Kant, the Republican Peace, and Moral Guidance in International Law

Just as Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes became etched into the minds of international relations scholars as the oracles of realpolitik during the Cold War, Immanuel Kant appears to be well on his way to becoming the prophet of “progressive international reform” in the post—Cold War era. Not only has Kant's thought provided the underpinnings of one of the major traditions of international law, but there is a groundswell of interest among international relations scholars today in the question of whether contemporary events, particularly the proliferation of republican states and attempts to create them, signal the march forward to the Kantian ideal of republican peace. Yet, prior to asking what contemporary events signify for the attainment of the Kantian ideal, we should analyze the conflicting interpretions fo Kantian political thought so as to understand the meaning and implications of the ideal itself. Such a task is not merely pedantie—it is necessary to determine the utility of political philosophy for providing understanding and guidance in the real world.

This article proceeds by looking at earlier analyses of Kant by international relations theorists, contrasting them with contemporary usages of Kant. It then relates them to Kant's writings on politics and history to take a first step toward developing what might be considered the outlines of a Kantian research program for discerning what is of common interest to students of international relations: namely, discovering the prerequisites for the evolution toward "perpetual peace."s Most students of Kant acknowledge the sketchiness of his political and historical writings. Yet, if Kant is to be considered a post-Cold War prophet, his views on international politics and peace, as well as the varied interpretations of his views, should be re-examined. In opening debate on the Kantian project, this article takes the position that Kant's understanding of historical development and change cannot be considered apart from his emphasis on ethical action and moral purpose. It argues against interpretations of Kant that entail either a mechanical notion of historical process or an over-attention to the creation of specific kinds of political and economic structures. The article also calls for correction of the increasingly accepted shorthand interpretation that Kant's thesis concerned the relationship between democracies and peace, when in fact Kant distinguished between democracy, which he distrusted, and republicanism, which he saw as the only means of government that could allow free will, reason, and morality to flourish .9 Finally, in assessing the question of whether the Kantian moral imperative provides a sufficient guide for the development of "peace-through-law," it cautions against the potentially interventionist implications of some current analyses of the "separate peace" for both foreign policy and the development of international law. * Much of Kant's political and historical writings is found in a series of essays, including but not limited to "Perpetual Peace" (by far the most popular for contemporary theorists), These include: "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View," "What is Enlightenment?" "The End of AH Things," and "An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" In addition to these essays, a few international relations theorists base their analyses of Kant's political thinking on the discussion of private and public right in The Metaphysics of Morals and The Philosophy of Law. Although some of his political thought can also be found in his work on the philosophy of religion, this is rarely cited by students of international relations. Editions and collections consulted for this article include the collection of political essays listed above found in Lewis White Beck, cd,, Kanr on History, trans. Lewis White Beck, Robert E. Anchor, and Emil L. Fackenheim (New York: Macmillan, 1963); Kant, Furrdarrrenta/ Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Thomas K. Abbott (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949); The Metaphysics of Morals, intr. and trans. Mary Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 19X4),[21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29] For Waltz, consequently, Kant's moral philosophy can at best amount to little more than idle speculation. Although, Waltz says, Kant does set forth the "'shoulds' and 'oughts' of state behavior .... He does not expect them to be followed in a state of nature." Kant, despite engaging in such speculation, manages to escape from the follies of idealism in Waltz's view because he understands that morality and international law are not of much use in the real world. In Waltz's interpretation, although Kant demonstrates that peace is possible, just as he has demonstrated that moral behavior on the part of the individual is possible, he does not believe it probable. There is no way to get from here-a world of sovereign states operating in a state of nature-to there-a world of permanent peace, where morality and law reign in relations between sovereign entities. Behavior depends upon the full prior attainment of the necessary international (first) and domestic (second) conditions. People cannot act morally without the structure of a republic to guide and restrain them; peaceful republics cannot be constituted without a voluntary agreement to conduct their relations lawfully and combine in a federation. Consequently, Waltz invalidates the moral duty so emphasized by Kant in asserting that, "In describing what the states and the world will have to do and to become if moral behavior is to be possible, Kant makes understandable and in a sense excuses the failures of men and their rulers to achieve moral rectitude."'2

McGraw
