Unmasking Maps, Unmaking Empire: Towards an Archipelagic Cartography

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The territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it.

— Jean Baudrillard, “Simulacra and Simulations”

What Joseph Campbell in his classical study calls the “monomyth” is, as psychoanalyst Clarissa Pinkola Estés notes, a meta-narrative that “informs and [...] spiritually grows the cultures, and the peoples within those cultures, through its universal cache of idioms and images.” Acknowledging that human placemaking, meaning-making, and storytelling rely on mental mapping and mapmaking, this essay expands the scrutiny of narrative structures of placemaking towards the realms of spatial imaginations, human geographies, and transnational cartographic practices of mobility. Tracing both colonial and anti-colonial nodes of these practices across oceanic circuits makes visible what Albert Wendt described as “so fabulously varied a scatter of islands, nations, cultures, mythologies and myths, so dazzling a creature.” What emerges is, I suggest, an archipelagic cartography that opens new venues for critical reconceptualizations of islands, mainlands, centers, peripheries, colonial histories, and transnational future trajectories.

Be it through gesturing directions, drawings in the sand or stick figures, the urge to conceive maps is perhaps as old as humanity itself. Embellishing the depths of ancient caves in northern France, some of the earliest-known maps in fact do not partition the surface of the earth but trace constellations of the night sky. Knowing little about their creators, we may nevertheless assume that they, like all following generations, looked beyond terrestrial borderings in search of meaning, connection, and transcendence. Much like modern maps, these first known cartographic specimen embed spatial symbols within networks of meaning. They construct, communicate, and naturalize spatial imaginations by imparting them with stability and authority. In this sense, all maps are acts of poiesis through which people engender spatial meaning.
that potentially did not exist before. But maps also represent material artifacts that provide access to interfaces between desires to control external spaces and ways to reconcile them with psychological and imaginative mindscapes.

As some of the most powerful human artifacts, maps (re)connect temporally and spatially distant experiences, hence underlining Doreen Massey’s definition of place as “the ever-changing outcome of complex sets of relations.” This essay applies archipelagic, transnational, and mobility studies approaches to examine how relations between dominant and alternative mapmaking practices may unravel the homogenization and commodification of spatial imaginations under conditions of (neo-)imperialism and globalization. Exploring connectivities, mobilities, memories, and polysemic knowledges, I trace cartographies through the spatio-cultural nodes of the mainland United States, Hawai‘i, and Micronesia. The results suggest that archipelagic approaches to mapping underline the importance of “minor” imaginations, practices, and traditions that question the authority of continental, national, and imperial/colonial spatial vocabularies. While some of these vocabularies may appear interspersed, fragmented, or insular, they form narrative nodes in archipelagic networks of resistance against colonizing cartographic regimes that aim to homogenize, police, and commodify space according to imperial logics.

Fathoming Theoretical Trajectories of Archipelagic Mappings

As both physical artifacts and figments of the imagination, maps facilitate orientation and navigation alongside physical coordinates, but they also establish emotional, sensual, and semantic trajectories of being-in-the-world. As Adam Gopnik notes in the foreword to Mapping Manhattan: “The artifact envelops the emotion, and the emotion stores away the artifact. [...] We go to live somewhere, and then we see a schematic representation of it, and superimposing our memories upon it, we find that it becomes peculiarly ... alive.” Maps hence are by no means passive documents or object slides of geographical facts but ambiguous and messy. “Far from holding up a simple mirror of nature that is true or false,” J. B. Harley maintains, “maps redescribe the world—like any other document—in terms of relations of power and of cultural practices, preferences, and priorities. What we read on a map is as much related to an invisible social world and to ideology as it is to phenomena seen and measured in the landscape.” At the same time, the study of cartography merits—but still mostly lacks—a critical methodology that moves beyond the mere pointing out of biases and shortcomings by conceding that “human history is linked to the history of landscapes, and since landscapes are themselves exploded, [refuses] to consider a human history that is monolithic.” Like projections of varved sediments from lakes whose diameter indicates frost-free periods, the essay shows that maps in their role as sociocultural actors also divulge sedimented histories and—if given a voice through archipelagic, mobility studies, and transnational approaches—communicate with us across broad cultural spectrums.
In recent decades and by building on the work of Heidegger, Foucault, Deleuze, and others, speculative realism and object-oriented ontology have reworked the paradigms of spatio-temporal mapping. For instance, Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman’s understanding of OOO (which they call “onticology”) rejects the inherent anthropocentrism of subject/object relations and underlines the consciousness and agency of all things by reasoning “if a difference is made, then the being is.”

Putting similar emphasis on the generative relationships between objects and subjects enables an archipelagic cartography to chart “relations between machines or networks of machines composing a world.” This article builds on this theoretical reflexivity by drawing out the material agencies of maps and by emphasizing the discursive weight of transnational, archipelagic, and mobile maps in the shaping of social, cultural, political, and ecologic relations past and present. Analogous to speculative realism’s critique of continental philosophy as the dominant narrative of modernity, archipelagic cartography brings into question homeland-centric spatial epistememes, formats, and orders like the frontier, manifest destiny, errand into wilderness, and the nation-state with imperial extensions.

