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**Title**

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**Permalink**

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0wr9v4fb>

**Journal**

American Indian Culture and Research Journal , 27(1)

**ISSN**

0161-6463

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**Publication Date**

2003

**DOI**

10.17953

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# The Birth of an Activist: Fred Mahone and the Politicization of the Hualapai, 1918 to 1923

**CHRISTIAN MCMILLEN**

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Fred Mahone, recently sprung from Chilocco Indian School and just about to ship out for France, took time in the summer of 1918 to reflect on the past and think about the future. Whiling away his time at Michigan's Selfridge Field, Mahone put pencil to paper in the language he had only recently learned to write, and announced himself to the world, "I am a full blooded born from ... Ancient descendent who has gained three fourth of an education."<sup>1</sup> But having no use for what would come to be called primitive anti-modernism<sup>2</sup>—that tangle of ideas which celebrated the past, and often indigenous peoples, as repositories of authenticity, and used them as antidotes for the hurly-burly of modern life—Mahone was eager to jettison the Indian past he said he learned about at Chilocco. He urged: "Let us forget to-day the sole object of the mere early savagery of the passed period. Wearing apparel of peculiar specimens, long hair, feathers, blankets, moccasins are curiosity for to-day." Shucking the hull of primitivism, however, did not mean growing the skin of a white man. Mahone, hoping to escape from underneath the weight of history—a weight pressed upon him, not a burden he chose to bear—implored "the redmen of the western hemisphere must make up our mind to be ... in the modern History of to-day." After all, he said, the "ancestors of the redmen remains the same. But their present generations are aiming themselves toward the modern life."<sup>3</sup> And to help the Hualapai aim straighter, Mahone drafted an eighteen-page manifesto. Broken down into nine parts and thirty-seven sections, his letter from Michigan was a thoroughly modern and quite detailed blueprint for self-government and education, as well as a clear demand for citizenship and all its privileges and burdens, including the right to vote and the responsibility of paying taxes. When he

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came home to the Hualapai Reservation in northwestern Arizona after the war, a new tribal organization, "The Redmen Self Dependent [*sic*] of America," would carry out his plan.<sup>4</sup>

In this essay, which is part of a larger project that tells the entire story of the landmark Supreme Court case *United States, as Guardian of the Hualapai Indians of Arizona v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co.* (1941), I look closely at a brief period in Mahone's life, as he went from student to soldier to activist. Eventually embracing the views of the radical California-based Mission Indian Federation (MIF), Mahone's politicization gave the Hualapai their modern voice, for the first time allowing the tribe to articulate a set of collective political goals. For centuries, the Hualapai had been living in bands, hunting and gathering across what is now western Arizona, bordered on the north and the west by the Colorado River. The bands' territories overlapped, and they shared a common language. They had no central leader. And while they had been coalescing into a coherent tribe since contact in the 1860s, Mahone's influence on their political organization was unique.<sup>5</sup> When he returned to the reservation after World War I, he started what became a more than twenty-year struggle to expel the ranchers and the railroad from Indian land. These had long been Hualapai concerns, but Mahone gave them new urgency—he "started all this" is the way elder Lydia Beecher expressed it.<sup>6</sup> And he used tactics heretofore unknown among the Hualapai such as petitions and the formation of a tribal organization.

However, Mahone never became a sanctioned Hualapai leader. He did not fit the "cultural broker" model, nor was he an "intermediary" or "middleman." Although Mahone negotiated between Anglos and Indians, only a few whites viewed him as a progressive leader.<sup>7</sup> In time, many Hualapais came to think of Mahone as an upstart.<sup>8</sup> He was an agitator, an activist, and his often troubled and always complex relationship with the Hualapai earned him their scorn and admiration.

Hualapai elder Ben Beecher remembered that Fred was both loved and hated. According to Beecher, whose family had sided with Mahone in the 1930s in the Hualapais' fight against the railroad, Mahone had a realization when he was in the service that caused him to ask a lot of questions. Beecher claimed Mahone came home a different man, and advocated big changes that scared some Hualapais.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, Mahone's activism so raised the ire of some Hualapais that he came to fear for his safety.<sup>10</sup> After the Hualapais formalized the reservation government under the Indian Reorganization Act in 1939, they formed a tribal council, but Mahone served only one term as secretary. A veteran of the war and a boarding school, he was aware of the wider world but had quickly returned to the reservation where he encountered the suspicion of both whites and Hualapais.<sup>11</sup> Fred Mahone was impatient, impetuous, and frustrated, but once he became politicized, he was also dedicated to securing Hualapai land rights.

Fred Mahone's politicization and his modernity are also offered as a counterpoint to the better-known story of more prominent Progressive era Indian leaders and activists like Arthur Parker and Charles Eastman. Arguing that the image of Indian America crafted by Parker, Eastman, and the Society

of American Indians (SAI) had little to offer men like Mahone, that in fact he, like other reservation Indians, rejected it, this article seeks to shed light on a heretofore unknown Indian. To a young Fred Mahone, popular images of the Indian past crippled the Hualapai. The exterior symbols of primitiveness Parker and Eastman at times donned as authentically Indian to gain favor with white America, Mahone, in contrast, found to be a barrier to progress. Mahone had no need to drape himself in authentic Indian costume; playing Indian would not have occurred to him. Fred Mahone set his sights on the future in order to “aim ourselves toward maximum equal rights. The maximum Equal Opportunity. The good homes, the good roads. The common wealth and the well fare for [today] and the days to come.”<sup>12</sup>

Because better educated, elite Indians left behind easily accessible records of their views, we risk taking their lives as emblematic of politically engaged Native Americans. But, by digging a little, it is possible to uncover individuals like Mahone and continue to build a fuller picture of Indian political activism in the early twentieth century.<sup>13</sup> Fred Mahone’s political awakening was akin to the experiences of other students who became soldiers in World War I and then returned to life on the reservation. Eventually, Mahone’s activism had an impact that reached well beyond the Hualapai Reservation, leading to what Felix Cohen, in 1942, called “one of the most important cases ever to reach the Supreme Court in the history of our Federal Indian law.”<sup>14</sup> Mahone helped to change the course of federal Indian law, as well as usher in a new era of Indian activism and protest based on reservation-specific issues.

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The first years of Fred Mahone’s life are difficult to retrieve. He was born in 1888 and spent his childhood on the reservation, attending the agency school at Valentine, Arizona, until he was sixteen. In 1914, he left for Chilocco Indian school in Oklahoma, staying until 1917.<sup>15</sup> Then the war started. Steeped in patriotism and proud of its men in uniform, Chilocco urged them to “follow the flag,” otherwise they risked the shame of being labeled “slackers in this critical period.”<sup>16</sup> Mahone followed and when America went to war, so did he, joining the American Expeditionary Force and shipping off to France in 1918.<sup>17</sup>

Fred Mahone, pan-Indianism, and assimilation all grew up and went to school together in the years just before and after World War I. Among the multiple reasons for the origins of pan-Indian activism, the influence of the boarding school experience ranks near the top. When the Society of American Indians (SAI), the nation’s first pan-Indian organization was formed in 1911, most of its founding members had been boarding school students; at its first annual conference at least a third of the delegates were either Carlisle or Hampton graduates.<sup>18</sup> The boarding school influence on the SAI was unmistakable: assimilation and education, tinged with a healthy dose of nineteenth-century evolutionism, were markers of the society’s ethos. Clearly, the formation of the SAI signaled a change in national Indian politics: for the

first time Indians organized on a national scale, and, unlike other reform organs such as the Indian Rights Association, the SAI was run by Indians. But its assimilationist tendencies, along with its failure to establish strong connections to Indian reservations, were the source of its ultimate downfall by the mid 1920s.<sup>19</sup>

The Society's largely non-reservation leaders celebrated Indianness in a generic, occasionally romantic, way. However, at a time when most American Indians lived on reservations, not living generic Indian lives, but in countless diverse settings, the SAI's appeal was minimal.<sup>20</sup> "Bridge figures"—to use Philip Deloria's term—like Arthur C. Parker, the Seneca pan-Indian activist and eventual president of the SAI, tried to join the primitive past to the modern present and the future.<sup>21</sup> If that approach meant mixing and matching Indian cultures, so be it. For example, when the Iroquois donned Sioux regalia at their celebration of the 500th anniversary of the founding of the Iroquois League, Parker admitted that "Indians to be recognized as such must 'play' Indian."<sup>22</sup> Indians were loyal and close to nature; they were thrifty and honest—"the American Race," according to Parker.<sup>23</sup> By rendering the past more palatable, by reframing it as romantic, Parker, Charles Eastman, and the SAI worked hard to disarm those who saw Indians as "savages."<sup>24</sup> They vigorously asserted their Americanness, practicing what Matthew Jacobson has called "vindictive assimilationism."<sup>25</sup> In doing so, however, a man like Fred Mahone was relegated to embracing an image of the past he wanted to transcend.

Confronting the challenges of this new world was not possible for everyone. From the beginning, the SAI wanted to cultivate "race leaders"—Parker's term—from the "small company of Indians of broad vision," meaning those with just the right mix of Indian and non-Indian traits.<sup>26</sup> Yet, in the teens and twenties of the last century, the SAI's program fell largely on deaf ears because most Indians lived on reservations. In truth, very few were even listening. One who was, Cahuilla leader Francisco Patencio, bristled at what he heard. At the SAI's 1919 meeting, Patencio said, "My friends, you are different from my people.... I hear that you want citizenship. I and my people we do not want citizenship, because we have already been citizens in this country always."<sup>27</sup>

Fred Mahone was a Hualapai first and an Indian second, and the SAI would have been incapable of understanding his ties to a place and to history. Or, perhaps, they understood these ties all too well and feared them. They knew the deep roots that connected reservation Indians to their homes could not be severed. In the SAI's way of thinking this gave them, on the positive side of the ledger, a link to the past, a loyalty to place, to home, and a closeness to nature; but, on the negative side, they were trapped by that same past, living in the rude conditions of the reservation. They inhabited a place of *permanent* primitiveness, rather than being able to travel at will between the reservation and the modern world. Indians like Charles Eastman and Arthur Parker tapped into that primitiveness when it suited them, when it coincided with the few positive notions Americans had of Indians. But in their celebration of anti-modernism they risked keeping real Indians from having modern rights—rights to property and citizenship, for example. Relegating Native

peoples to the past, of course, is not a uniquely American practice; it has been an effective tool elsewhere in the world, either explicitly or implicitly, in denying native people modern rights.<sup>28</sup> Fred Mahone recognized the danger in seeing the Indian past this way; he did not want to be considered a primitive, “[w]earing apparel of peculiar specimens.”

