The Integration of the White into the Community of Color, or How the Europeans Became Brazilian in the Twentieth Century

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Abstract
Studies of immigrant integration in Europe and North America generally assume that immigrants are less white and considered less “modern” than the nationals of the countries where they arrive. In this essay, my purpose is to examine what happens when we apply the idea of “immigrant integration” to European immigrants who arrived in Brazil at the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. These immigrants and their descendants have faced a contradiction between integrating into a national “imagined community,” constructed as “mixed-race,” and participating in local, national and global projects of (white) “modernity.” The paper explores how this contradiction was historically constructed in Brazil, how some Brazilians of European descent resolved it, and how we can think of the relationship between race, modernity, nationhood and immigrant integration from a more global perspective.

Key Words: Latin America, Brazil, Immigrant Integration, Whitening, National Identity, Whiteness.

In the 1960s, the Brazilian sociologist Florestan Fernandes wrote, in *The Integration of the Black into the Society of Classes*, on the relationship between blacks and whites in the city of Sao Paulo:

O antigo agente do trabalho escravo foi expelido, nas condições em que se formou e se consolidou, inicialmente, a ordem social competitiva na cidade de São Paulo, para as ocupações marginais ou acessórias do sistema de produção capitalista. O imigrante aparece como o legítimo agente do trabalho livre e assalariado, ao mesmo tempo que monopoliza, praticamente, as oportunidades reais de classificação econômica e de ascensão social, abertas pela desagregação do regime servil e pela constituição da sociedade de classes.¹ (11)

In Fernandes’s account, former Afro-Brazilian slaves and their descendants, who formed the bulk of the Brazilian workforce and population and had been living in Brazil for many generations, needed to be absorbed into a modern “society of classes” of which recently arrived European immigrants and their children were the best representatives. This “society of classes,” however, did not come to define national identity through much of the twentieth century as white; rather, the idea of Brazil as a “mixed” nation, whose founding myth did not seem to include these more recent European immigrants, rose to prominence. In contrast, North
American and European scholarship on “immigrant integration” generally assumes that being integrated into the modern economy also means being assimilated into a white national identity. Recent North American scholarship has suggested that contemporary immigration challenges the boundaries of the nation-state, threatening the established exclusionary forms of modern citizenship and national identity that these nation-states have worked to delimit (for a review, see Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2008).

However, in the Brazil of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, state elites initially did not see immigrants as a threat to the boundaries of the nation-state, but as an instrument in national modernizing and whitening projects (See Skidmore, 1995), similar to the project of creating “white settler” societies in North America and Australia (See Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, 1995). In Brazil this project ultimately failed because domestic and international cultural entrepreneurs (intellectuals, artists, and media broadcasters), and the broader Brazilian population, jointly contributed to creating a new kind of national identity based on race mixture, during a period when state elite members still associated European immigrants and their descendants with (white) modernity, but as potentially disloyal to the nation too.

This paper examines what happens when we apply the notion of “immigrant integration” to European immigrants who arrived in Brazil in the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and their descendants. To understand “immigrant integration” fully from a more global perspective, one should locate immigration within the project of “modernity.” As part of modernization projects in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, some nations have unmistakably been constructed as “modern” and “white,” while “others” remain “primitive” and “nonwhite.” Similarly, some immigrants are constructed as whiter and more modern than the local population. In this context, for European immigrants to Brazil and their descendants, investments in being modern and white often ran contrary to the possibility of identification with an allegedly racially mixed Brazilian national identity.

**White European Immigration, Racial Underpinnings of National Identity in Brazil, and the Case of Samba**

Between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, Brazil imported more African slaves than any other country in the Americas (Eltis 37). Slavery was slowly phased out between the end of the slave trade in the mid-nineteenth century and abolition in 1888. Social unrest ensued among slaves and former slaves, who increasingly refused to work under slavery-like conditions.
Anxieties over social control led white agrarian and political elites to debate whether to replace slaves with what they believed to be more “disciplined” European workers, or whether former slaves could be taught to become good workers and orderly citizens (See Azevedo, 1987; Andrews 25-89). By the end of the nineteenth century, concluding that Afro-Brazilians were “naturally” inferior to Europeans, these elites started importing European immigrants to replace slave labor. However, this immigration policy caused another form of anxiety: immigrants were deemed naturally superior, but there were fears that immigrants would be disloyal to the nation and import dangerous foreign ideologies (Seyferth, “Construindo a Nação” 49-50). Consequently, the elites concluded that newcomers needed to be taught to be Brazilian. Bringing immigrants was not only a project of control over labor, but also a project of nation-state consolidation that meant protecting the national borders and creating a productive and loyal population. In the nineteenth century, the Brazilian imperial government had given small plots of land to European immigrant families, so as to make “productive” use of the “empty” land in southern Brazil. These immigrants were expected to protect national borders by occupying border areas with Argentina and Uruguay (Lesser, Immigration 27-34). This process resulted in the dispossession of the indigenous people. Between the 1880s and the 1960s, thousands of European immigrants arrived in Brazil, mainly from Portugal, Spain and Italy and, to a lesser extent, Germany (See Appendix: Figure 1, and Table 1A).

