

Caught in the Crossfire: Explanations of Insurgency Use of Indiscriminate Violence

Andrew J. Woo

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Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science

University of California, Berkeley

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Abstract

As the predominant mode of warfare since World War II, civil conflicts have resulted in the deaths of more than 16 million people worldwide, often noncombatants due to high levels of indiscriminate violence committed by governments and insurgencies. Under what conditions are insurgencies more likely to employ indiscriminate forms of violence against civilians? Whereas some scholars have attributed indiscriminate violence to insurgencies being incarnates of “decentralized criminality,” others have focused on alternative theories such as resource endowment and foreign support as important. This thesis seeks to fill the current gap in the literature by testing competing explanations for insurgent-led indiscriminate violence. I argue insurgencies are less likely to commit indiscriminate violence when these organizations establish robust vertical linkages with their pre-war social base through political wings and strategies. Insurgents are less likely to victimize civilians who are socially connected with them and receive popular support from. Data from the regression analysis show rebel political wings to be statistically significant, as well as other potential explanatory variables such as the level of foreign support and strength of control over constituent groups by the central command. Furthermore, process tracing in insurgencies in El Salvador and Uganda outline the mechanisms whereby political wings and activities reduce an insurgency’s use of indiscriminate violence. The implications of the research are that conventional theories that solely focus on resource endowment and foreign actor support are inadequate, and need to account for these political aspects of insurgent warfare.¹

Keywords: Insurgency, Indiscriminate violence, Civilian Victimization, Selective Violence, One-Sided Violence, Foreign Support, Social Linkages

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List of Abbreviations

BPR	Popular Revolutionary Bloc
CEBs	Christian Base Communities
CRM	Revolutionary Coordination of the Masses
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
ERP	Revolutionary Army of the People
ESAF	Armed Forces of El Salvador
FARN	Armed Forces of National Resistance
FDR	Democratic Revolutionary Front
FMLN	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
FPL	Popular Forces of Liberation
ICC	International Criminal Court
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LP-28	28 th of February Popular Leagues
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MLP	Popular Liberation Movement
NRM	National Resistance Movement
OP-M	Political-Military Organization
PCS	Community Party of El Salvador
PRS	Party of the Salvadoran Revolution
PRTC	Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers
RCD	Congolese Rally for Democracy
RN	National Resistance
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
UNITA	Angola's National Union for the Independence of Angola
UTC	Union of Rural Workers

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Introduction

As the bloodiest conflict since World War II, the Second Congo War (1998-2003) grew from a political struggle into a humanitarian crisis that killed more than an estimated 5 million soldiers and civilians (Gettleman 2012). The intense fighting between the Hutu soldiers and the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) commonly involved indiscriminate violence against noncombatants, in which innocent women and children were brutally murdered.² For instance, by January 1, 1999, Congolese rebels indiscriminately massacred over 500 civilians in a span of three days during their attacks on Hutu militiamen aligned with the Kabila regime (Fisher 1999). The leader of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, initially declared punishment for those fighters culpable for any alleged indiscriminate violence. However, he subsequently claimed “there were no civilian victims in the course of the fighting” (Fisher 1999).

Civil conflicts such as the Second Congo War involved high levels of indiscriminate violence against noncombatants. In total, more than 16 million people have died in civil conflicts, emphasizing the moral imperative to protect noncombatants, or civilians who do not have explicit roles in the wars (Fearon 2003; O’Neill 2005). Despite the exigency to win the hearts and minds of civilians, some insurgencies have used indiscriminate violence extensively, while others have avoided adopting it as their modus operandi. Under what conditions are insurgencies more likely to employ indiscriminate violence? Why do some insurgencies rely on indiscriminate violence and terrorist methods more so than other groups?³ Indiscriminately

² Furthermore, these deplorable acts of brutality led to the displacement of millions of civilians within the region, resulting in even more deaths as a consequence of insufficient living conditions, preventable illnesses, and poverty (McGreal 2008; Gettleman 2012).

³ In this paper, I do not exclude insurgencies that have waged terrorism— often a form of indiscriminate violence— from my research. This decision is based on Cronin’s (2002, xi) definition of terrorism, in which the goal is to “disrupt normal functioning by the dissemination of fear and intimidation...” Given in most civil conflicts there are

targeting civilians, whether they are on the side of insurgents or not, eliminates incentives for them to cooperate, given doing so would earn few assurances of protection from violence and death (Kalyvas 2006). Whereas some scholars attribute indiscriminate violence to those insurgencies being incarnates of “decentralized criminality,” others blame the corrosive effects of lucrative resources and foreign support on these insurgencies (Hovil and Wercker 2005; Weinstein 2006; Wood 2010; Salehyhan et al. 2014).

In this paper, I argue insurgencies are less likely to commit indiscriminate violence when these organizations establish robust vertical linkages with their pre-war social base through political wings and strategies. Vertical linkages are the “social anchors” for insurgencies, consisting of trust and common beliefs that turn social bases into key sources of domestic support (Staniland 2014). The stronger the vertical linkages are, the less likely an insurgency will commit indiscriminate violence because these ties discourage insurgents from victimizing civilians who are socially connected with and receive popular support from (Woo 2015). As the corollary, insurgencies without political wings or strategies are more likely to resort to coercive means of extracting resources from civilian populations, and thus committing indiscriminate violence.

Data from this paper’s large-N regression analysis demonstrate the proxy measure of vertical linkages, rebel political wings, to be both statistically significant and relatively large in its negative effects on the level of indiscriminate violence being used by insurgents. In each of

civilian deaths at the hands of insurgents, a definition of terrorism cannot solely focus on whether or not a group has killed civilians; otherwise, all insurgencies being attributed with the death of noncombatants would be classified as a terrorist group. Instead, a more reasonable definition would define terrorism to not only involve the killing of noncombatants, but include other characteristics such as it being part of a systemic campaign and used to achieve fear and intimidation as an objective itself. Insurgencies are capable of using terrorism and being classified as a terrorist group, but it should not mean that all insurgencies that have killed noncombatants should be identified similarly.

the five regression models presented, I find support for the theory of rebel political wings in explaining indiscriminate violence. There are other potential complementary explanations that achieve statistical significance, such as foreign support and horizontal discipline within an organization, and are included in the qualitative analysis.

To further understand the causal mechanisms by which rebel political wings reduce indiscriminate violence, I conduct process tracing on selected case studies, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Based on the results of the content analysis that measures the levels of indiscriminate violence, two different stories of violence are presented. While the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) adopted indiscriminate violence as their modus operandi, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front of El Salvador were immensely successful in fighting government forces without resorting to such civilian victimization (Weinstein 2006; Clapham 1998). Instead, the FMLN established political wings that helped develop strong vertical linkages with their pre-war social base. Specifically, the FMLN established important political education and instructions on how to cooperate with civilians. The LRA had few vertical linkages with their pre-war social base, resorting to coercive techniques of depredation, kidnapping, and massacres to sustain the fighting against the government.

Defining Indiscriminate Violence

Indiscriminate violence is conceptually defined as violence committed against noncombatants irrespective of their cooperation in the civil conflict with the insurgent or incumbent government forces (Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2006; Hultman 2009). Unlike selective violence, indiscriminate violence punishes in a way that civilians cannot be certain that their cooperation will be exchanged for immunity from future harm (Weinstein 2006). Aside from

brutal homicide, indiscriminate violence typically includes civilian massacres, looting, abductions, and other human rights violations as defined in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention (Weinstein 2006; Van Woudenberg et al. 2010).

For the purposes of this paper, indiscriminate violence is operationalized in two ways. First, indiscriminate violence is measured by the number of civilian deaths caused by insurgent attacks. I draw upon data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) One-Sided Violence Dataset (Harbom et al. 2008; Eck et al. 2007) for one-sided violence count data to serve as the first proxy measure of indiscriminate violence. The second operationalization of indiscriminate violence is derived from a content analysis of news reports on the civil conflict itself, which identifies a rebel attack as being selective or indiscriminate against noncombatants.

The Importance of Understanding Indiscriminate Violence

With the knowledge of what makes insurgencies predisposed to indiscriminate violence, policy makers in charge of counterinsurgent policy can form better policies aimed at protecting civilian populations during civil conflicts. Due to the high number of civilian deaths observed in these intrastate wars, there is even a greater moral imperative to protect civilians who are innocent bystanders, and are unlikely to have any recourse when their government is also notorious for their human rights abuses.

Based on the pre-existing knowledge of insurgent violence, counterinsurgent strategies have taken on the form of circumscribing foreign actors and their provision of assistance to domestic insurgencies in other countries. Another common counterinsurgent tactic has been to undermine insurgent financing, which involves waging military interdiction efforts against illicit drugs such as opium farms in Afghanistan (Meyer 2006; Zucchini 2014). While the research

recognizes the conflicting interests in shaping counterinsurgency strategy, it seeks to offer knowledge on the broader conditions that drive insurgent indiscriminate violence, and potentially reshape the way strategies are implemented to protect noncombatants during war.

Roadmap

The paper begins with a review of the current scholarly literature on indiscriminate violence. Each primary explanation offers testable hypotheses, which include social linkages, the level of ethnic or religious fractionalization of the country of origin, insurgent territorial control, resource endowment, and foreign support that all require proxy variables for representation in the large-N analysis (Huntington 1993; Kalvyas 2006; Hovil and Wercker 2005; Weinstein and Humphreys 2006; Staniland 2014). Following the literature review, I go over the operationalization of each explanatory and control variable, and then summarize the data results from the negative binomial regression analysis. After the data analysis, I present two case studies in order to test the mechanism behind my findings on vertical linkages, and measure the levels of indiscriminate violence used in both conflicts. I conclude the paper with a discussion of possible avenues of future research and the policy implications based on the findings from this paper.

Literature Review

Using Staniland's theory on insurgent cohesion and social linkages, I propose vertical linkages, developed through rebel political wings, as an important condition to be considered in reducing insurgency use of indiscriminate violence. The stronger the vertical linkages between the insurgents and their pre-war social base, the less likely an insurgency will commit indiscriminate violence because these ties discourage insurgents from victimizing civilians who are socially connected with them and receive popular support from (Woo 2015). The five alternative theoretical explanations of indiscriminate violence include: (1) non-rationalized violence (2) resource endowment (3) financier-insurgent relationship (4) control and coercion and (5) rebel capabilities. In this section, I provide a summary of the overarching literature that could explain the use, and thus variation in insurgency use of indiscriminate violence.

Main Argument — Social Linkages

In *Networks of Rebellion*, Staniland argues that insurgent cohesion is significant because it “shapes how wars are fought, how wars end, and the politics that emerge after war,” with “undisciplined armed groups often predatory towards civilians...” (Staniland 2014, 2). Moreover, greater insurgent cohesion reduces fragmentation, improves military effectiveness, and increases discipline over undesired behaviors. There are no explicit arguments offered on insurgency use of indiscriminate violence. When confronting their pre-war social base, insurgencies depend on two critical components of social linkages to turn these social bases into wartime organizations, which are horizontal and vertical linkages. Horizontal linkages are what directly connect insurgents and supporters to each other through their shared identity or beliefs, regardless of their place of origin. This encourages “communication, coordination, and cooperation” across space (Staniland 2014, 21). Vertical linkages are “the social anchors”

composed of trust, information, and common beliefs between insurgents and local communities, which enable insurgents to develop “political, economic, or social projects in these communities” (Staniland 2014, 22). An example of a strong vertical linkage would be creating local political structures to replace government institutions, and administer social services in agriculture, political education, and self-defense areas.

Using Staniland’s theory, I propose my own theory of indiscriminate violence, which is based on the vertical linkages. I argue insurgencies are less likely to commit indiscriminate violence when these organizations establish robust vertical linkages with their pre-war social base through rebel political wings and strategies (Woo 2015). When enjoying popular support from the people, insurgents have fewer incentives to terrorize, coerce, and exploit noncombatants when they have developed these bonds of trust and common belief with them. The corollary to this is not having strong vertical linkages makes it more likely for insurgents to turn to coercion and indiscriminate violence given the low opportunity costs. Hence, the greatest challenge for insurgencies is “to convert these pre-war social networks into a wartime organization” with these social linkages in mind (Staniland 2014, 23).

H1: *The stronger the vertical linkages are, the less likely an insurgent organization will commit indiscriminate violence against those they are connected with and receive popular support from.*

The theory of social linkages and insurgent cohesion has not been empirically tested for their effects on indiscriminate violence. I also posit horizontal linkages, or strong control over constituent groups and internal discipline, may be a condition in which groups are able to prevent constituents from diverging from civilian protections. In the presence of relatively weak horizontal linkages, insurgencies suffer from poor coordination and consensus on military and political decision making within the organization. An outcome of isolation amongst the

constituent groups and fighters allows individual, self-seeking agendas to dominate and lead to violence and greed-driven attacks. This would predict less cohesive and undisciplined insurgent groups to commit a higher level of indiscriminate violence.