But Indians need not remain stuck in the past. They, like whites, had the capacity to evolve and become modern people. And so Parker rejoiced in the knowledge that some Indians had “attained great distinction as leaders in the white world [which] proves the virility of the race and demonstrates its capacity.” While Indian virility could lead to white achievements, redemption must come first, so Parker cryptically counseled his readers, “to make good where we have sinned.”<sup>29</sup> Parker’s “we” was both Indian and white. He took on both identities, and, at times, he could mask his Indian heritage entirely. Contrasting Indian and immigrant efforts to assimilate, Parker posed, in 1916, as if he were not Native at all: “The Indian ... comes out of his own peculiar form of civilization, an undeveloped form, *to our way of thinking*, and into the full glare of twentieth century enlightenment. Little wonder that he is for the moment dazed and stumbles as he walks.”<sup>30</sup> The allusions to evolution, so obvious they hardly even rank as metaphor, are nonetheless instructive: Indians were a work in progress. Parker, of course, held himself out as an example of an Indian no longer dazed and stumbling; he had emerged from the depths and become an American, clear-eyed and walking tall.

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Fred Mahone’s politicization began in the pan-Indian atmosphere of the Chilocco Indian school. In his long letter to Cato Sells, written just after he left Oklahoma for the army in 1918, the influence of the boarding school experience is obvious. In fact a Chilocco education was considered so important that the new tribal organization, the Redmen Self Dependent of America, would ensure that Hualapai boys and girls got a Chilocco education, and no uneducated Hualapais would be allowed to serve the new tribal government Mahone envisioned.<sup>31</sup> At Chilocco, Mahone began to get a sense of the scope of the forces lined up against the Hualapai. Surrounded by young people from more than forty tribes, trading stories from their homes, it is easy to imagine, given his later reputation for being outspoken, that upon meeting other Indians he began to first air some of his complaints.<sup>32</sup> It is possible, too, that he kept to himself. Whether or not he did, like so many other young men at Chilocco and other boarding schools, Mahone went to war to fight for the United States. And like roughly 90 percent of his fellow Indian students, he went as a volunteer.<sup>33</sup> In a photograph from 1918, Mahone stands erect in his new uniform, looking stern and a bit stiff, but ready for action. While stationed in Michigan, he kept up with the news from Chilocco, trained for war, and began to wonder about the past and the Hualapais’ place in the future.<sup>34</sup>

Service in World War I exposed Indian men to a wider world and forever altered their perspective on America. A new generation of leaders emerged from the war demanding citizenship for all Indians and settlement of land

claims in exchange for service. Their country owed them: because they had risked their lives for America, Indian men wanted to be treated as citizens. Time spent in boarding schools, and loyalty to the United States during the war, made these men more Americanized than any previous generation of Indians, and more demanding.<sup>35</sup> Men like Fred Mahone came back from Europe hoping to regain lost ground. He returned to Hualapai country as an American, but his newfound faith in American democracy and equality did not simply cause him to cast off his Indian clothes and step in line with white America. On the contrary, Mahone returned with a deep sense of purpose: to get back the land taken from the Hualapai by the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway.

While journalists, Indian Service officials, and other commentators could not contain their excitement at finally seeing Indians catching up with white America and embracing American values like discipline, loyalty, and service, men like Mahone were preparing to delve into the past and expose perceived injustices.<sup>36</sup> If Mahone became a true American as a result of his wartime service, if he came home “with a new light on his face and a clearer conception of the democracy in which he may participate and prosper,” as Cato Sells, commissioner of Indian Affairs hoped, he also returned from the war with a keen sense that something was amiss in Indian country.<sup>37</sup>

Fred Mahone stood poised to be the kind of Indian Arthur C. Parker envisioned: one who embraced aspects of the white world and retained a vestige of what was good about being Indian.<sup>38</sup> Mahone achieved what Parker, at his most optimistic, hoped all Indians could achieve: as firm a place as possible in two worlds, with equal reverence, and not a little disdain, for both.<sup>39</sup> Yet Parker’s vision could also be bleak. He might have been imagining Fred Mahone when he wrote, “The solitary educated Indian sent back to his own tribe could do little for it. Moreover, he could do little for himself, for he has lost all his skill as an Indian, and his knowledge of most things was of little use to his tribesmen.”<sup>40</sup> Parker could not have been more wrong about Fred Mahone. After returning to the reservation, Mahone mobilized the Hualapai and used his education to secure Indian rights.

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After the war, Mahone briefly enrolled in college. He left Valparaiso University in Indiana after two quarters of a full course load, and in the spring of 1920 he departed to Riverside, California, where he re-enrolled in the service.<sup>41</sup> In California, his life took a new direction. A version of his vision of the Redmen Self Dependent of America had come to life; he discovered the Mission Indian Federation (MIF).

The radical MIF, founded in Riverside in 1919, demanded self-government, pressed for land claims legislation, called for the abolition of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and generally lobbied for sovereignty. Quickly gaining influence in Southern California and the greater Colorado River watershed, by the summer of 1921 the BIA feared that most Mission Indians solidly supported the MIF.<sup>42</sup> Also popular, but less radical, was the statewide



Indian Board of Cooperation. Based in San Francisco, the board too worked hard on a California claims bill and lobbied Southern California tribes for their support. The board even garnered some positive reviews from the BIA.<sup>43</sup>

The MIF, in contrast, would receive nothing but criticism from the BIA due to the group's perceived antagonism and radicalism. If the Society of American Indians' hallmark was equal rights through assimilation, the MIF's was separation. Although founded and run in its early years by a non-Indian, Jonathan Tibbet, whom one inspector called "the enemy of the Government," the MIF was eventually led by reservation Indians for reservation Indians.<sup>44</sup> And Tibbet, for his part, claimed the MIF was "conceived in the minds of the Indians."<sup>45</sup> While the SAI tried to make Indians respectable and acceptable to the mass of Americans—indeed, to be viewed as essentially American—the MIF reminded the BIA that angry Indians, dedicated to their tribes and to their land, would not go away. They presented a real threat, for they challenged BIA control of Indian land and Indian people. Where Indian reformers like Carlos Montezuma, an on-again and off-again member of the Society of American Indians and at least a tepid supporter of the MIF, wanted to end BIA control and dismantle the reservation system as a method for assimilation, the MIF wanted the same as an assertion of sovereignty.<sup>46</sup> Their appeal to a largely reservation-based constituency explains the group's rapid ascent; only two years elapsed between their first stirrings in 1919 and 1921 when the BIA feared they controlled most Mission Indians in Southern California. The SAI's support base was more diffuse; it had no center. The BIA never feared them. While the MIF was a regional, not national, organization, its support was densely concentrated and more effective. Mahone naturally gravitated toward the latter group.

Fred Mahone came to Riverside just as the MIF quickly gained in popularity. Several large-scale gatherings held there garnered the support of Indians from across the region. Before Mahone arrived, Frederick G. Collett and George Wharton James of the Board of Indian Cooperation held a meeting on the status of a bill to settle California Indian claims in October 1920. Then Jonathan Tibbet held at least two large MIF meetings at his home in Riverside—one that ran for close to a week in late January and early February 1920, and another in the spring of 1921. Hundreds of Indians attended both meetings.<sup>47</sup> And present at the spring meeting were several Hualapais, including Kate Crozier, Richard Magee, and Fred Mahone.<sup>48</sup> The spring 1921 meeting was the most worrisome to the BIA. By then the MIF's influence was both wide and deep, reaching out across the region to all of the Mission tribes and into the Hualapai, Havasupai, and Mojave tribes, with whom Tibbet met in the fall of 1920 at Needles, California.<sup>49</sup> The MIF tapped into existing connections deeply embedded in the history of the Colorado River region; the ties forged long ago between the Hualapai, Havasupai, and the Mojave were especially strong.<sup>50</sup>

Until the spring of 1921 Tibbet and the MIF had been carrying their message of Indian liberation unmolested by the BIA. Initially, the BIA did not consider Tibbet a threat, and the MIF had been, if not encouraged, then at least sanctioned, by the government.<sup>51</sup> For almost two years the MIF's pres-



ence was without doubt both a bother and a concern, but not a challenge to BIA control. But that spring, things changed. Fueled by fears of an Indian uprising, the BIA asked the Department of Justice to prosecute Tibbet and fifty-three Mission Indians for conspiracy for attempting to alienate the Indians from the government. If the Indians of California and the Southwest were to be “amalgamated into the citizenship of the community” then the message of the MIF needed to be erased and Tibbet and his followers stopped lest it led to a “very unfortunate uprising.”<sup>52</sup> Unwilling to believe that the Indians of the various Mission reservations were capable of having a political consciousness separate from a white man’s, the BIA and the Justice Department resolved to prosecute Tibbet. If Tibbet was removed, the Indians would settle down; thus they decided they must “strike down and destroy the organization.”<sup>53</sup> But Tibbet tapped into grievances already present, distrust of the government foremost among them. For example, one of Tibbet’s co-conspirators, Joe Pete, a Torres-Martinez Mission Indian living on the Malki Reservation, had led a troublesome draft Resistance movement during the late war.<sup>54</sup>

Hundreds of radicalized Indians demanding rights, the government clamping down, tension mounting: this was the climate Mahone found himself in when he arrived in Riverside. Starving for action, Mahone’s time in California finally began to sate his hunger. His political education, begun prior to his arrival in California, now formulated. Either Mahone became convinced of the MIF’s message, finding its model to be the most appropriate for the Hualapai; or he was simply so bowled over by organized, politicized Indians that he joined immediately. However he arrived at his decision, the MIF offered what Fred wanted. Prior to the war Mahone imagined forming his own group, “The Redmen Self Dependent of America”; now he saw it could be done. He made plans to go home.

