxious about transfusions, as demonstrated in an issue of Yi Kŭnyŏng's serialized novel "The Third Slave," that depicts a life-saving transfusion received by the protagonist as a way of educating the reading public.⁵⁸

Ideologically, the modern collapsing of national identity and biological being into blood experienced in Western military campaigns from the Spanish Civil War through the Second World War was ushered in on the Korean peninsula through anticolonial activism and mobilization for the Pacific War. In response to the March First Movement for Korean independence in 1919, the Japanese approach to colonial governance on the peninsula pivoted from military domination to a strategy of cultural rule supported by the doctrinal pillars of *naisen ittai* (K: *naesŏn ilch'e*; "Japan and Korea as One Body") and *nissen dōso* (K: *ilsŏn dongjo*, "Japan and Chosŏn Share a Common Ancestry"). Together, these theories subsumed Koreans within the embrace of Japanese-ness while simultaneously subordinating them to a less developed position on that shared racial plane, offering the promise of integration and enfranchisement on the one hand and threatening the possibility of forced assimilation and

⁵⁷ Douglas P. Starr, *Blood: An Epic History of Medicine and Commerce* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).

⁵⁸ Yi Kŭnyŏng 이근영, "Che-sam noye 88-89" 第三奴隸 88-89 ("The Third Slave 88-89"), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), June 17-18, 1938.

ethnocide on the other.⁵⁹ In an effort to reverse these colonial doctrines of racial hierarchy, Korean nationalists seized on the concept of ethnic identity symbolized in an “unbroken 5,000-year blood-line stretching back to [the mythical Korean progenitor] Tan’gun.”⁶⁰ While during the Chosŏn era bloodline (*hyŏlt’ong*) had largely been the prerogative of elite lineages, the new logics of the nation-state system demanded its extension into a communal property, since independence rested on a claim to shared, manifest nationhood. Blood therefore assumed a prominent place in anti-colonial Korean nationalist discourse advocating a distinct Korean ethnation.⁶¹

As nationalist intellectuals wove together myth and history to craft a new national community grounded in the symbol of a shared bloodline, the rise of racial sciences and eugenics created a corresponding imperative to confirm the existence of the Korean ethnation on scientific grounds. As with other colonial powers, Japan received eugenics as a means of not only optimizing its own population, but also of controlling its colonial subjects.⁶² Rather than rejecting eugenics rubrics conflating race and evolutionary “fitness,” Korean intellectuals largely accepted the basic framework—whether to argue for full assimilation or agitate for Korean autonomy.⁶³ In the latter vein, the eugenics movement and the nationalist movement overlapped

⁵⁹ Todd Henry, *Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014); Michael Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988); Mark Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009).

⁶⁰ Gi-Wook Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).

⁶¹ See Hyung Il Pai, *Constructing “Korean” Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-formation Theories* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000); Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

⁶² Sujin Lee, “Problematizing Population: Politics of Birth Control and Eugenics in Interwar Japan,” PhD diss., Cornell University, 2017.

⁶³ Shin, Young-jeon 신영전 and Ilyeong Jeong 정일영, “Misu I Kap-su ūi saengae wa sasang: usaeng kwallyŏn sasang kwa hwaldong ūl chungsim ūro” 미수 이갑수의 생애와 사상: 우생 관련 사상과 활동을 중심으로

in Korea to spawn a potent coalition of scientists and social activists invested in scientifically validating an independent Korean ethnic identity and pursuing its racial betterment. Groups like the Korean Eugenics Association (*Usaeng hyöphoe*) formed to propagate nationalist inversions of colonial race sciences through publications like the bulletin *Usaeng (Eugenics)*.⁶⁴ In its first issue, *Usaeng* devoted its cover article to the science of racial blood-type distribution, reflecting the rising dominance of blood in the arsenal of Japanese colonial scientists in the 1930s.⁶⁵ Beginning as early as the 1920s and picking up speed in the 1930s, so-called “serological anthropologists” like Furuhashi Tanemoto conducted surveys of ABO blood-group distribution across the empire, focused primarily on the Korean peninsula with the assistance of Korean medical students like Yi Samyöŏl who were also involved in the eugenics movement.⁶⁶ For young Korean scientists such as Yi, the training they received under colonial blood scientists like Furuhashi and their exposure to eugenicist interpretations of nationalist assertions of a “pure Korean bloodline” proved formative for their future role in designing a South Korean system of blood administration.

(“Life and ideas of Lee Kap-soo: Focusing on the ideas and activities related to eugenics”), *Korean Journal of Medical History* 28, no. 1 (2019), 43-88.

⁶⁴ Shin, Young Jeon 신영진, “‘Usaeng’ e nat’anan 1930-nyöndaŏ uri nara usaeng undong ŏi t’ükjing: pogönsajök hamŏi rül chungsim ŏro” 우생에 나타난 1930년대 우리 나라 우생운동의 특징: 보건사적 함의를 중심으로 (“The characteristics of Korea’s eugenic movement in the colonial period represented in the bulletin *Woosaeng*”), *Korean Journal of Medical History* 15, no. 2 (December 2006), 133-155.

⁶⁵ Paek Inje 白麟濟, “Hyöŏlhyöng paljön e kwanhayö” 血型遺傳에 關하여 (On blood type heredity), *Usaeng* 優生 (*Eugenics*), No. 1 (September 1934), 5-6.

⁶⁶ “While physical anthropologists in the field of anatomy limited their methodology to anthropometrics, and clinicians did not institutionalize hematology and transfusion medicine in imperial Japan until the mid-1930s, Japanese forensic scientists expanded their interest in blood groups as forensic identification markers to include serological anthropology.” Jaehwan Hyun, “Blood Purity and Scientific Independence: Blood Science and Postcolonial Struggles in Korea, 1926-1975,” *Science in Context* 32, no. 3 (2019), 241.

Yi and his cohort were further shaped by the mobilization of Korean medical students for the imperial war effort during the Pacific War. Between 1910-1950, Korea and Japan remained abreast of news of rapid developments in the scientific understanding about blood and new technologies to safely administer it but lagged behind in practical applications.⁶⁷ In the West, the Allied research and development push during World War II developed technologies and protocols to safely sterilize, store, and fractionate blood that revolutionized international blood exchange programs and lay the foundations for nationalized peacetime blood programs.⁶⁸ By contrast, during the Pacific War Japan failed to establish a coherent military-medical blood supply program in contrast to the revolutionary Allied network.⁶⁹ Consequently, while the Euro-American Atlantic became a busy hub of tightly organized and expansive traffic for blood and blood-derivatives during the war, the Pan-Asian Pacific sphere established no lasting framework for future blood programming. Nonetheless, as the Pacific War deepened, blood—like other Korean resources—was mobilized for the Japanese war effort. *Katakana* ads were placed in colonial newspapers soliciting patriotic blood donations on behalf of the war effort, and Korean

⁶⁷ Newspapers reported British breakthroughs in developing transfusion equipment for “aerial hospitals,” innovations in mobile blood transportation in the Spanish Civil War, and Russian experiments in necro-transfusion—transfusing blood from dead bodies. See “Pihaeng pyöngwön (Yöngguk üi sinsisöl)” 飛行病院 (英國의新施設) (Aerial hospital (new British technology)), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), June 28, 1936; “Söban ajönsön üi taeryang suhyöl saöp” 西班牙戰線の大量輸血事業 (Large scale blood transfusion undertaking on the war frontline in Spain), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), December 11, 1937; “Suhyöl yoböpsang üi pogüm” 輸血療法上の福音 (The good news of transfusion treatment), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), April 25, 1935.

⁶⁸ Starr, *Blood: An Epic History*, 250-300; Douglas B. Kendrick, *The Blood Program in World War II: Supplemented by Experiences in the Korean War* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1964); Kara W. Swanson, *Banking on the Body: The Market in Blood, Milk, and Sperm in Modern America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014).

⁶⁹ 20th century wars played a crucial role in expanding blood treatments from rare experiments into mass mobilization projects. World War I precipitated the development of blood banks and new transfusion techniques. The Spanish Civil War gave rise to mobile blood deliver to and transfusion on combat frontlines. And World War II began the nationalized blood collection and administration programs that became the modern standard. Starr, *Blood: An Epic History*, 250-300.

medical students were conscripted to travel the country registering the blood types of fellow Koreans for future requisition.⁷⁰ Meanwhile, the imperial military undertook its infamous campaign of biological warfare development at human experimentation labs in Manchuria, where blood figured prominently as a subject of research.⁷¹ The research and registration thrust of these initiatives proved foundational to the training of young Korean doctors, as would their exposure to American medical methods of blood administration when the peninsula was divided between US and USSR military occupations at the end of the Pacific War—forestalling true peninsular liberation indefinitely.

In post-war Korea, the ravages of colonial exploitation, wartime mobilization, and peninsular division left even the most prominent national medical institutes struggling to maintain a stable electrical power supply, let alone acquire the technologies needed to maintain a standing blood store.⁷² “Liberated” from colonial rule in 1945 but riven by the peninsular division that would erupt into savage civil war a mere five-years later, medical professionals in the new state of South Korea were necessarily focused on surviving, rather than thriving.⁷³ In this context, developing blood storage capabilities remained a luxury, not a necessity.

⁷⁰ “Kōgun ni chi o sasageru: Jūgo no kenketsu undō 皇軍に血を捧げる：十五の献血運動 [Dedicate blood to the Imperial Army: Fifteen blood donation movements],” *Maeil sinbo* November 15, 1942.

⁷¹ Sheldon H. Harris, *Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American Cover-Up* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

⁷² In 1947, the three South Korean laboratories producing biologicals were the National Vaccine Laboratory in Seoul, the Institute for Veterinary Research in Anyang, and the Institute for Veterinary Research in Pusan. Of these three, only the National Vaccine Laboratory in Seoul produced human biologicals. South Korean Interim Government Activities, No. 27 (Dec. 1947): 177, NARA II.

⁷³ Choi Ŭnkyōng 최은경, “1950-60-nyōndae ūiryo chōnmun’ga ūi tongwōn kwa chingbyōng kōmsa ūi surip” 1950-60년대 의료 전문가의 동원과 징병검사의 수립 (Mobilization of medical professionals and establishment of physical standards for conscription in 1950s-60s South Korea), *Inmun kwahak yōn’gu nonch’ong* 인문과학연구논총 (*The journal of humanities*) 36 no. 4 (2015), 237.

Under American military occupation, South Korean medical institutions were reduced to near-total dependence on US aid for resources—including limited supplies of whole blood and reagents imported from the United States—along with capital and training. Just as the country’s political “Liberation” was compromised by the deferral of full independence, so too was the medical sphere’s capacity for self-sufficient supply and operations. In terms of blood, very little was available, and even if it had been Korean institutions had limited access to the technologies required for sterile treatment or long-term storage, to say nothing of advanced processes like fractionation. Scattered reports note shipments of blood under US Military Government in Korea (USMGIK), but these were irregular and clearly not part of a regular supply program.⁷⁴ Meanwhile there was no effort to set up a domestic collection program because Korean institutions were hard pressed just to maintain the basic needs of day-to-day operations.⁷⁵ American observers at the time had little good to say about the South Korean medical system, describing it as backwards and plagued by adverse conditions and incompetent personnel.⁷⁶ For their part, Korean doctors generally concurred with such disparagements and, viewing their own state as less advanced, expressed a sense of dependence on US medical aid and training programs much as they had Japanese programs under the colonial system. Indeed, several Korean doctors were trained under both occupation powers, studying first under Japanese colonial programs and later under American military exchange programs such as the Minnesota

⁷⁴ South Korean Interim Government Activities, No. 26 (Nov. 1947): 220, National Archives (United States). GALEISC5113715748; South Korean Interim Government Activities, No. 27 (Dec. 1947): 180, NARA II.

⁷⁵ In the USMGIK period, each province had a hygiene laboratory—usually in the provincial capital—capable of performing routine exams of stool, urine, and blood samples. These facilities were diagnostic, however, and not treatment or production centers. Central File: Decimal File 895.50, Internal Affairs of States, Korea, Economic Matters, August 1947 – January 19, 1948, National Archives (United States).

⁷⁶ Richard J. H. Johnston, “Dribblets of Drugs Reach Korea’s Ill: Scanty Supply Spread Thin Over Needy Millions—U.S. Army Stemmed Cholera Spread,” *New York Times* Aug. 6, 1946, pg. 2.

Program.⁷⁷ After the official establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the persistent conflicts with the North caused an immediate militarization of the medical profession that hallowed out services across the country and undercut any efforts to establish coherent, consistent blood provision program independent US aid.

Meanwhile, after 1945 the United States, too, allowed its international blood program infrastructure to dissolve, and certainly made little effort to establish any domestic program in occupied Korea. The Korean War's blood demands consequently caught the United States and South Korea unaware and unprepared.

First Response: Dependence on Foreign Blood During the Korean War

The onset of the Korean War (1950-1953) launched expansions of military and civilian blood programs in South Korea, the US, and Japan and initiated a trans-Pacific exchange program in biological tissues, the foremost of which was blood. Meanwhile, the wartime foregrounding of blood also revealed its importance not only for the symbolic preservation of Korean identity but also the literal preservation of Korean bodies. Moreover, the critical nature of blood to modern warfare made it a vital strategic resource even after the war, as the divided peninsula marched into the Cold War decades in a state of unabated division and war merely paused by the ceasefire declaration in 1953. In spite of the growing consensus on the need to stockpile Korean hospitals with reserves of blood as a buffer against communist incursion, however, South Korea's dependence on shipments of foreign blood throughout the Korean War also gave rise to anxieties about maintaining a self-sufficient medical infrastructure and preserving Korean blood against racial contamination. The massive aid South Korea received in

⁷⁷ John P. DiMoia, *Reconstructing Bodies: Biomedicine, Health, and Nation-Building in South Korea since 1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

physical blood supplies, technologies, and training during the Korean War consequently inspired a two-fold investment in blood independence: a military-medical interest in ensuring a self-sufficient stockpile of blood as a strategic resource, and a bio-nationalist interest in safeguarding the purity of Korean blood against the transfusion of foreign, racially other bloods.

When North Korean forces barreled south on June 25, 1950, neither South Korea nor its American ally were prepared to meet the attack. US forces had withdrawn from South Korea in 1949, leaving behind only a small military advisory group.⁷⁸ Meanwhile, South Korean President Syngman Rhee's somewhat baffling reshuffling of troop formations along the 38th parallel in the month before the invasion left an open path for North Korean premier Kim Il Sung's forces.⁷⁹ Pushed rapidly backwards before the Northern advance, Rhee's calls for aid caught the US—which had been steadily demobilizing its military troops and supply networks after World War II—unable to provide the desired immediate response.⁸⁰

In the first weeks of the war efforts to move lifesaving blood supplies to the Korean frontline had to contend with shortages in personnel and materials on both sides of the Pacific, as well as the need to implement transportation networks and training structures on a tight timescale. In South Korea, the medical profession was so beleaguered that the phrase “doctorless village” (*muŷich'on*) was a political talking point of the newly sovereign state's inaugural

⁷⁸ Pak Tongch'an 박동찬, *Chuhan migun sago mundan KMAG 주한미군사고문단 (Korean Military Advisory Group)* (Hanyangdae ch'ulp'anbu, 2016).

⁷⁹ Kim Tongch'un 김동춘, *Chŏnjaeng kwa sahoe: uri ege Han'guk chŏnjaeng ūn muŏsiŏnna 전쟁과 사회: 우리에게 한국전쟁은 무엇이었나? (War and society: what was the Korean War to us)* (Sŏul t'ŷkpyŏlsi: Tol pegae, 2000), 65-76. For the English translation, see Dong-Choon Kim, *The Unending Korean War: A Social History*, trans. Sung-ok Kim (Larspure, CA: Tamal Vista Publications, 2009), 41-50.

⁸⁰ Albert E. Cowdrey, *The Medics' War: United States Army in the Korean War, Volume IV* (Washington, D. C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1987), 1-10.

years.⁸¹ With only 5,000 doctors registered to serve a population of 12 million, well over half the townships in South Korea were without access to medical care.⁸² Furthermore, the North Korean invasion disastrously coincided with a South Korean state order that mandated lengthy terms of military service for medical professionals and exacerbated shortages in civilian medical care, complicating the initial wartime medical mobilization process.⁸³ Meanwhile in the US, the mass demobilization of World War II military medics and the post-USMGIK withdrawal of American troops and supply chains to Korea caused over a year's delay in mobilizing trained personnel and supplies for a medical blood supply program adequate to frontline demands.⁸⁴ As a result of mobilization schedules, most of the early medical teams deployed to Korea were inexperienced (few veterans were re-conscripted), reluctant to be in Korea, and resentful of military discipline and structures.⁸⁵ In both South Korea and the US, the harsh reality was that medical personnel were simply spread too thin and faced competing demands from all sides.

Like personnel, medical supplies were hard come-by in the early days of the war. The medical supply crisis was especially severe in the chaotic first months of the war, as North Korean troops swept relentlessly to the southernmost tip of the peninsula and trans-Pacific

⁸¹ Choi Ŭnkyōng 최은경, “1950-60-nyōndae ūiryo chōnmun’ga ūi tongwōn kwa chingbyōng kōmsa ūi surip” 1950-60년대 의료 전문가의 동원과 징병검사의 수립 (Mobilization of medical professionals and establishment of physical standards for conscription in 1950s-60s South Korea), *Inmun kwahak yōn’gu nonch’ong* 인문과학연구논총 (*The journal of humanities*) 36 no. 4 (2015), 237.

⁸² “Muūich’on haegyōl-an” 무의촌 해결안 (Proposal to rectify doctorless villages), *Ŭisa sibo* 의사시보 (*Doctor’s bulletin*), 11 December 1955.

⁸³ Ch’oe Kyōng-il 최경일, “Muūich’on haegyōl saan” 무의촌 해결 사안 (Addressing doctorless villages), *Ŭisa sibo* 의사시보 (*Doctor’s bulletin*), 27 November 1955.

⁸⁴ Douglas B. Kendrick, *The Blood Program in World War II: Supplemented by Experiences in the Korean War* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1964).

⁸⁵ William J. Anderson, *Battlefield Doc: Memoirs of a Korean War Combat Medic* (St. Louis, MO: Moonbridge Publications, 2015).

supply-lines remained nearly non-existent.⁸⁶ In the interim, US military administrators hastily requisitioned blood from nearby bases in Japan.⁸⁷ With no structure in place, the first blood dispatched to Korea from Tokyo was sent in 70-pound refrigerated marmite cans rather than the standard sanitized glassware developed specifically for blood storage and transportation in World War II.⁸⁸ By the end of 1950, donors in Japan had provided 22,099 pints of blood to Korea, but it was barely a drop in the bucket of the 300,000 pints demand.⁸⁹

Although it took over a year for supplies to meet demand, the Korean War occasioned one of the largest American blood drives to date, driven by the immediate crisis and long-term Cold War anxieties. Red Cross President General George Marshall announced a new “Marshall Plan” to meet the dual mandate of supplying blood for overseas and domestic needs.⁹⁰ Under the Marshall plan, the blood program became a separate arm of the Red Cross that reported directly to the US president, was overseen by a military committee, and coordinated with the Department of Defense for a “Blood for Korea” campaign.⁹¹ Through the Blood for Korea campaign, military

⁸⁶ “Blood Sent to G.I.’s in Korea,” *New York Times*, July 12, 1950, pg. 21.

⁸⁷ Although Tokyo and Osaka Army Hospitals had small blood banks for their own needs, these were inadequate for frontline demands. US military occupation authorities in Japan quickly set up a supply line made up of a mobile collection team, a collecting and processing center in Tokyo, an advance blood depot in southern Japan, and a courier service for delivery to Korea, all organized under the 406th Medical General Laboratory, which would continue to serve as the epicenter of the Far Eastern Command’s branch of the blood program for the duration of the war.

⁸⁸ Each of these cans held roughly 9 units (9 pints) of blood. 406th Medical General Laboratory, Annual Report of Medical Service Activities, Professional Section (Annual Historical Report), 1950, pp. 155-58, file 319.1-2 (406th Medical General Laboratory) Far East-1950, HRB.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 155.

⁹⁰ “Red Cross to Gather Blood for the Forces; Accepts Johnson Plea to Be Official Agency,” *New York Times*, July 26, 1950; Kendrick, *Blood Program*, 726.

⁹¹ The Committee oversaw the medical policies and professional practices of the program in consultation with a group of scientists and physicians, as well as the chief medical officers of military arms of the government like the DOD, the National Security Resources Board, the Veterans Administration, and the Atomic Energy Commission. The 5 committee members of the DOD committee were Ross T. McIntire [wartime Surgeon General of the Navy], Charles A. Janeway, I. S. Radvin, Charles A. Doan, and Carl V. Moore. Kendrick, *Blood Program*, 725-8.

facilities were converted into blood-collection centers⁹² and, in the civilian sphere, Red Cross-led efforts swept across the country so energetically that within months of the Blood Drive 94% of American adults had “heard or read about the need for blood for soldiers wounded in Korea,” and by Armistice nearly one-third of Americans reported having donated to the war effort.⁹³ Despite the ongoing ambivalence many Americans felt about the conflict in Korea, servicemembers and civilians alike demonstrated widespread willingness to support the medical needs of US forces.

The Red Cross encouraged prospective civilian donors to see giving blood as a way to personally connect with soldiers, recognizing that blood investment had to be personal—a gift shared between individuals rather than an anonymous drop to nameless strangers—to drum up the level of support the program needed.⁹⁴ Posters advertised the opportunity to “Dedicate your Blood to a man overseas” by personally signing the package their blood was shipped in.⁹⁵ The intimacy of this exchange—the blood that had flowed in one American flowing again through another—also presented a political opportunity to biologically bind an immigrant nation and a trans-Pacific military empire. In war, Americans would be literally bound by blood, not only to

⁹² “Red Cross Starts Expanded Service: General Marshall Says He is Ready to Provide Facilities for All Combat Troops,” *New York Times*, 21 July 1950: 6.

⁹³ Less than 0.5% of those interviewed for this poll reported that they were physically qualified but unwilling to contribute blood to the war effort. Gallup Organization, Gallup Poll # 1951-0481: Inflation/Foreign Policy/Political Parties, Question 22, USGALLUP.51-481.QK08A, Gallup Organization, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1951), Dataset, DOI: {doi}; Gallup Organization, Gallup Poll # 1955-0549: Television/Diet and Health/Boxing/Safety Belts, Question 46, USGALLUP.55-549.Q099A09, Gallup Organization, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1955), Dataset, DOI: {doi}.

⁹⁴ Harry S. Truman, Address at the Cornerstone Laying of the District of Columbia Red Cross Building. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/231154>.

⁹⁵ “Now dedicate your blood to a man overseas! Sign your name on the package.” 1915/1980, Poster collection, Hoover Institution Archives, <https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/41450>.

one another but also to their South Korean “blood brothers.”⁹⁶ The cohering humanitarianism of this vision, however, paralleled another outgrowth of the Red Cross Blood Program—namely, growing support for compulsory blood collection and registration systems that undercut these principles of identity-blind universalism.



Figure 2.1. American Red Cross Blood for Korea Campaign Poster.

⁹⁶ President Eisenhower to President Rhee, June 6, 1953, Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1953, 835-836.



Figure 2.2. Harpers Bazaar Blood for Korea Cover featuring Lauren Bacall in her first modeling appearance.

The Korean War blood drive corresponded with Cold War calls to make giving blood a compulsory wartime duty for men of draft age who had deferred military service⁹⁷ along with plans to legally require all US residents to carry identification tags with their name, residence,

⁹⁷ Gallup Organization, Gallup Poll # 1951-0481: Inflation/Foreign Policy/Political Parties, Question 1, USGALLUP.110251.RK08C, Gallup Organization, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1951), Dataset, DOI: {doi}.

and blood type.⁹⁸ Although the compulsory character of these proposals ran counter to the voluntarist ethos of the Red Cross drive, the two initiatives nonetheless enjoyed equally widespread approval in public polls.⁹⁹ Compulsory collection and registration schemes highlighted a growing culture where blood—like bodies—could be conscripted for American military imperialism. The contradiction between humanitarianism and military nationalism in the blood program were most visible in minority populations.

Race-based conscriptions, segregations, and exclusions of blood in Korean War blood drives across the Pacific reveal the enduring, eugenics-inspired connections between blood and race in both the public eye and institutional arrangements. Red Cross drives in the United States and at American collection centers in Japan separated the blood of Black and Asian donors from reserves for transfusing white soldiers.¹⁰⁰ Although the medical establishment acknowledged that there was no scientific reason to separate blood by race, in practice Black donors often found themselves turned away from collection centers or had their race marked on donor cards, while Military authorities in Japan segregated Japanese blood for use on Koreans but not white American soldiers.¹⁰¹ Meanwhile, the combat theater itself produced yet another instance of

⁹⁸ Gallup Organization, Gallup Poll # 1949-0438: Health Insurance/Politics/Taft-Hartley Law/Taxes, Question 39, USGALLUP.043049.R08A, Gallup Organization, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1949), Dataset, DOI: {doi}; Gallup Organization, Gallup Poll # 1950-0460: Politics/Korea/Communism/Readiness of Next War, Question 7, USGALLUP.092350.R01B, Gallup Organization, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1950), Dataset, DOI: {doi}.

⁹⁹ The preceding two proposals had 80% and 90% approval ratings respectively. *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ Racial blood segregation contrasted with and contributed to the process of military desegregation. On troop integration and black-American discourse about the Korean War, see Daniel Widener, “Seoul City Sue and the Bugout Blues: Black Dissent and the Forgotten War,” in *Afro/Asia: Revolutionary Connections*, eds. Fred Ho and Bill V. Mullen (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008): 55-87.

¹⁰¹ “Negroes Offer Their Blood, But Army Won’t Take It!” HQ 61-6728, Section# Sub A.; Date: March 1936 – 1952; Source Library: Federal Bureau of Investigation Library; Bertram M. Bernheim, *Adventure in Blood Transfusion* (New York: Smith & Durrell, 1942), 13-17; Kara W. Swanson, *Banking on the Body: The Market in Blood, Milk, and Sperm in Modern America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 64-66, 72-78; Cowdrey, *Medics’ War*, 154.

racial blood anxieties: the specter of North Korean vampirism, which gave vent to fears around blood and the Oriental other alike. A 1951 report on the treatment of Allied POWs by Chinese and North Korean forces claimed that POW camps had begun collecting prisoners' blood "ostensibly for their own benefit" while actually using it to supply Chinese and North Korean field hospitals with plasma. According to the report, "To begin with the prisoners contributed blood to help the wounded among their own group. On the surface they announced that this was a self-help to each other. In fact, most of the blood was taken and used at front-line hospitals."¹⁰² In a macabrely literal take on such charges of abusive extractions of blood by North Korean forces, a wartime issue of the comic book series *Captain Marvel* transformed North Koreans into vampiric "Blood sucking Mongols" intent on consuming Red Cross blood shipments to UN forces and draining the veins of hale American GIs.¹⁰³



Figure 2.3. Otto Binder, C. C. Beck, and Pete Costanza, "Captain Marvel Fights the Mongol Blood-Drinkers," *Captain Marvel Adventures* 24, Iss. 140 (January 1953).

In Korea, Republic of Korea (ROK) medics transfusing imported blood to Korean soldiers and civilians in US operated field hospitals internalized and mapped these anxieties

¹⁰² "Important Information on the Maltreatment and Killing of Allied Prisoners by the Chinese and Korean Communists," (3) and "The Important Information of Korea Captives," (3) in 321.4 Prisoners of War (1951), National Archives (United States), GALEISC5101271322, p. 4, 21.

¹⁰³ "Captain Marvel Fights the Mongol Blood-Drinkers," *Captain Marvel Adventures* 24, no. 140 (January 1953).

about racial pollution via transfusion onto the prior nationalist concern with maintaining the purity and independence of the Korean bloodline. Of his first exposure to direct vascular injection in the Korean War, the surgeon Kim Kwang-yŏn recalled, “At our first sight of [direct] transfusion of 500 cc of whole blood airlifted from the United States, we were so ignorant that we worried, ‘If this is a black person’s blood will our skin also turn black?’”¹⁰⁴ From the vantage point of five-decades of distance, Dr. Kim described the racial worries that medical blood procedures provoked in Korean medics as “ignorant.” At the time, however, his racist reaction against Black blood perfectly mirrored the systematic treatment of blood collected from Black donors by the American Red Cross and his commanding US medics, and seamlessly mapped the American imperative to protect the sanctity of white blood onto the anticolonial nationalist Korean mandate to preserve the independence of Korean blood.

After the division of the peninsula, the anti-colonial narrative of a distinct blood-based Korean ethnonation had been taken up by ideologues on both sides of the 38th parallel as the natural basis for reunification.¹⁰⁵ Appeals for reunification described the Korean people as a historically united family, “one people” who “Inherit[ed] the blood of Tan-goon [*sic*]” and therefore claimed the whole peninsula as “the hereditary property of the Korean nation only.”¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Yŏnse ūidae oegwa hakkyosil 연세의대외과학교실, “Haebang hu ūi yŏksa: Kim Kwangyŏn chŭngŏn” 해방 후의 역사: 김광연 증언(Post-Liberation history: Kim Kwangyŏn’s testimony), *Yŏnsei oegwa hakkyosil 115-nyŏnsa* 연세의대외과학교실 115 년사 (115-year history of Yonsei surgical laboratory) (November 2000).

¹⁰⁵ From the “opening” of Chosŏn on, asserting Korean nationhood thus became the main focus of anti-colonial and nationalist advocates. As Korean studies scholars have shown, this project worked multiple fronts, including political and legislative, cultural and historical, and ethnic and racial. For reviews of political and legislative approaches, see Alexis Dudden, *Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004); and Henry Em, *The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and historiography in modern Korea* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013). For cultural and historical approaches, see Michael Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea* (1988); and Hyung Il Pai, *Constructing “Korean” Origins* (2000), and for ethnic and racial approaches see Gi-Wook Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea* (2006); and Sujin Lee, “Problematizing Population” (2017).

¹⁰⁶ “Message to UN General Assembly,” Decimal File 895.00, February 17, 1948 – December 31, 1949. NARA II.

Organizers across the political spectrum attributed national independence to the blood spilled by Korean patriots, metonymized the Korean peninsula as a body suffering from blood-poisoning, and called for national healing by re-connecting the people's blood vessels.¹⁰⁷ Blood as a cohering force quickly became the dominant basis for reunification agendas in both South and North Korea, and the pivotal question became who had the right to reunite and control the political fate of a people that both sides agreed were of a single blood. In the immediate post-colonial context, the dichotomy of a people united by blood but divided by outside forces lent new potency to blood-based Korean identity by underscoring the tragic injustice of the physical and political division of a geographically, historically, and ethnically cohesive national body.¹⁰⁸ Political leaders in the south and the north sought to turn this to their advantage.

In the South, Syngman Rhee promulgated the concept of *tanil minjok* (single people) and the attendant philosophy of *Ilminjuüi* (one-people principle) through public statements, press releases, and institutional dissemination.¹⁰⁹ While the concept of *tanil minjok* reflected the work

¹⁰⁷ A handbill at a June 10, 1949 meeting of the Students National Defense Corps (*hakdo hogukdang*) in Seoul read, "We marched unitedly (toward the goal)...past the bodies of our ancestors, bleeding from the laceration of flesh in the June 10th and March 1st "Mansei" movements, Kwangjoo Students incident, Anti-Trusteeship movement, and in the May 10 Elections...What are the poisons in the body of the new Korea established by blood? Purge all the vicious profiteers, anti-national traitors, corrupt government officials and let us make the Republic of Korea a healthy being! ...Because Stalin became the land-owner and Kim Ilsung [*sic*] his farmboss, look! The blood vessels on the skinny neck of the poor old farmer have expanded out of exasperation...The blood vessels of our people must be connected everywhere...in the North and South!" "Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 367, dated June 20, 1949, from American Embassy, Seoul," Central File: Decimal File 895.20, July 12, 1948 – December 18, 1949. NARA II.

¹⁰⁸ On "deferred" Korean "postcoloniality," see Chungmoo Choi, "Nationalism and Construction of Gender in Korea," *Dangerous Women: Gender and Korean Nationalism*, eds. Elaine H. Kim and Chungmoo Choi (New York: Routledge, 1998).

¹⁰⁹ Contemporaneous observers were quick to note that the foremost ministerial proponent of *Ilminjuüi* was Rhee's minister of education, An Hosang. "The Philosophy of Ilminjooi (One-People Principle)," February 1, 1950, in Central File: Decimal File 795.00, NARA II. For more on An and Rhee's infusion of *Ilminjuüi* into the South Korean educational system, see Yŏn Chŏngŭn 연정은, "An Hosang üi ilminjuüi wa chŏngch'i-kyoyuk hwaldong" 안호상의 일민주의와 정치교육 활동 (An Hosang's one-people principle and political-educational actions) *Yŏksa yŏn'gu* 역사연구 (*Historical Studies*) 12 (June 2003), 7-38; Kim Hanjong 김한중, "Ilminjuüi wa minjujök minjok kyoyuk-ron e nat'an an Hosang üi yŏksa insik" 일민주의와 민주적 민족교육론에 나타난 안호상의 역사 인식 (An Hosang's historical perspective as produced by the one-people principle and democratic nationalist educational theory), *Yŏksa wa tamnon* 역사와 담론 (*History and debate*) 45 (December 2006), 313-342.

of colonial-era nationalist intellectuals who asserted an independent Korean identity based on a shared bloodline from the mythical progenitor Tan'gun,¹¹⁰ Rhee's philosophy of *Ilminjuŭi* was a Cold War philosophy that inflected ethnic-identity with anti-communist politics.¹¹¹ Calibrated to take advantage of the transitional Liberation space between anti-colonial ethnonationalism and post-colonial reunification, *Ilminjuŭi* was a platform for celebrating Rhee's patriotic affidavits while propounding a "unique" Korean philosophy premised on five-thousand years of history and promising independence and unification.¹¹²

In the North, blood-unity was inflected with anti-imperialism rather than anti-communism. North Korean leaders argued that the independence of Korean blood was grounds for not only reunification, but also peninsular sovereignty free of foreign interference.¹¹³ For North Korean pundits, the heritability of property through blood formed the basis of the argument against Korea's 1945 division and subsequent foreign occupations—particularly by "blood-thirsty" US forces in the South to whom "Koreans [were] an inferior people" and who would inevitably take the "opportunity to follow in the footsteps of their forefathers, who were fond of lynching the Negroes and killing the natives."¹¹⁴ Moreover, the emotional resonance of blood-ties between Koreans promised that Kim Il Sung's anti-imperialist mission would be

¹¹⁰ Schmid, *Korea Between Empires*, 172-195.

¹¹¹ Rhee first enunciated the principles of *Ilminjuŭi* in a radio address on April 21, 1949. "The Philosophy of *Ilminjooi* (One-People Principle)," February 1, 1950, Central File: Decimal File 795.00, Internal Political and National Defense Affairs, Korea, January 7, 1950 – August 20, 1950. NARA II.

¹¹² "Enclosure 1: Translation of Article in *Yunhap Sinmoon*, January 21, 1950: Round Table Conference on Philosophy of *Ilminjooi*," Central File: Decimal File 795.00, Internal Political and National Defense Affairs, Korea, January 7, 1950 – August 20, 1950. National Archives (United States).

¹¹³ Henry Em, *The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea* (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2013), 58.

¹¹⁴ Occupation Forces 7-10: Folder 3, May 31, 1946-August 11, 1948, National Archives (United States).

welcomed and assisted by Koreans living south of the 38th parallel. “The North Korean people,” Kim explained, “Being of the same blood as the South Korean people, consider it a most pressing task to launch a nationwide common struggle together with the South Korean people, in order to frustrate the aggressor program of American imperialists to divide Korea.”¹¹⁵ As *Iminjuŭi* evolved from Rhee’s combination of anti-communism and blood-based ethnonationalism, so would Kim Il Sung later develop this pairing of anti-imperialism and a blood-bound Korean identity into the doctrine of *Chuch’ejjuŭi* (self-reliance ideology).¹¹⁶

Such contests over the politics of Korean blood seemed primed for the kind of volunteer-driven nationalist blood drives underway in the US, but the ravages of war made blood collection unreliable and methods relied on compulsion rather than volunteerism. In addition, the reemergence of Orientalist tropes around Korean blood management cast a pall over early solicitation efforts, while encouraging blood conscription to organize itself around twinned defensive goals: defending the independence of the South Korean state from further communist aggression on the one hand and defending the independence of Korean blood from transfusions of foreign bloods on the other.

