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Research Article

The Changing Face of Pakistani Migration to the United Kingdom

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Abstract

This article brings together a range of data sources to chart cohort change in the human capital characteristics of Pakistani immigrants to the United Kingdom over the last fifty years. We demonstrate how restrictions on labor migration and family reunification have transformed characteristics of new arrivals while still maintaining some elements of chain migration patterns. Despite these changes, we note substantial consistency in the sociocultural characteristics of Pakistani-origin U.K. residents across cohorts, specifically in identity, religiosity, and social networks. We reflect on the implications of these patterns of change and continuity.

Introduction

There is a prevailing view in European migration research that (except for some special cases) the lives of immigrants and their children are marked by disadvantage and economic exclusion that persists, even if with some improvements, across generations. An example of this perspective is found in the summary findings reported in a recent Eurostat statistical portrait:

> Migrants also have a lower level of income and particularly those from outside the EU have a significantly increased risk of poverty or social exclusion, even if they are in employment [….] The situation of second-generation migrants with a foreign background (both parents born abroad), while being more positive than that of the first generation migrants, still shows disadvantages compared to the situation of persons with a native background. (European Commission, 2011, 21)

This picture is one seen as typical of labor migrants who originated from relatively disadvantaged regions and with limited skills to work in specific industries, such as Turks in Germany, the Netherlands, and other parts of Europe and Pakistanis in the United Kingdom. However, such a broad-brush portrait of migrants' experience described in terms of national origins is potentially misleading on many counts.

First, there is substantial variation across receiving countries in the experience of labor migrants and, more particularly, their children, even when those of the same national origins are considered. For example, Crul and Schneider (2010) highlight the differing outcomes of Turks in different educational systems. Second, the rather static perspective on ethnic inequalities belies a much more dynamic picture. While disadvantage and discrimination persist as obstacles to economic parity (Simpson et al., 2006), levels of upward mobility across many groups are striking, and not just among those highlighted as model migrants, such as Indians in the United Kingdom or Chinese in the United States. Recent analysis has demonstrated that even over a ten-year period, the "story" of intergenerational mobility across groups such as Pakistanis in the United Kingdom can alter quite substantially (compare, e.g., Platt 2007a with Zuccotti 2015). Third, and most importantly for the purposes of this article, the outcomes of immigrants from a single national origin may differ substantially by time of arrival: Members of different migration waves are motived by different "push and pull" factors, enter under more or less economically buoyant circumstances, and are selected both by receiving country criteria and relative to their nonmigrant compatriots to a greater or lesser degree. Countries may restrict or enable access according to criteria linked to education and labor market skills as well as family ties, a process we term *receiving country selection*; and migrants may be self-selected relative to their compatriots in terms of both observed characteristics—their position in the distribution of skills and qualifications—and on unobserved characteristics such as motivations and aspirations, a process we term *migrant selectivity*. Such forms of selection may operate together or separately to affect different cohorts, and have implications for attitudes and subjective orientations toward the country of destination, a point we elaborate in the following text.

Despite the fact that heterogeneity within national origin groups is widely acknowledged (Alba, Jiménez, and Marrow, 2014; Kritz and Gurak, 2015; Luthra and Soehl, 2015), both scholarly and political discussions continue to treat ethnic groups based on a given national origin as

an analytically meaningful form of categorization. An important reason for this is the generally small sample sizes of specific origin groups in most nationally representative datasets. For instance, Algan et al. (2010) had to combine quarterly Labour Force Survey data over a span of fourteen years (fifty-six datasets from 1993 to 2007) just to obtain 1,091 second-generation Pakistani men from the ages of sixteen to sixty-four. The result is that analysts frequently cannot differentiate immigrants and their descendants by different periods of arrival, birth cohorts, or periods of observation. Instead, all immigrants of a national origin (and often their descendants as well) are treated as a single category. Such stocks will tend to be dominated by the most stable populations and typically, therefore, by the more long-established and older "flows." In cross-sectional data, which represents the predominant source for analysis, it can be problematic to disentangle age from cohort effects. Analysis of the current second generation, extrapolated forward as predictors of future group disadvantage and marginality, will not reflect characteristics of the children of more recent immigrant parents, who may grow up with different family resources, in a different economic context, having faced different immigration and institutional contexts (Reitz, 1999), and with different patterns of intergenerational transmission.

In this article, we address the broader issue of immigrant cohort and generation heterogeneity by focusing on the case of Pakistanis in the United Kingdom. By Pakistani, we refer both to those who were born in Pakistan and migrated to the United Kingdom and their U.K.-born children, who now define themselves as of Pakistani ethnicity. We disentangle the different flows from Pakistan that have followed on from the original labor migration to the United Kingdom of the 1950s and 1960s, a migration that is in many ways typical of those in the major immigrant-receiving nations of Western Europe. Focusing on this specific case, we aim to make a broader point: Claims made about specific national origin "groups" may no longer be meaningful considering the increasing heterogeneity of recent migration dynamics. This heterogeneity in migrant flows reflects the changing conditions in origin countries, for example with the global expansion of education, including tertiary education, and hence the migrant pool. It also reflects the shifting focus of migration policy toward an emphasis on high-skilled migration, as we elaborate in the following text. Such a move toward increasing *receiving country selection* is also found across many European countries, and thus our case study speaks to more general processes and analytical issues.

We illustrate the distinctiveness of different Pakistani cohorts (or migration flows) by bringing together a rich range of data sources from different dates to establish the extent to which cohorts measured at different times are similar or distinctive, and that capture both socioeconomic and more subjective measures. While our data sources are not immune to the sample size issues identified in the preceding text, we demonstrate how descriptive analysis drawing on such a range of different sources can nevertheless help to draw out continuities and differences across cohorts. We explore similarity and change in educational and economic outcomes as well as in subjective measures of identity, religiosity, and belonging. Changing economic outcomes in response to greater selection on skills and qualifications may imply the need to adjust for heterogeneity explicitly in analytical approaches. At the same time, national origin commonalities across identity, religiosity, and belonging, reflecting more common "cultural" heritage (Polavieja, 2015) and long-standing transnational ties, may support continuing group-level analysis. Underlying our exploration of cohort change is the need to treat seriously the implications of heterogeneity for future profiles of second- and later-generation Pakistanis in the United Kingdom, which cannot simply be read off from the experience of the original labor migrants and their children.

Our research therefore contributes to developments in the work on ethnic inequalities that has not only begun to recognize the heterogeneity underlying summary measures of group-based inequalities (Alba, 2014), and the importance of *migrant selectivity* in the interpretation of group "culture" and positive "group" outcomes (Lee and Zhou, 2015), but that also uses empirical analysis of that heterogeneity to raise questions about "groupness" itself (Nandi and Platt, 2010; Platt, 2007b; Platt, 2011b). In doing this, it offers a contribution that extends beyond specific U.K. debates and the particular case study of Pakistani immigrants, offering a potential way of bridging the sometimes fraught divide that operates more generally between those who recognize utility in group categories for understanding ethnic inequalities and those who reject them as reinforcing discredited racial perceptions and ascriptive practices (Aspinall, 2002; Ballard, 1997; Burton, Nandi, and Platt, 2010; Kertzer and Arel, 2002; Ratcliffe, 1996).

Somewhat paradoxically given our emphasis on heterogeneity and change, we can use existing ethnic classifications to challenge understandings of groupness because of the relative stability of self-categorization of British Pakistanis. While there is evidence of instabil-

ity in self-ascription within individuals over time (Platt, Simpson, and Akinwale, 2005), self-ascription is relatively stable among those identifying as Pakistani at any point, with more than 90 percent continuing to categorize themselves as Pakistani over successive ten-year periods (Simpson, 2014). Moreover, there is also a high degree of consistency in relation to own/parental country of birth, that is, recognizing Pakistan as the "origin" country. Existing studies of attitudes and identity have also demonstrated that ethnic identity among those who self-categorize as Pakistani is high (Nandi and Platt, 2015; Platt, 2014). Hence, while what it *means* to be Pakistani may be changing over time, by contrast with studies of some groups (e.g., Duncan and Trejo 2011's study of Mexicans in the United States) this is not accompanied by a rejection of the label. In a context in which the United Kingdom's Muslim groups and Pakistanis in particular are highlighted as "problematic" in political and social discourse (Casey, 2016), processes of both owned identity and of ascription by the majority U.K. population (YouGov, 2013) converge to maintain high levels of Pakistani identification among those born in Pakistan and their descendants.