Operating at first below the BIA’s radar screen, he brought his own brand of the MIF to Hualapai country in early 1921. Embracing the MIF’s message—what he called “Human Rights and Home Rule”—and using its constitution and by-laws, Fred Mahone and other members of the tribe formed the American Wallapai<sup>55</sup> and Supai Indian Association on 1 January 1921. “With our counselor, Hon. Tibbet,” Mahone declared that the group’s “work is principally based upon restoration means on Indian land and rights.”<sup>56</sup> The Hualapai, according to Mahone, “authorized and empowered” him to lead the tribe because he knew “with clear understanding the Ways my Wallapai Indian lives at present. They are suffered to great extent and many lives lost yearly.”<sup>57</sup> Wanting to control their own affairs, Mahone wrote:

We are now seeking for immediate [*sic*] time to elect by our own selves a highly recommended [*sic*] a college graduate and must deal and justify any of our rights with all our delegates [*sic*] of American Wallapai Indian Association.... We want some right to [make] immediate changes at Valentine, Arizona. What ever changes shall be It shall be known to or be for the delgtes and member of American Wallapai Indian Association.<sup>58</sup>

Mahone's fractured English, rendered in elegant penmanship and wrought with a pencil, made his message clear: Hualapais knew their needs best and should be in control of the reservation. Charles Burke, commissioner of Indian Affairs, disagreed. Mahone's role as head of the newly formed group was "without lawful authority." The commissioner cautioned Mahone to be careful or to subject "yourself to punishment for possible violation of the Federal Laws."<sup>59</sup>

Before announcing his new association's goals, Mahone spent the winter and spring of 1921 traveling back and forth between Arizona and California, keeping the formation of his group a secret. But when news of a "plot" making its way from Southern California to Arizona reached the Havasupai reservation in April, the superintendent grew concerned. Gaining information, however, proved difficult. The superintendent was wary, but if there were any Havasupais involved they would reveal little; the Havasupais were "guard[ing] all their plans with the utmost cant ... to find or understand the exact scheme is quite difficult."<sup>60</sup> In August, organized and energized, Mahone headed back to Hualapai country for good, having identified what became his life-long pursuit: "the protection of our sacred lands." Threatened by the railroad and Anglo ranchers, Mahone declared, "We claim the Indians' right of prior occupancy of the lands and the water."<sup>61</sup>

When Fred moved back to the reservation in the summer of 1921 the reservation superintendent, William A. Light, hoped to elicit information about the "plot" developing in Riverside. Mahone fit the profile of a progressive Indian: he was an educated veteran and had escaped the reservation, if only temporarily. Light had unsuccessfully tried to gather news from others in Mahone's circle: Kate Crozier, although "quite a reliable man and one of the most industrious Indians among the Hualapai," remained tight-lipped. As for Richard Magee, Light let loose with a torrent of invective. Magee was a "parasite, an imposter," and likely the ringleader of any plan to defraud the Hualapai of their money.<sup>62</sup> But Light had no luck with Mahone either; he soon learned that Mahone was the leader of the perceived insurgency, and within a couple of months the two were bitter enemies.

Temperatures and tempers began to soar on the reservation in June 1921. Light, on the reservation only since 1919, had made few friends among the Hualapai and soon would engender the enmity of most of the tribe. Prior to the summer of 1921 Mahone had had no direct dealings with Light, but based on reports from other Hualapais he came to distrust him. Sparking action that June was a plan to build a highway across the reservation. Mahone was furious, claiming that the BIA had granted the state of Arizona a permit to build a road on Hualapai land after Light allegedly reported that the Hualapai were in favor of the plan. The Hualapai did not want a road, Mahone averred. And even if they did, it was for them to decide democratically. The newly formed American Wallapai and Supai Indian Association had been organized for just such purposes; all decisions now needed to go through them. After all, declared Mahone, "The organization of American Wallapai Indian Association has right to bring any matter before the state and Federal Court to justify any wrongful causes amongst the Wallapai Indians and others."<sup>63</sup> Mahone assured the governor and

the state highway engineer that the Hualapais would meet about the new road and “discuss and settle it out right in a political manner.”<sup>64</sup> In the meantime, he urged them to postpone construction. Despite their profession of faith to American values like democracy and representation—values the BIA had been hoping Indians would embrace for generations—this new group threatened Light’s already weak hold over the Hualapai. He would not allow any attempt to diminish the autocratic role the reservation superintendent played in Indian life.

The American Wallapai and Supai Indian Association was not only a threat to Light. It would have been, if not a threat, at least a foreign idea to many Hualapais. Decision making had not been done in such a fashion in the past, nor could someone like Fred Mahone simply declare himself a spokesman and leader. Leadership was loosely hereditary, but also based on strong oratorical skills, one’s war record or descent from a person with a strong war record, and an ability to negotiate effectively with Anglos. The Hualapai had never before been a unified political entity; they had been dispersed across their vast territory in camps comprised of kinship networks and led by a headman. Camps coalesced into bands based on regional affiliations, and these in turn made up the tribe. Unified by a common language and cultural practices, day-to-day activities were nonetheless carried out in the camps, and regional bands had few dealings with one another. It was only after contact began in earnest in the 1860s that the need for a more cohesive political tribe emerged.<sup>65</sup> A single, supreme tribal leader was unknown, and it seemed unlikely that such a role would be filled by a young man who had been gone for close to seven years and who had weak hereditary links to power. None of these barriers to leadership appeared to deter Fred Mahone. He was not willing, then or later, to follow a traditional path to leadership. He would ally himself with prominent elders, like Kate Crozier and, at first, Jim Fielding. But in large part, Mahone chased leadership through new means, and, over time, shook up local politics.<sup>66</sup>

When Mahone came home, band affiliations remained important. But since contact, and especially since the coming of the railroad in 1883, more and more people moved to Peach Springs or outlying towns for work, away from older, more far-flung residences.<sup>67</sup> As a result, social structures became fragile or were not able to meet new challenges, which in turn opened opportunities for a man like Mahone. Mahone returned to the reservation at a time when increased threats to their land from ranchers and the railroad had many Hualapais worried. His unique ability to translate the tribe’s fears and concerns into articulate protests gave the tribe a political voice in a new world. Older leaders, like Jim Fielding, lacked one critical component Mahone had: an education. Fielding, to be sure, was a respected leader and would remain so until he died in 1936. He had ascended to power because of his lineage and because he was a *pa-kawha’t* (“a good talker”); these attributes helped him become a reservation policeman, which further cemented his leadership status. But Mahone knew how to write, and new circumstances demanded new skills that leaders like Fielding did not have.<sup>68</sup>

Deeply affected by lessons learned in school and the war, Mahone and others sincerely believed, perhaps naively, in the power of what they saw as

American democracy. Appealing to his “white friends the loyal hearted American citizens of the State of Arizona,” Mahone hoped to achieve equal rights for the Hualapai.<sup>69</sup> Having served his country and now armed with an education, it was time “to carry out the sufferage Indian in a busines [*sic*] manner and civilize them thru my education.”<sup>70</sup> The first step was having a representative group of Hualapais who could speak for the tribe. Others echoed Mahone. Richard McGee, the secretary and treasurer of the association and the object of so much of Light’s scorn, was also a returned student, and to him the biggest problem was the inability of the Indian Service to concede any power to educated Indians. What, he wondered, had been the point of their education?<sup>71</sup> And Roger Havatone, another member of Mahone’s circle, angrily appealed to “our true hearted white friends of America.” He wanted them to know that: “we are not free people. We are prisoners.” The Hualapais’ subordinate position made no sense to Havatone because “we were here first befor [*sic*] any whites came to this country.” Havatone, tongue-in-cheek, wondered: “Who was that person discovered America first and meet Indians on that country [?] [H]e did not brought any Indians along with him to this Country from other Countries across the ocean.” By Havatone’s reckoning, the fact that Indians were here first gave them the “right to bring this matter [of others claiming the reservation land] up before some one...who are working to help to get back my rights or the Indians rights on the reservation.” Havatone lamented that as a result of having had their land alienated, their attempts at improving the reservation thwarted, and their rights compromised, “we are all depressed.” Continuing, he declared that “we Indians are greatly suffered by these undesirable matter of rights and we raised our hands and called our white brothers to help us, for we help the white people when the world wars is going on.” They had offered their aid, and, in return, hoped for “great help from our true hearted white friends of America.”<sup>72</sup>

But the Hualapais’ declarations of independence and demands for rights were ignored. William Light mocked them, calling their protests simply “complaints of creatures so small mentally” that they were hardly worthy of reply. Mahone fared the worst. Light dismissed him as “so unwise, so brainless, and so much of a fool.” Allegiance to the MIF and his “miserable use of English” marked Mahone “brainless,” an Indian whom the government had wasted thousands on, his education and training as a soldier all for naught. But worse, his attitude toward the government—the same government, Light intoned, that had done everything in its power for Mahone and the Hualapai—was traitorous. Mahone, in fact, had sunk “his record as a soldier into the slimy ooze of treason.”<sup>73</sup>

Like the Mission Indian Federation in California, Mahone and the American Wallapai and Supai Indian Association were a threat to BIA control. They scared William A. Light, and his fear fueled threats: “I will say further, if these Indians do not use their reservation, live upon it, and cease their indolence, gambling, and immorality, they deserve to lose it, and it should be opened for settlement by men who would use it, and make good homes thereon.”<sup>74</sup>

\* \* \*

The influences on Mahone were myriad, but several stand out. Fred Mahone's contact with the radical Mission Indian Federation energized him, preparing him to come home ready to fight. For the first time he saw Indians organized and politicized, and their influence is clear. Equally influential was his service in the war. Fighting for America was a lifelong source of pride, but it was also a wellspring of entitlement. His country owed him, and he expected the debt to be paid. Finally, after his long absence, alliances with Hualapai elders allowed him to learn about long-brewing frustrations—anger over the presence of the railroad and ranchers, for example—and to gather support by already established and influential leaders.