Localized Treatment: Militarized Blood Collection and the Pursuit of Blood Independence in Post-War South Korea

As the war slowed to an inconclusive armistice (July 27, 1953), South Korean military medical authorities began considering how to establish an independent blood supply that was self-sufficient for the possibility of another war against North Korea and independent of foreign

¹¹⁵ “Enclosure No. 1: Radio Intercepts (26 April 1948),” in Korea Central File: Decimal File 895.00, Internal Affairs of States, Korea, March 4, 1948-June 30, 1948. National Archives (United States).

¹¹⁶ Jae-Jung Suh, ed., *Origins of North Korea’s Juche: Colonialism, War, and Development*. (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012); Robert Scalapino, *Communism in Korea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

aid. Ensuring a standing stockpile of Korean blood became a core pillar in the military imperative to maintain the level of constant combat-readiness demanded by a state of prolonged war. Ensuring the means to manage blood independent of foreign infusions of blood supplies, equipment, and knowhow therefore became the focus of concerted efforts in the ROK military at the end of the Korean War and in the years after.

The first step in moving towards an independent blood administration was weaning South Korea off of its dependence on foreign aid. During the war, nearly all of the blood used to treat military and civilian casualties was airlifted to Korea from the United States.¹¹⁷ Under US oversight, the Korean War blood program provided blood for the treatment of UN soldiers as well as Korean soldiers and civilians, adding a blood supply supplement to its military aid package to Korea in the form of \$50 per bottle to buy blood from local sellers since the trans-Pacific supply program was limited by the short shelf-life of whole blood.¹¹⁸ After Armistice, however, US blood aid to Korea diminished along with the rest of US military aid and Korea had to find its own store of blood providers and the means to reimburse them.¹¹⁹ The step-by-step diminishment of foreign military support motivated Korean authorities to build up domestic resources to sustain and anticipate future combat.

The initial buildup was determined by the strategic imperatives of the war. Due to the dominance of maritime strategy in the war's first months, the Navy became the first branch of

¹¹⁷ Supplemented by some shipments from UN allied countries, and of course also sourced from nearby US bases in Japan. "Communications Re Provision of Blood Plasma for Korean Relief," RG 59, Department of State, Decimal File, 1950-1954, Relating to Korea, Box No. 1376, from 357.AD/1-151 to 357.AD/5-3151.

¹¹⁸ Kim Kihong, Yi Samyŏl, and Kang Tŭkyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han'guk hŏnhyŏl undongsa* 한국헌혈운동사 (*History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea*) (P'aju-si: Nanam sinsŏ, 1990), 38.

¹¹⁹ Headquarters of the United States Army, Far East and Eighth United States Army (Rear), *Logistics in the Korean Operations, Vol. III* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History Department, 1953).

the ROK military to pursue an independent blood store.¹²⁰ In 1952, it established the Navy Blood Depot (*haegun hyölaekko*) in Song-do, Pusan—the first blood storage facility in South Korea.¹²¹ In its early days, wartime exigencies made the Depot a markedly mobile operation. Over the course of the war, it moved from its original rented space in the Livestock Hygiene Research Center in Song-do to a hospital ship following a fire in the Surgeon General’s Office, and then into its own building on land following the great Pusan fire of autumn 1953. Supplies, like space, were also makeshift in that first year, as Depot staff not yet provided with the proper transfusion gear tried to manufacture their own tools with sometimes fatal results.¹²²

The chaotic conditions of war not only complicated efforts to erect blood administration facilities, but also effected efforts to solicit domestic donations, skewing towards conscription. As the war wound down, the Depot pursued full-scale transfusion activities but struggled to collect blood itself. It was assisted in securing donors by Blood Transfusion Societies (*suhyöl hyöp’oe*), organizations that provided military collection centers with donors through the wartime mobilization law (*chönsi tongwönböp*), gathering and delivering donors to the Navy Depot.¹²³ The first such agency in post-Liberation Korea, the Korean Transfusion Society (*Han’guk suhyöl hyöp’oe*), was a 1951 registry of 200+ donors founded as an organization to “make donors give blood to the Army and Navy Hospital,” but precedents for the format lay

¹²⁰ Pak Pongch’an 박봉찬, “Haegun hyöraekko öpjök e taehayö” 해군 혈액고 업적에 대하여 (On the operations of the Navy Blood Depot), *Haegun üidan chapji* 해군의단잡지 (*Naval Medical Journal*) 4 (July 1959), 205-210.

¹²¹ “Ch’aehyöl undong chön’gae” 採血運動展開 (Blood collection movement expands) *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), June 3, 1951.

¹²² Incidents of blood poisoning from cross-type transfusion, improper sterilization and contamination, or other issues dropped drastically from the beginning of WWII through the end of the Korean War, but casualty lists in the first hectic years of the war still include deaths from complications with blood procedures, such as post-transfusion contractions of hepatitis.

¹²³ Pak Tuhyök 박두혁, *Üidang Kim Ki-hong* 의당 김기홍 (*Kim Kihong, penname Üidang*) (Söul: Tösup, 2016).

further back in the registration and conscription of Korean blood for Japan's imperial war effort in the previous decade.¹²⁴ Additional societies soon followed, including a Korean Transfusion Society licensed by the Ministry of Welfare on April 15, 1952 to provide blood to injured soldiers and policemen with the aim of "mutual transfusion for civilian defense,"¹²⁵ and local iterations like the North Pusan Transfusion Society (*Pukpusan suhyŏl hyŏp'oe*), the Central Transfusion Society (*Chungang suhyŏl hyŏp'oe*), and later the Naval Transfusion Society (*Suyŏng ŭi suhyŏl hyŏp'oe*).¹²⁶ These societies were not volunteer registries but rather a kind of donor conscription system that "half-forced" Koreans to give blood to army and police forces.¹²⁷ Unlike the Red Cross blood drive in the US, these society drives were neither strictly voluntary nor NGO-organized (most transfusion societies were government appointed). However, the same conceptual frameworks of patriotic service, civilian blood as a repayment for soldiers' blood, and militarized nationalism underscored the South Korean campaigns.

Reflecting the difference between voluntary and conscription-based or incentive-driven drives, most Korean donors were refugees, and the majority were women. In October 1952, the South Korean Transfusion Society (*Taehan suhyŏl hyop'oe*) ran a month-long nation-wide blood drive to meet the urgent frontline need for blood for transfusions. The post-campaign results fell

¹²⁴ "Ibaekyŏ-myŏng i chajinhae konghyŏl suhyŏl hyŏp'oe maenghwal" 二百餘名이 自進해 供血 輸血協會 猛活 (200+ people volunteer blood donation with vigorous transfusion society), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), 23 September 1951.

¹²⁵ The president of the new agency was Ch'oe Chaeyu, its chairman was Ch'oe Tong, and its managing director was Ku Kihoe. "Han'guk suhyŏl hyŏp'oe ch'angnip" 韓國輸血協會創立 (Korean Transfusion Society Inauguration), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), 18 April 1952; "Han'guk suhyŏl hyŏp'oe ch'angnip" 韓國輸血協會創立 (Korean Transfusion Society Inauguration), *Kyŏngnyang sinmun* 경향신문 (*Kyŏngnyang newspaper*), 19 April 1952.

¹²⁶ Kim Kihong, Yi Samyŏl, and Kang Tŭkyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han'guk hŏnhyŏl undongsa* 한국헌혈운동사 (*History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea*) (P'aju-si: Nanam sinsŏ, 1990).

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

short of the Society's goals, collecting 4,600 donors nation-wide.¹²⁸ Transfusion Society campaign organizers criticized non-participation by those with power and means, noting caustically that male donors were “an extreme minority” and that even among the scant 13 donors in the total North Kyöngsang Provincial Area—which included the temporary capital of Pusan— “we could not find a single government official [willing to give blood].”¹²⁹

Moreover, a blistering critique of the drive's poor results made explicit comparison with blood drives in UN countries:

“Even if you can't win the eternal glory of joining the frontline as a Korean national who yearns for certain victory and reunification, can you not even still give just a tiny amount of the blood that becomes life-giving fluid for soldiers. Isn't it an intolerable disgrace that we, who pride ourselves on being a civilized nation, have to rely on the US for even this? ... The health of blood donors is completely guaranteed. Don't hesitate, and let's do this as a normal form of relief/aid. The chaste blood of unmarried people is especially welcome (according to the society), but also impassioned male and female students, comrade public officials committed to justice, and comrade patriots let's set an example and actively cooperate in this sacred undertaking.”¹³⁰

In the wake of its inaugural drives disappointing results—not only in quantitative terms, but also its reflection on common consensus and investment in the value of blood and popular association of blood donation with the war effort, civic duty, and nationalism/patriotism—the South Korean Transfusion Society began running inspirational stories in the South Korean press that modeled

¹²⁸ “Suhyöl konggü� sanghwang pullyang” 輸血供給狀況不良 (The poor state of supply for blood transfusions), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), 16 November 1952. The *Chosön ilbo* coverage of the same incident reports slightly higher overall numbers of 5,000 total donors. “Taebubun i p'inanmin” 대부분이 피난민 (The majority are refugees), *Chosön ilbo* 조선일보 (*Chosön daily*), 17 November 1952.

¹²⁹ “Suhyöl konggü� sanghwang pullyang” 輸血供給狀況不良 (The poor state of supply for blood transfusions), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), 16 November 1952. The *Chosön ilbo* coverage of the same incident reports slightly higher overall numbers of 5,000 total donors. “Taebubun i p'inanmin” 대부분이 피난민 (The majority are refugees), *Chosön ilbo* 조선일보 (*Chosön daily*), 17 November 1952.

¹³⁰ Chöng Saryön 정사련, “Suhyöl hyöp'oe saöp e chökwi hyömnyökhaja” 輸血協會事業에 積爲協力하자 (Let's work together to contribute to the Transfusion Society enterprise), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), 6 December 1952.

not only the behavior of blood donation, but the desired psychological motivators and social consciousness that would bind blood and nation in a direct, physical line in the same vein as the American Red Cross' publicity campaigns.¹³¹ Beginning in November 1952, immediately after the close of their October campaign, they ran "inspirational stories" to show how and why different social groups should participate in this new form of national engagement.

In hopes of raising patriotic blood donation, Transfusion Societies published inspirational stories in the South Korean press that modeled blood donation behavior and explained why different social groups should participate. For non-enlisted men, blood donation was framed as a substitute for combat, particularly for those with disabilities,¹³² while for enlisted men blood donation was encouraged in addition to their service.¹³³ Particularly since men were so absent from the October blood drive, the Society was keenly interested in convincing them that this, too, was part of their manly national duty.

Blood donation as a substitute for national military service was also a key part of soliciting women's donations. Since women already constituted the majority of donors in the October drive, the Society continued to capitalize on that existing trend by trying to motivate not only refugee women responsible for providing for their family, but also the "chaste blood of unmarried women."¹³⁴ Anecdotes about young donors like an Ewha University sophomore

¹³¹ Pak Chint'ak 박진탁, *Sarang ūi hōnhyōl undongsa* 사랑의 헌혈운동사 (*Blood donation movement of love*) (Sōul: Parūn'gil, 2001).

¹³² "Chajinhae ch'aehyōlk'e Ulsan ch'angnim[changnim] migō" 自進해採血케 蔚山장님美舉(Commendable act of voluntary blood giving in Ulsan), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), June 20, 1951.

¹³³ "Nae "p'i" rūl sangbyōng ege" 『내"피"를傷兵에게』 (My "blood" for wounded soldiers), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), 20 November 1952.

¹³⁴ Chōng Saryōn 정사련, "Suhyōl hyōp'oe saōp e chōkwi hyōmnyōkhaja" 輸血協會事業에 積爲協力하자 (Let's work together to contribute to the Transfusion Society enterprise), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), 6 December 1952.

specifically stated that, “As a young girl, Ms. Yi Sukcha cannot go stand on the front-line, but she nonetheless says she will repay those fighting to make our nation with her own blood.”¹³⁵

According to first Blood Depot Director Oh Yunhong, the blood donors who were conscripted by transfusion societies and delivered to the Depot received a 1,000mL injection of glucose and a certificate of donation to ease physical discomfort and promote patriotic pride. Nonetheless, Oh admitted that “Strictly speaking, it would be difficult to call these earliest blood collection efforts voluntary blood donation, and even though we appealed to patriotism, there were still people [among those assembled by the societies] who were scared of having their blood taken and would try to run away.”¹³⁶ Korean doctors like Kang Tŭkyong tried to ease public concerns by publicly donating blood themselves, but domestic donation remained stagnant. Consequently, as US blood aid dwindled, military medical centers increasingly turned to blood sales to fill the gap.



Figure 2.4. Kang Tŭkyong setting an example by donating blood at the 1st Army Hospital in 1954. The placard at the far rear reads, “Thank you for the gift of your warm blood.”

¹³⁵ “Nae ‘p’i” rŭl sangbyŏng ege” 『내"피"를傷兵에게』 (My “blood” for wounded soldiers), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), 20 November 1952.

¹³⁶ Kim Kihong, Yi Samyŏl, and Kang Tŭkyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han’guk hŏnhyŏl undongsa* 한국헌혈운동사 (*History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea*) (P’aju-si: Nanam sinsŏ, 1990).

As the sole blood facility in Korea, the Navy Depot initially formed the core of a centralized military blood supply system. During the war, in addition to collecting, it also provided blood to other Korean medical facilities. Twice a week, it sent at least fifty bottles of blood to the Navy Hospital in Chinae while also responding to urgent requests from the 5th Army Hospital. Collection quotas vacillated in accordance with the level of demand from medical facilities.¹³⁷ After the war, as the Navy Depot took up a more settled position, the project to set up similar services across the branches of the military got underway. The Army, in particular, pursued an aggressive course of expansion for its blood services, coordinating with American military advisors to established dedicated transfusion departments across its hospitals. In the fall of 1953, Dr. Rha Sejin, director of the Army Central Pathology Research Center, established an Army Transfusion Department at his center and organized an intensive, month-long training program at the Central Pathology Research Center.¹³⁸ Coordinated by Rha's Central Pathology Research Center Team and conducted under US military supervision, the training course aimed to equip the future directors, medical officers, and nurse officers of the Army's planned Transfusion Departments with necessary technical facility.¹³⁹ The training, led by US Major

¹³⁷ The second director of the Depot was Oh Seho--a graduate of the 3rd Seoul Medical School class. At the time of his appointment, Oh—along with Yi Hyöpyöng—followed orders and went to the 121st Field Hospital where he received hands on training at their blood bank. They were joined by Yun Töksön, who was a civilian at the time. After training, Oh Seho took over the Depot from Oh Yunhong and the administration, collection, and distribution of blood became full-fledged. Kim Kihong, Yi Samyöl, and Kang Tükyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han 'guk hönhyöl undongsa 한국헌혈운동사 (History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea)* (P'aju-si: Nanam sinsö, 1990), 40.

¹³⁸ Establishment and administration of the department was entrusted to Major Kim Hyokyu and Captain Yang Hakto.

¹³⁹ The Central Pathology Research Center Team, led by Major General Rha Sejin, consisted of Kim Hyokyu and Chöng Ŭipaek in pathology and Sö Insu and Yang Hakto in microbiology. Yang Hakto later took charge of the blood bank. Kim Kihong, Yi Samyöl, and Kang Tükyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han 'guk hönhyöl undongsa 한국헌혈운동사 (History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea)* (P'aju-si: Nanam sinsö, 1990).

Harteny deployed from the 406th Medical General Laboratory in Tokyo¹⁴⁰, Kim Hyokyu and Yang Hakto, covered a broad swathe of content including techniques for drawing and transfusing blood to how to manage a blood bank and safely administer blood. It was attended by leaders in the medical community who would assume prominent positions in Korean blood policymaking in the coming decades, most notably First Lieutenant Kang Tŭkyong from the Capital Army Hospital, Captain Ch'oe Ilhyŏng from the 1st Army Hospital, First Lieutenant Son Ch'unho from the 63rd Army Hospital, and Captain Kim Kyŏnghwa from the 36th Army Hospital. After the training, the Army Medical Officers each returned to their hospitals and transfusion department business formally got under way from February 1954 and the expansion of blood services proceeded apace across Army facilities.¹⁴¹

The concentrated development of blood services around military needs and structures meant that hubs of military activity in Seoul and Taegu were prioritized by both Korean military authorities and American military advisors.¹⁴² In the postwar military center of Taegu, for example, US and ROK authorities coordinated to establish and manage transfusion services as early as September 1953.¹⁴³ The Transfusion Department at the 1st Army Hospital in Taegu, was

¹⁴⁰ 406th Medical General Laboratory, Annual Historical Report, 1952.

¹⁴¹ From these luminaries to lowly nurses, all of the participants had direct frontline experiences that underlined the need to collect, store, and administer blood and came to the course from an earnest and sober place. "Training Commences for Korean Blood System," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, November 30, 1954.

¹⁴² In Seoul, In the Capital Army Hospital, Kim Kihong was appointed section chief of the Clinical Pathology Department in September 1953. In November of that year, Kang Tŭkyong returned from the transfusion department personnel training at the Army Central Pathology Research Center and established a transfusion department at the Capital Army Hospital, where he worked for around 2.5 years. Afterwards, Pak Sŭngham and others developed the blood bank one step at a time, firmly establishing it. Pak Tuhyŏk 박두혁, *Ŭidang Kim Ki-hong* 의당 김기홍 (*Kim Kihong, penname Ŭidang*) (Sŏul: Tŏsup, 2016), 144-45.

¹⁴³ At the time, Taegu hosted both ROK Army Headquarters and the Combined Forces Command (CFC) of the Korean Military and all military administration was arranged out of Taegu. Kim Kihong, Yi Samyŏl, and Kang Tŭkyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han'guk hŏnhyŏl undongsa* 한국헌혈운동사 (*History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea*) (P'aju-si: Nanam sinsŏ, 1990).

constituted on the advice of the chief KMAG medical officer in Taegu, established by Ch'oe Ilhyŏng, a Korean doctor serving under the Eighth United States Army (EUSA) command, and managed by a nurse officer named Smith who was dispatched to consult on technical affairs.¹⁴⁴ Both Koreans and Americans involved in the department were invested in establishing a Korean blood program that could function independent of US blood aid, in no small part because of a rising resentment on the part of Americans and Korean military medical officials wary awareness of that resentment.

With the cessation of hostilities, Americans had quickly gone from seeing blood aid to Korea as an act of American largesse to a symptom of sucker-ism. The feeling was that Korea had already taken more than its fair share of American blood on its battlefields and through overseas donations, and “Don't Koreans even have their own blood,” became a constant complaint.¹⁴⁵ EUSA even held a meeting at the same time as the Korean blood training course to consider establishing an internal American blood supply entirely cordoned off from Korean use.¹⁴⁶ There was, however, a basic disconnect between the ROK government and EUSA on this issue. For the Rhee administration, the pressing needs of postwar reconstruction meant that the country could afford neither the time nor the resources to build facilities, acquire technologies, and train personnel for a blood administration system. On the other hand, for EUSA authorities, the massive aid that the US was supplying for Korean reconstruction made supplemental blood aid a ridiculous indulgence/shameless extortion of American goodwill. While the EUSA

¹⁴⁴ Established September 1953, Ch'oe also attended the Clinical Pathology Research Center training course several months later. *Ibid.*, 43.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 47.

¹⁴⁶ Douglas B. Kendrick, *The Blood Program in World War II: Supplemented by Experiences in the Korean War* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1964).

proposal to cut Korea off from American blood cold turkey was not adopted, in practice after the meeting EUSA deliberately began to limit the blood brought from the US to the EUSA by turning down Korean hospitals' requests for blood provisions. Korean hospitals consequently faced a severe blood shortage—referred to by some doctors as a "blood famine"—and Korean military medical officials became urgently invested in establishing the infrastructure for an independent Korean blood program.¹⁴⁷ But training personnel and establishing facilities was only one part of the problem—finding the material to stock it with was another.

At first, the Transfusion Department in Taegu gathered blood from within the hospital, beginning with the Army Hospital Director and going on through Medical Officers and hospital staff. Eventually, however, as the department's blood demands expanded along with its scope of operations, it began soliciting and buying blood from Taegu residents and refugees. Hospital employees ran calls for donors in newspapers and pasted ads on telephone poles in downtown Taegu. In exchange for several hundred milliliters of blood, donors received a can of C-Rations from the ROK Army or a tin of canned beef from the KMAG.¹⁴⁸ By 1954, when transfusion departments were standardized across all Army hospitals, the military's remuneration for blood donations was standardized to one can of US C-rations and 1,000 *hwan* in cash.¹⁴⁹

In this way, the military established transfusion departments and a blood depot to meet the need to treat wartime casualties but had to rely on blood sales for almost all its blood

¹⁴⁷ Kim Kihong, Yi Samyŏl, and Kang Tŭkyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han'guk hŏnhyŏl undongsa* 한국헌혈운동사 (*History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea*) (P'aju-si: Nanam sinsŏ, 1990), 47.

¹⁴⁸ For primary accounts of C-ration contents in wartime and immediate post-Armistice South Korea, see: https://qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/korea/food_UN_korea.htm, <http://www.paulnoll.com/Korea/581-Sig/581-Inchon-chow.html>, <https://vimeo.com/331273542>.

¹⁴⁹ Pak Tuhyŏk 박두혁, *Ŭidang Kim Ki-hong* 의당 김기홍 (*Kim Kihong, penname Ŭidang*) (Sŏul: Tŏsup, 2016), 144.

stores.¹⁵⁰ The continued antipathy of the Korean public towards voluntary blood donation meant that achieving independence from foreign aid entailed growing more dependent on blood sales. A vicious circle thereby began to develop, where the better developed the facilities for medical blood provision became, the more they drew on blood sales that undercut their purpose and encouraged the further growth of a black market for blood that transfusion specialists all agreed was antithetical to the best interests of the profession.

Conclusion

This was the paradox faced by postwar Korean military medical planners: independence from foreign blood aid could only be achieved through dependence on an unregulated and fundamentally undependable black market for blood. In an attempt to forestall the oncoming crisis, on December 11, 1953 the Minister of Health called a meeting at the Red Cross offices to coordinate a centralized system for domestic blood collection, storage, and distribution between the Red Cross organizers, the Medical Bureau of the Ministry of Health, the Surgeon General of the ROK Armed Forces, the Director of the EUSA 121st Hospital, and the Korean Rotary Club. Rather than entrust such a system to a social organization like the Red Cross, the deciding parties instead opted to continue the wartime model of militarized, state-run administration.¹⁵¹ Six months later, the National Blood Center opened on June 7, 1954 at the Ministry of Health Annex in front of the old Bando Hotel by Euljiro Entrance.

¹⁵⁰ Kim Kihong, Yi Samyŏl, and Kang Tŭkyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han'guk hŏnhyŏl undongsa* 한국헌혈운동사 (*History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea*) (P'aju-si: Nanam sinsŏ, 1990), 45.

¹⁵¹ This was in many ways a practical concession to the fact that, due to the wartime mobilization law, the majority of doctors and scientists with the requisite specialized knowledge for blood management were concentrated in the ROK Armed Forces.

Over the next decades, the militarized protocols for blood conscription foundational to the National Blood Center vied with the savage market logics of the blood market for control over the national resource of Korean blood. State policymakers struggled to balance the pursuit of a defensive reserve of blood on the one hand against the desire to purify the national blood store of undesirable elements. Reliance on the market ensured a relatively well-stocked blood bank but came at the cost of permitting the blood of donors outside the bounds of normative national subjectivity into the stockpile. Refugees and indigents dislocated and dispossessed by the war sold blood that demanded extra screenings for malnutrition and disease, while the prevalence of women donors raised social alarm bells about the moral degradation of postwar Korean society. Through the remainder of the 1950s, the gendered dynamics of the blood market became a rallying point for social commentators and public health policymakers invested in defining and disciplining the blood of an independent but unruly national populace.

The colonial concept of ideological blood independence was transformed during the Korean War into an agenda with clear physical touchstones—namely, military stockpiling and domestic sourcing. These arrangements to regularize blood flow across the eastern periphery of the US's Cold War empire created the groundwork for “a kind of allied blood supply” as well as “a new racial-geographic bloodline.” The imperatives of mutual defense bonded the US and Japan to Korea militarily but also medically from the Korean War through the present. For Korean military medical planners, the ongoing threat of North Korea ensured that blood would remain as much a defensive stockpile as a medical material in the decades after the Korean War. Beyond rhetoric that coded the ethnonational Korean community as bound by “one blood,” the Korean War demonstrated that the Korean people's blood could be conscripted as state property. In this way, securing Korean blood became part and parcel of South Korean national security.

Chapter 3

Domesticating Blood: Gendered Bloodshed and Blood Donation in South Korea

Despite her own battered bodily state, the young maidservant, still in her teens, implored the crowd to “Draw our blood and give it to the injured”... Thanks to the sacrificial blood donation of these female students, there was no shortage of blood to be had.

—*Ŭisa sibo*, April 1960

Introduction: Gendered Economies of Blood

In 1954, an article in the South Korean national periodical *Tonga ilbo* castigated a teenage girl, the eldest of five, for giving blood on behalf of her younger brothers and sisters because she was not acting “for a noble cause.”¹⁵² Scant years later, in 1960, the same paper praised the “tear-inspiring, beautiful gift” of another young woman, a student at a Seoul women’s high school, for donating blood to treat protestors injured while demonstrating for a new democratic government.¹⁵³ What happened in the intervening years to utterly overturn public disdain for the former’s ignoble act to adoration for the latter’s noble gift? How could the same deed inspire such polarized emotional extremes, and what role did gender play in the narrative framings—disparate though they may have been—of the two stories?

For the first decades of blood collection in South Korea, women were the primary contributors to the national supply, but this contribution is largely erased in medical histories.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² “Semo e pŏrim padŭn saramdŭl (6) Sarip hyŏraek ūnhaeng (Paek pyŏngwŏn)” 歲暮에 버림받은 사람들 (6) 私立血液銀行 (白病院) (Private blood bank (Paek Hospital)), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), December 18, 1954.

¹⁵³ “4.19 hŭisaengja e nunmul ōrin tonjokae” 4.19 犧牲者에 눈물어린 同族愛 (Tear-jerking fraternal love for those who sacrificed in the April 19 Uprising), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), April 22, 1960.

¹⁵⁴ Kim Kihong, Yi Samyŏl, and Kang Tŭkyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han 'guk hŏnhyŏl undongsa* 한국헌혈운동사 (*History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea*) (P’aju-si: Nanam sinsŏ, 1990).

Likewise, during these same decades, Korean women also gave their blood to national causes like the 1960s democratization movement in literal and symbolic ways, but these contributions also go unnoticed—passed over in favor of heroic stories that center men in national narratives of South Korean medical development, political maturation, and nation-building.¹⁵⁵

South Korean historical memory of the twentieth century often commemorates the blood spilled during the violent traumas experienced across the peninsula in the forms of colonization, war, and rapid development. The blood sacrificed by the men who fought against Japanese colonial rule, the military and civilian blood toll incurred during the Korean War, and the blood of male laborers invested in the project of industrial modernization are variously extolled, mourned, or critiqued within the “androcentric discourse” of national history.¹⁵⁶ By contrast, the substance and symbol of women’s blood is largely occluded in modern histories and popular memory, wherein the Korean nation is constructed “as a community of men in which women exist merely as its precondition.”¹⁵⁷ Despite this occlusion, women’s blood was pivotal to the development of a modern blood management industry in South Korea. From the black-market blood sales that Korean blood collection centers relied on during the 1950s through the nascent voluntary blood donation movement instigated by the April Revolution, women disproportionately contributed the physical blood for South Korea’s medical blood stockpile and performed the labor of solicitation and administration that was framed in terms of gendered

¹⁵⁵ Ju Hui Judy Han and Jennifer Jihye Chun, eds., “Gender and Politics in Contemporary Korea,” Thematic issue, *The Journal of Korean Studies* 18, no. 2 (Fall 2014).

¹⁵⁶ Seungsook Moon, “Begetting the Nation: The Androcentric Discourse of National History and Tradition in South Korea,” in *Dangerous Women: Gender and Korean Nationalism*, ed. Elaine H. Kim and Chungmoo Choi (New York: Routledge, 1998), 33-66.

¹⁵⁷ Moon, 1998: 35; Insook Kwon, “Militarism in My Heart: Women’s Militarized Consciousness and Culture in South Korea,” PhD diss., Clark University, 2000.

responsibility to the nation. South Korean women provided the physical substance and administrative support that allowed the nation's medical blood program to develop from a minimal operation reliant on foreign aid to a self-sufficient, nationalized, and nationalistic regime for regulating and optimizing Korean blood.

This chapter examines women's disproportionate physical contributions into and labor on behalf of the domestic Korean blood supply in the first decade of national collection. It analyzes the economic conditions and social narratives that made women more likely and more willing to give their blood for collection. Alongside this, it interrogates how the material conditions and gendered discourses that incentivized and expected women to give blood also erased them from an androcentric national narrative of patriotic bloodshed in service of the nation.

Over the last several decades, research in the field of Korean Studies has illuminated the gendered and raced aspects of Korean nationalism but have rarely considered the connection between the production of an androcentric and homogenous form of modern Korean identity. Feminist scholarship has highlighted the androcentric character of Korean "hetero-patriarchal nationalism" from colonial anxieties about "new women" through the exploitation of women laborers to the hyper-masculine militarist culture that persists to this day.¹⁵⁸ Meanwhile, studies of Korean ethnonationalism have excavated the colonial roots of the insistence on Korean racial homogeneity and charted the domination of race-based movements over alternative forms of nationalism.¹⁵⁹ However, gendered analyses rarely attend to the racialization of their subjects,

¹⁵⁸ Hyaeweol Choi, *Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea: New Women, Old Way* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); Janice C. Kim, *To Live to Work: Factory Women in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009); Elaine H. Kim and Chungmoo Choi, *Dangerous Women: Gender and Korean Nationalism* (New York: Routledge, 1998); Seungsook Moon, *Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Insook Kwon, "Militarism in My Heart: Militarization of Women's Consciousness and Culture in South Korea," (PhD diss., Clark University, 2000).

¹⁵⁹ Gi-Wook Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006); Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919* (New York: Columbia University

and racial analyses likewise do not consider the gendering of their subjects. As postcolonial studies scholars like Edward Said and intersectional theorists like Kimberlé Crenshaw have shown, however, the construction of gender and race are interlinked processes.¹⁶⁰ This chapter asserts that in Korea, the intertwined development of a gendered and raced form of identity was situated in the body—the common site of both processes.

This chapter makes the underexamined connection between the gendering and racing of Korean bodies explicit by centering the substance of blood—a biological marker of gender and race alike—in evolving post-Liberation understandings of Koreanness as a quality baked into particular bodies. It examines women’s role in shifting widespread social concepts of blood from a family-bound fluid to a nation-binding property. In doing so, it fills in a significant piece in the puzzle that the overall study—interrogating the centrality of blood in modern Korean identity—addresses by demonstrating the link between the social construction of gender and the biological substance of blood. As other chapters show, this collapsing of the social and the biological in Cold War developments in Korean identity also extended to other constructs—namely race, class, and political affiliation. Together, they illuminate the emergence of blood as the common thread in an extensive project to cohere disparate categories of Korean society into a body-based, medico-scientifically regulated Cold War form of bio-national Korean identity.

Press, 2002); Hyung Il Pai, *Constructing “Korean” Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000).

¹⁶⁰ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, ©1994); Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” *University of Chicago Legal Forum* (1989), 139-167. Additional works that attend to the coproduction of gender and race in the context of national identity notably include Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Context* (New York: Routledge, 1995); and Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

The following analysis tracks the changing role of women in relation to blood collection practices on the Korean peninsula from the colonial period through the aftermath of the Korean War to the 1960 democratization movement. It examines how and why, at each of these crucial junctures, women's participation in blood donation was used to ameliorate the shock of new technologies and modern medical practices, deployed as proof of social erosion, or brought together so that traditional womanly ideals and new South Korean national identity became a single object marked by the "beautiful gift" of blood. Elevated or castigated, this history demonstrates that historical erasure notwithstanding, Korean women constituted the core of the national blood program's material operations and social advocacy.

Battlefields and Black Markets: South Korean Blood Management in the 1950s

Throughout the 1950s, blood collection became a microcosm for tensions between pre- and post-war conceptions of women's biological duties, modern and traditional medical understandings of the body and its component parts, and technological interventions and cultural reservations. Through it all, women emerged as mainstay participants in the halting development of a biomedical blood administration system in South Korea. While elite medical professionals, politicians, and public intellectuals hotly debated the balance between the medical benefit and social cost of mass blood collection in society papers and periodicals, a black market for blood sold primarily by women carried on over the postwar decade, fueled by women's uncompromising need to provide for themselves and their families in the face of grinding poverty.¹⁶¹ Mothers, wives, and daughters, charged with sustaining families ripped apart by the

¹⁶¹ "Suhyöl konggŭp sanghwang pullyang" 輸血供給狀況不良 (The poor state of supply for blood transfusions), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), 16 November 1952. The *Chosŏn ilbo* coverage of the same incident reports slightly higher overall numbers of 5,000 total donors. "Taebubun i p'inanmin" 대부분이 피난민 (The majority are refugees), *Chosŏn ilbo* 조선일보 (*Chosŏn daily*), 17 November 1952.

death, dislocation, and property loss of war queued to the commercial blood banks that sprouted up as opportunistic middlemen between the hospitals desperate for a steady blood supply and the masses of postwar refugees desperate for compensatory rations and cash.¹⁶² Intellectuals might decry blood banks for eroding the values of Korean society, but for the women who flocked to them they offered a practical means to survival by purchasing one of the few things that they had left to sell.

While South Korean efforts to collect and maintain a standing medical blood supply first began in earnest during the Korean War (1950-53), previously Korean doctors and scientists had been conducting transfusions and blood exams since the 1920s.¹⁶³ Like most medical professionals around the world prior to the discovery of strategies and technologies for long-term, stable blood storage, however, colonial-era Korean doctors solicited blood as needed, rather than in anticipation of demand.¹⁶⁴ Even in this early era of ad hoc blood gathering, women emerged as the primary targets of transfusion advocates and educators.

Whereas in postwar decades blood programming faced public reluctance and pushback because it undercut Confucian ethics of bodily integrity and family-centered understandings of the community, during the colonial period it fell comfortably into these models. Public health

¹⁶² “Semo e pörim padün saramdül (6) Sarip hyöraek ünhaeng (Paek pyöngwön)” 歲暮에 버림받은 사람들 (6) 私立血液銀行 (白病院) (Private blood bank (Paek Hospital)), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), December 18, 1954.

¹⁶³ Industry histories like *Han'guk hönhyöl undongsa* and *Sarang üi hönhyöl undongsa* locate the origins of biomedical blood treatments in Korea in the Korean War. This study examines accounts in newspapers and court records dating back to the early 1900s to disprove that consensus. Kim Kihong, Yi Samyöl, and Kang Tükyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han'guk hönhyöl undongsa* 한국헌혈운동사 (*History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea*) (P'aju-si: Nanam sinsö, 1990); Pak Chint'ak 박진택, *Sarang üi hönhyöl undongsa* 사랑의 헌혈운동사 (*Blood donation movement of love*) (Söul: Parün'gil, 2001).

¹⁶⁴ Douglas P. Starr, *Blood: An Epic History of Medicine and Commerce* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).

educators and periodicals employed prominent social tropes like that of the “good wife, wise mother” to encourage women to see giving their own blood for the medical needs of family members as part of their domestic duties.¹⁶⁵ Infusing an educational agenda into public entertainment, a two-episode arc in a popular serialized novella entitled “The Third Slave” by social-realist author Yi Kūnyōng unfolded the domestic drama of two women saving their beloved by giving him their blood. In this storyline, Yi, speaking through the avatar of the medical doctor tending the critically ill protagonist Hōil, lectured the female characters—and through them, the female reading public—on not only the methods and efficacy of medical blood transfusion, but also its place in a gendered Korean family system that expected and extolled female sacrifice.¹⁶⁶ The explanatory notes and domestic setting of the story worked to reassure readers, entrenched in Confucian edicts to preserve bodily integrity, that blood transfusion was both safe and respectable.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, the confinement of the drama to the walls of a single domicile reassured its audience that blood-giving maintained the family’s patrilineal bloodline (*hyōlt’ong*), rather than threatening it with the potential degradation from alien infusions.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ Hyaeweol Choi, ““Wise Mother, Good Wife”: A Transcultural Discursive Construct in Modern Korea,” *The Journal of Korean Studies* 14, no. 1 (Fall 2009), 1-33.

¹⁶⁶ Yi Kūnyōng 이근영, “Che-sam noye 88-89” 第三奴隸 88-89 (“The Third Slave 88-89”), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), June 17-18, 1938.

