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**RESTRAINING MAYORS: LOCAL COUNCILS AS AGENTS OF
HORIZONTAL ACCOUNTABILITY**

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

POLITICS

by

Martín Ordóñez

March 2019

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Abstract

Restraining Mayors: Local Councils as Agents of Horizontal Accountability

Martín Ordóñez

Local councils in Latin America often fail to hold mayors accountable, even where they are legally required and empowered to do so. These failures are particularly significant, considering that decentralization has given greater power to mayors throughout the region. The dissertation aims to improve our understanding of local horizontal accountability by analyzing the influence of mayors and constituencies on local councils' disposition for horizontal accountability, and by conceiving these actors as embedded in systems of local relationships. Following an inductive and theory building strategy, the research compares five municipalities in Santiago de Chile with diverse socioeconomic and political features using original qualitative evidence.

The results challenge explanations of accountability based on administrative capacity, socioeconomic characteristics, and partisan alignments. They show, instead, that the configuration of local systems of relationships—comprising relationships between councils, executives (i.e., the mayor and the municipal bureaucracy) and constituencies (i.e., the local voters)—have significant effects over a critical factor determining Municipal Councils' disposition for horizontal accountability: their autonomy from the mayor.

According to the cases analyzed, local councils' dependence on the mayor is a significant factor for inhibiting their disposition to hold these mayors accountable. This dependence, has a critical electoral component, thus making the triangular relations

between council members, local executives and constituencies a determinant factor going beyond their party affiliation. Specifically, and as a general proposition, when council members are unable to generate and maintain sufficient constituent support, local executives can use their resources and influence to reduce or increase council members' electoral chances. This influence on council members' electoral performance can be used to induce their loyalty to the mayors, thus discouraging them from holding these mayors accountable.

Constituencies, therefore, also play a significant role in local horizontal accountability, by giving council members a chance to be autonomous from their mayors despite their disposition to hold the mayor accountable (or lack thereof). This autonomy, however, disappears if council members rely on the help of the local executives to obtain constituents' support.

To Emilia

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1. Introduction

Who controls the mayors? The name of Jorge Soria is undoubtedly well known in Chile's northern city of Iquique. As Emmanuelle Barozet (2004) reported, by 2004 Soria was running for his fourth consecutive term as Iquique's mayor, not just as the only person in being democratically elected for that position since the return to democracy. Since he also was Iquique's mayor during the two consecutive terms immediately before the dictatorship (1964-1970 and 1970-1973), by 2004 he could be proud to run as the only democratically elected mayor of Iquique in 40 years. However, it is not these democratic credentials what called Barozet's attention. Instead, it was the fact that behind this constant—and increasing—democratic support, Soria had a history of loss-making and corrupt financial management; unfinished projects and poor delivery of services; and lack of professional bureaucracy. All this not only supported by Soria's populist style and his attractive and eloquent rhetoric, but also by patronage and clientelism, which, according to the author, would ultimately explain his high popularity and, consequently, his electoral success.

Chile does not lack formal instances of oversight and control over public authorities. In fact, the same Jorge Soria was investigated by the Comptroller General, removed from office in 2006 and convicted in 2009 for the crimes of bribery, conflict of interests and fraud against the government, committed between 1998 and 2001¹. Nonetheless, one significant instance is notably absent in cases like Soria's: the local council (called *Municipal Council* in Chile). According to Chile's law, these councils are expected to oversee local governments and report their wrongdoings, with which they would

compensate the difficulties that the General Comptroller's Office usually have in overseeing the over 340 municipal administrations in the country (OECD 2017). As the newspapers show, on many occasions Municipal Councils effectively fulfill these obligations². However, as a Regional Comptroller expressed concerning the case of Soria, that is not as common as it should (Barozet 2004, 228), which coincides with the opinion of the OECD, judging Municipal Councils' oversight as *limited* (2017, 30), and their general service as, usually, no more than an *advisory board for the mayors* (2017, 48).

The present research explores this problem and looks for an answer to the limited role that local councils play in holding their mayors accountable. Why is that the case? What prevents Municipal Councils from becoming an active organism of *horizontal accountability*, as the Law expect them to be?

Once countries in Latin American managed their way out from authoritarian regimes in the late 20th century, they were left with at least two new challenges, associated with their capacity to raise their recently recovered democracies above the mere election of governments through popular vote. The first of them is related to the *quality* of these elected governments and, therefore, of the democracy in these countries (Diamond & Morlino 2004). This challenge has been salient in the literature addressing the regions' democratization processes, especially given the persistence of patterns of arbitrary and particularistic behavior, including violations of human rights, abuse of authority, corruption, improper use of public resources and impunity for state actors throughout the region (Mainwaring 2003; Diamond et al. 1999). This situation has made it visible the insufficiency of elections to ensure high-quality governments. This insufficiency is

crystallized on the region's development of *Delegative Democracies*, which, as O'Donnell (1994, 59) described them, “rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit”, without much more constraints than the term limits of office. In response to this challenge, the literature has stressed the relevance of developing mechanisms of *horizontal accountability*, based on the oversight and sanctions wield by independent agents of the state over the executive³.

The second challenge—not wholly dissociated from the first one—is related to the problems derived from the high level of concentration of power inherited from the dictatorships and, consequently, the trends towards decentralization (Devas & Delay 2006; Bland 2011), through which, according to Falletti (2005, 328), the state transfer responsibilities, authority or resources to the lower levels of government. Specifically, these decentralization processes aimed at restoring elected local governments and redistribute authority; overcoming inherited exclusionary and undemocratic social structures; and improving the efficiency of service delivery, among others objectives (Devas & Delay 2006; Bland 2011; Nickson 2011). However, at subnational states' level at least, decentralization alone has been unable to fulfill these objectives, and in many instances has implied, instead, the transfer of the characteristics of delegative democracies to this second tier of government, where democratically elected governors hold undemocratic practices once in power. The literature reporting on the emergence of *Subnational Undemocratic Regimes* and the persistence of illiberal practices at the subnational level most paradigmatically illustrates this situation⁴.

Consistent with the objectives of decentralization, the international literature has

highlighted that, given their position closer to citizens, local governments are generally in a privileged position for improving democratic representation, making the delivery of public goods and services more efficient, and making poverty reduction initiatives more effective (Devas & Delay 2006; Nickson 2011). However, the existing literature on the effects of decentralization in Latin-American local governments shows that the results of these processes have not always been in line with these capacities and objectives (Grindle 2007; Sabatini 2003; Eaton 2006; Falletti 2005).

While the international literature argues that attaining high levels of democracy and quality governance are critical requirements for local governments to meet these developmental and democratizing expectations (Yilmaz et al. 2010; Devas & Delay 2006; UNDP 1997; Blair 2000; Narayan 2002), we still lack significative knowledge about local democracy in Latin America. As Pino (2017) argued, the literature on subnational democracy in the region has mainly focused on federal cases, thus leaving the local level understudied and producing a *federal bias* in the conceptual and theoretical developments on these issues. Also, the existing research addressing local democracy in the region has focused mainly on the relationship between citizens and local governments—either under its electoral⁵ or citizen direct participation⁶ dimensions—paying little attention to the democratic relevance of horizontal relations between equally elected local authorities. However, cases of democratically elected mayors holding undemocratic practices reported throughout the region⁷ suggest that these governments might also share the characteristics of delegative democracies and are, therefore, similarly affected by the lack of horizontal accountability.

In this context, this research aims at improving current understanding of local

democracies in Latin America by exploring local councils' role as sources of *horizontal accountability*—i.e., sources of oversight and sanction for their respective local executives' illegal and impolitic behavior.

According to the literature, although excessive accountability can be detrimental to governments' efficacy (Mainwaring 2003)⁸, accountability—in all of its kinds—is expected to have positive impacts for the quality of local democracy and governance, therefore improving the results of decentralization processes. Specifically, accountability has been argued to reduce corruption (Devas & Delay 2006; Moncrieffe 1998); counterbalances local governments' discretion and, therefore, make them more responsive (Yilmaz et al. 2010); ensure the correspondence between public policy and its implementation, as well as the efficient allocation and use of public resources (Moncrieffe 1998); improve control over local governments' actions (Blair 2000); and improve people's empowerment vis-à-vis the government (Narayan 2000).

However, local councils are in a privileged position to oversee and sanction local governments—thus holding them horizontally accountable. In all systems where they exist, local councils are conceived as a critical communication channel between citizens and local governments and are mandated with the role of steering and scrutinizing the operation of the local executive to make it responsive to citizens (Denters 2006; Chasukwa & Chinsinga 2013). This accountability role of local councils—which are widely present throughout the region and allow for a constant oversight over local executives—compares positively to citizen-based forms of accountability, be either *vertical* (voters punishing or rewarding politicians with their electoral support) or *social* (citizens taking actions to oversee and punish their authorities outside electoral times). While vertical accountability have been regarded as a broad and imperfect mechanism

of popular control, unable to guarantee by themselves high quality of government (Blair 2000; Diamond et al. 1999), social accountability has been criticized for its dependence on citizens' organizational capacity and dependence on the participation opportunities open by the governments (Grindle 2007; Moreno-Jaimes 2007). Therefore, in the context of decentralization reforms, local councils not only are expected to play a central role in local horizontal accountability (Chasukwa & Chinsinga 2013; Chiweza 2007; Moncrieffe 1998; Devas & Delay 2006), but also their absence has been observed to negatively impact the control over local executives' abuses (Chasukwa & Chinsinga 2013).

As the next chapter argues, despite this consensus about its relevance, there has been little systematic research about local horizontal accountability. Moreover, while it is possible to infer possible explanatory factors (either merely theoretical or empirically founded) from the literature on diverse adjacent phenomena, they do not provide a framework allowing to organize these factors and analyze their possible interrelations. In response to this situation, this research adopts an *institutional power* model and analyzes local horizontal accountability as an element within a broader *system of local relationships*—which comprises local executives, councils and constituencies, and conditions councils' disposition (their willingness to take actions) to hold their executives accountable.

The research assumes an exploratory character and implements a comparative method and aims to build—rather than test—an explanatory argument for local horizontal accountability. It selects five cases (municipalities) in Santiago de Chile for the analysis, which offer ideal conditions as a site for the research. Like many countries in Latin America, Chile's local governments follow a Strong Mayor model, thus clearly differentiating between a local executive and a local legislative, bestowing the latter with

the duty to oversee the executive. However, within the region, Chile also offers privileged conditions to observe systems of local relationships with minimal influence of undemocratic practices from other levels of government. In particular, since Chile is a unitary state, where parties have limited influence in local politics, and that has made substantial progress in the process of democratization—including high democratic consolidation, low levels of perceived corruption, high levels of horizontal accountability at the national level, and high levels of democracy at the local level. Within Chile, Santiago provides a set of cases that are highly diverse on socioeconomic and political terms. The five cases selected maximize variation on these dimensions.

The results highlight council members' electoral independence from their mayors as a critical enabling factor for local horizontal accountability: council members depending on the mayors and their administration to obtain sufficient constituent support showed a low disposition to hold their mayors accountable. This disposition, in turn, showed to be a function of three factors. First, local executives' high capacity to address communities demands gives them an advantage over council members, isolating them from local communities by reducing the latter's incentives to turn to council members for help. Second, when this capacity is low and, therefore, local communities have greater incentives to contact council members, the local executive can still induce council members' loyalty to the mayor by increasing their opportunities to intermeditate between local communities and the municipal bureaucracy to address the local demands they receive. Finally, especially when the executive's capacity is low, council members can gain electoral independence from the mayor using their personal resources to address local communities and their demands; capitalizing on pockets of popular discontent with the mayor or strong partisanship among citizens; securing their

incorporation in successful party lists; or by renouncing to be reelected. Alternatively, even when council members lack substantive interactions with local communities, they can escape from the influence of the mayor, if the executive lacks the capacity to address local demands and do not provide council members opportunities to intermediate between local communities and local bureaucrats.

The rest of the text is structured as follows. Chapter two, first, clarifies how *horizontal accountability* is understood and implemented in this research, and describes the theoretic perspective adopted. Then it describes the methodological aspects and describes the argument presented in this research.

Chapters three to five are dedicated to the analysis of the cases addressed in the research. Chapter three analyzes the case of Las Condes, where a highly usable and capable municipal administration can dominate the relationships with local communities, thus isolating further council members who were, in general, already detached from local communities. In consequence, these council members tended to become electorally dependent on the mayor, thus discouraging them from holding the local executive accountable.

Chapter four analyzes the cases of Estación Central and Quinta Normal, where municipal bureaucracies showed a low capacity to address communities demands and were able to obtain the loyalty of some council members by providing them opportunities to intermediate between local communities and the municipal bureaucrats. However, other council members in these municipalities either were able to raise independent constituent support or renounced to be reelected, thus raising their respective local councils' disposition to hold the mayors accountable to a middle

level.

Chapter five analyzes the cases of Pudahuel and Providencia, which local councils showed a high disposition to hold their mayors accountable, although as a consequence of different combinations of factors. In Pudahuel, a significant proportion of council members were able to either reis independent constituent support or secure their inclusion in successful party lists. In Providencia, council members considerably detached from local communities were able to maintain their independence from the mayor as a consequence of the low capacity of the municipal administration to address local demands and the lack of opportunities for council member intermediation between local communities and the municipal bureaucrats. Chapter six concludes by summarizing the main results and describing their implications.

2. Theory and Methods

2.1. Defining Horizontal Accountability

Although the term *horizontal accountability* is not entirely new, in its short lifetime there has been extensive discussion around the meaning and proper implementation of this concept. As Andreas Schedler (1999, 13) expressed it, horizontal accountability is a concept “*whose meaning remains evasive, whose boundaries are fuzzy, and whose internal structure is confusing*”. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to clarify how horizontal accountability is understood and implemented in this research, addressing the basic notions and controversies around it. As a result, and summarizing the conceptual decisions that this research makes, the section concludes providing the operational definition of horizontal accountability that will be used here.

Since its original formulation by O’Donnell (1994), horizontal accountability has been conceived as intimately connected with the ever-present concern with the possibilities of power running wild, and the complementary need to discipline and restrain it (Schedler 1999). Thus, for example, O’Donnell depicted horizontal accountability as a critical requirement for representation, so that “*somehow representatives are held responsible for their actions by those they claim to be entitled to speak for*” (61). According to O’Donnell, holding representatives responsible would entail not only *vertical* accountability—i.e., “*making elected officials answerable to the ballot box*”—but also “*a network of relatively autonomous powers (i.e., other institutions) that can call into question, and eventually punish, improper ways of discharging the responsibilities of a*

given official" (61)—who, therefore, would *horizontally* hold these representatives accountable.

In later works, O'Donnell formalized this conceptualization in similar terms, defining horizontal accountability as "*the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omission by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as unlawful*" (1999b, 38). However, far from being consensual, this definition contains elements that have been extensively discussed. To organize the discussion, we may encapsulate the controversies in three categories: those about the nature and structure of horizontal accountability relations; those about the dimensions of horizontal accountability (answerability and enforcement); and those about the scope of horizontal accountability.

Nature and structure of horizontal accountability relations: A first controversy related to the nature of horizontal accountability relations refers to the whether it should be reserved exclusively to the acts of state agencies or it should be extended to some of the accountability manifestations of civil society. As mentioned earlier, O'Donnell drew a clear demarcation between horizontal (intrastate) and vertical (societal) forms of accountability. However, in consideration of the notions of independence (or autonomy) between the parts involved, constant oversight, and distinction from electoral sanctions over which horizontal accountability is built, some authors have blurred this clear demarcation to include the oversight and sanctioning role played by the media and different social organizations within the horizontal form (see for example Schmitter 1999; and Schillemans 2008). Here, however, this research

follows O'Donnell (1999a, 68) and Kenney (2003, 61) in treating horizontal-vertical divide as a conceptualization for the distinction between state and society, therefore reserving the *horizontal* plane to clearly designate *the part that holds another accountable* (the subject of accountability relations): legally enabled and empowered state agents⁹. As Kenney suggested, under this categorization, the non-electoral accounting activities performed by societal actors find a proper space within the subcategory of vertical accountability, which Smulovitz and Peruzzotti (2000; 2003) termed *societal accountability*.

Within the realm of intrastate relations, horizontal accountability still needs to be distinguished from two other concepts it might be confounded with: checks and balances and control. As Kenney (2003) argued, both horizontal accountability and checks and balances fulfill a governmental self-control role within the state, and both are permitted and reinforced by the separation of powers. However, while checks and balances refers to the shared authority in decisions making by separated segments of the government, horizontal accountability refers to the liability of branches and agents of the state to be overseen and sanctioned by other state actors—neither check and balances imply oversight or sanctions, nor horizontal accountability imply shared authority in decision making. Similarly, as Mulgan (2000) argued, the proper conceptualization of accountability should not be stretched to include all the mechanisms of control, but only a limited subset of them—those “*where governments and officials are actually called to account, made to answer for their actions and accept sanctions*” (563-564). Therefore, it should leave aside, for example, constitutional constraints, or legal regulations narrowing the scope of these agencies actions and the resources they have available.

Finally, the internal structure of horizontal accountability—and accountability relations in general—has often been interpreted in terms of *principal-agent* relationships, where a principal entitle an agent to act in their behalf and hold them accountable for their actions (see, for example, Elster 1999; Goetz & Jenkins 2005; Lawson & Ranker 2005; and Laver & Shepsle 1999). This interpretation has been useful to identify and handle essential components of accountability relationships—for example, the existence of two actors where one hold accountable the other. It also provides a framework to understand horizontal accountability (especially when performed by elected public officials) as an extension of vertical accountability, thus becoming a form of *mediated accountability*: citizens (as principals) hold accountable public officials who, in their representation, would hold accountable other public officials (Laver and Shepsle 1999; Moreno et al. 2003).

However, as Kenney (2003) observed, relationships of horizontal accountability do not align easily with the principal-agent model, especially since accountability does not necessarily include the *entitlement* element central to this model. No entitlement exist, for example, between a popularly elected parliament and a popularly elected president and, still, the former can oversee and remove the latter from office. Even in the case of the relation between voters and their elected representatives, as Fox (2015) argued, the principal-agent model assumes what needs to be demonstrated: that citizens are indeed in charge. Given this lack of mandate in horizontal relations, understanding accountability thoroughly as principal-agent relationships, as Moreno et al. (2003) highlighted, leads to disregarding the possibility of accountability between independent agencies of the state and, more generally, the possibility of accountability relations between actors who are in a horizontal relation.

Thus, instead of the principal-agent model, the internal structure of horizontal relations is considered here following Kenney's (2003) more straightforward and less controversial account of its core elements. These are, first, two autonomous state actors, which Kenney called the *subject* and the *object* of horizontal accountability, to denominate the one who holds accountable (subject) and the one is held accountable (object)¹⁰. Second, the means through which the subject holds the object accountable. As the next point explains, according to Schedler (1999), the means can be categorized along two dimensions: answerability and enforcement. Lindberg (2013), associate these two dimensions with two rights of the subject: the right to require information and explanations and justifications, and the right to sanction. Finally, the actions (or omissions) for which one of the actors hold the other accountable.

While this first subsection has dealt with the controversies around the first of these elements (the participants and the nature of their relations), the second and third subsections deal with the controversies of the second and third elements (the means for horizontal accountability, and the actions to which horizontal accountability is applicable) respectively.

Answerability and enforcement: The means of horizontal accountability are considered here following Schedler's (1999) two dimensions of horizontal accountability¹¹. According to the author, the first of these dimensions, *answerability*, involves both public officials' obligation to answer questions to *inform* and *explain* their decisions and accounting agencies' monitoring and oversight over these officials. The second dimension, *enforcement*, refers to the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on power-holders who have violated their public duties.

While these two dimensions are commonly admitted as dimensions of horizontal accountability, there is less agreement about how much of each dimension—particularly enforcement—is required for an act to be recognized as horizontal accountability. Under Schedler’s conception, these two dimensions should be considered as continuous variables, showing up with different mixes and emphases, and not necessarily implying the total absence of one of them an absence of horizontal accountability. As Mainwaring (2003), this point would find implicit support in the inclusion of agencies that usually cannot impose formal sanctions (such as ombudsmen and fiscalías) among accountability agencies¹². However, authors like D. Dunn (1999); J. Dunn (1999); and Kenney (2003), considered the formal sanctioning power of accounting agencies a necessary component of horizontal accountability. As the latter of these authors explained, even if we consider only the obligations to inform and provide justifications as sufficient to constitute horizontal accountability, some sanctioning capacity would be required to provide its *obligation* nature¹³.

In these respects, this research follows Mainwaring (2003) middle point solution, based on the distinction between *direct* legally ascribed sanctioning attributions and *indirect* sanctions of oversight agencies by referring the wrongdoings they observe to actors with sanctioning capacity. As he proposed, although accountability requires some sanctioning capacity, indirect sanctions are enough to characterize relationships of accountability, insofar as they generate in the objects of accountability the need to respond to the requirements of the subjects—thus making effective the control over them.

This solution is consistent with two significant considerations about horizontal accountability. First, as Mulgan (2000) reminded us, there is an element of potentiality

implicit in *accountability*, according to which, more than the accounting actions themselves, what is ultimately relevant to keep state agents under control is that they *may* be called to account at any time—“*the ever-present threat of being called to account*” (p. 567). As O’Donnell (2003) argued, the assessment that a would-be transgressor makes about the probability of being caught and sanctioned is fundamental for the efficacy of horizontal accountability. Because of this element of potentiality and this effect on would-be transgressors, it is also possible to assess the efficacy of horizontal accountability mechanisms, even when only a few transgressions are committed (O’Donnell 2003). Second, Mainwaring solution is consistent with O’Donnell’s observation (1999a)—also admitted by Kenney (2003)—that effective horizontal accountability requires *networks*, where agencies raising information cooperate with the sanctioning ones (for example, courts) to hold state agents accountable. Thus, even when they are not sanctioning institutions themselves, accounting agencies that can credibly threaten state agents with some probability of sanctions, can, therefore, elicit the answerability required from them, and produce the type of control that horizontal accountability seeks.

Following a similar line of reasoning, the acts of horizontal accountability can be extended to incorporate another debated manifestation: the public divulgence of elected officials’ decisions. As O’Donnell (1999b) and Kenney (2003) manifested, in itself, these types of manifestations would not constitute acts accountability, since they do not impose sanctions on these state agents. However, especially for public official whose position depend on popular vote, the public divulgence of their decisions may lead to sanctions in a similar way in which the reports to sanctioning institutions may do, implying, ultimately, the possibility for these officials to be removed from office—

although, this time, vertically, by voters in the ballot box¹⁴. Therefore, public divulgation of state agents' wrongdoings is considered here among the means of horizontal accountability that rely on *indirect sanctions*, admitting its hybrid nature (*horizontal oversight* and *vertical direct sanction*) whenever the dimension of direct sanctions becomes significant.

Scope of horizontal accountability: One last controversy refers to the actions (or decisions, or omissions) for which state agents should be held accountable. Specifically, whether horizontal accountability should be limited to these agents' legal transgressions (as, for example, O'Donnell 1999b; and Kenney 2003 suggest) or their *impolitic* actions should be included as well (as, for example, Schmitter 1999; and Mainwaring 2003 suggest).

O'Donnell's and Kenney's limiting horizontal accountability to legal transgressions is consistent with their general orientation toward establishing its boundaries around legality, thus highlighting that, according to O'Donnell's definition, accounting agencies must be *legally* enabled and empowered, and that the means of horizontal accountability would consider *legal* sanctions only, as Kenney suggested. Under this conception, the scope of horizontal accountability should also be limited to the legality of state agents' actions—especially since it is only over illegal activity that legal sanctions can be imposed (Kenney 2003).

However, O'Donnell and Kenney's argument loses its strength once the sanctioning means of horizontal accountability are expanded beyond the *direct legally ascribed attributions* (as this research does), thus already admitting elements that are outside strictly legal boundaries. Also, as Mainwaring (2003) pointed out, some classic

forms of horizontal accountability go beyond perceptions about the legality of state agents' actions, and include providing political accountings—paradigmatically, the case of cabinet or ministerial accountability to the legislature. Kenney (2003) recognized this situation and admitted including cabinet accountability to the legislature among the manifestations of horizontal accountability, but only for parliamentary regimes. Kenney's solution, however, leaves us in the uncomfortable situation of a concept that is not consistent throughout cases. Similarly, as Mainwaring (2003) suggested, restricting horizontal accountability to the transgression of legality would leave out political issues that have play a dominant role in the understanding of accountability in general. Finally, Mainwaring (2003) argued that a broader scope for horizontal accountability—admitting both legal transgressions and impolitic actions—is consistent with the notions of vertical accountability, where citizens can hold accountable politicians for both their political judgments and legal transgressions.

In sum, horizontal accountability is considered here as a control mechanism over state agents, based on the oversight and sanction functions performed by other state agents, who directly sanction or report to other agents either perceived legal transgressions or impolitic actions and decisions of the former.

2.2. Towards an Understanding of Local Horizontal Accountability

The present research analyzes the relationships of horizontal accountability conceiving them as an element within a broader system of interactions between state agents. This

system of interactions can be illuminated from an *institutional power* model. Following Wirls (2015, 5), institutional power is understood here as “*an assessment or measure of an institution’s overall ability to influence the system within which it operates, relative to the other systemic institutions with some authority and relative to its degree of power across time*”. Thus, this notion conceives each state agents as embedded in a network of relations between state agents, where each of them can influence the system, while susceptible of being influenced by it, and where agents’ influence is ultimately relative to that of the others.

According to Wirls’s (2015) interpretation of the Federalist Papers, this institutional influence depends on the three constitutive elements of government institutions, the interrelationships among them, and how they are distributed across institutions. The elements are, first, these institutions *powers*, understood as their constitutional authority, the duties delimiting their functions, and the formal tools they are provided with for these purposes (e.g., veto, appointment or impeachment). Second, their *organization*, encompassing institutional structure (including size, membership, tenure, remuneration), procedures (their rules of operation and decision), and other internal resources (such as staff). Finally, their *constituency*, understood as the sympathy and support (or lack thereof) of public opinion or relevant segments of society.

Although these three elements would have an independent impact over their respective institution’s power, each of them is also affected by the other elements. For example, although institutions are constitutionally granted with specific powers (e.g., veto, impeachment or oversight), how and when institutions use them depends not only on their legal attributions. They also depend on their capacity to implement them (e.g.,

knowledge, adequate procedures or staff) and their motivation to do so (which would be affected if their membership is appointed by other institution or by popular election, and the support they receive from public opinion). Similarly, whether institutions' use of these powers is perceived to be adequate or inadequate can affect the general trust and support these institutions receive from their constituency. Also, an institution may deploy both organizational resources and constituent support to expand its powers.

Finally, how these elements are distributed and related across institutions would also be significant, ultimately determining how much influence each of these institutions have over other institutions and the system as a whole, their capacity to resist these influences, and, therefore, their *de facto* separation and balance. Thus, for example, while powers grant institutions with specific tools that allow them to affect the decisions and constitutive components of the others (e.g., judicial review, veto or appointment attributions), their capacity to use them depends, once again, on the constituent support they have for doing so, and their specific organizational characteristics (a unitary president, independently selected for four years, would be more likely to resist pressures from the legislative and implement a veto, than one who is selected by and dependent on the legislative) (Wiris 2015, 19-20).

The framework described by Wiris intended to analyze, broadly, the influence of government branches on policy decisions (regarded as the primary output of the system). However, it provides two main elements that are useful to analyze mechanisms of horizontal accountability—understood as one of the legally granted tools (a power), through which an institution can influence other institutions and policy outcomes. First, as the following sections show, the recognition of legal or constitutional

attributions as insufficient to ensure their materialization or effective implementation is consistent with a similar usual argument within the literature on horizontal accountability. For example, O'Donnell's (1999b, 38) suggested that, for horizontal accountability to work, state agents should be not only *legally enabled and empowered* to take action but also *factually willing and able* to do so. However, the attention that the literature has paid to the conditions under which state agents have such ability and will has been partial and unsystematic. The consideration of institutions' organizational characteristics and constituency, as well as the interrelations between them and with the legal attributions, provide a useful framework to systematically and comprehensively incorporate O'Donnell's requirement of factuality in the analysis.

Second, by recognizing state agencies as embedded, in this way, in a system of institutions where they can influence and be influenced, the framework provides a way to analyze external influences to each institution, including their capacity for horizontal accountability among the elements that can be influenced. By making state institutions' capacity for horizontal accountability dependent on the interaction of their three constitutive institutional elements (powers, organization, and constituency), this framework indicates how other institutions can influence the former's capacity for accountability (i.e., by affecting significant components of these elements). Also, since institutions' influence is also dependent on these elements, it indicates the resources they have available to influence other institutions' capacity for horizontal accountability.

However, four considerations are significant in implementing this framework to local horizontal accountability. First, since the institutions that are analyzed are of subnational character, the influence of state institutions of higher level over them

should also be considered—especially given their capacity to determine powers and resources of local institutions. Second, since local institutions can be constituted by a small number of members, some *organizational* characteristics might need to be considered at—or adequate to—the individual level. Third, given its expected relevance, the constitutive elements of institutions should be expanded to incorporate informality among them, especially when dealing with resources, rules, and sources of authority. Finally, and primarily because of their smaller size, local constituencies are in a better position to be analyzed as a third actor (or set thereof) in these relations—basing their support on the significant interactions they hold with local politicians—rather than as sources of public opinion, reacting to the information they receive about state institutions.

In what follows, this section will analyze, in the light of this framework, how powers, organization, constituency and the influence of other institutions should be considered for the case of local councils' role in horizontal accountability, relying on the existent literature to explain the impact that these elements may have. Given the lack of studies directly addressing local horizontal accountability¹⁵, the arguments described in the following subsections come from a wider variety of sources. Beside arguments directly addressing this topic, they also include those about local vertical accountability; general and national-level accounts of vertical, societal and horizontal accountability; and arguments about the performance of local governments. These sources were selected insofar as the arguments they propose were considered to apply to the accountability relations that are the focus of this research.

2.2.1. Powers

Regarding the role of institutions' powers, more than the specific legal tools and attributions they are provided with, authors have highlighted the relevance of clear separation of powers, which would be a critical condition for horizontal accountability, at national as well as the local levels (O'Donnell 1999a 2003; Mainwaring 2003; Moreno et al. 2003; Kenney 2003; Yilmaz et al. 2010; Edwards et al. 2014). According to his separation would require, on the one hand, each institution to be autonomous and have their role and functions clearly identified and, on the other hand, the inclusion of courts entitled and able to impartially resolve conflicts that arise between other institutions (Yilmaz et al. 2010; Venugopal & Yilmaz 2010; Lawson & Ranker 2005).

However, both at national and local levels, the literature on horizontal accountability have highlighted the insufficiency of institutional arrangements, thus manifesting the relevance of obtaining *de facto*, and not only *de jure*, autonomy and division of powers. O'Donnell (1999b, 39), for example, explicitly argued that effective horizontal accountability required agencies that are, *de facto*, autonomous. Similarly, Moreno et al. (2003, 97-98) warned against the presence of *informal* hierarchical relations undermining the *formal* independence of branches—as, for example, when legislators win office based on state patronage rather than policy-based campaigns.

In the case of local governments, how the specific institutional design distributes power and influence in decision-making has been argued to be of particular influence for how separated these powers are and its implications for horizontal accountability. Four main institutional arrangements have been distinguished in the literature about these respects (Lankina 2008; Sisk 2001; Bowman & Kearny 2011). Under the *Strong Mayor* model, the mayor and the local council are elected through popular vote. In the *Strong*

Council model, on the other hand, only the local council is directly elected through popular vote, which, in turn, elects the mayor. Similarly, in the *Council-Manager* model, the popularly elected local council appoints a politically neutral (instead of a mayor) manager as head of the local executive. Finally, in the *Commission* model commissioners are elected through popular vote, as council members in the previous models, although, instead of having separated head of the executive, the commissioners manage, at the same time, separate departments.

However, how these institutional arrangements are implemented would be critical for the actual division of powers they produce. The Strong Mayor model most clearly separates between the council and the mayor, bestowing the latter with strong authority in local decision making, and leaving the former in a privileged position for horizontal scrutiny. Nonetheless, also under this model the local separation of powers could be weakened if, due to the overwhelming power of the mayor, the council becomes marginalized and its role reduced to only make official her decisions¹⁶ (Lankina 2008; Yilmaz et al. 2010; Yilmaz & Venugopal 2013; Devas & Delay 2006). In the Strong Council and the Council-Manager models the source of executive (policy-making) power is concentrated in the council, leaving the mayor as a merely ceremonial figure (in the Strong Council model), and the manager as the mere executioner of the policies made by the council (in the Council-Manager model) (Lankina 2008; Bowman & Kearny 2011). Under these circumstances, although the oversight and sanctioning capacities of the council over the local executive are expected to be higher, these models also risk conflating both branches and weaken the independence of the local executive. Finally, the last Commission model merges the executive and legislative functions by design and has been criticized, therefore, for violating since its conception the principle of division

of powers (Montjoy & Watson 1995).

Moreover, regardless of the specific institutional arrangement, authors have highlighted the possibility of local politicians being captured by local elites, thus affecting the local separation of powers. This has been argued to be the case, especially, where systems of chieftaincy are still present (Jackson 2007; Edwards et al. 2014; Boone 2003), or there is a history or culture of patronage, corruption, and subservience to hierarchy (Yilmaz & Venugopal 2013; Lankina 2008; Azfar et al. 2001).

Specifically for the case of local horizontal accountability, authors have suggested that the identification of roles and functions across institutions, and the provision of legal tools of accountability, are not sufficient to ensure its success. Even when the rules regulating each actor role are clearly stated, they can be “*bent, broken or flouted*” (Lawson & Ranker 2005, 18). Also, access to informal sources of power may make some actors more influential than what the models assumed (Bowman & Kearny 2011, 278). Finally, even when council members are granted with legal tools to oversee and punish the mayors, they may not be used primarily to respond to mismanagement or corruption (Hiskey & Seligson 2003).

In sum, consistent with the proposition made in the previous section, the literature highlights two elements about institutions’ powers related to horizontal accountability. First, at least at a theoretical level, autonomy and separation of powers are recognized as a critical requirement for horizontal accountability, for which institutional arrangements that distribute power across different institutions would be of primary significance. Second, although institutional arrangements are necessary both for preventing one institution to encroach on another and providing them with significant

tools for horizontal accountability, they are recognized as insufficient to ensure the effective autonomy and the effective use of the tools.

2.2.2. Organization

Two broad categories of local councils' organizational characteristics have been discussed in the literature in relation to their capacity for horizontal accountability: the resources available to council members for their horizontal accountability duties (specifically, their skills, staff and status), and the composition of local councils (specifically, council members' party membership and the local party competition).

Regarding council members' resources, various elements would be relevant for making effective their formal accountability attributions and autonomy. First, unsurprisingly, authors have highlighted the relevance of council members' capacity to properly understand the issues they are expected to oversee and the regulations around them, while reporting about the difficulties they face in holding local executives accountable when they lack these capacities. Besides knowledge and technical skills, council members' communication abilities have also been mentioned to be relevant, especially in contexts where different languages are spoken (Yilmaz & Venugopal 2013; Venugopal & Yilmaz 2010; Morgenstern & Manzetti 2003; Azfar et al. 2001; Chasukwa & Chisinga 2013; Golooba-Mutebi 1999).

Secondly, the conditions under which council members work have also been considered among the factors explaining their capacity to hold mayors accountable. Some authors have argued that, where council members' job is low paid and part-time, they are more likely to be motivated by civic spirit and volunteerism, and hold a second

(full-time or part-time) job. Council members under these conditions, first, would tend lack the dedication and preparation of those who pursue a professional career in politics (Lankina 2008; Yilmaz et al. 2010; Pelissero & Krebs 1997; Venugopal & Yilmaz 2010). Second, they would tend to be responsive to another source of accountability—overlapped to that of the citizens whom they represent—thus lacking independence and possibly interfering with their role of overseeing and sanctioning the mayor. This last situation would be problematic when council members' jobs and staff depend on higher bureaucracies or politicians as well as when they depend on other private interests (Chasukwa & Chasing 2013; Lankina 2008; Lankina 2007; Yilmaz et al. 2010). Finally, council members could be similarly exposed to overlapping sources of accountability, possibly interfering with their duties, when they either are appointed or can be removed by higher state authorities (Lankina 2008; Olowu et al. 2004; Mathew & Mathew 2003), or where other patrimonial or traditional sources of authority are in place (Ito 2008; Munro 2001; Lankina 2008).

Regarding the composition of local councils, the literature suggests that local party competition and the presence of national political parties may impact local horizontal accountability in opposed directions. On the one hand, both at the national and the local level, party competition—and especially the presence of opposition parties—has been argued to be a critical element for materializing the formal divisions of powers and, therefore, the dispositions for horizontal accountability. For example, at a theoretical level, Przeworski (2010, 137) has argued that, if the same party controls the executive, the legislature, and appoints judges, the separation of powers is meaningless. Similarly, O'Donnell (1999b, 43-44) pointed out that giving opposition parties a

preponderant role in directing agencies is critical for enhancing horizontal accountability. More empirically oriented, Morgenstern & Manzetti (2003) observed that divided government has led to higher independence of the legislature and, therefore, the development of a higher capacity to hold the executive accountable. At the local level, authors have argued that competition and the presence of opposition parties would help to materialize the separation of powers, bringing transparency and higher accountability, especially given their intrinsic incentives to uncover wrongdoing and hound powerholders for their misdeeds (Packel 2008; Ayee 2004; Crook 1999; Blair 2000).

On the other hand, authors have also argued that national parties' involvement in local politics may deviate council members from their role of overseeing local government. Specifically, council members might become more interested in advancing their political career within their parties than performing their duties at the local government, especially where candidates' nominations for council members are made by parties' elites (Ahmad et al. 2005; Larson 2003). Thus, instead of being motivated to watch over the local executives, council members can be used as a source of corruption, patronage, and clientelism in favor of their parties, especially where local governments deal with *bread and butter* issues and partisan identifications are of a lesser significance (Olowu 2003; Yilmaz et al. 2010; Ruhil 2003). Alternatively, council members can be pushed by national parties to use their accountability attributions to punish mayors from the opposition rather than control their possible excesses (Altman & Lalander 2003). Finally, local politicians belonging to national parties might be held accountable by their constituents for the performance of their parties at the national level rather than that of their own (Prud'homme 1995), thus providing them more incentives to

cooperate with the party than to focus on their duties.

For the national level at least, Moreno et al. (2003) proposed still a third option to the role of political parties in horizontal accountability, highlighting the relevance of both the relationship between voters and elected representatives (following a principal-agent perspective) and electoral institutions. As the authors suggested, horizontal accountability (or horizontal exchanges, according to them) requires parties that are sufficiently institutionalized and representative, so that they are neither too weak to let elected representatives to become uninterested in addressing the entire electorate, nor too strong to make these representatives unaccountable to their own voters. In either of these cases, representatives would become uninterested in exercising oversight and political control on the executive¹⁷. However, as Packel (2008) argued, there is little evidence—and contradictory arguments can be obtained from different theoretical perspectives—about the effect on local horizontal accountability of institutional variables affecting parties' institutionalization and representativeness, like electoral systems¹⁸ and term limits for local representatives¹⁹.

In sum, on the one hand, regarding local councils' organization, the literature has highlighted that council members' lack of resources and ambivalent status are significant factors reducing local councils' capacity for horizontal accountability. However, the literature says little about possible indirect effects of these resources on horizontal accountability, specifically about the possible influence they might have on council members' capacity to build constituency support that enhances their accountability role.

On the other hand, while recognizing party composition of local councils as a

significant factor, the literature has presented contradictory arguments about their effect on local horizontal accountability, thus highlighting the diversity of possible effects that the party competition and the presence of national parties may have. Also, similar to the case of local council's resources, the literature tends to focus exclusively on parties' direct influence on council members' disposition (or willingness to take actions) to hold mayors accountable, leaving mostly unexplored the possible interactions with the effects of local constituencies. While the proposition of Moreno et al. (2003) is an exception in these respects, it still requires empirical evidence to support its implementation at the local level.

2.2.3. Constituency

Arguments addressing the effect of the constituency on horizontal accountability have often started from notions of democracy that highlight its capacity to produce responsive and accountable governments, primarily through retrospective voting (Scmitter & Karl 1991; Fiorina 1981; Key & Cummings 1966). Based on these conceptions, these arguments stress the role played by voters in a principal-agent relation with their elected representatives, providing them with a mandate punish them if they fail to represent them adequately—thus holding their representatives *vertically* accountable (Manin et al. 1999).

According to these arguments, horizontal accountability depends on the principal-agent relationship between voters and their elected representatives, insofar as it is considered a part of the mandate voters give to their representatives, and for which they hold them vertically accountable. Thus, horizontal accountability is understood here as a *mediated* form of accountability, in which voters hold accountable state agents

through their elected representatives (Laver & Shepsle 1999), and, therefore, would tend to fail when the accountability relationship between voters and their representatives is defective. In other words, it would fail when representatives do not represent the values and preferences of the citizenry (Moreno et al. 2003), and citizens do not hold their representatives accountable.

Similarly, authors have highlighted the relevance of non-electoral mechanisms through which civil society oversee and sanction the performance of state agents, either through the independent actions of the media or organized groups (social accountability) or through citizen engagement with public sector oversight functions (diagonal or hybrid accountability) (Smulovitz & Peruzzotti 2000 2003; Goetz & Jenkins 2001; Fox 2015). This type of civic involvement could be significant for horizontal accountability insofar as it can be translated into pressure over state agents—most likely their elected representatives—to hold other state agents accountable (Cheibub Figueiredo 2003).

The factors argued to affect the quality of vertical accountability can be categorized into three main types. One first set of factors refers to the cultural characteristics of local communities. In particular, it has been argued that vertical accountability is weaker where there are traditional or customary sources of authority overlapping the formal ones (Lankina 2008; Ribot 2004); where there are competing notions of accountability (Lawson & Ranker 2005); where clientelism and corruption are perceived as valid ways of addressing local problems (Auyero 2001; Schedler 2004); and, especially for the relevance of pressure groups, where local communities are characterized by low levels of social capital (Inglehart 1997; Putnam 2000; Oxhorn 2011; Tarrow 2011; Lankina 2008). Additionally, people's socioeconomic level has been suggested to be a significant factor in determining the quality of vertical accountability. Specifically, poor and less educated

people have been argued to be less informed, less politically aware, more receptive to clientelistic incentives, lack critical knowledge to assess governments' performance, and face more significant obstacles both to participate in official and social instances and to pressure their governments (Lankina 2008; Bardhan & Mookherjee 2000; Agraval & Gupta 2005; Lankina et al. 2008; Ahmad et al. 2005; Dixit & Londregan 1996; Calvo & Murillo 2004; Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007; Desposato 2007; Schattschneider 1975).

Finally, many institutional factors are expected to affect the relationship between citizens and their elected representatives by determining whether voters can associate their vote to specific candidates, and the relevance they assign to local elections. Critical among them are the type of electoral system; whether candidates run on a party ticket; whether candidates are nominated by party elites or primaries; whether elected representatives are granted with (and perceived to wield) sufficient power; whether local elections are concomitant with national ones; and whether electoral manipulation is informally institutionalized (Lankina 2008; Packel 2008; Sisk 2001).

Although the argument that citizen pressure (either electoral or otherwise) on their representatives increases the latter's disposition (or willingness) to hold other state agents accountable is usually uncontested, at least four critics can be made, addressing how reasonable is to expect voters to behave that way and how important ultimately is this behavior for horizontal accountability. First, it has been argued that vertical accountability rests on strong assumptions about citizens' information about the conditions under which government makes decisions (Manin et al. 1999; Moreno-Jaimes 2007). However, most of them most of times would be highly uninformed, especially regarding issues that are of a highly technical nature (Rubin 2005; Bartels 1996; Lankina

2008), while the dissemination of information does not necessarily imply that citizens will act on it (Fox 2007 2015; Boas et al. 2018).

Second, elections themselves have been argued to be a broad and imperfect instrument for popular control, since they usually occur at widely spaced intervals (usually some years); have no effects for officials in their last term or serving when their successors have been already decided; and provide voters with a narrow set of realistic options, mapping either a large set of issues or addressing the broadest of them (Blair 2000; Rubin 2005; Lankina 2008; Devas & Delay 2006; Devas & Grant 2003). Also, it is unclear whether citizens actually use their vote to punish or reward their representatives retrospectively, or they rather vote paying more attention to either candidates' promises, their loyalty to local dynasties, candidates' ethnic group or identity, or the subjective sympathies they have for them (Manin et al. 1999; Fearon 1999; Lankina 2008; Ahmad et al. 2005; Rubin 2005; Boas et al. 2018). Finally, although principal-agent model applied to vertical accountability relationships in this way assumes that citizens-as-principals have relatively similar interests and goals (Fox 2015), there is, instead, multiple principals, among which the intentions of a minority to hold their representative accountable might get diluted.

Third, some authors have documented cases where not only high levels of horizontal accountability coexist with low levels of vertical accountability, but also it is the rise in the levels of horizontal accountability debilitates preexisting relationships of vertical accountability (Luna 2016; Hagopian 2016; Luna and Vergara 2016). In doing so, they show that horizontal accountability can be independent of vertical relations and call into question the proposition that high quality of vertical accountability is a necessary condition for horizontal accountability.

Finally, and consistent with the last point, by reducing the problems in horizontal accountability to a problem of inadequate representation, these perspectives tend to disregard the influence that constituencies may wield by empowering one institution over others in a broad way, independently of the specific actions they take or initiatives they propose.

In sum, while constituency is generally expected to play a significant role in horizontal accountability, this role has been mainly considered regarding citizens disposition to pressure their representatives and punish them when they do not behave as expected. However, although this disposition is expected to vary along cultural, socioeconomic and institutional variables, it is still unclear the extent to which voters could be reasonably expected to behave in this way. Moreover, these arguments do not allow to explain the role of constituencies where horizontal accountability is high, and voters lack such a disposition and ignore other possible ways in which constituencies might be influential in these respects.

2.2.4. Other Institutions' Influence

Two sources of institutional influence on local councils' oversight and sanction can be identified in the literature: the national government (broadly) and the local executive.

Regarding the influence of national governments, besides the unsurprising effects of democratization over different forms of accountability (Eisenstadt 1999; Goetz & Jenkins 2005), two other factors have been discussed in the literature. First, decentralization has been argued to bring better democratic performance at the local level in general, either

in the short or the long term. This effect would be the result of the expected effects of bringing policy decisions closer to people on the appropriate allocation of resources, and the pressure to improve local governments' standards that the presence of more accountable local government would impose (Lankina 2008; Ahmad et al. 2005; Huther & Shah 1999; Besley & Case 1995; Dreher 2006). However, partial decentralization, implying an incomplete transfer of authority from the central to the local governments, has been argued to hamper local accountability. Specifically, where local bureaucracies' status and finance are still dependent on the national government, they become *de facto* more accountable to the central governments than to local politicians (Blair 2000; Venugopal & Yilmaz 2010; Steffensen et al. 2004).

Other authors have suggested that the moment and the conditions under which a country undergo a process of *decentralization* can have significant implications for the performance of local accountability. One relevant element in these respects is the level of democratization at the onset of decentralization. As some authors argued, where a tradition of democracy is lacking, decentralization might reduce local governments' performance (Olowu et al. 2004) and reinforce local (despotic) power-holders vis-à-vis other actors (Boone 2003; Yilmaz et al. 2010; Lankina 2008). Similarly, it has been suggested that countries' *socioeconomic development* at the moment of the decentralization might have an impact on local governments' accountability, especially since expectations about decentralization has been based on theories and experiences of industrialized countries (Litvack et al. 1998). Thus, decentralization would produce higher levels of local accountability (and local government performance in general) in contexts of higher socioeconomic development, while having the reverse impact in less developed countries, where clientelism, patronage and elite capture are more common

(Bustikova & Corduneanu-Huci 2011; Kitschelt & Kselman 2012; Lankina 2008).

Second, independence, transparency, and predictability of the national legal system are argued to be necessary conditions for effective local accountability. When the judicial branch is not independent from the national government, local governments and politicians can be captured by the national ones, and penalized for political reasons rather than mismanagement or performance (Lankina 2007). Similarly, dysfunctional justice systems would make it difficult to use the pursuit of legal sanctions as a mechanism to hold local politicians accountable (Lawson & Ranker 2005).

Regarding the role of local executives, there is little literature addressing their influence on horizontal accountability wielded over them, most of which base its arguments on the prevailing political culture, suggesting that local executives may discourage councils' disposition (or willingness to take actions) to hold them accountable by relying on alternative, or just informal, sources of power. Some, for example, argued that, regardless of the formal institutional designs, local informal practices may prevail where governments and administrations follow a *patrimonial* (e.g., where local bosses wield substantial coercive power) rather than a *bureaucratic* (i.e., structured around rational-legal authority) pattern (Hutchcroft, 2001; Lankina 2008). Similarly, it has been often suggested that strong local traditional or customary authorities (e.g., chiefs, kings and religious leaders), and histories and cultures of patronage, corruption, or subservience to hierarchy also play a significant role. Specifically, where these authorities, histories and cultural traits prevail, accountability can be based on beliefs, culture, and tradition, rather than institutional mechanisms, when not merely obstructed (Lankina 2008; Ribot 2004; Yilmaz & Venugopal 2013; Azfar

et al. 2001). Also, it has been suggested that tensions between formal and informal institutions reduced the efficacy of local accountability arrangements Edwards et al. (2014), as, for example when accountability understood as answerability and enforcement co-exist with other notions of accountability (Lawson & Ranker 2005).

Research at state and national levels, however, has suggested that also constituencies and institutional arrangement could be significant. For example, addressing the relationship between executives and accountability agencies at states' level, Melo et al. (2009) argued that, when elite turnover is high, executives have incentives to delegate more power and organizational resources to autonomous accountability institutions (although not necessarily legislatures), so that their rivals will have less discretionary power if they are elected in the future. Therefore, higher party institutionalization and competition would increase horizontal accountability.

Also, consistent with propositions made earlier, it has been argued that executives might be able to exploit unbalanced distributions of power between them and the legislatures to reduce the latter's capacity for oversight and sanction, especially when these unbalances are reinforced by legislatures' organizational features. For example, at national level, Cheibub Figueiredo (2003) observed that, where (1) the constitution grants the executive strong legislative agenda-setting powers, (2) congressional rules allow party leaders to control the legislative process, and (3) the formation of coalition governments is the dominant pattern, the government tends to show a strong coordination between the executive and the legislative powers, which ultimately hampers parliament's exercise of accountability over the executive.

In sum, regarding the interaction between national and local governments,

processes of democratization, the degree, and quality of decentralization processes, and the quality of the national legal system have been argued to have significant effects on local horizontal accountability. Little is known, however, about the influence of local executives on horizontal accountability wielded over them. Also, although some different explanatory factors can be inferred from state and national level studies, the research addressing more directly local executives' influence on local politics, tend to rely on cultural explanations, leaving unaddressed both how these influence work in different cultural settings and how to explain possible variations within similar cultural settings.

2.3. Methods

2.3.1. Research Question and Scope

At the center of this research is the interest in understanding local councils' role in holding their mayors accountable, especially given its expected relevance in restraining mayors' capacity for discretionary administration of local governments.

In this context, the research makes two decisions that are significant for specifying its final scope. First, it analyzes local councils' *disposition* to hold their mayors accountable—rather than their capacity to do so or actual instances of accountability. Disposition is understood here as *willingness to act*, thus highlighting it as an intrinsic and latent characteristic of local councils (and council members), that can materialize into concrete actions when specific conditions are met (e.g., when the mayor shows an illegal behavior). This disposition is taken as a fundamental element for the final results

on horizontal accountability. On the one hand, without it, variations on local councils' capacity for horizontal accountability are inconsequential, especially when they have at least a minimum of legal attributions, status, and resources. On the other hand, it maintains the element of potentiality stressed by Mulgan (2000) and O'Donnell (2003), which makes the assessment of accountability independent of the good or bad behavior of the objects of horizontal accountability.

Second, the research addresses local councils' disposition for horizontal accountability as an element within a system of local relationships. Therefore, it highlights this accountability's relation with other local actors (especially executives and constituencies) and other constitutive elements (powers, organization, and constituency²⁰) in this system, which are themselves interconnected and can have either direct or mediated influences on local councils' disposition for horizontal accountability. As the last section argued, although local horizontal accountability remains an understudied subject and there is little direct knowledge about the conditions explaining the performance of local councils as agencies of accountability, the existing literature on neighboring phenomena allows making significant inferences. Specifically, the literature finds consensus about the general relevance of accountability agencies' autonomy; the resources and status of local councils; and—although through different ways—parties' involvement in local politics. By addressing it as an element in a system of local relationships, this research focuses, more narrowly, on two sources of influence that remain either unexplored or insufficiently explained—local executives and constituencies. It, however, addresses them not as separate sources of influence but stressing their relational qualities and the interactions on their effects, thus highlighting their condition as a system of relationships.

