

UC San Diego Newsletters

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Building Regional Orders

Emerging from post-Cold War policy chaos is a clear sense that without collective safeguards, volatile regional conflicts can quickly sweep away new opportunities for peace. But which safeguards will best protect U.S. interests—and be acceptable to other countries? How can and should they be established?

In this issue, we highlight projects which provide practical lessons for policy-makers interested in securing regional peace. Ambassador Linton Brooks provides concrete negotiation advice gained from his European experience. Our front page story boasts recent success in a region once thought intractable. Related viewpoints and U.S.-Japan reportage indicate when bilateral, and when



Louka Katseli, Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister (Top Left), IIR Chancellor D. Consta (Top Center), Greek Defense Minister G. Arsenius (Top Right), IGCC Director S. Shirk (Right), Russian Ambassador V. Gogitidze (Bottom Center) and other participants listen to closing remarks at the 3-7 January Middle East II Workshop in Delphi

multilateral meetings are essential. The China Circle (p. 10) digs at the economic roots of regional security.

Finally, Director Susan Shirk speaks out on U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific region.

Making Peace Concrete

Arms Control and Security in the Middle East

As the new year opened with the promise of real progress toward peace in the Middle East, the European Cultural Center at Delphi, Greece, provided the perfect setting for the latest in a series of IGCC conferences designed to complement the peace process. On January 3-7,

IGCC joined with the Institute of International Relations of Panteion University, Athens, to sponsor a Workshop on Arms Control and Security in the Middle East. Funded by the Office of Nonproliferation Policy of the US Department of Energy, the meeting built upon the

success of IGCC's first workshop on Middle East arms control, held in La Jolla in March 1993.

The Delphi workshop was attended by current and former government officials, veteran arms control negotiators, military officers, and leading academic specialists on arms control

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and regional security issues from Arab states, Israel, the United States, Europe, and Russia (participants list follows). The workshop gave Arab and Israeli participants an opportunity to draw upon the expertise that American, European, and Russian experts have gained through research efforts and negotiations between and within governments on arms control issues. At the same time, Arab and Israeli experts voiced their ideas, perspectives, and concerns to each other and to the participants from outside the Middle East.

As the meeting served as an unofficial "track-two" meeting of policy-makers and delegates to the ongoing official regional security talks, the workshop was designed to allow participants to speak freely and express their opinions in a manner rarely possible at formal negotiating sessions. All discussions at the Delphi Workshop were held off the record. Topics considered

included confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs), the application of verification technology to the strategic environment of the Middle East, and "tricks of the trade" of arms control negotiations between and within governments.

Veterans of past US-Soviet talks, including Ambassadors Max Kampleman, Linton Brooks, Maynard Glitman, Oleg Grinevsky, Oleg Sokolov, and General Lynn Hansen, contributed their perspectives on the possibilities and limitations of arms control. (See feature, p.6). The liveliest exchanges occurred during a roundtable discussion of Arab and Israeli threat perceptions, where presentations by Egyptian General Ahmed Fakhir, Professor Shafeeq Ghabra of Kuwait University, Ariel Levite of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Abderraouf Ounaies of the Tunisian Foreign Ministry, and Abdullah Toukan, Science Advisor to King

Hussein of Jordan were followed by an open forum on regional security issues.

While the conferees made no attempt to conceal their differences at the workshop, the conference concluded with widespread agreement that progress in the multilateral Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) negotiations offers great hope for regional stability in the long term, and that unofficial meetings such as IGCC's Delphi Workshop play an important role in the Middle East peace process.

Workshop on Arms Control and Security in the Middle East II: Summary Report by Paul Chrzanowski, Director of the Center for Security and Technology Studies at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory will be published in Summer '94 as IGCC Policy Paper #7.

See related articles, pp. 4, 6.

Workshop on Arms Control and Security in the Middle East II

Delphi, Greece 3-7 January 1994

List of Participants



Ziad Abu Zayyad
Bilateral Advisory
Committee, Jerusalem

**Munther
Al-Mantheri**
Second Secretary,
Embassy of the
Sultanate of Oman,
Wash. DC

Brig. Gen. Mohammad

A.F. Al-Qudah
Assistant for Chief of the Air Staff,
Royal Jordanian Air Force

**Amb. Taleb Bin Meiran Bin
Zaman Al-Raisi**
Min. of Foreign Affairs, Oman

Prof. Abdulaziz Al-Saqqaf
Sanaa U.; Chief Editor, Yemen
Times

Mohammed Amar
Counselor, Mission of Morocco
to the UN

Gen. Yaacov Amidror
Israeli Defense Forces,
Tel Aviv

Hassan Aourid
Political Counselor,
Embassy of Morocco, Wash., DC

Fredrick W. Axelgard
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,
US Dept. of State

Hanan Bar-On
Vice-President For Int'l Operation
and Public Affairs, Weizman Inst.
of Science, Rehovot, Israel

Youssef Barkett
Ambassador of Tunisia, Athens

Eytan Bentsur
Sr. Dep. Director-General
Min. of Foreign Affairs,
Jerusalem

John Capsis
Member of Parliament, Athens

Chen Jiang
The Rockefeller Foundation,
New York

Paul L. Chrzanowski
Director, Center For Security and
Technology Studies, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, CA



Ariel Levite

Dmitris Conostas
Chancellor, Inst.
for Int'l Relations,
Panteion U.

Prof. Andreas Coutris
Inst. for Int'l Relations,
Panteion U.

Catherine Dalakoura
Research Assoc., London School
of Economics

Marios Evriviades
Assist. Prof., U. of Economic
Studies, Athens

**Brig. Gen. Mohammed Mokhtar
El Fayoumy**, Min. Of Defense, Egypt

Edward T. Fei
Director, Office of Nonproliferation
Policy, US Dept. of Energy

Shai Feldman
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies,
Tel Aviv U.

Adm. Thomas Fox
Senior Director, National Security
Directorate, Battelle Pacific
Northwest Laboratory, Richland, WA



Shalheveth Freir

Shalheveth Freir
Weizman Inst. of Science, Israel
Victor Gogitidze
First Deputy Director, Dept. for the Middle East and North Africa, Min. of Foreign Affairs, Moscow

Brig. Gen. Mamdouh Ahmed Abdel Haq
Min. of Defense, Egypt

Alexander Heraklides
Assist. Prof., Inst. of Int'l Relations, Panteion U.,

Wolfgang Heydrich
Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik, Germany



Arian Pregonzer

Prof. Panayiotis Ifestos
Inst. of Int'l Relations, Panteion U.

Maj. Gen. David Ivry
Director General, Min. of Defense, Israel

Othman Jerandi
First Counselor, Mission of Tunisiato the UN

Max Kampelman
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver, & Jacobson, Wash. DC

PRESENTERS AND PAPERS:

How Are Arms Control Treaties Negotiated?