¹⁶⁷ Socially, Confucian ideology maintained that bodily alterations constituted an affront to one’s ancestral line, while medically, the loss of blood threatened to disrupt the flow of *qi* and destabilize the balance of bodily elements. Soyoung Suh, *Naming the Local: Medicine, Language, and Identity in Korea since the Fifteenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2017), 34; Hongkyun Kim, “A Party for the Spirits: Ritual Practice in Confucianism,” in *Religions of Korea in Practice*, ed. Robert E. Buswell (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 163-176; Paul U. Unschuld, *What is Medicine? Western and Eastern Approaches to Healing* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 2-5, 70-73.

¹⁶⁸ Between the 1950s and 1980s, the reluctance to adopt outside the family bloodline made South Korea the foremost worldwide exporter of children for adoption. Eleana Kim, *Adopted Territory: Transnational Korean Adoptees and the Politics of Belonging* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).



Figure 3.1. An illustration of home blood transfusion featured in Yi Kün-yǒng’s “The Third Slave”

Such infotainment, employed from the very beginning of modern medical blood gathering on the Korean peninsula, anticipated and informed the gendered collection practices that would arise decades later. The so-called “donors-on-the-hoof” system of the colonial-era was certainly inadequate for the mass collection and long-term storage needed for a comprehensive medical blood supply program.¹⁶⁹ But by the same token, its reliance on proximate networks for immediate blood delivery allowed medical practitioners and their advocates to fold a novel medical procedure into pre-existing frameworks of bloodline sanctity

¹⁶⁹ At the time, a mass collection and storage program were impossible anywhere in the world. The technologies for stable blood storage were not developed until the mid-1930s and were still being perfected against chronic challenges like sterilization well into World War II. Robert Slonim, Carmen Wang, and Ellen Garbarino, “The Market for Blood,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 28, no. 2 (Spring 2014), 177-196.

and gendered duty within Korean households.¹⁷⁰ The severance of blood donation from these family confines that occurred with the post-colonial expansion of blood collection would also transform public opinion of women donors, transforming them from familiar paragons of wifely, motherly, and daughterly duty into suspect symptoms of postwar social decay.

Between 1910-1950, Korea remained abreast of news of rapid developments in the scientific understanding about blood and new technologies to safely administer it but lagged behind in practical applications.¹⁷¹ In the West, the Allied research and development push during World War II developed technologies and protocols to safely sterilize, store, and fractionate blood that revolutionized international blood exchange programs and lay the foundations for nationalized peacetime blood programs.¹⁷² In Korea, however, the ravages of colonial exploitation, wartime mobilization, and peninsular division left even the most prominent national medical institutes struggling to maintain a stable electrical power supply, let alone acquire the technologies needed to maintain a standing blood store.¹⁷³ “Liberated” from colonial rule in 1945

¹⁷⁰ On parallel processes of incorporating hygienic monitoring into women’s domestic duties as part of the twin projects of colonial modernization and surveillance, see Sonja M. Kim, *Imperatives of Care: Women and Medicine in Colonial Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2019).

¹⁷¹ Newspapers reported British breakthroughs in developing transfusion equipment for “aerial hospitals,” innovations in mobile blood transportation in the Spanish Civil War, and Russian experiments in necro-transfusion—transfusing blood from dead bodies. See “Pihaeng pyöngwön (Yöngguk üi sinsisöl)” 飛行病院 (英國의新施設) (Aerial hospital (new British technology)), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), June 28, 1936; “Söban ajönsön üi taeryang suhyöl saöp” 西班牙戰線의大量輸血事業 (Large scale blood transfusion undertaking on the war frontline in Spain), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), December 11, 1937; “Suhyöl yoböpsang üi pogüm” 輸血療法上의福音 (The good news of transfusion treatment), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), April 25, 1935.

¹⁷² Starr, *Blood: An Epic History*, 250-300; Douglas B. Kendrick, *The Blood Program in World War II: Supplemented by Experiences in the Korean War* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1964); Kara W. Swanson, *Banking on the Body: The Market in Blood, Milk, and Sperm in Modern America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014).

¹⁷³ In 1947, the three South Korean laboratories producing biologicals were the National Vaccine Laboratory in Seoul, the Institute for Veterinary Research in Anyang, and the Institute for Veterinary Research in Pusan. Of these three, only the National Vaccine Laboratory in Seoul produced human biologicals. South Korean Interim Government Activities, No. 27 (Dec. 1947): 177, NARA II.

but riven by the peninsular division that would erupt into savage civil war a mere five-years later, medical professionals in the new state of South Korea were necessarily focused on surviving, rather than thriving.¹⁷⁴ In this context, developing blood storage capabilities remained a luxury, not a necessity.

The 1950 outbreak of the Korean War changed that nearly overnight. Soaring casualty numbers led medics to cable Washington with estimated demands of 300,000 pints of blood per month, but for the first year frontline organizers struggled to cobble together a combined monthly total of even 20,000-40,000 pints from collections in occupied Japan and aerial shipments from the US.¹⁷⁵ Not only was there no blood administration system within Korea to fall back on, but the trans-Pacific blood supply infrastructure from WWII had atrophied in the interwar years. Consequently, there was a mad scramble in the first year of combat to scrape together blood from wherever it was available and rush it to the frontlines in whatever form possible—including, in the case of the first shipments from US field hospitals in Japan, repurposed marmite cans.¹⁷⁶ By the 1953 Armistice, the Korean War had invigorated the largest blood drive to date in the US, revolutionized the blood industry from an economy bound within the “spatial limits of the nation” to an international enterprise, and created the foundations for a

¹⁷⁴ Choi Ŭnkyŏng 최은경, “1950-60-nyŏndae ūiryo chŏnmun’ga ūi tongwŏn kwa chingbyŏng kŏmsa ūi surip” 1950-60년대 의료 전문가의 동원과 징병검사의 수립 (Mobilization of medical professionals and establishment of physical standards for conscription in 1950s-60s South Korea), *Inmun kwahak yŏn’gu nonch’ong* 인문과학연구논총 (*The journal of humanities*) 36 no. 4 (2015), 237.

¹⁷⁵ Albert E. Cowdrey, *The Medics’ War: United States Army in the Korean War, Volume IV* (Washington, D. C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1987), 155; Steven Casey, *Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion, 1950-1953* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 322.

¹⁷⁶ 406th Medical General Laboratory, Annual Report of Medical Service Activities, Professional Section (Annual Historical Report), 1950, pp. 155-58, file 319.1-2 (406th Medical General Laboratory) Far East-1950, HRB.

South Korean national blood collection, storage, and administration program run by the ROK military forces.¹⁷⁷

During the war, the need for medical blood supplies and blood storage and transfusion equipment to treat casualties compelled US and ROK military authorities to erect an infrastructure for stable blood management. The American program involved airlifting bulk quantities of whole blood to South Korea – 340,207 pints of Rh-positive type O blood alone.¹⁷⁸ However, these shipments were suspended following the 1953 armistice, compelling South Korean medical institutions to seek out a stable domestic supply of blood.

In the final year of combat, South Korean forces began to establish their own blood storage centers under the guidance of U.S. military advisors, culminating in the South Korean government founding the National Blood Center in 1954.¹⁷⁹ Beginning with the ROK Navy Blood Depot, established in 1952, and expanding rapidly through an initiative to institute Blood Transfusion Departments across all the ROK Army hospitals in 1954, the Korean military established the infrastructure to deliver blood to its own personnel in relatively short order.¹⁸⁰ In addition to its military orientation, the direction of South Korean blood administration was determined by an intergenerational assemblage of medical professionals involved, ranging from

¹⁷⁷ Kendrick, *The Blood Program in World War II*, 790-850; Casey, *Selling the Korean War*, 340; Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell, *Tissue Economies: Blood, Organs, and Cell Lines in Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 41.

¹⁷⁸ Camp et. al, 1973: 39.

¹⁷⁹ “Hyölaek ünhaeng kot t’ansaeng, taehan chöksipjasasö undong chön’gae” 혈액은행 곧 탄생, 대한적십자사서 운동 전개 (Birth of the blood bank, opening of the Korean Red Cross movement), *Kukje sinbo* 국제신보 (*International Bulletin*), June 2, 1953; Kim Kihong, Yi Samyöl, and Kang Tükyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han’guk hönhyöl undongsa* 한국헌혈운동사 (*History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea*) (P’aju-si: Nanam sinsö, 1990), 41.

¹⁸⁰ Kim Kihong, Yi Samyöl, and Kang Tükyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han’guk hönhyöl undongsa* 한국헌혈운동사 (*History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea*) (P’aju-si: Nanam sinsö, 1990), 38-45.

well-established colonial scientists like pathologist Rha Sejin to the first generation of medical practitioners trained entirely in the South Korean system, like Kang Tŭkyong.¹⁸¹ The resulting program was a military system that infused colonial-era preoccupations—such as eugenics and the imperative to define and segregate desirable and undesirable bloods—into Cold War biomedical advances—such as the ability to identify increasingly minute categories of blood-type sub-groups.¹⁸² Kang, in particular, played a leading role in founding the wartime system, and would go on to have a pointed impact on gendered blood collection practices a decade later during his influential tenure as Chief of Clinical Pathology at Ewha Women’s University Hospital.¹⁸³

While the military succeeded in establishing the infrastructure for blood administration, however, its storage centers and transfusion departments struggled to find people to collect from. Initially, they were forced to rely on their own staff for contributions.¹⁸⁴ To remedy the chronic undersupply of blood donors, intermediary organizations sprang up during and after the war.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 42. During the Korean War, Rha [1908-1984]—a 1932 graduate of Kyōngsōng Imperial University employed under Japanese colonial scientists like Ueda Sunekichi and Imamura Yutaka—served as director of the Army Central Pathology Research Center (*Yukgun chungang pyōngni yōn’guso*), where he established and oversaw the Transfusion Department in August 1953. A recent graduate of Yōnsei Medical College (matriculating with the 4th cohort in 1953) Kang [1928-2005] led the establishment of the Transfusion Department at the Capital Army Hospital (Sudo yukgun pyōngwōn) in November 1953 and oversaw the department for the next several years. For more on Rha, see Hyun, Jaehwan 현재환. “Chibangch’a wa ‘korip’an mendel chipdan’: tu ‘chungsimbu’ kwahak kwa Na Se-jin ūi hongjongjōk ch’ejil illyuhak” 지방차와 ‘고립’안 멘들 집단: 두 ‘중심부’ 과학 나세진의 혼종적 체질 인류학 (“Sejin Rha’s Hybrid Physical Anthropology Between Two “Metropolitan” Sciences, 1932-1964). *Han’guk kwahaksa hak’oeji 한국과학사학회지 (Journal of the History of Korean Medicine)* 37, no. 1 (2015): 345-381.

¹⁸² Hyun, ““Chibangch’a’ wa ‘korip’an mendel chipdan,’” 345-50.

¹⁸³ Kang’s role in converting the momentary passion for blood donation in April 1960 into a sustained movement among young women is considered further in the second part of this paper.

¹⁸⁴ Kim et. al., *Han’guk hōnhyōl undongsa*, 40; “Yukgun pyōngwōn ūl pangmun Son Changgwan tŭng Pusan e” 陸軍病院을訪問 孫長官等釜山에 (Minister Son and others visit 6th Army Hospital), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), February 5, 1954.

During the war, so-called Blood Transfusion Societies (*suhyŏl hyŏp'oe*) would deliver civilians into military collection centers through the Wartime Mobilization Law (*chŏnsi tongwŏnbŏp*).¹⁸⁵ However, as Oh Yunhong, director of the Navy Blood Depot, observed in 1953, such coercion more often than not simply delayed the moment when a frightened prospective donor would dash out the door again—their blood still safe in their own veins.¹⁸⁶ After the war, private blood banks sprang up on the strength of a surefire solicitation model—material remuneration.¹⁸⁷ In exchange for several hundred grams of blood, blood providers received military rations and cash payments, while the bank administrators up-sold their supplies to hospitals.¹⁸⁸ It was at this juncture that women once again emerged at the center of social discussions about blood management in South Korea.

The public solicitation models of both the wartime Blood Transfusion Societies and the postwar private blood banks relied heavily on women—particularly war widows and schoolgirls—for blood.¹⁸⁹ In contrast to successful colonial-era mobilizations of women to

¹⁸⁵ “Han’guk suhyŏl hyŏp’oe ch’angnip” 韓國輸血協會創立 (Korean Transfusion Society Inauguration), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), 18 April 1952; “Han’guk suhyŏl hyŏp’oe ch’angnip” 韓國輸血協會創立 (Korean Transfusion Society Inauguration), *Kyŏngnyang sinmun* 경향신문 (*Kyŏngnyang newspaper*), 19 April 1952.

¹⁸⁶ Kim et. al., *Han’guk hŏnhyŏl undongsa*, 40; Cho Hanik, Sŏ Tonghoe, and Kim Hyŏnok 조한익, 서동회, 김현옥, “Taehan suhyŏl hak’oe 30-chunyŏn ūl kinyŏm hamyŏ” 대한수혈학회 30 주년을 기념함여 (Commemorating the 30-year anniversary of the Korean blood transfusion society), *Taehan suhyŏl hak’oeji* 대한수혈학회지 (*Journal of the Korean Blood Transfusion Society*) 23, no. 2 (2012), 99.

¹⁸⁷ “Hyŏraek ūnhaeng paljok” 혈액은행발족 (Development of blood banks), *Chosŏn ilbo* 조선일보 (*Chosŏn daily*), June 9, 1964; “Hyŏraek ūnhaeng i hanŭn il” 血液銀行이 하는 일 (The business of blood banks), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), June 14, 1955; “P’i p’ara kohak hanŭn namnyŏ” 피를 팔아 공부하는男女 (Boys and girls selling their blood to go to school), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), November 3, 1954.

¹⁸⁸ In the absence of any standardized regulations, remuneration rates and limits on repeated donations varied widely. In general, however, newspapers reported that a normal “bank deposit” amounted to 300-400 grams of blood, in return for which the donor received anything from 1,000- 3,000 *hwan* (~\$4) or US Army C-Rations. “P’i p’ara kohak hanŭn namnyŏ” 피를 팔아 공부하는男女 (Boys and girls selling their blood to go to school), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), November 3, 1954; Kim et. al., *Han’guk hŏnhyŏl undongsa*, 44.

¹⁸⁹ In October 1952, the South Korean Transfusion Society (Taehan suhyŏl hyŏp’oe) ran a month-long nation-wide blood drive, which underperformed expectations—gathering only 4,600 donors nation-wide—and revealing that

assuage fears about blood donation, however, the relationship between women and blood banks in the postwar period undercut the domestication of biomedical blood programming by casting the postwar erosion of gender roles, family structures, and social safety nets into stark relief.¹⁹⁰ During the colonial period, the reassuring narrative of wives and mothers within the home sharing their blood in intimate exchanges with family members quieted public concerns about the safety and respectability of transfusion. But in the postwar period, the women most likely to give blood—flinty-eyed widows and errant teenagers—were a far cry from that middle-class respectability. The war widow population between 1955 and 1960 was 40% illiterate, 30% unemployed, and over 70% were responsible for more than two children – characteristics that compelled these women to pursue all available means of earning an income, including selling their blood and bodies (sex work).¹⁹¹ Likewise the schoolgirls forced to sell blood to pay school fees or contribute to their families’ survival often fell into a disenfranchised youth demographic pathologized under the new category of “juvenile delinquency.”¹⁹² In both cases, the willingness of these women to sell an intimate part of their bodies to faceless strangers definitively severed them from the prior politics of respectability in transfusion. The mass blood collection system’s

most donors were refugees, and the majority were women. “Suhyŏl konggŭp sanghwang pullyang” 輸血供給狀況不良 (The poor state of supply for blood transfusions), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), 16 November 1952. The *Chosŏn ilbo* coverage of the same incident reports slightly higher overall numbers of 5,000 total donors. “Taebubun i p’inanmin” 대부분이 피난민 (The majority are refugees), *Chosŏn ilbo* 조선일보 (*Chosŏn daily*), 17 November 1952.

¹⁹⁰ “Suhyŏl kwa sahoe” 수혈과 사회 (Blood transfusion and society), *Chosŏn ilbo* 조선일보 (*Chosŏn daily*), August 21, 1955.

¹⁹¹ Pogŏn sahoebu 보건사회부 (Bureau of Social Welfare), “Mimang’in ch’ongsu” 미망인 총수 (Survey of widows), *Kukjŏng kamsa charyo* 국정감사자료 (*National census data*) (Seoul: 1956), 15-16; Pogŏn sahoebu 보건사회부 (Bureau of Social Welfare), *Pogŏn sahoe t’onggye yŏnbo* 보건사회통계연보 (*Social welfare yearbook*) (Seoul: 1960), 466-469.

¹⁹² James D. Hillmer, “‘A Children’s Paradise’: Reforming Juvenile Incarceration under the US Military Government in Korea, 1945-48,” *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society Korea Branch* 94 (2019), 19-42.

qualities of anonymity, crass consumerism, and reliance on women with a promiscuous willingness to monetize their body parts stamped it in the public eye as a symptom and stimulant of Korea's moral and social decay—in the same category as camptown prostitution.¹⁹³



Figure 3.2. Women gathered in a Pusan refugee camp marketplace just after the 1953 Armistice

¹⁹³ On Korean women's bodies as vehicles for social morality, see Katherine H.S. Moon, "Prostitute Bodies and Gendered States," in *Dangerous Women: Gender and Korean Nationalism*, Elaine Kim, ed. (New York: Routledge, 1998); Lee Imha 이임하, "Migun ūi tongasia chudun kwa seksyuöllit'i" 미군의 동아시아 주둔과 섹슈얼리티 (Sexuality and the U.S. military in East Asia), *Tongasia wa kŭndae, yŏsŏng ūi palgyŏn* 동아시아와 근대, 여성의 발견 (*East Asia and modernity, women's development*) (Ch'ŏngŏram media), 274.

Commentators decried the socio-economic conditions that led to the wretched crowds jostling at the doors of private blood banks each day. Describing the morning queue outside the infamous Paek Hospital (*Paek pyŏngwŏn*)—perhaps the best known commercial middleman between blood sellers and hospitals in the 1950s—one journalist wrote, “Although actual blood collection does not begin until 2 pm, the crowd has to arrive early in the morning and fight each other for a place in line because this decides whether they will be able to sell that day.” This bitter contest to give blood, the journalist clarified, was not for a “noble cause,” as it was in “developed countries where an individual’s donation provides for poor patients or family members designated by the donor.” Rather, in postwar Korea, “Poor people sell blood while rich people buy it.”¹⁹⁴

Between 1955 and 1957, the government-run National Blood Center solicited blood from 5,489 sellers. Of this total, 1,4111 (about 26%) were students while 1,925 (about 35%) were unemployed.¹⁹⁵ The pressing need for blood supplies at medical institutions and the desperate impoverishment of many sellers sometimes drove individuals to sell their blood multiple times in a single day while the purchasing institutions turned a blind eye, with sometimes fatal results for the blood seller.¹⁹⁶ Ironically, the stories that seeped out of the black market for blood thus corroborated public fears about giving blood, rather than relieving them. The blood economy,

¹⁹⁴ “Semo e pŏrim padŭn saramdŭl (6) Sarip hyŏraek ũnhaeng (Paek pyŏngwŏn)” 歲暮에 버림받은 사람들 (6) 私立血液銀行 (白病院) (Private blood bank (Paek Hospital)), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), December 18, 1954.

¹⁹⁵ Korean Red Cross, 2006: 486.

¹⁹⁶ “Kagonghal hyŏlaek amgŏrae” 可恐할 血液闇去來 (The abominable black market for blood), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*) March 11, 1955; Yi Sŏkkang, Yu Kwangsu, Kim Hyŏngkyu, and Kwak Tongsu 이석강, 유광수, 김형규, 광동수, “Kŏn’gang’in mit chigŏpjŏk maehyŏl ro inhan silhyŏlsŏng pinhyŏlja ũi chok’yŏlgu ch’uiyagsŏng e kwanhayŏ” 건강인 및 지겹적 매혈로 인한 실혈성 빈혈자의 적혈구 추이약성에 관하여 (On the erythrocytic vulnerability of hypovolemic anemia caused by occupational blood sales), *Taehan saengnihak hoeji* 대한생리학회지 (*Journal of the Korean Physiological Society*) Vol. 5, No. 2 (1971).

from war to postwar, continued to engender and define the liminal role of women within the national polity.

Modern approaches to blood management have been dominated by the dichotomy of gift and commodity, with proponents of commodification arguing that market efficacy optimizes the quantity and quality of blood collected while those in favor of gift economies decry market systems as dehumanizing and exploitative.¹⁹⁷ Gift systems, the latter argue, build and maintain “the constitution of a community minded citizenry and a resilient nation.”¹⁹⁸ Richard Titmuss, the founding proponent of a gift economy in blood and advocate of welfare state systems in postwar England, opposed a commercial blood market partly because the promise of financial reward disincentivized honest reporting on the quality of blood sold (increasing the danger of bloods at risk of hepatitis or syphilis passing into the national system), and because market logics exacerbated the physical exploitation of “indigents.”¹⁹⁹ Echoing Titmuss’ argument, Schepers-Hughes has described neoliberal market rationalism in blood and organ collection systems as “a new form of late modern cannibalism” in which “[organ givers] are an invisible and discredited collection of anonymous suppliers of spare parts” while “[organ receivers] are cherished patients, treated as moral subjects and suffering individuals” with unquestioned “proprietary rights over the bodies and body parts of the poor, living and dead.”²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁷ Lori B. Andrews and D Nelkin, *Body Bazaar: The Market for Human Tissue in the Biotechnology Age* (New York: Crown, 2001); Nancy Schepers-Hughes, “The Global Traffic in Human Organs,” *Current Anthropology* 41 (2000):191-224; Andrew Kimbrell, *The Human Body Shop: The Engineering and Marketing of Life* (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993).

¹⁹⁸ Waldby and Mitchell, 2006: 9.

¹⁹⁹ Richard Titmuss, *The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy*, ed. A. Oakley and J Ashton (London: LSE, 1997 [1971]).

²⁰⁰ Nancy Schepers-Hughes, “Bodies for Sale: Whole or in Parts,” *Commodifying Bodies*, ed. Nancy Schepers-Hughes and Loic Wacquant (London: Sage, 2002) 1-8: 4.

Similarly, in Korea, the unreliability of both the blood market and the blood quality acquired through it incited repeated warnings from serological specialists and medical professionals alike about the dangers of the quantitative and qualitative insufficiency of the national blood store. The pathologist Yi Samyŏl, who assumed control over the Department of Emergency Medicine at Yonsei University's Severance Hospital following his return from the United States in 1958, deplored the national reliance on blood sales to supply transfusion stores. Yi conveyed his concerns about the blood market to national press outlets in his capacities as a serological specialist with extensive training in American blood banking and transfusion technologies and an ethno-nationalist concerned with ensuring the "independence of Korean blood transfusion" and maintaining the "racial purity" of bloods stored and exchanged in Korea.²⁰¹ Yi's cautions were notably echoed by Wŏn Chongtŏk, the acting director of the Korean Red Cross Center, who warned that through South Korea's reliance on a national blood supply cobbled together from "undesirable" domestic sellers and supplemental foreign aid, the "pure blood" of the purportedly homogeneous Korean ethno-nation would be diluted through the transfusion of compromised bloods.²⁰²

Such dire warnings, however, did little to change public antipathy to blood donation throughout the 1950s. In contrast to countries like the U.K., where Titmuss' advocacy of a gift economy of blood donation was facilitated by the fact that British civilians accustomed to blood donation from WWII continued to give more than enough to meet postwar demand, South Korea had neither the institutional infrastructure nor the precedent of a popular culture of blood giving

²⁰¹ Yi Samyŏl 이삼열, "Kajok konghyŏl undong ūl chech'anghamyŏnsŏ" 가족공혈운동을 제창하면서 (Announcement regarding the family blood donation movement), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), May 4, 1965; for an extensive exploration of Yi's serological anthropology, see Hyŏn Jaehwan.

²⁰² *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), May 2, 1963.

to rely on.²⁰³ Despite efforts by Yi, Wŏn, and their serological colleagues (including Kang Tŭkyong at Ewha University, Kim Kihong at Hanyang University, and Pak Chint'ak at Wusŏk University) to disseminate pro-blood donation attitudes and knowledge amongst their academic peers and students, public health concerns rooted in Confucian ideologies about bodily integrity proved stubbornly persistent.²⁰⁴

It was not until the April Uprising that a sudden surge in blood donation took hold in the public consciousness, out of the potent combination of outrage at the violence perpetrated by the government on civilians and an unprecedented pressing material need for medical blood supplies not seen since the Korean War. Moreover, while the April Uprising has largely been historicized and historically analyzed in terms of masculine bloodshed, it was the blood of women, across divisions of age and class, that was particularly solicited for political, social, and particularly medical purposes.

Martyrs and Mothers: Gendered Bloodshed and Blood Donation in the April Uprising

The April 1960 Uprising that ousted President Syngman Rhee from office and inaugurated the Second Republic has been variously elegized as revolution, uprising, event, or as the “unfinished revolution.”²⁰⁵ The qualitative distinctions between these designations gesture at

²⁰³ Waldby and Mitchell, 2006: 10.

²⁰⁴ According to one anecdote, Yi's efforts to convince the Yonsei community of the safety of blood donation included standing during a service in the university chapel to deliver a pro-blood donation lecture that was so convincing that one young man joined him on-stage, where Yi drew his blood immediately with no obvious ill-effects. Republic of Korea Red Cross, “Kŭm kwa ūn ūn ōpsŏdo chŏlmŭn p'i naege i'nora” 금과 은은 없어도 젊은 피 내게 있노라 (Young blood given with neither gold nor silver recompense), *Red Story*: https://blog.naver.com/PostView.nhn?blogId=blood_info&logNo=90145219053&parentCategoryNo=&categoryNo=54&viewDate=&isShowPopularPosts=false&from=postView.

²⁰⁵ Charles R. Kim, “Unlikely Revolutionaries: South Korea's First Generation and the Student Protests of 1960,” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2007; Namhee Lee; *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); Wol-san Liem, “Telling the ‘Truth’ to

a larger uncertainty in public memory and conventional historiography alike on what the contemporaneous significance and contemporary legacy of the event were and have been. This variation also reflects the range of subjective engagements with the uprising and its related social upheavals.²⁰⁶ As the nation clamored in papers, periodicals, and placards over what shape the polity would take moving forward from the “darkness” of dictatorship, the proper gendering of the new order emerged as a site that demanded a careful balance between convention and progressivism.

Given the Rhee regime’s violent response to metropolitan unrest, and the unprecedented scale of the anti-regime protests, it is perhaps unsurprising that much of the printed reflection surrounding April 1960 alternated between lurid morbidity and saccharine effusion. Blood was ubiquitous in the protestors’ language and the media coverage of the event alike. Student calls to arms insisted that, “We cannot stand by in this poisonous time as the blood of our brothers is spilled,”²⁰⁷ while their celebrations of Rhee’s resignation thrilled, “The students rose up, fought for us, shed their blood, and triumphed!”²⁰⁸

Koreans: U.S. Cultural Policy in South Korea during the Early Cold War, 1947-1967,” Ph.D. diss., New York University, 2010.

²⁰⁶ Charles R. Kim, “Moral Imperatives: South Korean Studenthood and April 19th,” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (May 2012), 399-422.

²⁰⁷ Sim Chaet’aek 심재택, “4-wŏl hyŏngmyŏng ŭi chŏn’gae kwajŏng” 4 월 혁명의 전개 과정 (The development of the April Revolution), in *4.19 hyŏngmyŏngnon I 4.19 혁명론 I (Theories of the 4.19 Revolution)*, eds. Han Wansang, Yi Uchae, Sim Chaet’aek 한완상, 이우재, 심재택 (Sŏul: Ilwŏlsŏkak, 1983), 44; Kim Sŏngchin 김성진, *Han’guk chŏngch’i 100-nyŏn ŭl malhanda 한국 장치 100 년을 말한다 (Telling 100 years of Korean politics)* (Sŏul: Tusantonga, 1999, 179).

²⁰⁸ Chosŏn Ilbosa 조선일보사, *Chosŏn ilbo ch’ilsimnyŏnsa cheilkwŏn 조선일보 칠십년사 제일권 (70 year history of Chosŏn Ilbo, volume one)* (Sŏul: Chosŏn Ilbosa, 1990), 655.

Meanwhile, the press dubbed April 19, 1960 – the day that the uprisings began – “Bloody Tuesday,”²⁰⁹ a moniker echoed in headlines like, “The National Assembly Must Stop Profaning the Blood of 4.19,” “Those Whose Names have been Written in Scarlet Blood,” and “Victory of the Noble Blood Spilled for Democracy.”²¹⁰ The content of reportage was no less stricken by the bloody spectacle of Rhee’s violent crackdown on civilian protestors. *Tonga Ilbo* correspondent Yi Myōng-tong compared the chaos in Seoul to a battlefield, writing, “The corpses of the slain lay crumpled here and there, and the bodies of injured students writhed as they shrieked. Four or five policemen leading dogs drew up alongside the fallen wounded and, ignoring their cries, deliberately released the dogs’ leashes.”²¹¹

Many press accounts were sensationalist, but there was also an earnest reverence in reportage for the sanctity of the blood and lives sacrificed for the anti-authoritarian movement. The blood of protestors was sacrosanct fluid, described variously as “noble [*kokwihan*],” “sacred [*kōrukhan*],” and “binding [*hanp’itchul*]” – language that ironically testified to the success of the Rhee administration’s decade-long endeavor to instill a rigorous doctrine of nationalism in the new generation as a form of secular religion.²¹² Within this widespread homage to the semiotic

²⁰⁹ Kang Chunman 강준만, *Han’guk hyōndaesa sanch’aek, 1960-yōndae p’yōn: 4.19-hyōngmyōng esō 3-sōn kaehōn kkaji* 한국 현대사 산책, 1960 년대 편: 4.19 혁명에서 3 선 개헌까지 (*A Walk Through Modern Korean History, 1960s Edition: From the April Revolution through the Third Constitution*) (Sōul-si: Inmul kwa Sasangsa, 2004), 26-27.

²¹⁰ Naver’s digital news archive logs more entries with the word “blood” (*p’i*) in 1960 than in any other year in its collection ranging from 1920 through the present, with 1,859 entries total. The article headings cited above are, in order, “Kukhoe nūn sailgu ūi p’i rūl modok malla” 國會는 四一九의 피를모독말라 (National Assembly, do not profane the blood of April 19), *Tonga Ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), April 29, 1960; Kim Namjo 김남조, “Kū irūm ūl sōnhong ūi p’i ro ssūgogan idūl” 그 이름을 선홍의 피로 쓰고간 이들 (Those whose names are written in the varnish of blood) *Yōwōn* 여원 (*Women’s sphere*) June 1960, 56-57; and “Minjujuūi wihan kogwihan p’i ūi sūngni” 民主主義위한 高貴한피의勝利 (Victory of noble blood for democracy) *Tonga Ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), April 27, 1960.

²¹¹ Sim Chaet’aek, 1983, 49-50.

²¹² Charles R. Kim, “The April 19th Generation and the Start of Postcolonial History in South Korea,” *The Review of Korean Studies* 12(3), September 2009, 71-99.

conflation of blood-shed and devotion to the democratic project, however, there were also minute distinctions in the types of blood that were sacrificed and the different ways in which its bearers' bodies conditioned the manner in which it was spilled, as well as the effects that its shedding bore.

The mobilization of female blood during the April Uprising took three main distinct but interconnected forms: the literal shedding of blood in physical clashes with Rhee's militarized police force, the solicitation of blood donations from women to replenish the critically underequipped stores in medical institutions, and discursive emphasis on the symbolic profundity of the blood of women as martyrs and mothers.




Figure 3.3. A farewell note to her parents left behind by a student killed in the April 1960 protests

Young women from high schools and colleges throughout the country surged into the streets during the demonstrations that roiled the nation from the lead-up to the fraudulent March 15 election through Syngman Rhee's resignation on April 26, 1960. The eagerness of schoolgirls and university coeds to join the ranks of demonstrators is attested to by the casualty lists [*pusangja myŏngdan*] that became a front-page staple in newspapers from April 19 through the end of the month, in an effort to aid panicked relatives and friends locate missing loved ones.

These registers were organized first by hospital, then by patients' names and educational institution affiliations, or occupation or address. Although women are often overlooked as combatants and potential casualties in the uprising, an attentive reading of these registers reveals that not only were women present, but they were also explicitly identified and distinguished from a presumption of masculinity in these lists. For example, a typical entry for a male casualty in one representative *Tonga Ilbo* register reads, “Kim Ŭngsöp (22 = Tongguk University),” while an entry for an injured woman reads “Yi Hyekyöng (Woman [yö] 17 = Sophomore, Töksöng Girls High School).” Without fail, while men were registered by their name and affiliation alone, injured women's names were invariably followed by the descriptor “yö,” or female.²¹³

Students of the preeminent women's education institution, Ewha University, occupied a significant portion of the hospital cots lining the corridors of hospitals pressed beyond capacity.²¹⁴ This belies a widespread consensus to the contrary in scholarly histories and personal retrospectives, which agree that Ewha students uniformly abided by University Dean Helen Kim's admonition to the student body to refrain from the anti-government protests out of respect for their “elder sister,” Ewha alumni Maria Park, the prominent and widely vilified wife of Rhee's patently corrupt running-mate in the March election, Yi Ki-poong (Yi Kipung).²¹⁵ In a

²¹³ “4.19 sat'ae pusangja myöngdan” 4.19 事態負傷者名單 (Register of those injured in the 4.19 incident), *Tonga Ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), April 22, 1960.

²¹⁴ Yi Hyöng 이형, *Cho Pyöngok kwa Yi Kipung: Cheil konghwaguk chöngch'i üi chaejomyöng* 조병옥과 이기붕: 제일 공화국 정치의 재조명 (*Cho Pyöngok and Yi Kipung: A reexamination of the politics of the first republic*) (Samilsöjök, 2002), 303-304; Yi Chaeoh 이재오, *Haebanghu han'guk haksae undongsa* 해방후 한국학생 운동사 (*Postwar history of student activism in Korea*) (Hyöngsöngsa, 1984), 173-175; and Ryu Süngryöl 류성렬, *Bburi kip'ün han'guksa saem'i kip'ün iyagi 7: hyöndae* 뿌리 깊은 한국사 샘이 깊은 이야기 7: 현대 (*Deep-rooted Korean history, hidden stories 7: modernity*) (Sol, 2003), 366.

²¹⁵ Hong Ilsik, Pak Sil, O Chinmo, and Yi Yönpok 홍일식, 박실, 오진모, 이연복, *4.19 Hyöngmyöngsa I* 4.19 혁명사 I (*History of April 19 Revolution, I*) (Söul-si: 50 chunyön 4.19 hyöngmyöng kinyöm saöphoe 50 주년 4.19 혁명기념사업회 (50-year anniversary of the April 19 revolution memorial association), 2011), 489-490; Yi Hyöng 이형, *Cho Pyöngok kwa Yi Kipung: Cheil konghwaguk chöngch'i üi chaejomyöng* 조병옥과 이기붕: 제일 공화국 정치의 재조명 (*Cho Pyöngok and Yi Kipung: Reexamination of the politics of the first republic*)

chagrined remembrance of Ewha absenteeism, Yi Hyochae – a faculty member in 1960 – recalls that the Ewha community’s avoidance of the protests was so conspicuous in the public eye that students would remove the lapel pins identifying the institution from their jackets before braving the politically charged streets on their way to class.²¹⁶

Given the public prominence of Helen Kim’s reminder to her students that “Pak Maria, wife of vice-presidential candidate Yi Ki-poong is not only a board member of our university but also your senior,” as well as Maria Park’s politically tone-deaf equation of respect for the state with respect for the divine in a reflection on the March 15 election published one month later in the Ewha student journal *Idae Hakbo*, the common antipathy described by Yi Hyochae does not seem unlikely.²¹⁷ That being said, the very fact of this broadly negative reaction to Ewha students’ presumed political disinclination undermines the conventional assumption of women’s participation in the April protests as exceptional, rather than standard. If most women’s educational institutions were abstaining from the protests, the story of Ewha absenteeism would not have been a story at all. The fact that Kim and Park’s remarks were so widely reported,

(Samilsöjök, 2002); Kim Kyosik 김교식, “Han’guk hyöndaesa üi misüt’öri – Yi Kipung ilga chasal: Mosal (謀殺) üi naemsae ga nanda” 한국 현대사의 미스터리—이기봉 일가 자살 (A mystery of modern Korean history – Yi Kipung’s family suicide: The scent of murder), *Wölgan Chosön* 월간조선 (*Monthly Chosön*), August 1991, 444; and Cho Kapche 조갑제, *Nae mudöm’e ch’im ül paet’öra 3: hyöngmyöng chönya* 내무덤에 침을 뱉어라 3: 혁명 전야 (*Spit on my grave 3: the eve of the revolution*) (Chosön Ilbosa, 1998), 192.