Thus, this research asks about the influence of the system of local relationships on local councils' disposition (or willingness to take actions) to hold their mayors accountable. Addressing this question implies not only elucidating the influence of local executives and constituencies over local councils' disposition for horizontal accountability, but also the influence of that their interrelations have over it. Therefore, the research specifically inquires, first, about the conditions under which local constituents support council members and the influence they have on their actions or decisions. Second, about the conditions under which local executives (mayors and local bureaucracies) can influence council members' actions or decisions, especially by affecting their availability of resources and constituent support.

2.3.2. Type and Character of the Research

Since the understanding about horizontal accountability relations at the local level is still very limited, as previously argued, the present research assumes an exploratory character, emphasizing the intrinsic value of descriptive inference for the scientific knowledge (Gerring 2012). Aiming at *theory-building* rather than *theory-testing* (Gerring 2004), and using cases (municipalities) from one single country, the research implements the comparative method to explore how systems of local relationships may influence municipal councils' disposition to hold their mayors accountable. Therefore, the cases' descriptions and the comparisons among them are used as *plausibility probes* (Eckstein 1975) to illustrate the operation of the theoretical propositions and the framework adopted.

2.3.3. Cases Selection

Five cases (municipalities) from Santiago de Chile were selected for the research. Chile offers ideal conditions as a site for the research due to three main reasons. First, like most countries in Latin America, Chile's local governments follow, since 2004²¹, a Strong Mayor model, differentiating the local executive from the local legislative (the appointment to both is directly dependent on popular vote), and mandating the local legislative with the duty to oversee the local government (Devas and Delay 2006; Nickson 2011; Rosales 2007; Ley N° 18.695 2006).

Chilean mayors are elected for four years, although they can be reelected indefinitely. They are the highest authority of municipal administrations, they receive a salary and have a full-time dedication to their role as head of the local executive. Mayors are frequently highlighted for their preponderant role in local decision making. For example, they, with the advice of their administration, are in charge of elaborating municipal budgets and, although they need to be approved by Municipal Councils, council members cannot propose new expenditures. Also, they set the agenda of the issues to be addressed and decisions to be voted in Councils' meetings. Finally, although the appointment of municipal bureaucrats under the civil service system²² is made by open concourse, they are not always objective and impartial, as neither are the yearly performance evaluations deciding whether bureaucrats must be fired²³. In any case, the mayor has the right to directly appoint bureaucrats in high-rank positions of the municipal administration (Rosales 2007; Ley N° 18695 2006).

Municipal Councils in Chile, on the other hand, operate as local legislative powers. They approve the yearly budgets, take part in other decisions made by the municipality (*Communal Plans*²⁴ and ordinances, among others), and oversee the municipal

administration. They are constituted by six to ten members, depending on the size of the respective communal population. Similar to the mayor, council members are elected by popular vote for four years with unlimited possible reelections. The system for electing council members is an Open-List Proportional Representation, following the D'Hondt method. Their standing and resources contrast with those of the mayors and are characterized by low pay, part-time dedication, and lack of formal resources and staff to carry on their duties in general (Rosales 2007; Ley N° 18.695 2006; Rivera-Ottenberg 2004).

However, unlike any other country in the region, the Chilean model of local government is heavily *managerial*, thus limiting the scope of attributions and functions performed by them. Under this model, local governments stress their administrative over their governing character, aiming at addressing local communities' needs and delivering services on behalf of the central government, rather than producing self-government. Moreover, regardless of their formal autonomy granting them with their own legal personality and assets, local governments in Chile remain highly dependent on the national state. They receive from it a significant proportion of their funds (above 50% on average), and they share with the central state the responsibility for many of these functions—most significantly on education, public health, and public security, among many others²⁵. This sharing of responsibilities is reinforced by local governments' general lack of funding and sufficiently trained personnel to address these functions (Nickson 2011; OECD 2017; Fernández Richard 2013).

A second reason for selecting Chile as a site for the research is that local councils in this country are granted with a minimum of formal attributions and resources for horizontal accountability. Specifically, local councils can, for example, summon any head of

municipal departments for interrogation, and any council member can request information through the mayor, who is required to provide a written answer within a limited lapse of time. Council members also receive the advice and assistance of the Control Unit²⁶ of the corresponding municipality and can request an external audit to assess the financial status, the implementation of the budget and the implementation of the development plan. Although the law does not provide council members any formal attribution for sanctioning mayors or their administrations, they can sanction them indirectly. In particular, they can report cases not only to the criminal justice system, but also to the Comptroller General's Office, which can initiate disciplinary processes and issue legal rulings for municipal administrations, and the Electoral Court, who can remove the mayor from office in case of severe legal transgressions or negligence (Ley N°18.695 2006; Rosales 2007). Despite these attributions and resources, Municipal Councils' role in holding mayors accountable is perceived to be generally limited (OECD 2017). Although this limited role is consistent with council members' low standing and resources (previously described), this situation—and the variations behind these broad generalizations—still waits for a clear explanation.

Finally, Chilean systems of local relationships can be expected to be minimally affected by undemocratic practices from higher levels of government. In particular, as a unitary state, Chile cannot develop the undemocratic regimes at the subnational state level observed in federal countries of the region. According to Polity IV, Chile is also one of the few consolidated democracies in the region, alongside Uruguay and Costa Rica (Marshall & Gurr 2014). Moreover, Chile has been characterized by its comparatively high levels of horizontal accountability, with comparatively minor corruption scandals since the mid-1990s, most of which were triggered by agencies of horizontal

accountability acting independently, and that generated strong popular reaction—thus showing low tolerance to corruption and reinforcing the role of accountability agencies (Luna 2016). Levels of corruption in Chile’s public administration—including municipalities—are themselves comparatively low, according to international independent assessments and public opinion (Rosales 2007; Transparency International 2012). Also, Chile (alongside with Colombia and Brazil) has been considered to have one of the most democratic municipal systems in the region, at least under an electoral conception of democracy (Bland 2011). Finally, national political parties have been reported to have only a low relevance in local politics, with party elites usually leaving local politicians unchecked, while parties are mostly unable to contest the position of incumbent candidates—although parties maintain a preponderant role in candidate nominations for open seats (Rosales 2007; Luna & Altman 2011)²⁷.

Within Chile, the selection of cases (municipalities) was restricted to the metropolitan area of Santiago. This city is composed of 34 territorial units (communes)—each of them administrated by a municipality (Ducci 2002)—and show high external heterogeneity and internal homogeneity in socioeconomic terms (Sabatini et al. 2001). Thus, Santiago provides a universe of possible cases for comparison, which is highly diverse on a critical dimension, while maintaining a similarity that allows controlling the possible effect of cultural and institutional variables.

Consistent with the exploratory character of the research, the case selection followed a *diverse case* strategy (Seawright & Gerring 2008), ideally aiming at maximizing the variance of the dependent variable. However, given the lack of readily available information on local councils’ disposition for horizontal accountability (the

dependent variable of this research), cases were selected looking for different values on relevant contextual variables. These variables include, first, municipalities' levels of party competition, reflected on the margin of victory in elections of councils and mayor, and the party composition of the council. Second, the political coalition dominating the local government, as reflected on the party membership of mayors. Finally, the socioeconomic level of the corresponding population, as reflected on the rate of poverty, the average years of schooling, and the average per capita income of these communes²⁸. Following these criteria, the municipalities of Estación Central, Quinta Normal, Pudahuel, Providencia, and Las Condes were selected, which were analyzed considering the term beginning on December 6, 2012, and ending on December 6, 2016. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of these characteristics across the municipalities selected for the research.

Table 1: Characterization of Cases

Cases	Socio-economic Level	Party competition	Council Members per Coalition			Dominant Coalition	Party of the Mayor
			Nueva Mayoría	Alianza	Total		
Estación Central	Mid-Low	Mid-High	5	3	8	Alianza	UDI
Quinta Normal	Mid-Low	Mid-High	5	3	8	Nueva Mayoría	Christian Democrat
Providencia	High	High	4	4	8	Nueva Mayoría	Independent
Pudahuel	Mid-Low	Low	6	2	8	Nueva Mayoría	Socialist
Las Condes	High	Low	1	8	9	Alianza	UDI

2.3.4. Variables and Analysis

As discussed earlier, the dependent variable studied in this research privileged Municipal Council's *disposition* (or willingness to take actions) to hold the mayor accountable over their capacity and actual exercise of their accountability attributions. This disposition was measured, in its most part, at council members' level, generating

an assessment of Councils' disposition by aggregating these individual measurements. These assessments were complemented with actors' perceptions about Municipal Councils' general disposition to hold the mayor accountable.

Three sources of information were considered to make these evaluations. First, interviews with relevant actors, who reported about council members' loyal, skeptical or ambivalent stance toward their mayors and their administrations, and significant attempts councils' members made to control the local executive (e.g., rejecting the budget, making public or administrative denunciations or requesting administrative investigations). Second, printed and electronic news media reports issued during the period analyzed (the term between December 6, 2012, and December 6, 2016) and manifesting council members' support, criticism (or opposition), ambivalence or neutrality about the mayors and their administration (either generally or on specific issues); council members' public denunciations about political or legal misbehavior of the mayors and their administrations; and significant attempts councils' members made to control the local executive (e.g., rejecting the budget, making public or administrative denunciations or requesting administrative investigations)²⁹. The research considered news reports in *local* news media for Pudahel, the only case for which news media of this type were available. For the other cases, only reports in *national* news media were analyzed. Finally, council members' reports to the Comptroller General's Office about perceived wrongdoings of the mayors or their administrations during the period analyzed, given this institution's formal capacity to initiate disciplinary processes and issue legal rulings for municipal administrations³⁰. Table 2 specifies the number of news reports and council members' reports to the Comptroller General's Office analyzed for each case.

Table 2: Secondary Sources for the Dependent Variable*

Cases	Reports in Printed News	Reports in Electronic News	Total News Reports	Reports to Comptroller General's Office
Estación Central	5	21	26	2
Quinta Normal	4	1	5	8
Providencia	26	16	42	5
Pudahuel	0	52	52	2
Las Condes	8	7	15	0
Total	43	97	140	17

*News reports in *national* printed and electronic news sources were considered for Estación Central, Quinta Normal, Providencia and Las Condes. News reports in *local* electronic news media (*Diario Tropicón*) were considered for Pudahuel.

Based on this information, Municipal Councils' disposition to hold the mayor accountable was categorized as *Low* in one case (Las Condes), where only a minority of council members showed a significant disposition to hold the mayor accountable, while interviews reported a general perception of loyalty to the mayor. It was categorized as *Medium* in two cases, where a significant proportion of council members showed an ambivalent disposition to hold the mayor accountable (Estación Central), or a significant minority of them showed an unambiguous disposition to hold the mayor accountable (Quinta Normal). It was categorized as *High*, in two cases where the majority of council members showed a marked disposition to hold the mayor accountable (Pudahuel and Providencia).

The effects of the systems of local relationships on Municipal Councils' disposition for horizontal accountability were investigated in an exploratory way, addressing, primarily, the influence that constituencies (i.e., local communities), and local executives (i.e., municipal bureaucrats and mayors) wield over this disposition. In

particular, the research focused, first, on the conditions under which local constituents support council members and the influence they have on their actions or decisions. Second, the conditions under which local executives (mayors and local bureaucracies) can influence council members' actions or decisions, especially by affecting their availability of resources and constituent support. Therefore, this research analyzed the effect three specific paired relationships on council members' disposition for horizontal accountability: relationships between council members and local communities; between council members and local executives; and between local communities and local executives.

These relationships were investigated primarily through semistructured interviews with key actors, in 2015 and 2016. The actors interviewed include council members, municipal bureaucrats, leaders of neighborhood associations (*Juntas de Vecinos*³¹) and members of parliament representing the districts corresponding to these municipalities. No selection process was implemented to choose council members and parliamentarians to interview—all of them were contacted, and those willing to participate in the research were interviewed. The selection of municipal bureaucrats and leaders of neighborhood associations followed the snowball sampling method, starting from the suggestions made by the council members interviewed, and the saturation of information criterion. Table 3 shows the number of interviews implemented in each case. In total, 78 interviews were implemented.

Table 3: Interviews per Municipality

Cases	Members of Parliament	Council Members	Municipal Bureaucrats	Local Leaders	Total
Estación Central	1	6	6	5	18
Quinta Normal	2	5	7	7	21
Providencia	1	4	3	5	13
Pudahuel	1	3	3	5	12
Las Condes	1	5	3	5	14
Total	6	23	22	27	78

The specific dimensions analyzed for each paired relationship were determined inductively, addressing the elements of each paired relationship revealed in the interviews as significant for the influence of different actors over Municipal Councils' disposition for horizontal accountability. Three dimensions were considered for the relationship between council members and local communities, as table 4 shows: council members' history involvement in local communities before their election as council members; their current interactions with these communities, and their involvement in local problem-solving (i.e., providing solution to the demands that local communities bring to them).

As table 4 shows, one dimension was analyzed in the relationship between council members and the local executives—the coordination between them for addressing local demands, most clearly expressed in council members role as *intermediaries* between local communities and the local executives. This coordination could be between council members and municipal bureaucrats, between council members and the mayor or the Municipal Council as a whole, or just nonexistent.

Table 4: Independent Variables

Relationships	Dimensions	Sources (type of information)
Council Members- Local Communities	History of Involvement in Local Communities	Interviews (general)
	Current Interactions with Local Communities	Interviews (general)
	involvement in local problem-solving	Interviews (general)
Council Members- Local Executives	Council Members' Intermediation	Interviews (general)
	Availability of Financial Resources	Interviews (general) SINIM (municipalities' incomes)
Local Executives- Local Communities	Active Involvement With Local Communities	Interviews (general) SINIM; Chile's Ministry of Finance (funds transfers to local organizations)
		CASEN 2015 Survey (participation in local organizations)
	Capacity to Receive and Respond to Local Demands	Interviews (general) SINIM (size and profesionalization of bureaucracies)

Consistent with local executives' formal orientation towards serving local communities, the elements highlighted in the interviews as relevant for the relationship between them are directly associated to local executives' delivery of public goods and services, and their role in promoting local communities' associations. These elements can be organized according to three components of these executives' organization, as table 4 shows. The first of them, is related to their potential, thus demarcating the limits of what municipalities can do (their *availability of financial resources*). The second dimension refers to their organizational disposition to initiate the interactions (their

active involvement with local communities), including their promotion of local civil society organizations and the deployment of municipal bureaucrats throughout the commune. Finally, their organizational disposition to react to proposed interactions (their *capacity to receive and respond to local demands*), including the characteristics of the bureaucracy in terms of capacity (their size, professionalization, and administrative organization) and usability (as reflected in their loyalty to the mayor and the administration he or she represents).

Two clarifications are significant regarding this systematization of local executive-community relations. First, although the term *capacity* appears explicitly only in the third component, state capacity, as the “*ability of government officials to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm*” (Mann 1984, 189)³², is constitutive to all of them. Specifically, these components address one dimension of state capacity considered by Saylor (2014)—its ability to provide public goods and services, as reflected on the availability of resources, and the characteristics of the bureaucracy and its organization. It, however, leaves aside the *institutional* dimension, relative to the creation of rules that constrain and shape human interaction (Saylor 2014). Secondly, similar to the previous point, although the *usability* of the bureaucracies was analyzed under the third component (since it is a characteristic of these bureaucracies, like their size or their professionalization), it is ultimately constitutive of all the components involving bureaucracies (the second and the third). In these respects, the research follows Linz and Stepan’s (1996) notion of *usability of state bureaucracies*, to indicate the degree to which bureaucracies are, in fact, willing to cooperate with current governments in their attempt to carry out their functions. This usability is operationalized here as municipal bureaucracies’ loyalty to their mayors and

the administration these mayors represent³³.

In addition to the information provided by the interviews, the relationships between local executives and communities were investigated resorting to public information on municipalities' availability of financial resources; the monetary resources destined to local civil society organizations; and local communities' participation on civil society organizations; and the size and level of professionalization of their bureaucracies; . Most of this information was obtained from Chile's *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM)³⁴, which collects, aggregates and makes publicly available municipalities' information in all these variables. The information about local communities' participation in civil society organizations was obtained from CASEN 2015 survey³⁵. Additional information about monetary resources destined to local civil society organizations was also obtained from Chile's *Ministerio de Hacienda* (The Ministry of Finance).

2.4. The Argument

Consistent with the literature on horizontal accountability, this research proposes that local councils' *electoral independence from the executives* is a critical variable determining their disposition to hold these mayors accountable. As a general proposition, then, council members unable to build and maintain sufficient constituent support without the help of the local executives are susceptible to be harmed in their electoral chances by these executives. Local executives can use this sanctioning capacity to induce these council members' loyalty and discourage them from holding them accountable. Council members who fail to demonstrate their loyalty to the mayor and are unable to raise constituent support on their own are unlikely to be reelected.

Under these circumstances, constituencies play a significant role in local horizontal accountability, although different from the one that the literature expected. Instead of their pressure on council members to hold mayors accountable, what is significant is their capacity to secure council members' permanence in office, *despite* their disposition to hold the mayor accountable (or lack thereof). In other words, constituencies are relevant because they give council members a chance to be independent from their mayors—independence that disappears if council members rely on the help of the local executives to raise constituent support.

This role of constituencies is expected to be particularly significant where the delivery of goods and services and the solution of local problems rank high among the elements defining these constituencies' electoral support—as in the cases analyzed here. This situation, however, have three important implications. First, council members' capacity to raise constituent support tend to be conditional to their capacity to get involved in the processes of delivery of goods and services and local problem-solving. Moreover, their involvement in these processes (and their role as local problem-solvers) might become *informally institutionalized* and, therefore, not only given for granted but also unofficially enforced³⁶, even if they are in conflict with the fulfillment of their official duties.

A second implication follows from the previous one—the tendency to exchange access to goods and services (or provide a solution to specific local problems) for political support, and, therefore, to form clientelistic relationships between local communities and politicians³⁷. However, some of the ways these exchanges are enforced (and therefore institutionalized) may imply an inversion in how clientelistic relations are traditionally understood. According to the literature, politicians are usually the ones in

control in clientelistic relationships, holding voters accountable for their electoral decisions³⁸ and constituting, therefore, a case of *perverse accountability* (Stokes 2005), where local communities' political subordination is exchanged for material rewards (Fox 1994, 153). Instead, the cases analyzed show that local communities can also be the ones enforcing these relationships—and, therefore, controlling them—especially since they may not only reward politicians with their vote, campaign support or endorsement but also actively punish them by damaging their reputation or impeding them to contact other members of the community.

As a final implication, local organizations may play a significant role on the formation of these clientelistic relationships, especially given their members' usually low knowledge about local politicians (heightened in the case of council members), and the subsequent influence of their organizations' leaders on their electoral decisions. In particular, leaders of local organizations can influence their members through two mechanisms. First, given local leaders' more frequent interaction with local authorities, the members of their organizations tend to trust their knowledge about the performance and help they receive from these authorities and, therefore, follow the vote suggestions these leaders make. Second, by *de facto* controlling politicians' access to their organizations, local leaders can give some of them more visibility among their members and special opportunities of interaction between them, thus increasing the likelihood that these members will support these politicians. Given that influence of local leaders over their organizations' members, local politicians have incentives to distribute resources to local organizations to induce local communities' electoral support and form clientelistic relationships with them—involving an institutionalized *quid pro quo* exchange of services or goods for political support. These organizations

are, thus, transformed into structural replacements of *political machines*—similar to what Marwell (2004) described for nonprofit community-based organizations in New York. In the cases analyzed, these clientelistic relationships were most visible under the form of *godparenthood* relationships (*apadrinamiento*)—a practice in which local organizations nominate one or two local authorities as their *godparents*, thus making explicit a relationship of mutual cooperation and loyalty (or the intention to build such relationship), usually translated into a preferential treatment between them.

In the strive for obtaining constituents' support, municipal bureaucracies' high capacity³⁹ and usability⁴⁰ to address local communities' demands give them an organizational advantage over local councils. Where local executives are provided with high financial resources, are active in reaching local communities, and have bureaucracies that are loyal their mayors and efficient in handling local demands, local communities have lower incentives turn to council members for help. Under these circumstances, council members have limited opportunities to interact with local communities and validate themselves as authorities in front of them. These council members, then, have incentives to rely on the help of the executive to increase their constituent support, giving up their accountability duties in exchange.

This organizational advantage of the local executives can be reinforced or compensated by other organizational attributions, especially those affecting council members' capacity to intermediate between local communities and municipal bureaucrats. First, mayors can create (formal or informal) internal procedural rules regulating municipal bureaucrats' direct interaction with council members. They can also, distribute formal opportunities for council members to interact with local communities. Finally, mayors

can distribute higher or lower resources for council members to perform their duties.

Local executives can use these attributions in different ways to improve mayors' position under different circumstances. For example, where municipal bureaucracies are highly capable and usable, local executives may use these attributions to further detach local councils from local communities and increase their dependence on the mayor. Specifically, they can either prohibit council members to channel local demands directly to municipal bureaucrats, thus further reducing local communities' incentives to turn to council members for help). They can also require them to channel these demands to the mayor or the Municipal Council, thus reducing council members' capacity to gain recognition for solving problems and the support that comes with it. Finally, they can minimize their resources or formal opportunities to interact with local communities.

However, where municipal bureaucracies lack capacity and usability to address local communities' demands, these communities have higher incentives to turn to council members for help, thus increasing their chances of interaction allowing these council members to raise independent constituent support. Under these circumstances, local executives can selectively provide council members with access to municipal bureaucracies, municipal resources, and the formal opportunities of interaction with local communities, thus providing them a capacity for intermediation between local communities and municipal bureaucrats. By doing so, local executives would be able to induce council members' loyalty to the mayor (rewarding loyalty with access to them, and punishing disloyalty with exclusion) and compensate, to some extent, the executives' organizational deficiencies.

Council members can use different strategies to resist the pressures of local executives. Most significantly, and especially where municipal bureaucracies lack capacity to

address communities' demands, council members may increase their availability of resources by resorting to informal (although not necessarily illegitimate) sources to address the local demands they receive and, therefore, build independent constituent support. This strategy can be reinforced by council members' previous and current active involvement in local communities, increasing both the personal connection between them and the possibility to receive demands to be addressed. This strategy, finally, might also include a form of intermediation between local communities and municipal bureaucrats, which does not entail the dependence on the mayor described in the previous paragraph. That is paradigmatically the case when municipal bureaucrats are part of council members' network of personal connections and are, therefore, willing to receive the local demands that council members bring to them despite their loyalty to the mayor or lack thereof.

As a second possible strategy to resist the pressures of local executives, council members might be able to capitalize the support of pockets of highly disciplined members of their parties or neighbors' discontent with the mayors—especially when they do not compete for these sources of support with other council members. Thirdly, although of lesser relevance, where elections to local council follow a proportional representation rule, council members may gain electoral independence by securing their inclusion in a successful party list. Fourth, council members not interested in running for reelection are—by definition—electorally independent from the mayor, and cannot be punished for holding them accountable.

Finally, even when council members lack mechanisms to resist the pressures of the mayor, they can be able to maintain their electoral independence if the local executive both lack capacity or usability to address communities' demands *and* do not offer

opportunities for council members' intermediation. In these cases, the local executive lacks direct mechanisms and influence over voters to induce council members' loyalty, thus making it possible for these council members to hold the mayor accountable without risking their electoral chances for doing so.

In consequence, local councils can be expected to have a high disposition for horizontal accountability *only* when a high proportion of their members are thus electorally independent from the mayor. However, while council members' dependence on the mayor implies a low disposition for horizontal accountability, their independence from the mayor does not translate automatically into a higher disposition for horizontal accountability, and additional elements need to be considered to explain their higher or lower disposition. Two elements related to local councils organizational dimension were of particular significance in the cases analyzed. First, council members understanding and regard for their role—independent local councils with high esteem for their institutional autonomy and corporate oversight duties, showed a higher disposition for horizontal accountability. Second, council members' party affiliation may also become a significant element for determining Municipal Council's disposition to hold the mayor accountable, even if local politicians remain independent from their parties. This relevance of parties might be particularly significant where party competition is high, party politics has gained a higher significance, and council members are also detached from local communities—and, therefore, unrelated to the solution of their quotidian problems.

Table 5 shows the values that these variables assume in the cases analyzed. As this table shows, Las Condes illustrates the case of a popular mayor, supported by an efficient and

loyal municipal bureaucracy and rules prohibiting council members to channel demands to municipal bureaucrats. Under these circumstances, local communities had low incentives to turn to council members, who remained, therefore, marginalized from the interaction with local communities and depended on the mayor's support to improve their electoral chances. Consequently, Las Condes's Municipal Council showed a low disposition to hold the mayor accountable.

Table 5: Summary of Variables in the Cases Analyzed

Cases	Bureaucratic capacity to address demands	Council members' intermediation	Council members' independent constituent support	Horizontal accountability
Las Condes	High	Low	Low	Low
Estación Central	Low	Mid-High	Mid-Low	Medium
Quinta Normal	Low	Mid-High	Mid-Low	Medium
Pudahuel	Medium	Mid-Low	High	High
Providencia	Low	Low	Low	High

Estación Central and Quinta Normal illustrate cases where the municipal bureaucracy showed a little capacity to address communities' demands, and its usability was, in consequence, secured through patronage. In these cases, council members' access to municipal bureaucrats, their availability of resources and their formal opportunities to interact with local communities were used as bargain chips to induce their loyalty to the mayor. In both municipalities, however, some council members were able to resist these pressures by either resorting to their history of active involvement in local communities and informal resources to address their demands; obtaining the support of highly disciplined party members; or renouncing to their reelection. Correspondingly, in both cases, Municipal Councils showed a moderate disposition to hold the mayor accountable.

Pudahuel and Providencia illustrate cases of Municipal Councils with a high disposition to hold their mayors accountable, although this similar outcome responded to different explanatory factors in each case. In Pudahuel, the municipal bureaucracy showed a moderate capacity and usability to address communities demands, and council members were allowed to intermediate between local communities and the municipal bureaucracy. However, a majority of council members were able to maintain their electoral independence from the local executive and hold the mayor accountable without risking to be punished for doing so. These council members obtained that independence by either relying on their histories of active involvement with local communities and informal resources to address the demands they receive or securing their inclusion in a successful party list. This independence was accompanied—and translated into high disposition for horizontal accountability—by an understanding of the Municipal Council as an independent *collegiate body*, thus highlighting both their collective and diligent dedication to their duties and the prioritization of their role as supervisors over their partisan affiliations.

In Providencia, despite its high availability of resources and professionalization, the municipal bureaucracy showed severe problems of loyalty, thus hampering its performance in addressing local demands. These difficulties were paired with low levels of council members' intermediation, resulting from their lack of direct interaction with local communities and the presence of rules prohibiting them to channel demands directly to municipal bureaucrats. Thus, although council members lacked mechanisms to resist possible pressures from the mayor, it was the mayor who lacked mechanisms to wield that pressure on council members in the first place. On the basis of this incapacity of the mayor to induce council members' loyalty, party affiliation had a

stronger influence in structuring the Municipal Council's disposition to hold the mayor accountable, especially given the high levels of party competition and the mayor's implementation of symbolic policies of high political signification.

3. Low Horizontal Accountability: Las Condes

3.1. Characterizing Las Condes

Considering both its socioeconomic and political characteristics, Las Condes is not only an exceptional commune⁴¹ but probably also a strange place to find low levels of horizontal accountability.

Located in the Northeast corner of Santiago, Las Condes stand out as a populous and wealthy commune, when compared to the other communes in the city. With a population of about 283,000 habitants estimated for 2015, Las Condes was within the six most populated communes in Santiago—well above the city’s communal average population (around 176,000 habitants)⁴². Regarding socioeconomic standards, Las Condes’s high average households’ per capita autonomous income (about 365,000 pesos⁴³) is only second to that of Providencia, among Santiago’s communes self-represented in the CASEN 2015 survey, and over three times the communal average within the Metropolitana Region (about 116,000⁴⁴ pesos)⁴⁵. Consistent with that level of income, Las Condes showed the lowest poverty rate (0.6%) and the second highest education level (15.1 years of schooling on average) among Santiago’s communes self-represented in the CASEN 2015 survey⁴⁶.

Regarding political tendencies, ever since the return to democracy the right has been predominant in Las Condes. Two mayors have led this municipality since the first democratic election in 1992. Both of them came from the *Unión Demócrata Independiente* party (UDI), and both obtained over 70% of the vote after their first

election⁴⁷: Joaquín Lavín (1992 to 1999) who left the mayoral seat to run for president in 1999, and Francisco De la Maza (2000 to 2016), who desisted from running for a new period to cede the mayoralty back to Joaquín Lavín⁴⁸. In consequence, since 1992 the rightist *Alianza* coalition has obtained a vast majority in the Municipal elections, counting above the 60% of the valid votes in all of them, and reaching above the 80% in the election of 1996. In the three elections held since 2004 (when mayors were first elected separately from council members), the right list obtained between 65% and 70% of the votes, allowing them to elect a substantive majority of the Municipal Council—six out of the eight council members in 2004 and 2008, and eight out of the ten council members in 2012. In all these elections the remaining two seats in the Municipal Council were obtained by candidates from the center-left coalition *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (or simply *Concertación*).

Thus, Las Condes could be characterized as a highly populated and wealthy commune, with low levels of party competition. These circumstances allow formulating contradictory expectations about council members' disposition to hold the mayor accountable. Given that wealthier and more educated population are expected to be better informed, more aware of council members' duties, and more likely to pressure them, council members in Las Condes can be expected to be highly willing to hold the mayor accountable. Given that the presence of opposition parties have been considered to play a fundamental role in local horizontal accountability, Las Condes' low party competition can be expected to imply a low disposition in the Municipal Council to hold the mayor accountable. Consistent with this second expectation, the next section will argue that Las Condes' council members showed only a low disposition to hold the mayor accountable. However, instead of the low party competition, the data analyzed

in this chapter suggest that council members' electoral dependence on both the mayor and his efficient administration played a significant role in dissuading council members from holding the mayor accountable and was, therefore, a primary factor explaining their low disposition for horizontal accountability.

3.2. Low Horizontal Accountability

In the 2012 municipal elections, Las Condes elected ten council members, an overwhelming majority of which (eight) came from the right—five from *Renovación Nacional* (RN)⁴⁹ and three from the *Unión Demócrata Independiente* (UDI)—, while only two came from the center-left *Concertación*⁵⁰ coalition—one from the Christian Democrat party (PDC) and one independent who ran in Concertación's list. However, at the middle of the term, the independent pro-Concertación council member abdicated due to health issues (and was, reportedly, absent most of the time before that) and her seat was left empty until the next election. Thus, in practice, Las Condes had a total of nine council members, only one of which came from a political party opposed to the mayor. In what follows, this chapter will refer only to these nine council members, except when it opposite is indicated in the document.

Consistent with these partisan alignments, the Municipal Council showed a high loyalty to the mayor—and, therefore, a low disposition to hold him accountable (see table 6). Three council members (the PDC and two of the RN ones) showed a somewhat skeptical stance towards the mayor and his administration. However, these sources of opposition were downplayed by council members (even the ambivalent RN ones), while the PDC council member was the only one to show a consistent—and starker—opposition stance. This assessment of the Municipal Council's disposition for horizontal

accountability was obtained through the analysis of the information coming from three sources—interviews, council members appearances in national news sources, and their reports to the Comptroller General’s Office.

Table 6: Council Member’s Disposition for Horizontal Accountability in Las Condes (Appearances in News and Reports to the Comptroller General’s Office 2013-2016)

		Loyals						Ambivalents		Skeptics
		Loyal UDI 1	Loyal UDI 2	Loyal UDI 3	Loyal RN 1	Loyal RN 2	Loyal RN 3	Ambivalent RN 1	Ambivalent RN 2	Skeptic PDC
Appearances in News	Criticizing	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	9
	Supporting	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1
	Neutral	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
	Ambivalent	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Total	0	0	2	2	0	1	2	1	12
Reports to the CGO against the executive		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: created by the author based on news reports obtained from Chile’s *national* printed and electronic news sources and council members’ reports made to *Contraloría General de la República* (<https://www.contraloria.cl>).

In the interviews, the PDC council member was recurrently recognized as the most skeptic of the mayor and his administration, both as a general impression and describing specific moments of opposition⁵¹. Additionally, another two council members from RN declared to have a more critic stance towards the mayor and oppose some of his projects—although they were not identified as opposition in the interviews. However, the Municipal Council was described in the interviews highlighting a generalized climate of cooperation and support to the mayor, that overshadowed these manifestations of opposition. As one council member described, manifesting a common perception among the interviewees:

“We are three UDI and five RN, but everyone supports the mayor anyway. Even the PDC council member, sometimes complaints more and whatnot but, generally, he has supported all the important projects of the mayor. This Council is very collaborative with

the mayor. There has never been an important project where the mayor has had to decide [what to do because the Council was incapable of reaching an agreement]” (Loyal UDI Council Member 2, Las Condes)⁵².

Council members appearances in the news reports complemented and reinforced the perceptions collected in the interviews. During the period analyzed (the term between December 6, 2012, and December 6, 2016), in 15 news reports in Chile’s national newspapers and electronic news sources, council members from Las Condes appeared either criticizing (or opposing), supporting, being neutral or being ambivalent about the mayor and his administration⁵³. As table 6 shows, the PDC council member is, by far, the one with more appearances (12), in most of which (9) he criticized or opposed either the mayor or his administration for the projects they proposed or how they implemented them. Of these, two are particularly telling about the PDC council member disposition to hold the mayor accountable. In the first one, is the mayor who singled out, and therefore recognized, the PDC council member as a (politically motivated) member of the opposition⁵⁴. The second one, while describing a public argument between the mayor and the PDC council member, accounted for the latter’s request, in one Municipal Council’s meeting, for an administrative investigation—which the mayor refused⁵⁵. Only one of the two RN council members who manifested some opposition to the mayor in the interviews also appeared in news reports criticizing him for his handling of internal partisan issues (in one of his two total appearances). The other ambivalent RN council member counted only one, neutral, appearance in news reports. Only three of the six remaining council members appeared—either once or twice—in news reports, and in all of them they either supported or were neutral about the mayor and his administration.

Finally, in only one occasion during the period analyzed, council members from Las Condes resorted to the Comptroller General's Office. However, rather than reporting the mayor or his administration, the two council members who presented the requirement (the PDC and one loyal RN council members) asked the Comptroller General's Office to clarify the application of a supplementary payment for council members.

Thus, with only one council member manifesting a clear skeptical stance toward the mayor and his administration—while other two showed a mild ambivalence—, Las Condes' Municipal Council was widely loyal to the mayor, standing out for its broad disposition to cooperate rather than to hold him accountable.

Why did Las Condes' Municipal Council show this low disposition for horizontal accountability? While partisan alignments may seem to offer a likely explanation—given the prominence of the mayor's party coalition—it fails to explain why in other cases (like Pudahel) similar compositions of the Municipal Council could not be similarly translated into high loyalty to the mayor. Moreover, the information collected in the interviews pointed, instead, at *council members' electoral dependence on the mayor* as the primary explanatory factor for this situation. As one of the ambivalent council members explained:

“There have been stupid ideas that are approved by the majority that supports the mayor, even when the ideas are bad ones [...]. There wasn't very deep thinking behind the approval of these propositions, but rather only the support to the mayor. Here, everyone is from the party of the mayor once they are elected—there is a lot of reverence to the executive power [...]. People like to be in good terms with the gentleman who decides [...]. He is very popular in the commune, so they like to be seen as friends of the mayor [...].”

Neighborhood associations⁵⁶ attend to the Council meetings, and there they can more or less figure out who is in good terms with the mayor and who is not” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 1, Las Condes).

Expressing a similar idea, another council member explained how there was little room for disagreement in the Municipal Council and how, according to his impression, the mayor’s capacity to make council members irrelevant—and therefore invisible—for local communities was the main reason behind this situation:

“The management style of the mayor leaves you with no space [for dissidence]. Since everything is covered [by the municipality], it renders council members invisible [to the community, and] there is not much space for rebelliousness. We [the council members] never have to work to reach an agreement, because the weight of the mayor is big enough for whoever who disagree with him to feel it. So there is scarce rejection [to what the mayor proposes], there is not much dissidence” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, Las Condes).

In the following sections, this chapter will explain council members’ dependence on the mayor resorting to two main factors. First, council members’ difficulties to create and maintain an independent network of supporters among voters. Second, the high capacity of the municipal bureaucracy, which both obstructed council members’ interactions with local communities and exalted the figure of a highly effective mayor. As the previous quotes suggest, under these circumstances, council members’ electoral chances generally depended on the support they received from the mayor and, therefore, on the loyalty they show to him.

3.3. Council Members' Interaction with Local Communities

Council members in Las Condes, in general, developed only limited relationships with local communities. In particular, they tended to lack a previous history of strong involvement in local communities; also tended to hold mostly low-intensity interactions with local communities; seldom participated in local problem-solving, either using their own resources or connecting local communities with the municipal bureaucracy. As a result, they manifested a low capacity to build independent networks of supporters, marked by the low recognition they receive from local communities, and the difficulties they expressed in identifying who vote for them, beyond voters' demographic profiles developed from elections' results. Under these circumstances, these council members capacity to associate their image to that of the popular figure of the mayor was a significant resource to obtain the electoral support they needed.

Previous involvement in local communities: Council members interviewed in Las Condes reported scarce previous involvement leading to their election as council members. Only one of them reported a history of local leadership preceding his involvement in local politics—similar to the ones used by council members in other cases to build their network of supporters⁵⁷. However, his electoral results suggest that his leadership might not have been strong enough to build a network of supporters that guarantees him a seat in the Council⁵⁸.

One other council member showed a previous work with local communities, addressing local problems as a volunteer civil support for the police⁵⁹. However, first,

his work supporting the police may have not always implied working with local communities, and second, its relevance in forming his network of supporters is overshadowed by the recognition he received as a national figure (after his active participation in television and radio) and the support he received from the mayor⁶⁰.

The remaining council members reported having low previous work and connection with local communities. Instead, their election as council members was preceded either by their work in the territory division of their parties, and their relationship with national and relevant local figures (one of them was the son and shared the name, of a former president of the RN party and former council member. Another of them counted with the support and help in the campaign of one of the Member of Parliament representing Las Condes' district and the mayor)⁶¹.

Current relationships with local communities: As the interviews revealed, council members' interaction with local communities, although extensive, tended to be highly formal, and of low intensity. Consistent with that type of interaction, local leaders reported low levels of recognition of council members, while council members themselves showed a limited capacity to identify their voters, beyond the statistics obtained from elections' results.

Although council members declared to contact a high proportion of Las Condes' local organizations⁶², these interactions were sporadic and of low intensity, while council members regarded as highly difficult for them to address all of the numerous local organizations in the commune. Council members' nomination as godparents of local organizations⁶³ was particularly telling about the low intensity in these relationships. While this is a frequent practice elsewhere, interviews reported it to be

practically nonexistent in Las Condes and, in the few cases where it was mentioned to happen, it did not imply the formation of strong relationships (translated, for example, into frequent interactions, preferential treatment, open channels of communication, tutelage and constant guidance, as observed in other cases). The one single council member who declared being the godmother of a local organization exemplified this situation, describing the interaction she had with the single organization that proposed her to be their godmother:

“I do have one senior citizens’ club that asked me to be their godmother, but we never did the baptism—they treat me as their godmother, but we never made it official [...]. And that is the only one [I have]. I visit them two or three times a year and, for example, this year I gifted them a trip to [a museum]. But they usually have a hard time contacting me, and they always expect it to be me [the one who contact them]” (Loyal UDI Council Member 2, Las Condes).

The interviews identified, instead, two formal instances as the most prominent instances in which council members interacted with local organizations. First, local leaders’ participation in the municipal council’s committees and the Communal Council of Civil Society Organizations; second, local leaders request of council members’ support for the projects they presented to the municipality and needed to be voted in the Municipal Council. Providing an eloquent example about the relevance of the first one, one council member recognized them as the only instance in which he interacted with organized communities, and described how these formal meetings worked highlighting how they were insufficient to develop stronger ties with them:

“It is almost impossible to have a relationship at the massive level [with the local communities]. But, as president of the Security Committee, I have meetings with

neighborhood associations⁶⁴ leaders and many other neighborhood security associations, which we do in the municipal office of public security. There is when I have contact [with them]. I stand up and speak in the name of the mayor, I greet all the neighborhood representatives, and we talk. But keep in mind that in Las Condes there are [a lot] of voters, and we do these meetings only with the leadership of these organizations [...]. Yes, [They are the only instance where's I have contact with neighbors], because we can't do politic proselytism publicly” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Las Condes)⁶⁵.

On the other hand, one local leader provided an example of the relevance of local organizations' support request for their projects, identifying those interactions as the primary instance of interaction between with council members. As one of them reported:

“When do we talk the most with [council members]? When we present a project to competitive funds. There, one has to get their approval [...], so we visit each of the ones we know [and tell them] ‘hey, we are proposing this project’ [...] and they see whether they like it or not. Because they are the ones who decided whether the project will be implemented or not, they vote in the Council's meetings. So, one [tries to] get one additional voice in that instance” (Local Leader 5, Las Condes)⁶⁶.

Consistent with this situation of low interaction, on the one hand, local leaders and council members shared a perception of distant relationships between them, usually accompanied with the impression of council members being unaware of local communities' real situation and needs. As one local leader expressed:

“I couldn't say that all the council members are open to the community. As of today, I can tell you that there are some council members I have never met [...]. Not all of them are really humane, to be honest [...]. They are always questioning [your needs]

because, in Las Condes, there is supposedly not too much need—but that is not the truth” (Local Leader 2, Las Condes)⁶⁷.

Also, expressing a common perception among the council members interviewed, one of them described how local communities perceived them as being absent, and explained that it was impossible for council members to have more intense interactions with them:

“Some people tell us ‘you know what? You haven’t even come to visit us’. And to be rigorous, in a commune [as big as this one] you most likely are going to visit and greet one percent of the population in the four years [of your term]” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, Las Condes).

On the other hand—and unlike council members in other cases—council members in Las Condes tended to show a limited capacity to identify, based on the interaction with local communities, where their strongest electoral supporters were, and relied instead on the statistics from previous elections to obtain that information. The answer of one council member to the question about who votes for him exemplifies this situation:

“My voters are only around 6,600; half men, half women. I don’t have the information about the ages [...]. I don’t have information [about specific zones where my voters are concentrated]. I only receive the results of the elections [...]. I think there are [some neighborhoods] where I might have better receptions and [others] where they don’t even want to see me [...]. But I don’t have the information about where [the votes] may come from” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Las Condes)⁶⁸.

In sum, council members current interaction with local communities was characterized by infrequent contacts, and the high formality and low intensity in the

relationships it generated. In consequence, and consistent also with their scarce history of previous involvement in local communities, council members showed to lack a capacity to form independent networks of supporters, mainly manifested in the lack of recognition they receive from local leaders and their low capacity to recognize who vote for them. As it will be explained later in this section, this deficit in forming independent networks of supporters was a significant element contributing to council members' electoral dependence on the mayor and, therefore, their lower willingness to hold him accountable.

Addressing local problems: Consistent with their low involvement with local communities—which harmed their capacity to receive communities' demands—council members were reported to have low direct participation in the resolution of local communities' problems, thus reinforcing their lack of recognition among them. In the other cases observed, council members usually cooperated in the solution of local problems either resorting to their own time and resources or by interceding with the municipal bureaucracy in favor of local communities, recognizing in it a significant activity for maintaining their network of supporters. However, council members in Las Condes tended to bring local communities' demands they receive either to the mayor himself or the Council meetings, instead of municipal bureaucrats directly, thus diluting their influence in the process of resolving local demands⁶⁹. Illustrating the absence of council members' intermediation between local communities and municipal bureaucrats, the conversation with one local leader revealed how surprising it was for them to hear about it:

“Interviewer: I have seen in other municipalities that council members are the ones

receiving demands or concerns from the neighbors and channeling them to the municipal bureaucrats.

Interviewee: Really!? I can't believe it. That is extraordinary, but it doesn't happen here [...]. I mean, council members, of course, have some participation with local communities, but they are more from the Municipal Council's table. They are there to deal with the bigger projects and things like permits and commerce" (Local Leader 2, Las Condes).

Accounting for the low disposition to address communities demands with their own resources, one council member mentioned:

"Someone may tell me 'I have an aunt with cancer' or things like that, like when they are looking for some more personal help. [In these cases] if the municipality can't help them, then it is your decision whether to donate money or not to them. I usually try not to do it, for example, when they are going to do a bingo [to address these cases]. I figure out with the Social Department what is this case about, and if they say that they are already helping them, but some part of the problem is unattended, only then I donate a prize for a bingo" (Loyal UDI Council Member 2, Las Condes).

Another council member accounted eloquently for the generalized preference for channeling local demands to the mayor and the Municipal Council, describing when each of these channels was better, and highlighting how that was the adequate way to proceed:

"Generally, what I do [with demands I receive from the community] is to send an email to the mayor, so he can do something if he thinks appropriate. He is the executive power, so he is the one who approves. We are supposedly here to control, supervise, and provide ideas. In the context of providing ideas, I send those to the mayor, and he decides

whether he implement them or not [...]. I also bring [those cases] to the Council meetings, when they worth it. There are small issues [...], and you don't need to bring those to the Council—you just report them in an email [to the mayor]" (Ambivalent RN Council Member 1, Las Condes)⁷⁰.

Thus, council members in Las Condes were generally depicted as detached from local communities. As this section shows, they tended to show low previous involvement in these communities, low current interaction with them, and low participation in the resolution of their demands and requests. As a result, council members' ability to create and maintain a network of supporters would have been heavily impaired, as both their low levels of recognition among local communities and their limited capacity to identify their voters suggest. Under these circumstances, the figure of the mayor became a prominent resource for council members to raise their electoral support, thus becoming electorally dependent on him and less prone to hold him accountable, as the quotes in the previous section suggest. One council member most clearly illustrated this electoral dependence on the mayor, explaining how, during the last electoral campaign, it was critical for her to be perceived as close to the mayor, and how using her party's label was more useful to that end than to appeal to voters' party preferences:

"[In the previous election] it was important for the UDI [candidates] to identify with [the mayor]—who is from the UDI too [...]. I didn't know him, but I had to hold on to him anyway. How did I do it? Saying that I was from UDI and [the mayor] was from the UDI too [...]. So, for me, it was an advantage to be from the mayor's party. And people always say it: one of the reasons they choose you and vote for you is because they identify

you with the party of the mayor. To me, it was 100% convenient, and I'm going to do the same [the next election]" (Loyal UDI Council Member 2, Las Condes).

However, why were council members unable to develop further their relationships with local communities to escape to this dependence? The following sections are dedicated to answering this question. In doing so, they focus on the factor reported to be the most prominent on these regards—the municipal bureaucracy's capacity to dominate the relationships with local communities.

3.4. The Role of the Municipal Bureaucracy

Among the factor explaining council members' difficulty in developing more substantive relationships with local communities, the municipal bureaucracy's high capacity to dominate the relationships with local communities—thus making council members seem superfluous to them—was reported to be of primary relevance. This situation contrasted with other cases studied, where local communities' difficulties to get their demands addressed by the corresponding municipal bureaucracies was reported to be a significant motivator to interact with council members. In Las Condes, two specific elements of the municipal administration were significant in these regards. First, while in other cases studied the municipal procedural rules allowed council members to channel local demands directly to local bureaucrats, in Las Condes, council members were required to channel all the demands they receive either to or the Municipal Council or the mayor himself. Due to these rules, council members in Las Condes were impeded to participate as intermediaries in the processes of solving local problems, as seen in those other cases. Second, Las Condes' municipal bureaucracy

showed high usability and capacity to address communities' demands, thus making unnecessary for these communities to look for help beyond the formal municipal channels. The present section accounts for the effect of these characteristics on the relationships between council members and local communities, while the next one will describe with more detail the most significant elements of the bureaucracy's capacity in these regards.

As the interviews reported, although some communities' demands would have been presented directly to council members, because of the municipality's hierarchical structure and the procedural rules governing it, council members could only channel those demands through the mayor or the Municipal Council. Therefore, while in other cases studied council members were able to gain constituent support by intermediating between local communities and municipal bureaucrats in the solution of local problems, that possibility was not available for council members in Las Condes. One municipal bureaucrat manifested this situation mentioning that bureaucrats did not receive community's demands through council members, and explained that the right way for council members to handle the demands they received was to channel them through the mayor. He also highlighted the discipline of the bureaucracy in following these norms:

“[Council members channel communities' demands to us] through the mayor—not them on their own because that is not adequate. And here, in this municipality [...], we are very legalist—we are rigorously devoted to the norms, and we follow them thoroughly. So, a council member can't order us to do anything. A council member can request information or cooperation. He can ask suggestions, and we can talk. But give orders? He

can't. Why? Because he must do that through the mayor" (Bureaucrat 1, Las Condes).

Similarly, one council member accounted for this situation in his answer to the question about how he addressed the demands he received from local communities. In his words:

"Generally, what I do [with demands I receive from the community] is to send an email to the mayor [...]. I do it that way because I like order and that is the right way to do this [...]. I can't start giving instructions to the personnel subordinated to the mayor—who is not under my command—and I don't want to get anyone in troubles [...]. There might be someone who may feel they are entitled [to do so], but the truth is that the hierarchy has to be respected" (Ambivalent RN Council Member 1, Las Condes).

However, even if council member were allowed to intermediate between local communities and municipal bureaucrats, Las Condes' municipal bureaucrats showed high usability and capacity to receive, channel and respond to communities' demands, thus reducing neighbors' need to contact council members to find a solution of local demands. Accounting for this situation, one local leader explained that, since the Heads of Municipal Departments are efficient in receiving and processing their demands, they prefer to contact them directly, while resorting to council members only to keep them informed:

"We have a really straightforward and friendly relationship with the Heads of the Municipal Departments [...]. I call them on the phone [and] we are in constant communication with [them] because, in the end, they are the ones who resolve the issues. So, if you have any problem, you have to take it to the head of some department to see what the problem actually is, analyze it and find the solution. And then you can go to the

council members to say [...] ‘we have presented this project (or we have made this request) [...], and you are a supervisor—that is your responsibility—please, follow up with it’” (Local Leader 1, Las Condes).

Taking this point even further, one council member highlighted that—because of the municipal bureaucracy’s capacity to receive and address local demands and local organizations efficiency in channeling them to the municipal bureaucracy—council members were regarded as *nonexistent* in Las Condes:

“Here, there are resources to address everyone’s needs and more. And this [municipal administration] might end up being, in my opinion, the most authoritative mayor in Chile, because, here, the mayor is the only one who exists. There are other actors—the council members—but they don’t exist here. They are not seen as council members, because the municipal machinery swallows them. This municipality can solve almost every single issue [without them. And] social organizations are experts in relations with the municipality. And in this municipality, everything is structured by the administration so that all the demands that can, are resolved without passing through the council members [...]. And the neighbors who are not a member in any of these organizations [...] are always in troubles because they don’t know the [municipal] structure. And, sometimes, ends up here, or somewhere else. But in general, local leaders are—and receive many incentives to be— the receptors and the ones who channel the relationship between the bureaucracy and the community” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, Las Condes).

Moreover, holding a more suspicious stance, another council member mentioned that, given the *clientelistic* relationship between local organizations and the municipal administration, it was challenging for council members to get close to these

organizations:

“What happens in Las Condes is that the neighborhood associations⁷¹ and the senior citizens’ clubs are heavily encapsulated by the municipality, and, therefore, they don’t like to get close to the candidates they don’t know. So, you have to interact with neighbors that are not in any organization [...]. Interacting only with the leadership [of these organizations] gives you a very biased vision because [...] they are in a clientelistic relationship with the municipality, so they will never bring a complaint to you—even if you are a council member from the opposition” (Skeptic PDC Council Member, Las Condes).

Consistent with these perceptions, council members’ nomination as godparents of local organizations⁷² were also reported to be difficult to implement given municipal bureaucracy’s high capacity to address communities’ demands. As one council member explained:

“I know that the parliamentarians do have a lot [of organizations they are the godparents of]. But I don’t do it. You don’t see it much of that here because it would be an excess, given what we have. Here, if people want to travel, [the municipality will provide them] the bus and the financing; if they want to do some activity, [the municipality] will finance it; if they want to do sports [the same; and so on]” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, Las Condes).

In sum, through two characteristics allowed Las Condes’ municipal bureaucracy to dominate relationships with local communities, thus making council members seem irrelevant to these communities. On the one hand, municipality’s rules requiring council members to channel all the demands they receive through or the Municipal

Council or the mayor himself reduced council members direct involvement in the resolution of the demands they may receive. On the other hand, municipal bureaucracy's usability and capacity to address local demands reduced neighbors' incentives to contact council members. Thus, unlike other cases analyzed, Las Condes' municipal administration would have significantly reduced council members' capacity to build substantive relationships with local communities—over which they could base their networks of supporters.

