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Identity Politics, Criticism, and Self-Criticism

More than forty years ago the Combahee River Collective (CRC), a Black lesbian feminist socialist group in Boston, coined the term “identity politics.” For much of those forty years, it was largely forgotten that identity politics arose as a variety of Marxist politics. Instead, identity politics appeared to us as the ruination of all universal political projects, whether these were to be conducted in the name of the citizen, the proletariat or the human. But both to celebrate identity for its subversion of homogeneity and to lament its corrosion of solidarity is to reduce identity to difference. For Mao, on the contrary, identity had the dual aspects of particularity and totality, and indeed is the very name for the contradictory relationship that unites them. Mao’s dialectical sense of identity, I will argue here, was also the CRC’s. The CRC’s 1977 statement in which this first use of “identity politics” appeared can be read as a document of US Maoism, registering the moment of the latter’s passing from a phase of a strategic politics to an ideological politics.

By reading the CRC statement as a translation of Mao’s theory of contradiction to US circumstances, I hope to encourage future investigations of the relationship between the forms of

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self-inquiry developed by US Third Worldists and the structuralist theory of ideology developed by Althusser and his students.¹ These were two lines of global Maoism which sprang from a common interest in the relations of production or social reproduction developed on separate continents in the period of long sixties. Soon, in the 1980s, these would directly confront each other in the US university as an antinomy between (subaltern) “experience” and (French) “theory.” There, the English Department played host to the imagination of literature as a privileged medium for the working out and possible resolution of that antinomy. This was a vision of the English Department as a guerilla base area for the conduct of ideology critique, a Yan’an where sixties social movements sought refuge from the neoliberal counter-revolution in their “long march through the institutions.”² Whether in 2020 this vision of English has any life left in it or has already died some time ago is a question requiring more exploration than I am capable of here, but also entails a more disciplinarily specific set of stakes that others in the special issue discuss. Here, my aim is simply, and more broadly, to ask us to consider: what would it mean to think of identity politics as a recommendation for how to build a revolutionary mass subject? To that end, what I can offer is a new historicization of the CRC statement.

In 1977, when the CRC published its statement, the occasion was how to reenergize what they saw to be the two leading anti-systemic movements of their time, feminism and Black Power. By the mid-1970s these were losing visible momentum as a result of external and internal factors, and also seen to be offering competing theories of social oppression. “Identity politics” was the CRC’s proposal for their unification. In their formulation, the CRC suggested: “This focusing on our own oppression is embodied in the concept of identity politics. We believe that the most profound and potentially most radical politics came directly out of our own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else’s oppression” (Taylor 2017: 19). The CRC reasoned that since the oppression experienced by Black women was not of one kind but several—they mention specifically racial, sexual (by which they meant what we would now call gender), heterosexual and class oppression—reflection on personal experience would be a means for generating a future theory of how multiple oppressions “interlock” in the “synthesis” that “create[d] the conditions of our lives” (Taylor 2017: 15). In the Third World revolutionary nationalist context of the mid-1960s to mid-1970s, “Black” was understood to be synonymous with “Third World.”³ As such, Black feminism was the proposed “logical political movement to combat the simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face” (Taylor 2017: 15).

The lasting uptake of the CRC statement was the thesis that race, gender, sexuality, class (and possibly other) factors are always co-present, with no one factor having a necessary causal priority. Though the CRC proposed turning to Black women's experience to discern the way multiple systems of oppression were structurally interconnected, its statement came to be received as a standpoint epistemology that could give experiential or sociological credence to philosophical arguments against historical causality in the abstract, whether these types of arguments were partisan to Althusserian overdetermination (or structural causality), Derridean linguistic materiality, or some mixture of both (cf. Mann 2013).

The subsequent influence of the CRC's concept of "manifold and simultaneous oppressions" would be guaranteed by its collection in two key anthologies published at the start of the Reagan era: Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa's *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color* (1981), and Barbara Smith's *Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology* (1983).⁴ These collections were crucial to preserving the memory of the sixties for both activist veterans of sixties movements who subsequently went into academia or other forms of intellectual production and cultural work, as well as for the younger generation of university students who saw their own intellectual and activist projects in the 1980s—South African divestment, Central American sanctuary, Rainbow Coalition campaigning, literary canon reforms—as a continuation of the sixties. Initially, the CRC statement attained its widest audience through *This Bridge Called My Back*, the anthology that helped to institutionalize the woman-of-color as a literary subject within then newly multiculturalizing English departments. Meanwhile, the CRC statement's placement in *Home Girls*, a founding collection of Black feminist studies edited by CRC core member Barbara Smith herself, would ensure a smaller but dedicated readership among subsequent cohorts of Black feminists across different disciplines and beyond academia. Within this line of propagation, the CRC's ideas would eventually come to see their most powerful translation via the work of the Critical Race Studies scholar and legal theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw.