²¹⁶ Yi Hyochae 이효재, “Yösöng kwa 4.19” 여성과 4.19 (Women and 4.19), *Silch’önmunhak* 실천문학 (*Literature in Action*), June 1985, 305-308.

²¹⁷ Chöng Pyöngchun 정병준, “Pak Maria: Myönjoebu rül chul su ömnün ch’inil kwa kwöllyökyok üi hwasin” 박마리아: 면죄부를 줄 수 없는 친일과 권력욕의 화신 (Maria Park: the embodiment of an unforgivably power-hungry pro-Japanese collaborator), *Ch’öngsanhaji mot’han yöksa 2: Han’guk hyöndaesa rül umjik’in ch’inilp’a 60* 청산하지 못한 역사 2: 한국 현대사를 움직인 친일파 60 (*Unsettled history 2: 60 collaborators in modern Korean history*), ed. Panminjokmunje yön’guso 반민족문제연구소 (Center for the study of anti-nationalist issues) (Ch’öngnyönsa, 1994), 125. For Helen Kim’s remarks, see Hong Ilsik, Pak Sil, O Chinmo, and Yi Yönpok 홍일식, 박실, 오진모, 이연복, *4.19 Hyöngmyöngsa I* 4.19 혁명사 I (*History of April 19 Revolution, I*) (Söul-si: 50 chunyön 4.19 hyöngmyöng kinyöm saöphoe 50 주년 4.19 혁명기념사업회 (50-year anniversary of the April 19 revolution memorial association), 2011), 489-490.

discussed, and condemned, and that this condemnation extended to the Ewha student body – as well as the revelation by casualty registers that these reports of uniform political abstinence were overstated – cumulatively dismantle a central pillar in narratives that assume women’s political silence in the April Uprising, diminishing them to political non-entities.²¹⁸

At the time of the Uprising, the Ministry of Health conservatively estimated fatalities of nearly 200 and injuries of over 300 in the first day of demonstrations alone. Subsequent accounts list as many as 6,000 total casualties over the course of the protests.²¹⁹ The demand for blood transfusions to treat critically wounded patients created an unprecedented strain on medical institutions. In several Seoul hospitals, the need for blood was so desperate that hospital employees – including doctors, nurses, and administrators – began giving their own blood on a daily basis during the height of the protests.²²⁰ The medical blood shortage and consequent scramble for volunteers to replenish dwindling supplies led reportage on the uprisings to attend not only to the terrible blood cost of the state-civilian violence, but also to inspiring acts of blood giving in service of civic duty and human decency. For example, a headline article in *Ŭisa sibo* (*Medical Bulletin*) documented that when Ewha University Hospital was so overrun by emergency patients that they were at the point of turning dozens away, several teenage students – hospitalized themselves with injuries a day prior – volunteered their own blood and successfully encouraged nearly forty others to do so as well. Describing the ringleader, the report marveled, “Despite her own battered bodily state, this young maidservant still in her teens implored, ‘Let’s

²¹⁸ Charles Kim’s dissertation details the diverse participation in the April Uprising and the subsequent historical homogenization of protestors to male college students. Charles R. Kim, “Unlikely Revolutionaries: South Korea’s First Generation and the Student Protests of 1960,” PhD diss., Columbia University, 2007.

²¹⁹ Bruce Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: Norton, 1997), 346; Youngmi Kim, *The Politics of Coalition in Korea: Between Institutions and Culture* (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 20.

²²⁰ Korean Red Cross, 2006: 487.

draw our blood and give it to the injured' ... This tear-inspiring story is something that hospitals could never before have imagined, that thanks to the sacrificial blood donation of these male and female students there was no shortage of blood for transfusion.”²²¹

As a result of such public service announcements, a diverse crowd of adult citizens, students, and even foreigners gathered outside the entrances of the Seoul National University and Severance hospitals to donate their blood by dawn the day after the initial demonstrations. Meanwhile, the South Korean Red Cross Blood Center received blood donations from sixty-two students – an unprecedented number in its history – that it delivered to medical centers across Seoul to treat those injured in the protests. Although the number of voluntary blood donors during the April Uprising seems relatively small by comparison to today’s expansive daily blood donation industry, they cumulatively represented an outpouring of medical blood hitherto unknown in South Korean history.

Women played a particularly prominent role in blood donation during the April Uprising, as well as in the growth of the blood donation movement over the following decade. In addition to occupying hospital cots as patients, teenage students from prominent girls’ high schools like Ewha and Sookmyung gave blood in such high numbers that both schools were recognized three years later by the International Red Cross on the occasion of its centennial.²²² The high-rates of volunteerism at these women’s colleges is particularly striking in the face of South Korea’s continuing struggle to invite blood donation in a sustained or significant amount – in the four

²²¹ “4.19 hūisaengja e nummul ōrin tonjokae” 4.19 犧牲者에 눈물어린同族愛 (Tear-jerking fraternal love for those who sacrificed in the April 19 Uprising), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), April 22, 1960.

²²² “Centenary Congress of the International Red Cross,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 3, no. 25 (April 1963): 202-211.

year period between 1958 and 1962, the Korean Red Cross Center reported that of a total 44,771 bottles of blood collected, only 239 came from unpaid donors.²²³

The position of women's high schools and colleges at the forefront of the Korean blood donation movement continued decades after the heightened public scrutiny and reportage around the April Uprising. In large part through the efforts of Professor Kang Tŭkyong to introduce a blood donation and administration system based on the Australian model to Ewha, the university set internal standards for blood policy that remained unachievable on a national level until the 1980s.²²⁴ By invoking Ewha's responsibility to live up to the standard that the lauded "forty-plus blood donor" students had set in 1960, in 1965 Kang was able to successfully push the university hospital to provide blood transfusion services free of charge if the patients' families provided their blood for the procedure. By 1967, blood collection, transfusion, and storage training were mandatory for all medical personal employed at Ewha University hospital.²²⁵

In contrast to majority male colleges, where blood donation rates dropped gradually after the April Uprising and fell precipitously following the 1961 Military Coup, the rate of donation

²²³ The report came from the Korean Red Cross, which assumed administrative control for and renamed the National Blood Center in January 1958 following the government's decision to rescind its responsibility in the face of public critique over the death of several frequent blood sellers. Kim Kihong, Yi Samyŏl, and Kang Tŭkyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han'guk hŏnhyŏl undongsa* 한국헌혈운동사 (*History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea*) (P'aju-si: Nanam sinsŏ, 1990), 41.

²²⁴ Serological and hematological specialist Kang Tŭkyong graduated from Yonsei Medical College in 1953, served as chairman of the Korean Blood Donation Association (1971-1975), a member of the blood administration specialists team advising the Ministry of Health (1980-1982), and as head of the Korean Serological Society (1986-1988). Sunch'ŏnhyang University Medical College, *Kang Tŭk-yong kyosu chŏngnyŏn kinyŏm nonmun-jip* 강득용교수 정년기념 논문집 (*Commemorative Anthology on the Occasion of Professor Kang Tŭk-yong's Retirement*) (Onyang: Sunch'ŏnhyang taehakkyo, 1993).

²²⁵ Yi Ŭnchŏng 이은정, *Hŏnhyŏl, sarang ŭl mannada: 'hŏnhyŏl in'gu 300-man' sidae, kanhosa ka tŭllyŏjunŭn sesang esŏ kajang arŭmdaun 'nanum' iyagi* 헌혈, 사랑을 만나다: "헌혈인구 300 만" 시대, 간호사가 들려주는 세상에서 가장 아름다운 "나눔" 이야기 (*Giving Blood, Meeting Love: The Story of the Most Beautiful "Exchange" in the World, Ushered in By Nurses in the Age of "Blood Donation by Three Million People"*) (Sŏul: Haengbok enŏji, 2015).

among Ewha’s student population remained relatively stable in the years following 1960. While male students had been motivated to give blood for a specific emergency, blood donation advocates at Ewha were able to retain women students’ altruistic interest by holding up blood transfusion as particularly vital to female health interests, such as treating post-natal blood loss or conducting safe Cesarean sections. According to Kang, by giving blood Ewha students were supporting their sisters, contributing to the future of the nation by bolstering the health of Korean mothers, and investing in their own future as mothers-to-be.²²⁶ Within a decade of the April Uprising, Ewha’s blood donation organizing was so effective that an average of over fifty students per month traveled to the Blood Collection Center in Tongdaemun to donate, despite its inconvenient location relative to the Ewha campus in Sinch’on. The movement was a full-fledged industry to the extent that, rather than being rolled into the nationwide “Love’s Blood Drive,” it was referred to separately as the “Ewha Blood Donation Movement.” The Ewha movement even had its own slogan, intended to evoke the Christian model of the Good Samaritan: “The one hour you spend giving blood can save your neighbor’s life.”²²⁷ This admonishment to virtue supplemented another, less moralizing, slogan that was first promoted to encourage women’s blood donation during the April Uprising, “If you give blood, it will make you prettier.”²²⁸

²²⁶ Kang Tükyong 강득용, “Hyölaek ünhaeng punya üi chön’gong üi kyoyuk kyehoek 혈액은행 분야의 전공의 교육 계획 (Plans for the education of specialists in the division of blood banking), *Journal of the Korean Society for Emergency Medicine* 5, No. 1, 1985; Kang, Tükyong 강득용, Kim Wönbæ 김원배, Yi Tonghwa 이동화, and Yi Taeil 이대일, “Han’guk’in hönyölja wa imsanbu mit kyöngsanbu üi pulkuch’ik hangch’e kömsaek e kwanhan yön’gu” 한국인 헌혈자와 임신부 및 경산부의 불규칙 항체검색에 관한 연구 (“The Incidence of Irregular Antibodies in Korean Blood Donors, Pregnant, and Multiparous Women”), *Journal of Pathology and Translational Medicine* 16, no. 2 (1982).

²²⁷ Yi, 2015: 143.

²²⁸ Pak, 2016: 348.

Discursive representations of female blood certainly expressed social expectations about divisions in gendered roles. While the blood of the young male students was narratively cast as a heroic casualty of combat,²²⁹ women's blood was most commonly described through the trope of either virginal martyrdom or maternal parturition, both of which emphasized (re)generative rather than combative qualities.²³⁰ While this narrative dichotomy did make women's protest participation contingent on conformity to patriarchal norms, many women nonetheless used gendered narratives around blood to justify their otherwise transgressive public forays. Contemporaneous discussions around women's blood in service to the nation revolved principally around three figures: true "martyrs," false martyrs, and "mothers of the nation." Young coed protestors often navigated the balance between expectations of political awareness and activity on the one hand and the strictures of conventional gendered divisions of male public spheres that assumed female exclusion on the other by situating their protest participation within the context of a deeper commitment to salvific national politics. For example, Myönsöng Girls' High School student Lee Chaeyöng embedded her autobiographical account in two nationalist traditions – masculine blood oaths and feminine virgin martyrdom.

According to Lee's account, she and a group of students appropriated a government rally to publicly stage signings of "blood oaths" (*hyölsö*) in support of the anti-regime, pro-democratization cause.²³¹ Going by contemporary reports, she garnered special notice by going

²²⁹ Andrew Lynch, *Malory's Book of Arms: The Narrative of Combat in Le Morte Darther*, *Arthurian Studies* 30 (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1997), 71.

²³⁰ Peggy McCracken, *The Curse of Eve, the Wound of the Hero* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 10.

²³¹ "Minjudang Söul sön'gö kangyönhoe saman simin'i ch'amjip" 民主黨光州選舉講演會 四萬市民이 參集 (Forty-thousand citizens join Democratic Party election rally in Seoul) *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), March 5, 1960; "Minjudang Söul kangyönhoe, siljöngpip'an sillal 'chönggwön kyoch'e rül chölgyu" 民主黨서울講演會, 失政批判辛辣 "政權交替를絶叫" (Democratic Party Seoul rally, biting critique of performance "Crying out for government turnover") *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), March 6, 1960; "Minjudang kangyönhoe p'i rül

beyond the finger-piercing formula normally associated with blood oaths and actually severing a digit to use as a writing implement instead.²³² In spite of such radicalism, however, Lee also carefully inscribed her political participation within a rubric of domestic, family-fostered nationalism. Her autobiographical account begins with an expression of gratitude to her father for instilling in her the importance of political informed-ness and patriotic commitment through such nationalist models as Yu Kwansun – the so-called “Jean d’Arc” of Korea, martyred to the cause of independence in the March 1 Uprising against Japanese colonial rule.²³³ In appropriating blood oaths – a traditionally masculine symbolic act rooted in the colonial period – as a vehicle by which she could demonstrate her dedication to the nation within a legible historically precedented framework, Lee also potentially challenged blood oaths’ historical signification not only of masculinity, but also of the reclamation of personal and national manhood. For this reason, her confinement of that act of gendered transgression within a rubric of gender normative was a necessary strategic step to make her public political foray acceptable to a broader audience still struggling with women’s public mobility in the consumer sphere, to say nothing of the political.²³⁴

hüllimyö yölkwang” 民主黨講演會 피를 흘리며熱狂 (Flowing blood and passion at Democratic Party rally) *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), March 6, 1960.

²³² Lee Chaeyöng 이재영, “Kwanghwamunsa’kõri kun’in üi pyök ül irõhke ttürhõ’ta” 광화문사거리 군인의 벽을 이렇게 뚫었다 (This is how we broke through the wall of soldiers at Kwanghwamun intersection) in Hong Ilsik, Pak Sil, O Chinmo, and Yi Yönpok 홍일식, 박실, 오진모, 이연복, *4.19 Hyöngmyöngsa I* 4.19 혁명사 I (*History of April 19 Revolution, I*) (Söul-si: 50 chunyön 4.19 hyöngmyöng kinyöm saöphoe 50 주년 4.19 혁명기념사업회 (50-year anniversary of the April 19 revolution memorial association), 2011), 160-165.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 160.

²³⁴ Yi Chõnghüi 이정희, “Chõnhu üi söngdamron yõn’gu: chongjõn esõ 4.19 ijõn sigi üi yösõng chapji wa chõnhusedae yösõng chakka üi sosõl ül chungsim üro” 전후의 성담론 연구: 종전에서 4.19 이전 시기의 여성 잡지와 전후세대 여성 작가의 소설을 중심으로 (A study of postwar sexual discourse: women’s journals from the armistice to 4.19 and novels by women authors of the postwar generation],” *Tamron* 담론 (*Debate*), 201, 8(2), 2005, 193-244.



Figure 3.4. *Hyōlsō* blood oath in the April Uprising

Not all accounts of young women who glommed onto the patriotic affidavits of traditional female martyrs in the course of the April Uprising were adulatory. An article in the August 1960 edition of the *Sŏul Sinmun*, titled “A False Jean d’Arc,” claimed to expose one family’s efforts to capitalize on the April surge in nationalist fervor by trading in the currency of patriotic martyrdom.²³⁵ Charged by his bureau chief with finding inspirational stories of present-day Yu Kwansun emulators in the wake of the April protests, the *Sŏul Sinmun* reporter instead uncovered a sad and sordid tale in his interviews with hospital staff and bereaved family associations. On April 26, in the midst of the final wave of police violence against anti-regime protestors, a six-months pregnant fourteen-year-old girl bled to death in the course of an abortion procedure undertaken at a hospital near Seoul’s Eastern Gate. Ashamed of the circumstances of her death, her parents colluded with the surgeon to falsify her birth certificate to indicate that her death was not the result of a botched abortion, but one of the numerous other valorized young students felled by police bullets.²³⁶

On the one hand, the *Sŏul Sinmun* article was unrestrained in its castigation of the offending parents’ expedient manipulation of the “noble” losses sustained by the nation in order to mask the socially stigmatized sordidness of their personal loss. The author subtitled the piece “Daughter who dies in disgrace pretends to have died in glory: Here are parents who blaspheme the spirit of justice,” and reported with grim satisfaction on the arrest of the offending parents.²³⁷ On the other hand, in his recollection of the scoop decades later, the author recalled that his

²³⁵ “Kajja chandarŭk’ŭ” 가짜 잔다르크 (False Jean of Arc), *Sŏul Sinmun* 서울신문 (*Seoul newspaper*), August 18, 1960.

²³⁶ Hŏ Yongbŏm 허용범, *Han’guk ōllon 100-tae t’ŭkjong* 한국 얼론 100 대 특종 (*100 scoops in Korean media*) (Nanam, 2000), 78-81.

²³⁷ “Kajja chandarŭk’ŭ” 가짜 잔다르크 (False Jean of Arc), *Sŏul Sinmun* 서울신문 (*Seoul newspaper*), August 18, 1960.

editor was so reluctant to print the piece that he had to submit it eleven times before it finally made it to print.²³⁸ The tension between the editor's reluctance to undermine a narrative of valorized nationalist martyrdom and the reporter's commitment to exposing the ways in which the martyrdom narrative could be manipulated to mask personal – rather than nationalist – womanly agendas demonstrate a pervasive awareness of the potential of these paradigms to both underscore and undermine conventional social formations.

In the months following the violence and death surrounding the protests, there was also a surge in articles addressing the “April mothers,” or women who had lost children to the violence.²³⁹ Their bloodshed was separated by a degree – i.e., rather than sacrificing their own blood (at least, that tended to be the assumption), these women had sacrificed a child. Editorials repeatedly enjoined bereaved mothers to regard this as a “sacrifice,” rather than a “loss,” demanding that bereaved mothers subsume their personal grief into communal duty.²⁴⁰ Public statements by the most prominent “April Mother,” Kwŏn Ch’anchu – the mother of Kim Chuyŏl, whose death at police hands had started the long lead up to the April Uprising – enacted the expected narrative of nation as family and family in service to nation. While accepting a reward on her deceased son's behalf, “Mrs. Kwŏn expressed her feelings in trembling tones, saying, ‘Although Chuyŏl is tragically dead, [his death] has given birth to a new democratic republic, and so my unbounded joy outpaces my sadness.’”²⁴¹ In giving birth to a son whose blood had in

²³⁸ Hŏ Yongbŏm 허용범, *Han'guk ōllon 100-tae t'ŭkjong* 한국 얼론 100 대 특종 (100 scoops in Korean media) (Nanam, 2000), 79.

²³⁹ “Sawŏl ōmŏni ūi widaehamiyŏ” 四月어머니의 偉大함이여 (The greatness of the April Mother), *Kyŏnghyang Sinmun* 경향신문 (*Kyŏnghyang newspaper*), October 10, 1960.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.; and “Ōmmaya nunaya nunmul ūl kŏduja” 엄마야 누나야 눈물을 거두자 (Mothers and elder sisters, dry your tears), *Yŏwŏn* 여원 (*Women's sphere*), June 1960, 62-65.

²⁴¹ “Sawŏl ōmŏni ūi widaehamiyŏ” 四月어머니의 偉大함이여 (The greatness of the April Mother), *Kyŏnghyang Sinmun* 경향신문 (*Kyŏnghyang newspaper*), October 10, 1960.

turn watered the grounds of the new state, she had contributed to the generation of a new and better nation.

Conclusion: Valuing Blood and Bodies

Women's blood, sacrificed in combat and given in solidarity, contributed to both the political aims of the April Uprising and the developmental agenda of the blood donation movement and the national blood management industry in South Korea. The narrative bifurcation of the "gift" of women's blood into martyrdom and maternity, however, demonstrates that Korean women's bodies and the bloods within them remained deeply tied to the ideological diminishment of women to their reproductive value. As we have seen, female blood was even solicited specifically by appeals to reproductive function in service of the national community. While South Korea's official "androcentric narrative" celebrates combative male bloodshed, the national blood program disproportionately conscripted women's blood in ways that underscored patriarchal conventions of female sacrifice and labor while also turning these tropes toward the service of a new medico-scientific national industry. Much as the April Uprising was intended to politically and socially revitalize the nation, the women-reliant blood drive of the 1960s explicitly set out to regenerate the nation by ensuring the biomedical means to do so. The Korean polity was thus, as Lori Jo Marso has put it, "constituted by the simultaneous denial of, and need for, the bodies of actual women."²⁴²

The April Uprising provided a crucial impetus to the movement to develop a culture of voluntary blood donation in South Korea, although it would be another two-plus decades before

²⁴² Lori Jo Marso, *(Un)Manly Citizens: Jean-Jacques Rousseau's and Germaine de Staël's Subversive Women* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 129.

the culture of donation became fully embedded. If the Korean War marked the first blood crisis that introduced biomedical processes and technologies for drawing and storing blood, the April Uprising provided a second blood crisis that animated a public interest in medical blood supplies on a political level, beyond the confined medico-scientific interests of specialists. From there, the blood donation movement staggered forward in fits and starts, alternately helped and hindered by government investment for the purposes of regulating and optimizing the national body and the social turmoil precipitated by political upheavals like the 1961 Military Coup.²⁴³ A third blood crisis, the AIDS crisis of the mid-1980s, finally realized the movement to proselytize a culture the synonymized blood donation and civic duty by elevating the meaning of blood donation beyond medicine and even politics to a question of national integrity.²⁴⁴

Chapter 3, in part, is currently being prepared for submission for publication of the material. This dissertation author, Inga Kim Diederich, was the primary investigator and author of this material.

²⁴³ Pak, 2016: 355.

²⁴⁴ Korea Alliance to Defeat AIDS [Taehan eijū yebang hyōphoe], “AIDS News,” *Red Ribbon [Redū ribbon]* Vol. 68 (2006): 46-49; Chōng Kui-ok and Ch’oe Ŭn-pōm, *50-year History of the Women’s Services Advisory Committee to the Korean Red Cross, 1955-2005 [Taehan chōksipjasa yōsōng bongsa t’ūkbyōl jamun wiwōnhoe 50-nyōnsa: 1955-2005]* (Sōul: Taehan chōksipjasa yōsōng pongsa t’ūkbyōl chamun wiwōnhoe, 2007).

Chapter 4:

Purifying Blood: Scientific Surveys and Medical Definitions of *Honhyöl'a* Bodies

But here in the midst of this pure race nation, a whole new race sprang up. Something deep down in people's souls objected vehemently to the idea of having a mixed race child in the family circle. The pure-homogeneous people of the "Land of the Morning Calm" had somehow been defiled and mixed up with all these different people like whites, blacks and Filipinos etc. and that was more than they could take. It turned out to be an emotional problem as well. Some could hardly stand the sight of these blue, gray or even green eyes or blond, yellowish or curly negroid hair. Wherever the mixed race child was born, the welcome he got was always the same, "I wish you were never born." He was born as a foreigner in the land of his mother and a displaced person in his own country.

—Sveinung J. Moen²⁴⁵

What we hate, we take seriously.

—Michel de Montaigne²⁴⁶

Introduction: Making a New Race

Born in the decade between the American military occupation of the southern half of the Korean peninsula in 1945 and the immediate wake of the Korean War (1950-1953), the first generation of Amerasian "*honhyöl'a*" (lit. "Mixed blood children")²⁴⁷ embodied a direct challenge to the anti-colonial aspirations of America's Cold War liberal empire and undermined postcolonial South Korean efforts to establish a "pure-blooded" sovereign nation. For

²⁴⁵ Sveinung J. Moen, *The Amerasians: A Study and Research on Interracial Children in Korea* (Seoul: Taewon Publishing, 1974), 33-34.

²⁴⁶ *Of Democritus and Heraclitus*, I, 50, (*Oeuvres completes*, eds. Albert Thibaudet and Maurice Rat (Paris: Pleiade, 1962)) 291, (*The Essays of Montaigne*, trans. E. J. Trechmann (New York: Oxford University Press, n.d.) 296.

²⁴⁷ The Sino-characters mixed (*hon* 混) and blood (*hyöl* 血) can be qualified with the characters child (*a* 兒) or person (*in* 人) to indicate a mixed-race child or adult, respectively. This paper focuses on the diminutive form to reflect its relative prominence in Cold War South Korean discourse and critically unpack the racial anxieties and social realities—including infanticide, racially-motivated murders, and the targeted export of mixed blood children via the international adoption industry—that informed this reflexive infantilization of mixed blood persons.

Americans, the intimate coupling of Amerasian children with the Korean sex industry for U.S. troops undermined the narrative of an equitable partnership by evoking neo-colonial overtones counter to liberal aspirations. Meanwhile, for Koreans, the connection between *honhyöl'a* and a domestic sex work sector that catered to an occupying foreign force challenged the anti-colonial ideal of South Korean sovereignty. The admixture of putatively distinct racial bloods in these children also threatened an insular postcolonial commitment to maintaining ethnic homogeneity in South Korea's national body that was championed, among others, by scientists intent on quantifying, delimiting, and isolating "Korean blood." Consequently, the first generation of Amerasians was rigorously excluded from the South Korean national polity through intersecting sets of legal and medical regulations that was engineered to biologically define, medically pathologize, and legally disown "mixed bloods." This endeavor to distinguish "mixed blood" Koreans, in turn, became a crucial arm in the racial project to consolidate a "pure blood" Korean identity.

Michael Omi and Howard Winant define a "racial project" as "simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial identities and meanings, and an effort to organize and distribute resources (economic, political, cultural) along particular racial lines."²⁴⁸ This bears true universally in the modern period insofar as "racial projects connect the meaning of race in discourse and ideology with the way that social structures are racially organized."²⁴⁹ Moreover, in spite of the fact that "race" as a modern concept originated in Euro-American

²⁴⁸ Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States* (New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), 125.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

efforts to apply evolutionary theory to social constructs, it is indisputable that the idea of race quickly gained global purchase in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.²⁵⁰

It is, however, a mistake to assume that “race” means the same thing in a non-Western context like Korea that it does in the American context theorized by Omi and Winant. Understandings of “race” in modern Korea have, at different historical moments, reflected colonial ideologies, imperial anxieties, biological epistemologies, or more often a complex combination of these and more influences from transnational currents in shared but locally contingent thought.²⁵¹ Korea has never been a passive receptacle for ideas about race, but has rather borrowed and reconfigured racialist ideas and systems to meet its own domestic needs. Analyses that castigate Korean racial formations and discourses for failing to meet the western (usually American) “standard” fundamentally misunderstand the problematic at hand.²⁵² That is, the question is not “what does Korea get wrong about race,” but “what is the Korean understanding of race, and how did it come to be that way?” The answer can be found, in part, in historical moments of population displacement that propelled a diverse assortment of peoples across the peninsula and produced new kinds of people, as well as in subsequent domestic attempts to come to terms with these new racial formations.

²⁵⁰ Michael Kevak, *Becoming Yellow: A Short History of Racial Thinking* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

²⁵¹ Gi-Wook Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); John Lie, ed., *Multiethnic Korea?: Multiculturalism, Migration, and Peoplehood Diversity in Contemporary South Korea* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 2014); Hanscom, Christopher P. and Dennis Washburn, eds., *The Affect of Difference: Representations of Race in East Asian Empire* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2016).

²⁵² For a critique of the colonizing gaze in western studies of Korea, see Hong Yung Lee, Yung Chool Ha, and Clark W. Sorrensen, eds., *Colonial Rule and Social Change in Korea, 1910-1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, c2013).

This chapter explores the interconnected racial projects of making “Koreans” and “mixed-Koreans” from 1945-1975, the decades during which American military presence and the offspring of American military personal transformed from a temporary exigency to a permanent fixture on the peninsula. It aims to understand how colonial racial ideologies and Cold War race studies were domesticated in South Korea by analyzing the scientific epistemologies, academic institutions, and medical practices through which “mixed blood” South Koreans were biologically defined and regulated. Serological, physiognomic, and pathological studies – all conducted under the rubric of “physical anthropology” – defined “mixed blood” bodies in contrast to “pure blood” bodies, thus the othering of “*honhyōl’a*” was also intimately connected to the consolidation of “*han’guk’in* (Korean).” In order to better understand South Korean scientists’ Cold War search for blood markers of race, the following analysis will therefore consider the role of scientific studies, medical treatments, and legal regulations in producing biological models of pure and mixed Korean bloods suited to the needs of the Cold War state.

Demonstrating that the process of making an exceptionalized other was central to constructing an ideal national self pushes back against the marginalization of mixed-raceness in historiographies of racialization and nation-building in favor of accounts that enunciate the constructedness of majority or minority identities within and beyond Korea. To be mixed race is to be always *in* the minority, but never *of* the minority. It is that very existential condition of perpetual residence at the edges of socially constructed categories that makes mixed-race persons a threat to social order, and the best analytic of the modern concept of race. Through the case of the postwar generation of Korean *honhyōl’a*, this chapter therefore broadly asserts that mixed-raceness should be the central heuristic, rather than a tangential curiosity, in mainstream

scholarly discussions on modern racial orders because it uniquely undercuts the concept of biological race while also highlighting the inescapability of racial constructs in the lived experiences of those whose very existence exposes the falsity of the modern concept of race.²⁵³

The “Honhyŏl’a” Problem: Social Responses to Race-Mixing in Postwar South Korea

In 1974, Norwegian Reverend Sveinung J. Moen introduced his informational pamphlet *The Amerasians* by underscoring the oft-repeated myth that race-mixing was as foreign to the Korean peninsula as the American soldiers charged with producing it. A church and social worker who had trained as a theologian and psychologist at the Norwegian Baptist Theological Seminary in Oslo before he was called to Korea, Moen had been personally charged with directing the Pearl S. Buck Foundation Opportunity Center for mixed race children by Pearl S. Buck herself—the originator of the very term “Amerasian” to identify the progeny of American-Asian couplings in East Asia.²⁵⁴ In his tract, Moen echoed a common consensus that his Amerasian charges in the 1960s and 1970s constituted “a whole new race” that radically departed from an undefiled tradition of “pure-homogeneous people in the “Land of the Morning Calm.””²⁵⁵ The assertion that Amerasian children born in the post-Korean War decades

²⁵³ See Remi Joseph-Salisbury, *Black Mixed-Race Men: Transatlanticity, Hybridity and “Post-Racial” Resilience* (Bingley: Emerald Publishing Limited, 2018) and Shirley Anne Tate, *Decolonizing Sambo: Transculturation, Fungibility, and Mixed Race Futurity* ([S.I.]: Emerald Group Publ, 2019).

²⁵⁴ The term “Amerasian” was first coined by Pearl S. Buck, and developed from an informal identity category that marketed Amerasian children to the international adoption industry into a formal legal category that simultaneously denoted American paternal responsibility and codified American imperial paternalism in the post-Vietnam War decades – especially the 1982 Amerasian Immigration Act. See Kori A. Graves, “Amerasian Children, Hybrid Superiority, and Pearl S. Buck’s Transracial and Transnational Adoption Activism,” *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 143, No. 2 (April 2019); Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

²⁵⁵ Sveinung J. Moen, *The Amerasians: A Study and Research on Interracial Children in Korea* (Seoul: Taewon Publishing, 1974), 33-34.

constituted the first break from a history of near-absolute peninsular insularity and consequent racial homogeneity, however, was an ahistorical assertion invented by Moen and other sociological and physiological surveyors of Amerasians. Such claims of the racial purity of “full” Koreans and the racial novelty of “mixed” Koreans overlooked centuries of previous population movements through and across the peninsula—from 6th century vibrant cosmopolitan trade networks that carried foreign goods and merchants to 6th century Silla to 12th century intermarriages between the Koryŏ royal family and Mongol rulers to twentieth century intermarriages between Japanese and Koreans and, indeed, Westerners and Koreans, as in the case of the first South Korean president, Syngman Rhee, and his Austrian wife Francesca Rhee—to say nothing of the contemporary generation of mixed-Koreans being fathered by Korean soldiers in Vietnam even as Moen penned his study on this “new” phenomenon in Korea.²⁵⁶

The claim of racial novelty was not only ahistorical. It also worked to rationalize the hostile social response against mixed-Koreans by “pure” Koreans for whom such unprecedented racial defilement “turned out to be an emotional problem as well.”²⁵⁷ More than this, it was also the basic grounds justifying a concentrated campaign by scientists and sociologists targeting mixed-race Koreans as objects of study. The enduring power of the myth of the newness of mixed-race in Korea proved a potent and enduring force, persisting into the twenty-first century in the National Human Right’s Commission [*Kukka in ’gwŏn wiwŏnhoe*]’s division of Amerasian South Koreans (defined by the NHRC as those born to American national paternity and Korean

²⁵⁶ Mary Lee, “Mixed Race Peoples in the Korean National Imaginary and Family,” *Korean Studies* 32 (2008): 56-85.

²⁵⁷ Sveinung J. Moen, *The Amerasians: A Study and Research on Interracial Children in Korea* (Seoul: Taewon Publishing, 1974), 33-34.

national maternity) into three distinct generations. First, those born in the post-Korean War reconstruction period (1953-1961) during which the NHRC asserts a mixed-race population first emerged “in earnest/in force” [*pon'gyökjök ūro*] on the Korean peninsula. Second, those born between the passage of the 1961 Prostitution Prevention Act [*Yullakhaengwi tŭng iminböp*] in South Korea and the 1982 Amerasian Immigration Act (PL 97-359) in the United States. Third, those born after the 1982 Amerasian Immigration Act.²⁵⁸

As a necessary corrective, however, it is important to note that while the NHRC’s categorization is useful for addressing the history of South Korean state/society’s engagement with an important category of mixed-race persons (Amerasians), it nonetheless reinforces several erroneous assumptions that shape public understandings of the domestic experience of race mixing into the present. Confining inquiry into these three generational categories overlooks: (1) The longer history of race-mixing on the Korean peninsula, both with other Asian peoples in the pre-modern period and with Asian and non-Asian peoples in the early-modern period and first half of the 20th century (particularly Japanese-Korean intermarriage and unions between white women and Korean men in the early 20th century); (2) Mixed-race persons born in the post-Liberation period who were not of American paternity, such as *lai daihan* born during the Vietnam conflict; (3) The so-called “Kosian” population whose explosion invigorated the growth of research into domestic South Korean policies towards mixed-race persons, but who, in this tripartite generational genealogy, are homogenized into a post-1982 mass that belies their own generational complexity. The NHRC’s generational categories thus offer a useful lens for concentrating on the particularities of Amerasian Korean experiences, but problematically

²⁵⁸ Kukka in'gwön wiwönhoe 국가인권위원회, “Kijich'on honhyöl'in in'gwön silt'ae chosa” 기지촌 혼혈인 인권 실태조사 (Human rights fact finding survey on mixed-race persons in camptowns), 2003: 7-15.

replicate the myth that post-Korean War race-mixing between American men and Korean women constitutes the original sin of degraded Korean racial purity.

Historical and contemporary counterevidence notwithstanding, the generation of “Amerasian” *honhyŏl’a* after 1945 was stubbornly perceived as a “new” population produced by the movement of foreign bodies into Korea. Although Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule with Japan’s defeat and the close of WWII, prior wartime arrangements by the Great Powers for the dispensation of Japanese colonies resulted in the division of the peninsula and the establishment of a Soviet military government in the north and of the U.S. Military Government (USMGIK) in the south.²⁵⁹ Under the direction of Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge, the USMGIK developed an unofficial system of regulated prostitution to serve the 72,000 men of the Twenty-Fourth Army Corps during the three-year period (1945-1948) of direct American rule in the southern half of Korea.²⁶⁰

When an independent South Korean government was established in 1948, President Syngman Rhee continued to uphold the U.S. military policies of suppressing unregulated military prostitution while screening women around U.S. bases for venereal diseases – criminalizing general prostitution but supporting it for American soldiers.²⁶¹ During the Korean War, the South Korean government adopted the institutional model of “comfort stations” used by Japan in WWII under the same rationale of protecting the virtue of respectable women and rewarding soldiers for their sacrifices. The difference was that these reincarnated comfort women

²⁵⁹ Bruce Cumings, *Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1-2* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981-1990).

²⁶⁰ Katharine H. S. Moon, *Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

²⁶¹ Na Young Lee, “The Construction of U.S. Camptown Prostitution in South Korea: Trans/formation and Resistance,” PhD diss., University of Maryland, College Park, 2006.

were now serving Allied and Korean forces.²⁶² Because the Korean War concluded in an armistice agreement, rather than a full peace, U.S. military forces remained stationed in Korea, resulting in the 1950s in the accelerated development of camptowns, or *kijich'on*, around American bases to cater to the entertainment and sexual wants of American soldiers. It was largely in these camptowns that the bulk of the first generation of Amerasian *honhyöl'a* was born, and from which the stigmatization of these children as not only racially but also morally impure derives.²⁶³ The stigma faced by the mothers of Amerasian *honhyöl'a* was simultaneously social and national in character. The inescapable correspondence between military prostitution and multiracialism in the Korean public consciousness inevitably smeared the mothers of *honhyöl'a* and *honhyöl'a* themselves with the taboo of the sex trade, further exacerbated by the shadow of race mixing.