H2: *The stronger the horizontal linkages are, the less likely an insurgent organization and its combatants will commit indiscriminate violence because of better disciplining mechanisms of errant fighters, as well as achieving consensus on norms against indiscriminate violence.*

While having implied horizontal linkages to potential decrease indiscriminate violence, Staniland (2014) alludes to the fact that even disciplined groups can exercise violence towards civilians. The common example is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, who targeted noncombatants as part of their ethnic cleansing campaign. Thus, I test for this contested claim using the regression analysis to determine cross-nationally if insurgencies are less likely to commit indiscriminate violence when there are greater horizontal and vertical linkages.

Non-rationalized violence

Some scholars assert that conflict onset and the brutal killings of civilians is the product of religious or ideological discrepancies embedded in competing groups. Despite growing political and economic divisions in the world, it is the civilization identity, composed of language, culture, history, and religion, that engenders violent conflict (Huntington 1993). Furthermore, there is no sufficient rationalization to the violence waged against another individual, other than this primordial violence stemming from different instrumental emotions felt by these groups. These instrumental emotions include the resentment of other groups for their longstanding dominance in society, accumulated grievances against those who have done harm in the past, or the basic fear of being killed by others when the opportunity presents itself

(Petersen 2002). In lieu of rational mechanisms, instrumental emotions are the drivers of violence, whether it is indiscriminate or selective.⁴

Examples of this include the 1991 Yugoslav Wars with ethnic cleansing, 1994 Rwandan Genocide, and post-2003 Iraq with the fighting between Kurds, Shiite, and Sunni factions. Although Fearon and Laitin (2003) demonstrate ethnic and religious fractionalization are not statistically significant variables with respect to civil war onset, these variables have not been tested for their effects on indiscriminate violence. If this theory was to be supported, civil conflicts with higher levels of either fractionalization should see a higher level of indiscriminate violence relative to other conflicts where there is lower levels, holding all else constant.

H3: *The greater the level of ethnic fractionalization in a country experiencing civil conflict, the higher the level of indiscriminate violence.*

H4: *The greater the level of religious fractionalization in a country experiencing civil conflict, the higher the level of indiscriminate violence.*

Implied from the school of non-rationalized violence is that the type of conflicts also shapes the form of insurgent violence. An alternative measure to fractionalization is a variable identifying an intrastate conflict if it involves a difference in ethnic identities between the insurgency and the government. Identity-based conflicts should exhibit higher levels of civilian abuses due to similar reasons outlined in the non-rationalized violence approaches.

H5: *In identity-based conflicts, wherein insurgents have different ethnic identities than that of the government, insurgents are more likely to commit indiscriminate violence.*

The scholars of non-rationalized violence appear to be convincing at the micro-level of civil conflict, particularly when insurgents become willing participants in these terrible atrocities.

⁴ Petersen (2002) contends that rational choice theories does not adequately explain civil violence because they cannot effectively explain why people choose to risk their lives in return for minor gains, or gains that cannot be excluded from non-actors. Additionally, underneath a rationalized choice are emotions that drove us to making that decision, and thus take precedent over alternative theories.

These “ancient hatreds” pit rivals against the other groups in their entirety, thus leaving no need to rationalize a clash of civilizations. However, such theories have not expressly offered any predictions on the whether or not there will be more indiscriminate violence committed in these conflicts over identities. Furthermore, empirical evidence has shown that ethnicity, religious discrimination, and grievances are not statistically significant factors with respect to civil conflict onset (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Resource Endowment and Financier-Insurgent Relationship

Two separate explanations of insurgent use of indiscriminate violence exist with overlap in terms of their explanatory variable, foreign support. These explanations are resource endowment and financier-insurgent relationship, and are covered together in this sub-section. First, resource endowment theorists argue that the organizational characteristics of an insurgency, specifically the structural responses to drug and foreign money coming in, drive higher levels of indiscriminate violence. Weinstein (2006) asserts that an insurgency’s resource endowment affects its organizational decisions on the type of violence. Within the organization, insurgent leaders confront information problems in identifying these uncommitted fighters from those morally invested in the fight, and those who are opportunistic and susceptible to greed. Analogous to a “resource curse,” insurgents with resource endowments heavily structured around lootable resources or foreign support attract opportunistic fighters, who are predisposed to not be committed to the cause or following conventions on how to interact with noncombatants (Weinstein 2006). As a consequence, these resource-afflicted insurgencies suffer from its members being predisposed towards predatory behaviors.⁵ Such examples include the RENAMO

⁵Based on the theory of resource endowment, testing for horizontal linkages, or the ability for insurgencies to have control over its groups, may be also testing Weinstein’s theory of the resource curse. However, if Weinstein’s theory was to be supported, it would require that his two primary variables, contraband and foreign support, would need to

of Mozambique and the Shining Path of Peru, in which indiscriminate violence became prevalent because of unabated, rent-seeking behaviors of these opportunistic fighters in the organizations (Weinstein 2006). Thus, the two main independent variables to examine are an insurgent organizations' resource endowments, with respect to lootable resources, such as gems, diamonds, illicit drugs, and foreign support (Wood 2010).

H6: The presence of lootable resources increases the likelihood that an insurgency will commit indiscriminate violence because such reliance exacerbate.

As discussed earlier, foreign support is a common explanatory variable for several different theories with their own set of causal mechanisms (Weinstein 2006, Hovil and Wercker, 2005; Wood 2010; Salehyan et al. 2014). Three mechanisms for foreign support exist, which are resource endowment, financier-insurgent relationship, and the basic explanation that more foreign money and assistances translates to fewer incentives to protect noncombatant populations. Whereas Weinstein (2006) contends foreign support affects violence through resource endowment, scholars for financier-insurgent relationships claim it is the foreign actors themselves that forcefully shape the strategies of the insurgencies they provide assistance to, and promote their patrons to typically destabilize and wreak havoc (Hovil and Wercker, 2005; Salehyan et al. 2014). The Second Congo War serves as a prime example of the financier-insurgent relationship. With many African states, such as Uganda and Rwanda, wanting to overthrow President Laurent Kabila, they turned towards supporting separate guerrilla insurgencies with weapons and training to politically destabilize the opposing government. The specific case study in Hovil and Wercker (2005) demonstrates how foreign assistance from

both be supported. As shown later, only foreign support achieves statistical significance (Woo 2015). And even with that finding, there needs further evidence to explicate the mechanisms by which foreign support works to increase indiscriminate violence.

Sudan and Al Qaeda has encouraged the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) to destabilize the current Ugandan government through massacres and ambushes. Aside from the other two mechanisms, Wood (2010) shows foreign support to be statistically significant in his quantitative analysis of factors that contribute to civilian violence. His work suggests these insurgencies may feel less incentivized to develop positive relationships with their domestic bases of support when their material and military resources derive from elsewhere. Foreign support, in this case, is a necessary condition for reduced incentives by insurgencies to withhold indiscriminately harming civilians.

H7: Foreign support, either from state or nonstate actors, makes it more likely an insurgency will commit indiscriminate violence.⁶

Control and Coercion

Control and coercion explanations attribute insurgent use of indiscriminate violence to the fact these insurgencies lack territorial control, and have imperfect information on who they can trust and identify as government collaborators. The purpose of indiscriminate violence is to “shape civilian behavior indirectly through association, and to shift responsibility for hostile actions to a wider group of people” (Kalyvas 2006, 171).⁷ Thus, insurgents are more likely to use indiscriminate violence when they want to coerce those into submission, with little information on who to trust (Kalyvas 2006, 14). Fagerlund (2011) offers further evidence in

⁶ Given that multiple mechanisms may exist for how foreign support affects insurgent violence, the quantitative analysis tests Weinstein’s general theory through lootable resources and foreign support. Additionally, the case studies in this paper serve to shed light on which of these arguments may best explain how foreign support affects the decisions by insurgent leaders to use violence.

⁷ In cases where there are strong vertical linkages between insurgencies and their pre-war social base, it may also be possible that these insurgencies exercise control over territory. In the regression analysis, the two explanatory variables are independently tested for their effects, in which territorial control fails to achieve statistical significance. Process tracing focuses on vertical linkages and rebel political wings, which may be complemented by control over territory. However, additional qualitative research would be needed to demonstrate territorial control as complementary to the argument of this paper.

cases such as in Sri Lanka with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) that having territorial control is a determinant of where and how much civilian violence will occur.

Certainly there are alternative mechanisms that be considered with respect to territorial control. In areas where there is inadequate control over civilians, insurgents may use indiscriminate violence to not only coerce individuals into obedience, but also “weaken the support for the government and create war fatigue” (Hultman 2009, 1). The killing of civilians indicts the ability for the government to protect its people, and receive signals from insurgents that the costs of fighting are much higher. Insurgents demonstrate their “power to hurt” in order to extract greater concessions from the government (Hultman 2009; Crenshaw 1981; Kydd and Walter 2006). The generated hypothesis then is the greater the level of an insurgency’s control over a given territory, the less they will employ indiscriminate violence in those areas.

H8: Insurgents with territorial control are more likely they will commit indiscriminate violence in those areas.

Although control may be important in understanding the likelihood for civilian violence, perhaps insurgent leaders have incentives to terrorize their own civilians in areas where they exhibit territorial control, contrary to Kalyvas’ argument. By destroying the basic livelihoods of their own civilians, civilians confront a depressed wage when considering to either remain farmers or become fighters, and would turn to the latter when it is financially advantageous to do so (Azam 2006). For insurgent leaders, when committing violence leads to depressing the wages of farmers, they can pay less in wages to their own soldiers as a response to the lower, if not absent, competing wages of alternative employment available for civilians.

Rebel Capabilities

A separate explanation for indiscriminate violence stems from the relative strengths, or fighting capability, of the insurgency relative to the opposing government. Wood (2010) demonstrates that for insurgencies that are relatively weak in their fighting ability, they must compensate for their perceived lower chance of defeating the government with more selective incentives achieved through predatory behaviors and civilian victimization. The higher costs in recruiting fighters in these weak insurgencies may pressure insurgent leaders to see plundering and indiscriminate violence as their solution to collective action problems. Other theories regard terrorism, a form of indiscriminate violence, as a “weapon of the weak.” When insurgencies have few options, particularly in their ability to win an outright military victory, terrorism becomes “a relatively inexpensive and simple alternative, and because its potential reward is high” (Crenshaw 1981, 387; Kydd and Walter 2006).

H9: *When insurgencies have relatively low fighting capabilities vis-à-vis the government, they will turn towards indiscriminate violence to compensate for higher recruiting costs amongst its members.*

In this paper, I test each of these hypotheses in the hope of understanding the particular conditions that drive insurgent violence against civilians. Next, I review the operationalization of the explanatory and control variables, which will be used to test each of the previous hypotheses stated.

Quantitative Methods

I use the UCDP Dyadic Dataset to collect start and end date information for 113 armed conflicts, involving more than 212 insurgent organizations from 1989 to 2009.⁸ UCDP defines *armed conflict* as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year” (Harbom et al. 2008). In this paper, the dataset used for the regression analysis combines the Wood (2010) and Salehyan (2014) datasets to yield 244 unique insurgent groups from 1989 to 2009.⁹ Moreover, I added several new explanatory variables, such as rebel political wings and constituent control, and used the most recent data for many of the control variables in order to test the driving conditions of indiscriminate violence.

Defining Indiscriminate Violence

Measuring indiscriminate violence is difficult because it requires characterizing the nature of each insurgent attack as either selective or indiscriminate. To demonstrate this challenge, the United National Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), a Christian-based insurgent group in northeast India, is opposed to the settlement of Bengali settlers in their lands (Bhaumik 2010). Many of their civilian killings are nativist-driven assassinations and bombings. If the objective is centered on culling foreign settlers, this would difficult to classify as “indiscriminate” violence. The task of classifying violence as either selective or indiscriminate

⁸ The UCDP dataset focuses on civil conflicts of a large enough magnitude to not be classified as minor incidents of violence, and involve asymmetrical warring parties (Wood 2010).

