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2020

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, MERCED

Individualism-Collectivism Orientation in American Political Attitudes and
Behavior

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Kathryn Herzog

Committee in charge:

Professor Matthew V. Hibbing, Chair
Professor Elaine K. Denny
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2020

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2020

Dedication

To my family, whose endless love and support mean the world to me.

Table of Contents

List of Figures.....	vi
List of Tables.....	vii
Curriculum Vita.....	viii
Acknowledgements.....	xi
Abstract.....	xii
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
Chapter 2: Theory.....	5
Chapter 3: Ideology and IC Orientation.....	15
Chapter 4: Partisanship and IC Orientation.....	29
Chapter 5: Political Engagement and IC Orientation.....	38
Chapter 6: Conclusion.....	47
References.....	49
Appendix A.....	57
Appendix B.....	63
Appendix C.....	71
Appendix D.....	76

List of Figures

Figure 1: The direct effect of IC orientation on abortion attitudes.....	20
Figure 2: The direct effect of IC orientation on gun control attitudes.....	21
Figure 3: The direct effect of IC orientation on immigration attitudes.....	22
Figure 4: The direct effect of IC orientation on Social Security funding attitudes.....	24
Figure 5: The direct effect of IC orientation on welfare program funding attitudes.....	25
Figure 6: The direct effect of IC orientation on Public School funding attitudes..	26
Figure 7: The direct effect of IC orientation on environmental protection funding attitudes.....	27
Figure 8: Predicted party identification by IC orientation.....	34
Figure 9: The direct effect of IC orientation on affective polarization.....	36
Figure 10: The direct effect of IC orientation on political interest.....	42
Figure 11: The direct effect of IC orientation on attention to news media.....	44

List of Tables

Table 1: Factor analysis for IC orientation scale.....	14
Table 2: The effect of IC orientation on Ideology.....	18
Table 3: The effect of IC orientation on social policy attitudes.....	19
Table 4: The effect of IC orientation on economic policy attitudes.....	23
Table 5: The effect of IC orientation on direction of partisan identification.....	31
Table 6: The effect of IC orientation on party identification.....	33
Table 7: The effect of IC orientation on affective partisanship.....	35
Table 8: The effect of IC orientation on political interest.....	41
Table 9: The effect of IC orientation on attention and knowledge.....	43
Table 10: The effect of IC orientation on voting.....	45

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Acknowledgements

My journey through graduate school was possible because of the support of numerous incredible people in my life. First, thank you to my dissertation committee for your encouragement and understanding through this process. 2020 has been a wild year for everyone, and it helped me immensely to have you all in my corner. I would like to thank my fellow graduate students; I deeply appreciate the friendship and support throughout the years. Thank you to all my professors at UC Merced. You taught me so much and I am incredibly grateful.

I owe so much to my family. I could not dream of a better support system. First, thank you for being understanding and encouraging of my decision to move far away from home for graduate school. I miss you all every day. Thank you to my mom and dad for always being there, for the countless pep talks, and for your unconditional love and encouragement. Thank you to my sisters, Carly and Emma, for being my best friends, listening to me rant, cheering me on, and for keeping me somewhat sane. Thank you to my grandparents, Bill and Carole Herzog and Jim and Jan Deetjen your love means the world to me. Finally, an extra special thanks to Emma and Mom for being my amazing editors on countless papers over the years.

Thank you to Stephanie Nail. I would not have made it through grad school without you. Thank you for your kindness, your never-ending patience, and for answering my endless statistics questions. Thank you for celebrating with me in my successes and for comforting me in failures. You are the best friend anyone could have, and meeting you made every hard part of this program worth it.

Thank you to Theresa and Charlie Skaar for being my West Coast family. Thank you for taking me in every Thanksgiving and being my home away from home. Theresa, your loving advice and reassurance over the years have made graduate school feel doable. Thank you for doing “dissertation power hour” with me, it has made everything feel more manageable. I am so grateful we were able to go through this journey together.

To my Metro State family, thank you. The years we spent together will forever be some of the best of my life. And thank you to the incredible women who brought us all together, Kerry Kleyman. Kerry, there are no words that can express the difference you made in my life. Thank you for taking an interest in me when I was an undergraduate, for sparking my love of research, and for teaching me to believe in myself. I would not be the person I am today without your mentorship and encouragement.

Last but not least, thank you to Dan. I couldn't ask for a better partner in life. Thank you for taking a leap and moving across the country to be with me while I went to school. Thank you for being my pillar of support throughout all of this. We have made it through this crazy phase in our lives, I cannot wait to see what comes next.

Abstract

Individualism-collectivism orientation is a construct that summarizes fundamental differences in how people see the relationship between individuals and how they view themselves in relation to others. The current dissertation explores the role of individualism-collectivism orientation in American political attitudes and behaviors. Using a nationally representative sample, I conduct a series of regression analyses and show that variation in individualism-collectivism orientation predicts various policy attitudes, likelihood of partisan identification, higher levels of affective polarization, and some aspects of political engagement. This dissertation serves as an initial assessment of the role variation in IC orientation plays in political attitudes and behaviors, directions for further research are discussed.

Chapter 1

Individualist/Collectivist Orientation and Politics

Political scientists have a long tradition of applying robust theories from social psychology to the study of politics. A few examples of this include: Social Identity Theory being used to develop a better understanding of political partisanship (e.g., Huddy, 2001), The Big Five personality index being applied to partially explain predispositions to ideological attitudes (e.g., Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, & Shang, 2010; Mondak, Hibbing, Canache, Seligson, & Anderson, 2010) and Motivated Reasoning helping to shed light on individuals' propensity to interpret information differently based on their political party preferences (e.g., Taber & Lodge, 2006).

Despite their extensive use of psychological research, political scientists have largely overlooked an important theory in social psychology thus far; Individualism-Collectivism Orientation (IC Orientation). The scarcity with which this psychological principle is applied in political science research is particularly conspicuous because of the group-based nature of IC orientation. IC orientation is the variation in how people view themselves in relation to groups; whether they view themselves as separate and autonomous entities, or as embedded in interdependent salient groups (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995). Those who are higher in individualism view themselves as separate and autonomous and place the needs of the individual above the needs of the group. Collectivists on the other hand view themselves as interconnected and value the needs of the group above the needs of individuals (Brewer & Chen, 2007; D Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Triandis, 1995). Given the group-based nature of American politics, it is fairly surprising that IC orientation has not yet been applied in political science research.

Similar to dispositional psychological traits such as: The Big Five, Need for Closure, or Disgust Sensitivity, IC Orientation is not obviously associated with political attitudes and behaviors. Research has shown that individual level variation on IC Orientation predicts differences in various attitudes and behaviors. For example, IC orientation has been used extensively to study and understand differences in workplace attitudes and behavior such as: differences in employee cooperation (Cox, Lobel, & McLeod, 1991; J A Wagner, 1995), attitudes toward various management practices (Ramamoorthy & Carroll, 1998), employee loyalty to their company (Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1991), and response to negative feedback (Stone-Romero & Stone, 2002). Just as the Big Five traits are associated with a range of political attitudes and behaviors (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Gerber et al., 2010; Jeffery J Mondak, Hibbing, Canache, Seligson, & Anderson, 2010), I argue that the application of IC orientation to political contexts will add to our understanding of motivations for attitudes and behaviors in the political realm.

1.1 History, Meaning, and Measurement of Individualism and Collectivism

The concepts of individualism and collectivism have played a role in academic thought for quite some time, at least since the writings of French philosopher, De Tocqueville, in 1835. De Tocqueville wrote of early American society, "Such folk owe no man anything and hardly expect anything from anybody. They form the habit of thinking of themselves in isolation and imagine that their whole destiny is in their own hands" (1835/1969, pg. 508). The modern conceptualization of Individualism and Collectivism largely stems from Hofstede's (1980) seminal work *Culture's Consequences*, which investigated cultural level differences in workplace values. According to Hofstede (1991), "Individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose; everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family only...Collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty" (pp. 260-261).

Following Hofstede's publications, Individualism and Collectivism quickly became the predominant constructs for researchers to classify and study variations between cultures. On a cultural level, individualism and Collectivism are distinguished by the society emphasizing the importance of the individual person or the group respectively (D Oyserman et al., 2002; D Oyserman & Uskul, 2008). IC Orientation has played an outsized role in cross-cultural research for many years and was applied largely to contrast and explain differences between European American and East Asian cultures (e.g., Hui, 1988; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997; Yamaguchi, 1994).

As research on IC orientation progressed, more psychologists came to understand individualism and collectivism as dispositional characteristics that vary on the individual level, not only between cultures but within cultures as well (Kim, 1994; Triandis, 1995; Yamaguchi, Kuhlman, & Sugimori, 1995). Cultures are labeled as collectivist or individualistic based on individuals within the population. If the majority of individuals in a population are collectivistic, the culture is labeled as collectivist, and vice versa (Hofstede, 1980; Hui & Triandis, 1986). While overall trends toward either collectivism or individualism may exist within cultures, there is still variance within those populations that leads to differences in attitudes and behaviors amongst individuals.

The dominant view today is that research can be conducted at either the cultural level or the individual level, with recognition that cultures and individuals are two different units of analysis (Kim, 1994). Individual level differences in IC orientation have been found repeatedly in both individualist and collectivist cultures (Hui & Triandis, 1986; Triandis et al., 1986; Triandis, Leung, Villareal, & Clack, 1985; Yamaguchi, 1994) and many researchers have treated IC orientation as an individual level variable (Agrawal, Menon, & Aaker, 2007; Dolan, Diez-Pinol, Fernandez-Alles, Martin-Prius, & Martinez-Fierro, 2004; Eby & Dobbins, 1997; Gundlach, Zivnuska, & Stoner, 2006; Kelly & Kelly, 1994; Kozan & Ergin, 1999; Leonhardt, Pezzuti, & Namkoong, 2020; Schwartz, 1992; Sinha &

Tripathi, 1994; Triandis, 1989, 1995; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988; J A Wagner, 1995; John A Wagner & Moch, 1986). For the purposes of this dissertation, I will focus on individual level variation in individualism and collectivism within the United States.

Individualism-Collectivism Orientation¹ is a construct that encapsulates fundamental differences in how people see the relationship between individuals and how they view themselves in relation to others. Some researchers have argued that IC Orientation is made up of two separate dimensions and individualism and collectivism are not mutually exclusive (D Oyserman et al., 2002; Daphna Oyserman, 2016; Triandis, 1995). In this conceptualization of IC Orientation, individuals can be high on individualism and collectivism simultaneously. While I acknowledge that conceptualization of individualism and collectivism is an ongoing debate in the literature, for the purposes of this dissertation, IC Orientation is conceptualized on one dimension with individualism and collectivism existing on opposite ends of a single continuum. Those individuals who are high on collectivism are described as 'collectivists', whereas those high on individualism are 'individualists'. This understanding of IC Orientation is in line with numerous studies (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2007; Dolan et al., 2004; Gundlach et al., 2006; Kelly & Kelly, 1994; Leonhardt et al., 2020; Nagarajan Ramamoorthy & Flood, 2002, 2004).

Despite decades of research on the topic, there is a lack of consensus in the literature regarding the underlying nature of IC orientation. Some researchers maintain that IC orientation is a variation in cognitive style or disposition, while others treat IC orientation as an innate individual level trait akin to a personality trait. The difference in understanding of IC orientation has led to various measurement approaches. Researchers who take a trait-based approach use self-report questionnaires to assess individuals' IC orientation (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2007; Leonhardt et al., 2020; Nagarajan Ramamoorthy & Flood, 2002; Singels, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; J A Wagner, 1995). Cognitive style based approaches use more abstract cognitive tests to evaluate individuals' position on the individualism-collectivism dimension (e.g., Ji, Zhang, & Nisbett, 2004; Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003). Although there is clearly some murkiness surrounding the specific nature of IC orientation, I make the assumption that IC orientation is a distinct, enduring psychological trait that influences individuals' attitudes and behaviors and can be assessed using self-report measures for the purposes of this dissertation.

Those high on individualism tend to hold an independent view of the self that emphasizes autonomy, internal attributes, and the uniqueness of the individual. In contrast, those who are high on collectivism tend to hold an interdependent view of the self that emphasizes connectedness, social context,

¹ The concept of Individualism has also been labeled as independent, egocentric, idiocentric, analytic, and self-contained. Collectivism has also been called interdependent, collective, allocentric, connected, holistic, and relational. For the purposes of this dissertation, I will use the terms individualism and collectivism, or individualist and collectivist.

and relationships with others (Hofstede & Minkov, 2005; Hazel Rose Markus & Kitayama, 2010; D Oyserman et al., 2002; D Oyserman & Uskul, 2008; Singelis, 1994; Triandis, 1989). As a result, there are attitudinal and behavioral differences between people with individualist vs. collectivist orientation. For example, self-definition and inner attributes are more important for individualists, while enhancing relatedness and furthering connections with others is more imperative for collectivists (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Similarly, attitudes toward autonomy and uniqueness are more favorable for those with individualist orientations, and attitudes toward connectedness with others and relationships are more favorable for those with collectivist orientations. These attitudinal differences in IC orientation impact motivations for behavior. People with individualist orientations are more motivated by personal preferences and inner drives, whereas those with collectivist orientations are more motivated by the preferences and needs of close others.

1.2 Chapter Outline

In this dissertation, I examine the role of individualism and collectivism in American political attitudes and behaviors. First, I outline three broad questions concerning the relationship between individualism and collectivism. Each of these questions corresponds to studies in three empirical chapters.

- I. What is the relationship between IC orientation and ideology? Do underlying differences in individualism or collectivism map onto conservative or liberal policy attitudes?
- II. Does IC orientation predict partisan attachment or affective partisanship?
- III. Is there a relationship between IC orientation and political engagement?