3.5. An Efficient Municipal Administration

So far, while council members showed a limited capacity to build and maintain an independent network of supporters, the high efficiency of Las Condes' municipal bureaucracy and, therefore, to dominate the relationship with local communities, was identified as a significant factor obstructing council members' relationship with these communities. As reported in the interviews, this high municipal efficiency was characterized by three main components: high availability of resources, a high level of municipal bureaucracy's active involvement in local communities, and a high capacity and loyalty of this bureaucracy to receive and respond to local demands. This high capacity of the municipal bureaucracy to address local demands was also a significant factor behind the preponderant figure of the mayor, who, although frequently described as authoritative, was acknowledged for his administrative capacity—rather than his charisma⁷³.

Availability of resources: Compared to other municipalities in Santiago, the municipality of Las Condes showed a remarkably high availability of resources. With an average annual municipal income of about 110 billion pesos during the period analyzed

(the term between December 6, 2012, and December 6, 2016), Las Condes was the wealthiest municipal administration in Santiago, more than quadrupling Santiago's average municipal income (around 26 billion pesos)⁷⁴. As table 16 in the Annex shows, this situation was slightly different when the size of the corresponding communes is taken into account. With an average of about 385 thousand pesos per habitant between 2013 and 2016, Las Condes was among the four wealthiest municipalities, more than doubling the city's municipal average (152 thousand pesos per habitant).

Addressing the magnitude of these resources and its implications, one council member compared Las Condes with the situation of Chilean municipalities in general, and illustrated the possibilities that this availability of resources opened for them:

“The majority of the municipalities in Chile don't have enough resources to subsist [on their own]. But that doesn't happen here. Today we have enough resources to propose [for example] the development and implementation of a tramway, [which], although it will benefit three communes, we are the only ones financing it. What I want to say is that we don't fit in the typical characterization of Chilean communes [...]. Neither are we between the ten [...] wealthiest. We are the commune with THE HIGHEST availability of resources. And we can afford mistakes—we can come up with a project, do it wrong, and do it again, and here that is not a problem” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, Las Condes)⁷⁵.

Moreover, the same council member described how this large availability of resources also allowed the municipal administration to induce their loyalty to the mayor, by handing personalized gifts to the members of a broad number of local organizations. However, these inducements were distributed following a universal rather than politicized criterion, and no signs were reported about of constituting the *quid pro quo* exchange for political support that characterizes clientelistic relationships:

“Local organizations—especially their leaders— know that at some point we are going to come to them requesting their vote, and they use that to their favor [...]. I don’t do that because, well, we already have enough of it. The municipality sends a gift in the name of the mayor to all the members of senior citizens clubs [...]. Once a year, all the all the members of senior citizens’ clubs receive a gift, which is arranged by semester: for the first semester is done in June—all the members whose birthday was during the first semester receive a gift from the mayor, financed by the municipality. All that in the name of the mayor, not the mayor and the Municipal Council. Only the mayor” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, Las Condes).

Active involvement in local communities: Beyond the presence of a Municipal Department dedicated to the relations to local communities—which is usual among Chile’s municipal administrations—two characteristics made Las Condes’ organizational disposition to work with local communities remarkable. First, the municipality’s transfer of some of its responsibilities to neighborhood associations⁷⁶, so that these organizations acted, in these regards, as an extension of the municipality. Second, the role that Las Condes’ bureaucracy assumed in organizing local communities and supporting their initiatives. As a result, the relationships between neighborhood associations and municipal administration in Las Condes highlight these associations’ formal purpose of *cooperation with state and municipal authorities* (Ley N° 19.418 1997), in a way that is unseen in the other cases analyzed, and that resembles the *administrative grassroots engagement* system described by Read (2012)⁷⁷.

However, there were no signs of a clientelistic use of municipal resources. According to the reports of both supporters and skeptics of the mayor, despite these

organizations' proximity to the municipal administration, the resources were distributed widely among local organizations—rather than following a criterion of political selection. This distribution is consistent with interviewees' usual perception of the municipality as having enough resources to address most (if not all) of local communities' demands—which is supported by the municipality's official reports of extremely high distribution of resources to local organizations. Also, there were no reports in the interviews about resources being distributed following a *reciprocal basis*—therefore, there were no signs of neighbors being required to return something to their organizations or the municipality in exchange for the resources and services they receive⁷⁸.

In two areas the municipality's transfer of responsibilities to neighborhood associations was particularly visible. First, unlike the other cases analyzed, neighborhood associations were recognized as intermediaries between local communities and the municipal bureaucracy, thus becoming an additional channel of communication between them and solving some of the common difficulties that neighbors face when interacting with these bureaucracies (as seen in the other cases analyzed). Accounting for the change in their relationship with the municipal bureaucracy introduced by the mayor, one local leader described how this new system works, and highlighted its advantages compared to the previous situation:

“Nowadays, all [the demands from the neighbors] pass through the neighborhood associations. That was something that the current mayor changed—that [every request from the neighbors] are now first made to the neighborhood association, and from these associations, the requests are made [to the municipality. So], if neighbors have any problem [...] they come here [first]. So, now we are the channelers of these demands.

[Before], you would have had to go directly to the municipality [...], and you would have been sent from [one department to another], and you ended up trapped in red tape. The change, then, was that now you come to the neighborhood association, talk with the leaders, and the leaders have to know about what department they have to direct you” (Local Leader 2, Las Condes)⁷⁹.

Second, according to the interviews, the municipality both financed some activities carried out by neighborhood associations in replacement of similar activities that were directly administrated by them and put these associations in charge of the implementation of some of their own programs. One local leader accounted for the municipality’s delegation of the administration of some initiatives describing how their program on *community libraries* worked:

“Another important detail is that all the community libraries must be administrated by the president of a neighborhood association. It is not that we have any influence on the size of resources and the supervision of how they are used, but we do are the ones who carry it out [...]. So we end up being the producers. Those are municipal resources, municipal projects, but administered—in this case—by the president of a neighborhood organization” (Local Leader 5, Las Condes)⁸⁰.

Accounting for the activities carried out by neighborhood associations in replacement of the municipal ones, one local leader explained—in general terms—how they replaced the activities organized by the municipality with those of their own, by developing workshops and activities that were proposed and carried out by these organizations, and financed by the municipality:

“Look, this is the system we have here. The thing is that there are many instructors [for workshops] in the municipality [...]. But the system works another way. It is true that

the municipality pays for the workshops anyway, but we receive the instructors that come out from here—so we can give an opportunity to young people from the community. For example, there are a lot of young people graduating from physical education. So, they come here and say, ‘I have a project, and—for example—I would like to arrange an indoor soccer championship’. Then, we request to use the stadium that is around here, I ask them to write a project [...], and we present it to the municipality. And the municipality [...] usually accepts [...]. And the instructors from the municipality [who were previously working here] are taken to a different zone of the commune” (Local Leader 2, Las Condes).

Additionally, Las Condes’ bureaucracy assumed an active role in organizing local communities and supporting their initiatives. Regarding economic support, Las Condes made a remarkably high investment on these items during the period analyzed (the term between December 6, 2012, and December 6, 2016). As table 17 in the Annex shows, the Municipality of Las Condes spent, on average, around 5.8 billion pesos every year in money transfers to finance community organizations. This amount was not only about eighteen times what the municipalities in Santiago spent on average but also over seven times the average amount spent by the municipality with the second highest expenditure. This exceptionally high expenditure remained similar when the amounts were considered in relation to the size of the communal population⁸¹.

Exemplifying what that investment meant for local organizations, one local leader described how many of their several activities are almost entirely financed by the municipality, which assigned the resources directly—i.e., without needing to bid for those resources:

“The municipality contributes with almost the totality of the resources for the [...] the sports and recreational workshops. They [also] finance all the instructors and teachers

we have [to help people in the areas of] language, math, and English. Also, the music teachers [...], and the instructor of the physical conditioning [...]. They also finance materials and supplies. There are workshops of handcrafts and decorative painting and that kind of things [...]. So, they finance almost all the workshops [because] Las Condes is the wealthiest commune in Chile, so there are enough funds for this kind of things [...]. I request [finance for] three or four additional workshops every year. I modify the spaces, so we can use the time gaps [...], and they finance the totality of those workshops” (Local Leader 5, Las Condes)⁸².

Similarly, interviews described the non-financial support local organizations received for the development of their activities, highlighting the guidance and feedback municipal bureaucrats provided for the development and improvement of the activities these organizations carried out. Accounting for the relevance of this type of support, one local leader described the feedback they received and its implications:

“Often [municipal bureaucrats] come here to supervise [the workshops]. They collect beneficiaries’ concerns and ask them whether they are satisfied with the infrastructure, the instructors, with the type of workshops, and the interaction with the leaders of the neighborhood association [...]. And they do the same with the instructors. So there is a straightforward communication [with them], and it has been very positive. Because, to be honest, we want to know what should be corrected, what is going wrong and what is going right, so we can improve and get what is best for the neighbors” (Local Leader 1, Las Condes)⁸³.

According to the interviews, this involvement of the municipal bureaucracy in local communities played a significant role in the efficacy of the municipality’s promotion of local organizations, highlighting the connection between the rise in the

levels of participation and the support these organizations receive to solve local demands. One municipal bureaucrat accounted eloquently for this role, emphasizing how the municipal administration made organizing local communities one of its priorities, and how its involvement in local problem solving was used as a mean for that purpose:

“Now we have a lot of community organizations, mainly neighborhood associations. And it is great that they are all active and with their legal paperwork up to date [...]. And they work in good coordination with us. There was a strengthening of the work we do [in this department] with the current mayor [...], who understood the work we were doing [...]. When we started, [around 12 years ago], there were 24 neighborhood associations. Now, there are more than double of that [...]. Besides, of those 24 about the half didn't have much activity. But now, we developed a work program for them [...]. We started working with the few that existed and tried to come up with programs to solve the problems they brought us [...]. Organized communities presented projects, and we financed [a part of them]. And that had a multiplying effect when [the communities realized] that their problems were being solved. [To produce that effect] we required every project to have a sign stating the name of the project, the amount provided by the municipality, and the amount provided by the community. So, the neighbors who passed by could see the works that were taking place, that they received the support of the municipality, [and] wanted to have the same in their neighborhood. [Also, sometimes] someone comes here or meet the mayor or any of the head of departments [with a public problem they want to get solved]. But we cannot do much with one neighbor alone, so we always tell them that would be good for them to organize, and we orient them [about how to do so]” (Bureaucrat 2, Las Condes).

This work and resources oriented to promote local organizations were also consistent with the available data showing a high level of participation in civic organizations in Las Condes during the period analyzed. According to CASEN 2015 survey, 28.6% of Las Condes' residents declared to participate in any civil society organization⁸⁴, while 9% declared participating primarily in territory-based organizations⁸⁵—situating this commune among the two and three with the highest level of participation in each respective measurement, within the communes from Santiago self-represented in this survey.

Bureaucratic capacity to receive and respond to local demands: During the period analyzed (the term between December 6, 2012, and December 6, 2016), Las Condes presented, on average, a relatively large and professionalized bureaucracy. With an average of about 750 bureaucrats, Las Condes' was the third largest among the municipal bureaucracies in Santiago (see table 22 in the Annex)⁸⁶. However, the size of this bureaucracy is not as impressive when it is considered in relation to the size of the local population. With about 2.6 bureaucrats per every 1,000 inhabitants, Las Condes' ratio of bureaucrats to population was almost equal to both the median and the average among Santiago's municipalities (see table 23 in the Annex)⁸⁷. Similarly, with an average of 27% of its bureaucrats holding a professional degree, Las Condes was the second most professionalized among Santiago's municipal bureaucracies with over 500 bureaucrats. When the size of the bureaucracies is not taken into account, Las Condes' level of bureaucratic professionalization was lower—although still above Santiago municipalities' average (25%) and median (24.1%)⁸⁸.

Consistent with these high levels of professionalization, municipal bureaucracy

was described in the interviews highlighting its low level of politicization and the relevance, instead, of bureaucrats' technical character, while maintaining a high loyalty to the mayor that manifested its usability. Thus, contrasting with other cases analyzed, this loyalty was not merely the result of patronage or bureaucrats' political affinities with the mayor. Instead, two other factors were reported to explain this situation. First, the long uninterrupted time in which the same party has governed Las Condes would have helped to ensure that all the key positions in the municipal administration were filled with loyal bureaucrats. Second, the hierarchical organization, reinforced with incentives and punishments, would have helped to ensure that bureaucrats are highly responsive to the heads of their departments. As one council member described:

“[With] over twenty years of administration of this mayoralty [by the same party], almost all the high-rank positions are filled with bureaucrats of unyielding loyalty. And other measures that this municipality takes to stimulate bureaucrats' commitment [...] allow ensuring that bureaucrats are accountable to their hierarchy [...]. The ones who fail to account for their job are fired very soon—and I can tell about that [...]. Here, bureaucrats are very fearful, and they have good reasons to be. They are directly affected in their pay, and very hard” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, Las Condes)⁸⁹.

These high levels of bureaucratic loyalty and professionalism, added to the unusually high availability of resources, were translated into efficient handling of communities' demands, characterized by low use of politicization and personalization as criteria for distributing resources. Providing a telling example of this situation, one local leader closer to the opposition to the mayor mentioned that, regardless of the political differences, her projects and requests have had a good reception and response from the municipal bureaucracy:

“[The projects we present to the municipality] do materialize. I mean, politically I am not close to Las Condes’ Municipal [administration]—I am rather closer to the opposition— but, talking as the president of a neighborhood association, yes, we get [the projects] done [...]. I cannot say that I’ve had a bad relationship with the municipality. Everything that I have really asked for, they have helped me” (Local Leader 2, Las Condes).

Suggesting how this situation was generalized throughout the commune, one council member mentioned that there were almost no needs left unaddressed by the municipality, highlighting the role that the availability of resources and municipal personnel played in it:

“There are neighbors to whom we provide them with education, housing, security, and health. I mean, we cover everything [...], here, we don’t lack anything. Our system is good and broad. We have professionals for everything and in the sufficient amounts—and, sometimes, more than enough [...]. Here, you can’t say to someone ‘look, come in two months and then your problem will be solved” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, Las Condes).

Complementing the bureaucracy’s professionalism and loyalty, structural arrangements and processes of the municipal administration were reported to play a significant role in its capacity to address communities’ demands. According to the interviews, for example, the presence and constant improvement of efficient mechanisms to receive, channel, process and follow up with communities’ demands were a significant contribution in these respects—as remarkably exemplified by the case of the Department of Public Security. As described in the interviews, this department extended its role beyond its sectorial delimitation, and used to receive communities’ requests (even when the municipal offices were closed), and channel them to other

departments, both through their emergency phone line and their personnel in the streets. As one bureaucrat from that department described:

“[Local communities] ask us to meet them to address problems of diverse nature—not only [public security]. They are interested in meeting us because, in the end, we are the Department with the highest visibility in the public space. So, when the neighbor sees one of our cars in the streets, he sees the Municipality on wheels. Because, if he has a problem—for example] when some trees are about to fall—he knows that, even if that car is for public security, there is a municipal bureaucrat within that vehicle who is obliged to listen to him and either handle or channel his requests. [In those cases], the bureaucrat calls the headquarters and says, ‘there is a fallen tree in this street, in front of...’. And, then, a report is open, in which [all the Departments involved are] called and sent an email—we do both [...], we have an obligation to do so [...]. And we are always, 24 hours a day in the public space, the 365 days of the year” (Bureaucrat 1, Las Condes)⁹⁰.

Accounting for the efficacy of these mechanisms and their constant improvement, one local leader described, for example, how communication technologies were recently incorporated, improving the municipality’s capacity to respond to their demands:

“Previously, the system worked by submitting letters to the Correspondence Office. So, there, you sent a letter reporting, [for example], about holes in a sidewalk, and it used to take a maximum of 15 to 20 days for them to receive, confirm, come to verify... and only then they did the repairs. Today it is much faster—you just send an email [...]. It changed about three years ago [...]. The municipality changed the system. They also implemented a [web-based system and a cellphone app] where it says: ‘communication with neighbors’. There, they give you a code [for your requests], and you submit your needs

there. If it takes longer than five days, you can re-submit the request [...]. And that [information] goes to the different departments [...], depending on the specific need [...]. So, you send the email [to the specific department, and] they verify on the field, together with us.” (Local Leader 2, Las Condes)⁹¹.

In sum, during the period analyzed Las Condes’ municipal administration showed a high capacity and usability to address local communities demands. These attributes were marked by this administration’s substantive financial resources, its strong orientation towards a direct involvement with local communities and the relatively large, professionalized and loyal bureaucracy, capable of efficiently handling the reception and response to communities’ demands. Under these circumstances, Las Condes’ municipal administration was able to reduce local communities’ incentives to resort to council members to address their demands, thus dominating the relationships with these communities, making council members seem irrelevant, and increasing their dependence on the figure of the mayor, as previously reported.

3.6. Conclusion

At first sight, Las Condes leaves us with puzzling results about horizontal accountability. Although the literature expects local horizontal accountability to be higher in contexts of high socioeconomic level (where voters are expected, for example, to be better informed, more politically aware, and have more critical knowledge to assess governments’ performance), council members in Las Condes showed a comparatively low disposition to hold the mayor accountable. Moreover, although these results are more consistent with the lower levels of party competition in this Municipality, the

information collected in the interviews suggest that party involvement in local politics is not a decisive factor. As one council member admitted, party labels were more useful to show loyalty to the mayor rather than political affiliation. How can this low disposition to hold the mayor accountable be explained, then?

The information analyzed in this chapter points at the relevance of council members' (lack of) independence from the mayor as a primary explanatory factor. Consistent with the proposition of the research, this situation was determined by the interaction of two factors—council members' constituent support, and the influence of the local executive. As the interviews revealed, council members had a low capacity to build networks of staunch supporters and, therefore, faced significant difficulties to ensure their reelection. Under these circumstances, and according to their reports, council members considered showing loyalty to the mayor as a promising strategy to obtain constituent support and, therefore, tended to withhold themselves from holding him accountable. Added to council members' general lack of history of involvement in local communities, the municipal bureaucracy played a significant role in producing this situation, both marginalizing council members from local communities, and making them dependent on the mayor. Specifically, as a result of its high availability of resources, technical capacity, loyalty, and involvement in local communities, Las Condes municipal administration was highly usable and efficient in receiving and responding to local communities' demands, thus reducing these communities' incentives for turning to council members for help. This situation was reinforced by administrative rules prohibiting bureaucrats to receive local demands channeled by council members directly to them, thus further detaching council members from local problem-solving networks, and reducing local communities' incentives to interact with them.

Therefore, the case of Las Condes highlights the *organizational advantage* that specific attributes of the municipal administration—combining resources, capacity, loyalty and procedural rules—gives to mayors over local councils, making them significantly influential in council members' capacity to build constituent support and, in consequence, allowing them to induce council members' loyalty. As this case suggests, the significant organizational attributes for this organizational advantage combine

Under these circumstances, council members may still hold a more skeptical stance towards the mayor and his administration. However, as the case of one of the RN skeptic council members illustrates, by doing so, they risk becoming unable to raise sufficient constituent support to get reelected and, in consequence, it is unlikely that they remain in office the next term.

4. Medium Horizontal Accountability: Estación Central and Quinta Normal

4.1. Characterizing Estación Central and Quinta Normal

Compared to Las Condes, Estación Central and Quinta Normal presented more socioeconomically precarious and politically competitive scenarios, which were coincidental with their similarly higher—although still moderate—levels of local horizontal accountability.

Located in the north-western sector of Santiago, the commune⁹² of Estación Central is characterized by a middle size population and medium to low socioeconomic levels. With around 150,000 habitants estimated for 2015, the population of Estación Central fell below the average (around 188,000) and close to the median (around 144,000) among Santiago's communes⁹³. Regarding its population's socioeconomic situation, Estación Central was characterized in 2015 by medium levels of income, education, and poverty. According to CASEN survey, its average households' per capita autonomous income⁹⁴, (around 75,000 pesos⁹⁵) was within a middle range, although substantively below both regional⁹⁶ and national averages (about 116,000 and 93,000 pesos⁹⁷ respectively)⁹⁸. As the same survey showed, the average years of schooling in Estación Central in the same year (10.9 years) was similarly at a medium level, although below both national and regional averages (11.0 and 11.6 years respectively)⁹⁹. Finally, the proportion of the commune's inhabitants living in poverty (6.2%) was substantively below both the regional and the national levels (9.2% and 11.7%), although still within a medium

range¹⁰⁰.

Politically, Estación Central has transitioned from clear domination from the center-left coalition *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (or simply *Concertación*) during the 1990s towards a scenario of greater competition between the left and the right since 2000. In the two municipal elections of 1992 and 1996, *Concertación* obtained above 55% of the vote, percentages that not only were well above the vote obtained by the rightist *Alianza* coalition (27% and 22%), but also allowed it to both obtain the majority of the seats in the Municipal Council (four out of seven) and elect a mayor from their own coalition¹⁰¹. Two of the remaining seats in the Municipal Council were obtained by the right and one by the Communist Party. The election of 2000 marked a turning point in this situation. Although *Concertación* obtained once again the largest share of the vote (50%) and a majority of the seats in the Municipal Council (four), it lost the mayoralty to Gustavo Hasbún—from *Unión Demócrata Independiente* (UDI)—who, with 27.2% of the vote, obtained a plurality with less than one percentile point of difference with the incumbent candidate. The following elections (2004 2008 and 2012), maintained that pattern in general terms. The UDI gained the mayoralty—reelecting Gustavo Hasbún once and electing twice the current mayor, Rodrigo Delgado—by narrow margins (between one and four points of distance). *Concertación* and the Communist Party, on the other hand, systematically obtained the majority of the seats of the Municipal Council (five), while the UDI obtained the three remaining seats¹⁰².

Adjacent to Estación Central, the less populated commune of Quinta Normal presented higher—although still moderate—socioeconomic levels. With around 115,000

habitants estimated for 2015, Quinta Normal's population fell below both Santiago's communal average and median¹⁰³. According to the CASEN survey, the commune's 2015 average households' per capita autonomous income (of about 109,000 pesos¹⁰⁴) was at a medium level, situated between the national and the regional averages¹⁰⁵. Quinta Normal's average years of schooling in 2015 (11.7) was also at a middle level—above the national average while practically meeting the regional mean¹⁰⁶. Similarly, the commune's rate of poverty that year (5.9) was at a medium level, although substantively below both the national and regional rates¹⁰⁷.

Regarding political tendencies, Quinta Normal also showed moderate to high levels of party competition. Since the return to democracy the municipal elections in this commune has been dominated by *Concertación*—and by the Christian Democratic party (PDC) within it—, obtaining about 60% of the vote in 1992 and between 48% and 55% from 1996 to 2012¹⁰⁸. This domination, however, has not impeded one candidate from the right to obtain the largest share of the vote and gain the mayoralty in two consecutive terms (elections of 1996 and 2000). Also, with between 26% and 40% of the vote since 1996, the right coalition has been able to maintain a significant minority of the seats in the Municipal Council (two out of six until 2008, and three out of eight in 2012¹⁰⁹). Within the governing coalition, the prevalence of the PDC has not translated into a majority of the Municipal Council's seats corresponding to this coalition in the recent elections. In the three municipal elections between 2000 and 2012, the PDC obtained only two seats (of the four to five corresponding to *Concertación's* parties during this period), a number matched by the *Partido por la Democracia* (PPD) in 2000 and 2004 and corresponding to a minority within the coalition in 2012.

Thus, contrasting with the case of Las Condes, both Estación Central and Quinta

Normal showed similarly middle-to-low levels of socioeconomic development and moderate-to-high levels of party competition. Moreover, both municipalities presented a similar composition in their Municipal Councils (with three from the parties of the rightist *Alianza*, four from the *Concertación* coalition and one from the Communist Party), although the political competition had a different character in each of these municipalities. While in Estación Central the mayor and the majority of council members came from opposed coalitions, in Quinta Normal the mayor and the majority of the Council came from the same political sector.

As it will be described in the following section, in both cases, the Municipal Council showed a moderate disposition to hold the mayor accountable—thus situating them between Las Condes, and Pudahuel and Providencia. What explains local horizontal accountability under these circumstances? While the higher party competition of these municipalities (when compared to Las Condes) may seem a plausible explanation, the data analyzed showed, that in both municipalities (although more clearly in Quinta Normal than in Estación Central), both supporters and detractors to the mayors were found in left and right coalitions. Thus, the higher levels of accountability could not be deduced merely from the increased number of council members from opposition parties. A second possibility would look for an explanation on the more precarious socioeconomic scenario of these communes when compared to Las Condes. Here, however, the relation with horizontal accountability is not entirely evident and, in fact, contradicts the expectations from the literature in these respects—why would council members in less privileged sectors be more willing to hold their mayors accountable?

This chapter—together with the next one, addressing the high levels of

horizontal accountability in Pudahuel and Providencia—offer a different explanation, pointing at local executives' capacity to induce council members' loyalty. The argument holds, first, that municipal bureaucracies' lack of usability and efficiency to address local communities' demands open spaces for council members to have greater involvement in these communities. In particular, the low performance of the municipal bureaucracies would increase local communities' incentives to turn to council members for help, thus increasing council members' opportunities to interact with these communities and obtain their support by taking care of the demands that the bureaucracies leave unattended. However, how council members address these demands have significant implications for their autonomy from the mayor—those relying on municipal resources to do so become electorally dependent on their mayors and, therefore, compelled to remain loyal to them. Council members who do not need to rely on municipal resources to address the demands they receive are, in turn, free from these pressures and may hold the mayor accountable without being punished for doing so.

4.2. Medium Horizontal Accountability

During the period analyzed (the term between December 6, 2012, and December 6, 2016), Estación Central's Municipal Council was formed by eight members. Three of them came from the single rightist party represented in the Council, which was also the party of the mayor (*Unión Demócrata Independiente*—UDI). The other five came from center-left parties: two from the Socialist Party (PS), one from the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), one from *Partido por la Democracia* (PPD) and one from the Communist Party (PC).

This left-right division, however, did not directly translate into a higher or lower disposition to hold the mayor accountable. With three ambivalent council members, two holding a skeptical stance, and three supporting him, the mayor was able to elicit the support of a majority in the Municipal Council when he most needed it¹¹⁰, as table 7 shows. This assessment of the Municipal Council’s disposition for horizontal accountability was obtained through the analysis of the information coming from three sources—interviews, council members appearances in national news sources, and their reports to the Comptroller General’s Office.

Table 7: Council Member’s Disposition for Horizontal Accountability in Estación Central (Appearances in News and Reports to the Comptroller General’s Office 2013-2016)

		Loyals			Ambivalents			Skeptics	
		Loyal UDI 1	Loyal UDI 2	Loyal PPD	Ambivalent UDI	Ambivalent PS	Ambivalent PDC	Skeptic PS	Skeptic PC
Appearances in News	Criticizing	0	0	0	0	4	1	6	11
	Supporting	3	1	1	1	0	2	0	0
	Neutral	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
	Ambivalent	0	0	0	0	8	2	0	0
	Total	3	1	1	1	12	5	8	12
Reports to the CGO against the executive		0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1

Source: created by the author based on news reports obtained from Chile’s *national* printed and electronic news sources and council members’ reports made to *Contraloría General de la República* (<https://www.contraloria.cl>).

According to the interviews, only two of the three UDI council members remained decidedly loyal to the mayor¹¹¹. The third one kept a more ambivalent stance. He was recognized in the interviews as close to the Communist and the skeptic Socialist council members while holding a skeptical stance toward the mayor and the other two UDI council members. However, he was reported to support the mayor in the Council’s roll-call votes usually¹¹². Similarly, only the Communist and one of the Socialist council members were systematically identified as holding a skeptical stance toward the mayor’s

administration¹¹³. The other Socialist council member was described as more ambivalent, starting with visible support to the mayor—even campaigning for him in the last elections, along with the PDC council member—and moving to a more critical stance, once she became a candidate for mayor. The PDC council member was also recognized as ambivalent, supporting the mayor in electoral campaigns and critical discussions in the Municipal Council, although aligned with the opposition in some significant occasions¹¹⁴. Finally, the PPD council member was described as loyal to the mayor and, consistent with that description, in an interview, he defended the mayor and his administration and criticized the council members who opposed him¹¹⁵.

The perceptions reported in the interviews were consistent with council members' appearances in national news sources. In 26 news reports in Chile's national newspapers and electronic news sources, council members from Estación Central appeared either criticizing (or opposing), supporting, being neutral or being ambivalent about the mayor and his administration. As table 7 shows, the two council members recognized in the interviews as opposing the mayor appeared mostly criticizing him and his administration. Similarly, no instance was found of these council members supporting either the mayor or his administration. Consistent with interviews identifying him as ambivalent, the appearances of the PDC council member had two appearances supporting the mayor, one criticizing him and two where he both blamed the mayor and assumed his responsibility in the problems addressed in the news. The ambivalent PS council member, on the other hand, appeared criticizing either the mayor or his administration in four occasions, in eight instances her appearances were coded as ambivalent¹¹⁶, and she supported the mayor in none of them. The remaining council members (the three from the right and the loyal council member from the left)

were rarely mentioned in national news sources—either one or three times—and in all of these instances they appeared supporting the mayor.

On three occasions, during the period analyzed, council members from Estación Central resorted to the Comptroller General's Office. In two of them, they reported the mayor or his administration. The first one, presented by the PC council member alone, complained about the illegality in the decision of alienating the property of Santiago's interurban bus terminal, made by the Municipal Council—with the vote of the mayor and the council members loyal to him. The second one, presented by the ambivalent PS council member alone, reported irregularities in different permits granted by the municipality, although none of them were credited as constituting an offense. The last one was presented by a mixture of opposition, ambivalent and loyal council members from the left¹⁷. Rather than reporting the mayor or his administration, council members asked the Comptroller General to declare whether the municipality is competent to address their demand for renaming a street after Víctor Jara—a famous musician, assassinated under the dictatorship.

Although Quinta Normal's mayor came from a different political party (PDC) and there was a greater party dispersion, the composition of its Municipal Council resembles that of Estación Central, with three members from the right and five from the center-left. Among those from the right, two were from the UDI and one from *Renovación Nacional* (RN). Among the Council Members from the center-left, two were from the party of the mayor (PDC), one from PPD, one from PS and one from PC.

However, similar to Estación Central, this left-right division did not directly translate into a higher or lower disposition to hold the mayor accountable. As table 8

shows, by obtaining the loyalty of two council members from the right, the mayor kept the loyalty of a slight majority in the Municipal Council (five of the eight), despite the skeptical stance of two of the council members from her political coalition. This assessment of the Municipal Council’s disposition for horizontal accountability was obtained through the analysis of the information coming from three sources—interviews, council members appearances in national news sources, and their reports to the Comptroller General’s Office.

Table 8: Council Member’s Disposition for Horizontal Accountability in Quinta Normal (Appearances in News and Reports to the Comptroller General’s Office 2013-2016)

		Loyals					Skeptics		
		Loyal PDC 1	Loyal PDC 2	Loyal UDI 1	Loyal UDI 2	Loyal PC	Skeptic PS	Skeptic PPD	Skeptic RN
Appearances in News	Criticizing	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
	Supporting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Neutral	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Ambivalent	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0
Reports to the CGO against the executive		0	0	0	0	0	0	4	5

Source: created by the author based on news reports obtained from Chile’s *national* printed and electronic news sources and council members’ reports made to *Contraloría General de la República* (<https://www.contraloria.cl>).

Among the three council members from the right, the two from the UDI were consistently identified in the interviews as loyal to the mayor—described as personally close to her and as council members, she relied on to approve ambitious proposals. Among the council members from the center-left, the interviews consistently identified the two PDC, along with the Communist council members, as loyal to the mayor, not only voting with her in Council’s roll-call votes but also shielding her against other

council members' attempts to hold her accountable¹¹⁸. On the other hand, the RN council member was identified as a critic of the mayor and her administration, consistently holding an opposition stance. Similarly, the PS and the PPD council members were identified as sharp critics of the mayor and her administration, impressions that both of them ratified in the interviews, mentioning, voting against her proposals, attempts to audit her, and heated public quarrels with her and the council members loyal to her¹¹⁹.

Unlike the other municipalities studied, the analysis of news reports provides little information about council members disposition to hold the mayor accountable. In only five occasions Chile's council members from Quinta Normal appeared in national newspapers and electronic news sources manifesting their opinions or perceptions about the mayor and her administration. All of them refer to the PS council member, who was also a national figure, given her participation as a leader of the 2006 high school students' movement. In three of these reports mentions exclusively her intentions to compete in primary elections for the mayoralty of Quinta Normal¹²⁰, and in two she criticized the mayor.

Seven reports against either Quinta Normal's mayor or her administration were submitted to the Comptroller General's Office by council members during the period analyzed (the term between December 6, 2012, and December 6, 2016). All of them were presented, in equal numbers, by either the PPD or the RN council members, who on one of these occasions submitted a report together. These reports addressed irregularities of diverse types, most notably among them, irregularities in public bids and the administration of human resources (including hiring, firing and inadequate economic compensation for overtime work). Additionally, the RN council member

reported against one of the PDC council members for conflict of interests in decisions related to public education, which, however, was dismissed by the Comptroller General's Office.

Thus, in both cases, the Municipal Council showed a moderate disposition to hold the mayor accountable, either as a consequence of an extended ambivalence in this respect (in Estación Central) or as a consequence of a highly critical stance in a significant minority of the Council—despite the loyalty of members of the opposition parties (in Quinta Normal). In both municipalities, it is noteworthy that critics and supporters are found in both coalitions—particularly visible in the case of Quinta Normal, where strong critics and supporters are found in both coalitions, while in Estación Central there is one council member from the mayor's party who kept an ambivalent stance. Thus, council members' loyalty to their mayors and their disposition to hold them accountable did not merely follow partisan lines, contrasting with the case of Las Condes, where a majority of council members from the coalition of the mayor coincided with (although not explained) the staunch loyalty that the mayor received from them.

How, then, can we explain these moderate levels of local horizontal accountability? This chapter argues that three elements are relevant considering to answer this question. First, the municipal administrations in these cases faced critical weaknesses, thus making unavailable what explained the low levels of horizontal accountability in Las Condes. Second, despite these weaknesses, the mayors were still able to elicit the loyalty of some council members, exchanging it for access to municipal resources council members could use to address the local demands they receive and,

therefore, increase their popular support. Most significantly, these council members were allowed to channel the demands they receive directly to municipal bureaucrats, thus becoming intermediaries between local communities and the municipal bureaucracy. Third, some other council members were, however, able escape from the influence of the mayors and maintain a skeptical stance towards them, most significantly by pulling resources from other sources to address the local demands they receive and, therefore, becoming electorally independent from the mayors.

4.3. Municipality-Community Relations

As the case of Las Condes suggested, municipalities that have funds, personnel adequately trained and loyal to the mayor, and an orientation to work with local communities, tend to be highly usable and efficient in attending communities' demands. By doing so, they may, first, reduce these communities' incentives to turn to council members for help, and second, increase mayors' influence on voters' electoral decisions. Therefore, these practices would limit council members' ability to create and maintain an independent network of supporters.

Estación Central and Quinta Normal illustrate the opposite case scenario. In the context of local communities perceived as highly demanding and scarce municipal resources, the corresponding municipal bureaucracies showed significant limitations to relate with the local communities actively, and to receive, channel and respond to their demands. In consequence, as the following sections suggest, local communities tended to turn to council members for help, most commonly when they either faced problems in their interaction with municipal bureaucrats; when they needed to contact some municipal bureaucrat but did not know precisely who; or had a need or demand they knew would

be better addressed by council members than the bureaucracy.

Availability of resources: Compared to other municipalities in Santiago, during the period analyzed (the term between December 6, 2012, and December 6, 2016) Estación Central and Quinta Normal showed medium to low levels of income. As table 15 in the Annex shows, both municipalities' average annual income fell substantively below the average of all municipalities of Santiago. The situation, however, was more severe for Quinta Normal, whose average annual municipal income (about 9.5 billion pesos) was about the half of Estación Central's (about 17.5 billion pesos), situating it among the six poorest municipal administration of the city, while Estación Central's income was still slightly above the city's municipal median (about 16.8 billion pesos)¹²¹. This situation remained similar for both municipalities when considering their respective per habitant municipal income, where both municipalities fell substantively below Santiago's average—although, while Quinta Normal was among Santiago's poorest, Estación Central remained above the median (see table 16 in the Annex).¹²²

Active involvement in local communities: Both municipal administrations manifested an interest in being active promoters of positive interactions with local communities. However, the interviews and external data revealed significant deficiencies in the teams dedicated to doing that work, which, added low levels of funding destined to promote local organizations, coincided with the low levels of community participation in these instances.

In both municipal administrations, this interest in promoting a positive interaction with local communities was translated into the developing of territory teams

oriented to make more efficient the assistance to local communities. These teams were specifically oriented towards attending local communities' demands, organizing these communities and connecting them with the different departments of the Municipality. Illustrating this disposition, the head of Quinta Normal's Office of Community Organizations, for example, described this office's duties highlighting the orientation towards organizing local communities, attending their needs, and promoting participation:

“[Here] we work with organized communities, according to the participation guidelines indicated in the Law. [One of the things we do] is related to the legal advice to community organizations and mediations that territories may require because of conflicts between neighbors, and that type of things. [Another line of work] has to do with promoting participatory processes, as well as helping organizations to develop their processes of self-management and training. [We also do] roundtables [...] the idea here is that we, apart from inviting local leaders, we invite single neighbors. [We also] receive demands. For example, when we delivered the trash containers, we coordinated meetings to explain [how to use them], and spontaneously other demands emerged, like the trimming of the trees or the lack of security” (Bureaucrat 1, Quinta Normal)¹²³.

However, as the interviews reported, these teams suffer from serious deficiencies related to the limited personnel, the low availability resources¹²⁴, and the inefficiency of their work. One local leader from Estación Central exemplified the inefficiencies of territory bureaucrats' work, describing how she ended up doing these bureaucrats' job:

“Let me give you the example of the meeting [...] called ‘How would you like to improve your commune?’. [The bureaucrats were supposed to] come here to hand a brochure. They did it for one single sector, and it was me the one who did the job for the

other ones. So, I told the Territory Coordinator of this sector: ‘you know what? [...] we are the Fourth Zone, and you didn’t deliver the information to the Carrera and the Edwards sectors. And what happens then with the opinion of the people from Carrera and Edwards, when they have more relevant problems than [us]?’ So, what did I do? I did the hard work, I knocked on door after door, and here we got over 70 neighbors for our meeting” (Local Leader 5, Estación Central).

Additionally—and consistent with their tight financial situation—compared to other municipalities in Santiago, Estación Central and Quinta Normal allocated only low to moderate monetary resources to the development of local organizations during the period analyzed (the term between December 6, 2012, and December 6, 2016). As table 17 in the Annex shows, the Municipality of Estación Central spent, on average, approximately 80 million pesos every year in money transfers to finance local organizations. Although this amount left Estación Central right on the median (about 80 million pesos), it was significantly below the average (nearly 320 million pesos) among Santiago’s municipalities. This expenditure remained at a comparatively middle level when it is considered in relation to the size of the communal populations (see table 18 in the Annex)¹²⁵.

The Municipality of Quinta Normal did not report any information about their money transfers to the private sector to finance local organizations during the period analyzed¹²⁶. Thus, the records of Chile’s Ministry of Finance about Municipalities’ transfers of public funds to private organizations were used, instead, to account Quinta Normal’s situation in these regards¹²⁷. As table 19 in the Annex shows, during the period analyzed Quinta Normal reported a yearly average of about 63 million pesos in money transfers to private organizations. This average was one of the five lowest in among the

31 municipalities of Santiago that reported information in this respect, far from Santiago's municipal average (about 4.4 billion pesos) and median (about 1.6 billion pesos). The situation remained similar when the amounts transferred were considered in relation to the size of the communal populations (see table 20 in the Annex).

Consistent with these deficiencies and limitations, the neighbors of these communes declared low participation in civil society organizations. Compared to the other municipalities in Santiago self-represented in CASEN 2015, a relatively small proportion of the population of Estación Central and Quinta Normal declared to participate in civil society organizations of any type (18.3% and 16.6%, respectively)¹²⁸. Similarly, only a low proportion of the neighbors of these communes declared to participate primarily in territory-based organizations—4.3% and 5.2%, respectively, situating these communes among the six with the lowest proportion of participation (see table 21 in the Annex)¹²⁹.

Bureaucratic capacity to receive and respond to communities demands:

During the period analyzed (the term between December 6, 2012, and December 6, 2016) both municipalities presented significant limitations in their usability and capacity to receive and respond to communities demands. Most important among them, these bureaucracies showed low levels of professionalization, problems of loyalty within the bureaucracy leading to patronage, and problems in handling human resources. Consistent with these limitations, interviews reported significant deficiencies in the distribution of municipal resources.

During the period analyzed, Quinta Normal and Estación Central had medium size bureaucracies, compared to the other municipalities in Santiago, and both

considering the raw number of bureaucrats and ratio of bureaucrats to the respective communal population¹³⁰. These bureaucracies, however, had comparatively low levels of professionalization, as SINIM¹³¹ reported. With averages of around 18% (Estación Central) and 17% (Quinta Normal) of municipal bureaucrats holding a professional degree, these municipal administrations were among the five least professionalized of all Santiago's municipalities, and the least professionalized of their respective size groups (see table 24 in the Annex)¹³².

Accounting for the implications of these low levels of professionalization in practice, in both municipal administrations, interviews highlighted the lack of skilled bureaucrats as one of their significant challenges. As one council member and former municipal bureaucrat from Estación Central, for example, described:

"I arrived in a team where there were ten bureaucrats. Of those ten, the one who was best trained was a sound technician. The majority of the rest had not even finished high school. So, we were not working under conditions that allowed us to do a good job. We lacked professionals" (Ambivalent UDI Council Member, Estación Central).

Two interrelated issues reinforced the low levels of professionalization and the effects on these bureaucracies' capacity to address local demands: bureaucrats' loyalty to the mayor and patronage. As the interviews suggest, bureaucrats' loyalty to the mayor, although recognized as a critical factor for the efficiency of the municipal administration¹³³, could not be given for granted, and was acquired by exchanging it for positions in the municipal administration. This patronage, however, increased the probabilities of hiring bureaucrats who didn't have the skills required for the corresponding positions. As one council member and former municipal bureaucrat from Estación Central described, when asked about why the municipality hires bureaucrats

that lack skills for their job:

“I think that there is a political issue [in hiring bureaucrats with low skills]. For example, there is a person here that, as a way to thank him for his help in the electoral campaign, he offered them a job in the municipality” (Ambivalent UDI Council Member, Estación Central).

Accounting for the similar situation in Quinta Normal, a former bureaucrat and former council member illustrated this point by mentioning how, according to his impression, many municipal bureaucrats were not suited for the job they did, and highlighting the role of patronage in it:

“[The municipal bureaucrats] are people who don’t have any preparation to be in their positions but got there because of political favors; people who wouldn’t have a chance to work in any other place. So, they are people who are going to defend their position, because if they are fired, they die, they would be unemployed” (Bureaucrat 4, Quinta Normal)¹³⁴.

Complementarily, interviews manifested municipal bureaucrats’ need to make explicit their loyalty to the mayor. Providing an eloquent example of this need, one municipal bureaucrat described how signaling the loyalty to the mayor by becoming a member of her party was essential to keep her job in the municipality:

“I joined the Christian Democratic party here, [working in the municipality] because it is instrumental to me. [Being a member of the party gives you] better chances to keep the job. Because then, you are clearly working—and will keep working—for the mayor and support the administration that she leads [...]. It would be different if here were working someone who is not supporting the administration, [because] they could do a bad job on purpose [to harm the administration]” (Bureaucrat 3, Quinta Normal)¹³⁵.

In both municipalities, these issues—reinforced by others derived from the general lack of resources, for example, the poor working conditions for bureaucrats¹³⁶—were translated into deficiencies in local bureaucracies' capacity to respond to communities demands. These included particularly inefficiency, and personalization and politicization in the distribution of resources. One council member in Estación Central, for example, described how bureaucrats' lack of skills and personal problems were related to the poor responses they give to communities' demands:

“Many of the bureaucrats have economic problems [...], and they lack tools and training. But, in the end, they are the first visible face of the municipality. They receive many problems in the day-by-day, they have to hear people's problems and face people's problems and their own problems. There, we have some moments of catharsis, when the bureaucrats have people [complaining] to them, and [they are so overwhelmed that] they only want to send the municipality to hell” (Ambivalent UDI Council Member, Estación Central).

Similarly, accounting for a usual experience among the local leaders interviewed, one of them described how difficult it was to get municipal bureaucrats to provide solutions to their demands, even when the mayor was directly involved in the conversations:

“It is incredible how hard it is to get to the right bureaucrats to solve the problems. ‘No, come here, go there...’ And in the end, the only one who can make the decisions is one specific person. But to get there, you have to make a long round [...]. We are very insistent because it is the only way to achieve something. And that is what we tell people: ‘go, go, go, and be a nuisance for them. Otherwise, you are not going to achieve anything. [Also, the mayor seems to be] surrounded by the wrong people. She is poorly advised or receives

poor management [from her personnel]. We have had meetings with her, and she is not aware of what is going on. The last time we met with her, many issues were left unresolved. It has been about one year since then, and we haven't received any response yet" (Local Leader 2, Quinta Normal)¹³⁷.

In this context, neighbors who developed close relationships with municipal bureaucrats were reported to get better responses from municipal bureaucrats, thus accounting for personalization in the distribution of resources. One local leader exemplified this situation, describing how her close relationship with the municipal bureaucrats helped her to get her community's problems attended:

"[...] The way in which some heads of municipal departments greet us attracts people's attention because they don't treat all local leaders the same way [...]. We have their phone numbers, and we tell them 'hey, we have this or that problem' [...]. Moreover, once, there was [a benefit] that did not correspond to us, but we called [them] anyway and they got it for us" (Local Leader 2, Quinta Normal)¹³⁸.

Alternatively, and consistent with the politicization of relations within the municipality, the distribution of resources would have followed a political criterion. While patronage was reported to be one manifestation of this politicized distribution of resources—eliciting local leaders' support to the mayor¹³⁹—distributing resources to benefit local organizations that were loyal to the mayor and punish those who were not was reported to be another one. Providing examples of the latter, one local leader in Estación Central described how the municipality used to divide neighborhood associations¹⁴⁰ (a practice reported to be common in both Estación Central and Quinta Normal) to separate loyal and disloyal neighbors and reward only the loyal ones. Also, he described how a local organization was denied a previously promised benefit for

failing to support the mayor:

“In Santiago slum, there are six [neighborhood associations], and they are divided ideologically. Estación Central’s mayor has been a master in [doing that] because he cannot have THE Santiago slum neighborhood association because most of the people there are from the left. So, he sends people to organize another neighborhood association, with 25 or 30 persons, and so they divide further and further the neighbors. Then, they play the game of ‘whom I will benefit more’, and the smaller ones that are loyal to him receive [many benefits] while denying salt and water to the other ones [...]. After the last election, they owed a senior citizens organization some wheelchairs they promised them. But when they went to the mayor to ask for them, he answered that he wouldn’t do it, because they were ungrateful and disloyal. Because someone leaked that the members of that organization voted for [the PC candidate for mayor]” (Local Leader 3, Estación Central).

Complementing these perceptions, one local leader close to Estación Central’s mayor suggested that her capacity to obtain benefits from the municipality would be reduced if she failed to manifest her loyalty to the mayor. Specifically, after manifesting that her excellent relationship with the mayor made it easier for her to get her association’s problems attended, she told how municipal bureaucrats reprehended her for having banners suggesting that they received help from a parliamentarian from an opposition party:

“When the mayor and his chief of staff saw [these banners] they freak out. At that same time, I was organizing an activity [for which I needed the help of the municipality]. So, I went to the Mayor’s Office [to ask for the things I needed], and the chief of staff said: ‘Yes, ok. [But] I wanted to have a word with you because I saw the banners announcing your community health center [with the name of the opposition member of parliament]’.

So, those banners brought me many problems with the mayor, because he's been very generous to me” (Local Leader 5, Estación Central).

In sum, during the period analyzed both municipal bureaucracies showed comparatively low levels of finance, a limited capacity to involve actively with local communities and severe deficiencies in their usability and capacity to receive and respond to communities' demands. Under these circumstances, the municipal administrations had a low capacity to isolate council members from local communities or make them seem irrelevant to them, as seen in Las Condes. Instead, as the following section will argue, these communities frequently turned to council members for help—especially when the bureaucracies were unable to attend or respond to their demands—actually transforming these interactions into informal institutions.

4.4. Council Members as Problem Solvers

Council members in Estación Central and Quinta Normal were able to compensate, to some extent, the deficiencies of their municipal bureaucracies in addressing communities demands. Specifically, council members were able to receive demands from these communities, and either address them themselves, relying on their own resources, or channel them through the corresponding municipal bureaucrats (which, unlike Las Condes, was permitted in these municipalities). According to council members in both municipalities, a significant part of what they did as council members were dedicated to these occupations—thus becoming a crucial part of their duties¹⁴¹, which emerged out of the severe needs of these communities¹⁴² and the failures of the municipal administration to address them¹⁴³. As the next chapter will show, this

situation is similar to that of council members in Pudahuel, although different from that of those in Providencia and Las Condes.

However, beyond the significant space they took among council members duties, this involvement in local problem-solving was recognized as an unofficial requirement of council members' position, thus becoming an *informal institution*—i.e., a rule that was “*created, communicated and enforced outside the officially sanctioned channels*” (Helmke & Levitsky 2004, 725). Apart from the expectations associated with it, two sources of enforcement of this requirement were identified in the interviews. On the one hand, council members' ability to address communities' demands was taken by voters as a prominent indicator of who deserved to be a council member and who did not. Correspondingly, council members' reputation, access to local organizations, and the electoral support they received from their constituents were affected by it. On the other hand, council members reinforced these transactions privileging the neighbors and organizations who support them, while refusing to help those who failed to reciprocate as they expected.

Insofar as council members' role as local problem-solvers was thus enforced, using their electoral possibilities as mechanisms of reward and punishment, it acquired a *clientelistic* character, given the conditional exchange of targeted excludable benefits or goods for political support¹⁴⁴ that result from these interactions. However, while council members' enforcement of these transactions reflects the traditional understanding of clientelism, where politicians are the ones in control of these relationships¹⁴⁵, local communities' enforcement constitutes an inversion in this understanding of clientelism, leaving these communities—and not politicians—in control of the relationships.

In these clientelistic relationships, local organizations play a significant role, especially given their capacity to transform their members into *reliable voters* for local politicians and to form collective relationships of loyalty with them. In these respects, it is significant, first, local leaders' influence on the members of their organizations (mobilizing them and suggesting them whom to vote), and their condition as *gatekeepers* of their organizations, thus enabling or impeding council members to meet with the members of their organizations to incentivize their vote. Second, local organizations' possibility to form relationships of mutual collaboration with council members, usually formalized under figure of *godparenthood (apadrinamiento)*¹⁴⁶— a practice in which local organizations, nominate local authorities as their godparent to make explicit a relationship of mutual cooperation and loyalty with them, usually translated into a preferential treatment between the organization and the authority. Finally, the emphasis on council members' role as problem-solvers had two main effects on the accountability relations within these Municipal Councils. First, as the quotes throughout this section suggest, it gives incentives for council members to relegate their role as supervisors of the mayors to a second priority. Second, as the following sections will argue, council members' involvement in local problem-solving increased mayors' influence over them, particularly when they addressed communities' demands through the municipal bureaucracies.

Expectations: As reported in the interviews, providing solutions to concrete local problems was the primary function voters expected from council members—an expectation that clashed with council members' official description of duties, and left them at a dilemma about how to do their job. Two council members accounted

eloquently for this situation. The first one, from Estación Central, described how his dedication to problem-solving marginalized his official duties, how this informal role was a motive of pride among council members, and how there was a sense of duty around these practices:

“The institution of the council member has become very blurry. [My duties, as described in the law], correspond to about the ten percent of the things I do as a council member, which has to do more with help neighbors to obtain some benefits, and articulate specific demands they may have [...]. These other practices are institutionalized, although not regulated: for example, here, some people brag for being ‘the council members of bingos’, as if it were the role of council members to satisfy those type of [demands]. But we also have a sense responsibility there: if we went once to seek the vote [to one neighborhood, we have to] respond to these people in this way too: with some logistical support of some kind or through prizes for bingos... That doesn’t correspond to what our responsibilities are, but many brag here about their work as social problem solvers” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Estación Central).