The use of Kant today by theorists of the relationship between democracy and peace holds similarities and differences with both the early twentieth century international law scholars and Waltz, but departs from them both to form yet another strand of Kantian interpretation on international affairs. Like earlier international law scholarship, contemporary work using Kant as a point of departure is concerned with the question of achieving a more peaceful world. Michael Doyle's 1983 and 1986 analyses of the existence of a "separate peace" among states he classified as "liberal," for example, spawned an entire research program concerned with the relationship between these states and peace. This research program has grown increasingly precise, moving from the assertion that democracies are inherently more peace-loving to the correction by Doyle and others that they are only peaceful toward each other; and from that observation to the analysis of whether it is "political culture" and its attendant expectations, or the constraints imposed by democratic political structure, that provide the ultimate cause of democracies' behavior toward each other. 1~In a variant of If the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared.. nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the future.]' For Doyle, this is the "fundamental reason" why republics, once established, lead to peace; for Weede, it is the "basic idea" behind contemporary usages of Kantian claims. 18 However, in privileging this passage and the questions that arise from it and in conceptualizing Kant's normative argument narrowly, contemporary studies of the relationship between democracy and war both marginalize questions of the role of reason, morality, and freedom, and implicitly emphasize the necessity of creating particular kinds of civil structures, including both those of representative government and those of market liberalism, over the messiness and dialectic of the historical process. Some go so far as to interpret Kant's project as encouraging the active furtherance of such structures abroad, an interpretation with clear implications for the foundational principle of state sovereignty in international law. Fernando Tes6n, for example, has combined a liberal interpretation of Kant with the findings of the "democratic peace" literature explicitly to argue in favor of founding international law on principles of respect for the sovereignty of liberal states only. On this basis, he justifies intervention in nonliberal states. 19 This interpretation is questionable, however, if one looks at Kant's writings on history in a more comprehensive fashion.
'y".,. since peace is our goal and since unt~ormity of regimes is lhe only guarantee for peace, we have a choice of designing a system of international law that would either require respect for human rights or require despotism. On any defensible theory of morality, if that is our choice, we would prefer an international legal system that required states to secure human rights and political representation and thus be uniform on the side of liberty" (emphases added). Also, "the protection against intervention is a consequence of domestic legitimacy" (emphases added), thus, "nonintervention holds only among liberal states.. ." (emphasis in original). Tes6n, "The Kantian Theory," 81,92-93.
behavior, but as autonomous agents they must be free to choose whether or not their actions are to be founded on ethical criteria.
These notions of freedom of choice and the requirements of reason and morality have important implications for Kant's notions of process and progress in history, and thus for his conceptualization of the prospects and causes of international peace. Many students of Kant, even realists like Waltz, agree with Thomas Donaldson that "by Kant's own admission, his theory of morals provides the foundation for his political philosophy, including its international dimension."24 In Kant's view, humans are duty-bound to use moral criteria in making decisions, including political ones, no matter what the consequences. But whether or not such criteria are obeyed has implications for political outcomes. Kant's views concerning the causes of historical progress toward universal peace should not, therefore, be confined to the creation of appropriate political and economic structures and the attendant political acculturation of citizens into respect for those who behave in a like manner, and the ideal of universal peace should not be separated from any notion of actual historical possibility, as is done by Waltz. Nor should Kant's views on the role of nature in forcing humans together to overcome their natural "unsocial sociability" lead, as they have for some, to the postulation of a purely mechanical or "inevitable" teleology of historical progress toward peace.25 According to Kant, humans are initially forced to use reason by Nature to overcome the "unsocial sociability" it has thrust upon them.2G The role of Nature in "willing" that humanity overcome its tendencies toward conflict and violence, resulting in the constitution of republics and the rule of law among them, has led some earlier analysts to the interpretation that individual motives, action, and will do not matter, as they are unable to affect the ultimate achievement of peace. Kant, in fact, does assert that "Nature inexorably wills that the 136. Waltz submits that "it is incumbent upon us 10take Kant at his word and begin by briefly discussing his moral philosophy" (Wallz. "Kant, Liberalism, and War," 331). He both begins and finisheshis discussionof Kant in this manner, although, as indicated previously, in his view Kantian morality ends up as no more than a Sisyphean duty.
25Michael Doyle, in "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," refers more than once to the "inevitability" of the growth of the separate peace for Kant. See also Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New York: Praeger, 1965), 83-84.
