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American Indian Culture and Research Journal

Title

The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics among the New England Indians. By Patrick M. Malone.

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1187m8rn>

Journal

American Indian Culture and Research Journal , 16(3)

ISSN

0161-6463

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Publication Date

1992-06-01

DOI

10.17953

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reduce the productivity and value of Indian resources in comparison to privately owned resources. What these authors really are avoiding saying is that, in effect, privatization carried to its logical conclusion represents termination of the Indian reservation as a separate structure.

Indian tribes have no problem with the distinction between self-determination and termination. They see the difference as comparable to the magnitude of the Grand Canyon. But, in addressing the question of economic incentives for the Indian economies, many of the book's authors may see such incentives as a logical extension worth considering. Economists have always had trouble incorporating political and cultural objectives into their analysis. Many of the public choice-based articles in this book have the same problem. Jennifer Roback, in her article on exchange and sovereignty, clearly recognizes this difficulty. On the one hand, she documents why government structures and their associated bureaucracy are not economically efficient; on the other hand, she states that there may be reasons why individualism is not the way for many Indian tribes to go in their economic development process.

I believe a quote from Roback's concluding section on page 24 best explains the book's strengths and weaknesses:

I recall that when the Political Economy Research Center began this project on Indians and Property Rights, we had high hopes of discovering a property rights innovation that would help the Indians become richer. In many respects, we began with all the enthusiasm of the "Friends of the Indian" who initiated the disastrous Dawes Act. I am now much less hopeful that the Indians will learn anything from us. On the other hand, we have learned a great deal from them.

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The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics among the New England Indians. By Patrick M. Malone. Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1991. 133 pages. \$29.95 cloth.

The prime virtue of Malone's book is the way in which he has managed to combine sound scholarship with the visual seductiveness—almost—of *Life* magazine. The text, which, on its own,

would make merely a substantial journal article, is supplemented by a hundred illustrations, ranging from seventeenth-century drawings through fanciful Victorian depictions of colonial heroism to photographs of recent reenactments. As much as any professional archaeologist or historian, a child could enjoy this work through its pictures; the text, with its references to pecking stones and deer shuts, might be more opaque. Unlike the maps in some other books on the same subject, the maps here are big enough, avoid including too much, and show clearly what they are meant to show.

Malone is not concerned to spar with other academics. His tone is cool; not for him the acidulous vocabulary with which Francis Jennings berated the Puritans. Malone does, nevertheless, indicate how slow the Puritans were in many ways to learn from experience. The New England Indians were much quicker to appreciate the superiority of the firelock over the matchlock, of swanshot over ball for hunting, and of the hatchet over the sword for combat. Not until "King Philip's War" did the Connecticut colonists discover how useful to them American Indian scouts could be in combat, and the Massachusetts colonists were even slower to absorb that lesson.

While it never seems to have occurred to all the New England tribes to unite against the colonists, it also never seems to have occurred to the colonists that the spread of firearms among the Indians—which they so deeply deplored—was hastened by their enlistment of Indian allies to fight with them in time of war. Slow or swift, that spread was inevitable. As Governor William Bradford wrote of the Indian passion for firearms, "They became mad after them and would not stick to give any price they could attain to for them, accounting their bows and arrows but baubles in comparison." The English colonists blamed foreign traders for supplying the New England Indians with firearms, but the high selling prices tempted English traders, too, and the trade was beyond government control.

With much the same arrogance with which Rhodesians of a later era scoffed at the possibility that the stone Zimbabwe fortifications could have been created by Africans, so, too, did some New Englanders scorn the notion that the great stone defensive work near Wickford known as the Queen's Fort, replete with flanker structure and semicircular bastion, could have been the work of an Indian. No, they thought, its architect and builder, Stonemason John, must have been a renegade European engineer. In fact, John

was a Narragansett—one of a number who had the aptitude to design sound military defenses and the ingenuity to adapt useful architectural features from Europeans.

Concerning technological expertise, Malone is quick to admit that military engineering was, in general, not the New England Indians' forte. Like others before him, however—T. M. Hamilton, for instance—Malone is able to show that the Indians had widespread ability in the everyday and necessary business of repairing firearms and making ammunition. The author, a former president of the Society for Industrial Archaeology, is particularly convincing in his use of archaeological evidence. His drawings of artifacts from the Burn's Hill burial ground, in particular, show that the Wampanoag were adept at making shot molds as well as shot, and at making flints for firearms, which they could and did repair, probably repeatedly. Malone has less material evidence for the Indians' aptitude for carpentry and weaving, but since these merely required adaptation, with European equipment, of traditional skills, there is no reason whatever to doubt the Indians' proficiency.

What they could not do was make gunpowder or cannon. Had they been able to do so, their wars against the colonists might have been less one-sided. Certainly the colonists' fortified houses, which Malone gives as one of the four reasons for the Indians' defeat in their seventeenth-century wars against the colonists (along with inferior numbers, fewer supplies, and disunity), would have been more vulnerable.

Malone makes the interesting point that the New England Indians proved much more proficient with muskets than were the colonists who supplied those muskets. The reasons he gives for the colonists' ineptitude include the general ban on commoners' hunting in Britain, the decayed state of military training there, and the discounting of the value of marksmanship. Perhaps he overstates his case. Edward Winslow noted that, at the first Thanksgiving, Plymouth's governor sent out four colonists "who in one day killed as much fowl as, with a little help beside, served the company almost a week." And before Thomas Morton employed Indians to hunt for him, he showed them, presumably drawing on personal experience, how much powder to use and the different sizes of shot to use for fowl and deer. Possibly it was not so much lack of skill as laziness or concern for efficiency that best explains colonists' reliance on Indians to hunt for them.

Introducing Indians to firearms was, in some ways, a boon for

them. Nothing of the sort can be said of introducing them to the practices of total war, for which there were many precedents in the New World, though not in New England before Captain John Mason destroyed the Pequot fort and those within it with Himmlerian thoroughness in 1637. Like the Nazis, the colonists felt no remorse about exterminating human beings whom they considered inferior. There are far too many colonial references to Indians in animal words—"feral bipeds" and the like—for there to be any doubt about how much below themselves colonists placed the Indians. If they needed justification for the massacre of Indians, it could easily be found. In 1625, Grotius had published *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, which excused the refusal of quarter to "barbarians." More cogent for Puritan consciences would be the authority cited by Captain John Underhill, who, quoting scriptural precedent, cited God himself as permitting the slaughter of "heathen" enemies, their women, and their children.

Malone's is a meticulously researched, admirably written, and beautifully presented book.

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A Time of Gathering: Native Heritage in Washington State. Edited by Robin K. Wright. University of Washington, Thomas Burke Memorial Washington State Museum, 1992. 248 pages. \$55.00 cloth; \$29.95 paper.

A Time of Gathering: Native Heritage in Washington State catalogs an exhibit developed over a four-year period for the 1989 Washington Centennial celebration. One of the projects of the exhibit dealt with preserving and protecting Washington's Native American heritage. Both Indians and non-Indians participated in the project, which was on view for six months in the University of Washington's Thomas Burke Memorial Washington State Museum. Art objects were culled from worldwide depositories to represent artifacts originating in Washington State from precontact times to the present.

A Time of Gathering records the exhibit's development and its specimens, whose captions are well worth reading by those with more than just a passing interest in the culture of indigenous Pacific Northwestern peoples. Essays provided by fourteen schol-