Going one step further, one council member from Quinta Normal accounted not only for the existence of a dual conception of council members’ role tied to communities’ expectations (under the labels of an *academic* and a *social* understanding of their role), but also for how not conforming to these expectations can harm their chances to be reelected:

“Saying ‘no’ [as an answer to local communities’ demands] doesn’t work as an explanation. If you say: ‘no, I don’t have the money’, that electorate died for you. So, they put you [...] in a dilemma in which you first have to try to resolve the problems they have. Because sometimes they actually are terrible problems, but also because you cannot afford

to stay out of the resolution of their quotidian problems. Because what people want from their local authority is to resolve those problems: that they got bitten by a dog, that the water or the electricity bills, [and all these] domestic problems. One could actually [try to] stay out of this and say: 'hey, I'm not here to do this', but that would be an academic understanding of our job and not a social understanding of what people expect from us. And, in the end, the ones mandating council members' position are the citizens, the people who vote for us, not the law. And those are the people who in the next election is going to say whether you had a good or bad performance. But according to their standards, not according to the manuals saying what you should do" (Loyal PDC Council Member 1, Quinta Normal)¹⁴⁷.

Local communities' enforcement: As the last quote suggests, council members' role as local problem solvers was enforced by local communities, in ways that affected council members' chances to be reelected. Specifically, these communities either rewarded council members' positive response to their demands with loyalty (expressed in voting, campaigning support, endorsement, and access to local organizations) or punished their failure to do so by denying this loyalty and damaging their reputation¹⁴⁸. Moreover, although in both communes the interviews reported pockets of strong partisan support¹⁴⁹, successful involvement in local problem-solving was reported to be the most prominent criteria defining local electorates' political support¹⁵⁰. In this context, in both communes, local leaders were reported to play a significant role, both as gate-keepers of their organizations and by influencing their communities' electoral decisions. As one council member from Estación Central explained:

Local leaders are also gate-keepers: they open the doors [of their organizations] for you to meet more people, and the more people you meet, the more possible it is that more people will adhere to you [...]. The more hands you shake, the more votes you get [...]. So, they give you that possibility of opening the doors, and they endow you with their capital, their reputation [in front of their communities], if you fulfill some requirements, they think are important [like solving their demands]" (Skeptic PS Council Member, Estación Central)¹⁵¹.

Providing a concrete example about how local leaders used their support and loyalty to council members to reward the help they received, one council member from Estación Central described how a local leader publicly endorsed him because of the support he gave to that leader's organization, highlighting how that meant a high loyalty commitment:

"For example, there was [an event] that some council members and the mayor attended to. And [the local leader inaugurating the event] said 'I want to thank the cooperation of the mayor [...] and to these council members too but, above all, I want to thank [Loyal UDI Council Member 1] because he is the one who really made all this possible' [...]. People notice that [...] and now everyone knows that that organization is mine. [Other council members] can go there and waste their shots if they want, but it is only going to be a waste" (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Estación Central)¹⁵².

In addition to rewarding council members for their help, local leaders were reported to penalize council members who failed to help them in the way they expected. In addition to direct manifestations of disapproval¹⁵³, these penalizations commonly included attempts to harm council members' reputation and denying or obstructing their access to local organizations they represent. One council member from Quinta

Normal, for example, explained how local leaders harmed their reputation when they failed to cooperate, highlighting how the punishment for not giving could be more relevant than the reward for doing it:

“[...] When you give, [people] might not say ‘hey, thank you very much’. But if you don’t give, they will slander you [...] If you don’t give, you will have [people saying] ‘hey, see how this cheap council member didn’t even give me a glass [as a prize for a bingo]’. And then they tell that to everyone [...]. Actually, they even gossip with us: ‘I went to [this council member’s] office because he promised to give us [some food], but there was nobody there’ [...]. And they tell the same thing to their neighborhood associations¹⁵⁴, their families...” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Quinta Normal)¹⁵⁵.

Consistent with their role of gate-keepers, local leaders were also reported to block the entrance to their organizations to council members who did not support them. As one council member from Estación Central exemplified:

“There are local leaders, for example, who don’t invite some council members [...]. They block them the entrance. [They do it] through the invitations, or when they are doing activities. For example, one neighborhood association is going to celebrate its anniversary and only invite the ones they think have supported them. They don’t expand the invitations beyond that” (Loyal PPD Council Member, Estación Central)¹⁵⁶.

According to the interviews, these clientelistic exchanges of support and loyalty for help had significant electoral consequences for council members. As, for example, one council member from Quinta Normal explained, there was a high probability of being electorally supported as a result of those actions, even if they were not able to say, at the individual level, who voted for them:

“If I go to the local organizations and do all these things, I most probably will ask

them later to vote for me, and they are going to vote for me. So, it will pay-off. I won't have absolute certainty, but most probably [...]. At least half of them are going to vote for me" (Skeptic PPD Council Member, Quinta Normal).

Consistent with that situation, interviews also reported that it was not uncommon to find loyalties crosscutting political parties among these electorates, thus implying the low relevance of political parties at the local level in these communes—which is consistent, for example, with the recent inroads of the UDI in Estación Central. As one council member from Estación Central explained:

"Here you cannot ask for anything else than crossed vote. It is unbelievable. Here you can find anything. For example [you ask] 'whom you voted for?', [and they answer] 'for Mayor Delgado and [the PC council member]' [...]. And also, the other way around [...] I got many votes in a leftist neighborhood, where the [most voted candidate] for mayor was [the PC candidate], but for council member, it was me" (Loyal UDI Council Member 2, Estación Central)¹⁵⁷.

Council members' enforcement: Council members reinforced this exchange of help for political support through two mechanisms. On the one hand, council members reported privileging neighbors and leaders they recognized as supporters when distributing resources. On the other hand, council members were reported to punish (or threaten to punish) neighbors and leaders who refused to support them. Accounting for the preferential treatment that organizations closer to them have, one council member from Estación Central described how the organizations that had supported her—and especially the ones she is the godmother of—were the first ones she benefited:

“If one day you tell me: ‘Look, here I have a truck full of [some good] for you to distribute’ [...], I won’t take it to the neighborhood association N° 7 [whose leader has been in all the parties and asks all the council members for help]. But I will be happy to take it to the neighborhood association N° 15. Because [they support me] and I know that, if they gave me something, I have to give them something back whenever I have the chance [...]. And the leaders [are relevant], because they are going to carry at least ten persons they influence. [Also, council members] have their own organizations, the ones they are the godparent of, and one try them to be not too many because otherwise, you won’t have the time nor the resources [to serve them]” (Loyal UDI Council Member 2, Estación Central)¹⁵⁸.

As interviewees described, council members also punished leaders who refused to support them, by either directly affecting their access to resources or affecting their relationships with other authorities. One council member from Estación Central, for example, described how he would push to revoke the benefits these organizations receive from the municipality (in the quote, the support organizations receive to maintain a space for their activities), in response to local leaders attempts to exclude him from their organizations:

“All council members work with a group of strong supporters [in the community], but I don’t care about that. Actually, if I go to their offices, they cannot deny me the entrance. That is the law. And if anyone dares to tell me ‘you have to leave’, I’ll revoke the subsidies they receive for these offices [...], I will push in the Council’s meetings to revoke the gratuitous loan they have” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Estación Central)¹⁵⁹.

Similarly, one local leader from Estación Central described how one council member threatened to harm her relationship with the mayor because she tried to

impede him to use his name in a bingo she was organizing:

“I ran into [the PDC council member] because of a bingo that, although I was organizing it, someone else asked him to provide the amplification system. And I said ‘Ok, no problem, it is just the amplification’. But then he came with a raffle box with his face, with the bingo cards, and all that stuff, saying [his name]. And I then tell him ‘hey, stop it there. I am the one organizing the bingo, I have my raffle box and my bingo cards, so you have to take yours away’ [...]. And then we had a strong argument. And he said ‘you want the favor of the mayor. Well, I am close to the mayor, and I’m going to tell him what you are doing here’” (Local Leader 2, Estación Central).

Effect on local horizontal accountability: Thus, while compensating bureaucracies’ deficiencies in addressing communities’ demands, council members’ involvement in local problem-solving became an unofficial requirement of their position, with specific expectations associated to it and enforced by both local communities and council members resulting, therefore, in clientelistic relationships.

Additionally, these unofficial requirements gave council members incentives to relegate their official duties to a second priority and, therefore, disregard their role as the supervisors of the mayors. As the first quotes in this section suggest, this *social* dimension of their role was not only a motive of pride among council members but also an important factor determining their future electoral success. In consequence, to the detriment of the *official* dimension of their role, it ended up consuming most of the time council members dedicated to their duties and reached a higher level of priority. One council member from Estación Central most clearly illustrated these incentives, manifesting how he prefer to work directly with local communities than supervise or

criticize:

“I could take all those letters [of neighbors telling about their problems], make a list and present them in Council’s meetings [...]: ‘hey, in this neighborhood the sewage system is clogged up; in this other neighborhood [the municipality] hasn’t done this or that’ [...]. What I do, instead, is with the neighbors, ask for the authorizations and solve these problems ourselves [...]. So, while everyone else around here come complaining about this and that, if you look at the [Council meetings]’ records, you will see that I don’t speak in those meetings. I speak in the neighborhood [...]. I work the other way around [...]: I respond for myself, and I don’t criticize those from the other side” (Loyal PPD Council Member, Estación Central)¹⁶⁰.

4.5. Ways of Solving Problems: I. Intermediating for Municipal Resources

How council members addressed communities’ demands can be categorized into three main types, according to the source of the resources they used for this purpose. Under the first category (analyzed in this section), council members relied on municipal resources and, therefore, acted as intermediaries between local communities and the municipal bureaucracies, channeling the demands they receive directly to bureaucrats. Under the second (analyzed in the next section), council members resorted to time, knowledge or material resources coming either from the council members themselves or their personal networks. Under a third—hybrid—category (analyzed in the next section), council members who cultivated strong friendship relationships with municipal bureaucrats were able to resort to municipal resources as if they came from

these council members' personal networks. This section and the next one argue that these distinctions have significant implications for council members' independence from their mayors and, therefore, their ability to hold them accountable. Focusing on council members relying on municipal resources, the present section shows how municipal bureaucrats' disposition to grant council members access to municipal resources depended, to a significant extent, on the latter's loyalty to the mayors, thus making them susceptible to be influenced by their mayors. The next section, on the other hand, analyzes how it was possible for some council members to address the demands they receive without relying on municipal resources, thus escaping to the influence of the mayor.

As the interviews reported, council members loyal to their mayors were able to address the local demands they received by intermediating between them and the municipal bureaucracies, which, unlike the case of Las Condes, was permitted in these municipalities. Specifically, through these intermediations council members either allowed these communities access to public goods and services otherwise they would not obtain, speeded up procedures within the municipality or got better attention from municipal bureaucrats¹⁶¹, or obtained access to municipal equipment for their self-help initiatives¹⁶².

Similar to Las Condes, council members in these communes were reported to lack the authority to give orders to municipal bureaucrats. Therefore, their intermediation efforts corresponded to an informal procedure that required bureaucrats' disposition to cooperate. One council member from Quinta Normal, while describing how they were able to give neighbors access to public goods, emphasized their incapacity to give orders

to municipal bureaucrats—even when bureaucracy’s limitations to attend neighbors were the reason why neighbors end up resorting to them:

“For example, Mrs. María comes at 10 am on a Friday to ask for groceries because she doesn’t have anything to eat. [...] So, she gets to the municipality and here and the bureaucrats say to her: ‘no, we were receiving people only until 9 am’. [...] She already asked her [family and friends] for help, and she still doesn’t have anything to eat over the weekend. So, she ends up in one of the council members’ office. And what many times we end up doing is calling the Head of the Social Department to say, ‘I have Mrs. María here, and she is in a very complicated situation, can you please attend her and see whether there is any possibility to help her [...]?’ And, thus, the Head of the Social Department accepts the petition. I want to insist: this is not an order, because we [the council members] cannot give orders” (Loyal PDC Council Member 2, Quinta Normal).

Similarly, while describing how receiving and channeling communities demands as a central part of their duties, two collaborators of a council member from Estación Central explained that their contacts in the bureaucracy and their extensive knowledge about the municipality were essential resources to obtain affirmative and prompt answers from municipal bureaucrats:

Collaborator 1: “My job is, first, to receive people who come here, to the [council member’s] office. I receive them and, more or less, I orient them about how to handle municipal errands. And if I can help them by accompanying them, I do that [...]. If the solution requires tools I don’t have, then [Collaborator 2] intervenes. He has the capacity to handle all the errands very efficiently because he has all the necessary contacts [in the municipality] and he knows from head to toe the municipal system in terms of requirements and processes”.

Collaborator 2: “And I know the people who are working in every department. So, I go with the neighbor and [tell the bureaucrats] ‘I need you to help this person with this, this and that’. If they say ‘fine, but this takes a long time’ [I tell them back] ‘no, don’t give me that, I know it doesn’t take long’” (Collaborators Loyal UDI Council Member 2, Estación Central).

Finally, highlighting the informality of these mechanisms, the collaborator of one council member in Quinta Normal described how, by skipping the official channels and procedures, they were able to get neighbors’ issues addressed by the municipal bureaucrats:

“In fifteen minutes, I solved a problem that [one neighbor] carried for months. And I solved it because I have a direct relation with [the bureaucrat] who manage the process that this neighbor needed. So, I come, skip all the protocols, and speak directly with the head of the department, and I tell him ‘here, there is this person and I need to talk to you’. And then, [he tells the neighbor] ‘ah, of course! Come in’” (Collaborator Loyal PDC Council Member 1, Quinta Normal).

Loyalty to the mayor: Although council members lacked authority to enforce municipal bureaucrats’ cooperation to address communities demands, the interviews reported that being loyal to the mayor was a significant factor increasing their chances of obtaining a positive response from them—while failing to be loyal to the mayor made it unlikely to obtain a similar response. However, this loyalty (or disloyalty) affected council members’ capacity to address communities demands in two additional ways that are connected to their capacity to receive these demands, thus allowing them to compensate their lack of previous and current interaction with local communities. It,

first, increased (or reduced) their chances to participate in events organized by the municipality, and, second, increased (or reduced) the municipal information and resources the municipalities provide them to contact local communities and process their demands.

Describing the effect of council members' loyalty to the mayor on their capacity to obtain a positive response from municipal bureaucrats, one council member from Estación Central told how, according to his impression, municipal bureaucrats had a high degree of discretion in deciding which cases they give priority to, and how supervising the mayor and having a bad relationship with him were disqualifying factors in this respect:

“We depend a lot on the willingness that the heads of municipal departments have so that our request can be well received [...]. And the heads of department have good disposition when you have a good relationship with the mayor [...]. If you are not on good terms with the mayor, you can forget that [some] request is going to have any type of support [...]. And this is even harder when you are opposition [to both the national and the local governments], as I was before. Then you are forced to have a good relationship with the mayor. If you have a bad relationship—[like when you] are supervising him all the time, which is the job we have to do—everything else gets cut off, all the network of relationships. And you need to find another type of relationship with the neighbors, who, of course, turn to you to find a solution to their problems” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Estación Central)¹⁶³.

Accounting for the opposite situation, a UDI council member from Quinta Normal justified his loyalty to the mayor —i.e., not holding her accountable, according to his account—by explaining how that loyalty helped him to address communities

demands:

“I’m loyal to the mayor because, in reality, you [as a council member] are like a prince consort: you don’t have much power. You can listen to [the neighbors] once and again but, in the end, you need to turn to the highest authority, the one who is in charge [to get their problems solved]. [the difference between the ones who support the mayor and those who don’t is that] some council members go years back in time and start to investigate [...]. So, they are good supervisors, so to speak. I am a bad supervisor. I am an observer from the future [...] so that I don’t get involved with what happened. And if anyone is unhappy with the [current] authorities, there are some other places to take their complaints” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Quinta Normal)¹⁶⁴.

Municipal bureaucrats were also reported to endow loyal council members with opportunities to interact positively with local communities—thus allowing them to compensate their lack of previous and current interaction with local communities-- while excluding disloyal ones from these opportunities. For example, one municipal bureaucrat from Quinta Normal explained how they organized events with local communities that were used by council members for political proselytism, and how they excluded opposition council members from these instances:

“The ones that participate the most [in these events] are [Loyal PDC 1, Loyal UDI 1, and Loyal PC] Council Members. Those three are always with the mayor. The others don’t participate. [But these three] are in all the events [...]. There, they talk to people, take the chance to do their partisan politics talking to people, and do their political proselytism. [The other council members] don’t participate because, here, there is a group of persons who think that everything is done the wrong way. There is a problem in the Municipal Council that, if they need to approve the budget for something, they vote against it because

of 'a', 'b' or 'c' reasons. But the reason is ultimately just political, because, of course, opposition council members want the mayor to perform poorly" (Bureaucrat 2, Quinta Normal)¹⁶⁵.

Finally—and predominantly in Estación Central—council members' loyalty to the mayor was also reportedly rewarded with more information and resources to contact local communities and process their demands. For example, one council member from Estación Central described how bureaucrats provided her with more information about local organizations:

"Things are always easier [when you are aligned with the mayor]. Well, to me the work is much harder because I have to defend my position and that of the mayor. [But there is also a difference regarding] the possibilities you have with municipal bureaucrats to obtain information [...]. Because we have [local organizations'] anniversaries, neighborhood associations that changed their leadership... [and since] I don't have a radar to be everywhere, the municipal bureaucrats can hand me [that] information" (Loyal UDI Council Member 2, Estación Central).

And accounting for the differences in the municipal resources they are granted to receive and process communities' demands, one council member from Estación Central described how those who are loyal to the mayor received a larger team of collaborators paid by the municipality. In doing so, he also highlighted how, according to his impression, the mayor is, therefore, able to induce council members loyalty, through this method in addition to the ones previously described¹⁶⁶:

"The mayor [induces council members' loyalty] because he coopts council members and has the majority in the Municipal Council, although nominally the majority should be us. [He coopts] through one thousand different things. Mainly through the

relationships with the heads of the Departments of the municipality [to solve local problems]. But through the number of people hired to help us as well [...]: the PDC council member has around 12 collaborators—one of them, [for example], is only hired to sing in the bingos on the weekends. [The other Socialist council member] has about five. Well, now that she is running for mayor, she complains that some of their collaborators have been fired” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Estación Central)¹⁶⁷.

In sum, in both municipalities, council members’ loyalty to the mayor was rewarded, through different ways, with access to municipal resources and opportunities that affected their involvement in local problem-solving. In consequence, these mayors and their municipal administrations were able to influence council members’ capacity to create and maintain a network of supporters—and therefore their chances to be reelected—, which were used to dissuade these council members from holding them accountable.

4.6. Ways of Solving Problems: II. Own and Mixed Resources

Council members were also reported to address communities’ demands using resources of their own. These include both material¹⁶⁸ and non-material resources¹⁶⁹, coming from either council members themselves, their collaborators or their personal network of contacts¹⁷⁰. Most commonly, these resources were used to contribute to communities’ self-help initiatives (e.g., prizes for bingos, or participation in neighborhood improvement initiatives)¹⁷¹; provide immediate solution to specific situations¹⁷²; provide

them useful information (e.g., about opportunities, or administrative and financial orientation)¹⁷³; give them company and emotional support¹⁷⁴; give them access to networking opportunities (e.g., contact with other authorities or useful professionals)¹⁷⁵; and give them small quotidian gifts (e.g., cakes for local organizations' meetings)¹⁷⁶.

In a third, hybrid, category, council members—especially those who were former municipal bureaucrats—were also reported to address communities' demands intermediating between them and municipal bureaucrats. However, instead of relying on their loyalty to the mayor to obtain these bureaucrats cooperation, they resorted to the friendship relationships they developed as peers of those same bureaucrats—so that these bureaucrats' cooperation was granted as a personal favor. Thus, while solving local problems through the mechanism described in the first type, here, council members' ability to do so depended on the inclusion of those bureaucrats in their network of personal relationships. One council member from Quinta Normal accounted for this type of interaction, highlighting how it allows them to overcome their lack of authority over municipal bureaucrats:

“I am an instrument, a mediator. I am the one who can help others to solve their problems [...]. But council members, although they are authorities, they don't have any power within the municipality. It is a very strange figure. I don't have the power to give an instruction to any municipal bureaucrat. Therefore, that mediation [to address communities' demands] depends a lot on the good relations you may have. I was a bureaucrat in this municipality, and because [...] I know most of them—and I get to know them being their peer—[they accept my requests]” (Loyal PDC Council Member 2, Quinta Normal).

These two ways of addressing communities demands (either using council

members' resources or relying on personal relationships with municipal bureaucrats), then, offered council members an alternative to using municipal resources controlled by the mayor to address the local demands they received. By relying on these mechanisms, council members were able to respond to expectations about their involvement in local problem-solving and, therefore, build and maintain their networks of supporters, although with independence from the influence of their mayors. In consequence, they were able to hold these mayors accountable without risking their chances to be reelected.

This independence was reinforced by council members' capacity to develop intense interactions with local communities, which allowed them to increase their chances of receiving their demands and obtain their support. While the municipal bureaucracy provided council members loyal to their mayors with greater opportunities to interact with local communities (as described in the previous section), independent council members tended to rely on strategies of current and previous active involvement with local communities. Three of these strategies were particularly visible in the cases analyzed. First, some council member used intense canvassing strategies during their electoral campaigns and maintained the structure of that campaign to keep the contact with local communities. As one council member from Quinta Normal exemplified:

"[My campaign] was a lot of canvassing. A lot of being in the streets, talking to people and convincing them. [I could do that] because I left my studies unattended [...], I wasn't working, and I lived with my parents [in Quinta Normal]. So, I was there day and night, and my house became the headquarters of the campaign [...]. I started campaigning well before the other candidates, with a friend [...], my boyfriend, and other ten volunteers

from the party. With them I did lots and lots of canvassing and, then, another ten volunteers joined the team. [So, now I have] a group of about twenty volunteers from Quinta Normal, who help me with my work with local communities [...]. For example, two weeks ago, we celebrated the children's day with one neighborhood [and] we are going to celebrate the national day in a local market. There, they help to organize, and they talk to people because that is how you receive communities' demands" (Skeptic PS Council Member, Quinta Normal).

Second, some council members relied on their former leadership position in local organizations to get easier access to some specific communities. One council member from Estación Central illustrated this situation by explaining how he was able to get in contact with religious communities:

"[Local communities] have some gatekeepers who let you get in people's homes. They are not necessarily organization leaders. They can be the old ladies who know everyone and don't stop talking, the local priests, or the policeman standing in the corner [...]. For the Catholics, the priest is evidently the one who rules [...]. These communities are niches of votes where I can be more easily accepted, [or] sensibilities that I can attend better, even if they are not necessarily politicized [...]. I'm very well received in the Catholic communities [...] because I was a leader of a Catholic group before and the priests receive me very well. They take me to their events and, for example, dress me as Santa Claus for Christmas celebrations" (Skeptic PS Council Member, Estación Central).

Finally, some council members were able to take advantage of their previous positions within the municipalities, not only for increasing the chance of obtaining the favor of municipal bureaucrats (as previously argued) but also to develop an intense interaction with local communities. Accounting for this situation, another council

member from Estación Central explained:

“I assumed as the head of the Department of Community Development, [which] ultimately is the coordinator of all the social programs we offer [...]. There, I started to have more interaction with local leaders and all the neighbors [...]. We had our doors open to local communities the whole day, [they came here telling their problems] and we contacted them with other departments to find a solution [...]. I did a lot of guidance and coordination with them too, to strengthen local leaders within their organizations, so that they can become relevant to their communities” (Ambivalent UDI Council Member, Estación Central).

In sum, some council members were able to address the local demands they received resorting to their own time and resources (or that of their personal contacts), and reinforce these strategies with autonomous mechanisms of interaction with local communities. These strategies had significant implications for the Municipal Councils' disposition to hold their mayors accountable. Contrasting with the situation of those who relied mainly on municipal resources to serve their constituencies, these council members could escape from the influence of their mayor and were, therefore, able to hold them accountable without risking their chances to be reelected.

However, two exceptions to these trends are worth mentioning. First, some council members relied on alternative sources to obtain sufficient constituent support. Specifically, they relied either on the strong loyalty and discipline of their party members (particularly the Skeptic Communist Council Member in Estación Central¹⁷⁷) or their relationship with prominent local political figures (specifically, the Ambivalent UDI Council Member in Estación Central was also the son of a former council member,

and he recognized that as a second significant source for the support he received, besides his interaction with local communities involving local problem-solving). Second, one council members in Quinta Normal was able to obtain independent constituent support by relying on his personal connections with municipal bureaucrats to address local demands, and therefore escape from the influence of his mayor, but remained firmly loyal to her—the Loyal PDC Council Member 2 in Quinta Normal.

4.7. Conclusion

Considering the socioeconomic level of their populations, the literature would expect council members in Estación Central and Quinta Normal to have lower incentives for holding their mayors accountable than the ones in Las Condes. However, local councils studied in this chapter showed a higher (although still moderate) disposition to hold the mayor accountable. While this result might be explained by the higher party competition they show, local councils' disposition for horizontal accountability does not structure around partisan divisions—council members skeptic of their mayors are not only the ones from opposition parties, and those loyal to their mayors are not only those from their same party coalitions.

Instead, the information analyzed pointed at council members' electoral independence from the mayor as a determinant factor in structuring Municipal Councils' disposition for horizontal accountability. As this research proposes, the council members who could escape the influence of the mayor by building an independent network of supporters, were able to hold their mayors accountable without risking their electoral chances. In consequence, both how council members built their constituent support, and the influence that mayors had in these processes, were of primary relevance for these

results.

In these regards, one significant difference between these municipal administrations and that of Las Condes is their lower usability and capacity to address local communities' demands. In particular, Estación Central and Quinta Normal showed low levels of financial resources, low involvement in local communities and significant bureaucratic deficiencies to receive and respond to local demands. Under these circumstances, these municipal administrations increased local communities' incentives to turn to council members for help, thus providing them with better opportunities to build their constituent support with independence from the mayor, under an informally institutionalized exchange of help for electoral support.

However, these local executives were not entirely deprived of their organizational advantage over council members—especially given council members' general lack of time and formal resources to address the local demands they received—and were, therefore, still able to wield some influence over council members. In particular, they were able to selectively grant council members with access to bureaucrats, municipal resources and formal opportunities to interact with local communities, thus materializing their organizational advantage. Council members accessing these resources, contacts, and opportunities were able to use them to increase their own capacity to receive and address local communities, gaining constituent support in exchange. Besides improving their performance by receiving council members' help in addressing local demands, these municipal administrations gained leverage on them, being able to reward loyal ones with the access those resources, contacts, and opportunities, and punish disloyal ones denying that access to them.

Some council members, however, were able to resist these pressures of the executive.

By resorting to their own time and resources (or those of their personal networks of contacts), they were able to address the local demands they receive independently of the municipal resources and reinforce their involvement with local communities—thus rising their constituent support while escaping to the influence of the mayor. In other words, by pulling resources from alternative sources, these council members could *informally* improve their own organizational capacity to build constituent support, therefore reducing the executive's organizational advantage over them.

These results also have significant implications regarding the role of constituencies on local horizontal accountability. Although the literature has highlighted the relevance of adequate representation of constituents for horizontal accountability, these cases illustrate how constituent support can be still relevant when citizens neither pressure their representatives to wield their accountability attributions nor punish them electorally for failing to do so. Even if constituents' support depends on the direct help they receive to address their immediate demands—instead of council members' performance in their official duties—this support may provide council members with the autonomy council members need to hold the mayor accountable. Thus, although these results do not deny the relevance of constituents' disposition to pressure and punish their representatives, they show how this disposition is not a necessary condition, while simple constituent support can act as an *enabling factor* for horizontal accountability.

5. High Horizontal Accountability: Pudahuel and Providencia

5.1. Characterizing Providencia and Pudahuel: Dissimilar Contexts for High Accountability

Although in both cases we find similarly high levels of local horizontal accountability, Pudahuel and Providencia stand out more for their socioeconomic and political differences than for their similarities.

Localized in the north-western end of Santiago, Pudahuel is both one of the most populated communes¹⁷⁸ of Santiago—with over 230,000 habitants estimated for 2015¹⁷⁹—and characterized by middle to low socioeconomic levels. With an average households' per capita autonomous income¹⁸⁰ of around 68,000 pesos¹⁸¹ in 2015, Pudahuel not only fell substantively below the national and regional¹⁸² averages (about 93,000 and 116,000 pesos¹⁸³ respectively) but also one of the eight poorest communes of Santiago self-represented in the CASEN 2015 survey¹⁸⁴. The indicators of education and poverty depict a similar socioeconomic situation. The average years of schooling in Pudahuel reached 10.8 years in 2015, about one year below the regional average (11.6 years), and slightly below de median (10.9) among the 23 communes of Santiago self-represented in the CASEN 2015 survey¹⁸⁵. Similarly, 7.8% of Pudahuel's inhabitants live in poverty, a rate that is at a medium level, compared with the other communes in Santiago self-represented in the CASEN 2015 survey¹⁸⁶.

Politically, ever since the return to democracy in the early 90s Pudahuel has been visibly partial to the left. Its Socialist mayor, Johnny Carrasco, has been in office since the first democratic municipal election, receiving above 60% of the votes in the three elections held between 2004 and 2012¹⁸⁷. Although Carrasco's popularity could be attributed to personality traits, the relevance of the left in the commune is also shown in the results in Municipal Council elections. In the three elections held between 2004 and 2012 the Socialist Party was, by far, the most voted party, concentrating, on average, around 32% of the valid votes¹⁸⁸ for council members—about 12 perceptual points above the voting of the second most voted party in the commune, the rightist *Unión Demócrata Independiente* (UDI). Also, during the same period, the center-left coalition *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (or *Concertación*) obtained, on average, above the 55% of the valid votes during this period—and above the 70% of them if we consider the Communist party among them, to account for the forces of the left that formed the *Nueva Mayoría* coalition in 2013. In consequence, a substantive majority of the Municipal Council elected in 2012 (6 members) were coalition partners of the mayor¹⁸⁹, while only two of them were from the right.

Located in the conjunction between Santiago's downtown and the wealthy north-east area of Santiago, Providencia presents a different socioeconomic panorama. On the one hand, its population was estimated to be around two-thirds of that of Pudahuel (around 147,500 inhabitants) in 2015, amounting for a middle size population, when compared with the other communes of Santiago¹⁹⁰. On the other hand, Providencia stands out for its comparatively high socioeconomic levels. With an average households' per capita autonomous income more about eight times that of Pudahuel (around 550,000 pesos¹⁹¹ in

2015), Providencia was the wealthiest among Santiago's communes self-represented in the CASEN 2015 survey¹⁹². Accordingly, Providencia showed one of the lowest poverty rates (0.7%) and the highest education level (15.7 years of schooling on average) among Santiago's communes self-represented in the CASEN 2015 survey¹⁹³.

Regarding political tendencies, the election of mayor Josefa (Pepa) Errázuriz in 2012 marked a particular moment for Providencia. Although lacking partisan affiliation, Errázuriz ran as the candidate of *Concertación*, to defeat—with 56% of the valid votes—UDI's incumbent candidate and former member of the dictatorship, Cristián Labbé, who lost his seat as Providencia's mayor after 16 years in office. By doing so, Errázuriz became Providencia's first mayor from the center-left since the return to democracy¹⁹⁴ and crystalized a new situation characterized by higher levels of electoral competition at the mayoralty level. Again, this shift could be explained by personality traits, especially considering the drop in popularity that Labbé presumably faced after publicly honoring an ex-military man sentenced to 144 years in jail for crimes against humanity during the dictatorship¹⁹⁵. However, the increased relevance of the left finds a similar trend in council members' elections. While council members from the right coalition were a clear majority until the elections of 2000 (controlling five out of the seven available seats), this trend started to change in 2004 and 2008, after the addition of one seat in the city council. In both of these elections, the left obtained three out of the eight available seats, and reach the parity between left and right (4 seats each side) in 2012.

Thus, while Pudahuel is a mid-low class commune with consistent and long-lasting support to the left and a highly popular mayor, Providencia is characterized by a wealthier context and a trend that goes from the visible political domination of the right towards a more competitive scenario. However, these differences have not prevented

the corresponding Municipal Councils from reaching a similarly high disposition to hold their mayors accountable.

This chapter aims at explaining how, in such different cases, the respective Municipal Councils showed a similarly high disposition to hold their mayors accountable. Consistent with the previous chapters, this one argues that council members' electoral independence from the mayor is a necessary condition for that outcome. This independence, however, responds to different explanatory factors in each case. In Pudahuel, it emerged primarily from council members' ability to create and maintain an independent network of supporters. In Providencia, on the other hand, council members' electoral independence seemed to result from the mayor's lack of mechanisms to influence council members' electoral performance.

5.2. High Horizontal Accountability

5.2.1. Pudahuel

Eight members formed Pudahuel's Municipal Council. Six of them came from parties in the center-left coalition (*Nueva Mayoría*)—four from the *Socialist Party* (PS), one from *Partido por la Democracia* (PPD) and one from the *Communist Party* (PC)—and only two came from the rightist *Unión Demócrata Independiente* (UDI). Regardless of this prominence of the mayor's party coalition a majority (five) of Pudahuel's council members showed a significant disposition to hold the mayor accountable, as table 9 shows. This assessment of the Municipal Council's disposition for horizontal accountability was obtained through the analysis of the information coming from three

sources—interviews, council members appearances in national news sources, and their reports to the Comptroller General’s Office.

Table 9: Council Member’s Disposition for Horizontal Accountability in Pudahuel (Appearances in News and Reports to the Comptroller General’s Office 2013-2016)

		Loyals		Ambivalents	Skeptics				
		Loyal PS	Loyal PC	Ambivalent UDI	Skeptic PS 1	Skeptic PS 2	Skeptic PS 3	Skeptic PPD	Skeptic UDI
Appearances in News	Criticizing	0	1	5	12	16	7	7	6
	Supporting	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
	Neutral	1	1	1	6	7	0	0	0
	Ambivalent	0	0	3	1	4	0	1	0
	Total	3	3	10	20	29	8	9	7
Reports to the CGO against the executive		0	0	0	1	2	2	2	2

Source: created by the author based on news reports obtained from *Diario Tropezón* (<https://www.tropezon.cl>) and council members’ reports made to *Contraloría General de la República* (<https://www.contraloria.cl>).

As reported in the interviews, most of the skeptic council members (three) came, surprisingly, from his own party (PS), while another one came from a coalition party (PPD), and only one of them came from the rightist UDI¹⁹⁶. Similarly surprising, the other UDI council member was reported to hold only a somewhat loyal stance toward the mayor, while one of the PS and the single PC council members were reportedly the only unambiguously loyal to the mayor.

These perceptions were consistent with news reports in local newspapers. In 52 news reports in Pudahuel’s local newspaper (*Diario Tropezón*) council members appeared either, criticizing (or opposing), supporting, being neutral or being ambivalent about the mayor and his administration, during the period analyzed (the term between December 6, 2012, and December 6, 2016)¹⁹⁷. Although the distribution of appearances was uneven across council members, table 9 shows that the five council members recognized in the interviews as holding a skeptical stance toward the mayor appeared

mostly criticizing or reporting him or his administration. The opposite was the situation for two of the council members recognized in the interviews as supporting the mayor—one of the PS and the PC ones—who either didn't criticize the mayor and his administration or did it only once. Finally, in half of his appearances, the ambivalent UDI council member criticized the mayor or his administration¹⁹⁸.

Two of these news reports are worth highlighting. The first one, published at the beginning of the period analyzed (December 2012), informed about the “*commitment beyond ideology*” the five skeptic council members made to “*surveil and decide*” about the municipality's use of resources, after rejecting the municipal budget for 2013¹⁹⁹. The second one (published in August 2014) was a public declaration made by the same five council members to inform against a case of municipality's misuse of resources and their opposition to it²⁰⁰.

During the period analyzed, in two occasions a cross-party coalition of council members reported Pudahuel's mayor to Chile's Comptroller General's Office (the same five council members in the second case, and four of them in the first one)²⁰¹. In the first of these cases, the council approved the budget for 2013, although reducing the amounts assigned to some specific items. However, the budget finally approved by the mayor did not consider these modifications. In the second case, the mayor forced the council to vote the budget for 2014 as a whole, impeding them to review their specific items. In both cases, the Comptroller General's Office ruled in favor of the council members—thus confirming the mayors' misbehavior²⁰².

As the interviews reported, this disposition to hold the mayor accountable was accompanied by an understanding of the Municipal Council as an independent *collegiate body* (thus highlighting their collective and diligent dedication to their

duties), based on which Pudahuel's council members would have prioritized their role as supervisors over their partisan affiliations. As one council member expressed it:

“We, as a Municipal Council... we are a collegiate body. We work for the wellbeing of the community. Of course, no-one wants to look bad in front of the community. But we do come together when we need to supervise [...]. We work together, not thinking in the political party [...]. The point is that we generally work as a collegiate body [...]. We meet, we make a smaller meeting [before council meetings], ‘these things here, those things there,’ and then present our concerns to the mayor” (Skeptic UDI Council Member, Pudahuel)²⁰³.

However, this high disposition for accountability was not free of costs for coalition partners of the mayor, especially given the generalized expectation of cooperation between them. As the interviews revealed, it has implied retaliations from their parties, ranging from labeling them as traitors²⁰⁴ to attempts to take them out of their party list for the coming municipal elections²⁰⁵. Exemplifying the latter case, one of them mentioned:

“[They tried to] take me out of the party list. [Because] mayors require councils with council members close to them. I am from the mayor's party, I am close to his ideas, but that had made it difficult to understand what the role of council members is. [...] We are supervisors [...]. My role as a supervisor is, in the end [...], to be the eyes of the citizens [...]. And these last years, my affinity with my mayor [...] probably has not been really prudent. From both sides [...]. It was misunderstood, for example, that I reported to the Comptroller General's Office, but that is just the role that one has” (Skeptic PS Council Member 2, Pudahuel).

In sum, a majority of Pudahuel's council members were systematically identified

as holding a skeptical stance toward mayor—both in interviews and news reports—and in two instances reported mayor’s misconduct to the Comptroller General’s Office, while highlighting the collegiate orientation that accompanied their disposition. Surprisingly, it was the mayor’s coalition partners who mainly showed a high disposition to hold him accountable, despite the expectations of loyalty among party fellow members and the reprisals for not fulfilling those expectations. As this chapter argues, Pudahuel’s skeptic council members were capable of creating and maintaining their networks of supporters relying on their own means. By doing so, they were able to keep high chances to be reelected, despite these pressures.

5.2.2. Providencia

When compared to the case of Pudahuel, two characteristics of Providencia’s Municipal Council stand out. First, Providencia’s Municipal Council was proportionally divided across party lines, consistent with its higher party competition. Four council members were from the right—two from *Renovación Nacional* (RN), one from *Unión Demócrata Independiente* (UDI) and one independent (IND)—, while the other four were from center-left parties—one Christian Democrat (PDC), one from *Partido por la Democracia* (PPD), one from the Socialist Party (PS) one from *Partido Progresista* (PRO)²⁰⁶. Second, as the interviews systematically reported, council members’ loyalty and skepticism toward Providencia’s mayor matched, almost exactly, their party membership—the single exception to being Skeptic PPD Council Member, who early on switched sides and tilted the balance in favor of the rightist opposition (see table 10)²⁰⁷.

Table 10: Council Member’s Disposition for Horizontal Accountability in Providencia (Appearances in News and Reports to the Comptroller General’s Office 2013-2016)

		Loyals			Skeptics				
		Loyal DC	Loyal PRO	Loyal PS	Skeptic RN 1	Skeptic RN 2	Skeptic IND	Skeptic UDI	Skeptic PPD
Appearances in News	Criticizing	0	0	0	18	11	13	10	18
	Supporting	8	7	9	0	0	0	0	4
	Neutral	1	1	0	2	1	0	0	2
	Ambivalent	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	3
	Total	9	11	9	20	12	15	10	27
Reports to the CGO against the executive		0	0	0	5	1	1	1	1

Source: created by the author based on news reports obtained from Chile’s *national* printed and electronic news sources and council members’ reports made to *Contraloría General de la República* (<https://www.contraloria.cl>).

Two additional sources of information complement this assessment of the Municipal Council’s disposition for horizontal accountability—council members appearances in national news sources, and their reports to the Comptroller General’s Office.

These perceptions are consistent with the depictions portrayed in news reports from national news sources. For the more media-exposed municipality of Providencia, the report of municipal issues in *national* news sources was far more frequent than for Pudahuel—and any of the other cases studied. In 42 news reports in Chile’s national newspapers and electronic news sources, council members appeared either, criticizing (or opposing), supporting, being neutral or being ambivalent about the mayor and his administration²⁰⁸. Although the distribution of appearances is uneven across council members, table 10 shows that the five recognized in the interviews as holding a skeptical stance toward the mayor appeared mostly criticizing or reporting her and her administration, while none of the four council members from opposition parties appeared supporting the mayor or her administration. The opposite was the situation for the three council members recognized in the interviews as supporting the mayor, who did not criticize or reported the mayor or her administration in the sources

reviewed—although on three occasions the PRO council member showed an ambivalent position about the mayor (i.e., supporting and criticizing her at the same time)²⁰⁹.

During the period analyzed (the term between December 6, 2012, and December 6, 2016), in five occasions Providencia's council members reported the mayor or her administration to the Comptroller General's Office. Four of them were presented by one of the RN council members alone, and the Comptroller General's Office credited none of them as constituting an offense. The remaining one was presented by the five council members identified in the interviews and news reports as opposing the mayor. In this occasion, council members accused her of transgressing the principle of probity and abusing her authority by authorizing the use of a municipal building for her nephew's personal purposes. The Comptroller General's Office resolved against the mayor.

According to the interviews, two milestones were significant in the development of this division within the council. First, the renaming of one of Providencia's core avenues, from *11 de Septiembre*²¹⁰ to the politically neutral *Nueva Providencia*, marked a turning point in the relations between the blocks in the council, closing the possibilities for future understanding between the two party coalitions²¹¹. The second one had as a consequence the one single exception to the solid partisan blocks, with the corresponding switch in the balance within the council. The PPD council member stopped supporting the mayor after being accused of misuse of public resources by the PDC council member, and of homophobic behavior by the PRO council member. The latter also implied the break-up between the PPD council member and his party. Acknowledging his role in the switch of balance in the Municipal Council, the PDC council member who reported Skeptic PPD Council Member for misuse of public

resources, declared:

“There I am responsible for impeding a better relationship because I reported [the PPD] Council Member for defrauding the Treasury. And, I reported him to the Prosecutor General’s office [...]. He didn’t change sides for everything, but he allied with the opposition. Opposition to the mayor, opposition to what we were proposing [...]. We had guaranteed a majority for almost every issue and, with that, we lost it. And that put many issues in an uphill situation” (Loyal PDC Council Member, Providencia)²¹².

In sum, similar to Pudahuel, a majority of Providencia’s council members were systematically identified in interviews and news reports as holding a skeptical stance toward the mayor and reported (once) mayor’s misconduct to the Comptroller General’s Office. However, contrasting with Pudahuel, the higher disposition to hold the mayor accountable in Providencia ran mostly along partisan alignments. While these partisan alignments might provide a critical motivation for holding the mayor accountable, this chapter will argue that council members’ electoral independence played a central role in allowing them to translate this motivation into action. However, unlike Pudahuel, rather than council members’ ability to create and maintain their networks of supporters, this independence was the result of the mayor’s lack of means to influence their electoral chances—thus also contrasting with the cases of Estación Central, Quinta Normal, and Las Condes.

5.3. Explaining Pudahuel: Well Connected Council Members

To some extent, Pudahuel shared with the Las Condes, Estación Central and Quinta

Normal the characteristics that allowed mayors to limit council members' electoral independence—and therefore explain the lower levels of accountability in these cases. Similar to Las Condes, Pudahuel's municipal bureaucracy showed some usability and capacity to dominate the interactions with local communities. Similar to Estación Central and Quinta Normal, Pudahuel's council members were allowed to act as intermediaries between local communities and municipal bureaucrats. Why did Pudahuel's council members show a greater disposition to hold the mayor accountable, then?

This section suggests that the combinations of two factors help to explain this outcome. First, both municipal bureaucracy's usability and capacity to address communities' demands, and council members' role as intermediaries faced significant limitations. Second, according to the interviews, the skeptic council members were particularly capable of building and maintaining their networks of supporters without resorting to municipal resources, thus limiting mayor's influence in their electoral chances—similar to skeptic council members in other cases studied.

5.3.1. Municipality-Community Relations

As the case of Las Condes suggests, municipalities that have funds, personnel adequately trained and loyal to the mayor, and an orientation to work with local communities, tend to be highly efficient in attending communities' demands. By doing so, they are able to reduce these communities' incentives to turn to council members for help and, consequently, council members capacity to raise independent electoral support. Estación Central and Quinta Normal illustrate the mirror case scenario, showing that,

when the bureaucracy does not adequately respond to their demands, local communities tend to turn to council members for help.

Pudahuel showed significant ambivalences on these respects. On the one hand, its municipal bureaucracy showed a disposition towards an intense interaction with local communities, it was recognized as loyal to the mayor and showed medium to high levels of professionalization. However, the interviews reported significant limitations in the municipal bureaucracy's usability and capacity to attend communities' demands, including deficiencies in the distribution of public resources, alongside budgetary restrictions, and problems in the management of human resources.

Availability of resources: Compared to the other municipalities in Santiago, during the period analyzed (the term between December 6, 2012, and December 6, 2016) Pudahuel showed a medium level availability of resources. As table 15 in the Annex shows, Pudahuel's average annual municipal income (about 29 billion pesos) fell in a medium range although above both Santiago's municipal average (about 26 billion pesos) and median (about 17 billion pesos)²¹³. The situation changed, however, when considering the municipal income per habitant of the corresponding commune²¹⁴ (see table 16 in the Annex). With an average around 119 thousand pesos per habitant, Pudahuel's per habitant income fell well below Santiago's municipal average (about 152 thousand pesos per habitant), although remaining above Santiago's municipal median (100 thousand pesos per habitant).

Active involvement in local communities: According to the data analyzed, the municipality of Pudahuel allocated significant resources to maintain regular and

intense relations with Pudahuel's local communities, looking to help to organize and assist them.

First, despite its budgetary restrictions, Pudahuel allocated substantial monetary resources to the development of local organizations. As table 17 in the Annex shows, during the period analyzed Pudahuel's municipality spent, on average, about 767 million pesos every year in money transfers to community organizations²¹⁵, which corresponds to the second highest average expenditure in this item among Santiago's municipalities²¹⁶. This expenditure remained comparatively high when it is considered in relation to the size of the communal population. With an average annual expenditure over 3 million pesos per every 1,000 inhabitants²¹⁷ during the period analyzed, Pudahuel remains among Santiago's three municipalities with the highest expenditure in this item, more than doubling, once again, the city's municipal average (see table 18 in the Annex).

Second, like in many municipalities, Pudahuel had both personnel dedicated to organizing local communities and channel their interactions with them, and to teams of bureaucrats assigned to keep the communications with local communities in specific zones of the commune. One municipal bureaucrat illustrated the particular efficiency of these bureaucrats—especially the territory teams—highlighting the relevance of these bureaucrats for keeping local communities organized, and comparing Pudahuel to the neighboring commune of Cerro Navia, where he lived and was a local leader:

“When the local government changed in Cerro Navia, they took away the territory bureaucrats. So, if you see how they have organized, the amount of active local organizations that are in Cerro Navia and compare with those that were here [in Pudahuel], there might be a difference of 50% of organizations that are not active in Cerro

Navia and are still active in Pudahuel. [That has to do with the territory bureaucrats and] how they make the direct linkage with the municipality. For example, they go to the organizations: neighborhood associations²¹⁸, mothers' organizations, sports clubs, all that. The territory bureaucrats are also in charge of making neighborhood roundtables²¹⁹. And, with that, a good number of local organizations are kept alive" (Bureaucrat 1, Pudahuel).

Thus, although Pudahuel shared these organizational features, for example, with Quinta Normal and Estación Central, here, they seemed to have had a higher impact on the level of organization of local communities—consistent with this bureaucracy's higher levels of professionalization, described below. In the case of Pudahuel, this investment on local organizations was paired, apparently, with high numbers of active local organizations. With around 150 active neighborhood associations, Pudahuel had the highest number of them among the five municipalities included in this research²²⁰. Moreover, although the official numbers of organizations are not entirely reliable²²¹, they count around 2,000 organizations for Pudahuel during the period analyzed, far above most of Santiago's communes²²².

However, this high number of organizations was not paired with similarly high levels of citizen participation in them. Compared to the other municipalities in Santiago self-represented in the CASEN 2015 survey, around an average proportion of Pudahuel's population (22.4%) participated in civil organizations of any type²²³, while a similarly average proportion of the same population (7.1%) participated primarily in territory-based organizations (see table 21 in the Annex)²²⁴.

Bureaucratic capacity to receive and respond to communities demands:

During the period analyzed (the term between December 6, 2012, and December 6, 2016), Pudahel medium to small bureaucracy²²⁵ presented a relatively high levels professionalization²²⁶, while its loyalty to the mayor was not reported to be a relevant issue²²⁷. However, according to local leaders and municipal bureaucrats, the bureaucracy presented administrative problems, paired with significant deficiencies in its performance in addressing local demands. These administrative problems included the criteria with which human resources were managed and the use of personalization and politicization as criteria for the distribution of resources.

Notably, among the problems in handling human resources reported, the interviews highlighted, first, the lack of a meaningful assessment of bureaucrats' performance, allowing some of them to perform poorly²²⁸. Second, political alignments and personal connections were reported to be used as criteria for hiring and promoting bureaucrats²²⁹.

Consistent with these practices, bureaucrats and local leaders reported about the use of a political criterion for distributing municipal resources. Explicitly connecting this criterion with the politicization in handling human resources, a bureaucrat explained that new territory bureaucrats are hired for political reasons, disregarding their lack of experience and skill and politicizing the access to benefits:

“[The new territory bureaucrats] are younger, first, and the other thing is the experience with local organizations: they don't have it [...]. So, if there is a person at the head of that whole program who also lacks experience, it is difficult to achieve the goals. [The problem is that] many of them [are hired] through political connections [...]. And the territory bureaucrats are almost always tilted towards the party of the current mayor, so it belongs only to one political side [...]. And the local organizations that don't have a

linkage with their territory bureaucrat do not receive the information. So, what happens? The other day there was a benefit [a subsidy] to be delivered, and many didn't know about it. The one who knew were the ones that had more contact" (Bureaucrat 1, Pudahuel).

Complementing these impressions, local leaders reported about both bureaucracy's attempts to privilege socialist leaders²³⁰, and their use of municipal resources (specifically, boxes with food) as means of vote buying. Accounting for the latter case, one of them explained²³¹:

"They say that if you vote for someone, you have to receive something in exchange. For example, Mayor Carrasco in [the sector of] Pudahuel Sur offered 10,000 pesos. He said: 'if you don't vote for me, I will come tomorrow and take those away' [...]. And in previous elections [municipal bureaucrats] delivered boxes of food. I have heard that they were giving those typical boxes with food for one week" (Local Leader 4, Pudahuel).

Local leaders also manifested that their ability to obtain goods and services from the municipality were increased once they developed closer relationships with bureaucrats, thus, accounting for a personal (and therefore discretionary) criterion for distributing of resources. Consequentially for the assessment of the municipal bureaucracy's work with local communities, this personalization did not exclude the municipality's territory teams. For example, one local leader described this situation highlighting the relevance of having good relations with their corresponding territory bureaucrat was relevant to get problems attended:

"When I have, for example, a neighbor with leaks in his bedroom roof, I call [the territory bureaucrat], and I tell him '[hey], there is a neighbor whose shack's roof is leaking'. He calls the Emergency Office; they visit this neighbor, they check the situation, and then the help to repair the roof comes. [This channel works] because I have a good

friendship with [him]. Because had I have a lousy friendship with him, I think things would go wrong. But I have a good relationship” (Local Leader 2, Pudahuel)²³².

Consistent with these issues, a wide variety of actors interviewed (including both supporters and opponents to the mayor among municipal bureaucrats, council members, and local leaders) reported severe deficiencies in bureaucrats’ handling of communities’ demands. Bureaucrats and council members made references to these deficiencies, either broadly mentioning how municipal bureaucrats’ way of working tend to be outdated or describing cases where bureaucrats were not able to give adequate responses to easy demands. Local leaders, on the other hand, were emphatic and explicit about these problems, often highlighting how neighbors were poorly received by municipal bureaucrats and how the treatment is different for local leaders. As one local leader loyal to the mayor described:

“I use the regular channels, of course, [and there is no problem]. But I have also seen people coming in [some municipal office] and talk to [some municipal bureaucrat], but [that bureaucrat] was not the person in charge, so they sent her to the counter on the left. There, [the neighbors] told her problem, but she was told to go to the [next] door [and so on]... that, I think, is embarrassing, denigrating [...]. There was a time when I resorted to the fastest solution: my own food provisions. And then [I told them] ‘well, here you have something for tomorrow and try to solve the problem tomorrow or the day after. And if you can’t, come to see me and, if I can, I come with you [to the municipality]’. Back then, I wasn’t working, and I was able to go to the municipality with them. And when you know whom to talk to, what doors knock, it is faster” (Local Leader 5, Pudahuel)²³³.