M Kant's Fourth Thesis in the "Idea for a Universal History" asserts: "The means employed by Nature to bring about the development of all the capacities of men is their antagonism in society, so far as this is, in the end, the cause of a lawful order among men." He goes onto say, "By 'antagonism' I mean the unsocial sociability of men, i.e., their propensity to enter into society, bound together with a mutual opposition which constantly threatens to break up the society" ("Idea for a Universal History," in white Beck, cd., Kant, 15).  2" K:mt, "Perpetual PCJUC,"in While Beck, A'</rIl, I 12-[3 for us, since it seems that our own intelligent action may hasten this happy time for our posterity."3°T his is why, rather than behavior being dependent exclusively upon propitious international conditions or domestic political and economic structures, there appears to be a more complex interrelationship between the use of reason, consequent moral deeds, the constitution of republics, and the creation of a league of peaceful, law-abiding nations. Again, reason, or "enlightenment," counts: "For if fortune directs that a powerjiul and enlightened people can make itself a republic, which by its nature must be inclined to perpetual peace, this gives a fulcrum to the federation with other states so that they may adhere to it and thus secure freedom under the idea of the law of nations." It is this interrelationship that "proves " "the practicability (objective reality) of this idea of federation, which should gradually spread to all states and thus lead to perpetual peace."31 Moral and political progress (that is, progress toward constituting republics at the national level and a peaceful federation at the international level) is not necessarily accomplished in a linear fashion-it is not even assured at any given point in time; rather, the type and rate of progress is dependent upon action inspired by reason. The use of individual reason, the creation and maintenance of the republic, and the peaceful international federation are mutually dependent. At any time, political choices made according to irrational (immoral) criteria can negate progress toward a peaceful international order.
Universalist and the Categorical Imperative Given this interpretation of the relationship between Kant's understanding of reason and ethical duty and its implications for the attainment of peace in his-t{~rl,.one mi:h[ conc]ude, along with early twentieth-century iciealists, that the Kantian program provides a clear guide to what should be the content and purpose of the type of state behavior that can be sanctioned by international law. Yet the "Kantian tradition" in international law is increasingly seen to be problematic and, ironically, lacking in moral guidance. This is in part because for many, as Kratochwil notes, the Kantian slant on traditional international law is captured by Nardin's term of "practical association." "Such an association," he . -It has often, though wrongly, been said that for Kant not even moral acts can have a purpose; yet Kant sees the concept of purpose as essential for our practical reason, which is concerned with human projects and aspirations .... The final purpose of the world, that which is end and should not be merely means, Kant finds in man, rational man legislating and obeying moral law in an otherwise meaningless world. Granted this, the world itself must then be interpreted as the stage for moral evolution and human action ....
In this interpretation, Kantian morality is not merely founded on agreement or consensus; rather, any agreement on rules or laws of behavior reached between individuals or states may or may not be a moral one. Fulfilling the destiny of the human race, therefore, requires action according to reasoned, moral criteria. For Kant, moral philosophy "is a priori knowledge from concepts" while "history is empirical, not a priori, knowledge of human events." Still, White Beck continues, "human actions, including moral actions, take place on the stage of nature, and history is the recounting of the movement of man from the state of being a mere part of the mechanism of nature to the state of being the creator of and citizen in the world of culture, where he can eventually come to know and perform his duties and realize his moral ends."~' This poses the question of whether reason, moral duty, and, by implication, the universalist principles underlying international law can ever be known, or revealed, in their entirety. Kant himself appears to answer that humans' ability to grasp such principles advances over time with enlightenment: If,.. one concentrates on the civic constitutions and their laws and on the relations among states, insofar as through the good they contained they served over long periods of time to elevate and adorn nations and their arts and sciences, while through the evil they contained they destroyed them, if only a germ of enlightenment was left to be further developed by this overthrow and a higher level was thus prepared-if, I say, one carries through this study, a guiding thread will be revealed,~' 'CWhite Beck,cd,,Karz[,37 Kant Ninth Thesis in "Idea for a Universal History, " in White Beck. cd,, Kant, 24-25. Paul Stern distinguishes between notions of historical development of morality and that of a moral disposition, arguing that Kant's formulation of the categorical imperative precludes any notion of "historical development in the meaning of morality itself' (emphasis added). As Stern points out. however. this does not preclude an:dyses ofcurrcn[ events."] C~leditsch wgues, for exwnplc, thtit, ulthough many peace rescmchers '-who subscribed to x 'third way' in (hc Cold War" were tvary of these implications during the debate ubou( imperialism in the 1970s, the end of the superpower rivalry should nmkc such concerns moot. "The Cold Wm has now ended in the real world" he writes, "it should end in peace research, too."4°F inally, such policy and legal implications are sometimes attributed to Kant himself. Sorensen interprets Kant's project as one of "democracies seeking to promote democratic values in relations with other countries"; Fukuyama assigns primary importance to "the need for democratic states to work together to promote democracy and international peace."41 Likewise, Tes6n calls for elevating the notion of the superiority of liberal states-and their consequent right to intervene in the domestic affairs of nonliberal states-to the status of a foundational principle of international law.42

Kant's Caution Against Interventionism
It is difficult, however, to show that Kant would approve of policies or an international legal code that sanctioned most levels of interventionism, even if directed toward "good" ends. The construction of republican institutions cannot be coerced by either internal or external forces: But woe to the legislator who would wish to bring about through coercion a constitution directed to ethical ends. For he would not only bring about the exact opposite of his ethical goals, but also undermine his political goals and render them insecure.43 The same goes for coercion from the outside. Kant explicitly granted states both juridical equality and the status of "moral personhood," asserting that a state "is a society of men whom no one else has any right to command or to dispose 40yet Gleditsch also acknowledges that a prodemocracy discourse that justifies intervention continues to influence the actions of liberal states in the post-Cold War period, and that it was "compatible with at least some of the rhetoric in the 1991 Gulf War" (Gleditscb, "Democracy and Peace," 373-74).