In a 1989 law review article published in *University of Chicago Legal Forum*, Crenshaw (1989: 149) first used the term *intersectional* to conceptualize situations wherein more than one kind of discrimination is present. There she wrote:

The point is that Black women can experience discrimination in any number of ways and that the contradiction arises from our assumptions that their

claims of exclusion must be unidirectional. Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going in all four directions. Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in any intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a Black woman is harmed because she is in the intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination.

As Left critics of intersectionality theory have observed, the figuration of social injury as a traffic accident reflects a conceptualization of social violence as a merely contingent event. On this account, intersectionality theory is incapable of yielding a cognitive map of the systemic interrelations between racial and gender discrimination, much less between racism and sexism as social forces from which such discrimination arises.⁵ Nevertheless, despite—or perhaps because of—its fundamental political modesty, there is currently, as a recent critic has aptly put it, “a scramble for intersectionality” (Alexander-Floyd 2012: 2).

In our post-Affirmative Action era, intersectionality has become a handy institutional tool for carrying on the formally-constrained liberal project of diversifying the professions.⁶ In this particular instance, intersectionality entails an additive notion of multiple disadvantage. It’s a way of pursuing diversity without reliance on racial categories, now legally disallowed; in this manner, intersectionality tactically functions as the replacement for categorical identity-based remediation. Here, the intersectional person becomes the ideal minority subject, to be sought for inclusion because the form of her multiplicity is not qualitatively distinct from that of the majority, just quantitatively. Consisting of simply more unranked differences, her intersectionality can be considered to exist on a continuum with the marks of uniqueness that distinguish the abstract liberal individual. This is the narrow window by which higher education institutions today must maneuver to reconcile a commitment to “diversity” and to “excellence,” assimilating the former to the latter. In this application, intersectionality is compatible with individuality and indeed signifies the very opposite of identity as it was conceived by the CRC and, in fact, Crenshaw.⁷

Despite this liberal institutional inscription of intersectionality, it’s also a word that is commonly used as a synonym for the CRC’s notion of interlocking oppressions. The Wikipedia page for Barbara Smith describes the CRC as a collective that “emphasized the intersections of racial, gender, heterosexist, and class oppression in the lives of African-American and other

women of color.”⁸ CRC core member Demita Frazier, in a recent interview by Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor (2017: 123), says that what the CRC conceptualized was in fact intersectionality before the term was claimed by Crenshaw. Appreciative recoveries of an earlier radical Black feminist tradition—in which are included figures such as Claudia Jones and Frances Beale as influences upon the CRC—often read intersectionality back into that tradition as the best way to describe its core theoretical contribution and internal continuity. One finds the scholarship relying on the word “intersectional” to describe that tradition’s core insight that different oppressions of racism and sexism are always interconnected, whether what is being emphasized is that they are concrete parts of a larger system called capitalism and/or imperialism, or that they reflect in the abstract the nonhierarchizability of differences.⁹ Whether internationalist or postnationalist, the reliance on “intersectionality” as a way to variously describe the meeting of multiple oppressions reflects the fact that their social relationality is hard to think.

Recent years have seen an emerging body of scholarship more open to discussing the fruitfulness (and not just the impasses) of the historical interactions between Marxism and Black liberation movements in the US. This has yielded more textured descriptions of the Marxist milieus within which the Black feminist notion of multiple oppressions was first hatched and developed, from the Old Left to the New.¹⁰ The appearance of this scholarship reflects the relaxing of internalized censorship on Marxist topics within the US academy, as well as recognition of the insufficiency of antiessentialism as a condition for Left coalition politics. Still, more work remains to be done to explain how we got from interlocking oppressions to intersectionality, why it is possible on the one hand to think they mean the same thing and on the other hand to think they are different enough so that the solution to the bad hegemony of intersectionality is to revisit the position of the CRC (to be seen in perennial calls by Marxist critics since the 1990s, and most recently Asad Haider (2018)).¹¹