In sum, Pudahuel’s municipal administration showed relatively high levels of

professionalization and a disposition to hold intense interaction with local communities. However, it also showed a moderate availability of resources, alongside severe problems in the management of human resources and its capacity to attend communities' demands. Under these conditions, it would have been only partially capable of dominating the relationships with local communities, as the politicization and personalization—and, therefore, the lack of universal criteria—in the distribution of resources suggest.

5.3.2. Council Members as Intermediaries

As the cases of Estación Central and Quinta Normal suggest, council members can compensate municipal bureaucracy's deficiencies to address communities demands, by acting as intermediaries between them. In doing so, council members would gain reputation and support from the community but also would need to find bureaucrats willing to cooperate with them. Under these circumstances, being loyal to the mayor is one way through which council members can raise the probabilities of obtaining cooperation from the municipal bureaucrats, although at the expense of reducing their independence from the mayor.

Although municipal rules allowed council members to intermediate between local communities and municipal bureaucrats in this way (unlike the case of Las Condes), these instances were reported to be weakly politicized and not used to incentivize council members' loyalty to the mayor. Two factors may help explaining why. First, council members were reported to use this type of intermediation rarely, while other actors were reported to play a similar role, thus competing with council members' intermediation. Second, according to the interviews, bureaucrats tended to reduce

council members' ability to take credit from the intermediation by stressing the role of the mayor over that of council members to solve the problem.

Although council members' intermediation role was mentioned in the interviews among the components of their mutual help relationships with local leaders²³⁴, especially municipal bureaucrats and local leaders reported these instances to constitute a minority of the interactions between them. One local leader, for example, illustrated this duality recognizing the presence of council members' intermediation, although highlight how limited is council members' capacity to get things done through the bureaucracy:

“With [the ambivalent UDI council member] we have achieved many things. We [...] rely on him because we know him, they support us. [He helps us with] personal issues, he resolves neighbors' issues. The same with [the Skeptic UDI council member]. They refer you to the corresponding department, and people go [...]. But, look, for what I've seen, council members do push the municipal departments, they do call to remind them about this and that. But don't forget that they are no more than council members. Here, unfortunately, there is a hierarchy, and if a guy [a bureaucrat] don't want to respond [to council members], they just don't do it” (Local Leader 4, Pudahuel)²³⁵.

Two elements help to explain the lower relevance of council members' intermediation in Pudahuel. First, as described in the previous section, developing personal relationships with municipal bureaucrats was an efficient way for local communities to get access to municipal resources. While effectively increasing these communities' access to municipal resources, municipal bureaucrats in these relationships played an intermediary role similar to that of council members channeling demands to the municipal bureaucracy. This role of municipal bureaucrats, then,

competed with council members' intermediation—insofar these relationships were sufficient for local communities to attend their demands, these communities had no incentives to turn to council members for help.

Similarly, local leaders suggested that the mayor can also work as an intermediary with the local bureaucracy, thus competing with the role played by council members in this respect. As one local leader, for example, reported:

“I have a very good relationship with the mayor, you see? We communicate through email, we share some social media, we are militants in the same party... and I think that, so far, he has had a very friendly reception to me and to the favors I have asked him [...]. Sometimes we have complained about some situations, and we were not really taken into account by the corresponding departments [...]. We reported, for example, a problem with a liquor store [but we didn't have an answer from the corresponding department]. Until we told the mayor, and then the issue immediately acquired a different status” (Local Leader 5, Pudahuel)²³⁶.

As a second explanatory element, municipal bureaucrats were reported to downplay council members' contribution—and give the mayor most of the credit—when they intermediate. This tendency of bureaucrats would not only reduce council members' incentives for intermediating but also hollow out these intermediations of what allowed council members to use them as reinforcements of their networks of supporters—their reputation for solving problems. One council member explained this situation expressing how it was unavoidable to involve the mayor in their intermediations between local communities and municipal bureaucrats:

“This is what I tell the neighbors: ‘Look, the only thing you need to know is that it is not me the one who will give a solution, it is the mayor’ [...]. Yes, because, in the end,

there are things you can solve from the mayor's office and also things you can solve from the council member's office, but in the long run everything, everything, everything requires the approval of the mayor. So, when you start solving something from the council member's office, from the beginning you need to discuss the solution with the mayor, you see? And since they [the bureaucrats] have been here for years and they know the scene, [and] they use that methodology” (Loyal PC Council Member, Pudahuel)²³⁷.

Consistent with this lack of incentives—and similar to what council members reported in Las Condes—some council members declared that, instead of resorting to municipal bureaucrats, they preferred to present communities demands directly to the mayor or the council meetings. There, although their influence in the process of resolving local demands was diluted, council members' expectations of rewards in terms of reputation were higher²³⁸.

Thus, although council members' intermediation between local communities and bureaucrats was allowed in Pudahuel, its use was reported to be limited. Two elements are worth considering to explain this situation. First, local communities' possibilities to resort to the mayor or bureaucrats they have developed personal relationships with, instead of council members. Second, this intermediation role was less useful for creating and maintaining council members' network of supporters than in other cases, given the small chances they had to gain reputation from it.

5.3.3. Council Members' Interactions with Local Communities

One final factor—added to the limitations in the municipal bureaucracy's capacity to attend local communities' demands and the lower council member intermediation—helps explain the high disposition of Pudahuel's Municipal Council to hold the mayor

accountable: council members' ability to create and maintain their networks of supporters, with independence from the mayor and municipal resources. As a general proposition, council members who can do so would be able to supervise and oppose the mayor without jeopardizing their chances to be reelected—thus escaping from the pressures that mayors and their administrations may exert over them. In other words, council members who are not able to maintain a network of supporters, risk paying high electoral costs for doing so, and therefore they would rarely be able to do so over more than one term.

In Pudahuel, as in the other cases analyzed so far (especially Estación Central and Quinta Normal), council members' capacity to create and maintain an independent network of supporters was intimately related to their capacity to provide a solution to local demands without resorting to municipal resources. Like reported in Estación Central and Quinta Normal, this problem-solving role of council members tended to form clientelistic relationships between local organizations and these council members, once again, most evidently under the form of *godparenthood* relationships²³⁹. In consequence—and consistent with the general argument described in the previous paragraph—skeptical council members in Pudahuel tended to show strong connections with local communities, developed through both a history of involvement with them and the use of their own time and resources to serve their networks of supporters. According to the interviews, local communities rewarded these connections with electoral support—thus providing council members electoral independence from the mayor. Alternatively, one council member who was able to keep her inclusion in a successful electoral list²⁴⁰ also showed, through this different route, electoral independence with similar consequences.

As the interviews reported, council members skeptic of the mayor shared a similar history of previous involvement with local communities, developed either as local leaders or municipal bureaucrats close to these communities. According to their declarations, this involvement was a significant factor for both their incorporation in their political parties and (for most of them) their arrival at the Municipal Council. Providing an example of this general trend, one council member explained how she and her husband's involvement with local communities, was relevant for joining the UDI and then becoming a council member:

“Well, I liked the right. I liked their Christian principles. My husband is a local leader, so we had some involvement [with local communities]. And I began to realize that they [the UDI] cared a lot about local leaders, and that is why I liked it: because they have good communication with local communities. So that made up my mind [to join the party] [...]. And then it happened, in 2004, that [the district office of the UDI] saw how I worked with local schools, that I had close relations with local leaders, and all that, and they offered me the possibility to run for council member” (Skeptic UDI Council Member, Pudahuel)²⁴¹.

Consistent with this initial involvement, most council members reported that they maintained their intense interactions with local communities—especially attending and responding to their demands, as a significant part of their work as council members. Importantly, most of the contributions they declared making involved resorting to their own time and resources rather than resorting to the municipality. Although council members contributions could sometimes involve a significant display of resources, like in Estación Central and Quinta Normal they more commonly fell

under the following categories: contributions to communities' self-help initiatives (e.g., prizes for bingos); informational resources (e.g., about opportunities, or administrative and financial orientation); networking opportunities (e.g., endorsement, or contact with parliamentarians and useful professionals); or small quotidian gifts (e.g., cakes for local organizations' meetings). Illustrating these interactions, one council member described how she dedicated significant time to attend neighbors, highlighting how her relationships were particularly strong with local organizations she is the *godmother* of:

“Most of all, Wednesdays, which is the day we have the council’s meetings, I dedicate all day. I have permission to be absent from my job, and I do everything. Then, Saturdays, if there are activities in the morning or the afternoon. And during work days, at least two days in the evening, mainly on Fridays. I can’t be with organizations between three and six because I work, but I do am, after that, in the meetings I can [...]. I have about 59 [organizations I’m the godmother of]. With these organizations, there is preferential treatment. It is translated, for example, in supporting them, orienting them mainly in the management of their resources [...]. Or keep them informed of important municipal agreements favoring them [...]. Then, it is not only about keeping them informed, [but also] advising and helping them with the paperwork for the creation of the projects and the applications [to funds]. Also, we help them in the renewal and update of their leadership. All those administrative issues for the organization to be impeccable” (Skeptic PS Council Member 1, Pudahuel)²⁴².

According to the interviews, this direct involvement with and support for local communities was paid back with loyalty and support, expressed both electorally and providing access to the respective organization. Thus, this problem-solving involvement with local communities showed to be a significant mechanism through which council

members create and maintain their networks of supporters. One council member, for example, explained how her base of supporters was made almost entirely of the networks she made this way, while the membership to them allowed her to infer who supported her:

“Well, the support is mutual. For example, when we convene to events, we call them. And of course, for electoral issues too. I mean, our greatest base of support is made of local leaders. The team more connected to this councillorship is basically 90% of local leaders [...]. Even when I’m not able to see how they vote, I know they support me [...] because there are direct manifestations. You see that, regarding the actions of their local leaders and their organizations, one, as a council member, has preferential treatment [...]. For example, they invite you to their activities, so [they say] ‘listen, you have to come because you are our godmother, don’t forget, you have to come’” (Skeptic PS Council Member 1, Pudahuel).

This reciprocal loyalty was also reported by local leaders, who manifested communities’ exclusive preference for the council members they were closer to. One local leader, for example, illustrated this loyalty describing how municipal bureaucrats campaigning for the mayor were harshly dismissed by supporters of opposition council members, highlighting the relevance of council members history of involvement and current relationships with local communities for this loyalty:

“The last time, they offered those boxes [with groceries]. But one [person I know] told [these bureaucrats] ‘why don’t you shove that box? Because I’ll vote for [the ambivalent UDI council member]’. Why? Because we have obtained many things with [him]. He was a neighbor who lived here, he grew up here, and we know his sons [...]. And everyone here relies on them, because we know them, and they support us” (Local Leader

4, Pudahuel)²⁴³.

However, these reciprocal relations would face two limitations. First, council members' limited ability to establish these relations with a large number of local communities, therefore needing to concentrate their efforts on specific organizations and sectors of the commune. Thus, while some council members have a selection of organizations they are a godparent of (as previously mentioned) other council members described how focusing their work on specific sectors of the commune is another viable strategy²⁴⁴. This situation was consistent with local leaders generalized declarations of having close relationships with only one or two council members, while the other council members rarely appeared or were broadly unknown²⁴⁵. The second limitation involved local organizations' disposition to establish reciprocal relationships of this type. While there are some organizations more reticent to manifest their support to any authority, neighborhood associations²⁴⁶ tend to be explicit about whom they support and whom they reject²⁴⁷.

Finally, the case of one skeptic PS council member presented some remarkable differences to this general trend, obtaining electoral independence from the mayor by ensuring her inclusion in a successful electoral list. Although she reported having less intense interaction with local communities (mainly based on casual encounters with individual neighbors²⁴⁸), she remained independent from the mayor by relying on her connections within the Party elites. According to her, these connections played a crucial role in both her first nomination as a candidate for council member²⁴⁹ and her survival to her party's attempt to take her out of the party list after the conflicts she had with the mayor (for reporting him to the Comptroller General's Office). Referring to the latter, she described how her supporters defended her alluding to her ever-improving electoral

support (although, with 3.3%, her votes account for about one-tenth of the total vote her party obtained in 2012 elections—33.5%)²⁵⁰. As she explained:

“What was prioritized [in this case] was the fundamental idea what the party is [...]. One cannot have affinities with everybody. Neither can everybody know what you do or stop doing. But what was prioritized is [the stance that argued]: ‘here [this council member] has done her job, and here is the evidence: in her second election she increased her voting. And in these [last] four years [...], how has she done that smeared what the party says is council members’ role? Show us something’. But there was nothing. That is what was prioritized: ‘she did her job’” (Skeptic PS Council Member 2, Pudahuel).

In sum, although with some limitations, council members opposing Pudahuel’s mayor tended to develop and sustain strong relationships with local communities, which were rewarded with these communities’ support. Importantly, these relationships were based on council members’ own resources, instead of relying on municipal ones, thus limiting the ability of the mayor and the municipal administration to influence in these council members’ electoral chances. Finally, the case of the Skeptic PS Council Member 2 suggests that, although having strong connections within a successful party should not be disregarded as a relevant source of electoral independence, it is possible that these connections are most effective when council members are independently capable of maintaining and increasing their networks of supporters.

5.3.4. Loyal Council Members

One final comment can be made about the three council members who showed to be more loyal to the mayor. While one of them had a strong dependence on him, the other two seemed to remain somewhat independent. Therefore, these cases suggest that,

although depending on the mayor would strongly increase loyalty to him, the opposite—being independent from the mayor—does not necessarily imply a higher disposition to hold him accountable. Instead, additional considerations are required to determine this disposition, such as council members’ own understanding and regard for their duties (like the ones expressed in the idea of working as an independent *collegiate body*); or their partisan loyalties and discipline; or the quality of their personal relationship with the mayor (as seen in Providencia).

As the daughter of the mayor, the loyal PS council member was not only recognized as his close collaborator—as she might be expected to be—, but also as being beneficiary of special treatment and support from the municipal bureaucracy. As one council member reported, Loyal Council PS Member received priority in her interactions with municipal bureaucrats favoring her electoral performance:

“During that [election], the daughter of the mayor was running to be a council member [and] there was more support for her [from municipal bureaucrats]... it was like downplaying the other council members’ campaigns. And it worked, because everyone else’s support lowered notably, and she got twelve thousand votes [about 23% of the total votes]” (Skeptic UDI Council Member, Pudahuel).

The PC council member presented a different case. Although she showed to be electorally independent from the mayor, that independence was not due to her involvement in reciprocal relationships with local communities. Instead, like the PC council member in Estación Central, this independence was reportedly the result of the discipline of her party’s members—a discipline that ultimately may explain her own loyalty to a mayor who is a Socialist coalition partner. In clear contrast with the council members skeptic of the mayor, the PC council member’s entrance to the Communist

Party was more related to her family connections with this party²⁵¹, while her nomination to run for council member was explained more by her position in the party than an intense interaction with local communities²⁵². Moreover, as she explained, it was her involvement with local communities what was explained by her party affiliation rather than the other way around²⁵³.

In consequence, when asked about how she knew who her voters were and whether there was any local organization she had a closer relationship with, she answered:

“Ah, it is very easy [to know who my supporters are] because this commune is made of communities with historical Communist leaders. So, there are entire communities in Pudahuel where the vote always goes to the Communist Party and the forces of the left. [I have organizations I am closer to, but] it is because of the closeness that life gave us. Because there was a comrade in that organization, or because the comrades themselves decided to organize” (Loyal PC Council Member, Pudahuel).

Finally, the case of ambivalent UDI council member is best understood in light of its essential duality. While he was widely recognized for his strong interaction with local communities, consistent with his ambivalence, he relied only partially on the municipal resources and partially on other sources for doing so. On the one hand, he was mentioned by municipal bureaucrats as one of the council members with whom they have better and more frequent interactions—and, consistently, by other council members for having a good and long relationship with the mayor. Taken separately, this situation would suggest that he depended on the mayor for his cooperative relations with local communities. However, on the other hand, he worked part-time in the district office of an UDI representative, brokering between him and local communities in

Pudahuel, thus suggesting that he relied on his party for his relationship with local communities and remained loyal to it—especially considering that his son ran as the UDI candidate for Pudahuel’s mayoralty. Thus, the case of this council member should be taken as a hybrid one—where there was a limited loyalty to the mayor in exchange for privileged access to municipal resources while maintaining some electoral independence from him based on the support he obtained from his party’s territorial structure.

In sum, these cases—particularly the second one—highlight the non-reversibility of the main argument developed so far: while electoral dependence on the mayor may force council members’ loyalty, electoral independence does not automatically mean holding a more skeptical stance toward the mayor.

5.4. Explaining Providencia: A Detached Municipality

While the high disposition to hold Pudahuel’s mayor accountable was paired with council members’ independent connections with local communities, the situation seemed to be different in Providencia, where the interaction between council members and local communities was generally perceived as low.

How, then, did council members obtain the autonomy required to oppose the mayor? Although it cannot be discarded that the mayor just did not try to induce council members’ loyalty, the information obtained suggests that she lacked the means to do so. On the one hand, contrasting with Las Condes, Providencia’s municipal bureaucracy faced severe limitations to establish strong, positive relations with local communities, despite its high levels of professionalization and availability of resources. On the other hand, contrasting with Quinta Normal and Estación Central, Providencia’s council

members showed low levels of intermediation between local communities and municipal bureaucrats, thus limiting the extent to which council members could be incorporated in the distribution of municipal resources. In this context, council members were able to supervise and oppose the mayor without risking their electoral chances for doing so—even when they lacked strong relationships with local communities.

5.4.1. Council Members' Interactions with Local Communities

Pudahuel and Providencia showed contrasting experiences regarding council members interactions with local communities. In Pudahuel, council members' disposition to hold the mayor accountable seemed to rely heavily on their ability to maintain their own networks of supporters, given the electoral independence associated with it. However, Providencia's council members showed, in general, little concern for their interaction with local communities. Not only were these interactions admittedly scarce, but they were also reported to be of little relevance for both council members affiliation to their parties and their subsequent nomination and election as council members. Instead, ideological commitment, personal connections, and creative campaigning strategies showed to be more significant than strong connections with local communities in these regards. This situation, then, leaves open the question about how Providencia's council members obtained the autonomy required to oppose the mayor.

As council members' declarations revealed, ideological commitments and family affinities—rather than a history of local leadership—were the decisive factors for their affiliation to parties. As one of them illustrated, for example, accounting for the relevance of his family's connections to his party to deciding to join it:

“I got closer to the party during college [...]. And when I graduated, I wanted to get into territorial political work. So, one day I took my ID and came to the party’s office in Providencia to enroll [...]. Now, I come from a family linked to the Christian Democracy. My grandfather, my dad, my siblings. They never forced me into it, but regarding ideological tendencies, I didn’t need anyone to convince me for me to become a Christian Democrat” (Loyal PDC Council Member, Providencia)²⁵⁴.

Similarly, in all the cases observed, becoming a council member was not related to their involvement with local communities, as it was reported in Pudahuel. Their nominations as candidates were instead explained by their position in their respective parties, while creative campaigning would have been decisive for their election. For example, one council member explained how his relationship with the party leadership, specifically a Parliamentary Representative from his district, was crucial for his nomination:

“In 2008 I went to the United States to study. [Earlier] that year I ran across [the PDC Member of Parliament representing Providencia’s district], and he told me ‘hey, I’ve been trying to find you because I’m looking for candidates to Municipal Councils’. Back then I already had my scholarship and all, so I told him no, but that for the next election I would be available. [I knew this Member of Parliament] from family relations. My family participated in the university parish his family attended, and they shared the same friend during the eighties. And although he was not really a close friend of my parents, they knew each other, and we meet each other in some activities. His sons and I were in the same school, so we see each other in the school activities” (Loyal PDC Council Member, Providencia)²⁵⁵.

Accounting for the relevance of creative campaigning, another council member

explained how adopting a risky strategy allowed him to improve his electoral performance—compared to a previous attempt—and get elected:

“I did a very, very curious campaign because I risked, and I got lucky. I contacted [...] an expert in communications. I gave him my huge curriculum, with four M.A.s and one Ph.D., and he focused on the last line which said, ‘yoga instructor’. And he said: ‘I believe this is it’. And he designed a campaign where I was pictured in yoga positions, dressed in office-style shirt and pants, in a technically perfect position. And that was a very good campaign. Because for council members campaigns, since there are so many people running, if you show yourself as someone serious—like ‘here is your council member, trust him’—you disappear. Is like throwing water to the sea [...] this campaign [was] completely disruptive. It was in the very thin line between standing out and being ridiculous. And it was simply genius” (Loyal PS Council Member, Providencia)²⁵⁶.

Beyond this initial detachment from local communities, council members admitted that they continued to hold low interactions with these communities after that, mainly due to their scarce time availability²⁵⁷. Different actors recognized this situation as generalized among Providencia’s council members and highlighted its contrast with their perceptions about other municipalities. As one council member, for example, described:

“Look, council members in communes like Providencia don’t have very deep rooting with specific groups of voters. At least for what I see. And that also has to do with the time we have available for our duties. In communes like this one, no one lives only on their salary for being a council member [...]. So, there is less involvement [in Providencia]. In other places, council members are indeed much more invested in cultivating relationships. More clientelistic relations are established too, not because the council

member has much to offer, but there is a possibility to make a linkage with the municipality, to help some organizations to get [funds for their] projects” (Loyal PDC Council Member, Providencia).

Although with different levels of emphasis, local leaders also highlighted the limited interaction between Providencia’s council members and the local communities. In the most emphatic version, local leaders declared that they refused any interactions with council members so that they keep—and made evident—the political neutrality of their organizations²⁵⁸. Providing a more nuanced perception, some local leaders reported significant deficiencies in their relations with council members, such as council members not responding to the problems they present to them²⁵⁹ or lacking knowledge about critical aspects of the commune²⁶⁰. In the most nuanced version, some local leaders mentioned that they held some interactions with the council members from one of the two sectors. These interactions were, however, more oriented toward addressing general interests than attend specific needs, framed within the council members’ role as head of specific committees within the Municipal Council, and did not generate a more intense relationship, as seen in other cases²⁶¹.

Finally, the perception of low interaction between council members and local communities was also shared by municipal bureaucrats, who nonetheless identified some exceptions. Manifesting her impression not only of limited involvement with local communities but also generalized disinterest about them among council members, a municipal bureaucrat declared:

“Regarding this Council-Municipality-Community relationship... I feel in this commune this relationship is not really fluid, there is very little communication. We have a Municipal Council that what it does is rather come, listen, and feel that they are some

kind of small Senate, but with very little inclination for the community. I mean, out of four weekends a month, I work three, or so. In them, there might be seven activities, and none of the council members attend any of those seven. So, we are talking about that type of council members” (Bureaucrat 1, Providencia).

Another bureaucrat reported similarly about the limited interaction between council members and local communities, although highlighting two council members as exceptional cases:

“Generally, in our work in the territory, in our meetings with neighborhood associations, with the neighbors, there are no council members present [...]. [Although], I think that [Skeptic RN Council Member 1] does have an important presence in the territory [...]. If you ask me which council member I saw the most in the territory, I think that is [she]. [The others] don’t appear much. Or maybe they do, but they don’t run across us [...]. I mean, we meet with all the local actors, and we don’t run much across [council members]. There is another one that I haven’t seen much in the territory, but [...] if you talk to him, you’ll realize he has done some direct work with the community. That is [the Skeptic PPD Council Member]. But then he had a conflict, let’s say, with the municipality, a conflict with the other council members [...]. He was expelled from his party, and now he disappeared [from the territory], clearly” (Bureaucrat 2, Providencia).

In sum, contrasting with Pudahuel, Providencia’s council members were reported to hold only limited interactions with local communities and to rely more on creative campaigning than intense interactions to get elected. How were they able to keep their independence from the mayor, then? The following sections argue that, contrasting with the other municipalities analyzed, Providencia lacked the two mechanisms through which mayors and their administrations may attempt to induce

council members' loyalty. On the one hand, the municipal bureaucracy shows important limitations in addressing local communities demands while, on the other hand, council members' scarce interaction with local communities and specific municipal regulations limited council members' intermediation between these communities and municipal bureaucrats.

5.4.2. Municipality-Community Relations

Similar to Las Condes, Providencia showed a well-financed municipality with a highly professionalized bureaucracy and a decided orientation towards working with local communities. However, three main obstacles impeded Providencia to translate these advantages into the efficient local problem-solving that allowed Las Condes to limit council members' independence²⁶². First, the new administration inherited from the previous one limited and mostly negative relationships with poorly organized local communities. Although the new administration worked to revert this situation, interviewees reported that these efforts were slow to produce visible results. Second, bureaucrats coming from the previous administrations were identified as disloyal to the new mayor, intentionally obstructing the work of the other ones and, therefore, reducing the usability of the bureaucracy. Finally, interviewees reported a clumsy relation between some departments of the municipality and local communities, unintentionally hampering each other. Under these circumstances, unlike Las Condes, in Providencia the municipal bureaucracy's usability and capacity to address communities' demands remained limited, thus restricting its ability to dominate the relationship with local communities and influence council members' electoral chances.

Availability of resources: Compared to the other municipalities in Santiago, Providencia was characterized by its high availability of resources. With an average annual municipal income of about 56.5 billion pesos during the period analyzed (the term between December 6, 2012, and December 6, 2016), Providencia is one of the five wealthiest municipal administrations in Santiago, more than doubling Santiago's average municipal income (about 26 billion pesos)²⁶³. As table 16 in the Annex shows, this situation was similar when the size of the corresponding communes was taken into account. With an average of 396 thousand pesos per habitant between 2013 and 2016, Providencia was among the three wealthiest municipalities, more than doubling once again the city's municipal average (152 thousand pesos per habitant).

Active involvement in local communities: The administration of mayor Errázuriz intended to be a turning point regarding the municipal administration's interaction with local communities. Rising herself from a history of deep involvement in grassroots organizations, which she kept until her successful candidacy to Providencia's mayoralty, mayor Errázuriz made the promotion of citizen participation and association a central component of her campaign and administration²⁶⁴. Translating this new emphasis into action was perceived as particularly challenging²⁶⁵, especially given the dismissive attitude of the previous administration about its interaction with local communities. As one municipal bureaucrat described, highlighting the differences between the two administrations:

“When we first got here as an administration [...] there was no associativity, there practically wasn't any organization. There were six neighborhood associations²⁶⁶, which received, with luck, 230,000 pesos yearly. Today we have sixteen neighborhood

associations, which receive four million pesos [yearly]. There was very little. So, effectively, people didn't participate in anything during that period. Nobody asked anything, and if they came [to the municipality], they were not well received either. It was difficult. [But] we started with a participative Communal Development Plan²⁶⁷, the 'Think Providencia'. 5,000 persons participated [...], and from then on, for most of the activities involving municipal policy design, we invite the community to participate, through local organizations, or in [neighborhood] roundtables²⁶⁸ or open spaces" (Bureaucrat 1, Providencia).

The change in the municipal bureaucracy's relationship with Providencia's communities was also recognized by local leaders, who agreed both about the lack of communication and bureaucrats' persistent obstruction during the previous administration, and the work of the new administration to organize local communities and address their demands. For example, making a direct comparison between the two administrations, one local leader reported about the difference in the interest these administrations showed in working with local organizations, reflected in the financial and administrative support they provided:

"When [the current mayor] appeared, in her discourse was the community participation, and [...] it was put into action: the neighborhood associations received more resources. I investigated and found that the association corresponding to my neighborhood wasn't active for six or seven years. Of course, [the former mayor] was not interested [...] and he actually gave them only 380,000 pesos yearly, and it was impossible to maintain a neighborhood association with these resources [...]. Josefa [instead] gives us 3.8 million pesos to activate these associations, and [help us with] all the paperwork, and etcetera. [To activate the neighborhood association] we went to the municipality. And the

people who arrived with Josefa, [...] they had that type of training. [...] They knew how to activate the neighborhood associations [and] they told us what to do” (Local Leader 4, Providencia)²⁶⁹.

However, while these interviews suggest a strong connection between municipal bureaucrats and local organizations, the low number of territory organizations in Providencia, low levels of participation on them, and the relatively low total funds transferred to them suggested that these strong connections were still limited to a small portion of the commune.

As one municipal bureaucrat reported, the number of active neighborhood associations almost tripled during the current mayor’s administration. However, their final number (sixteen) was still meager—and the lowest among the cases studied. Moreover, according to CASEN 2015 survey, although a comparatively large proportion of Providencia’s residents (30.8%) declared to participate in any civil society organization²⁷⁰, the proportion participating primarily in territory-based organizations was rather low (5.4%)²⁷¹. Finally, as table 17 in the Annex shows, during the period analyzed (the term between December 6, 2012, and December 6, 2016) the Municipality of Providencia spent, on average, approximately 84.7 million pesos every year in money transfers to community organizations. This amount puts Providencia slightly above the median (about 79 million pesos) but substantively below the average (nearly 320 million pesos) among Santiago’s municipalities—despite the comparatively high financial resources available for this municipality. This expenditure remained at a similar medium level when considered in relation to the size of the communal population²⁷².

Thus, although both local leaders and municipal bureaucrats reported visible improvements in the relation between them, these would not have been enough to

overcome the legacies of the previous administration completely. Agreeing with this situation, one municipal bureaucrat explained how, from his perspective, it is the trust and the confidence between the two parties that need to be recomposed. Doing so, in his opinion, would take time—which has not been enough yet—and intense and proficient work in the territory—which has not always been there. As he explained:

“I think that that trust and confidence is built slowly. And it is built, I believe, with a higher presence in the territory. As people say, to get married first you need to date. And effectively there are expectations from the community, related to some improvements, and I tell you very honestly, I don’t know [if we meet them]. [...] we work a lot on activities within the territory, because [...] this is how we are building a relationship with the community. We expect that, through some basic criteria of transparency, and participation promotion, in the end, we start building a relationship with them, so that we can work with them through their community development. (Bureaucrat 2, Providencia).

Additionally, these limitations would have been reinforced by the tendency of some departments of the municipality to begin conflicts with some local communities, thus impeding more cooperative relationships and forcing the Municipality’s Territory Team to focus in the resolution of these conflicts rather than reinforcing more positive interactions. As one bureaucrat exemplified when explaining his daily duties:

“The day by day has two lines. One of them has to do with attending the emergencies, the alerts that rise in the territory [...]. For example, in Julio Prado street, there was a process that started with a neighbor who had a garden center in the community, which was very beloved by the neighbors. And because of an administrative mistake [...], the municipality didn’t renew his permit. The neighbors organized and gather 500 signatures to support him, [but] the municipality was close-minded in applying the

current legislation [...]. A senior citizen with cancer, saying with 500 neighbors supporting him, that he wants to set a garden center, and we, because of an administrative mistake, are denying that... there are very few arguments in a public discussion to support that” (Bureaucrat 2, Providencia)²⁷³.

In consequence, although there were significant changes in how Providencia’s municipal bureaucracy actively approached local communities, as municipal bureaucrats recognized, the legacies from the previous administration may still be impeding to develop the confidence needed for stronger interaction between them, thus negatively this bureaucracy’s capacity to dominate the interactions with local communities. Additionally, problems of coordination within the municipality might have reinforced this situation, impeding an appropriate delivery of public goods and services, and diverting the attention of the territory teams from creating a more positive interaction with local communities.

Bureaucratic capacity to receive and respond to local demands: With around 900 bureaucrats and over 30% of them holding a professional degree, Providencia had one of the biggest²⁷⁴ and most professionalized²⁷⁵ bureaucracies in Santiago. This depiction of a massive and highly professionalized bureaucracy was not contested in the interviews. However, the interviewees perceived that its translation into an efficient reception and adequate response to communities’ demands was hindered by a divided loyalty to the mayor among bureaucrats—thus reducing the usability of the bureaucracy and reinforcing the coordination problems in their interaction with local communities. According to their declarations, this division overlapped with the distinction between bureaucrats who arrived with mayor Errázuriz

and bureaucrats who were kept from the former administration, the latter being identified as more disloyal, and prone to sabotage the work of the new administration. As one municipal bureaucrat explained, describing the type of interaction between different bureaucrats and implying the consequences it has for handling communities' demands:

“I didn’t get here that [first year of the new administration], but I tell you that the earthquake [of the transition] is still here today. There are like two administrations here: the old one and the new one. The old bureaucrats are always waiting for us, the new ones, to leave; and the new ones [are] wishing to chase the old ones out, [or] at least seduce or enchant them with a different project [...]. The old ones row backward²⁷⁶ all the time. I mean, if a memo has to be done within five days, sometimes it takes fifteen, or twenty or twenty-five days. They reject it, and reject it, and reject it. They try to trap you in red tape. They deny information to us [...]. And they don’t give it; they don’t respond. So, sometimes, [...] we ask the neighbors to ask for the information themselves, through Transparency channels. Then they are obliged to give it to them. But not to us” (Bureaucrat 1, Providencia)²⁷⁷.

Reflecting the implications of these divisions in the municipal bureaucracy, some local leaders emphasized how some bureaucrats are dismissive of their problems. Specifically, after declaring a robust cooperative work with some bureaucrats, one local leader mentioned:

“And there is also a group of persons within [the municipality] who don’t care about [our problems], bureaucrats of this [higher] level and this [lower] level who don’t care. Many have kept their position [in the municipality], but they don’t care. I’m left with the impression that they don’t empathize with this kind of things” (Local Leader 3,

Providencia).

In sum, the municipality of Providencia had substantive financial resources, a massive and professionalized bureaucracy, and a strong orientation towards a direct involvement with local communities. However, the interviews suggested that the new administration had significant limitations to take advantage of these characteristics to adequately address local communities' demands. In particular, the legacy of scarce and negative interactions between the municipal bureaucracy and local communities, the lack of coordination among them and the lack of loyalty among municipal bureaucrats, reducing the usability of the bureaucracy and reinforcing the problems of coordination. Under these circumstances, Providencia's municipal administration is expected to have a low capacity to limit council members' interactions with local communities and, therefore, influence their electoral chances. This inability of the municipal bureaucracy makes unlikely the type of council members' dependence on the mayor observed in Las Condes and, therefore, a similar capacity of the mayor to dissuade council members from holding her accountable.

5.4.3. Council Members as Intermediaries

As the cases of Estación Central and Quinta Normal suggest, where municipalities face limitations to address local communities' demands, there are opportunities for council members to act as intermediaries between these communities and the municipal bureaucracy. When that happens, the mayors and their administration can make council members' access to municipal resources conditional to their loyalty to the mayor—thus making them dependent on them.

In Providencia, instances in which council members intermediate between local

communities and the municipal bureaucracy were reported to be scarce²⁷⁸. Added to council members' own limitations to interact with local communities (described earlier), the municipality imposed procedural rules similar to those of Las Condes, requiring them to channel all the demands they receive through the mayor's cabinet (the Chief of Staff and four close collaborators). Therefore, similar to Las Condes, in Providencia intermediation was a strategy broadly unavailable for council members. As one municipal bureaucrat described, these rules were established early during the new administration, to maintain control over the bureaucracy's workflow:

“Early on in this local government, council members tried to relate directly with the technical teams [in the municipality]. And I think that, somehow, that is always a complication for the mayor. Because the mayor is the leader of the government and, in the end, must keep the municipal work well organized [...]. So, early on it was established that all the communications with council members had to go through the [mayor's] cabinet [...]. So, there would be a formal channel through which the petitions are collected and is that department—the cabinet—the one that makes the corresponding referral (Bureaucrat 2, Providencia).

In consequence, the relationship between council members and municipal bureaucrats tended to be scarce and highly formal, generally mediated either by the mayor's cabinet or the Municipal Council and where both council members' intermediation and their participation in municipal public events were rare. According to municipal bureaucrats, this type of interactions was particularly noteworthy when considered in comparison with the reality of other municipalities in Chile. Illustrating this point, one municipal bureaucrat highlighted how formal and mediated these relationships were and made the comparison with other municipalities she knew:

“Look, what happens is that, here, council members work as they do elsewhere: they have an office, a secretary, and some advisors. And following the Laws regulating Lobby, the neighbors ask to meet them. In general, what council members do is receiving communities and present their demands to the Municipal Council. Well, if they actually present them at all is not clear to me. We are in contact with council members basically through the Municipal Council, [but] we don’t even interact directly [with them in the Council’s meetings]. It is left in the meetings records that something has been required. Then, we provide a written response, and that is delivered to council members through the Municipal Secretary [...]. So, we do interact with them, but always in very formal terms. Even when we organize activities [with the community], we don’t invite them directly. It is the Department of Communications the one that invites them [...]. I have never work in another municipality, but I do have seen that in other communes [the bureaucrats] talk with council members, and there is a more fluent relation. But not here” (Bureaucrat 1, Providencia)²⁷⁹.

Council members also admitted that most of the intermediation they did followed the formal procedures. Therefore, it was limited to passing the information about the demand they receive, instead of advocating in front of the bureaucracy in favor of the community and following up with the process of providing a solution. By acting in this way, they limited their ability to take credit for problem-solving, disappointing neighbors’ expectations. As one council member, for example, described:

“I have never given an anticipated answer saying that I can or cannot do something. I listen to people and tell them that I’m going to do what I can. I transmit the problem [and] it is like building the bridge, so to speak. But never like doing a favor—I have to follow the regular channels [...]. People tend to think that if they have one authority

on their side things are going to move faster, but I basically pass the information” (Loyal PS Council Member, Providencia).

Local leaders’ perceptions are consistent with these descriptions. As previously described, local leaders reported a generally low interaction with council members (who tend to be unavailable) on the one hand, and a more fruitful (although probably not spread enough yet) relation with municipal bureaucrats, on the other hand. If so, local communities may prefer to address their demands directly through municipal bureaucrats, rather than through council members intermediation²⁸⁰.

In sum, according to the interviews’ reports, council members intermediation between local communities and the municipal bureaucracy was severely limited regarding both quantity and intensity. While municipal rules requiring council members to channel all the demands they receive through the mayor’s cabinet offer a primary explanation for this outcome, council members’ own limitations for interacting with local communities reinforced this effect. Among the cases analyzed, only Las Condes reported the existence of similar rules. In that case, they helped to strengthen the already tight relationship between the municipal bureaucracy and the local communities, by consolidating the channels of communication between them. That effect seemed unlikely in Providencia, where the municipal bureaucracy showed significant problems to address communities demands efficiently, as previously described. Instead, these rules made unavailable a mechanism (council members’ intermediation) that, like in Estación Central and Quinta Normal, could help to compensate the deficiencies of the municipal administration while providing the mayor a source of influence to induce council members’ loyalty.

5.5. Conclusion

Both in socioeconomic and political terms, Pudahuel and Providencia constitute an odd match, standing out more for their differences than for their similarities. However, in both communes, council members showed a similarly high disposition to hold their mayors accountable. How did cases as different as these arrive at these similar outcomes?

The information analyzed in this chapter suggests that, although in different ways and produced by different combinations of factors, in both Pudahuel and Providencia council members shared similarly high levels of autonomy from the mayor. Similar to the cases analyzed in previous chapters, both constituent support and the (lack of) influence of the mayors were critical in determining this autonomy.

Similar to the cases of skeptic council members in Estación Central and Quinta Normal, in Pudahuel's context of moderate usability and capacity of the municipal administration to address communities' demands, council members' ability to create and maintain their constituent support with independence of municipal resources, raised as their most significant source of autonomy from the mayor. Relying on their history of deep involvement in local communities and their personal time and resources to address to communities' demands, skeptic council members *informally* improve their organizational capacity to build constituent support, thus reducing the executive's organizational advantage over them. Based on that independent support, these council members were able to hold the mayor accountable without risking their electoral chances, despite the mayor's influence and attempts to punish them.

Two additional factors help to explain council members' electoral independence in Pudahuel. First, council members' ability to maintain their inclusion in successful

party lists may interact with their ability to maintain their network of supporters to ensure their electoral independence from the mayor—especially in a proportional representation electoral system. In the case of one council member in Pudahuel, this was manifested through her relationships with influential groups within her party, who refer to her electoral performance to defend her from the attempts to take her out of the party list. Second, as the case of one loyal council member in Pudahuel suggested, membership in a disciplined party might be enough to maintain a network of supporters. According to her perception, despite her loyalty to the mayor, it was the relevance of the Communist Party in Pudahuel what allowed her to obtain the necessary votes to get elected.

This independence of Pudahuel's council members was accompanied by an understanding of the Municipal Council as an independent *collegiate body*, thus highlighting both their collective and diligent dedication to their duties and the prioritization of their role as supervisors over their partisan affiliations. This particular understanding and regard for their oversight duties help to explain how where they able to translate that autonomy into a high disposition to hold the mayor accountable, despite their party affiliations.

Providencia, on the other hand, presented a more puzzling case scenario. Here, council members showed higher isolation from local communities—similar to that of council members in Las Condes—as they reported low involvement in local communities and rather minimal involvement in local problem-solving. Moreover, similar to Las Condes, municipal rules prohibited bureaucrats from receiving local demands channeled by council members directly to them, thus increasing council members isolation from local communities, reducing these communities' incentives to

turn to them for help. How, then, were they able to sustain a high disposition to hold the mayor accountable?

In this case, council members' electoral independence from the mayor was paired with the incapacity of the executive to capitalize on its organizational advantage. Two main reasons explain this situation. On the one hand, the interviews suggested that, despite its high availability of resources and large and highly professionalized bureaucracy, the new administration's capacity to address local demands was severely hampered, first, by the legacies of the previous one, second, internal problems of coordination, and third, the lack of loyalty among municipal bureaucrats that reduced the bureaucracy's usability. Under these circumstances, the local executive was unable to become a predominant and influential actor—like the local executive of Las Condes—and, therefore, council members had little electoral incentives to show loyalty to the mayor. On the other hand, municipal rules prohibiting bureaucrats to receive demands channeled from council members directly to them, not only reinforced council members' isolation but also further limited the role played by council members as intermediaries, which in other cases was used to induce their loyalty to the mayor. In sum, in Providencia, the executive was also detached from local communities and was, therefore, unable to electorally punish or reward council members for their loyalty.

In Providencia's context of mayoralty incapacity to structure the loyalties within the Municipal Council and high council members' detachment from local communities, party affiliations had a stronger influence in structuring Municipal Council's disposition to hold the mayor accountable. This influence of party affiliations seemed to be particularly relevant given the high party competition and the mayor's implementation of symbolic policies of high political significance.

6. Conclusions

The results of this research show that the configuration of local systems of relationships—comprising relationships between councils, executives (i.e., the mayor and the municipal bureaucracy) and constituencies (i.e., the local voters)—have significant effects over a critical factor determining Municipal Councils' disposition for horizontal accountability: their autonomy from the mayor.

According to the cases analyzed, local councils' dependence on the mayor is a significant factor for inhibiting their disposition to hold these mayors accountable. This dependence, has a critical electoral component, thus making the triangular relations between council members, local executives and constituencies a determinant factor. Specifically, and as a general proposition, when council members are unable to generate and maintain sufficient constituent support, local executives can use their resources and influence to reduce or increase council members' electoral chances. This influence on council members' electoral performance can be used to induce their loyalty to the mayors, thus discouraging them from holding these mayors accountable.

Constituencies, therefore, play a significant role in local horizontal accountability by giving council members a chance to be independent from their mayors, *despite* their disposition to hold the mayor accountable (or lack thereof)—independence that disappears if council members rely on the help of the local executives to obtain constituents' support.

This role of constituencies is expected to be particularly significant where the delivery of goods and services and the solution of local problems rank high among the elements

defining this constituencies' electoral support—as in the cases analyzed here. Under these circumstances, council members' capacity to raise constituent support tend to be conditional to their capacity to get involved in the processes of addressing local demands. Moreover, council members' involvement in the processes (and their role as local problem-solvers) might become *informally institutionalized* and, therefore, not only given for granted but also unofficially enforced both by local communities and council members themselves. Therefore, council members in these situations have strong incentives to form *clientelistic relationships* with local communities—conditionally exchanging goods and benefits for political support—especially when these communities are willing to punish council members who fail to deliver, by damaging their reputation or denying them access to their local organizations.

The cases analyzed illustrate two scenarios in which council members' dependence on the mayor is more probable to be higher. In the first of them, a popular mayor supported by a usable and efficient municipal bureaucracy is able, to reduce these communities' incentives to turn to council members for help and, therefore, maintain these council members generally isolated from these communities. Under these circumstances, council members have limited capacity to validate themselves and tend to depend on the mayor's figure to increase their electoral chances.

According to the cases analyzed, two elements are of particular relevance in producing these results. First, local executives' capacity to create rules prohibiting council members to channel local demands directly to municipal bureaucrats (thus further reducing local communities' incentives to turn to council members), or requiring them to channel these demands to the mayor or the Municipal Council (thus reducing council

members' capacity to obtain recognition for solving problems). Second, municipal bureaucracy's high usability and capacity to address communities' demands—marked by their availability of financial resources, their disposition to actively reach local communities, and their loyal and efficient members—making council members seem irrelevant to local communities. These two elements, then, give the local executive an *organizational advantage* over council members, which can be used to marginalize council members from local communities and consolidate the executive's dominant position in front of these communities. Among the cases analyzed, Las Condes best illustrates this scenario.

In a second case scenario, a local executive lacking a usable and capable bureaucracy to address communities' demands is still able to induce council members loyalty. Here, municipal administrations' difficulties in addressing communities needs and demands increased these communities' incentives to turn to council members for help and, therefore, council members' possibilities to interact with these communities and ensure their support. However, council members may respond to these demands by connecting these communities with the municipal bureaucrats and following up the processes of producing a response. This *intermediation* role assumed by council members provides local executives with new possibilities to induce council members' loyalty to the mayor—rewarding loyal council members with access to municipal bureaucrats while denying it to disloyal ones. Thus, under these circumstances, local executives can compensate for their low bureaucratic usability and capacity with other organizational attributes, to maintain their organizational advantage over council members. As these cases illustrate, these additional attributes include not only the flexible and arbitrary use of rules regulating the interaction between bureaucrats and council members but

also the discretionary distribution of resources (such as staff) and formal opportunities, for council members to interact with local communities. In consequence, although council members in these situations are less directly dependent on the mayor as a result of their greater possibilities to interact with local communities and gain more reputation as problem-solvers, these possibilities can be highly influenced by their loyalty to the mayor. The cases of Estación Central and Quinta Normal best illustrate this scenario.

Even when the municipal administrations have some usability and capacity to address local communities' demands and offer some opportunities for intermediation, council members can use diverse strategies to resist executives' pressures for loyalty. Most significant among them is council members' use of their personal time and resources (or those of their personal networks) to interact with local communities and address their demands without resorting to municipal resources. By doing so, Council members informally improve their own organizational capacity to build and maintain their constituent support, thus reducing both the organizational advantage of local executives and mayors' influence over them. Consequently, for the effects of intermediation on council members' disposition to hold the mayor accountable, these improvements of their organizational capacity include having municipal bureaucrats within their personal networks and relying on them to address communities demands. In these cases, by obtaining the favor of bureaucrats based on personal connections rather than loyalty to the mayor, council members would be able to play an intermediation role between local communities and the bureaucracy, although escaping from the influence of the mayor.

Council members may also use two additional strategies to resist executives' pressures

for loyalty—although they were less significant in the cases analyzed. First, council members may gain electoral independence by capitalizing the support either of highly disciplined party members or pockets of local discontent with the mayors—especially if they do not compete for these sources of support with other council members. Second, council members may gain independence from the mayor through non-electoral means by either ensuring their inclusion in a successful party list—so that they would be elected even with a low proportion of votes—or renouncing to their reelection. Although council members with these characteristics were found in all the municipalities analyzed (especially in Estación Central and Quinta Normal), the case of Pudahuel best illustrates this scenario, presenting a Municipal Council with a high disposition to hold the mayor accountable paired to its higher level of autonomy.

In a final scenario, the Municipal Council can maintain a high degree of autonomy when local executives both lack usability and capacity to address communities' demands and do not offer opportunities for council members' intermediation. These circumstances reduce local executives' organizational advantage over council members, so that, even if council members also lack mechanisms to gain constituent support, their electoral chances cannot be influenced by their executive. Therefore, council members may hold the mayor accountable without risking their chances of being reelected for doing so. Among the municipalities studied, the case of Providencia best illustrates this scenario.

In consequence, local councils can be expected to have a high disposition for horizontal accountability *only* when a high proportion of their members are thus electorally independent from the mayor. However, while council members' dependence on the mayor implies a low disposition for horizontal accountability, their independence from

the mayor does not translate automatically into a higher disposition for horizontal accountability, and additional elements need to be considered to explain their higher or lower disposition. Two elements related to local councils organizational dimension were of particular significance in the cases analyzed. First, council members understanding and regard for their role—independent local councils reporting high esteem for their institutional autonomy and corporate oversight duties, showed a higher disposition for horizontal accountability (especially in Pudahuel). Second, council members' party affiliation may also become a significant element for determining Municipal Council's disposition to hold the mayor accountable, even if local politicians remain independent from their parties. This relevance of parties might be particularly significant where party competition is high, party politics has gained a higher significance, and council members are also detached from local communities—and, therefore, unrelated to the solution of their quotidian problems (as the case of Providencia shows).

These results have several implications for the study and understanding of local horizontal accountability.

First, the results highlight the relevance of analyzing relations of horizontal accountability from a systemic approach—as this research did, using an institutional power framework—to incorporate the interactions between different dimensions and actors to the analysis. In particular, while arguing about the relevance of local councils' constituent support for their disposition to hold the mayors accountable, the research shows that this support is not independent of constituents' interactions with both local executives and council members, thus highlighting the presence of systemic effects of a semi-closed circuit of relationships on these regards. Moreover, the research shows,

more specifically, how different combinations of organizational attributes of both local executives and councils affect the latter's capacity to obtain the constituent support they require, therefore highlighting how variations in constitutive elements across institutions may produce significant impacts in the implementation of their constitutional powers. In consequence, the research shows that an adequate understanding requires considering not only the effect of single factors coming from single sources but also how different factors coming from diverse sources can interact to have significant effects on horizontal accountability. This conclusion is particularly relevant, given the trend in the literature on horizontal accountability to prioritize the analysis of isolated effects of single factors or dimensions over those of more complex systems of interactions.

Second, the literature has proposed that constituencies are relevant for horizontal accountability insofar as they are aware of the accountability role of their representatives and are willing to reward or punish them for their performance in these respects. Although this research does not deny the impact that constituencies have when they behave that way, it shows how the role they play is more complicated, illustrating how constituents are still relevant when they behave differently—even if that *different behavior* implies clientelistic relationships. Specifically, by ensuring their electoral support, constituencies may provide council members with sufficient autonomy from local executives, so that they can hold them accountable without risking their chances of being reelected for doing so. This autonomy tends to disappear when constituents' support becomes contingent to the help council members receive from local executives to address their demands. In consequence, constituent support obtained without executive interference is an enabling factor for local horizontal

accountability even when voters are uninformed, politically unaware, or in clientelistic relationships with their representatives.

Third, this research shows that local executives are capable of influencing local councils' disposition to hold them accountable even where local administrations are highly usable and efficient. Moreover, as the case of Las Condes illustrates, these characteristics give local executives an organizational advantage over council members, allowing them to dominate the interactions with local communities, while isolating council members and making them, therefore, dependent on the mayors' influence. These counterintuitive results contrast with the literature highlighting the relevance of cultural factors and systematic administrative deficiencies as determinants of mayors' influence on horizontal accountability, and shows, instead, how mayors can still be influential *because* of the highly usable and efficient organization of the local bureaucracy.

Although seemingly paradoxical, these results about the influence of efficient local executives are consistent with Mainwaring's (2003) discussion about the conflicting relationship between accountability and governmental effectiveness. According to the author, although it is reasonable to expect accountability to improve governmental effectiveness to some degree, by restraining corruption and improper use of resources, governments might become ineffective "*if they are so hampered by mechanisms of oversight and sanctioning agencies that they cannot undertake new initiatives*" (p. 4). Therefore, although unlikely, it is not entirely unreasonable to find highly efficient governments paired with low levels of horizontal accountability, especially if that efficiency can be used to reinforce the dominant position of the executive vis-à-vis the local council, as this research suggests.

Finally, regarding the concerns about the quality of local horizontal accountability, the results of this research echo the relevance that the literature on horizontal accountability has placed on the autonomy of accountability agents. Specifically for the case local councils, the research highlights the role that constituent support plays and, in consequence, of the different ways in which council members may build meaningful relationships with local communities in building that autonomy.