Amb. Oleg Grinevsky, Min. of the Russian Federation, Stockholm

Amb. Lynn Hansen, Political Advisor to the Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces In Europe

Challenges of Arms Control and Nonproliferation

Amb. James Leonard, Director, Wash. Council on Nonproliferation
Arian Pregonzer, Manager, Verification & Monitoring Analysis Dept., Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM

Peace Monitoring and Regional Security

John M. Taylor, Verification & Monitoring Analysis Dept., Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM

Prof. David A. Lake
Research Director for Int'l Relations, IGCC; Dept. of Political Science, UC San Diego

Yassine Mansouri
Advisor to the Minister of the Interior, Morocco

Brig. Gen. Kuti Mor
Director of Foreign Affairs, Min. of Defense, Israel



Abderraouf Ounaies

Inst. for Int'l Relations, Panteion U.

Alan Platt
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Wash. DC

George Poukamissas
Min. of Foreign Affairs, Greece

James Gerard Roche
Corporate Vice President & Chief Advanced Development & Planning Officer, Northrop Corporation, Los Angeles

Khalil Shikaki
Prof. of Political Science, Al-Najah National U.; Director, Center for Palestine Research And Studies

Prof. Susan L. Shirk
Director, IGCC; School of Int'l Relations and Pacific Studies & Dept. of Political Science, UC San Diego

Prof. Etel Solingen
Dept. of Politics, UC Irvine

Prof. Steven L. Spiegel
Dept. of Political Science, UC Los Angeles

Brig. Gen. Zvi Stauber, Min. of Defense, Israel

Prof. Constantin Stefanou
Inst. of Int'l Law, Panteion U.

Gerald Steinberg
Research Director, BESA Inst. for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan U., Ramat-Gan, Israel



Jennie Pickford

George Mourtos
Min. of Defense, Greece

Jennie L. Pickford
Deputy Chairperson, Middle East Task Force, US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency

Prof. Athanassios Platias



Steven Spiegel


Maj. Gen. Adrian St. John
US Army, Ft. Belvoir, VA

W. Andrew Terrill
Int'l Security Analyst, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, CA

Maj. Gen. Dan Tolkowsky
Tolkowsky and Associates, Tel Aviv

Timothy Trevan
Special Advisor, UNSCOM, UN Headquarters

Sotiris Varouxakis
Head, Middle Eastern Section, Min. of Foreign Affairs, Greece



Shafeeq Ghabra

Fred Wehling
Policy Researcher, IGCC, UC San Diego

Mohamed A. Zabarah
Prof. of Political Science, Sanaa U., Yemen

Gen. Evangelos Zacharis
Min. of Defense, Disarmament Section, Athens

Fayez Zaidan
Director General, Palestine Airways, Amman

ROUNDTABLES:

Alternative Frameworks for Arms Control Negotiations

Amb. Linton Forrestall Brooks, US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency

Amb. Maynard Glitman, US Dept. of State

Amb. Oleg Sokolov, Director, Directorate for Disarmament and Arms Control, Min. of Foreign Affairs, Russia

Arab and Israeli Threat Perceptions

Maj. Gen. Ahmed Fakhri, Director, National Center for Middle East Studies, Cairo


Prof. Shafeeq Ghabra, College of Commerce, Economics, and Political Science, Kuwait U.

Ariel Levite, Jaffee Center for Strategic Affairs, Tel Aviv U.

Abderraouf Ounaies, Director-General for American & Asian Affairs, Min. of Foreign Affairs, Tunisia

Abdullah Toukan, Science Advisor

Viewpoints: Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security



Abdullah Toukan (L) and Shai Feldman at the Workshop on Arms Control and Security in the Middle East II, Delphi, January, 1994

A Jordanian View Of The Middle East Peace Process

by Abdullah Toukan

The year 1993 witnessed two very important events on the road towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. The signing of the Declaration of Principals between the PLO and Israel on September 13, and the signing of the Jordan-Israel Common Agenda on the next day.

From a Jordanian point of view, the Jordan-Israel bilateral agenda of work, which was the result of nearly two years of negotiations, addresses a comprehensive range of issues that are of concern to each party's national security. For Jordan the central feature of the agenda is that it projects the strong linkage between sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the security of a state. This particular principle has been the basis of Jordan's national security concern. Other issues that automatically follow are: water sharing, refugees, the settlement policies of Israel in the West Bank and Gaza, the status of Jerusalem, and finally economic development and cooperation. These issues have all been taken into consideration and included in the formation of the Jordan-Israel agenda as well as the PLO-Israeli Declaration of Principles.

The starting point from the Jordanian point of view is that, based upon the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity, delimitation and demarcation of the international boundary between Jordan and Israel should be initially concluded. Bilateral security arrangements on and around the international boundary between Jordan and Israel should be initially concluded. Bilateral security arrangements on and around the international boundary will also be negotiated and agreed upon leading to military contacts for the exchange of information on data and military activities, thereby providing transparency and eventually predictability, i.e. reducing the possibility as well as capability of the launching of surprise attacks, and of initiating large scale

The Middle East Multilateral Arms Control Talks

By Shai Feldman

Almost entirely unnoticed by the international media, considerable progress has been made during the past two years in planting the seeds for the future application of confidence building and arms reduction measures of the Middle East. The initial rounds of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) talks were plagued by fundamental disagreements on priorities, primarily between Israel and Egypt. Egypt attributed the highest priority to arresting the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and, within this context, to focusing on Israel's nuclear weapons first. Accordingly, Egypt called for an early consensus regarding the end-products of a Middle East arms control process, and pressed Israel, directly as well as indirectly, to commit itself to de-nuclearization.

Israel, conversely, stressed the prevailing profound mistrust and the impact of conventional weapons, and the resulting importance of addressing the asymmetries of the conventional forces in the region. Israel therefore proposed the application of a wide range of regional confidence building measures designed to prevent misperceptions, mis-assessments, and unintended escalation, and to reduce mutual fears of a surprise attack. Behind this approach was Israel's conviction that during the long and uncertain transition to reconciliation in the Middle East, Israel should continue to maintain a credible deterrent.

The working group's September 1992 meeting in Moscow settled these conflicting agendas by adopting a US-proposed compromise, incorporating both Israeli and Egyptian priorities. In effect, the US urged a joint effort to define long term objectives (a "vision") for the process, but argued that progress toward the realization of these goals must be built "brick by brick," through the gradual growth of mutual confidence. Consequently, at the multilateral working group meeting held in Washington in May 1993, draft definitions

military campaigns. These will automatically form the basis of establishing the linkage to the multilateral arms control and regional security working group activities.

Taking into consideration Jordan's limited resources and the conviction that deterrence by threat or punishment and reliance on military superiority alone can no longer in themselves provide long-term security, deterrence by denial of conflict aims and intentions has been seen to be preferable. In this context Jordan believes that a Cooperative Security Policy within a comprehensive framework should be established in the region, that will provide the means of developing economic, political, and military stability. Stated in brief the objectives of Jordan in any arms control measures in the region are: The reduction of defense spending and military expenditures, that would be expected to follow a comprehensive peace and reallocated for social and economic development. Secondly the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the region. Thirdly, developing an arms control process yielding stable qualitative structures in the region as well as restructuring the military forces to defensive military doctrines.