In the early twentieth century, Brazilian political and intellectual elites adopted a modified version of scientific racism based on the idea that the Brazilian population could be “whitened” as European immigrants mixed with Brazilians of color. Since the 19th century, prominent foreign race scientists repeatedly visited Brazil and scorned the country as a mostly non-white society where not even the elites appeared white. They predicted that the country would degenerate due to its race mixture, a view that some Brazilian intellectuals embraced with much concern. In response to this discourse, and observing the increase in immigration from Europe, other intellectuals predicted that, by “whitening” through immigration, Brazil could build a strong, successful and modern nation (See Skidmore, 1995).

From 1910 onward, using a neo-Lamarckian version of eugenics that preached that effects of the environment on individuals could affect the biological fitness of their offspring, elites saw no contradiction between whitening through immigration and “improving” the local population of color through education, hygiene, and other measures to improve public health (Dávila, Diploma de Brancura 52-93). The reorganization of urban public space was used to
Europeanize and modernize Brazil. In Rio, for example, the downtown cortícios (tenement housing for the poor) were removed to make way for Paris-style buildings and wider streets, while poor people were forced to move to the periphery and to the hills surrounding the city (Fischer 19-49). Street-level cultural manifestations by poorer citizens, such as carnival parades, religious processions, and music playing in the city’s center were often put down by the police. In short, social policies were designed to discipline—often through violent means—poor and/or black people on their behavior and cultural expressions to make them more European-like, and thus allegedly more civilized.

This Eurocentric “civilizing” approach was still dominant among political elites in the 1930s, but it became framed less around biology, and more on changing the culture of the Brazilian population (See Dávila, 2005). During the first Vargas Government (1930-1945), educational policies partially reflected a continuation of those which had been promoted by Lamarckian eugenicists. Government bureaucrats were now mainly preoccupied with promoting hygienic habits among the Brazilian population, such as teeth brushing and physical fitness in schools (Dávila, Diploma de Brancura, 47-94, 199-241). They were really concerned with bringing European civilization to Brazilians, by fostering the teaching of Latin, Greek, and ancient European history (Schwartzman, Bomeny and Costa 189-216). Thus, governmental policy during the Vargas era continued the “whitening” project, not by attempting to make Brazilians whiter, but by introducing health and educational policies which, in turn, propagated European values, knowledge, and behavioral standards.

Despite the ideological and practical continuity regarding race, we perceive a shift during the Vargas period as well. Government officials were increasingly suspicious of immigrants and “unassimilated” Brazilians of immigrant background. The government felt an increased concern to promote national sentiment and allegiance among those living in the country (Schwartzman, Bomeny and Costa 157-88; See also Seyferth, 1997). At the same time, the government instrumentalized the nonwhite, poor populations attempting to create a povo (a people) which would be loyal to the state in exchange for some form of symbolic recognition and some material benefits in the form of new labor legislation (Fischer 116-48), thus balancing their fears.

The change of attitudes toward immigrants did not come just from the state itself, but was a reflection of the changing national and global context of the time. Immigration from Europe dropped abruptly due to the Great Depression of 1929 and World War II, as these events limited movement across the Atlantic (See Appendix: Figure 1). Brazilian legislation
became more restrictive to immigration too. As the Brazilian middle-class expanded, and urban working classes became more politically influential, both resisted competition from immigrants, and pushed the government to limit immigrants’ access to jobs. As in North America, anti-immigrant sentiment was increasing, partly associated with new “kinds” of immigrants which were considered less desirable, such as Arabic, Jewish and Japanese people (Lesser, *Immigration* 136-40, 163-68; Fitzgerald and Cook-Martin 278-90).

In the years before, during and immediately and after World War II, in the midst of fascism, Nazism and communism, the Brazilian government became paranoid about threats to the nation-state from the outside: from immigrants with allegiances abroad, and from Brazilian citizens who retained cultural or political connections to other nations. As Brazil joined the Allies in the war, Vargas’s nationalist project came to include the forced assimilation of immigrants. Germans and German-Brazilians as well as Japanese and Japanese-Brazilians came to be the “legitimate” scapegoats for assimilationist projects. More broadly, “foreigners” were viewed as a threat to national security. Schools were required to teach in Portuguese and to adopt a curriculum that was increasingly dominated by nationalist content. The government also created barriers to several immigrant-based ethnic organizations—including recreational and sports organizations—banned publications in foreign languages and prohibited speaking foreign languages in public. This period included military intervention and police violence to punish and control unassimilated Brazilians and foreigners (Seyferth, “A Assimilação” 96-98; Schwartzman, Bomeny and Costa 157-88; Lesser, *Negotiating* 138, 165-66).

