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Cooperation without Submission: Indigenous Jurisdictions in Native Nation–US Engagements. By Justin B. Richland. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2021. 224 pages. \$95.00 cloth; \$25.00 paper.

Justin B. Richland's new book, Cooperation without Submission, provides a valuable decoder ring for non-Native government officials, scholars, and researchers who seek to consult meaningfully with Native leaders, Native nation governments, and their advocates. Rather than characterize and base recommendations on generalized Indigenous values or philosophies, the author draws conclusions from scrutinizing the details of specific Native–US engagements, and observing and analyzing the language used in meeting transcripts and legal texts. Richland does so with a thorough consideration of the current sociolegal scholarship on Indigenous law ways, settler colonialism, and US federal Indian law.

A non-Native, Richland is a linguistic anthropologist with long-standing relationships with the Hopi people and the Hopi Tribe in Arizona. Cooperation without Submission explores the questions: why do Native leaders, advocates, and their Native nations continue to work with colonizing governments and their agents even when they are cheated repeatedly, particularly in Native nation-US engagements? When engagement nonetheless continues, does it involve a form of resistance, foolish optimism, or something else? In part, Richland's analysis borrows from former Hopi judge and legal anthropology scholar Emory Sekaquaptewa, extending Sekaquaptewa's concept of "cooperation without submission" (CWS) to wider Native nation-United States engagements. In the context of the Hopi village matrilineal clan systems and their ceremonial societies, inter-clan respect for clan-held norms, knowledge, and relations (navoti) and inter-clan cooperation is an ongoing necessity to make the village ceremonial cycles go forward and to ensure rain for crops—both of which are the basis for a good Hopi life and a stable Hopi society. No one clan imposes its power or knowledge on another, and each clan respects the right of others to control their internal affairs with their own members and secret knowledge systems.

One might ask, how can this very specific Hopi concept be made relevant to other interactions, such as other Native nation engagements with the US government? According to the author, he "deploy[s] an Indigenous theory of sociopolitical action not as an object of analysis but as the analytic framework itself" (23). Richland argues that, like the Hopis, many Native nations have a similarly distributed, decentralized theory of sociopolitical authority and self-governance. He notes that they also have a shared experience of centuries of Euro-American settler colonialism with its similar impacts and harms. For Richland, continued Native nation engagements with the US government are much more than mere resistance and are far from being motivated by foolish optimism. Rather, he sees a "Native insistence"—acts of self-determination where Indigenous norms, knowledge, and relations are the foundation in the building of new relationships and possibilities. Richland believes the Hopi notion of CWS is an Indigenous theory of "juris-diction." He describes juris-diction as the law-talk that Native nation leaders deploy when undertaking government-to-government relationship with the US settler state. He invites non-Natives to reflect on their current

one-sided, extractive, and evaluative goals, to build CWS relationships with Native Nations and to meet the attendant duties and obligations of these new relationships.

A scholar of legal language, Richland introduces the reader to scenes of Native-US engagements which he uses to highlight his theoretical approaches and methods of legal language analysis, as with excerpts from transcripts of a 2013 consultation meeting between members of the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office and non-Native archaeologists representing the US Forest Service in regard to sites of Hopi cultural significance within the control of the USFS and slated for excavation. Richland sees the power and authority of law in the details of legal language. Specifically, he focuses on the interactional and textual back-and-forth in actual engagements between tribal leaders and their counterparts in US agencies. In the details he finds that Native leaders insist on their Indigenous norms, knowledge, and relations—that the USFS care for Hopi sacred sites the way the implicated Hopi clans would. Thus, Native leaders signal both their cooperation with US regulatory practices of consultation while they simultaneously refuse the imposition of settler colonial logics. The author sees this as an act of CWS and views such talk and text as part of Indigenous enactments of juris-diction, but argues that non-Natives almost always fail to recognize the significance of what is happening, or even that it is happening. He views such failures on the part of non-Natives as "making Indigenous cooperation in these moments unrecognizable." Alternatively, non-Natives in consultative interactions could be open to engaging in a higher quality of talk and text and be open to coordinating action considering it.

Richland's notion of juris-diction is both part of a legal relationship-building process and a lens for making sense of what Native leaders and advocates say and do during a given consultation event. Juris-diction is a play on the modern legal notion of jurisdiction in Euro-American law, which is concerned with the reach of a nationstate's (or a subnational component's) laws over territory, and the types of issues and persons over which a governmental entity has authority. In contrast, Richland's juris-diction does not focus on the sources of legal authority, but rather on the scope of authority a given legal institution and actors have over a specific case under consideration. He observes legal actors, engaged in everyday legal discourse, wrangling over the scope and content of the authority of their legal institutions. He argues that this wrangling makes it possible that the legal authority is not yet settled. He further argues that sociolegal scholars should analyze these moments of legal language to see how participants are imagining the scope and extent of sovereign power. Ultimately, he thinks that where non-Natives fail to recognize the way in which the leaders and representatives of Native sovereign nations approach government-to-government relations, non-Natives undermine proposed policy changes and regulatory decisions—that they are blind to Native invitations to build ongoing relationships with attendant duties, obligations, and expectations.