There are important differences within the radical Black feminist tradition worth noting. Jones was a leader within the left flank of the CPUSA in the 1940s and 50s who wrote of the “triple oppression” of US Black women. Beale was a non-Party Third Worldist who wrote of the “double jeopardy” of US Black women in 1969, which she soon expanded into the “triple jeopardy” of US Third World women. *Triple Jeopardy* was the name of the journal of her organization, the Third World Women’s Alliance (TWWA), which was an expansion of the Black Women’s Alliance (BWA) so as to include Latinx and Asian American members. The CRC openly called itself socialist. For all

three activist authors—Jones, Beale and the CRC—the goal was the quest for a revolutionary anticapitalist subject to which Black women might belong and, in belonging, transform and advance.¹² By contrast, Crenshaw's argument for intersectionality was published within the context of Critical Legal Studies' importation of deconstruction into the legal academy. Crenshaw's stated aim was not the cohering of any vanguard Black female subject, but the demonstration of the impossibility of the representation of one.

And yet if Crenshaw chose to speak of discrimination rather than oppression, it was not without awareness of a downsizing of analytic scale from a problem of social theory to a problem of judicial doctrine. Her project was simply of a different type—by no means a revolutionary theory, but not incompatible with the anti-systemic sensibilities of the sort that the CRC openly avowed. Her critique of the law's constitutive limitations, after all, suggested that civil rights work had always to be accompanied by a socially transformative—not simply reformist—activism. Contra its institutional policy uses today, intersectionality in Crenshaw's conceptualization clearly argued against a merely additive understanding of discrimination or difference (cf. Harris 1990). To this end, Crenshaw sought to lay out quite systematically the complex, variable outcomes of what it meant to be subject to the intersection of two kinds of discrimination:

To bring this back to a nonmetaphorical level, I am suggesting that Black women sometimes experience discrimination in ways that are both similar to and different from those experienced by white women and Black men. Black women can experience discrimination in ways similar to white women's experiences; sometimes they share very similar experiences with Black men. Yet often they experience double-discrimination—the combined effects of practices which discriminate on the basis of race, and on the basis of sex. And sometimes, they experience discrimination as Black women—not the sum of race and sex discrimination, but as Black women. (1989: 149)

Being subject to two (intersecting, nonparallel) discriminatory practices can produce as many as four kinds of possibilities— x and not y , y and not x , both x and y , not x and not y . And of these four, the latter two possibilities involve unknown territory. In the third option, the combined effect of racial and gender discrimination is more than a simple one plus one, requiring a more complex mathematical or accounting procedure. Worst of all, in the fourth option, to experience discrimination as a Black woman conforms to no legal precedent and thus is unlikely to be legally actionable or representable at all.

It's possible to see Crenshaw's reframing of the CRC's quest for a politically conscious subject in terms of the problem of that subject's representa-

tion as a sincere answer or follow-up that's simply reflective of her historical moment. After all, though the CRC posited the belief that capitalism, imperialism and patriarchy were systemically interlocked, it did not itself provide a conceptual or empirical account of how they were—hence its turn to personal experience in hopes that this would in the future yield theory or history. We might thus read intersectionality as marking out the place where manifold oppressions can only be felt or experienced as the violence of contingency because their systemic interrelationship cannot be—had not yet, at the time of Crenshaw's writing, been—cognized. If Crenshaw's project sits at some disjuncture from the CRC's, it is not, I'd argue, in the inconsistency between contingency and systematicity but in Crenshaw's skepticism as to the emancipatory promise of a politics of subjectivity. That skepticism is a sign, in 1989, of the passing of the sixties (cf. Connery 2009).