Despite the instrumentalization of education to foster nationalism among both immigrants and the broader population, the content of the nationalist curriculum was still Eurocentric and elitist (Schwartzman, Bomeny and Costa 199-220). Continuing an earlier tradition that dates back to the times of the Empire (and has partly continued until today), Brazilian history school textbooks portrayed blacks and indigenous peoples as part of the Brazilian past, but they were (and often still are) treated as passive, emotional and usually nameless historical subjects, while whites were (and are) named, and portrayed as intelligent makers of history (See Ribeiro, 2008; Abud, 1998). Beyond the myth of origin, however, the content of nationhood promoted through education was not—and still is not—particularly “mixed-race.” Although the Vargas-era Ministry of Education did interact with people of different worldviews, proponents of a more multiculturalist, multi-racialist view of Brazil such as writer Mario de Andrade became marginalized, while those who favored Europeanization of
education were privileged (Schwartzman, Bomeny and Costa 97-106). We see here a continuity with the whitening project by the Vargas government (and arguably by later governments) even with the decline of scientific racism and with the emergence of intellectual elites that sought to promote a less white and Europeanized national identity.

In contrast to the government’s continued “whitening” project, influential non-government actors have, since the 1920s, increasingly promoted an image of Brazil that was not simply white. This new image, at least on the surface, included and valued the country’s Afro-descendant population. Intellectuals such as Gilberto Freyre followed the global trend in the social sciences of challenging scientific racism and becoming interested in the “cultures” of non-European peoples, highlighting how Africans, Indigenous peoples and the Portuguese together contributed to the formation of the Brazilian national character (See Freyre, 1933). Elite artists in Brazil and abroad turned to seek out “primitive” and “authentic” Brazilian art forms, of which music was perhaps the best example (See Guimarães, 2003). Those who controlled or profited from the emerging radio and sound-recording industry saw new business opportunities in marketing the cultural production of the Brazilian people of color both in the country and abroad. This new cultural, intellectual and economic context allowed for the creation of discursive spaces where non-elite, nonwhite Brazilians—especially those living in Rio de Janeiro, the country’s capital and the center of its broadcasting and recording industries—could broadcast, albeit often in a limited and negotiated way, an alternative image of the nation which was less white and less Eurocentric. The history of samba is perhaps the most well-documented example of this story. Although the actual origins of samba are disputed, in Rio de Janeiro it was frequently played in predominantly black and lower-income neighborhoods.

While more recent approaches recognize samba as having a variety of influences, early on it was mainly associated with Afro-Brazilian religious rituals of macumba and candomblé. In the early twentieth century, Rio elites would both officially condemn and privately participate in Afro-Brazilian cultural and religious manifestations. On the one hand, this contradictory behavior reflected their simultaneous subscription to ideologies of “Western modernity” and scientific racism (through their cultural and intellectual ties to Europe) while, on the other hand, their embeddedness in social and cultural relationships within the city often transcended racial and class boundaries. Afro-Brazilian artists and religious leaders in the periphery negotiated their relationships with white elite members, who sometimes had them arrested, and sometimes came at their defense (See Reis 246-60).
By the 1910s and 1920s, “primitivist” trends such as the avant-garde movement in Europe and the modernist movement in Brazil led foreign and local elite artists and intellectuals to become more openly interested in the music played by black and lower-class Brazilian musicians, as well as other forms of black and lower-class cultural manifestations (Vianna 95-107; Reis 265-70; D. Fernandes 14-17). But foreign as much as domestic elites often preserved the understanding of music composed and played by black Brazilians as natural, emotional and traditional. Elite Brazilian composers sought out “authentic” Brazilian elements too, using them as “raw material” for their more “sophisticated” artistic production. Foreign audiences similarly considered music produced by black and/or lower-class Brazilian artists to be “primitive,” but often looked down on white elite Brazilian artists and government officials’ attempt to “civilize” Brazilian “authentic” music, making it “fake” and “for show.” Be as it may, this new cultural context gave some black Brazilian musicians the opportunity to perform in predominantly white venues in Brazil and abroad. Thus, they perpetuated a national image that bypassed Brazilian elites’ efforts to showcase a whiter national identity (Reis 260-70). Nonetheless, as these foreign audiences consumed such music to satisfy their desire for “primitive” art, such performances reinforced the image of Brazil as a “primitive” country.