U.K. Pakistanis provide a particularly relevant case study because of their historical links with the United Kingdom, migration history, and the way that has interacted with changing migration policy, as well as with the institutional and social features (the "warmth of the welcome," Reitz, 1999) of the U.K. context that tend to maintain high levels of inequality in employment (Zwysen and Longhi, 2017) but opportunities for educational attainment (Burgess, 2014; Strand, 2014). We now elaborate these particular features of our example case, before turning to our data sources and analysis.

Pakistani Migrants to the United Kingdom: An Illustrative Example

British Pakistanis are one of the larger of the United Kingdom's minority groups, with historical colonial connections to the United Kingdom. Though there have been South Asians in the United Kingdom for much longer, the major postwar flow of Pakistanis came as labor migrants when they were recruited to particular industries during the 1950s and 1960s (Peach, 1996), a period of net overall emigration from the United Kingdom that persisted till the 1970s (Hatton, 2005). Pakistanis have continued to migrate to the United Kingdom to the present day, experiencing a changing migration regime and broader economic and demographic context in which immigration has strongly outnumbered emigration, with strong ensuing policy emphasis on mi-

gration restrictions. In line with this changing regime, after a period from the 1970s dominated by family reunification, many now migrate for study, as well as to work in skilled occupations.

Migration Policies and Pakistani Response

The 1948 Nationality Act established the right for all commonwealth residents to reside in Britain, a policy that opened borders with Britain to an estimated 600 million people (Somerville, 2007, 14). Though the actual numbers of Commonwealth migrants who took advantage of this right never exceeded 1 percent of the total population from 1948 to 1961, the numbers of Pakistani migrants did increase steadily in the period to an estimated 25,000 by 1961 (Peach, 1996), when immigration restrictions were initiated. Pakistanis came primarily to work in areas that were experiencing growth: London, the Midlands, and the Pennines attracted workers to particular occupations including motor vehicle manufacture and textile industries. The older wave of Pakistani migration primarily stemmed from poorer areas of the Punjab and the Mirpur region.

Pakistani migration was traditionally male dominated and largely unchecked until the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act, after which Pakistanis continued to arrive as unskilled visa category C workers. In 1964, this unskilled visa was halted; and subsequent migration took primarily the form of family reunification, and forms of family-based chain migration, still often as labor migration. Partly in response to planned immigration restrictions, Pakistani migration peaked in the late 1960s and by 1971, the Pakistani population of England and Wales numbered nearly 135,000 (Office for National Statistics, 2013). Hence, as noted for other migration flows, what began as an intended male-only temporary (even if medium-term) migration, with men leaving women and children while they earned money in the United Kingdom, resolved into settlement (Castles and Miller, 2009).

The 1971 Immigration Act repealed earlier legislation, ended economic migration, and increased controls on family reunification, by making family members ineligible for public funds until they were granted indefinite leave to remain (Evans, 1983). The 1971 Immigration Act became the pillar of migration policy in the United Kingdom. This major legislation was complemented by restrictive asylum measures in 1987, 1993, and 1996, as well as decreased rights afforded to asylum seekers upon arrival. In this, the United Kingdom was acting in parallel with increased restrictions throughout much of Europe.

After 1971, Pakistani migration flows slowed; but natural increase and ongoing family reunification continued to result in an expansion of the population, with net migration of around 68,000 per annum in the 1970s and 1980s. This resulted in a Pakistani population of around 477,000 by 1991 (Peach, 1996) of whom around half (225,000) were Pakistan born (Office for National Statistics, 2013). Despite restrictions on family reunification, marriages with extended family members from Pakistani resulted in an ongoing supply of new migrations, with women migrating in larger numbers (Ballard, 1996) from this point, even if both male and female Pakistan-based spouses came this route in fairly equal shares (Charsley et al., 2012). In 1981, the British Nationality Act abolished the 1948 definition of British citizenship and replaced it with a differentiated scheme that excluded overseas residents from the right to live in the United Kingdom.

With the election of the Labour Party in 1997, restriction on asylum seekers continued, but was now combined with efforts to increase skilled migration and use migration to fuel economic growth. White papers in 2002 and 2005 presented concrete plans for British migration policy, including a more assimilationist naturalization process, decreasing asylum seekers, securing the border through increased policing, and streamlining former visa categories for non-E.U. migrants into a single points-based system. This new system was phased in during 2008, and included four tiers. Tier 1 in the new system—which replaced the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme—gave points for age, education, earnings, and previous U.K. experience but not for work experience. Tier II enabled skilled workers with a job offer to come to the United Kingdom, either because they were on a list of shortage occupations or because the employer conducted a prior search that could not be filled. Tier III workers defined a class of low-skilled workers, a tier that would be phased out through E.U. labor mobility; and, finally, Tier IV was for students and specialists where there was no issue of competition with the domestic labor force. Settled migrants were allowed to be joined only by immediate family members (spouses and children under eighteen, as well as parents and grandparents over sixty-five). They also needed to demonstrate necessity of care from relatives in the United Kingdom to obtain admission.

In the most recent policy context, family reunification and study visas remained the primary conduits for migration from Pakistan. But there has been further legislative activity restricting both channels. Starting in September 2007, all students and prospective students intending

to work or wishing to extend their stay beyond their initial grant of leave were required to apply for entry clearance before traveling to the United Kingdom. At the same time, the ability of those already in the United Kingdom in another capacity to switch into the student category was restricted. This has been followed by a series of major changes to the Tier 4 (student) visa starting in 2010, including requiring Highly Trusted Sponsor status for educational institutions, restricting the rights of students to work and bring dependants, and closing the Tier 1 Post Study work route that allowed students a year following completion of a degree to find skilled work.

At the same time, the bar to allow family migration has been continuously raised. From 2012, family migration was restricted to those who reached minimum income thresholds, and the probationary period before a partner could apply for settlement was increased from two to five years, to test the genuineness of the relationship. Immediate settlement for migrant partners where a couple had been living together for at least four years overseas was abolished. The result was a steep decline overall in family visas in 2012 from a prelegislation high of 2,900 in the fourth quarter of 2012 to only 689 in the first quarter of 2013.

Table 1 summarizes the types of migration to be expected consequent on these migration policies and the broad periods in which they occurred. It also outlines the times at which the different cohorts could be expected to be active (or at their peak period) in the labor market, and their approximate age distribution by the time of the 2011 census, our primary source for migrant distributions and cohort change. It also identifies when the children of the different cohorts might be expected to reach adulthood, and thus inform analysis of the second generation. It thereby provides us with a short-hand to understand the composition of the Pakistani population as analyzed at different times.

