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Guerrillas Today, What Tomorrow: Transformation of Guerrilla Movements

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by

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The Dissertation of Kevin Edward Grisham is approved:

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Any errors or omissions in this work are solely my own.

## Dedication

To Jimmie L. Alford, my grandfather, who instilled in me the passion for learning that has lead me to this project and to instill the same passion in other people.

## ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Guerrillas Today, What Tomorrow: Transformation of Guerrilla Movements

by

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In recent years, there has become a greater need to understand how rebellious organizations (particularly, guerrilla movements) may transform into new organizations during conflict and following the end of major hostilities. During conflict and following conflict, either rebellious organizations become the new state, cease to exist or they transform into something completely different. In looking specifically at guerrilla movements, one can see many have transformed into other types of organizations including political parties, terrorist organizations, and criminal organizations. This phenomenon leads to the following questions: how do guerrilla movements transform in conflict and post-conflict environments? This study contends this transformation occurs because of the interaction between four independent variables – resources (both physical and human resources), beliefs and associated frames and political accessibility. The manners in which these variables interact are influenced by ‘who’ has the advantage during the conflict – the state or the guerrilla movement and what kind of advantage they

have – social, political or resource power advantages. Through the study of two paired comparisons (four individual case studies – the Provisional Irish Republican Army and Sinn Féin [PIRA/SF] in Northern Ireland, and the Spear of the Nation [*Umkhonto We Sizwe*] and the African National Congress [MK/ANC] in South Africa, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC] in Colombia and the Abu Sayyaf Group [ASG] in the Philippines), this work traces the mechanisms and processes that have lead these organizations to transform into political parties and criminal organizations. Using qualitative comparative methodology (i.e., field interviews, archival research and historical analysis of each former guerrilla movement), this study finds that each transformation is a result of the interaction of the four independent variables in a particular way. These interactions influence the relationship between the various subgroups in the guerrilla movements and therefore, these interactions influence changes in the overall structure of the guerrilla movement. Likewise, these new structures take on different means and ends than when compared to their previous guerrilla movement form.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures	xvi
List of Tables	xvii
<u>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION</u>	
INTRODUCTION	1
The Tradition of the Scholarship Concerning Civil Wars And Rebellion	3
Changes in Organizations Who Struggle Against the State	8
OUTLINE OF WORK	11
IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH	13
BIBLIOGRAPHY	15
<u>CHAPTER 2: THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT &amp; ITS ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOME</u>	
WHY IS DEFINING NECESSARY?	18
ONE MAN’S GUERRILLA FIGHTER, ANOTHER MAN’S TERRORIST	20
How is the Guerrilla Movement Different from the Terrorist Organization?	22
THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF DEFINING “TERRORISM”	26
U.S. Municipal Law and Definitions of “Terrorism”	26
International Law and The Historical Development of Defining “Terrorism”	27
A Scholarly Approach to Defining “Terrorism”	28
Why is There No Single Definition of “Terrorism?”	31
The Definition of Terrorist Organization Used in This Study	35

THE OTHER TWO ORGANIZATIONS – POLITICAL PARTY AND CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS	35
Political Parties: How Do We Define	36
A Definition of Political Parties	39
Criminals and Criminal Organizations	40
A Definition of Criminal Organizations	45
CONCLUSION	45
BIBLIOGRAPHY	47
CHAPTER 3: THE COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE TRANSFORMATIVE MODEL	
<hr/>	
INTRODUCTION	51
Processes, Mechanisms, and Transformation	52
Contentious Politics: What Is It and How Does It Apply?	55
Social Movements and Development of a Struggle	58
A THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE TRANSFORMATION	66
DEFINING THE VARIABLES OF THE CPVT MODEL	69
Antecedent Condition	69
Belief Systems and Associated Frames	74
Beliefs, Associated Frames, and the Internal Dynamics of the Group	77
Political Accessibility	79
Human Resources and Physical Resources	82
Interactions and Outcomes	83
Assumptions Underlying the CPVT Model	83

THE COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE TRANSFORMATIVE (CPVT) MODEL	86
Guerrilla Movement To Political Party	87
Guerrilla Movement To Criminal Organization	95
CONCLUSION	104
BIBLIOGRAPHY	106
<u>CHAPTER 4: THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH</u>	
INTRODUCTION	110
DEVELOPMENT OF GUERRILLA MOVEMENT DATASET	112
CASE SELECTION APPROACH	118
Selecting On the Dependent Variable	120
Cases Selected	122
Variability In Context and Controlling for This Variability	122
APPROACHES TO DATA COLLECTION	126
PROCESS TRACING AND ITS APPLICATION	129
COMPARISON AMONGST THE CASES: AN ADJUSTMENT	132
CONCLUSION	133
BIBLIOGRAPHY	134
<u>CHAPTER 5: REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC) AND THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG)</u>	
INTRODUCTION	137
COMPARING FARC-EP AND ABU SAYYAF	138
A CASE STUDY: FARC-EP	139
An Alternative Route Of FARC-EP Development: A Counterfactual Argument	144

Modern Development of FARC-EP: Land Struggles to Connection With Illicit Drugs	145
A Desire for Peace With Colombia: Repeated Opportunities For Political Accessibility	154
Era of Uribe In Colombia and FARC-EP Today	160
FARC-EP: MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES OF TRANSFORMATION	161
FARC-EP and Changes to Its Belief System and Associated Frames	162
Beliefs and Associated Frames During the FARC-EP Formation Phase	163
FARC-EP and Its Transition of Beliefs and Associated Frames	167
Justification of Kidnapping and the Issue of the Drug Trade	170
The Frames of Today and FARC-EP's Position	173
Overview of the Changes in Beliefs and Frames of FARC-EP	175
A CASE STUDY: THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG)	178
Preconditions to Militancy in the Philippines	178
Moros Islamic Liberation Front (MILF): Militancy by Islamists	182
The Early Years of the Abu Sayyaf Group	184
The Death of a Leader and Its Aftermath	189
Abu Sayyaf Today	193
ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG): MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES OF TRANSFORMATION	195
ASG and Changes to Its Belief System & Associated Frames	196
ASG and Political Accessibility to the Philippine Political System	202
ASG and Physical and Human Resource Needs	203
CONCLUSION	205
BIBLIOGRAPHY	207

**CHAPTER 6: PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY/SINN FÉIN (PIRA/SF) &  
SPEAR OF THE NATION/AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (MK/ANC)**

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INTRODUCTION	213
CASE STUDY: PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) AND PROVISIONAL SINN FÉIN (PSF)	214
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROVISIONALS AND THE “TROUBLES”	216
The Struggles of the late 1960s and 1970s	217
Bloody Events of the 1970s & 1980s	220
The Change In Approaches By the Provos and Sinn Féin	229
A Lasting Peace in Northern Ireland?	232
A Meeting of the Minds and the Future of the Conflict	235
Good Friday Agreement, Decommissioning, and a Different Future for the North	242
PIRA/SF: MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES OF TRANSFORMATION	246
PIRA/SF and Changes to Its Belief System & Associated Frames	247
PIRA/SF And Their Belief System And Associated Frames (1960s & 1970s)	251
The Limited Warfare Period: 1969-1971	251
Full-Scale Warfare to Diminished Warfare: 1970s -2000s	253
PIRA/SF and Political Accessibility to Northern Ireland’s Political System	258
PIRA/SF and Physical and Human Resource Needs	263
CASE STUDY: AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC) AND SPEAR OF THE NATION (MK)	267
South Africa After Union & the Growth of the Political Struggle (1910-1948)	269
The Development of a ‘New’ ANC (1948-1960)	274

THE BEGINNING OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE OF THE MK	281
Saboteurs Begin – The Early Days of the Armed Struggle	285
Prison and the Struggle Continues	288
Struggle From Outside And Inside	291
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ANC AND MK	295
A Shift from Sabotage to Something Much More Violent (Full-Scale Warfare Period)	298
POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA & THE ANC AND MK	301
The First ‘True’ Openings – A Shift towards the Diminished Warfare Period	304
A Move to the Post-Conflict Stage (Transitional Peace Period in South Africa)	305
MK/ANC: MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES OF TRANSFORMATION	310
MK/ANC and Changes to Its Belief System & Associated Frames	311
MK/ANC and Physical and Human Resource Needs	314
CONCLUSION	318
BIBLIOGRAPHY	320
 <u>CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION</u>	
ALTERNATIVE VARIABLES – LEADERSHIP	330
ALTERNATIVE VARIABLES – MEASUREMENT OF RESOURCE NEEDS	333
ALTERNATIVE VARIABLES – ISSUE OF RHETORIC	334
QUESTIONS RAISED BY THIS STUDY	335
FUTURE EXPANSION OF RESEARCH PROJECT	335
CONCLUSION	336

APPENDIXES

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APPENDIX A – CIVIL WARS FROM 1945 TO 2004 (DURATION GREATER THAN 1 YEAR)	337
APPENDIX B – CASE SELECTION CRITERIA	341
APPENDIX C – RESPONDENT LIST	342
APPENDIX D – QUESTION LIST USED IN FIELD INTERVIEWS	344

## List of Figures

Figure 1.1 – Phases Of Conflict and Transformation	8
Figure 3.1 – Phases Of Conflict and Transformation (with Periods)	54
Figure 3.2 – Collective Political Violence Transformative Model	68
Figure 3.3 – Collective Political Violence Transformative Model (Political Transformation)	70
Figure 3.4 – Collective Political Violence Transformative Model (Criminal Transformation)	72
Figure 3.5 – First Stage of Transformation (GM to Political Party)	87
Figure 3.6 – Second Stage of Transformation (GM to Political Party)	89
Figure 3.7 – Third Stage of Transformation (GM to Political Party)	90
Figure 3.8 – Fourth Stage of Transformation (GM to Political Party)	92
Figure 3.9 – Fifth Stage of Transformation (GM to Political Party)	94
Figure 3.10 – First Stage of Transformation (GM to Criminal Organization)	96
Figure 3.11 – Second Stage of Transformation (GM to Criminal Organization)	97
Figure 3.12 – Third Stage of Transformation (GM to Criminal Organization)	98
Figure 3.13 – Fourth Stage of Transformation (GM to Criminal Organization)	104
Figure 5.1 – The Development of the FARC-EP	143
Figure 5.2 – The Development of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	183
Figure 6.1 – The Irish Republican Army and the Development of the PIRA	215
Figure 6.2 – Deaths Due to “The Troubles”	221
Figure 6.3 – Development of the African National Congress & Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)	268

## List of Tables

Table 1.1 – Occurrences of Intra-State Conflict (1945-2004)	3
Table 2.1 – Characteristics of Organizational Outcomes	46
Table 3.1 – Interaction Table and Organizational Outcomes	84
Table 4.1 – Dyadic Incompatibility in Armed Conflicts 1945-2007 (Conflict Year as Unit)	114
Table 4.2 – Dyadic Incompatibility in Armed Conflict & Type of Conflict 1945-2007 (Conflict Year as Unit)	115
Table 4.3 – Intrastate Conflict between Government and Opposing Internal Groups Categorized by Region & Incompatibility Issue (Conflict Year as Unit)	116
Table 5.1 – FARC-EP Income from Cocaine Industry & Other Illicit Activities	150
Table 5.2 – Coca Cultivation by Affected Departments in Known FARC-EP Areas of Operation (hectares) (2003-2008)	155
Table 5.3 – Beliefs and Associated Frames in the Development of FARC-EP	176
Table 5.4 – Number of Incidents and Casualties from ASG Attacks	188
Table 5.5 – Beliefs and Associated Frames in the Development of ASG	200
Table 6.1 – Deaths Caused by the PIRA and British Army (1969-2001)	222
Table 6.2 – Beliefs and Associated Frames in the Development of the PIRA & SF	248
Table 6.3 – Beliefs and Associated Frames in the Development of the ANC & MK	312

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

*On December 31, 1991, the government of El Salvador developed a peace treaty with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), a guerrilla movement which had been waging war against the government since the early 1980s, which allowed the FMLN to become one of the two major political parties in El Salvador.*<sup>1</sup>

*Prior to 1981, the cultivation of coca and marijuana in guerrilla-controlled areas (i.e., FARC and ELN) in Colombia was seen as an obstacle to the true aims of the guerrilla movements. As of 1998 in Colombia, guerrilla movements and paramilitaries derived \$551 million from the drug trafficking business.*<sup>2</sup>

### INTRODUCTION

How do guerrilla movements transform in conflict and post-conflict environments? At the core of the two examples listed previously (i.e., the FMLN of El Salvador and the FARC-EP of Colombia) and a multitude of other similar examples is this question. Exploring the ‘how’ is the focus of this work. All one has to do is open the newspaper, listen to the radio, or turn on the television and they are bombarded with scenes of violence. Much of this violence is at the individual level (i.e., violence associated with criminal activity). Yet, one is also flooded with images of civil wars, terrorist attacks, and inter-state wars.<sup>3</sup> From the end of Second World War till 1990, many events in the

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<sup>1</sup> MIPT, "Group Profile: Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front," Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, <http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=228>.

<sup>2</sup> Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001).

<sup>3</sup> In his work, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, civil war is defined “[...] as armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the onset of the hostilities.” See, Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5. The two parties include “[...] a relatively large rebel organization with military equipment and full-time recruits.” See, ———, "Civil Wars," in *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative*

world centered on the bipolar struggle between the United States and the USSR. Even though there were numerous civil wars occurring during the Cold War era, many of these conflicts went virtually unnoticed unless they were linked to the Cold War struggle for ideological dominance.<sup>4</sup> In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the number of intra-state conflicts was prevalent around the globe. As noted by Collier, Hoeffler, and Sambanis, 21 civil wars began after 1989.<sup>5</sup> From these civil wars, approximately 20 million people have been killed and 67 million people have been displaced.<sup>6</sup> These intra-state conflicts ranged across the international community, from Afghanistan to Angola to Yugoslavia to Georgia, as can be seen in Table I (Appendix A).<sup>7</sup> As illustrated by Table I, the phenomenon of intra-state struggle is not a recent occurrence housed only in the post-Cold War era. According to a dataset collected by Håvard Strand at the Centre for the Study of Civil War (ICWS), located at the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), from 1945 to 2004, there were 138-recorded struggles between opposing

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*Politics*, ed. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). From this context, intra-state struggle between the governments (as used in this work) is synonymous with civil wars.

<sup>4</sup> Michael K. Steinberg, "Generals, Guerrillas, Drugs, and Third World War-Making," *Geographical Review* 90, no. 2 (2000): 260.

<sup>5</sup> Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Nicholas Sambanis, "The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design," in *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, ed. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2005), 3-5.

<sup>6</sup> Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, "Preface," in *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, ed. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2005), xiii.

<sup>7</sup> The information in Table I, Appendix A and Table 1.1 was drawn from the database, *Onset and Duration of Intrastate Conflict*, constructed by Håvard Strand at the Centre for the Study of Civil War (ICWS), housed at PRIO. All civil wars not lasting 12 months or more were dropped from the data set of Table 1.1. This was done to delimit between limited conflicts that occur between the state and a small group of individuals who are discontent with the state. This data should better reflect the occurrence of sustained movements who rebel against the state.

organizations and the government of a state. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the number of struggles between a state government and an opposing force grew exponentially. As delineated below (Table 1.1), the greatest number of inter-state struggles was initiated between 1989 and 1999. Along with the occurrence of civil wars comes the development of rebels, insurgents, and guerrilla movements.

Table 1.1  
Occurrences of Intra-State Conflict  
(1945-2004)

Total Count	1945-55	1956-66	1967-77	1978-88	1989-99	2000-2004
138	18	22	27	22	43	6

From 1945 to 2004, the struggles included approximately 228 different organizations & defined rebellious movements.<sup>8</sup>

#### The Tradition of the Scholarship Concerning Civil Wars and Rebellion

An exploration of the literature on intra-state struggles (more particularly, civil wars and revolutions) finds a wealth of discussion concerning the onset and duration of these occurrences. Examples of the writings concerning the onset of civil war include works by Collier and Hoeffler, Sambanis, and Fearon.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, extensive studies

<sup>8</sup> This number was gained by examining Table I (Appendix A) drawn from the ICWS dataset. From the opposing organizations listed in the table, the number of organizations with a defined name or acronym was counted. Those not counted included: intra-state regions listed under one name (e.g., Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh); groups listed only as “irregulars,” “insurgents,” “separatists,” and only as “various organizations.” These cases are not in the count due to not being able to identify various organizations that maybe lumped underneath these general terms. If these units were included, the total would be 267.

<sup>9</sup> For more concerning these works, see, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001), Nicholas Sambanis, "Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1)," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (2001), and James Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?" (paper presented at the World Bank Conference on Civil War Duration and Post-Conflict Transitions, University of California, Irvine, 18-20 May 2001).

have been conducted on the duration of civil wars including those by Elbadawi and Sambanis.<sup>10</sup> Both literatures and similar scholarship can be divided into one of two categories – greed-based explanations or grievance-based explanations. Some economic models (such as the one proposed by Grossman) suggest the activity of those involved in rebellions is based in greed. In this context, the scholars suggest the rebels are no different in their behavior when compared to criminals.<sup>11</sup> In a similar fashion, William Reno suggests civil war onset may be due to the creation of states within state through the greater development of patronage networks. Similar to the findings by Grossman, the variables of greed influences the behavior in Reno’s work.<sup>12</sup> In further studies of the reliability of the greed models versus the grievance models, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler found a connection between rebellion onset and opportunity. In their quantitative study of 44 civil wars (from 1960 to 1999), Collier and Hoeffler found little correlation between “[...] inequality, lack of democracy, and ethnic diversity.”<sup>13</sup> Even though, these authors in an earlier work consider grievance as a possible explanations,

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<sup>10</sup> See, Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, "Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict," *Journal of African Economies* 9, no. 3 (2000).

<sup>11</sup> For more detail concerning Grossman’s economic modeling of civil wars, see, Herschell I. Grossman, "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," *The American Economic Review* 81, no. 4 (1991); and, Herschel I. Grossman, "Kleptocracy and Revolutions," *Oxford Economic Papers* 51 (1999).

<sup>12</sup> For more detail, see, William Reno, "Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars," in *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, ed. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 43-68.

<sup>13</sup> Charles Cater, "The Political Economy of Conflict and U.N. Intervention: Rethinking the Critical Cases of Africa," in *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievances*, ed. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003). For more detail concerning the Collier-Hoeffler (C-H) model, see, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (2004).

they find grievance-based explanations of rebellion are problematic because of susceptibility of the rebellions to collective action problems.<sup>14</sup>

Other scholars of civil wars have suggested the reasons behind civil war onset or the duration of civil wars are centered on grievances. These are various grievances held by individuals or groups involved in the civil war. In a re-examination of the C-H model (i.e., the model created by Collier and Hoeffler), Collier, Hoeffler, and Sambanis include measures of grievances (ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality) in the re-testing of the C-H model.<sup>15</sup> Fearon and Laitin have suggested the role of grievances in the onset or duration of civil war may have some impact. Yet, this influence of grievances is limited. They instead argue – along with Collier and Hoeffler – state capacity is the key to explaining civil wars.<sup>16</sup> This difference of scholarship illustrates the debate concerning the role of democratic institutions and its influence on the prevalence of civil wars, rebellions, and political violence. Some have suggested the propensity for civil wars occurs most frequently when a state is transitioning into a democracy. In this instance, the combination of

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<sup>14</sup> Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, "How Much War Will We See?: Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 3 (2002): 310.