As scholars like sociologist Lee Na-young and political scientist Katherine Moon have shown, the South Korean state was directly involved in the expansion of the military sex work industry, institutionalizing the trade into camptown zones in order to maximize and mobilize the state's relationship with the U.S. military towards developmental ends.²⁶⁴ Entertainment districts

²⁶² Moon, Seungsook. "Regulating Desire, Managing the Empire: U.S. Military Prostitution in South Korea, 1945-1970," in Maria Höhn and Seungsook Moon, eds., *Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010, 39-77.

²⁶³ On top of this, President Syngman Rhee's predication of the South Korean state and South Korean citizenship on a shared ethno-nationalist narrative added a state-based component to the perceived active and ontological transgressions of multiracial mothers and children respectively. Kim Iryöng 김일영, *Kön'guk kwa puguk: I Söngman, Pak Chöng-hüi sidae üi chaejomyöng* 건국과 부국: 이승만, 박정희 시대의 재조명 (*National foundation and national development: Reevaluating the Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee eras*) (Söul-si: Kip'arang, 2010).

²⁶⁴ President Syngman Rhee's administration hastily crafted "comfort stations" for UN forces during the Korean War. In the following two decades these temporary arrangements evolved into permanent entertainment districts that abutted American military bases, were strictly prohibited to Korean nationals, and under the jurisdictional control of the American Military Police, the State effectively created concentrated districts of prostitution catering exclusively to foreign forces. Lee Nayöng 이나영, "Kijich'on konggohwa kwajöng e kwanhan yön'gu, 1950-1960: kukka, söngbyöllhwa twöen minjokjuüi, yösöng üi chöhöng" 기지촌 공고화 과정에 관한 연구, 1950-1960: 국가, 성별화 된 민족주의, 여성의 저항 (Camptown consolidation, 1950-1960: the state, gendered nationalism, and

and the sex workers and “slinky boys” employed in them not only insured happier GIs (and by extension amicable diplomatic relations), but also created a steady flow of American cash into the war-ravaged South Korean economy.²⁶⁵ Despite their political expediency and economic necessity, however, camptown women were socially denigrated as a “national shame,” and certainly not fit female subjects for the responsibility of reproducing the nation.²⁶⁶ *Honhyŏl’a* born to such unfit reproductive subjects were therefore implicitly excluded from the national body. As a 1969 editorial in the daily newspaper *Maeil kyŏngje* described them, the mixed-blood products of camptown unions were “Fatherless waifs no different than the second-hand GI rags that they are raised in. They have no paternity, no lineage, and as the root of their mothers’ misfortune they have no future to look forward to.”²⁶⁷

The *honhyŏl’a* population increased rapidly following the Korean War.²⁶⁸ The census figures available indicate that *honhyŏl’a* numbers increased in proportion to local concentrations of U.S. troops.²⁶⁹ Kangwŏn province, for example, saw an abrupt rise in its *honhyŏl’a* population

women’s resistance), *Han’guk yŏsŏng-hak* 한국여성학 (*Korean women’s studies*), Vol. 23-4, 2007, 21-22; Katharine H.S. Moon, *Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

²⁶⁵ Katherine H.S. Moon, “Prostitute Bodies and Gendered States,” in *Dangerous Women: Gender and Korean Nationalism*, Elaine Kim, ed. (New York: Routledge, 1998).

²⁶⁶ Lee Imha 이임하, “Migun ūi tongasia chudun kwa seksyuŏllit’i” 미군의 동아시아 주둔과 섹슈얼리티 (Sexuality and the U.S. military in East Asia), *Tongasia wa kŏndae, yŏsŏng ūi palgyŏn* 동아시아와 근대, 여성의 발견 (*East Asia and modernity, women’s development*) (Ch’ŏngŏram media), 274.

²⁶⁷ “The appeal of dollars earned by comfort women,” *Maeil kyŏngje*, April 24, 1969.

²⁶⁸ While this augmentation certainly reflected an increase in U.S. force levels, a corresponding rise in prostitution activity, and the institutionalization of camptown entertainment districts around U.S. military bases, the annual rise in the number of *honhyŏl’a* births recorded was as much a factor of a higher rate of reporting as it was a reflection of an actual rise in population. The breadth and accuracy of census surveys during and immediately after the war reflect the general instability of the era. Particularly with regard to the *honhyŏl’a* population, which, like many marginalized phenomenon, were endemically under-reported, the addition of unreliable survey methods to a socially stigmatized caste skews the statistical record.

²⁶⁹ Census statistics between 1945-1960 in South Korea are, unfortunately, notoriously unreliable given the conditions of social, political, and economic upheaval in which they were conducted. That being said, in terms of

following the relocation of the 100 Corp U.S. Artillery Battalion from Japan in 1958.²⁷⁰ The over-determined relationship between U.S. military presence, camptown prostitution, *honhyŏl'a* resulted in the equation of biracialism with military prostitution in across social stereotypes, academic studies, and public policies.

The presence of a growing population of mixed-blood Koreans was particularly threatening in South Korea's early years because it undercut the Republic's claim that it, rather than North Korea, represent the "true" Korea – a presumption already compromised by its clientelist relationship with the U.S.²⁷¹ The new South Korean state was so invested in propounding a doctrine of Korean ethnic homogeneity that it wrote it into its name. In naming the new nation "Taehan Minguk," or "Nation of the Great Han People," state founders gestured to the anti-colonial myth that the Korean polity constitutes a line of unbroken racial purity stretching back to the legendary founder, Tangun.²⁷² President Syngman Rhee codified this ethos by institutionalizing the principle of "*ilmin chuŭi*," meaning a single nation composed by a single people, as a required component of the national education curriculum. By instilling a conviction in ethnic homogeneity in the first generation of South Korean citizens through the school system,

marginalized populations like *honhyŏl'a*, census figures tend to under report rather than over report, and therefore the increase reflected in existing figures was likely even greater in reality. Kim Aram 김아람, "1950-nyŏndae honhyŏl'in e taehan insik kwa haeye ipyang" 1950년대 혼혈인에 대한 인식과 해외입양 (1950s perceptions of mixed-blood Koreans and international adoption), *Yŏksa munje yŏn'gu* 역사문제연구 (*Studies of historical issues*) 22 (2009), 33-71.

²⁷⁰ Tak'yu inp'o 다큐인포, *Pukkŭrŏun migun munhwa tapsagi* 부끄러운 미군 문화 답사기 (*A survey of shameful U.S. military culture*) Pukijŭ, 2004, 219.

²⁷¹ Kim Iryŏng 김일영, *Kŏn'guk kwa puguk: I Sŭngman, Pak Chŏng-hŭi sidae ŭi chaejomyŏng* 건국과 부국: 이승만, 박정희 시대의 재조명 (*National foundation and national development: Reevaluating the Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee eras*) (Sŏul-si: Kip'arang, 2010).

²⁷² Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

Rhee sought to suppress divergent strains of political thought (communism) and eliminate anomalous forms of existence (biracialism).²⁷³

As demonstrated by scholars like Sabine Frühstück for Japan and Hyeweol Choi for Korea, the process of capitalist modernization has often legislated women's provision of reproductive services to the nation-state and regulated the terms of "desirable" and "progressive" motherhood as a consequence.²⁷⁴ In Rhee's educational policy, the bodies of women and children likewise became charged sites of national interest in the course of South Korea's post-1945 decolonization and pursuit of scientific modernization. Ideologues like blood donation advocate Kang Tŭkyong – who called on women particularly to give blood as an expression of national service – synonymized Korean children's bodies with the "future of the nation."²⁷⁵ The South Korean state was therefore compelled to monitor and not only regulate the health of Korean women, but also to weigh the relative worthiness of bodies charged with (re)producing the nation's future. South Korean mothers therefore became crucial incubators for the perpetuation of eugenics principles into the Cold War decades.

Inevitably, then, the evaluation of "*honhyŏl'a*" bodies became bound to the physical experiences and moral fiber of their mothers. In South Korea, where citizenship was conferred exclusively by patrilineal bloodline, a woman who compromised the purity of the familial – and

²⁷³ Lee Chul Soon 이철순, "Kodŭng hakkyo Han'guksa kyosa kyoyuk panghyang t'amsaek: Yi Sŭng-man ŭi Taehan min'guk kŏn'guk e taehan saeroun haesŏk" *고등학교 한국사 교사교육 방향 탐색: 이승만의 대한민국 건국에 대한 새로운 해석* (Directions for Korean History Teachers' Education: New Interpretation of Syngman Rhee's Founding of the Republic of Korea), *Kyosa kyoyuk yŏn'gu* 교사교육연구 (*Education studies*) 55, no. 4, 2016.

²⁷⁴ Sabine Frühstück, *Playing War: Children and the Paradoxes of Modern Militarism in Japan* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017); Hyaweol Choi, "'Wise Mother, Good Wife': A Transcultural Discursive Construct in Modern Korea," *Journal of Korean Studies* Vol. 14, No. 1 (Fall 2009), 1-33.

²⁷⁵ See Inga Kim Diederich, "A Beautiful Gift: Gendered Bloodshed and Blood Donation in South Korea's 1960 April Uprising," ICHSEA Presentation.

by extension national – bloodline by introducing foreign bloods was physically compromised by her engagement in interracial sex and morally compromised by her lack of patriotism.²⁷⁶

Socially, the offspring of such women carried the stigma of their mothers. As the number of *honhyŏl'a* births rose, accompanied by frequent incidents of infant abandonment, interracial relations and its biracial products came to the fore as a cause for national concern in the domestic public consciousness.

Contemporary press accounts traced the roots of what was called the “*honhyŏl'a* problem” to the postwar erosion in public order and devolution of female morality. *Honhyŏl'a* were described as the products of “female immorality (*yŏsŏng ūi pudodŏk*),” “social disorder and gender equality (*sahoe ūi mujilsŏhan chayu wa namnyŏ p'yŏngdŭnggwŏn*),” and of “the sinful indulgence of vanity and vice (*hŏyŏng kwa akdŏk ūi kyŏlkwa ro ōkulhan chŏe rŭl ssŭgo t'aeŏnanda*).”²⁷⁷ The abandonment of biracial infants and children, whether out of moral turpitude or dire poverty, also indicated the unfitness of their mothers to observers.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁶ Kim Ŭnkyŏng 김은경, “Han'guk chŏnjaeng hu chaegŏn yulli rosŏ ūi 'chŏnt'ongnon' kwa 'yŏsŏng'” 한국전쟁 후 재건 윤리로서의 ‘전통론’과 ‘여성’ (“Tradition” and “women” in ethical reconstruction after the Korean War), *Asia yŏsŏng yŏn'gu* 아시아여성연구 (*Studies of Asian women*) 45, no. 2, Sungmyŏng Women's College, Asian Women's Research Center, 2006.

²⁷⁷ “Norang mŏri – kŏmdung'i honhyŏl'a ūi pŏmnam” 노랑머리·검둥이 混血兒의汎濫 (The deluge of blonde and black *Honhyŏl'a*), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), September 1, 1947; “Hŏyŏng kwa akdŏk ūi kyŏlkwa, ōkulhan chŏe ssŭgo t'aeŏnanŭn honhyŏl'a” 허영과 악덕의 결과, 억울한 죄 쓰고 태어나는 혼혈아 (*Honhyŏl'a*, the result born of the sinful indulgence of vanity and vice), *Chosŏn ilbo* 조선일보 (*Chosŏn daily*), December 1, 1946.

²⁷⁸ *Taedong Sinmun* August 22, 1946, cited in Lee Imha 이임하, “Migun ūi tongasia chudun kwa seksyuŏllit'i” 미군의 동아시아 주둔과 섹슈얼리티 (Sexuality and the U.S. military in East Asia), *Tongasia wa kŭndae, yŏsŏng ūi palgyŏn* 동아시아와 근대, 여성의 발견 (*East Asia and modernity, women's development*) (Ch'ŏngŏram media), 274.



Figure 4.1. Cover of Kim Suntök's *Mommy, why am I the only black one?*

An excerpt from the autobiography of the black-Korean author Kim Suntök, entitled *Mommy, why am I the only black one?*, succinctly demonstrates the degree to which military prostitution and biracialism were bound in the public imagination, and how the myopic focus on moral degradation excluded any consideration that a *honhyöl'a* might signify an act of neocolonial violence, rather than constitute a threat to the moral and ethnic national fabric:

“Mother was forced to bear a seed planted by a criminal act: a respectable lady giving birth to a black bitch (*kömdung'i kyejip'ai*).

...

The children would greet her with curses. ‘*Yanggg kalbo! Ttongkalbo!* Western whore! Shit [black] whore!’”²⁷⁹

Although Kim’s mother had become pregnant after being raped by an American soldier, neighbors nonetheless regarded her as a “Western whore,” in keeping with the dominant *honhyöl'a* origin narrative. Kim’s story demonstrates the over-determined relationship between presumptions about sexuality and the discourse around *honhyöl'a* bodies – a discourse that deeply affected not only social debates but also scientific studies.

Defining “Mixed-Blood”: Scientific Studies and Surveys of Honhyöl’a Populations

The South Korean state agenda to present itself as a homogenous ethno-nation and pervasive anxieties about the moral breakdown of Korean society also incentivized medico-scientific research into blood mixing and mixed blood person out of prominent academic institutions. Beginning immediately after the Korean War ended in the mid-1950s and continuing in force through the end of Park Chung Hee’s regime in the late-1970s, sociological and biological surveys registered biometric data on *honhyöl'a* lineages, physiognomy, development,

²⁷⁹ Kim Suntök 김순덕, *Ömma, naman woe kömöyo* 엄마, 나만 왜 검어요 (*Mommy, why am I the only black one?*) (Chöngöhoe, 1965), 3, 23.

and environments.²⁸⁰ Such studies were supported indirectly by government funding via state-sponsored research institutes and their results informed policy making, particularly around the recognition of personhood in medical contexts and defining the legislative terms of national inclusion.²⁸¹ The unavailability of a stable category for *honhyöl'a* in the repertoire of socio-political constructs – similar to the way in which Judith Butler says that “the vacillation between categories” of trans bodies causes unease because “one cannot with surety read the body that one sees” when “one’s staid and usual cultural perceptions fail” – compelled the state to collaborate with scientific researchers to create a new racial category particular to the Korean context.²⁸²

Table 1. Materials

Age	0~1	1~2	2~3	3~4	4~5	5~6	6~7	7~8	8~9	9~10	Total
W×K	8	14	17	17	22	22	39	33	25	0	197
B×K	2	17	6	0	8	9	22	16	9	4	93

W×K=White-Korean, B×K=Negro-Korean

Figure 4.2. A list of the materials (human subjects) for Chang Chin-yo’s anthropometric studies.

Academic studies of *honhyöl'a* by biological and social sciences were generally premised on the novelty of blood mixing as a social phenomenon and of mixed-blood persons as a biological phenomenon in the Korean context. Although interracial relationships had also occurred in the colonial period – primarily between Japanese men and Korean women, and

²⁸⁰ The tapering off of biometric surveys of *honhyöl'a* in the late 1970s likely reflects a disruption in the close government-researcher relationships in tandem with Park’s 1979 assassination and the end of his regime. Pae, Ŭngyöng 배은경. “Han’guk sahoe ch’ulsan chojöl ũi yöksajök kwajöng kwa chendö: 1970-yöndae kkaji ũi kyönghöm ũl chungsim ũro” 한국 사회 출산 조절의 역사적 과정과 젠더: 1970 연대까지의 경험을 중심으로 (“A social history of Korean women’s birth control: 1950s-1970s”). PhD dissertation, Seoul National University, 2003.

²⁸¹ For historical records of the monetary ties between government and scientific agencies, see ROK National Human Rights Commission [Kukka in’gwön wiwönhoe], “Survey on the actual human rights conditions of *honhyöl'in* in camptowns [Kijich’on *honhyöl'in* in’gwön silt’ae chosa],” Söul-si: 2003; Chaewoe tongp’o chaedan, “Survey of the actual conditions of Korean *honhyöl'in* living in the United States [Miguk köju han’gukgye *honhyöl'in* silt’ae chosa],” Söul-si, 2007.

²⁸² Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1999), xxii-xxiii.

occasionally between Korean men and western women missionaries²⁸³ – these postwar studies invariably cited the “rising number of *honhyöl’a* since the Korean War” as statistically significant.²⁸⁴ Seoul National University (SNU) physical anthropologist Chang Chinyo’s introduction to his physiognomic study comparing Koreans to “white and black hybrids” was characteristic of the genre. Chang explained, “The material development brought about by our alliance [with the U.S.] has also given rise to the mixing of bloods between separate nations ... In Korea, mixed-blood children have been on the rise since the end of the Second World War and increased in number rapidly since the Korean War.”²⁸⁵

In addition to their novelty, the new mixed-blood populations also demanded academic study to determine their potential, whether to undermine or improve “pure blood” Korean stock. Chang’s introduction, for example, not only noted the rising numbers of mixed-blood children, but also noted that this increase was “creating all kinds of social problems.”²⁸⁶ Likewise, SNU pathologist Yu Yangsök opened his “Study on the Dental Arch Growth of Koreans Compared to White and Black Mixed Bloods” by cautioning readers, “Although the pro-freedom forces safeguarded South Korea in the Korean War, their presence on the peninsula has also led to the first historical instance of mixed-blood children produced from unions between Korean women with white or black men. The rising number of these historical anomalies is cause for alarm.”²⁸⁷

²⁸³ The first president of South Korea, Syngman Rhee, was famously married to an Austrian woman. Takashi Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans During World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

²⁸⁴ Chang Chin-yo, “An Investigation into the Physical Anthropology of Koreans as Compared to White and Black Mixed Bloods,” *Seoul Medical Journal* Vol. 2, Iss. 1 (1962): 63.

²⁸⁵ Chang Chin-yo, “An Investigation into the Physical Anthropology of Koreans as Compared to White and Black Mixed Bloods,” *Seoul Medical Journal* Vol. 2, Iss. 1 (1962): 63.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁷ Yu Yangsök, “Study on the Dental Arch Growth of Koreans as Compared to White and Black Mixed Bloods,” PhD diss., Seoul National University, 1966.

The justifications for research into *honhyöl'a* offered by Chang, Yu, and their academic peers demonstrate how deeply the scientific interest in and production of knowledge about *honhyöl'a* was embedded in the paradoxical politics of nationalist modernity in South Korea.²⁸⁸ Just as Korea's pre-1945 experience of modernity was conditioned by its colonization, so too was its post-1945 pursuit of development in a state of constant tension with a nationalism that sought to both preserve tradition and achieve progress.²⁸⁹ Scientific researchers like Chang and Yu expressed this tension by approaching the national problem posed by *honhyöl'a* from the putatively detached standpoint of modern science. That is, they sought out a scientific solution to a socially constructed problem.²⁹⁰

In the process of pursuing empirical scientific certitude, these medico-scientific studies of *honhyöl'a* developed a consistent methodological formula intended to ensure objectivity and consistency. In order to ascertain the generalizable characteristics of *honhyöl'a* bodies, researchers first defined the parameters of their research subject (i.e., who fell into the category of "*honhyöl'a*"), then collected a corresponding population and tested and surveyed it to collect statistical data that could be reduced to an average qualification characterizing the group as a whole. In establishing their preliminary definitions of "*honhyöl'a*," the majority of institutional

²⁸⁸ Hyung-A Kim, "State Building: The Military Junta's Path to Modernity through Administrative Reforms," in *The Park Chung Hee Era*, ed. Byung-kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 85-112.

²⁸⁹ Tani Barlow's collection set the foundation for analyses of "colonial modernity" in East Asia, while Gi-wook Shin and Michael Robinson's edited volume focused specifically on expressions of colonial modernity in Korean history. Tani E. Barlow, ed., *Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999).

²⁹⁰ For a comparative history on scientific approaches to socially constructed problems like race in the American context, see Nancy Ordovery, *American Eugenics: Race, Queer Anatomy, and the Science of Nationalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).

surveys confined their scope to “mixed-blood” persons of Korean and white or black parentage.²⁹¹ Occasionally “yellow *honhyöl’a*” was included as a third category, indicating a Korean mother and a father with another Asian origin.²⁹²

Because Korean researchers were less interested in accurately representing a diverse or accurate racial spectrum than they were in creating “*honhyöl’a*” as a new racial category in the Korean context, “white” and “black” remained homogenous and un-interrogated constructs in their studies.²⁹³ A corresponding homogenized category of “Asian” was also sometimes included to explain race-specific physical characteristics like Mongolian spots. For the most part, however, studies of *honhyöl’a* tended to specify “Korean” rather than Asian, revealing that the research was driven less by an interest in race generally, and more by the pressing political need to delimit the category of “Korean” and create a Korea-specific racial category for *honhyöl’a*.²⁹⁴

Some studies further limited their research focus, concentrating exclusively on *honhyöl’a* of white American paternity. The most well-known instance of this is serologist Yi Samyöl’s blood-type survey of Koreans, Korean women pregnant by white men, and *honhyöl’a*

²⁹¹ “Institutional” here refers to studies conducted through elite academic institutions with direct ties to government policymakers, such as SNU and Yonsei University.

²⁹² As of this writing, none of the scientific studies of *honhyöl’a* that I have so far identified specifically names *laiddaihan honhyöl’a*, meaning children of Korean-Vietnamese parentage born as a result of South Korea’s significant involvement in the Vietnam War. Future study is necessary to evaluate the hypothesis that these children were overlooked in domestic studies because few of them left Vietnam and had Korean fathers and Vietnamese mothers. This population’s physical removal therefore was likely less of an immediate threat to the sense of biological Korean nationhood, and also reaffirmed rather than undermined Korean masculinity via what Jin-Kyung Lee calls South Korean “sub-imperialism” in South-east Asia. Jin-kyung Lee, *Service Economies: Militarism, Sex Work, and Migrant Labor in South Korea* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).

²⁹³ By contrast, contemporaneous race-based studies by American researchers indicated “scientism” by dividing the category of “white” into sub-sections of “Anglo-saxons, Irish, Italians, and Jews.” Ordover, 2003: 87.

²⁹⁴ For example, in his explanation of the emergence of Mongolian spots among children with Korean-white and Korean-black parentage, Chang Chinyo wrote, “The Mongolian spot appears among Asians at a rate of nearly 100%, while among whites (North Americans) it is only 0.3%.” However, the study then went on to compare the rates of Mongolian spot expression between “Korean-white and Korean-black hybrids, and Japanese-white and Japanese-black hybrids.” Chang, 1962: 77.

children.²⁹⁵ Yi's reason for limiting his study to "white hybrids" stands out from standard ethno-nationalist concerns in scientific research because he saw white-Korean mixes as a potential way for Koreans to become "whiter" as a nation, and thereby ascend the evolutionary racial ladder.²⁹⁶ The flip side to Yi's singular conviction in a specific form of hybrid vigor, however, was his equally ingrained belief in the perils of hybrid degeneration, for which reason he excluded non-white "blood mixes" from his study.²⁹⁷

Researchers segregated their survey populations into these absolute categories, and divided the biometric data they collected by Korean, white, black, white-*honhyŏl'a*, and black-*honhyŏl'a* to produce definitive averages that homogenized the characteristics of each group. Surveys collected data on a wide range of physiognomic and biological characteristics, including skin pigmentation, anatomy and physiognomy, blood type, unique physical markers associated with race like Mongolian spots or epicanthic eyelid folds, growth and maturation rate, environmental conditions, and psychology.²⁹⁸ There seemed to be no limit to physical

²⁹⁵ Another example of a study limited to white fathers examined the dental crowns of "Korean-American hybrids" and limited the paternal line to white-Americans. Yu Yank-sŏk, "Investigation into the dental crowns of Koreans versus Korean-American hybrids," PhD diss, Seoul National University Department of Anatomy, 1966.

²⁹⁶ Jaehwan Hyun, *The Making of A Genetic Nation: Human Heredity, National Identity, and Transnational Scientific Exchange in South Korea, 1926-2009* [*Yujŏnjŏk minjok mandŭlgi: han'guk ūi illyu yujŏn yŏn'gu, minjok chŏngch'esŏng, kŭrigo ch'ogukjŏk kwahak kyoryu, 1926-2009*], PhD diss., Seoul National University 2018, 70.

²⁹⁷ Peggy Pascoe analyzes the concepts "hybrid vigor" and "hybrid degeneration" in discourse about miscegenation in U.S. history, while Emma studies their appearance specifically in relation to "Eurasian" populations. Peggy Pascoe, *What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Emma Jinhua Teng, *Eurasian: Mixed Identities in the United States, China, and Hong Kong, 1842-1943* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).

²⁹⁸ Pigmentation samples were drawn from the medial forehead, suprasternal notch, medial superior, hair, iris, teeth, interdentium; physiognomic measurements were taken for hair type, fingerprints, standing and seated height, length of arms and legs, chest cavity depth, pelvic width, cranial measurements, weight, etc.; measures of environmental conditions included place of residence, parents' education level, mother's age at time of birth, relationship between parents, living standards, etc.; and psychological evaluations considered mental stability, personality, sexual maturation, etc. Pak, Chŏng-hyŏng 박정형. "Injongjŏk 't'aja'rosŏ ūi honhyŏl'in mandŭlgi: 1950-nyŏndae ~ 1970-nyŏndae Han'guk ūi ūihakjisik saengsanmul ūl chungsim ūro." 인종적 타자로서의 혼혈인 만들기: 1950년대~1970년대 한국의 의학지식 생산물을 중심으로 ("Making Racially Other Mixed Blood People: Focusing on the Products of Korean Medical Knowledge, 1950s-1970s"). MA thesis, Chungang University 2012.

characteristics that could be quantified to ascertain the degree of difference between racial populations.

Table 6. The frequency of problem indices according to body parts

		C-G N=285	O-G N=90	H-G N=103	Groups compared					
					C-G x^2	vs P	O-G x^2	vs P	H-G x^2	vs P
head	뿔시큰머리 頭髮強調	41(14.4) 59(20.7)	43(47.8) 45(50.0)	41(39.8) 58(56.3)	43.875	P<0.01	29.330	P<0.01	—	—
					—	—	3.831	P<0.05	—	—
face	輪廓不分明	11(3.9)	10(11.1)	14(13.6)	6.858	P<0.01	61.888	P<0.01	—	—
	노려보는印象	23(8.1)	8(8.9)	17(16.5)	—	—	5.821	P<0.02	—	—
	凶한表情	30(10.5)	14(15.6)	24(23.3)	—	—	10.306	P<0.01	—	—
	특히強調	3(1.1)	9(10.0)	12(11.7)	17.682	P<0.01	—	—	—	—
eye	強調한눈	107(37.6)	28(31.1)	61(59.2)	—	—	14.483	P<0.01	15.276	P<0.01
	큰눈	70(24.6)	29(32.2)	57(55.3)	—	—	32.552	P<0.01	10.391	P<0.01
	瞳子の省略	93(32.6)	39(43.3)	22(21.4)	—	—	—	—	10.735	P<0.01
	瞳子の強調	110(38.6)	36(40.0)	58(56.3)	—	—	9.670	P<0.01	5.059	P<0.05
	男像에속눈섭	72(25.3)	39(43.3)	20(19.4)	10.728	P<0.01	—	—	12.941	P<0.01
nose	크게強調	21(7.4)	34(37.8)	24(23.3)	50.542	P<0.01	18.731	P<0.01	4.787	P<0.05
mouth	큰입	25(8.8)	20(22.2)	30(29.1)	11.718	P<0.01	25.766	P<0.01	—	—
	입술의強調	30(10.5)	10(11.1)	23(22.3)	—	—	8.612	P<0.01	4.269	P<0.05
	單純화된입	126(44.2)	54(60.0)	44(42.7)	6.832	P<0.01	—	—	5.739	P<0.02

Figure 4.3. A data table of anthropometric measurements in the second volume of Chang Chin-yo's study.

Demonstrating the next step of averaging population characteristics, physiognomist Nam Kit'aek found, based on his investigation of the interdental palette tone of 844 Koreans, 186 “white-honhyöl'a” and 119 “black-honhyöl'a” between 7-12 years of age, that, “The interdental palette of Koreans and white mixed-bloods is red toned in the preponderance, while that of black mixed-bloods is dark red in preponderance, with almost no difference based on age or sex.”²⁹⁹ Likewise, Chang Chinyo also employed the averaging approach in his biometric survey of 128 “white-honhyöl'a” and 73 “black-honhyöl'a” in order to announce the preponderant physical

²⁹⁹ Nam Ki-t'aek 남기택. “Han'guk'in honhyöl'a e issö ch'igan saekjo e kwanhan yön'gu” 한국인 혼혈아에 있어 치간 색조에 관한 연구 [“A study into the interdental palette tone of Koreans and mixed-bloods”] *Chungang üihak* 중앙의학 [Central Medicine] 10, no. 6 (1966), 724.

characteristics of each population.³⁰⁰ Although “Korean” consistently occupied the control group position, the baseline averages for this group differed from study to study. For example, Chang Chinyo’s 1962 serological survey stated that the majority of Koreans had an O blood-type while AB blood-types were rare, while Yi Sam-yŏl’s 1972 survey concluded that the majority of Koreans were B or AB blood-types.³⁰¹

Such studious efforts to surveil and define various racial groups in order to construct a racial system suited to the socio-political demands of South Korea’s postcolonial developmental modernity expressed the heady appeal of the sciences as means of reconstructing politically expedient realities. *Honhyŏl’a* evaded the racial categories made available by Korea’s exposure to colonial racial doctrines or Cold War racial systems, and the collection of quantitative and averaged population data offered a compellingly “objective” means to create a category within which the threat of “mixed blood” could be confined. The South Korean study of racial physiognomy repeats in the Cold War context the “allure of numbers,” as Stephen Gould describes nineteenth-century Western scientists “faith that rigorous measurement could guarantee irrefutable precision, and might mark the transition between subjective speculation and a true science as worthy as Newtonian physics.”³⁰² By measuring *honhyŏl’a* bodies and bloods, state-backed South Korean scientists sought to transform the specter of “mixed blood” from a

³⁰⁰ Chang, 1962.

³⁰¹ Chang, 1962; Yi Sam-yŏl, “Caucasian kwaŭi honhyŏl’i han’guk’in ŭi hyŏlaekhyŏng yŏn’gu e kkich’inŭn munjejŏm” Caucasian 과의 혼혈이 한국인의 혈액형 연구에 까치는 문제점 [“Problematic points derived from the study of blood-types between Koreans and Korean-Caucasian hybrids”]. *Taehan hyŏlaekkhakhoe chapji* 대한혈액학회잡지 [*Journal of Korean Serology*] 10, no. 1 (1972).

³⁰² Stephen Jay Gould, *Mismeasure of Man* (New York: Norton, 1981), 73-74.

threat to the integrity of the category “Korean” into a recognizable “[category] of identity that...juridical structures engender, naturalize, and immobilize.”³⁰³

While the scientific knowledge about *honhyŏl’a* was produced for contingent Korean circumstances, however, it nonetheless evinced South Korean researchers’ unique amalgamation of Japanese and Western racial theories with modern medico-scientific processes and technologies.³⁰⁴ The majority of Korean scholars engaged in the scientific study of *honhyŏl’a* had been directly or indirectly influenced by the intellectual dominance of Japanese physical anthropologists like Furuhata Tanemoto – the foremost advocate of a colonial “bio-chemical race index” based on blood-type distribution – during their formative educational years.³⁰⁵ The persistent influence of Furuhata and his ilk can be seen particularly in blood-type surveys, such as that conducted by Yi Samyŏl, and phrenological examinations.

While phrenology fell out of favor in the west after WWII, South Korean Cold War phrenologists continued to carefully measure Korean and *honhyŏl’a* skulls to reveal the relative intellectual capacity and evolutionary position of each group.³⁰⁶ Elite scientists like Rha Sejin drew on phrenology to confidently announce to *Kyŏngnyang Sinmun* in a 1969 interview that, “Our country, with three exceptions, is the foremost global center for the cranial sciences...through which we have determined that Koreans have the fifth greatest intellectual

³⁰³ Butler, 1999: 8.

³⁰⁴ John P. DiMoia, *Reconstructing Bodies: Biomedicine, Health, and Nation-Building in South Korea since 1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 72-108.

³⁰⁵ Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Debating Racial Science in Wartime Japan,” *Osiris* 13: 354-75; Hyun Jaehwan.

³⁰⁶ For a review of the technology of phrenology in the west, see Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 293.

capacity of any peoples, behind Americans, British, Germans, and Chinese nationals.”³⁰⁷ Chang Chinyo’s 1962 study also asserted Korean racial superiority based on the relatively undiluted heritability of Korean cranial characteristics. He stated that, “Although the cranial form of Malaysian and Chinese hybrids is superior in the first generation, it frequently deteriorates into a state of dolichocephaly in the second generation. By contrast, the superior Korean cranial characteristics of brachycephalie and hyperbrachycephalie can also be seen in Korean hybrids, albeit somewhat degraded – more so in black hybrids than in white hybrids.”³⁰⁸

Paradoxically, colonial practices like phrenology persisted side by side with the effort by many *honhyŏl’a* researchers to definitively overturn the colonial racial order, which had both denigrated Korean racial qualities and erased Korean distinctiveness through the doctrine of *naissen ittai*.³⁰⁹ Yi Samyŏl’s blood type survey, for example, was motivated by his desire to establish the independence of the Korean people as a race and the autonomous pursuit of sciences suited to Korea’s locally conditioned needs.³¹⁰ *Honhyŏl’a* were indispensable to the endeavors of scientific researchers like Rha and Yi because they provided a perfect foil for the

³⁰⁷ “Interview with Rha Sejin, two-time winner of the presidential award for scientific technology,” *Kyŏngnyang sinmun* April 19, 1969.

³⁰⁸ Chang, 1962.

³⁰⁹ Hyung Il Pai has convincingly demonstrated that the scientific practice and academic institutions of archaeology in Korea similarly inverted colonial Japanese practices to anti-colonial nationalist ends. Hyung Il Pai, *Constructing “Korean” Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000).

³¹⁰ Jaehwan Hyun 현재환, “Yujŏnjŏk minjok mandŭlgi: Han’guk ūi illyu yujŏn yŏn’gu, minjok chŏngch’esŏng, kŭriigo ch’ogukjŏk kwahak kyoryu, 1926-2009” 유전적 민족 만들기: 한국의 인류 유전 연구, 민족 정체성, 그리고 초국적 과학 교류, 1926-2009 (“The making of a genetic nation: human heredity, national identity, and transnational scientific exchange in South Korea, 1926-2009”). PhD diss., Seoul National University, 2018; Kim, Ki-hong 김기홍, “Han’guk imsangbyŏngnihak ūi ch’och’anggi” 한국 임상병리학의 초창기 (The early stage of clinical pathology in Korea), *Taehan imsangbyŏngni hak’oeji* 대한임상병리학회지 (Journal of the Korean Clinical Pathology Society) 1, no. 1 (1981), 5-9.

nation-making project. In defining *honhyŏl'a*, scientific researchers contributed to making a modern, science-backed definition of “Korean.”

Public Policing of Mixed-Bloods: Medical Monitoring and Legal Regulations of *Honhyŏl'a*

Where did institutional researchers acquire the broad pool required for the population mapping projects that were so central to the South Korean project of nation-formation? Ironically, the institutions created to provide medical support and attend to the social welfare of *honhyŏl'a* were also the foremost providers of bodies for testing and sampling by researchers. Welfare providers like hospitals, orphanages, and adoption agencies, public schools and charitable educational programs intended specifically for *honhyŏl'a*, and penal institutes like juvenile detention centers provided researchers with access to their charges in the name of “scientific knowledge production” and with the expectation that the research results would validate and promote their existence.³¹¹ In his survey on the average physiognomic features of white-*honhyŏl'a* compared to Koreans, Chang Chinyo amassed a specimen pool from various orphanages, schools, and hospitals. In order to properly map the “*honhyŏl'a* scattered around Seoul,” he surveyed “197 Korean and white *honhyŏl'a* (110 boys, 87 girls)” from “Ch’unghyŏn Orphanage, Sŏngyuk Orphanage, Holt Adoption Agency, *honhyŏl'a* enrolled at Yŏnhapsŏngja Academy, and *honhyŏl'a* who visited the dermatology department and Catholic University Hospital.”³¹² A more wide-ranging study conducted by Nam Kit’aek, conducted over several

³¹¹ Because they were denied citizenship, many *honhyŏl'a* were denied access to public education. Charitable organizations therefore set up small “academies” to provide rudimentary education to *honhyŏl'a*. Kang Chiyŏng 강지영, “Han’guk’in ūi ūisik kwa *honhyŏl'in* ūi salm ūi yŏn’gwansŏng e kwanhan yŏn’gu” 한국인의 의식과 혼혈인의 삶의 연광성에 관한 연구 (“Investigating the connection between *honhyŏl'in* lives and the concept of “Koreanness”), (MA thesis, Sŏgang University Department of Journalism, 2007).