Going beyond mere deconstruction and concurrently tripping up uniform mappings of space, this approach also puts emphasis on the search for potentialities that lay bare tectonic activities and fault lines where continental spatial narratives and traditions grate, bleed, and crumble as they collide with opposing cartographic conceptions; an approach that might be seen as a cartographic continuation of Gloria Anzaldúa’s borderland poetics by recognizing that “the skin of the earth is seamless” and that every act of mapping also represents an act of wounding that leaves behind “the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary.” Like the fractal, fuzzy, and infinite edges of archipelagic constellations, cartographic placemaking power thus extends far beyond solely practical purposes and histories that view maps as auxiliary objects of human mobility, settlement, warfare, or resource extraction. The lives of maps thus go beyond representation and include highly mobile social biographies and far-reaching agency in processes of spatialization, storytelling, and meaning-making. As an extension of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s observations in A Thousand Plateaus, archipelagic mappings emerge as rhizomatic and assembled processes that are “entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious. It fosters connections between fields [...] onto a plane of consistency. [...] The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation.”

Maps, I would add, never exist in isolation but are intrinsically connected by their “being-in-the-world” and therefore “signifying something ongoing and generative, which could not be reduced to either a philosophical state or a scientific materiality.” Like other cultural artifacts, maps are iterative agents of discursive (transcultural) networks that create, exchange, and synthesize imaginations of spaces and places. Making visible the nodes, scope, scales, and
connections within these networks then becomes the task of an archipelagic cartography.

Realizing this shift in scholarly praxis, however, necessitates a twofold methodological swing. First, about the way we think of and, more importantly, with maps. As stressed by spatial turn scholarship since the 1980s, this means overcoming notions of space as a territorial container for resources and dwellings. It also means breaking with Euro- and Western-centric placemaking paradigms which imply hierarchies among places and knowledges and reproduce dichotomous imaginaries such as island-/continent, nature/culture, subject/object, or modern/primitive. Prevailing geographic conceptions of the US continue to hail the nation-as-continent paradigm as a smooth, transcontinental territory that holds a position of dominance over its adjoining oceanic spaces. Historically, even more experimental mappings such as R. E. Harrison’s centrifugal projection rarely challenge US-centric cartographic paradigms; even when “centering, geographically around the North Pole” they still revolve “ideologically and economically around the U.S.” (Harrison; see Fig. 1). Irrespective of its arrogation of centralized global power during the so-called American century, the US concurrently

Fig. 1: The World Divided (1941), Richard Edes Harrison.
transformed into an oceanic nation whose extracontinental, liquid, and archipelagic extensions exceed the continental homeland in terms of scope. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the United States’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is by far “the largest in the world, spanning over 13,000 miles of coastline and containing 3.4 million square nautical miles of ocean—larger than the combined land area of all fifty states” (see Fig. 2). While the bulk of imperial extensions are localized in Caribbean and Oceanic spaces, the nation’s mental outreach also happens towards the North. An entry in Barack Obama’s archived presidential blog, for instance, suggests that America is also becoming “an Arctic Nation” whose future hinges on “[m]elting glaciers and land-based ice sheets [that] are contributing to rising sea levels. The future of America is inextricably linked to the future of the Arctic.”

Doing away with what Wigen and Lewis in their eponymous study described as the “myth of the continents” then means displacing the discursive centers of place-making power and demands new ways of thinking, narrating, and mapping space. Archipelagic thinking, as Jonathan Pugh suggests elsewhere in this special forum, takes up this task by emphasizing the relationality among allegedly remote or insular sites where spatial meaning is generated in circuits that exceed monolithic and hierarchical conceptions of places and peoples. The swells of archipelagic thinking emerge from the work of authors such as Derek Walcott (Collected Poems, 1986), Édouard Glissant (Poetics of Relation, 1997), and Epeli Hau‘ofa (We Are the Ocean, 2008) and their poetics that put islands and island cultures in dialogue with each other and with narratives of continental power. In doing so, they ask us to rethink metanarratives of archipelagoes as Robinsonades of tropical and sequestered fringes defined by tropes of treasure maps, shipwrecks, cannibals, or Hollywood fantasies of civilized castaways befriending an anthropomorphic volleyball. The archipelagic points to both reality and representation and, crucially, to their intersections as the sites where new significances are being generated at the confluences of physical spaces and human imaginations. Archipelagic cartography zooms in on the visual images of this creolization: the mixing, recombining, experimenting, and uprooting of maps and other visualities as “the means by which several distinct cultures, or their elements, come into contact in a particular place in the world.”