⁹ Salehyan et al. (2014) expand on previous studies of indiscriminate violence by lengthening the period of observations from 1989 to 2009, increasing the number of dyad observations to well over a 1000 from 1989 to 2009. Their findings build on Wood’s (2010) comprehensive research on rebel capabilities and civilian victimization, focusing primarily on the role of foreign support and regime type on civilian violence

for each rebel attack becomes especially arduous when completed for over a hundred insurgent groups in a large-N analysis. Additionally, insurgent leaders usually deny having committed acts of indiscriminate violence, which may lead to underestimated measures of the intensity of indiscriminate violence. For example, Joseph Kony of the LRA claimed his soldiers “don’t fight (the) civilian. We fight the force of Museveni” (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 177).¹⁰

Nonetheless, indiscriminate violence is operationalized in two ways. First and foremost, indiscriminate violence is measured by the number of civilian deaths caused by insurgent attacks. Although this conceptualization is limited in its ability to truly distinguish the indiscriminate nature of attacks, this proxy measure is useful for conducting a large-N analysis over a long span of time. I rely on the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset (Harbom et al. 2008; Eck et al. 2007) to provide the annual number of civilian killings attributed to nonstate actors. One-sided violence is defined as “the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year” (Eck et al. 2007). The second operationalization of indiscriminate violence, discussed later, derives its measures from a content analysis of news reports on these civil conflicts. The content analysis attributes rebel attacks to either being selective or indiscriminate based on the identity of the reported victims, in which those related to the government or military are considered more selective forms of violence, as opposed to indiscriminate (Weinstein 2006)

Defining the Explanatory Variables

Main Variables

¹⁰ Another example was when RUF leader Foday Sankoh outright denied documented acts of human atrocities, including abduction, gang rape, and even cannibalism, despite having been known to execute his own members who have “tried to moderate the excesses of the RUF” (Brown 2000).

The main variable of interest is vertical linkages, the connections that embed insurgencies within their pre-war social bases. As one possible operationalization of vertical linkages, rebel political wings is a clear representation of the political nature of insurgencies, and their non-military efforts at connecting with noncombatants through their ideology, beliefs, and programs. Rebel political wings is a dichotomous variable taken from the expanded Non-State Actors (NSA) dataset, and serves as the proxy measure for vertical linkages (Cunningham et al. 2009).¹¹

The other variables, complementary to the main theory of interest, are horizontal linkages and foreign support. Horizontal linkages determine how well an organization's leadership is able to have effective communication and coordination among its constituent groups, and lower level rebels (Staniland 2014). A dichotomous variable, constituent control, is derived from the NSA data, with a coded value of 1 indicating strong or moderately strong command control over constituent groups.

Foreign support should increase the number of civilian deaths by insurgent group through three mechanisms (Wood 2010; Weinstein 2006, Hovil and Wercker 2005, Salehyan et al. 2014). Foreign support was coded using UCDP External Support Data (2011), which indicates whether a group or not received confirmed foreign support from one or more foreign state or nonstate actors. As an alternative operationalization, I added a continuous variable, from 1-10, that measures the comprehensives of foreign support based on the ten different types of support from direct military intervention to financial assistance.

¹¹ Another possible consideration for a proxy would be the popular support of the rebel group. The more popular a rebel group is amongst civilians, the less likely they will commit indiscriminate violence. However, many issues arise with measuring popular support of a rebel group fighting against an incumbent government that may make it infeasible to gather accurate measures of support. Additionally, I contend using popular support as a proxy measure of vertical linkages would be conflating a consequence of such linkages for a proxy or causal factor of them itself. The factors that are behind vertical linkages and popular support are more important, thus leading to focusing on rebel political wings and political strategies.

Secondary Variables

Non-rationalized violence suggests that ethnic and religious tensions would increase the indiscriminate killing of noncombatants, particularly when a noncombatant's identity is associated with the enemy (Huntington 1993; Petersen 2002). These tensions are operationalized using ethnic and religious fractionalization indexes, which is the "probability that two randomly drawn from a given population belong to different groups, respectively" (Lindbergh 2008). An additional variable distinguishes the type of conflict, and whether the incompatibility was over territory, governmental control, or identity-based (Harbom et al. 2008; Buhaug and Gates 2002).

Weinstein (2006) argues that resource endowment can exacerbate information problems on who is recruited into insurgent organizations, and test organizational disciplinary mechanisms. Wood (2010) constructs a dichotomous variable for lootable resources in which "any gems or drugs are located with the conflict zone" are coded as a 1, and 0 otherwise.

Relating to territorial control, Kalyvas (2006) implies that an actor's control of territory is likely to reduce indiscriminate violence because they have access to greater information over potential defectors. I use a dichotomous variable taken from the NSA dataset, which is coded a 1 to indicate that the insurgency asserts territorial control in parts of the conflict zone.

For rebel groups with relatively strong fighting capabilities, they "can credibly deliver protection and other incentives...lessening the relatively capable rebels' reliance on violence" (Wood 2010, 605; Crenshaw 1981). For insurgencies with relatively weak fighting capabilities vis-à-vis the government, they face higher recruiting costs that lead to exploitation, and are less reluctant to use indiscriminate violence and terrorism when the returns seem greater than the costs. NSA data provides variables that measure rebel's fighting capabilities relative to the

government, and their ability to mobilize personnel (Wood 2010; Cunningham et al. 2009). Both are included in the regression analysis to test rebel capabilities as an explanation.

Control Variables

Several control variables are added into the regression models. These control variables include the geographical characteristics, government use of indiscriminate violence, and time-period variables (Wood 2010). Appendix 1 provides descriptive statistics on all the variables used in this analysis.

The geospatial dimensions of the conflict zone, such as density and size, are potential factors that influence the surrounding constraints on insurgent strategies. As conflict zones become denser, insurgent attacks may result in greater civilian casualties because of the proximity of targets from noncombatants, but also worsening information problems regarding who are loyal to rebels and defectors (Kalyvas 2006). Wood (2010, 606) operationalizes conflict density as the “the estimated number of persons per square kilometer inside conflict zone.” Likewise, conflict area is the logged-value of conflict area as reported in the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) Geo-referenced Data as of 2011.

On the government side, the political nature of the regime and the government’s use of indiscriminate violence could provoke retaliation by insurgents with their own attacks on civilians (Wood 2010; Lyall 2009; Krueger 2008). The Polity IV dataset provides a 21-point indicator measure of democracy, with a coded value of 10 being the most politically open and democratic, and a coded value of -10 being the least open and autocratic. From UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset (2014), I use the best estimate of government incidences of one-sided violence to test the theory of violence being a product of reciprocation. To account for a

country's economic factors and the "greed" effects on insurgent decisions regarding indiscriminate violence, I include a measure of Gross Domestic Product, the logged-value of GDP per capita from the NSA data (Wood 2010; Cunningham et al. 2013; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

Conflict duration, as argued by Kalyvas (2006), accounts for the ability of political actors to gain better information about the costs of certain military tactics, such as bombings and massacres. Hence when wars become longer, actors learn not to use indiscriminate violence because of its counterproductive effects. Likewise, I include a control variable accounting for the number of battle deaths. Hultman (2007; 2009) shows that the greater the number of rebel deaths, the more likely there was to be indiscriminate violence to undermine the government's legitimacy. Due to missing data on several dyad years, the inclusion of this control variables leads to the size of the sample to decrease in around hundred observations. There were no feasible substitutes that could fill in the missing data for battle deaths for the various conflicts.

For some scholars, both the Cold War and War on Terror represent a punctuated equilibriums in the way wars were fought. The War on Terror signifies the emergence of warfare wherein fighters and thugs are "more likely to use gratuitous violence," and forgo the conventions on human rights (Wood 2010; Kaldor 1999). Terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) influence the actions of like-minded individuals and other insurgencies; a recent example is that of Boko Haram forming the "alliance from hell" with ISIS (Tucker 2001; Alkhshali and Almasry 2015). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) test for the effect of the end of the Cold War on conflict onset, finding little support for the theory that the changes in financing and material support from superpowers affected civil war onset.

New variables previously untested, such as group fragmentation and peace keeping operations, are examined in this paper. I code for group fragmentation as a dichotomous variable from the UCDP Actor Dataset, which indicates whether or not a non-state actor broken away from another actor listed in their data. Staniland (2014) argues broadly that insurgent cohesion, or the lack thereof, affects the discipline and potentially civilian abuses, and that tensions typically arise between competing rebel groups over scarce material and political resources (Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012; Metelits 2009). Peacekeeping operations are aimed at typically enforcing peace accords in the aftermath of civil wars, and have been shown to be effective in cases with high number of battle deaths (Fortna 2008). In cases where the United Nations (U.N.) sent peacekeeping forces in, I test to see if the presence of such operations affected the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians.

Negative Binomial Regression Analysis

Given the over dispersion in the dependent variable, an annual count of civilian deaths, I use negative binomial regression to acquire the coefficients and p-values for each of the conditions. I create five negative binomial regression models, starting with Model 1 that is a basic test of the independent effect of rebel political wings on indiscriminate violence. Model 2 adds more explanatory variables commonly used in other quantitative analyses. Model 3 adds measures of lootable resources and foreign support. Model 4 tests foreign support using a more comprehensive measure of foreign support that accounts for how comprehensive and robust that support is. Finally, Model 5 tests the possible effects of peacekeeping and group fragmentation on indiscriminate violence. The results of these statistical analyses are detailed in the data results section, providing the β -coefficients and p-values associated with each variable.

Data Results

A preliminary cross-tabulation, shown in Table 1, is conducted.¹² It demonstrates the relationship between two nominal variables of interest, which are rebel political wings and indiscriminate violence. The cross-tab results indicate a strong association between rebel political wings and indiscriminate violence, with the calculated p-value approaching zero ($p < 0.001$). Comparing insurgencies that have political wings to those that do not, 31 percent of insurgencies without political wings committed acts of indiscriminate violence, while only 21 percent did so when they did have them.

TABLE 1.
Cross-Tabulation of Rebel Political Wings on Indiscriminate Violence

	Indiscriminate Violence	No Indiscriminate Violence
Rebel Political Wing	21% (85)	79% (312)
No Rebel Political Wing	31% (231)	69% (510)

The results from the negative binomial regression analyses are shown in Table 2, which include coefficients and corresponding p-value denoting statistical significance in cases where they meet the appropriate thresholds. The results from Model 1 show rebel political wings to have a strong negative relationship with civilian deaths that is highly statistically significant, and operates in the hypothesized direction (~ -1.326). Model 2 shows early indications of other explanatory variables being statistically significant, which include government-attributed indiscriminate violence, polity IV score, GDP per capita, conflict density, and rebel fighting capabilities vis-à-vis the government. Subsequent models, however, reveal government-attributed indiscriminate violence and rebel fighting capabilities to be statistically insignificant

¹² The null hypothesis would assert that any observed difference in the dependent variable percentages is due to random chance variation, and not some change in the independent variable.

when accounting for other control variables. Model 3 shows rebel political wings as a robust factor of importance. The model also shows foreign support to have a positive effect on indiscriminate violence. Model 4 uses an alternative measure of foreign support with a variable that measures the total comprehensiveness of support, in which it effectively replaces the former in terms of its coefficient size and p-value. Model 5 shows U.N. peacekeeping operations and group fragmentations and their calculated effects to be likely due to chance variation.

First and foremost, the results of the negative binomial regression analysis show that rebel political wings have a strong, negative relationship with indiscriminate violence. This supports claims that when insurgent groups have vertical linkages, they are less likely to commit indiscriminate violence against noncombatants they have developed bonds of trust, common beliefs, and popular support. Rebel political wings and its relatively large effect remain robust throughout each of the five models. Furthermore, constituent control, the operationalization of horizontal linkages, is also shown to be statistically significant in all models once introduced with a negative relationship with the dependent variable. These consistent findings reinforces paper's argument that vertical linkages decrease the likelihood for insurgencies, and the theory of horizontal linkages as another possible condition.

Similarly shown in Wood (2010) and Salehyan et al. (2014), foreign support achieves statistical significance in the predicted direction on the dependent variable, but becomes irrelevant when substituting with the alternative measure of the comprehensiveness of support.