It was already clear that the MIF inspired Mahone, but what about his service? Because being a soldier meant so much to him, Mahone was likely pleased by the funerals of two other Hualapai soldiers, Sam Swaskegame and Clarence W. Watson, both buried in 1921. Watson died of measles before shipping out to Europe; Swaskegame was killed in France. In a cross-cultural affair that Fred Mahone likely attended, Swaskegame's body was given a hero's welcome.<sup>75</sup> Residents of Kingman helped to plan the homecoming; Hualapais and Anglos joined together to hold a funeral at Kingman's Methodist church in a service that combined Christian and Hualapai funeral rites. And in honor of Swaskegame, the American Legion in Kingman named its post in his honor; the name remains today.<sup>76</sup>

The funeral in Kingman came at an auspicious time, and is remembered today as a turning point in Hualapai history.<sup>77</sup> Mahone's involvement with the MIF was at its height, and his new group was still young. Excited by the prospect of organizing the Hualapai, and homing in on the tribe's single most important struggle—regaining their land from the railroad—the joint Anglo/Hualapai funeral signaled a changed climate. After all, the funeral honored a Hualapai veteran, such as himself. In death, whites and Hualapais honored Sam Swaskegame for his service; in life, Fred Mahone wanted the same respect. The funeral in Kingman was not an isolated incident. Returned soldiers, both living and dead, were feted across the country; American Legion posts sprang up on Indian reservations; and funerals combining Indian and non-Indian rituals were not uncommon.<sup>78</sup> In some respects, Fred came back to a new world: Indians were honored by whites, and they were organized.

Hualapai elders furthered Fred's politicization. Having already made an alliance with Kate Crozier by 1921, Mahone needed to reach out to others. And while it is not possible from existing evidence to learn just how Mahone enlisted them, it is clear that he did in fact make alliances with some Hualapai elders. In 1922, Jim Mahone, Fred's uncle, applied for a pension. Reported to be 120 years old when he died in 1949, Jim Mahone was a revered elder who had served under Generals George Crook and Nelson Miles in the army's hunt for Geronimo in the 1880s. Jim Mahone's service in the fight against the Apache was a mark of pride, as it was for all of the Hualapai scouts and eventually the tribe—portraits of the Hualapai scouts now hang prominently in the Peach Springs school. One of Mahone's most prized possessions was a letter of introduction of sorts written by an army major on Mahone's behalf vouch-

ing for his good character. Crook apparently said, “no braver man ever trod shoe leather.”<sup>79</sup> Mahone carried it with him everywhere. While Mahone’s pride may have run deep, his memory of specifics was shallow, and he no longer remembered precisely whom he served under or who was in his unit. Nor could his name be found on the muster rolls. To receive a pension one must prove service, and much of the evidence pointed in that direction, such as the corroborating testimony of fellow scouts. But the pension bureau denied Mahone’s request, for despite his testimony and that of others, no definite record of his service could be found.<sup>80</sup>

Fred Mahone likely knew of the denial. And while he never specifically alluded to the incident, it is plausible that it angered him. The ex-scouts’ army service was an exceptionally important part of their identity as Hualapai men and leaders. To have the fact denied that Jim Mahone had served the country, was unjust. In the context of all that was happening on the reservation, including Fred’s newfound patriotism, the formation of the American Wallapai and Supai Indian Association, and reservation-wide disenchantment with William Light, it is likely the denial angered him. Jim Mahone was not the only Hualapai elder that might have influenced young Fred. Jim Fielding, another former scout, one-time reservation police officer, and important leader of the Hualapai, had a memory that stretched back before contact, when “we were all Indians.”<sup>81</sup> He knew that times had changed, however. Young Indians now went to school “to make them capable of competing with the whites.” And despite his disapproval, sending children away to school had had a pleasing effect on some of the students. They came home having learned a valuable lesson: “some of the boys [that] have been sent away to school, they have discovered many things are wrong.”<sup>82</sup> Whether or not he was referring to Fred Mahone is unknown, but Mahone’s activism resonated with Fielding and they were soon allies.

A third Hualapai elder, Steve Leve Leve, the official, but not de facto, leader of the Hualapai, lent Mahone’s cause critical support. Aligning himself with a hereditary leader (Steve Leve Leve was the son of the important nineteenth-century band leader Leve Leve) was a shrewd move.<sup>83</sup> For Mahone’s activism to have an impact on the Hualapai it would need the sanction of a recognized leader; Mahone could not simply thrust himself into that role, despite his eagerness to do so. And now that at least some Hualapai elders approved of his work, with their sanction Mahone’s political career was firmly underway.

With solid backing from Fielding, Leve Leve, the elder Mahone, and Kate Crozier Fred Mahone’s activism did not go unnoticed for long. With the tense summer over and the fall having just begun, Mahone was already known as a troublemaker. Marked as a source of unrest among Colorado River region Indians, the government began to monitor him. His letters and statements to the BIA about Indian rights, conditions on the Hualapai Reservation, and information regarding the formation of the American Wallapai and Supai Association made their way from Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles Burke to the assistant US Attorney in Los Angeles. His missives were used as evidence in the case pending against Jonathan Tibbet.<sup>84</sup>



Unhappy with William Light and unable to get him to take them seriously, in December 1921, Steve Leve Leve and Fred Mahone asked the commissioner of Indian Affairs to send an inspector to the reservation to look into Light's management of cattle sales. Commissioner Charles Burke showed little interest; until the Hualapai fleshed out their vague petition with the particulars of Light's malfeasance, the BIA would not act.<sup>85</sup> But they pushed on, renewed their demands, and petitioned the government again in 1922. This time Leve Leve and Mahone drafted a petition and got it signed or thumb-marked by one hundred others. They demanded to know just how the Santa Fe Railroad Company got possession of the Hualapais' land and water; asked that the Hualapai be given total control of the reservation; and ordered all non-Indian ranchers out of Hualapai country. Four years earlier, two of these three demands—getting rid of the ranchers and ceding control of the reservation to the Hualapai—had figured prominently in Mahone's letter from Michigan. Now, with the aid of the American Wallapai Association and of Hualapai leaders like Leve Leve and Jim Fielding, Mahone could begin to carry out his plans.<sup>86</sup>

The BIA disregarded their complaints, and matters only got worse on the reservation. A group of Hualapais now accused Light of cheating them out of the proceeds from cattle sales. And early in the new year, Light was assaulted. Meeting in his office on the school grounds, Mary Tokespeta, to her mind the rightful recipient of any money earned from the sale of the cattle of her former husband, Dude Ross, made her case to Light. Rejecting her initial appeal, Light tried to convince her that an heirship hearing would have to be held. Jim Fielding, elder and reservation policeman, intervened. Siding with Tokespeta, he urged Light to skip the hearing, pay her, and avoid tangling with the BIA. According to Hualapai rules of inheritance, if the cattle had been hers when she married Dude Ross—cattle could be owned by both men and women in a Hualapai marriage—then they became hers again when the union ended in divorce or death.<sup>87</sup> Light refused and the confrontation turned violent. They argued at length. In the thick of their exchange Tokespeta struck Light in the back. From his telling, one imagines Light crumpled on the floor, flattened by her blow, pleading in vein for Fielding to arrest her. On his own now, Light tossed her out of the office. And once outside, in rapid succession, first her husband attacked, and then she did, hitting him several more times. They wanted their money. Fielding only watched. After the brief melee was over, Light collected himself and suspended Fielding, declaring him useless as a policeman.<sup>88</sup> Believing Light's story, Burke backed him and had Fielding fired.<sup>89</sup> The incident shook Light; he lost confidence in a once-trusted ally and was subjected to a severe reprisal for his duties as superintendent.

What had caused Fielding to abandon Light? Fred Mahone. Fielding was "well coached" by Mahone, according to Light.<sup>90</sup> The pair were now the "self styled and self constituted leaders" of the Hualapai.<sup>91</sup>

Light was losing control. Needing proof that Fred Mahone was "guilty of violating the law against interfering with the duties of a Superintendent of an Indian reservation," he pleaded with the BIA to send a "Secret Service repre-



sentative, or some other Officer” to spy on Mahone. The unrest on the reservation caused Light to characterize Mahone’s gang as “the most insolent and ugly spirited Indians, I have ever met in the Service.” The uppity Indians, Light averred, “have been trained by transient miners, who were I.W.W.’s, socialists, and communists, and by this man Mahone, whom your office has cautioned as to his conduct.” As a result of their actions “they should be severely punished for their attitude toward the Government, the local officers, and the Indian Office.”<sup>92</sup>

Despite Commissioner Burke’s dismissal of the Hualapais’ initial complaints, the fight got his attention, and he dispatched an inspector to the reservation. Traveling auditor L. E. Murphy, charged with looking into the cattle sales but not the more general unrest, arrived on the reservation in mid-February 1922. He reached a conclusion quickly: Light had not intentionally done anything wrong, but had merely mishandled the proceeds from the fall 1921 cattle sale.<sup>93</sup>

While he found that Light had scrupulously accounted for all the sales and had come up with a plan for how to distribute the funds, Murphy nonetheless chided him for the way he handled the sale. But that was it. He largely dismissed the Hualapais’ concerns. Learning that Mahone and Fielding had been the source of so much of the trouble, he sought them out. But when asked, neither Mahone nor Fielding would offer any specific information as to Light’s wrongdoing, and they both refused to sign anything attesting to Light’s alleged malfeasance. The investigation ended there: Murphy left and Light was exonerated.<sup>94</sup>

Conditions deteriorated. And in the fall, the BIA dispatched another inspector to Hualapai country, this time to investigate the unrest unleashed by the MIF. When John Atwater came to the reservation in October 1922, Hualapai political unity was beginning to cohere. Atwater stayed three weeks, and quickly discovered that the fight with the railroad, control of the reservation, the ejection of Anglo ranchers, and the dismissal of William A. Light were at the top of the Hualapais’ agenda. Led by Fred Mahone, a good man, Atwater surmised, but “obsessed with Utopian dreams for his people,” the Hualapai were at a turning point, rallying around a set of issues for the first time. Their political awakening was just beginning, but some older Hualapais, like Indian Beecher, already knew what they wanted: “We want no white people to use this land anymore.”<sup>95</sup>

Jim Fielding was angry. Speaking to a group of Hualapais in the fall of 1922, reminding them that “with the increase in cattle we will soon need all of the range very much,” Fielding advocated ridding the reservation of Anglo ranchers. Money earned from their leases mysteriously made its way to Washington, never to be seen again; non-Indian cattle crowded the reservation herd; and, at times, stray Hualapai livestock was not returned, spirited away by Anglo ranchers, Fielding suggested. Fielding’s idea was simple: Allow the Hualapai to run their own cattle operation on a reservation that was entirely theirs. Fielding had used his influence with the BIA just before World War I to get the cattle operation running; now he wanted the Hualapai to control it.<sup>96</sup>

Hualapai political activity began to coalesce around what Fred Mahone called their “foremost urgent need,” the need to foment “action to prevent the Santa Fe from acquiring title to the land in the Walapai reservation.”<sup>97</sup> And, because it was possible that they might find refuge in the courts, they did what any property owner would do if their land was threatened: they hired a lawyer, Washington attorney Everett Du Four, who, poetically enough, lived on John Marshall Place.<sup>98</sup> Fred Mahone, Jim Fielding, and Steve Leve Leve, supported by ninety-seven male members of the tribe who either signed or gave their thumbprint to the contract with Du Four, laid out in explicit detail their demands and grievances. Mahone drafted the documents and decided to bypass the BIA, electing instead to try to enlist the support of Arizona’s congressional delegation. He hoped that he could count on them to help expose “the ill treatment accorded [the] Walapai Indians and in helping to secure for them their rights which have been withheld.”<sup>99</sup> The petition articulated for the first time the issues that would power the Hualapai political engine for the next generation: a secure title to their land and control of the water at Peach Springs, as well as all proceeds from grazing and mining leases.