Given these dramatic shifts in migration policy and restrictions on flows from non-E.U. countries in general, it should be clear that potential Pakistani immigrants faced very different opportunities to migrate, work, and study in the United Kingdom across the past six decades, and indeed that the gender and skill composition of new arrivals has subsequently changed across time. The current Pakistani migrant stock thus represents all the major forms of migration flows (except for asylum): labor migrants, family reunification, and, with a large escalation in the latest phase, student migration (Luthra and Platt, 2016). Pakistanis have also been subject to differentiated within-U.K. economic and political processes and policies, from deindustrialization in the major industries

Table 1. The phases of migration

	Primary migration type	Time of arrival	Peak LFP period	Age in 2000s	Period in which children reach adulthood
First cohort	Labour	50s–70s	60s–80s	60s+	70s–2000s
Second cohort	Family	70s–mid-1990s	70s–2000s	40s–60s	Mid-1990s–present
Third cohort	Skilled+Family	1997–2007	1990s–present	30s–40s	Present onward
Fourth cohort	Skilled+Student	2007 onward	Current	20s	Future

in which they worked (and many of the regions in which they settled) to uneven patterns of schooling, and to targeted policies aimed at deradicalization and counterextremism (e.g., the antiterrorist Prevent strategy; see Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016). They have thus been subject to different degrees to the internal dynamics of economic restructuring and a changing policy and political landscape in the United Kingdom as well as to those in their country of origin. The result is that the stylized picture of disadvantage is far from being the whole one, disguising substantial diversity and change within outcomes and relatedly within the experience of the "group", changing the face of Pakistanis in the United Kingdom.

Pakistani Integration Outcomes

Although the changing face of migration is widely acknowledged (Frattini, 2017), there is little current research that directly examines the extent to which these more recent migrants are similar or different to their much-studied earlier counterparts, and thus offers little guidance in understanding the implications of increased heterogeneity for the outcomes of Pakistani immigrants and their descendants in the future.

Pakistani immigrants (and their offspring) are under intense public scrutiny and their (non)integration is a source of intense political debate (e.g., Cameron, 2011; Cantle, 2001; Casey, 2016). Yet most of the academic literature on Pakistani integration in the United Kingdom has focused on the outcomes of the earlier labor

migration wave, in particular documenting disadvantage in economic outcomes following the deindustrialization of areas of Pakistani migrant concentration (Platt, 2007b). More recently, attention has focused on the children of these migrants, for instance in their academic and labor market outcomes (e.g., Cheung and Heath, 2007); and in marriage migration research there has been substantial attention paid to the spousal choices of the native-born children of Pakistani immigrants (Charsley, 2007; Charsley et al., 2012; Dale and Ahmed, 2011; Georgiadis and Manning, 2011). Scholars now rightly draw attention to the emerging heterogeneity within the U.K. Pakistani-origin population with inequalities differing, sometimes dramatically, across generations (Ahmad, 2001; Longhi, Nicoletti, and Platt, 2013). Generational change in educational outcomes (Heath et al., 2008), men's as well as women's labor market participation (Georgiadis and Manning, 2011), in life satisfaction and identity (Knies, Nandi, and Platt, 2016; Nandi and Platt, 2015; Platt, 2014) and to a lesser extent in religiosity (Platt, 2014) have also been demonstrated.

Yet the intergenerational story is typically interpreted in the context of an assumed static parental or foreign-born population, even despite the high rates of foreign-born spouses among U.K.-born Pakistanis (Charsley, 2007; Georgiadis and Manning, 2011). Changes in the immigrant population may, however, shape the evolution of second-generation outcomes in the future directly through differences in parental characteristics and transmission, but also indirectly through changes in community resources, practices, and expectations.

Migration Policy, Selection, and Integration Outcomes

The dramatic shifts in migration policy reviewed in the preceding text, alongside changes in Pakistan, should substantially alter the possibilities and incentives for mobility over time. We therefore expect substantial variation in educational attainment and labor market outcomes—of both the first and the second generation—by time of arrival. In common with much of postwar Western Europe, the United Kingdom's active recruitment of unskilled manpower from former colonies resulted in early labor migrants who typically arrived with limited transferable skills and were vulnerable to hypercyclical unemployment, that is greater unemployment in recession and slower return after a recession (Leslie and Lindley, 2001; Lindley, 2005). Yet even this most disadvantaged immigrant wave brought with them the motivation of pioneers and strong aspirations for their children (Strand, 2014). The

result has been exceptional upward mobility: For instance, although in the 1991 Census Pakistanis were concentrated in older industrial cities, clustered in poorer quality housing, and more likely to be unemployed (Peach, 1996), recent analysis has revealed that their children have experienced high rates of educational mobility (Modood, 1993; Strand, 2014; Zuccotti, 2015), with dramatic increases in tertiary-level qualifications across second-generation Pakistani women and men (Platt, 2011a).

Those arriving in the next wave through family reunification would be expected to demonstrate lower rates of *migrant selectivity* than the initial pioneer labor migrants: Network theories generally imply declining rather than increasing skills across time; and family migrants are less likely, particularly if they are women, to be invested in realizing labor market opportunities (Campbell, 2014), though motivations may be complex (Gonzalez-Ferrer, 2011). Overall, we would expect those migration flows dominated by family migrants to be characterized by lower qualifications, lower labor force participation among women and poorer occupational outcomes among both genders, with potential knock-on effects for subsequent generations. Yet, because family reunification is often with U.K.-born as well as earlier migrating family members, with more than 60 percent of British Pakistanis marrying a foreign-born spouse in the period to 2006 (Georgiadis and Manning, 2011), the nature and implications of such migration may not be straightforward and may show greater continuities with the earlier labor migration than migration "motive" alone implies.

The more recent skilled migrants and students might be expected to have more qualifications and higher skills, including English-language skills than earlier flows. We would expect them to fill higher-status occupations than previous cohorts, with a reduced tendency to work in self-employment and niche economies. However, even if selected by the receiving country for their skills, it is unclear how far these new waves of migrants are positioned to translate them into more positive labor market outcomes, with Qureshi, Varghese, and Osella (2013) demonstrating the underemployment and inability to use their skills faced by skilled migrants from neighboring Indian Punjab.

Although immigration policy generally selects only for sociodemographic characteristics, and migration motivations are typically also primarily economic, the primary concerns for states and existing populations after settlement tend to be with cultural as much as economic integration. This has been exemplified in the current policy debates, in which "social integration" is emphasized, despite the fact that economic

integration is what is most often measured (Algan et al., 2012; Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius, 2014; Sobolewska, Galandini, and Lessard-Phillips, 2017). In a time of increasing nationalistic sentiment across Western Europe and the United States, governments are increasingly responding to constituent fears about the loss of "compositional amenities" through increased diversity due to migration as well as economic concerns (Card et al., 2012).

This raises the question of whether and how the changing composition of migrants across migration cohorts impacts on sociocultural outcomes. Pakistanis show high rates of naturalization, in both older streams (e.g., in the 1997 British Election Study ethnic minority boost sample, rates of British citizenship among those born in Pakistan were 79 percent), as well as among the stocks analyzed more recently in the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (citizenship rates of 75 percent among those born in Pakistan) (Platt, 2014). Almost all second-generation Pakistanis have British citizenship. Pakistanis become closely identified with the United Kingdom over time, assimilating to a British identity more quickly than white immigrants, even as they also maintain higher levels of home country and religious identification (Manning and Roy, 2010; Nandi and Platt, 2015; Platt, 2014). Indeed, there seems substantial evidence that Muslim/Pakistani and British identities are complementary, rather than conflicting (Nandi and Platt, 2015; Platt, 2014).

Within these more general trends, those with the most favorable sociodemographic conditions—younger, more highly educated, and in professional occupations—are, however, *less* likely to identify as British than older and less educated individuals (Nandi and Platt, 2015). This compares with the general population, where higher levels of education are generally associated with more cosmopolitan attitudes and lower levels of national identification and pride (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005). Specific to immigrants and minorities, receiving country identification has been linked to a more vulnerable status and has been regarded by Ong and Lee (2011) as a "defensive" strategy. Higher education and economic status tends to lead to more distance from national identification, for immigrants and the U.K. born alike. Thus, the contemporary stream, more skilled and qualified, but more restricted in options for settlement, may display more cosmopolitan orientations, for instance less investment in "belonging" and in host country identification, by comparison with the dominant pattern in the group as a whole (Nandi and Platt, 2015; Platt, 2014).