In the 1920s and 30s, the recording industry and commercial radio broadcasting enabled samba to move from a music heard by black people in Rio’s poorer neighborhoods–and perhaps a few eccentric elite and middle-class members–to something that Brazilians in all regions and of all social classes would hear, thus making it a “mainstream” and “national” genre. New communication technologies made it possible for less powerful, often poor and/or black people, to write music and lyrics that would be heard across the country. Therefore, the lyrics of Samba was heavily “cleaned” and changed in the process by recording companies. Moreover, they were frequently sung by white singers, and even the authorship of the songs often had to be ceded to more powerful and whiter people in order to achieve success.

But the national samba never became fully white: black or mixed-race and non-elite portrayals of Brazil and its people came to be heard by diverse groups of people across the country and to shape the ever-changing national imagination. In a way that echoes Benedict Anderson’s description of the role of printing press in Europe, the spread of the recording and radio industries in their circulation of music composed by Afro-Brazilian and lower-class artists managed to diffuse an alternative, less white, Brazilian “imagined community” (Vianna 109-27).
When Vargas reached power in 1930, samba had already been popularized to national audiences. As late as 1937, the government started controlling and censoring the musical style. While the government encouraged music that promoted the country and the regime, discouraging music that advocated for antagonism between blacks and whites, government officials did not direct musicians to portray Brazil as a mixed nation. Despite the control and censorship, musicians were still able to get their own messages across. For example, the censoring of samba focused on combatting the apology of “malandragem,” while encouraging a work ethic. A closer look at the lyrics and recordings of the time reveals that several songs were performed in such a way as to subvert the original meaning, showing how stupid it seemed for poor, moreno people to work the whole day for a meager salary and poor living conditions (Paranhos 107-69). This shows the agency of black and poor Brazilian artists. It also evidences the way in which they were able to influence the cultural content that came to form the national identity.

Public Perception and Lived Experience Regarding Mixture and Whiteness in Contemporary Brazil

Descendants of European immigrants in Brazil today still seem to live immersed in their contradictions between their white, immigrant-descendant identity and their idea of Brazil as a mixed nation. Or, as a university student I interviewed in 2005 explained to me:

*Rita:* Hoje em dia, eu acho que na nossa sociedade não existe ninguém que não seja mais ou menos mestiço, entendeu?

*Autora:* E na sua família, como é que é? Tem alguém índio, negro?


Similarly, in a 2003 survey by the Fundação Perseu Abramo, ninety-five percent of Brazilians agreed with the statement that “a good thing about the Brazilian people is racial mixture” regardless of racial self-identification, reported racial composition in the family, or reported immigrant origins (See Appendix: Table 2A). Yet survey results also suggest that, for many Brazilian whites, the connection to “mixture” is not a very personal one. Table 1 below shows that a significant proportion of white Brazilians, especially those of immigrant background,
those who have a college degree and people living in the wealthier regions of the country (the South, the Southeast and the Center-West), tend to inhabit social spaces where the majority identifies as white, and where a relatively large minority report having exclusive white parents or grandparents.

Table 1 – Classification as “white” or immigrant background, by education, region and place of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percent white classification, forced choice with census categories</th>
<th>Percent white classification, open-ended question</th>
<th>Percent claiming exclusive white ancestry</th>
<th>Percent claiming immigrant background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>23.18</td>
<td>16.41</td>
<td>9.38</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center West</td>
<td>45.03</td>
<td>37.43</td>
<td>20.76</td>
<td>21.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>28.10</td>
<td>21.04</td>
<td>13.41</td>
<td>4.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>72.36</td>
<td>65.99</td>
<td>55.01</td>
<td>41.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>48.85</td>
<td>42.86</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>26.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>36.21</td>
<td>33.91</td>
<td>20.11</td>
<td>27.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>54.49</td>
<td>49.36</td>
<td>30.77</td>
<td>33.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than primary</td>
<td>38.71</td>
<td>31.43</td>
<td>24.46</td>
<td>13.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>48.49</td>
<td>41.29</td>
<td>24.92</td>
<td>22.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>49.66</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>28.88</td>
<td>30.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College or more</td>
<td>65.14</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>38.53</td>
<td>48.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant background</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>62.87</td>
<td>58.38</td>
<td>35.33</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>81.61</td>
<td>75.86</td>
<td>52.87</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>76.72</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>56.61</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>85.15</td>
<td>76.24</td>
<td>62.38</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>59.23</td>
<td>51.54</td>
<td>37.69</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44.27</td>
<td>37.76</td>
<td>26.18</td>
<td>20.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: N=5,003

(*The “other” category includes Japanese, Arabic, Turkish, Jewish, African and “others.”