Table 2. Regression Results

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Rebel Political Wings	-1.326*	-1.582***	-1.616***	-1.62***	-1.627***
	(-2.56)	(-4.60)	(-4.79)	(-4.5)	(-4.69)
Rebel Prior Violence		2.076***	2.157***	2.252***	2.224***
		(8.38)	(8.88)	(8.40)	(8.41)
Government Violence		-0.00000245*	-0.00000258*	-0.00000181	-0.00000638
		(-1.96)	(-2.19)	(-0.15)	(-0.45)
Rebel Fighting Capability		0.77*	0.407	0.312	0.341
		(2.00)	(1.04)	(0.8)	(0.88)
Identity Conflict		0.733	0.623	0.839*	0.886*
		(1.77)	(1.57)	(2.26)	(2.3)
Territorial Conflict		-0.492	-0.566	-0.728	-0.717
		(-0.81)	(-0.83)	(-1.04)	(-1.03)
Government Conflict		0.517	0.605	0.794	0.774
		(0.78)	(0.86)	(1.09)	(1.02)
Conflict Density		0.00522***	0.0051***	0.00493***	0.0051***
		(3.5)	(3.83)	(3.63)	(3.85)
Conflict Area		-0.0924	-0.147	-0.115	-0.117
		(-0.83)	(-1.24)	(-1.09)	(-1.07)
Battle Deaths		0.738***	0.714***	0.664***	0.656***
		(7.03)	(7.07)	(7.21)	(6.97)
Conflict Duration		0.189	0.175	0.203	0.22
		(1.32)	(1.24)	(1.24)	(1.39)
Polity IV		0.0835**	0.0699*	0.069*	0.0711*
		(2.91)	(2.49)	(2.48)	(2.57)
GDP per Capita		-0.825***	-0.78***	-0.539**	-0.592**
		(-4.08)	(-4.07)	(-2.9)	(-3.19)
Cold War		0.184	0.191	0.511	0.53
		(0.42)	(0.46)	(1.34)	(1.33)
War on Terror		0.386	0.603	0.392	0.413
		(1.39)	(2.05)	(1.39)	(1.47)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.629	0.824	1.105	1.046
		(0.92)	(1.3)	(1.82)	(1.77)
Religious Fractionalization		-0.256	-0.818	-0.192	-0.427
		(-0.26)	(-0.91)	(-0.21)	(-0.43)
Territorial Control		0.504	0.457	0.18	0.219
		(1.75)	(1.7)	(0.58)	(0.69)
Lootable Resources			0.391	0.358	0.342
			(1.22)	(1.23)	(1.2)
Foreign Support			0.866**	-0.159	-0.135
			(3.19)	(-0.36)	(-0.3)
Comprehensive Support				0.406**	0.391*
				(2.58)	(2.42)
Constituent Control				-0.776**	-0.739*
				(-2.64)	(-2.43)
Mobilizing Capability				0.374	0.298
				(1.27)	(0.96)
UN Peacekeeping Operations					0.0823
					(0.2)
Splinter Group					-0.283
					(-0.67)
_cons	4.914***	3.551*	3.622*	1.552	2.093
	(12.64)	(2.18)	(2.29)	(0.89)	(1.14)
Inalpha_cons	3.078***	2.593***	2.573***	2.524***	2.521***
	(20.79)	(18.35)	(18.28)	(17.64)	(17.59)
N	1135	1043	1039	1005	1003

t-statistics in parentheses

* P<0.05, ** p<.01, ***p<0.001

The use of the alternative measure that accounts for the level of comprehensiveness maintains statistical significance in all the tests. Furthermore, this measure of foreign support continues to work in the positive direction of intensifying the level of indiscriminate violence. With foreign support being significant and lootable resources not, Weinstein's hypothesis on resource endowment is weakened.¹³

Second, other variables achieved statistical significance, including some of the controls. For example, polity IV score achieved statistical significance in each of the four models, showing a positive relationship that increasing scores led to higher incidences of civilian deaths. This supports claims that democratic regimes may be easier targets for insurgent rebellion where participatory politics may transpire into social movements, and thus violence (Wood 2010). Likewise, GDP per capita is significant in all four models while its predicted effect is to lower indiscriminate violence. A possible implication is that government with greater resources can undermine insurgent capability to wage warfare, including that indiscriminate violence (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

Battle deaths were statistically significant and have a positive effect on indiscriminate violence, which supports what may be an inextricable connection when there are more deaths in general (Wood 2010). Similarly, prior indiscriminate violence for insurgencies was an extremely strong predictor of future violence. Once insurgents begin to target noncombatants indiscriminately, it may become harder to retract those actions, if not get trapped in becoming repeat offenders. Although denser areas are shown to lead to higher civilian casualties, the predicted effect was relatively negligible (Wood 2010; Kalyvas 2006).

¹³ However, two mechanisms remain for how foreign support operates to increase violence, which are the financier-insurgent relationship and decreased rebel incentives to avoid targeting civilians indiscriminately.

Lastly, many variables also failed to consistently sustain statistical significance when accounting for each other. Interestingly, ethnic and religious fractionalization were shown to work in opposite directions, in which greater ethnic fractionalization supposedly increase the level of indiscriminate violence, while religious fractionalization would decrease such tendencies. Neither variables achieved statistical significance in any of the models. Unlike ethnic and religious fractionalization, identity-based conflicts, defined as the insurgent group differed in terms of ethnic identity, achieved temporary statistical significance in Models 4 and 5. This provides mixed evidence as to whether or not there is a clash of civilizations.

Initially, both rebel fighting capability and government-attributed indiscriminate violence were statistically significant in Model 2. The subsequent models, however, showed p-values above the acceptable threshold for significance in later models. In none of the models were conflict type, either over territory or governmental control, significant factors in causing indiscriminate violence. Whereas GDP per capita was proven undoubtedly significant, both conflict area and the conflict direction had no such empirical support. Territorial control, another measure of insurgent confrontations with information problems, was statistically insignificant, and operate the opposite direction as predicted by Kalvyas (2006).

Both the time period variables in this analysis, the Cold War and War on Terror, failed to hold statistical significance. Therefore, evidence does not exist proving the transition at the end of the Cold War in 1991 affected the material resources given to insurgencies cross-nationally to considerably revamp their strategies and interactions with noncombatants. Likewise the advent of terrorist networks in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks in 2001 did not escalate the use of indiscriminate violence. The final two variables, UN peacekeeping and group fragmentation were also insignificant in all models. Even if peacekeeping operations and

splintering were shown to be significant, they both suffered problems their coefficient working in the opposite direction as proposed by their hypotheses.

Based on these results, several variables are shown to be statistically significant and operated in the predicted directions by their models. In the following case study analyses, I focus on how rebel political wings reduce indiscriminate violence, and two other complementary variables, horizontal linkages and foreign support. Table 3 shows the basic pathways involving vertical linkages, horizontal linkages, and foreign support.

Table 3.

Explanations of Indiscriminate Violence

Vertical Linkages	Horizontal Linkages	Foreign Support
<p style="text-align: center;">↓</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Low Intensity of Indiscriminate Violence</p> <p>Insurgencies with rebel political wings-> political strategies aimed at boosting popular support.</p> <p>Political strategies may include political, social, and economic programs that develop “relations of information, trust, and belief” between insurgents and noncombatants.</p> <p>Insurgents gain information on government movement, potential fighters committed to their cause, and can rely on their social base.</p> <p>Stronger vertical linkages increase the social embeddedness of insurgencies within local communities.</p> <p>Insurgent organizations have fewer incentives to terrorize, coerce, and exploit noncombatants when they have developed bonds of trust with them.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">↓</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Low Intensity of Indiscriminate Violence</p> <p>Insurgencies with strong control over constituent control-> horizontal discipline within the organization.</p> <p>Common political experiences, obligations, and backgrounds that unite people from different places and communities to fight together.</p> <p>Strong horizontal linkages ensure collective action, and brings discipline against disobedient members who go against the insurgency’s ideology and practices.</p> <p>Private agendas and incidents of exploitation can be disciplined by leaders, and discouraged by the insurgent organization.</p> <p>Strategies of indiscriminate violence can be ruled out, and enforced amongst lower ranks.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">↓</p> <p style="text-align: center;">High Intensity of Indiscriminate Violence</p> <p>Insurgencies with foreign support, especially high levels of assistance-> reliance on foreign sponsors.</p> <p>FMLN: Received foreign support from Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union.</p> <p>LRA: Receives foreign support from the Sudanese government</p>

Note: Presented above at the three theoretical arguments, vertical linkages, horizontal linkages, and foreign support demonstrated statistical significance through their operationalizations in the quantitative analysis. While the main theory of interest in this paper is vertical linkages, horizontal linkages and foreign support are treated as complementary explanations of indiscriminate violence.

Qualitative Methods

In addition to the regression analysis, I employ process tracing and content analysis in order to (1) understand the causal mechanisms whereby rebel political wings and strategies decrease the level of indiscriminate violence (2) measure the frequency of indiscriminate violence used in each particular case. This is important in providing increased robustness to the results found in the data section, but also understanding how rebel political wings and strategies achieve their effects. I now provide a detailed breakdown of the case study approach and the content analysis used in the paper.

a.) Case Study Analyses

First, I conduct process tracing with two cases that vary on the primary variable of interest, rebel political wings, and seeing how this difference affected insurgent use of indiscriminate violence. I also dedicate a portion of my case study to considering alternative theories of explanation, such as horizontal linkages and foreign support, which were controlled for in between the two selected cases. I selected the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front and Lord's Resistance Army as my case studies by using the methods of difference. This attempts to hold all war characteristics between cases the same with exception to the independent variable (Weinstein 2006). Reviewing the selected cases, the FMLN and LRA were both coded for being conflicts over governmental control, having potential pre-war social bases to rely on, boasting strong horizontal linkages, and enjoying foreign support from undemocratic countries. While these two cases had much in common, they provided the key difference in terms of having a rebel political wing or not.

A basic hoop test is employed to the alternative explanations, which accepts a hypothesis on causal relationships when the intervening mechanism necessary for Y is present with the

variable of interest and predicted outcome. Passing a hoop test, however, only seeks to show the hypothesis is a necessary condition, and not a sufficient one (Mahoney 2012, 371). Process tracing dictates that “the goal is to account for variation in the independent variables of interest map on to the distinct choices rebel leaders make at each step in an organization’s evolution” (Weinstein 2006, 54). Aside from showing the importance of rebel political wings and a political strategy, I show horizontal linkages and foreign support as alternative explanations provide mixed results in terms of failing to properly predict violence based on their theoretical claims.

b.) Content Analysis

The second operationalization of indiscriminate violence focuses on determining the identity of those targeted in insurgent attacks, in which targeting military and political functionaries with the government would be classified as selective attacks (Weinstein 2006). In order to measure the indiscriminate violence used in both selected case studies, I conduct a content analysis using national news agencies that report on the specific events throughout these two intrastate conflicts, and who the targets were in the attacks. Doing this analysis provides prima facie evidence that an insurgency uses indiscriminate violence, and particularly when they do not. A ProQuest search used the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and the Wall Street Journal as the primary sources of information; all prominent papers that not only are extensively engaged in covering foreign policy matters, but also the economic, social, and political conflicts that impact U.S. national security and foreign policy.¹⁴ Despite limiting article results, roughly a

¹⁴ In conducting the content analysis with these selected papers, bias may be introduced on the dependent variable depending on the selection of which national news agency I selected. In selecting, the New York Times, Los Angeles times, and the Wall Street Journal, there could be suspected potential biases in that there was an underreporting of rebel-attributed acts of violence by national governments to downplay claims of instability, etc. First, I handle this concern by using U.S. news agencies instead of those within the selected countries where government can best downplay certain incidents. These agencies also happen to capture much violence committed by these foreign governments, which should serve to alleviate some concerns bias in either direction is at work. Second, this analysis is to provide prima facie evidence that an insurgent group has committed indiscriminate

hundred articles were identified to specifically include these acts of violence, namely massacres and rapes, in the reports along with the names of the warring parties.¹⁵ When coding for news articles where the insurgent group's attack did not involve an identifiable military or government functionary, these were coded as a 1, classifying it as an act of indiscriminate violence.¹⁶

In the following two sections, I present the qualitative findings on the FMLN and LRA, demonstrating that there has been two stories of violence. In El Salvador, the FMLN used low levels of indiscriminate violence, being far more selective in their targeting of military personnel and officials. I attribute this to their rebel political wings and political strategies that were implemented, including local popular power governments and political education programs. Unlike the FMLN, the LRA avoided following its Ten Point Program to national reforms and political empowerment, instead turning towards terrorist tactics and coercion to acquire materials and human capital to wage their continued war.

violence, and give a possible comparison relative to government's level of such violence, if so reported in the search results.

¹⁵ I limited the scope of articles by using key terms relating to major human rights violations such as "massacre" and "rape" to produce a manageable list of article results that maximizes the chance to find indiscriminate violence. The term "massacre" is useful insofar perpetrators "kill larger numbers of noncombatants at a time," and "provides a rough indication of the degree to which violence was selective or indiscriminate" (Weinstein 2006, 213). Likewise, rape captures a weapon of war that has become increasingly common in civil conflicts (Maedl 2011). The only articles removed from the analysis are those that ProQuest included as a duplicate from the same news source, or do not clearly attribute the massacre or indiscriminate violence to one warring party. In cases where a massacre is attributed both, I coded against the insurgency and included it under the rebel category.

¹⁶ For those rebel attacks where targets involved a mixture of civilians and figures affiliated with the government, these were coded as 0.5 to reflect the selectiveness of the attack. As for all the remaining cases, a value of 0 was assigned to indicate that the article described government-perpetrated massacres, in which this paper is not particularly focused on disaggregating the nature of such actions.

Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front: “The People Are Our Mountains”

Case Overview

The argument in this section is that the FMLN’s political wings and strategies drove the decision by insurgents to not use indiscriminate violence during the civil war. It also outlines the causal mechanism by which the development of these vertical linkages decrease insurgency use of indiscriminate violence. First, I present historical information on the insurgent organization, and then go over results from the content analysis that evince low levels of indiscriminate violence. Afterward, a discussion of the pre-war social base that the FMLN had to work with is provided, which is shown to be the product of the Catholic Church and its constituent political-military organizations. Without a pre-war social base, the FMLN would have unlikely sustained such a prolonged popular war. Then I show how the FMLN interacted with its pre-war social base through their rebel political wings and strategies. Alternative explanations involving horizontal linkages and foreign support are included at the end, in which the former complements the argument made here.

Not Terrorists, but “Los Campeneros”

As a FMLN member noted, “It is impossible militarily, for a guerrilla movement to survive, even for a few weeks, if it does not have the massive support of the population...El Salvador has no mountains, but the mountains of the guerrillas are their people” (Montgomery 1995, 116). From 1980 to 1992, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) conducted a prolonged popular war against the El Salvadoran government and its Armed Forces (ESAF) for governmental control. By the end of this twelve year civil conflict in the smallest Central American country, El Salvador experienced the deaths of more than 75,000 people, with more than a quarter of its population displaced (Byrne 1996, 210). Notwithstanding formal

economic and military support from communist foes of the U.S., the FMLN and its constituent groups were not responsible for most of the civilian deaths and the indiscriminate acts of violence. Salehyan et al. (2014) suggests that external support, particularly from undemocratic regimes, would exacerbate the intensity of indiscriminate violence. However, the 1993 Truth Commission in its significant report, “attributed 85 percent of the acts of violence to State agents... [while] 5% of the acts of violence were attributed to the FMLN” (Truth Commission, 1993). In comparison to the U.S.-backed ESAF, the FMLN never had the formidable military capabilities to the government, whether it was ground vehicles, aircraft, weapons, and military training.¹⁷ Additional obstacles to the formation of a viable insurgency included to the unsuitable geography, such as the ostensible absence of mountains and sanctuaries in El Salvador’s natural environment. Whereas the ESAF relied on the U.S., the FMLN-FDR relied on external supporters in Cuba and Nicaragua. Nevertheless, the FMLN-FDR sought to make the people of El Salvador their “mountains.”

The FMLN was an umbrella insurgent organization formed on October 10, 1980, uniting the five disparate political-military organizations (OP-Ms) from the 1970s that were opposed to the military dictatorship (Montgomery 1995, 102). The FMLN General Command consisted of a five-person directorate with one member from each constituent group, many of whom shared backgrounds as educated elites with ties to the progenitor Communist Party of El Salvador (Moroni 1995, 4; Montgomery 1995, 109; McClintock 1998). Due to innate differences in

¹⁷ The issue of rebel capabilities emerges, in which weaker insurgencies may be more likely to create rebel political wings and strategies to compensate. In the regression analysis, rebel capabilities, a measure of an insurgency’s relative fighting strength to that of the government, fail to achieve statistical significance. In both the FMLN and LRA, their relatively low strengths against the government do not predict whether or not they develop political wings. In the FMLN, the decision to form political divisions came from ideological underpinnings of Maoist insurgency, which involve conducting popular war. Despite the relative weakness for the LRA, they did not form political wings, and more importantly, vertical ties.

leadership, size, and undoubtedly programmatic objectives within each organization, the FMLN adopted flexible governance. Each group would preserve their organization structure and ideological foundations. Moreover, the FMLN General Command operated on democratic centralism, which resulted in binding decisions on military offensives, bolstering of the rearguard, and political strategies (McClintock 1998, 48). By the start of the war, the estimated size of the insurgency was around 4,000 guerrillas and 5,000 in local militiamen, benefitting from the collection of fighters under this umbrella organization (Montgomery 1995, 116). Appendix 2 provides chronology of events that occurred during this civil war.

The FMLN was composed of five OP-Ms, which include the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL), the National Resistance (RN), the Party of the Salvadoran Revolution (PRS), the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS), and the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC).¹⁸ Many of these groups splintered from the PCS due to internal disagreements over strategy, specifically how to extract concessions from the government. Each of these OP-Ms had a separate political wing they were associated with for organizing political activities, and an armed forces division. The rebel political wing of the FMLN, the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), was instrumental at both the domestic and international levels in securing weapons from abroad, and bolstering popular support through its political strategies. The FMLN-FDR quickly secured recognition as a “representative political force” from Mexico and France in 1981. Furthermore, the FDR issued its platform for the Revolutionary Democratic Government (GDR). This included new local governments, the reconstitution of the armed forces, and “adherence to the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights and due punishment for those responsible”

¹⁸ On May 22, 1980, the Unified Revolutionary Directorate, pre-cursor to the FMLN, was created as a “joint chief of staffs,” consisting of three commanders from each OP-M.

(Montgomery 1995, 118). Shortly after, the FMLN and its directorate passed a declaration that further elaborated on these general principles. The declaration highlighted broader democratic and socialist notions of reform to the economy and military versus a purely Marxist-Leninist approach.

Measuring Indiscriminate Violence

The results from the content analysis are clear: the ESAF and right-wing death squads, such as the U.S.-trained Atlacatal battalion, were the main perpetrators committing massacres and other acts of indiscriminate violence. From 1981 to 1992, the end of the El Salvadoran Civil War, 101 articles appeared and covered the most publicized events of brutality and rebel attacks. Furthermore, these results provide the best chance to observe indiscriminate violence committed by the insurgents.

FIGURE 1.
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front and Reported Use of Indiscriminate Violence




Figure 1 provides a bar graph that shows the percentage of civilian killings attributed to the government and FMLN, with the latter being divided into selective and indiscriminate

violence. Overall, the FMLN were responsible for only 16.8 percent of the news-reported killings, massacres, and rapes. Based on the identity of the victims, only 3.96 percent of those news-reported killings were classified as indiscriminate violence, in which civilian victims had no affiliation to the government or military. Interestingly this statistic closely matches the Truth Commission's reported rate, 5 percent, of total civilian deaths attributable to the FMLN and constituent groups.¹⁹ Rebel-attributed attacks involved the use of land mines that maimed and killed affected targets, car bombings in nation's capital that left three dead, and a sabotage operation of "electrical installations and power lines affecting about two-thirds of the nation" and killed 7 civilians (LeMoyne, 1988; AP, 1990). In 1988, more than 150 people were killed by mines (Truth Commission 1993). The remaining 11 percent of the news-reported violence attributable to the FMLN often reported civilian deaths associated with selective violence, which included the notorious La Zona Rosa Massacre and the execution of U.S. military advisors and prisoners of war. In 1984, La Zona Rosa Massacre left 13 people dead, including four U.S. marines, two U.S. citizens, and the rest civilians. The PRTC claimed responsibility for the attack, in which they said the direct target was the "Yankee Aggressor in El Salvador," obviating beliefs this was indiscriminate (Los Angeles Times 1985). The extrajudicial execution of civilians, including a truck driver the FMLN claimed had admitted to being a spy, were followed by a town meeting to explain their actions (Miller 1988).

Serious massacres involving the deaths of over hundreds of civilians were committed by the government. The largest of such massacres was the El Salvadoran army sweeps that led El

¹⁹ Regarding potential media bias, if the U.S.-based newspapers were to be biased against communist threats such as the FMLN-FDR, the expectation would be higher than expected reporting of civilian violence, massacres, and rapes by the rebels than that of the government. However, the opposite is true in this case, thus affirming that such a bias did not affect the predominant number of articles reporting the El Salvadoran Armed Forces and their use of violence.

Mozote on December 11, 1981, in which more than seven hundred civilians died (Crossette 1982). Notwithstanding denials by the U.S. State Department of El Mozote, early exhumations of grave sites, such as the recovery of 93 skeletons of children containing bullet fragments, quickly disproved these assertions. In the Las Hojas Massacre, 74 indigenous civilians from a cooperative were executed by soldiers. Many civilian deaths came as the result of aerial bombardments and retaliation for rebel attacks, which included military operations from September 25-26 that resulted in over a hundred civilians dying (Truth Commission 1993). Through government sweeps of rebel-controlled territory, paramilitaries such as the Altacatal battalion kill hundreds, with their abuses worsening as escalation to insurgent violence.

Creating the Pre-War Social Base for the FMLN: The Church and Existent Political-Military Organizations

Before discussing the mechanism of rebel political wings and vertical linkages, I discuss the FMLN and their pre-war social base that became the essential target of their political operations. The presence of a pre-war social base is critical for insurgencies to receive needed popular support and resources for war (Staniland 2014). The FMLN's primary base of popular support were the peasant communities centralized in the northern, rural parts of the country. Despite quiescence among peasants for most of the 20th century, they became increasingly active in response to the increasing centralizing of wealth and land ownership among the affluent. Both the Catholic Church and political-military organizations contributed to preparing the pre-war social base with a revived peasant consciousness conducive for the FMLN's prolonged popular war.

On January 22, 1932, Farabundo Martí, the peasant leader of the Communist Party of El Salvador, organized a national insurrection against the minority of landowners known as the "Fourteen Families," who owned most of the land used for agriculture since privatization came

to land ownership.²⁰ In what became the “La Matanza,” meaning massacre, more than 25,000 civilians and supporters were killed by government troops during this revolt. Since the 1930s, coffee continued being the largest cash crop of an agrarian society, accounting for 36 percent of agricultural production and more than half of the country’s export values (Byrne 1996). The disparity in land ownership and wealth intensified by the 1970s, in which nearly half of the country’s families were landless and the “richest fifth [received] 66 percent of the national income” (Byrne 1996, 20). Despite growing inequality in society, the people of El Salvador were confronted with a quiescent and demoralized civil society until the emergence of the Catholic Church and political-military organizations.

In Montgomery and Byrne’s study of the El Salvadoran Civil War, both assign an important role to the Catholic Church and its pastoral work to recreate the prospect for collective action among the peasants. The Catholic Church became increasingly politically involved in the issues of landlessness and poverty that came to redefine a lost era between the failed insurrection of 1932 and the emergence of the FMLN-FDR. Archbishop Oscar Romero, prominent church leader in El Salvador and other cardinals adopted an “institutional” church wherein lied “bureaucratic interests that often have little do with the fundamental values of Christianity (Montgomery 1995, 84). Furthermore, the Catholic Church broadened its role “to defend the rights of the oppressed,” and to “promote grassroots organizations” (Byrne 1996; Montgomery 1995, 83). The differences notwithstanding, both revolutionaries and church figures served as

²⁰ The introduction of the coffee bean to the El Salvadoran economy became the impetus for privatization of former, communal lands, forcing many peasants to become landless farm workers for the minority of landowners.

political entrepreneurs among the peasant and rural communities (Popkin 1979). This made both groups susceptible to government violence.²¹

Church activism led to the creation of hundreds of Christian Base Communities (CEBs). These communities allowed peasants come together under a system of values, to participate in decision making, and also discuss liberation theology, or about being freed from oppression (Montgomery 1995, 87). With over 15,000 leaders of laity trained in these communities, the Church not only brought leadership skills to peasants, but had redressed the existing quiescence that was imbued in peasant consciousness, following La Matanza of 1932. CEBs supplied “the initial bases for collective peasant action and support... against repression from the state and landowners...” (Byrne 1996, 27). The vituperative attitudes toward the Church from right wing elements of the military resulted in the consequential assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in 1980 and the death of eleven priests.

Second, the many fledgling political-military organizations built off the pastoral work laid down by Church-based communities, further mobilizing peasant resistance to the regime. The FPL, the first group to split from the PCS, quickly sought support from the peasants in areas most economically marginalized by the government. Both the FPL and ERP “had a strong militaristic conception of the revolutionary strong,” with the former believing in mobilizing the masses and the latter a foquismo-style approach (Montgomery 1995). The FPL leaders “visited communities, getting to know peasant families, learning from them, and...increase its influence in the peasant movement” (Byrne 1996, 36). The FPL allowed its political wing, the Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR), to gain civilian support from certain labor unions such as the Union

²¹ For example, Father Jose Inocencio Alas was kidnapped and brutally beaten by soldiers following his overt support for agrarian reform in front of the El Salvador’s National Assembly (Montgomery 1995).

of Rural Workers (UTC), student associations, and the teachers of Andes (Byrne 1996, 36). In eastern El Salvador, the ERP concentrated on their youth Christian base, working with priests to transform the existent grievances among the peasants and Christians into military action premised on foquismo. Their political arm, the 28th of February Popular Leagues (LP-28), entered only after the ERP believed it was being left out from the overarching movement towards mass mobilization.²² The OP-M with the greatest success in mobilizing urban social communities was the National Resistance with their political wing, the Popular Forces of Liberation (FARN).