To that extent, as much as our current moment urges a return to the CRC statement on the premise that it's been feeling more like the early 70s than ever before, we're also more likely to share Crenshaw's critical sensibility than the CRC's. Reading the statement in 2020, we are most likely struck by the disconnect between the revolutionary ends of the statement and the modesty of its suggested practical means. The statement turns in its penultimate paragraph to the topic of the group's manner of internal self-conduct:

"In the practice of our politics we do not believe that the end always justifies the means. Many reactionary and destructive acts have been done in the name of achieving 'correct' political goals. As feminists we do not want to mess over people in the name of politics. We believe in collective process and a nonhierarchical distribution of power within our own group and in our vision of a revolutionary society. We are committed to a continual examination of our politics as they develop through *criticism and self-criticism* as an essential aspect of our practice." (Taylor 2017: 27, italics mine)

These lines come almost directly before the statement's concluding sentence: "As Black feminists and Lesbians we know that we have a very definite revolutionary task to perform and we are ready for the lifetime of work and struggle before us" (Taylor 2017: 27). Though the CRC statement is often called a manifesto, by that generic measure the ending is rhetorically anticlimactic. Rather than feeling roused to action, the reader is more likely to feel uncertain as to what exactly is that "very definite revolutionary task" the group knows to perform, having just been emphatically told about the group's process rather than platform.

The best way to make sense of the CRC's choice of rhetoric is to see its emphasis on process as itself the platform. The final turn to process comes

on the heels of an open-ended list of concrete struggles in which the group is involved—support for Third World women’s workplace organizing, picketing on behalf of community healthcare, the fight for rape crisis centers and battered women shelters in Third World and black neighborhoods, the defense of abortion rights and campaigns against forced sterilization. The list is open-ended and concludes with the acknowledgment that the aforementioned activities and issues are merely representative; this is because “the work to be done and the countless issues that this work represents merely reflect the pervasiveness of our oppression” (Taylor 2017: 26).

If multiple oppression translates into an infinity of concrete manifestations, then practical work must be accompanied by ongoing theoretical work. The statement thus turns to describe the group’s consciousness-raising activities in the form of workshops held on Black feminism on college campuses, women’s conferences, and high schools. These workshops are partly to address racism in the white women’s movement, but in accord with the statement’s opening sense that the point of identity politics is to apply oneself to the work of ending one’s own oppression and not someone else’s, “eliminating racism in the white women’s movement is by definition work for white women to do” (Taylor 2017: 27). Thus while the CRC will not cease demanding accountability on this issue from white feminists, it makes sense that the statement should end with an emphasis on the group’s work of internal self-reflection; then ensues the paragraph quoted above. Criticism, as it were, must be accompanied by self-criticism.

Though Mao is not explicitly named, the CRC’s mention of “criticism and self-criticism as an essential aspect of our practice” would have been recognized by readers at the time as an obvious allusion to him. Nor would such an allusion have been exceptional. In alluding to Mao, CRC would have been using a rhetoric common to 70s US feminism many strands of which, far beyond “hard Maoist” circles, drew inspiration from the Chinese communist revolution that subjective work was a primary precondition of wider social transformation. The historiography of the Second Wave has made note of Chinese communist inspirations for 70s feminism’s practice of consciousness raising and the idea that personal is political (Echols 1989; Lieberman 1991; Van Houten 2015).¹³ Meanwhile, scholars of Black Power are taking an interest in the Black Panthers’ uses of the Little Red Book and the travels of several US Black revolutionaries to Mao’s China (see Wu 2013; Mullen 2014; Frazier 2015). Strangely, least researched is global Maoism’s uptake by US Third World feminism even though, arguably, it was in this sector of US social movements that Maoist ideas took deepest root and through which it had the widest theoretical impact (cf. Chow 1993: 10–20; Ross 2005).

In his 1937 essay “On Contradiction” which, along with “On Practice,” was required reading for many US Third World activists, Mao argued for the existence within an historical moment of multiple contradictions, among which were to be distinguished principal and secondary contradictions. Furthermore, contradictions were divided into antagonistic and non-antagonistic types. Antagonistic contradictions were those such as between colonies and imperialism, and could only be resolved by national revolutionary war. Non-antagonistic contradictions, such as those between incorrect and correct thinking among comrades, could be resolved nonviolently, by ideological struggle. A main lesson of his essay was that there were many different types of contradiction, each involving different modes of resolution. The “contradiction within the Chinese Communist Party is resolved by the method of criticism and self-criticism” (Mao 1937: 222).