Documenting the various non-Indian uses of the reservation, Mahone made clear that non-Hualapais profited from their land; he thought the tribe should share in the bounty.<sup>100</sup> Mahone, Jim Fielding, and others believed that Light routinely ignored them, squandering any money earned from leases. By getting rid of Light and securing title, the Hualapai hoped to gain total independence. They wanted to manage their own affairs on the land that “Chester A. Arthur set aside and reserved for the use and occupancy of the Hualapai Indians.... It is our desire to make this tract our everlasting home for ourselves and our future generations.”<sup>101</sup>

Their greatest wish was to be free to do with their land as they saw fit. For forty years every agent had denied them their rights. According to the tribe’s petition, a three-pronged assault had been waged on the Hualapai: the individual agents did not take care of them; the railroad claimed land that was not theirs; and the money from leasing went to the government, not to the Hualapais where it belonged. Mahone declared: “We want to be as AMERICANS are, free to develop our resources, as a community, and to hold as community property, our reservation.”<sup>102</sup>

Mahone invoked the government’s promise of land to the Hualapai and, for the first time, played on the historical relationship between the government and the tribe. According to Mahone, when the army “sent out a call or official order for all Wallapai Indians to meet,” they did so willingly and made peace, amicably ending hostilities. And when they were asked to scout against the Apache, they agreed to do so with no protest. Mahone condensed many years of Hualapai and government relations into a page and a half and in the process left out what has come to be called the Walapai war, fought between 1866 and 1869. Mahone wanted to relinquish what he thought of as the “savage” past, but in truth the Hualapai had been formidable enemies of the army. Hostilities lasted several years. In 1869, the army defeated the Hualapai.<sup>103</sup> Afterwards, they made peace with the government. Fred called their truce “a treaty of brotherhood with the Whites.” (The Hualapai have no

formal treaty with the government.) Bound to abide by American law, the Hualapai made “friends with the white people.” Shortly after coming to peace their new friends had needed them, for according to Mahone “conditions were bad. Apache Indians were on the war path killing government mail carriers and committing many depredations.” The army’s solution was to call out the Hualapai to “clean up the country and rid it of hostile Indians.” That done the government decided the “Wallapai Indians were to have the privilege of education which meant the Americanization of the Wallapai Indians of to-day.”<sup>104</sup>

Out of this came a new world, at least as Mahone saw it. As a result of their “treaty of brotherhood,” and in return for their service as scouts, they were given a reservation. Mahone looked back in time and saw this as the moment in which the modern Hualapai emerged. And now they were the “American Wallapai Indian Tribe,” in possession of rights the US government was bound to respect. But they were hindered from “advancing with equal rights, such as the new civilization includes for others.”<sup>105</sup> In Mahone’s vision of the “new civilization,” commencing with the “treaty of brotherhood,” the Hualapai were bound to become Americans; but the government was also committed to honor the Hualapais’ most basic right, the right to their property.<sup>106</sup> If allowed to have their entire reservation, the Hualapai “shall advance in the new civilization in sociality [*sic*], politically or as a citizen not a ward.”<sup>107</sup>

Fred Mahone created a new historical consciousness for the Hualapai. Events in the past took on a new meaning; or, rather, they were *given* meaning and put to use in the present. Fred’s use of history corresponded with his modernism, his belief that allegiance to the primitive past was crippling. Grasping that a past marked by peace and cooperation could be used as a tool in the present, and as one of the few literate, educated Hualapais, Fred Mahone had great power. Though he was not alone in crafting a Hualapai past, he more than anyone articulated that past to the outside world. His reverence for his elders, at least as far as can be documented, likely went a long way in determining what was important in Hualapai history. Scouting, for one, clearly meant a great deal to the older men of the tribe, but Fred also knew its political value.

When Fred Mahone and the Hualapai united, harnessed history, and demanded protection of their reservation, their modern history began. It was 1923, and what he began to imagine in 1918 was coming to fruition. By 1923, despite the changes in tactics and leadership and the bitter rivalries that would mark future Hualapai politics, the modern Hualapai tribe had formed. For the next twenty years they would, as a tribe, fight the Santa Fe Railroad for the title to their reservation.

## CONCLUSION

Over time, Fred Mahone’s reverence for the Hualapai past grew; it changed from a simple story about Hualapai scouting to a narrative with more depth, one that reached into the precontact past. Eventually, he came to see that the Hualapais’ claim to their land was not based on their service to the US army,

but on something much more important: the fact that they had occupied the land since time immemorial. In the spring of 1942, after largely prevailing in the Supreme Court the previous December, Fred Mahone wrote to Felix Cohen, the Hualapais' primary advocate. The Hualapai "country," Mahone told Cohen, "was marked and bounded by ... ancient laws and rulings. These laws and rulings, only made in mouth words, [are] just as powerful as the present white mans Western laws and rulings." How had it come to be that "western laws and rulings" prevailed and Hualapai "mouth words" did not? Mahone answered the question with a rare bit of sarcasm born out of frustration, providing an illustration of how absurd he thought the Indians' predicament was:

It was as if the Hualapais should go across the Ocean and come to small groups of nations and say: I discover a new country; a new people. Now, I have my laws and rulings; I have the right to put up notices on certain water and land, saying: this is my right, and it is my own. Now, you go away. And keep this up until every water hole or spring or stream, and all the land is taken away from people situated like the Hualapais are.<sup>108</sup>

Fred Mahone embraced the Hualapais' deep history, but he rejected the primitive antimodernism espoused by the Society of American Indians. To be sure, Charles Eastman, Arthur C. Parker, Zitkala-Sa, and others did more than proffer a quaint, romantic view of Indian people. Zitkala-Sa, for her part, spent a good deal of the 1920s and 1930s as a political activist.<sup>109</sup> And, of course, Mahone was not the only Indian who realized outward symbols of Indianness might need to be traded for "civilized" dress in order to gain respect in the political arena.<sup>110</sup>

But in the immediate post-war years, as the Society of American Indians faded into obscurity, Indians hidden on reservations, whose deeds and words are buried in archives and memories, formed the vanguard of a new movement: reservation-based radicalism. It would be people like Mahone, not Parker, that effected real change in Indian country. Indians like Mahone spent the inter-war years at home developing the tactics necessary to build a truly substantial and effective pan-Indian movement, a movement that would flourish after the Second World War. The "warriors with attaché cases" that were in the vanguard of post-war Indian politics rejected anti-modernism.<sup>111</sup>

#### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Ronald "Man" Susanyatame for facilitating interviews during two trips to Peach Springs, as well as for many, many hours of conversation concerning Hualapai politics and history. Many thanks also to Mark Carey, John Mack Faragher, Aaron Sachs, Jeff Shepard, Adriane Smith, Tanis Thorne, and Stephanie Tatel for reading this essay. For financial assistance I would like to thank the Howard Lamar Center for the Study of Frontiers and Borders, the Program in Agrarian Studies at Yale, and the American Philosophical Society for a grant from Phillips Fund for Native American Research.

## NOTES

1. Fred W. Mahone to Cato Sells, CIA, 29 July 1918, Central Classified Files (CCF) 66662-18-823-Truxton Canyon, Box 49, Record Group (RG) 75, NA.

2. For antimodernism in general, although it leaves out Indians as subjects and objects, see T. J. Jackson Lears, *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880–1920* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981; reprint, University of Chicago Press, 1994). For antimodernity and Indians see Philip J. Deloria, “Natural Indians and Identities of Modernity,” in *Playing Indian* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

3. Fred W. Mahone to Cato Sells, CIA, 29 July 1918, CCF 66662-18-823-Truxton Canyon, Box 49, RG 75, NA.

4. Ibid.

5. For more on Hualapai history and social organization see footnote 65 and accompanying text.

6. Author interview with Benedict and Lydia Beecher, 24 September 2002, Peach Springs, Arizona. Ronald “Man” Susanyatame, translator. Man helped with all interviews, save two.

7. The profiles so deftly sketched out by historians such as David Rich Lewis, Loretta Fowler, Frederick Hoxie, and Melissa Meyer, among others, of educated Indians who both frustrate and facilitate interactions between Anglos and Indians, and gain positions of leadership, are models for this article. David Rich Lewis, “Reservation Leadership and the Progressive-Traditional Dichotomy: William Wash and the Northern Utes, 1865–1928,” *Ethnohistory* 38, 2 (1991): 124–148; Melissa Meyer, “Warehouses and Sharks: The Social and Economic Basis of Political Factionalism,” in Meyer, *The White Earth Tragedy: Ethnicity and Dispossession at a Minnesota Anishinabe Reservation, 1889–1920* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994); for an excellent profile of a contemporaneous leader, who as a returned student has interesting parallels to Mahone, see Frederick E. Hoxie and Timothy Bernardis, “Yellowtail: Crow,” in *The New Warriors: Native American Leaders Since 1900*, ed. David R. Edmunds (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 55–77; for a fuller treatment of Robert Yellowtail within the context of Crow history see Hoxie, *Parading Through History: The Making of the Crow Nation in America, 1805–1935* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Loretta Fowler, “Political Middlemen and the Headman Tradition among the Twentieth Century Gros Ventre of Fort Belknap Reservation,” *Journal of the West* 23, 3 (1984): 54–64; in the same issue see Walter L. Williams, “Twentieth Century Indian Leaders: Brokers and Providers,” 3–6; on the culture broker see Margaret Szasz, ed., *Between Indian and White Worlds: The Cultural Broker* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994); R. David Edmunds, ed., *American Indian Leaders: Studies in Diversity* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980).