The ongoing Multilateral Arms Control and Regional Security working group, in the Middle East peace negotiations, has been hard at work in two areas: One a "Conceptual Basket" and the other an "Operational Basket". The Conceptual Basket group has been developing and establishing a wide range of principles governing security relations between states in the region, principles upon which the process of negotiations of this group should be based, and finally principles regarding the objectives and intentions of regional states. The document will form the political-military foundation upon which technical-military arms control measures, operational and structural, can be developed that are region specific in type and scope. The Operational Basket group is discussing in parallel technical-military CSBMs that seem to be relevant and promising for the region, such as communications network system, exchange of military information, and maritime measures.

This systematic methodology, when coupled to the time-table of any progress in the bilateral negotiations, will achieve its purpose which is to support and reinforce the bilateral peace negotiations that form the very heart of the ongoing Middle East peace process.

Abdullah Toukan is science advisor to His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan. He received his Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

of the 'visionary goals' were presented by Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Oman, and a number of proposals for confidence building measures were discussed. The Washington talks ended in agreement that inter-sessional meetings by sub-working groups would be held, and all the region's states were urged to send to these meetings military officers who, in the future,

might be instructed by their governments to help implement confidence building measures.

Only a few years earlier, the willingness of a large number of Arab states to cooperate with Israel in examining alternative

region-wide confidence building measures was considered a dream. Moreover, such cooperative examinations themselves comprised an important confidence building measure, since they provided excellent opportunities for a growing number of Israeli and Arab military personnel and government officials to interact informally with one another and to develop an understanding of each other's perceptions and security concerns. The cumulative effect of these developments must be considered — especially by Middle East standards — a dramatic breakthrough.

The next ACRS plenary meeting, held in Moscow in November 1993, ended in an agreement to discuss a 'conceptual basket' which would provide a framework for agreement on the principles which would guide the future relations of the region's states, on the ultimate objectives of the arms control process, and on a set of declaratory measures which could provide the parties with effective mutual reassurances.

The first meeting of the ACRS 'conceptual basket' talks, which took place in Cairo in early February 1994, produced a draft declaration of principles on peace and security in the Middle East. This document accorded the various parties' priorities by addressing their future political relations, the need to establish mutual confidence, and their commitment to arms reductions, including the transformation of the Middle East to a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The declaration comprised an enormous achievement: while remaining at the level of generalities, it contains the first multilateral Arab-Israeli draft agreement on the principles which should guide inter-state relations in the Middle East.

Shai Feldman is a senior research associate at Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS). He received his Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley.

"Jordan believes that a Cooperative Security Policy within a comprehensive framework should be established in the region, that will provide the means of developing economic, political, and military stability."

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Feature:

Negotiating with an Adversary

by Ambassador Linton Forrester Brooks

Arms control is a political process. Without the right political conditions, no negotiation can succeed. But even given such conditions, negotiations take time and skill. I want to review the U.S. experience with START I to see what lessons can be drawn for other complex negotiations between parties who don't fully trust each other.

These are my personal observations, not a formal U.S. position, drawn from the last two years of the START negotiations. During that period, the United States and the Soviet Union had moved beyond polemics. My counterparts were pleasant and decent men. Still, there was clear mistrust on both sides.

In particular, the Soviet military and military-industrial complex were suspicious of American motives, while the U.S. verification community was skeptical that the Soviets could be trusted to keep agreements without stringent verification provisions. Some of the lessons from these bilateral negotiations may be valuable for multilateral negotiations as well.

The Overall U.S. Approach

There were three elements in the overall U.S. approach to the START negotiations. The first, and most important, was to ensure a clear understanding of what we were seeking. That was not always easy. There were often disputes within our government about where our interests lay. For example, there was tension between the desire to reduce the threat and the need to preserve some military capability of our own. Similarly, there was tension between our fear of compromising our own secrets and our need for intrusive verification. We always had a more difficult time in dealing with the Soviets when our internal goals were unclear or in dispute.

This leads to the first lesson: have clear goals. The clearer the goal, the better the agreement and the quicker it can be reached. No one should underestimate the difficulty of establishing goals. It is hard. The goal must be attainable, both politically and technically. Among other things, that means you need to understand what you are willing to give up to reach agreement.

The second element of our approach was to negotiate on several levels. We had formal delegations in Geneva, but the most important agreements were reached in meetings between presidents, between foreign ministers,

or between subcabinet officers. In complex treaties, we found that this approach was essential. Only the political level can make major decisions. Only a negotiating delegation can codify complex points. In addition, as a practical matter, foreign ministers can usually handle no more than three or four significant issues at once because of time pressures. By default, the negotiator has to handle the rest.

Negotiating on multiple levels, as we did, means that the negotiator has to be the one who worries about details, not a major independent figure. It also means there is a potential coordination problem between the different levels of negotiations. That leads to the second lesson: write down what is agreed at high levels so the negotiating team knows what to implement.

The best way is to always have people from the negotiating team present at ministerial or summit meetings. After a major meeting of foreign ministers

in Houston in late 1990, we discovered the two sides had drastically different understandings of what had been agreed. The resulting mistrust and mutual recriminations might have been avoided if we had documented agreement in some form.

One thing that must be decided at the outset is how much flexibility the negotiator will have. We had flexibility

about how to record agreements, but (except for some minor issues in the closing days of the negotiations) all issues of substance had to be approved in Washington. That's not the only way to negotiate, of course. In the SALT era, U.S. negotiators had somewhat more latitude. While all negotiators like to be given maximum flexibility, there are some advantages in keeping tight control in capitals. It is far easier to maintain a team spirit among representatives of different agencies on the negotiating team when divisive issues can be referred home.

The third element of our approach was to settle in for the long haul. With a legacy of mistrust, things take time. A neutral site with good communications to both capitals is important; we caused significant ill will, without meaning to, when we held one of our periodic meetings between the U.S. Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister in Houston, where the Soviets had no way to communicate with Moscow.

"It's clear that everyone here wants to engage in dialogue on economic and security cooperation, but the question is: How to proceed? What goals to set?"

-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Peter Tomsen, at the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialog

Two (or Three) Parallel Negotiations

In speaking of arms control negotiations, it is tempting to talk exclusively about the two sides doing the bargaining. Actually, I had three separate negotiations going at once:

- With the Soviets, aimed at reaching agreement.
- With the bureaucracy, to approve what I wanted to do.
- With the Congress, to make sure that what I agreed to would be approved when the treaty was submitted for ratification.

It is important not to ignore the second two “negotiations.” We involved a broad cross section of our government, including the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, our Defense Department, the uniformed military, our intelligence experts, and the White House. Each of these agencies was involved at all levels, from policy formulation to participation on delegations.

That is another important lesson: create mechanisms at the beginning so that all relevant agencies are involved. It is tempting to circumvent this inclusive process and use a small, secret group for negotiations, but such an approach won’t work; the people cut out at the beginning can kill the agreement.

The same thing is true with Congress or Parliament (at least for nations where legislative approval of treaties is more than a rubber stamp). We created a Senate Observer Group, including Senators of both parties, representing all relevant Senate committees plus the Senate leadership. The group came to observe the negotiations periodically. Members were also briefed routinely and received formal internal progress reports. As the Soviet legislature became more and more an independent body, the Soviets adopted a similar system.