Source: calculated using microdata from Fundação Perseu Abramo).

The table suggests that Brazilians with memory of European immigration are over-represented in these more exclusively “white” and privileged spaces. Twenty-one percent of Brazilians reported having an immigrant background as a response to the question that asks interviewees if they “come from a family of immigrants” or if their family “has always been from Brazil.”
Eighty-seven percent of survey respondents who reported having an immigrant background traced their origins to Portugal, Spain, Italy or Germany. In contrast to the general population, people who reported having a European immigrant family overwhelmingly classify as white and are more likely to report an exclusively white ancestry, than the general Brazilian population. Brazilians reporting immigrant ancestry are over-represented at higher educational levels and the more developed regions, which also have higher proportions of whites. While less than ten percent of Brazilians living in the North and Northeast region report an immigrant background, around twenty percent reported this background in the center-west, almost thirty percent do so in the Southeast and more than forty percent in the South. While only thirteen percent of Brazilians with less than primary school reported an immigrant background, almost half of Brazilians with a college degree or higher reported this background.

Given the latter structural position of whites and of the descendants of European immigrants in Brazil, and the historical context described in the previous section, it is not surprising that another student I interviewed explained his identification as white this way: “Por que a minha cor de pele é branca, tenho traços faciais brancos, pelo aspecto físico, e pelo aspecto cultural, por que, na prática, eu faço parte de uma cultura ocidental branca, ou seja, eu faço parte da classe média branca.” When making sense of the experience of European immigrants and their descendants in Brazil, contemporary European and North-American immigration scholarship’s assumptions about a white, modern “core,” “mainstream” society against which “integration” of (usually non-white) immigrants is measured become problematic. In Brazil, while the normative way of life, the economic “core” or “mainstream,” are white and middle-class, the national community is represented as nonwhite (usually “mixed”) and poor. Thus, this twofold conception of Brazil and Brazilian-ness offers two ways for white immigrants to “integrate:” they could either opt to take part in this middle-class lifestyle or identify culturally as part of the “mixed” nation. These modes of integration may often contradict each other, because the “mainstream” in these two senses is not aligned. The hierarchy of economic and political rights is not defined within national borders, but beyond them. The source of advanced capitalist economy is understood to be located abroad (See Takhteyev, 2012), in the “white” middle-classes (Bonnett 49-67), or in particular regions of the country—especially São Paulo (See Weinstein, 2015)—which have not succeeded in providing the image of what it means to be “Brazilian,” either at home or abroad.
Global Imbrications of Modernity, Race and National Belonging

Rethinking “immigrant integration” requires an understanding of how immigrants fit into a world where nationhood, modernity and race jointly constitute hierarchies between different “kinds” of immigrants and nationals (See also Bashi Treitler, 2015). “Modernity” has been described in different ways by social historians: in one sense, modernization is often described as an expansion and deepening of the reach and control of states over populations (for example, see Tilly, 1990, and Scott, 1998). Within the colonial project (and here I include the “internal colonial” projects of post-independent American states), this “modernization” often resulted in a heightened racialization of colonial hierarchies, as, European colonialists in the Americas gave privileged (and “white”) status to people of European descent as a way to ensure their cooperation in their efforts to centralize and increase control over colonial subjects (Bonnett 17; Cooper and Stoler 612-16).

Paradoxically, “modernity” is often associated with the removal of state controls, through practices associated with classic liberal ideologies. But as liberalism legitimized social movements for the abolition of slavery and other forms of forced labor, for more democratic states, and for freedom of movement, threatened elites reacted by using racial and national ideology and exclusionary practices to delimit citizenship, control labor and establish social order (See Holt 1992; Torpey, 2000; Roediger, 1999). In Europe and North America, class compromises leading to improved citizenship were tied to whiteness—enhancing the privilege and “whiteness” of (part of) the working class, while denying rights in majority non-white colonies of European powers (Bonnet 28-48), and among black, indigenous and Asian-descent people North America (See Roediger, 1999; Backhouse, 1999; K. Anderson, 1991). Thus, the emergence of a liberal and ostensibly egalitarian ideology brought about new forms of social exclusion based on race, citizenship and nationhood.

Thus, in a third sense (which comes in part to resolve the contradictions between the first and the second), “modernity” has been understood as a category of social distinction between people and between nations, a distinction which has been historically racialized. Elites in Europe and North America attempted to regulate sexual relations to prevent miscegenation and to influence which immigrants could cross the countries’ borders and become citizens. They promoted immigration from desirable “races” of people and the assimilation of those deemed assimilable, restricting the entrance of undesirables and increasing the disconnect between metropolitan and colonial populations. These newly constructed “modern white nations” were
juxtaposed against their opposite, i.e., primitive, or decaying nonwhite or “mixed-race” nations (Skidmore 27-32; Loveman, *National Colors* 125-26; Bonnett 7-44; Lake and Reynolds 1-15). Race and nation-building thus became intimately intertwined.