This body of evidence, which documents a negative relationship between economic position and British identification rarely, however,

considers the shifting patterns of *receiving country selection* across arrival cohorts. Younger and more educated Pakistanis may either be (1) more recent arrivals, who have come as students or skilled workers following the points-based migration system, or (2) the upwardly mobile children of labor migrant parents, born and raised in Britain. Depending on which subgroup the individual belongs to, we would assign very different meanings to the observed associations between education, age, and identification. Even models that control for compositional differences by place of birth do not allow the strength or direction of these relationships to differ, yet differences in educational selection of migrants are not the same as processes of educational mobility among the children of immigrants. Highly educated U.K.-born Pakistanis are likely to have had parents with little formal schooling, whereas highly educated immigrants from Pakistan are more likely to be members of Pakistan's elite or at least the developing middle class. The U.K. born have attachment born of upbringing, and expectations of treatment in accordance with birthright citizenship, socialization, and education in the receiving country. It is well documented that higher expectations among the "better integrated" second generation paradoxically leads to greater perceptions of discrimination (Heath and Demireva, 2014; Platt, 2014) and lower levels of well-being (Gelatt, 2013; Verkuyten 2016). In contrast, foreign-born Pakistanis who migrated as adults will have been active agents in the choice to move to the United Kingdom, with accordingly different expectations of treatment and attitudes toward the receiving country.

More recent arrivals might also distinguish themselves from earlier Pakistani migrations in their patterns of social and geographical settlement. Earlier migrations were very much network migrations, and minorities migrated into areas of prior migration (Simpson, 2004), becoming concentrated in geographically circumscribed communities offering enclave employment opportunities (though see Clark and Drinkwater, 2002) and community resources (Phillips, 2006). Being embedded in such networks implied the evolution of friendships and networks that were strongly own-group oriented, even if not exclusively so (Platt, 2012). Family migrants would be particularly likely to be embedded in close kin and group ties, though labor migration as chain migration would also indicate such patterns.

The settlement and social patterns for the more recent high-skilled and student migration flows are currently unknown, and expectations for these less theoretically developed. We might expect migrants who are more advantaged, who come for study (or skilled work) rather than

marriage, and who start with greater levels of English language skills to reside in different areas and associate less with earlier cohorts from the same country of origin, with whom they may feel they have less in common. However, such independence from coethnics in the receiving country does not automatically lead to greater integration with the receiving country population, as those with more resources may be less bound by proximity constraints in maintaining social networks (Werbner, 1999).

Yet even as we expect variation across time, there are also reasons to anticipate continuity. Although skilled and student visa applications involve direct recruitment from receiving country institutions, the choice of school or firm is frequently informed by informal social ties. Moreover, certain benefits of ethnic embeddedness may apply even to more advantaged migrants, who additionally face the insecurity of a complex and restrictive visa system alongside an increasingly hostile anti-immigrant environment (Duffy, 2014). The benefits of own-country networks apply not only to settlement and employment opportunities, but may also support well-being and protect against discrimination (Bécares, Nazroo, and Stafford, 2009; Knies et al., 2016).

Similarly, the drivers of migration may be expected to remain fairly consistent: Even with changes in policy, the economic position of Pakistan relative to the United Kingdom continues to provide ample incentive to migrate. Existing transnational ties arising from earlier migration streams might be expected to continue to produce migration flows, even if the direct family connections no longer provide the link. In 2005, Hatton showed the high correlation between student and other forms of migration, which he interpreted as showing that the same (economic and chain-based) drivers operated similarly across different forms of migration.

The current literature on more economically selected migrants therefore suggests countervailing hypotheses about their identificational and sociocultural integration: on the one hand, we may expect lower levels of engagement with the receiving society among the more recent arrivals, and on the other hand, continuity between earlier and later arrivals, despite their expected socioeconomic differences. In this article, we can demonstrate whether such continuities exist.

The extent to which we find ethnic embeddedness among more recent migrants also has implications for how we understand the future of the U.K. Pakistani population. If newer migrants are rather separate from existing migrant (and migrant origin) populations, then we would expect their trajectories to have little impact on those of the current set-

tled populations and their children. But if newer migrants are linked to some degree to older migrant cohorts, both in terms of friendships and residence, then they will change the composition of the community, its level of "ethnic capital" (Borjas, 1992), and hence shape the trajectories of subsequent second-generation children as they enter and complete education and enter the labor market, in a way we appear to be seeing currently for U.K. Indians (Zuccotti and Platt, 2016).

In what follows, we mobilize a variety of data sources from different periods, selected to cover both socioeconomic and sociocultural domains to illustrate the extent to which Pakistanis show expected cohort distinctions in socioeconomic status, and how far such distinctions impact upon cultural and attitudinal orientations.

Data Sources and Approach

A classic challenge in examining demographic change across time is unpicking the influences of age, cohort, and period on characteristics of interest. Applied to our case, are changes in the characteristics of the Pakistani-origin population across time due to different *receiving country selection* processes at their time of arrival (cohort), changes within the population as they adjust to life in the United Kingdom in relation to their life course (age), or general changes across time in the United Kingdom or Pakistan? In other words, if we observe that Pakistanis in the United Kingdom are more educated in 2016 than in 1980, is that a reflection of educational expansion in Pakistan during this period, is it due to new immigration law in the United Kingdom preventing low skill migration, or is it because Pakistanis resident in the United Kingdom acquire educational credentials over time and generations?

Without longitudinal data of individuals of multiple ages and across different periods of arrival, it is impossible to completely unravel these different factors. However, we are fortunate in that the United Kingdom is remarkably rich in data sources for the analysis of ethnicity over the last twenty to twenty-five years. By piecing together cross-sectional data from a variety of different periods of observation, and controlling for age and time of arrival, we can at least adjust for the effect of age and acculturation over time, allowing us to compare across periods. Prior to the early 1990s, however, we have less purchase on minority groups' experience except through the use of retrospective measurement of cohorts still present in later periods. We therefore focus primarily on the distinction between the experience of minorities in the early 1990s prior to the shift to the new managed migration regime

post-1997, the experience in the early 2000s following that shift, and the recent period from 2011, with the impact of the points-based system, postrecession restrictions, and the increase in student migration.

We draw on the following sources:

Census for England and Wales: Our key source is published and bespoke tables from the decennial Census for 2011 for England and Wales. Alongside measures of ethnicity and country of birth, this census introduced questions on time of migration, passport holding, and English (or Welsh) language fluency. Collecting information on every person present in the United Kingdom at the time of data collection (March 27, 2011), the census is the most representative data source on Pakistanis, with sufficient numbers to disentangle patterns across different arrival cohorts, as well as between the foreign and U.K. born. All tables cited are accessible from www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011. We also supplement this analysis with information from the 2001 and 1991 censuses.

Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS): The LFS began in 1973 as a biennial survey of employment and economic activity in the United Kingdom; in 1992, quarterly data were made available. The survey includes information on ethnic origin, place of birth, and year of arrival in the United Kingdom, and has been used for numerous studies of the economic experience of ethnic minorities in the United Kingdom. Here we use it to identify different Pakistani migration cohorts and their employment outcomes (Office for National Statistics, 2016f).

Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (FNSEM): Fielded in 1993, the FNSEM is a survey of social and economic conditions, discrimination, and identity in England and Wales designed to be representative of five minority groups, including Pakistanis (Berthoud et al., 1997). It also included a white comparison sample. Interviews could be undertaken in English or the respondent's first language (if different), using a translated questionnaire. These data allow us to look at the Pakistani-origin stock at an intermediate period before the increase in migration flows that took place from the late 1990s.

Ethnic Minority British Election Study 2010 (EMBES): Like the FNSEM, the EMBES is a representative survey of the United Kingdom's five largest ethnic minority groups, including Pakistanis (Heath et al., 2012). The survey includes place of birth and time of arrival information, and we use the survey for its information on the ethnic composition of friendship networks across arrival cohorts and among the U.K. born of Pakistani origin.