This, as Brian Russell Roberts and Michelle Stephens illuminate, implies that “the archipelago emerges as neither strictly natural nor as wholly cultural but always as at the intersection of the Earth’s materiality and humans’ penchant for metaphoricity.” An archipelagic cartography must therefore become part of what might be called the archipelagic turn because it provides means of translation and exchange as it brings into dialog spatial imaginations that break with cartographic conventions and fantasies of neutral and objective geographic representation. Importantly, archipelagic cartography insists on untying the ironclad correlation between author, map, and model whose absurdity Jean Baudrillard arrested in the image of the
"cartographer’s mad project of an ideal coextensivity between the map and the territory." Archipelagic cartography furthermore moves beyond understandings of maps as mere visual metaphors or graphical resources that help users conjure, navigate, and reproduce spatial imaginations. In contrast, it strives to divulge the fractal and interconnected rhizomatic networks of “a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits and its own lines of flight.” What emerges as a result of these deliberations is an interdisciplinary study of maps that does away with the walled garden of traditional cartography. It allows maps to express the narrative fragmentation of empires, continents, and...
nation-states by capturing the erosion of monolithic geographic scripts and an epistemic (re)centering of supposedly insular spatial knowledges. It does so by postulating the creative and visually expressive power of relations, diffractions, faultlines, and ambiguities over the ultimately continent-centric trajectories of imperial placemaking—hence by expanding on Hans Ulrich Obrist’s suggestion that “the story of humanity has no center. [...] There are only archipelagos, strings of islands whose proximity enriches their difference.”

A second methodological shift concerns the importance of a transnational angle that uncovers—often unexpected—metamorphoses and connectivities among Euromerican and non-Western cartographic epistemes. This includes not only probing persistent myths vis-à-vis Western scientific superiority but also exploring the ways in which marginal cartographic techniques challenge the homogenization of spatial (meta)narratives under conditions of imperialism, globalization, and neoliberalism. The results, as will be seen below, deal further blows to what Shelley Fisher Fishkin in “Crossroads of Cultures: The Transnational Turn in American Studies” described as “the national paradigm of the United States as a clearly bordered geographical and political space.” On the one hand, US maps frequently reflect the transformation of spatial imaginations from continental frontiers subjugated by a westering nation to the idea “that the United States is itself a transnational circuit of physical, economic, and cultural exchanges whose dominion extends to regions that cannot be contained within the nation’s geographical territory.” On the other hand, both old and new maps work to uphold or undermine these circuits. At the current moment of multiple global crises in places like Ukraine and Taiwan, the United States’s enduring pivot to Asia with its intensifying dependencies stresses the importance of decrypting the cartographic knowledges that have shaped the nation’s transpacific imaginary—beginning with the first depictions of Alta California, the Lewis and Clark expedition that opened trade with China, and finally the formation of an imperial archipelago stretching across Hawai‘i, Cuba, the Philippines, and many other extra-continental spheres of influence. US geopolitical placemaking projects did not cease with the advent of the postcolonial era following World War II. Conversely, they remain manifest in far-reaching networks of trade zones, military bases, scientific laboratories, and nuclear test sites.

The following examples of Hawaiian and Micronesian mappings suggest that much can be gained by shifting epistemic gears from the prevailing transatlantic histories towards an outlook that no longer “map[s] the world with the Atlantic, not the Pacific, at its center” but dares to engage in “looking at American history ‘the wrong way.”’ Acknowledging the disciplinary achievements of transnational, cultural, and mobilities studies in recent decades, the study of cartography hence must also become, as Lisa Lowe observes, “a site that shifts and marks alternatives to the national terrain by occupying other spaces, imagining different narratives and critical historiographies, and enacting practices that give rise to new forms of subjectivity and new ways of questioning the government of human life by the national state.”
Archipelagic cartographies, to summarize, demand a reevaluation of semantic, ontological, epistemic, narrative, and representational dimensions of placemaking and its underlying dynamics of power and agency. In doing so, they challenge the permanence of ubiquitous imperial histories and their cartographic underpinnings that have ordered discourses about centers and peripheries since the inception of American Studies.

“Moon and stars brighter than the mainland”: The Conspicuous Cartographies of Hawaiian Cruises

Made possible through the accessibility of newspaper and other print media, maps became instrumental in making sense of the newly independent American nation whose scope had doubled overnight after the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. The expanding nation constantly relied on maps as vital tools of knowledge about resources, infrastructures, and population development, inspiring a sense of mission and progress that is commonly subsumed under the moniker of manifest destiny. In imagination and praxis, maps facilitated images of a westering nation with burgeoning states and territories and their destined transformation into a transcontinental entity. In documenting—and celebrating—continental conquest, nineteenth-century mapmakers developed the visual languages that continue to inform today’s expectations to identify clearly discernable borders and other stylistic conventions such as the use of certain color palettes (see Fig. 3).26 The absence of clear boundaries, however, is equally telling since it projected the nation as a potentially unlimited space constantly poised towards expansion. At the same time, already established techniques like the stereographic separation between terrestrial and oceanic hemispheres introduced in Nicolas Antoine Boulanger’s Nouvelle Mappemonde (1753) “moved west with Europeans, employed as tools for the propagation of both political and religious visions of history.”27 In the perpetually tenuous early republic, however, borders needed to be frequently drawn and redrawn in concert with expansive movements, not least because the diverse populations of newly incorporated regions challenged the stability of racially segregated human geographies. Continental exceptionalism hence relied on a dual logic: On the one hand, mapping the American nation underlined a fixation on territoriality and the right (or duty, or burden) to colonize through hierarchical narratives of human difference, most notably civilization versus primitivism. On the other hand, the constant flux of territories underlined both economic benefits and (racialized) threats of permeable margins, frontiers, and borderlands.
As part of its equally circumscribed and limitless imaginative conception, the nation thus “reversed the directions: it put its Orient in the West, as if it were precisely in America that the earth came full circle; its West is the edge of the East.”