National elites that could not claim whiteness for their populations have, generally, either translated scientific racist ideas to advance their populations in their racial hierarchies, as in China and Latin America (Dikötter 423-30; Stepan 135-71; Loveman, *National Colors* 121-68) or forged “nations within a nation,” where the majority of the population was excluded from citizenship and national belonging, as in South Africa (Marx 84-104). Latin American elites sought to provide representations of their nations—both abroad and at home—that allowed them to imagine a viable, modern and, by implication, whiter, future (Skidmore 64-69; See also Loveman, 2015). These very same alternative national representations were often not accepted as legitimate in Europe and North America, whose members continued to see and treat Latin Americans (including their self-described “white” elites) as non-white.

**White Immigrants in a Racialized World**

Within the historical context described above, how can we come to terms with immigration and immigrant integration? Since the nineteenth century, political and economic elites have become concerned with how to control the labor, movement and behavior of people, as well as their elites’ own continuation in positions of power, in a context where people were increasingly thought to have the freedom to work as they pleased, go wherever they wanted and choose the government they wanted to have. In Brazil, the way these tensions got resolved was for boundaries to be drawn around what “kinds” of people could be trusted to be good citizens and good workers. Within this framework, the prospect of nations prospering became seen as depending on the “racial kinds” of people that were available. Consequently, that explains why immigrants from Europe were thought as a source of strength for countries in the Americas. Indigenous, African-descendant and Asian-descendant peoples were seen as challenging the prospect of building “modern societies,” while immigrants from Europe were compatible with this project (Loveman, *National Colors* 121-68, and Whiteness 221-22).

In the same vein, in North America, immigrants from Northwestern European countries were seen as desirable citizens and workers, and came to define the national character, based on the idea of a Northwestern European “settler society.” More established peoples of indigenous and African slave descent were excluded from citizenship, as were immigrants from non-
European countries, while Southern and Eastern Europeans were given formal rights while expected to be culturally assimilated (Boyd, Goldman and White 38-40; See also Jacobson, 1998).

The “immigrant integration” framework in North America comes from assimilation theories of the 1930s, when immigrants from southern and eastern Europe were seen as a “threat” to WASP middle-class sensitivities though, unlike Asian immigrants and black migrants from the US South, potentially assimilable (Alba and Nee 17-66). It was in this period that less desirable and variously racialized Europeans started becoming incorporated into a more encompassing category of “whiteness” (Jacobson 91-135). In both Europe and North America, the “integration” question re-emerges after World War II, when racial barriers are lifted, former colonies became independent and a large wave of “third world” immigrants started moving to the global north, thus challenging the boundaries of “white nations.”

In the rest of the world, nonetheless, the story of immigration is more complicated. Nationalist movements often reframe non-white or non-European identities as positive and legitimating of national sovereignty. These “other” nations seek legitimation in a world where Europe and North America provide the model for “modernity” (See Loveman, 2015). Historically, in many of these contexts, colonial immigrants from Europe and their descendants have retained power and privilege over the majority, nonwhite population. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they were not expected to “integrate” but to “civilize,” and colonial administrations often took precautions so that they did not “mix” with local populations (Cooper and Stoler 612-16). In many places, contemporary immigrants from Europe and North America are still not expected to “integrate” at all but to retain their national identities, being often called “expats.” While this process was occurring in the north, Latin American elites sought to make their countries more like Europe and the United States, using immigrants from Europe to make their nations more “white” and “modern.”

Some Latin American countries, such as Argentina, partly reproduced the “settler society” model of Americans, while countries like Mexico and Brazil never managed to achieve a national image of whiteness and modernity. Therefore, as the case of Samba illustrates, these countries started building national allegiances with their local, nonwhite populations (Appelbaum, MacPherson and Rosemblatt 7). Starting from the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, as Latin American countries begin adopting multiculturalist and anti-racist rhetoric and policies, new racially and ethnically diverse national identities gain legitimacy.
Yet, throughout Latin America, “white” skin color and European culture still retain high status and is associated with power and privilege (See Telles, 2014).