8. This assessment of Mahone was reached in the early 1930s and will be fleshed out further in my dissertation. Christian W. McMillen, “Making Indian Law, Rewriting History: The Origins of Modern Federal Indian Law and the Birth of Indian Activism between the World Wars,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, expected completion spring 2004.

9. Author interview with Ben Beecher, 25 May 2001, Peach Springs, Arizona. See also author interview with Mabelene Mahone and Ardith Bell, Fred Mahone’s daughters, 5 June 2002, Phoenix, Arizona.

10. Mahone to Jonathan Steere, President of the Indian Rights Association, 13 March 1931, reel 47, Papers of the Indian Rights Association, microfilm edition.

11. On the myriad problems returned students faced see David Wallace Adams, *Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875–1928* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 292–306.

12. Mahone to Cato Sells, 29 July 1918.

13. As an example of this trend see Frederick E. Hoxie, ed., *Talking Back to Civilization: Indian Voices of the Progressive Era* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001). I greatly admire Hoxie's work, and this is an excellent collection. I point to this volume simply as an example of the tendency to present Parker et al. as *the* voices of Indians in the Progressive era.

14. Felix Cohen to Alfred L. Kroeber, 25 February 1942, box 1, Entry 824, Records Concerning U.S. v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company, RG 48, NA. On Mahone's experience as similar to others see Frederick E. Hoxie, "Exploring a Cultural Borderland: Native American Journeys of Discovery in the Early Twentieth Century," *Journal of American History* 79, 3 (1992): 969–995, quote on 989.

15. Details about Fred Mahone's life are from Fred Mahone to (recipient unknown) 28 January 1921, Central Classified Files (CCF) 34163-21-175, part I, General Service, box 447, RG 75, NA. According to Mahone, he was at Chilocco for three and a half years, but then says his dates of enrollment were 9 December 1914 to 15 December 1917. The discrepancy is slight, but worth mentioning. I have tracked Mahone's life via Hualapai census material, reels 580–581, Indian Census Rolls, 1885–1940, microfilm publication 595, RG 75, NA. See also obituary for Fred Ward Mahone in *Gum-U*, Hualapai Newsletter, March 1971, 1. See also a copy of Mahone's Honorable Discharge and Enlistment Record, which has his age at time of enlistment as twenty-nine, Papers of the Indians Rights Association, reel 46. These dates mean that Mahone would have been twenty-six when he went to Chilocco. This seems old, but I have found nothing to contradict this information.

16. "In the Council Tepee: Following the Flag," *Indian School Journal: An Illustrated Monthly Magazine About Native Americans* (monthly Chilocco newsletter), September 1917, 583. By November 1918, 131 former Chilocco students were in the armed forces. See "Chilocco Students Who Have Answered their Country's Call," *Indian School Journal*, November 1918, 124.

17. Mahone enlisted on 9 February 1918. Card File Relating to Indians in World War I, 1916-20, entry 977B, box 11, RG 75, NA.

18. Hazel W. Hertzberg, *The Search for an American Indian Identity: Modern Pan-Indian Movements* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971), 36, 72–74. On the ideology of assimilation see Frederick E. Hoxie, *A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880–1920* (University of Nebraska, 1984; reprint, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 239–244; on political activism, pan-Indianism, and the boarding school experience see Stephen Cornell, *The Return of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), especially 110–118. On the SAI, Cornell, and other historians follow Hertzberg.

19. Hertzberg argues that the decline of pan-Indianism should be blamed on the general demise in the reform spirit that had characterized the Progressive Era, but had vanished in the 1920s. As an external factor this might be true; see Hertzberg, *Search for an American Indian Identity*, 209.



20. This is not to say nonexistent. For one example of the SAI's influence in western Washington see Alexandra Harmon, *Indians in the Making: Ethnic Relations and Indian Identities around Puget Sound* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 178–179.

21. For “bridge figures” see Deloria, *Playing Indian*, 122; On the SAI and its leaders like Charles Eastman and Arthur C. Parker and the version of Indianness they fed to America—both Indian and non-Indian—see Deloria, *Playing Indian*, 122–125. On this aspect of Parker's life and its impact on the SAI, see also Joy Porter, *To Be an Indian: The Life of Iroquois-Seneca Arthur Caswell Parker* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), 91–142.

22. Parker quoted in Hertzberg, *The Search for an American Indian Identity*, 57.

23. Arthur C. Parker, “The Red Man is not a Tanned Mongolian,” *Indian School Journal*, March 1915, 269 (emphasis in original).

24. Philip Deloria puts it this way: “. . . Arthur C. Parker, Charles Alexander Eastman, and many others also wanted to become bridge figures, using antimodern primitivism to defend native cultures against the negative stereotypes left over from colonial conquest.” *Playing Indian*, 122.

25. Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876–1917* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 209.

26. Editorial from the first issue of *The Quarterly Journal* 1, 1 (1913), quoted in Hertzberg, *Search for an American Indian Identity*, 103.

27. Chief Francisco Patencio, as told to Margaret Boynton, “Speech Making in Minneapolis,” in *Stories and Legends of the Palm Springs Indians* (Los Angeles: Times-Mirror, 1943), 64–66.

28. *Indigenismo*, a non-Indian discourse, sought to celebrate Indians' good qualities while dragging them into the modern world. *Indigenismo* and antimodernism are, in many respects, strikingly similar. For a review of the literature, which suggests fruitful comparisons between the US and the rest of the Americas, see Mark Carey, “The Legacy of Race in Latin America: *Indigenismo* in Peru and Mexico” (University of California at Davis, seminar paper, 15 June 2001); for Australia see Patrick Wolfe “On Being Woken Up: The Dreamtime in Anthropology and in Australian Settler Discourse,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 33, 2 (1991): 197–224; and “Repressive Authenticity,” in *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event*, ed. Patrick Wolfe (London: Cassell, 1999).

29. Both quotes from Arthur C. Parker, “The Legal Status of the Indian,” *The Red Man* 4, 10 (1912): 461–463.

30. Arthur C. Parker, “Problems of Race Assimilation in America, with Special Reference to the American Indian,” *Quarterly Journal of the Society of American Indians* 4, 2 (October–December 1916): 285–304, quote on 301 (emphasis mine).

31. Mahone to Sells, 29 July 1918.

32. K. Tsianina Lomawaima, *They Called it Prairie Light: The Story of Chilocco Indian School* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 11.

33. Lomawaima found that over one hundred Chilocco students went to the war, *They Called It Prairie Light*, 21. Russel Barsh found that almost all eligible men from boarding schools went to war, and 90 percent of them were volunteers. Russel Lawrence Barsh, “American Indians in the Great War,” *Ethnohistory* 38, 3 (1991): 276–303, comment on 278. The high rate of volunteerism was noted at the time, too. An



editorial in the *Dallas News* claimed 85 percent of Indians in the armed forces were volunteers; "Their Country," *Dallas News*, 18 February 1918, quoted in the *Indian School Journal*, March 1918. On the ways in which Indians made it into the army, especially the citizenship requirement, see Thomas A. Britten, "The Draft and Enlistment of American Indians," in *American Indians in World War I: At Home and Abroad* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997), 51–72. Britten notes the difficulties associated with figuring an exact volunteer to draftee ratio, but settles for a roughly 50/50 split (199, note 29).

34. Fred Mahone to the *Indian School Journal*, 4 August 1918; *Indian School Journal*, September 1918, 28, including photograph.

35. Britten, *American Indians in World War I*, see especially quotes on 173 from veterans on the transformative effects of the wartime service. See also Barsh, "American Indians in the Great War," 296–297. For the effects of the war more generally see Donald Parman, *Indians and the American West in the Twentieth Century* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 59–66; Michael L. Tate, "From Scout to Doughboy: The National Debate over Integrating American Indians into the Military, 1891–1918," *Western Historical Quarterly* 17, 4 (1986): 417–438. Not all Indians embraced the war; indeed some protested Indian enlistment with great vigor. See David L. Wood, "Gosiute-Shoshone Draft Resistance, 1917–18," *Utah Historical Quarterly* 49, 2 (1981): 173–188; Eric M. Zissu, "Conscription, Sovereignty, and Land: American Indian Resistance During World War I," *Pacific Historical Review* 64, 4 (1995): 537–566.

36. Thomas Britten discusses the image of the Indian warrior in WWI at length in *American Indians in WWI*, see especially "American Indians as 'Doughboys': The Influence of Stereotypes," 99–115.

37. Cato Sells, *Salt Lake City News*, 13 February 1918, quoted in Barsh, "American Indians in the Great War," 292.

38. For a thoughtful analysis of Parker on education see Hazel W. Hertzberg, "Nationality, Anthropology, and pan-Indianism in the Life of Arthur C. Parker (Seneca)," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 123, 1 (1979): 59.

39. Parker had a deep affinity for his tribe, the Seneca, but also seemed to disdain the provincialism of tribal identity. In the years after his affiliation with the SAI ended, he embraced tribalism.

40. Parker, quoted in Hertzberg, *The Search for an American Indian Identity*, 62.

41. Details of Mahone's time at Valparaiso University from Mel Doering, Valparaiso University archivist, personal communication to author, 13 February 2002.

42. Inspectors E. B. Linnen and T. B. Roberts wrote to CIA Burke in July that "The majority of these southern Mission Indians are under the spell and control of this man Tibbet..." Linnen and Roberts to Burke, 12 July 1921, file #216628, straight numerical files, box 3586, RG 60 (Department of Justice), NA. For the support of the MIF and the general disruption its leader, Jonathan Tibbet, caused among the Mission Indians see George W. Armijo, "General Conditions," 5, Inspection Report, 2 October 1921, CCF 82891-1923-150-Mission, box 12, RG 75, NA.