Throughout the nineteenth century, visions of the US incremented the cartographic scale, zooming out from local to regional, national, continental, and finally global scales (here, also see Fig. 3). The continental gaze shifted towards a terraqueous triumphalism that dissolved planetary distances through imperial projects in Caribbean and Asian-Pacific spaces. As Epeli Hau'ofa explains: “Nineteenth-century imperialism erected boundaries that led to the contraction of Oceania, transforming a once boundless world into the Pacific Island states and territories that we know today. People were confined to their tiny spaces, isolated from each other. No longer could they travel freely to do what they had done for centuries.”

In processes of imperial mobilization and Indigenous demobilization, maps no longer were specialized statistical and navigational instruments but narrative extensions of imperial power. Like Walter Crane’s “Imperial Map” (1886), many utilized color codes to trace the spatial expanse of empires. Levi Yaggy’s The Five Zones (1887) incorporates ethnographic data to pinpoint those colonies the author deemed most suitable for white settlement. Growing networks of trade and extractive industries nationalized a Pacific that Herman

![Fig. 3: “Territorial Growth” (1970), US Geological Survey and Arch C. Gerlach, eds.](image-url)
Melville’s literary mapping in *Moby-Dick* had envisaged as a space of both complexities and connections where “[t]he same waves wash the moles of the new-built Californian towns, but yesterday planted by the recentest race of men, and leave the faded but still gorgeous skirts of Asiatic lands, older than Abraham; while all between float milky-ways of coral isles, and low-lying, endless, unknown Archipelagoes, and impenetrable Japans. Thus this mysterious, divine Pacific zones the world’s whole bulk about; makes all coasts one bay to it; seems the tide-beating heart of earth.”

By the 1880s, imperial policies engendered a new view of the nation as a transcontinental actor and epistemic interface between hemispheres. “The nation’s largest map producer, Rand McNally,” Susan Schulten notes, “redrew its map of the country in order to make room for the Philippines, Hawai‘i, Cuba, and Puerto Rico,” entities that were (re)mapped through chronicles of progress, religious charity, and the “burden” of bringing civilization to nonwhite peoples. Not unlike today, the “liberation” and subsequent colonization of places was justified by an exceptional mission of conveying democratic values. This global remapping, however, sometimes commenced through unexpected channels. In November of 1899, President McKinley avowed in a “confessional” statement addressed to religious leaders:

I didn’t want the Philippines, and when they came to us, as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do with them. [...] I walked the floor of the White House night after night [...]. And one night it came to me [...] that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and, by God’s grace, do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed, and went to sleep, and slept soundly, and the next morning I sent for the chief engineer of the War Department (our map maker), and told him to put the Philippines on the map of the United States (pointing to a large map on the wall of his office).

Not long after this revelation, McKinley’s phantasmagoric mapping of the Philippines spiraled into a bloody war with native insurgents who used the labyrinthine topography of more than seven thousand islands and islets to resist their assimilation into the imperial archipelago (see Fig. 4). More than five thousand miles away and located at the epicenter of Melville’s “tide-beating heart of earth,” Hawai‘i and its history of colonial placemaking also became a hotbed of newfangled imperial cartographies. Annexed in 1898 (then still called the Sandwich Islands), the Hawaiian archipelago consists of 137 volcanic islands and countless smaller islets. Today, its banner remains the only state flag that displays the insignia of a foreign power; positioned above eight stripes that symbolize the eight major islands, the Union Jack references
Fig. 4: “Map of the China Seas Showing Philippine Islands and Adjacent Countries with European Colonial Possessions Under Their National Flags” (1898), W. B. Duncan.

the empire that helped the unification of the islands and foundation of the Hawaiian Kingdom by Kamehameha I in 1795. The flag—and its symbolic toppling as a sign of distress by the Hawaiian sovereignty movement—raises questions about the fiftieth state’s relationship to the mainland. Throughout the nineteenth century, the island kingdom turned into a refueling base for American troops and stopover for merchants and missionaries that energized the nation’s imperial projects in Oceania and the Far East. Hawai‘i eventually developed into a lynchpin of US military dominance in the Pacific, culminating in Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor that prompted the nation’s entry into World War II and global authority in the postwar world order.
Parallel to Hawai‘i’s reshaping into a bulwark of military prowess, a new tropicity of leisure–colonialism in the guise of tourism and cruise ship industries reallocated the islands’ relationship to the continent and changed the imagination of both spaces in the process. The final decades of the nineteenth century were rocked by the Great Migration and compounding waves of European immigration into increasingly crowded urban centers, prompting efforts at social and racial control that manifested themselves in contemporary mappings. Frederick Law Olmsted’s design of Central Park, for instance, conceives Manhattan’s green lung as a pseudo-public space and strolling promenade for New York’s WASPs, barring access for undesirable elements through high entrance fees for the most attractive areas. Maps of San Francisco’s Chinatown plot Asian exclusion and xenophobia in the guise of statistical neutrality. In contrast, W. E. B. Du Bois’s The Seventh Ward of Philadelphia: The Distribution of Negro Inhabitants Throughout the Ward, and Their Social Conditions (1899) visualizes the limits of African American mobility and intensifying metropolitan ghettoization. Agnes Sinclair Holbrook’s and Florence Kelley’s Nationalities Map No.1 (1895) expresses both the diversity and social squalor of Chicago neighborhoods (see Fig. 5).33