In the cases analyzed, these meaningful relationships—and constituents' rationale for supporting local politicians—tended to be driven by council members' capacity to deliver goods and services to them. Although this framing of the relationship between council members and local communities may work, to some extent, as an effective mechanism for building council members' autonomy, it has at least three critical drawbacks. First, it tends to move these relationships closer to—when not completely into—clientelistic relationships. By doing so, it focuses on constituents' particularistic interests rather than their programmatic perspectives about the local government, it makes council members' performance in the delivery of goods and services more relevant for voters than their performance in their official duties, and it makes it possible for local politicians to punish voters who fail to support them. Second, given local executives' normally higher availability of resources, this situation tends to make their organizational advantage more significant for council members' autonomy than it could presumably be in situations where council members are not required to compete with the local executives' capacity for delivering goods and services to have meaningful relationships with local communities. Third, especially where council members work in precarious conditions (e.g., where their jobs are part-time, they are underpaid and lack resources), their capacity to build and maintain sufficient

constituent support with independence of local executives' influence depend, ultimately, on their capacity to *informally* improve their organizational resources to address communities demands. This resource to informality as an effective strategy to gain autonomy highlights how council members, under these conditions, tend to be inadequately equipped to perform their duties, and how this framing for their relationships with local communities is, therefore, misplaced.

Different contextual settings could help to produce a different type of relationship between council members and local communities. In particular, contexts in which national parties have higher influence in local politics, local governments have a greater *governmental* (as opposed to merely *administrative*) role, council members have better conditions to perform their duties, and where local councils have higher influence in local decision making, could be promising for finding more programmatic relationships between council members and local communities. However, it is up to future research to explore these different contextual setting and elucidating the degree to which the particularistic exchanges observed in this research are constitutive of council members' relationships with local communities, and the conditions under which these relationships can be framed in a different way.

7. Footnotes

¹ See: El Mercurio en Internet (2006) and “Condenan a Jorge Soria por tres delitos” (2009). Jorge Soria was finally absolved of these charges by the Supreme Court in 2012. However, it is still a telling example of the existence of the oversight and sanctioning over public authorities in Chile. See Ayala (2012).

² See, for example, the following news reports: Morales (2018), Epicentro Chile (2018), Bustos (2018), Stuardo & Montoya (2017) and Parra (2018).

³ See, for example, the edited volumes of Schedler et al. (1999) and Mainwaring & Welna (2003) on these respects.

⁴ See Pino (2017), Giraudy (2012) and Behrend & Whitehead (2016) for further references on these issues.

⁵ See, for example, Bland (2011).

⁶ Following the successful experience of Porto Alegre, the use and implications of local participatory mechanisms in the region have been profusely studied. See, for example Baiocchi (2005), Wampler & Avritzer (2004), and Montambeault (2016).

⁷ See, for example, Barozet (2004), Eaton & Prieto (2017), Arévalo León (2015), and Silva (2016).

⁸ Given that mechanisms of oversight and sanctioning can slow down the processes of decision making and the implementation of programs as well as the delivery of public goods and services. However, Mainwaring also highlights that, in Latin America, it is the general lack of accountability what is a critical challenge across the region.

⁹ Mainwaring (2003, 18-20) offers a viable alternative solution by merely exchanging the term *horizontal* for *intrastate*, and the term *vertical* for *electoral*. This proposition, however, does not fundamentally change the categorization proposed by O'Donnell, beyond the change in the name.

¹⁰ Alternative nomenclatures have been developed and could be used as well. Goetz and Jenkins (2005), for example, distinguish between a *seeker* and a *target* of accountability to avoid the principal-agent language.

¹¹ Different accounts follow similar considerations of the means of accountability, while some other stresses one of them over the other. See Mainwaring (2003) for a review on this topic. See Goetz and Jenkins (2005) and Lindberg (2013) for examples of similar accounts.

¹² See, for example, O'Donnell 1999, 39.

¹³ Especially if, as Schedler (1999) recognized, “*the demand for accountability (as answerability) originates from the opacity of power*” (p. 20), thus highlighting the natural capacity of objects of accountability to keep information private.

¹⁴ For this argument, this research assumes that voters will consider the new information in their voting decisions, which, although reasonable, cannot be given for granted. See Boas et al. (2018) and Fox (2015) for arguments in this direction.

¹⁵ Packel (2008) and Lankina (2008) offer extensive literature reviews including local accountability. Similarly, Yilmaz et al. (2010) offer some extensive account of possible mechanisms for local accountability. However, while the first of them is limited to the electoral institutions, all of them are more concerned with government performance than accountability in itself, making the reports on accountability either partial or confusing.

¹⁶ Cheibub Figueiredo (2003) holds a similar argument for the executive-legislative relations at the national level. According to her observations, where (1) the constitution grants the executive strong legislative agenda-setting powers, (2) congressional rules allow party leaders to control the legislative process, and (3) the formation of coalition governments is the dominant pattern, the government tends to show a strong coordination between the executive and the legislative

powers, which ultimately hamper parliament's exercise of accountability over the executive.

¹⁷ See also comments of Melo et al. (2009) on these respects.

¹⁸ On the one hand, proportional representation systems are expected to increase the chances for smaller (and opposition) parties to obtain a seat in local councils and make elected officials more dependent on their parties (Farrell 2001; Gallagher & Mitchell 2005). On the other hand, as Morgenstern & Manzetti (2003), for example, observed for the national level, single-member district, especially when combined with primaries, increases candidates' independence from their parties, which the authors associated with incentives for legislators to professionalize their workplace, thus increasing their capacity of horizontal accountability. At the local level, this independence from parties could also reduce national parties' incentives for council members to deviate from their role mentioned earlier.

¹⁹ On the one hand, term limits could prevent local politicians from becoming entrenched in their positions through undemocratic means. On the other hand, term limits that are too restrictive might prevent local politicians from mastering their responsibilities before their term expire.

²⁰ Constituencies are considered both as actors and constitutive elements to highlight its ambiguous position as the only constitutive element that is, at the same time, another agent (or set of agents). Although the institutional power approach adopted here consider them as constitutive elements of state institutions (to analyze, narrowly, the relationship between these institutions), the fact that even there they are considered as significant components suggests that they must be considered among the relevant actors when analyzing, more broadly, the influential local relationships.

²¹ Between 1992 and 2004, only the members of the municipal council were elected through popular vote. Mayors were elected by the Municipal Councils, choosing them among council members, and usually corresponding to the most voted candidate.

²² Chile has three types of contracts for bureaucrats. Bureaucrats under the civil service system (*Planta*) are hired for an undefined period, for positions that are declared *permanent*, and are protected by the civil service career code. Bureaucrats working under fixed-term contracts (*Contrata*) are hired to perform transitory functions, and their contract must end by December 31 of the corresponding year—although each year it can be extended to the next one. Bureaucrats working under a fee-for-service status (*Honorarios*) are not covered by a contractual relation (Ley N° 18.883 1989).

²³ According to the law, all municipal bureaucrats must be evaluated on their performance and abilities. Obtaining the lowest grade in these evaluations imply that the bureaucrat is automatically removed from office and must leave their position within 15 days. The same is the case for bureaucrats obtaining the second lowest grade for two consecutive years. The evaluations are carried out by a committee composed of the highest ranked bureaucrats, who are, in turn, evaluated by the mayor. Bureaucrats can appeal their evaluations, in which case they are reevaluated by the mayor (Ley N° 18.883 1989).

²⁴ Municipalities must decide, with the participation of local communities, a plan organizing the urban areas (*Plan Regulador*), and a four-year plan orienting the development strategy of the commune (*Plan de Desarrollo Comunal*).

²⁵ The Law regulating Chilean municipalities distinguishes two types of functions they are required to carry out—those that are of exclusive responsibility of the corresponding municipality, and those on which municipalities are allowed to share the responsibility with of other state agencies.

Under those of exclusive responsibility of the municipality, the law mentions: the elaboration of the Communal Development Plan (*Plan de Desarrollo Comunal*) and the Regulatory Plan (*Plan Regulador*); the promotion of community development; Implement and enforce the laws on transportation and public transit; Implement and enforce the laws on construction and urbanization; and the maintenance and beautification of the commune.

Under those of which they are allowed to share responsibility with other state agencies, the law

mentions: education and culture; public health and environment protection; social and legal aid provision; employment training, and employment and production promotion; tourism, sports and recreation; urbanization and road management; building of social housing and water and sewage infrastructure; public transit and transportation; risk prevention and help assistance under emergencies or catastrophes; social and situational prevention, and implementation of public security measures; promotion of equal opportunities between men and women; the development of local activities of common interest (Ley N° 18.695 2006).

²⁶ The Control Unit is an autonomous department of the municipal administration, which works with the technical assistance of the Comptroller General's Office to oversee the legality of municipalities' actions (Rosales 2007; Ley N° 18695 2016).

²⁷ This low relevance of parties at the local level was also reported by council members and parliamentarians interviewed in this research, who highlighted the lack of accounting and control mechanisms over council members, while *el que tiene mantiene* (the one who has it, keeps it) was reported as the general rule of thumb for nominating incumbent candidates.

²⁸ As the following sections and chapters show, this selection strategy obtained cases with different values on the dependent variable, although these values were not correlated with any of the variables used to select cases.

²⁹ The research considered news reports in *local* news media only for Pudahuel since it is the only commune where news media of this type was available. For the rest, only reports in *national* news media were included.

³⁰ The research also considered denunciations made by council members to the corresponding Electoral Tribunals and the Prosecutor General's Office. However, no denunciations were made to the Electoral Tribunals, while the information obtained from the Prosecutor General does not include who made the denunciations.

³¹ *Juntas de Vecinos* are civil society organizations representing the people who live in the same *Unidad Vecinal*—a territorial subdivision of a commune. Their formal purpose is to promote the development of the community, defend the interests and rights of their members, and collaborate with authorities of the state and municipalities (Ley N° 19.418 1997). They were formally recognized in 1968, represent about one-third of all civil society organizations in the country, and are highlighted by its role in promoting communities' life and holding the dialogue between these communities and the authorities (Delamaza 2018).

³² As Saylor (2014, 2) reminds us, Mann's definition of *infrastructural power* quoted here is what scholars more commonly call *state capacity*.

³³ Linz and Stepan (1996) do not offer an explicit definition of the *usability* of bureaucracies. Moreover, they used it indistinctly to refer to bureaucracies' availability to current governments, civil society, and the opposition. However, they are explicit, first, in differentiating usability from "a functioning state" and, therefore, from state capacity. Second, in portraying usability as something that is hampered by bureaucrats who remain staunchly loyal to the previous governments (in the cases they analyzed, loyal to previous authoritarian or totalitarian governments, after democratization).

³⁴ National System of Municipal Information.

³⁵ The CASEN survey is implemented periodically by Chile's Ministry of Social Development. It collects information to produce a socioeconomic characterization of the population. In its version of 2015, it was representative at the commune level for 23 communes of Santiago.

³⁶ In these respects, the research follows Helmke and Levitsky's definition on informal institutions as rules that are "*created, communicated and enforced outside the officially sanctioned channels*" (2004, 725)

³⁷ Following Stokes et al. (2013), clientelism is understood here as the conditional exchange of targeted excludable benefits or goods for political support.

³⁸ See, for example, Stokes et al. (2013, 13) and Fox (2012, 191-192). See Hicken (2011) for an extended discussion on this topic. As this last author reports, the literature usually considers clientelism as either enforced by politicians or, at most, as a voluntary commitment between the

parts involved.

³⁹ As explained in the previous section, the notion of *capacity* is used here to indicate the ability of the state to provide goods and services, following one of the dimensions of state capacity described by Saylor (2014).

⁴⁰ As explained in the previous section, this research follows Linz and Stepan (1996) in understanding the *usability* of the bureaucracy as the degree to which this bureaucracy is willing to cooperate with the current government in its attempts to carry out its functions.

⁴¹ The term *commune* is used to refer to a delimited territorial unit, corresponding to the smallest territorial subdivision in Chile. The term *municipality* is used to refer to the local government that corresponds to a commune.

⁴² See table 11 in the Annex. Source: Chile's National Statistics Institute (INE) estimations based on the 2002 national census. Reported by the National System of Municipal Information (SINIM) in <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

⁴³ About 558 USD, according to the average exchange rate for 2015. Source *Banco Central de Chile*. Information available at <https://si3.bcentral.cl/>.

⁴⁴ About 177 USD, according to the average exchange rate for 2015. Source *Banco Central de Chile*. Information available at <https://si3.bcentral.cl/>.

⁴⁵ See table 13 in the Annex.

⁴⁶ See tables 14 and 12 in the Annex. Source: CASEN 2015 survey, developed by Chile's Ministry of Social Development.

⁴⁷ Obtaining this high share of the valid vote is particularly remarkable for the elections before 2004, where only council members were elected by popular vote, while mayors were elected by the Municipal Council, normally choosing the most voted among their members. This system was changed for all the elections since 2004, requiring both mayors and council members to be elected through popular vote.

⁴⁸ Carlos Larrain, from the *Renovación Nacional* party (RN), assumed as interim mayor after Joaquín Lavín left the mayoralty and until the election of Francisco De la Maza.

⁴⁹ Mikel Uriarte, one of the RN council members elected in 2012, left his seat in the Council in April 2013 and was replaced by Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, a former council member and RN candidate to Municipal Council the 2012 election, who, however, was not elected. Given that Ambivalent RN Council Member 2 held the position for almost the entire period, the following analyses consider only him as part of Las Condes' Municipal Council.

⁵⁰ In the context of the campaigns for the 2013 presidential election, *Concertación* included other left parties within the coalition (the Communist Party among them) and changed its name to *Nueva Mayoría*.

⁵¹ One council member, for example, described how the PDC council member successfully mobilized neighbors to oppose some of the mayors' projects:

"[In the context of a project to refurbish a park], someone started giving additional information saying that [the project] included an underground parking lot, and the neighbors said opposed that the park would be intervened. So, the mayor said 'Ok, so we are not doing anything'. And the one motivating these neighbors was [the PDC council member]. There was another project [to put a fence around a park], and there [the PDC council member] joined with the neighbors who opposed the project, and, as a result, we had to make a binding referendum with the neighbors [...]. The option for taking the fence out obtained the 55%, and they had to take it out" (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Las Condes).

⁵² The declarations of the two RN council members who manifested some opposition to the mayor were also telling, both of them downplaying their opposition stance, and coinciding with the perceptions of council members' great cooperation with the mayor:

"There is an opposition council member, [the PDC one], who sometimes is in favor and sometimes is against [the mayor]. I also am sometimes in favor and sometimes against the things that the mayor does. And we are the greatest focus of opposition [...]. And this is, supposedly, the opposition, [which], in any case, is not a very permanent opposition either" (Ambivalent RN Council Member

1, Las Condes).

“I would say that there is very little [division] among council members because [even the PDC council member], who sometimes can really disagree with something, but end up voting as the mayor ask him to do” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, Las Condes).

⁵³ In none of these occasions did any of these council members appear being ambivalent (i.e., both supporting and opposing the mayor), as seen in the other cases studied.

⁵⁴ See Adriasola (2016).

⁵⁵ See La Segunda (2013).

⁵⁶ Neighborhood Associations (*Juntas de Vecinos*) are civil society organizations representing the people who live in the same Unidad Vecinal—a territorial subdivision of a commune. Their formal purpose is to promote the development of the community, defend the interests and rights of their members, and collaborate with authorities of the state and municipalities (Ley N° 19.418 1997). They were formally recognized in 1968, represent about one-third of all civil society organizations in the country, and are highlighted by its role in promoting communities’ life and holding the dialogue between these communities and the authorities (Delamaza 2018).

⁵⁷ As he described it:

“I was participating in a sports club in the commune, and I ended up being, in 2008, the president of [Las Condes] soccer association, which has 1,500 members [...]. I did many things there. [So many that] we ended up using all the municipal infrastructure available [...], and we filled up the stadiums with the people who attended [these activities]. That, I think, attracted politicians’ attention—[as] parliamentarians and council members of that time started visiting me [...]]—so I understood that I was in a place that was very useful for them [...]. And when I understood where I was standing, I called the parliamentarians [of this district] and I told them that I was closer to the right [and I was willing to cooperate with them]. I started talking with [the president of RN] and he invited me to be a candidate” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, Las Condes).

⁵⁸ In his first election (2008), he seemed to be effectively elected, regardless of the small share of the vote he received (0.3%, the fourth lowest among the 31 candidates), due to his inclusion in a highly successful list. In his second election (2012), although he obtained a higher vote (0.8%), he failed to be reelected and was incorporated in the Municipal Council only to replace another RN council member who abandoned his position soon after being elected.

⁵⁹ As he described it:

“I was a volunteer civil support for the police, so whenever I saw [for example] people drinking alcohol in the street I called the police captains [...], we coordinated with some police officers, and we cleaned the streets [...]. There, I was doing an ad honorem job for the neighborhood, but then I said ‘no, I want to do it as an authority” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Las Condes).

⁶⁰ As he explained it:

“I called the mayor to [tell him I wanted to be a candidate for council member] because I had him a couple of times as a guest in my radio program. And he said okay, and he called me back saying hey, your name had a good impression [in the party]’. [The mayor] called the UDI, I was already in the UDI. And the UDI approved it because, since I worked in the television and I still have my radio program, I had some exposition to the media, and they liked that, and I did well because of that, and now I’m running for my second term” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Las Condes).

⁶¹ Although we lack detailed information about the remaining council members, the additional data available suggest that their situation did not substantially differ from the ones interviewed. One of them was a national figure (as former anchor in a television news show); another mentioned in a press report that she ran for council member because the mayor, which was a personal friend of her, asked her to do so; and another of them, in an interview carried out by the author in 2009, mentioned that he ran for council member motivated by the benefits he had received from the public education system, once his work left him the time to do it, and because a parliamentarian he knew asked him.

⁶² According to their declarations, council members considered their interaction with local communities a significant element of their duties as council members and were proactive in

producing these interactions—especially with local organizations. As one of them declared, expressing a common situation among the council members interviewed:

“[My work as council member] consists in trying to understand the problems of the commune, participate in the councils, analyze and approve projects, the work of the committees [...], and attend meetings with the neighbors. There are a lot of senior citizens’ clubs and neighborhood associations in Las Condes [...]. Sometimes they invite you to their events, the municipality organizes others [and] I call them to schedule a visit [...]. In the last year, I visited 115 senior citizens’ clubs [...]. I try to visit each of them at least once a year” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 1, Las Condes).

Along the same terms, another council member declared:

“With local organizations, they sometimes request us [to visit them], and we go. And in other cases, we visit them in a round, a tour. We have [many] senior citizens’ clubs, and we try to visit them all. They don’t always have a proposition or a concern. They sometimes they just want you to visit them. [So, my interactions are mainly] with groups of senior citizens. And since I was before the president of the sports committee, sometimes sports clubs call me to address some issues” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, Las Condes).

Although expressing a more intense interaction with some communities—which were incongruent with her later declarations manifesting her difficulties to identify who vote for her—another council member expressed a similar idea.

“I call [the organizations I visit]. I tell them that I want to visit them, I want to know how they are, and what are they doing. Then we schedule a visit [...]. I visit organizations every week [...]. There are [a lot of] senior citizens’ clubs. There are some of them I haven’t visit in over a year and a half because there are the senior citizens’ clubs, the folkloric ones, these ceremonies that we have here [in the municipality], the Council meetings, and my children [...]. I have prioritized the contact with [the zone of lowest resources], there I have some groups I have worked with for different reasons, they have asked me to help them [...], or because they wrote to all the council members and I was the only one who replied. So, there I have tried to be more present. I haven’t tried to address other sectors because there is no reason. I’m very good at [social media], and through them, I reach the other sectors of the commune” (Loyal UDI Council Member 2, Las Condes).

⁶³ In Chile, it is a common practice that local organizations nominate one or two local authorities as their godparents. By doing so, they make explicit that they have a relationship of mutual cooperation and loyalty (or the intention to build such relationship), normally translated into a preferential treatment between the organization and the authority.

⁶⁴ Neighborhood Associations (*Juntas de Vecinos*) are civil society organizations representing the people who live in the same *Unidad Vecinal*—a territorial subdivision of a commune. Their formal purpose is to promote the development of the community, defend the interests and rights of their members, and collaborate with authorities of the state and municipalities (Ley N° 19.418 1997). They were formally recognized in 1968, represent about one-third of all civil society organizations in the country, and are highlighted by its role in promoting communities’ life and holding the dialogue between these communities and the authorities (Delamaza 2018).

⁶⁵ Similarly, another council member mentioned how his interaction with local organizations went mainly through his participation in the Senior Citizens Committee—despite his reluctance to interact with local organizations:

“I am the president of the Senior Citizen Committee here. So, I visit these clubs, although I don’t like depending on these clubs—or local organizations in general—because they know that at some point we are going to come back asking for their vote in exchange, and they use that” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, Las Condes).

One local leader also accounted for the relevance of these meetings, highlighting how his perception of a close relationship with council members was marked by the interactions he had with them in these meetings:

“We have had a very close relationship, not only with the mayor but also with the council members. I can personally tell you that I participate in the Communal Council of Civil Society Organizations

of this commune, where all the neighborhood associations are represented and, today, is a relevant [instance] in the commune, and where we present our projects and concerns. And as a neighborhood association, we participate in four [of the council's] committees: the one on senior citizens, the one on urbanism, the one on family, and the one on sports [...]. There are a series of instances where neighbors present their concerns and where you can participate" (Local Leader 1, Las Condes).

⁶⁶ Similarly, one council member mentioned:

"[The main requests we receive from] local organizations, is when they present you a project and comment on it 'we have this project, we are going to send it [for finance support] to the municipality. We hope you will support us'" (Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, Las Condes).

⁶⁷ The same local leader also provided an example illustrating council members' lack of knowledge about Las Condes' local communities, and how they may act based on their prejudices instead:

"There was a council member who, in a meeting between council members and neighborhood associations' leaders, said 'hey, why is this community going to pay so low [for the implementation of a project] when I see two or three cars per house?'. I thought it was wrong for him to say that. To be a council member, and say something like that, he should have visited those houses and their families to see whether things are as he thinks or not. Because, you may see ten cars outside my house, but none of them are mine, you see?" (Local Leader 2, Las Condes).

Similarly, another local leader also accounted for the lack of interaction they had with Las Condes' council members:

"There is one council member [we were close to] in the past. But [our relation] with the rest is actually not so good. Because, as far as one can see, they are not really committed. They might be very good at working internally [...], but we don't see them much" (Local Leader 5, Las Condes).

⁶⁸ Another council member provided a similar answer to the same question:

"I more or less [know who vote for me]. I have had more votes from women between 35 and 50 years old. Mostly from [some specific districts. I know this] because, after you get elected, the Electoral Service send you a report [...]. I think that the people with a higher educational level are sincerer to tell their vote. But among voters of lower educational level [...], the vote is tremendously volatile" (Loyal UDI Council Member 2, Las Condes).

⁶⁹ Although contradicting the consensus among council members, municipal bureaucrats, and local leaders, two council members loyal to the mayor declared to be able to pull services and resources from municipal bureaucracy. As one of them exemplified:

"The other day a neighbor called me [saying] 'hey, here [where I live] the municipality wants to take a part of my front yard to broaden the street'. So met with their lawyer, I spoke with them, I took pictures, I talked with the personnel from the corresponding departments [in the municipality]. Or a friend called me and said 'hey, I need something to get the approval of [a specific department]' and I help them" (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Las Condes).

Similarly, the other council member described:

"I always tell [the neighbors] that, independently that my role here is to supervise the use of municipal resources, my job as a council member has been to be a link between the municipality and the neighbors. I mean, if you have a problem, I understand that—sometimes, [for example], the municipal bureaucrats are inspecting the streetlights, but they missed your street [...]. Then, I call [the corresponding department] and say, 'there is a neighbor calling, could you check the street lights in her street?'. And they effectively go, inspect them and call back saying 'they are working' or 'no, they are not working'" (Loyal UDI Council Member 2, Las Condes).

Finally, the PDC council member used his time to help local communities organizing against the implementation of some of the mayors' initiatives which were perceived as authoritatively imposed. As another council member described:

"[In the context of a project to refurbish a park], someone started giving additional information saying that [the project] included an underground parking lot, and the neighbors said opposed that the park would be intervened. So, the mayor said 'Ok, so we are not doing anything'. And the one

motivating these neighbors was [the PDC council member]. There was another project [to put a fence around a park], and there [the PDC council member] joined with the neighbors who opposed the project, and, as a result, we had to make a binding referendum with the neighbors [...]. The option for taking the fence out obtained the 55%, and they had to take it out” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Las Condes).

⁷⁰ Expressing a similar idea, another council member explained that he preferred to address communities demands in the council meetings given the special character he can imprint on them on these instances:

“I feel that, when you bring the issues to the Municipal Council, they have a different impact [...]. There I can say ‘Hey, I am not just telling a particular story of a neighbor, I am saying that, because of that complaint, I want to include in the discusión that, [for example], there we lack doctors in a primary health center, so we have a problem there” (Skeptic PDC Council Member, Las Condes).

⁷¹ Neighborhood Associations (*Juntas de Vecinos*) are civil society organizations representing the people who live in the same *Unidad Vecinal*—a territorial subdivision of a commune. Their formal purpose is to promote the development of the community, defend the interests and rights of their members, and collaborate with authorities of the state and municipalities (Ley N° 19.418 1997). They were formally recognized in 1968, represent about one-third of all civil society organizations in the country, and are highlighted by its role in promoting communities’ life and holding the dialogue between these communities and the authorities (Delamaza 2018).

⁷² In Chile, it is a common practice that local organizations nominate one or two local authorities as their godparents. By doing so, they make explicit that they have a relationship of mutual cooperation and loyalty (or the intention to build such relationship), normally translated into a preferential treatment between the organization and the authority.

⁷³ As one local leader eloquently expressed, the mayor was valued for his accomplishments, although he was recognized as having a bad—and even authoritative—character:

“The mayor has a very structured handle of the resources, but the way he deals with persons is different. He has a very strong character and the way he brings things up is overwhelming. But that has made him stay for sixteen year—a very long time. Because he has done many things—for what I see, I think he has done many very good things. He might not have a very good rapport with people, but to manage is not to make friends” (Local Leader 5, Las Condes).

Similarly, one council member resorted to the municipality’s high capacity to get things done to explain the mayor’s influence over the Municipal Council:

“[The mayor leaves no space for anyone else because], if this was a municipality which depended on the national government, that had a limited budget, we would have to debate in the council [to decide what to do]. But we don’t have much of that here, because there is low external pressure [...], the budget is well managed [...], the administration of the most important issues is good, [and because of the large availability of resources] we can do anything we want” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, Las Condes).

⁷⁴ See table 15 in the Annex. Municipal Own Income (*Ingresos Propios*) includes municipalities’ revenues obtained from territorial taxes, municipal vehicle registrations, municipal permits, cleanliness and other rights, property rents, driver and similar licenses, fines and interests, concessions, underwater permits, mining and casinos permits, and what they receive from the *Fondo Común Municipal* (Municipal Common Fund). Data obtained from *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

⁷⁵ Another council member, one bureaucrat, and one local leader also provided examples of the possibilities that the high availability of resources opened for the municipality in different areas. Referring to the situation in public security, the council member mentioned:

“We spend [every year] around four to five billion pesos on security [...]. We do it because we have the resources. Other municipalities don’t have resources to provide security to their neighbors. The Ministry of the Interior should provide public security through the police, but they don’t have enough officials to address all the demands of Santiago. If we didn’t have all the inspectors [...], the resources in vehicles and the equipment that we have, forget about it! That would be a total

disaster, as it is in many communes” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Las Condes).

Accounting for how these resources are used to benefit local organizations, one local leader mentioned:

“Well, we all know that Las Condes is the wealthiest commune in Chile, and they have a special fund for [financing local organizations’ activities], which is very high—there over 1,300 workshops in different areas [...], and all that is financed by that fund. I ask every year [resources] for three or four additional workshops [...], and they entirely finance all of them” (Local Leader 5, Las Condes).

Finally, one municipal bureaucrat accounted for the possibilities that these resources opened in the provision of health services in this commune. In her words:

“[For example] health issues are a recurrent problem. What this municipality did [to address it] is to buy a private hospital here in Las Condes. Because public doctors’ offices [which are the ones under the administration of municipalities] here are for primary health only [and the public hospitals] are swamped. So they bought the private hospital, the building, call for tenders to provide the medical part [...] and asked the tender to pay by providing a number of health services [for the neighbors]” (Bureaucrat 2, Las Condes).

⁷⁶ Neighborhood Associations (*Juntas de Vecinos*) are civil society organizations representing the people who live in the same *Unidad Vecinal*—a territorial subdivision of a commune. Their formal purpose is to promote the development of the community, defend the interests and rights of their members, and collaborate with authorities of the state and municipalities (Ley N° 19.418 1997). They were formally recognized in 1968, represent about one-third of all civil society organizations in the country, and are highlighted by its role in promoting communities’ life and holding the dialogue between these communities and the authorities (Delamaza 2018).

⁷⁷ According to the author, administrative grassroots engagement is a system in which “states create, sponsor, and manage networks of organizations at the most local of levels that facilitate governance and policing by building personal relationships with members of society”. Among other relevant characteristics, in these systems, local leaders serve as a connection between neighbors and state agents; the local organizations lend assistance to run a variety of state programs; and they provide various community-oriented services (Read 2012, 3-4).

⁷⁸ See Marwell (2004) for an extended treatment of reciprocal and nonreciprocal basis for service provision at the local level.

⁷⁹ Similarly, another local leader described:

“[In case of the communities’ demands] we do the contact with the different departments [of the municipality]. Normally, we provide [the bureaucrats] with the address, name, and phone number of the person making the request, so that they can contact them internally. But we make the first call to initiate the conversations. [All this because] there have been difficulties with people requesting some service [directly to the municipality] and, since they are private citizens, they had a bit of a hard time to get to the right department. We [the neighborhood association] have some weight in terms of having a direct connection with the head of the departments so that we can get [the neighbors] a faster solution” (Local Leader 5, Las Condes).

⁸⁰ Describing this system in more general terms, the same local leader mentioned:

“There are two ways [to create a workshop]. You can make a massive enrollment, which is open to all the public through the municipality’s website, and they enroll the participants. [Or you can] do an own enrollment: you say, ‘I will create an English workshop, I need only twelve participants because I don’t have room for more’. You enroll the public who needs to participate, you send the information [to the municipality]. Other neighborhood associations work more directly with the municipality. The municipality is the one in charge of [...] coming up with the workshops and seeing whether [the neighborhood associations] have room for it. so, in some way, they say ‘we have this workshop, can you receive it in your offices?’ and you have to see whether you can make the arrangements to do it” (Local Leader 5, Las Condes).

⁸¹ See table 18 in the Annex. Data available at *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

⁸² One council member accounted for the same situation, describing, in more general terms,

the relevance of these resources for local organizations, and how they are distributed across all local organizations:

“Here, all the local organizations—all of them—receive money to carry out their activities. And people know it. Some days ago, a folkloric group requested 4.5 million pesos for clothing [...]. Here, that is not a problem. But I know the reality in other places—if they receive help for 300,000 pesos, they [are delighted]. Here, I tell you, some groups have traveled to Easter Island, others that go on tour and request support. There is enough money to give to everyone” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, Las Condes).

⁸³ Similarly, one council member described the human resources available in the municipality to help local communities to formulate and develop their projects:

“Our Department of Community Development has an army of professionals, where we have social assistants, psychologists, lawyer, architects. They help them formulating the project until it arrives at the Municipal Council to be voted” (Ambivalent RN Council Member 2, Las Condes).

⁸⁴ Including both organizations that are circumscribed to communal population and organizations transcending commune limits. Among them: neighborhood and other territory-based organizations; sports or recreation clubs; church or religious organizations; artistic or cultural groups; cultural identity groups; youth or students' organizations; women associations; senior citizens associations; voluntary service organizations; health-related self-help groups; ideology-based organizations (political parties); corporative associations; parents' groups; and other organizations.

⁸⁵ See Table 21 in the Annex. Source: Ministry of Social Development, Casen 2015 survey.

⁸⁶ Indicators created using municipalities' number of bureaucrats under the civil service system (planta) and those working under fixed-term contracts (contrata). Data from Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>. These numbers do not consider bureaucrats who were working under fee-for-service contracts (honorarios).

⁸⁷ Indicators created using municipalities' number of bureaucrats under the civil service system (planta) and those working under fixed-term contracts (contrata), and the projections of population size estimated by Chile's National Institute of Statistics (INE) from the data of the 2002 census for each corresponding municipality and year. Data from Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>. These numbers do not consider bureaucrats who were working under fee-for-service contracts (honorarios).

⁸⁸ See table 24 in the Annex. Data from Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>. The indicator provided by SINIM considers only the proportion of workers with a professional degree among bureaucrats in the civil service system (planta) and bureaucrats under fixed-term contracts (contrata). Thus, it excludes bureaucrats under fee-for-service contracts (honorarios) from the indicator.

⁸⁹ Also accounting eloquently for the low levels of politicization and high regards of technical capacity of the municipal bureaucracy, one bureaucrat mentioned:

“[Local communities] trust us because we've been here for a long time, and we are not politicians. The team [of municipal bureaucrats] is technical. It might be the authority, but people here are very technical [...]. Since we've been here for a long time we know [other bureaucrats' political affinities] but that is not an issue [...]. The only issue here is the work we do with the community [...]. Moreover, neither the mayor has ever asked or said anything [related bureaucrats' political affinities]” (Bureaucrat 2, Las Condes).

⁹⁰ Accounting more precisely for how the system works for public security issues, the same bureaucrat described how the requests received through the emergency phone line were processed, registered and supervised:

“We have a phone number—the 1402— which is free of charge, and you can use it from any telephone and request that one of the bureaucrats we have on the streets to go to your home to resolve any issue related delinquency or public protection. The operator will assess how serious is the situation affecting you and will estimate the time that that assistance requires and assign it to a dispatcher [...]. All of this is that we are talking here is registered in the system: in the telephone,

there is an audio recording, and [also] there is a software that asks [the operator] the type of assistance that is being provided, the type of phone call [received], and registers all the elements as they appear. Thus [...], the operator is obliged to provide an answer, and the quality of that answer is going to be contingent on the type of request [...]. At that moment a procedure is initiated, and it must get closed. How? When the neighbor who called receives an answer—either positive or negative” (Bureaucrat 1, Las Condes).

One local leader accounted similarly for the relevance of the efficient mechanisms of communication with the municipality, describing how these mechanisms work and the influence they have on the timely responses from the municipality:

“In our case [the municipality] has always been very fast to respond [...]. And you can always contact them through the Department of Public Security because they are involved in all particular issues, and neighbors’ problems, so that they can work as the office that receives information and, then, channel the information [to other departments. Especially because] sometimes our times don’t match with the Municipality’s office hours, so then one calls the Department of Public Security—1402—, explain [the problem], they send an inspector [...] who confirm, verify and make the report, so that the next day the corresponding department come and [solve the problem]. And we can also do the same through the Mayor’s Office, the Department of Community Development... different departments can receive and channel the information one gives them” (Local Leader 5, Las Condes).

⁹¹ Referring a more traditional form of interaction, another local leader highlighted how direct and efficient the communication with the heads of municipal departments was to address their demands:

“We have a really straightforward and friendly relationship with the heads of the municipal departments [...]. I mean, we I don’t necessarily need to schedule a meeting. I call [one of them] by phone and say, ‘can you receive me to talk about some issue?’, and they receive me or call me back saying ‘Look, we are going to review this issue, would it be okay with you to come and give your opinion?’” (Local Leader 1, Las Condes).

⁹² The term *commune* is used to refer to a delimited territorial unit, corresponding to the smallest territorial subdivision in Chile. The term *municipality* is used to refer to the local government that corresponds to a commune.

⁹³ See table 11 in the Annex. Source: Chile’s National Statistics Institute (INE) estimations based on the 2002 national census. Reported by the National System of Municipal Information (SINIM) in <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

⁹⁴ Households’ autonomous income corresponds to the sum of all the payments received by the members of the households, coming from either jobs or assets. They include wages and salaries—both monetary and in-kind—; earnings coming from independent jobs; self-provision of goods produced within the household; rents; interests; dividends and profit withdrawals; pensions and social security; and money transfers.

⁹⁵ About 115 USD, according to the average exchange rate for 2015. Source *Banco Central de Chile*. Information available at <https://si3.bcentral.cl/>.

⁹⁶ *Regional* corresponds here to Chile’s *Metropolitana* Region, one of the fifteen major territorial subdivisions. Santiago is located within the *Metropolitana* Region.

⁹⁷ About 177 and 142 USD, respectively, according to the average exchange rate for 2015. Source *Banco Central de Chile*. Information available at <https://si3.bcentral.cl/>.

⁹⁸ See table 13 in the Annex. Source: CASEN 2015 survey, Chile’s Ministry of Social Development.

⁹⁹ See table 12 in the Annex. Source: CASEN 2015 survey, Chile’s Ministry of Social Development.

¹⁰⁰ See table 14 in the Annex show that. Source: CASEN 2015 survey, Chile’s Ministry of Social Development.

¹⁰¹ Before 2004, Chilean municipal elections only considered the vote for council members (in an Open-List Proportional Representation system). Mayors were elected by the municipal councils, choosing them among their members, and usually corresponding to the candidate who obtained the largest share of the vote.

¹⁰² The number of seats in Estación Central's Municipal Council was increased from seven to eight in 2004.

¹⁰³ See table 11 in the Annex. Source: Chile's National Statistics Institute (INE) estimations based on the 2002 national census. Reported by the National System of Municipal Information (SINIM) in <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

¹⁰⁴ About 166 USD, according to the average exchange rate for 2015. Source *Banco Central de Chile*. Information available at <https://si3.bcentral.cl/>.

¹⁰⁵ See table 13 in the Annex. Source: CASEN 2015 survey, Chile's Ministry of Social Development.

¹⁰⁶ See table 12 in the Annex. Source: CASEN 2015 survey, Chile's Ministry of Social Development.

¹⁰⁷ See table 14 in the Annex show that. Source: CASEN 2015 survey, Chile's Ministry of Social Development.

¹⁰⁸ Counting council members' elections since 2004.

¹⁰⁹ Two seats were added to Quinta Normal's Municipal Council in 2012.

¹¹⁰ As two council members manifested:

"Nominally, the Nueva Mayoría coalition has the majority of 5 to 3 [in the Municipal Council]. But in reality, there is some realignments were some members of Nueva Mayoría end up favoring the most complex decisions of the mayor and the right in Estación Central (Skeptic PC Council Member, Estación Central).

"Here, the mayor co-opts council members and, [because of that], he has the majority in the Municipal Council, regardless that, nominally, we are the ones who should win" (Skeptic PS Council Member, Estación Central).

¹¹¹ As the collaborators of one of these council members admitted while describing their work: *"She is like the right hand of the mayor [...], so we always have to act thinking on her together with the mayor. We can't do anything that hurt the mayor. On the contrary, we have to work for her and the mayor" (Collaborators Loyal UDI Council Member 2, Estación Central).*

Expressing a similar idea, one council member accounted for her loyalty to the mayor:

"[This council member] is UDI 100% [...]. She approves everything and never complains about anything. All what [the mayor] does is perfect, and what the others do is wrong" (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Estación Central).

Regarding the other loyal UDI council member, the interviews additionally highlighted his close friendship with the mayor, which would give him a special status in the Council. As the collaborator of one council member described:

"Here, everyone makes jokes because [this council member] is a personal friend of the mayor [...] so that he is like his favorite" (Collaborator Ambivalent UDI Council Member, Estación Central).

And admitting this situation, that council member mentioned that:

"I am the most hated here [in the municipality] because I'm a personal friend of the mayor" (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Estación Central).

¹¹² As one council member described him:

"[this council member] is more independent [...]. He doesn't have any empathy with the mayor, and he will never have it. So, he will never be on good terms with him" (Skeptic PS Council Member, Estación Central).

Similarly, one council member from his same party accounted for his critical stance toward the mayor:

"[He] is a bit unruly [...]. He is a very good guy, but sometimes he gets mad and starts criticizing [the administration]—many times without knowing what happened" (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Estación Central).

And confirming these impressions, the ambivalent UDI council members manifested how he felt closer to the opposition than the mayor and the council members from his party:

"I have a better relationship with [the PS council member] than with any UDI council member [...]. As a political sign, I seat at the [Council's] table with [the PC council member] on the one side and [the PS] council member on the other. I have had very good relations with them. We have never had a fight, and I have no problem in talking to them [...]. And I am not a friend of the mayor. I have

never been, and I will never be. I have a good relationship with him, but I am not willing to be his useful fool. I don't need to" (Ambivalent UDI Council Member, Estación Central).

And manifesting how he ends up supporting the mayor in the Council's roll-call votes, his collaborator mentioned:

"No, he hasn't [vote against any proposition from the mayor]. I think he has wanted to, but only because they are from the same party, he hasn't" (Collaborator Ambivalent UDI Council Member, Estación Central).

¹¹³ As one loyal UDI council member describe them:

"[The PS council member] is a good guy but, if you hand him a microphone, he starts saying stupid stuff. For example, he said that we wanted to sell Santiago's Interurban Bus Station to finance our political campaigns. [The PC council member] is capable of being against building a fantastic school because it is [this mayor], from the right, the one promoting it. No, he is against everything" (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Estación Central).

The opposition PS council member complemented these impressions, declaring his opposition to the mayor, and describing how there are people from his political sector how think otherwise: "My greatest political difference with other sectors [in his party] is, precisely, that I am not in any agreement with the municipality and I will never be. I'm not going to participate in a municipal agreement with the UDI [...]. There is another sector in my party who is [in an agreement], and that is translated into keeping a structure that allows maintaining the UDI [local] government" (Skeptic PS Council Member, Estación Central).

¹¹⁴ As one council member reported on these ambivalent council members:

"The [PDC Council Member] sometimes supports the opposition and sometimes supports the mayor—most of the times he supports the mayor [...]. And the [ambivalent PS council member] used to be with [the mayor and his administration], but now she wants to be the mayor, so she switched sides" (Skeptic PS Council Member, Estación Central).

Accounting for how they were loyal to the mayor, one local leader described how they campaigned for him during the elections:

"[some council members], knowing that they needed to support [the PC candidate], they secretly asked their supporters to vote for [the current mayor]. Those were these two: [the PDC and the ambivalent PS council members]" (Local Leader 3, Estación Central).

And supporting the idea that the ambivalent PS council member switched sides after defining her interest in running for mayor, another council member mentioned:

"Now she wants to be mayor, so, wherever she goes, she thinks that everything is wrong" (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Estación Central).

¹¹⁵ As one council member described:

"The PPD council member is like he was from the UDI. He has no linkage with his own party and votes everything in favor of [the mayor]. And you can also see how he is retributed: he has everything he needs" (Skeptic PS Council Member, Estación Central).

And confirming these impressions, the PPD council member manifested his support to the mayor and criticized those in the opposition:

"Everyone is telling me 'you should run for mayor', but if I do that, I have to start talking against the mayor and saying that everything is wrong [...]. And, what happens, is that I value all the things that are done —and here many things many have been done. So, you have to be blind to say that [the mayor] hasn't done anything [...]. I can tell how people work here [in the municipality]. So, I can be from the Nueva Mayoría coalition, but I can't say that people don't work if people are actually working [...] I get along with all the council members but, sometimes, they are wrong when they criticize [and say] 'we should question everything and vote against everything'" (Loyal PPD Council Member, Estación Central).

¹¹⁶ Six of them corresponded to news about the 2016 elections, where she was only mentioned as a candidate competing with the mayor. In the other two, she blamed on the *lack of political will* (in general terms) the incapacity to reach solutions to specific problems. By doing so, she avoided placing the responsibility on the mayor himself (as other council members did) and

seemed to blame the Municipal Council as a whole.

¹¹⁷ The two Socialist (one ambivalent and one skeptic) the Communist (skeptic) and the PPD (skeptic) council members.

¹¹⁸ One council member described the composition of this group of loyal council members, highlighting the relevance of personal relations in it:

“The council members who are closer to the mayor [supporting her] are the two PDC, the Communist and the two UDI—who are closer to the mayor, not for political issues, but because there are good relationships with her [...]. What happens is that we get along, the UDI council members [...] trust her” (Loyal PDC Council Member 2, Quinta Normal).

Another council member complemented these impressions highlighting how the UDI council members’ support the mayor in roll-call votes:

“[To get her projects approved] the mayor pulls her linkage [with] the UDI council members, which is what is easier for her. I don’t know exactly why, but they have approved all of her projects” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Quinta Normal).

The same council member also illustrated how this group of council members were reticent to hold the mayor accountable. In her account, she highlighted how this group of council members were obedient to the mayor and described they canceled one of the Council’s meeting to avoid talking about a critical issue for the mayor:

“I think they have never voted against the mayor [...]. Actually, whenever they criticize the mayor immediately shut them up [...]. And there was this one Council meeting where we were going to address [a case of misappropriation of the education funds], and as soon as we started to talk about this, [the loyal council members] left, leaving us without the quorum necessary to be in session” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Quinta Normal).

Finally, confirming these impressions, one UDI council member identified himself as loyal to the mayor, and mentioned that with *loyalty* he meant not supervising the mayor—as the non-loyal council members did:

“I’m loyal [to the mayor], and I’m from an opposition [party] but, nonetheless [...], it seems like support her more than those from [her coalition]. [The difference between the ones who support the mayor and those who don’t is that] some council members go years back in time and start to investigate [...]. So, they are good supervisors, so to speak. I am a bad supervisor. I am an observer from the future [...] so that I don’t get involved with what happened. And if anyone is unhappy with the [current] authorities, there are some other places to take their complaints” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Quinta Normal).

¹¹⁹ As one council member described, identifying these three council members as critics of the mayor:

“On the other side of the road, we have one PPD and one Socialist council member, who—although they are not from opposition parties—are very critic of this administration. There is also one RN council member, who is, indeed, from the opposition. So, with them, the relations are nonexistent” (Loyal PDC Council Member 2, Quinta Normal).

Similarly, the PS council member confirmed this situation, manifesting how she and the PPD council members are critic of the mayor’s administration:

“The PPD council member and I [...] not always support the mayor [...]. I don’t get along with this administration. Although we are from the same side—we are from the Nueva Mayoría coalition—I have almost no relation with the mayor [...]. So, I constantly fight with her, but the PPD council member fights with her even more” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Quinta Normal).

Exemplifying her disposition to hold the mayor accountable, the PS council member described a specific issue, regarding the resources for education (which ended in a failed discussion in the Municipal Council, as described in the previous footnote):

“I had one big fight with the mayor [about a year ago] because some resources coming from the Ministry of Education [disappeared] and the person responsible for that was never found [...]. And when I first got here, I saw that and I [started investigating], until they started saying that I wanted to take the mayor out of office” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Quinta Normal).

Similarly, the PPD council member accounted for his disposition to hold the mayor accountable by mentioning the reports he had presented to the General Comptroller's Office, for example, regarding the irregular hiring of municipal personnel:

"I'm one of the critic ones here [...]. I mean, I have a huge amount of reports to the General Comptroller's Office, [for example], about hiring in [different departments of the municipality]. And who do they hire? Their family and friends, of course. And they even pay them more than what corresponds" (Skeptic PPD Council Member, Quinta Normal).

¹²⁰ However, the *Nueva Mayoría* coalition (of which both parties, PS and PDC, were members), discarded doing primary elections for Quinta Normal, and opted to keep the current mayor as their candidate. See Jiménez (2013).

¹²¹ Data obtained from municipalities' Own Income (*Ingresos Propios*) *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

¹²² Indicator created using municipalities' Own Income (*Ingresos Propios*) and the projections of population size created by Chile's National Institute of Statistics (INE) from the data of the 2002 census for each corresponding municipality and year. Data obtained from *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

¹²³ Similarly, the head of Estación Central's Department of Community Development described the work of his department, highlighting recent structural improvements including teams oriented to engage with local communities proactively:

"In the past, the work here was organized by function, I mean there was a department for the senior citizens, another for women, for children [...]. But I have the opposite belief: I believe in the multidimensional character of neighbors, independently of the place where they are expressing their needs. Thus, all the strategies that DIDECO is developing are of a territory character. [...] We started with the design, where we had to divide the commune into four quadrants—which didn't exist by then. We designated zonal coordinators to allow us to reach organized communities. We also designated the corresponding 'infantries'—as I call them—who are the personnel that reaches non-organized neighbors [...]. I'm interested in having these personnel in the street every day, talking to these neighbors. That allows us to make diagnoses, obtain some information and know how to plan" (Bureaucrat 2, Estación Central).

¹²⁴ Addressing the challenges they faced to reach the whole communal territory, one bureaucrat from Quinta Normal referred to this first limitation:

"It is difficult. It is not like we can easily reach the whole territory. We are five in the team. Five for 100 thousand habitants. It is impossible! [...] To be honest, we don't have the resources, and we cannot afford a huge team, an impressive machine to reach all the territories" (Bureaucrat 1, Quinta Normal).

¹²⁵ See Table 18 in the Annex. Data available at *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

¹²⁶ Chile's National System of Municipal Information (*Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal*—SINIM) builds that indicator based on Municipalities' Budget Implementation Balance (*Balance de Ejecución Presupuestaria*—BEP), which includes a specific budget item destined to money transfers to the private sector to finance local organizations. According to its transparency website, the Municipality of Quinta Normal reported only the total amount of money transfer, without specifying how much corresponded to community organizations. See Quinta Normal's transparency website: "Transparencia Activa - Municipalidad de Quinta Normal".

¹²⁷ According to Chile's Law N° 19862 of 2003, municipalities must keep records and inform the Ministry of Finance about all the transfers and they made and the receptor of these resources. The Ministry of Finance keeps a unified record, which is publicly available at www.registros19862.cl. This record allows identifying transfers to *private sector organizations*, a category that does include local community organizations, but organizations of other types too (e.g., schools, national voluntary organizations, and others). Also, as the comparison with 17 in the Annex reveal, for some years, some municipalities reported money transfers to local

organizations in their Budget Implementation Balance, although they did not report transfers to the private organizations to the Ministry of Finance, thus revealing failures in the recording and reporting systems. In consequence, this new information should be handled carefully, and taken as a proxy indicator of municipal spending on local organizations.

¹²⁸ Including both organizations that are circumscribed to communal population and organizations transcending commune limits. Among them: neighborhood and other territory-based organizations; sports or recreation clubs; church or religious organizations; artistic or cultural groups; cultural identity groups; youth or students' organizations; women associations; senior citizens associations; voluntary service organizations; health-related self-help groups; ideology-based organizations (political parties); corporative associations; parents' groups; and other organizations.

¹²⁹ Source: Ministry of Social Development, Casen 2015 survey.

¹³⁰ According to the data reported by SINIM, Estación Central had around 460 municipal bureaucrats that were either part of the civil service system (*planta*) or working under fixed-term contracts (*contrata*) during the period analyzed. This number of bureaucrats corresponded to a medium size bureaucracy when compared to the other municipalities in Santiago (see Table 22 in the Annex). As Table 23 in Annex shows, with about 3.5 bureaucrats per every 1,000 habitants, the size of Estación Central's bureaucracy remained relatively high compared to the other municipalities in Santiago. Similarly, SINIM reported around 320 bureaucrats in Quinta Normal's municipal administration, who were either part of the civil service system (*planta*) or working under fixed-term contracts (*contrata*). That number corresponded to a medium size bureaucracy when compared to the other municipalities in Santiago (see Table 22 in the Annex). However, as Table 23 in Annex shows, when the ratio of municipal bureaucrats to habitants is considered, Quinta Normal's bureaucracy seemed of a medium-large size (3 bureaucrats per every 1,000 inhabitants) compared to the other municipalities in Santiago (Data available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>. These numbers do not consider bureaucrats who were working under fee-for-service contracts—*empleados a honorarios*).

¹³¹ SINIM refers to the *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (National System of Municipal Information), according to its Spanish initials.

¹³² The indicator provided by SINIM considers only the proportion of workers with a professional degree among bureaucrats in the civil service system (*planta*) and bureaucrats under fixed-term contracts (*contrata*)—i.e., it excludes bureaucrats under fee-for-service contracts (*honorarios*). Source: Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

¹³³ Accounting for the relevance of bureaucrats' loyalty to the mayor, one local leader from Estación Central described how, according to her perception, unloyal ones did a bad lousy on purpose to harm the mayor, thus expressing a common perception among the interviewees: "Sometimes, the mayor gives orders, but the bureaucrats don't do the job [...]. Why? Because they are not loyal to him. They say: 'with the mayor we are going to row backward. We are not going to do that thing with the neighborhood associations so that they will turn against him'" (Local Leader 5, Estación Central).

Moreover, accounting for how loyalty issues were a long-lasting problem in Estación Central, one council member described how, when the previous UDI mayor first arrived, they formed a parallel administration of voluntary collaborators to compensate for bureaucrats' lack of cooperation:

"[In the beginning] the system was that I helped the municipality but as a representative from UDI. We were a group that helped with the day-by-day duties. When we first got here [...], there were many things that the bureaucrats [from the previous administration] didn't want to do, but the mayor did want them to get done. So, we took care of those, voluntarily, with a team of our people" (Loyal UDI Council Member 2, Estación Central).

¹³⁴ One council member from Quinta Normal also highlighted the problem of inadequate personnel within the municipal administration and the irregularities in the corresponding hiring

processes:

“I have a huge amount of reports to the Comptroller General’s Office, [for example], about hirings in [different departments of the municipality]. And who do they hire? Their family and friends, of course. And they even pay them more than what corresponds” (Skeptic PPD Council Member, Quinta Normal).