Socio-Cultural Integration of New Immigrants (SCIP): For the very most recent period, and for identifying the contribution of current and ongoing migration flows, we use SCIP data. That is, a large, chain-referral survey of Pakistani immigrants very close to the time of arrival (within eighteen months) (Diehl et al., 2016). This survey took place during the peak period of student migration (which was also the period the 2011 Census took place), and thus enabled us to capture a substantial flow sample predominantly of students (Luthra and Platt, 2016). The sample was focused on London and was dominated by relatively young (aged thirty-five or less) men, consistent with the recorded flows of student migrants in other datasets (see further Platt, Luthra, and Frere-Smith, 2015). Therefore, when comparing this sample with earlier migrant samples we compare primarily with men aged thirty-five or younger. The rich data in this source on both educational and socioeconomic background and a wide range of sociocultural experiences and attitudes, including cultural consumption, friendships, and identity, enables us to link the two among those who are at the forefront of the new migration wave.

World Values Survey (WVS): To provide some additional insight into the "cultural" factors prevailing in the country of origin we use the WVS 2012 data on the general population in Pakistan (World Values Survey, 2015). This internationally standardized survey provides rich demographic data and a wide array of variables on beliefs and values. The Pakistani sample is nationally representative through a sample selection procedure stratified by region and urban/rural distinction.

Other secondary data sources: We also rely on a variety of published statistics. To examine the educational performance of Pakistani students in the United Kingdom, we use the 2014 Statistical First Release from the U.K. Department for Education, comprising aggregate data on students in state-funded schools in England. Our measures of Pakistani migration flows (see Figure 1) are from the Office for National Statistics Long-Term Migration Statistics, where *long-term* refers to migration for at least one year. Finally, we also use statistics reported in other academic work: Where these are used, the proper citation is given.

Patterns of Economic and Socioattitudinal Experience across Pakistani Cohorts

Pakistani Characteristics by Time of Arrival

We first explore the Pakistani response to changing migration policy and receiving country context. The 2011 Census of England and Wales enumerated nearly half a million people born in Pakistan living in the

United Kingdom (482,000), the third-largest foreign-born group (after Indians and Poles), as well as the largest Muslim one. The group has more than doubled in size in the past twenty years and increased by 50 percent in just the last ten (Office for National Statistics, 2013), so that by 2011 those who had migrated from Pakistan comprised just under 1 percent of the population of England and Wales. Including U.K.-born Pakistanis, the numbers claiming Pakistani ethnicity amounted to 2 percent of the population in 2011 (1,125,511 individuals). Among all foreign-born Pakistanis in 2011, 29 percent arrived before 1981, 13 percent between 1981 and 1990, 20 percent between 1991 and 2000, and 39 percent between 2001 and 2011. Thus, the more recent arrivals, entering under a very different migration regime, constitute a substantial proportion.

Table 1 demonstrated the different "phases" of Pakistani migration, with family migration dominating the second and continuing through the third phase. While family migration dominates as the reason for migration among the overall stock of South Asian (including Pakistani) migrants (Cooper et al., 2014), it plays a smaller role in current flows. Figure 1 shows the overall pattern of flows from 1977, when statistics from the International Passenger Survey first were first provided, revealing a steady decline in inflows from 1978 with an increase around 1997, peaking in 2009/10 before declining, but to rates still well above those that had dominated in the 1980s. Breaking this down, from 1986, by main reason for migration, it shows the dominance of family migration for much of the period, echoing the "all migration" pattern, with some decline in the late 1980s/early 1990s. All three forms of migration increased in the late 1990s but with a particularly sharp escalation in student migration up to 2010. In 2010, the U.K. government introduced a "highly trusted" status requirement for higher education institutions sponsoring student visas, which led to more than 800 institutions losing their license to sponsor third-country student visas between 2010 and 2014. Correspondingly, student migration fell back to leave work, family, and student migration flows at very similar levels in the most recent year. While these published statistics are not disaggregated to country level below South Asia, investigating statistics for individual years suggests that these patterns are similar for Indians and Pakistanis.

The patterns in Figure 1 demonstrate a strong and consistent demand for migration, evidenced by the response of migrant flows to the current policy regime, most tellingly with the huge jump in student migration in response to impending restrictions on work and student visas. Czaika and De Haas (2013) have discussed how migration policy can re-

sult in a substitution of precise visa statuses without necessarily reducing overall immigrant numbers, as some migrants can be diverted from one type of migration flow to another in accordance with current policy constraints. The result is that, despite differences in visa statuses, there may be greater similarity among immigrants than we would expect.

We can also explore the extent to which current stocks approximate migration flows, noting that the older age of earlier cohorts, and hence higher rates of retirement and lower rates of studentship will influence these patterns. Analysis of census data from 2011 shows that, despite the fact that many of the earliest (pre-1981) cohort are now retired, self-employment, a distinctive feature of much labor migration, made up 40 percent of those still in work. Self-employment remains a substantial status among later cohorts as well, particularly when compared with the overall national U.K.-born profile. There are also substantial shares of migrants from the 1980s and 1990s who are "looking after home and family"—more than 20 percent of each of the cohorts—reflecting the dominance of

Figure 1. South Asian migration flows to the United Kingdom, 1977–2015 all reasons, and 1986–2015,by main reason for migration



Source: Adapted from Office for National Statistics Long-Term Migration Estimates, March 2016.

Note: Series broken down by reason for migration are only extended back to 1986 due to large shares of "other" and "reason not given" in the source data in earlier years, rendering the patterns harder to interpret.

family reunification in these periods as well as the challenges for those coming as family members in finding employment opportunities. In the latest period, there are high rates of students (around 20 percent).

In Figure 2, we draw on a specially commissioned census table to draw out the gender differences in employment status between the most recent (by 2011) migrants those who had migrated since 2001 and the earlier arrival cohorts, as well as U.K.-born Pakistanis. We can also hold age constant to some degree, comparing those aged eighteen to thirty-five with those aged thirty-six to fifty-nine within each of these cohorts. We see the dominance of students among men of the most recent cohort, but that students feature substantially across the younger men (in the top panel) even among those not so recently arrived as well as in the U.K.-born Pakistanis compared to the age group as a whole. Study also is prominent among younger, and especially U.K.-born women, but even among the more recently arrived there is a dominance of "looking after home and family" among women—despite the relatively high levels of qualifications that they come with, as we see in the following text. Among the thirty-five to fifty-nine cohort, more recently arrived men do not seem to gain labor market advantage, with high rates of unemployment as well as relatively high rates of students for this age group. There appears to be some evidence that labor market access "beds down" for men and for women over time, but unemployment rates for both remain high and participation rates remain low among women, suggesting that there is no substantial discontinuity with earlier labor migrants' experience.

Selection across Cohorts

We can investigate differences in social origins across different (broad) migration phases, as an indication of higher *receiving country selection* of newer migrants, in line with recent policy. Analysis of the Labour Force Survey revealed that the family origins (parental occupational group) of more recently arrived (post-2000) Pakistanis are significantly more advantaged than those of earlier (pre-2000) immigrants. Specifically, while 46 percent of post-2000 immigrant Pakistanis had social origins in the professional and managerial classes, this was only 28 percent among earlier cohorts. Among U.K.-born Pakistanis the rate was 32 percent. While these figures cannot directly indicate *migrant selectivity* because the socioeconomic composition of Pakistan has been changing in tandem, they do, nevertheless, indicate the drive toward more highly skilled migrants in more recent years.

Figure 2. Employment status among Pakistani men and women aged 18–34 by time of migration and compared to all men and all women f this age in England and Wales (top panel: N = 186,739 [women] and 198,279 [men] and aged 35–59 bottom panel: N = 126,965 [women] and 135, 159 [men])



Source: Constructed by the authors from Office for National Statistics Census 2011 Table CT0718—Economic activity by highest level of qualification by age by length of residency in the United Kingdom by sex; and Table DC6107EW—Economic Activity by sex by age ONS Crown Copyright Reserved (Nomis, July 13, 2017).