43. On the Board see E. M. Sweet, Inspection Report, 19 January 1921, Inspection Reports, 1908–40, Inspection Division, entry 953, box 42, RG 75, NA; see also their newspaper, *The California Indian Herald*.

44. *Ibid.*, 9. On the early influence of Tibbet and the beginnings of the MIF see Sweet Report, 19 January 1921. Sweet thought Tibbet an "unscrupulous impostor and

a flagrant criminal." See E. M. Sweet, Jr., Inspection Report, 9 May 1921, CCF 86894-1920-150-Mission, box 12; for an outline of the MIF's goals see Walter Robert Baggs, "An Unfortunate Kind of Leadership: Jonathan Tibbet and the Mission Indian Federation" (M.A. thesis, University of California at Riverside, 1978), 35.

45. Testimony of Jonathan Tibbet, 26 May 1920, in "Indians of the United States: Investigation of the Field Service, Hearing by a Subcommittee of the Committee on Indian Affairs," vol. 3, House of Representatives, H. 231, Pt.3-9.

46. This is not to say that the MIF had no use for activists like Montezuma or that they did not share some, if not many, of the same values and goals. Montezuma published essays in *The Indian: A Runner from Tribe to Tribe: The Magazine of the Mission Indian Federation*. On Montezuma see Hertzberg, *The Search for an American Indian Identity*, and Peter C. Iverson, *Carlos Montezuma and the Changing World of American Indians* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982); for Montezuma's views on the reservation system see Carlos Montezuma, "The Indian Reservation System," *Quarterly Journal of the Society of American Indians* 1, 3 (July-September 1913): 359-360, and "The Reservation is Fatal to the Development of Good Citizenship," *Quarterly Journal of the Society of American Indians* 2, 1 (January-March 1914): 64-68; on the MIF and the climate of discontent in Southern California see Tanis C. Thorne, "On the Fault Line: Political Violence at Campo Fiesta and National Reform in Indian Policy," *Journal of California and Great Basin Anthropology* 21, 2 (1999): 182-212; and John Collier, "The Mission Indians The Mission Indian Federation, and the Allegations of Mr. Purl Williams and Mr. Adam Castillo," no date, but sometime in 1933, CCF 33247-33-155-Mission Agency, part 1, folder 2/3, box 16, RG 75, NA. This document gives a short history of the organization from the perspective of Collier and suggests the BIA's continued anxiety over the MIF. See also "The Story of the Mission Indian Federation, by its President [Adam Castillo]," in "Fact-Finding Study of Social and Economic Conditions of Indians of San Diego County, California and Reports from Specialists in Allied Fields," folder 24-Mission Indians of California, Study of Social Conditions, box 47, RG 46 (Records of the U.S. Congress), Records of the Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, 1928-1953, Center for Legislative Archives, National Archives.

47. For information on the fall meeting of the Indian Board of Cooperation see E. M. Sweet, Jr., Inspection Report, 9 May 1921, CCF 86894-1920-150-Mission, box 12; for the Tibbet meetings see Armijo report and Sweet report of 19 January 1921. For the spring meeting see also "Indians Ask for Rights" 24 April 1921, *Los Angeles Times*, A1, 4. The article reported that Indians came from the Grand Canyon country to the meeting.

48. Light to CIA, 17 June 1921, CCF 34163-21-175-General Service, Part I, Box 447, RG 75, NA.

49. On Mojave interest in the MIF see W. E. Thackrey, Supt. at Fort Mojave School, 14 June 1921, CCF 34163-21-175-General Service, Part I, box 447, RG 75, NA.

50. David E. Ruppert, *Lake Mead National Recreation Area: An Ethnographic Overview* (Tucson: National Park Service, Western Archeological Center, 1976), see especially "Lake Mead Inter-Ethnic Social Organization."

51. Tibbet first inquired about visiting the mission reservations in 1917; the superintendent at Pala gave him permission to do so. See Richard Maxfield Thomas, "The Mission Indians: A Study of Leadership and Culture Change" (Ed.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1964), 87. Ironically, and probably much to his chagrin,

their tour of Indian reservations in the region had been facilitated by Arizona Representative Carl Hayden, who later would fight the Hualapai and their land claim. But in 1920 he was eager to grant Tibbet's wish to have "freedom of the reservations." And in doing so he made it possible for the MIF message to spread throughout the region unabated. Tibbet to Hayden, 28 February 1920; Hayden to Cato Sells, 5 March 1920, CCF 4840-20-121-Malki, box 1, RG 75, NA.

52. On the BIA's fear of the MIF see Burke to SOI Albert Fall, [illegible] July 1921; Fall to Attorney General, 21 July 1921; "very unfortunate uprising" in Raymond Benjamin, Asst. Dist. Atty. to AG, telegram, 2 August 1921 all in #216628, box 3586, RG 60, NA. The indictment was for violating section 2113 of the revised statutes, "Attempt to Alienate the Confidence of the Indians from the Government of the United States." The case eventually became Criminal Case 2979, US v. Jonathan Tibbet, Joe Pete, J. H. Jones and F.U.S. Hughes, United States District Court for Southern District of California, 1921.

53. Joseph Burke, Asst. AG to John W. Crim, Asst. U.S. Atty., 22 March 1922, #216628, box 3586, RG 60, NA.

54. See various documents in file #19803, box 2830, concerning Pete's efforts to resist the BIA's survey of Indian eligibility for service, RG 60, NA.

55. Over the years, the tribe's name has been variously spelled as Hualapai, Walapai, Hualpai, and Wallapai.

56. Details on the formation of the group, such as where they were when they formed, are unknown. Supai was quickly dropped from the group's title. For the date of formation see Statement of Fred Mahone, 28 June 1921; "Human Rights and Home Rule," "With our counselor," and other details in Fred Mahone to Governor Campbell of Arizona and J. Maddock, state highway engineer, 21 July 1921; on the organization of Mahone's group under the by-laws and constitution of the MIF see Mahone to CIA, 29 August 1921, all in CCF 34163-21-175-General Service, Part I, box 447, RG 75, NA.

57. Statement of Fred Mahone 28 June 1921, CCF 34163-21-175-General Service, Part I, box 447, RG 75, NA.

58. Ibid.

59. Burke to Mahone, 28 September 1921, *ibid.*

60. George J. Laten (illegible signature) to CIA, 21 April 1921, CCF 34163-21-175-General Service, Part I, box 447, RG 75, NA.

61. The quote comes from Mahone to Albert B. Fall, Secretary of the Interior, 1 July 1921; he discusses his August discharge in another letter to Fall, 8 July 1921, *ibid.*

62. All quotes and characterizations from Light to CIA, 17 June 1921, CCF 34163-21-175-General Service, Part I, box 447, RG 75, NA.

63. Statement of Fred Mahone, 28 June 1921, CCF 34163-21-175-General Service, Part I, box 447, RG 75, NA.

64. Mahone to Governor Campbell and State Highway Engineer Maddock, 21 July 1921, *ibid.*

65. For the clearest delineation of Hualapai sociopolitical structure see Henry F. Dobyns and Robert C. Euler, *Wauba Yuma's People: The Comparative Socio-Political Structure of the Pai Indians of Arizona* (Prescott, AZ: Prescott College Press, 1970), especially 10–51; on hereditary leadership see "hereditary index," 45. For a more contemporary, but somewhat later look at social structure, using Kate Crozier as informant see Philip Drucker, *Yuman-Piman: Culture Element Distributions: XVII*, Anthropological

Records 6, 3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1941), 132. The question of Hualapai political structure has recently been bitterly debated in a series of five articles in the *American Indian Quarterly*. For the most important points see Timothy Braatz, "The Question of Regional Bands and Subtribes Among the Pre-Conquest Pai (Hualapai and Havasupai) Indians of Northwestern Arizona," *American Indian Quarterly* 22, 1&2 (1999): 1 (pagination to web version). Braatz argues that while the Pai bands did indeed vary they did so along geographical lines, not social or political boundaries. See response to Braatz: Henry F. Dobyns and Robert C. Euler, "Band of Gardeners," *American Indian Quarterly* 23, 3&4 (1999): 1–10 (web version pagination).

66. Eventually, Mahone's tactics proved too alienating. On the importance of local level politics and manifest intricacies see Loretta Fowler, "Local-Level Politics and the Struggle for Self-Government," in *The Struggle for Political Autonomy*, Occasional Papers in Curriculum Series No. 11 (Chicago: Newberry Library, 1989), 125–133, esp. 135 on the "legitimacy of authority and the limits of power."

67. The Pine Springs country to the east of Peach Springs is an example: Between 1882 and 1888 the Hualapai virtually abandoned the area. In 1882 Major J. W. Mason reported that ninety-five individuals were living at Pine Springs; in 1888 G. M. Brayton reported that fifty of the Pine Springs band had left for Peach Springs to work on the railroad. See Major J. W. Mason, Whipple Barracks, Arizona Territory, to Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters, Department of Arizona, 16 June 1882; and GM Brayton to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Arizona, 8 June 1888, both in United States Senate, *Walapai Papers: Historical Reports, Documents, and Extracts from Publications Relating to the Walapai Indians of Arizona*, Sen. Doc. 273, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1936, 264 (hereafter *WP*), 142, 167. On Hualapais as laborers and the consequent moving to towns see Henry F. Dobyns and Robert C. Euler, "The Nine Lives of Cherum, the Pai Tokumhet," *American Indian Quarterly* 22, 3 (1998): 363–386.

68. On leadership see A. L. Kroeber, et al., *Walapai Ethnography*, Memoirs of the American Anthropological Association, no. 42 (Menasha, WI: American Anthropological Association, 1935), 154–156, "good talker" quote from Blind Tom on 156.

69. Statement of Fred Mahone, 28 June 1921, CCF 34163-21-175-General Service, Part I, box 447, RG 75, NA.

70. *Ibid.*

71. Statement of Richard McGee, no date, CCF 34163-21-175, part I, box 447, RG 75, NA. This is the same person mentioned in the text above as Richard Magee. Names were often spelled a variety of ways.

72. Statement of Roger Havatone, 28 June 1921, CCF 34163-21-175, part I, box 447, RG 75, NA.

73. Light to CIA, 25 August 1921, CCF 34163-21-175, part I, box 447, RG 75, NA.

74. *Ibid.*

75. William A. Light, the Hualapai superintendent, wrote on 17 June that he had never met Mahone, but knew that he had been in Kingman "a few weeks ago." Could he have meant late May when the funeral took place? Light to CIA, 17 June 1921, CCF 35163-21-175-General Service, part I, box 447, RG 75, NA.