41Sorensen, "Kant and Processes, " 404, The problem here is that such a characterization of Kant can lead to a variety of prescriptions. Although Sorensen, following Doyle, recognizes that the attempt to promote democratic values abroad can lead to ethnocentric crusades, he interprets Kant as arguing "for the victory of democracy as the superior form of state" (399-400). In Fukuyama's reading of Kant, liberal states can do little wrong. The principle of the "sovereign equality" of states enshrined in the United Nations, for example, should be nullified. Instead, "If one wanted to create a league of nations according to Kant's own precepts, that did not suffer from the fatal flaws of earlier international organizations, it is clear that it would have to look much more like NATO than the United Nations-that is, a league of truly free states brougbt together by their common commitment to liberal principles. Such a league should be much more capable of forceful action to protect its collective security from threats arising from the nondemocratic part of the world" (Fukuyama, The End ofilisfory, 281-83). ment of moral autonomy. Economic coercion, therefore, cannot be legitimized in the eyes of the law of nations. Consequently, although a number of analysts of the liberal peace have pointed out that the actual content of liberal morality often encourages messianic crusades that result in irrational wars, they often neglect to mention that such crusades are not condoned by Kant. This is the major reason why F. H. Hinsley cautioned thirty years ago against taking the "consent of the citizens" passage as the foundation of Kant's analysis for the causes of peace. For Hinsley, the argument in this passage errs in giving the impression "that republican states will always act right," an assumption in which Kant himself has little faith.49 If peace is in general assured by the lack of agreement on the part of the liberal populace to engage in war, and the ensuing constraint is expressed through democratic institutions, then one might infer that, when the liberal populace does grant its consent in military ventures, such undertakings become legitimate. But the consent of the liberal populace is not enough to insure the rightness of the cause. Liberal institutions, therefore, be they domestic or international, are inadequate in and of themselves to ensure peace. As Stanley Hoffmann has pointed out, "For Kant, the best society is not the one that makes man behave morally, it is the one in which man is most~ree to behave morally if he wants to. If world peace presupposes republican states, it is because they are least likely to be bellicose... the establishment of republics all over the world does not eliminate the problem of war... mas's evil propensities may still prevail."5°C onclusion To say that Kant considers the state a "moral person" with attendant rights and duties is not to assert, like Waltz, that the Kantian project is one of preserving 49Hin~ley had two reasons for criticizing this passage; the other, and in his view secondary, reason being that "it destroys the force of the distinction which Kant had tried to draw between a republican form of constitution and a democratic form of government-since in a democracy if the majority is despotic, it is also the majority that undergoes all the deprivations." Thus, as Hinsley points out, Kant was not a democrat; indeed, populist majoritarianism was for him one of the worst forms of despotism "because it establishes an executive power in which 'all' decide for or even against one who does not agree; that is, 'all' who are not quite all, decide, and this is a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom" (emphasis added). Rather, Kant favored a republican, or representative, legislature divorced from an executive to ensure that all views be aired and despotism checked, presumably to encourage good decisions to be arrived at through a process of collective reason. Thus, if a "despotic" majority checks state action on the basis of being inconvenienced (the implication of much contemporary work on the "liberal peace"), such a check would be made in accordance with neither republican nor ethical grounds. and strengl hening the state at all costs. 11 is, rather. 10 con:lo[c" :1Conccptioll of the st~~te akin to that of R. B. J. W:dkcr, who :~cknow Icdgcs th~it the Kimti:m project demands two separate requirements i"oIpc-rpclual~wace \ [he est~}bl ishrnen[ of a perfect civic constitution intern:dly, and the UIC;IIrcco~l)ilion '"extcrn:d]y '> that "the use of coercion bdwem states is irr:~[i(~il:~l:md unl L\w!'LIl" read: "'Seek ye first the kingdom of pure pmctic:~l I"C:LW)II :(IICI i(~ri:i]tcousness, wrd your end (the blessing of perpctud pcacc).~~III nCCLi\\:IiilJ' Collow.""$" BUL