¹³⁵ Complementing these accounts, interviewees from Quinta Normal described how, according to their impressions, bureaucrats who were not perceived as loyal to the mayor risked losing their jobs. As one local leader described:

“We’ve been very shocked to know that [municipal bureaucrats], who are doing their job as they should, and are punished for not following a [partisan] criterion. [We know of cases] where you can see those break-ups within the municipality, [and the bureaucrats who can’t be fired] are demoted to inferior positions” (Local Leader 2, Quinta Normal)

One council member from Quinta Normal expressed the same idea, describing how bureaucrats who contradict the mayor may risk their job:

“[Being loyal to the mayor is very important for bureaucrats]. For example, [...] I had voted against many projects because the head of one of the departments told me ‘don’t approve that project. If the Comptroller General knows about it, there are going to be problems [...]’. And I am very grateful of that, but I the mayor knows about it... well, those bureaucrats are risking their heads. I mean, they can’t say things that are not aligned with the commands of the mayor” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Quinta Normal).

¹³⁶ Accounting for this point, one council member from Estación Central described, for example, the impact of scarce municipal resources on the work of his team when he was a municipal bureaucrat:

“[The problem we had to resolve was] how could we creatively solve problems when we didn’t have resources. When our budget was about 100 million pesos for a whole year, which was not enough to do anything. When we didn’t have adequate conditions in our offices, we had constant power outages and had no heating system” (Ambivalent UDI Council Member, Estación Central).

A former bureaucrat from Quinta Normal accounted in his resignation letter for similar problems in that municipality. As he wrote:

“[...] It is important to point out the terrible working conditions that exist in these facilities, where sections have leaks in practically all offices’ roofs, which also constitute a severe risk, given that the electrical installations are in-sight [...]. That, added to the inhumane conditions to bear the heat during the summer [...], a situation that has never been seriously addressed” (Manuel Martínez, former bureaucrat and council member).

¹³⁷ Accounting similarly for a usual experience among local leaders in Quinta Normal, another one described the problems she had applying to national funds for local organizations, which were usually announced by the municipality too close to the deadline:

“There are lots, lots of funds we can apply to. The problem is that here, in this commune, they are not announced, or if they are, it is with very, very close to the application deadline. Because these funds are announced by the national government one month before the deadline. For example, the National Fund of Public Security was announced on July 28, and the deadline was on August 29. But we were told about it around mid-August. So, we didn’t have enough time to prepare the application” (Local Leader 4, Quinta Normal).

Similarly, a local leader loyal to Estación Central’s mayor mentioned how, according to her perception, she was more extensively benefited by the municipality because of her skills and insistence, while other organizations had different luck:

“As a local leader, I am very grateful of the municipality. Maybe because I had pushed the right buttons or because they already know that I make a big fuss when I don’t like something, [but] they have helped me a lot. Well, I don’t think [it is actually a help], because I know that the municipality has benefits that people don’t know of, only because there are local leaders that don’t know how to approach the municipality” (Local Leader 2, Estación Central).

¹³⁸ Another local leader in Quinta Normal expressed, after describing the difficulties she faced

in getting resources to her organization, a consistent perception:

“There are [other] neighborhood associations that are very well covered... The problem is ‘the friends’ and I am not much of a friend [...]. Because the friends are the ones who go [to the municipality], and then it goes as usual: [they tell the bureaucrats] ‘you are my friend, please do me a favor’. But not me. I am not sickly-sweet with none of them, neither with the mayor [...]. I will not congratulate the mayor when I see that there are things that are not well done” (Local Leader 3, Quinta Normal).

¹³⁹ As one council member from Estación Central reported describing how, according to his impressions, patronage was intended not only to obtain the loyalty of municipal bureaucrats but also of local leaders:

“What UDI does is to co-opt local leaders from different parties [...]. So, when they see a skilled local leader [...], they give them a job in the municipality, hiring them, for example, to do the cleaning in a public school. But [many times] they don’t really do that job—only when bureaucrats from the General Comptroller’s Office come to supervise. [...] And then local leaders say: ‘this mayor is great! He can pay the local leaders and give them the tools they need to do their work’. [...] And I can tell you, around 60% of the local leaders in this commune are militants in the PS [...] and still, they are all working for the mayor. Even the Secretary of Planning, which is a position of extreme confidence of the mayor, until recently was the president of the PS in Estación Central” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Estación Central).

Similarly, one local leader from Estación Central accounted for the municipality’s use of patronage, highlighting how it allows them to ensure local leaders’ loyalty:

“For example, the president of Nogales Norte Neighborhood Association works for the municipality [...]. They give them jobs to keep them under control. So, then, during electoral campaigns, [these leaders] have to make rounds in their neighborhoods and tell the neighbors ‘vote for mayor Delgado” (Local Leader 3, Estación Central).

¹⁴⁰ Neighborhood Associations (*Juntas de Vecinos*) are civil society organizations representing the people who live in the same *Unidad Vecinal*—a territorial subdivision of a commune. Their formal purpose is to promote the development of the community, defend the interests and rights of their members, and collaborate with authorities of the state and municipalities (Ley N° 19.418 1997). They were formally recognized in 1968, represent about one-third of all civil society organizations in the country, and are highlighted by its role in promoting communities’ life and holding the dialogue between these communities and the authorities (Delamaza 2018).

¹⁴¹ As one council member from Quinta Normal illustrated:

“I try to solve problems. And that is what I have been doing during these two and a half years [that I’ve been a council member]. For example, when there are fires, I go and help the people, I help them to apply for subsidies, and see what else we can do. I can also contact them with the national government or the municipality” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Quinta Normal).

¹⁴² For example, one council member from Quinta Normal explained:

“Quinta Normal has a very significant elderly population [...]. These are people who are living with minimum pensions, who live alone [...] in absolute solitude. They look for spaces of socialization and survival, but they lack resources to organize. So, they turn to [the council members] for clientelism, because normally it is not ‘help me to achieve something’ or ‘what can we do to solve this problem?’ but rather, ‘I need this” (Loyal PDC Council Member 1, Quinta Normal).

¹⁴³ One council member from Estación Central explained how, according to his impression, this role was connected with municipalities’ failures to address local communities’ demands:

“As you might realize by now, in the end, we are just handlers of favors. [But] the fact that you have to trust on someone [a council member] who has some influence to get you out of the red tape, or to finally obtain a benefit, is wrong. Especially considering that, if a municipality works properly, as it should work, handing goods and services to those who are entitled to them, there would be no need for these type of intermediaries” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Estación Central).

¹⁴⁴ According to Stokes et al. (2013), this conditional exchange is what defines clientelistic relationships.

¹⁴⁵ See, for example, Stokes et al. (2013, 13) and Fox (2012, 191-192). See Hicken (2011) for an extended discussion on this topic. As this last author reports, the literature usually considers clientelism as either enforced by politicians or, at most, as a voluntary commitment between the parts involved.

¹⁴⁶ *Apadrinamiento* is a practice in which local organizations nominate one or two local authorities as their godparents. By doing so, they make explicit that they have a relationship of mutual cooperation and loyalty (or the intention to build such relationship), usually translated into a preferential treatment between the organization and the authority.

¹⁴⁷ The collaborator of one council member in Quinta Normal expressed a similar idea, emphasizing the conflict between the two roles. While explaining what a typical day looks like she declared:

“A typical day here is people coming to ask for help [...] for bingos and other activities of the neighborhood associations, cultural centers, sports clubs, etcetera. Because they actually think that that is the duty of the council member [...] I have tried to tell them, kindly, that the council member is actually here to supervise, he is a supervisor. And if he [does help communities] it is because he wants, because he can, but it is not his duty [...]. So, one has to make them understand that. Of course, kindly, with very moderate words, because they may get offended” (Collaborator Loyal PDC Council Member 2, Quinta Normal).

Similarly, one local leader from Estación Central described how, among local communities, it is a common assumption that council members must solve problems:

“Here council members know—and it is actually instituted—that council members must have resources to give to people. For the bingos, and every other thing” (Local Leader 3, Estación Central)

¹⁴⁸ Summarizing local leaders’ tendency to reward council members who help and punish the ones who do not, one of them described how her attitude towards one council member in Estación Central changed after she perceived him to be more willing to help:

“[...] I’m just getting to know [Loyal UDI Council Member 1] now. But I had a very bad opinion on him [...] because I thought he was one of those who promise a lot and does nothing [...]. He promised to deliver many things to [one school], but those things never arrived. And I told the mayor [in a meeting when he was trying to help us] ‘hey, [Loyal UDI Council Member 1], those things but he didn’t keep his promises’. And the mayor called him right there and reprehended him [...]. But I invited him to an activity that we had two weeks ago [...] because he participated in a bingo of our organization, and in that opportunity, I felt he was sincerely doing so [...]. Because he donated a prize, and he joined us coming alone, not with his assistant taking photos, and he [cooperated with everything]. Now, that doesn’t mean I will change my mind one hundred percent” (Local Leader 2, Estación Central).

¹⁴⁹ Expressing this point in general terms, one council member from Estación Central described how there were pockets of strong partisan support in the communes, where council member could not enter if they were not from the same political party:

“There are very politicized places in this commune. There are others that are more social, with which you can enter even if they are not from your political side [...]. But [the formers] are closed. I’m talking about [neighborhoods] where [the left] is very strong” (Loyal UDI Council Member 2, Estación Central).

Similarly, the collaborator of another council member from Estación Central described how, according to her impression, it was unlikely for a UDI council member to receive the support of communist neighbors, despite the good relationship between council members from these two parties:

“You can identify a communist by looking at their faces. And also, because they are very closed-up [...]. They would never vote for [Ambivalent UDI Council Member]. They may have some affection for him, because he has a very good relationship with [the PC and the critic PS council members]—even more than with [those from the UDI]—, but there are communists who would never vote for him, only because he represents a party from the right” (Collaborator Ambivalent UDI Council

Member, Estación Central).

Finally, a council member of Quinta Normal described how being from the PS allowed her to develop good relations with the people of a specific sector of the commune:

“My best sector is El Bajo neighborhood [...]. The first time I went there I was very well received. I think because I am a young woman [...]. When I went the second time, the relations improved even further [they said]: ‘what happens is that we are from the left [...] we have voted this way and you are from the PS’” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Quinta Normal).

¹⁵⁰ One council member from Estación Central, for example, described this situation in general terms while explaining how the UDI was able to make inroads in a traditionally leftist commune: *“The UDI works in a very structured way to organize territories. They don’t necessarily want to become a mass party, so they don’t seek militancy, but rather adhesion, in very pragmatic terms, from local leaders and neighbors [...]: I give you, and you support me back with votes”* (Skeptic PS Council Member, Estación Central).

Complementing that impression, another council member from Estación Central explained how, according to his impression, neighbors are more responsive to the help they receive than party affiliations:

“For local communities, what counts, in the end, is the work you do with the neighbors. That is what makes the difference in one hundred percent. In the neighborhoods, people don’t care if you are from the UDI, or from Concertación, or Nueva Mayoría coalitions [...]. Instead, they are happy when someone, some authority, comes to support their dreams [and] in their smaller demands. Then is when people really feel happy” (Loyal PPD Council Member, Estación Central).

One council member from Quinta Normal accounted for a similar situation in her commune, emphasizing how parties are not highly relevant to define their electoral support:

“The only thing that average people want is for you to solve their problems, and they generally approach us because of that [...]. I have realized here that they are not very well politically informed. I mean, they might have general notions of center, left and right, but they also care about the [concrete] things that are done. So, they don’t care if the mayor is a Christian Democrat [...], they are not going to support her unconditionally only because she is a Christian Democrat, you see?” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Quinta Normal).

¹⁵¹ Accounting more straightforwardly for the electoral dimension, another council member from Estación Central described how local leaders could influence their neighbors’ electoral decisions, thus highlighting the high probability of obtaining electoral rewards for helping these leaders (and their organizations):

“[Local leaders] are influential on their neighbors’ votes [...]. Because those leaders are closer to the authorities, they know what they are talking about and know them [...]. And many neighbors don’t even know who the current authority is and ask [their leaders] ‘whom do we have to vote for?’ so those leaders tell them whom to vote” (Loyal UDI Council Member 2, Estación Central).

¹⁵² Council members were also reported to actively use the help they provided to leverage these leaders’ support. One local leader from Quinta Normal exemplified while describing how she allowed a council member to meet the organization she represented after he helped her to solve one specific situation:

“A [UDI] council member is helping me to water the front garden [...]. I came to the municipality because I was tired [of taking care of] that garden [...], so I wanted the municipality to take it out [...]. But I ran into the council member [and I told him the problem], and he answered that it was not going to be possible because the commune has too few green areas. ‘But I’m going to give the order [in the municipality] to get the garden watered at least every other day’, he said. And they are actually doing it. [In exchange he asked me] to do a meeting here with the people of the neighborhood, when he was running for reelection [...], and he came here and had the meeting he asked for” (Local Leader 3, Quinta Normal).

One council member from Quinta Normal reinforced this point explaining how, according to his impression, access to local organizations was more commonly the payback for problem-solving:

“Not because you deliver something you will have a guaranteed vote. What you are making possible

is for that people to listen to you, just that [...]. It is like your entrance ticket, so people will be willing to listen to what you want to say and what you want to propose” (Loyal PDC Council Member 1, Quinta Normal).

¹⁵³ One council member from Quinta Normal provided an example of the manifestations of this type, describing neighbors’ reactions to council members refusing to help them:

“[One council member] decided, as a general policy, not to give prizes for bingos [...] and I have heard how people yell at him [in response]: ‘Oh, you be so cheap! And with all the money you make!’” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Quinta Normal).

Another council member from Estación Central, described a similar reaction when he refused to attend an illegal request from a neighbor:

“One woman ended up yelling at me ‘who do you think you are?!’ because she wanted me to change her score [in the system to receive social benefits] and I told her that I couldn’t do that because it is illegal [...]. So, she said: ‘you come to us only when you need support... go to hell!’” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Estación Central).

¹⁵⁴ Neighborhood Associations (*Juntas de Vecinos*) are civil society organizations representing the people who live in the same *Unidad Vecinal*—a territorial subdivision of a commune. Their formal purpose is to promote the development of the community, defend the interests and rights of their members, and collaborate with authorities of the state and municipalities (Ley N° 19.418 1997). They were formally recognized in 1968, represent about one-third of all civil society organizations in the country, and are highlighted by its role in promoting communities’ life and holding the dialogue between these communities and the authorities (Delamaza 2018).

¹⁵⁵ Similarly, one council member from Estación Central told how he contributed with local organizations’ initiatives only to avoid being slander:

“In the cases of bingos [...] I had paid the costs, so they don’t talk bad about me, so they don’t say ‘hey, don’t ask him anything because he doesn’t help’. I prefer them to be left with the idea that I did help” (Ambivalent UDI Council Member, Estación Central).

Another council member from Quinta Normal provided an additional example while explaining how careful they have to be with the type of prizes they donate for bingos:

“There are different prizes which each of us [as council members] can donate, according to their possibilities or the strings they can pull to obtain prizes. So, for example, one council member can donate a set of six glasses, but the local leader knows that in the supermarket that set cost 3,000 pesos. So, when he hands it, the local leader says, ‘and for this...?’ [...]. And they say it without any embarrassment. Even more, once one local leader sent a letter to all the council members saying that we were the worst, that, of course, when we need votes, we come to them and ask them to vote for us, but when they are the ones in need, we only hand them garbage, and that that is an insult, that gifting that is an insult” (Loyal PDC Council Member 1, Quinta Normal).

¹⁵⁶ Corroborating this impression, one local leader from Quinta Normal described how she excluded from her organization’s events the council members that don support them:

“No, [we don’t invite all council members]. We make a selection, you see? When we see that a council member doesn’t cooperate with us, we don’t invite them. So, we do a selection” (Local Leader 4, Quinta Normal).

Similarly, one municipal bureaucrat from Estación Central highlighted how local leaders were able to deny council members the entrance to their organizations. Specifically, when explaining what the expression *knocking (on doors) with the elbows* means and how it is used to describe council members’ requirements to approach local organizations, she said:

“[It means bringing a courtesy gift], because your hands are full—with a piece of cake or something. But you can never get there empty-handed. And nowadays the elderly are very demanding [...], and their requirements have been growing time after time [...]. And there are some groups that, for example, easily stop the candidates or persons that come closer to see whether they can come in and if they don’t support them, they simply say no” (Bureaucrat 1, Estación Central).

¹⁵⁷ Similarly, one local leader from Estación Central—a militant of the Socialist Party who supports the UDI mayor—exemplified the lack of relevance of partisan alignments in her

commune, explaining why her approach to politicians is different from that of communist leaders:

“Some neighborhoods are too much into low politics. So, they are, for example, communists who would never compromise with the right. But what I teach them—and it is what have learned—is that you have to be first and foremost the representative of the community and say ‘goodbye’ to politics. Because, if you start with political divisions, you will only end up harming your communities. Nothing else” (Local Leader 5, Estación Central).

¹⁵⁸ Similarly, the collaborator of another council member from Estación Central described how they privileged helping the organizations that helped him in his electoral campaign to apply for funds:

“We also help organizations to apply for public funds to finance their projects [...]. There, we are the ones who call the organizations. We call the ones that are closer to us because we can know which ones are with Ivo. [That is very visible] during the campaigns [...], because they worked for him for free, and they offered different things [to help], like ‘I know a woman in whose roof we can put a signboard’, and other things of that kind” (Collaborator Ambivalent UDI Council Member, Estación Central).

¹⁵⁹ Accounting for a different case, one local leader from Estación Central described how one council member refused to contribute with a bingo, organized to raise funds for a child with cancer, arguing that his parents did not support her during her campaign:

“I don’t like council member Angelica Cid [...]. Some time ago, there was a child with cancer, and we made a bingo for him [...]. And I remember that, on that occasion, I asked council members for support, and she asked me about what neighborhood he was from and which party did [his parents] support [...]. And she [refused to cooperate saying] ‘oh, but they didn’t support my campaign’ [...]. She expected them to have campaigned for her, to have voted for her, recommend people to vote for her or have participated actively in her campaign” (Local Leader 2, Estación Central).

¹⁶⁰ Expressing a similar idea, another council member from Estación Central declared:

“[Serving the community] is very important to me, because there is when I feel I am doing my job. Although other [council members] then say: ‘but no! Our job is to supervise the mayor, and if you don’t like it, don’t be a council member’. But for that, council members should have [the same working conditions and time dedication] than the mayor so that they can work on these issues” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Estación Central)

¹⁶¹ For example, one council member described how she was able to get surgery for a man who was waiting for it for a long time. Significantly for the arguments hold in this section, she highlights how it is an exception for her, who oppose the mayor, to have this type of influence on the bureaucracy.

“I have helped to solve a complex case of health issues. [There], I talked to the Head or the Department of Health: ‘Hey, I have the case of this man [...], who is has been waiting for two years to get his surgery, can you help him?’ And he is very committed with this kind of matters, I mean, he is not going to reject it because it is me [a council member who opposed the mayor] the one who is asking. So, he went to the man and had the surgery three days ago” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Quinta Normal).

¹⁶² For example, one council member from Estación Central described how he was able to get the bureaucrats to lend him some municipal equipment so that he can cooperate with local communities in the solution of specific demands:

“No, I join the mayor and do my part for the development of the commune [...]. So, if there is a micro-trash dump, we have to clean it. So, I talk with the Department of Maintenance and Beautification to borrow the trucks and the hoppers and go with the neighbors to clean it up” (Loyal PPD Council Member, Estación Central).

¹⁶³ Similarly, one council member from Quinta Normal described how, according to her impression, her lack of good relations with the mayor explained why her attempts to mediate between neighbors and the municipal bureaucracy were never successful.

“But I don’t work with the [municipal administration]. I mean, even if we are from the same side,

we are both from Nueva Mayoría, I have almost no relation with the mayor [...]. It existed, although weak, in the beginning, but now there is none. And, therefore, sometimes [neighbors] do come to me asking me to connect them with the municipality, but my interventions never end well, because there are no [good] relations with me [...]. And the bureaucrats working in the municipality is only people that are with the mayor. Christian Democrats or Communists that are close to her. Moreover, there are two Socialists, but they are close to the mayor, not to me” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Quinta Normal).

¹⁶⁴ Similarly, another council member from Quinta Normal explained, by describing a specific case, how council members who were loyal to the mayor obtained—because of that loyalty—better responses from municipal bureaucrats:

“One of the PDC council members always gets what he wants. He asks for something and all [the bureaucrats] run [to help him]. I have noticed that his cases always, always are promptly resolved [...]. It is because he is an ally of the administration, he is like the right hand of the mayor. I have noticed, when we have difficult roll call votes [in the Council]—for example when the mayor is going to lose them—he manages to postpone them [...], and then tries to obtain the votes they need [...]. And his cases actually always have a good response. For example, I have never heard him complaining [about these issues], and he actually complains a lot [about other issues]. And also, because he is always with the mayor [in the field], so when he receives a case, the mayor can immediately give him her consent [for the bureaucrats] to handle these demands” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Quinta Normal).

¹⁶⁵ Similarly, while explaining how things are easier for council members who are aligned with the mayor, one council member from Estación Central described how it was possible for them to interact with neighbors in specific activities organized by the municipality:

“For example, the mayor has buses every day to take the organizations out for a day trip, and some council members go there to interact with the neighbors before the buses depart” (Loyal UDI Council Member 2, Estación Central).

Additionally, one council member from Quinta Normal described how their participation in events, in general, can be used to receive and process demands from the community:

“Now, for the [national day celebrations] we are going to do an [event]. There we hand people some [gifts], and we share time with people because, there, there is always someone who comes with a case, which then we follow up in our council member’s office” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Quinta Normal).

Although her experience is more connected to the mayor’s participation in these instances, one municipal bureaucrat from Quinta Normal illustrated, in similar terms, how these instances can be used to receive demands from local communities:

“[In these events, the mayor] listen to everyone. It takes us hours [...]. Sometimes I’ve been in charge of writing down the petitions that people make [...]. So, we carry a small notebook and take note of the neighbors’ contact information, and then send an email to the corresponding municipal departments [to tell them about these cases]” (Bureaucrat 3, Quinta Normal).

¹⁶⁶ Also, he mentioned that his collaborators were fire right before the interview because he voted against a crucial project for the mayor.

¹⁶⁷ Additionally, the collaborator of the ambivalent UDI council member described how he was less benefited than other council members, and how the ones who are closer to the mayor receive more resources:

“[I would expect the mayor] to be more equitable with the three [UDI] council members. If they are from the same party, they should have the same benefits [...]. There are things that the others have that [this council member] doesn’t receive [...]. For example, the others have more than two collaborators, and he has only one [...]. And here, everyone makes jokes because [one of the UDI council members] is a personal friend of the mayor and, therefore, he has three offices—and is the only council member who has that [...]. So, he is like the favorite [...] and has about five collaborators” (Collaborator Ambivalent UDI Council Member, Estación Central).

¹⁶⁸ Two council members eloquently described the prominence of the use of their own monetary

resources in attending local communities:

“With the stipend [of] 600,000 pesos we are handed here, we do wonders [...]. I use all my stipend in the neighborhood. Only in gas, I spend about 200,000 every month. Then you have the lunches for the team, the bingos, and all the other things that may emerge. But I have always believed that this resource is for you to do, not for you to keep” (Loyal PPD Council Member, Estación Central).
“My monthly stipend is 600,000 pesos. I spend over a million each month [in serving communities]. This council-membership cost me at least another 400,000 pesos each month. I mean, I visit 3 or 4 senior citizens’ clubs every day, and I bring a cake [...]. So, every day I need 20,000 pesos and another 20,000 in gas. And if I go to [another organization] afterward, I also bring something for us to eat” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Estación Central).

¹⁶⁹ Both council members’ time and work figure prominently here. As one council member from Estación Central illustrated:

“[...] I take my work team on weekends and work. We trim trees, we clean gutters, we paint houses’ fronts. I mean, productive work” (Loyal PPD Council Member, Estación Central).

And accounting for merely spending time with neighbors, one council member from Quinta Normal explained:

“When you visit senior citizens, what they expect is for you to seat and have a cup of tea with them. And if you don’t have tea with them, they get upset. If you go, you have to take the time needed to be with them, [and] have a conversation with them” (Loyal PDC Council Member 1, Quinta Normal).

¹⁷⁰ Most of these sources are clearly illustrated in the examples provided below. However, one council member also described the resort to donations as an additional external source:

“They asked me, ‘where did you get resources for notebooks?’ I asked all the municipal bureaucrats to donate notebooks [...] then I asked a notebook manufacturer to donate. I sent them a letter saying ‘I’m a council member of a poor commune...’ And they sent me 200 notebooks [...]. Then I went to [a friend], and I asked him ‘hey why don’t you donate some backpacks’, and he did. I put two or three notebooks in the backpacks and gave it to the neighbors, and that is very important for them” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Estación Central).

¹⁷¹ One council member from Estación Central illustrated this situation telling how he help neighbors to raise money for their medical needs:

“[...] When there is no money for health, we make big events that allow us to raise the money and solve those problems. [The point is to] solve them directly [...] not through applications to see whether it will work or not. Here we give direct solutions [...]. I cannot make neighbors wait [...]. I mean, if they need a wheelchair I say, ‘a wheelchair costs about 300,000 pesos, neighbor, lets’ do this and buy it’. And within a month we buy it, then we go to the neighborhood, and we start organizing the whole donation thing” (Loyal PPD Council Member, Estación Central).

Similarly, council members from both municipalities accounted for the support they give for the many bingos that local communities organize:

“I buy salad bowls, and I give one of them for each bingo petition I receive [...] that works, at least for the people asking for bingo prizes” (Ambivalent UDI Council Member, Estación Central).

“Look, we have around six bingos every weekend. So, people come and leave you a letter saying that this person has cancer, or that this senior citizens’ club wants to go for a day trip somewhere [...]. And they ask you to contribute with a prize. Now, they are not thinking on a glass [...], because they have the perception that every citizen has about an authority: that this authority, or the municipality, has resources for this” (Loyal PDC Council Member 1, Quinta Normal).

¹⁷² One council member from Estación Central illustrated this situation telling how he pay some electricity bills:

“I pay the electricity bills of many of my senior citizens whom I know they have many troubles and are very decent” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Estación Central).

Another council member from Estación Central accounted for a similar use of resources to provide a direct solution, although using non-monetary resources to attend a more contingent situation:

“The other day a neighbor came saying that another neighbor had surgery and urgently needed blood donors and they had nobody [...], so I said ‘okay, I will donate’. So, I went the same day to the hospital, made the donation, came back and handed the receipt to the neighbor” (Ambivalent UDI Council Member, Estación Central).

¹⁷³ Three council member provided illustrative examples of these situations, highlighting either how they help them to either solve specific situations or make good decisions:

“For example, today, just before talking to you, a local leader came to talk with me. He said ‘Mr. Council member, I come here because I made a big mistake. I didn’t update the board of directors of our sports’ club [...], and the guys from another neighborhood are telling me that they are going to denounce us to the Electoral Court and take away from us [the soccer court we have in gratuitous loan]’. And I told him ‘that is simply not possible [...]. Look, this is what is going to happen: if they want, they are going to denounce you to the Electoral Court. Then the Court is going to come to you and give you one month to regularize the situation. If you don’t regularize the situation, the Court will notify the Municipality, and only then the Municipality is going to start a hugely bureaucratic process to decide whether they take the court away from you or not. So, you have a lot of chances to update the board of directors. The only thing that I ask you is to start working now to regularize the situation’. So, with information like that you calm them down, because you see that they are anguished” (Ambivalent UDI Council Member, Estación Central).

“Some people are selling their houses to development projects and come here for advice [...] I cannot move a finger, because it is illegal, but I advise them: ‘hey, pay en bloc, negotiate, find out how much they pay...” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Estación Central).

“They come here asking for guidance, for example, to write letters. Because many of them are senior citizens, who don’t know how to use a computer. So, we write them the letters, and we guide them through some procedures” (Collaborator Loyal PDC Council Member 2, Quinta Normal).

¹⁷⁴ As the collaborator of one council member from Quinta Normal illustrated:

“I have to stay here [in the office] and be the psychologist [...], the social assistant, and many times the darts’ board. Because many people come here with really strong problems and they don’t know whom to ask for help. And then we many times we are the shoulder to cry on for people of scarce resources, who are in real poverty“ (Collaborator Loyal PDC Council Member 1, Quinta Normal).

Providing another example, one council member from Estación Central described:

“I take care of accidents. For example, I go to all the fires. If there is a fire now, I’m going to leave you and go. Because in fires, I believe, emotional support is really important for people. And when there are floods, I am always in the streets. There you can see my rain suit and my boots. I put them on and pum! Out we go” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Estación Central).

¹⁷⁵ Council members from both municipalities provided examples of how they used their networks to grant local communities access to professional assistance:

“[...] I have a teeth repair service. I mean, I have some people that come here and do the exams for free, therefore, for people to have a diagnosis at least” (Loyal UDI Council Member 1, Estación Central).

“I have a network of friends who are local leaders, or from the party who help me. For example, for legal advice, I have lawyers, or social workers, psychologists [...]. It is a network of friends, and they are always present [...], they give me technical advice, they come with me to visit people, and everything else” (Loyal PDC Council Member 2, Quinta Normal).

Two other council member provided complementary examples to illustrate how they could contact other authorities to get some specific problems solved:

“Now that I am a council member from the same coalition that of the national government [...] it is easier, for example, to get meetings with [the national services] to address the local requirements we constantly have. There is a better disposition to meet with us” (Skeptic PS Council Member, Estación Central).

“I once went to the Ministry of Education [...] to address the problems we had to retire some school teacher [...]. And [one Senator] came with us. Honestly, it was one of the few times that I felt how different are things when you go with someone [...]: you see that all the doors open immediately.

[We spoke with] the Undersecretary [...] and you could see that, there, the authority was the senator, [and the Undersecretary] did the necessary arrangements [to solve the problem]" (Loyal PDC Council Member 1, Quinta Normal).

¹⁷⁶ In addition to the notes at the beginning of this paragraph, one council member from Quinta Normal illustrated the use of these small gifts, describing how they use them in their visits to local organizations:

"When you go to a senior citizens' club you have to get inside with a cake because they go there to have some tea. It is when you are visiting someone, and you bring something to eat with the tea, or when you go to a gathering with friends, and you bring a bottle of wine or something else" (Loyal PDC Council Member 1, Quinta Normal).

¹⁷⁷ As he recognized in the interview, he had no previous history in the commune and was nominated and elected due to his position in the structure of the party. Also, the different interviews coincide in describing Communist neighbors as highly disciplined and loyal to the party.

¹⁷⁸ The term *commune* is used to refer to a delimited territorial unit, corresponding to the smallest territorial subdivision in Chile. The term *municipality* is used to refer to the local government that corresponds to a commune.

¹⁷⁹ See table 11 in the Annex. Source: Chile's National Statistics Institute (INE) estimations based on the 2002 national census. Reported by the National System of Municipal Information (SINIM) in <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

¹⁸⁰ Households' autonomous income corresponds to the sum of all the payments received by the members of the households, coming from either jobs or assets. They include wages and salaries—both monetary and in-kind—; earnings coming from independent jobs; self-provision of goods produced within the household; rents; interests; dividends and profit withdrawals; pensions and social security; and money transfers.

¹⁸¹ About 104 USD, according to the average exchange rate for 2015. Source *Banco Central de Chile*. Information available at <https://si3.bcentral.cl/>.

¹⁸² *Regional* corresponds here to Chile's *Metropolitana* Region, one of the fifteen major territorial subdivisions. Santiago is located within the *Metropolitana* Region.

¹⁸³ About 142 and 177 USD, respectively, according to the average exchange rate for 2015. Source *Banco Central de Chile*. Information available at <https://si3.bcentral.cl/>.

¹⁸⁴ See table 13 in the Annex. Source: CASEN 2015 survey, Chile's Ministry of Social Development.

¹⁸⁵ See table 12 in the Annex. Source: CASEN 2015 survey, Chile's Ministry of Social Development.

¹⁸⁶ See table 14 in the Annex show that. Source: CASEN 2015 survey, Chile's Ministry of Social Development.

¹⁸⁷ In 2004 mayors and council members were elected separately for the first time. Before 2004, only council members were elected by popular vote. Mayors were elected by the Municipal Councils, choosing them among their members.

¹⁸⁸ Valid votes corresponds to the total number of votes issued, discounting blank and null votes.

¹⁸⁹ Four from the Socialist party and two from other parties of Nueva Mayoría (one Communist and one from the Partido por la Democracia).

¹⁹⁰ See table 11 in the Annex. Source: Chile's National Statistics Institute (INE) estimations based on the 2002 national census. Reported by the National System of Municipal Information (SINIM) in <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

¹⁹¹ About 840 USD, according to the average exchange rate for 2015. Source *Banco Central de Chile*. Information available at <https://si3.bcentral.cl/>.

¹⁹² See table 13 in the Annex.

¹⁹³ See tables 14 and 12 in the Annex. Source: CASEN 2015 survey, developed by Chile's Ministry of Social Development.

¹⁹⁴ Before Labbé, between 1992 and 1996, Providencia's mayoralty was held by Carmen Grez, who as appointed as mayor by the military government in 1982 and kept her seat after the

democratic municipal election of 1992.

¹⁹⁵ See Lagos (2012) and Maltrain Macho (2011).

¹⁹⁶ Particularly telling about this situation were the comments from one municipal bureaucrat of Pudahuel, who explained how the three Socialist council members have actually been the fiercest opponents to the mayor:

“Here, in Pudahuel, now came together those who, not too long ago, were not united [...]. The two from the right and the PPD used to support the mayor, but they joined the Socialists. The most conflictive have been the ‘fellow countrymen,’ so to speak. [For example] in participatory budgets, the destination of the money is not always clear. There, there is one of them whom I think reads everything, [Skeptic PS Council Member 1]. She joined up with [Skeptic Council Members 2 and 3], and they have struggled to impede the approval of thing until they are completely clear” (Bureaucrat 1, Pudahuel).

¹⁹⁷ Out of the 144 news reports found in Diario Tropezón, during this period, where at least one council member and either the mayor or Pudahuel’s municipality were mentioned.

¹⁹⁸ As table 25 in the Annex shows, most of council members’ appearances in local news sources as opposing or reporting the mayor and his administration are related to municipal mismanagement of public resources. Less predominant, although still relevant, are issues related to the mayors’ agenda, decisions or management of communities’ issues, problems with municipality’s employees and municipality’s failures in the provision of public goods and services.

¹⁹⁹ See Diario Tropezón (2012)

²⁰⁰ See Diario Tropezón (2014)

²⁰¹ A third report, submitted by Loyal PS Council Member, was directed against the Municipal Council rather than the mayor or his administration, and it was aimed at limiting the type of information council members could ask the municipality to supervise its work. That report, then, constituted more an act of support than of accountability against the mayor and his administration.

²⁰² These instances were highlighted by council members for its impact, magnitude, and consequences. As one of them described, for example, for the first case:

“The municipality shut down completely [...] because we reduced too much the budget [...]. But taking everything to the General Comptroller’s office [...]. Then, there were two days in which the municipality did not operate, and there was a municipal strike [...]. That demonstrated that we are strong... today, for every proposal, the mayor consults us first [...]. And no municipality... well, I think no council member in the whole country has done what we did here in Pudahuel” (Skeptic UDI Council Member, Pudahuel).

²⁰³ Although seeing it more as a problem than a virtue, Loyal PC Council Member confirmed how party labels had a limited relevance within the municipal council:

“Here things are still messy. From the Nueva Mayoría coalition [The national center-left coalition of parties], things get mixed up... first, because council members’ party identification has been very hard to obtain [...]. They do not use their ‘last names’ [referring to party labels], so when we started trying to impose things like ‘I come from the Communist council member’s office...’ Actually, when I tried to introduce myself in that way, the right protested immediately, saying that this was not a political space to say that... and I’m sorry, but people choose political representatives, and this is a space for political discussion, in spite the fact that we are talking about social issues” (Loyal PC Council Member, Pudahuel).

²⁰⁴ Similarly, Skeptic PS Council Member 1 explained how she was called a traitor by her fellow party members for holding the mayor accountable, and how she was expected, instead, to remain loyal and inhibit herself:

“Supervising at that level and exposing complicated situations like these... I was called a traitor for supervising the mayor. Because I am a Socialist, we are from the same party. Many times, the mayors think that council members’ support means inhibition of their role. That happens here as it does anywhere. It has to do with relations of power, rather than with the role that each one has”

(Skeptic PS Council Member 1, Pudahuel).

²⁰⁵ Chile uses an open list proportional representation system for municipal council elections.

²⁰⁶ Formally, PRO was not part of either *Concertación* or *Nueva Mayoría* coalitions. Also, in the middle of the term Loyal PRO Council Member pulled out from PRO and remained an independent during the final part of the term. However, he is systematically expected to be loyal to the mayor, given his affinity with the left.

²⁰⁷ As one local leader with a good understanding of the issues in municipal council succinctly described:

“When the current mayor got elected, four council members supporting her were elected too, alongside another four that opposed her. Early on, one of the council members that supported her started voting with the opposition. So now we are three to five” (Local Leader 3, Providencia).

²⁰⁸ Out of the 52 news reports in all national newspapers and electronic news sources found during this period, where at least one council member and either the mayor or Providencia’s municipality were mentioned.

²⁰⁹ As table 26 in the Annex shows, most of council members’ appearances in national news sources either criticizing or reporting the mayor are related to misuse of public resources, followed by ideological and programmatic issues, and mismanagement of public resources.

²¹⁰ This name commemorates the day of the coup de état that initiated Pinochet’s dictatorship.

²¹¹ As one council member explained:

“At the beginning, I tried to generate some routes of communication but, to be honest, all the possibilities of transversal agreement and less politicized work disappeared with the renaming of 11 de Septiembre Avenue. I tried to talk to [Skeptic RN Council Member 1 about this, saying] ‘but why don’t we compromise to [...] try to make it less of a divisive issue [...]. But no, no, she said no [...]. And to be honest, there something broke. Because, on the top of that, the council members [who wanted to keep the name] decided not to show to the sessions to avoid providing the quorum [needed to approve the name change]. And since then the environment changed” (Loyal PDC Council Member, Providencia).

²¹² The conversation with one council member also accounted for this situation eloquently. Specifically, when asked about how do the alignments in the Municipal Council work, he answered:

“We have a problem there. [The Council] was very neat and well-organized right after the mayor was elected [...]. We were four council members [from the left], plus the mayor, we were five—always a majority. But the PDC council member noticed that, [the PPD council member was keeping some money illegally]. He took the case to the Prosecutor General’s office [and the PPD council member] blamed the mayor [for the accusation]. Long story short, now he is working with [the opposition] to take the mayor out of office [...]. We could have always been a solid block [...], but [the PPD council member] has voted many things with the right, you see? So, now we are a minority” (Loyal PS Council Member, Providencia).

²¹³ Data obtained from municipalities’ Own Income (*Ingresos Propios*) *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

²¹⁴ Indicator created using municipalities’ Own Income (*Ingresos Propios*) and the projections of population size created by Chile’s National Institute of Statistics (INE) from the data of the 2002 census for each corresponding municipality and year. Data obtained from *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

²¹⁵ Data on municipal money transfers to community organizations obtained from *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

²¹⁶ Surpassed only by the much wealthier municipality of Las Condes, and more than doubling the city’s average.

²¹⁷ Data on municipal money transfers to community organizations obtained from *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>. Data on municipal population obtained from Chile’s National Statistics Institute (INE) estimations based on the 2002 national census. Reported by the National System of Municipal Information

(SINIM) in <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

²¹⁸ Neighborhood Associations (*Juntas de Vecinos*) are civil society organizations representing the people who live in the same *Unidad Vecinal*—a territorial subdivision of a commune. Their formal purpose is to promote the development of the community, defend the interests and rights of their members, and collaborate with authorities of the state and municipalities (Ley N° 19.418 1997). They were formally recognized in 1968, represent about one-third of all civil society organizations in the country, and are highlighted by its role in promoting communities' life and holding the dialogue between these communities and the authorities (Delamaza 2018).

²¹⁹ Neighborhood roundtables (*mesas barriales*) are an instance where representatives of the municipality and local communities meet to discuss a specific problem, proposition, or need.

²²⁰ Numbers obtained from interviewees' report about the total number of active neighborhood associations in each of the five communes analyzed.

²²¹ The numbers reported by Chile's National System of Municipal Information (SINIM) on this issue vary widely from one year to the next one, and don't differentiate between active and non-active organizations. The number of organizations reported by SINIM for each commune and year includes Sports Clubs, Mothers Associations, Senior Citizens Associations, Parents Associations, Neighborhood Associations, and Other Functional Associations. Data available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

²²² Over two-thirds of Santiago's communes systematically reported having less than 1,000 organizations during the same period.

²²³ Including both organizations that are circumscribed to communal population and organizations transcending commune limits. Among them: neighborhood and other territory-based organizations; sports or recreation clubs; church or religious organizations; artistic or cultural groups; cultural identity groups; youth or students' organizations; women associations; senior citizens associations; voluntary service organizations; health-related self-help groups; ideology-based organizations (political parties); corporative associations; parents' groups; and other organizations.

²²⁴ Source: Ministry of Social Development, Casen 2015 survey.

²²⁵ According to the data reported by SINIM, Pudahuel had around 320 municipal bureaucrats that were either part of the civil service system (*planta*) or working under fixed-term contracts (*contrata*) during the period analyzed. This number of bureaucrats corresponds to a medium size bureaucracy when compared to the other municipalities in Santiago (see table 22 in the Annex). However, as table 23 in Annex shows, when the ratio of municipal bureaucrats to population is considered, Pudahuel's bureaucracy seemed rather small (1.3 bureaucrats per every 1,000 inhabitants) compared to the other municipalities in Santiago, where this ration is, on average, about twice as big as in Pudahuel (2.6 bureaucrats per every 1,000 inhabitants). Data available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>. These numbers do not consider bureaucrats who were working under fee-for-service contracts (*honorarios*).

²²⁶ According to SINIM, around one-fourth of Pudahuel's bureaucrats held a professional degree, situating this bureaucracy right on the average level of professionalization among Santiago's middle size municipal administrations (see table 24 in the Annex). The indicator provided by SINIM considers only the proportion of workers with a professional degree among bureaucrats in the civil service system (*planta*) and bureaucrats under fixed-term contracts (*contrata*)—i.e. it excludes bureaucrats under fee-for-service contracts (*honorarios*). Source: *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

²²⁷ One bureaucrat illustrated this general loyalty to the mayor, highlighting how even bureaucrats that came from the previous administration were highly regarded for the quality of their work:

"There are some bureaucrats in the civil service system, who come from previous administrations [...]. Everybody knows who these bureaucrats are, but they are professional about their duties, and they do a very good job [...]. I have co-workers in excellent positions in the municipality [...]"

are from the right” (Bureaucrat 3, Pudahuel).

²²⁸ Accounting for a number of these cases one local leader mentioned:

“The funniest part is that [bureaucrats] make a mistake and they are only switched from one department to another. [...] Someone who was in the Municipal Secretary switched to the Department of Maintenance and Beautification. And as the head of the department. And there was an inspector who made a mistake and was sent to the Arboleda zone [...]. Even when they have had administrative briefs against them at the end they are not fired, they are only moved from one position to another [...]. And I tell you, [they are always] the same head of departments... the mayor has been in office for 24 years, 24. If you ask their career information you are going to find the same names but in different Departments. So, it is like a network, where if you don’t join them, you are left out” (Betty Herrera, President of “Teniente Merino” Neighborhood Association).

²²⁹ As one municipal bureaucrat explained:

“You analyze it, and you see how [...] the most of [the hiring and promotion decisions] work through political favors [...]. There are three different things: friends, pituto, and politics. I can actually add another one: ‘palos blancos’ [...]. Palos blancos means that there is one who doesn’t understand a thing and is put in a [leadership] position, and there is another one who does the job for him. Why? Because then it is easier for the first one to be promoted [...]. Now, regarding the heads of Departments, within the public world, it is like a culture. And that culture is very particular. It does not depend on the ‘administrative process’ (between quotation marks), but rather on which political party do you come from, or on the current government. Then, [...] if the current government changes, then half of the municipality is out” (Bureaucrat 1, Pudahuel).

²³⁰ For example, one of them declared:

“We went to elections, and I won by at least three [percentage] points. It was tight, but I won by three points, and the municipality didn’t want to certify my election [...] because, supposedly, people were complaining, although no written complaints. Then, [supposedly because] there were votes from people that were already dead, although they had the rosters of voters. An infinity of problems. [And after resolving the problem through the National Electoral Service] the municipality wanted to impose the other candidate as a treasurer of our organization because he got the second place, you see? But the statutes are very clear and say that it is put to the new leadership to organize the positions. [...]. In that occasion, political affiliations played an important role. Unfortunately, the Socialist Party has a great majority in Pudahuel [and the other candidate] is a socialist, a militant of the Socialist Party [...]. Here political parties are too relevant, and they play with local leaders. The leader that is politically useful [to the municipality] is the one that is relevant. Here it doesn’t matter if you are a good worker, if you like social work and you burn your eyelashes for social work. They simply don’t take that into account. Unfortunately, everything here moves with the political party” (Local Leader 4, Pudahuel).

²³¹ This practice was also reported off the record by another local leader, who showed pictures of municipal bureaucrats delivering the boxes and was pondering to use them to report the mayor.

²³² Similarly, another local leader explained:

“That changes when you have been in this for years and [the bureaucrats] know a bit who you are [...]. Then they contact you with the people who really can solve the problems and without much formalities [...]. I understand that one also has to meet some requirements, that this is the reason they fill you up with formalities [...]. But at least my credibility is still well noticed. So, they know that when I bring them a social case, it is because that person really is in need and should be attended soon” (Local Leader 5, Pudahuel).

Accounting for the mirror-image situation, another local leader shared her perception of being left aside because of her lack of good relations with the bureaucrats:

“I think I am not benefited because I complain too much and because I don’t kiss anybody’s feet, you see? Because I don’t have the time to play the pretty girl with nobody” (Local Leader 4, Pudahuel).

²³³ Similarly, another local leader described:

“We need a clean-up in the municipality [...]. Sometimes you see five persons working, and only one of them is assisting people. The other ones are just drinking coffee [...]. I have argued with people, I have complained. Well, if you are a community leader, you are treated very well. But if you are not a leader, if you are simply a dweller, they don’t treat you the way they treat us [...]. And if the neighbor, the dweller, doesn’t go with the local leader, they are poorly treated, they are sent to one place and then to another. But if they go with a local leader, then there are solutions to the problems” (Local Leader 2, Pudahuel).

²³⁴ As one of them described:

“Generally, local leaders are the catalyzers of all these social needs. So, they—to avoid walking around the municipality—come here, and we somehow help speeding up the paperwork [...]. I would say [we are] bridges, facilitators, of the leader’s efforts. Here, there is [...] a tacit agreement or implicit with the local leaders. We help a lot the efforts of the local leaders [...]. We help them, and they help us” (Skeptic PS Council Member 1, Pudahuel).

Along the same lines, another council member described in more detail one instance of intermediation, which, as she mentioned later, repeated with other neighbors and other municipal departments:

“We see the needs; we see that there are senior citizens who need to work because their pensions are not enough. They work at the back of the street markets, and they come to tell us ‘Ms. Council member, the problem is that our pensions are not enough, is it there any chance you could help us getting, through your intermediation, a monthly permit to work in the street markets?’ [...]. So, we send them to the Department of Inspection. And the senior citizens ask for the [permit] letter, and then we follow up with the head of the Department of Inspection: ‘How is it going? Are we going to have an answer for this person? Because he needs it’” (Skeptic UDI Council Member, Pudahuel).

²³⁵ Going even further, another local leader stressed how is it better for him to go himself to talk with the bureaucrats than resorting to council members:

“No, I have never had a case [of intermediation] like that. I do it myself, I go myself [with the neighbor], and we go, and we get what we need. For example, in the same case we were talking, when a neighbor die and they don’t have enough to buy a casket, I go and take him to the municipality. And since I already know where I have to go, we get that service” (Local Leader 2, Pudahuel).

Also illustrating this duality, one municipal bureaucrat, first, recognized this intermediation and how it was used by the mayor to induce council members’ loyalty, and then nuanced its relevance mentioning that he received a minority of cases (for job training) from council members:

“I know [about this intermediation] through the local organizations that come here saying ‘Hey, I need you to do this and do it quickly because [one council member] offered that to me’ [...]. Most of the issues with council members [are about this]: when the mayor needs to resolve something, he must negotiate. And in the negotiation, nothing is free: if I say yes now, you will have to say yes to the favor that I will ask you later on [...]. And yes, we receive many [cases recommended by council members]. Well, not too many, but still... Actually, we receive more directly from the mayor. Or sometimes they come directly from the secretary of the council member [...]. But it is actually us the ones who fill the seats. We fill the seats using [other] available networks” (Bureaucrat 1, Pudahuel).

Similarly, another bureaucrat reported that the cases of local needs they receive through council members are, actually, a minority:

“Well, council members should coordinate directly with the head of the Social Area, but many times they also coordinate directly with us. Directly with any of us to ask for a case to be visited, because they [the council members] do spend a lot of time in the field, so they ask us to go and see specific cases. They explain to us what it is about and ask us to visit them [But they are] few. Generally [the cases] are spontaneous demand. I mean, people come by their own means to the municipality to ask something. It is not much what we receive through council members” (Bureaucrat 2, Pudahuel).

²³⁶ Similarly, another local leader mentioned how resorting to the mayor help him to receive

better treatment from municipal bureaucrats:

“I have good relations with many people within the municipality. I go to the municipality a lot because they don’t treat me so bad anymore [...]. Because they know that if one goes there and is not treated well, one knows where to complain: directly with the boss [meaning the mayor]” (Local Leader 2, Pudahuel).

²³⁷ Similarly, although referring to a specific event during electoral campaigns, another council member described:

“We sent a woman [to one Department] to get some paperwork done, and [she was told] that ‘no, here it is the mayor the one who provides the solutions. Not the council member’. And that was the Head of the Department of Community Organizations because she is really on the side of the mayor” (Skeptic UDI Council Member, Pudahuel).

²³⁸ One council member expressed this preference arguing that, since council meetings are recorded and made available on the municipality’s website, it shows local communities what she is doing for them:

“I present [these demands] to the council meetings. I present them to the mayor, and moreover [I say]: ‘look Mr. Mayor, once again we visited some of senior citizens clubs, and the complaints they have I bring them to the council meetings’. I don’t send him letters, because the one single place where one has voice and vote is in the council meetings, independently that I can actually send him the letters. But that [the council meetings] are recorded, and the community knows that I went to their organization, I represented them, and I informed what was happening. Then the mayor takes the issues into his own hands” (Skeptic UDI Council Member, Pudahuel).

²³⁹ Relationships of godparenthood (*apadrinamiento*) is a common practice in which local organizations nominate one or two local authorities as their godparents. By doing so, they make explicit that they have a relationship of mutual cooperation and loyalty (or the intention to build such relationship), usually translated into a preferential treatment between the organization and the authority.

²⁴⁰ Municipal Council elections in Chile follow an open list proportional representation rule.

²⁴¹ Similarly, although highlighting the relevance of becoming a municipal bureaucrat (added to the experience as a local leader) for joining her party and becoming a council member, another one described:

“I started [being a leader] when I was fourteen years old, leading a youth group. [Later], I became a neighborhood leader [and then the] president of the Communal Union of Neighborhood Associations. That was in 1992, and I was asked to be the head of the campaign of the current mayor [...]. I was from the Izquierda Cristiana party, but [that year] Mayor Carrasco joined the Socialist Party, and many of us joined the party [with him]. Then I joined the municipality, [where I have been in different positions] but always working in programs highly related to citizen participation [...]. And in the year 2000 [...], the mayor came to me, and we talked about [the possibility of running for council member]. So, they asked me, and then I became a council member” (Skeptic PS Council Member 1, Pudahuel).

²⁴² Similarly, another council member declared to dedicate a good part of her week attending neighbors’ needs, which she addresses using her own time and resources:

“I receive neighbors Mondays and Thursdays. I come [here] to receive them in the mornings. [Also, every day] in the afternoon, there is a moment when I go to local organizations. I visit senior citizens’ clubs to tell them about the projects we have, modifications in the laws, what we can do and what we cannot, and resolve the doubts they might have. I work a lot with the community. I am an all-terrain council member because I live in this commune, so I’m not 24 hours, I’m 24/7 [...]. I always gave prizes for bingos. I always saved a percentage of my salary, which is low, and bought prizes. I used to support many bingos for illnesses. I have had a lot of petitions for bingos, sometimes even up to twenty [...]. Also, I usually went to senior citizens’ clubs, and I brought them a cake [...]. It could be their birthday, so I went there [...] and, if I didn’t bring a cake, I brought a prize so they can make a bingo... or they also play the lottery, so I got them a prize so that they could play” (Skeptic UDI Council Member, Pudahuel).