In today’s “nonwhite” nations, “white” nationals occupy an ambivalent position relative to national boundaries. Local whites increase their status by tying themselves to “global modernity” and selling this modernity to non-whites in their countries. They thus see themselves as part of projects of national whitening. When explicit mentioning of race (such as using a language of whitening or whiteness) is no longer politically legitimate, as in post-Apartheid South Africa, local whites appeal to “universal” and “modern” values, which are talked about in non-racial terms, but are symbolically racialized (Steyn 127-33). At the same time, these same whites are often seen as inauthentic representatives of their respective nations, which are portrayed as non-white. In the case of Asia and Latin America, they are also often seen as not really white, and therefore are understood to be “faking” white modernity (Bonnett 46-77). They are therefore “fake” in both the national and the modern worlds. Though they may often try to sell nationality to those abroad, and modernity to those within the nation, foreigners would rather bypass national whites to get the more “authentic” experience from “the natives.” Nationals, on the other hand would rather import foreign modernity directly from “the source” (Takhteyev 210). In short, whites who inhabit “non-white nations” are not always “integrated” into the national imaginary, but they often see themselves—not always successfully—as building bridges to the “integration” of their countries into the “modern” (white, Europeanized) world.

Based on the latter discussion: can we say that European immigrants to Brazil “integrated”? What did they “integrate” into? In particular, where did European immigrants to Brazil and their descendants fit in this context where belonging to the “nation” and belonging to the “modern” world were not always consistent, but often in contradiction? And last but not least, are there other “entities” immigrants may have “integrated” into?

One resolution is to see how immigrants “integrate” into competing constructions of Brazil. As I have argued in this paper, historically there have been—and there still are—competing constructions of Brazil. We might even contrast the construction of the Brazil of the past and present with the construction of the Brazil of the future. Within the construction of the Brazil of the future, the image of a modern, and often whiter Brazil has been historically consistent with the view of the country as currently backward and nonwhite (See Skidmore, 1995). Temporal discourses about Brazilian nationality have also been reflected in regional identities, and the way
that different regions contribute to the national character. While Rio and the Northeast have established themselves as contributors to the national “culture,” with its African past and its “mixed” present (Vianna 61-62, 111; See also Blake 2011), discourse about São Paulo is about its role as the “locomotive” of Brazil, which attempts, with much hard work and discipline (allegedly absent from the rest of the population), to bring the country from the backward past into the modern, economically advanced (and whiter) future. In some narratives, it is immigrants’ hard work that drive the São Paulo locomotive (Weinstein 273). While this is often a narrative of whiteness that European immigrants are able to make, Lesser, in “A Reflection on Foreigness and the Construction of Brazilian National Identities,” has found similar claims among Brazilians of Asian descent. In the south of Brazil, descendants of German and Italian immigrants narrate their ancestor’s role as colonizers, settling on land and contributing to the country’s “civilized” culture (Seyferth, “A Idéia de Cultura” 168-72; Zanini 125-44). Other immigrants and their descendants have inserted themselves into the more “cultural” narrative of mixture. In Hotel Trópico, Dávila argues that Portuguese immigrants have, in the 1960s, encouraged the Brazilian government to support the ideology of Luso-Tropicalism, which claimed that the Portuguese were relatively benevolent colonizers, being able to “mix” well with people in the tropics (23-33). Lebanese and Syrian immigrants also inserted themselves into a similar narrative, claiming that Portuguese colonizers were partly Arabic, and thus Arabs were part of the Brazilian “mixture” (Lesser, Negotiating 41-79).

Another possibility is to think about “integration” into “mainstreams” other than the nation-state, as referring to geographic or social units beyond or within the nation-state. In Brazil the “national” (racially “mixed”) mainstream, which represents the Brazilian “people” (povo) and the national identity contradicts the “mainstreams” of local, privileged and predominantly white spaces (e.g., the “middle-classes,” certain Brazilian regions). Brazilians of European immigrant descent disproportionately occupy these latter spaces, into which they did not simply “integrate,” but often replaced nonwhites who used to occupy them before (Dávila, Diploma de Brancura 147-98). Their personal family background is dominated by whiteness, with not so much experience of mixture. Moving beyond the nation-state (but also in the context of the relationship between nation-states and the broader world), one can think of “integration” as the role of immigrants and their descendants as similar to “Creole elites” as well (B. Anderson 49-68). When in the country, they are understood, and see themselves, as relatively less “Brazilian,” but more civilized and modern (See Norvell, 2001). When abroad, their whiteness,
civilization and modernity get questioned, and they become associated with a (nonwhite) Latin American identity (See Beserra, 2007; McDonnell and Lourenço, 2009).