We next turn to consider how qualifications are distributed across migration cohorts. A comparison with the whole U.K. population (Appendix: Figure A1) shows that those arriving in the most recent period were more highly qualified (fewer with no qualifications and more with higher qualifications) than the stock of qualifications in the U.K. population as a whole in 2011. Contrary to expectations, however, educational qualifications changed monotonically across the different periods: The period of family reunification did not see a decline in qualifications levels (see Figure A1). This is probably partly a consequence of changes in patterns of educational attainment in Pakistan, and, partly as a result, a declining gender gap in qualifications across cohorts (Georgiadis and Manning, 2011). We outline gender differences in qualifications further in the following text.

The final factor that has been considered in terms of *receiving country selection* of recent migrants is language fluency. Fluency in the destination country language is considered both to be central to integration, as it is acquired in a mutually reinforcing pattern within the country of destination (Chiswick and Miller, 2002; Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003; Dustmann and van Soest, 1998), and a marker of initial skills and indicative of *migrant selectivity*. Thus, we would expect the highly qualified newer migrants to arrive with a level of English language fluency that their earlier migrating counterparts may only have acquired over time.

From the 2011 Census language question it is possible to chart the contemporary fluency of those who immigrated at different periods. While more of the earlier (pre-1981) migrants have English as their main language, as we would expect from their duration in the United Kingdom, there is also a higher proportion that lack fluency. English language fluency is greater among men than women across the cohorts, but the cohort pattern is consistent across the sexes.

We also compared the fluency among recent Pakistani migrants aged eighteen to thirty-five surveyed in the SCIP study in 2011 with those aged eighteen to thirty-five who had also arrived as adults and who were surveyed in 1993 (FNSEM). In 1993, 33 percent reported that they could only speak English slightly or not at all, even though some would have been living in the United Kingdom for several years. In contrast, the recently arrived SCIP sample of Pakistani men in London already reports better rates of fluency with only eighteen months or less in the country of destination: Only 20 percent said they spoke English not well or not at all. This is also consistent with census results for those Pakistani men who arrived in the period 2007 to 2011, whose English

language proficiency stood at nearly 90 percent, suggesting fast acquisition of language among these more skilled and with more exposure to native English speakers in their learning or working environments.

Implications of Cohort Change for Socioeconomic Outcomes of First and Second Generation

It is clear then that recent Pakistanis are more skilled than previous flows, and there has been some general trend in this direction over time. The changes in English language fluency are striking, especially as language is important not just for work but also for social relations. This then brings the question of how that relates to employment outcomes and to the socioeconomic outcomes of the second generation.

First, we look at the relationship between education and socioeconomic position across the cohorts. The aim here is to ascertain whether different cohorts are achieving distinct occupational positions, and whether they are converting educational qualifications into occupational success to a different degree across cohorts. We might expect that as Pakistanis start coming from more advantaged origins they will be better placed to translate that advantage into labor market outcomes. However, as Campbell (2014) has argued—and illustrated—those who arrive as students rather than for work may be less successful in terms of labor market outcomes as their participation is more incidental rather than having driven their migration. Using the Labour Force Survey, we map broad cohorts based on timing of arrival and excluding all those who arrived aged under sixteen. We focus on occupation, as occupation can, in principle, be measured even for those who do not currently have a job. However, it may fail to capture those who are long-term unemployed. We therefore additionally explore the probability of being in the "never worked" category. We compare the proportions who achieve a professional managerial or technical occupation compared to a skilled/semiskilled or an elementary occupation across cohorts and educational levels. Given the large differences in labor market participation by sexes and the degree of occupational segregation, we conduct this analysis separately for men and women.

Table 2 (top panel) indicates that even if they were not so likely to have tertiary qualifications, those men among the earlier cohorts for whom we have occupational information managed to

achieve returns to those qualifications; and few from the earliest cohort ended up in elementary occupations (the chi^2 tests illustrate the statistical significance of the positive association between education and occupation across the cohorts). At the same time, a very high proportion of the earlier cohorts with no qualifications never worked, thus we lack information from nearly half of this group. Rather than nonparticipation, this is likely to suggest retirement or early retirement for health, especially following industrial restructuring that is associated more with elementary than with skilled occupations (Qureshi et al., 2014). At the same time, the more highly educated recent cohort is clearly yet to fully enter into the labor market, though the extent to which they cluster in elementary occupations, despite qualifications, does not suggest an improving occupational situation across cohorts (cf. the discussion for Punjabi Indians in Qureshi et al., 2013).

The bottom panel of Table 2 shows the pattern for women. At first glance, it looks remarkably similar to the pattern for men. However, the ever/never worked columns show just how selected those with an occupation are—only one in five Pakistani women are in the labor market. Nevertheless, interestingly, those small numbers who are highly educated do participate in much larger proportions and tend to get returns to those qualifications across cohorts. Yet because of the changing patterns of education and participation, the more recent cohorts do not have a statistically different occupational pattern to the earlier cohorts ($chi^2 = 0.8$, $P = 0.993$). What we do see, however, is a significant change in participation patterns across cohorts. Thus, as qualifications increase among women we might expect to see more favorable outcomes, and hence gradual changes in the composition of the stock of Pakistani women, a point we revisit in the following text.

The second aim of this subsection is to map parental educational patterns onto child educational and economic patterns and trace the extent to which they are changing in tandem. For example, while extensive evidence has shown that in the United Kingdom migrants' children typically overachieve in education when taking account of their social origins, does this mean that there are increases in (relative) attainment (and occupational success) as parental qualifications increase? We mapped educational outcomes across a series of cohorts, using, first, Labour Force Survey data to capture arrival cohorts and then 2011 Census data to compare

Table 2. Occupational outcomes by cohort and educational level, row percentages

Pakistan-born men								
Cohort	Ed level	Prof/man	Skilled/semi	Elementary	N	Ever worked	Never worked	N
Arrived 16+ before 1980	Tertiary	70.2	29.8	0	22	94.0	6.0	31
	Less/other	46.4	49.6	4.0	65	70.2	29.8	112
	None	25.2	68.1	6.7	53	54.4	45.6	131
	All	41.8	53.2	5.0	144	65.5	34.5	275
Chi2: 16.0(4), P = 0.003						Chi2: 20.2(2), P < 0.001		
Arrived 16+ 1980–96	Tertiary	79.8	20.2	0	75	95.2	4.8	81
	Less/other	22.1	69.0	8.9	200	92.3	7.7	252
	None	18.9	70.6	10.5	114	78.8	21.2	172
	All	32.1	59.8	8.1	403	88.4	11.6	505
Chi2: 103.1(4), P < 0.001						Chi2: 24.4(2), P < 0.001		
Arrived 16+ 1997+	Tertiary	51.4	33.3	15.3	109	65.2	34.8	154
	Less/other	14.8	59.5	25.6	289	77.5	22.5	375
	None	1.8	62.9	35.3	132	80.1	19.9	191
	All	19.9	54.1	26.0	545	75.3	24.7	720
Chi2: 105.7(4), P < 0.001						Ch2: 8.6(2), P = 0.014		
Pakistan-born women								
Cohort	Ed level	Prof/man	Skilled/semi	Elementary	N	Ever worked	Never worked	N
Arrived 16+ before 1980	Tertiary	70.2	29.8	0	14	71.8	28.2	25
	Less/other	27.2	54.1	18.7	26	32.1	67.9	115
	None	11.3	47.8	40.9	21	12.3	87.7	284
	All	31.9	46.8	21.2	62	14.6	83.3	649
Chi2: 17.8(4), P = 0.001						Chi2:38.8 (2), P< 0.001		
Arrived 16+ 1980–96	Tertiary	80.8	15.0	4.2	19	63.8	36.2	34
	Less/other	12.6	66.5	20.9	43	31.3	68.7	209
	None	7.0	30.3	62.7	27	11.3	88.7	450
	All	25.0	45.8	29.2	92	18.7	81.3	786
Chi2: 44.8(4), P < 0.001						Chi2: 83.6(2), P < 0.001		
Arrived 16+ 1997+	Tertiary	73.5	26.5	0	19	39.0	61.0	82
	Less/other	22.5	55.0	22.5	51	25.5	74.5	300
	None	10.7	42.4	46.9	19	12.1	87.9	249
	All	30.4	46.4	23.2	89	21.3	78.7	672
Chi2: 24.1(4), P < 0.001						Chi2: 32.0(2), P< 0.001		

Source: Authors' analysis of Labour Force Survey 2002–10. Weighted percentages; unweighted Ns. Chi2 for cohort by occupation: 0.8(4), P = 0.993; Chi2 for cohort by never worked: 8.9(2), P = 0.011.

recent arrivals and U.K. born from different broad age bands. (see Appendix: Table A1). We compared each cohort with the majority / total population of a comparable age. We further added in the rates of those who obtain the "expected level" in age sixteen exams (in England) from recent administrative data.