<sup>15</sup> Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Nicholas Sambanis, "The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design," in *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, ed. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2005), 8.

<sup>16</sup> Andrew Mack, "Civil War: Academic Research and the Policy Community," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 5 (2002): 520-21. For further discussion of this argument against the grievance-based explanations of civil wars, see, James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003).

repression against a particular group and yet openness to protest against this repression may lead to greater levels of intrastate violence.<sup>17</sup>

The most common grievance-based explanation of various forms of political violence (including civil wars) is the relative deprivation concept. This concept suggests people tend to rebel when there is a “[...] perceived disparity between expectation and gratification.”<sup>18</sup> One of the seminal works in the study of rebellions that supports this premise is *Why Men Rebel* by Ted Robert Gurr. In his work, he sees this grievance as the instigating factor for collective violence.<sup>19</sup> This relative deprivation leads to frustration and then to violence. Some studies suggest groups or individuals may see violence as the only manner to gain access to the political system that they are not routinely allowed access to in a state.<sup>20</sup> Some scholars have taken this modeling to the next step in explaining rebellions. This has been done by combining grievance-based explanations along with the issue of natural resources scarcity.<sup>21</sup>

It should be noted increasingly the grievance-based explanations have been eclipsed by the quantitative analysis work by those supporting a more greed-based explanation. Yet, there is great criticism concerning the applicability of either theoretical

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<sup>17</sup> Havard Hegre et al., "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992," *American Political Science Review* 95, no. 1 (2001): 33.

<sup>18</sup> Donald L. Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 36.

<sup>19</sup> Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 13.

<sup>20</sup> For more detail on this theoretical argument, see, Edward N. Muller, *Aggressive Political Participation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

<sup>21</sup> A great example of this approach is the work by Colin Kahl. See, Colin H. Kahl, *States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 36-39.


approach without taking into account environmental context. A good example of this criticism can be seen in a study of the conflict in Papua New Guinea.<sup>22</sup> There is still another deficiency with this literature. Whereas the focus of much literature studying civil wars tends to focus on the onset and duration of the conflict, little discussion has occurred concerning what happens to the rebellious organizations during the conflict and at the end of major hostilities between the government and the rebellious organization. During the conflict and in the finality of the intra-state conflicts, the organizations opposing the state government may take a variety of different trajectories in their development. This can be seen in the two examples presented at the beginning of this chapter concerning the different trajectories taken by the FMLN and FARC in Latin America. The mechanism and processes involved in this transformation of these opposing organizations (including guerrilla movements) will be discussed in this study.

This study intends to delve into the manner in which guerrilla movements transform during the conflict and in some cases, continue to transform in the post-conflict environment. As shown in Figure 1.1, all guerrilla movements (GMs) are in a state of militancy (i.e., using armed force against their targets) at the beginning of the conflict. During their development, the GMs move from an organization that is primarily in a state of militancy to an organization that blends the use of both militancy and political approaches. As the conflict continues into the settlement of the conflict, the GM can potentially transform into an organization that only relies on political approaches. Their

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<sup>22</sup> For more detail concerning this criticism using the single case study of Papua New Guinea, see, Anthony J. Regan, "The Bougainville Conflict: Political and Economic Agendas," in *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*, ed. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 157-59.

Figure 1.1  
Phases of Conflict and Transformation



procession through this development is influenced by ‘who’ has the power advantage at a given stage of the conflict and ‘what’ type of advantage they have (social power advantage, political power advantage, or resource power advantage). In turn, this influences a variation in the guerrilla movement’s belief system and associated frames, the political accessibility made available to the guerrilla movement by the state and the human and physical resource needs of the guerrilla movement. All of these independent variables interact with each other and influence the relationship between the various actors in the guerrilla movement. These relational changes between the actors result in new particular organization to develop. The exploration of this theoretical argument with the use of case study work is the focus of this study.

#### Changes in Organizations Who Struggle Against the State

The struggle against the state government has been characterized in two ways. The guerrilla movements, insurgencies, and/or rebels are losing decisively to the government. Alternatively, these organizations begin to win decisively in their struggle. Yet, an examination of conflictual settings in the real world finds “grey area” between decisive victory and complete loss. Some conflicts result in the following conditions:

during the conflict, a stalemate between the rebellious organization (i.e., guerrilla movements, insurgents or rebels) and the central government where neither is gaining a significant advantage; no complete advantage by either party, yet the central government gains a significant advantage when compared to the rebellious organization; or no complete advantage by either party, yet the rebellious organization gains a significant advantage. From these conditions, the new trajectory of organizational development taken could result in new organizations to form from the previous guerrilla movements. Examples of these new trajectories taken by guerrilla movements can be seen in the cases of the FMLN (*Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* or Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) in El Salvador, the Provisional IRA (Irish Republican Army) in Northern Ireland, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and al-Qaeda. In each of these examples, the guerrilla movements have transformed in their post-conflict environments into political parties, criminal organizations, and transnational terrorist organizations, respectively.

There are many different trajectories taken which are not discussed in-depth in this work. For example, there are examples where a guerrilla movement may form into a political party yet retain a militant component. The best examples of this occurrence can be seen in the cases of *Hezbollah* (The Party of God) in Lebanon and HAMAS (*Harakat al-Muqawammah al-Islamiyya* or the Islamic Resistance Movement) in Palestine. Hezbollah – which formed as a guerrilla movement in the latter phase of the Lebanese

civil war – has become a growing political party in Lebanese politics.<sup>23</sup> Yet, as witnessed by their actions in the summer of 2006, Hezbollah has retained a militant component to fight against Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon. Likewise, HAMAS – which is traditionally characterized as a terrorist organization by Western governments and as “freedom fighters” by Arab and Muslim governments – ran HAMAS members in the January 2006 Palestinian elections. In January 2006, Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) candidates won 74 seats out of the 132 seats in the Palestinian parliament.<sup>24</sup> Because of their electoral successes, HAMAS controls a significant portion of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and as of late spring 2006, the military wing of HAMAS territorially controls the Gaza Strip.<sup>25</sup> In some other cases, the guerrilla movements have transformed into a component of the armed forces or a part of the security apparatus of the state. This can be seen with the inclusion of former NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia) members in the Liberian military and internal security forces.

The deficiency of the literature when compared to real world observations results in the following set of questions: what happens when a guerrilla movement progresses through conflictual settings and the advantage gained by the rebellious organization or the state are not black and white, but grey? Could these “grey” conditions lead these organizations (in particular, guerrilla movements) to transform into different types of

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<sup>23</sup> For more discussion concerning the transformation of Hezbollah, see, Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

<sup>24</sup> Graham Usher, "Hamas Risen," *Middle East Report* 238 (2006).

<sup>25</sup> As of the writing of this work, HAMAS and Fatah – the secular Palestinian organization founded by Yasser Arafat – continue to fight over who should control the West Bank and various other components of the Palestinian government.

organizations during the conflict and in the post-conflict era? Alternatively, are the previous examples and dozen more like them just anomalies? If, as this study contends, transformation of guerrilla movements occurs, what processes and mechanisms are involved and how do they interact to influence organizational change? It is from these basic questions the focus of this study begins.

## OUTLINE OF WORK

In the following chapters, this study will address how guerrilla movements transform during and after conflict into new types of organizations. The work will begin with an explanation of what the various organizational outcomes are and the work will conclude with a discussion of four case studies (FARC-EP, ASG, PIRA/SF and ANC/MK) to explore how guerrilla movements from four different regions of the world have changed over time into new organizations. The collective political violence transformative (CPVT) model explains this observed behavior.

In Chapter 2 (The Guerrilla Movement & Its Organizational Outcomes), the various organizational outcomes that occur when guerrilla movements transform are defined. Given the potential criticism that a change of a guerrilla movement is merely a changing of labels (i.e., 'one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist'), this section outlines the characteristics that discriminates a guerrilla movement from a political party, criminal organization, or terrorist organization. Additionally, this chapter will explore the problems inherent in distinguishing guerrilla movements from terrorist organizations.

In Chapter 3 (The Collective Political Violence Transformative Model), the processes that interact to influence the transformation of guerrilla movements are defined. Further, the interaction of these processes (the opening or closing of political accessibility; the transformation, or retention of beliefs and associated frames; the increase or decrease in human and physical resource needs) is examined through the development of the collective political violence transformative (CPVT) model. Additionally, the antecedent condition of ‘who’ has the advantage in a given conflict and the type of advantage will be discussed and how it influences the interactions will be discussed. Each of the interaction of the processes and their resulting new organizational outcomes is shown.

In Chapter 4 (Methodology), the methods used to pick the case studies for this work are reviewed. Additionally, the various methods for collecting data on each case is examined. To complete this work, Chapter 5 (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia & the Abu Sayyaf Group) and Chapter 6 (The Provisional Irish Republican Army/Sinn Féin & the Spear of the Nation/African National Congress) presents paired comparison of four case studies. In Chapter 6, the transformation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army/Sinn Féin (PIRA/SF) and the African National Congress/Spear of the Nation (ANC/MK) from guerrilla movements in Northern Ireland and South Africa, respectively, will be explored. Through analysis of historical evidence, speeches, communiqués, and other media forms – in connection with interviews conducted by the author in Northern Ireland, this section will explore how these former guerrilla movements transformed using the processes and mechanisms discussed in the CPVT model. Similarly, in Chapter

5, a pairwise comparison in made between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) of Colombia and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) of the Philippines. Through the analysis of the history of both organizations, analysis of statements made by the guerrilla movements, and examination of data concerning their activities and resources, the transformation of these two former guerrilla movements into criminal organizations will be examined.

#### IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH

The findings of this work have implications for two major areas – public policy making and advancement of the study of contentious politics, political violence, and social movements. In the case of improvements in public policy making, the findings of these studies could better explain how various mechanisms and variables can lead to new trajectories being taken in the development of guerrilla movements and insurgencies. This could allow public policy to be constructed to influence those mechanisms and therefore, influence the type of organization that develops from the evolution of rebellious organizations. For example, the findings of this work could help the development of policy that would influence rebellious organizations to develop into political parties versus develop into terrorist organizations (e.g., influencing the transformation of insurgents and militias in Iraq into legitimate political parties in the Iraqi political system). Concerning the advancement of the study of contentious politics, political violence, and social movements, these findings would allow voids to be filled. As noted at the beginning of this proposal, generally, the creation and persistence of guerrilla movements has been studied. This study and its findings would allow

scholarship to develop on the transformation of guerrilla movements (and other forms of rebellious organizations) during and after conflict. These findings would allow scholars to gain a better appreciation for how rebellious organizations develop into new organizations.

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## CHAPTER TWO

### THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT & ITS ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOMES

All scientific studies tend to begin with two major components – the research question and definitions of the terms and concepts associated with the research question. The use of systemized thought and inquiry are essential to better understanding the world around us.<sup>1</sup> A given research question allows one to focus on a given phenomenon. Theories develop as potential answers to these research questions. As observed by Van Evera, “[t]heories are general statements that describe and explain the causes or effects of classes of phenomena.”<sup>2</sup> If this is true, then defining these classes are essential for any study.

#### WHY IS DEFINING NECESSARY?

For a theory concerning a phenomenon to be constructed or for a construction of a hypothesis to occur, one needs to be clear concerning ‘what’ is being studied. Without clear distinctions about the items to be studied in a given research project, manageability of a study becomes a problem. The context of imprecision – or ‘muddling’, as Babbie would call it – is not the aim of science.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, classification of the class of items to be studied is necessary.<sup>4</sup> Terms are associated with given concepts. These terms allow

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<sup>1</sup> Kenneth Hoover and Todd Donovan, *The Elements of Social Scientific Thinking*, Eighth ed. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2004), 6.

<sup>2</sup> Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 7.

<sup>3</sup> Earl Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research*, Eighth ed. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998), 120.

<sup>4</sup> Edgar Bright Wilson, *An Introduction to Scientific Research* (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 1952).

individuals to communicate with each other in regards to given concepts. Based on this communication, an agreement is drawn between individuals concerning what is meant by the terms.<sup>5</sup> Hoover and Donovan note, "[t]o call a thing by a precise name is the beginning of understanding, because it is the key to the procedure that allows the mind to grasp reality and its many relationships."<sup>6</sup> There is not always complete agreement between individuals concerning the *true* definition of a term. This is particularly true in the case of this study given the varied disagreements over what dictates a guerrilla movement and how is it different from a terrorist organization.<sup>7</sup> Yet, regardless of agreement on a term, the defining of terms in a study allow for greater precision. In addition, in outlining the exact definitions, other scholars can revisit a given study and collected data to confirm results through the same research process.

With this in mind, this chapter has been constructed – to provide the reader with a clear understanding of what is meant by “guerrilla movement” and its related outcomes. This subsequent chapter will outline the definitions of the three independent variables in this study. (This will be done in connection with the discussion of the theoretical model proposed in this work.) Previous scholarly research and definitions by those directly involved in guerrilla movements will be used to draft both the nominal and operational definitions for this study. When one creates a working definition for a term (i.e., in an

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<sup>5</sup> Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research*, , 118.

<sup>6</sup> Hoover and Donovan, *The Elements of Social Scientific Thinking*, ,17.

<sup>7</sup> An example of this need for distinction can be seen in a correspondence between the author and Dr. John Harrison, Assistant Professor and Manager of Terrorism Research at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore. In this correspondence, Dr. Harrison noted the problems with defining the difference between terrorism and guerrilla movements. Email correspondence with author: John Harrison, October 2 2007.

attempt to limit confusion and disagreement over what a term means), we refer to this as a nominal definition. Operational definition allow a researcher to "specify exactly what we are going to observe, how we will do it, and what interpretations we are going to place on various possible observations."<sup>8</sup> In each of these cases, this conceptualization process will assist in gaining greater precision in this study. This is not only essential for the building of this study's theory, but also for the data collection process to be used in this qualitative study. Greater concentration on the defining of terms and concepts will allow for a more careful collection of the data. The first place to begin is the defining of the primary unit of analysis for this study – the guerrilla movement.

#### ONE MAN'S GUERRILLA FIGHTER, ANOTHER MAN'S TERRORIST

The main unit of analysis for this study is guerrilla movements. For the purpose of this study, a guerrilla movement will be defined in the following manner:

*a collective of individuals organized into military-like units who use a variety of techniques similar to terrorism (e.g., assassinations and bombings) to primarily target military and government sites and who are attempting to gain physical control over a defined geographical area.*

As noted in the previous section, it is vital that all definitions of concepts be constructed before being studied. This premise is even more important when one is studying various forms of political violence. Regardless of studying riots, panics, rebellions, civil wars, guerrilla movements, or terrorist organizations, subjectivity tends to be prevalent when discussing these types of organizations and activities. The violence associated with these organizations and their related activities makes them pejorative terms that are hard to define. This is due to a combination of the moral absolutes associated with the actions

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<sup>8</sup> Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research*, ,122.

and who is doing the labeling of individuals.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, the primary unit of analysis in this study – the guerrilla movement – is often confused as the same as terrorists organizations or insurgencies by both scholars and practitioners.<sup>10</sup> For example, in “Guerilla Warfare in Theory and Policy,” Huntington saw “terrorism” as one of three components of insurgencies. The other two components were guerilla warfare, and conventional warfare. This example denotes how terrorism and guerrilla warfare as being components of another form of political violence – insurgencies.<sup>11</sup> Yet, in writings by other scholars, such as Morris, guerrilla movements and insurgencies can be seen as one in the same. Terrorist organizations are dramatically different from guerrilla movements and insurgencies. For example, Morris argues, “[t]errorists may pursue political, even revolutionary, goals, but their violence replaces rather than complements a political program.”<sup>12</sup> In this case, guerrilla movements and insurgents are very similar as they see the use of violence as a short-term tactic than meshes well with a political approach to their struggle. In the case of guerrilla movements, the absolute necessity of using a political approach (program) in the struggle against the government has been noted by many successful guerrilla movement leaders. This can be seen in the writings

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<sup>9</sup> For more detail on this issue, see subsequent section on how terrorism is defined.

<sup>10</sup> For example of the confusion in scholarly works in differentiating between guerrilla movements and terrorism see, Samuel Huntington, "Guerilla Warfare in Theory and Policy," in *Modern Guerilla Warfare*, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), ;,; Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 1990).; and Arthur Campbell, *Guerillas* (New York: The John Day Company, 1968).

<sup>11</sup> Huntington, "Guerilla Warfare in Theory and Policy," xvi.

<sup>12</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Morris, "Al-Qaeda Insurgency" (Strategy Research Project, United States Army War College, 2005), 2.

by Che Guevara and Mao Tse-Tung.<sup>13</sup> The necessity of having a political component in a guerrilla movement may explain why as the movement develops after the conflict is over, it is not hard for the movement to shift into more political, non-violent, activities. For example, after the conflict had subsided in Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein became the primary negotiator on the political front for the PIRA and today; it had helped to lead the PIRA towards greater political inclusion and participation in Northern Irish politics.

How is the Guerrilla Movement Different from the Terrorist Organization?

Since one of the potential dependent variables in this study (i.e., the outcomes after the transformation of the guerrilla movements) is a terrorist organization, it is important to differentiate between these two types of organizations. As noted by Bruce Hoffman, former director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews, it is vital to distinguish various forms of political violence from each other -- particularly, terrorism. This assists researchers in highlighting how distinct each form is from one another. If one is to visual how guerrilla movements can transform over time into other forms of organization that use violence to achieve their goals, it is vital these distinctions be made.<sup>14</sup> The other two forms of organizations that can develop from the transformative process – political parties and criminal organizations – are much easier to distinguish from guerrilla movements.

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<sup>13</sup> In his writing, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, Mao makes many references to the multiple facet nature of guerrilla movements. In one passage, he notes guerrilla warfare (and therefore, guerrilla movements as an organization who are involved in this activity) is made up of “[...] constituent parts, in varying importance, [...] military, political, economic, social and psychological.” See, Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 7.

<sup>14</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), , 40.

Therefore, the definitional constructs of these two other entities will be addressed briefly later in this chapter.