Vertical Ties: Establishing the Rear Guard

The presence of the FMLN-FDR and political strategies strengthened the vertical linkages between the insurgency and the pre-war social base of peasants with a revived consciousness due to the activities of the church and OP-Ms. As explicated in the hypothesis on rebel political wings, these political elements are causally linked to reducing the likelihood of indiscriminate violence by establishing these vertical ties that allow rebels “to tap into local support and manpower in order to keep fighting” (Staniland 2014, 36). This necessary intervening mechanism is what enabled the FMLN-FDR to be socially embedded in these communities even when ESAF threatened the lives of the peasants, and rely less on coercive techniques such as intimidation.

After the January Offensive of 1981, the FMLN-FDR gained sizable pieces of territory where a rearguard can be built with winning the hearts and minds of noncombatants. But

²² The PCS bolstered the National Democratic Union (UDN) since 1967, creating inroads with urban elements such as labor unions and teachers associations. As the smallest of all the OP-Ms, the PRTC was the last to integrate its political arm, the Popular Liberation Movement (MLP) to the CRM.

exerting territorial control for the rear guard was “as much a political as a key military problem...” (Ucles 1996, 48). In order to establish civilian control, strict adherence to political doctrines and efforts at cajoling the social base was necessary. As declared in the FMLN-FDR’s document on a revolutionary government, their combatants promised adherence to the Geneva Convention and on human rights accords. The insurgency needed to develop the vertical linkages that would give them greater control over the civilian population. Both the creation of local popular powers and political education reified equal representation and empowerment among the civilian population.

Local Popular Power Governments

On its political platform, the FMLN-FDR issued a “guarantee to the Salvadorian people peace liberty welfare, and progress by implementing social, economic and political changes that ensure a just distribution of the wealth... and the effective exercise of democratic rights of the great majorities” (Montgomery 1995, 119). Amid the conversation of El Salvadoran peasants, they routinely avoided classifying members of the FMLN as “terrorists” and “subversives” (Montgomery 1995, 116). Instead, the peasants referred to these political-military organizations as “popular organizations,” and their members as “los campaneros,” or companions.

One of the methods of earning the trust and reducing indiscriminate violence was the creation of local popular powers (PPLs). The main purpose of the PPLs was “to integrate and mobilize the masses of our fronts and rearguard areas to struggle for their day-to-day needs, to educate and raise their consciousness and to lay the basis for their participation in the war” (Byrne 1996, 133). The incentive to indiscriminately kill from the rebels’ perspectives was effectively removed as a strategy, especially in these rural communities where rebels and civilians developed closer interrelationships through shared experiences and assistance given to

one another. In northern and eastern parts of El Salvador, the FMLN-FDR established several of these rivaling forms of government to the Duarte regime to challenge claims of sovereignty (Montgomery 1995, 120). For example, in El Jicaro, Chalatenango, PPLs incorporated all 2,000 civilians into their political system, in which people participated in routine meetings and addressing basic needs (Montgomery 1995, 120). Jenny Pearce (1986) described it “as a means by which the civilian population could guarantee their needs and organize their society...”

Each of these local popular powers (PPL) were composed of ruling juntas for periods of six months, including a president, a vice president, and other secretaries who dealt with legal arbitration, education, commerce, and self-defense (Montgomery 1995, 120). Likewise, the PRTC established Consejos Farabundistas, or administrative councils, “to normalize civic life and control and administrate resources and collective production” (Montgomery 1995, 121). Many of these duties were that of a typical governing municipality, including handling the civil registrar, political and religious education, economic programs, and self-defense measures with militia training and tunnel systems.

Certainly, variation in PPLs existed based on the operating OP-M in the area. In Guazapa, more restrictive rules were placed, including the prohibition on the use of alcohol and drugs due to concerns it would undermine security and military readiness for government attacks. In Morazan, the ERP utilized vertical linkages to recruit militiamen who would take up arms to defend the area from the ESAF. Some PPLs adopted visions of bringing equity to its people, turning towards communal ownership of land and property. The individual was responsible not only for their own welfare, but the welfare of others. As a peasant noted, “Now, we all work the same land and all of us have food. We don’t go hungry. Do I miss having my

own land? No. This way my children get enough to eat. I can't feed them a handful of earth"
 (Montgomery 1995, 122).

Political Education Programs

Among the services provided by the FMLN-FDR, literacy campaigns and political education helped combatants develop the necessary skills to fight and be invested in the rebel's cause. The FMLN commanders upheld an ideological commitment that "all people are capable of learning and are entitled to the opportunity...[as] education forms the whole person" (Hammond 1998, 53). Coordination between the military and political wings were required to administer a multi-faceted education. First, most of the peasants being recruited lacked a formal education. This became apparent in basic military training and understanding how to use different firearms. Second, there was the need to instill discipline and political education into minds of the fighters to incorporate civilians and risk their lives. A "high level of consciousness...about why all this sacrifice was necessary," and gain assurances "that militant was going to stick with the process" (Hammond 1998, 61). Without an ideological underpinning to the revolutionary movement, there was no insurgency, and thus support in vital areas under FMLN control.

First, the FMLN-FDR invested in teaching their combatants and peasants how to read and write. A basic level of general education was necessary for the proper administration of medicine to the wounded, radio communication of enemy movements, and manufacturing of explosives. Peasants in training were separated into different groups based on the level of education. Combatants routinely wrote in their notebooks, and practiced their reading of various political pamphlets and other propaganda that served to boost the morale of their combatants. Consequently, the FMLN benefitted from a more educated core of fighters who knew how to

handle weaponry, and the political role they have in getting the support of other civilians they interact with (Ucles 1996, Montgomery 1995).²³

Second, in 1981, the FMLN-FDR laid the groundwork for political education with the printing of workbooks for teachers to offer political meaning to their sacrifices as combatants and supporters of the revolution. The FMLN printed “political pamphlets with simple lessons, usually in comic book form....” and made sure teachers in these rearguard zones had some learning resources to use in their literacy campaigns (Hammond 1998). Declaring a “War of All the People,” the FMLN-FDR focused on greater political work with the civilian population, and strengthen its core values amongst its ranks and constituent groups (Byrne 1996, 105). By 1985, the FMLN-FDR published “The Fifteen Principles of the Guerrilla Combatant,” which included important political ideas and rules of engagement the FMLN-FDR wanted instilled in their combatants. For example, the exhortation “We will struggle against ignorance and always dedicate ourselves to advancement” is emblematic of the prolonged popular war strategy, while “No. 8 We must be friends of the people, be deeply aware of their problems, give them guidance, and incorporate them into the struggle everywhere” (Hammond 1998). They were instructed to avoid indiscriminate violence in congruence with the GDR and FMLN’s political beliefs, and the related importance of expanding their teachings of popular democracy and equality for all people. The FMLN labelled military personnel, government functionaries, and informants as the only legitimate targets. The ERP took the greatest initiative in the extrajudicial executions of mayors and judges “considered to be working against it [FMLN]” (Truth Commission 1993).

²³ The FMLN-FDR extolled the participation of women in its struggle against injustice, in which “30 percent of the FMLN combatants and 20 percent of the military leadership were women” (Montgomery 1995, 123). Thus, the FMLN-FDR developed close linkages with the local fighters and civilians, particularly in urban areas and without discrimination.

Horizontal Ties: Mending Differences through the FMLN-FDR

The FMLN, by virtue of its existence, enjoyed a strong sense of horizontal linkages, which was reinforced with its general command structure. As Staniland (2014) asserts, “weak horizontal ties limit communication, coordination, and cooperation across localities.” The hypothesis claiming an independent, negative relationship constituent control cannot be ruled out in this context, and could be viewed as a complement to the effect of vertical linkages on indiscriminate violence. Horizontal linkages brought effective coordination and consensus within the organization to not use terrorist tactics and adhere to their political objectives without deviation.

Despite occasional strategic disagreements, the FMLN General Command boasted a homogenous leadership in terms of political background and formal education. The military commanders of the FMLN were mostly members from the Community Party of El Salvador, having decided to split and form their own political-military organizations. Four of the five commanders received formal education at the National University of El Salvador, and came from middle class backgrounds.²⁴ The meetings for the FMLN General Command were conducted occasionally abroad in Nicaragua and Cuba, where they discussed strategy, and were able to flexibly respond to the exigencies that appeared with each phase during the war. Decisions from the FMLN General Command were binding for all its members, which was demonstrated from many of the coordinating political campaigns that are discussed later, and the systematic aversion from indiscriminate violence. As the mechanism that led to reduced indiscriminate violence, there was effective communication between commanders on their coordination of military

²⁴ In addition to being educated at the National University, Joaquin Villalobos of the ERP had partial education at a seminary, which explained his tendencies to areas where many of the pastoral work of the 1970s laid the ground work for mass mobilization.

offensives, and their denouncement of terrorism and other systemic forms of indiscriminate violence. This also allowed the FMLN to engage in peace negotiations without great fear that any one political-military organization would seek to spoil such efforts with the regime in power.

Foreign Support from the Communist Bloc

While there was explicit support provided from Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union, the FMLN-FDR did not expectedly turn towards the use of indiscriminate violence based on the existing literature. Despite receiving substantial foreign aid in weapons, sanctuary for high profile meetings between commanders, and military training, the FMLN-FDR never sought to wreak havoc or destabilize the El Salvadoran government with rampant killings. Unlike what is predicted in the financier-insurgent hypothesis, the FMLN-FDR exercised control over their strategies, and heavily emphasized focusing on political aspects of its military struggle (Hovil and Wercker 2005). Looking at another possible mechanism, reduced incentives to connect with pre-war social base, it was evident that the exact opposite happened through the efforts of the FMLN's political wing. The FMLN-FDR worked internationally to reinvent their image not as Communist guerrillas but legitimate political actors, evidenced in gaining political recognition from France and Mexico. The FDR also pressured the U.S. government into reconsidering their support for an increasingly abusive regime. Domestically, the implementation of local popular power governments and political education in the rearguard seems to reject the hypothesis that receiving foreign support led to reduced incentives to work with the campesinos. Many FMLN leaders, including the prominent EPL leader Joaquin Villalobos, underscored the importance to win the support of the people.

The Lord's Resistance Army: "A Clean War is known to God only"

Case Overview

The purpose of this section is to show the effects of the absence of vertical linkages, in which there are no rebel political wings or strategies. Both the FMLN and LRA have a pre-war social base to mobilize into a wartime organization, formidable horizontal discipline within their organizations, and foreign support. However, there has been a wide divergence in terms of the nature of violence employed. Kony has preyed upon the Acholi people of northern Uganda, devoting little resources in establishing vertical ties with those they claim to fight for. Similar to the previous section, I provide a historical background of Lord's Resistance Army. I discuss the results from the content analysis that document their routine use of massacres, rapes, and other indiscriminate forms of violence. I then briefly describe their pre-war social base, the ethnic Acholi, and their failure in connecting with them due to the absence of vertical linkages.

Fighting for the Ten Commandments

Since 1987, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has engaged in a brutal civil war against the Ugandan government controlled by President Yoweri Museveni. The LRA and its spiritualistic leader, Joseph Kony, claim their struggle is for the Ten Commandments. In the LRA's Ten Point Program manifesto, the insurgency had went further in promising political reforms, such as the implementation of multiparty democracy, economic reforms to close disparities between the north and south, and greater social services for the marginalized. The rebel motives, however, remain unclear to this day, as the LRA has become a predatory organization. When questioned about the LRA's record of human rights violations, Kony exonerated himself in saying "a clean war is known by God only" (Schomerus 2010). To the

contrary, the LRA has undoubtedly been the primary perpetrator of indiscriminate violence in Uganda, South Sudan, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since 2006, the LRA has been credited with the murder of more than 2319 civilians, 5346 abductions, along with a slew of atrocities (Invisible Children, 2015). The U.N. estimates more than 20,000 children have been kidnapped and forced to become either child soldiers or sex slaves. More than 1.5 million Ugandans have been displaced from their villages (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010). Why is it that the LRA, a group claims to live by the Ten Commandments, chooses to commit such terrible acts of indiscriminate violence?

As the successor group to Alice Lakwenas's Holy Free Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF), the Lord's Resistance Army's quickly grew into a scattered band of killers and rapists. The LRA's command structure remains secretive, with its three senior commanders "Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo, and Domb binic Ongwen" at the top of the hierarchy (Van Woudenberg et al. 2010, 16). The LRA does not communicate a clear political strategy, or have a political wing to conduct operations to change its poor image among its people and the international community. In 2010 the LRA is estimated to have a little more than 200 combatants throughout the region, with the number likely underestimated due to new abductees and lack of adequate intelligence. As much as President Museveni and other African leaders claim to have destroyed the insurgency, in 2009 alone, "the LRA killed 1,096 civilians and abducted 1,373 adults and 255 children..." (Van Woudenberg et al. 2010, 17).

The leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony, is a distant cousin of Alice Lakwena, and a former Ugandan People's Democratic Army (UPDA) soldier. Accounts claimed Kony had dropped out of school to join other youth in engaging in militarized politics (Behrend 1998). Earlier disagreements between Kony and Lakwena prevented the LRA and HSMF from merging their

forces, which coalesced in occasional violence between the two factions. Following the collapse of the Lakwena's HSMF, Kony sought to recruit all the remnant fighters from the HSMF and the Kitgum district. Likewise, Kony claimed to have been possessed by different spirits who guide him in his struggle for freedom and purification of his people and country. He utilized his own set of spiritual instructions on what was allowed amongst his fighters, and how to defend themselves from enemy gun fire spiritual objects, such as "malaika," meaning angel (Behrend 1998, 115). Whereas the HSMF possessed a semblance of popular support among the youth Acholi, the LRA never fostered such social linkages. Consequently, these rebels quickly engaged in human rights violations, including abduction, rape, mutilation, and extrajudicial execution of hundreds of thousands of noncombatants.


In 2003, President Museveni appealed to the International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague for Kony and his senior LRA commanders' war crimes and crimes against humanity; thus, five warrants were issued by the ICC in apprehending these condemned warlords for irrevocable crimes. Between 2006 and 2008, Riek Machar, former Vice President of South Sudan, started the Juba Talks between the Ugandan government and LRA representatives. While a peace agreement was forged, Kony never showed up to sign the agreements because of opposition to the ICC charges that had been leveled against him. Thus, Ugandan military leaders to launch Operation North, a failed military attempt to destroy the LRA with the isolation of civilians and government sweeps of rebel-occupied territory. In 2009 Operation Lightning Thunder, a counterinsurgent operation assisted by the U.S. military, was launched by Uganda, South Sudan, and the DRC to dismantle the insurgency. Against expectations, the LRA has not faltered, and only escalated its indiscriminate violence with the 2009 Christmas Massacres in the

Garamba National Park region of the DRC and more. Appendix 3 shows a chronological ordering of events that have occurred since the beginning of this conflict.

Measuring Indiscriminate Violence

In contrast to the FMLN-FDR and their use of violence, the Lord’s Resistance Army was responsible for all but one of the massacres and acts of indiscriminate violence reported in the selected media. Figure 2 includes results of the content analysis for the LRA since 1987. As shown below, 97.9 percent of the sample of news articles attributed the massacres and rapes to the LRA. Moreover, there was little divergence in reporting that assigned blame to Museveni, despite the existence of accounts of some abuses by the government.

FIGURE 2.
Lord’s Resistance Army and Reported Use of Indiscriminate Violence



Based on the identity of the victims, all the LRA attacks against civilians, even of Acholi ethnic identity, had no affiliation to the government or military. Some of these rebel-attributed massacres included the 1994 Atiak Massacre where more than 300 captives were executed, a

spate of 2004 massacres in IDP camps, and more recently the Christmas Massacres in 2009 in Garamba National Park in northeastern Congo. The one news article that assigned responsibility to the government was from a Ugandan journalist on African conflict, contending that the Museveni regime has used a “directed campaign of murder, intimidation, bombing and burning of whole villages to drive the rural population into IDP camps” (French 2009). However, this sentiment among the media has not been thoroughly discussed. Although Kony ardently insists the national government is implicated in abusing the people of Uganda, the LRA has been inextricably connected with indiscriminate violence.

Pre-War Social Base for the LRA: The Acholi People

Before discussing the consequences of weak vertical linkages, I discuss the LRA and their potential pre-war social base that similar Acholi-based insurgencies in the past relied on for support. The LRA’s primary base of popular support were the ethnic Acholi and northern Ugandans who were disillusioned with the current government that favored the southern Bantu, and faced difficulty being reintegrated into traditional Acholi culture.

In May 1985, a spiritual medium named Alice Auma claimed she was possessed by the spirit of Lakwena, thereby convincing her to take on armed struggle to purge “president Museveni’s government, witches, other nebi and akwakai and bad ‘people...’” (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010, 8).²⁵ What made Alice Lakwena’s HSMF into a threat was the presence of a pre-war social base in the Acholi people in northern Uganda, a populace of 1.2 million who mostly oppose the southern, Bantu-dominant government (Green 2012; Oloya 2013, 55). Most of her followers who treated Lakwena as their spiritual mother were “northern Acholis, who

²⁵ When training her insurgents, Lakwena disseminated her “Holy Spirit Safety Precautions,” a list of prohibitions on perceived sins such as theft, lying, killing, and sex that must be eliminated or risk the threat from evil spirits.

dominated the army before Museveni's predominantly southern forces seized Kampala in 1986" (Rule, 1987). The people of the Acholi region, consisting of the Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader districts have been left politically and socially marginalized by the emergence of the NRA. For many Acholi, the NRA "were perceived as the enemies of the Acholi, and consequently, they were met with intolerance, suspicion and outright hostility" (Acker 2004; Oloya 2013, 46). The militarization of Ugandan society and ethnic divisions, the de-institutionalization of Ugandan politics with the north seen as primarily underdeveloped, and the divide between the North and South (Acker 2004). Militarized politics has been the post-colonial mode of gaining power till the NRA (World Vision 2004). Most of those Acholi soldiers who returned with Museveni in charge "were unable or willing to adapt to village life," and "thus forming a fertile recruitment ground for successive insurgent Acholi groups (Acker 2004, 11). Few of these youth sought the spiritual processes of cleansing their sins through their tribes, and instead turned towards Lakwena's army.

Among the Acholi youth, both Alice Lakwena and Joseph Kony portrayed themselves as the alternative to President Museveni. The LRA and its Ten Point Program revealed secular components of the insurgency that were intended to appeal to the Acholi, such as rehabilitation of the economy and the country's infrastructure, national unity, universal education, and reformation of the national army to reincorporate the Acholi (Allen 2006, 43). Nevertheless, the LRA never worked to achieve its secular components, or engender popular support from its ethnic Acholi.

Vertical Linkages: "I did not kill the civilian of Uganda"

Kony claims alleged innocence from the reported abductions, rapes, and killing of his own Acholi. The rebel leader was quoted, "I kill the force, the soldier of Museveni, I did not kill

the civilian of Uganda. I kill the soldier of Museveni... Museveni used that word [killing people] to spoil our name, to spoil our name so that people did not support us” (Schomerus 2010, 116; Eichstaedt 2009). This section offers the argument that the absence of vertical linkages have allowed the LRA to commit indiscriminate violence, such as massacres and rapes, of noncombatants. If the LRA cannot motivate local populations to join their cause due to the lack of social linkages, then coercion becomes their course of action. Thus, commanders and rebel fighters resort to predatory behaviors such as abductions, rape, and massacres to achieve their ends, given the low costs.

In the LRA’s Ten Point Program, Kony and his commanders listed “national unity, education for all... diplomatic relations with neighboring states” among others as their priorities (Allen 2006, 43). Nevertheless, the LRA neglected to pursue local governments that would politically empower their marginalized vis-à-vis the southern-represented government, and make sovereignty claims against the government. Additionally, the LRA did not offer political education programs to educate Acholi about their organization’s ideology. Whereas the FMLN-FDR valued education as empowerment of the peasants in El Salvador, the LRA resorted to instilling prevalent fear and intimidation through violence against all those not with them. More than 250,000 students have been left without an education in northern Uganda, not accounting for the estimated 25,000 abductions of mostly young males (Eichstaedt 2009, 49). Some years saw priests being regularly abducted and targeted by the LRA (Eichstaedt 2009, 57). In 2004, more than 80 percent of the Acholi population lived in IDP camps, reduced to sustenance living with little economic and social stability (Allen 2006, 53). According to an abductee, he explained indiscriminate violence against the Acholi as retribution for them being “stubborn and did not want to support their [LRA] movement...” (Allen 2006, 68).

To further cripple vertical ties between the LRA and social base, the Ugandan government focused on severing any potential social linkages between the insurgency from their potential social base. These efforts have certainly degraded the prospects for well-built vertical linkages between the LRA and Acholi. The government also aided the formation of local defense forces such as Home Guards, the Local Defense Forces, and the Acholi-based Arrow Brigades because the LRA typically attacked through ambushes that are difficult to detect with large standing armies. These defense forces typically included former rebel members and some Acholi into their ranks, which certainly made them hated by the LRA for their supposed betrayal. Most of those militiamen captured by the LRA were subjected to brutal torture, and subjected to torture, and subjected to torture, and “marked as traitors, [with] their noses, ears, arms and mouths being cut off” (Behrend 1998, 117).

Horizontal Linkages: Indoctrination of the Unwilling

The LRA does impose horizontal discipline across its constituents, particularly their abductees with whom they put through their process of spiritual indoctrination. In testing the validity of constituent control on insurgent violence, insurgent organization’s ability to impose control over its own combatants is shown not to necessarily reduce civilian abuse in all cases. In fact, horizontal discipline could benefit the leadership and its decision to intentionally promote indiscriminate and terrorist acts of violence. This sections shows that even cohesive organizations with a firm grip over its members may resort to civilian violence, and even systemic abuses without much care for who is targeted. In this context, constituent control is empowers its senior commanders, particular Joseph Kony. Hence, Kony exerts near monopolistic authority on what members can and cannot do, and has chosen to foster a culture of violence amongst his rebels.

From 1996 onward, the LRA through the “repurposing of [Acholi] culture” have forcibly recruited thousands of child soldiers. Children are most commonly abducted because they prove the most impressionable (Allen 2006, 64; Oloya 2013). These practices impose social control over their members, whether it is the fear of being killed or unable to return to their normal lives (World Vision 2004). As a horizontal linkage, the torturous process of becoming a LRA fighter instills a unifying identity to the Acholi and child soldiers who are conscripted to fight for the warlord.

Based on informant interviews, Opiyo Oloya (2013) reconstructs the cultural repurposing process that abductees undergo in becoming child soldiers and sex slaves for the LRA. Abductees typically undergo physical torture, brain washing, committing, and then purification rituals as part of their induction into the insurgency. The purpose of these spiritual indoctrination is to destroy whatever possible social connections an abducted child or woman have within their communities, and force violence upon them. Children are taken to the bush where “evil spirits” are spoken to only dwell, be physically tortured into compliance with their captors’ demands, and forced to kill or witness a murder. For those who choose to disobey any of the LRA’s commands, this was equated with choosing to not be “Acholi” in identity. Abductees are warned “working against the wishes of the LRM/A brought excruciating pain,” in which noncompliance almost guaranteed death (Oloya 2013, 83). As it is explicitly forbidden in Acholi culture, the LRA forces their abductees to kill or be a witness the murder of a person (Oloya 2013 84). In an interview with an abductee in 2004, he responded that “forced me to kill many times...so many times that I cannot remember...If you refused to do the killing they would cut off the head and make you carry it...None of us wanted carry the head” (Allen 2006, 69). This repeated indoctrination process for thousands of abductees “inverts the moral order” by forcing children

to kill their parents. This ultimately “instills respect and fear” for the LRA’s power, given they are able to determine who gets to live or die (Allen 2006, 64). Once the abductees are fearful in returning to their communities because of what they have done and retaliation by their captors, they become a part of the LRA.

Foreign Support from Khartoum

In the case of the LRA, foreign support serves as a complementary explanation to the explanation of no rebel political wings and vertical linkages. Due to foreign support from the Sudanese government, the LRA leaders has few real incentives or restraints when it comes to committing violence against its civilians. Relying on Sudan instead of those local communities for their support, the LRA has turned towards kidnapping and plundering in order to acquire the needed manpower and resources to sustain their “killing sprees,” with little clarity as to what they offer to the Acholi and other people. Maiming and killing is the LRA’s way of socially controlling local communities, if such groups survive the attacks. Considering the financier-insurgent hypothesis, one of the main alleged reasons the Sudanese government offers its resources to such as destructive group is longstanding opposition of Uganda. President Museveni has been a known supporters of John Garand’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in their struggle for independence. Furthermore, the Khartoum-backed LRA has been known to operate in formerly southern Sudan on the behalf of Khartoum to terrorize these secessionist elements, likely as a product of (Damon 2012). Ugandan journalist Mwenda argues, “When Sudan became the major sponsor of the LRA the LRA transformed being a popular movement...and became a mercenary force...its survival would [then] on the patronage of Khartoum” (Al Jazeera 2011). It is difficult to determine whether the LRA would have used

indiscriminate violence as much as it had without the support from Khartoum, but it is known that such support has not been leveraged to restrain the rebels' use of it.

Summary of Case Studies

In comparing the FMLN-FDR to the LRA, the main variable that consistently predicts the outcome of violence is rebel political wings. When insurgents have rebel political wings, they are likely to be invested in developing the important vertical ties that not only bring social bases into the fold of insurgency, but offers them greater safeguards from violence being committed indiscriminately. Without a political wing or strategy, it is more likely an insurgency group has few meaningful ways of developing the same robust vertical linkages that their counterparts with political divisions can. Thus, they resort to coercion and terrorist tactics as seen with the LRA. Table 4 provides a graphical interpretation of the two contrasting cases, controlling for the two complementary explanations, horizontal linkages and foreign support.