This analysis showed that while educational attainment is clearly increasing substantially across cohorts, the second generation, even from fairly low educated forbears, are achieving levels of education that are almost comparable—and that are beginning to outstrip those of their U.K. peers. Levels of zero qualifications have also declined commensurately, though interestingly they remain relatively high among recent women immigrants, giving them a somewhat bimodal distribution of qualifications. While new flows are especially highly educated, then, they are likely to find common ground in terms of qualifications levels with their U.K.-born Pakistani peers, even if not with earlier immigrant generations. Overall, Table A1 suggests that the levels of higher qualifications within the "stock" of Pakistanis are rapidly increasing in ways that are likely to have implications for future outcomes.

If we link these qualifications levels to employment and participation rates, we find that while women's economic activity (even excluding students) is low at 49 percent among eighteen to thirty-four year olds and 37 percent among thirty-five to fifty-nine year olds, it rises to 71 percent and 74 percent, respectively, among those with degree-level qualifications (authors' analysis of Census Table CTO718). Moreover, it is higher among the U.K. born, reaching 85 percent (among those eighteen to thirty-four) and 80 percent (among those thirty-five to fifty-nine) for those Pakistani origin women with degree-level education. Hence, participation patterns are likely to see considerable change over the future, but less as a result of targeted migration policies it would appear, than of generational change and rapid educational mobility.

Implications of Cohort Change for Attitudes and Identity

We know U.K. Pakistanis identify strongly with both Pakistan and Britain, and express high levels of religiosity as well as relatively high intragroup friendships and association. These patterns persist, even if to a lesser extent, into the second generation; but this may stem from strong patterns of intergenerational transmission from (earlier migrant) parents. Identification, as well as re-

ligiosity, has tended to be linked with socioeconomic position, and with social status, as high rates of citizenship presuppose strong investment in the receiving country and identification and religiosity offer security in an insecure—and even hostile world (Inglehart and Norris, 2004). As noted, U.K. Pakistanis have high rates of naturalization, and in 2011, even including the recent migrant cohort, 69 percent of those born in Pakistani had a U.K. passport (Office for National Statistics Census 2011 Table DC2208EW).

These characteristics are also likely to be reinforced by group processes, as they receive social reinforcement from clustered and interacting communities. But as migrants become more educated, will this in turn undermine such features of community and integration? If education is negatively associated with identification and as those with more options or with more cosmopolitan orientations envisage a range of futures for themselves, at the same time as paths to citizenship are made more challenging, will they identify less with their destination country—and invest less in local community networks? In this section, we turn to that question focusing primarily on our most recent sample of new migrants in the SCIP sample, but we supplement it with corresponding analysis of the earlier cohort found in the FNSEM. Given the low proportions of women in the SCIP sample, we focus primarily on men.

We first explored whether newly arrived and highly educated Pakistanis are less affectively engaged with their country of residence and found that the new Pakistani migrants show surprisingly high rates of identification (see Appendix: Table A2). This may be partly a consequence of the fact that they have not had the time to become disillusioned with the country of destination, with alienation tending to be higher in the second than the first generation (Heath and Demireva, 2014; Platt, 2014) and experience of discrimination influencing identification (Nandi and Platt, 2015). Nevertheless, it illustrates that identification with Britain is on a comparable level among newly arrived Pakistani immigrants as among more settled and lower skilled, who were surveyed in a rather different political and economic context, more than fifteen years earlier. We also found high levels of religiosity across the board, despite arguments relating to the role of religion in relation to economic insecurity (Inglehart and Norris, 2004) and for facilitating migrant integration (Guveli, 2015). Indeed, religiosity was higher among the newer migrants, perhaps reflecting the closer in-

fluence of the sending society, which also demonstrated very high rates of religiosity.

In terms of identity and affective ties, the newer arrivals appear to have much in common with preceding cohorts. Turning to social embeddedness, the literature on migration has demonstrated the importance of prior concentrations of a group in a destination country for ongoing migration flows. Some of this embeddedness operates through direct ties, kin marriage and social networks in countries of origin and destination, and most migration theories test such interpersonal connections (Boyd, 1989). But with longstanding ties and with substantial populations from a country of origin in a specific destination, co-ethnic social links may operate in more diffuse meso- and macrolevels of connectedness (Fawcett, 1989) and be less interpersonal (Luthra and Platt, 2016).

Table 3 compares recent Pakistani migrants in SCIP with those in the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election study, as the FNSEM did not provide questions on friendships. The findings in Table 3 show that there are substantial levels of social embeddedness in Pakistani networks among the most recent migrants, which make them comparable to a certain degree with those earlier flows. However, the findings suggest a system/internationalization interpretation rather than network drivers. While one in four of the recent Pakistanis had some prior contact and around a third spend time with someone from Pakistan or have a Pakistani close friend, these levels of contact are far from those saturated networks that we might expect from a network migration perspective.

The findings from more recent flows indicate that there is some degree of colocation, even if it is again not at a level that would be expected from direct network flows. Alongside larger existing populations this provides the institutional completeness (Breton, 1964) that can both ease settlement and integration as well as providing group-level resources that may support cultural maintenance and, potentially, segregation. The newest migrants' networks and identity orientations suggest some degree of cultural similarity even into the new migration era, though the resistance to newer migrants from settled communities has also been noted (Charsley and Bolognani, 2017). These imply a level of ongoing and future colocation that will facilitate and capitalize on group concentration for resources and cultural maintenance. At the same time, the nature of the community will be gradually shifting, in-

Table 3. Friends and networks among more established and recent Pakistanis

2010 EMBES							Recent migrants (men < 35) (SCIP, 2011)				
Friends of same ethnic group?							Spends time with				
	Arrived < 1980	Arrived 1980–9	Arrived 1990–9	Arrived > 2000	All (incl. U.K. born)	Men not U.K. born < 35	N Pakistanis in Network			Pakistani people[a]	British people[a]
All of them	16%	8%	10%	14%	11%	14%	Mean	14.1	Every day	39%	11%
Most of them	51%	45%	57%	45%	50%	47%	Median	3	Several times per week	24%	32%
Some of them	16%	30%	18%	14%	21%	16%	Share with at least 1 Pakistani close friend	30%	A few times per month	17%	29%
A few of them	14%	15%	14%	25%	17%	24%	Knew someone before migrating	25%	Several times per year	8%	11
None of them	3%	1%	1%	2%	1%	0%			Less often or never	9%	15%
N	99	64	91	132	647	104		594		595	595

Sources: Authors' analysis of Ethnic Minority British Election Study, and SCIP data.

[a] Percentages do not round to 100 as 2.5 percent in each case refused or responded "don't know."

cluding in terms of levels of ethnic capital and attitudes toward (as well as enactment of) female labor force participation that have been highlighted as significant drivers of future generations' outcomes (Shah, Dwyer, and Modood, 2010; Zuccotti and Platt, 2016); characteristics that we have noted are tending to change as levels of qualifications rise.