To begin to distinguish between guerrilla movements and terrorist organizations, one must note the similarities and differences between their forms and the functions those forms perform (means to achieve goals). In each instance, there are immediate goals associated with the actions taken by the organizations and the long-term goals of the organizations. The immediate goals of both organizations are often similar. Hoffman notes the purpose of the violent actions of each organization is “[...] to intimidate or coerce, thereby affecting behaviour through the arousal of fear.”<sup>15</sup> Although, when one examines the long-term goals of each organization, they are very different. In the case of guerrilla movements, there is often an organizational goal to gain control over a “defined geographical area and its population.”<sup>16</sup> The latter is rarely case for terrorist organizations.<sup>17</sup>

The means to achieve goals are sometimes overlapping between these two types of organizations. Both entities often use assassinations, kidnappings, detonating explosives in public areas, and other similar violent activities.<sup>18</sup> However, the specific targets selected by each group differ. Each group wants to instill fear in a given population. However, guerrilla movements are wanting to instill fear in and/or damage

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., , 41.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency," ed. Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, No date), 2.

<sup>18</sup> Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, , 41.

on the government or its agents. They often focus on attacking government targets (in particular, military forces).<sup>19</sup> Guerrilla movements generally do not specifically target non-combatants. If non-combatants were targeted, guerrilla movements hinder the potential support they can gain from the general population.<sup>20</sup> The support and sympathy for the guerrilla movement is essential for both organizational survival and attainment of the goals of the organization. To target the civilian population would hinder the survivability of a guerrilla movement.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, guerrilla movements normally do not target civilian populations. Nevertheless, terrorist organizations are generally attempting to instill fear in the general population. The primary target of terrorist organizations is non-combatants. Generally, terrorist organizations do not directly engage opposing government forces.<sup>22</sup> Most definitions of terrorism include the targeting of civilians as a key defining characteristic of terrorism.<sup>23</sup> In addition, the difference between guerrilla movements and terrorist organizations can be found in their form (structure).

The guerrilla movements are organized into armed, military-like units (squads, platoons, and companies).<sup>24</sup> In addition, guerrilla movements tend to be larger when

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> One of the defining characteristics of guerrilla movements used by many scholars is their successful attempts to gain support from the general population for their actions against the opposing government forces. For an example, see, Gordon H. McCormick, "People's Wars," in *Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II* (New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc., 1999), 23.

<sup>21</sup> For an example of how important support from the general population is for the success and survival of a guerrilla movement, see, Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*.

<sup>22</sup> "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency," 2.

<sup>23</sup> For an example, see, Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, *The Political Economy of Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

<sup>24</sup> Morris, "Al-Qaeda Insurgency", 2.

compared to terrorist organizations. As observed by Laquer, “there have been guerrilla units of ten thousand men and women, but an urban terrorist unit seldom, if ever, comprises more than a few people.”<sup>25</sup> Due to their structure and size, guerrilla movements tend to be hierarchical and all of the subunits have established connections between themselves. This is similar to insurgencies.<sup>26</sup> Terrorist organizations tend to be of a cellular structure and smaller with limited connections between each of the units. Additionally, guerrilla movements tend to be very overt in their activities against the government. Dissimilarly, terrorist organizations tend to be secretive in their actions. The cellular structure of the terrorist organization versus the hierarchical structure of the guerrilla movement leads to this secretive versus overt behavior by both organizations.<sup>27</sup>

In addition to these differences, there is some suggestion by various scholars that guerrilla movements do not estrange themselves from the society they evolved from prior to conflict. As suggested by Mao Tse-Tung, the support of the people is absolutely necessary for the survival of the struggle and the guerrilla movements involved in those struggles. A study by Wiewiorka suggests terrorist organizations tend to see themselves alienated from society. They tend to be “social antimovements.”<sup>28</sup> Guerrilla movements tend to associate themselves very closely with components of society. They will retain both

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<sup>25</sup> Walter Laquer, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1976), , xi.

<sup>26</sup> Morris, "Al-Qaeda Insurgency", 2.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Michel Wiewiorka, *The Making of Terrorism*, trans. David Gordon White (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 3-41 & 61-77.

supporters and sympathizers. This lends to the continuance of the goals and objectives of the movement.

Based on the previous discussion, one can see there is a clear distinction between guerrilla movements and terrorist organizations. Yet, to understand fully the distinction between these two types of organizations and to understand how guerrilla movements can transform into terrorist organizations, there is a need for a clearer definition of *terrorism*. To construct a definition of terrorist organization, it is vital to explore the problems in defining terrorism.

#### THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF DEFINING “TERRORISM”

There are multitudes of definitions of “terrorism.” These definitions come from the legal arena and the scholarly environment. From an examination of these definitions, a more precise definition can be created. The problematic nature of creating a single definition of “terrorism” will also be seen by exploring these various approaches to defining terrorism and terrorist organizations.

#### U.S. Municipal Law and Definitions of “Terrorism”

There are a variety of ways to define “terrorism” under municipal law and international law. The definitions of “terrorism” and “terrorists” in municipal law in the United States come from two main areas – the diplomatic and immigration milieu and the enforcement arena.<sup>29</sup> The definition of “terrorism” used in the diplomatic and

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<sup>29</sup> There is a third manner for defining “terrorism” by the United States government. This comes from the U.S. Department of Defense. A discussion of the differences between this definition and the other two – the State Department definition and the FBI definition – will not occur in this work. In the post-9/11 environment, the U.S. Department of Defense primarily defines terrorism in the context used by the President of the United States. This definition is either the U.S. State Department’s definition or the FBI’s definition or a combination of both definitions. The definition of “terrorism” outlined by the U.S.

immigration arenas is contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the United States Code, Title 22, Chapter 38, § 2656(f), subsection d(2). The United States Department of State uses the definition of “terrorism” contained in the U.S. Code (Title 22 USC 38, § 2656(f), subsection d(2)) in their annual reports to Congress, *Global Patterns of Terrorism*.<sup>30</sup> The U.S. State Department defines terrorism in the following manner:

The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.<sup>31</sup>

The definition of “terrorism” – as contained in the AEDPA Amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act -- is used by the U.S. Department of State in defining *who* “terrorists” are.

#### International Law and the Historical Development of Defining “Terrorism”

The codification of a single definition of “terrorism” in international law has been attempted through various international conventions, treaties, and United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly resolutions. According to M. Cherif Bassiouni, as of 1999, the United Nations system has had a minimum of seven studies by the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, 6 draft U.N. resolutions, fourteen international conventions, 34 U.N. resolutions, and 46 assorted U.N. reports dealing with the issue of international

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Department of Defense prior to September 11, 2001, can be found in a field manual used by the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force. See, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet, 3-20 ", ed. Department of the Army and the Air Force Department of Defense (Department of the Army and the Air Force, 1990).

<sup>30</sup> For an example of this definition, see "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2001, Preface and Introduction," ed. U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State, 2002).

<sup>31</sup> "Foreign Relations and Intercourse," ed. U.S. Congress (1987).

terrorism.<sup>32</sup> One hundred and nine (109) draft resolutions concerning the creation of a definition of “terrorism” were put forth for a vote in the United Nations General Assembly from 1936 to 1981.<sup>33</sup> In the post-9/11 era, this number has dramatically increased. This increase came as the international community attempted to address the issue of terrorism.

The debate over the codification of an international definition of “terrorism” continued after the “terrorist” attacks on September 11, 2001. This is seen in the 2002 report written by the U.N. ad hoc committee that was established by UNGA Resolution A/RES/51/210. The ad hoc committee was tasked with developing a comprehensive international convention on international “terrorism.” In their report, the ad hoc committee defined a “terrorist” as any individual who causes:

(a) death or serious bodily injury to any person; or (b) serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or (c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems[...]<sup>34</sup>

### A Scholarly Approach to Defining “Terrorism”

Varieties of scholars from a multitude of academic disciplines have constructed a series of definitions of “terrorism.” Similar to the discussion about defining “terrorism”

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<sup>32</sup> M. Cherif Bassiouni, "International Terrorism," in *International Criminal Law* (Ardsley, New York: Translation Publishers, 1999).

<sup>33</sup> Walter Laquer, "Reflections on Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (1986): 88.

<sup>34</sup> "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996," ed. United Nations General Assembly (United Nations Publications, 28 January – 1 February 2002 (Sixth Session)), Supplement No. 37, A/RES/57/37-Annex II.

in municipal and international law, no single scholarly definition has been created. Some scholars argue the need for clarifying a single definition of “terrorism” is not necessary and possibly, “a waste of time.”<sup>35</sup> An example of scholarly antipathy towards defining “terrorism” can be found in Walter Laquer’s statement in his 1977 work, *Terrorism*. In his discussion of this issue, he stated, “... disputes about a comprehensive, detailed definition will... make no notable contribution toward the understanding of terrorism.”<sup>36</sup> Yet, most scholars understand the necessity for clarifying the term prior to developing studies around it. This is seen in recent works written by Hoffman and various other scholars of “terrorism.”<sup>37</sup> Given the problems of confusing a guerrilla movement (the focus of this work) and a terrorist organization, it is imperative a clearer definition be constructed for this work.

Those scholars who believe it is important to create a single definition of “terrorism” have often attempted to link it with a variety of other concepts. These concepts come from one of three areas – “the nature of the act, the intentions

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<sup>35</sup> In Alex P. Schmid’s survey of defining “terrorism,” he found 6 out of 50 respondents saw the process of defining “terrorism” as non-necessary. See, Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1984), , 8.

<sup>36</sup> Walter Laquer, *Terrorism* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1977), , 79.

<sup>37</sup> Hoffman recognizes the creation of an all-inclusive and universally accepted definition of “terrorism” may be impossible. Yet, he does state it is necessary to distinguish it from other forms of violence and therefore, some defining (i.e., distinguishing the components that distinguish “terrorism” from other forms of violence) is necessary. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, , 39-40. It is also interesting to note Walter Laquer may have changed his opinion about the importance in discussing the creation of a definition of “terrorism.” In his most recent work, he spends the first chapter of his book discussing the creation of a single definition of terrorism (i.e., the historical development of the term and concept). For more information with regard to this development of an alternate point-of-view by Laquer, see, Walter Laquer, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), , 8-25.

behind their violent acts, or the type of actor involved.”<sup>38</sup> The use of the terms – for example, “religion,” “environmentalists,” or “narcotics” is used as adjectives to describe the justifications behind terrorist activities (i.e., religious terrorism, eco-terrorism, and narco-terrorism). The most common linkage can be found in the connecting of particular religious value systems with acts of “terrorism” – for example, the use of the term, “religious terrorism.”<sup>39</sup> Additionally, scholars use the *goal* of an act of “terrorism” as a modifying term. This can be seen in the use of the term, “political terrorism,” in some scholarly writings in the field of “terrorism” studies.

The problem with using the goal as a defining characteristic of terrorism, it suggests that not all acts of terrorism have a political goal as an end. Activities by terrorist organizations and guerrilla movements are based on the desire to achieve a political goal. These two organizational forms share this similarity with political parties. It is important to note this point, because when guerrilla movements transform into criminal organizations, they shed those political goals for economic goals.

The lack of agreement in the scholarly environment may be due to the influence of the interest of the “...defining agency...” (i.e., each scholarly

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<sup>38</sup> Richard Falkenrath, "Analytic Models and Policy Prescriptions: Understanding Recent Innovation in U.S. Counterterrorism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 24 (2001): 162-63.

<sup>39</sup> One of the most recent examples where “religion” is used as a modifier of the term “terrorism” is Mark Juergensmeyer’s book, *Terror in the Mind of God*. See, Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), , 4-10. See also, Jean-Francois Mayer, "Cults, Violence and Religious Terrorism: An International Perspective," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 24 (2001): 361-76.

discipline may have their own way of defining “terrorism” due to the focus of their academic field of study).<sup>40</sup> This can be seen in a recent work by Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, in *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*. In their definition of “terrorism,” Evans and Newnham identify “terrorism” in the following manner: “The use of threatened use of violence on a systematic basis to achieve political objectives.”<sup>41</sup> Mark Juergensmeyer – a Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara – uses terminology associated with the sociological study of “terrorism” in his definition. In his discussion of what “terrorism,” he relates the term “terrorism” with the issue of disenfranchisement. In addition, his discussion of the defining of “terrorism” includes issues of environmental factors as a motivating factor of “terrorism.”<sup>42</sup>

#### Why is There No Single Definition of Terrorism?

Before a definition of “terrorism” is developed, it is necessary to analyze briefly the main factor that has lent to a problem with defining “terrorism.” This factor is the *pejorative nature* of the term.<sup>43</sup> Any discussion of “terrorism” will

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<sup>40</sup> As suggested by Schmid in his book, *Political Terrorism*, “the question of definition of a term like terrorism can not be detached from the question of who is the defining agency.” Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature*, , 6.

<sup>41</sup> Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, "Terrorism," in *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 530-31.

<sup>42</sup> Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, , 4-10.

<sup>43</sup> It should be noted herein the author believes there is another factor that may influence the lack of a agreed-upon definition of terrorism and how guerrilla movements and guerrilla warfare may often be mistaken for it. This is due to the dynamic nature of how the term and concept has been defined from one

reveal a discussion that deals in moral absolutes.<sup>44</sup> It is due to this fact that “terrorism” is normally associated with the negative and therefore, it is pejorative in nature.

As suggested by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, human beings often use devices that simplify complex discussion. This simplification process usually includes creating binary systems of right and wrong.<sup>45</sup> This is a concept that is applied by scholars of political violence often when discussing how to distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence.<sup>46</sup> Some scholars and practitioners would argue the killing of noncombatants is intrinsically evil. Therefore, “terrorism” is always a negative term/concept regardless of the objectives.<sup>47</sup> Similarly, some individuals would argue the targeting of combatants is also evil. This may explain why the term guerrilla movements are often used interchangeably with terrorist organization.

The pejorative nature of the term “terrorism” seems to come primarily from two areas. First, the term is not value neutral. Often, the value neutrality of the term is

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period of history to the next period of history. Due to space limitations, this theory is not discussed in this work, but a discussion of this idea can be found in Hoffman’s work, *Inside Terrorism*.

<sup>44</sup> In the aftermath of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks against the United States, a framework of moral absolutes was drawn by U.S. government officials. This can be seen repeatedly in the speeches given by U.S. President George W. Bush. He continually draws this moral absolutes by stating that if you are not with us, you are with the terrorist.

<sup>45</sup> In his work, *Breaking the Vicious Cycle*, Justice Stephen Breyer states the following: “We simplify radically; we reason with the help of a few readily understandable examples; we categorize (events and other people) in simple ways that tend to create binary choices – yes/no, eat/abstain, safe/dangerous, act/don’t act – and may reflect deeply rooted aversions[...].” Stephen Breyer, *Breaking the Vicious Cycle* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), , 35.

<sup>46</sup> For example of the use of the Breyer framework to define terrorism, see, Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

<sup>47</sup> Virginia Held, "Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals," in *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice*, ed. R.G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 6.

associated with the issue of legitimacy. One group or individual may describe a certain act as heroism or martyrdom. Another individual or group may describe the same act as murder or “terrorism.”<sup>48</sup> The lack of value neutrality for the term “terrorism” also comes from the previous discussion surrounding moral absolutes. The classification of occurrences into a system of moral absolutes has changed with world history. In early writings – often called the pre-history of “terrorism” – the killings of tyrants were seen as a positive action and a necessity for the better good of humanity.<sup>49</sup> An example of this premise can be observed in Seneca and Cicero’s writings.<sup>50</sup> A moral absolute construction saw the individuals committing tyrannicide as good and the state as evil. (If the target was morally objectionable, then the act was sanctioned.) This occurred again when the attempted assassination of Hitler and the killing of Heydrich, the man working for Hitler in Prague, transpired. In the 1960’s and early 1970’s, groups and individuals involved in acts of “terrorism” used this same argument of moral absolutes. In these cases, such as actions by the Weather Underground and the Black Panthers in the United

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<sup>48</sup> The best example of this debate about the *legitimacy* of an act can be seen in examining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If an individual places explosives on themselves and detonates him or herself, is this act of “terrorism” or an act of warfare? In the Western media, in statements by various governmental officials and in some academic literature, this act would be referred to as a “suicide bomber” or an act of terrorism. If no one is killed except for the bomber himself or herself, is this still an act of terrorism? In addition, what makes this different from a soldier sacrificing themselves to protect their comrades in arms? All of these questions deal directly with the issue of legitimacy of the act itself. For more discussion of the issue of legitimacy of an act and its connection to defining “terrorism,” see, Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures*, 2 ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 5-7.

<sup>49</sup> Issac Cronin, ed., *Confronting Fear: A History of Terrorism* (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002), 2-3.

<sup>50</sup> According to Walter Laquer, “Seneca wrote that no sacrifice was as pleasing to the gods as the blood of tyrants, and Cicero notes that tyrants always attracted a violent end.” Laquer, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*, , 10.

States, the groups depicted themselves as fighting injustice.<sup>51</sup> Due to this factor, most people did not see these acts of violence as evil. The approval of violent actions changed in the 1980s and 1990s. Laquer suggest this changed as the targets became more random and the attackers came from rightist political ideology.<sup>52</sup> With this change, “terrorism” was linked more commonly with acts of evil. This creates a problem of value neutrality for the term/concept.

Secondly, the pejorative nature of the term/concept “terrorism” comes from its selective use. If one wants to negate the actions of an individual or a group, all one has to do is label it “terrorism.” As proposed by Jonathan R. White, in his most recent work, *Terrorism: An Introduction*, any individual or group who is labeled as a “terrorist” is “...politically and socially degraded.” In addition, political movements may be prevented from fulfilling their goals after they are labeled as “terrorists.”<sup>53</sup> Adrian Guelke further supports this view by stating Western democracies have used the “terrorism” label to “[...] demonize any violent group.”<sup>54</sup> In addition, society, as a whole, will not support organizations or political movements that are labeled as terrorist organizations.<sup>55</sup> This is due to the negative value attached to the term. In this case, he who labels a group or individual or a movement as a “terrorist(s)” has the ultimate power.

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid., , 9.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism: An Introduction*, 4 ed. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003), , 4.

<sup>54</sup> Adrian Guelke, "Wars of Fear: Coming to Grips with Terrorism," *Harvard International Review* 20 (1999): 44.

## The Definition of Terrorist Organization Used in This Study

Due to the problematic nature of defining “terrorism” and “terrorist organization,” it is necessary to develop a less pejorative definition for this phenomenon and the organizations that uses terrorism. This definition should also include the commonly used terms and ideas from pre-existing definitions. Terrorism, for purposes of this work, will be defined in the following manner: Premeditated violent activities or threats of violence perpetrated by nation-states or non-state actors against non-combatants in attempts to gain political or social objectives.<sup>56</sup> Likewise, a terrorist organization will be defined as: a non-state actor that uses premeditated violent activities or threats of violence to achieve political goals and in which civilians are the primary target.

## THE OTHER TWO ORGANIZATIONS – POLITICAL PARTY AND CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION

Distinguishing between guerrilla movements and the various entities they can become is essential in this work. The delimitation of one type of organization from another form is vital, because this transformation is not merely a change of labels. It is a change of form and function. Previous sections have attempted to differentiate between guerrilla movements and terrorist organizations due to the similar nature of these two organizations. Political parties and criminal organizations tend to be very different from

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<sup>55</sup> An example of the strong negative nature of the term/concept “terrorism” is the refusal of political scientist and various other social scientists to testify in the 2001 federal trials of the defendants associated with the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. The reasoning for this refusal is the scholars’ apprehension in being associated with “terrorists.” For further discussion of this event, see, “Experts Refuse to Testify in Embassy Bombing Case,” (MSNBC, 1 June 2001).