Such an approach helps in two ways. It allows the executive branch to take the pulse of the Senate on contentious issues. It also reduces problems during ratification because senators know the Senate has been involved along the way.

Negotiating with an Adversary

While internal executive branch negotiations and working with Congress are both important, most of a negotiator’s time and effort goes into dealing with the other side. There are nine specific techniques I found helpful in negotiating with the Soviets:

1. Avoid big, formal meetings with prepared statements.

In large meetings, the temptation to posture and make propaganda statements, or to make statements designed to show segments of your own government

that you are being vigorous in protecting their interests, is almost overwhelming. Less formal working groups are far better. One-on-one meetings are best of all.

My counterpart and I met daily for coffee, ostensibly to coordinate other meetings and to discuss overall status. These sessions provided a good forum to try out ideas on one another informally. Such sessions gave us a reading on what was possible and what was not. During larger group sessions, we sometimes found it useful to take a break and for the two of us to take a walk and talk, after which we would each caucus

separately with our delegations. (Ambassador Lynn Hansen, who has extensive experience with multilateral arms control negotiations, points out that in such negotiations plenary meetings serve the valuable function of keeping all delegations up to speed on discussions and

agreements reached in separate meetings.)

2. Keep track of what you agree on, no matter how minor.

Negotiations, particularly complex ones like START, take time. People change and memories fade. To avoid having to repeat the efforts of the past, it is essential to keep good records of areas of agreement. Our technique was joint working papers and a joint draft test. These documents recorded not only areas of agreement, but areas of disagreement as clearly as we could, usually through alternative treaty text formulations.

3. Try to understand how the situation looks through the eyes of your negotiating partner.

The two sides think differently. Negotiators need to recognize this and make allowances for it. I spent lots of time trying to understand Russian culture and concerns and following domestic politics in the Soviet Union. This is not saying a negotiator needs to be sympathetic to his counterpart’s point of view. All negotiations are adversarial; the negotiator’s job is to advance his country’s interest. But to do this effectively a negotiator must understand what point the other side is trying to make and how the other negotiator views the issues.

4. Package things so both sides win something.

We found it helpful to settle issues in pairs, with one issue going each way. If a negotiator’s opposite number always loses, he won’t be there very long. You are unlikely to like who he is replaced with. In applying this technique, it is important to pay attention to both form and substance. When people mistrust each other, form is important; it is a symbol that the sides are taking account of each other’s concerns. Sometimes we were able to get our substance by agreeing to the Soviet form.

“Recognizing the danger of arms races, [Asians] are now asking us to join them in a multilateral security dialog...”

-IGCC Director Susan Shirk

“[M]ilitary to military contacts...providing transparency and eventually predictability...will form the basis of ...multinational arms control...”

-Jordanian Science Advisor

Abdullah Toukan

5. Keep things private.

Once people or governments take a public stand, it is hard for them to change positions. This is particularly true when the populations don't trust each other. In a democracy, where keeping the public informed is an obligation, a negotiator may need to talk to the press a bit to ensure popular support. To the extent possible, such talk should be limited to agreements that have already been reached. I never saw anything good come of public disclosure and discussion of negotiating positions.

6. Watch what you offer.

A negotiator must be able to take yes for an answer. It is a bad idea to offer something you couldn't live with for propaganda purposes or as a negotiating tactic. The other side may surprise you and say yes. The classic example was the U.S. INF zero option, which at least some in the United States never expected would be accepted. At the same time, a negotiator should not try to do his counterpart's work. Negotiators should be willing to offer something that seems bad for the other side. Your counterpart may have a different evaluation and might say yes. That happened to me several times.

7. Use deadlines creatively.

Negotiators always claim they don't negotiate against deadlines, but we always do. Senior level meetings force negotiators to settle issues or, at a minimum, shape them for their superiors. For us, presidential summits and periodic ministerial level meetings served this function. I didn't like them at the time, but they helped.

8. Take some risks.

One way to take risks is to try for ad referendum agreements, that is, for agreements that exceed your instructions. This is taking a risk (your government

may—and sometimes will—repudiate you), but such agreements can pay dividends. This technique works only after the sides have made some progress. We found it best to start with little things.

A negotiator who decides to try such agreements needs a good sense of internal politics at home to know what is worth trying. Asking for permission to try something first doesn't always help; it is too easy to say no. It's more difficult to say no to an agreement that has already been reached.

If he elects to use this technique, a negotiator should try to determine if his counterpart has the same attitude toward ad referendum agreements or he can get burned. I went through a period where I thought my counterpart had to get approval in advance even to explore subjects. That's dangerous because it can mean that your side is doing all the compromising.

9. Remember what you are trying to do.

In long, complex negotiations, it is easy to get bogged down in details and lose sight of what is important and what isn't. Sometimes we got so wrapped up in details we lost the big picture. We either would be making much too much of a trivial point or treating something of fundamental importance as just another bargaining chip. That brings me back to where I started: the overwhelming importance of having a clear understanding of what you are seeking in any negotiation.

Linton F. Brooks, now a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia, and a consultant to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was the chief U.S. negotiator for the START I Treaty.

This paper is based on remarks presented at the IGCC-sponsored workshop "Arms Control and the Middle East," which convened in Delphi, Greece, January 1994.

"During the initial rounds of discussions, the talks were plagued by fundamental disagreements on priorities..."

-JCSS Research Associate Shai Feldman

NOTEWORTHY

Herbert F. York, IGCC Director Emeritus, has received the American Physical Society's Leo Szilard Award for Physics in the Public Interest. The award recognized Prof. York's "outstanding leadership in efforts to control nuclear weapons and to create rational science policy, exemplified by his contributions to the President's Science Advisory Committee, the Arms Control movement, the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, and his service as U.S. Ambassador to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations."

The U.S. State Department has appointed IGCC Director **Susan Shirk** to the Board of Governors of the East-West Center in Honolulu. Funded primarily by the U.S. Congress, the Center is a national education institution established in 1960 to promote better relations and understanding between the United States and the nations of Asia and the Pacific. Its Board plays an active and substantial role in discussing upcoming developments in the Asia-Pacific region.

Dr. Shirk also has accepted an invitation to be a founding member of the U.S. Committee of the Council for Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCAP), composed of policy analysts and representatives of business, government and the military. CSCAP is an international non-governmental organization which provides a structured environment for regional confidence-building and security cooperation among Asia Pacific countries and territories.

IGCC Steering Committee member **Barbara Geddes** (Political Science, UC Los Angeles), was named a 1993-94 fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. She is researching *The Initiation of New Democratic Institutions*.

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, IGCC Steering Committee member from UC Santa Barbara, with Jonathan Hasegawa and Andrew Kuchins has co-edited *Russia and Japan: An Unresolved Dilemma between Distant Neighbors*. Berkeley: University of California Area Studies Publication, 1993.