**Conclusion**

This paper sought to show how, for European immigrants coming to Brazil, there was a contradiction between being “modern” and being Brazilian. At the turn of nineteenth to the twentieth century, European immigration fit well with Brazilian political elites’ efforts to create a Europeanized and thus purportedly “modern” national identity. However, while political elites’ whitening and Europeanizing projects continued through the 1920s and 1930s (and arguably, in some respects, continue today), other political, economic and cultural interests ensured that this project would not be successful, contributing to creating a “mixed-race” national identity. First, as the history of samba suggests, the emergence of a recording and radio industry in the 1920s created a national and international audience for the cultural production of urban black and lower-class artists from Rio de Janeiro, which in turn created a national black or mixed-race cultural identity. Second, starting with the Vargas government of the 1930s, the governments’ efforts to curb immigrants’ (and European and Japanese “ethnic” Brazilians) national betrayal led to increased government control and nationalization of educational and media institutions. Although this nationalization still privileged Europeanized content and contained a heavy dose of cultural censorship, it also provided support for the growing Brazilian cultural industry, which served to further diffuse the idea of Brazil as a mixed-race nation. When we look at the racial identities and social position of contemporary descendants of European immigrants, we see that they disproportionately occupy economically privileged social spaces, while overwhelmingly identifying as white. At the same time, they generally subscribe to the idea that Brazil is racially mixed. Thus, they seem to be well-“integrated” into a white, socioeconomically privileged world, but not so much as part of the Brazilian povo.

This bifurcation of the meanings of integration among European immigrants and their descendants in Brazil is not surprising, given the concomitant historical development of the relationship between race, nationhood and practices and ideologies associated with “modernity.” In this context, some countries became defined as white and modern, while others were defined as not white and primitive. In this world, different countries had to reinvent for themselves a story where a bright national future was possible, by either inverting racial hierarchies discourse (as in China), delimiting the boundaries of national belonging (as in South Africa, North
America and Australia) or through employing ideologies of mixture and whitening, as in much of Latin America. Differently racialized immigrants were thus evaluated in the context of these national identities and global racial and civilizational hierarchies. White nationals of nonwhite nations thus become liminal or intermediary figures between global whiteness/modernity and local nonwhiteness/national authenticity. In this context, the descendants of European immigrants in Brazil, caught between white foreign modernity and nonwhite national backwardness, are faced with a different meaning of “integration” than that which immigrants from the Global South to Europe and North America face. For them to identify as Brazilian and retain their modernity, they often identify Brazilian-ness in a different way, one where they place themselves as the modernizing agents of their country, and thus the less wealthy and less white Brazilians, the Brazilian povo, as passive recipients of civilization.

Appendix

Figure 1 - Total number of immigrants arriving yearly to Brazil

![Graph showing total number of immigrants arriving yearly to Brazil](image)

(Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística)

Table 1A - Percentage of immigrants by nationalities arriving to Brazil in different periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian/Lebanese</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística
Table 2A. Percent agreeing that “A good thing about the Brazilian people is race mixture”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial self-identification (open question)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Branca</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>1,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preta</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parda</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amarela</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indígena</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morena clara</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestiça</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negra</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morena escura</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morena</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulata</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other categories/no reply</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination of races/colors from parents and grandparents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>black and white</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>1,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>white and indigenous</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>white, black and indígena</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>only white</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>1,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant family?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (family was always Brazilian)</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>1,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>3,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese*</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (incl. Japanese, Arabic, Latin American)</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>4,888</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*Family’s country of origins here refers to the first origin that the respondent mentioned
Source: calculated from microdata from the Fundação Perseu Abramo).
In the context in which the competitive social order was originally formed and consolidated in the city of São Paulo, the former slave worker was expelled toward the marginal or ancillary occupations of the capitalist production system. The immigrant emerges as the true agent of free wage labor, while monopolizing almost all real opportunities for economic improvement or upward social mobility that had become available as the servile regime was dismantled and the society of classes was constituted.” (My trans) (All translations found in this paper have been done by the author unless a different source is explicitly indicated).

Rita: Nowadays, in our society, there isn’t anyone who isn’t more or less mestiço.

Author: And in your family, is there any índio, negro?

Rita: No. Let me think. If there is it’s very distant, or nobody I ever knew. There is something wrong, but surely, at some point in history, some miscegenation happened, especially here, we live in Brazil, you see?

“Because my skin color is white, I have white facial features, . . . and . . . because I am part of a Western white culture, that is, I’m part of the white middle class.”

While contemporary U.S. and European scholarship acknowledges the existence of national minorities, the changing racialization of the mainstream (e.g., Alba and Nee, 2003), and the bifurcation of immigrants’ paths of integration (e.g. Portes and Zhou, 1993), or the existence of distinct “national models” that differentially affect the integration of immigrants (for a review, see Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2008), all of this scholarship posits that the “core” or “mainstream” of the host society has—at least initially—a higher racial and socioeconomic status than the immigrant group.
Works Cited


Freyre, Gilberto. Casa-grande e senzala: formação da família brasileira sob o regime da economia patriarcal.