<sup>56</sup> The international legal definition of non-combatant is to be used in connection with this definition.

each of these previously discussed organizations. Yet, it is still very important to discriminate these two types of organizations from a guerrilla movement.

#### Political Parties: How Do We Define

Similar to the problems associated with defining terrorist organization, there is great debate concerning what exactly is a political party. In a comparable manner, defining what a political party is tends to evoke strong feelings.<sup>57</sup> As noted by Hennessy, one of the most common terms in the political science discipline – political party – is without a “neatly edged definition.”<sup>58</sup>

The definitions of political parties vary and are great in number. Fred W. Riggs defines political parties in the following manner: “Any organization which nominates candidates for election to a legislature.”<sup>59</sup> In his discussion of African political parties, Hodgkin defines political parties as “[a]ll political organizations which regard themselves as parties and are generally so regarded.”<sup>60</sup> La Palombara and Weiner suggest an organization can only be labeled a political party if the following occur: the organization sets up local units; the organization looks for electoral support from the public; the organization actively recruits; and the organization’s goal is to gain power or maintains control over power. The latter done through individual efforts by the organization or in a

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<sup>57</sup> Robert Harmel, "On the Study of New Parties," *International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique* 6, no. 4 (1985): 406.

<sup>58</sup> Bernard Hennessy, "On the Study of Party Organization," in *Approaches to the Study of Party Organization*, ed. William J. Crotty (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), 1.

<sup>59</sup> Fred W. Riggs, "Comparative Politics and Political Parties," in *Approaches to the Study of Party Organization*, ed. William J. Crotty (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), 51.

<sup>60</sup> Thomas L. Hodgkin, *African Political Parties* (London: Penguin, 1961), , 16.

coalition with other similar organizations.<sup>61</sup> Schlesinger defines political parties similar to the previous listed definitions but he also includes the concept of competitive behavior in his definition.<sup>62</sup>

A political party can be defined by examining its form (structure) and/or its function (activities of the organization). Some writings have defined political parties by addressing the following series of questions: (a) what actors makeup the organization; (b) what type of activities is the organization performing; (c) what is the purpose of the organization; and (d) what is the domain of the organization.<sup>63</sup> Hence, this approach is associated with defining political parties through addressing both form and function. In the case of using form to define a political party, some argue the size and organizational structure is another means of defining what is and is not a political party.<sup>64</sup> This use of form to define a political party is further used to describe the different types of political parties. Some scholars outline the different forms a political party can take by examining the types of collective action they represent. For example, Robert Michels outlines a different form of collection action called “the revolutionary political party.”<sup>65</sup> In defining

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<sup>61</sup> Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), , 29.

<sup>62</sup> Schlesinger defines political parties as: “the political organization which actively and effectively engages in the competition for elective office.” This definition is controversial. This is because some scholars note how can competition be a defining component of a political party if there is a single party system. In this context, competition does not occur because only one party dominates. See, Joseph Schlesinger, "Party Units," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 428.

<sup>63</sup> Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), , 61.

<sup>64</sup> Harmel, "On the Study of New Parties," 406.

<sup>65</sup> Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchic Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), , 384-85.

this type of political party, he sees this form as “a state within a state, pursuing the avowed aim of destroying the existing state in order to substitute for it a social order of a fundamentally different character.” This type of distinction in form is useful as some guerrilla movements may transform into different forms of political parties – including the political party type described by Michels.

In the case of function, one can see how definitions similar to Schlesinger’s definition can see how the actions of an organization can help to define it as a political party or not. Likewise, Tilly defined political parties by emphasizing the function of the organization in accumulating and transferring loyalties to the state.<sup>66</sup> This functional approach to defining a political party is used by McCormick in his introductory text concerning comparative politics. In his definition, he outlines the six functions a political party has. Through this definition, he hopes to differentiate a political party from other organizations.<sup>67</sup>

Regardless of what components compose a political party or what activities the organizations are involved, it is critical to discriminate one type of organization from another in this study. Given the premise of this work is organizational transformation, it is important to note what distinguishes a guerrilla movement from a political party. Eckstein suggested that delimitation is the process whereby one can first start to define a

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<sup>66</sup> Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978), , 76.

<sup>67</sup> John McCormick, *Comparative Politics in Transition* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2004), , 272.

concept.<sup>68</sup> In creating boundaries, one can establish what the term does not mean. In defining political parties, delimiting can be used to establish how a political party is not the same organization as a political movement, social movement, or faction.

#### A Definition of Political Parties

For purposes of this work, the dependent variable “political party” will be defined as: an organization with a particular ideological focus that is centered on the electing of individuals to legislative, executive, or judicial components of the government (central and/or subnational). This organization intends to change the political sphere of life through influencing government policy and government action. The goal being to change the political sphere in the way that matches with the organization’s ideology. Unlike an interest group, a political party intends to change this political sphere of life through the electoral system.

Further, this study notes that two types of political parties can develop. One type of political party does not pose a political threat to the current governing coalition. Instead, the political party tends to work with the current government and it is more assimilated into the current government form. This type of party works as part of the governing coalition (“party with the governing coalition”). The second type of political party poses a political threat to the current governing coalition. This party will work within the established institutionalized political structure, but it will continue to counter some of the policies and actions of the government. This political party will be referred to

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<sup>68</sup> For more detail on this concept of delimitation and its association with creating definitions, see, Harry Eckstein, *Internal War, Problems and Approaches* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), , 8-16.

as an “opposition party.” This latter type of political party may also retain a militant wing to maintain their opposition to the government (e.g., Hezbollah and HAMAS).<sup>69</sup>

### Criminals and Criminal Organizations

The last type of organization needing a clear definition, which guerrilla movements can transform into, is a criminal organization. Similar to the other organizational forms discussed in this section, it is often difficult to differentiate between this form of organization and other forms. For example, some scholarship from criminological studies classifies terrorist organizations as a type of criminal organization.<sup>70</sup> This makes it problematic to suggest that a terrorist organization could transform into a criminal organization, if one is considered a subclass of the other type. Therefore, a clear definition for a criminal organization is necessary.

In creating a criminal organization definition, one can apply the “form and function” paradigm used for creating a useable definition in the previous sections (i.e., the approach used to define a guerrilla movement, terrorist organization, and political party). Therefore, if one was to examine the function that a criminal organization performs, then the term “crime” needs to be defined first.

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<sup>69</sup> There is a third possible variation regarding the transformation of a guerrilla movement to a political party. This third option is the formation of a “revolutionary political party.” The revolutionary political party is when the new political party retains a goal of overthrowing the current government. In an attempt to gain this goal, this particular movement creates a political party that has the sole purpose of gaining complete control of the government through legitimate means. This is the form of political party suggested by Michels.

<sup>70</sup> Juin-Jen Chang, Huei-Chung, and Mingshen Chen, "Organized Crime or Individual Crime? Endogenous Size of a Criminal Organization and the Optimal Law Enforcement," *Economic Inquiry* 43, no. 3 (2005): footnote 1.

A review of criminological literature finds a great debate concerning how crime is defined. Further, the individual labeled as a “criminal” is also greatly disputed. In fact, these debates have been at the center of what the scope of study should be for criminologist.<sup>71</sup> One of the largest debates concerning how to define a crime and criminals is between those who take a legalistic approach versus those who see the construction of the terms as related to power dynamics in society (conflict model). In the former case, crime is any action that is prohibited by law. A large portion of the scholarship on criminality uses this legalistic approach as the basis for defining crime (and therefore, criminals). An example of this approach can be seen in the definition created by Michael and Adler: “the most precise and least ambiguous definition of crime is that which defines it as behaviour which is prohibited by the criminal code.”<sup>72</sup> Likewise, Tappan defines crime as: “[a]n intentional violation of the law, committed without defense or excuse and penalized by the state.” Furthermore, some related scholarship has suggested criminals are only those who have been convicted through the “operation of the due process of criminal law.”<sup>73</sup>

Those supporting the conflict model of defining crime have contested this approach to defining crime and criminal behavior. Most notably, Sellin suggested that criminal law is a reflection of the shifting power dynamics within society. In

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<sup>71</sup> Clive Coleman and Clive Norris, *Introducing Criminology* (Devon, United Kingdom: Willan Publishing, 2000), , 6.

<sup>72</sup> Jerome Michael and Mortimer J. Adler, *Crime, Law, and Social Science* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1933), , 2.

<sup>73</sup> Coleman and Norris, *Introducing Criminology*, 9.

society, those who have the most power define crimes. Therefore, the definition of crime and criminal behavior is constantly shifting as different groups gain power and then redefine what behavior is criminal and what conduct is not criminal.<sup>74</sup> Sellin suggested the focus should not be on violation of the law, but violations of conduct norms. Yet, even with this focus on conduct norms, Sellin suggested the term crime should still be retained “[...] for the offenses made punishable by the criminal law.”<sup>75</sup> Since a great deal of the scholarship – including from those who support the conflict model – tends to focus on defining crime and criminals using the legalistic approach, this definition of criminal organizations will work from this premise.

If the legalistic approach is the basis for addressing the function served by criminal organization, then the form it takes is also important. In exploring various criminological literatures, there is limited discussion concerning the term “criminal organization.”<sup>76</sup> Nevertheless, as noted by Cohen, an individual cannot make things happen as efficiently as an individual then as with a group.<sup>77</sup> Criminal behavior is no different. One does see the term organized crime used frequently. From the use of this term and discussion related to defining it, one

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<sup>74</sup> For more discussion of this conflict model, see, Thorsten Sellin, "Culture Conflict and Crime," *The American Journal of Sociology* 44, no. 1 (1938): 97-103.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*: 32.

<sup>76</sup> The one noted exception to this is the work by Cressey or Cohen. In their works, there are discussions concerning the different organizational structures used by organized crime and how criminals organize themselves to achieve given goals.

<sup>77</sup> A.K. Cohen, "The Concept of Criminal Organisation," *The British Journal of Criminology* 17, no. 2 (1977): 97.

can create a clearer definition for criminal organization. Another reason for using organized crime as a basis for defining the term criminal organization is the characteristics of organized crime (both form and function) seem to fit the observable features of criminal organizations which were once guerrilla movements (e.g., FARC in Colombia and Abu Sayyaf in Philippines). For example, FARC has become more involved in drug trafficking in recent years and this type of behavior is traditionally discussed in the context of organized crime. Similarly, Abu Sayyaf has become involved in piracy and kidnapping which are often associated with organized crime. Additionally, many of the studies of criminal organizations have focused on “the large-scale syndicate type of organization, which is synonymous there with ‘organized crime.’”<sup>78</sup>

In using this approach, one can see – similar to all of the previous discussions – there are a variety of disagreements concerning what constitutes organized crime. The term was originally coined in the 1920s, yet no clear definition was attached to this term.<sup>79</sup> The reason for the problems with construction of a clear definition was no clarity in the concept of organized crime. This vagueness and the contradictory nature of the term lend itself to this problem.<sup>80</sup> Even though there has been great vagueness on the defining of

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid.: 99.

<sup>79</sup> Dwight C. Smith, "Illicit Enterprise: An Organized Crime Paradigm for the Nineties," in *Handbook of Organized Crime in the United States*, ed. Robert J. Kelly, Ko-Lin Chin, and Rufus Schatzberg (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), 123.

<sup>80</sup> Petrus C. Van Duyne, "Mobsters Are Human Too: Behavioural Science and Organized Crime Investigation," *Crime, Law & Social Change* 34 (2000): 370.

organized crime, there have been numerous definitions created.<sup>81</sup> There have been attempts to address this problem by examining various descriptions of organized crime. In earlier scholarship, Hagan found in his scrutiny of this issue in both books and government reports – ranging from 1968 to 1983 – 13 different authors had offered definitions.<sup>82</sup> A recent update of this research found greater consensus among scholars over four primary elements that constitute organized crime. These four elements include the following: “a continuing organization, an organization that operates rationally for profit, the use of force or threats, and the need for corruption to maintain immunity from law enforcement.”<sup>83</sup> Along with these components, some scholars agree that a degree of legitimacy has to be considered. In defining organized crime, some argue it may be a “degree of criminal activity or as a point on the spectrum of legitimacy.” If one is to use organized crime as a basis for constructing a definition of criminal organization, then the legitimacy of the actions of the organization have to be included. One of the problems inherent in this approach is *who* is determining the legitimacy of a given set of acts by an organization. To determine this factor, one needs to refer to the previous discussion concerning how to define crime. Since the recognized government determines what constitutes a violation of the crime and prescribes

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<sup>81</sup> Jay S. Albanese, "The Causes of Organized Crime: Do Criminals Organize around Opportunities for Crime or Do Criminal Opportunities Create New Offenders?," *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 16, no. 4 (2000): 410.

<sup>82</sup> For full discussion of this study, see, F.E. Hagan, "The Organized Crime Continuum: A Further Specification of a New Conceptual Model," *Criminal Justice Review* 8 (1983): 52-57.

<sup>83</sup> Albanese, "The Causes of Organized Crime: Do Criminals Organize around Opportunities for Crime or Do Criminal Opportunities Create New Offenders?," 411.

penalties, then the established government also determines what is considered legitimate and illegitimate activity.

#### A Definition of Criminal Organizations

Based on these previous discussions concerning crime and organized crime, one can construct a definition of criminal organization” to be used in this work. For purposes of this study, a “criminal organization” is defined as: an organization that uses illegitimate – as defined by the established government – means (including force or threats of force) with the goal to acquire material resources to benefit the organization as whole or specific members of the organization. As suggested by Cohen, the cooperative effort by criminals to commit crimes may be to advance the goals of the organizations, individual interests or the goals of another organization.<sup>84</sup> In defining criminal organizations in the manner suggested above, this study takes into account both individual motivations for criminal behavior and organizationally driven motivations. The form of criminal organizations is generally hierarchical. However, it can shift into different organizational forms as additional organizational goals present themselves.<sup>85</sup>

#### CONCLUSION

In the preceding discussions, this chapter outlined the definitions of guerrilla movements, terrorist organizations, political parties, and criminal organizations. As can be seen in each of these attempts to define, the development of clear and distinct definitions for each type of organizations is difficult. To distinguish clearly in the

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<sup>84</sup> Cohen, "The Concept of Criminal Organisation," 103.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.: 104.

Table 2.1  
Characteristics of Organizational Outcomes

Organization	Form	Function	Goal	Area of Operation
Guerrilla Movement	Hierarchical, Military-Style	Targets primarily government or military	Overthrow current government system and establish a more equitable system	Local
Terrorist Organization	Cellular	Targets primarily civilians	Overthrow the current dominant system and replace with utopian system	Local or transnational
Political Party	Hierarchical	Places individuals supporting their views into government	Gain political control in current government system	Local
Criminal Organization	Hierarchical (form sometimes shifts given additional organizational goals)	Gain resources through criminal behavior to benefit the organization or individuals within the organization	Acquire physical resources for personal gain or gain for a clique of individuals	Local or transnational

reader's mind how each organization is different, this study has used how each form compares to one another along a form-function axis. As illustrated in Table 2.1, most of the organizations are similar in form – with the exception of terrorist organizations. On the other hand, each of the organizations differs greatly in the function these forms serve.

Through these previous discussions, one can see how guerrilla movements and these other types of organizations differ. Therefore, in constructing a theory, which explores how guerrilla movements transform into these other entities, one can see how this is not just a change in labels. The transformation is one of organizational form and how it functions and not merely one of terms.

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## CHAPTER THREE

### THE COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE TRANSFORMATIVE MODEL

*Knowing reality means constructing systems of transformations that correspond, more or less adequately, to reality.* – Jean Piaget (1896-1980)

#### INTRODUCTION

If an individual looks at the world today, one will see an international community replete with state and non-state actors. Amongst the non-state actors, there are INGOs (international non-governmental organizations), multi-national corporations, and a variety of other organizations including groups who use collective political violence. In this latter group, one can find a range of actors including guerrilla movements, insurgencies, and terrorists. An observation of these organizations during a conflict and following conflict often finds a series of organizational transformations occurring. One can see guerrilla movements – once reviled by the government they were fighting against – are now partners with their former foes. Another observer may see guerrilla movements transform from organizations fighting the government to a group using indiscriminate violence against civilians. Furthermore, some examinations of this transformative process may find guerrilla movements morphing into criminal organizations who are more interested in attaining financial goals than political goals or believe the use of criminal activities is more efficient than gaining physical resources from the people they purport to represent. Any viewing of these occurrences leads to the question – how do these transformations occur? The potential answer of this question is the focus of this chapter.

## Processes, Mechanisms & Transformation

A large portion of the model presented in this chapter draws from the contentious politics literature. In particular, the works by Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and Doug McAdam and related contentious politics scholars were used as a basis for the development of the Collective Political Violence Transformative (CPVT) model. This study contends mechanisms of interaction must be studied to understand how collective political violence transforms into other forms of collective action. The transformation of collective action and contentious politics over time is a dynamic process and not static in nature. To understand it in this context, scholars must identify three concerns: causal mechanisms, the manner in which these mechanisms combine, and the sequencing of these interactions.<sup>1</sup> Additionally, the original conditions that lead to the causal mechanisms must be understood. As noted by Tilly and Tarrow, various forms of contentious politics – including social movements and collective violence – and their development over time involve a series of interactions between causal mechanisms. In gaining a better understanding of these types of phenomenon, it is vital the processes of interaction be described, be dissected into its various mechanisms, and an explanatory model be constructed using this information to accurately depict how the phenomenon occurs.<sup>2</sup> This is referred to a “mechanism-process approach” in the contentious politics

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<sup>1</sup> Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 12-13.

<sup>2</sup> Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, *Contentious Politics* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 27.

literature.<sup>3</sup> The construction of the CPVT model uses this mechanism-process approach to explain the transformation of guerrilla movements.

A model of collective political violence transformation will be constructed by examining the interaction between changes in political accessibility to the state's political system, alteration in the human and physical needs of the guerrilla movements, and changes in the guerrilla movement's belief systems and the associated frames of these beliefs. Each of these items can be seen as a separate mechanism that combine in different fashions and create a process that effects organizational change. Prior to these interactions, the antecedent condition of 'who' has advantage over the other party and 'what' kind of advantage they have develops during the conflict and it has an influence on one of the mechanisms in the model. This influence on one of the mechanisms effects the manner in which the interaction occurs among the mechanisms. These interactions result in a process of organizational change. These results are due to the interactions changing the overall structure of the original guerrilla movement.