I explore these questions in the theory chapter, then move on to test the hypotheses derived from the theory in a series of empirical chapters. In the first empirical chapter, I investigate the relationship between IC orientation and self-reported ideology. I also examine attitudes on a number of policy positions and their relation to IC orientation. In the second empirical chapter, I turn to the group-based nature of political partisanship and look at the relationship between IC orientation and partisan attachment as well as IC orientation and affective partisanship. In the last empirical chapter, I examine the role IC orientation plays in political engagement, including likelihood of voting and attention paid to politics. In the final chapter I conclude by discussing the implications of this dissertation and outlining future directions for research on IC orientation in the political space. The goal of this work is to further expand our knowledge of key aspects of American political attitudes and behavior by employing the robust psychological concept of IC orientation.

Chapter 2: Theory

2.1 The Role of IC Orientation in Ideology

2.1.1 IC Orientation

Individualism-collectivism orientation is a construct that summarizes fundamental differences in how people see the relationship between individuals and how they view themselves in relation to others. People who have a more individualistic orientation are more autonomous, place higher value on self-reliance, and strive to differentiate themselves from the group. People with collectivist orientations are more relationship-oriented, view themselves as part of the group, and value interdependence and group harmony (Oyserman et al., 2002).

What causes variation in IC orientation? As I discussed in Chapter 1, there is disagreement among researchers on the exact psychological nature of IC orientation. I maintain that IC orientation is an enduring psychological disposition, akin to a personality trait (Triandis, 2001; Triandis & Suh, 2002)². In his book, *The Personality Puzzle*, Funder (1997) defined personality as “an individual’s characteristic pattern of thought, emotion, and behavior, together with the psychological mechanisms – hidden or not – behind those patterns” (p. 1-2). I argue that IC orientation is a psychological mechanism behind peoples’ pattern of thought, emotion, and behavior. Differences in IC orientation likely come from cultural values that individuals are exposed to and internalize from an early age that become a psychological mechanism that drives attitudes and behaviors.

Where do these values come from? Vandello and Cohen (1999) explained variation in IC orientation across the United States using an ecological framework. They show that differences in the environment and history of regions shaped differences in tendencies toward individualism and collectivism. For example, in regions of the United States where the economy was based on agricultural crop farming, and thus relied on many people working together, people were more collectivist. Conversely, in regions of the country where economies were based in more self-reliant trades, such as ranching and herding, people were more individualistic. This research shows how differences in environment lead to subcultures espousing fundamental values based in self-preservation.

Variation in IC Orientation has been shown to be significantly related to other enduring personal characteristics. For example, IC orientation has been shown to be significantly related to the Big Five personality traits – collectivism is negatively correlated with openness and positively correlated with agreeableness and conscientiousness (Burton, Delvecchio, Germani, & Mazzeschi, 2019; Realo, Allik, & Vadi, 1997). Researchers have also found genetic differences between

² Triandis refers to the personality traits that correspond to individualism and collectivism as idiocentrism and allocentrism, respectively.

individualists and collectivists –collectivism is associated with higher allelic frequency of the serotonin transporter polymorphism (Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010; Luo & Han, 2014).

Moving beyond associations with enduring personal characteristics, differences between individualists and collectivists have been shown to have substantial influence on people's attitudes and behaviors. Research has shown that individualism is associated with stronger adherence to norms of equity, whereas collectivism is associated with stronger adherence to the norm of equality (Nagarajan Ramamoorthy & Flood, 2002). When asked to explain other people's behavior, collectivists are more likely than individualists to attribute behavior to external (situational) factors, whereas individualists make internal (personal) attributions (Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002). Collectivists tend to be more cooperative and work better in team environments than individualists (Cox et al., 1991; J A Wagner, 1995).

How do individual differences in IC orientation impact political attitudes and behaviors? In remainder of the chapter I cover several key areas of American politics and theorize about the role of IC orientation in related attitudes and behaviors.

2.1.2 Ideology and Political Attitudes

Academic research on political attitudes has typically measured ideology on a single dimension, ranging from liberal to conservative. This approach to measurement mixes social attitudes and economic attitudes. Although measuring political attitudes on a single dimension is common, research shows that while social and economic attitudes are correlated, they are distinct (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). Social political attitudes generally concern opinions on personal freedoms, such as abortion, drug legalization, and gay rights. Liberals typically hold social political attitudes that advocate for less government involvement in regard to personal freedoms, while conservatives want more government involvement to maintain social order. However, it is important to note that this is not always the case. For example, liberals largely want more government involvement in regulation of firearms, whereas conservatives want less. General attitudes toward government involvement are reversed in the economic policy domain, which deals with government regulation of business and taxes. People who hold more liberal attitudes generally want more government involvement in the economy, including higher levels of taxes for social programs and more business regulation, whereas those with more conservative attitudes want less government involvement in the economic space.

2.1.3 Political Attitudes and IC Orientation

I reason that individualism and collectivism do not map neatly onto ideology when it is conceptualized as a single dimension. This lack of uniformity is due to the observation that individualistic and collectivistic tendencies can be found in aspects of both liberal and conservative attitudes. Specifically, I make the argument that individualism predicts liberal attitudes on social policies,

whereas collectivism is more predictive of conservative attitudes. The opposite is true of economic policies, where individualism should be associated with conservative economic attitudes and collectivism with liberal economic attitudes.

American conservatism is often associated with more rural areas, whereas liberalism is associated with metropolitan areas. This is important in the current context because rural areas tend to be characterized as interconnected communities and cities are characterized by loose connections (Kashima et al., 2004). Conservative social policy stresses conformity whereas liberal social policy is more based on self-expression and individualization. Take for example liberal and conservative attitudes toward gender identity. In general, liberals tend to embrace the open expression of one's preferred gender identity, whereas conservatives maintain that individuals should conform to the sex at birth. Another salient example includes attitudes toward abortion. Liberals generally advocate for personal choice with the popular phrase, "my body, my choice," whereas conservatives tend to think outside the immediate individual (the female) to the fetus, therefore placing the emphasis on societal good rather than individual choice. With this information alone, one could reasonably come to the conclusion that liberals are more individualistic while conservatives are more collectivist. But conservative and liberal economic policy positions add more to the puzzle.

Conservative economic policy is characterized by a "pull yourself up by your bootstraps" attitude – the belief that people will succeed if they try hard enough and that having government social programs for the poor, such as welfare, just acts as a crutch and makes people dependent. The focus on self-reliance in conservative economic policy is a hallmark of an individualist. On the other hand, liberal economic policy supports social programs to help those that are down on their luck and share societal resources to support others. Liberal economic policy therefore reflects collectivist attitudes.

Based on the discussion above, I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Individualism-collectivism orientation will have no significant effect on direction of self-reported Ideology.

Hypothesis 2: Individualism-collectivism orientation will influence social policy attitudes such that higher levels of individualism will predict liberal attitudes on social policy.

Hypothesis 3: Individualism-collectivism orientation will influence economic policy attitudes such that higher levels of individualism will predict conservative attitudes on economic policy.

2.2 The Role of IC Orientation in Partisanship

2.2.1 Partisanship

It is hard to study anything in American politics without accounting for partisanship. Partisanship is the most salient identity in the political environment

and has a disproportionate impact on political behavior. Partisan identification is highly predictive of political engagement (Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2002), vote choice (Ansolabehere, Rodden, & Snyder, 2008; Bartels, 2000; Lewis-Beck, Norpoth, Jacoby, & Weisberg, 2008), the media people choose to consume (Slyngar & Hahn, 2009), and effects the way in which people process political information (Bartels, 2002; L Huddy, Mason, & Horwitz, 2016; Lodge & Taber, 2013). But even with the outsized role partisanship plays in American political behavior, not everyone is partisan. Why do some people identify with a political party while others do not?

The nature of partisanship in the United States has become increasingly characterized in political science research as expressive, affective and negative. There has been a long standing debate over the nature of partisanship. Some scholars view partisanship as a continuously evolving process in which citizens update their party preferences based on new information. From this view, citizens take into account factors such as the political party's distance from their own preferred policies, each party's relative performance while in office, and the differences in future utility they expect to derive from a Republican administration versus a Democratic administration (e.g., Achen, 2002, 1992; Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1977, 1981). However, this rational choice view of partisanship has been challenged by political psychologists who argue that partisan identities are an emotional attachment to a political party that become a part of a citizen's social identity (e.g., Bartels, 2002; Green et al., 2002; Leonie Huddy, 2001; Nicholson, 2012). This conceptualization defines partisanship as an emotional attachment grounded in enduring group loyalties, rather than a deliberate choice based on a preference for one set of policy positions over another.

A psychological identity view of partisanship draws the social psychological theory of Social Identity (Tajfel, 1978, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) which holds that partisanship is an enduring identity strengthened by other salient social affiliations such as gender or race. The social affiliations with a political party and its associated groups promote an emotional attachment to the political party. Social Identity theory posits that individuals have a number of different groups with which they identify (e.g., gender, race, religion) (Tajfel, 1981). One of the social groups that is becoming increasingly salient in the United States is the political party. Individuals vary in the number of groups they identify with. Individuals also vary in terms of how strongly they identify with a given group. Once an individual internalizes being part of a group, they are motivated to positively distinguish that group from salient out-groups and are eager to protect and advance the group's status. This motivation to see one's group in a positive light relative to other groups leads to the development of ingroup bias (Tajfel, 1981). Motivation for group elevation varies with the level to which one identifies with a particular group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), thus the closer a group is to an individual's social identity, the more they will work to increase the group's status.

I take the position of partisanship as a social identity. In viewing partisanship from a social identity perspective, a better understanding of what leads some people to be partisan while others are not should come from understanding what makes people more likely to develop an attachment to groups. I argue that individualism-collectivism orientation will provide insight.

2.2.2 IC Orientation and Group Membership

Social identity is defined as a part of a person's self-concept that relates to group membership (Tajfel, 1978). People seek to maintain a positive social identity by giving positive value to their own group (ingroup) and distinguishing their group from other groups (outgroups). People vary in the degree to which they identify with their ingroups (Stangor & Thompson, 2002; Vignoles & Moncaster, 2007).

One of the key differences between individualists and collectivists is how they identify with ingroups. Individualists' sense of self tends to be independent of groups and based instead on individuating personal characteristics, whereas collectivists' sense of self is interdependent and derived from the groups with which they associate (Hofstede, 1980; Kim, 1994; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, 1994; Triandis & Singelis, 1998). Individualists stress independence, individual uniqueness, and personal autonomy, whereas collectivists emphasize interdependence and group harmony. The relationship between individualists and their ingroups is loose and impermanent, whereas collectivists develop lasting connections to ingroups that incorporate them into their identity. Individualists tend to place their own personal interests ahead of the group and ignore group interests when they conflict with their own, whereas collectivists place the needs of the group ahead of their own (Wagner & Moch, 1986). To some degree then, IC orientation can be thought of as the extent to which individuals identify with groups. Indeed, research has shown collectivism is associated with ingroup identification and with ingroup bias (Brown et al., 1992) and collectivists perceive more of a distinction between ingroup and outgroup (Leung & Bond, 1984; Triandis, 1989).

2.2.3 IC Orientation and Partisan Identification

Research on the nature of partisanship has shown that partisan identities are an emotional attachment to a political party that becomes a part of a citizen's social identity (Bartels, 2002; Green et al., 2002; Leonie Huddy, Mason, & Aaroe, 2015; Miller & Shanks, 1996; Nicholson, 2012). A social identity involves a sense of belonging to a group that is internalized to varying degrees, resulting in individual differences in identity strength, a desire to positively distinguish the group from others, and the development of ingroup bias (Tajfel, 1981). Thinking of partisanship from the social identity perspective, individuals who are prone to develop stronger attachment to groups will be more partisan than those who do not attach with groups as strongly. As previously discussed, collectivists are more group oriented and incorporate group affiliation into their identity.

Therefore, it follows that collectivists will be more likely to develop attachment to political parties than individualists.

Hypothesis 4: Individualism-collectivism orientation will have no significant effect on direction of partisan identification.

Hypothesis 5: Individualism-collectivism orientation will influence partisanship such that higher levels of collectivism will predict likelihood of partisan identification.

Hypothesis 6: Individualism-collectivism orientation will influence strength of partisanship such that higher levels of collectivism will predict stronger attachment to a political party.

2.2.4 IC Orientation and Affective Polarization

Over the last several decades, the American political environment has become increasingly contentious. Political scientists have identified a significant escalation in negative feelings toward the opposing political party, not just in elite rhetoric, but among the citizenry. This phenomenon has been referred to as “affective polarization” (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Nicholson, Coe, Emory, & Song, 2016). Affective polarization is the “tendency of people identifying as Republicans or Democrats to view opposing partisans negatively and co-partisans positively” (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015, p. 691). Affective polarization is the consequence of individual’s identifying with a political party, which leads people to view politics in group terms – ingroups (one’s own political party) and out-groups (the opposing political party). Increasing affective polarization has real life consequences. People now are more likely to be upset by a relative marrying someone from a different political party than from a different racial or ethnic background (Shanto Iyengar & Westwood, 2015), and people tend to find a person less attractive when they learn they are from the political out-party (Nicholson, Coe, Emory, & Song, 2016).

In addition to attachment to a political party, I argue that collectivists will be more affectively polarized than individualists. Studies on IC orientation have shown that the impact of group identification on intergroup differentiation is stronger for collectivists than individualists (Brown et al., 1992; Hinkle & Brown, 1990). Collectivists’ stronger tendency toward intergroup differentiation also means that collectivists likely show more in-group bias and thus will be more affectively polarized than individualists.

Hypothesis 7: Collectivism will be positively associated with higher levels of affective polarization.