Bilateralism and Multilateralism: U.S. and Japan in Asia



IGCC Director Susan Shirk with Seki Tomada, Asia University

On March 21-22, with funding from the Center for Global Partnership, IGCC co-hosted with the Japan Center for International Exchange and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) a conference entitled "The U.S. and Japan in Asia." The conference addressed the possibilities for conflict and cooperation in these two nations' policies towards Asia, focusing on the interaction between the U.S.-Japanese bilateral relationship and a geographically broader range of policy issues. IGCC commissioned brief policy memos for the project and included participants from governments and international organizations (attending in their private capacities) as well as scholars.

Not unexpectedly given the tension between the U.S. and Japan at the time, the session addressing a range of economic issues focused primarily on the bilateral relationship. The issue of quantitative targets received much attention. A number of participants spoke favorably of the previous Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks, and noted that these, as well as the private sector talks that led to the recent Motorola agreement, should provide valuable models for the future. Given the pressure for progress and the complexity and sheer number of issues to be resolved, most participants

agreed that any future economic negotiations are likely to remain two-sided.

After lively discussion of political and security issues, participants generally agreed that multilateral fora are best for working out security arrangements—a notable contrast from the aforementioned

support for bilateralism in economics.

There was also strong sentiment that in the long run the U.S. military withdrawal from Asia was both inevitable and would have negative effects. U.S. involvement in the region was deemed key to future stability by many, although a few seemed to suggest that Japan was now able (and ought) to share leadership responsibilities.

Not surprisingly, concern about the nuclear problem in North Korea was expressed, particularly by the Americans. There was also great uncertainty, both in terms of likely outcomes and preferences, about China. Although everyone agreed that a democratic and non-fragmenting China was ideal, questions about how strong China should be remained unresolved.

The discussion of human rights values centered on recently propounded concepts of 'Asian values.' Most agreed that the notion of a cohesive 'Asian' definition of values might be politically expedient for some authoritarian elites, but could not reflect a common perspective across Asia—the region is too large and the definitions too varied.

Other discussion focused on the question of "is attention to human rights at odds with economic development?" Finally, although some Japanese participants expressed a desire for Japanese policy to support human rights, others also felt that U.S. unilateralism in this area was counterproductive.

In the discussion of science, technology, and the environment, it became clear that the U.S. and Japan have very different (albeit potentially complementary) technology and R&D sectors: The U.S. has a strong, government-supported basic science program, while Japan's R&D is more applied and dominated by private firms. Nevertheless, mutual suspicions restrain the possibilities for profitable collaboration. Several Americans raised oft-heard concerns about limited technology transfers by Japanese subsidiaries to production bases in other Asian countries.

The unanticipated emphasis on the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship indicates the importance of solving specific kinds of bilateral conflicts before coordinating regional policies between two countries. This and other topics raised by the project such as the changing role of China and the importance of balancing security and economic interests will continue to be research interests for IGCC.

Participants list, p. 12.



Hong Yung Lee (UC Berkeley), Bruce Stokes (CFR), Hideo Tamura (Nippon Keizai Shinbun), and Takashi Kiuchi (Long Term Credit Bank of Japan)

New Efforts Toward Peace:

IGCC Initiates Multilateral Dialogue on Northeast Asia

IGCC is implementing a project that explores the prospects for multilateral cooperation on a broad range of issues in Northeast Asia, with the aim of enhancing security and preserving peace in the region.

The Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue brings together, in an unofficial university setting, participants from the six countries in this region: Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. Following a planning meeting in late July, the first session of the Dialogue met on October 8-9, 1993 in San Diego, California.

Attending this session were two government policy-level officials (one each from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense) and two private individuals from each country. North Korea did not attend the October meeting, although they did send a supportive note and had attended the planning meeting.

In perhaps the most important decision of the conference, the delegates agreed to meet again in only six months, in Japan. This decision signifies the participants'

commitment to developing mechanisms for reducing tensions in Northeast Asia and the value they placed on the Dialogue as an aid to this end. Participants expressed particular interest in continuing focused discussions of confidence-building measures (CBMs). Economic relationships will also remain an important topic.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Peter Tomsen and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Stanley Roth were the government participants from the United States. The Dialogue is an example of a "track two" process, whereby ideas can be unofficially explored without being interpreted as government policies. In such meetings, all government officials participate in their private capacities and discussions are both private and off-the-record.

The planning meeting, attended by representatives of all six nations, had agreed on a range of topics for the October Dialogue: the national perspective of each country on its regional relations in Northeast Asia; economic and environmental issues;



Ambassadors Peter Tomsen (U.S.) and Kwon Byong-hyon (Republic of Korea)

and CBMs. Background papers on economic and environmental issues, circulated before the meeting, have been published as IGCC Policy Papers No. 5 and 6 (see back cover).

The Japan National Institute for Research Advancement will co-host the May 1994 meeting in Tokyo. The spring Dialogue will discuss maritime, nuclear, land-based, and other CBM's, and crisis prevention centers. Further discussions on general perspectives on security issues, conflict prevention, and the prospects for economic cooperation will also continue.

We have high hopes for this project. IGCC will, in consultation with the participants and several institutes in the region, continue to provide the institutional continuity for the Dialogue. We look forward to continued progress in security cooperation within the region.

Participants list, p. 12.

IGCC Studies New Links Among Chinese Economies

IGCC is leading a multi-year project funded by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Ford Foundation entitled *The China Circle: Regional Consequences of Evolving Relations among the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong-Macao*. We have recently completed the first stage, the intercampus workshop. The workshop was an exceptional brainstorming session, especially the discussions of the economics of the China Circle and the Overseas Chinese.

Senior economists specializing in China from the PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore led by Professor Barry Naughton, will meet this summer. The goal of this Economic Working

Group is to lay the foundations for a broader discussion of the China Circle by examining in depth the economic forces driving the new relations.

The project will conclude in late 1994 with a large conference in Hong Kong where, in addition to further discussion of the economic working group reports, the participants will present papers on a wide variety of topics such as the nature of "guanxi capitalism," the changing role of Hong Kong, the distribution of industries within the China Circle, Japan's economic and political stakes in the China Circle, and how the China Circle affects the distribution of economic and political power in the region.

Kanter Accepts IAB Chair

Arnold Kanter (Ph.D., Yale, 1975), Senior Fellow at The RAND Corporation, has accepted IGCC's invitation to chair the institute's International Advisory Board (IAB). The IAB reviews and provides guidance for IGCC research activities and fellowship programs.

Dr. Kanter has had a distinguished career in both academia and government. He is a former Professor at the University of Michigan and held several posts in the U.S. State Department and the National Security Council before becoming Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in 1991.

Los Angeles Times

Outlook Section

Sunday, November 14, 1993

America Sits Out at Its Own Risk

Don't let failures elsewhere blind us to a chance for a multilateral approach to security and economic issues.



By Susan L. Shirk

This week President Clinton will host the first summit meeting of Asian-Pacific leaders. The President's initiative, which coincides with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Seattle, signals new American support for multilateral cooperation on security as well as economic issues in the Pacific.

Americans, discouraged by the United Nations' failures in Somalia and Haiti and NATO's passivity in Bosnia, may question why our country should help create multilateral arrangements in the Asia-Pacific. The answer is that—unlike Somalia, Haiti, or Bosnia—the Asia-Pacific really matters to the U.S., strategically and economically. Our stake in the region is real and direct.