This type of organizational change – due to these interactions – may be due to an overall transformation of contention. This path of transformation can be seen below in Figure 3.1. As can be seen in this figure, all GMs can potential go from an organization involved in militancy to an organization which combines militancy and political approaches to an organization that just relies of political approaches. In this case, militancy refers to the use of armed force by the guerrilla movement. Who this armed force is used against may vary over the time of the conflict – solely against the

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<sup>3</sup> See a fuller discussion of this approach in Tilly and Tarrow's book, *Contentious Politics*. See, *Ibid.*, 29.

government; against the government and civilian population; or solely against a civilian population. This all occurs during two main phases of the struggle between the central government and the GM – the conflict stage and the post-conflict stage. These two periods of the struggle are defined by the following criteria: conflict stage is occurring when identifiable armed action occurs between the GM and the central government; and post-conflict stage is when no further identifiable action occurs between the GM and the central government.<sup>4</sup> As can be seen in Figure 3.1, these two phases can be further subdivided into five periods. During the conflict stage, there are three periods – limited warfare, full warfare, and diminished warfare. In the post-conflict stage, there are two periods – transitional peace and permanent peace.

Figure 3.1  
Phases of Conflict and Transformation (with Periods)



<sup>4</sup> The term “identifiable action” is used to delineate between actions by the guerrilla movement versus actions by a single individual associated with the guerrilla movement but who is acting on his own accord. This also accounts for some activities conducted by splinter (dissident) groups of the original guerrilla movement. This activity would not be considered as “identifiable action.”

## Contentious Politics: What Is It and How Does It Apply?

Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and Doug McAdam in their work, *Dynamics of Contention* developed the idea of contention politics.<sup>5</sup> The subsequent work, *Contentious Politics*, further established this concept as a new approach to the study of various forms of political behavior and action. Contentious politics is defined as: “Interactions in which actors make claims that bear on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinating efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are [,] as targets, the objects of claims, or third parties.” In short, contentious politics is seen as referring to collective political struggle – in a variety of forms.<sup>6</sup>

In dissecting the definition of contentious politics, it is evident that guerrilla movements are an organization involved in contentious politics. First, whether one examines guerrilla movements as a unitary actor or an aggregate of individuals, the organization is making claims against the government.<sup>7</sup> In addition, guerrilla movements coordinate this shared interest to challenge the government. Lastly, the government is a target of this challenge.

Each of the components, making a guerrilla movement an organization that is involved in contentious politics, may also influence its future development. For a

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<sup>5</sup> Tilly and Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*, 202.

<sup>6</sup> Charles Tilly, "Large-Scale Violence as Contentious Politics," in *International Handbook of Violence Research*, ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John Hagan (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 440. In the comparative politics tradition, this study also uses the term “state” to refer to the central government of a country.

<sup>7</sup> For purposes of this study, the definition of “government” is: an organization within a given territory that controls the principal means of coercion in that territory and has priority over all other organizations within that same territory.

guerrilla movement to maintain support for its beliefs, it must construct and reconstruct frames concerning those beliefs throughout the conflict. These beliefs and the associated frames allow the guerrilla movement to coordinate efforts among many different individuals who share the same interest in challenging the government. This includes the rank-and-file members and the leadership of the movement, movement supporters and movement sympathizers. Without a structured voice centered on their demands (frames associated with a belief system), the guerrilla movement would flounder. The need for the framing process persists throughout the development of insurgents, guerrillas, rebels, and other forms of collective protest. The emergence of these forms of organizations is not the only time framing is a vital component.<sup>8</sup> In addition, human and physical resource needs are associated with the furtherance of these coordinated efforts. Without members for the organization and absent goods to continue the struggle against the government, the guerrilla movement would cease to exist. These material and human needs to foment the challenge are not just specific to guerrilla movements, but are necessary for any political struggle against the government.<sup>9</sup> Lastly, political

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<sup>8</sup> Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes - toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, *Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 16.

<sup>9</sup> Doug McAdam and W. Richard Scott, "Organizations and Movements," in *Social Movements and Organization Theory*, ed. Gerald F. Davis, et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 6. The role of resources in rebellious movement survivability and social movement sustainability became the focus of much scholarship with the development of resource mobilization theory. For example of this literature, see, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *The American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 6 (1977). As noted by Zald and Ash, survivability is a central goal of any movement. The maintaining of "membership, funds, and other requirements of

accessibility or lack thereof is also directly linked with the claims guerrilla movements make against the government's interest. Government leaders want to stay in power and the guerrilla movement wants to remove them from power or lessen their control on the populous of the state. Political accessibility can be used as a mechanism to limit the challenge to the guerrilla movement posed by the government. This is done by sharing power with the guerrilla movement. This would diminish some of the claims made against the government by the guerrilla movement. As suggested by social movement scholars, those challenging the government may be allowed limited accessibility to co-opt them.<sup>10</sup> As suggested by Kowalchuk, this may be a "means of social control."<sup>11</sup> If involvement with the government will influence the overall transformation of the guerrilla movement, then one can see how political accessibility is linked to contentious politics. If political accessibility, human and physical resource needs, and changes in frames and their related belief systems interact, and that interaction can be linked to contentious politics, then any developments that result may be seen as a transformation of contention.

When examining the transformation of contentious politics, the causal mechanisms behind this type of political behavior may not just influence the type of contention, but also the organizational form involved in the collective political struggle.

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organizational existence" is essential to this survivability. Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash, "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change," *Social Forces* 44, no. 3 (1966).

<sup>10</sup> Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 21-22.

<sup>11</sup> Lisa Kowalchuk, "The Discourse of Demobilization: Shifts Activist Priorities and the Framing of Political Opportunities in a Peasant Land Struggle," *The Sociological Quarterly* 46, no. 2 (2005): 238.

This is because the organization is constructed both because of its membership behavior and as a mechanism to further that behavior. Therefore, a change in contention would then lead to a change in organizational structure. Different behavior equals different organizational form.

### Social Movements and Development of a Struggle

In the study of guerrilla movements and other forms of collective political violence, one can see a similarity with discussions concerning social movements. As noted by Snow, Soule, and Kriesi, social movements are a mechanism for individuals with grievances to draw attention to their issues. Additionally, social movements can allow these aggrieved populations to take action concerning these issues.<sup>12</sup> As was suggested in the previous chapter, guerrilla movements can be seen as a similar form of social expression. Therefore, these two forms of collective action use the same mechanism and processes in their emergence and development.

Tilly and Tarrow have argued that there is a difference between contentious politics and social movements. Both forms of politics have many of the same mechanisms. Yet, social movements do have many characteristics that are different from many forms of contentious politics – strikes, revolutions, and political violence.<sup>13</sup> Akin to various forms of contentious politics and the organizations who are involved in

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<sup>12</sup> David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, "Mapping the Terrain," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 3.

<sup>13</sup> Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, "Contentious Politics and Social Movements," in *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, ed. Charles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 437.

contentious politics (e.g., guerrilla movements), social movements are a social form that allows an aggregate of individuals to voice their grievances and concerns. Therefore, fully defining is even more necessary if they have similar properties to guerrilla movements. Tilly and Tarrow have defined social movements in the following manner: a social movement is “a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of public displays of that population’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment.”<sup>14</sup> Guerrilla movements have many of the same characteristics as a social movement. Guerrilla movements generally begin and sustain their struggle against the government in the name of the people. Unlike, the standard definition of a social movement, a guerrilla movement uses force to effect this change to the current political system.<sup>15</sup> Further, unlike the social movement, they may or may not frame the population in a positive light. The focus may be more on the struggles the populations endures against the government.<sup>16</sup>

Regardless of these two slight differences, the core similarities may suggest the same variables that influence the trajectory of social movements would also influence guerrilla movement transformation. In particular, the three major factors thought to influence social movements (individually or interactively) – political opportunity

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 442.

<sup>15</sup> Sam C. Sarkesian, "Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: An Introduction by Sam C. Sarkesian," in *Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare*, ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1975), 7.

<sup>16</sup> Examples of these type of arguments as the core basis for a guerrilla movement, see, Mao Tse-tung, "On Guerilla Warfare," (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1961), & Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, ed. Marc Becker (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska, 1961).

structures, mobilizing structures and framing processes – can be seen to influence the transformation of guerrilla movements.

In the case of political opportunity structures, there is a clear linkage to the development of guerrilla movements. It has been suggested by social movement scholars that the political systems of the state create opportunities and place constraints on the behavior of social movements (POS approach).<sup>17</sup> Some of the first scholars who worked on social movements in this tradition were Charles Tilly, Doug McAdam, and Sidney Tarrow.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, the interaction of “[...] institutionalized and movement politics [...]” has been explored by comparative scholars, such as, Hanspeter Kriesi and Herbert Kitschelt in comparative studies.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, some POS-oriented scholars have suggested the social movements may sometimes resort to protest behavior (e.g., organizing protest actions).<sup>20</sup> This is similar to guerrilla movements who have to organize their protest form – which will include force against a government entity (i.e., police, government officials, or military personnel) – prior to action and during activities.

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<sup>17</sup> McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes - toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements," 2.

<sup>18</sup> For more information on the role of Tilly, Tarrow and McAdams in developing the political opportunity structure (POS) approach to the study of social movements, see: Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978), Sidney Tarrow, "Struggling to Reform: Social Movements and Policy Change During Cycles of Protest," in *Western Societies Program Occasional Paper, No. 15* (Ithaca, New York: New York Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1983), & Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

<sup>19</sup> For examples of comparative studies using the POS approach, see: Hanspeter Kriesi, "New Social Movements and the New Class in the Netherlands," *The American Journal of Sociology* 94, no. 5 (1989), & Herbert P. Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies," *British Journal of Political Science* 16, no. 1 (1986).

<sup>20</sup> Jack A. Goldstone, "Introduction: Bridging Institutionalized and Noninstitutionalized Politics," in *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, ed. Jack A. Goldstone (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 4.

In both cases, the opportunities made available by the state can dramatically influence the course of either movement. Yet, there is a significant difference between the political opportunities available to a social movement when compared to a guerrilla movement. In the case of social movement, the structure of the political opportunities range from closed to open. Over time, the POS changes and influences the development of social movements. On the other hand, guerrilla movements are constrained from participating in the political system from the beginning of their struggle against the government of the state. Without constraints in their way as an obstacle, there would be little to no reason for the guerrilla movement to exist. Unlike a social movement which has a good possibility the government will change enough to allow political opportunities to develop, the guerrilla movement have to fight aggressively against the state to gain any accessibility to the system. During the conflict and occasionally in the post-conflict environment accessibility for the guerrilla movement may become available. This is directly tied to the progression of the conflict and in some cases, due to the outcome of the conflict. Whether the government gains a military power advantage or the guerrilla movement gains a military power advantage will dictate the changes in political accessibility. If the guerrilla movement gains a military advantage, they have an advantage to be able to dictate to the government how they enter the political system. Likewise, if the state has an advantage they may decide to open up the system to marginalize the guerrilla movement. Under this particular situation, the state will limit the conditions of entrance. These conditions lead to the assimilation or incorporation of

the guerrilla movement into the political system.<sup>21</sup> This phenomenon can have a large impact on the development of the guerrilla movement. For example, comparable to social movements, revolutionary movements (including guerrilla movements) can fracture when the opportunity to join the government occurs.<sup>22</sup> This assertion is in line with the CPVT model. When the CPVT model sketches how political accessibility may interact with resources needs and beliefs and associated frames and lead to organizational changes, one can see the similarity between the POS literature and the premise of the CPVT model. Additionally, as recognized by Tilly and Tarrow, the political opportunities (and accessibility to the government as this study argues) made by the government change over time due to factors influencing change with the government.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, if the conditions of the government (e.g., strength of the government and/or structure of the government) change, this could be an indirect effect on political accessibility. It could then influence the final transformation of the guerrilla movement. Finally, as suggested by Campbell, many POS scholars conjecture political opportunity structures (POS) can shape “[...] the *strategy*, organizational *structure*, and ultimate

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<sup>21</sup> For the purpose of this study, “incorporation” refers to entrance into the political system, but the guerrilla movement does not relinquish their core disagreements with the state. The state and the guerrilla movement ‘agree to disagree’ minus the use of arms. “Assimilation” refers to the entrance of the political system, and the guerrilla movement relinquishes their arguments against the state and adopts the beliefs of the state.

<sup>22</sup> John K. Glenn, "Parties out of Movements: Party Emergence in Postcommunist Eastern Europe," in *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, ed. Jack A. Goldstone (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 152.

<sup>23</sup> Sidney Tarrow, "States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 41.

*success* of social movements.”<sup>24</sup> As will be seen in the next section, the same argument is made concerning political accessibility and its impact on the transformation of relational structures of guerrilla movements.

In a similar fashion to the parallels between the CPVT model and social movement scholarship on the issues of political opportunities, the CPVT model has similarities with some discussions on resource and movement mobilization.<sup>25</sup> As suggested by Kriesi, the emergence and persistence of a social movement is directly linked to resource availability. In the early stages of the movement, the resources tend to be primarily human resources – the activist and adherents.<sup>26</sup> Greater mobilization efforts – including the shifting of how they frame the struggle of the movement – are necessary to gain greater support.<sup>27</sup> This similar argument is made in the CPVT to explain how resource needs and beliefs/associated frames interact and have an effect on the

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<sup>24</sup> John L. Campbell, "Where Do We Stand? Common Mechanisms in Organizations and Social Movements Research," in *Social Movements and Organization Theory*, ed. Gerald F. Davis, et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 45.

<sup>25</sup> A component of this discussion is how *mobilizing structures* are defined: “collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action.” Doug McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, *Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3. This definition describes the structure, but it is important to note a component of that structure is how to best gain and retain resources – particularly, human resources.

<sup>26</sup> Hanspeter Kriesi, "The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in a Political Context," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 154.

<sup>27</sup> For an example of a how consensus amongst the population has to be mobilized to gain greater resources for the movement, see: Bert Klandermans, "The Formation and Mobilization of Consensus," in *From Structure to Action: Comparing Movement Participation across Cultures*, ed. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, 1988).

transformation of guerrilla movements. Related to the mobilization of members, supporters, and sympathizers for a social movement and a guerrilla movement is the issue of beliefs of the movement and how those beliefs are framed.

Scholars of social movements have questioned for many years what factors lead to collective action. As suggested by the previous discussion, some scholars have suggested mobilizing structures and resources. Others have suggested political opportunities encourage collective action (such as social movements and guerrilla movements) to occur. However, some other scholars have suggested “[...] interpretative processes lie at the heart of spontaneous collective action.”<sup>28</sup> The role of frames in the life of a social movement (and likewise, a guerrilla movement) is the mediating role it serves between “[...] opportunity, organization, and action [...]”<sup>29</sup> Individuals have shared meanings and definitions concerning a given situation they also bring with them. Mobilization can occur when these items are activated.<sup>30</sup> For movements to justify their actions and motivate others to join them in their actions, these interpretive objects (frames) must explain the issue in limited fashion. Furthermore, these frames have to

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<sup>28</sup> John A. Noakes and Hank Johnston, "Frames of Protest: A Road Map to a Perspective," in *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective*, ed. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 3.

<sup>29</sup> Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes - toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

highlight some issues and overlook others.<sup>31</sup> The movement may create a series of master frames that acts as a foundational mobilizing feature.<sup>32</sup> These frames may change over time and this change may be due to changes in the beliefs that the frames are associated with in the movement. These adjustments in frames may be done to account for regional differences amongst potential supporters and sympathizers. Yet, at the same time, the movement has to remain true to the original goals and values of the organization.<sup>33</sup> Additionally, in the case of guerrilla movements, the disparity in power between the state and guerrilla movement during conflict can influence transition in beliefs and their associated framing. This can occur when either party to the conflict has achieved no decisive victory. Yet, one of the parties has retained their core beliefs and its associated framing and its overall arguments retain their original essence. This is opposed to the other party which has had to shift away slightly from their original beliefs because they feel they no longer apply or may not resonate with the populous and/or the political and economic elites of the country. (This situation is labeled later as an antecedent condition of “social power advantage.”) This situation explains why splinters may occur within a guerrilla movement over the beliefs and associated frames –especially as they interact with the other variables.

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<sup>31</sup> Noakes and Johnston, "Frames of Protest: A Road Map to a Perspective," 7.

<sup>32</sup> Mayer N. Zald, "Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 269.

<sup>33</sup> Noakes and Johnston, "Frames of Protest: A Road Map to a Perspective," 9.

As seen in this limited overview, some pre-existing scholarship in the study of social movements could be helpful in the study of guerrilla movements. In particular, the three major theoretical approaches to describe the evolution of social movements could be used to explain the transformation of guerrilla movements. Through applying the pre-existing literature in both the study of social movements and contentious politics, one can construct a model that would explain the transformation of guerrilla movements (a form of collective political violence).


#### A THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE TRANSFORMATION (CPVT)

Similar to the argument concerning contentious politics, the study of the transformation of guerrilla movements requires a greater understanding of the causal variables, and the antecedent conditions that influence variation in these causal variables, how these causal variables interact, and the sequencing of these variables. During major hostilities between the guerrilla movement and the government, a variety of mechanisms involving the actors is still occurring. The conditions of the conflict influence the manner in which individual mechanisms interact. These interactions lead to a given process of transformation. This process leads to the transformation of the guerrilla movements into a variety of new entities – including political parties, criminal organizations, and terrorist organizations.

One could view these mechanisms and their interactions in the same manner which scholars of chemistry and biochemistry view the interactions between compounds. These “compounds” – in the context of this study – develop out of an environment

created by the conflict. Variations in the power imbalance between the state and the guerrilla movement during the conflict are similar to agents in chemical reactions. Similar to agents (e.g., heat or cold) that influence variation in chemical compounds and how they interact, the conflict setting may influence ‘who’ has an advantage and ‘what’ kind of advantage exist. These antecedent conditions may influence variation in the independent variables (mechanism) in the model. (See an illustration of this interaction of mechanisms in Figure 3.2) As each of the mechanisms (similar to compounds in chemistry) interacts with the other mechanisms, a new process (similar to a complex compound in chemistry) develops. The present study argues this process is the transformation of guerrilla movements. For example, if during conflict, the guerrilla movement gains a military advantage, they gain greater political accessibility to the state’s political system, the beliefs of the organization and the frames used to explain those beliefs change. This change is a reaction to the greater political accessibility. As members in the movement see these changes in beliefs and associated frames, the decision to continue to support the movement occurs. This mechanism involving human resource needs is interacting with the political accessibility variable and the beliefs and associated frames variable. Similarly, physical resources are impacted by the human resource needs and decisions to continue the campaign against the government (i.e., decisions involving the beliefs of the organizations and the frames associated with those beliefs). These interactions lead to structural changes within the guerrilla movement. This mechanism-process approach is the foundation of the collective political violence transformative (CPVT) model (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2  
 Collective Political Violence  
 Transformative Model




## DEFINING THE VARIABLES OF THE CPVT MODEL

To understand better, how these interactions result in transformation, one first needs to understand what is meant by the variables involved in this process. These variables are belief systems and associated frames; political accessibility; and resource needs (human and physical resources). Additionally, there are antecedent conditions that influence variation in the independent variables. These antecedent conditions are related to ‘who’ has a power advantage during conflict and ‘what’ type of power advantage they have.