2.3 The Role of IC Orientation in Political Engagement

2.3.1 Political Engagement

Political engagement is a broad concept that encompasses many related

attitudes, cognitions, and behaviors, which makes providing an exact definition a challenging task (Moy & Hussain, 2011). One way of thinking about political engagement can be simple political participation, including behaviors such as voting, attending a political rally or protest, or donating to a political campaign. But definitions of political engagement can also be stretched to include antecedents to political participation, such as political interest, attention to news, and political knowledge (Sidney Verba, Burns, & Schlozman, 1997). In this dissertation, I adopt a broad conceptualization of political engagement, including not only participation behavior (i.e. voting), but the underlying attitudes and cognitions that spur people to take part in such behavior.

What leads some people to be more politically engaged than others? Past research has shown there are many environmental factors that influence levels of political engagement. Specifically, people with higher levels of income and education are more likely to be politically engaged (Sidney Verba & Nie, 1972). There is also evidence that genetics and individual traits play a role in political participation. Fowler (2008) used twin studies to show that variation in voting turnout can be accounted for by genetics, meaning that some people are genetically predisposed to be politically engaged. However, research has consistently shown that party identification is one of the most important variables in explaining political engagement. Those who identify strongly with a political party are more likely to be politically engaged (Bartels, 2000; Campbell et al., 1960; Wray-Lake, Arruda, & Hopkins, 2019).

2.3.2 IC Orientation and Political Engagement

In line with the social identity perspective on groups, people who are highly attached to a group will be motivated to monitor the status of the group and participate in activities that help bolster the status of their group. Fittingly, research has shown that citizens who are partisan vote at higher rates, participate more actively in politics, care more about it and follow it more closely than political independents (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Donald, 1960; Conway, 1991; Lien, 1994; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Uhlander, 1996). I argue that in the same way IC orientation influences individuals' propensity to identify with groups, it also influences individuals' engagement in politics.

Individualists feel less connected to those around them. When a person perceives themselves as separate and independent from those around them, they will feel less of a need to engage. Politics and government are societally based; therefore, individualists may be more apathetic and disengaged from the political system. A common refrain you hear from people who are uninterested in politics is, "it doesn't impact my life, why should I care?" Collectivist on the other hand likely see politics impacting them personally because they feel more connected with those around them and society more generally.

Research has shown that IC orientation impacts willingness to participate in collective action, such that those higher in collectivism are more likely to get

involved in collective action activities (Kelly & Kelly, 1994; Wheeler, Reis, & Bond, 1989). Taken together with my previous expectations, it follows that those who are more collectivist will be more politically engaged than those who are more individualist.

Hypothesis 8: Collectivism will be positively associated with interest in politics.

Hypothesis 9: Collectivism will be positively associated with attention paid to news media.

Hypothesis 10: Collectivism will be positively associated with political knowledge.

Hypothesis 11: Individualism-collectivism orientation will influence voting behavior such that higher levels of collectivism will predict a higher likelihood of voting.

2.4 Contribution of IC Orientation the study of Politics

As previously discussed, theories and measures from psychology have added a great deal of knowledge to political scientists' understanding of political phenomena. I argue that IC orientation will similarly extend our understanding of political attitudes and behaviors. But what differentiates IC orientation from the other psychological measures and theories that have been brought into political science? In particular, what makes IC orientation different from important measures such as The Big Five personality index?

The Big Five personality index has been well established as an important predictor of political attitudes and behaviors. Research has consistently shown that conservatives are low in openness to experience and high in conscientiousness while liberals are high in openness (Carney et al., 2008; Furnham & Fenton-O'Creedy, 2018). Research on the relationship between IC orientation and The Big Five has shown that collectivists tend to be low in openness and high in conscientiousness and agreeableness (Burton et al., 2019; Realo et al., 1997). Based on this information, one may reasonably conclude that collectivists are more conservative and individualists more liberal. So, what is IC orientation adding to the study of politics that the Big Five doesn't already account for? I argue that IC orientation is an important addition to the study of political attitudes and behaviors because it accounts for something the Big Five does not capture, which is degree of interpersonal connectedness and relationship to groups. As I have outlined in the theory above, I maintain that because IC orientation captures individuals' interconnectedness with others and their propensity to place value on the group or the individual, it will further our understanding of a range of political attitudes and behavior.

2.4.1 Measurement of IC Orientation

Debates over measurement of IC orientation have prompted decades of research, with over 20 different measures created claiming to most accurately

capture differences in IC orientation (Oyserman et al., 2002). For the purposes of this dissertation, I used the Individualism-Collectivism Questionnaire developed by Triandis and Gelfand (1998). I chose this measure because it is widely used in the literature (Paquet & Kline, 2009) and the items clearly address the emphasis individuals' place on connection to others and groups, the key differences between individualism and collectivism.

Triandis and Gelfand's (1998) 16-item scale has itself been the topic of heated debate within the IC orientation literature. The authors created the scale to measure 4 subscales: horizontal collectivism (HC), which is meant to assess the degree to which individuals emphasize interdependence (e.g., "If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud"); vertical collectivism (VC) purports to assess the degree to which individuals feel the need to place the group ahead of themselves (e.g., "It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups."). horizontal individualism (HI) is meant to evaluate the degree to which individuals strive to be self-reliant and distinct (e.g., "I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others."); vertical individualism (VI) purports to measure the degree to which individuals desire special status compared to others (e.g., "It is important that I do my job better than others").

Although Triandis and Gelfand's (1998) measure was originally intended to capture four dimensions, studies have shown that the scale does not reliably load onto the four intended factors (Li & Aksoy, 2006; Soh & Leong, 2002). As a result, there are a variety of approaches researchers take when using the IC orientation measure. Some researchers keep the intended four factor structure, using horizontal individualism, vertical individualism, horizontal collectivism and vertical collectivism as four independent constructs (e.g., Germani, Delvecchio, Li, & Mazzeschi, 2019), others take a two components approach by taking the sum of horizontal individualism and vertical individualism as individualism and the sum of horizontal collectivism and vertical collectivism as collectivism (e.g., Xia et al., 2019), and others treat it as a unidimensional scale by subtracting the individualism items from the collectivism items (e.g., Leonhardt et al., 2020).

I conducted a factor analysis to investigate the structure of the IC orientation scale in the data used for this dissertation. As can be seen in Table 1, the analysis yielded four factors. However, the loadings are not entirely consistent with Triandis and Gelfand's (1998) intended factors. The main difference is that VC1 loads on factor 1 and not factor 2. Consistent with my theory, I treat the IC orientation measure as a unidimensional scale by subtracting individualism from collectivism in my analyses. However, I include analyses using both two and four factors for the IC orientation scale in Appendix D.

Table 1: Factor analysis for IC Orientation Scale

<i>IC Scale Items</i>	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Factor 2</i>	<i>Factor 3</i>	<i>Factor 4</i>
<i>HI1</i> : I'd rather depend on myself than others."	0.1085	0.1501	0.7640	-0.0219
<i>HI2</i> : I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others.	0.0012	0.2350	0.7110	0.1060
<i>HI3</i> : I often do "my own thing"	0.0613	-0.0668	0.6809	0.1307
<i>HI4</i> : My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me.	0.4253	0.1375	0.5616	-0.0146
<i>VI1</i> : It is important that I do my job better than others.	0.2724	0.25053	0.2401	0.5325
<i>VI2</i> : Winning is everything.	0.0217	0.0089	0.0582	0.8070
<i>VI3</i> : Competition is the law of nature.	0.1554	0.2037	0.2496	0.5587
<i>VI4</i> : When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused.	-0.0800	-0.0757	-0.0834	0.7511
<i>HC1</i> : If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud.	0.7380	0.1860	0.1577	-0.0944
<i>HC2</i> : The well-being of my coworkers is important to me.	0.7860	-0.1493	0.1272	0.3632
<i>HC3</i> : To me, pleasure is spending time with others."	0.5508	0.3522	-0.1512	0.1420
<i>HC4</i> : I feel good when I cooperate with others.	0.7487	0.2834	0.1043	-0.0010
<i>VC1</i> : Parents and children must stay together as much as possible.	0.2402	0.7637	0.1146	-0.0059
<i>VC2</i> : It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice what I want.	0.2921	0.7010	0.2013	-0.0632
<i>VC3</i> : Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required.	0.1653	0.8140	0.0699	0.1016
<i>VC4</i> : It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups.	0.6601	0.2234	0.0229	0.2127
Eigenvalue	4.6812	1.8909	1.5904	1.0586
Percent of Total Variance	29.26	11.82	09.94	06.62
Total Variance				57.63

Chapter 3

IC Orientation, Ideology, and Policy Attitudes

Individual differences in Individualism-collectivism orientation have been shown to have significant impact on attitudes and values. Despite this, there is limited research in political science investigating the impact of IC orientation on political attitudes. In this chapter I ask whether IC orientation has an impact on political ideology generally or on political attitudes more specifically. To answer this question, I draw on data from a nationally representative survey conducted in 2018 through Survey Sampling International (SSI). The findings from this chapter help inform our understanding of the role IC orientation plays in American political attitudes and raises questions for further investigation.

3.1 Ideology and Policy Attitudes Expectations and Measures

As noted by Jost (2006), political ideology can be thought of as "...an interrelated set of moral and political attitudes that possesses cognitive, affective, and motivational components. Ideology summarizes a person's overall stance toward the political world..." (p. 207). Ideology is typically conceptualized on a single dimension running from liberalism to conservatism or "left" and "right" in the United States (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, 2003b; Knight, 1990). As discussed in Chapter 2, I argue that IC orientation is one of the underlying motivational components that impacts political ideology, however, I maintain that the relationship is more nuanced than a simple mapping of IC orientation onto liberal-conservative ideology. I reason that aspects of IC orientation can be seen in both liberal and conservative attitudes. Therefore, I hypothesize that there will be no relationship between IC orientation and self-report ideology when measured on a traditional single dimension.

Although I predict that there is no relationship between IC orientation and single dimension ideology, I argue that differences in IC orientation will impact policy attitudes when social attitudes are distinguished from economic attitudes and vice versa. Despite the fact that attitudes toward economic and social issues are correlated, research shows that they are meaningfully distinct (Jost et al., 2009). Liberals tend to argue for more individuating positions with less government involvement in the individual's life on social issues (abortion, drug legalization, gay rights, etc.). This pattern is reversed for economic issues (taxation, business regulation, government programs, etc.) and Conservatives become the advocate for individuating policy positions with less government involvement. I hypothesize that higher levels of individualism will be associated with liberal positions on social policy and conservative positions on economic policy.

Data

I draw on data from a nationally representative large-N online study fielded in November of 2018 through Survey Sampling International (SSI) to analyze the effect of IC orientation on ideology and policy attitudes. SSI recruits and maintains a survey panel of more than 600,000 Internet users. Participants were selected from a sample frame that closely mirrors U.S. census data. Descriptive statistics showed respondents were 68% White, 15% Black, 11% Hispanic, and 6% Other. The average age of respondents was 49.69 years ($SD = 15.72$) and 53% were male. The full survey includes 3,050 respondents, however, I restricted the sample to respondents who provided responses to all questions used to measure IC Orientation ($N = 2,291$), the key independent variable.

The dependent measures are split into three categories: single dimension ideology, social policy attitudes, and economic policy attitudes. Single dimension ideology is based on a traditional self-report measure that asked respondents to place themselves on a 7-point continuum ranging from “very liberal” to “very conservative”. The data is coded such that -3 represents “very liberal” 0 represents “moderate” and +3 represents “very conservative.”

Social policy attitudes are measured with three items on social policy. The three social policy items are only modestly correlated, so instead of creating an index combining the three items into one indicator of social policy attitudes, each item is used as a standalone dependent variable. Items for social policy attitudes included attitudes toward abortion, immigration, and gun control. Responses were coded from 0 to 1, 0 indicating the most liberal position and 1 indicating the most conservative position.

To measure economic policy attitudes, respondents were presented with a number of spending issues and asked whether they thought federal spending on that issue should be “increased, decreased, or kept the same.” The issues included were: Social Security, public schools, welfare programs, and protecting the environment. As with the social attitude items, the economic items were not highly correlated and are therefore also treated as separate dependent variables in analysis. Responses were coded from 0 – 1, 0 indicating the liberal position and 1 indicating the conservative position.

The key independent variable, IC orientation, was measured with the 16-item Triandis & Gelfand's (1998) IC orientation scale, which assessed individualism with 8 items (e.g., “I would rather depend on myself than on others”) and collectivism with 8 items (e.g., “I feel good when I cooperate with others”). I added each set of 8 items to generate a score of individualism ($\alpha = 0.71$) and collectivism ($\alpha = 0.85$) for each participant, as has been done in previous studies using IC orientation measures (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2007; Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000; Leonhardt et al., 2020). I then subtracted the individualism score from the collectivism score, resulting in a collectivist-individualist score for each respondent. I standardized the IC orientation indicator such that it ranges from 0-1, 1 being high in collectivism and 0 being high in individualism. A complete list of the IC orientation questions is provided in the appendix.

3.2 Model Specification

I include a set of control variables in the regression analyses to attempt to isolate the effect of IC orientation on Ideology and policy attitudes to test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. In the models I account for gender, race, age, education, and income. I explain the justification behind the variables included in the model specification below.