The U.S. has had a military and political commitment to East Asia since the end of World War II. Today we have bilateral alliances with South Korea, Japan, Thailand, Australia, and the Philippines, buttressed by about 100,000 troops stationed in the region. Although originally intended to deter Soviet aggression, these forces have also served to maintain regional stability and keep sea lanes open.

With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, however, the Asian countries have become uncertain about our commitment. No Asian nation, not even North Korea, wants the U.S. to withdraw. They fear that if we pull out, intraregional arms races and rivalries between China and Japan might destroy the peaceful environment on which their prosperity depends.

It's no secret that U.S. economic power has slipped in relation to Japan and other Asian nations and that Americans are preoccupied with solving domestic problems. Without a Soviet threat, how can an American president

justify to Congress and the public the need to fund a military presence in the Pacific?

The best way for the U.S. to demonstrate the permanence of its commitment to the Asia-Pacific is to transform its role from sole protector to active partner in regional security cooperation. Asians will understand that by sharing financial burdens and military risks, the U.S. is not evading its responsibilities but rather placing them on a politically and economically sound footing.

Unlike in other parts of the world, our security role in the Pacific is directly tied to our nation's economic interests. Forty percent of American foreign trade is with East Asia, where dynamic economic growth is a bright spot in an otherwise gloomy global economy. Should Asians sense we have abandoned them militarily, they might reject the open economic cooperation of APEC and instead create an "Asia for the Asians" trade bloc. To keep the region's fast-growing economies open to our exports, we need to reassure Asians that we are there to stay. Leadership in creating a new Pacific security order therefore is a sound investment for the U.S.

There is talk these days in Asian capitals about using economic incentives to maintain U.S. security presence in the region. The Japanese and others believe that greater American investment and exports will induce us to remain politically and militarily involved in Asia to protect our economic interests. In the short term, keeping them guessing about U.S. intentions might give us greater flexibility in bilateral trade negotiations, but in the longer term, a pullback will cost America business in Asia.

In addition to furthering U.S. strategic and economic interests, multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific is

eminently feasible. Unlike in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, the agenda for Pacific multilateralism is not nation-building—something we don't know how to do. Instead it involves coordinating relations among nations—something we do well.

Except for a few disputes over small islands, the East Asian nations do not have conflicting interests or threaten one another. Yet in recent years, to hedge against a possible U.S. military withdrawal, they have spent more money on weapons than any region in the world except the Middle East. Recognizing the danger of arms races, they are now asking us to join them in a multilateral security dialogue with the goal of building trust to prevent war.

Encouraging Asian-Pacific multilateralism will not require us to send our troops into dangerous situations under international commands. No one in Asia is envisioning a full-blown multilateral alliance such as NATO or peacekeeping with integrated force structures. What Asians have in mind is far more modest: a set of overlapping subregional and regional forums similar to the Commission for Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) for discussing security issues and exchanging information about military intentions and capabilities.

The momentum toward Asian multilateralism is now building. If Americans adopt a timid attitude toward it because of negative experiences in other parts of the world where our stakes are not as high, we risk being shut out of Asian markets and allowing regional arrangements to develop in ways that do not accord with our interests. This is one region where U.S. multilateral statesmanship makes good sense.

Susan L. Shirk is director of the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.

THE U. S. AND JAPAN IN ASIA

La Jolla, California March 21-22, 1994

List of Participants

USA

Kimberly Gould
Program Assoc.,
Center for Global Partnership

Prof. Miles Kahler
Graduate School of Int'l Relations and
Pacific Studies, UC San Diego

Prof. Hong Yung Lee
Center for Korean Studies, UC Berkeley

Marcus Noland
Senior Staff Economist,
Council of Economic Advisors,
Executive Office of the President

Prof. Robert Scalapino
Inst. of Asian Studies, UC Berkeley

James J. Shinn
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

Bruce Stokes
Project Director, Project on Int'l Trade,
Council on Foreign Relations

Mike Thies
Dept. of Political Science, UC San Diego

JAPAN

Keikichi Honda
Economic Advisor to the President,
Bank of Tokyo, Ltd, Japan

Kazumasa Iwata
Prof. of Economics/ Int'l Relations,
U. of Tokyo

Takashi Kiuchi
Chief Economist, General Manager of
Economic Division, The Long-Term Credit
Bank of Japan, Ltd

Makito Noda
Senior Program Officer, Japan Center for
Int'l Exchange

Katsuo Seiki
Executive Director, Global Industrial and
Social Progress Research Inst.

Hideo Tamura
Senior Staff Writer, Economic News Dept.,
The Nippon Keizai Shimbun

Seki Tomoda
Prof. of Int'l Relations, Inst. for Asian
Studies, Asia U.

Taizo Yakushiji
Prof. of Political Science, Keio U.

Tadashi Yamamoto
President, Japan Center for Int'l Exchange

PRESENTERS AND PAPER WRITERS

Economics

Prof. Stephan Haggard, Graduate School
of Int'l Relations and Pacific Studies, UC
San Diego

Naoko Ishii, Policy Development and
Review Dept., Int'l Monetary Fund
[Commentator]

Politics and Security

Hiroshi Nakanishi, Assoc. Prof. of Int'l
Relations, Kyoto U.

Alan D. Romberg, Director of Research
and Studies, US Inst. of Peace

Human Rights Values

Seiji Endo, Assoc. Prof. of Int'l Relations,
Faculty of Law and Politics, Seikei U.

Susan L. Shirk, Director, IGCC, U. of
California

Science, Technology, and Environmental Issues

Kenneth H. Keller, Senior Fellow for
Science and Technology, Council on
Foreign Relations

Jiro Tamura, Assoc. Prof. of Law, Keio U.

IGCC Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue

La Jolla, California October 8-9, 1993

List of Participants

Mr. Mikhail M. Bely
Director, First Dept. of The Asia-Pacific
Region, Min. of Foreign Affairs, Russia

Mr. Hotsuki Yoshiaki
Director, Defense Planning Division, Bur. of
Defense Policy, Japan Defense Agency

Prof. Izumi Hajime
Faculty of Int'l Relations, U. of Shizuoka,
Tokyo

Prof. Ji Guoxing
Director, Asian-Pacific Dept., Shanghai Inst.
for Int'l Studies,
People's Republic of China

Prof. Kim In June
Dept. of Int'l Economics, College of Social
Sciences, Seoul National U.