Fig. 5: Nationalities Map No. 1 (1895). Jane Addams and Florence Kelley.
On the other side of the social spectrum and driven by a growing sentiment that “the American homeland is the planet,” America’s upper classes enjoyed a new and privileged mobility facilitated by nascent tourist enterprises in the Pacific and Caribbean colonies. Cruise ship brochures such as the Matson Navigation Company’s “4 Days to Honolulu: S. S. Malolo” (1927) stirred perspectives of the Pacific that tethered Hawai‘i to the continental homeland by conjuring velocities and luxuries—including record travel times, electric elevators, and high-end movie theaters—yet mostly unknown on the mainland. Advancements in steam technology underscored the speed with which previously inaccessible destinations could be reached. “The new Malolo brings a completely new conception of speed, comfort and luxury to the Pacific,” the colorful brochure proclaims: “The super-speed of the Malolo makes possible a round trip to Honolulu in the unbelievable time of only eleven days from San Francisco ... twelve days from Los Angeles ... fifteen days from Denver ... seventeen days from Chicago ... nineteen days from New York ... including three full days in Hawaii.” Ever faster ships became epitomes of conspicuous consumption and boundless mobility as benchmarks of both Americanness and whiteness. On visits to the colonies, both could be performed for the world to witness through the technical marvel of cruise ships as highly mobile global platforms. Concurrently, the exclusive non-place of the modern cruise liner functioned as a protective bubble in which fantasies of racial and economic control continued to exist insulated from the chaotic continental remappings caused by immigration and inner-city ethnic melting pots. While modern cruise liners turned into itinerant antidotes to chaos that kept the categorical narratives of the republic afloat, the ships’ destinations were simultaneously remade into leisure landscapes. As tourists left the comfort of their vessels, places like Cuba, Hawai‘i, and Panama turned into exotic backdrops for recreational activities that appeared different yet familiar.

As the Matson leaflet advertises, “Hawaii offers manifold attractions in a completely new environment. All your favorite sports. Fifteen gold courses. The new Royal Hawaiian Hotel on Waikiki Beach, with four hundred rooms.” A brochure of the Los Angeles Steamship Company orchestrates the tourists’ arrival in Honolulu as a demonstration of US economic power: “[a]s this majestic liner slowly noses its way into the dock, native swimmers hold your attention by diving for coins thrown into the water by passengers.” Engaging in these spectacles, which often saw Hawaiian boys drowned or attacked by sharks, American tourists and businesspeople became seemingly benevolent actors in the respatialization of an archipelago whose diversity was gradually diminished by tourist ads and investment incentives. A map displayed in the same brochure shrinks the Hawaiian archipelago with its 137 islands to only those where the company’s vessels came into port (see Fig. 6).
What remains is an idealized figment, a utopian fantasy of a “wonderland […] with moon and stars brighter than the Mainland” where prosperity and leisure are enabled by the work of mild-mannered subalterns. In another Matson Company leaflet from 1939, these fantasies already emerge as part of larger colonial circuits and geopolitical ambitions. Now, Hawai‘i is no longer the destination but merely a stopover on a round trip to more remote destinations in Samoa, Fiji, New Zealand, and Australia. However, unlike a decade earlier, activities no longer include participation in local culture through singing and dancing (see Fig. 7). Instead, the islands have transformed into an offshore bulwark of the mainland. Nicknamed “Uncle Sam’s Gibraltar,” they house “Schofield Barracks, largest U. S. military post, and Wheeler Aviation Field” with its “big guns” proudly on display. Visitors are invited to stroll among an idyllic, chronotopical microcosm of cultural remnants, gliding in open cars through the drivable outdoor museum of a disenfranchised indigenous society as “a little spatial world [that] is limited and sufficient unto itself, not linked in any intrinsic way with other places, with the rest of the world.” The brochure explains that “‘Old King’s Highway’ shows the remains of this ancient Hawaiian enterprise [and] a side trip presents Kailua and Lanikai, excellent beaches for bathing and picnics.” A static Indigenous history complements the speed of change with which local industries (“Hundreds of acres of
sugar cane and pineapple are passed on the way”⁴³) and geopolitical spaces are re-made on the boundless and fluid maps projecting the nation’s imperial archipelago—exemplified and matched only by the colonizing velocity of the cruise ship industry.

