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Zeinab Abul-Magd. Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in Egypt.

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uals to equally diverse institutions of power. Some may find the level of detail excruciating at times, but the author clearly wished he had found more sources in order to offer an even finer-grained narrative. There are many ways this book stands apart, and the attention to empirically verifying the changing meaning and purposes of patriotism in Arabic is one of those ways. Given the level of detail, this review cannot do justice to all the significant contributions such a well-sourced narrative brings to Egyptian and Ottoman historiography. In general, Mestyan is to be commended for taking culture seriously. At the same time, it is the very seriousness assigned to culture that limits the view of its significance to the political.

Although the book is rich in primary materials, which are for the most part analyzed carefully, the treatment of relevant secondary literatures is uneven, with glaring holes that cast doubt on claims to novelty that the author repeatedly makes. The problem of conceiving culture and the political as serious to the extent that they were forged within the crucible of khedivial state formation is linked to the way Mestyan positions his work within a specific historiography, or genealogy—one that places him in the line of Ehud Toledano and Khaled Fahmy and apart from that of Ernest Dawn and others. When other contributions are mentioned, they are not differentiated from this simplified genealogy or engaged in any substantial way. Still other texts, such as Lisa Pollard's *Nurturing the Nation: The Family Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing, and Liberating Egypt, 1805–1923* (2005), and Ussama Makdisi's crucial article on Butrus al-Bustani ("After 1860: Debating Religion, Reform, and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire," *JMES* 34, no. 4 [2002]: 601–617), which make similar arguments about patriotism/nationalism as products of a layered dynamic between local, regional, and transimperial levels, are never mentioned. Pollard's analysis of the transformation of the household under khedivial rule as central to the development of a modern conception of nation-ness belies Mestyan's claim that conceptual tools to study dominant ideas of pre-1908 Arab nationalisms are lacking.

Mestyan has succeeded in showing how a certain intimate, though stratified, space of elite cultural ties elaborated in Arabic was a space in which Arab patriotism could emerge as secular love of homeland. And, in the growing publicity of that space, territorial nationalism as idea gestated. However, in the revisionist zeal to genetically connect Arab patriotism/nationalism to the Ottoman imperial framework, global realignments that remade the latter tend to fade from view amid tautological flourishes such as "Egypt is not India" (10). It was not only with the 1876 Debt Commission and 1882 occupation that European empires played critical roles in shaping Egypt's future. After all, the khedivate and the dynastic rule of Mehmed 'Ali's family was secured by an Ottoman *firman* in 1841, which was only made possible by the London Convention of 1840 and the landing of British troops in Beirut.

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ZEINAB ABUL-MAGD. *Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in Egypt*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017. Pp. vii, 326. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$30.00, e-book \$29.99.

When popular uprisings swept across Egypt in February 2011 and drove Hosni Mubarak to step down as president after thirty years in office, a long-standing theory of military-state relations was put to the test. In authoritarian states with professionalized militaries constructed alongside a centralized governing apparatus, such as in Egypt, Tunisia, or Jordan, presidents-for-life or their monarchical equivalents tended to rely on internal security forces for the coercive means of rule rather than on the armed forces. As a result, the theory went, military coups became less likely, since rulers in these states could utilize domestic security organizations to "coup-proof" their governments against the officer corps. Furthermore, if rulers and their security pillars were challenged by rising social unrest, then military officers would be reluctant to nakedly step in on the side of the political establishment. Compared to revolutionary armies or paramilitary groups, bureaucratized militaries with professionalized officers were believed to be more prone to staying out of politics when the government was challenged by mass mobilization.

In Egypt, facts have not fit the theory. After a postrevolutionary period of military-guided transition, during which Muslim Brotherhood officials attempted to brusquely consolidate control over state institutions and sideline critics, a July 2013 coup d'état drove underground all competitors to military rule. Thereafter, Field Marshal 'Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi took off his officer's uniform to occupy the presidency, ushering in an autocracy more high handed, restrictive, and farcical than had previously been experienced by most Egyptians. What happened to Egypt's coup-proofed political institutions, and what does this tell us about the types of power wielded by military organizations across the world?

In *Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in Egypt*, Zeinab Abul-Magd chronicles the ascent of military officers to positions of power inside and outside the Egyptian state over the past six decades. Alongside the penetration of political institutions, she also tracks the extension of military-linked economic enterprises into the country's most lucrative sectors. Trained as a historian, Abul-Magd penned a series of popular articles after 2011 outlining the economic pursuits and tony privileges enjoyed by military elites subsequent to Mubarak's ouster. With the closing of the public sphere and the quashing of oppositional politics, *Militarizing the Nation* can be read as the culmination of Abul-Magd's project to expose the sinews of military power in Egypt.

In Abul-Magd's reading, an internal logic of power accumulation propelled the Egyptian military to increasingly expand into economic, social, and cultural fields. To explain the impulse of this logic, Abul-Magd draws from a set of lectures given by Michel Foucault in the late 1970s, subsequently published in *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978* (2009).