Conclusions

In this article, we set out to chart the migration flows of a "typical" postwar labor migration (Castles and Miller, 2009), and to investigate change and continuity across arrival cohorts for a single national origin group. We questioned whether it made sense to think of and analyze as a group, migrants who had experienced changing policy, institutional and economic contexts, and different periods of settlement; and we queried how far it made sense to extrapolate the trajectories of future generations from the experience of the current "mature" second generation, who are children primarily of the early labor migrants.

Migration policy has clearly influenced the size of flows and types of migrant, and more recent migrants were more highly skilled than previous waves, particularly in terms of English language fluency. Yet these assets do not appear to be clearly placing them in an elite—or even an advantaged—occupational position. Rather, we found substantial continuity in both economic and sociocultural position of newer and more long-standing migrants, particularly in identities and religiosity across cohorts, as well as a high degree of ethnic embeddedness even in the non-network migration flows of the latest period. Importantly, we must remember that while migration policy has become more focused on selecting migrants on measured skills, the pool from which they are drawn continues to change over time. Greater selection on skills from the receiving country does not *necessarily* translate into greater *migrant selectivity* among those migrating.

The links observed in the extant literature between educational attainment, a younger age profile, and lower levels of identification with national identities appear to be a generational difference, rather than a sociodemographic one. Despite a shorter period since arrival and lower citizenship rates, the more educated and recently arrived immigrants showed surprisingly high levels of social integration and identification with Britain. Additionally,

despite their higher educational levels, the recently arrived U.K. Pakistani population continues to be linked to fellow coethnics across social networks and common subjective orientations. They additionally share with them—or even exceed—risks of unemployment and indeterminate labor market outcomes.

Given the young age, on average, of the most recent cohorts, we may still anticipate further divergence in labor market and social outcomes across time, as well as in the subsequent generations' outcomes as these more selected migrants settle and raise families of their own. One part of the future story will undoubtedly find a section of the newest skilled and student migrants developing distinctive highly successful trajectories typical of "elite" migrations, with a cleavage between them and those labor and family migrants typically characterized as disadvantaged. Yet the patterns we have shown suggest that there will also be continued refreshment of local communities and community-level resources and the support (as well as constraints) that such communities can offer. While we have identified a somewhat surprising level of continuities, this does not, however, necessarily mean that the changes in migrant skills and the emerging profile of the latest second generation is not relevant for reconsidering our interpretation of this traditionally disadvantaged group.

The precise implications for the second and subsequent generations deserve further consideration, particularly for women, where increasing participation at the community level, supported by higher levels of educational attainment, may foster further increases in labor market engagement for individual women, while the refreshment of potentially more traditional attitudes and cultural maintenance, alongside the very substantial obstacles to participation in terms of discrimination and labor market exclusion, may reinforce existing patterns of traditional divisions of labor (cf. Zuccotti and Platt, 2016). Overall, whatever processes dominate we would expect the next generation to exceed the outcomes of their migrant parents in occupational terms. But at the same time, the current hostile climate may increase dissatisfaction; and geographical and social integration accompanied by systematic exclusion can foster alienation (Heath and Demireva, 2014; Platt, 2014; Verkuyten 2016).

Our findings suggest that we have only a limited understanding at the microanalytical level of how (potential) migrants respond to policy, and how far their migration aims or motiva-

tions are realized. These are areas for further work. Similarly, we highlighted at the outset how patterns of selection through policies of the receiving country may or may not align with increasing *migrant selectivity*: Bringing together analysis of both sides of the migration flow could provide additional purchase in understanding the intergenerational changes as well as cohort continuities. The article has also highlighted the ways in which attention to group heterogeneity can challenge static discourses that continue to reproduce "groups" in ways that do not adequately capture the dynamism—or indeed the successes—of traditionally disadvantaged groups. By doing so, it also provides greater potential for challenging the determinism that is often linked to such discourses of disadvantage, and which persists in locating causes of disadvantage within particular national origin groups, rather than seeking for them in mechanisms that operate across social groups.

These are issues that are not specific to one destination country or a specific origin country. Indeed, the issue of increasing intragroup heterogeneity has already been flagged for researching Mexican-origin individuals in the United States (Alba et al., 2014) and for immigrants residing in "superdiverse" European capitals (Crul, 2016). This article therefore has broader implications for the need for researchers to question the integrity of national origin groups as stable entities and to consider the ways in which migrant origin groups evolve in relation to the intersection of migration policies, economic contexts, and premigration characteristics and contexts.

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Appendix

Figure A1. Qualifications of those born in Pakistan by cohort of arrival, and all U.K. born in 2011, England and Wales



Source: Constructed by the authors from Office for National Statistics Census 2011 Table CT0071—Highest level of qualification by year of arrival in the United Kingdom by country of birth by age (national). Office for National Statistics Crown Copyright Reserved (Nomis, October 29, 2016).

Table A1. Educational attainment across migrant cohorts and the second generation

Cohort/age	Pakistani migration cohorts (White U.K./ All of comparable age in brackets)	
	BA+	None
Arrived 16+ before 1980 (age range 50–75)[a]	8.3 (24.2)	58.8 (26.7)
Arrived 16+ 1980–96 (age range 30–55)[a]	9.9 (30.7)	50.6 (12.4)
Arrived 16+ from 1997 (age range 22–45)[a]	18.9 (33.6)	31.2 (9.0)
Arrived 34–59 from 2009[b]	36.0 (33.6)	21.8 (12.5)
Arrived 34–59 from 2009: men[b]	41.9 (33.3)	15.5 (13.2)
Arrived 34–59 from 2009: women[b]	28.2 (33.9)	30.2 (11.7)
Arrived 16–34 from 2009[b]	41.7 (27.8)	10.2 (9.8)
Arrived 16–34 from 2009: men[b]	45.2 (26.0)	7.1 (10.4)
Arrived 16–34 from 2009: women[b]	35.5 (29.6)	15.7 (9.2)
Aged 18–34 U.K. born[b]	30.5 (27.8)	9.4 (9.8)
Aged 18–34 U.K. born: men[b]	29.5 (26.0)	10.2 (10.4)
Aged 18–34 U.K. born: women[b]	31.5 (29.6)	8.6 (9.2)
End of compulsory school exams, age 16[c]	83.6 (82.7)	
End of compulsory school exams, age 16, boys[c]	81.0 (79.2)	
End of compulsory school exams, age 16, girls[c]	86.4 (86.3)	

[a] Authors' analysis of pooled LFS 2002–10, survey weighted percentages.

[b] Pakistani figures derived from Office for National Statistics Census Table CT0718—Economic activity by highest level of qualification by age by length of residency in the United Kingdom by sex; All derived from Office for National Statistics Census Table DC5102EW—Highest level of qualification by sex by age (All: ages from 16–34 and 35–49).

[c] Department for Education, Statistical First Release SFR05, 2014.

Table A2. Identification among earlier and recent cohorts of Pakistani migrants, 1993 (all and men) and 2011/12

	1993 (all)[a]	1993 men < 35[a]	Recently arrived (men < 35)[b]	Pakistan (from 2012 WVS)[c]
% identifying with Great Britain	62	71	76	N/A
% identifying with Pakistan	92	91	92	91
% regarding religion as very important	79	72	84	94
N	453	92	595	335

[a] Authors' analysis of FNSEM, 1993, weighted percentages, unweighted Ns; due to the FNSEM split sample design sample sizes are substantially reduced for these measures: Response is based on agrees or strongly agrees thinks self British/Pakistani.

[b] Authors' analysis of SCIP data, 2011: Response is based on considers United Kingdom/ Pakistani fairly important or very important for identity.

[c] World Values Survey 2012: Response is based on agree or strongly agree self is part of Pakistani nation.

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