Finally, Hawai’i’s conspicuous colonial mappings find poetic equivalence in Derek Walcott’s figure of the Western explorer who, as Roberts and Stephens note, “sallies forth with confidence that if the world is as yet unknown, then it at least may be surveyed and hence known via the Euclidean geometry of a latitudinal and longitudinal grid superimposed upon an idealized sphere.”⁴⁴ Like the tourists’ expectations which are plotted through leisurely fantasies in colorful brochures “[i]n the explorer’s world, space is mapped, before it is known.”⁴⁵ Today, more and more scholars work

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Fig. 7: “The New Fast Service to Australia: 17 Days via Hawaii, Samoa, Fiji” (1928). Matson Line South Seas and Australian Service.
towards reversing this Western-centric spatial narrative. David Chang, for examples, traces nineteenth-century oceanic explorations of Kānaka Maoli (i.e., Indigenous Hawaiians) and asks: “What if we were to understand indigenous people as the active agents of global exploration, rather than the passive objects of that exploration? What if, instead of conceiving of global exploration as an activity just of European men […] we thought of it as an activity of the people they ‘discovered’?”

While, as Chang notes, islands discovered and visited by Hawaiians seafarers are indeed identifiable on contemporary maps, other Oceanic mapping traditions further elucidate the diversity and precision inherent in the cartographic vocabularies of archipelagic knowledges.

**Travels in Hypercartography: The Planetary Relations of Micronesian Stick Charts**

Around the second millennium BCE, Micronesian navigators reached today’s Marshall Islands in outrigger canoes by using stick charts. These material maps use shells and coral pieces to mark the position of islands on a framework of coconut fibers; leaf-veins of palms indicate the directions of sea swells, enabling navigators to find their way in

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**Fig. 8. Library of Congress, Marshall Islands Stick Chart Rebbelib Type. Circa 1920s.**
an Oceanic water world of myriad islands (see Fig. 8). When the Micronesian archipelago came under German governance during the late nineteenth century, imperial scholars identified three distinctive types of stick charts: Meddo and rebbelib serve navigational purposes and differ mainly in their degree of accuracy while mattang charts were used for training purposes and signify “an abstract presentation of how swells refract around an island and meet in a series of nodes.”47 Notably and in contrast to early maps found in Europe and Asia, stick charts are neither fixed nor final but flexible, organically composed, and able to be rearranged and adapted to new circumstances and discoveries.

Navigation by stick charts operates based on principles of swell diffraction that approximate the size and position of land masses. As paleoceanographic researcher Ingo Hennings explains: “Like as a stone thrown into a pond produces ripples, islands

Fig. 9. Lecacheux et al. 2012. Wave field models near Reunion Island.
alter the orientation of the waves that strike them, create characteristic swell patterns that can be detected and used to guide a vessel to land” (as visualized in wave field models, see Fig. 9). By observing over centuries how water flows and behaves as it encounters islands—together with phenomena concerning light reflection and shadow effects—Marshallese peoples aggregated an immense archive of cross-generational empirical knowledge about this and other physical phenomena which enabled them to chart courses based on surprisingly accurate predictions of interactions between multiple swell patterns and island formations.

Following German, Japanese, and finally American rule (the latter of which included a decade of nuclear tests at Bikini Atoll) the Marshall Islands achieved national independence from the US-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) in the 1980s. At this historic moment, the cultural heritage of mapping and navigation was immortalized in the nascent nation’s seal that shows a stick chart next to a traditional sailing vessel. This decision further underlines the significance of maps as spatio-cultural actors.

First, as agents of historical and social cohesion among the diverse cultures of Oceania connected through mnemonic artifacts and traditions such as stick charts. And second, in relation to individuals and their place in the world as “individual charts [were] constructed by a navigator to suit his own particular requirements. Indeed, an entirely competent navigator cannot, under any circumstances, interpret a chart which he himself has not made.” Like Lukasa remembrance boards of Congolese societies or Ammassalik wooden maps of Greenlandic Inuit communities, stick charts hold personal geographical knowledges but also embody mnemonics of significant historical events in societies without a printing culture. They thus bridge the terra nullius between individual human geographies and transfer of social knowledge as they are passed down through generations. Stick charts are at once material and spiritual sites of knowledge that encompass a “totemic geography linking together place and people” by mapping archipelagic spaces as “not something ‘natural’ and opposed to people, but totally socialized.”

Marshallese navigators hence navigated and (mentally) charted an archipelagic world made up of infinite centers. Or, as Glissant put it, “a world of many worlds” that reflects the inextricable entanglement of human and spatial relations and coagulates into an anti-imperial and anti-nationalist counter-cartography. Whereas present-day cartographers, geographers, computer scientists, and an increasing blend of quantitative and qualitative research in the digital humanities must rely on geographic information systems (GIS), machine learning (ML), and computational algorithms to process ‘thick’ spatial data, satellite images have confirmed the accuracy of traditional Micronesian stick charts. Without making them explicit, their users were aware of principles of wave length, dynamic motion, and wave diffraction that are at the heart of physics and determine, among others, mechanisms of atomic nuclei and chaos theory. “The interaction of neutrons with atoms,” Hennings writes, “is analogous to the interaction of swell waves with atolls of the Marshall Islands.” An archipelagic perspective on
cartography shows that Micronesian navigators possessed profound, intuitive insights of natural sciences, achieved through mnemonic networks of hydrographic knowledges, without Western-style scientific instruments, and in fact long before Western scientists formalized the rules of contemporary mapmaking. This explains, for instance, why European scholars for over 200 years attributed the authorship of the first detailed map of Oceania—created by the Tahitian Polynesian navigator Tupaia who joined James Cook’s crew and aided the exploration of Terra Australis Incognita—to the HMS Endeavour’s resident botanist Joseph Banks (see Fig. 10).55