³¹² Chang Chinyo, 1962: 63

years, drew its biometric data from “844 Koreans (425 boys, 419 girls), 186 Korean and white *honhyöl’a* (96 boys, 90 girls) and 119 Korean and black *honhyöl’a* (60 boys, 59 girls)” who were variously “registered at Ch’unghyön Orphanage, Holt Adoption Agency, Yöngghwa Elementary School, and It’aewön Elementary School.”³¹³

These studies not only took into account the biometric data from individual *honhyöl’a*, but also drew connections between their conditions (familial and institutional) and patterns in their development – particularly with regards to psychological stability and sexual deviance. In particular, the popular association between *honhyöl’a* and camptown sex work informed researchers’ interest in evaluating the fitness of their Korean mothers, and created a concern about hyper-sexuality in *honhyöl’a* as a result of genetic predisposition and environmental conditions. A “social medical” survey of *honhyöl’a* conducted by the public health policy advisor Lee Chöngghwan therefore drew a direct connection between the subjects of his study and camptown women, announcing, “This study considers the pervasive social problem of female prostitution alongside the problem of *honhyöl’a*, and draws its insights from the relationship between the two problems.”³¹⁴

³¹³ Söngyuk Orphanage was established in 1949 to accommodate the “war orphans” produced by World War II and later the Korean War, Ch’unghyön Orphanage was established in 1952 as an institution for war orphans, and Holt Adoption Agency was a 1960s adoption agency. Kim Aram, 2009: 53.

³¹⁴ Lee Chöngghwan, “A Social Medical Survey of *honhyöl’a*,” PhD diss. in Environmental Sanitation, Seoul National University, Department of Public Health, 1963.



Figure 4.4. Children in a mixed blood orphanage. Photographer Joo Myung Duck, 1965.

The assumption that *honhyŏl'a*'s mothers were uniformly sex workers – and the moral judgments that inevitably accompanied such assumptions – deeply impacted the methodology, execution, and conclusions reached by medical and social scientific studies of *honhyŏl'a*.

Researchers tended to presume a standard pattern of parentage, in which the father was presumed to be foreign while the mother was assumed to be a Korean sex worker. Typical socio-medical surveys of *honhyŏl'a*'s family, environment, and parentage recorded the father's nationality, education level, and occupation, but only noted the mother's level of education.³¹⁵ One representative example of such a study also evinces the prevailing concern with what Charles R. Kim describes as “wholesome modernity” in Cold War South Korea, describing transitory

³¹⁵ Ibid., 4.

honhyöl'a family cohabitation (23.6% of respondents reported that parents cohabitated for 3-6 months, while only 3% reported cohabitation lasting over one year) negatively in comparison to “normal” long-term family living arrangements.³¹⁶

Many socio-medical surveys argued that the presumptive camptown conditions and compromised genetic lineage of *honhyöl'a* was manifested psychological conditions, particularly regarding sexuality. According to neuro-psychiatrist Pak Not'aek's study on the physical ideations expressed in drawings by *honhyöl'a*, the childhood experience of “abnormal” environments predisposed *honhyöl'a* to deviant and threatening hyper-sexuality. Pak asked Korean orphans and *honhyöl'a* (due to the high rate of abandonment of *honhyöl'a*, many filled both categories) to draw human bodies, and concluded that the resulting sketches conclusively demonstrated “premature sexualization and an excessive interest in sexual matters” by the respondents, based on which he advised “that measures be taken to account for and curb this truly overwhelming sexual proclivity in a minority population.”³¹⁷ The presumptions about parentage underlying Lee's study and the conclusions about hyper-sexuality drawn by Pak are both embedded in social judgments about camptown women and the interracial militarized sex work industry.

While debates over the relative desirability of certain children and the suitability of certain mothers are not inherently eugenicist, the biological tenor and vocal participation in South Korea's Cold War policy debates around family planning and population control by scientists trained by Japanese eugenicists cannot be discounted. A case in point is Rha Sejin's

³¹⁶ Ibid.; Charles R. Kim, *Youth for Nation: Culture and Protest in Cold War South Korea* (Honolulu, Hawai'i: University of Hawai'i Press, 2017).

³¹⁷ Pak No-T'aek, “A Study Into the Physical Ideations of *honhyöl'a* and Orphans as Seen Through Their Drawings,” PhD diss., Wusök University, Department of Medicine and Neuropsychiatry, 1969.

vociferous criticism of the Park Chung Hee administration's family planning campaign (roughly 1961-mid-1970s) on the grounds that "it will deplete the number of worthwhile people and enlarge the number of worthless people."³¹⁸ In a 1972 interview with *Kyŏnghyang Sinmun*, Rha, trained in colonial Japanese physical anthropology at Kyŏngsŏng Imperial University and later in American biomedicine through the Minnesota Project and then serving as the dean of SNU Medical College, warned that Park's family planning campaign threatened to "limit the offspring of families with economic means and good genetic stock."³¹⁹ Echoing the socio-medical studies conducted by Lee and Pak at SNU under his purview, he asked "what kind of children," "what kind of child-rearing environment," and "what kind of mothers" were really most in the interest of the nation.³²⁰

Mobilizing their academic studies for policymaking in the interests of optimizing the nation, scientific researchers therefore prescribed a set of protocols to identify and exclude *honhyŏl'a* from the "pure blood" national body. "Passing" posed a particular concern.³²¹ Millions of families had been displaced and separated during de-colonization and the Korean War, and the peninsula was consequently awash with children and teenagers unidentifiable by the usual family

³¹⁸ John P. Dimoia's investigation of the family planning effort in South Korea, which he asserts are more properly viewed as a series of campaigns than a single drive, argues that although the intensification of these programs roughly coincided with the consolidation of Park Chung Hee's political power (mid-1960s – mid-1970s), family planning was also a major part of "a broader campaign of rural revitalization" that spanned through the mid-1980s. John P. DiMoia, *Reconstructing Bodies: Biomedicine, Health, and Nation-Building in South Korea Since 1945* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2014).

³¹⁹ Jaehwan Hyun, "'Chibangch'a' wa 'korip'han mendel chipdan': tu 'chungsimbu' kwahak kwa Na Sejin ūi honjongjŏk ch'eji illyuhak, 1932-1964 [Sejin Rha's Hybrid Physical Anthropology Between Two 'Metropolitan' Sciences, 1932-1964]," *Han'guk kwahaksahak hoeji* Vol. 37, no. 1 (2015): 347.

³²⁰ *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, January 15, 1972.

³²¹ On social anxieties around "passing" as a phenomenon in the history of race-relations in the United States, see Peggy Pascoe, *What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

networks.³²² Fearing that some abandoned *honhyŏl'a* might take advantage of this chaos to pass themselves off as a “normal Korean,” researchers re-purposed the averages of their data towards identification purposes for the public good.³²³

In their policy recommendations, researchers replicated the procedures they had used in the course of their studies to pigeon-hole subjects of uncertain parentage and ambiguous racial identity – protocols that simply reinforced pre-existing racial stereotypes. Race-specific markers like Mongolian spots were advocated as a means of distinguishing the blood purity of infants. In his study on the appearance and disappearance of Mongolian spots, Chang Chinyo opined, “Mongolian spots appear at a higher rate in Korean-white and Korean-black hybrids than they do in white or black populations, therefore I believe that an examination for Mongolian spots will be helpful in determining whether or not dispossessed children (*kia* – meaning orphans or those separated from their families) are or are not blood-hybrids.”³²⁴ There were limits to the utility of the Mongolian spot as a definitive race marker, however. According to Chang’s study, the existence of a Mongolian spot did not uniformly accord with absolute racial categories, since they “appear in hybrids at a conspicuously higher frequency than the 0.3% rate at which they appear among whites (North Americans).”³²⁵ Moreover, Mongolian spots fade quickly and few children past the age of five retain them. Consequently, other markers were necessary to police racial boundaries in older children, teens, and adults.

³²² John P. DiMoia, *Reconstructing Bodies: Biomedicine, Health, and Nation-Building in South Korea Since 1945* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2014).

³²³ Chang, 1962.

³²⁴ Chang, 1962: 72.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

Skin color and hair type offered alternate methods of identifying race past the age of five. Several researchers developed a scale categorizing the degree of hair curl in *honhyöl'a* and Koreans for identification purposes.³²⁶ Hair type was sorted along a scale of 1 to 9, with the upper-end of the scale indicating extreme curliness. 1 and 2 were straight hair, 3-5 were wavy (like waves), 6 was spirals (like a whirlpool), and 7-9 were corkscrews (like the tight turns on a conch shell).³²⁷ According to Chang's survey, Koreans (88.9%) fell into categories 1 and 2 with straight hair, 63.4% of Korean-white *honhyöl'a* fell into categories 3-5 with wavy hair and 35.6% fell into categories 1-2 with straight hair, while by contrast 45.1% of Korean-black *honhyöl'a* fell into categories 3-5 with wavy hair and 45.2% fell into categories 6 or 7 with spiraled or corkscrewed hair.³²⁸

These measures to sort racially ambiguous persons to forestall the danger of “non-Koreans” passing into the pure-blood national body filtered into obstetric medical practice and legal documentation as well. Those who were registered as *honhyöl'a* at birth were documented on medical intake forms as “disabled,” a reflection in part of medical pathologization based on scientific studies such as those discussed above.³²⁹ Such scientific protocols for identification and medical pathologizations also directly informed the development of a set of legal exclusions

³²⁶ Categorizing racially ambiguous persons according to scientized measures of hair curl was also common practice in apartheid South Africa with the infamous “pencil test.” Birgit Brander Rasmussen, ed., *The Making and Unmaking of Whiteness* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).

³²⁷ Ch'oe Tongryul, “A study on the Racial Anatomy of Korean-American mixed-blood children [Han-mi honhyöl adong üi kwanhan injong haebuhakjök yön'gu],” *Hyöndaë üihak* Vol. 6, No. 2 (1967).

³²⁸ Chang, 1962.

³²⁹ Yuri Doolan, “Being Amerasian in South Korea: Purebloodness, Multiculturalism, and Living Alongside the U.S. Military Empire,” BA Thesis, The Ohio State University, 2012.

that concretized the social marginalization of *honhyöl'a* from the ethno-national community by also denying them state citizenship.³³⁰

The Nationality Law of 1948 legally codified the principle of patrilineal descent, limiting South Korean citizenship to individuals born to Korean men. It limited citizenship to individuals who met the following qualifications: In cases of clear paternity, having fathers who were South Korean citizens, or if deceased had been citizens at the time of their death; in cases of uncertain paternity or in which the father lacked citizenship, having a mother with ROK citizenship; and in cases of uncertain parentage or in which both parents lacked citizenship, a child born on Korean land.³³¹ For *honhyöl'a* born of Korean women and American servicemen, disconnected from the patrilineal bloodline, the Family Law gave legal form to the informal social exclusion by which the principle of Korean ethnic homogeneity had previously been enacted.³³² The law effectively rendered all Amerasians born before 1998 stateless nonpersons with no legal or social standing in Korea, and ineligible for US citizenship if unclaimed by father. It acted as an impetus for mothers to give children up for adoption, to place children in a country with legal rights denied

³³⁰ Eunjung Kim discusses the Eugenics Law of 1974 as another example of such legal exclusions. Eunjung Kim, *Curative Violence: Rehabilitating Disability, Gender, and Sexuality in Modern Korea* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017).

³³¹ Kukka põmnyõng chõngbo sent'õ [National Center for Legal Information] (<http://www.law.go.kr>), Kukkabõp (Law No. 16, December 20, 1948), Article 2.

³³² Sõk Tong-hyõn, "Kukjõkbõp ùi kaejõng panghyang [Revisions in the citizenship law]," *Sõul kukjebõp yõn'gu [Seoul International Law Studies]* Volume 4, Number 2, Seoul International Law Center, 1997, 4-5; Lee Chang-hũi, "Han'guk kukjõkbõp ùi kukjebõpjõk kõmt'o wa kaejõng panghyang [Revisions and international legal study of the Korean citizenship law]," *Oebõp nonjip* Volume 5, Han'guk oegukõ taehakyyo oegukhak chonghap yõn'gu sent'õ põphak yõn'guso, 1998, 9; Lee Ch'õl-u, "Kukjõk kwa chongjoksõng e ùihan chipdanjõk cha'a wa t'aja ùi kubyõl [Citizenship, communal identity, and discrimination]," *Sahoe iron* Volume 23, Han'guk sahoe iron hakhoe, 2003, 15; Kim Hyõn-sõn, "Kungmin, pankungmin, pikungmin: han'guk kungmin hyõnsõng ùi wõlli wa kwajõng [Citizen, half-citizen, non-citizen: the origins and development of Korean citizenship]," *Sahoe yõn'gu* Volume 12, Han'guk sahoe chosa yõn'guso, 2006, 85-86.

them in Korea; also encouraged abandonment. Nationality law grants automatic citizenship to any child found abandoned in South Korean territory (Art.2.1).³³³

The most reliable way to circumvent these obstacles to full citizenship was for the mother of a Amerasian child to persuade the Korean head of family to add the child to the maternal family register, under the mother's family name. Due to the dual social and state stigmatization of *honhyŏl'a*, however, the vast majority were denied access to even this backdoor route to state recognition. A 1959 survey 1,020 of *honhyŏl'a* in police custody counted only 325 with citizen identification cards, prompting a *Chosŏn Ilbo* reporter to estimate that at least 67.6% of the overall *honhyŏl'a* population was likely without citizenship.³³⁴ In many cases, even a rudimentary public education was accessible only through the temporary loan of the credentials of a *honhyŏl'a* child's maternal line.³³⁵ The "making" of *honhyŏl'a* as a legible racial category for scientific study, medical treatment, and legal processing thus worked to sanitize a threat to the Korean body politic and bolster the insular boundaries of the Korean ethno-nation.

Conclusion

Why all these questions?

We don't like that. Why should we always be victims of all this questioning? We are not strange animals. We are not different from others. We do not need that kind of attention. We have had enough of that during our childhood. It is so annoying. All these journalists and social workers or whatever they call them, keep bugging us with their questions. Please, leave us alone.

—Sue, age 17 (1974)³³⁶

³³³ Kukka pŏmnyŏng chŏngbo sent'ŏ, Minbŏp (1958, Law 471), Hojŏkbŏp (1960, Law 535).

³³⁴ "Ch'ŏnyŏ myŏng honhyŏl'a chung ilbaekyŏ myŏng i ch'uihak [100 of 1,000 *honhyŏl'a* enrolled in school]," *Chosŏn Ilbo* March 17, 1959.

³³⁵ Kim Yong-ho, *Ilsŏn kija such'ŏp* [Notes from a front line reporter]. Sŏul sinmunsa, 1953, 22.

³³⁶ Moen, *The Amerasians*.

The medico-scientific and social scientific researchers who authored academic papers on *honhyŏl'a* anatomy and psychology that impacted policymaking towards *honhyŏl'a* populations mobilized the authority of science – particularly potent in a developmental state – to regulate women and children situated at the borders of an insular “Korean” polity. The interracial transgressions of camptown women and *honhyŏl'a* – through the former’s sex work and the latter’s corporeal constitution – not only necessitated efforts to define the limits of the nation in the interests of “the future of the nation,” but also because of the threat they posed to South Korean masculinity. That is, by sexually possessing Korean women and genetically compromising the “pure” Korean bloodline, the “pro-freedom forces” that occasioned the existence of Amerasian *honhyŏl'a* also compromised the integrity of Korean patriarchy and the privileged place of men at the pinnacle of South Korea’s social order.

Facilitated by the transnational exchange of technologies for blood testing and encouraged by inter-state efforts to identify criteria for regulating the international movement of interstitial populations like military wives and offspring, social and biological scientists proactively participated in shaping social unease and advocating political policy towards camptown women and *honhyŏl'a*. In South Korea, the potent mix of postcolonial grievances, Cold War defensive anxieties, and developmental ambitions thus imbued the study of communities that threatened the integrity of the normative “pure blood” polity with national significance.

Chapter 5

Disciplining Blood: State Regulations of Blood Under the Yusin Constitution

“Wow,” I thought, “I’m a human, too, after all. But then how come I’m wearing this ragged army uniform? Why can’t I afford long underwear so I don’t have to shiver the whole freezing winter? Why do I go hungry? Why do I have to sell my own blood?” ... At that point, I was not alone, and this whole city seemed to be swarming with nonhumans.

—Hwang Sökyöng, “Neighbors”

Commoditizing and Conscripting Blood

In 1969, the monthly magazine *Asean* profiled a young man named Yi Hyön-su, whose primary means of support was selling his blood for money. Like many young blood sellers, Yi had neither a fixed address nor stable employment. He worked as a porter-for-hire in the central Seoul market, where he first learned about the semi-organized blood markets in the neighborhoods around large hospitals. When he was first introduced to the option of supplementing his meager and unreliable earnings by selling himself to one of these blood collection agencies, the prospect struck him as dirty, daunting, and demeaning. Eventually, however, the sheer precarity of his position drove him to join the many other day laborers regularly queued outside the doors of hospital blood centers. One day, after a painfully long stretch of bad weather and no porter work to be found, he was finally driven to go to a clinic to “drip,” or sell blood, earning himself a meager 20 *wön*. That first time, Yi was so overcome by the sheer unfairness of the petty repayment for such a vital fluid and the feeling he was committing a great crime against his parents that he broke down and wept. But he was so desperate for cash that he nonetheless “Gritted my teeth and bore through even as tears ran down my face.”

Within weeks, however, Yi's initial trepidation gave way to a reliance on blood-selling for steady money, which, in a terrible catch-22, soon undermined his ability to work at his normal job as a day laborer. His frequent donations weakened him physically, and he described his legs shaking uncontrollably as he went about his porter work. When he was able to find temporary employment at construction sites, he found himself sweating profusely as he struggled to carry sandbags up scaffolding. While chronic over-perspiration was uncomfortable, however, it was when his sweat dried up that he knew he was in real trouble, signaling the imminent onset of severe bouts of vertigo and his vision blurring into an alarming fog of mustard yellow. As his ability to secure jobs as a manual laborer deteriorated, Yi grew ever more reliant on the blood-selling that was weakening him in the first place, caught in a vicious cycle of poverty and precarity mediated through his body's limited ability to produce labor or reproduce blood.³³⁷

This story illustrates how the act of giving blood in Cold War Korea took place at the intersection of cultural stigma, economic need, and social precarity. As discussed in earlier chapters, blood selling had been foundational to institutionalized South Korean blood collection from its inception. While soliciting blood sellers had initially been seen as a temporary concession to wartime conditions, however, by the 1960s the practice had congealed into a semi-institutionalized system. This, in turn, led to the state stepping in in the 1970s to fully institutionalize blood-management as it sought to guarantee that Korean blood was not only independent—as wartime planners had wanted—but also drawn from desirable social sectors. During these decades, the problem of blood supply was no longer national self-sufficiency, but rather bionational optimization – blood from the right kind of Koreans for the right kind of Koreans.

³³⁷ Yi Tonggyu 이동규, *Asean 아세안*, July 1969.

The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a change in who made up the major populations selling blood, as well as the social discourse around and political response to the persistent problems of Korea's medical blood supply system. As the focus in South Korea shifted from postwar reconstruction to developmental pursuits—spearheaded by Park Chung Hee's aggressive industrialization agenda, series of economic plans, and profiteering in Vietnam—the constitution of the standing pool of blood sellers changed as well.³³⁸ The refugees and widows who had supplied blood centers in the post-Korean War years gave way to a new breed of economic refugee. By and large, these were young men like Yi Hyŏn-su—a generation of South Korean youth made mobile and exploitable by the disappearance of jobs and opportunities for upward mobility—or, indeed, stability—in their rural hometowns.³³⁹ Flocking to major cities like Seoul in search of opportunity, these young men sold their labor when they could and their blood when they could not. In the process, their bodies became the site of intense debate about capitalism, class, and bodily autonomy in a market system and developmental state. Yi's story thus raises broader questions about blood, community, and ownership. Who could lay legitimate claim to

³³⁸ Hyung-A Kim, *Korea's Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961-79* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004); Jung-en Woo, *Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Frank Baldwin, "America's Rented Troops: South Koreans in Vietnam," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 7, no. 2 (October-December 1974): 33-40; Dong-Ju Choi, "The Political Economy of Korea's Involvement in the Second Indo-China War" (PhD diss., University of London, 1995); Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel, eds., *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); Yi Pyŏngch'ŏn 이병천, *Kaebal tokjae wa Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae: uri sidae ŭi chŏngch'i-kyŏngjejŏk kiwŏn* 개발독재와 박정희 시대: 우리 시대의 정치경제적 기원 (*Developmental Dictatorship and the Park Chung Hee Era: The Political-Economic Origin of Our Age*) (P'aju: Changbi Publishers, 2020 (2003)).

³³⁹ Hong Sŏngt'ae 홍성태, "P'okapjŏk kŭndaehwa wa wihŏmsahoe" 폭압적 근대화와 위협사회 ("Coercive modernization and a dangerous society"), in *Kaebal tokjae wa Pak Chŏnghŭi sidae: uri sidae ŭi chŏngch'i-kyŏngjejŏk kiwŏn* 개발독재와 박정희 시대: 우리 시대의 정치경제적 기원 (*Developmental Dictatorship and the Park Chung Hee Era: The Political-Economic Origin of Our Age*), ed. Yi Pyŏngch'ŏn 이병천 (P'aju: Changbi Publishers, 2020 (2003)).

Yi's blood—his family, the medical market, or perhaps the nation-state—and how did these claims relate to one another?

This chapter focuses on the socio-political tides that shaped the rapid postwar expansion and gradual dismantling of black markets for blood in South Korea in order to illuminate the role of this crackdown in state efforts to reconceptualize blood as a national property and thereby justify its reach into the bodies of everyday Koreans. As the Park regime consolidated political power and social authority over the 1960s, culminating in the inauguration of the Yusin constitution in 1972 and the subsequent decade of constitutionally sanctioned authoritarianism, it extended its disciplinary reach into Korean bodies through a regimen of public health programs and interventions.³⁴⁰ Under the overarching rubric of national development, the Park administration invested in health policies ranging from hygienic reform (anti-parasite campaigns) to medical interventions (vaccination programs and family planning efforts), all designed to mobilize the population, families, and individual bodies and their constituent parts towards advancing Korea's productive capacity.³⁴¹ Meanwhile, the administration also adopted policies that reduced certain segments of the population to exploitable bodies, body parts, and bodily

³⁴⁰ In 1972, after a week of emergency rule including the declaration of martial law, dissolution of the National Assembly, partial suspension of the constitution, and ban on political activity, the Yusin constitution passed on October 27. It granted the president (Park Chung Hee) power over the election process, removed presidential term limits, and guaranteed Park control over the National Assembly majority and Supreme Court, effectively securing all branches of government. Youngju Ryu, ed., *Cultures of Yusin: South Korea in the 1970s* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018), 4-5. See also Paul Y. Chang, *Protest Dialectics: State Repression and South Korea's Democracy Movement, 1970-1979* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2015); and Han Honggu 한홍구, *Yusin: Ojik han saram ūl wihan sidae* 유신: 오직 한 사람을 위한 시대 (*Yusin: The age of one man alone*) (Söul: Hankyöre ch'ulpan, 2014).

³⁴¹ John DiMoia, *Reconstructing Bodies: Biomedicine, health, and nation-building in South Korea since 1945* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2013); Eunjung Kim, *Curative Violence: Rehabilitating Disability, Gender, and Sexuality in Modern Korea* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017); Eunjung Ma, "Medicine in the Making of Post-Colonial Korea, 1948-2006" (PhD diss., Cornell University, 2008); Pae, Ūn'gyöng 배은경, "Han'guk sahoe ch'ulsan chojöl ūi yöksajök kwajöng kwa chendö: 1970-yöndae kkaji ūi kyönghöm ūl chungsim ūro" 한국 사회 출산 조절의 역사적 과정과 젠더: 1970년대까지의 경험을 중심으로 ("A social history of Korean women's birth control: 1950s-1970s") (PhD diss., Seoul National University, 2003).

functions that could be expended for the state's geopolitical gain, whether as soldiers in foreign wars or sexually marketed to foreign soldiers.³⁴² In this way, developmental governance in South Korea disciplined its subjects through programs for bionational optimization, on the one hand, and necropolitical exploitation, on the other.

Nowhere is this paradox more evident than in the blood markets of the 1960s, which relied on a necropolitical program that reduced sellers from Korean subjects to saleable body parts, and the cleanup campaigns of the 1970s, which bionationalized blood donation by reconceiving donors as ideal disciplinary subjects and donation as a national duty. Underlying both efforts lay the longstanding intersecting imperatives to establish Korean blood independence and ensure Korean blood purity, the emphasis on the former informing the institutionalization of blood markets in the 1960s while course alteration toward the latter drove the 1970s drive to eliminate them and reclaim Korean blood in state disciplinary institutions—namely schools and the military. Through a historical consideration of the development of blood markets and thick description of their internal dynamics, this chapter addresses how the precarity of blood sellers made them first the basis for blood collection and then for a joint initiative by medical establishments and state agents to wrest blood from an unruly market and consolidate blood control in disciplinary spaces like schools and the military. I argue that the relative longevity of a black market for blood in South Korea derived from a commitment to blood independence, and that the drive to regulate and dismantle that market signifies the pursuit of blood purity in the national blood supply. In short, the Park Chung Hee military regime used the

³⁴² Jin-kyung Lee, *Service Economies: Militarism, Sex Work, and Migrant Labor in South Korea* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics," *Public Culture* 15, no. 1 (2003): 11-40; Daniel Y. Kim, *The Intimacies of Conflict: Cultural Memory and the Korean War* (New York: New York University Press, 2020); Sunyoung Park, *Revisiting Minjung: New Perspectives on the Cultural History of 1980s South Korea* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019).

imperative to regulate the blood market as an opportunity to repackage blood donation as a nationalist duty and thereby legitimize the extension of state demands further into Korean institutions, homes, and bodies.



Figure 5.1. Students giving blood for soldiers, 1967.

An investigation into the logics of medical blood solicitation, storage, and disbursal is engaged, from the outset, with not only questions of bodily ownership but also the issue of what kind of governance system is best suited to the demand for body parts. Modern approaches to blood management have been dominated by the dichotomy of gift and commodity, with proponents of commodification arguing that market efficacy optimizes the quantity and quality of blood collected while those in favor of gift economies decry market systems as dehumanizing and exploitative.³⁴³ Gift systems, the latter argue, build and maintain “the constitution of a community minded citizenry and a resilient nation.”³⁴⁴ Richard Titmuss, the founding proponent of a gift economy in blood and advocate of welfare state systems in postwar England, opposed a commercial blood market partly because the promise of financial reward disincentivized honest reporting on the quality of blood sold (increasing the danger of bloods at risk of hepatitis or syphilis passing into the national system), and because market logics exacerbated the physical exploitation of “indigents.”³⁴⁵ Echoing Titmuss’ argument, Scheper-Hughes has described neoliberal market rationalism in blood and organ collection systems as “a new form of late modern cannibalism” in which “[organ givers] are an invisible and discredited collection of anonymous suppliers of spare parts” while “[organ receivers] are cherished patients, treated as moral subjects and suffering individuals” with unquestioned “proprietary rights over the bodies

³⁴³ Lori B. Andrews and D Nelkin, *Body Bazaar: The Market for Human Tissue in the Biotechnology Age* (New York: Crown, 2001); Nancy Scheper-Hughes, “The Global Traffic in Human Organs,” *Current Anthropology* 41 (2000):191-224; Andrew Kimbrell, *The Human Body Shop: The Engineering and Marketing of Life* (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993).

³⁴⁴ Waldby and Mitchell, 2006: 9.

³⁴⁵ Richard Titmuss, *The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy*, ed. A. Oakley and J Ashton (London: LSE, 1997 [1971]).

and body parts of the poor, living and dead.”³⁴⁶ Such studies sensitively reflect biopolitical disciplinary logics developed in the West, particularly as blood management systems developed in liberal, developed democracies after the Second World War.

But as this history of blood collection in Cold War Korea shows, post-colonial, post-war, and military-authoritarian sites like Korea present a third model of blood management: a conscription system, based on and contributing to the development of a blood-based form of bio-national South Korean identity. Although modern medical technologies and clinical methods for treating blood on a large scale were introduced to South Korea through western auspices, constant war and consequently illiberal militarized governance set the basic conditions for the institutionalization of blood management.³⁴⁷ A forestalled decolonization process catalyzed into a civil war without end only further guaranteed that blood solicitation be understood as a defense priority (blood independence, or self-sufficient supply) and nationalist ideology (blood purity, or desirable donations).³⁴⁸ In contrast to its western counterparts, South Korean blood donation campaigns that sought to wrest control back from the blood markets were explicitly militarized, classed, gendered, and racialized. Unlike western blood donation systems, where a pretense at benign universal humanism has historically characterized many public campaigns, the Cold War

³⁴⁶ Nancy Scheper-Hughes, “Bodies for Sale: Whole or in Parts,” *Commodifying Bodies*, ed. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Loic Wacquant (London: Sage, 2002) 1-8: 4.

³⁴⁷ Yun Hongsik 윤홍식, “Pak Chŏnghŭi chŏnggwŏn sigi han’guk pokji ch’eje: pangong kaebal kukka, pokji kukka ŭi kinŭngjŏk tŭngkamul” 박정희 정권시기 한국 복지체제: 반공개발국가, 복지국가의 기능적 등가물 (“The Welfare Regime of the Park Chung Hee Administration Era: The Functional Equivalence of an Anti-communist Developmental State and Welfare State”), *Han’guk sahoe chŏngch’aek* 한국사회정책 (*Korean Social Policy*) 25, no. 1 (March 2018): 195-229.

³⁴⁸ On the Korean War’s enduring effects on Korean political subjectivity, see Heonik Kwon, *After the Korean War: An Intimate History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020). On the connection between the war, American military imperialism, and South Korean military authoritarianism, see Christine Hong, *A Violent Peace: Race, U.S. Militarism, and Cultures of Democratization in Cold War Asia and the Pacific* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2020); and Simeon Man, *Soldiering Through Empire: Race and the Making of the Decolonizing Pacific* (Oakland, Calif.: University of California Press, 2018).

Korean transition from blood sales to blood donation was explicitly about securing and preserving a national Korean blood.³⁴⁹ This history promises to broaden our historical and conceptual understanding of blood management, necessarily decentering western trajectories as normative or necessary. The battle between blood markets and blood regulation under the military dictator Park Chung Hee’s authoritarian Yusin regime thus offers an instructive rebuttal to the dominant understanding of blood management systems in histories of medicine.

“Drips” and “Bosses”: Blood Markets in the 1960s-1970s

In the decades after the Korean War, a system of blood-selling became the staple basis of supplying the medical blood store. Military and civilian hospitals alike relied on blood sales, and from the 1950s-1960s an underground network of intermediaries evolved to solicit and organize the impoverished masses desperate enough to sell this vital life-essence for remuneration. In the 1950s, the government-run National Blood Center solicited blood from 5,489 sellers, about 35% of who were unemployed.³⁵⁰ By the 1960s, Korea had achieved its goal of independence from reliance on foreign blood – throughout the decade, blood donated by foreigners accounted for only 0.13% of total collections.³⁵¹ Women’s blood donations also fell from their 1950s rates, and

³⁴⁹ Nationalism informed western blood campaigns as well, perhaps most explicitly in France. However, a rhetorical emphasis on universal humanism developed in tandem with other western projects under the banner of global humanitarianism. See Douglas Starr, *Blood: An Epic History of Medicine and Commerce* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998); Young-Sun Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); and Youngjin Kiem 김영진, Kihwan Sung 성기환, and Yongsang Kim 김용상, “4-ch’a sanhōphyōngmyōng indojuūi wigi kūrigo chōksipja undong” 4 차 산업혁명 인도주의 위기 그리고 적십자 운동 (“The Fourth Industrial Revolution, Crises of Humanitarianism, and the Red Cross Movement”), *Journal of the Korean Society of Hazard Mitigation* 19, no. 7 (2019): 191-201.

³⁵⁰ Korean Red Cross 대한적십자사, *Han’guk chōksipja undong 100-nyōn 한국 적십자 운동 100 년 (100 Years of the Red Cross Movement in Korea, 1905-2005)* (Sōul: Taehan chōksipjasa, 2006), 486.

³⁵¹ Kim Kihong, Yi Samyōl, and Kang Tūkyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han’guk hōnhyōl undongsa 한국헌혈운동사 (History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea)* (P’aju-si: Nanam sinsō, 1990).

while the impropriety of female blood selling continue to be a talking point for social commentators women's actual donations rate, like that of foreigners, dropped steadily over the 1960s.³⁵² At the same time as blood collection was achieving its goal of independence from foreign and female contributions, blood sales grew to account for 97.56% of total blood collections.³⁵³ By the 1970s, the black market for blood was its own world – complete with written rules and unwritten codes for circumnavigating these rules.

Acknowledged and used by respectable institutions like the Central Army Hospital and Severance Hospital and abused by unlicensed clinics and disreputable gangsters, the South Korean black market for blood functioned at the intersection of half-hearted rhetorical regulation by institutions and the total lack of regulatory oversight in reality. Advocates for a modernized blood administration system repeatedly critiques the “evils” of the blood sales system but bowed to its realities in practice.

The blood markets of 1970s South Korea hinged on the desperation of those most severely dispossessed by the waves of traumatic change endured on the peninsula: impoverished by war and left behind by the drive towards industrialization.³⁵⁴ Long lines of blood sellers who felt they had no other recourse but to sell their bodies for money cued up outside of blood centers across the country, particularly large university hospitals in Seoul.³⁵⁵ Meanwhile, the precise

³⁵² Korean Red Cross, 2006.

³⁵³ Kim Kihong, Yi Samyöl, and Kang Tükyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han'guk hönhyöl undongsa 한국헌혈운동사 (History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea)* (P'aju-si: Nanam sinsö, 1990).

³⁵⁴ Hagen Koo, *Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Hwasook Nam, *Building Ships, Building a Nation: Korea's Democratic Unionism Under Park Chung Hee* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009).

³⁵⁵ “Pujjõngnün ‘jorok pudae’: Sogaebi tteõgamyõ p'i p'allõ mollyõ” 부쩍는 ‘쫓록부대’ 소개비 떼어가며 피팔러 몰려 (Extreme brokerage deduction in “dripping camps”—cornered into blood selling), *Kyõnhyang sinmun* 경향신문 January 28, 1965.

combination of economic precarity and social vulnerability that compelled these crowds to sell their blood in the first place also gave rise to a class of extortionist agencies and enforcers that trafficked illicitly in poor quality blood.³⁵⁶ These black market societies grew in proportion to the expansion of medical blood centers. By the 1970s they were an entrenched and complex world of their own.

Demographic surveys of the black market for blood reveals both the socio-economic distress of sellers and the concerns expressed by reporters over not only the biological integrity of stockpiled Korean blood but also the social caliber of its sources. A 1970 Usök University Hospital³⁵⁷ survey of one-thousand professional blood sellers revealed that over three-quarters of blood sellers were in their twenties, half were without a fixed residence, and nearly half were young runaways or abandoned youth. The vast majority of respondents reported that their primary motivation for selling blood was economic hardship, and that they intended to sell their blood repeatedly despite some twenty percent of respondents saying that they were experiencing adverse health effects from over-donating.³⁵⁸

Kim's report also indicated that, in addition to relying on repeat visits, many respondents had already been regulars on the market for over a year. With such sustained participation, it is no surprise that the black market quickly developed its own social categories and vocabularies, unregistered by hospital surveys. Within the blood market underworlds clustered around soliciting hospitals, the major social division was one of relative power. On one side stood the

³⁵⁶ *Sindonga*, July 1978 Issue.

³⁵⁷ Korea University (Koryö taehakkyo) today, after the two institutions merged in 1971.

³⁵⁸ Kim Semin 김세민, "Usökdaehakkyo hyölaekwön chosa kyölkwa" 우석대학교 혈액원 조사 결과 (Survey results from Usök University blood center), *Usökdae üdae chapji* 우석대의대잡지 (*Usök University Medical College Journal*) 7, no. 1 (1970).

tebbang gangsters, or “bosses,” who extorted money from vulnerable blood sellers and profited from off-books transactions between unlicensed clinics and major hospitals. The term “*tebbang*” was a Koreanization of the Japanese word for iron-plate (a word perhaps better known outside Asia for the popular *teppanyaki* iron griddle cooking technique), and described the iron-faced, or brazen, actions of these gangs. On the other side sat the *jjorok*, or “drips,” who sold their blood—a descriptor drawn from the sound of liquid splashing out like rain from a gutter or blood from a vein. According to one professional blood seller’s explanation, “When blood is drawn, every time you clench and unclench your fist your blood runs out, and when it falls in the bottle it makes a “drip-drop, splish-splash” sound, so blood-sellers are called “drips” for the sound of their lives leaking out through this selling of their blood.”³⁵⁹ These monikers denoting the implacable power of black market profiteers, on the one hand, and its exploitable human resources, on the other, pithily encapsulated the stark power imbalance driving the organization of blood market societies.