76. On the events see "Wallapais to Have Big Pow-wow in Memory of Hero," 6 May 1921, and "Wallapais to Hold Big Pow-wow Monday," June 1921, both in *Mohave County Miner*. For an account of Sam Swaskegame's funeral based on interviews with partici-

pants, witnesses, and newspaper accounts see Dick Waters, "The Day Sam Swaskegame Came Home," *Mohave Magazine*, 20 May 1971, 17. It is unclear why Watson is not mentioned in this article. On Swaskegame see "Sam Swaskigamai, Local Indian, Killed in Action," *Mohave County Miner*, 30 November 1918.

77. Dolores Honga's grandfather was present at the funeral and he passed on his stories of the event to her. She remembers when she was growing up in the 1940s, hearing her grandfather and other elders talking about the funeral as a turning point. Author interview with Dolores Honga, 23 September 2002, Peach Springs, AZ.

78. A virtually identical funeral took place in Oklahoma in 1921, when two thousand residents of the town of Thomas held a memorial service in honor of, and named an American Legion post after, Henry Goodbear. Goodbear was either Cheyenne or Arapaho. Donald Parman, *Indians and the American West in the Twentieth Century* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 63. For the positive reception Indians found upon returning home see Britten, *American Indians in World War I*, 159–160; see him also on American Legion posts, 166; for American Legion posts see also Barsh, "American Indians in the Great War," 295 and see him for funerals, 296.

79. On the letter and quote see May E. Young, "Jim Mahone, Hualpai Scout," *Desert Magazine*, February 1957, 8; on Mahone in general see John R. Winslowe, "Maha'Navie—Hualapai Warrior: He Spent a Lifetime Fighting His Own People," *Westerner*, May–June, 1970, 10–13, 50–51. For another sketch of Jim Mahone's life see A. P. Miller, "Mu-Ko-Hoi-Na-Vie, Jim Mahone, Sr., Indian Scout of the Hualapai Indian Tribe," June 1937, manuscript in Dennis Casebier collection, Mohave Desert Archives, Goffs Schoolhouse, Essex, CA.

80. Declaration for Survivor's Pension-Indian Wars, 15 August 1922, CCF 58388-22-725-Truxton Canyon, Box 42, RG 75, NA.

81. "Speech of Jim Fielding, Chief of the Hualapais, made Monday, October 14, 1922," Exhibit E, in John M. Atwater, "Investigation Report on Charges Against the Administration of Superintendent Light, Truxton Canyon Agency and School," Made October 4–24, 1922, report filed 24 March 1922, Inspection reports 1909–40, Inspection Division, Entry 953, Box 70, RG 75, NA (hereafter Atwater Report). For more on Fielding and his place among the Hualapai see A. P. Miller, "The Passing of Chief Pachilawa," no date but written on the occasion of Fielding's death, 31 May 1936, Dennis Casebier Collection, Mohave Desert Archives, Goffs Schoolhouse, Essex, CA.

82. Atwater, "Investigation Report'.

83. On Leve Leve see Dobyns and Euler, *Wauba Yuma's People*, 27–28.

84. Mahone's letters and statements made their way into the file on Tibbet at the request of Inspector E. B. Linnen. Linnen wrote to Charles Burke, commissioner of Indian Affairs, requesting that Mahone's writings be forwarded to the assistant US attorney in Los Angeles to be used as evidence in the case against Tibbet and his co-conspirators. Linnen to Burke, 7 October 1921, CCF 34163-21-175, part I, box 447, RG 75, NA.

85. Steve Levey Levey, 1st Chief and Fred W. Mahone, Chief's Secretary to CIA, 3 December 1921; Stewart to CIA, 2 January 1922; Burke to Stewart, 14 January 1922, all in CCF 34163-21-175-General Service, Part II, box 447, RG 75, NA. The petition came through S. D. Stewart, a Kingman attorney representing the Hualapai. Stewart remains a shadowy figure; it is possible he had the Hualapai's best interests in mind, but there is also a chance he wanted the reservation opened to mining which would have been easier if the Hualapai were in charge rather than the government.

86. Atwater, "Investigation Report." Part of the petition gave E. W. Myers power of attorney.

87. On property and marriage see G. A. Mook, "Property," in Kroeber, et al., *Walapai Ethnography*.

88. Details of the incident in Light to CIA, 1 February 1922, CCF 34163-21-175-General Service, part II, box 447, RG 75, NA.

89. Burke to S.D. Stewart, 14 February 1922, CCF 34163-21-175-General Service, part II, box 447, RG 75, NA.

90. Light to CIA, 1 February 1922, CCF 34163-21-175-General Service, part II, box 447, RG 75, NA.

91. Light to CIA, 29 June 1923, CCF 30310-23-174.1-Truxton Canyon, box 11, RG 75, NA.

92. Light to CIA, 1 February 1922, , CCF 34163-21-175-General Service, part II, box 447, RG 75, NA.

93. Murphy to CIA, 18 February 1922, CCF 34163-21-175-General Service, part II, box 447, RG 75, NA.

94. Ibid.

95. Statement of Indian Beecher (Young) of Pine Springs, Exhibit D, Atwater, "Investigation Report."

96. "Speech of Jim Fielding, Chief of the Hualapais, made Monday, October 16, 1922," Exhibit E, in Atwater, Investigation Report", on Fielding establishing the cattle operation, see interview with Ben Beecher, 24 September 2002. Fred Mahone estimated that the Sanford Cattle Company grazed 6,500 head, and that Abe Cauffman had 1,000 in the Pine Springs area. Mahone, 23 April 1923, "Present and Previous Livestock," CCF 30310-230174.1-Truxton Canyon, Box 11, RG 75, NA. For other estimates of cattle numbers see Jeffrey Shepard, "Building an American Indian Community: The Hualapai Nation in the Twentieth Century" (Ph.D. diss., Arizona State University, 2002).

97. Fred Mahone to Senator Henry A. Ashurst, and Congressmen Carl Hayden and Clyde Kelly, 6 April 1923, 6 April 1923, CCF 30310-230174.1-Truxton Canyon, Box 11, RG 75, NA.

98. See "Power of Attorney" contract, 6 April 1923, CCF 30310-230174.1-Truxton Canyon, Box 11, RG 75, NA. This file contains a variety of documents Fred Mahone compiled to buttress the Hualapai claim to the land around Peach Springs. It is not clear how Du Four came to the attention of the Hualapais, nor is it evident that he actually did any work for them. It is possible that Du Four was of that class of lawyers that preyed on Indians, for example by getting them to sign away valuable mineral rights in return for promises of sovereignty. This was the initial, and quite sensible, reason the BIA forbade Indians, except with their permission, to hire their own counsel. In later years such restrictions on hiring attorneys became a bar to acquiring adequate legal aid.

99. Fred Mahone to Senator Henry A. Ashurst, and Congressmen Carl Hayden and Clyde Kelly, 6 April 1923, CCF 30310-230174.1-Truxton Canyon, Box 11, RG 75, NA. It was Hayden who sent the petition and supporting documents to the CIA. Carl Hayden to CIA, 10 April 1923, CCF 30310-23-174.1-Truxton Canyon, Box 11, RG 75, NA.

100. See "Previous and Present Livestock, sheets 1-3, supporting petition," CCF 30310-23-174.1-Truxton Canyon, Box 11, RG 75, NA. Despite the title, Mahone dis-



cusses non-livestock businesses such as the Nelson Lime and Cement Company which operated on the eastern border of the reservation; Mahone claimed they mined over the line on the reservation.

101. "Petition," 6 April 1923, CCF 30310-23-174.1-Truxton Canyon, Box 11, RG 75, NA.

102. "Sheet #13, Supporting Petition," 6 April 1932, CCF 30310-23-174.1-Truxton Canyon, Box 11, RG 75, NA.

103. Fred Mahone, "Explanatory history accompanying renewed petition by Hualapai Indians to United States Congress," 6 April 1923, CCF 30310-23-174.1-Truxton Canyon, Box 11, RG 75, NA. On the Hualapai war see Dan Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 39–52.

104. Fred Mahone to Senator Henry A. Ashurst, and Congressmen Carl Hayden and Clyde Kelly, 6 April 1932, Sheet #13, "Supporting Petition." On the use of Hualapais and Apaches as scouts against the Apaches see Thomas Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army, 1860–90* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1982), 165–186; for the early use of Hualapais as allies against the Apache see John G. Bourke *On the Border with Crook* (1891; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), 167–171.

105. "Question 2, sheet 7, Petition," 6 April 1923, CCF 30310-23-174.1-Truxton Canyon, Box 11, RG 75, NA.

106. While I do not agree with all of his points, I do find value in Robert Williams's comment that treaties, from the Indian point of view, can at a minimum be seen as a relationship of trust. Indians, including the Hualapai, ceded certain of their rights and protected others. And surely Mahone, at least rhetorically, suggested that the Hualapai entered into an agreement with the US based in trust. Williams' argument that the power differential between Indians and colonists was not necessarily weighted to one side, because Indians were able to bring their own notions of peace and justice to the negotiating table, is less useful in the Hualapai context. Obviously, in the late nineteenth century this was no longer true. Robert Williams, *Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Law and Peace, 1600–1800* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

107. "Answer 6, sheet 11, Petition," 6 April 1923, CCF 30310-230174.1-Truxton Canyon, Box 11, RG 75, NA.

108. Fred W. Mahone to Felix Cohen, 21 May 1942, box 1, Entry 824, Records Concerning U.S. v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company, 1919–1943, Records of the Office of the Solicitor, Records of the Department of the Interior (RG 48), National Archives (NA).

109. For the most recent assessment of her life see Deborah Welch, "Gertrude Simmons Bonnin (Zitkala-Sa)/Dakota," in *The New Warriors*, 35–54.

110. On this point see Hoxie's discussion of Francis LaFlesche in "Native American Journeys of Discovery," 991.

111. I take the term "warriors with attaché cases" from Laurence M. Hauptman's chapter of the same name on contemporary tribal attorneys in *Tribes and Tribulations: Misconceptions About American Indians and their Histories* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995).