The resulting projection of islands emerges as a transnational assemblage of Polynesian geographic knowledges and Western imperial mobilities. Taking up Brian Russell Roberts’s concept of archipelagic translation (see his contribution in this volume), Tupaia’s Map represents what Lars Eckstein and Anja Schwarz describe as an early “act of translation that simultaneously articulates both European and Oceanic worldmaking systems.”56 Perhaps even more strikingly, unlike their Western counterparts who used sextants and compasses aboard ships, Polynesian seafarers were not reliant on stick charts, which “were exclusively used on land, prior to a voyage. To carry one at sea would put a navigator’s skill in question.”57 Acutely internalized representations of swell patterns and wave lengths, infinitely complex interactions of
liquid and solid geographies, Oceanic cartographers worked through deep, intergenerational networks of mental algorithms. They thus harken back to Walcott’s counter-concept to Western placemaking that is expressed in the figure of the anti-explorer, who, in the words of Roberts and Stephens, “conceptualized the world not by means of the Euclidean set of lines that constitute the latitudinal and longitudinal grid, but rather by means of the post-Euclidean schemas of chaos and fractal geometry.” The anti-explorer, analogous to the narrator’s movement of Walcott’s poem “A Sea-Chantey” traverses the ocean not to order the world alongside unwavering grids of absolute certainty but guided by the sublime momentum of a poetics of relationality between inner and outer spaces that observes

The needles of their masts,
That thread archipelagoes,
Refracted embroidery,
In feverish waters,
Of the seafarer’s islands, […]
The sea’s liquid letters, […]
The pasture of ports,
The litany of islands,
The rosary of archipelagoes

Anti-exploratory archipelagic mappings skirt epistemic paradigms of cartography, ethnology, poetry, the humanities, and various STEM disciplines. Considering the recursive workings of natural spaces that are in constant flux, Micronesian mariners traversed vast distances relying solely on mental maps that dynamically adjusted themselves to virtually infinite permutations of wave lengths and swell patterns. In the West, fractal aspects of geography only came into focus in the 1980s—not least due to their aesthetic appeal—through Benoit Mandelbrot’s mathematical sets. Attempting to measure the coastline of England, Mandelbrot noticed that its length varied according to the measuring standards that were applied. This results in the so-called Steinhaus paradox, meaning that with increasing scale one finds a theoretically endless number of more and more complex iterations, for instance in trees, rivers, coastlines, mountains, clouds, hurricanes, or seashell textures (see Fig. 11). What Mandelbrot calls “corrugations” refers to the edginess of land masses that comes to light with greater magnification. Spaces, in other words, are not smaller or larger than others but reveal, if one just looks close enough, worlds of interminable scope and complexity—hence shifting cartographic emphasis towards scalable and fluid conceptualizations of space. “Classical (Euclidean) geometry,” as Nina Siu-Ngan Lam notes, “cannot readily describe these complex worlds. For example, a coastline is neither straight nor circular, and no other classical curve can describe its form well without extra effort. Similarly, topographic surfaces of the earth can hardly be measured by classical geometry because of their irregularity.” Oceanic mapping traditions that imagine places as
nodes in terraqueous, kaleidoscopic, and palimpsestic networks thus further accentuate the productivity of archipelagic epistemologies that manage without a center of discursive power.

Acknowledging the validity of cartographic counter-narratives then means disrupting imperial binaries of center/periphery and insular/continental that reject non-Western and nonlinear geographic traditions either by negating their scientific validity or by absorbing them into homeland-centric narratives. A striking example of the latter comes into view on a US naval intelligence map from the 1950s that transplants the Micronesian archipelago into the continental United States (see Fig. 12). But the map also unwittingly expresses an anti-imperialist message regarding the ultimate futility of ordering, homogenizing, and policing spaces according to monolithic spatial ideologies. The result, it becomes clear, is not the triumph of a continental thinking that imagines the American homeland as a universal narrative vessel that absorbs “lesser” and insular circuits of meaning. In contrast, by “speaking” the fractal language of mapping—and vice versa, since “[l]anguage is a map,” too\(^6\)—this ostensible absorption does not result in a coherent map of the continental center and its imperial

Fig. 11. Delsing, Jan. 2011. Conus textile / Linnaeus, 1758.
extensions. The continental United States instead becomes an exploded and fractal backdrop for archipelagic relationality: “a whole [which] can be considered as a series of ruptures and not as a harmony of aligning forms.”