Table 4.

Controlled Comparison

	Vertical Linkages	Horizontal Linkages	Foreign Support	Low or High Intensity of Indiscriminate Violence?
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)	The FMLN-FDR developed strong vertical ties with the rural, peasant communities through political strategies, such as local popular powers and political education.	The FMLN leaders shared common political experiences, and implemented strategies through their General Command Structure.	FMLN-FDR received foreign support from Cuba, Nicaragua, and the U.S.S.R.	Low Intensity of Indiscriminate Violence
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	No rebel political wings or strategies to develop vertical ties.	The LRA forces abductees and soldiers to undergo rigorous spiritual processes; defectors are tortured and killed to maintain discipline.	The LRA receives foreign support from the Sudanese government in Khartoum.	High Intensity of Indiscriminate Violence

Conclusion

In explaining the conditions that drive indiscriminate violence, this paper has shown the importance of vertical linkages in reducing insurgency use of violence against noncombatants. Unlike explanations that emphasize information problems or non-rationalized perspectives, I argue it has to do more with the organizational structure of insurgencies, and their social linkages with their pre-war social bases. Insurgencies are less likely to commit indiscriminate violence when these organizations establish robust vertical linkages with their pre-war social base through political wings and strategies. Vertical linkages are the “social anchors” for insurgencies that they use to develop trust and reliance on local communities for domestic support (Staniland 2014). These type of social linkages discourage insurgents from victimizing civilians who are socially connected with them and receive popular support from (Woo 2015). For insurgencies associated with high intensities of indiscriminate violence, such as the LRA, they may exercise strong horizontal control over their members, but fail to earn the trust and popular support from their pre-war social base to join their cause. When there are no “carrots” to motivate noncombatants for the insurgency’s extralocal goals, coercion and intimidation becomes a viable alternative for insurgents. The evidence from the regression analysis and process tracing provide support for the theory of rebel political wings and vertical linkages.

Alternative explanations such as horizontal linkages and foreign support are shown to be complementary explanations to vertical linkages, and the discussion of political wings and strategies. With the FMLN-FDR, I demonstrate that horizontal linkages, measured by constituent control, may complement the effect of political wings in reducing indiscriminate violence. However, this was not the case in Uganda with the LRA, where even child soldiers forced at gunpoint to follow any commands, are encouraged by Kony to murder innocent Acholi and even

their own family as part of a culture of violence. Instead, foreign support seemed to play a bigger role in Uganda than in El Salvador, where the Khartoum-backed LRA dissociated itself from the Acholi social base and had not vertical linkages to restrain its use of indiscriminate violence from affecting its own ethnic people.

Despite the results of this paper, there are many more future opportunities to expand on the study of indiscriminate violence. In addition to extending the time scope to include more recent insurgencies, such as the Free Syrian Army and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), one should consider alternate operationalizations of indiscriminate violence and the main explanatory variables. As data on more conflicts become available and more precise, better models can be ran to understand the conditions conducive for indiscriminate violence. Given process tracing was conducted only for vertical linkages, the same can be performed exclusively using other explanatory variables that achieved statistical significance, such as horizontal linkages and foreign support. The paper also does not take time discuss the several outlier cases to main theory in this paper. For example, the secessionist Eritrean People's Liberation Front committed very few acts of indiscriminate violence, despite not having a rebel political wing. Oppositely, Angola's National Union for the Independence of Angola (UNITA) bolstered a rebel political wing, but was attributed with a high intensity of indiscriminate violence. Additionally, insurgent violence is part of a dynamic exchange between moves by insurgents and the government forces. Future research should further investigate the interplay between insurgent strategy of violence and counterinsurgency operations. How does counterinsurgency operations aimed at undermining popular support for insurgencies affect the decisions by insurgent leaders to resort to indiscriminate violence?

The current findings of this paper offers interesting policy implications. First, efforts at curtailing foreign support for insurgencies may be well-founded, given insurgencies with support from outside of the country tend to use indiscriminate violence more so than others who are dependent on their local populations. Second, as shown in the data, once insurgencies commit indiscriminate violence in the past, it is likely they will continue doing so for reasons not clearly defined. Third, although counterinsurgency operations aim to isolate insurgencies from their pre-war social bases, this may inadvertently encourage combatants to engage in exploitative actions of noncombatants when they have weak vertical ties with them (Woo 2015). As evidenced in the data, insurgencies without vertical linkages are more likely to target civilians indiscriminately. Not only does this research suggest how to reformulate some of the policies on protecting noncombatants during civil wars, but also consider alternative non-military solutions to long-lasting civil conflict involving insurgencies that reflect legitimate political interests. When having fought against an insurgency for several years, choosing to pursue diplomatic options with politically-oriented insurgencies such as the FMLN-FDR may help governments bring an end to the war. Furthermore, these non-military alternatives, such as peace negotiations, can avoid incurring the serious devastation that long-lasting civil wars can inflict upon a society and subsequent generations of people.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Rebel Violence	1146	100.2243	961.1542	0	30110
Rebel Political Wing	1138	.3488576	.4768184	0	1
Rebel Prior Violence	1146	.2417103	.4283066	0	1
Government Violence	1143	528.8023	14790.28	0	500000
Rebel Fighting Capacity	1142	.2548161	.4359487	0	1
Identity Conflict	1146	.8001745	.4000436	0	1
Territorial Conflict	1146	.5	.5002183	0	1
Government Conflict	1146	.5244328	.4996207	0	1
Conflict Density	1144	101.2517	118.7505	.07074	839.443
Conflict Area	1146	11.54591	1.810074	6.10925	16.9651
Battle Deaths	1067	5.656424	1.647595	3.218876	10.7797
Conflict Duration	1146	2.002878	1.141779	0	4.110874
Polity IV	1145	1.21048	6.384139	-9	10
GDP Per Capita	1146	7.531936	1.042118	4.762174	10.49468
Cold War	1146	.1108202	.3140465	0	1
War on Terror	1146	.3603839	.4803214	0	1
Ethnic Fractionalization	1140	.6223167	.2483163	.011	.984
Religious Fractionalization	1140	.3361145	.1666612	.0099	.75017
Territorial Control	1142	.3012259	.4589917	0	1
Lootable Resources	1140	.3912281	.4882395	0	1
Foreign Support	1146	.3926702	.4885577	0	1
Comprehensive Support (1-10)	1145	.980786	1.52301	0	7
Constituent Control	1104	.7653986	.4239415	0	1
Mobilizing Capability	1126	.4271758	.494888	0	1
UN Peacekeeping	1146	.1239092	.3296218	0	1
Fragmentation	1142	.1681261	.3741421	0	1

Appendix 2. Chronology of El Salvador Civil War

Year	Event
1932	La Matanza Massacre--more than 30,000 indigenous and peasants were murdered.
1979	Sandinista victory in Nicaragua increases urgency for U.S. to isolate communism in Central America. General Humberto Romero is ousted in coup by reformist officers who install a military-civilian junta.
1980	The military and Christian Democratic Party form a new junta (ruling council). FMLN launched its January 1980 "Final" Offensive. The Revolutionary Coordinator of the Masses (CRM) issued a comprehensive revolutionary program that promised agrarian reform and nationalization of key sectors of the economy. Monsignor Oscar Romero of the Roman Catholic Church is assassinated. Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) is formed. Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) is formed by five political-military organizations. Six leaders of El Salvadoran opposition organizations are abducted and killed. Four U.S. churchwomen in El Salvador are abducted, raped and killed.
1981	Salvadoran military occupies the Central American University (UCA). France and Mexico recognize the FMLN as legitimate political force. The U.S. continues to assist El Salvadoran government whose army continues to back right-wing death squads. Armenia Massacre--involved the killing of at least 23 persons after a fistfight started between members of the town's soccer team and soldiers of a local army unit. Local Popular Power governments were established in eastern Chalatenango. US Embassy in San Salvador is damaged when FMLN gunmen attacked. El Mozote Massacre--roughly 1,000 villagers are massacred by the Salvadoran army in and around the village of the same name.
1982	President Ronald Reagan certifies that El Salvador has complied with human rights conditions for receiving aid.
1983	Salvadoran army begins counterinsurgency strategy against FMLN rebels. Los Hojas Massacre--a killing of between 19 and 74 Indian peasants in the western province of Sonsonate. FMLN rebels killed 60 government troops in Cinquera.
1984	Five Salvadoran national guardsmen are convicted of the 1980 murders of U.S. churchwomen. Talks between Salvadoran government and the FMLN begin.

Napoleon Duarte, a U.S. backed Christian Democrat, is elected president of El Salvador.

FMLN attack and sabotage Cerron Grande hydroelectric stations, resulting in the death of 76 government soldiers.

First meeting between President Duarte and FMLN troops.

- 1985** FMLN kidnaps President Duarte's daughter and a friend. Father Ellacuria and Monsignor Rivera Damas, archbishop of San Salvador, negotiate a prisoner exchange that results in the victims' safe release

La Zona Rosa Massacre-- a killing of four Marines, two American civilians and seven civilians by a faction of the FMLN.

- 1986** Salvadoran government and FMLN talks break down.

The ARENA Party increases its power in El Salvador and move to strip Father Ellacuria of his citizenship.

- 1988** Father Ellacuria meets with FMLN commandants in Managua, Nicaragua.

George Bush is elected President of the U.S.

- 1989** Salvadoran President Cristiani asks Father Ellacuria to join a committee investigating a National Trade Union Federation bombing that killed 10 and wounded 35.

Nonessential U.S. personnel are shipped out of San Salvador.

Alfredo Cristiani is elected president of El Salvador.

Attorney General Roberto Garcia Alvarado is assassinated.

San Sebastian massacre--members of the army's 5th Brigade allegedly killed 10 civilians suspected of supporting the Marxist rebel organization

Explosion at the headquarters of the Federacion Nacional de Trabajadores Salvadorenos, killing ten people and wounded thirty.

In November, the FMLN launches a coordinated military offensive in El Salvador, attacking military centers in major cities. The Salvadoran army bombs residential neighborhoods believed to support the FMLN.

Senior Salvadoran military officers give orders to kill Father Ignacio Ellacuria and to leave no witnesses.

Six Jesuits, their maid and her daughter were murdered by government soldiers at the Central American University.

- 1991** FMLN executes three U.S. military advisors in eastern El Salvador.

The Salvadoran government and the FMLN sign peace agreements in New York, paving the way for the end of the civil war.

- 1992** Peace accords signed in Chapultepec (Mexico) on January 16, 1992.

Ceasefire between FMLN and Cristiani Regime.

Sources: (BBC; Uclés 1996; Montgomery 1995; PBS "Enemies of War")

Appendix 3. Chronology of Lord's Resistance Army

Year Event

- 1987** The Lord's Resistance Army engages in its war with the Ugandan government.
Defeat of Alice Lakwena's Holy Free Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF).
- 1991** Operation North is launched to cripple LRA support in the northern districts of Uganda. The Arrow Brigades are developed to serve as local defense militias.
- 1994** Peace talks between Kony and Ugandan government break down. Kony and the LRA gain support from the Khartoum, with some blaming President Museveni for the peace talks breaking down.
- 1995** Atiak Massacre--LRA executed more than 300 captives.
- 2000** Ugandan parliament passed the Amnesty Act, which established an Amnesty Commission and procedures for granting amnesty to LRA members and members of other Ugandan rebel groups.
- 2002** Operation Iron Fist is launched, seeking to destroy LRA safe-havens in southern Sudan through search-and-destroy campaigns.
- 2003** Museveni approaches the International Criminal Court in The Hague to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the LRA.
- 2004** Renewed efforts to reach a peace agreement between Kony and Uganda fail at the end of the year.
Barlonyo Massacre--200 internally displaced persons are killed.
Abia Massacre--LRA kill another 50 persons in an IDP camp.
Lukodi Massacre—LRA kill 60 civilians.
Mucwini Massacre—LRA murder 56 women, men, and children.
- 2005** Kony and his top commanders are indicted by the ICC. Kony retreats, eventually taking refuge in Garamba National Park in the far northeastern corner of the DRC.
- 2006** Peace talks restart in Juba, South Sudan between the LRA and Uganda.
- 2008** Peace agreement is reached between the LRA and Uganda, including a permanent ceasefire. Kony refuses to sign the agreement in April and again in May.
Operation Lightning Thunder; a joint effort between Uganda, Congo, and southern Uganda is launched to eliminate the LRA with U.S. assistance.
- 2009** Makombo Massacre, in which the LRA killed more than 321 civilians and kidnapped more than 250 others in northeastern Congo.

2010 U.S. Congress passed the "Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act."

Sources: (Eichstaedt 2009; Allen and Vlassenroot 2010; Van Woundenberg et al. 2010; Behrend 1998)

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