³⁵⁹ Kim Kihong, Yi Samyöl, and Kang Tükyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han 'guk hönhyöl undongsa* 한국헌혈운동사 (*History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea*) (P’aju-si: Nanam sinsö, 1990).



Figure 5.2. Blood sellers outside Seoul National University Hospital, 1975.

Some intrepid magazine reporters set out to illustrate the power-play in blood market society in lurid detail. Typifying such coverage, which wedded social and medical activism with voyeuristic fascination, a 1969 article in the monthly magazine *Asean* by reporter Yi Tonggyu opened with a dehumanizing metaphor that reduced blood sellers to bestial sub-humanity:

“If an octopus can’t catch anything to eat and is starving it will cut off its own leg and eat it to prolong its life and thereby endure. If the insects that a praying mantis eats in late summer all disappear, it will survive by eating its own front leg. ... There is a place where humans line up who are trying to survive exactly like an octopus or a praying mantis. It is called the blood bank.”³⁶⁰

³⁶⁰ Yi, *Asean*, 1969.

The description cast the fundamental stakes of blood markets into dramatic relief by conveying how, at its very heart, the enterprise hinged on sellers' struggles to meet their basic survival needs. Its pathos, however, also replicated the market's objectification of the people it relied on to simple resources, regressed from fully evolved humanity.

Yi's portrait of life as a professional seller, which followed the young porter Yi Hyönsu introduced in the opening anecdote, concentrated on sellers' feelings of confinement by life circumstances, rage at exploitative institutions, and a sense of impending doom. Prospective blood sellers competing for the limited daily collection slots available crowded around hospital doors in winter sleet and summer scorches, many camping out overnight to ensure a position at the front of the line.³⁶¹ Instead of pristine edifices and sterile hallways, the outer walls of hospitals were coated in layers of urine while inside waiting room walls were covered in graffiti. Of the latter, Yi observed that although it looked like the same scrawls found in public toilets, bars, or police holding cells, it lacked the variety. Roughly, the samples he recorded fell into several uniformly dour categories: death, shame and resentment, each filled out ad nauseum. Authors lambasted themselves and fellow sellers for their failures, begged forgiveness of parents and loved ones, and fumed at hospital extortions and gangster's abuses. A sampling of representative examples of blood center graffiti, reproduced in Yi's *Asean* article, reveals the visceral emotional reactions of blood sellers as well as their fluency in a new set of terminologies and language specific to this "tissue economy," to use Waldby and Mitchell's term.³⁶²

Reportedly drawn from "Downtown Blood Center C," examples included:

³⁶¹ Reports of the brutality of simply waiting to be able to sell blood and deplorable blood center conditions had been a consistent focus of reporting on the blood market dating back to the 1950s. See also "Kagonghal hyölaek amgörae" 可恐할 血液闇去來 (The abominable black market for blood), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 March 11, 1955.

³⁶² Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell, *Tissue economies: Blood, Organs, and Cell Lines in Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

“You young assholes, can’t do anything but sell your blood? Go die, die.”

“Mother, forgive me. I sold again today.”

“Dear X, I love you but today I’ve come here so you just have to wait for me to spill a bit out.”

“All you liars screw off and die, damn!”

“My sad fate is to miss my hometown but never return.”

“What is live [*sic*]? What is God? Who am I?”
[*Original in English*]

“What stupid assholes drips are, huh? Even if they squeeze all the blood out of you bastards it’s not gonna get you even 10,000 *wŏn*.”³⁶³

As indicated in the opening anecdote about the young Seoul porter Yi Hyŏnsu’s struggle to balance his ability to find manual labor with his reliance on blood-selling for steady money, “drips” had to carefully balance the monetary benefits of blood selling against its potential physical costs. Remuneration and baseline collection rates varied from place to place. Some, like Seoul National University Hospital, compensated generously in both money and food, but demanded a daunting 480 milliliters of blood for their kindness.³⁶⁴ The Red Cross Blood Center set the gold standard, at a generous 1,000 *wŏn* per 380 milliliters plus food and medicine.³⁶⁵ Such

³⁶³ Yi 1969.

³⁶⁴ Standard blood collection amounts differ across time and location, ranging from 200 milliliters to 500 milliliters. In the United States today, a typical donation is usually 450 milliliters, or around one-eighth of the total blood volume in an average American adult. In non-western countries where the average body size and blood volume has historically been lower like India and South Korea, however, standard donation amounts hover between 250 milliliters and 300 milliliters. Particularly for physically smaller persons who may be undernourished or hydrated, as in the case of a typical 1970s blood seller in South Korea, drawing over this amount at regular intervals could dangerously deplete the body’s total blood supply and limit its ability to restore normal blood levels in a safe and healthy fashion. For a description of current collection rates, see AABB, American Red Cross, America’s Blood Centers “Circular of Information for the Use of Human Blood and Blood Components,” July 2002.

³⁶⁵ Red Cross 2006.

additional incentives of food and medicine were not mere kindnesses, but rather practical concessions to the prevalence of poor health among repeat donors. A Ms. Kim employed as a phlebotomist at a Seoul blood center confirmed that each day at work saw two to three people in tears and at least one to two people fainting from extreme post-donation vertigo but confessed that after four years she had grown emotionally numb to the suffering.³⁶⁶

Nominally there were rules in place to try to mitigate the dangers of over-donation. Approved blood centers mandated that donors could not give blood more than once every two months. Committed blood sellers, however, simply cycled through different blood centers in the intervening months, erasing the tell-tale track-marks with folk remedies like salt water or pork fat rubs, as well as lye and urine solutions.³⁶⁷ Track marks were also a dangerous give-away to blood market gangsters, who roamed the streets in packs of five to six to corner repeat sellers cycling through blood centers and direct them to private, unregulated collection clinics. These clinics paid less than legitimate hospitals, and their slashed rates were only further reduced by the gangster “bosses” taking their cut. But they imposed no prohibitions on repeat visits and did not require pre-donation blood exams.³⁶⁸

The blood market also had a special term for those who fell too far into the trap of over-selling. These were the so-called “ghosts”—those who sold their blood once every ten days and suffered constantly from the effects of over-drawing, including weakness, vertigo, and loss of

³⁶⁶ Yi 1969.

³⁶⁷ “Pujjǒngnǔn ‘jorok pudae’: Sogaebi tteǒgamyǒ p’i p’allǒ mollyǒ” 부쩍는 ‘쫓록부대’ 소개비 떼어가며 피팔러 몰려 (Extreme brokerage deduction in “dripping camps”—cornered into blood selling), *Kyǒnhyang Sinmun* 경향신문 January 28, 1965.

³⁶⁸ Yi 1969.

appetite.³⁶⁹ If ghosts haunted the furthest depths of disempowerment in the blood selling trap, their powerful counterparts were the wealthy private solicitors and unregulated clinics known as “vampires.”³⁷⁰ Ironically, blood-selling to “vampires” also provided “ghosts” with one of the most desirable avenues out of this conundrum. Many “drips,” the porter Yi Hyönsu among them, aspired to strike up an arrangement with someone from the class of wealthy older men who underwent semi-regular blood transfusions because of its purportedly health-restorative effects, and would pay over five times the highest hospital remuneration rate for a single dose, particularly from a young man.³⁷¹ The same class fissures that made disenfranchised youth a convenient, if undesirable, demographic for fulfilling the nation’s medical collection needs also rendered them vulnerable to the predations of wealthy private collectors, as it were.

Press coverage exploited blood sellers in its own way, dramatizing their suffering in solicitation of greater readership. But it also issued advisories that echoed a growing movement in the medical profession and military government to wrest control of Korean blood back from the unregulated market, guaranteeing not just blood independence but also its purity. Commentators decried the socio-economic conditions that led to the wretched crowds jostling at the doors of private blood banks each day. Describing the morning queue outside “White Hospital (*Paek pyöngwöñ*)”—which boasted one of the largest blood centers in Seoul—one journalist wrote, “Although actual blood collection does not begin until 2 pm, the crowd has to

³⁶⁹ “Posabu sögyu chöngmaryön maehyöl ökje hönhyöl chönhwan” 保社部서규 정마련 買血억제 獻血轉換 (Health Department workers preparing to suppress blood sales, transition to blood donation), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), August 3, 1970.

³⁷⁰ Kim, Kihong 김기홍, Yi Samyöl 이삼열, and Kang Tükyong 강득용. *Han ’guk hönhyöl undongsa* 한국 헌혈 운동사 (*History of the Blood Donation Movement in South Korea*). P’aju: Nanam sinsö, 1990, 60.

³⁷¹ These practices date back to as early as the 1940s, according to one man named Kim Ungch’ae who claimed to have sold his blood in over 500 transactions from private arrangements in the late colonial period through the Cold War markets before the 1970s crackdown on the markets. See *Üisa sibo*, January 17, 1972.

arrive early in the morning and fight each other for a place in line because this decides whether they will be able to sell that day.” This bitter contest to give blood, the journalist clarified, was not for a “noble cause,” as it was in “developed countries where an individual’s donation provides for poor patients or family members designated by the donor.” Rather, in postwar Korea, “Poor people sell blood while rich people buy it.”³⁷²

Blood Whores: Hwang Sökyöng’s “Neighbors”

In 1972, at the height of the blood market ecosystem and just after the promulgation of Park Chung Hee’s authoritarian Yusin constitution in late-October, social critic and author Hwang Sökyöng published a short story entitled “Neighbors (*iut saram*)” about a Seoul laborer sucked into the underworld of blood selling.³⁷³ The narrative arc and specific details of “Neighbors” are so similar to the porter Yi Hyönsu’s tale as reported in *Asean* that it is almost certain that Hwang modeled his story on the article.³⁷⁴ The young blood seller’s tale of class exploitation in the strategic gap between political exclusion and medical economy offered an ideal template for Hwang’s signature style of politically dissident writing.³⁷⁵ Perhaps best known for his novel *The Shadow of Arms* critiquing the Vietnam War—where he had been deployed

³⁷² “Semo e pörim padün saramdül (6) Sarip hyöraek ünhaeng (Paek pyöngwön)” 歲暮에 버림받은 사람들 (6) 私立血液銀行 (白病院) (Private blood bank (Paek Hospital)), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga daily*), December 18, 1954.

³⁷³ Hwang Suk-young, “Iut saram” 이웃 사람 (“Neighbors”), *Ch’angjak kwa pip’yöng* 창작과비평 (*Composition and criticism*) (Winter 1972).

³⁷⁴ It should be noted this is my own opinion based on research for this chapter, rather than a statement made by Hwang or any publisher of his works.

³⁷⁵ Hwang’s immediate contemporary circle also included the similarly politically activist writer Kim Chiha. Gi-Wook Shin and Kyung Moon Hwang, eds., *Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Uprising in Korea’s Past and Present* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), xxx n.37.

himself—Hwang was a prominent member of a generation of political activist South Korean writers who turned their pens against the authoritarian excesses of the Park regime and its military successors.³⁷⁶ As such, whereas Yi’s narrative ends in a fantasy of escape from the blood market trap through one big payday selling to a rich old man, Hwang imagines the possible result of such an event. Through his proxy protagonist, Hwang highlights the broader social contexts of South Korean graduated citizenship, militarism, and developmentalism left mostly implicit in the original *Asean* article, and furthermore interrogates whether freedom from the closed circuit of physical exploitation is actually possible for the Korean classes reduced to expendable body parts, rather than whole humans.³⁷⁷

“Neighbors” begins in a police interrogation room, where the story’s nameless protagonist is being held on a murder charge. Within the claustrophobic confines of police custody, the opening lines immediately set the major themes of the following narrative: classed categories of relative humanity, political structures of sanctioned and unsanctioned violence, and the legislation of class, humanity, and violence through the social regulation and biological exploitation of marginalized bodies. The first-person narrator addresses himself to the police interrogator, immediately identifying the power differential between them. While the lawman is well-dressed and sporting a tie around his neck, the narrator protests that the only tie that will ever adorn his neck will be a noose. Although the narrator is now subject to state discipline for murder—an unsanctioned act of violence, he notes wryly that even at his young age of twenty-

³⁷⁶ Hwang Suk-Young, *The Shadow of Arms*, trans. Chun Kyung-Ja (Ithaca, N.Y.: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1994). For commentary, see Lee, *Service Economies*, 48-54.

³⁷⁷ Hwang Suk-Young 황석영, *Samp’o kanŭn kil: Hwang Sök-yŏng chungdan p’yŏnjŏnjip 2 삼포 가는 길: 황석영 중단편전집 2* (The Road to Samp’o: Collected Works of Hwang Suk-Young, Volume 2) (Sŏul: Ch’angjak pip’yŏngsa, 2000), 161-181. On the concepts of graduated sovereignty and flexible citizenship, see Aihwa Ong, *Fungible Life: Experiment in the Asian City of Life* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016); and Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999).

five he has already “killed a few dozen” with the state’s blessing on the battlefields of Vietnam.³⁷⁸ A constant throughout the opening monologue, at the core of the contrast the narrator draws between himself and his interlocutor, is a persistent rhetorical dichotomy between full humanity accorded the policeman—an agent and beneficiary of state discipline—and the bare, brutalized biologization experienced by the narrator—a source of labor and body parts to sustain state development.³⁷⁹ “You’re an entirely different breed from me,” the narrator tells his interrogator, since “you were born to a better lot than mine...it’s bastards like me you people detest the most.” While the policeman expresses a breed of full, socially accepted and politically enfranchised humanity, the narrator variously describes the young men like him, “swindled” by South Korean society, as “a fish on a cutting board,” “the sort of mongrel they like to slaughter on a hot summer’s day,” and “the shit you took. Plopped into a dark hole and rotting away with an awful stench...I mean the steaming crap that was in your belly just a little while before.”³⁸⁰ The insistently visceral description of his debased state introduces the main theme of the following story—the ways in which poor South Korean youth are physically sacrificed for larger state agendas, whether shedding their blood for geopolitical gain in Vietnam or selling their blood for economic survival in Seoul.

Like the porter Yi Hyönsu, Hwang’s narrator left his rural hometown in search of opportunity in Seoul shortly after being discharged from the army. There, he lodged in an overcrowded workers’ shelter filled with other day laborers. Hwang’s description of the Laborers’ Association Hall in Kalwöldong, where he had previously lodged himself, again

³⁷⁸ Hwang, *Samp’o kanŭn kil*, 163.

³⁷⁹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998).

³⁸⁰ Hwang, *Samp’o kanŭn kil*, 161-162.

fixates on bestial metaphors to describe the environs—less like a barn even than a slaughterhouse, steaming with “the nauseating smell of filthy flesh” as “half-naked men moved sluggishly through the halls” in unwashed yellow underwear “like animals in a cage.”³⁸¹ Historians of labor movements in Park Chung Hee era Korea have similarly characterized workers housing in other scenarios, but for the day laborers that populate neighbors there is little hope for steady employment, let alone unionization.³⁸²

The narrator soon takes up work as an A-frame porter, what he calls a “dime-a-dozen story” visible any day at Seoul station as labor migrants flow in and out of the city in a constant stream from the countryside. Employment was scarce, social disdain plenty, and the temptation to breakdown and beg growing. When winter hit, the danger of literally freezing to death made all options imaginable. At this point, the narrator hears his friend Kidong mutter to himself, “Might as well go dripping.” Unfamiliar with the term, the narrator watches Kidong clench and unclench his fist in illustration and suddenly realizes his options are to starve or freeze on a cold cement floor or sell himself for just enough cash to afford a life-saving bowl of soup.

Finally it dawned on me that he meant to go to a hospital to sell blood. Maybe blood being drained made a sound like the drip or gurgle of an empty stomach. Should I sell myself to eat? Traveled all the way to Seoul to make a living, I had been begging and sleeping on the street, and now I was to gnaw at my own lifeblood? I was a bit reluctant at first, but I didn’t know what else to do.³⁸³

³⁸¹ Ibid., 165; Kim Chayŏng 김자영, “Hwang Sŏkyŏng tanp’yŏn sosŏl e nat’anan pet’ŭnam kwiguk changbyŏng ŭi t’ŭrauma hyŏnsang punsŏk: “Toraon saram,” “Nakt’anuggal,” “Iut saram” ŭl chungsim ŭro” 황석영 단편 소설에 나타난 베트남 귀국장병의 트라우마 현상 분석: “돌아온 사람,” “낙타누갈,” “이웃사람”을 중심으로 (“The Trauma of Vietnamese War Veterans in Hwang Sŏkyŏng’s Short Stories”), *Ewha ŏmun nonjip* 이화어문논집 (*Ewha Literary Collection*) 46 (2018): 57-84.

³⁸² Jie-Hyun Lim, “From Hard History to Soft History: Cultural Histories of the Korean Working Class,” *International Labor and Working-Class History* 61 (Spring 2002): 169-172; Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).

³⁸³ Hwang, *Samp’o kanŭn kil*, 167-168.

Left with few options, the two young men visit a nearby blood collection center and walk through what is then to them an unfamiliar and terrifying procedure: having their blood tested, gulping down water in hopes that it will lessen the amount of blood they lose, and finally giving blood. Rather than reassuring himself that the act is insignificant, the narrator's only solace is that life itself is insignificant, so that even an act this degrading is meaningless. Despite his efforts, however, "Once I laid down on the iron cot with a needle stuck in my arm, fear descended and enveloped me. It seemed my life itself would trickle out of my system drop by drop. Somehow I felt deeply wronged."³⁸⁴

When they collect their earnings at the end of the session, Kidong wryly observes that "Dripping is basically the same as whoring. In a pinch, you wanna do it, and when it's done, you regret it." His sentiment clearly echoes previous 1950s anxieties about war-impoverished Korean women selling their blood at medical collection centers and their bodies in brothels.³⁸⁵ A decade removed and in a space that has since become distinctly male in its constitution, however, the parallelism between blood selling and sex work in the 1960s and 1970s had become an expression of blood sellers' own fear of emasculation. Elsewhere, particularly in his work on the experiences of Korean soldiers deployed to Vietnam, Hwang has similarly described the struggle of the postwar generation of dispossessed South Korean men to claim full masculinity. As literature scholar Jin-kyung Lee has observed, the "spectacularization of ethnonational masculinity" in public ceremonies celebrating the deployment and return of South Korean

³⁸⁴ Ibid., 169.

³⁸⁵ See Chapter 3, "Domesticating Blood: Gendered Bloodshed and Blood Donation in Postwar South Korea;" and Yi Soyŏng 이소영, "Yŏsŏng ũi mom kwa nodong, kŭrigo minjujuŭi: 1970-nyŏndae sugi wa sosŏl e tŭrŏnan chŏngdong ũl chungsim ũro" 여성의 몸과 노동, 그리고 민주주의: 1970년대 수기와 소설에 드러난 정동을 중심으로 ("A study on women's bodies, labor, and democracy: on the affects presented in 1970s memoirs and novels"), *Han'guk hyŏndae munhak yŏn'gu* 한국현대문학연구 (*Studies in Modern Korean Literature*) 54 (April 2018): 43-90.

soldiers from Vietnam belied the ways in which soldiers themselves experienced emasculation in the field as an especially degrading aspect of their “classed and racial surrogacy.”³⁸⁶ In “Neighbors,” Hwang’s narrator similarly experiences the “sheer corporealization” of lower-class young men as dehumanizing them to the status of animals.³⁸⁷ But it is this charge of a gendered reduction from a position of minimum maleness—if nothing else—to no better than a “whoring” woman that strikes the most damning note in the story. It is clear that to the narrator, Kidong, and Hwang himself, the threat of feminization is the worst status reduction of all.³⁸⁸

As with Yi Hyönsu, the narrator soon finds himself drawn deeper into a cyclical reliance on blood selling even as it drains his capacity to perform physical labor. He becomes, as the “underworld” parlance puts it, a “dripping addict.”³⁸⁹ Reversing the expected logics of addiction, in which biological dependence on a foreign substance injected into the body exacerbates economic desperation, “dripping addicts” are driven to release biological substances from their bodies to feed the “habit” of financially supporting their needs for basic survival. The addiction to injecting intravenous drugs, which Hwang’s veteran narrator may have encountered in Vietnam, and the addiction to blood selling he falls into in Seoul share a surface presentation that invites the description of blood sellers as “addicts”: the medium of the needle, ritual of flicking

³⁸⁶ Lee, *Service Economies*, 37-77.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 49.

³⁸⁸ Hwang Kungmyöng 황국명, “Hwang Sökyöng sosöl e nat’anan yösöng iju wa honjong insik üi munje: “Simch’öng, yönggot üi kil” üi chungsim üro” 황석영 소설에 나타난 여성이주와 혼종 인식의 문제: “심청, 연꽃의 길”을 중심으로 (“The issue of the perception of women migrants and hybridity in Hwang Sökyöng’s “Simch’öng, the lotus road”), *Han’guk munhak nonch’ong* 한국문학논총 (*Korean Literature Collection*) 58 (2011): 319-346.

³⁸⁹ Hwang, *Samp’o kanün kil*, 169.

veins to life, and vain attempts to conceal bruised and hardened sites of overuse.³⁹⁰ But whereas for drug addicts relief from socio-economic distress flowed into their veins, for blood sellers the relief came in the form of payment after their veins had been emptied. In highlighting this contrast, the terminology of addiction itself wryly underscored the deeper commonality between drug addicts and dripping addicts—both driven to a bare biological existence by economic precarity and social marginalization.³⁹¹

Relegated to the bottom rung of South Korean society, the blood selling underworld developed its own ordered hierarchy of “bosses” and “drips” as well, and Hwang’s narrator soon descends to the lowest level of “drips”—a ghost. When he can no longer give blood at legitimate institutions, he falls in with a *tebbang* gangster who introduces him to so-called “secret clinics”—unlicensed middlemen without screening procedures or donation limits. Eventually, when the narrator has grown so anemic that even the gangster is reluctant to market his blood, he is offered a final golden ticket in the form of a private commission from a wealthy old man. For his final experience selling blood, he visits the residence of “the chairman” on Namsan mountain, going “not to the hospital, but into a residential neighborhood.”³⁹² There, within a villa

³⁹⁰ Jeremy Kuzmarov, *The Myth of the Addicted Army: Vietnam and the Modern War on Drugs* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009).

³⁹¹ For a general anthropology of the social construction of addiction, see Eugene Raikhel and William Garriott, eds., *Addiction Trajectories* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2013). There is little work on addiction in modern East Asian history, one of the few monograph exceptions is Frank Dikötter, Lars Peter Laamann, and Xun Zhou, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China* (London: C. Hurst, 2004). For a brief overview of the treatment of different kinds of addiction as a physical malady and social disease in Korea, see Kang Chunman 강준만, “Han’guk mayak ūi yöksa: woe Han’guk ün ‘mayak ch’öngjöngguk’ in’ga” 한국 마약의 역사: 왜 한국은 ‘마약 청정국’인가 (“History of Drugs in Korea: Why is Korea a ‘Drug Free Country’?”), *Inmul kwa sasang* 인물과사상 (*People and Ideas*), 126 (October 2008): 169-206; and Cho, Seok Yeon 조석연, “Haebang ihu ūi mayak munje wa sahoejök insik: haebang kwa chöngbu surip ch’ogi chungsim ūro” 해방 이후의 마약문제와 사회적 인식: 해방과 정부수립 초기를 중심으로 (“The narcotics problems after the liberation of Korea and social awareness: Liberation and the early establishment of government”), *Sahak yön’gu* 사학연구 (*The Review of Korean History*) 108 (December 2012): 301-342.

³⁹² Hwang, *Samp’o kanün kil*, 172.

flanked by a “walled private garden, bigger than the commons at the mouth of my village back home,” he is escorted to a full dinner—described as fattening the pig for slaughter—by a woman hired from the hospital for the occasion.³⁹³ Once he has eaten, the narrator is taken to a room where private nurses draw an alarming 400cc of his dangerously depleted blood for their purported restorative effects on the older gentleman, who never speaks directly to or acknowledges the narrator.

“I realized, I knew that I was expected to give my blood to someone in the house. There’s nothing money can’t buy, they say, but I suppose what this buyer did for me was at least done courteously, considering that he was about to buy the blood of his fellow man. Guided by the woman, I entered another room where, as expected, I found a wizened old man lying on the floor in his pajamas. As I stood in the corner of the room, the woman shook the man awake from his sleep, saying something about restorative treatment. ...The old man looked at me vacantly but didn’t say a word. I laid myself down next to him. A needle pierced my arm, and then I closed my eyes.

I kept on clenching my fist. Each time I opened my hand, I heard the faint sound of my blood being sucked out, like kerosene dripping from a can into a stove. *Jjol jjol jjororok*. ...After I made a fist about forty times, the volume reached 400 cc. My mouth tasted as if it were coated with rust, and my tongue was terribly dry. The needle rig was removed. I tried to rise but stumbled at the door and fell down.³⁹⁴

Compared to Yi Kŭnyŏng’s story of another home transfusion in “The Third Slave,” written to assuage the public’s concerns about a novel medical procedure, Hwang’s portrait of home transfusion seems almost to confirm that the worst fears of 1930s Korea had been realized in 1970s South Korea.³⁹⁵ In Yi’s portrait of transfusion, the home setting assures readers of the physical safety of the procedure, while promising that sharing blood can remain a family affair

³⁹³ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 172-173.

³⁹⁵ Yi Kŭnyŏng 이근영, “Che-sam noye 88-89” 第三奴隸 88-89 (“The Third Slave 88-89”), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 (*Tonga Daily*), June 17-18, 1938.

that will strengthen the traditional bonds of Korean society. Moreover, by featuring a young woman giving her blood to save a male relative, “The Third Slave” reinforces longstanding narratives, like the tale of Simch’ŏng and the story of Non’gae, that celebrate female physical sacrifice for the good of the family and the national community.³⁹⁶ By contrast, Hwang’s description of residential blood transfusion shatters the home’s aura of reassuring safety. Here, the home is not a communal space but an expression of the power differential between blood giver and blood receiver, “that shameless old rich man who wouldn’t die but instead consumed fellow humans like medicine.”³⁹⁷ The blood exchanged is no longer a gift that is shared to further consolidate preexisting bonds but a commodity, bought and sold by anonymous agents without personal connections or community incentives. Furthermore, the breakdown in social commitments portrayed is only further exacerbated by the reversal in domestic gender roles. In “Neighbors,” Hwang presents his readers not with an expected formula of a young woman’s sacrifice for the familial community, but instead with the distorted social inversion of a young man’s exploitation by an impassive representative of the rarified strata of South Korea’s economically privileged, socially elite, and politically powerful.³⁹⁸

It is at this point, where the original *Asean* article reporting concludes, that Hwang continues the narrative. The narrator’s paycheck for the home transfusion is substantial comparative to his previous compensations from clinics, but he is so physically drained by the

³⁹⁶ Kim, Elaine H. and Chungmoo Choi, eds. *Dangerous Women: Gender and Korean Nationalism*. New York: Routledge, 1998; and Pae Yongyi 배용이, *Han’guk yŏksa sok ūi yŏsŏngdŭl* 한국 역사 속의 여성들 (*Women in Korean History*) (Seoul: Ewha Womans University Press, 2009).

³⁹⁷ Hwang, *Samp’o kanŭn kil*, 176.

³⁹⁸ On the national character and transnational constitution of Korean masculinity, see Nadia Y. Kim, ““Patriarchy is So Third World”: Korean Immigrant Women and “Migrating” White Western Masculinity,” *Social Problems* 53, no. 4 (November 2006): 519-536.

experience that he falls into a state of physical numbness and semi-giddy mental exhaustion. Emboldened by the cash in his pocket and the agency it temporarily imparts to him, he gets “drunk as a skunk” and, “thanks to a sudden surge of bloodthirstiness,” buys a ten-inch butcher’s knife, thinking to himself, “Whoever you are, come on, I’ll slice you up into ribbons without thinking twice.”³⁹⁹ In this announcement of the violent intention to defend himself, the narrator feels “a pride not unlike that I felt in the past as a soldier at war,” and alongside this sexual desire. As he bought the knife to reclaim his personhood, he buys a girl to reclaim his masculinity, but finds himself unable to rise to the occasion: “After being treated like a nobody, all I could do was sleep the whole night through with her. Now and then I groped for her in my sleep, but at last the bitch slipped out for a side job and never reappeared. Cheap whore, no doubt about that, but even bitches like that don’t regard a man like me as a human being.”⁴⁰⁰

After his failed attempt to sexually reassert himself, the narrator realizes his big payday was only enough for one day of celebration. He wanders the streets of Seoul fingering the knife he purchased the previous night with a rising desire to strike out, but without any “idea of whom I should stab to get rid of the suffocating feeling in my heart.”⁴⁰¹ Finally, his wanderings lead him to a Bongch’ŏn-dong brothel, where he spends a night forging an emotional connection with a girl, but awakens to find that she or one of her peers has stolen from him. In the ensuing conflict, the house bouncer approaches the narrator and, in a moment of eerily disembodied calm, “I stabbed him hard and deep...almost thrilled to have found somebody to stab.”⁴⁰²

³⁹⁹ Hwang, *Samp’o kanŭn kil*, 174.

⁴⁰⁰ Hwang, *Samp’o kanŭn kil*, 175.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 177.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, 180.

Returning from the depths of his story to the police interrogation room, the narrator-cum-Hwang reflects that the murder was not an act of personal animus, but rather an impotent lashing out at the faceless, omnipresent forces that insistently disenfranchised, weaponized, and broke down young men like him.

I mean, it's really absurd, isn't it? The guy wasn't different from me in any way. What I'm saying is, I simply can't understand how I...after putting up with so much in the war, at home in the country, and on all the lousy jobs in Seoul, and after selling blood at the hospital...why couldn't I put up with him? ...“Must you, too?”—perhaps that was what I was thinking at that moment. For I had been carrying the knife around with no notion where the blade should be aimed. There's no doubt the bastard was killed by me, but I'm not so sure that it was me who actually killed him.⁴⁰³

“Neighbors” sought to shed a light on the broader material conditions of socio-economic exploitation involved in the “blood selling problem (*maehyöl munje*).” Hwang’s conclusion foreclosed the avenue for escape hoped for in the *Asean* exposé by instead describing private solicitors as yet another arm in a comprehensive disciplinary system that affirmed the “proletarianized body” only as “an assemblage of body parts—arms, legs, eyes, fingertips, backs, and sexual organs—that operate as surrogate laboring bodies and body parts.”⁴⁰⁴ Adding blood to this fractionated refister, Hwang’s narrative insists that readers understand the “problem” of blood markets as a symptom of the dispossession of the formative generation of South Korean youth by an authoritarian development agenda that literally sucked vulnerable bodies dry. In the 1970s, medical administrators and political policymakers alike agreed that the blood markets were no longer an ideal answer to Korea’s blood supply needs. While to Hwang the issue of

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*, 180-181.

⁴⁰⁴ Lee, *Service Economies*, 58.

blood selling clearly called for top-down reform of the conditions that made certain populations particularly vulnerable to medical predation, however, hospital administrators and Park administration officials instead called for a cleanup campaign to consolidate the state's authority over blood collection in disciplinary institutions.

Blood and Duty: Disciplining Blood Donation

As Park administration consolidated political control and the means to impose broader social discipline in the 1970s, blood markets became a target for policymakers. Throughout the preceding decade, the unregulated character of the blood market and the unreliability of the blood quality acquired through it had incited repeated warnings from serological specialists and medical professionals alike about the dangers of the quantitative and qualitative insufficiency of the national blood store. The pathologist Yi Samyöl, who assumed control over the Department of Emergency Medicine at Yonsei University's Severance Hospital following his return from the United States in 1958, deplored the national reliance on blood sales to supply transfusion stores. Yi conveyed his concerns about the blood market to national press outlets in his capacities as a serological specialist with extensive training in American blood banking and transfusion technologies and an ethno-nationalist concerned with ensuring the "independence of Korean blood transfusion" and maintaining the "racial purity" of bloods stored and exchanged in Korea.⁴⁰⁵ Yi's cautions were notably echoed by Wön Chongtök, the acting director of the Korean Red Cross Center, who warned that through South Korea's reliance on a national blood supply cobbled together from "undesirable" domestic sellers and supplemental foreign aid, the "pure

⁴⁰⁵ Yi Samyöl 이삼열, "Kajok konghyöl undong ül chech'anghamyönsö" 가족 공혈운동을 제창하면서 (Announcement regarding the family blood donation movement), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보, May 4, 1965; for an extensive exploration of Yi's serological anthropology, see Hyön Jaehwan.

blood” of the purportedly homogeneous Korean ethno-nation would be diluted through the transfusion of compromised bloods.⁴⁰⁶

To these reformers, consolidating the management of Korean blood under a centralized control system was not just a matter of preserving the ethnic purity of Korea’s medical blood supply. It was also a matter of national security. As early as 1960, just before the April Uprising, Yi Samyöl warned ROK intelligence agents that the continued growth of the blood markets undermined not only South Korea’s medical health and racial integrity, but also provided fodder for North Korean propagandists keen to highlight the exploitation of “the people.” According to one anecdote, a general from the South Korean Counterintelligence Department approached Yi after intercepting a Pyongyang broadcast charging that, "Severance Hospital, an agent of American imperialism, is taking the blood from starving, edema-ridden factory and farm workers for pennies and fat cats are using this blood as a restorative." When the General asked Yi what this was all about, the doctor bluntly replied, "That is the fact of it," and proceeded to tour the General through Severance’s wards of blood sellers to make the point that "Pyongyang’s accusations are not a lie."⁴⁰⁷

Blood center medical employees and administrative staff added their voices to these calls by directors and media outlets. As blood markets grew unabatedly in the two decades after the Korean War, doctors and scientists had been consistently advocating for legislation to regulate blood collection and oversight. Those employed at blood centers, in particular, appealed to legislators with horror stories of sneaking blood sellers out the back door of hospitals into vans

⁴⁰⁶ *Tonga ilbo*, May 2, 1963.

⁴⁰⁷ Kim Kihong, Yi Samyöl, and Kang Tükyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han 'guk hönhyöl undongsa 한국헌혈운동사 (History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea)* (P’aju-si: Nanam sinsö, 1990), 59.

with covered windows and secreting them to offsite facilities to guarantee the safety of blood sellers and blood center employees from interference or intimidation by the gangs of bosses.⁴⁰⁸

In 1970s, the National Assembly responded with the inaugural South Korean Blood Administration Law, with the express intention of “Guaranteeing blood purity and optimal administration.”⁴⁰⁹ Without enforcement mechanisms in place, however, the law alone proved little use in curtailing excesses of the black market underworld. Consequently, medical advocates and military authorities set out on a program to disassemble Korean reliance on blood sales by destigmatizing blood donation and transposing it from the realm of anarchic social undesirables to hyper-disciplined national subjects in schools and military units.

Reporter Yi Tonggyu perfectly captured the reforming spirit turned toward blood in the 1970s when he concluded his article by calling for making blood donation compulsory for active-duty military personnel and recommending the acculturation of blood donation to celebrate college admissions and graduations. “How,” he asked, “can national soldiers who cannot donate blood lay down their lives to protect the national land? How can students who cannot donate blood become the central workforce in the modernization of the fatherland? How can politicians, religious leaders, and social enterprise leaders who cannot donate blood speak of love of country or love of our race?”⁴¹⁰

In 1972 the Park Chung Hee administration, which had taken over the South Korean government in a 1961 military coup, instituted the Yusin constitution. Under Yusin, the semi-democratic pretenses that had marked the first decade of the administration fell away in favor of

⁴⁰⁸ “Hūphyōlgwi” 흡혈귀 (Vampire), *Sintonga* 신동아 July 1978.

⁴⁰⁹ Statute 2229, “Blood Administration Law,” Introduced August 7, 1970; Enforced November 8, 1970. <https://law.go.kr/LSW/lsRvsRsnListP.do?lsId=001784&chrClsCd=010102>.

⁴¹⁰ Yi 1969.

direct dictatorial governance. Yusin enabled the state to encroach on the minutiae of everyday life, intervening in particular in the intertwined projects of public health, nationalist education, and moral suasion.