The variables included in the models as controls are quite standard in models of political attitudes. Past research has consistently found that gender has an effect on political preferences. Women are more likely than men to hold liberal ideology and policy positions, particularly on social issues (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). Similar to gender, research has shown that race and ethnicity impact political ideology. Blacks and Hispanics are more likely to identify as more liberal than their White counterparts (Black, 2004; Tate, 1994, 2010). Age is another common demographic characteristic that has been shown to have an effect on political attitudes, so I include age in years and age squared to account for nonlinearity in the effect of age. Given the effect of gender, race and age on ideology and political attitudes, I include measures of each in order to isolate the effect of IC orientation on ideology and policy attitudes. Education and income are both common variables to include in models of political attitudes in order to account for socioeconomic status. Past research has shown a positive association between class and conservative ideology, particularly on economic issues (Henry E Brady et al., 1995; Peterson, 2016). Finally, I include state fixed effects in all models to account for potential unmeasured characteristics that may vary across states³.

Hypotheses:

H1: Individualism-collectivism orientation will have no significant effect on direction of self-reported Ideology.

H2: Individualism-collectivism orientation will influence social policy attitudes such that higher levels of individualism will predict liberal attitudes on social policy.

H3: Individualism-collectivism orientation will influence economic policy attitudes such that higher levels of individualism will predict conservative attitudes on economic policy

3.3 Results

Table 1 displays the results from the OLS Regression analyses predicting self-report ideology to assess H1, that there will not be an effect of IC orientation on

³ Models without state fixed effects are reported in Appendix B. There is no meaningful difference between models with and without state fixed effects.

overall ideology. As can be seen in Table 1, there is no statistically significant impact of IC orientation on self-report Ideology. This finding provides support for H1.

Table 2 reports the regressions from testing *Hypothesis 2*. Table 2 shows three separate OLS regression analyses predicting attitudes on social policy issues. The dependent variable is coded such that less government involvement is 0 and more government involvement is 1. H2 posited that higher levels of individualism would predict liberal attitudes on social policies. The data shows mixed support for the hypothesis. Attitudes on abortion were in the hypothesized direction, meaning that more liberal attitudes were predicted by higher levels of individualism and more conservative attitudes were predicted by higher levels of collectivism. However, the results were reversed for attitudes on gun control and immigration, where liberal attitudes were predicted by higher levels of collectivism and conservative attitudes were predicted by higher levels of individualism.

Table 2 – The effect of IC orientation on Ideology

	Self-Reported Ideology (-3 = very lib., 3 = very cons., 0 = moderate)
IC Orientation (0-1)	-0.009 (0.336)
Female =1	-0.073 (0.089)
Black = 1	-0.823** (0.130)
Hispanic = 1	-0.445** (0.141)
Other = 1	-0.114 (0.172)
Age (years)	0.055** (0.017)
Age squared/100	-0.040** (0.017)
Educ. = HS	-0.114 (0.262)
Educ. = Some College	-0.315 (0.264)
Educ. = 2-year College	-0.473 (0.285)
Educ. = College	-0.551* (0.269)
Educ. = Postgrad	-0.704* (0.281)
Income	0.033* (0.015)
Constant	-1.008 (0.600)
State Fixed Effects?	Yes
Observations	1,830
Adjusted R-squared	0.07

Notes: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.

Sample restricted to cases with valid observations for all variables.

OLS regression coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses

Table 3 – The effect of IC orientation on social policy attitudes

	Abortion Policy (0-1)	Gun Control Policy (0-1)	Immigration Policy (0-1)
IC Orientation (0-1)	0.267*** (0.067)	0.361*** (0.059)	-0.363*** (0.058)
Female =1	-0.054** (0.017)	0.047** (0.016)	-0.024 (0.015)
Black = 1	-0.016 (0.026)	0.107*** (0.023)	-0.073*** (0.002)
Hispanic = 1	0.005 (0.028)	0.037 (0.024)	-0.053** (0.024)
Other = 1	0.027 (0.035)	0.058 (0.030)	-0.048 (0.030)
Age (years)	-0.008** (0.004)	0.006 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Age squared/100	0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-(0.003) (0.002)
Educ. = HS	-0.032 (0.052)	0.043 (0.047)	-0.007 (0.045)
Educ. = Some College	-0.099 (0.052)	0.060 (0.047)	-0.040 (0.045)
Educ. = 2-year College	-0.049 (0.057)	0.048 (0.050)	-0.053 (0.049)
Educ. = College	-0.097 (0.054)	0.078 (0.048)	-0.083 (0.046)
Educ. = Postgrad	-0.026 (0.056)	0.032 (0.050)	-0.052 (0.048)
Income	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Constant	0.645*** (0.110)	0.193* (0.111)	0.851*** (0.109)
State Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,827	1,825	1,822
Adjusted R-squared	0.10	0.13	0.17

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Sample restricted to cases with valid observations for all variables

OLS regression coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses

Figure 1 shows the effect of IC orientation on attitudes toward abortion. As the figure demonstrates, as collectivism increases, so too do conservative attitudes toward abortion. Furthermore, higher levels of individualism predict liberal attitudes toward abortion. This finding is in line with the theory that individualism would predict liberal social attitudes, because liberals tend to advocate for less government involvement in these instances.




Figure 1 – The direct effect of IC orientation on abortion attitudes

Figure 2 shows a strong positive trend, indicating that as collectivism increases, policy attitudes on gun control become more liberal. This finding does not fit with the stated hypothesis that liberal social attitudes would be predicted by higher levels of individualism, however, it is in line with the idea that individualism is associated with less government control. Gun control is a social issue wherein liberals tend to advocate for more government intervention as opposed to less. Given this information, it can be argued that the result on attitudes toward gun control fits within the theoretical framework.




Figure 2 – The direct effect of IC orientation on gun control attitudes

Interestingly, Figure 3 shows a strong negative trend as Figure 2. Results indicate that as individualism decreases and collectivism increases, attitudes toward immigration policies become more liberal. This finding does not support the hypothesis that individualism is predictive of liberal social policy attitudes, nor does it fit with the idea that individualism predicts attitudes associated with less government involvement.




Figure 3 – The direct effect of IC orientation on immigration attitudes

Table 3 reports the results from four separate OLS regression analyses predicting attitudes on economic policy issues. *Hypothesis 3* posited that higher levels of individualism would predict conservative attitudes on economic policy issues. Table 3 shows that the data fully supports this hypothesis. Higher levels of collectivism predict liberal attitudes on economic issues and higher individualism levels predict conservative attitudes in all four regression models. The data shows a robust result between IC orientation and attitudes on economic policy for a wide array of issues.

Table 4 – The effect of IC orientation on economic policy attitudes

	Social Security (0-1)	Welfare Funding (0-1)	Public School Funding (0-1)	Environmental Protection Funding (0-1)
IC Orientation (0-1)	0.154** (0.060)	0.289*** (0.073)	0.459*** (0.064)	0.263*** (0.070)
Female = 1	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.030 (0.017)	0.020 (0.017)	0.008 (0.019)
Black = 1	0.069** (0.023)	0.236*** (0.027)	0.127*** (0.025)	0.122*** (0.027)
Hispanic = 1	-0.022 (0.025)	0.062* (0.030)	0.002 (0.027)	0.056 (0.029)
Other = 1	-0.053 (0.030)	0.063 (0.038)	-0.049 (0.003)	-0.041 (0.036)
Age (years)	0.008* (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)
Age squared/100	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Educ. = HS	0.004 (0.047)	0.050 (0.057)	0.097 (0.050)	0.025 (0.055)
Educ. = Some College	0.030 (0.047)	0.056 (0.057)	0.133** (0.051)	0.075 (0.055)
Educ. = 2-year College	0.049 (0.051)	0.064 (0.062)	0.090 (0.055)	0.066 (0.059)
Educ. = College	0.016 (0.048)	0.096 (0.058)	0.138** (0.052)	0.107 (0.056)
Educ. = Postgrad	0.017 (0.050)	0.163** (0.061)	0.168** (0.054)	0.135* (0.054)
Income	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.029*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)
Constant	0.612*** (0.108)	0.316** (0.131)	0.400*** (0.115)	0.552*** (0.125)
State Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,828	1,823	1,820	1,819
Adjusted R-squared	0.08	0.11	0.05	0.07

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

OLS regression coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses

Sample restricted to cases with valid observations for all variables




Figure 4 - The direct effect of IC orientation on Social Security funding attitudes

Figure 4 shows that as collectivism increases, attitudes toward Social Security funding become more liberal. Social Security is a widely popular government program, and while the magnitude of the effect of IC orientation is smaller relative to its effect on the other economic policy questions, it is a good demonstration of the robustness of the relationship between IC orientation and economic policy attitudes.




Figure 5 - The direct effect of IC orientation on welfare program funding attitudes

Figure 5 shows once again that there is a strong positive trend between IC orientation and attitudes toward welfare funding, meaning that as collectivism increases policy attitudes become more liberal.




Figure 6 - The direct effect of IC orientation on Public School funding attitudes

Figure 6 displays the effect of IC orientation on attitudes toward public school funding. Those who are more individualistic hold attitudes that are more conservative in regard to public school funding. The issue of public-school funding shows the largest effect (0.459) of IC orientation relative to the other economic policy issues.

Finally, Figure 7 depicts the effect IC orientation has on attitudes toward the level of federal funding going toward environmental protection. Again, the same pattern holds, with individualism predicting economically conservative attitudes and collectivism predicting economically liberal attitudes.




Figure 7 - The direct effect of IC orientation on environmental protection funding attitudes

3.4 Discussion

The object of this chapter was to examine the effect of IC orientation on ideology and political attitudes. The results are mixed, showing partial support for expectations laid out in the theory. After conducting a series of regression analyses, I find that there is no effect of IC orientation on overall ideology however, there is a somewhat consistent pattern between higher levels of collectivism and liberal policy attitudes. The one instance in which this is not the case is on attitudes toward abortion.

The absence of an effect of IC orientation on overall ideology is in line with my expectations. This result is consistent with the idea that aspects of IC orientation can be seen in both liberal and conservative attitudes and therefore people with high individualism or high collectivism could be on either side of the ideological spectrum. I argued that higher levels of individualism would predict economic attitudes that were conservative, but social attitudes that are liberal. This argument was based on the idea that individualism would be related to attitudes that were consistent with less government involvement. My prediction held across all economic policy attitudes regarding government spending. Social

policy attitudes consistent with less government involvement on abortion and gun control were similarly related to higher levels of individualism. However, this pattern did not hold for attitudes toward immigration. Higher levels of collectivism were related to attitudes consistent with allowing unauthorized immigrants to become United States citizens, while high levels of individualism were consistent with attitudes that advocated for sending unauthorized immigrants back to their home country. It should be noted that on this issue it is not entirely clear which attitude would constitute government involvement. On either side of the issue the government takes action in some way, by either taking action to send unauthorized immigrants away or by taking action to allow them to become citizens. Therefore, this policy attitude is not a clean test of my theory.

The analysis presented in this chapter was constrained by the answers to policy questions available in the data set. These questions were not designed to explicitly test my theory of the relationship between IC orientation and political attitudes. Future research should incorporate a wider range of policy questions to better understand the relationship between IC and policy attitudes.

Chapter 4

IC Orientation and Partisanship

In the previous chapter, I explored the impact of IC orientation on political ideology and political attitudes. The results were somewhat mixed and did not tell a clear story about the relationship between political attitudes and IC orientation. In this chapter, I turn my attention to the inherently group-based aspect of American politics, partisanship. Specifically, I ask whether variation in IC orientation plays a role in people's general proclivity to identify with a political party.

Research on the nature of partisanship has shown that partisan identities are an emotional attachment to a political party that becomes a part of a citizen's social identity (Bartels, 2002; Green et al., 2002; Leonie Huddy, Mason, & Aaroe, 2015; Miller & Shanks, 1996; Nicholson, 2012). Thinking of partisanship from the social identity perspective, individuals who are prone to develop stronger attachment to groups will be more partisan than those who do not attach with groups as strongly. IC orientation can broadly be thought of as the extent to which individuals identify with groups. People who are more collectivist are more group oriented and more likely to incorporate group affiliation into their identity. Therefore, it follows that collectivists will be more likely than individualists to identify with and develop a strong attachment to a political party.

Identifying with a political party in American politics creates an automatic out-group. An important line of research on partisanship has focused on affective polarization, which can be defined as the propensity for partisans to view co-partisans positively and out-group partisans negatively (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). Studies have shown that collectivists are more likely to show in-group favoritism and perceive more distinction between the in-group and out-group (Brown et al., 1992; Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Lee & Ward, 1998). Consequently, I posit that individuals higher in collectivism will show more affective polarization than those higher in individualism.

Hypotheses

H4: Individualism-collectivism orientation will have no significant effect on direction of partisan identification.

H5: Individualism-collectivism orientation will influence partisanship such that higher levels of collectivism will predict likelihood of partisan identification.

H6: Individualism-collectivism orientation will influence the strength of partisanship such that higher levels of collectivism will predict stronger attachment to a political party.

H7: Collectivism will be positively associated with higher levels of affective polarization.

4.1 Partisanship Direction Expectation and Measures

Prior to investigating the effect of IC orientation on one's propensity to identify with a political party, I examine the relationship between IC orientation and directional party identification. In keeping with the expectations and results presented in Chapter 3, I expect that there will be no significant effect of IC orientation on direction of partisan identification.

To test the relationship between IC orientation and directional party identification, I again draw upon data from the 2018 SSI survey. The dependent measure is a standard 7-point party identification scale. It is coded so that responses range from (-3) strong Democrat, to (3) strong Republican.

The key independent variable, IC orientation, was measured with a 16-item scale that assessed individualism with 8 items and collectivism with 8 items. The sum of the individualism items was subtracted from the sum of the collectivism items, resulting in a collectivist-individualist score for each respondent. I standardized the IC orientation indicator such that it ranges from 0-1, 1 being high in collectivism and 0 being high in individualism.

To isolate the effect of IC orientation on direction of partisan identification, I controlled for standard demographic variables that have been shown to impact partisan identification. The model accounts for participant gender, race, age, education and income, the same controls that were used for the models in Chapter 3.