### Antecedent Condition

In examining the transformation of guerrilla movements in conflictual environments, it becomes apparent to the observer that a significant antecedent condition exist which influences variation in the four independent variables and influences their interaction and outcomes. This antecedent condition is whether the central government (state) or the guerrilla movement has an advantage and what type of advantage that may be – social power advantage, resource power advantage or political power advantage (as dictated by military power advantage). As can be seen in Figure 3.3, if the government has a military advantage over the guerrilla movement, this can be parlayed into a political power advantage over the guerrilla movement. Political accessibility can become available for the guerrilla movement but only under the conditions acceptable to the government. Given the government has the advantage militarily, they gain a political power advantage over the movement. In turn, they can dictate the bounds of political accessibility to the guerrilla movement. This will generally result in the guerrilla


Figure 3.3  
 Collective Political Violence Transformative Model  
 (Political Transformation)



movement being assimilated into the government. There would be no reason – given the government has the military/political power advantage in this given situation – to allow the guerrilla movement to enter the political system without preconditions. Alternatively, if the guerrilla movement has a military/political power advantage, then the guerrilla movement can gain access to the political system but under the conditions dictated to the government by the guerrilla movement (e.g., the ANC/MK in the late 1980s and early 1990s). This will result in the guerrilla movement being incorporated into the political system. This results in the GM keeping some of their original beliefs and continuing their ‘struggle’ against the government, yet in this situation as a loyal opposition political party and not as an armed movement (e.g., Sinn Féin/PIRA after the mid-1990s). The GM becomes part of the system, but may see it as a continuation of their struggle against the pre-existing government.

In the case where one of the parties to the conflict has a physical resource power advantage, the needs for physical resources can vary and therefore, influence the trajectory taken by a GM towards becoming a criminal organization. (See Figure 3.4) The influence on variation in these two needs can also result in two varieties of criminality – transnational criminality and domestic criminality. If the government has a physical resource power advantage and this influences the physical resource needs of a GM, then this will influence the GM to transform into a transnational criminal organization. In this case, the government increasingly controls the area where the resources are located and therefore, the GM begins to be involved in criminal activity that will make them money outside of the geographical boundaries of the state where

Figure 3.4  
 Collective Political Violence Transformative Model  
 (Criminal Transformation)



they operate (e.g., FARC being involved at the local level as protection for drug barons in the early 1990s and then becoming the major trafficker of cocaine from Colombia in the late 1990s and 2000s). In an alternative case, if the government has the physical resource power advantage yet does not control the locality of the GM's area of basing, then the GM may rely on more local criminal activity to fulfill their needs. An example of this is ASG primary focus on criminal activity in the Southern Philippines and more limited in the rest of the Philippines. ASG after it began to become involved in criminal activity did not venture too far outside of the geographical boundaries of the Philippines. In either case, if the government has the physical resource power advantage, then it will influence the GM to seek other means for obtaining physical resources.

Lastly, when one party has a social power advantage, then variation in the GM's original belief system and its associated framing may occur. This is especially important when examining the transformation of GMs to terrorist organizations. In this case, the GM has an advantage over the government in the gaining support for their original beliefs and the associated frames of those beliefs (i.e., a social power advantage). Therefore, the GM does not see a need to change their belief and framing structures. They may persist and in this case, the hardliners in the movement may maintain control over the GM because their views are seen as being successful against the government. This lack of changing the belief could influence the interaction with the other variables and lead a GM to transform into a terrorist organization. If the government's belief system and the framing of those beliefs were more widely accepted by the masses (i.e., government has the social power advantage), the GM may feel they need to change their belief structure

because they see it necessary in retaining support for their cause and to undermine the arguments by the government. This may lead them back to transforming into non-violent movement or it could lead to their incorporation into the security apparatus of the state. As in all of these cases, these last two potential outcomes would be contingent on how the belief and associated frame variables interacts with the other variables. Given this phenomenon (GM becomes a terrorist organization) is not discussed further in this work, it is not modeled in this work.

As can be seen in this previous discussion, this antecedent condition of power advantage can influence variation on one of the four variables of the CPVT model and this variation interacts and influences changes in the other variables. This results in the transformations of relationships within the movement and changes in the organizational structure of the movement. Likewise, this leads the guerrilla movement to transform to a new organizational form.

#### Belief Systems and Associated Frames

In examining guerrilla movements, one can observe an organization consisting of individuals with their own set of beliefs. Along with these beliefs, each of these individuals has ideas they believe best allow the organization to maintain those core values (belief system), present those goals to the ‘outside world’ (framing process) effectively, and achieve the political goals of the organization. In this study, “beliefs” are defined as: the perceptions about the way the world is currently and the way the world should be in the future. Each member within the guerrilla movement holds these perceptions. This definition is in the tradition of numerous works written by collective

behavior scholars.<sup>34</sup> Derived from the beliefs of the guerrilla movement, a series of “frames” are constructed. By “frames”, this paper refers to the product of the “framing process.” The framing process “[...] involves the strategic creation and manipulation of shared understandings and interpretations of the world”.<sup>35</sup> These frames are a manner for individuals to perceive and label the activities that are occurring in their life and in the environment around them.<sup>36</sup> These frames help to arrange these experiences and link them to some future action, and are often constructed in a strategic manner by social movements (including guerrilla movements) as a mechanism for the mobilization of potential movement members.<sup>37</sup> These frames and beliefs interact with the human and physical resource needs of the movement through providing a manner to mobilize support and gaining more movement members (i.e., gain the needed human and physical resources). In addition, frames and their strategic construction are the basis for the legitimacy of the activities the movement uses to achieve their goals. For example, in the 1980’s, the Lebanese guerrilla movement Hezbollah viewed the Israeli and Lebanese governments as oppressors and the root of all Muslim problems (i.e., the belief). As a

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<sup>34</sup> Roger W. Cobb, "The Belief-Systems Perspective: An Assessment of a Framework," *The Journal of Politics* 35, no. 1 (1973), Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

<sup>35</sup> Campbell, "Where Do We Stand? Common Mechanisms in Organizations and Social Movements Research," 49.

<sup>36</sup> For more details concerning the concept of framing, see the following work: Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis : An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).

<sup>37</sup> David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," in *From Structure to Action: Social Movement Participation across Cultures*, ed. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, *International Social Movement Research* (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1988), 198.

result, violence was justified in fighting the oppressors and talking with the Israeli and Lebanese government was not viable (i.e., the frame and its strategic construction).<sup>38</sup>

Members of the organization work to ensure its survivability because the frame and belief structures are related to actions taken by the movement. It is the desire of these members and leaders to ensure the survival of the organization.<sup>39</sup> Through the maintenance and sometimes reconstruction of the beliefs and their associated frames, the members gain greater human resources (more supporters and sympathizers).<sup>40</sup> In some cases, this means the strategic calculation or the appropriateness of using violence to achieve one's goals has to be determined. Generally, it would be irrational for rebels to attack the civilian population – particularly during a civil war – as the rebels need the support of the people. Some scholars have suggested the decision to attack civilians is a rational decision (a “conflict strategy” versus a “military strategy”) in it allows the rebels a good bargaining position in the post-conflict environment.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> For more detail discussion of this phenomenon, see the case study work performed on Hezbollah in: Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

<sup>39</sup> Deborah L. Norden, "The Organizational Dynamics of Militaries and Military Movements: Paths to Power in Venezuela," in *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 110, Richard W. Scott, *Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1992), 67.

<sup>40</sup> For the purposes of this work, *supporters* are those individuals who directly become connected to the organization through providing material support (e.g., armament and housing) or monetary support. *Sympathizers* are those individuals who are not directly connected to the organization and they do not provide material support or monetary support. Instead, sympathizers agree with the beliefs of the organization and generally agree with the activities the organization is involved in to achieve those beliefs.

<sup>41</sup> An example of this type of argument can be seen in a recent work by Lisa Hultman at Uppsala University. See, Lisa Hultman, "Targeting the Unarmed: Strategic Rebel Violence in Civil War" (Uppsala Universitet, 2008), 13.

## Beliefs, Associated Frames and the Internal Dynamics of the Group

In a cursory examination of the survivability desire, the internal dynamics of the group shift. If the organization decides to take a new path towards their political goals, and some members believe this will lead to the downfall of the group, it is possible to see these members defect. Examples of this type of condition occurring can be seen in the development of the Real Irish Republican Army (Real IRA) after the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and Sinn Fein agreed to the Good Friday Accords in 1995. Former members of the PIRA defected following the change in the organization's belief system and the frames based on those beliefs. The differences in how to achieve survivability – through the modification of the organization's belief system and the frames associated with those beliefs – can lead to the development of subgroups within a movement.

This study argues two primary subgroups develop within the guerrilla movement over these differences. These groups will be referred as “true believers” (TB) and “pragmatic members” (PM). The true believers are those who are unwilling to compromise on the original beliefs that the movement was based on during its creation. Therefore, they are generally not willing to create frames that drastically differ from the original beliefs of the movement.<sup>42</sup> They believe straying from these original beliefs and associated frames – as well as the actions motivated by both – will lead to the end of the movement. In other words, the changing of the movement's views will lead to a

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<sup>42</sup> One could use the term “fundamentalist” to refer to these particular types of individuals. Due to the pejorative nature of this term, the more neutral term “true believer” has been selected for this work. For more discussion of this issue, one should consult the five volume of work by Marty and Appleby. See, Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalism Observed*, 5 vols., vol. 1, The Fundamentalism Project (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

trajectory of assimilation and/or defeat. Pragmatic members are those who are willing to compromise on the original beliefs that the movement was based on during its creation. Pragmatic members are more willing to create frames that drastically differ from the original beliefs of the movement. The pragmatic members will be more willing to change when necessary for the movement's survival, and sometimes see the need to change as a mechanism of survival. As a result, the appropriateness of violence may no longer be seen as justified or useful.

As suggested by Saouli, "political groups are often changed by the real world and by the conditions they face in trying to survive there."<sup>43</sup> Pragmatic members see the need to change as a survival mechanism. Generally, the desire to change is a reaction to the realities of political accessibility of the movement to the state and the need for human and physical resources (i.e., interaction leading to the process of transformation). If more support for the movement is needed the continued use of violence, and the endorsement of a given set of beliefs publicly, may hinder gaining or maintaining their support. As noted by in his work on Hamas, the development of the movement's ideology "were reflective of the environment from which Hamas had emerged and the socioeconomic background of its support base."<sup>44</sup> In other words, the general mantra of the pragmatic members should be as the environment changes, so should the movement. As suggested

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<sup>43</sup> Adham Saouli, "Lebanon's Hizbullah: The Quest for Survival," *World Affairs* 166, no. 2 (2003): 71. This is an important point noted by Richard Scott in his work on organizations. See, Scott, *Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems*, 67-68.

<sup>44</sup> Jeroen Gunning, "Hizbullah and the Logic of Political Participation," in *Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts*, ed. Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O'Leary, and John Tirman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 126-27.

by Zirakzadeh in his comparative study of ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom) and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), the development of factions within modern guerrilla movements can be seen with many different rebellious movements – for example, “the People’s Will, the Irish Republican Army, the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Gush Emunim Underground” (in Israel and Palestine).<sup>45</sup> Similarly, other scholars have argued fractionalization in rebellious movements occurs frequently, as decisions have to be made concerning the use of violence.<sup>46</sup>

#### Political Accessibility

“Political accessibility” is defined in this study as: accessibility to the institutionalized political system for individuals and/or groups. This definition is consistent with the dimensions set by many other scholars of social movements and contentious politics.<sup>47</sup> In this particular case, the defining of political accessibility is consistent with works by social movement scholars who favor the political opportunity approach. It includes the opening of the policy-making process to non-policy makers

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<sup>45</sup> Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh, "From Revolutionary Dreams to Organizational Fragmentation: Disputes over Violence within Eta and Sendero Luminoso " *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14, no. 4 (2002): 86.

<sup>46</sup> David C. Rappaport, "The Politics of Atrocity," in *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, ed. Yonah Alexander and Seymour Maxell Finger (New York: John Jay Press, 1977), & Bonnie Cordes, "When Terrorists Do the Talking: Reflections on Terrorist Literature," in *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, ed. David C. Rappaport (New York: John Jay Press, 1988). Additionally, the phenomenon was also observed in Northern Ireland by the author in his interviews conducted with former PIRA members and current Sinn Fein political party members. (See discussion in Chapter Six)

<sup>47</sup> McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes - toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements.", & Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Mass Politics in the Modern State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

(e.g., guerrilla movement members or social movement members).<sup>48</sup> It also includes the development of alliances between movement members and political elites in the government.<sup>49</sup> In the discussion of political opportunity structures (POS) a great deal of debate has occurred over what political accessibility does and does not include, which has led to the term being used in a haphazard fashion.<sup>50</sup> To create a more concrete definition of political accessibility, this work contends the accessibility to the institutionalized political system (of the government) for guerrilla movements take three forms - opening in the political arena; being able to join the government; and being able to join the military.

Openings in the political arena come in two sub-forms. One version is where the guerrilla movement is assimilated into the current political arena with other political actors. Their original beliefs cannot be kept if they desire to maintain this type of political opportunity. In the second version, the guerrilla movement is incorporated into the current political arena with their original beliefs intact. Some scholars would refer to this type of opening in the political arena as allowing *loyal opposition*.<sup>51</sup> As was suggested earlier, this type of opening in the political system is directly linked to the antecedent condition of political power advantage.

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<sup>48</sup> Examples of this definitional approach to political opportunity structures (POS) and the defining of political accessibility can be seen in: Charles D. Brockett, "The Structure of Political Opportunities and Peasant Mobilization in Central America," *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 3 (1991), & Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies."

<sup>49</sup> Kowalchuk, "The Discourse of Demobilization: Shifts Activist Priorities and the Framing of Political Opportunities in a Peasant Land Struggle," 238.

<sup>50</sup> McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions."

<sup>51</sup> Judith Palmer Harik, *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004).

The second type of political accessibility – joining the government – is when the current government makes an offer to the guerrilla movement for some of its members to have leadership positions in the government. An example of this would be the allowance of leadership from the guerrilla movement to serve in the current government’s ministry positions or in local government leadership roles. This may be following pledging allegiance to the government. An example can be seen in the struggle between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Philippine government. In this given situation, former MNLF members pledged loyalty to the government. In return, they were “[...] sworn in as local officials.”<sup>52</sup> The offer to join the government is made in an attempt to limit future actions by the guerrilla movement against those who hold political power.

The third type of political accessibility that may be made available to guerrilla movements is the potential of joining the military. Due to their prowess on the battlefield, the guerrilla movement is seen as a potential military threat to those in power. Instead of allowing the movement to remain this threat outside of the control of the government, an offer may be made to make the guerrilla movement members a part of the military, or a related security apparatus (e.g., internal security forces or a paramilitary group). The example concerning the MNLF and the Philippine government – discussed previously – can also be used to illustrate the phenomenon of the guerrilla movement

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<sup>52</sup> For more discussion of this issue, see, Cesar Adib Majul, *The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1985). Also, see, Thomas M. McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 162-63.

members being incorporated into the military.<sup>53</sup> A similar example can be seen in Indonesia just prior to the Dutch recognition of the independence of the state in 1949. In this case, regional warlords were incorporated into the military. This was a strategic choice by the Dutch to limit a “lengthy and costly military operation” against the local rebels.<sup>54</sup>

### Human Resources and Physical Resources

“Resources” are defined in this study as the total of material goods and human support. These resources come in two forms – human resources and material resources. These two forms of resources could interact with each other and, individually, they could interact with political accessibility or the beliefs and associated frames. Therefore, they are being treated as two separate variables in this study. Material resources include monetary and physical items (e.g., weapons and vehicles) which can be used by the guerrilla movement. Human support includes members currently belonging to the movement (rank-and-file and movement leadership), supporters of the movement who are not members but provide some physical resource or assistance to the movement; and sympathizers. These individuals support the action and goals of the movement, yet do not actively participate in the activities of the movement or provide any assistance to the

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<sup>53</sup> Similar to the former MNLF guerrilla movement members being given local government positions, some were incorporated into the military. McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*, 162-64.

<sup>54</sup> Nico Schulte Nordholt, "The Janus Face of the Indonesian Armed Forces," in *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, ed. Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2002), 137.

movement. Material goods and support by other humans for any movement is essential for the staying power of the movement.

### Interactions and Outcomes

The CPVT model contends the interaction between resources (both physical and human resources), beliefs, and associated frames, and political opportunities affect the tactics (means) and goals (ends) of the guerrilla movement.<sup>55</sup> As noted earlier, how interactions develop is directly linked to the antecedent condition of power advantage. Additionally, ‘where’ in the conflict period one is looking may also dictate the interactions and outcomes one sees. This is a dynamic process where the type of entity that the GM transforms into can change over time. The interaction of the four variables discussed leads to sixteen potential outcomes. In Table 3.1, one can see all of the potential outcomes from these interactions.

### Assumptions Underlying the CPVT Model

The collective political violence transformative (CPVT) model is based on a series of assumptions concerning the guerrilla movement, and the environment the movement finds during hostilities. Major hostilities go through two stages with multiple periods. The two stages are the conflict stage and the post-conflict stage. The conflict stage is made up of three periods – limited warfare (where militancy begins), full warfare (where full conflict exist consistently between the guerrilla movement and the state), and diminished warfare (where neither party has a decisive advantage over the other party nor

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<sup>55</sup> In the context of this study, means or tactics of the guerrilla movement mean the use of violence against the government and government targets. The goals (or, ends) herein refer to the desire of the guerrilla movement to change the current political dynamic between the populous and the government.

Table 3.1  
Interaction Table and Organizational Outcomes

<b>BELIEFS TRANSFORMED</b>	<b>POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>HUMAN RESOURCES NEEDED</b>	<b>PHYSICAL RESOURCES NEEDED</b>	<b>ORG. OUTCOME</b>
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Political Party**
Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Political Party with Militant Wing
Yes	Yes	No	No	State Militia
Yes	No	No	No	Self-defense units for local communities (Not affiliated with state)
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Security Apparatus of the State (Integration)
Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Non-violent Opposition Movement
Yes	No	No	Yes	Criminal** Organization
Yes	No	Yes	No	No Organization
No	Yes	No	Yes	Patronage network
No	Yes	Yes	No	Political movement
No	Yes	No	No	No Organization
No	No	Yes	No	No Organization
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Non-Violent – Organized Protestors
No	No	Yes	Yes	Guerrilla Movement Persist
No	No	No	Yes	Hybrid Organization – Terrorist Organization who are Involved in Criminal Activity
No	No	No	No	Terrorist Organization

\*\* The organizational outcomes that are the focus of this study.

subsequently the conflict has diminished substantially). It is primarily from this last period of conflict that the antecedent conditions develop that influence future guerrilla movement transformation. The post-conflict stage consists of two periods – transitional

peace (where conflict has diminished to only a limited few deaths that can be indirectly tied to the original conflict – e.g., revenge killings) and permanent peace (where the conflict has terminated completely between the original parties to the conflict).