The sustained criticisms of the blood provision and administration system that had marked the preceding two decades gave the Park regime an opening to extend its control over the Korean population not only into Korean homes, but directly into their bodies. Moreover, the military foundations of the blood management system in the Korean War meant that administration officials and health planners involved in the reforms already had close connections—both explicit and implicit.⁴¹¹ The Park regime’s reform efforts not only aimed to “clean up” the real health risks and imagined social dirtiness posed by impoverished and unregulated blood sellers, but also pushed those reforms beyond disciplining the blood of “social undesirables” into monitoring the blood of “normal” Koreans in everyday disciplinary spaces like schools, the military, and places of employment.⁴¹²

Publicity initiatives by well-known members of the Park administration and family as well as trusted organizations like the Red Cross contributed to a concerted effort to rebrand blood as a shared national property, the black market as a threat to that communal store, and blood donation as a patriotic duty. On March 6, 1971, President Park Chung Hee donated a blood mobile to the Korean Red Cross. The blood mobile’s first outing, two days later, was to visit the 5305 Air Force at Osan base in Kyönggi Province, where over 160 enlisted servicemen donated

⁴¹¹ Choi Ŭnkyöng 최은경, “1950-60-nyöndae ūiryo chönmun’ga ūi tongwön kwa chingbyöng kömsa ūi surip” 1950-60 년대 의료 전문가의 동원과 징병검사의 수립 (Mobilization of medical professionals and establishment of physical standards for conscription in 1950s-60s South Korea), *Inmun kwahak yön ’gu nonch ’ong* 인문과학연구논총 (*The journal of humanities*) 36 no. 4 (2015), 237.

⁴¹² Taehan chöksipjasa [Korean Red Cross], *Han ’guk hönhyöl undong 100-nyön [100-year history of the Korean blood donation movement]* (Seoul: 2006).

blood in a press event that kicked off a government campaign targeting soldiers and students with the slogan “Blood donation is an act on behalf of yourself, your family, and our nation.”⁴¹³ Bolstered by Park’s support, the Red Cross directly attacked the practice of blood selling that it had relied on for the past two decades, boldly issuing a statement that it would reject all blood sales and meet its demands entirely through donated blood (a goal that, as it turns out, took the better part of the next decade to begin to realize).⁴¹⁴

While Park’s collaboration with the Red Cross focused on mobilizing soldiers and students, his wife Yuk Yöngsu partnered with the organization to change the broader social perception of blood donation. A month after her husband’s blood mobile donation, the beloved “mother of the nation”—perceived as a tempering influence against Park’s more austere tendencies—participated in a Red Cross blood drive, registering as a donor and giving her blood in a public display of support for voluntary donation.⁴¹⁵ The First Lady joined several other Red Cross donation campaigns in the years leading up to her untimely death, throwing her softening support behind her husband’s hardline policies.⁴¹⁶

First Lady Yuk’s feminine sales pitch was quickly adopted by the Red Cross Women’s Welfare Advisory Committee, which began to develop and distribute promotional materials like posters, informational pamphlets, and even films in the early 1970s. The women’s campaign

⁴¹³ “Pak Taet’ongnyöng hanjök e idong ch’ahyölch’a kijüng” 朴大統領 韓赤에 移動採血車 기증 (President Park donates blood mobile to Korean Red Cross), *Tonga ilbo* 동아일보 March 6, 1971.

⁴¹⁴ “Taehan chöksipjasa e idong ch’ahyölch’a kijüng,” *Kyöngnyang sinmun* March 6, 1971.

⁴¹⁵ “Yuk Yöngsu yösa hönhyöl chöksipja hyölaekwön e” 陸英修여사獻血 赤十字血液院에 (First Lady Yuk Yöngsu donates blood at Red Cross Blood Center) *Chosön ilbo* 조선일보, April 15, 1971; “Yuk yösa hönhyöl, adong pyöngwön e kijüng” 陸여사 獻血, 아동병원에 기증 (First Lady Yuk gives blood, donates to Adong Hospital), *Kyöngnyang Sinmun* 경향신문, April 15, 1971.

⁴¹⁶ Red Cross 2006, 488.

relied on catchy slogans and broad distribution, from the 1970 poster slogan “We all donate blood,” to tens of thousands of promotional leaflets to the 1973 film “Blood is the lamp of love,” which was screened for women and children across the country.⁴¹⁷ In the gendered contrast between President Park’s pitch to young men about national duty and First Lady Yuk’s message to women about familial duty, we can see not only persistent gendered divisions in society and public marketing. Beyond a hit-all-targets strategy, it also shows the dual ambitions of the state’s investment in blood reform—to institutionalize blood administration in disciplinary spaces like the school and military, while also normalizing the extensive reach of state solicitation into individual Korean bodies as a social norm. While Park cracked down on social degenerates in blood markets and expanded the reach of blood surveillance beyond hospital ghettos, Yuk compelled comfortable Korean classes to re-consider blood donation as a humanitarian service and patriotic duty, and the state’s sampling of children’s blood in schools a form of benign familial oversight.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid. See also Pak Chint’ak 박진택, *Sarang ūi hŏnhyŏl undongsa* 사랑의 헌혈 운동사 (History of the Loving Blood Donation Movement) (Sŏul: Parŭn’gil, 2001).



Figure 5.3. First Lady Yuk Yongsu participating in the 1971 Red Cross Blood Drive.

These early 1970s campaigns did achieve an impressively significant increase in the number of blood donors: the number of blood donors in 1971 represented a 410% increase from the annual average from the preceding decade. At only 2,522 donors, however, that increase number remained a far cry from the hundreds of thousands of donors needed to fill the yearly needs of the Korean medical establishment.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁸ Red Cross 2006, 492.

The highly publicized deaths of two hospital transfusion recipients in November 1974 gave the Park administration, in collaboration with the Red Cross and the extended Korean medical establishment, precisely the platform it needed to crack down on the black market and spread blood collection firmly into army bases and school campuses.⁴¹⁹ The National Assembly promptly passed a list of amendments to the previous Blood Administration Law, instituting a tight registration system for all blood transactions. The system tied individuals to a catalogue of their blood's qualities as well as their own identifying details (name, age, gender, occupation, etc.) and coordinated permissions through an extensive network of jurisdictions delegated from the Minister of Health down through local mayors.⁴²⁰ The centralization of blood administration authority was enthusiastically welcomed by blood donation advocates like Kim Kihong, who campaigning for a government-medical coordination to regulate Korean blood for years. In a 1962 *Ŭisa sibŏ* article, he had written, "At this time, when it's not uncommon for people to show suspicion and mistrust for both advertisements for blood exams, viral exams, and the blood center (which are spilling into the streets) and the ignorant gangsters who bring in bottles of blood and blood sellers, it would be a great thing to have the president secure pathology labs' position by law."⁴²¹ Meanwhile, an enthusiastic Red Cross campaign from the mid-1970s on was conducted across regular radio and television programming in cooperation with the Ministries of Defense and Education to reach the primary target audiences of soldiers and students and

⁴¹⁹ Kim Kihong, Yi Samyŏl, and Kang Tŭkyong 김기홍, 이삼열, 강득용, *Han'guk hŏnhyŏl undongsa* 한국헌혈운동사 (*History of the Blood Donation Movement in Korea*) (P'aju-si: Nanam sinsŏ, 1990).

⁴²⁰ Red Cross 2006, 490.

⁴²¹ *Ŭisa sibŏ*, April 9, 1962.

inculcate into them an association between blood and national duty.⁴²² Sure enough, by the end of the decade (and the end of Yusin in 1979 with the assassination of Park), soldiers and students accounted for the majority of blood donations.⁴²³ They have continued to do so through the present day, when blood donation culture is a normalized and ubiquitous part of Korean culture with Red Cross collection centers clustered near every college campus and military base.




Figure 5.4. Dr. Yi Samyöl’s Blood Donor Registration Card.

⁴²² Kim Kihong 김기홍, “Hönyöi kwa hakkyo pogön” 獻血과 學校保健 (Blood donation and school health), *Hakkyo pogön (Han’guk hakkyo pogön hyöphoe)* 학교보건 (한국학교보건협회) (School health (Korean school health society)) 2 (1976).

⁴²³ Red Cross 2006, 854.

Chapter 6

Conclusion: “Blood Independence” and Bio-Nationalism

She takes the needle with its empty body to the skin. Stain from within dispel in drops in spills. She pulls out the needle and the skin lifts.

Should it appear should it happen to appear all of a sudden, suddenly, begin to over flow flood should it happen to.

Something that resembles the stain from the interior emptied into emptied upon this boundary this surface. More. Others. When possible ever possible to puncture to scratch to imprint. Expel. Ne te cache pas. Révéle toi. Sang. Encre. Of its body's extension of its containment.

—Theresa Hak Kyung Cha, *Dictée*

Change and Continuity

In South Korea today, the blood-based ideology of homogenous national identity contends with an array of challenges. “Foreigners,” once a rare sight, have become a fixture in daily life, mixed-race birthrates are on the rise, and a global diaspora threatens to transform “Korean-ness” from a category to a matter of degree.⁴²⁴ Responses to these developments vacillate between critiques against the anachronism of Korean homogeneity in a globalized world on the one hand, and protective insistence that the South Korean state must remain

⁴²⁴ Recently, the opening ceremony for the Pyeongchang 2018 Winter Olympics tellingly underscored the paradoxical South Korean embrace and rejection of national integration into a cosmopolitan capitalist world order. In video-montage and live-performance, the ceremony in part demonstrated how foreign spending power is both celebrated as part of the future-oriented “Miracle on the Han” narrative and limned into an urban-scape segregated from an essentialized Korean antiquity. See Sophie Gilbert, “The Quiet Modernism of Pyeongchang’s Opening Ceremony,” *The Atlantic* February 9, 2018: <https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/02/pyeongchang-opening-ceremony-olympics-2018/552902/>. For background on the centrality of corporate-state relations to colonial Korean and postcolonial South Korean development, see Carter J. Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991); and Jung-en Woo (Meredith Woo-Cumings, *Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

predicated on the Korean ethno-nation on the other. Korean literature scholar Jin Kyung Lee aptly qualifies these positions respectively as “Pan-Asianism” and “Pan-Koreanism,” contending that the cultural definition of the former and the ethnic definition of the latter allow Korean identity to straddle the contradictory demands of state citizenship and national subjectivity.⁴²⁵ Moreover, this balancing act is far from limited to South Korea. In recent years, disputes over whether the pillar of the modern nation-state is properly a state-citizen or a national-subject have roiled the world-over, as attested to by the reemergence of the eugenicist Nazi slogan “Blood and soil” in British and American identity politics.⁴²⁶

Conviction in the significance of Korean blood as a determinant of national identity has demonstrated endurance in the face of significant change since the Cold War. In 2021, I introduced my “Modern Korean History” class at the University of California, San Diego with the opening question, “What does “Korean” mean?” As they considered the question, students were encouraged to think about related issues, such as what makes someone or something Korean, if it is possible to become—or conversely un-become—Korean, and whether Koreanness is an absolute category or a matter of degree. Most of the students enrolled in the course were neither Korean citizens nor ethnically or culturally Korean and had therefore been raised outside the self-referential narrative of homogenous identity within South Korea.

⁴²⁵ Jin-kyung Lee, *Service Economies: Militarism, Sex Work and Migrant Labor in South Korea* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 20-21.

⁴²⁶ On the recent upsurge in populist nationalism in the West, see Wendy Brown, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution* (New York: Zone Books, 2015); Michael Ugorji, “BREXIT, Trumpism and the Agency of Populism in Contemporary Political Communication,” *Journal of Mass Communication & Journalism* Vol. 8, Iss. 1 (2018), 355-340 and Ronald F. Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Harvard Kennedy School (August 2016). On the global dimensions (how Anglo-American populist nationalism acts on and is acted upon by non-Western forces) of these socio-political trends, see Benjamin Wallace-Wells, “Trump’s Populism is Not Just a Western Phenomenon,” *The New Yorker* (16 November 2016) and Collin Crouch, “Globalization, Nationalism and the Changing Axes of Political Identity,” in *Brexit: Sociological Responses* (Anthem Press, 2017).

Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of responses identified blood as the core, in recorded responses like:

Korean can be used to identify people with specific biological blood ties to Korea.

Korean is someone who was born in Korea and have the same blood as their ancestors who was [*sic*] also born in Korea.

Someone who has Korean ancestry and Korean blood. Regardless of the exterior culture they may have been raised in.

Someone who identifies with Korean culture but also must has [*sic*] ties to the homeland, history, and blood.

What makes them Korean is the blood and history tied to them.

I think that being Korean is more so dependent on being ethnically Korean. So, being a Korean citizen without being Korean by blood means you are not really Korean.

In regards to blood and lineage you cannot simply un-become Korean, blood is forever.

A Korean is someone of Korean blood.⁴²⁷

Of respondents that did not name blood explicitly, most still identified an inviolable core of ethnic or racial identity that could not be corrupted by geographic distance from the peninsula or unfamiliarity with Korean culture. The students near unanimous conviction in the significance and integrity of Korean blood for Koreanness corresponds with the majority of Korean citizens who agree that Korean society is defined by a unique racial identity and demonstrates the reach of the pure blood narrative well-beyond the confines of the southern peninsula.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁷ Inga Kim Diederich, Padlet discussion board record from “Lecture 1.1. Course Introduction,” *HIEA 150: Modern Korean History, 1800-1845*, January 4, 2021.

⁴²⁸ Timothy Lim, “Who is Korean? Migration, Immigration, and the Challenge of Multiculturalism in Homogenous Societies,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 7, no. 30 (2009): 1-15.

The imperative of Korean blood, as we have seen, developed out of a set of intersecting demands and desires to defend the national body's integrity against threats like ethnic assimilation, racial dilution, territorial division, and global diaspora. One function of shared bloodline was to ensure that the Korean race did not disappear, did not become yet another casualty to the obliterating forces of settler colonialism and military imperialism.⁴²⁹ Today, alarmist headlines continue to warn of the impending disappearance of the Korean people.⁴³⁰ But now, the greatest threat of extinction comes from within in the form a plummeting domestic birth rate and consequent demographic change.⁴³¹

As of April 2021, South Korea continues to hold the world's lowest birthrate according to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)—a distinction it first claimed by overtaking Japan in 2020. While birthrates continue to fall, the population is also aging rapidly, exacerbated by South Koreans' unusually high life expectancy (83 years, the eleventh highest in the world) and promising heavy elder care demands on the dwindling youth population in the near future.⁴³² 2020 marked the first recorded instance of a decline total population count in South Korean history, prompting panicked outcries about “the last Koreans.”⁴³³ In the face this demographic

⁴²⁹ Henry Em, *The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2013).

⁴³⁰ Cheryl Teh, “These are the last children left on this South Korean island, a symptom of the country's demographic crisis,” *Insider*, March 24, 2021; Rick Gladstone, “As Birthrate Falls, South Korea's Population Declines, Posing Threat to Economy,” *New York Times*, January 4, 2021; Yu Pyŏnghun 유병훈, “IMF ‘Han’guk, puch’ae pudam p’okbal kyŏnggyehaeya...in’gu kamsŏ sok koryŏnghwa chingmyŏn” IMF “한국, 부채 부담 폭발 경계해야...인구감소 속 고령화 직면 (“IMF reports ‘Korea must guard against its exploding debt burden...confronting aging amid population decline”), *Chosŏn Pijŭ* 조선비즈 (*Chosŏn business*), April 14, 2021.

⁴³¹ Elizabeth Harvey Stephen, *South Korea's Demographic Dividend: Echoes of the Past or Prologue to the Future?* (New York and London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019); Sam Hyun Yoo and Tomáš Sobotka, “Ultra-low fertility in South Korea: The role of the tempo effect,” *Demographic Research* 38, no. 22 (2018): 549-576.

⁴³² “Korea marks world's lowest birthrate: UN report,” *The Korea Times*, April 14, 2021.

⁴³³ Jiyeun Lee and Sam Kim, “South Korea's Population Falls for First Time During Pandemic,” *Bloomberg News*, January 4, 2021.

“crisis,” Korea has several options, including: (1) To incentivize higher reproduction within the domestic population; (2) Encourage the return migration of co-ethnic diaspora populations; or (3) Adopt an immigration and naturalization model to supplement the declining domestic population. At the heart of this course determination is the fundamental concern with what it means to save “Korea.” Is the priority on preserving the state? Adapting the culture? Or maintaining the bionational integrity of the Korean *minjok*? How will the dynamic vehicle of blood, which has legislated the distance between state and national subjecthood in the twentieth century, meet the demands of the twenty-first?

One of the aims of this study has been to undercut this divide between state citizenship and national subjecthood by demonstrating how the potent vehicle of blood – imbued with scientific certainty and symbolic valence in equal measure –historically worked to smooth the incommensurate edges between citizenship and subjecthood in Cold War South Korea.⁴³⁴ Identifying and exploring the twinned imperatives of blood independence and blood purity reveals how Cold War South Korean political, professional, and cultural regimes produced a form of medicalized politics to consolidate the nation-state into a tight “pure-blood” familial unit through the scientific exclusion of potential blood-pollutants. By analyzing blood’s exclusionary utility in gendering, racializing, and classing subsets of the population, as well as its potential for reconfiguration towards claims to inclusion, we can arrive at a historically grounded understanding of the ways in which South Korean national identity has been a negotiation between all social sectors from the start. Prior research has touched on South Korean blood

⁴³⁴ This claim is predicated on my concurrence with Gil Anidjar’s assertion that – in spite of a physical materiality that should render it non-conceptual and a-political nature – blood is nonetheless a political concept. Gil Anidjar, “Blood” in *Political Concepts: A Critical Lexicon*, eds. J.M. Bernstein, Adi Ophir, and Ann Laura Stoler (New York: Fordham University, 2018), 25-44.

projects in the areas of gender, race, and class separately, but this study has argued that these areas must be considered together. Only by doing so can we see how these bloodlines constituted a common continuum of blood as a political concept crucial to conditioning a governable South Korean subject. Far from expressing either the government's power to impose a homogenous subject or the efficacy of resistant efforts to claim a diverse citizenship, this history reveals that the single constant in "Korean-ness" has been its reliance on contingency, compromise, and concession from all interested parties.

In order to attend to not only how a hegemonic blood-based nationalism was imposed from above but also how it was negotiated from below, my analysis of key areas of blood regulation has been organized around events that provoked broad public debate and discussion. I thus approach the Cold War hegemony of blood as a historical bloc in the making of South Korean identity.⁴³⁵ At the private-professional level, this negotiation is demonstrated in how government-medical collusion in the areas of reproduction, sexuality, race, and class deployed blood tests and treatments to "embody" Korean subjects, and how South Korean scientists in turn redefined a particular strain of "Korean" blood that was reified through political policies and social practices. At the state-subject level (inextricable from the private-professional medical exchanges), this negotiation is seen in the relative balance of demand and concession that characterized the first three decades of authoritarian rule after the Korean War, during which political and professional administrations still had to lobby the public for a lease on authority.

⁴³⁵ My understanding of "historical bloc" is informed by Stuart Hall's interpretation of Antonio Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony. I am especially compelled by Hall's reminder that "Hegemony is not a state of grace which is installed forever. It's not a formation which incorporates everybody. The notion of a 'historical bloc' is *precisely different* from that of a pacified, homogeneous, ruling class." Stuart Hall, "Gramsci and Us," *The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left* (London; New York: Verso, 1988); Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, ed. Joseph A Buttigieg; trans. Joseph A. Buttigieg and Antonio Callari (New York: Columbia University Press, [1992-2007]).

The balance of power and authority with regard to the biological regulation of Korean identity remains tipped between maintaining the “timeless” adherence to preserving Korean blood and approaching an understanding of Korean identity adapted to demographic demands. However, in contrast to alarmist reporting about the impending erasure of the Korean race and the inevitable “progress” of South Korean society to an enlightened (i.e., Western) multicultural standard of deracialized citizenship, the record of blood identity in Korea cautions against assuming the displacement of blood-based identity in the near future.⁴³⁶ Responses to the specter of demographic change in decades since democratization have consistently shown an adherence to blood-based identity in some form, as seen in the much-touted “multiculturalism (*tamunhwa*)” campaigns of the past two decades.

This movement, focused on the foreign brides of Korean men in rural areas and their “Kosian” (Korean + Asian) or “Onnurian” mixed-race children, advocates social acceptance of these parties as “Another kind of Korean (*To hana han ’guk ’in*).”⁴³⁷ While acknowledging the goodwill efforts of activists to curtail rampant physical and emotional abuse of foreign brides and mixed-race children in workplaces, schools, and within the home, it is also necessary to recognize the material conditions that occasioned the movement. The importation of foreign brides into Korea is a response to the emptying out of the countryside, as industry concentrates employment opportunities in metropolitan areas forcing the urbanization of young people, in

⁴³⁶ EuyRyung Jun, ““We have to transform ourselves first”: The ethics of liberal developmentalism and multicultural governance in South Korea,” *Focaal—Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology* 64 (2012): 99-112; Alexej Ulbricht, *Multicultural Immunisation: Liberalism and Esposito* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015); Annamari Vitikainen, *The Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism: Towards an Individuated Approach to Cultural Diversity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

⁴³⁷ “Kosian” is considered a racial slur today and has been replaced by other more palatable but lengthy and awkward terms. Mary Lee, “Mixed Race Peoples in the Korean National Imaginary and Family,” *Korean Studies* 32 (2008): 56-85; Darcie Draudt, “South Korea’s National Identity Crisis in the Face of Emerging Multiculturalism,” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 17, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2016): 12-19.

particular. Foreign brides thus meet a pressing rural need: to acquire women with whom male farmers can reproduce a new agricultural labor force.⁴³⁸ Unlike the previous generation of “Amerasians,” who served no labor function outside the camptowns where many became “slinky boys” or “Western princesses,” the present generation of “Kosians” exists for a specific productive function.⁴³⁹ They are designed to be a new class of rural workers—perhaps not “full blood” Koreans, but preferable, at least, to the fully foreign force of migrant workers that have otherwise filled the labor-force gap in South Korean fields.⁴⁴⁰ Seen in this light, the “multicultural” acceptance campaign is less a celebration of diversity and more an expression of racial wedge politics ranking minority groups and pitting them against each other.⁴⁴¹

In the same vein, in response to Korea’s current “demographic crisis,” multiple government administrations have increasingly turned to incentivizing ethnic Koreans abroad to return to the country. Indeed, the policy has emerged as one of the few constants between liberal and conservative administrations, making blood a rare bipartisan commitment. The invention of the F4 visa, a special visa category for Korean “co-ethnics abroad (*chaeoe tongp’o*),” is designed to incentivize the return of those with Korean heritage by imparting privileges such as a five-year visa period, a special “Overseas Korean Resident Card” during their stay that is distinguished

⁴³⁸ Sealing Cheng, *On the Move for Love: Migrant Entertainers and the U.S. Military in South Korea* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010); Jinsook Kim, “Rumors, Hatred, and the Politics of Multiculturalism: Unpacking Rumors About Jasmine Lee,” *Communication, Culture & Critique* (2017): 1-15.

⁴³⁹ Susie Woo, *Framed by War: Korean Children and Women at the Crossroads of US Empire* (New York: New York University Press, 2019), 148-173; Margo Okazawa-Rey, “Amerasian Children of GI Town: A Legacy of U.S. Militarism in South Korea,” *Asian Journal of Women’s Studies* 3, no. 1 (2016): 71-102.

⁴⁴⁰ Andrew Eungi Kim, “Demography, Migration and Multiculturalism in South Korea,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 7, no. 6 (2009).

⁴⁴¹ Claire Jean Kim, “The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans,” *Politics and Society* 27 (March 1999); Brock Bahler, ed., *The Logic of Racial Practice: Explorations in the Habituation of Racism* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2020).

from the standard “Alien Registration Card” by its duration (two-three years) and tax, property, and employment benefits.⁴⁴² As with efforts to encourage Korean society to accept “Kosian” children as an ethnically acceptable alternative to foreign labor, so to do immigration incentives like the F4 visa respond to the continued decline in Korea’s birthrate and rise in its elder population by creating conditions conducive to young ethnic Koreans abroad to return “home” to fill out that demographic gap. Moreover, what constitutes the category of “co-ethnic” has broadened as the population dips, in recent years expanding to allow those of maternal Korean heritage, rather than limiting “co-ethnicity” to those with a paternal claim.⁴⁴³ Even as it broadens in response to a shrinking peninsular populace, however, the F4 population replacement strategy consolidates the power/identity differential between ethnic Koreans and “non-Korean” foreigners within Korea, as well as creating hierarchies between different iterations of the diaspora. While the F4 system is designed to cater to some diasporas, like second and third generations Korean Americans with access to recent family registries, diaspora populations in non-Western regions like Central Asia and Latin America face ongoing repatriation issues linked to migration histories that predate the upper-middle-class “brain drain” of the 1970s-80s.⁴⁴⁴

Finally, while it has often been noted that the foreign population in Korea has grown every year, the overall percentage remains low compared to other developed countries and the

⁴⁴² Kim Park Nelson, *Invisible Asians: Korean American Adoptees, Asian American Experiences, and Racial Exceptionalism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2015); Consulate General of the Republic of Korea in San Francisco, “F4 Visa”: https://overseas.mofa.go.kr/us-sanfrancisco-en/wpge/m_20623/contents.do.

⁴⁴³ In my personal experience applying for a F4 visa, my application was repeatedly held up because consular staff were unaware that co-ethnicity was no longer confined to paternal descent.

⁴⁴⁴ Il-hyun Baek, “Scattered Koreans turn homeward,” *Joongang Daily*, November 27, 2005; Jeanyoung Lee, *Migration, Ethnicity and Citizenship: Ethnic-Korean Returnees in the Russian Far East*, Transformation & Prospect toward Multiethnic, Multiracial & Multicultural Society: Enhancing Intercultural Communication, Asia Culture Forum, Inha University, 2016.

barriers to naturalization remain high and subject to ongoing and heated debate.⁴⁴⁵ Under COVID conditions, foreigners have been particularly subject to suspicion and heightened state surveillance. When the pandemic broke out, the Seoul district of Itaewŏn—a foreigner heavy center also considered suspect for its gay clubs—was one of the first highly publicized sites of an outbreak of cluster infections.⁴⁴⁶ More recently, Kyŏnggi province ordered all foreigners—meaning those carrying Alien Registration Cards (ARCs), which notably exempts co-ethnic Koreans with F4-visa sponsored Co-ethnic Resident Cards (*kŏsojŭng*) that they must submit to mandatory COVID testing.⁴⁴⁷ The measure was ultimately axed when western expats with powerful ambassadorial representation from the United States, Europe, and Australia protested that they were the victims of racial discrimination and infringement on their bodily autonomy by the Kyŏnggi Province municipal government.⁴⁴⁸ It should be noted, however, that while the outrage of white foreigners killed the bill, they were not its intended targets. Rather, the measure continued the scapegoating of migrant workers that has dominated COVID coverage in Korea

⁴⁴⁵ Jean-Christophe Dumont and Georges Lemaitre, “Counting Immigrants and Expatriates in OECD Countries: A New Perspective,” *OECD Social Employment and Migration Working Papers* 25 (2005).

⁴⁴⁶ Steven Borowiec, “How South Korea’s Nightclub Outbreak Is Shining an Unwelcome Spotlight on the LGBTQ Community,” *TIME*, May 14, 2020; Jake Kwon and Julia Hollingsworth, “Virus outbreak linked to Seoul clubs popular with LGBT community stokes homophobia,” *CNN*, May 13, 2020; Anthony Kuhn, “South Korea’s Health Minister Describes Seoul as a ‘COVID-19 War Zone’,” *NPR*, December 7, 2020.

⁴⁴⁷ Sangmi Cha and Josh Smith, “South Korea Defends Mandatory COVID Testing of Foreign Workers,” *Insurance Journal*, March 18, 2021; Park Chan-kyong, “In South Korea’s Gyeonggi Province, mandatory coronavirus testing for foreigners sparks accusations of racism,” *South China Morning Post*, March 13, 2021; Lee Han-soo, “Mandatory Covid-19 tests on foreign workers trigger racism, human rights disputes,” *Korea Biomedical Review*, March 18, 2021.

⁴⁴⁸ Ko Jun-tae, “Expatriate community displeased with mandatory COVID-19 testing for foreign workers,” *The Korea Herald*, March 18, 2021; Josh Smith and Sangmi Cha, “Seoul ends mandatory coronavirus testing for foreigners after outcry,” *Reuters*, March 19, 2021.

and brought to bear a government authority that it habitually wields with impunity against migrant laborers.⁴⁴⁹

If anything, the demographic change of the past decade and pandemic response of the last year demonstrate not the impending displacement of blood-based Korean identity, but rather its striking endurance and adaptability. The partial acceptance of mixed-race Koreans as labor substitutes, establishment of immigration measures to incentivize the return of co-ethnics, and scapegoating of migrant laborers for endangering public health does not undercut Korean ethnonationalism, but sets into stark relief a doubling down on blood as Korean identity. Further research remains to be done on the late-nineteenth century transformation of blood at the juncture between “traditional” and modern medicine, as well as on the late-twentieth century reconceptualization of Korean blood in response to another global pandemic—the AIDS crisis. The work will continue, so long as Korean blood continues to shape and be shaped by politics, science, and society.

The Stain of Koreanness

Bringing this study full circle, “Blood of the Nation” ends where it began by returning to Theresa Hak Kung Cha, whose artistic exploration of Korean identity was cut short by her rape and murder in 1982, one week after *Dictée* was published.⁴⁵⁰ In the above epigraph Cha describes a blood drawing session, marked by the same clenching and unclenching of the fist and the same visceral response and existential reflection expressed by many of the subjects surveyed

⁴⁴⁹ Timothy C. Lim, *The Road to Multiculturalism in South Korea* (New York: Routledge, 2020); Amnesty International, “Republic of Korea: Briefing to the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” 43rd Session, November 2009; Hakjae Kim, “Migrant Workers in South Korean Society,” in *Democratic Governance in Northeast Asia: A Human-Centered Approach to Evaluating Democracy, Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia*, ed. Brendan Howe (London: Palgrave Pivot, 2015).

⁴⁵⁰ Cathy Park Hong, *Minor Feelings: An Asian American Reckoning* (New York: One World, 2020), 115-135.

in this study. From soldiers in the Korean War and women blood sellers and donors in the postwar years through “mixed blood” Koreans and “drips” in marginalized spaces like camptowns and blood markets, Koreans over the Cold War negotiated a shifting terrain of blood significations. The multivalent meanings coalesced to forge a widespread conviction that Korean blood constitutes the ultimate arbiter of authenticity and belonging. *Dictée*’s meditations on the affective and biological aspects of Korean blood expose how the dual edge of this pure blood ideology: suturing a fractured community but also binding the nation to an impossible, imagined ideal. Cha’s reflection on blood as the stain of identity, the body as its intended vessel, and the radical potential alterities of overflowing that vessel, when “The stain begins to absorb the material spilled on,” speaks powerfully to a deep attachment and deep ambivalence toward blood-based identity. What happens when Korean blood overflows its body-vessels? Exceeds its subjects? When the stain becomes stained itself? “Expel. Ne te cache pas. Révèle toi. Sang. Encre.” Expel. Do not hide. Reveal yourself. Blood. Ink.⁴⁵¹

The violent foreclosure of a voice struggling to subvert overdetermined national identities lays bare the life and death stakes of the struggle to define Koreanness within and beyond the peninsula that have been considered in this study. Along with the opening questions of “What is Korean blood?” and “What does it mean to be Korean?” Cha’s murder reminds us to ground our investigation of identity in sober reflection on who has the power to make these decisions and who can silence proposed alternatives in swift reckonings.⁴⁵² Although the focus of this study has been on the determinative authority of South Korean scientists, doctors, and political actors,

⁴⁵¹ Cha, *Dictée*, 64-65.

⁴⁵² As Cathy Hong contends, the conditions of Cha’s death are not a diversion from the accomplishments of her life. Rather, they tragically underscore the same power relations explored in her work, “saturating” *Dictée* with “a haunted prophetic aura.” Hong, *Minor Feelings*, 117.

the abrupt erasure of an imminent diasporic Korean woman's voice by a random American killer recalls the transnational politics of racial imperialism that overshadow peninsular developments.⁴⁵³ Blood-based South Korean identity labors under the occupational banner and incipient threat of American imperialism and white supremacy, as well.

Four weeks before this dissertation was submitted, a white gunman murdered six Asian women—four of whom were Korean—in Atlanta, Georgia.⁴⁵⁴ The Atlanta shooting followed over a year of escalating (and underreported) anti-Asian violence in the United States and other Western countries, driven in part by the scapegoating of Asians that has historically accompanied epidemics.⁴⁵⁵ Meanwhile, in Korea the COVID-19 pandemic facilitated a retrenchment into blood-based politics as “real” Koreans rallied defensively against the perceived threat to public health posed by racial and sexual “others.”⁴⁵⁶ In Korea, the US, and across the world, the urgent public health demands of the global pandemic lent scientific credulity to the rise of xenophobic,

⁴⁵³ Mayukh Sen, “A Kind of Blueprint: The radical vision of Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s Dictée,” *The Nation*, August 20, 2020.

⁴⁵⁴ The attack claimed eight lives in total: Dayou Feng (44), Paul Andre Michels (54), Xiaojie Tan (49), Delaina Ashley Yaun (33), Hyun Jung Grant (51), Yong Ae Yue (63), Suncha Kim (69), and Soon Chung Park (74). On the side-lining of Korean media and perpetuation of fetishistic assumptions about Asian women, Asian women’s labor, and the humanity of Asians to American society and its institutions, see: Regina Kim, “Atlanta Spa Shootings: What Korean-Language Media Told Us That the Mainstream Media Didn’t,” *Rolling Stone*, March 31, 2021; Natasha Ishak, “How mainstream media failed the Atlanta shooting victims,” *NiemanLab*, March 24, 2021; R. O. Kwon, “A Letter to My Fellow Asian Women Whose Hearts are Still Breaking,” *Vanity Fair*, March 19, 2021; Azriel Almera, Esther Choi, Wendy Matsumura, Simeon Man, and Vanessa Na, “To the Institutions We’ve Loved Before / To the Communities We’re Learning to Love Again,” *Society + Space*, April 7, 2021: <https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/to-the-institutions-weve-loved-before-to-the-communities-were-learning-to-love-again>.

⁴⁵⁵ On the rise in anti-Asian violence, see “Covid ‘hate crimes’ against Asian Americans on rise,” *BBC News*, April 2, 2021; Connie Wun, “Stop Asian Hate: Connie Wun on Atlanta Spa Killings, Gender Violence & Spike in Anti-Asian Attacks,” *Democracy Now*, March 18, 2021; Timothy W. Martin and Dasl Yoon, “From BTS to Britain, Anti-Asian Racism Gets New Attention Outside the U.S.,” *The Wall Street Journal*, March 31, 2021. On histories of anti-Asian violence in times of epidemic, see Nayan Shah, *Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

⁴⁵⁶ Jake Kwon and Julia Hollingsworth, “Virus outbreak linked to Seoul clubs popular with LGBT community stokes homophobia,” *CNN*, May 13, 2020; Park Chan-kyong, “In South Korea’s Gyeonggi Province, mandatory coronavirus testing for foreigners sparks accusations of racism,” *South China Morning Post*, March 13, 2021.

biologicistic nationalism, in some cases explicitly tied to racialized blood science.⁴⁵⁷ This resurgence of bionationalism in contravention of the self-congratulatory pretensions of global neoliberalism followed an escalation in “blood and soil” sloganeering in white nationalism that had already been proceeding apace for the past half-decade.⁴⁵⁸ Threading through all of these runs a politics of blood that insists on the biological concept of race and identity and attendant contests over the power to define and regulate the national body.⁴⁵⁹

Thanks to these developments, the final research and writing for this study—unexpectedly and unwelcomed—transformed from a historical project rooted in my personal experiences as a “mixed blood” Korean into a commentary on current events. “Blood of the Nation” became an urgent labor to understand the roots of pure-blood racialism and, in so doing, attempt to maintain some space outside it, at least for myself. Through fear, rage, grief, and re-traumatization, I have worked in the often-forlorn hope that knowledge can be power not just to reinforce but also to redirect. Inspired to add this study to the longstanding history of Koreans at the margins negotiating Korean community and identity through blood, I close with Cha’s dictation.

“Expel. Ne te cache pas. Révéle toi. Sang. Encre.”

Expel. Do not hide. Reveal yourself. Blood. Ink.⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁵⁷ Indi Samarajiva, “The Overwhelming Racism of COVID Coverage: Western media cannot write western failure,” *Medium*, September 10, 2020.

⁴⁵⁸ Teresa Retzer, “The resurgence of Blood and Soil: symbols and artefacts of *Völkische Siedlungen* and Neo-Nazi Villages in Germany,” *SHIFT: Journal of Visual and Material Culture* 11 (February 2019): 93-110; Meg Wagner, “‘Blood and Soil’: Protestors chant Nazi slogan in Charlottesville,” *CNN*, August 12, 2017.

⁴⁵⁹ Anidjar, Gil. *Blood: A Critique of Christianity*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014; and “Blood.” In *Political Concepts: A Critical Lexicon*, edited by J. M. Bernstein, Adi Ophir, and Ann Laura Stoler. New York: Fordham University Press, 2018.

⁴⁶⁰ Cha, *Dictée*, 64-65.



Figure 6.1. Graffiti mural by Korean artist Royyal Dog (Chris Changyang Sim)

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