Table 4 shows the results of an OLS regression model predicting directional party identification with IC orientation. Contrary to my hypothesis, there is a significant effect of IC orientation on direction of party identification. Higher levels of collectivism are associated with more Democratic identification.

Table 5 – The effect of IC orientation on direction of partisan identification

	Party Identification (-3 = Strong Dem., 3 = Strong Rep., 0 = Independent)
IC Orientation (0-1)	-0.827* (0.408)
Female =1	-0.252 (0.108)
Black = 1	-2.265*** (0.159)
Hispanic = 1	-1.266*** (0.172)
Other = 1	-0.671*** (0.210)
Age (years)	0.032 (0.021)
Age squared/100	-0.034 (0.021)
Educ. = HS	-0.335 (0.318)
Educ. = Some College	-0.621 (0.320)
Educ. = 2-year College	-0.408 (0.346)
Educ. = College	-0.851** (0.326)
Educ. = Postgrad	-0.569 (0.342)
Income	0.049** (0.018)
Constant	1.612 (0.731)
State Fixed Effects?	Yes
Observations	1,815
Adjusted R-squared	0.18

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

OLS regression coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses

Sample restricted to cases with valid observations for all variables

4.2 Partisan Identification Expectations and Measures

I now move on to look at the effects of IC orientation on people's propensity to identify with a political party and strength of partisan attachment. Using the same 2018 SSI survey data, I created a dichotomous indicator of party identification using the responses from the 7-point party identification scale. Respondents who reported strongly identifying with a party, weakly identifying, or leaning toward a party were coded as partisans (1). Respondents who reported no party identification were coded as non-partisans (0).

In addition to looking at dichotomous party identification, I also investigate the strength of party identification. I expect that those who are higher in collectivism will be more likely to report a strong attachment to a political party than those who are higher in individualism. To measure this, I use the traditional 7-point partisan identification scale and code it such that it is folded into a 4-point

scale of partisan strength, ranging from non-party identifiers (0) to strong party identifiers (3).

As controls, I once again use standard demographic controls including gender, race, age, education and income. I also include state fixed effects in all models to account for potential unmeasured characteristics that may vary across states. In addition to demographic controls, I create a measure of ideological strength by taking the 7-point ideology scale and folding it in half, such that it ranges from 0 (moderate) to 3 (strong ideology). Including an indicator of ideological strength allows me to isolate the effects of IC orientation from the more instrumental motivations for identifying with a political party (Leonie Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 2015; Wolak & Stapelton, 2019). Finally, because the analysis above revealed that collectivism is associated with democratic party identification, I include a control for party ID to ensure the results are not being driven by respondents who identify as democrats.

Logit and ordered logit results are reported in Table 5. I find that overall, people who are higher in collectivism are more likely to identify with a political party than those who are high in individualism. All else equal, a person high in individualism has an 80 percent chance of saying they identify with one of the political parties. For a person high in collectivism, that rises to a 90 percent chance of identifying with a political party⁴. However, I do not find a significant effect in the ordered logit model that analyzes the effect of IC orientation on the strength of partisanship, although the result is in the expected direction.

⁴ High in individualism and high in collectivism defined as the 5th and 95th percentile of IC orientation, respectively.

Table 6 – The effect of IC orientation on party identification

	Identifies with a party	Strength of party identification
IC Orientation (0-1)	1.164** (0.618)	0.395 (0.389)
Ideological Extremity	0.780*** (0.079)	0.862*** (0.046)
Party ID	-0.055 (0.041)	-0.091 (0.024)
Female =1	0.019 (0.166)	0.101 (0.103)
Black = 1	0.701** (0.256)	1.168*** (0.168)
Hispanic = 1	0.546 (0.309)	0.567** (0.164)
Other = 1	-0.398 (0.281)	-0.233 (0.188)
Age (years)	-0.087* (0.036)	-0.016 (0.019)
Age squared/100	0.087* (0.036)	0.016 (0.019)
Educ. = HS	0.154 (0.417)	0.125 (0.299)
Educ. = Some College	0.019 (0.424)	0.036 (0.300)
Educ. = 2-year College	-0.213 (0.464)	0.029 (0.325)
Educ. = College	0.363 (0.443)	0.237 (0.306)
Educ. = Postgrad	-0.184 (0.465)	-0.091 (0.330)
Income	0.046 (0.028)	0.030 (0.017)
Constant	2.020* (1.177)	-
Cutpoint 1	-	-1.196 (0.693)
Cutpoint 2	-	-0.088 (0.692)
Cutpoint 3	-	1.233 (0.693)
State Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,782	1,815

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Logit estimates, first column; ordered logit estimates second column.
Standard errors in parentheses.




Figure 8 – Predicted party identification by IC orientation

4.3 Affective Partisanship Expectation and Measures

Affective polarization is defined as “the tendency of people identifying as Republicans or Democrats to view opposing partisans negatively and co-partisans positively” (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015, p. 691). Studies on IC orientation have shown that the impact of group identification on intergroup differentiation is stronger for collectivists than individualists (Brown et al., 1992; Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Lee & Ward, 1998). This leads to the expectation that collectivism will predict higher levels of affective polarization.

To test the impact of IC orientation on affective polarization, a measure of affective polarization was created using feeling thermometers scales. Respondents were asked to rate each political party using a thermometer scale ranging from 0 to 100, where a score of 0 means the respondent feels “cold” toward the political party, a score of 100 means the respondent feels “warm” toward the political party, and a score of 50 means the respondent doesn’t feel “particularly warm or cold” toward the party. To create the affective polarization

indicator, the difference between respondents' ratings of the two political parties (Democrats and Republicans) was taken and the absolute value of the difference serves as the final indicator for degree of affective polarization (Iyengar et al., 2012).

$$|\text{Democratic Party Feeling} - \text{Republican Party Feeling}| = \text{Affective Polarization}$$

As I have done in the previous models in this chapter, I control for gender, race, age, education, income and ideological strength.

Table 7 – The effect of IC orientation on affective partisanship

	Affective Partisanship (0-100)
IC Orientation (0-1)	15.684** (5.650)
Ideological Extremity	8.580*** (0.601)
Female = 1	1.532 (1.489)
Black = 1	8.191*** (2.208)
Hispanic = 1	6.382** (2.356)
Other = 1	-1.814 (2.907)
Age (years)	0.377 (0.293)
Age squared/100	-0.093 (0.290)
Educ. = HS	-0.214 (4.343)
Educ. = Some College	1.182 (4.387)
Educ. = 2-year College	-2.856 (4.741)
Educ. = College	0.729 (4.451)
Educ. = Postgrad	-4.082 (4.668)
Income	-0.410 (0.247)
Constant	14.972 (10.028)
State Fixed Effects?	Yes
Observations	1,762
Adjusted R-squared	0.14

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Table 6 shows the results of an OLS regression estimating the effect of IC orientation on affective polarization. I show here that as expected, higher collectivism predicts higher levels of affective polarization.




Figure 9 - The direct effect of IC orientation on affective polarization

Figure 9 depicts the effect IC orientation has on degree of affective polarization. There is a strong positive relationship between IC orientation and affective polarization, indicating that as levels of collectivism increase, so do levels of affective polarization.⁵

4.4 Discussion

The goal of the current chapter was to examine the impact of IC orientation on party identification. The analysis presented here demonstrates several key findings about the effect of IC orientation on partisan identification. While the results do not fully support my expectations, it can be said that overall, collectivism is related to higher likelihood of identifying with a political party and a higher degree of affective polarization.

My analysis of the relationship between IC orientation and direction of party identification revealed that higher levels of collectivism were associated with democratic party identification. Because of this finding I included party ID as

⁵ The effect of IC orientation on affective polarization falls under the standard threshold for statistical significance when the Big Five Personality Items are included in the model. See Appendix C.

a control in the remaining analyses to ensure democrats were not driving the results.

I predicted that because collectivists are more prone to identify with groups than individualists, collectivism would predict likelihood of identification with a political party as well as strength of attachment. The results of my analysis showed that higher levels of collectivism did indeed predict a higher likelihood of identifying with a political party. However, this finding did not extend to strength of identification. Although the results were in the expected direction, they were not significant. Finally, my results show that higher levels of collectivism predict a higher level of affective polarization. This result is consistent with the theory that collectivists show more ingroup bias than individualists.

Taken together, the results of this chapter largely support the theory that because collectivists have an interdependent view of the self and are more prone to identify with groups than individualists, they are more likely to identify with a political party and more likely to show ingroup bias. This leads to interesting avenues for further research. Although I show here that collectivism impacts likelihood of party identification, it is clear that there are many individualists who identify with political parties as well. What can we learn about the difference in party identification between individualists and collectivists? Are collectivists more likely to be loyal to the party they identify with than individualists? More research on this may be able to inform our understanding of the nature of partisanship.

Chapter 5

Political Engagement

In the previous chapter, I analyzed the impact of IC orientation on partisanship. Although there was an unexpected relationship between IC orientation and directional partisanship, I showed that overall, collectivism impacts partisanship such that those higher in collectivism are both more likely to identify with a political party and more likely to be affectively polarized. In the current chapter, I analyze IC orientation and components of political engagement. Specifically, I examine how IC orientation impacts the following: political interest, knowledge of current events, political knowledge, and likelihood of voting.

Compared to individualists, collectivists are interdependent and derive their identity from their ingroups. When one feels more connected and invested in society, one is more interested in participating in its political system. Individualists on the other hand prize independence and uniqueness and feel less connected to those around them. Therefore, I predict that collectivists will be more politically engaged than individualists.

5.1 Political Interest Expectations and Measures

Political interest, defined as “a citizen’s willingness to pay attention to political phenomena at the possible expense of other topics” (Lupia & Philpot, 2005, 1122) is an important component of political engagement. Those who are more politically interested have more political knowledge, are more likely to seek out political news, more likely to vote, and more likely to participate in a range of other political behaviors (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Prior, 2005; S Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995).

To assess political interest respondents were asked how often they pay attention to what is going on in politics. They answered on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Never) – 5 (Always). I expect that higher collectivism will be associated with higher political interest.

5.2 News Media Attentiveness Expectations and Measures

While political interest and attention to news media are certainly related concepts of political engagement, reporting interest in politics and attentiveness to news are distinct. Therefore, to further explore the role of IC orientation in political engagement I investigate the relationship between IC orientation and news media attentiveness.

Instead of using a self-report measure of attention paid to news, I used an index consisting of five items that asked respondents about salient current events. For example, one item asked, “In August 2018, 43 people died in the northern Italian city of Genoa when what happened?” Respondents were then given a list of answers to choose from in which one was the correct response: “A

bridge collapsed; A fire destroyed the national museum; A regional airplane crashed on takeoff; Two bombs placed by terrorists exploded in a subway tunnel.” Correct responses were coded as 1 and incorrect responses coded as 0. The total correct responses were summed to create an index of attentiveness to media with higher scores indicating higher attentiveness. Using a knowledge measure instead of a self-report measure will better assess attention paid to news because it is able to assess whether respondents truly are paying attention to and processing information that is salient in the news media. I expect that collectivism will be positively associated with new attentiveness.

5.3 Political Knowledge Expectations and Measures

Attention to news media and current events is distinct from general factual knowledge about politics. Research has shown that attention to news media does not necessarily translate into fact based political knowledge (Prior, 2003). Having higher levels of political knowledge helps people interact with the political world more easily and consistently with their values. Therefore, political knowledge is an important component of political engagement.

Political knowledge was assessed using an index of five items that asked respondents a variety of basic knowledge questions. (e.g., “How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential veto?”). Correct responses were coded as 1 and incorrect responses coded as 0. The total correct responses were summed to create an index of political knowledge with higher scores indicating more knowledge. I expect that higher levels of collectivism predict higher levels of political knowledge.

5.4 Voter Turnout Expectations and Measures

Voting is perhaps one of the most important aspects of political engagement. A healthy democracy depends on citizens turning out to vote and expressing the will of the people. Despite the importance of voting, the American electorate has dismal turnout rates compared to other democracies around the world.

I have argued that IC orientation impacts political engagement because of the differences in independence vs. interdependence between individualists and collectivists respectively. I maintain that the interdependent nature of collectivists results in feeling more connected to society. Therefore, collectivism spurs political engagement. I therefore expect higher levels of collectivism to predict a higher likelihood of voting. Respondents were asked whether they voted in the 2016 election. Those that reported voting were coded as 1 and those did not vote were coded as 0.

Hypotheses

H8: Collectivism will be positively associated with interest in politics.

H9: Collectivism will be positively associated with attention paid to news media.

H10: Collectivism will be positively associated with political knowledge.

H11: Individualism-collectivism orientation will influence voting behavior such that higher levels of collectivism will predict a higher likelihood of voting.

5.5 Model Specification

Each of the regression models used to evaluate the hypotheses in this chapter include the same set of control variables to attempt to isolate the effect on IC orientation on the various aspects of political engagement. As discussed above, there are demographic factors that have reliably been shown to impact political engagement. In the models predicting levels of political interest, attention to news media, political knowledge, and voter turnout, I control for gender, race, age, marital status, education and income.

Gender has been consistently shown to impact aspects of political engagement. Relative to men, women have been shown to be less interested in politics, are less likely to follow the national news, and have lower levels of political knowledge (Bennett & Bennett, 1989; Verba et al., 1997).

Similar to gender, race has been shown to impact political engagement. Due in large part to decades of disenfranchisement from the political system, minorities in the United States have been shown to be less interested in and thus less engaged in politics than their White counterparts (Fridkin, Kenney, & Crittenden, 2006; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993a; Verba et al., 1995).

Age is another key demographic variable that has been shown to impact levels of political engagement. People have been shown to become more politically interested and engaged as they increase in age (Wattenberg, 2015). Thus, I control for age and expect a positive relationship between age and all aspects of political engagement.