Itself a part of recursive systems, the language of the homeland and its extra-continental imperial cartographic speech acts thus can never fully express the (fictional) form of one absolute (Euclidian) reality but can only ever point to other nodes in narrative and symbolic regimes of space—hence becoming relational. According to Mandelbrot, there is no absolute form that could be mapped: “Clouds are not spheres, mountains are not cones, coastlines are not circles, and bark is not smooth, nor does lightning travel in a straight line.” Likewise, language—including the language we use to speak about these processes—too becomes a part of the fractal geographies of archipelagic thinking that “are so irregular and fragmented, that [...] [t]he number of distinct scales [...] is for all practical purposes infinite.”

Expressed in the terms of Édouard Glissant’s poetics, this means that “you cannot stay in the United States, here, and think that you are apart from the world. But you also cannot think that the world is here, in the United States only, and you are in the world. Really, the world is in me and I am in the world. The world is mixed.”
cognizance of not only human but spatial diversity presents an important takeaway and a strong argument against the essentialization and homogenization of geographic imaginations that are hallmarks of imperialism and globalization. Archipelagic mappings—be they purely mental, made of sticks, or driven by big data—erode static conceptualizations of cartographic scales and geographic hierarchies. They question the “mimetic bondage” of representation and terrain that “look[s] down on the maps of the past (with a dismissive scientific chauvinism) [and] regard[s] the maps of other non-Western or early cultures [...] as inferior.”

Against this background, oceanic spaces emerge not as peripheral but as vibrantly poietic nodes that convey fractal, morphing patterns of meaning that inspire new ways in which we think about planetary futures. Fittingly, and after being submerged for many decades by imperial cartographies, the art of stick chart navigations today is experiencing a revival, not least to raise awareness about climate change and rising water levels that threaten the survival of Marshallese communities.

**Conclusion: Putting Archipelagic Cartographies on the Map**

Thin strands of human lives stretch from island to island of the Archipelago. They intertwine, touch one another for one night only [...] and then separate once and for all.

— Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago*

From the beginnings of recorded history, maps acted as antidotes to chaos. They made possible the planning and development of spaces for human dwelling, demarcation of boundaries, and visualization of connections. Questioning the authority of Western approaches to mapping, archipelagic cartography presents an invitation to practice what Walter Mignolo describes as “de-colonial thinking.”

As demonstrated by the examples of mappings of the Hawaiian and Micronesian archipelagos, this means “moving away from the explorer’s method (which looks at the as yet unknown world and attests to its fundamental knowability) and toward the anti-explorer’s method, which involves looking at the putatively known world and attesting to its final unknowability.” Doing so, however, necessitates a methodological shift that underscores the relationality and agency of maps as key elements in the generation and implementation of discursive networks. It also necessitates putting more focus on interplays of dominant and subaltern spatial imaginations that play out across transregional, transnational, and global cartographic circuits. Engaging with these circuits, it becomes clear, leads to reevaluations and redefinitions of our understandings of oceans, islands, continents, archipelagos, as well as those yet unnamed, unmapped, and unwritten places.

Archipelagic cartographies must attach themselves at the productive interstices amid spatial and cultural scales and—in its relation to global cartographic hegemonies—prompt practitioners to “imagine America as both there and not there,
at once central to and yet profoundly decentered from the globe and its connections. Unmasking fantasies of a cohesive homeland that is neatly separated from its imperial extensions then requires a critical examination of its cartographic power structures. Doing so makes available a diversity of analytical footholds that underwash the imperial archipelago and “reveal multiple emancipatory narratives that enunciate exceptions to colonizing grammars of empire.” Finally, we must also keep in mind that thinking about the United States as an imperial archipelago may, intentionally or inadvertently, normalize or buttress the legitimacy of ongoing imperial projects, for instance in the South China Sea. For scholars willing to pick up one of the many threads protruding from the nation’s archipelagic fabric, a self-reflexive stance thus becomes a vital corrective to the pleasures of engaging with maps and mapmakers that unstitch the very fabric of imperial placemaking.

Notes

6 Hans Ulrich Obrist and Édouard Glissant, The Archipelago Conversations, trans. Emma Ramadan (New York: Isolari, 2021), 100. Examples for pointing out technical flaws include the American Automobile Association’s failure to show Seattle on a 1960s road map or the Canadian tourist board’s refusal to honor the existence of Ottawa, see Mark Monmonier, How to Lie with Maps (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 44.


16 Obrist and Glissant, Conversations, 27.


19 Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 21.

20 Obrist and Glissant, Conversations, 16–17.


22 Yuan Shu and Donald E. Pease, “Transnational American Studies and the Transpacific Imaginary,” in American Studies as Transnational Practice: Turning Toward the Transpacific, ed. Yuan Shu and Donald E. Pease (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2016), 2.


29 Hau’ofa, Epeli. “Our Sea of Islands,” in *We Are the Ocean (Selected Works)*, 27–40 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2017), 34.

30 Herman Melville, *Moby-Dick; or, the Whale* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1851), 536.


The Marshall Islands is still connected in free association with the United States, receiving financial and developmental aid as well as access to infrastructures like the Federal Communications Commission and Postal Service.


Obrist and Glissant, *Conversations*, 25.


Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, 77.

Obrist and Glissant, *Conversations*, 103.


**Selected Bibliography**