²⁴³ Similarly, one local leader told about his campaign support to the husband of Skeptic PS Council Member 1, who was running for council member instead of her. As he explained it, he did so to reward their help and with the expectation of keeping the same relationship in the future:

“People have great esteem for [the husband of his council member] in our community. And we are with him [...]. As a local leader, I am with him, I work in his campaign, I talk to the dwellers and tell them that he is the only person who helps us, and I hope to have him for another four years, so we can avoid having problems [...]. I always mention him. He is like a brother, a friend. [Skeptic PS Council Member 1] as well. We always show respect to [her] as a council member. It is a great friendship, I visit their home, they come here, I introduce them to the neighbors ‘this is the council member [...] who is always with us’” (Local Leader 2, Pudahuel).

²⁴⁴ For example, one council member explained:

“No, I can’t reach [all the organizations]. I work more in Pudahuel Norte. I would lie if I say I work in Pudahuel Sur, I do very little in Pudahuel Sur. Because it is normally out of my way. Sometimes, going to Pudahuel Sur means having a vehicle, and sometimes I don’t have it” (Skeptic UDI Council Member, Pudahuel).

²⁴⁵ As one of them declared:

“The other day we had a meeting for a bingo we are organizing, and there we realized that [Ambivalent UDI Council Member] and [Skeptic PS Council Member 1] are the only ones that come here. There are eight council members, but the other ones are missing. Now we are going to have ten council members, I hope we get to know them because the only ones we know are the same ones” (Local Leader 2, Pudahuel).

Similarly, another local leader mentioned:

“Look, council members here are a joke. There are eight council members, but you only see their secretaries. Here there are only two of them that receive you: [Ambivalent UDI Council Member] and [Skeptic UDI Council Member]. And it isn’t because they are from the party I’m closer to, no. It is just like that. The other council members, ‘crickets’. You can see them on Wednesdays when they meet. There, you can run across them, and talk only briefly to them” (Local Leader 4, Pudahuel).

²⁴⁶ Neighborhood Associations (*Juntas de Vecinos*) are civil society organizations representing the people who live in the same *Unidad Vecinal*—a territorial subdivision of a commune. Their formal purpose is to promote the development of the community, defend the interests and rights of their members, and collaborate with authorities of the state and municipalities (Ley N° 19.418 1997). They were formally recognized in 1968, represent about one-third of all civil society organizations in the country, and are highlighted by its role in promoting communities’ life and holding the dialogue between these communities and the authorities (Delamaza 2018).

²⁴⁷ As one municipal bureaucrat revealed: *“With senior citizens, you never know. They receive everything and say to everyone that they support them. To everyone, yes, they don’t say ‘no, we cannot support you because we support someone else’. They don’t say that. Neighborhood associations are more honest. They do say ‘no, we are not going to organize a gathering for you’ [...]. For that, neighborhood association leaders are straighter. And if they have to work for a local leader that is running for office, they do it. They are not scared, like saying ‘no, I rather don’t commit to him’. And they go out to knock on people’s doors” (Bureaucrat 3, Pudahuel).*

²⁴⁸ Regarding her current relationship with local communities, she reported to dedicate significant time to interact with them, although these interactions were rather casual and with single individuals than well-established relations with local organizations:

“I might be dedicating three to four hours every day [to attend neighbors]. Maybe a criticism that someone can make about me: I do not visit local organizations too much, you see? I am the one who is there directly with the neighbor. Since I’m a pedestrian or biker citizen, most of the issues that I attend are those from the neighbors who never come to the municipality. From the neighbor I meet in the subway or, in third place—I would say in that order—the one who contact me a lot through [social media like] WhatsApp or Facebook [...]. And normally, through the year, I would

say every semester or quarter, I meet with local organizations, with their leadership, to orient them, in a breakfast. We have breakfast, and I make a sort of public report: 'look, I am doing this'. So, they can transmit that" (Skeptic PS Council Member 2, Pudahuel).

²⁴⁹ Explaining her first nomination, Skeptic PS Council Member 2 described her connections in the party as a more prominent factor than her connections with the local communities, despite her recognition of her long work for Pudahuel's communities promoting public libraries. In her own words:

"[For my first nomination] a group of comrades from the party—who are not from the commune—proposed me. They told me 'there is a possibility today for you to be the candidate [...], we think that today is your chance'. And I said 'ah, it could be' [and they put me on the list]. The decision was not really of the [commune's] bases because they didn't know that I was going to be a candidate. It was rather a decision of a group of old Allendistas-Socialistas militants, with whom we have an organization outside the commune [...]. This whole group proposed my name to the party leadership" (Skeptic PS Council Member 2, Pudahuel).

²⁵⁰ Source: Electoral Service of Chile (SERVEL). Data available at <https://www.servel.cl>

²⁵¹ As she described:

"I am the daughter of normal-school teachers, and I come from a family of normal-school teachers. My grandmother was a teacher in the Victoria, Buenaventura y Toco saltpeter mine, but as a teacher without a degree. From there comes my vocation and my inclination for the organization and the ascription to the Communist Party. It also comes from there, because we are a family that has been there since the birth of the labor movement, besides the workers [...]. I joined the Communist Party because my father was a militant of the Communist Party. My mother wasn't. She did participate in the [Communist] youths, though. My grandmother was a militant of the party... So, there was a whole family history related to our relationship with the party" (Loyal PC Council Member, Pudahuel).

²⁵² As she explained:

"During the dictatorship, there were no elections. But afterward, the comrades called me frequently; they asked me whether I wanted to be the candidate to "X" position because we knew that we wouldn't win, we knew that we were in a stage of gathering votes, of growing, of accumulating. So, I said 'Yes, I have no problem, because it is the only way to tell the people what we, the Communists, think'. So I took it that way, and that is how lived many campaigns [...]. So, how did this thing of becoming a council member started? [...] I have always had responsibilities in the party... I understood that these seats couldn't be treated carelessly. I think they need to be part of the organization and better treated. So, in a specific moment I told [the comrades] 'Comrades, [our council member] is leaving. Let's nominate this other comrade'. But then the communal office of the party told me: 'the thing is we don't agree with the nomination of that comrade. We want it to be you' (Loyal PC Council Member, Pudahuel).

²⁵³ Loyal PC Council Member declared to have low interaction and do little problem-solving with local communities. In her words:

"Here, we are all the time receiving letters asking for help and solidarity. Look, what we are mainly asked here, is whether we can cooperate for specific activities like bingos, solidarity... things that I don't do [...]. I don't give prizes because I don't have where to get them from. But there we initiate a dialog because I'm not so blunt. I help them take photocopies of things... 'Look, go here, ask there, ask here...' and they reply, 'how the other council members [do cooperate]?' Well, I don't know. They may have more ways, more resources... I don't have them" (Loyal PC Council Member, Pudahuel).

²⁵⁴ Similarly, another council member mentioned how joining his party was the result of the development of his ideological convictions, which started forming by the end of the dictatorship tending towards progressivism:

"I studied Law at Diego Portales University [...] Those were years of protest, so I was like opening my eyes, getting information. But already in my first or second year of university my most critical sense of the political reality we were living in finally curdled. But I didn't militate in any party back

then [...]. And my partisan ascription was... I think it was around the year 1997. One day I just went to the party's office, and I enrolled. Without knowing anybody, without knowing absolutely anybody" (Loyal PS Council Member, Providencia).

²⁵⁵ Similarly, for Loyal PS Council Member, his nomination for council member was related to his position as a member of the leadership in the communal branch of the party:

"When I came back from my Ph.D. in England I got involved [in politics] very seriously [...] In 2004 I started working in the campaign for council member in the municipality of Santiago of Jaime Tohá, from the PPD. And from then on, I couldn't stop. The other thing I did immediately is getting involved with the communal [branch of the party in] Providencia [...]. They invited me to join. Then I ran in a list and got elected as a member of the leadership [of the communal branch]. Afterward, I got elected president myself. But, briefly before that, I was nominated as one of the four candidates for council member. I didn't get elected [...]. Then, still being president, I ran in my second attempt to become a member of the Municipal Council, and I did get elected" (Loyal PS Council Member, Providencia).

²⁵⁶ Other creative strategies identified included, first, the use of the council members last names to imply relations with famous figures. For example, Skeptic PPD Council Member used the combination of his two last names to imply a family connection with a famous writer. Second, the activation of family and friends' networks to mobilize loosely connected voters. As one council member explained:

"[My campaign was] with very few signboards. A lot of activating networks; family networks, personal networks, school networks... We based the campaign on a paper, something very simple. It is a magazine paper, nothing more, but presenting a hypothesis—actually a proved thesis—saying that in local elections those who are not committed militants vote for candidates with whom they have some personal linkage, down to the third degree" (Loyal PDC Council Member, Providencia).

²⁵⁷ Describing his own situation, one council member, for example, reported that:

"Look, in my case, being a council member has a particularity: I have a very intense job. I am chief of staff [of the Environment Superintendent]. The Superintendent tolerates that I come [to the municipality] on Mondays—and that is the correct word: 'tolerate'. So, he only allows me to attend the council sessions, which are at least three per month. And if there is a fourth session, I can come too. But I come to the council sessions, and nothing else [...]. I focus on doing a good job the day we are cited for council sessions and the municipal committees [in which council members participate]. Generally, we concentrate on the committees' work that same day. And if I have something very important left, I do it after work, meaning I meet that person at 18:30 in the night. But that is not an ideal time. I'll tell you, out of 100 extra-sessions activities, with neighbors, I have attended about 15% of that. I want to believe I've been able to pick the most important ones, but many times you go there and say, 'this doesn't make much sense, but whatever, it is related to the neighbors'" (Loyal PS Council Member, Providencia).

Similarly, although more nuanced, another council member declared:

"Over the last two years I've been working very intensely for the [national] government, so my activity in the municipality has been rather low. However, around the municipality always some groups of people appear, gathered together for projects or issues they have in common. There I have certainly widened my knowledge about the commune. But I do not have an active strategy to get to know more neighbors every day. I did that up to a point with some issues, but basically because of problems with time availability, I haven't done it again" (Loyal PDC Council Member, Providencia).

²⁵⁸ Expressing this radical distance with council members, Local Leader 5, declared, in an unrecorded interview that she had no interaction with council members at all. Neither did they visit her, nor did she ask their support, or allow candidates to introduce themselves in the organization's meetings. Moreover, she explicitly declared that she preferred them to stay away from the neighborhood organization, so it can be clear to everybody that it was politically neutral.

²⁵⁹ One of them illustrated this situation describing how council members have been irresponsible to the problems they have with the clubs and bars they have nearby:

“Look, before being the president of this neighborhood association I was in this other organization we created to be able to get out, to give our neighborhood voice. So, every time that a new alcohol permit was requested, and we knew that the municipal council would analyze it, we sent some letters. And we emailed them to all the council members [...], and we received only one answer [...] saying: ‘that is interesting, it would be good to meet you’ [...]. I’m telling you, I’ve seen people that have to wash their house fronts in the mornings because it is filled with urine. And if you wait for it to go on its own, it gets chemically transformed, and the smell is horrible. And there are others that have their streets filled with excrement. But that gets into council members’ head through one ear and gets out them through the other [meaning that they didn’t really listened]. [And that is] one of the biggest fights we have with the council members. And I fight them all. Because there are neighborhood associations that say ‘what for? If they don’t do anything’” (Local Leader 3, Providencia).

²⁶⁰ For example, one local leader told outraged how, in a council session they attended to complain about the alcohol permits in their neighborhood, a council member manifested not knowing that their neighborhood was inhabited. In her words:

“And [Skeptic UDI Council Member] looked at us and said, ‘but is it there people living in Bellavista?’. I have never, never forgotten that phrase. How can someone be a council member? While we are missing our nights sleepless, and that person who votes for us, who decides for us... So, we have told our neighbors ‘hey, pay attention whom you vote for. If they don’t live here, if we have invited them, and they don’t come... then, what are you talking about?’. Why do they want to be council members? Why do they want to represent us? (Local Leader 3, Providencia).

²⁶¹ Illustrating this situation, one local leader reported that:

“[We’ve met with Loyal PDC Council Member], who is at the head of the Security Committee [...] we had a security problem in this area, so we organized a meeting with the Prefect [of Police]. And also, we have one meeting every six months with the Commissioner of Police, all the presidents of neighborhoods associations with those involved in security issues in this sector. So, well, we invited him to a meeting, and he participated, expressed his opinion, and the people asked him some questions, which he supported in the Council’s sessions. [We have also met] with [Loyal PDC Council Member], with [Loyal PS Council Member], with [Loyal PRO Council Member], now [that] we discovered that Providencia has the greatest proportion of patients with HIV, aids [...], so we let the municipality know because they didn’t have the slightest idea about this” (Local Leader 4, Providencia).

²⁶² Particularly, by reducing local communities’ incentives to turn to council members for help and increasing mayors’ influence in voters’ electoral decisions.

²⁶³ See Table 15 in the Annex. Municipal Own Income (*Ingresos Propios*) includes municipalities’ revenues obtained from territorial taxes, municipal vehicle registrations, municipal permits, cleanliness and other rights, property rents, driver and similar licenses, fines and interests, concessions, underwater permits, mining and casinos permits, and what they receive from the *Fondo Común Municipal* (Municipal Common Fund). Data obtained from *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

²⁶⁴ See Ahumada (2012), Contardo (2016) and Carmona López (2012).

²⁶⁵ For example, highlighting the organizational challenges in developing a stronger interaction with local communities, one municipal bureaucrat told how they came to realize about the relevance of zoning the commune and creating teams of bureaucrats to work with the community in each of these zones—something that didn’t exist before—to obtain a more comprehensive view:

“Soon after the beginning of this local government, we realized that a key element to address problems collectively is that it is also needed to have a more comprehensive view of the territory. And not all too ‘functional’, as in how a traditional municipal bureaucracy ‘functions’—where, of course, the architects get urban advice from other architects, the engineers from the Secretary of

Planning get advice from other engineers, the landscapists from other landscapists... and you have everything very segmented, but you are missing a more comprehensive view of the territory. So, from the Communal Development Plan (PLADECO), what we did is that we divided the commune into eight zones, and [we] created a management team in charge each of these zones” (Bureaucrat 2, Providencia).

²⁶⁶ Neighborhood Associations (*Juntas de Vecinos*) are civil society organizations representing the people who live in the same *Unidad Vecinal*—a territorial subdivision of a commune. Their formal purpose is to promote the development of the community, defend the interests and rights of their members, and collaborate with authorities of the state and municipalities (Ley N° 19.418 1997). They were formally recognized in 1968, represent about one-third of all civil society organizations in the country, and are highlighted by its role in promoting communities’ life and holding the dialogue between these communities and the authorities (Delamaza 2018).

²⁶⁷ The *Plan de Desarrollo Comunal (PLADECO)*, is a document aimed at orienting the development of each commune. According to Chilean law (*Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Municipalidades*), it is the responsibility of each municipality to develop these plans, which should last at least four years and has to be approved by the Municipal Council.

²⁶⁸ Neighborhood roundtables (*mesas barriales*) are an instance where representatives of the municipality and local communities meet to discuss a specific problem, proposition, or need.

²⁶⁹ Although she didn’t make a direct comparison between the two administrations, another leader reported two experiences that made visible the difference between the two administrations. The first one described the problems the former leaders had in trying to create their neighborhood association during the previous administration, emphasizing a lack of communication and bureaucrats’ persistent obstruction of their attempts to formalize their organization.

“More than problems, there was no communication. They [the municipality] did not want there to be a neighborhood association [...]. The previous leadership, when they tried to create [this neighborhood] association, they used the proper channels to present the letter [required to create the association] to the Municipal Secretary, for example, and they were stopped at the entrance. They never admitted the letters; there was no possibility of communication. Then the problem to resolve was how to do this and do it in a way that the municipality could not reject it. And as long as they were able to reject it, they did reject it” (Local Leader 1, Providencia).

The second experience describes the quotidian relations with the new municipal bureaucrats, highlighting the role of the territory teams in the resolution of their demands:

“From the municipality, since the minute we inform them that there were elections [to form a new leadership in the association] they have filled me up with calls: ‘Hi, I am ‘this person’, in case you need me’ [...]. and also emails to the whole leadership, inviting us to meetings where all the neighborhood associations gather—they are local leadership level meetings to talk about shared issues [...]. now they invited us to a meeting organized by the Department of Maintenance and Beautification, which is in charge of the recycling pilot plan. And well, the one about security, which was created by Macarena and Jaime, who are the [municipal bureaucrats] working in this zone [...]. they are our contact for everything, because every time we have a problem, I pick Jaime’s phone [...]. Jaime knows all the neighbors by name, he knows everyone who lives here. He is wonderful! Amazing! So, you call, and tell him: ‘we have a security problem because the street is too dark’. And he contacts us with the person in the municipality who cleans the lights, the ones who prune [etcetera]” (Local Leader 1, Providencia).

²⁷⁰ Including both organizations that are circumscribed to communal population and organizations transcending commune limits. Among them: neighborhood and other territory-based organizations; sports or recreation clubs; church or religious organizations; artistic or cultural groups; cultural identity groups; youth or students’ organizations; women associations; senior citizens associations; voluntary service organizations; health-related self-help groups; ideology-based organizations (political parties); corporative associations; parents’ groups; and other organizations.

²⁷¹ See table 21 in the Annex. Source: Ministry of Social Development, Casen 2015 survey.

²⁷² See table 18 in the Annex. Data available at *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

²⁷³ And describing another example:

“For example, let’s talk about the Department of Construction. Here there is no explicit protocol of construction [...]. Sometimes the construction works [in public spaces] start without letting the community know in advance. So, when these other departments find themselves in this kind of troubles, they call us and say: ‘Hey, we have a problem’. How do we resolve these problems? We organize a meeting with the community; sometimes we mediate [between the parts involved]” (Bureaucrat 2, Providencia).

²⁷⁴ With these numbers, Providencia’s administration was the second largest in Santiago, and one of the six municipalities having more than 500 bureaucrats (see table 22 in the Annex). This situation remained similar when the ratio of municipal bureaucrats to population was considered. With about 6.4 bureaucrats per every 1,000 inhabitants, Providencia’s ratio of bureaucrats to population is the second highest in Santiago, and more than twice as big as the average ratio in the city (2.6)—see table 23 in the Annex. Indicators created using municipalities’ number of bureaucrats under the civil service system (*planta*) and those working under fixed-term contracts (*contrata*), and the projections of population size estimated by Chile’s National Institute of Statistics (INE) from the data of the 2002 census for each corresponding municipality and year. Data from *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>. These numbers do not consider bureaucrats who were working under fee-for-service contracts (*honorarios*).

²⁷⁵ Providencia had the highest proportion of bureaucrats with professional degrees among Santiago’s municipalities of similar size (see table 24 in the Annex). Source: *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>. The indicator provided by SINIM considers only the proportion of workers with a professional degree among bureaucrats in the civil service system (*planta*) and bureaucrats under fixed-term contracts (*contrata*). Thus, it excludes bureaucrats under fee-for-service contracts (*honorarios*) from the indicator.

²⁷⁶ Meaning that they spoil the work of the others.

²⁷⁷ Also, recognizing the mistake in the decision of keeping bureaucrats from the previous administration another loyal bureaucrat mentioned that:

“When this local government began, one installation design had to do with not introducing too many changes at the head of departments and middle management levels [...], and there was a thesis—at this point I believe we all understand that it was wrong—of not producing too much noise by changing the municipal team too much. And that is something that still haunts us today. [...]. There are whole areas in the municipality that doesn’t have any loyalty to this local government. And, therefore, when there are serious problems of management or conflict resolution, those departments do not work as swiftly, as promptly, as diligently as required in a local government, especially in one as centrally localized as this one” (Bureaucrat 2, Providencia).

²⁷⁸ As interviews revealed, there were still some occasions where that type of interactions occurred. However, council members admitted that most of the intermediation they did was limited to channeling communities’ problems to the corresponding departments, following the formal procedures to do so, rather than advocating in front of the bureaucracy in favor of a specific resolution and making sure that a solution is provided. By acting in this way, they limited their ability to take credit for problem-solving. As one council member, for example, described: *“I have never given an anticipated answer saying that I can or cannot do something. I listen to people and tell them that I’m going to do what I can. I transmit the problem to the respective municipal department [...]. It is like building the bridge, so to speak. But never like doing a favor—I have to follow the regular channels [...]. People tend to think that if they have one authority on their side things are going to move faster, but I basically pass the information”* (Loyal PS Council Member, Providencia).

²⁷⁹ Similarly, another municipal bureaucrat mentioned:

“The truth is that I receive very few [communities’ demands through council members]. I’ve been for one year in [this job], and I think I have received less than ten requests in this whole year. Very few. And we do, say, about twenty activities each month. So, yes, very few. Very, very few [...]. And they also have a very scarce presence in the territory or the municipal activities. To give you an example, for women’s day we did a super event. There were about 300 women here. In the small municipality where I worked before—or in other, more popular, ones—any council member would see that it is crucial to have visibility there, get to know who the most prominent women with a presence in the territory are, and understand what the requirements of the community are. The truth is that I haven’t seen much interest from the council members here. They just don’t appear” (Bureaucrat 2, Providencia).

²⁸⁰ As a conversation with a local leader suggested:

Interviewer: I’m getting the idea that you have a very direct [communication] channel with the municipality that has nothing to do with council members...

Ana María: Yes, look, the young bureaucrats that arrived with Pepa [mayor Errázuriz], who are very convinced of a different view, do things with a lot of intensity, with a lot of conviction. So, it is a pleasure. [For example], I wrote to one of them: ‘help me, because I want to be independent [from] Chilectra [the electricity company]. What can I do?’ And if everything works, we will install solar panels in our house” (Local Leader 3, Providencia).

8. Annex

Table 11: Population of Santiago's Communes (2015)

Commune	Habitants
Puente Alto	610,118
Maipú	549,788
La Florida	388,805
Santiago	358,332
San Bernardo	297,262
Las Condes	283,417
Peñalolén	242,766
Pudahuel	233,252
Ñuñoa	220,779
La Pintana	212,656
Quilicura	209,417
El Bosque	193,915
Recoleta	168,342
Cerro Navia	158,299
Renca	151,500
Providencia	147,533
Estación Central	144,982
La Granja	143,237
Conchalí	141,089
Macul	124,015
Pedro Aguirre Cerda	122,304
Lo Espejo	120,014
Quinta Normal	114,958
Lo Prado	112,879
San Miguel	110,237
San Joaquín	104,327
Lo Barnechea	103,919
La Reina	101,548
San Ramón	99,749
Huechuraba	95,912
La Cisterna	92,580
Vitacura	88,323
Cerrillos	85,349
Independencia	83,059
Average	188,667

Source: Created by the author based on information from Chile's National Statistics Institute (INE). Estimations for 2015 based on 2002 national census. Reported by the National System of Municipal Information (SINIM) at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

Table 12: Average years of Schooling in Santiago's Communes (2015)

Commune	Average Years of Schooling
Providencia	15.7
Las Condes	15.1
Ñuñoa	14.2
Santiago	13.8
San Miguel	13.3
Macul	12.4
Maipú	12.1
Quinta Normal	11.7
Quilicura	11.4
La Florida	11.4
Puente Alto	11.4
Estación Central	10.9
Peñalolén	10.9
Pudahuel	10.8
Recoleta	10.6
Conchalí	10.6
San Bernardo	10.6
La Granja	10.4
Pedro Aguirre Cerda	10.3
El Bosque	10.1
Renca	10.1
Cerro Navia	9.6
La Pintana	9.6
Metropolitana Region	11.6
National	11.0

Source: Created by the author based on information from the CASEN 2015 survey, Chile's Ministry of Social Development. Communes of Santiago self-represented in the survey.

Table 13: Households' Per Capita Autonomous Income Average in Santiago's Communes (2015)

Commune	Chilean Pesos
Providencia	549,137
Las Condes	365,697
Ñuñoa	317,546
Santiago	242,395
San Miguel	176,052
Macul	125,365
Quinta Normal	109,516
La Florida	87,936
Peñalolén	83,063
Maipú	80,415
Estación Central	75,203
San Bernardo	73,686
Recoleta	73,104
Puente Alto	71,737
Quilicura	71,338
Pudahuel	67,570
La Granja	64,065
Conchalí	63,605
Renca	57,988
Pedro Aguirre Cerda	56,541
El Bosque	53,542
Cerro Navia	51,606
La Pintana	44,238
Metropolitana Region	116,509
National	92,939

Source: Created by the author based on information from the CASEN 2015 survey, Chile's Ministry of Social Development. Communes of Santiago self-represented in the survey. Households' autonomous income corresponds to the sum of all the payments received by the members of the households, coming from either jobs or assets. They include wages and salaries —both monetary and in-kind—; earnings coming from independent jobs; self-provision of goods produced within the household; rents; interests; dividends and profit withdrawals; pensions and social security; and money transfers.

Table 14: Poverty Rates in Santiago's Communes (2015)

Commune	Poverty Index
El Bosque	14.5
Recoleta	13.9
La Pintana	13.9
Cerro Navia	12.1
Pedro Aguirre Cerda	11.0
Conchalí	10.2
San Bernardo	9.2
Renca	8.5
Puente Alto	8.0
Quilicura	7.8
Pudahuel	7.8
La Granja	7.2
Estación Central	6.2
Quinta Normal	5.9
Santiago	5.9
Macul	5.3
Maipú	5.2
Peñalolén	4.8
San Miguel	3.5
La Florida	3.1
Ñuñoa	2.4
Providencia	0.7
Las Condes	0.6
Metropolitana Region	9.2
National	11.7

Source: Created by the author based on information from the CASEN 2015 survey, Chile's Ministry of Social Development. Communes of Santiago self-represented in the survey. Poverty Index corresponds to the estimated proportion of population living below the Chile's line of poverty.

Table 15: Municipal Own Income 2013-2016
(Municipalities of Santiago. Amounts in thousands of pesos)

Municipality	2013	2014	2015	2016	Average
Las Condes	92,653,499	101,171,278	117,522,595	128,859,784	110,051,792
Santiago	75,677,670	79,308,172	86,629,684	90,134,468	82,937,496
Maipú	49,969,147	54,391,678	61,603,659	66,364,386	58,082,216
Puente Alto	47,955,311	53,171,041	60,753,522	64,336,351	56,554,056
Providencia	48,343,014	53,786,866	59,871,039	63,827,095	56,457,004
Lo Barnechea	36,467,634	41,287,967	47,460,459	54,624,111	44,960,044
Vitacura	36,061,589	38,880,934	43,528,290	46,158,191	41,157,252
La Florida	30,209,359	34,252,614	39,418,339	42,539,371	36,604,920
Quilicura	25,076,531	29,611,615	32,566,084	36,505,435	30,939,916
San Bernardo	25,789,806	28,319,724	32,450,479	34,891,415	30,362,856
Pudahuel	24,435,802	26,877,264	30,621,512	33,613,589	28,887,042
Ñuñoa	24,593,759	23,883,855	26,795,060	27,737,790	25,752,616
Peñalolén	20,615,155	24,292,513	26,022,061	28,664,161	24,898,472
Huechuraba	19,559,524	21,844,128	24,458,211	26,744,953	23,151,704
La Pintana	15,557,239	17,270,771	19,935,250	21,443,041	18,551,576
Recoleta	15,630,965	17,367,578	19,249,475	20,413,084	18,165,276
Estación Central	14,053,104	13,301,733	24,050,995	18,518,304	17,481,034
El Bosque	13,615,500	15,220,540	17,175,487	18,136,036	16,036,891
La Reina	12,670,807	13,354,288	15,627,484	16,584,702	14,559,320
Renca	12,883,587	13,769,110	14,385,412	16,643,988	14,420,524
Cerro Navia	11,012,027	12,285,154	14,461,515	14,482,035	13,060,183
Conchalí	11,122,101	12,468,668	13,825,938	14,413,678	12,957,596
Macul	10,761,012	12,027,737	13,312,608	14,034,880	12,534,059
Cerrillos	11,165,288	11,626,505	12,777,171	13,550,997	12,279,990
La Granja	10,225,301	11,374,896	12,914,064	13,212,025	11,931,572
San Miguel	9,834,976	11,263,197	12,689,999	13,027,703	11,703,969
San Joaquín	8,804,058	10,232,019	11,673,444	12,221,324	10,732,711
Lo Espejo	8,886,093	9,645,799	10,817,346	11,747,897	10,274,284
Quinta Normal	8,056,933	9,241,665	10,290,236	10,667,626	9,564,115
Lo Prado	7,983,446	8,715,956	9,942,363	10,446,495	9,272,065
Pedro Aguirre Cerda	7,962,303	8,974,265	8,726,290	9,516,221	8,794,770
San Ramón	7,502,856	8,342,941	9,221,296	9,854,700	8,730,448
Independencia	6,938,015	8,972,624	8,573,071	9,301,240	8,446,238
La Cisterna	6,505,984	7,677,337	8,486,564	8,669,360	7,834,811
Average	22,605,276	24,829,777	28,171,677	30,055,483	26,415,553

Source: Created by the author based on information from *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

Table 16: Per Capita Municipal Own Income 2013-2016
(Municipalities of Santiago. Amounts in thousands of pesos)

Municipality	2013	2014	2015	2016	Average
Vitacura	460.48	441.50	492.83	521.28	479.02
Lo Barnechea	314.48	406.17	456.71	514.41	422.94
Providencia	381.87	368.73	405.81	427.90	396.08
Las Condes	317.34	359.24	414.66	451.92	385.79
Santiago	484.96	230.07	241.76	242.08	299.72
Huechuraba	226.01	231.54	255.01	274.39	246.74
Cerrillos	173.62	137.69	149.70	157.13	154.54
La Reina	134.74	131.62	153.89	163.21	145.87
Quilicura	108.62	146.48	155.51	168.34	144.74
Ñuñoa	175.01	110.34	121.37	123.22	132.48
Estación Central	130.93	92.25	165.89	127.06	129.03
San Miguel	142.84	104.49	115.12	115.61	119.51
Pudahuel	87.24	116.44	131.28	142.65	119.40
Recoleta	131.02	103.84	114.35	120.52	117.43
Independencia	142.86	109.75	103.22	110.26	116.52
San Joaquín	120.28	98.35	111.89	116.85	111.84
Macul	114.55	97.39	107.35	112.74	108.00
Peñalolén	82.21	100.56	107.19	117.55	101.88
San Bernardo	80.71	96.32	109.16	116.14	100.58
Conchalí	109.26	88.46	97.99	102.09	99.45
Renca	100.40	91.46	94.95	109.21	99.01
Maipú	53.66	99.82	112.05	119.67	96.30
La Florida	76.15	88.25	101.38	109.25	93.76
San Ramón	92.62	83.75	92.44	98.69	91.88
La Cisterna	95.16	83.19	91.67	93.39	90.85
Lo Espejo	93.05	80.49	90.13	97.78	90.36
Quinta Normal	96.85	80.86	89.51	92.29	89.88
Puente Alto	61.48	88.29	99.58	104.12	88.37
La Pintana	77.12	81.64	93.74	100.34	88.21
Lo Prado	90.41	77.42	88.08	92.33	87.06
La Granja	85.11	79.62	90.16	92.03	86.73
Cerro Navia	84.95	77.73	91.36	91.37	86.35
El Bosque	82.73	78.79	88.57	93.22	85.83
Pedro Aguirre Cerda	90.25	73.50	71.35	77.71	78.20
Average	150	139	156	165	152

Source: created by the author based on municipalities' Own Income (*Ingresos Propios*) and the projections of population size created by Chile's National Institute of Statistics (INE) from the data of the 2002 census for each corresponding municipality and year. Data obtained from *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>.

Table 17: Municipal Money Transfers to Community Organizations 2013-2016
(Municipalities of Santiago. Amounts in thousands of pesos)

Municipality	2013	2014	2015	2016	Average**
Las Condes	3,854,106	4,610,674	6,436,692	8,444,284	5,836,439
Pudahuel	702,955	531,365	1,028,157	805,548	767,006
Santiago	528,096	570,548	584,097	571,632	563,593
La Reina	411,848	527,149	558,805	626,815	531,154
Quilicura	336,258	432,203	547,716	609,029	481,302
Cerrillos	262,311	211,101	240,224	226,803	235,110
Ñuñoa	162,467	181,916	162,186	184,198	172,692
Recoleta	145,694	190,970	184,707	106,055	156,857
San Joaquín	134,859	166,913	159,701	128,192	147,416
Puente Alto	21,706	108,548	140,929	233,434	126,154
San Ramón	58,756	128,633	95,888	194,254	119,383
Lo Barnechea	64,926	42,932	71,280	266,695	111,458
Macul	95,400	105,137	112,650	128,257	110,361
La Cisterna	74,340	78,896	83,280	113,825	87,585
Providencia	62,995	76,724	118,707	80,356	84,696
Estación Central	20,172	45,493	102,126	154,689	80,620
Maipú	61,764	60,645	70,958	123,415	79,196
La Granja	62,570	78,957	69,626	94,053	76,302
Huechuraba	35,508	27,676	60,290	149,062	68,134
Lo Prado	56,152	52,973	57,774	73,921	60,205
Conchalí	53,071	52,778	-	-	52,925
San Bernardo	50,264	45,086	39,541	67,239	50,533
San Miguel	48,080	51,901	47,151	50,308	49,360
La Pintana	29,234	35,999	54,002	57,148	44,096
El Bosque	5,450	36,015	10,806	74,290	31,640
La Florida	18,630	21,729	32,591	27,452	25,101
Cerro Navia	12,231	15,498	19,953	49,875	24,389
Independencia	34,967	7,500	30,291	15,735	22,123
Renca	-	8,070	27,026	14,836	16,644
Pedro Aguirre Cerda	-	10,000	-	-	10,000
Lo Espejo	1,000	2,000	-	3,000	2,000
Peñalolén	-	-	-	757	757
Quinta Normal	-	-	-	-	-
Vitacura	-	-	-	-	-
Average*	255,373	274,711	398,113	455,839	319,538

Source: Created by the author based on information from *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>. Municipalities' average obtained considering only the years for which the reported data on this item.

* Averages considering only the municipalities and years for which there is data available.

Table 18: Municipal Money Transfers to Community Organizations per Every 1,000 inhabitants 2013-2016 (Municipalities of Santiago. Amounts in thousands of pesos)

Municipality	2013	2014	2015	2016	Average*
Las Condes	13,200	16,372	22,711	29,615	20,474
La Reina	4,380	5,196	5,503	6,169	5,312
Pudahuel	2,510	2,302	4,408	3,419	3,160
Cerrillos	4,079	2,500	2,815	2,630	3,006
Quilicura	1,456	2,138	2,615	2,808	2,255
Santiago	3,384	1,655	1,630	1,535	2,051
San Joaquín	1,842	1,604	1,531	1,226	1,551
San Ramón	725	1,291	961	1,945	1,231
Lo Barnechea	560	422	686	2,512	1,045
Recoleta	1,221	1,142	1,097	626	1,022
La Cisterna	1,087	855	900	1,226	1,017
Macul	1,016	851	908	1,030	951
Ñuñoa	1,156	840	735	818	887
Huechuraba	410	293	629	1,529	715
Providencia	498	526	805	539	592
Lo Prado	636	471	512	653	568
Estación Central	188	316	704	1,061	567
La Granja	521	553	486	655	554
San Miguel	698	481	428	446	513
Independencia	720	92	365	187	341
Conchalí	521	374	-	-	448
La Pintana	145	170	254	267	209
Puente Alto	28	180	231	378	204
San Bernardo	157	153	133	224	167
El Bosque	33	186	56	382	164
Cerro Navia	94	98	126	315	158
Maipú	66	111	129	223	132
Renca	-	54	178	97	110
La Florida	47	56	84	70	64
Pedro Aguirre Cerda	-	82	-	-	82
Lo Espejo	10	17	-	25	17
Peñalolén	-	-	-	3	3
Quinta Normal	-	-	-	-	-
Vitacura	-	-	-	-	-
Average*	1,427	1,335	1,844	2,087	1,549

Source: created by the author based on data on municipal money transfers to community organizations, obtained from *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>), and data on municipal population, obtained from Chile's National Statistics Institute (INE. Estimations based on 2002 national census --Reported by the National System of Municipal Information (SINIM. Available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>). Municipalities' average obtained considering only the years for which the reported data on this item.

* Averages considering only the municipalities and years for which there is data available.

Table 19: Municipalities' Transferences of Public Funds to Private Organizations 2013-2016 (Municipalities of Santiago. Amounts in thousands of pesos)

Municipality	2013	2014	2015	2016	Average*
Las Condes	28,362,902	34,442,958	38,876,006	44,570,435	36,563,075
La Florida	6,531,890	23,887,223	16,205,805	10,615,285	14,310,051
Santiago	11,156,586	11,950,440	13,547,838	10,405,382	11,765,061
Macul	10,044,411	11,042,658	10,960,233	12,581,424	11,157,182
Providencia	6,856,254	8,620,779	8,750,805	10,466,667	8,673,626
Puente Alto	6,308,270	3,423,484	9,776,833	11,059,782	7,642,092
Renca	6,254,385	8,409,547	11,393,869	4,334,885	7,598,172
San Bernardo	4,987,080	5,784,778	6,310,027	6,343,359	5,856,311
Cerro Navia	3,331,072	10,831,607	6,233,498	2,270,948	5,666,781
Ñuñoa	3,799,394	5,132,623	-	6,595,079	5,175,699
Lo Barnechea	3,819,019	5,469,745	5,503,350	5,388,998	5,045,278
Peñalolén	3,019,955	2,860,122	3,215,553	4,872,657	3,492,072
Vitacura	2,622,574	2,908,222	4,530,226	3,212,239	3,318,315
Pudahuel	1,042,856	941,479	5,374,659	4,774,788	3,033,446
San Joaquín	1,676,301	1,612,635	1,478,248	1,934,005	1,675,297
San Miguel	2,101,724	2,418,739	1,866,008	84,654	1,617,781
Maipú	-	-	771,180	831,060	801,120
Lo Prado	1,297,774	97,147	1,314,534	171,443	720,225
La Pintana	685,187	681,577	875,557	2,500	561,205
Estación Central	44,697	273,698	453,569	1,038,462	452,607
Quilicura	212,694	430,056	231,364	572,420	361,633
Huechuraba	125,552	117,541	339,503	406,800	247,349
Conchalí	136,887	319,071	210,644	184,214	212,704
Recoleta	-	-	315,121	29,450	172,285
San Ramón	73,563	154,017	110,135	143,265	120,245
La Reina	45,077	120,442	11,660	260,201	109,345
Quinta Normal	49,431	55,638	67,000	79,460	62,882
La Granja	39,768	66,937	4,600	-	37,102
Independencia	9,000	12,500	-	-	10,750
Pedro Aguirre Cerda	10,550	-	-	-	10,550
La Cisterna	-	650	850	1,220	907
Cerrillos	-	-	-	-	-
El Bosque	-	-	-	-	-
Lo Espejo	-	-	-	-	-
Average*	3,737,316	5,073,797	5,311,738	5,115,396	4,402,295

Source: created by the author based on data on municipalities' transferences of public funds to private organizations, obtained from *Registro Central de Colaboradores del Estado* of Chile's Ministry of Finance (*Ministerio de Hacienda*), according to the law N° 19862 (available online at <https://www.registros19862.cl>). Municipalities' average obtained considering only the years for which the reported data on this item.

* Averages considering only the municipalities and years for which there is data available.

Table 20: Municipalities' Transferences of Public Funds to Private Organizations per Every 1,000 inhabitants 2013-2016 (Municipalities of Santiago. Amounts in thousands of pesos)

Municipality	2013	2014	2015	2016	Average*
Las Condes	97,143	122,302	137,169	156,311	128,231
Macul	106,920	89,410	88,378	101,062	96,443
Providencia	54,159	59,099	59,314	70,168	60,685
Renca	48,739	55,860	75,207	28,444	52,063
Lo Barnechea	32,933	53,809	52,958	50,750	47,613
Santiago	71,494	34,668	37,808	27,947	42,979
Vitacura	33,488	33,024	51,292	36,277	38,520
Cerro Navia	25,697	68,535	39,378	14,327	36,984
La Florida	16,466	61,546	41,681	27,261	36,739
Ñuñoa	27,036	23,713	-	29,297	20,011
San Bernardo	15,608	19,675	21,227	21,114	19,406
San Joaquín	22,901	15,500	14,169	18,492	17,766
San Miguel	30,524	22,438	16,927	751	17,660
Peñalolén	12,043	11,839	13,245	19,982	14,278
Pudahuel	3,723	4,079	23,042	20,264	12,777
Puente Alto	8,088	5,685	16,024	17,899	11,924
Lo Prado	14,696	863	11,646	1,515	7,180
Estación Central	416	1,898	3,128	7,125	3,142
La Pintana	3,397	3,222	4,117	12	2,687
Huechuraba	1,451	1,246	3,540	4,174	2,602
Quilicura	921	2,127	1,105	2,640	1,698
Conchalí	1,345	2,264	1,493	1,305	1,602
San Ramón	908	1,546	1,104	1,435	1,248
La Reina	479	1,187	115	2,561	1,085
Maipú	-	-	1,403	1,499	725
Quinta Normal	594	487	583	687	588
Recoleta	-	-	1,872	174	511
La Granja	331	469	32	-	208
Independencia	185	153	-	-	85
Pedro Aguirre Cerda	120	-	-	-	30
La Cisterna	-	7	9	13	7
Cerrillos	-	-	-	-	-
El Bosque	-	-	-	-	-
Lo Espejo	-	-	-	-	-
Average*	22,565	24,880	25,642	22,879	21,854

Source: created by the author based on data on municipalities' transferences of public funds to private organizations, obtained from *Registro Central de Colaboradores del Estado* of Chile's Ministry of Finance, according to the law N° 19862 (available online at <https://www.registros19862.cl>), and data on municipal population, obtained from Chile's National Statistics Institute (INE. Estimations based on 2002 national census --Reported by the National System of Municipal Information (SINIM. Available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>). Municipalities' average obtained considering only the years for which the reported data on this item.

* Averages considering only the municipalities and years for which there is data available.

Table 21: Proportion of Population Participating in Civil Organizations 2015
(Municipalities of Santiago Self-Represented in CASEN)

Commune	Participation in All Civil Organizations*	Commune	Participation Primarily in Territory Based-Organizations
Providencia	30.8%	Cerro Navia	10.1%
Las Condes	28.6%	Macul	9.3%
Cerro Navia	27.2%	Las Condes	9.0%
Macul	24.5%	San Bernardo	7.9%
Ñuñoa	24.4%	La Granja	7.9%
La Pintana	24.1%	Peñalolén	7.8%
San Miguel	23.8%	Pudahuel	7.1%
San Bernardo	22.8%	San Miguel	7.0%
Peñalolén	22.8%	Maipú	6.9%
Maipú	22.4%	Renca	6.5%
Pudahuel	22.4%	La Pintana	6.4%
Santiago	21.9%	Pedro Aguirre Cerda	6.3%
El Bosque	21.2%	La Florida	6.3%
Renca	20.5%	Ñuñoa	6.2%
La Florida	20.3%	El Bosque	5.9%
La Granja	20.3%	Puente Alto	5.5%
Pedro Aguirre Cerda	19.1%	Providencia	5.4%
Estación Central	18.3%	Quinta Normal	5.2%
Puente Alto	17.7%	Quilicura	5.1%
Recoleta	17.7%	Conchalí	4.4%
Quinta Normal	16.6%	Santiago	4.4%
Quilicura	16.5%	Estación Central	4.3%
Conchalí	16.3%	Recoleta	4.0%

Source: Created by the author based on information from the CASEN 2015 survey, Chile's Ministry of Social Development. Communes of Santiago self-represented in the survey.

* Including both organizations that are circumscribed to communal population and organizations transcending commune limits. Among them: neighborhood and other territory-based organizations; sports or recreation clubs; church or religious organizations; artistic or cultural groups; cultural identity groups; youth or students' organizations; women associations; senior citizens associations; voluntary service organizations; health-related self-help groups; ideology-based organizations (political parties); corporative associations; parents' groups; and other organizations.

Table 22: Size of Municipal Bureaucracies 2013-2016 (Municipalities of Santiago)

Municipality	2013	2014	2015	2016	Average
Santiago	1781	1909	1954	1964	1902
Providencia	871	912	930	915	907
Las Condes	714	761	765	771	753
Maipú	644	626	655	717	661
La Florida	495	507	472	525	500
Estación Central	443	422	486	495	462
Vitacura	393	399	403	510	426
Peñalolén	397	404	411	414	407
San Bernardo	391	382	391	394	390
Ñuñoa	359	363	373	421	379
Puente Alto	376	358	379	382	374
San Miguel	350	347	328	361	347
Recoleta	342	327	318	348	334
Lo Prado	319	321	322	339	325
Conchalí	315	313	313	339	320
Quinta Normal	376	312	295	296	320
Pudahuel	324	310	321	323	320
San Ramón	302	308	313	335	315
Lo Espejo	308	341	290	303	311
Macul	291	325	292	313	305
La Pintana	293	299	299	326	304
Pedro Aguirre Cerda	296	284	288	313	295
El Bosque	301	265	304	305	294
Huechuraba	261	257	265	389	293
San Joaquín	279	279	296	305	290
La Granja	247	261	290	304	276
La Reina	260	260	267	271	265
Cerro Navia	235	260	253	278	257
Cerrillos	258	253	240	236	247
Lo Barnechea	209	253	243	249	239
Independencia	200	197	216	253	217
La Cisterna	112	247	246	248	213
Quilicura	177	192	182	219	193
Renca	150	151	96	193	148
Average	384	394	397	422	399

Source: Created by the author based on information from *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>. Numbers consider only bureaucrats that were either part of the civil service system (*planta*) or working under fixed-term contracts (*contrata*), thus excluding bureaucrats working under fee-for-service contracts (*honorarios*).

Table 23: Number of Municipal Bureaucrats per Every 1,000 inhabitants 2013-2016
(Municipalities of Santiago)

Municipality	2013	2014	2015	2016	Average
Santiago	11.41	5.54	5.45	5.27	6.92
Providencia	6.88	6.25	6.30	6.13	6.39
Vitacura	5.02	4.53	4.56	5.76	4.97
San Miguel	5.08	3.22	2.98	3.20	3.62
Estación Central	4.13	2.93	3.35	3.40	3.45
San Ramón	3.73	3.09	3.14	3.35	3.33
Cerrillos	4.01	3.00	2.81	2.74	3.14
Huechuraba	3.02	2.72	2.76	3.99	3.12
Quinta Normal	4.52	2.73	2.57	2.56	3.09
Lo Prado	3.61	2.85	2.85	3.00	3.08
San Joaquín	3.81	2.68	2.84	2.92	3.06
Independencia	4.12	2.41	2.60	3.00	3.03
Lo Espejo	3.23	2.85	2.42	2.52	2.75
La Reina	2.76	2.56	2.63	2.67	2.66
Macul	3.10	2.63	2.35	2.51	2.65
Pedro Aguirre Cerda	3.35	2.33	2.35	2.56	2.65
Las Condes	2.45	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.64
Conchalí	3.09	2.22	2.22	2.40	2.48
La Cisterna	1.64	2.68	2.66	2.67	2.41
Lo Barnechea	1.80	2.49	2.34	2.34	2.24
Recoleta	2.87	1.96	1.89	2.05	2.19
La Granja	2.06	1.83	2.02	2.12	2.01
Ñuñoa	2.55	1.68	1.69	1.87	1.95
Cerro Navia	1.81	1.65	1.60	1.75	1.70
Peñalolén	1.58	1.67	1.69	1.70	1.66
El Bosque	1.83	1.37	1.57	1.57	1.58
La Pintana	1.45	1.41	1.41	1.53	1.45
Pudahuel	1.16	1.34	1.38	1.37	1.31
San Bernardo	1.22	1.30	1.32	1.31	1.29
La Florida	1.25	1.31	1.21	1.35	1.28
Maipú	0.69	1.15	1.19	1.29	1.08
Renca	1.17	1.00	0.63	1.27	1.02
Quilicura	0.77	0.95	0.87	1.01	0.90
Puente Alto	0.48	0.59	0.62	0.62	0.58
Average	2.99	2.40	2.38	2.54	2.58

Source: created by the author based on data on number of municipal bureaucrats, obtained from *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>), and data on municipal population, obtained from Chile's National Statistics Institute (INE. Estimations based on 2002 national census --Reported by the National System of Municipal Information (SINIM. Available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>). Numbers consider only bureaucrats that were either part of the civil service system (*planta*) or working under fixed-term contracts (*contrata*),

Table 24: Level of Professionalization of Municipal Bureaucracies 2013-2016
(Municipalities of Santiago)

Size	Municipality	2013	2014	2015	2016	Average
Large (500 +)	Providencia	31.3	30.4	32.9	32.5	31.8
	Las Condes	27.6	26.5	26.4	27.6	27.0
	La Florida	21.4	29.4	24.2	28.0	25.7
	Santiago	17.0	16.7	17.4	13.0	16.0
	Maipú	13.4	13.1	14.1	17.0	14.4
Mid-Large (350-499)	Ñuñoa	40.4	38.3	34.3	45.8	39.7
	Puente Alto	31.4	29.9	34.0	34.6	32.5
	Vitacura	32.8	31.8	32.3	28.6	31.4
	San Bernardo	20.5	33.0	32.7	35.3	30.4
	Peñalolén	26.7	26.2	27.5	27.8	27.1
	Estación Central	17.2	17.8	18.9	18.8	18.2
Mid-Small (290-349)	San Joaquín	26.2	29.0	54.4	30.5	35.0
	Huechuraba	27.2	28.8	30.6	41.4	32.0
	La Pintana	30.4	32.4	32.8	31.6	31.8
	Macul	21.3	24.9	27.1	27.5	25.2
	Pudahuel	24.1	24.2	24.9	26.9	25.0
	El Bosque	23.9	24.2	24.0	22.6	23.7
	Recoleta	20.2	25.1	25.5	22.7	23.4
	Lo Prado	22.3	22.4	22.7	24.2	22.9
	Conchalí	21.6	21.1	21.4	22.1	21.6
	Pedro Aguirre Cerda	18.9	22.5	18.4	21.1	20.2
	San Miguel	17.7	17.9	18.3	26.3	20.0
	San Ramón	18.5	16.2	19.5	20.9	18.8
	Quinta Normal	23.1	10.9	16.3	17.6	17.0
Lo Espejo	16.6	14.4	16.2	18.8	16.5	
Small (0-289)	Lo Barnechea	40.7	39.1	39.5	40.6	40.0
	Cerrillos	22.5	29.6	25.4	23.3	25.2
	Independencia	21.0	25.9	26.4	24.9	24.5
	Cerro Navia	19.2	22.3	22.9	25.9	22.6
	Quilicura	24.9	21.4	19.2	23.7	22.3
	La Granja	25.1	24.1	23.1	15.1	21.9
	La Reina	18.1	20.4	21.0	21.0	20.1
	La Cisterna	30.4	15.8	16.3	16.1	19.6
	Renca	26.0	25.2	18.8	36.8	26.7

Source: Created by the author based on information from *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM), available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>. Level of Professionalization consider only bureaucrats that were either part of the civil service system (*planta*) or working under fixed-term contracts (*contrata*), thus excluding bureaucrats working under fee-for-service contracts (*honorarios*). The categories of size of municipal administrations were created by the author considering the breaks in the distribution of the data, and based on the data obtained from *Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal* (SINIM available online at <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>).

Table 25: Issues for which Council Members Criticized the Mayor of Pudahuel in News Media (2013-2016)*

	Criticizing	Ambivalent	Total
Community's issues	1	0	1
Municipal Council's decisions	0	2	2
Elections	1	0	1
General management	2	0	2
Mayor's agenda	7	0	7
Problems with municipal employees	5	1	6
Mismanagement of public resources	33	3	36
Failures in provision of public goods/services	5	3	8
Total	54	9	63

Source: created by the author based on news reports obtained from *Diario Tropezón* available online at www.tropezon.cl.

*The table reports the number of appearances of any council member either criticizing or showing an ambivalent stance toward the mayor in each specific issue. More than one council member could be counted in one news report.

Table 26: Issues for which Council Members Criticized the Mayor of Providencia in News Media (2013-2016)*

	Criticizing	Ambivalent	Total
General management	6	3	9
Ideological/programmatic issues	16	5	21
Problems with municipal employees	5	0	5
Mayor's agenda	8	0	8
Mismanagement of public resources**	15	0	15
Misuse of public resources**	20	0	20
Total	70	8	78

Source: created by the author based on news reports obtained from Chile's national printed and electronic news sources.

*The table reports the number of appearances of any council member either criticizing or showing an ambivalent stance toward the mayor in each specific issue. More than one council member could be counted in one news report.

** The "misuse" refers here to the illegal or corrupt use of resources, while "mismanagement" refers to poor, although still legal, management of resources.

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