I also control for marital status which has been shown to impact political engagement in that relative to single people, married people are more interested in politics (Verba et al., 1997; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Therefore, I expect married people to be more politically engaged than unmarried people.

Education and income have both been shown to impact political engagement because higher levels of both education and income provide the knowledge and resources necessary to understand and partake in the political process (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). I expect both higher levels of education and income to have positive effects on all aspects of political engagement assessed by the models included in this chapter.

Apart from demographic factors, I also control for strength of partisanship and strength of ideology. Both these factors have been found to influence political engagement. Including indicators of ideological strength and strength of

partisanship allows me to isolate the effects of IC orientation from the more instrumental motivations for engaging in politics (Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 2015; Wolak & Stapelton, 2019).

Table 8 – The effect of IC orientation on political interest

	Political Interest (1-5)
IC Orientation (0-1)	0.541** (0.217)
Ideological Extremity	0.160*** (0.023)
Female = 1	-0.355*** (0.058)
Black = 1	0.138 (0.084)
Hispanic = 1	0.122 (0.091)
Other = 1	-0.468*** (0.112)
Age (years)	-0.005 (0.011)
Age squared/100	0.013 (0.011)
Educ. = HS	0.409* (0.169)
Educ. = Some College	0.460** (0.171)
Educ. = 2-year College	0.638*** (0.184)
Educ. = College	0.938*** (0.174)
Educ. = Postgrad	0.965*** (0.182)
Income	0.017 (0.009)
Constant	1.762 (0.390)***
State Fixed Effects?	Yes
Observations	1,825
Adjusted R-squared	0.15

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

OLS regression coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses

Sample restricted to cases with valid observations for all variables

5.6 Results

Table 7 displays the results of the analysis regarding H8; those higher in collectivism will report higher levels of political interest. As can be seen, I find support for the hypothesis that higher levels of collectivism are related to higher levels of political interest.⁶

Figure 10 depicts the effect IC orientation has on level of political interest. There is a strong positive relationship between IC orientation and political interest indicating that as levels of collectivism increase so do levels of interest in politics.

⁶ The effect of IC orientation on political interest does not meet the standard threshold for statistical significance when the Big Five Personality Items are included in the model. See Appendix C.




Figure 10 - The direct effect of IC orientation on political interest

The findings regarding the relationship between IC orientation and knowledge are presented in Table 8. H9 and H10 posited that people higher in collectivism would show higher levels of attention to news media and higher levels of political knowledge. As can be seen, the results support only the hypothesis that collectivism would predict more attention to news.⁷

⁷ The effect of IC orientation on attention to news media does not meet the standard threshold for statistical significance when the Big Five Personality Items are included in the model. See Appendix C.

Table 9 – The effect of IC orientation on attention and knowledge

	Attention to News Media	Political Knowledge
IC Orientation (0-1)	0.583** (0.255)	-0.012 (0.225)
Ideological Extremity	-0.010 (0.027)	0.087*** (0.024)
Female =1	-0.203** (0.068)	-0.376*** (0.060)
Black = 1	-0.356*** (0.099)	-0.337*** (0.089)
Hispanic = 1	-0.145 (0.108)	-0.161 (0.096)
Other = 1	-0.288* (0.133)	0.040 (0.117)
Age (years)	0.076*** (0.013)	0.028* (0.012)
Age squared/100	-0.056*** (0.013)	-0.008 (0.012)
Educ. = HS	0.452* (0.201)	0.613*** (0.177)
Educ. = Some College	0.522** (0.203)	0.923*** (0.178)
Educ. = 2-year College	0.554* (0.219)	0.745*** (0.192)
Educ. = College	0.815*** (0.207)	1.235*** (0.181)
Educ. = Postgrad	0.775*** (0.216)	1.167*** (0.190)
Income	0.045*** (0.011)	0.031** (0.010)
Constant	0.154 (0.457)	0.923* (0.426)
State Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,793	1,673
Adjusted R-squared	0.14	0.21

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

OLS regression coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses

Sample restricted to cases with valid observations for all variables




Figure 11 - The direct effect of IC orientation on attention to news media

Finally, the results regarding H11, that collectivism would predict higher likelihood of voter turnout are presented in Table 9. There is no effect of IC orientation on likelihood of voting, thus the results do not support the hypothesis.

Table 10 – The effect of IC orientation on voting

	Vote (1=yes)
IC Orientation (0-1)	0.685 (0.594)
Ideological Extremity	0.372*** (0.068)
Female =1	-0.265 (0.164)
Black = 1	0.538* (0.250)
Hispanic = 1	-0.094 (0.254)
Other = 1	-0.919*** (0.278)
Age (years)	0.082** (0.030)
Age squared/100	-0.068* (0.031)
Educ. = HS	0.824* (0.346)
Educ. = Some College	1.010** (0.356)
Educ. = 2-year College	1.279** (0.416)
Educ. = College	1.427*** (0.377)
Educ. = Postgrad	1.546*** (0.426)
Income	0.087*** (0.027)
Constant	-2.691* (0.985)
State Fixed Effects?	Yes
Observations	1,748

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

5.6 Discussion

The goal of this chapter was to examine the role of IC orientation in political engagement. After conducting a series of regression analyses on multiple aspects of political engagement, I find that collectivism predicts some parts of engagement, but not others. Specifically, I find that higher levels of collectivism predict political interest and attention to news media, however, this same pattern does not extend to political knowledge and voting behavior. This is an interesting finding in that collectivism seems to impact the “softer” aspects of political engagement but stops short of predicting more involved and effortful political engagement.

Why would collectivism be related to attention to news media but not political knowledge? One possibility is that paying attention to news media and having a working knowledge of current events fulfills collectivists’ desire to feel connected and interdependent. Collectivists may feel more of a need than

individualists to be aware of what is going on in society around them because they feel more interconnected with society. Therefore, Collectivists feel current events are more relevant to them. However, this same motivation may not extend to fact based political knowledge as this type of information is less critical to feeling connected to others in society.

The results of my analysis did not show a relationship between collectivism and likelihood of voting. The relationship was in the expected direction, but it did not meet the threshold for statistical significance. One possibility is that due to the voting measure being self-reported, voter turnout rates are likely somewhat exaggerated. It is likely that reported voting behavior does not accurately reflect who actually voted, as research shows people are likely to overreport voting on surveys. A better test of the theory would be to examine IC orientation and validated voter turnout. The relationship between IC orientation and voting is something that can be investigated in future research.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The purpose of this dissertation was to examine individualism and collectivism in American political attitudes and behaviors. The analyses presented in the empirical chapters of this dissertation have provided some initial insights on the role IC orientation plays in the American political context. The analyses also sparked some new questions for further research. I will now review the findings from each empirical chapter, discuss the limitations of my methods, and outline future research directions.

The first empirical chapter of this dissertation asked, “What is the relationship between IC orientation and ideology?” and “Do underlying differences in individualism or collectivism map onto conservative or liberal policy attitudes?” Overall, my analyses showed that there is no relationship between IC orientation and self-report political ideology. This finding supports the theory that aspects of individualism and collectivism can be seen in both liberal and conservative ideologies. I further posited that higher levels of individualism would predict policy attitudes on social issues that are more liberal and attitudes on economic issues that are more conservative because these positions on issues tend to advocate for less government involvement. I conducted a series of regression analyses on a variety of policy positions and found that while the results largely supported my predictions, attitudes on immigration did not. On immigration, socially liberal attitudes were predicted by higher levels of collectivism. I reason that the role of the government on this specific issue is more ambiguous than on other issues, and therefore there needs to be further research done to fully understand the relationship between IC orientation and policy positions.

The second empirical chapter sought to answer the question, “Does IC orientation predict partisan attachment or affective partisanship?” My analyses showed that overall, collectivism is related to higher likelihood of identifying with a political party and a higher degree of affective polarization. The results of this chapter largely support the theory that because collectivists have an interdependent view of the self and are more prone to identify with groups than individualists, they are more likely to identify with a political party and more likely to show ingroup bias.

Finally, the third empirical chapter asks whether there is a “relationship between IC orientation and political engagement” I reasoned that because collectivists view themselves as more interdependent and connected to those around them, they would be more prone to be engaged in politics. My analyses partially supported this line of theorizing, showing that higher levels of collectivism predict more interest in politics and attention to news media but not political knowledge or voter turnout. I conclude that collectivism may only motivate aspects of political engagement that make people feel more connected to those around them.

There are some major limitations to the current dissertation that are important to discuss. First and foremost, throughout this dissertation I have made the case that IC orientation impacts political attitudes and behavior. However, because this dissertation relies solely on surveys, it is not possible to know with certainty whether IC orientation precedes political attitudes and behavior or if IC orientation is impacted by political attitudes and behavior. In order to truly understand this, more research would need to be conducted delving into the true nature of IC orientation and whether it can be primed to influence political outcomes.

In addition to this, there are likely more ideal measures that could have been used to test the theory presented in this dissertation. The analyses were limited to existing survey data. Although I maintain that the analyses conducted here provided a good first pass at testing the theory and helped build understanding of the role of IC orientation in American political attitudes and behavior, future studies should work to better tailor the measures to the theory.

I believe that the most fruitful and interesting avenue for future research on this topic is to further investigate the role of IC orientation in partisan attachment. I have shown that higher levels of collectivism predict identification with a political party and stronger affective polarization. However, it is obvious that those ranking high on collectivism are not the only ones who identify with political parties. What is the difference between individualists and collectivists who identify with political parties? Further research into the potential for different types of partisan attachment based on IC orientation could be an interesting avenue of research that would help lead to a better understanding of the nature of partisanship.

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Appendix A: Variable Question Wording and Coding

Data from Survey Sampling International November 2018

Individualism-Collectivism Orientation:

Question wording: "Please read the following statements and tell us whether you agree or disagree with each statement."

Coded: 1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)

Individualism Statements:

"I'd rather depend on myself than others."

"I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others."

"I often do "my own thing""

"My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me."

"It is important that I do my job better than others."

"Winning is everything."

"Competition is the law of nature."

"When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused."

Collectivism Statements:

"If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud."

"The well-being of my coworkers is important to me."

"To me, pleasure is spending time with others."

"I feel good when I cooperate with others."

"Parents and children must stay together as much as possible."

"It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice what I want."

"Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required."

"It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups."

Political Ideology:

Question wording: "In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?"

Coded: -3 = Very Liberal; -2 = Liberal; -1 = Slightly Liberal; 0 = Moderate; 1 = Slightly Conservative; 2 = Conservative; 3 = Very Conservative

Party Identification:

Question wording: “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican an Independent, or what?”

If responded Democrat or Republican: “Would you call yourself a strong Democrat/Republican?”

If responded Independent: No Preferences or Don't Know: Do you think of yourself as close to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?

Coded: -3 = Strong Democrat; -2 = Not Very Strong Democrat; -1 = Leans Democrat; 0 = Independent; 1 = Leans Republican; 2 = Not Very Strong Republican; 3 = Strong Republican.

Political Interest:

Question wording: “How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics?”

Coded: 1 = Never; 2 = Some of the Time; 3 = About Half the Time; 4 = Most of the Time; 5 = Always

Recent News:

Question wording: The following questions are designed to see whether you learned about various stories that were in the news in recent months.

Index of responses to 6 questions about current events, values range 0-6, 6 being most informed. Each question coded 1 = correct; 0 = incorrect

In September 2018, which state was most affected by Hurricane Florence?

Florida

North Carolina

Texas

Virginia

In August 2018, what college football coach was suspended for three games due to his handling of domestic abuse allegations concerning one of his former assistant coaches?

Mike Gundy of Oklahoma State

Chip Kelly of UCLA

Urban Meyer of Ohio State

Kirby Smart of Georgia

In September 2018, Pope Francis called for a major meeting of bishops, to be held early in 2019, to discuss what topic?

The crisis surrounding the sexual abuse of children by priests

Declining church attendance among Catholics

Whether and how the Catholic Church should address major world issues such as climate change and poverty

Whether the Catholic Church should change its rules in order to allow women and married priests

Which of the following entertainers died in September 2018?

Zsa Zsa Gabor

Jerry Lewis

Olivia Newton-John

Burt Reynolds

In September 2018, the Food and Drug Administration, or FDA, took what it described as "historic action" to address what situation?

The use of E-cigarettes by teenagers

Undetected Hepatitis C, especially among Americans ages 50-70

Opioid abuse

The rising cost of many prescription drugs

In August 2018, 43 people died in the northern Italian city of Genoa when what happened?

A bridge collapsed

A fire destroyed the national museum

A regional airplane crashed on takeoff

Two bombs placed by terrorists exploded in a subway tunnel

Political Knowledge:

Index of responses to 5 questions about American politics, values range 0-5, 5 being most knowledgeable. Each question coded 1 = correct; 0 = incorrect

Question wording: Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability.

What political position is currently held by Mike Pence?

Speaker of the House

Senate Minority Leader

Vice President

Presidential Chief of Staff

Whose responsibility is it to determine whether a law is constitutional or not?

President

Congress

Supreme Court

How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential veto?

two-thirds
five-sixths
Simple majority
three-fourths

Which of the following nations is NOT one of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council?

United States
China
Canada
United Kingdom
Russia
France

If the President of the United States is unable or unwilling to serve or is removed from office by Congress, the Vice President would become President. If the Vice President is unable or unwilling to serve, who would be eligible to become the President next?

Chief Justices of the Supreme Court
Speaker of the House
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of State

Race/Ethnicity:

Question wording:

Please specify your ethnicity-

White non-Hispanic
Black non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Other

Coded: 0 = White non-Hispanic; 1 = Black non-Hispanic; 2 = Hispanic; 3 = Other.
Dummy coded in models with White non-Hispanic dropped as the comparison category.