It is interesting to consider Richland's observations and assessments of what Native leaders are doing in real-life consultations (trying to build a relationship based on their own worldview and value system) and expecting in government-to-government consultations (respect and the carrying out of duties and obligations)—with

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what federal Indian law scholars are seeing when there is a challenge as to whether any real consultation has occurred. Despite numerous federal statutory provisions, executive orders, presidential memoranda, and guidelines, legal scholars argue that there is still much uncertainty as to how tribal consultations should be conducted (Elizabeth Kronk Warner, Kathy Lynn, Kyle White, Changing Consultation, 2021, 57–58). Kronk and colleagues note that such uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that tribes and the federal government have different definitions of what constitutes a successful consultation and that tribes are less likely to participate when consultation is seen as a purely procedural requirement with no legal recourse for the failure to consult. They would seek "effective" consultation mechanisms that are acceptable to both tribes and the federal government.

However, Richland's book seems to be arguing that a great deal may be happening in even dubious "consultations." It is just that non-Natives fail to notice, value, and make use of what Native leaders are saying and doing. Richland is also making legal, moral, and pragmatic arguments for effective tribal consultation. When he sees Native leaders insisting upon things, he sees assertions of tribal sovereignty. US federal Indian law recognizes the tribal sovereign with its rights and governmental powers, although it often fails to set out enforcement mechanisms or undermines them. The unspoken moral argument here is that the US government should (at least) follow and enforce its laws with respect to protecting the rights and sovereignty of federally recognized tribes. Richland also sees missed opportunities where US officials fail to recognize the significance of what is happening during Native–US engagements, thus undermining the efficacy of their policy and regulatory efforts and forgoing the building of ongoing working relationships.

So what do we make of Richland's specific assessments for purposes of effective consultation? He closely studies the discourse in sites of legal interaction to understand what the tribal actors are doing and expecting. He determines that they seek respectful relations between sovereign but interdependent nations. As an anthropologist, he focuses on things like mutual respect for the other's norms, knowledge, and relations; a recognition of the decentralized power and authority in Native communities; the building of ongoing relations of respect; and vigilance against the imposition of the norms and knowledge of the other. He calls for the parties to spend time and attention in learning about each other's law ways and comparing and negotiating a path forward, as partners. It would be interesting to consider how these assessments overlap with or add to the recommendations of the legal scholars who push for the establishment of a common understanding of the role, purpose, and principles of consultation, from both Indigenous and western worldviews; the recognition of the role and protection of the use of traditional knowledge in initiatives; the examination of the impacts affecting tribal access to and management of tribal resources; the identification of resources and the strengthening of tribal and agency capacity to engage in meaningful consultation (relationship building takes time and money); and the identification of opportunities for the co-management of tribally valued resources and including tribal leadership, traditional knowledge, and direction (Kronk, et al., 60-61).

These assessments and recommendations involve both process and substance. It seems it would be easy for US officials to latch onto buzzwords like "traditional knowledge" (as in "fill out this form telling us about your relevant traditional knowledge") and to forgo allocating the time and money—and thus the attention—to building the relationships necessary to understanding what tribal actors are saying, doing, and expecting. This all seems to boil down to respecting the tribal sovereign in deeds. Richland's work gets us to the point where we see that this is all about true relationship building and respect. At the same time, Richland is skeptical about whether US agents will ever be willing or able to appreciate the meanings that Native nations bring to "meaningful tribal consultation." He thinks that what ultimately matters is what tribal leaders think, and that whether the settler state catches their drift depends on their ability to appreciate Indigenous jurisdictions of cooperation without submission. And this seems to turn on resources and the moral commitment and will on the part of US officials to appropriate and allocate them effectively. Even so, Richland's work helps all sides determine what to shoot for: the time to listen to each other to figure each other out, and what to make of what Native leaders and advocates are saying and doing (meaning) in these engagements.

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Indigenous Women and Violence: Feminist Activist Research in Heightened States of Injustice. Edited by Lynn Stephen and Shannon Speed. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2021. 268 pages. \$100.00 cloth; \$35.00 paper; \$150.00 electronic.

Editors Lynn Stephen and Shannon Speed have created a multidisciplinary text that functions as an empowering site of engaged feminist scholarship, offering its readers the opportunity to learn about the intersectional violence that Indigenous women in North and Central America experience and the various forms of resistance they enact against it. *Indigenous Women and Violence: Feminist Activist Research in Heightened States of Injustice* appears to have the dual goals of calling for understanding violence against Indigenous women as an ongoing form of colonialism, as well as to uphold storytelling—the collecting of life histories and emotional (felt) experiences of Indigenous women's lives—as a primary theorization strategy towards a shared intellectual and methodological framework for "engaged feminist scholarship," as Stephen and Speed put it.

Beyond its contributions to the fields of Indigenous studies, Native feminism, and feminism more broadly, the book makes critical and long overdue interventions into ethnography and cultural anthropology. For example, the eight chapter authors uphold an approach to research and writing that Speed in chapter 1, "Grief and an Indigenous Feminist's Rage," calls "embodied knowledge": embracing embodied and emotional engagements that include recognizing the author/researcher's own personal experiences and responses to violence—not just their "subjects" of research alone.

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