During the last period of the conflict stage and the first period of the post-conflict stage, one can see five potential outcomes involving the guerrilla movement. These outcomes are a stalemate (no advantage is gained by either party and neither party has lost more when compared to each other); the government gains a decisive advantage; the guerrilla movement gains a decisive advantage; a non-decisive advantage is gained by either party, yet the government has retained more of a power advantage in some fashion (military/political, social, or economic) when compared to the guerrilla movement; and a non-decisive advantage is gained by either party, but the guerrilla movement has retained more of a power advantage in some fashion (military/political, social, or economic) when compared to the government.<sup>56</sup>

These five potential outcomes create a new environments that influence the political accessibility available to the guerrilla movement, human and physical resource needs of the guerrilla movement, the beliefs of the movement, and the strategic construction to present the beliefs to their membership, supporters, and sympathizers.

The guerrilla movement is *not* a unitary actor and consists of various subgroups that differ over beliefs of the movement and how to present these beliefs to their membership, supporters, and sympathizers. Additionally, the leadership and general

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<sup>56</sup> This study will focus generally on the variation in the four independent variables that occurs when there is not a decisive victory for the guerrilla movement or government.

members of the guerrilla movement are rational actors who are bounded by their environment. Lastly, the main motivation of the leadership and general members of the guerrilla movement is to ensure the survival of the movement until all of the goals of the movement are obtained.

#### THE COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE TRANSFORMATIVE (CPVT) MODEL


The collective political violence transformative (CPVT) model is centered on the principle that as the four variables interact with each other, the guerrilla movement begins to transform. To understand the transformation processes of the guerrilla movement, it is important to note the dynamic nature of the transformation. As interactions among the resource needs of the organization, belief systems, and access to the established political system occur, the relationships between the various actors in the guerrilla movement change. As a result, the individuals within the movement are confronted by a new set of costs and benefits. Therefore, due to the new type of relationship among actors, the potential action taken by the individuals as an aggregate is transformed which results in the change of the form and function of the movement. As the interaction of the four variables (mechanisms) result in various outcomes (processes) and these outcomes influence the forms and function of the movement, they will be treated separately in the following sections. As can be seen by the previous discussion, there are sixteen potential outcomes when the four variables interact. To present a clear idea to the reader of the mechanisms and processes involved in this transformation, this study will only focus on when guerrilla movements transform to political parties and when guerrilla movements transform into criminal organization. Subsequent discussion will focus on the

transformation of FARC and the ASG into criminal organizations and the discussion will focus on the transformation of PIRA/SF and MK/ANC into political parties.

### Guerrilla Movement to Political Party

The guerrilla movement starts by individuals sharing the same beliefs concerning the goals of the organization. These similarities will persist through the first and second periods of the conflict, because the guerrilla movement members realize to splinter would weaken the overall movement's cause. Yet, differences between the members over the beliefs and how they should be framed begin to develop as no clear advantage favors one party (GM or state) over the other actor. As modeled in Figure 3.5, beliefs differ concerning the path that should be adopted to achieve movement goals (part of the belief structures), and how to present these beliefs (strategic construction of frames). These differences lead to the development of subgroups within the movement – the true believer and pragmatic members. As can be seen in the first stage of the model, these subgroups of individuals are still linked to one another.<sup>57</sup>

Figure 3.5 – First stage of Transformation (GM to Political Party)



<sup>57</sup> This is similar in each modeling of guerrilla movement transformation.

When neither the guerrilla movement nor the government have a decisive advantage, yet the guerrilla movement has retained as some advantage (i.e., militarily), the guerrilla movement membership begins to look at the potential linkage between gaining political accessibility and gaining more human and physical resources. This desire is further influenced by the military advantage that the guerrilla movement has when compared to the state (i.e., the antecedent condition of military/political power advantage). This desire may interact with decisions concerning the beliefs and associated frames of the movement.

It should be noted herein that the manner in which they decide to change their original beliefs and their associated frames could be different if the military/political power advantage is on the side of the government. Change will still occur but the type will be influenced by this antecedent condition. (See previous discussion concerning types of political parties that could develop out of these conditions.)

Additionally, as the need for human resources is desired in larger numbers (“supporters” and “sympathizers”), debate arises within the movement of how to court these individuals. The pragmatic members support the greater moderation of the movements’ original beliefs. These beliefs include some of the goals of the movement and the actions adopted by the movement to achieve these goals. Both pragmatic members and true believers court supporters.<sup>58</sup> This is illustrated in Figure 3.6.

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<sup>58</sup> There is potential each of these subgroups could break their relationships with each other and then take their supporters and develop from one movement into two different movements. This may account for splintering of movements and the development of dissident groups who fight against the original guerrilla movement. An example of this can be seen with the development of the Continuity IRA and Real IRA in the post-Good Friday Accord environment of Northern Ireland.

As can be seen in Figure 3.7, some individuals in the movement began to be enticed by actors in the government by offers of greater political accessibility. Whoever had the military/political advantage will dictate the terms of the GM's entrance into the political system. The change in political accessibility occurs as individual members in government begin to build relationships with actors in the guerrilla movement. Additionally, these enticements by actors within the government will influence the decision by movement members to change their beliefs and the associated frames as it relates to the government. This further affects the internal dynamics of the movement and the relations between the true believers and the pragmatic members.

Figure 3.6 – Second Stage of Transformation  
(GM to Political Party)





Figure 3.7 – Third Stage of Transformation  
(GM to Political Party)



The government officials – who are attempting to build linkages between themselves and guerilla movement members – may build relationships due to one of the following: sympathy for the causes of the guerrilla movement, or a greater understanding that government would benefit from working with and not against segments of the guerrilla movement. Their decision may also be tied to the issue of ‘who’ had the military/political power advantage when these decisions are being made. This building of relationships across the boundaries separating the government and the guerrilla

movements is referred to as “brokerage.” Brokerage is the “[...] connecting at least two social sites more directly than they were previously connected.”<sup>59</sup>


As changes in political accessibility available to guerrilla movements occur and the conditions of that political accessibility (which is tied to the antecedent condition) become evident, further debates arise between the movement’s true believers and pragmatic members resulting in further transformation of the original guerrilla movement network (Figure 3.7). Given the military/political power advantage gained because of the conflict, the pragmatic members see an opportunity to become involved in the political system. Pragmatic members begin a dialogue with individuals from the government. The government members make promises of greater accessibility to the political system in return for changes in the positions taken by the guerrilla movement against them (i.e., changes in the belief systems and associated frames). Whoever had the military/political power advantage will make the decision of how much these changes have to be made. In addition, the pragmatic members see this change in beliefs and related frames as an opportunity to gain further political access and greater human resources (more supporters and sympathizers).

The true believers will begin to decide whether they will align themselves with the pragmatic members or to splinter off into a new movement, which can result in greater distancing of some of the true believers from the pragmatic members (Figure 3.8). This results in the formation of stronger links between some members of the true believer

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<sup>59</sup> Tilly and Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*, 21.

Figure 3.8 – Fourth Stage of Transformation  
(GM to Political Party)



and the pragmatic factions. Further, it results in a cluster of true believers who continue the previous activities of the movement, and do not change their original beliefs or the ways they present those beliefs to observers. These true believer members also reject the building the relationship with the government. Therefore, these members reject the greater political accessibility that is being provided to them. In other words, the true

believers form a splinter group. The decision to link yourself with one subgroup over another may change over time as the terms of political accessibility are dictated by the GM to the state (in the case where the GM had the power advantage) or as the terms of political accessibility are established by the state (in the case where the state had the power advantage).

As the belief systems and related frames are changed, the relationship between the pragmatic members and actors within the government grows (interaction between political accessibility and changes in the belief systems and associated frames). The true believers who do not align themselves with pragmatic members either leave the movement or remain with the cluster that is still connected to the movement. For those true believers who remain with the pragmatic members, they limit their resistance to accepting the greater political accessibility offered to them. Further, they adopt the changes made to the original beliefs of the movement and the framing of those beliefs presented outwardly. In essence, the true believers who remain with the movement take on the characteristics of the pragmatic members of the movement.


These interactions result in changes in the internal dynamics of the guerrilla movement and a shift towards moderation. (See Figure 3.9) The type of moderation will be heavily influenced by the parameters that were established earlier when political accessibility was first approached as an option.<sup>60</sup> In changing the function of the guerrilla movement from struggling against the government by using violence against government

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<sup>60</sup> The reader should remember these parameters are linked directly to whoever had the military/political power advantage when the idea of political accessibility was first approached.

targets to working inside the political system with government actors, the guerrilla movement has transformed as an organization.

Figure 3.9 – Fifth Stage of Transformation  
(GM to Political Party)




The type of political party they become within the state is directly tied to earlier conditions of how they entered the political system. They are either a loyal opposition party (incorporation due to the GM having the power advantage) or a political party that takes on the characteristics of the state's dominant political party (assimilation due to the state having the power advantage). The form does not change dramatically, as it retains it

hierarchical structure. Yet, the members in control of the guerrilla movement have changed and some of the membership has changed. This results in some change in the form of the guerrilla movement. The changes (change in form and function) that develop from the interaction of the processes lead to the guerrilla movement to transform to a political party.

#### Guerrilla Movement to Criminal Organization

Similar to the process where a guerrilla movement transforms into a criminal organization, the guerrilla movement starts by individuals sharing the same beliefs concerning the goals and tactics of the organization. Throughout the conflict, this type of intra-group dynamics persists. The guerrilla movement members do not want to differ dramatically from each other during conflict (the initial conflict period and the full conflict period) for fear of creating division in the organization. During the end of the full-scale conflict period and the transition to the diminished warfare period, there is some difference between the members over the future of the movement. This leads to the development of two major subgroups – the true believers and pragmatic members. The differences are minor and the relations between the two groups persist (see Figure 3.10). As the movement transitions from full-scale conflict to diminished conflict, the beliefs and the manner they want to portray those beliefs (frames) are very similar between the true believers and pragmatic members. Yet, due to the lack of power advantage over the

Figure 3.10 – First Stage of Transformation (GM to Criminal Organization)




government, both subgroups begin to question the organization's core belief system and the associated frames. The organization's members start to believe their original beliefs concerning the goals of the movement and tactics employed may have prevented them from gaining an advantage over the government. When the issue of political accessibility is raised, this questioning becomes even more important to the future characteristics of the movement.<sup>61</sup> The guerrilla movement – unlike the conditions when a guerrilla movement transforms into a political party – are not provided with political accessibility. This is directly related to the failure to gain a military/political advantage for the GM during the conflict. In this instance, the government actors do not form any connections with any of the guerrilla movement membership. Given their military/political advantage, the actors within the state do not see it necessary to offer accessibility to the political system. The government actors do not see it necessary to build these relationships. No sympathy for the guerrilla movement's cause is present (Figure 3.11).

<sup>61</sup> This is when, as the CPVT model would suggest the political accessibility variable interacts with the belief and associated frame variable.

Then, the issue of human and physical resources interacts with these previous two variables (political accessibility and belief system and associated frames).


Figure 3.11 – Second Stage of Transformation (GM to Criminal Organization)



In this particular instance, the need for human resources is non-existent, yet the need for physical resources is strong. Due to the lack of a decisive victory and the persistence of a government power advantage (likewise, a lack of political accessibility), the members of the movement want to continue the struggle. Yet, without more physical resources (weapons, money, and assorted other goods), this would not be possible. Therefore, the movement starts to rely on the pre-existing supporters for more goods (see Figure 3.12). When the supporters cannot or will not provide the goods, the movement takes these goods from the supporters, by force if necessary (coercive acquisition of

physical goods). Given the movement's human resource needs are non-existent, the organization does not worry about offending the populous by their tactics.

Figure 3.12 – Third Stage of Transformation  
(GM to Criminal Organization)



Additionally, this lack of concern leaves guerrilla movement members to begin to consider alternative ways to gain the physical resources they need. These means are vastly different because the movement sees the fastest and most efficient manner of gaining the resources they need is through criminal activities. These may include activities by the movement, which were considered prohibited previously by the movement (e.g., kidnapping, drug production, and extortion). This results in further debates in the movement concerning changes in the original beliefs and associated frames.

As the debate continues within the movement over how ‘best’ to gain the needed physical resources, the two subgroups of members begin to differ more on what beliefs and associated frames should be at the core of the movement. The pragmatic members believe the struggle of the movement can only persist if they can get the needed physical resources as quickly as possible. In addition, they argue certain activities (for example, drug trafficking and working as protection for criminal organizations – as in the case of FARC in Colombia) will allow them to gain the resources needed in larger number. This is linked to the power advantage that the state has in comparison to the guerrilla movement. The movement may see the government advantage and lack of opening in the government for the movement, as a signal that the government will work to destroy the movement. Additionally, during the conflict, the state may gain a resource advantage over the guerrilla movement. (This is in addition to the military/political power advantage they have over them.) This means during the conflict the state has gained control of geographic space, which has abundant resources that the GM could use to further their campaign (e.g., control over a diamond-rich area in the country). Alternatively, it could mean the guerrilla movement may be limited by the government in the type of physical resource procurement they can be involved in with the country. For example, if the GM attempts to sell legal goods in the marketplace to fund their struggle and the state prevents consumers from buying them, then it may influence what the guerrilla movement sees as permissible activity in the future. Further, the pragmatic members argue the continuation of the struggle is paramount. The pragmatic members note the populous may not be aware of this need for the struggle and the guerrilla

movement is acting as the vanguard for the populous. In this case, this may not be “false” rhetoric (portrayed through false rhetorical frames). (Once the pragmatists splinter into political pragmatists and economic pragmatist, the economic pragmatists may use the same rhetoric, but it is just rhetoric to justify their actions [false rhetoric]. For more detail, see discussion below.) Since there is no need for more recruits, the change in beliefs concerning previously prohibited activities (e.g., drug trafficking, kidnappings, forcing the peasantry to farm illegal crops) will not hurt the movement. Additionally, if the previous supporters have to be relied on for any resources, the guerrilla movement may use coercion to gain the support. This is instead of voluntary support by the supporters. Contrary to this position, the true believers see there is a need to attempt to stay away from the use of previously prohibited activities, regardless of the physical needs of the movement. The true believers see this as contradicting the original beliefs of the organization. Likewise, the true believers see the movement may be hurt in the eyes of those they are attempting to help (the populous) if the beliefs (which include the tactics to be employed by the movement) are changed. In this instance, the true believers see this change as a means of hurting the long-term support for the movement – particularly if they defeat the government and become the new government. The true believers see more long term as a condition of gaining support after guerrilla movement victory; whereas, the pragmatic members see the necessity of using certain activities (previously prohibited activities) to gain victory in the short-run. Through this victory, the pragmatic members believe the populous will support the new government made possible by the victories of the movement. The pragmatic members rely on the following

reasoning when deciding to use the previously prohibited activities to gain physical goods: any activities the populous did not favor will be forgotten in the victories of the movement. In the initial stages of this shift in physical good acquisition, the true believers and pragmatic members remain in the same organization, because either position could still result in an eventual victory over the government. Yet, splintering of the guerrilla movement occurs shortly as this debate over the means to acquire goods shifts. This debate is not just between the true believers and pragmatic members. A split develops between the pragmatic members between those who are political pragmatists and those who are economic pragmatists.

As the debate rages within the movement, the group initially retains its structure, yet the tactics and beliefs and associated frames change. The true believers' belief system maintains the movement should not abandon their original tactics of struggling only against the government. Similar to other transformations, the true believers could decide to break away over this debate as the other movement members (pragmatic members) move towards new tactics. Alternatively, these members may remain with the pragmatic members and become silent about the new activities of the movement.<sup>62</sup> The pragmatic members begin to dominate the guerrilla movement and its beliefs and the frames associated with the beliefs of the pragmatic members. This includes the taking up of activities that had previously been off limits for the guerrilla movement.

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<sup>62</sup> If the true believers remain, they may think they can stay silent while they wait to see what happens with the guerrilla movement long-term. The idea is the wrong path they believe the movement is taking under the leadership of the pragmatic members could be corrected in the future. The true believers would be the ones to help lead to a more correct path.

As the new tactics are begun to be used, a debate grows between the pragmatic members. One set of pragmatic members (labeled as “political pragmatic members”) see the use of previously prohibited activities (for example, serve as protection for criminal organizations) as a short-term necessity to continue the struggle of the movement. When the state retains a resource power advantage when compared to the guerrilla movement, the pragmatist may decide to conduct their illegal activities across defined state boundaries – *transnational criminal activity*. If the GM retains a resource power advantage, they may become involved in more local criminal activity – *domestic criminal activity*. As the conflict persists, who has this resource advantage may fluctuate and therefore, the type of criminal activity the pragmatists find themselves involved in may change over time. This would explain the fluctuation of FARC and Abu Sayyaf in the type of criminal activity they have been involved throughout their conflict with the Colombian and Philippine government.<sup>63</sup> The limited use of criminal activity or association with criminal organizations is seen as a short-term approach to addressing the physical resource needs of the movement. This explains why FARC acted as protection for Colombian drug traffickers prior to become the major producer and exporter of cocaine from Colombia. Alternatively, another portion of the pragmatic members (labeled as “economic pragmatic members”) begin to see a lot of opportunity for gaining resources for themselves as the movement moves toward greater use of previously prohibited activities. As the criminal behavior brings more and more resources into the


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<sup>63</sup> This study would argue that FARC and ASG are involved in conflicts with the Colombian and Philippine government, respectively, that continue to persist as of the writing of this work.

movement, the economic pragmatists see the new approach as a means for gaining resources for themselves. In this sense, this subgroup has given up on the original beliefs of the movement and replaced those beliefs systems with a desire for more personal desires. Ironically, even with this change, both subgroups rely on the same frames to argue their new beliefs. The political pragmatists and economic pragmatists both argue their desire to use more criminal-like tactics to gain physical resources will assist in continuing the struggle. Yet, the political pragmatists are closer in their belief system to this portrayal of their behavior than the economic pragmatists are in their behavior of personal gain (true rhetoric versus false rhetoric). This leads to these two groups splitting over these differences. These activities result in the economic pragmatists splintering off and they will pursue only criminal activity that will benefit them. They may still frame it as they are continuing the original struggle, yet they are not in reality. This leads to this portion of the original guerrilla movement becoming a criminal organization (see Figure 3.13). This type of new organization allows for both personal and organizational benefit. The economic pragmatists will be able to gain more for them if they remain together as an organization. Therefore, a portion of their physical resources will be given to the group to maintain this new criminal organization. The political pragmatists use the prohibited activity only short-term and work to wean themselves from this type of activity as shortly as possible. Therefore, they do not become a criminal organization and remain a rebellious group working against the government. In addition, if the political pragmatists eventually give up the prohibited activity or associations with criminal organizations, the true believers who broke away previously may be more likely to

remain with them.<sup>64</sup> Together, these two subgroups continue the original struggle and may go back to the original beliefs of the movement.