Age:

Question wording:

What year were you born? _____

Coded: 2018 - (year born)

Gender:

Question wording:

Please indicate your gender.

Male

Female

Coded: 0 = Male; 1 = Female. Dummy coded in models with Male dropped as the comparison category.

Income

Question wording: Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?

- Less than \$10,000
- \$10,000 - \$19,999
- \$20,000 - \$29,999
- \$30,000 - \$39,999
- \$40,000 - \$49,999
- \$50,000 - \$59,999
- \$60,000 - \$69,999
- \$70,000 - \$79,999
- \$80,000 - \$89,999
- \$90,000 - \$99,999
- \$100,000 - \$149,999
- \$150,000 - \$199,999
- More than \$200,000
- Prefer not to say

Education:

Question wording: What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?

- No High School Degree
- High school graduate
- Some college
- 2 year degree
- 4 year degree
- Post-grad degree

Social Policy Issues:

Do you think the federal government should make it more difficult for people to buy a gun than it is now, make it easier for people to buy a gun, or keep these rules about the same as they are now?

- More difficult
- Easier
- Keep these rules about the same

There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the options below best agrees with your view?

- By law, abortion should never be permitted
- By law, only in case of rape, incest, or if woman's life in danger

By law, for reasons other than rape, incest, or woman's life in danger in need is established
By law, abortion as a matter of personal choice

Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should be toward unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States?

Make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their home country

Have a guest worker program in order to work

Allow to remain and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship, if they meet certain requirements

Allow to remain and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship without penalties

Economic Policy Issues:

Should federal spending on protecting the environment be increased, decreased, or kept the same?

Increased

Decreased

Kept the same

Should federal spending on welfare programs be increased, decreased, or kept the same?

Increased

Decreased

Kept the same

Should federal spending on public schools be increased, decreased, or kept the same?

Increased

Decreased

Kept the same

Should federal spending on Social Security be increased, decreased, or kept the same?

Increased

Decreased

Kept the same

Appendix B: Models without State Fixed Effects

Chapter 3 Models

Table B1 – The effect of IC orientation on Ideology

	Self-Reported Ideology (-3 = very lib., 3 = very cons., 0 = moderate)
IC Orientation (0-1)	0.123 (0.333)
Female = 1	-0.058 (0.088)
Black = 1	-0.830*** (0.126)
Hispanic = 1	-0.541*** (0.135)
Other = 1	-0.201 (0.167)
Age (years)	0.053** (0.017)
Age squared/100	-0.038** (0.017)
Educ. = HS	-0.119 (0.259)
Educ. = Some College	-0.315 (0.262)
Educ. = 2-year College	-0.493 (0.282)
Educ. = College	-0.600* (0.265)
Educ. = Postgrad	-0.793** (0.278)
Income	0.023 (0.015)
Constant	-1.174* (0.507)
State Fixed Effects?	No
Observations	1,836
Adjusted R-squared	0.06

Notes: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.

Sample restricted to cases with valid observations for all variables.

OLS regression coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses

Table B2 – The effect of IC orientation on social policy attitudes

	Abortion Policy (0-1)	Gun Control Policy (0-1)	Immigration Policy (0-1)
IC Orientation (0-1)	0.279*** (0.070)	0.346*** (0.060)	-0.357*** (0.060)
Female = 1	-0.056** (0.019)	0.044** (0.016)	-0.027 (0.016)
Black = 1	-0.074** (0.026)	0.105*** (0.023)	-0.123*** (0.016)
Hispanic = 1	-0.047 (0.029)	0.035 (0.024)	-0.090*** (0.025)
Other = 1	-0.005 (0.035)	0.061* (0.030)	-0.055 (0.030)
Age (years)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)
Age squared/100	-0.0005 (0.003)	-0.0005 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)
Educ. = HS	-0.045 (0.054)	0.042 (0.047)	-0.009 (0.047)
Educ. = Some College	-0.131 (0.055)	0.074 (0.048)	-0.056 (0.047)
Educ. = 2-year College	-0.082 (0.059)	0.070 (0.051)	-0.078 (0.051)
Educ. = College	-0.151** (0.055)	0.103* (0.048)	-0.111* (0.048)
Educ. = Postgrad	-0.087 (0.058)	0.065 (0.051)	-0.088 (0.050)
Income	-0.007** (0.003)	0.0002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)
Constant	0.574*** (0.107)	0.305** (0.092)	0.732*** (0.092)
State Fixed Effects?	No	No	No
Observations	1,833	1,831	1,829
Adjusted R-squared	0.05	0.06	0.05

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Sample restricted to cases with valid observations for all variables

OLS regression coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses

Table B3 – The effect of IC orientation on economic policy attitudes

	Social Security (0-1)	Welfare Funding (0-1)	Public School Funding (0-1)	Environmental Protection Funding (0-1)
IC Orientation (0-1)	0.171** (0.060)	0.275*** (0.072)	0.458*** (0.063)	0.251*** (0.069)
Female =1	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.030 (0.019)	0.020 (0.017)	0.004 (0.019)
Black = 1	0.089*** (0.022)	0.234*** (0.027)	0.133*** (0.024)	0.119*** (0.027)
Hispanic = 1	-0.024 (0.025)	0.077** (0.030)	0.006 (0.026)	0.066* (0.028)
Other = 1	-0.062* (0.030)	0.079* (0.036)	-0.052 (0.031)	-0.036 (0.034)
Age (years)	0.010** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)
Age squared/100	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Educ. = HS	-0.007 (0.046)	0.050 (0.057)	0.093 (0.050)	0.013 (0.055)
Educ. = Some College	0.005 (0.047)	0.053 (0.057)	0.127** (0.050)	0.064 (0.055)
Educ. = 2-year College	0.026 (0.051)	0.055 (0.061)	0.081 (0.054)	0.053 (0.059)
Educ. = College	0.003 (0.048)	0.098 (0.058)	0.136** (0.052)	0.101 (0.056)
Educ. = Postgrad	0.008 (0.050)	0.170** (0.060)	0.168** (0.053)	0.132* (0.057)
Income	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.029*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)
Constant	0.459*** (0.091)	0.383** (0.110)	0.452*** (0.096)	0.631*** (0.105)
State Fixed Effects?	No	No	No	No
Observations	1,834	1,829	1,826	1,825
Adjusted R-squared	0.06	0.10	0.06	0.03

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

OLS regression coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses

Sample restricted to cases with valid observations for all variables

Chapter 4 Models

Table B4 – The effect of IC orientation on direction of partisan identification

	Party Identification (-3 = Strong Dem., 3 = Strong Rep., 0 = Independent)
IC Orientation (0-1)	-0.669 (0.408)
Female = 1	-0.208 (0.108)
Black = 1	-2.265*** (0.155)
Hispanic = 1	-1.266*** (0.166)
Other = 1	-0.842*** (0.205)
Age (years)	0.032 (0.021)
Age squared/100	-0.034 (0.021)
Educ. = HS	-0.225 (0.318)
Educ. = Some College	-0.554 (0.320)
Educ. = 2-year College	-0.369 (0.346)
Educ. = College	-0.833* (0.326)
Educ. = Postgrad	-0.562 (0.342)
Income	0.035 (0.018)
Constant	0.557 (0.624)
State Fixed Effects?	No
Observations	1,821
Adjusted R-squared	0.18

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

OLS regression coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses

Sample restricted to cases with valid observations for all variables

Table B5 – The effect of IC orientation on party identification

	Identifies with a party	Strength of party identification
IC Orientation (0-1)	1.431** (0.590)	0.254 (0.379)
Ideological Extremity	0.762*** (0.079)	0.868*** (0.046)
Party ID	-0.050 (0.041)	-0.082** (0.024)
Female = 1	0.023 (0.160)	0.088 (0.101)
Black = 1	0.694* (0.271)	1.077*** (0.168)
Hispanic = 1	0.648* (0.297)	0.554** (0.164)
Other = 1	-0.279 (0.264)	-0.202 (0.191)
Age (years)	-0.091** (0.036)	-0.018 (0.019)
Age squared/100	0.091* (0.036)	0.016 (0.019)
Educ. = HS	-0.068 (0.396)	0.125 (0.299)
Educ. = Some College	0.054 (0.424)	-0.031 (0.300)
Educ. = 2-year College	-0.125 (0.464)	-0.026 (0.325)
Educ. = College	0.414 (0.424)	0.151 (0.299)
Educ. = Postgrad	-0.037 (0.465)	-0.101 (0.312)
Income	0.047 (0.026)	0.034 (0.017)
Constant	1.912* (0.961)	-
Cutpoint 1	-	-0.808 (0.576)
Cutpoint 2	-	0.273 (0.575)
Cutpoint 3	-	1.574 (0.576)
State Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,821	1,821

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Logit estimates, first column; ordered logit estimates second column.
Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B6 – The effect of IC orientation on affective partisanship

	Affective Partisanship (0-100)
IC Orientation (0-1)	15.574** (5.650)
Ideological Extremity	8.470*** (0.593)
Female = 1	1.205 (1.469)
Black = 1	8.784*** (2.208)
Hispanic = 1	6.488** (2.356)
Other = 1	-1.903 (2.907)
Age (years)	0.369 (0.287)
Age squared/100	-0.085 (0.285)
Educ. = HS	-0.198 (4.343)
Educ. = Some College	0.943 (4.387)
Educ. = 2-year College	-2.372 (4.741)
Educ. = College	0.954 (4.451)
Educ. = Postgrad	-3.474 (4.668)
Income	-0.469 (0.247)
Constant	10.245 (8.466)
State Fixed Effects?	Yes
Observations	1,768
Adjusted R-squared	0.13

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Chapter 5 Models

Table B7 – The effect of IC orientation on political interest

	Political Interest (1-5)
IC Orientation (0-1)	0.521** (0.213)
Ideological Extremity	0.110*** (0.027)
Female = 1	-0.372** (0.056)
Black = 1	0.048 (0.082)
Hispanic = 1	0.093 (0.087)
Other = 1	-0.415*** (0.106)
Age (years)	-0.001 (0.011)
Age squared/100	0.009 (0.011)
Educ. = HS	0.350* (0.166)
Educ. = Some College	0.431** (0.168)
Educ. = 2-year College	0.612** (0.180)
Educ. = College	0.879*** (0.170)
Educ. = Postgrad	0.946*** (0.178)
Income	0.045*** (0.011)
Constant	0.154 (0.457)
State Fixed Effects?	No
Observations	1,810
Adjusted R-squared	0.17

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

OLS regression coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses
 Sample restricted to cases with valid observations for all variables

Table B8 – The effect of IC orientation on attention and knowledge

	Attention to News Media	Political Knowledge
IC Orientation (0-1)	0.628** (0.253)	0.017 (0.222)
Ideological Extremity	0.007 (0.029)	0.110*** (0.026)
Female = 1	-0.192** (0.067)	-0.371*** (0.087)
Black = 1	-0.309** (0.098)	-0.337*** (0.089)
Hispanic = 1	-0.116 (0.128)	-0.182 (0.091)
Other = 1	-0.415* (0.128)	0.013 (0.111)
Age (years)	0.078 (0.019)	0.029* (0.012)
Age squared/100	-0.058 (0.070)	-0.008 (0.012)
Educ. = HS	0.434* (0.199)	0.574*** (0.174)
Educ. = Some College	0.540** (0.201)	0.923*** (0.178)
Educ. = 2-year College	0.559** (0.216)	0.749*** (0.188)
Educ. = College	0.840*** (0.204)	1.198*** (0.177)
Educ. = Postgrad	0.787*** (0.214)	1.111*** (0.187)
Income	0.043*** (0.012)	0.034** (0.010)
Constant	0.321 (0.392)	1.301*** (0.357)
State Fixed Effects?	No	No
Observations	1,778	1,660
Adjusted R-squared	0.16	0.22

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

OLS regression coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses

Sample restricted to cases with valid observations for all variables

Table B9 – The effect of IC orientation on voting

	Vote (1=yes)
IC Orientation (0-1)	0.081 (0.585)
Ideological Extremity	0.116 (0.073)
Female =1	-0.250 (0.165)
Black = 1	0.032 (0.247)
Hispanic = 1	-0.273 (0.250)
Other = 1	-0.758** (0.270)
Age (years)	0.072* (0.030)
Age squared/100	-0.056* (0.031)
Educ. = HS	0.760* (0.346)
Educ. = Some College	1.052** (0.356)
Educ. = 2-year College	1.278** (0.416)
Educ. = College	1.366*** (0.377)
Educ. = Postgrad	1.610*** (0.426)
Income	0.072** (0.028)
Constant	-2.916* (0.847)
State Fixed Effects?	No
Observations	1,808

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Appendix C: Dissertation Models with the Big Five

Note: All models contain the same control variables as the original models

Chapter 3 Models

Table C1 – The effect of IC orientation and Big Five on Ideology

	Self-Reported Ideology (-3 = very lib., 3 = very cons., 0 = moderate)
IC Orientation (0-1)	-0.219 (0.359)
Openness (0-1)	-1.576*** (0.229)
Agreeableness (0-1)	-0.019 (0.269)
Extraversion (0-1)	-0.355* (0.183)
Conscientiousness (0-1)	1.343*** (0.254)
Neuroticism (0-1)	0.549* (0.220)
Constant	-0.593 (0.607)
Observations	1,766
Adjusted R-squared	0.12

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. Sample restricted to cases with valid observations for all variables.