Amb. Kwon Byong-hyon
Assistant Minister, Policy Planning, Min. of
Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea

Dr. Lee Chung Min
Fellow, The Sejong Inst.,
Republic of Korea

Prof. Lu Zhongwei
Vice President, China Inst. For
Contemporary Int'l Relations,
People's Republic of China

Mr. Morimoto Satoshi
Senior Researcher, Center for Policy
Research, Nomura Research Inst., Ltd.,
Tokyo

Maj. Gen. Park Yong Ok,
Director, Arms Control Office, Min. of
National Defense, Republic of Korea

Mr. Stanley Roth
Deputy Assistant Secretary, East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, US Dept. of Defense

Dr. Konstantin O. Sarkisov
Head, Center For Japanese Studies; Vice
Director, Inst. of Oriental Studies, Russian
Academy of Sciences

Dr. Alexander Savelyev
Vice President, Inst. on National Security
and Strategic Studies, Russian Academy of
Sciences

Prof. Robert Scalapino
Robson Research Prof. of Government
Emeritus, Inst. of East Asian Studies,
UC Berkeley

Prof. Susan L. Shirk
Director, IGCC, U. of California

Mr. Sun Qixiang
Chief, Asian Division, Foreign Affairs Bur.,
Min. of National Defense,
People's Republic of China

Mr. Takano Toshiyuki
Deputy Director General, Asian Affairs Bur.,
Min. of Foreign Affairs, Japan

Amb. Peter Tomsen
Principal Deputy Asst. Secretary, East Asian
And Pacific Affairs Bur.,
US Dept. of State

Mr. Wang Ying-fan
Director, Dept. of Asian Affairs, Min. of
Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China

OBSERVERS

Dr. Edward T. Fei
Director, Office of Nonproliferation
Policy, US Dept. of Energy

Mr. Igor Morgulov
Consul, Consulate-General of the
Russian Federation, San Francisco, CA

Dr. Jun Bong Geun
Secretary To The President For Int'l
Security, Republic of Korea

International Agreements and Environmental Policy Enforcement

Environment and Trade

International trade is closely linked to environmental problems. In many countries, increased economic activity has been associated with environmental degradation. Therefore, world trade must be structured to contribute to sustainable, rather than unsustainable, economic and environmental practices.

During the last year of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations, the parties concluded an environmental side agreement that was a critical factor in U.S. Congressional approval. This agreement contains provisions designed to ensure environmental protection in Mexico, Canada, and the United States.



Holly Hammonds, World Resources Institute and David van Hoogstraten

An issue of particular concern to developing countries is whether the environmental side agreement to NAFTA sets a standard

for future trade agreements. Under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules, a country cannot impose trade restrictions on products due to the process by which they were produced, even if the production process violates all applicable local standards. GATT permits nations to apply their own health and environmental standards as long as they are "not more trade restrictive than required." It is important to note that the NAFTA agreement specifically omits this language.

The side agreements to NAFTA therefore may reflect specific reactions against perceived shortcomings in the GATT regime. In December 1993, President Clinton called for a new round of GATT

negotiations to take into account the concerns of environmental groups. To what extent will the environmental protection measures built into NAFTA be considered in restructuring GATT? Will the United States continue in its attempts to use trade as a means of raising environmental standards throughout the world? These issues, and others, were considered in an IGCC-sponsored conference on Enforcement of International Environmental Agreements, held on September 30–October 2, 1993. The Winter 1994 issue of the *Journal of Environment and Development* presents the major papers delivered at the conference.

Latin America

In January, 1994 the Chilean Congress approved an Environmental Framework Law, creating a new legal tool that allows suit to force polluters to restore environmental quality. Also, Argentina upgraded the Secretariat of Natural Resources and the Human Environment to a Cabinet-level post, while Columbia named Manuel Rodriguez Becerra head of the new Environmental Ministry.

Such organizational reforms have been accompanied by stepped-up enforcement of existing environmental measures. In Mexico, a hazardous waste site cleanup plan is under way outside Tijuana, in part financed by a fine levied on the U.S. executive responsible for illegal dumping. Brazil is funding taxis and small companies in Rio de Janeiro to convert from gasoline to natural gas vehicles. Chile has initiated strong measures to clean copper smelter emissions.

Latin American nations play a major role in addressing global environmental issues. The natural resource base, and thus the biological diversity and ecological importance of such countries as Colombia, Mexico, Brazil and Costa

Rica are among the largest and richest in the world. Because rapid industrial and agricultural development places heavy burdens on the natural environment, unsustainable practices threaten the long-term development aims of the region.

Yet despite the prominence of these countries in the international environmental arena, researchers heretofore have given relatively little analytical attention to this region. Meager analysis has focused on policy options of the countries in question and was often strongly normative in tone, raising doubts about its credibility. It addressed subissues (such as forests, urban pollution, or wildlife) without effort to integrate findings. Little thought was expended on understanding the political foundations of environmental policy-making.

Ongoing democratization in Latin America has empowered emerging social actors (especially environmental groups) to press for new priorities. Additionally, public and private actors in the North and South have established international alliances. This changing role of non-governmental organizations also needs further study.

Participants from nations of the Americas discussed these problems at a meeting sponsored by IGCC and the Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies on January 21–23, 1994. The Winter 1994 issue of the *Journal of Environment and Development* includes a summary report. Major papers presented at the conference will be published by Westview Press sometime in 1995 in a volume titled *The Politics of Latin American Environmental Policy in International Perspective*.



Dr. Richard Nuncio, U.S. State Department

Enforcement of International Environmental Agreements

La Jolla, California September 30, October 1 & 2, 1993

List of Participants

Holly Hammonds

Visiting Fellow, World Resources Inst., Wash. DC

Peter Lallas

Int'l Activities Division, US EPA

Gordon J. MacDonald

Research Director, Environmental Policy, IGCC, U. of California

Lisa Martin

Associate Prof. of Government, Center for Int'l Affairs, Harvard U.

George Mitchell

Assistant Prof. of Int'l Political Economy, The Fletcher School, Tufts U.

Michael Molitor

Director, Program on Sustainable Development, UC Berkeley

Daniel Nielson

Graduate School of Int'l Relations and Pacific Studies, UC San Diego

Edward Parson

Assistant Prof. of Public Policy, JFK School of Government

Kal Raustiala

Dept. of Political Science, UC San Diego

Wolfgang Reinicke

Research Associate, The Brookings Inst.

Susan L. Shirk

Director, IGCC, U. of California

Marc Stern

Graduate School of Int'l Relations and Pacific Studies, UC San Diego

Christopher Stone

Roy P. Crocker Prof. of Law, U. of S. CA

Arvind Subramanian

Economist, Int'l Monetary Fund

David van Hoogstraten

Assistant General Counsel, Int'l Activities Division, US EPA

Robert Ward

Int'l Activities Division, US EPA

PRESENTERS AND PAPERS:

John Setear, School of Law

UC Los Angeles: Legal Approaches to Enforcing International Environmental Agreements

David G. Victor

Dept. of Political Science, Massachusetts Inst. of Technology: Economic Instruments for Climate Protection

Gilbert Winham

Eric Dennis Prof. of Government and Political Science, Dalhousie College: Issues of Environmental Enforcement in NAFTA

Stephen Mumme

Dept. of Political Science, Colorado State U.: Lessons from the U.S.-Mexican Border

Konrad von Moltke

Adjunct Prof. of Environmental Studies:

Multilateral Trade Organization and Sustainable Development

Hilary F. French

Senior Researcher, Worldwatch Inst., Wash. DC: Toward Treaties that Work

Katharina Kummer

Queen Mary & Westfield College, U. of London: Providing Incentives to Comply: an Alternative to Sanctions?