For Foucault, the political project of the modern state is a continuation of war not through outright violence, but rather by use of a “military model as a fundamental means of preventing civil disorder” (quoted on 81). The organization and discipline of the military camp, as a technique of producing and maintaining internal peace and order, is extended to all social institutions. Abul-Magd’s Foucauldian approach underscores a continuity of military power, leading to the “full subjugation” (2) of all social classes via the organization’s “omnipotent presence” (5). There was no possibility of coup-proofing in Egypt, in this telling, as the power of the Egyptian state itself was reproduced, decade after decade, through the spread of military-linked individuals and organizations into all arenas. After sixty years of Egyptian militarization of the nation, the 2011 revolution’s denouement as a caricature of the modern Arab republic is the final mutation of a country that used to be the region’s main source of political, cultural, and intellectual emulation.

As a social and institutional history of the Egyptian military, the book collects an unparalleled range of materials and wealth of details. Abul-Magd draws from score-settling officers’ memoirs; Arabic-language newspapers across the ideological spectrum; cultural depictions of the military in films, TV shows, and novels; Western reports on military aid to Egypt; and the digital ephemera of the 2011 uprisings. Each chapter traces how the military transformed and adapted to new environments. By the 1960s, in the wake of the Nasserist “revolution from above,” the military officer corps functioned as a new class inside the state, competing with technocratic nationalists and socialist ideologues alike. During the 1980s, officers spearheaded a conversion into “peacetime” economic production, relying on government subsidies, conscript labor, Persian Gulf markets, and exemptions from state regulation, all under the rarely perturbed eye of the United States. During the 1990s and 2000s, military-linked economic activities proliferated even while President Mubarak gave lip service to private sector-led liberalization. In reality, Mubarak heavily relied on the appointment of ex-generals to head positions in strategic provinces, seaports, and logistical organizations.

As an overarching explanation of a counterrevolutionary process, however, the argument of an omnipotent military logic incessantly charging toward a telos of martial control is underspecified. Powerful militaries were constructed in countries such as Indonesia, Turkey, China, and Brazil, along with military linkages to domestic and regional economies. Inasmuch as “professional” militaries around the world now engage in similar processes of capital accumulation and subcontractor cronyism, the Egyptian case is instructive given that this common form has become normalized and overlooked by historians. Yet because the process is so widespread, reinvigorated military rule in Egypt cannot be explained through an abstracted internal logic alone, for similar occurrences took place in other countries but resulted in different outcomes. What is missing, at least in the book’s analytical scaffolding, is attention to how changes in the relations between political, military, and security institutions could account for why

the military ended up displacing competitors in Egypt, but did not do so elsewhere.

Given the book’s rich material, though, an astute reader can glean why the 2011 revolution ended in both tragedy and farce. The accumulation of networks of privilege across the state, as well as the relative coherence of the military alongside a fractured political apparatus, provided advantages from which military officers could maneuver to steer revolutionary dynamics and commandeer the political process. Abul-Magd has given us, cloaked under Foucauldian regalia, a convincing account of the Egyptian national saga.

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~~ASHER ORKABY, *Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962–68*. (Oxford Studies in International History.) New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. x, 294. \$34.95.~~

~~On the evening of September 25, 1962, as they prepared to depose their ruler, Muhammad al-Badr, to overturn his thousand-year-old imamate, and to establish a new Yemen Arab Republic, soldiers loyal to Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal contemplated their mortality. Fearful they would not survive the following day’s coup attempt, many of the soldiers spent their entire month’s salary on chocolates, which they consumed with resignation. Asher Orkaby’s study *Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962–68*, is replete with such humanizing anecdotes, yet it is also a satisfying analytical study of the coup and the six-year war it ignited on the Arabian Peninsula. Orkaby characterizes that conflict as an “internationalized civil war” (3) that was “overrun by foreign interests, interventions, and politics” (7). The tiny and impoverished nation of Yemen, he writes, “became an open field for individuals, organizations, and countries to peddle their agendas in this remote region of South Arabia” (1). This book could not be more timely, as this once obscure corner of the Middle East is again riven by civil conflict and scarred by foreign intervention.~~

~~Orkaby’s is the second major study of Yemen’s civil war to appear in the last six years. It bears many similarities to Jesse Ferris’s 2012 monograph, *Nasser’s Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power*. Both, in their ways, are exemplary works of international history and are grounded in thorough multi-archival, multinational, and multilingual research. Both take seriously Odd Arne Westad’s charge in *The Global Cold War* (2005) to examine the forces of local political transformation and the ideological roots of foreign intervention along the Cold War’s periphery. Still, Orkaby’s work stakes out a scholarly agenda distinct from Ferris’s.~~

~~Orkaby’s is a story of Yemeni nationalism and state building propelled by a conflict that otherwise caused much destruction. In 1968, he contends, “a new Yemen emerged as a modern state, independent of three dominant forces in South Arabia: the Yemeni imamate, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Arab nationalism, and~~