Importantly, Mao’s “On Contradiction” was issued as a theoretical justification for the strategic necessity under pressures of the Sino-Japanese War of making a united front with the bourgeois nationalist party, the Kuomintang (KMT). In this context, Mao argued that class struggle between the communists and the KMT was secondary to anti-imperialist struggle. Identifying class division as a secondary contradiction in this context meant subordinating it to principal anti-imperialist purpose; moreover, it indicated the prospect of resolvability through nonviolent, ideological means (in the interest of enlarging one’s forces by not liquidating prospective allies). The theoretical subordination of a secondary contradiction to a principal one did not necessarily mean, however, the temporal deferral of its address, but in fact just the opposite. In the time of strategic politics to which Mao Zedong Thought belonged, resolution of the secondary contradiction often had to come first. Sometimes, the demands of adapting Marxism to an agrarian-based society required the stretching of orthodox Marxist models of base and superstructure wherein the principal contradiction was to be found in the superstructure. Thus, Mao ([1937] 1975: 336) wrote, “When the superstructure (politics, culture, etc.) obstructs the development of the economic base, political and cultural changes become principal and decisive. . . . This does not go against materialism; on the contrary it avoids mechanical materialism.” In the long revolution that characterized the Chinese twentieth century, both before and after 1949, the need to construct a revolutionary socialist agent out of many different classes (where workers did not form a majority) meant that revolution was conceived as a protracted and unceasing process, centrally involving the construction and reconstruction of political subjectivity.

Criticism and self-criticism in a Maoist sense denoted the friendly (i.e., nonviolent) form of struggle one reserved for comrades and allies. In using

that phrase, the CRC would have been thinking of their group as something like the Party and coalition-making (between white feminists and Black Power groups) as something like a United Front. And yet a big difference is that, in Mao's proposal, criticism and self-criticism was a method of moving Party members toward a correct line, whereas as we saw in the CRC passage previously quoted the CRC had turned to it as a method for just the opposite—as a way to avoid the temptation of insisting upon ideological uniformity. The CRC's bending of criticism and self-criticism toward the purposes of ideological pluralism reflects in part that the statement was written at the tail end of the period when New Communism in the US had been at a high point (roughly 1970–74), and intense sectarianism was splitting the newly formed Marxist-Leninist parties that were looking to China.¹⁴ That pluralist impulse is reflected in the insistence on “manifold and simultaneous oppressions” (Taylor 2017: 15) in which is refused the analytic hierarchizing of contradictions that Mao had insisted upon as the definite task of the revolutionary.

Just eight years before, Frances Beale's essay “Double Jeopardy,” which was (again) an important immediate predecessor of the CRC statement, had been clear to lay out that in the double oppression of black women by racism and patriarchy, racism was the principal contradiction and patriarchy the secondary. “Black people are engaged in a life-and-death struggle,” Beale wrote in 1969, “and the main emphasis of Black women must be to combat the capitalist, racist exploitation of Black people. While it is true that male chauvinism has become institutionalized in American society, one must always look for the main enemy” (Beale 1970: 110)¹⁵ “If the white [feminist] groups do not realize that they are in fact fighting capitalism and racism, we do not have common bonds . . . [and] then we cannot unite with them around common grievances” (Beale 1970: 120). Closer to the strategic spirit of Mao's writing, Beale's commitment to an ordering of contradictions reflects the reality of armed black revolutionary struggle before Cointelpro's effective repression of the Black Panthers, and the sense of the still vital comparability and continuity of Black nationalism within US and Third World revolutionary nationalisms abroad.¹⁶ Beale's rhetorical echoes of Mao are also more obvious, as in her allusion to Mao's description of women as holding up half the sky. Beale wrote:

If we are talking about building a strong nation, capable of throwing off the yoke of capitalist oppression, then we are talking about the total involvement of every man, woman and child, each with a highly developed political consciousness. We need our whole army out there dealing with the enemy and not half an army. (Beale 1970: 113)

Thanks to the work of Fredric Jameson, Julian Bourg, Camille Robcis, Fang Yan and others, we've come increasingly to understand just how influential Mao's theory of contradiction was on Althusser's formulation of the relative autonomy of ideology—and thus French Maoism's contribution to the post-sixties cultural turn (Jameson 1984; Bourg 2004; Robcis 2012; Yan 2018). US Maoism's contribution, for its part, was to the post-sixties turn toward identity politics as a privileged terrain of subjective inquiry that, as in the United Front context of the Chinese 30s, sought the cultural construction of a new mass revolutionary agent in a situation where existed on the horizon no apparent working-class proletarian vanguard.