Table C2 – The effect of IC orientation and Big Five on social policy attitudes

	Abortion Policy (0-1)	Gun Control Policy (0-1)	Immigration Policy (0-1)
IC Orientation (0-1)	0.275*** (0.077)	0.313*** (0.067)	-0.347*** (0.066)
Openness (0-1)	-0.183*** (0.049)	0.065 (0.043)	-0.166*** (0.042)
Agreeableness (0-1)	-0.018 (0.057)	0.128* (0.051)	-0.094 (0.050)
Extraversion (0-1)	0.025 (0.039)	-0.050 (0.034)	0.059 (0.034)
Conscientiousness (0-1)	0.030 (0.054)	0.121* (0.048)	0.124** (0.047)
Neuroticism (0-1)	0.044 (0.047)	-0.171 (0.041)	0.087* (0.041)
Constant	0.740*** (0.130)	0.135 (0.114)	0.886*** (0.112)
Observations	1,765	1,762	1,76
Adjusted R-squared	0.07	0.07	0.07

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Table 3 – The effect of IC orientation and Big Five on economic policy attitudes

	Social Security (0-1)	Welfare Funding (0-1)	Public School Funding (0-1)	Environmental Protection Funding (0-1)
IC Orientation (0-1)	0.072 (0.065)	0.259*** (0.078)	0.440*** (0.070)	0.220** (0.076)
Openness (0-1)	0.108** (0.042)	0.235*** (0.050)	0.192*** (0.044)	0.251*** (0.049)
Agreeableness (0-1)	0.174*** (0.049)	0.192*** (0.059)	0.108* (0.053)	0.058 (0.057)
Extraversion (0-1)	0.016 (0.033)	-0.012 (0.040)	0.009 (0.035)	0.035 (0.039)
Conscientiousness (0-1)	-0.087 (0.046)	-0.349*** (0.056)	-0.117* (0.049)	-0.097 (0.054)
Neuroticism (0-1)	-0.070 (0.040)	-0.081 (0.048)	-0.112** (0.043)	-0.078 (0.047)
Constant	0.569*** (0.110)	0.241 (0.133)	0.298** (0.118)	0.465*** (0.129)
Observations	1,765	1,760	1,756	1,755
Adjusted R-squared	0.10	0.14	0.07	0.05

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Chapter 4 Models

Table C4 – The effect of IC orientation and Big 5 on direction of partisan identification

	Party Identification (-3 = Strong Dem., 3 = Strong Rep., 0 = Independent)
IC Orientation (0-1)	-0.853 (0.440)
Openness (0-1)	-1.603*** (0.281)
Agreeableness (0-1)	-0.309 (0.331)
Extraversion (0-1)	-0.032 (0.224)
Conscientiousness (0-1)	1.057*** (0.314)
Neuroticism (0-1)	0.811** (0.270)
Constant	1.955 (0.745)
Observations	1,751
Adjusted R-squared	0.20

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Table C5 – The effect of IC orientation and Big Five on party identification

	Identifies with a party	Strength of party identification
IC Orientation (0-1)	1.138* (0.680)	0.357 (0.427)
Openness (0-1)	-1.176** (0.456)	0.884*** (0.273)
Agreeableness (0-1)	0.775 (0.509)	-0.046 (0.316)
Extraversion (0-1)	0.830* (0.358)	1.117*** (0.221)
Conscientiousness (0-1)	-1.041* (0.521)	-0.056 (0.305)
Neuroticism (0-1)	0.128 (0.418)	0.254 (0.264)
Constant	2.796* (1.265)	-
Cutpoint 1	-	-1.438 (0.722)
Cutpoint 2	-	-0.312 (0.721)
Cutpoint 3	-	1.040 (0.721)
Observations	1,718	1,751

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Logit estimates, first column; ordered logit estimates second column.

Standard errors in parentheses.

Table C6 – The effect of IC orientation and Big Five on affective partisanship

	Affective Partisanship (0-100)
IC Orientation (0-1)	1.240 (6.085)
Openness (0-1)	1.708 (3.854)
Agreeableness (0-1)	14.873*** (4.516)
Extraversion (0-1)	3.545 (3.088)
Conscientiousness (0-1)	16.998*** (4.303)
Neuroticism (0-1)	1.676 (3.712)
Constant	7.469 (10.218)
Observations	1,700
Adjusted R-squared	0.16

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Chapter 5 Models

Table C7 – The effect of IC orientation and Big Five on political interest

	Political Interest (1-5)
IC Orientation (0-1)	0.265 (0.235)
Openness (0-1)	0.582*** (0.150)
Agreeableness (0-1)	-0.217 (0.175)
Extraversion (0-1)	0.308** (0.119)
Conscientiousness (0-1)	0.480*** (0.166)
Neuroticism (0-1)	0.351* (0.143)
Constant	1.100 (0.399)**
Observations	1,740
Adjusted R-squared	0.18

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Table C8 – The effect of IC orientation and Big Five on attention and knowledge

	Attention to News Media	Political Knowledge
IC Orientation (0-1)	0.386 (0.280)	-0.171 (0.246)
Openness (0-1)	0.222 (0.179)	-0.124 (0.158)
Agreeableness (0-1)	0.028 (0.209)	-0.057 (0.187)
Extraversion (0-1)	-0.097 (0.143)	-0.241 (0.126)
Conscientiousness (0-1)	0.745*** (0.198)	0.499 (0.180)
Neuroticism (0-1)	0.047 (0.172)	0.127 (0.153)
Constant	-0.225 (0.477)	1.019* (0.444)
Observations	1,712	1,598
Adjusted R-squared	0.15	0.22

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Table C9 – The effect of IC orientation and Big Five on voting

	Vote (1=yes)
IC Orientation (0-1)	1.097 (0.738)
Openness (0-1)	1.385 (0.596)
Agreeableness (0-1)	1.225 (0.618)
Extraversion (0-1)	1.262 (0.442)
Conscientiousness (0-1)	0.413 (0.197)
Neuroticism (0-1)	1.443 (0.588)
Constant	0.029*** (0.032)
Observations	1,664

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Appendix D: Dissertation Models Using 2 Factor and 4 Factor IC Orientation

Note- All models contain the same control variables as the original models in the text.

Chapter 3 Models

Table D1 – The effect of IC orientation on Ideology

	Model 1	Model 2
Self-Reported Ideology (-3 = very lib., 3 = very cons., 0 = moderate)		
VI (0-1)	0.589* (0.236)	-
HI (0-1)	-0.004 (0.275)	-
VC (0-1)	1.057** (0.311)	-
HC (0-1)	-0.470 (0.298)	-
Individualism (0-1)	-	0.752* (0.324)
Collectivism (0-1)	-	0.484 (0.285)
Constant		-1.794** (0.616)
Observations	1,830	1,830
Adjusted R-squared	0.08	0.08

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.

Model 1 reports 4 factor coefficients; Model 2 reports 2 factor coefficients

All original control variables included in models

Table D2 – The effect of IC orientation on social policy attitudes

	Abortion Policy (0-1)	Gun Control Policy (0-1)	Immigration Policy (0-1)
VI (0-1)	0.296*** (0.048)	-0.340*** (0.043)	0.333*** (0.043)
HI (0-1)	-0.319*** (0.056)	0.049 (0.050)	0.105* (0.043)
VC (0-1)	0.391*** (0.064)	0.125* (0.057)	0.045 (0.056)
HC (0-1)	0.061 (0.061)	0.053 (0.055)	-0.151** (0.054)
Constant	0.533*** (0.127)	0.415*** (0.113)	0.475*** (0.111)
Individualism (0-1)	0.074 (0.068)	-0.336*** (0.060)	0.479*** (0.059)
Collectivism (0-1)	0.381*** (0.059)	0.217*** (0.053)	-0.135** (0.052)
Constant	0.488*** (0.129)	0.440*** (0.113)	0.458*** (0.111)
Observations	1,827	1,825	1,823

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Top Model reports 4 factor coefficients; Bottom Model reports 2 factor coefficients

All original control variables included in models

Table D3 – The effect of IC orientation on economic policy attitudes

	Social Security (0-1)	Welfare Funding (0-1)	Public School Funding (0-1)	Environmental Protection Funding (0-1)
VI (0-1)	-0.050 (0.042)	-0.153** (0.052)	-0.229*** (0.045)	-0.185*** (0.049)
HI (0-1)	0.099* (0.049)	0.016 (0.060)	0.037 (0.053)	0.140* (0.057)
VC (0-1)	0.069 (0.056)	0.078 (0.068)	0.143* (0.060)	0.031 (0.065)
HC (0-1)	0.123* (0.054)	0.155* (0.065)	0.244*** (0.057)	0.193** (0.039)
Constant	0.526*** (0.111)	0.387*** (0.135)	0.483*** (0.118)	0.551*** (0.128)
Individualism (0-1)	0.027 (0.058)	-0.163* (0.071)	-0.230*** (0.062)	-0.096 (0.068)
Collectivism (0-1)	0.209*** (0.051)	0.252*** (0.062)	0.419*** (0.055)	0.264*** (0.060)
Constant	0.537 (0.111)	0.399 (0.135)	0.504*** (0.118)	0.574*** (0.128)
Observations	1,828	1,823	1,820	1,819

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Top Model reports 4 factor coefficients; Bottom Model reports 2 factor coefficients
All original control variables included in models

Chapter 4 Models

Table D4 – The effect of IC orientation on direction of partisan identification

	Model 1	Model 2
	Party Identification (-3 = Strong Dem., 3 = Strong Rep., 0 = Independent)	
VI (0-1)	1.215*** (0.288)	-
HI (0-1)	-0.074 (0.335)	-
VC (0-1)	0.346 (0.379)	-
HC (0-1)	-0.341 (0.365)	-
Individualism (0-1)	-	1.344*** (0.395)
Collectivism (0-1)	-	-0.144 (0.347)
Constant	-	0.452 (0.751)
Observations	1,815	1,815
Adjusted R-squared	0.18	0.18

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Model 1 reports 4 factor coefficients; Model 2 reports 2 factor coefficients
All original control variables included in models

Table D5 – The effect of IC orientation on party identification

	Identifies with a party	Strength of party identification
VI (0-1)	0.740 (0.452)	1.409*** (0.283)
HI (0-1)	-1.607** (0.514)	-0.672* (0.317)
VC (0-1)	1.348** (0.551)	1.006 (0.357)
HC (0-1)	0.449 (0.552)	0.222 (0.347)
Constant	2.523* (1.203)	-
Cutpoint 1	-	-0.489 (0.714)
Cutpoint 2	-	0.639 (0.714)
Cutpoint 3	-	1.996 (0.715)
Individualism (0-1)	-0.591 (0.628)	0.981* (0.388)
Collectivism (0-1)	1.515** (0.516)	1.000** (0.331)
Constant	2.371* (1.195)	-
Cutpoint 1	-	-0.300 (0.710)
Cutpoint 2	-	0.817 (0.710)
Cutpoint 3	-	2.161 (0.711)
Observations	1,782	1,815

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Logit estimates, first column; ordered logit estimates second column.

Top Model reports 4 factor coefficients; Bottom Model reports 2 factor coefficients

All original control variables included in models

Table D6 – The effect of IC orientation on affective polarization

	Model 1	Model 2
	Affective Polarization (0-100)	
VI (0-1)	-19.070*** (3.918)	-
HI (0-1)	18.413*** (4.587)	-
VC (0-1)	4.650 (5.150)	-
HC (0-1)	6.843 (4.976)	-
Individualism (0-1)	-	-5.852 (5.478)
Collectivism (0-1)	-	15.605*** (4.800)
Constant	14.076 (10.185)	16.552 (10.269)
Observations	1,762	1,762
Adjusted R-squared	0.15	0.14

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.

Model 1 reports 4 factor coefficients; Model 2 reports 2 factor coefficients

All original control variables included in models

Chapter 5 Models

Table D7 – The effect of IC orientation on political interest

	Model 1	Model 2
	Political Interest (1-5)	
VI (0-1)	0.033 (0.152)	-
HI (0-1)	0.609*** (0.177)	-
VC (0-1)	0.092 (0.199)	-
HC (0-1)	0.798*** (0.190)	-
Individualism (0-1)	-	0.524* (0.208)
Collectivism (0-1)	-	0.976*** (0.184)
Constant	0.803 (0.395)	0.853* (0.395)
Observations	1,804	1,762
Adjusted R-squared	0.19	0.14

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.

Model 1 reports 4 factor coefficients; Model 2 reports 2 factor coefficients

All original control variables included in models

Table D8 – The effect of IC orientation on attention and knowledge

	Attention to News Media	Political Knowledge
VI (0-1)	-0.919*** (0.181)	-0.755*** (0.162)
HI (0-1)	0.665** (0.211)	0.552** (0.186)
VC (0-1)	0.297 (0.239)	-0.446* (0.207)
HC (0-1)	-0.006 (0.229)	0.008 (0.197)
Constant	0.369 (0.471)	1.281** (0.438)
Individualism (0-1)	-0.435 (0.249)	-0.381 (0.225)
Collectivism (0-1)	0.459* (0.220)	-0.295 (0.194)
Constant	0.463 (0.474)	1.396** (0.441)
Observations	1,772	1,654

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Top Model reports 4 factor coefficients; Bottom Model reports 2 factor coefficients

All original control variables included in models

Table D9 – The effect of IC orientation on voting

	Model 1	Model 2
	Voted (1=yes)	
VI (0-1)	-0.074 (0.451)	-
HI (0-1)	0.529 (0.518)	-
VC (0-1)	-1.439* (0.605)	-
HC (0-1)	1.619** (0.565)	-
Individualism (0-1)	-	0.196 (0.623)
Collectivism (0-1)	-	0.355 (0.512)
Constant	-3.911*** (1.073)	-3.745*** (1.062)
Observations	1,727	1,762

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.

Model 1 reports 4 factor coefficients; Model 2 reports 2 factor coefficients

All original control variables included in models