Laura Stroh

Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana U.: Implementing the Basil Convention

Steven Chamovitz

Policy Director, Competitiveness Policy Council, Wash. DC: The Pelly Amendment and the GATT

The Politics of Latin American Environmental Policy in International Perspective

La Jolla, California 20-23 January 1993

List of Participants

Prof. William Ascher

Director, Center for Int'l Development Research, Duke U.

Carl Bauer

Jurisprudence & Social Policy Program, UC Berkeley

Anne S. Forrest

Staff Economist, Environmental Law Institute, Wash. DC

Prof. Paul Ganster

Inst. for Regional Studies of the Californias, San Diego State U.

Prof. Ann Patrick Hawkins

Assist. Prof., Int'l Studies, U. of Oregon

Susanna B. Hecht

Graduate School of Architecture and Urban Planning, UC Los Angeles

Prof. Barbara Jancar-Webster

Dept. of Political Science, SUNY Brockport

Prof. Margaret Keck

Dept. of Political Science, Yale U.

Prof. Gordon J. MacDonald

Director, Environmental Policy Studies, IGCC, U. of California

Alan J. Moore

Dept. of Political Science, U. of Oregon

Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz

Permanent Representative of Chile to the Organization of American States

James E. Nickum

Senior Fellow, Program on Environment, East-West Center, Honolulu

Daniel Nielson

Graduate School of Int'l Relations and Pacific Studies, UC San Diego

Richard Nuccio

Senior Advisor, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, US State Dept.

Prof. Roberto Sanchez

Dept. of Urban and Environmental Studies, Colegio de la Frontera Norte

Prof. Eduardo Silva

Dept. of Political Science, U. of Missouri, St. Louis

Prof. Vaclav Smil

Dept. of Geography, U. of Manitoba

Prof. Peter H. Smith

Director, Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, UC San Diego

Marc Stern

Graduate School of Int'l Relations and Pacific Studies, UC San Diego

Lori Ann Thrupp

Director of Sustainable Agriculture, World Resources Institute, Wash. DC

Prof. Blanca Torres

Centro de Estudios Internacionales, El Colegio de México

Elizabeth D. Umlas

Yale U.


Eduardo J. Viola

Inst. for Int'l Studies, Stanford U.

Teaching Seminar Examines the Challenges of Transitions to Democracy and Markets

Just as the fall '93 semester came to a close at UC Berkeley, thirty educators from the UC, Cal-State and California community college systems gathered at UCB, December 9–10, 1993, to become students again for a two-day IGCC teaching seminar on the transitions to democracies and market economies. Organized and hosted by The Institute of International Studies (IIS), the presentations focused on the factors currently shaping the transition process in various regions of the world.

Nine academic experts provided a comparative analysis of a broad cross-section of national experiences. For the opening evening session, Professor Ken Jowitt, UCB, discussed the importance of institutions and infrastructures as a requirement for a stable democratic and market-oriented nation state. The lack of the proper infrastructure in countries that do not have a historical experience



Prof. Ernst Haas speaks on democratization

of open markets and non-authoritarian governments is the greatest threat to transition.

The following morning, Professor Ernst Haas, Robson Research Professor of Government, UCB, opened by outlining the process of democratization via multilateral governance, such as the United Nations. The participants then had a full day of presentations covering East Germany, Russia, China, Southern Africa, India, and the former Yugoslavia. Maureen McTeer, an attorney and Visiting Scholar at The School of Public Health, UCB, closed the seminar with an account of the practical experience gained by Eastern European lawyers who intern in Canada with the aid of the Canadian Bar Association.

IIS intends to produce a publication from the seminar. For more information on availability contact IIS directly at tel. (510) 642-1106.



Maureen McTeer relates Eastern European experience

Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation

University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive, (0518)
La Jolla, CA 92093-0518
Phone: (619) 534-3352 Fax: (619) 534-7655
E-mail: ph13@sdcc12.ucsd.edu

Director
Susan L. Shirk

Research Directors
David A. Lake, International Relations
Gordon J. MacDonald, International Environmental Policy

Director Emeritus
Herbert F. York

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Campus Program Representatives
Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, Harry Kreisler, (510) 642-1106 **Davis:** Global Conflict and Cooperation Program, Miroslav Nincic, (916) 752-3063 **Irvine:** Center for Global Peace & Conflict Studies, Patrick Morgan, (714) 856-6410 **Los Angeles:** Center for International Relations, Richard Rosecrance, (310) 825-0604 **Riverside:** International Economic Cooperation and Cooperation Program, Stephen Cullenberg (909) 787-5037 **San Diego:** Project in International and Security Affairs, Peter Cowhey, (619) 534-2900 **San Francisco:** Program in Health and Human Survival, Christie Kiefer, (415) 476-7543 **Santa Barbara:** Global Peace and Security Program, John Ernest, (805) 893-4718 **Santa Cruz:** The Adlai Stevenson Program on Global Security, Ronnie Lipschutz, (408) 459-2833

Administration
Management Services: Susan Greer
Campus Programs: Bettina Halvorsen
Fiscal: Rebecca Ball
Publications: Jennifer Pournelle
Photographers: Alan Decker, Judy Swanson
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Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive, (0518)
La Jolla, CA 92093-0518
Phone: (619) 534-3352 Fax: (619) 534-7655
E-mail: ph13@sdcc12.ucsd.edu

Publications

IGCC Policy Paper Series

New:

Workshop on Arms Control and Security in the Middle East II.

Paul L. Chrzanowski

IGCC-PP No. 7, 26 pages, April, 1994.

Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era

Lu Zhongwei

IGCC-PP No. 6, 21 pages, October, 1993.

Regional Cooperation and Environmental Issues in Northeast Asia

Peter Hayes and Lyuba Zarsky

IGCC-PP No. 5, 35 pages, October, 1993.

Workshop on Arms Control and Security in the Middle East

David J. Pervin

IGCC-PP No. 4, 17 pages, June 1993.

Japan in Search of a "Normal" Role
Chalmers Johnson

IGCC-PP No. 3, 45 pages, July 1992.

Climate Change: A Challenge to the Means of Technology Transfer

Gordon J. MacDonald

IGCC-PP No. 2, 51 pages, January 1992.

Building Toward Middle East Peace:

Working Group Reports from

"Cooperative Security in the Middle East."

Moscow, October 21-24, 1991

IGCC-PP No. 1, 43 pages, January 1992.

IGCC Studies in Conflict and Cooperation

Strategic Views from the Second Tier:

The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Great Britain, and China

Edited by John C. Hopkins and

Weixing Hu

IGCC-SCC No. 3. **Bestseller!**

Beyond the Cold War in the Pacific

Edited by Miles Kahler

IGCC-SCC No. 2, 155 pages, 1991.

Classroom edition available Fall '94

The Future of U.S. Nuclear

Weapons Policy

Edited by David P. Auerswald and

John Gerard Ruggie

IGCC-SCC No. 1, 187 pages, 1990.

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FAX (619) 534-7655

or write to Publications

Coordinator, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation,

University of California, San

Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, (0518),

La Jolla, CA 92093-0518.

Other Titles

Space Monitoring of Global Change

Gordon J. MacDonald and Sally K. Ride
California Space Institute, 56 pages, 1992.

Available from IGCC

The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace

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