Reading the CRC statement in light of (their reading of) Mao, we can see how identity held out the practical prospect of unity, as a way of linking particularity to totality. As Mao wrote: "It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other hand, they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this character is described as identity" (Mao 1937: 338). Furthermore, when we read the CRC statement in light of Mao, we can discern more clearly its Janus-facing historical quality, as a stepping stone or switch point between the New Communism of the early 1970s and the Critical Race Theory of the late 1980s. Traces of the strategic temporality of Beale's use of contradiction are still present in the CRC statement where "criticism and self-criticism" is offered as the road to revolution. But also present is the presentiment of a process of social change so protracted that the "lifetime of work and struggle" it requires may be historically unnarratable, stranding us at Crenshaw's violent crossroads where collide "manifold and simultaneous oppressions." More than ever, the truth value of multiple oppressions' temporal simultaneity in the realm of experience calls for something more than the reflective realism of intersectionality's analytical simultaneity—though what that is has not yet been born.

Notes

This essay benefited from the insights of Andrew Cole, the generosity of Ula Taylor who shared with me her insights into Frances Beale, and the conversation of Cedric Johnson. All errors and shortcomings are of course mine alone.

- 1 Since the publication of Christopher Connery's important 2007 essay "The World Sixties," there's been an efflorescence of scholarship on "global Maoism" understood as a phenomenon contemporaneous with the Chinese Cultural Revolution and inspired by a "wind from the East" but also distinct from the actual theories of Mao Zedong Thought and its practice in China. Yet much of this work on global Maoism studies various sixties movements' uptakes of Maoism in national isolation, and tends to emphasize the disconnectedness of US Third Worldism from Third World revolutionary realities. One

- important exception is Fabio Lanza, *The End of Concern* (2017), a study of the Committee for Concerned Asian Scholars, which might be seen as a site where global Maoism met US Third Worldism to productive ends.
- 2 The phrase is attributed to 1960s German student activist Rudi Dutschke. For more on Maoism in Germany in the 1960s, see (Slobodian 2018).
 - 3 In her interview by Keeanga-Yamattha Taylor (2017: 44–45), CRC core member Barbara Smith emphasized: “We considered ourselves Third World women. We saw ourselves in solidarity and in struggle with all third world people around the globe.”
 - 4 The statement was first collected in Zillah Eisenstein’s *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism* (1978), but with the near disappearance of socialist feminism by the start of the 1980s, this venue was not a major means by which 1980s readers would have encountered it.
 - 5 The entire literature on intersectionality is too vast to cover here. But since what concerns me here is the Marxist origins of identity politics, I’ll note in particular some Marxist critiques of intersectionality. See, for example, (Brenner 2000; D’Aguilar 2012; Farris 2015; Shi 2018).
 - 6 In the common parlance of how applicants to UC Berkeley’s graduate programs may be competitive for diversity fellowships, being able to reflect multiple types of disadvantage is referred to as “intersectional.”
 - 7 On Crenshaw’s abhorrence of a “flattened” use of intersectionality through “just multiplying identity categories rather than constituting a structural analysis or a political critique,” (see Alexander-Floyd 2012: 4).
 - 8 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barbara_Smith (accessed 1/16/20).
 - 9 See, for example, Cheryl Higashida’s (2011) immensely valuable *Black Internationalist Feminism*. Angela Davis also uses the term to describe women-of-color feminism as a formation “compelled to address intersectionality and the mutual and complex interactions of race, class, gender, and sexuality” (see Davis 1995: 310).
 - 10 See the essays in (Joseph 2006; Gore, Theoharis, and Woodard 2009); also (McDuffie 2011; Gore 2012).
 - 11 Also, see Taylor’s (2017) introduction to *How We Get Free*, op. cit. For a minority view of the CRC statement as already reflective of a liberal standpoint epistemology at core no more radical than Crenshaw’s intersectionality, see Cedric Johnson (2019).
 - 12 On how African American feminists in the Second Wave developed a “vanguard center” ideological approach to feminist activism, see Benita Roth (1999).
 - 13 Sarachild (1978) contains quotations from Mao’s “On Practice” and William Hinton’s *Fanshen*.
 - 14 On the rise and fall of New Communism in the US, see (Elbaum 2002).
 - 15 On Beale’s and her cohort’s evolution toward an increasing concentration on capitalism and imperialism as their main enemies, see (Anderson-Bricker 1999: 60).
 - 16 On Beale’s and the TWWA members’ political education program consisting of Marxism and socialist theory, see (Ward 2006: 137).

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