Figure 3.13 – Fourth Stage of Transformation (GM to Criminal Organization)



## CONCLUSION

As can be seen through the previous sections, the collective political violence transformative (CPVT) model assists in tracing the transformation of guerrilla movements into a variety of different entities – including political parties and criminal organizations. Using previous scholarship in the study of contentious politics and social movements, the CPVT suggest the interaction between political accessibility, belief systems and their associated frames, and resource needs (human and physical resources)

<sup>64</sup> This group could later decide to join their former fellow rebels in the new criminal organization. Or, their new group may transform into another organizational form as the processes and mechanism – discussed herein – continue to change and interact in different ways after the split of the pragmatists.

can constrain the form and function that guerrilla movements develop into conflictual environments. This same model can be applied to other forms of collective violence (e.g., insurgencies).

To trace out the mechanisms and processes outlined in this chapter, this study will compare the transformation of four former guerrilla movements into political parties and criminal organizations. Through comparing the transformation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa into political parties and participants in the government, the accuracy of the CPVT model will be verified. Similarly, the evolution of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines will be examined to see if the CPVT model accounts for their transformation into criminal organizations. The following chapter will explore the methodological approach used in this study to select the cases and the approaches used to collect data on all the cases.

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## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The goal is to practice sound research while capturing both a phenomenon (the real life event) and its context (the natural setting). [...] [T]he [case study] method enables you, as a social scientist, to address how and why questions about the real-life events, using a broad variety of empirical tools.<sup>1</sup>

#### INTRODUCTION

In the study of political violence in its various forms, many different methodological approaches have been employed. The methods range the gambit from econometric modeling to intensive case studies of individuals and organizations involved in political violence. In recent years, there has been greater use of quantitative methods and game theory to study the potential factors influencing the initiation, duration, and termination of collective political violence and other related issues involving rebellious organizations. Examples of the use of economic modeling to explore rebellious activity can be seen most notably by Collier and Hoeffler, and Fearon and Laitin.<sup>2</sup> In a similar fashion, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita uses a game theoretical approach to address the issue of membership mobilization in terrorist organizations and its connection to government actions against the population of a country.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, a variety of scholars has used

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Yin, ed., *The Case Study Anthology* (London: Sage, 2004), xii.

<sup>2</sup> See, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (2004), ———, "On Economic Causes of Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 50 (1998), James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003).

<sup>3</sup> See, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, "The Quality of Terror," *The American Political Science Review* 49, no. 3 (2005).

case studies as a means to explore fully the findings by quantitative researchers.<sup>4</sup> This synergy of quantitative and qualitative approaches has been done to find relationships between various variables behind collective political violence and explain the causal mechanisms behind this relationship.

Since the focus of this work is to explore how guerrilla movements transform in conflictual environments, a structured focused comparative case study approach was employed.<sup>5</sup> Then, process tracing was employed to map out the processes and mechanisms that have led to the transformation of the case studies selected for this inquiry. The cases presented in subsequent chapters will be used to illustrate how these processes and mechanisms occur.

To begin this methodological approach, a database of rebellious organizations had to be constructed to draw the comparative cases from for this study. As noted by George and Bennett, cases that are selected for study need to be pertinent to the research. They should not be selected merely because they are interesting to the researcher. This overall study began with observations made by the author concerning collective political violence in the Middle East (primarily, the transformation of Hezbollah and HAMAS – as noted in Chapter 3).<sup>6</sup> From these observations, the CPVT model was developed and then,

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<sup>4</sup> An example of this can be seen in the following work: Nicholas Sambanis, "Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War," *Perspectives on Politics* 2, no. 2 (2004).

<sup>5</sup> For more discussion concerning the method of structured, focused comparisons, see, Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 67-72.

<sup>6</sup> This is a similar process of theory development and subsequent case selection described by George and Bennett in their work. See, *Ibid.*, 84.

cases were selected from a subset of rebellious organizations found in the UPCD/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. For further discussion of this process of case selection, see the following discussion. Data was collected for each of the selected case studies and then process tracing was used to explore the mechanism and processes in the transformation of the selected former guerrilla movements. In performing this task, this work compares the real world findings against the theoretical model in Chapter 3. The purpose is to build and further develop the CPVT model for further research projects.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF GUERRILLA MOVEMENT DATASET

In examining previous research on guerrilla movements, it becomes evident that a standardized database is lacking. Generally, research conducted on guerrilla movements takes selected known cases and analyzes them.<sup>7</sup> These cases are highly visible cases that most scholars characterize as guerrilla movements or rebellious movements who are acting against the central government.<sup>8</sup> Yet, this lacks a rigorous selection process and therefore, some potential cases maybe left out of the analysis. Further, without a standardized manner for defining whether given cases are guerrilla movements or not, there is no manner for determining if these organizations have transformed into different entities. Therefore, to add to a more rigorous case selection process, a guerrilla

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<sup>7</sup> For an example of this type of approach, see, James Defronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).

<sup>8</sup> Rebellious movements and guerrilla movements are used interchangeably in this chapter. This approach is similar to the previous chapters.

movement dataset was developed and from this dataset, the case studies for this project were selected.<sup>9</sup>

In the development of the guerrilla movement database, the data collected by *Uppsala Universitet* (Uppsala University) – located in Uppsala, Sweden – and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) – located in Oslo, Norway – was used. This data can be found in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.<sup>10</sup> This data covers all forms of armed conflict from 1946 to 2007.<sup>11</sup> Each observation in the database is listed in the dataset as a *conflict-year*.<sup>12</sup> Each of the conflict-year has many different characteristics, including what the conflict was over primarily (labeled as *dyadic incompatibility*) and what type of conflict the observation can be categorized as in the dataset.

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<sup>9</sup> This requirement of a systemized method for gaining the cases to be studies is something often discussed by qualitative scholars. For example, see, George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 86, & Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

<sup>10</sup> The version used for this work is Version 4-2008. See, Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 5 (2002), & Lotta Harbom, Erik Melander, and Peter Wallensteen, "Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946-2007," *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 5 (2007).

<sup>11</sup> The following forms of armed conflict are recorded in this data set: extrasystemic armed conflict between state and non-state groups outside the territory of the state; interstate armed conflict between two states; internal conflict between the government of the state and one or more internal groups; and internationalized internal armed conflict between the government of the state and internal groups with intervention by other states on one of the sides of the conflict (i.e., government side or side of the rebellious group).

<sup>12</sup> According to the codebook for Version 4-2008, a *conflict-year* is where "[e]ach conflict is listed in all years where fighting in one or more dyad(s) caused at least 25 battle-related deaths." Lotta Harbom, *Ucdp/Prio Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook* (Uppsala, Sweden & Oslo, Norway: Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), 2007), 1.

To begin to develop the database for case study selection, these observations were grouped based on the type of dyadic incompatibility they were classified as in the armed conflict dataset. As can be seen in Table 4.1, there were three types of incompatibilities in the dataset – fighting over control of territory, fighting over control of the government, and fighting over control of both territory and the government. Most of the armed conflicts (1946-2007) occurred over who should control a defined area of territory. Very few of the armed conflicts occurred over the issues of who should control the territory and the government. Secondly, each of these subgroups was further subdivided based on the type of conflict the observation was labeled as in the dataset. As illustrated

Table 4.1  
Dyadic Incompatibility in Armed Conflicts  
1945-2007 (Conflict Year as Unit)

Territory	Government	Government & Territory
1084	811	17

This data was drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

in Table 4.2, each of the dyadic incompatibility categories was compared against the type of the conflict. In using this approach, one begins to see the connection between types of conflict that have occurred and the primary reason behind the conflict from 1946 to 2007. Additionally, since the defining of a guerrilla movement (in this overall study of guerrilla movement transformation) is based on two primary characteristics – a definable organization fighting against the government and the fight is over control of the government, it is important to eliminate particular occurrences from the dataset. The focus of this study is the intrastate conflict over both territory and control of the government. To get a better understanding of the prevalence of intrastate conflicts

throughout the international environment, the data illustrated in Table 4.2 was further subdivided into the five regional classifications, provided in the original UCDP/PIRO Armed Conflict dataset.<sup>13</sup> These results can be seen in Table 4.3. Most of the intrastate conflicts over control of territory occurred in Asia. The intrastate conflicts regarding control of the government occurred most frequently in Africa. Intrastate conflicts in Asia and the Americas were near the frequencies observed in Africa.

Table 4.2  
Dyadic Incompatibility in Armed Conflict & Type of Conflict  
1945-2007 (Conflict Year as Unit)

	Extrasystemic armed conflict	Interstate Conflict	Intrastate Conflict	Internationalized armed conflict	Totals
Territory	117	98	841	28	1084
Government	2	5	659	145	811
Gov't. & Territory	0	17	0	0	17
Totals	119	120	1500	173	

This data was drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

In the development of the guerrilla movement database, the final subset of cases was developed through drawing out the recognized organizations who were involved in the intrastate conflicts designated in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict database. Those groups without a name were not included in this collection of cases. (This meant the exclusion of the following cases from the dataset: those designated as “Republics”, “Independent States”, and groups only listed as “insurgents” or “irregulars.”) Without a definable name, one cannot be sure if these are collections of groups. This would make it more difficult to see if they would be comparable to those cases with names and recognized as a definable organization. For example, one cannot be sure if “Palestinian

<sup>13</sup> The original dataset was coded for where the conflict occurred. The locations of the conflicts were grouped into five potential regions: Europe, Middle East, Asia, Africa, and the Americas.

insurgents” is referring to a collective of definable groups. This would make it a problematic comparison if comparing it to the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), a single definable organization. There were approximately 123 definable organizations that were involved with intrastate conflicts over the issue of territorial

Table 4.3  
Intrastate Conflict between Government and Opposing Internal Groups  
Categorized by Region & Incompatibility Issue  
(Conflict Year as Unit)

	Europe	Middle East	Asia	Africa	Americas	Totals
Territory	72	143	468	155	0	838 <sup>1</sup>
Government	14	56	190	242	155	657 <sup>2</sup>
Gov't. & Territory	0	0	0	0	0	0 <sup>3</sup>
Totals	86	199	658	397	155	

<sup>1</sup> Three units were dropped due to their lack of being categorized in the 2008 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. The three units dropped from the totals were the Western Sahara.

<sup>2</sup> Two units were dropped due to their lack of being categorized in the 2008 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. The two units dropped from the totals were the Hyderabad. This region was located previously in Asia on the Indian subcontinent.

<sup>3</sup> The data between Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 concerning intrastate conflict are consistent in their finding of no cases from 1947 to 2007 where the events were intrastate conflict over control of the government and control of territory.

control. In these particular intrastate conflicts, 38 states were involved. Likewise, there were about 196 definable organizations from 1946 to 2007 involved in intrastate conflict concerning the issue of control of the government. In these types of intrastate conflicts, 81 states were engaged.

Many of these organizations ceased to exist following the end of the intrastate conflict. This is partially due to the outcomes of the conflict. In some cases, the state governments prevailed and soundly defeated the rebellious organizations. Examples of this can be seen with the demise of the following organization: Communist Party of

Thailand (CPT).<sup>14</sup> In some instances, the rebellious organizations were successful in defeating the existing government. The victors then became the new government. The best example of this can be seen with the success of the People's Liberation Army (a military wing of the Communist Party of China - CPC), which helped to install the CPC as the government in mainland China. Similarly, the Irgun (shorthand for the *HaIrgun HaTzva'i HaLe'umi BeEretz Yisra'el* or the "National Military Organization in the Land of Israel"), the *Haganah* ("The Defense") and LEHI (acronym for *Lohamei Herut Israel* or "the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel") were successful in fighting against the British Mandate forces and Arab guerrilla movements in Palestine in the 1930s and 1940s. Following these successes, British troops left the Palestine Mandate and in 1948, the former guerrilla movements established the government of the modern State of Israel.<sup>15</sup>

Some guerrilla movements transformed into new non-rebellious organizations and became part of the political process of the state. The best examples of this phenomenon can be seen with the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, Sinn Fein and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Other former guerrilla movements have left their political roots behind and become criminal organizations, such as Abu Sayyaf and their new orientation towards

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<sup>14</sup> The Communist Party of Thailand was active from 1951 until 1982. The UCPD/PRIO Armed Conflict 2007 dataset has these years as the beginning of the intrastate struggle in Thailand and the termination of hostilities. See, Harbom, *Ucdp/Prio Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook*. At its height, it is estimated there were 10,000 to 14,000 armed fighters who made up the military wing of the Communist Party of Thailand. For more detail concerning the CPT as a guerrilla movement, see, Paul Battersby, "Border Politics and the Broader Politics of Thailand's International Relations in the 1990s: From Communism to Capitalism," *Pacific Affairs* 71, no. 4 (1998-1999): 473-88.

<sup>15</sup> See, Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*, vol. 2 (Bloomington, IN: IUUniverse Incorporated, 2002), 1151-52, & Saul Zadka, *Blood in Zion: How the Jewish Guerrillas Drove the British out of Palestine* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, Inc., 1995).

piracy and kidnapping and FARC's change from Colombian guerrilla movement to one of the largest cocaine traffickers in Latin America.

From this subset of rebellious organizations, the four case studies were selected to study and compare against the theory outlined in Chapter Three. The cases selected were examples of those rebellious organizations that still exist but in a different organizational form.

#### CASE SELECTION APPROACH

In selecting each of the cases to be studied in this work, a “most-different” case selection approach was employed.<sup>16</sup> When creating a paired comparison for each of the possible outcomes (i.e., the entity that develops following guerrilla movement transformation), the cases were selected where the independent variables described in the CPVT model were similar. Additionally, cases were selected where the dependent variables (the new organizational outcome after transformation) were similar. Nevertheless, the other plausible factors influencing the transformation of the guerrilla movements vary in each of the compared cases. (See Appendix B) Controlled comparison is a method often employed by case study scholars to mimic the logic behind experimental studies.<sup>17</sup> This methodological approach was the foundation for case selection in this study.

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<sup>16</sup> This technique for choosing cases is sometimes referred to as the “method of agreement.” Although, the approach used in this study has more in common with the methodology suggested by Przeworski and Teune in *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* and not the strict Mill's method of agreement. See, John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 139, footnote 80.

<sup>17</sup> George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 151.

The use of a “most-different” systems approach was made more stringent through comparing two cases (dyadic controlled comparisons) for each of the outcomes. Through comparing two cases against each other for each outcome (e.g., guerrilla movement which has transformed into a political party – PIRA compared against the ANC), this study attempts to treat each transformation as a separate analysis. This further step in using controlled comparisons – along with process tracing – addresses the problems concerning method of agreement and difference raised by George and Bennett and similar scholars.<sup>18</sup> As suggested by Ragin, Tilly, and other similar scholars, the study of large-scale phenomenon (such as collective political violence and its development) may find multiple variables leading to change.<sup>19</sup> The use of Mill’s method of agreement – in its standard form – cannot adequately account for the potential of multicausality.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, this additional step of creating dyadic controlled comparisons (for each potential organizational outcome) allows this study to control for various conditions that could influence guerrilla movement transformation while focusing only on the processes and mechanisms under study. This approach allows one to control for the factors that could influence the transformation process while still focusing on the processes and mechanisms under study in this work. As noted by Gerring, “[c]ausal factors that do not

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 155-57.

<sup>19</sup> Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*, 24.

<sup>20</sup> George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 156. In the instance of multicausality, the use of Mill’s method of agreement may erroneously eliminate independent variables that lead to the change observed in the organizations in this study.

appear across the chosen cases [...] are evidently unnecessary for the production of Y.”<sup>21</sup> Since the study is comparing two cases with similar outcomes, yet they vary on many other potential causes, one can be assured the independent variables are the only necessary causes.

As noted previously, the selection of cases needed to be consistent with one of the final organizational forms described in this study. This meant selecting case studies that have transformed from a guerrilla movement organization to another entity. The new entity should be a political party or criminal organization. For example, Abu Sayyaf was selected because the current organizational status is a criminal organization. Yet, they were originally founded and operated as a guerrilla movement. This case was also selected due to its own background being completely different from FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces in Colombia) – the other case selected to compare against Abu Sayyaf.

#### Selecting on the Dependent Variable

Some would potentially suggest this approach to case selection introduces the error of selecting on the dependent variable.<sup>22</sup> This error is problematic because it results

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<sup>21</sup> Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*, 143.

<sup>22</sup> There is a great amount of discussion in the social science – particularly, in the political science discipline – concerning selection on the dependent variable. Two good examples concerning the issue of case selection bias and selecting on the dependent variable bias can be seen in: Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), & Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds., *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004).

in information for one-half of the explanation.<sup>23</sup> Given this study is centered on explaining how guerrilla movements transform into other entities (outcomes) and these outcomes are known, selecting on the dependent variable may not introduce the error that is often cited as problematic in this approach.<sup>24</sup> As noted by Geddes, “theories have implications that apply to only one end of the dependent variable.” If the theories are based on these implications – as in this study, then cases have to be selected from the relevant outcome spectrum.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, selecting on the dependent variable is seen as useful when trying to eliminate those variables that “[...] are not necessary or sufficient conditions for the selected outcomes.”<sup>26</sup> Therefore, the cases – as discussed previously – were selected based on their similarity in organizational outcome (i.e., political party and criminal organization) and those cases with similar outcomes were paired together. Lastly, given this study focuses on tracing out the mechanisms and processes, the error of selecting on the dependent variable is not an issue with this study.

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<sup>23</sup> Barbara Geddes, "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answer You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics," *Political Analysis* 2, no. 1 (1990): 132.

<sup>24</sup> Given the focus of this study is on exploring the mechanisms and processes that lead to the development of a given outcome, selection on the dependent variable is not as problematic. This is a point supported by even critics of the selecting on the dependent variable approach. See, *Ibid.*: 149.

<sup>25</sup> ———, *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003), 97.

<sup>26</sup> George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 23, & see, also, Douglas Dion, "Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study," in *Necessary Conditions: Theory, Methodology, and Applications*, ed. Gary Goertz and Harvey Starr (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 95-112.

## Cases Selected

The case studies selected for this analysis will include *guerrilla movements which have transformed into viable political parties*, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland and its political wing, Sinn Féin, and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and its military wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe; and *guerrilla movements which have transformed into criminal organizations*, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia & Abu Sayyaf. This work will only examine the paired comparison of MK/ANC and PIRA/SF and the pairing of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and FARC. Future work that will develop from this project will examine these other cases and additional potential outcomes not discussed in this work (e.g., when GMs transform into terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda).

## Variability in Context & Controlling for this Variability

In selecting these particular cases, other plausible factors that could influence the transformation of the guerrilla movements vary amongst the paired cases. These plausible factors include: area of operation for the guerrilla movement (where they are primarily located); the time period of the founding of the guerrilla movement; the ease of entry for political parties into the political system; levels of how lucrative the criminal actions are for a guerrilla movement; and differences in the role of third-party intervention. Additionally, each of these former guerrilla movements were selected because of how their conflict (incompatibility variable) was coded in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict database. In the case of PIRA, the intrastate conflict was over territory and the ANC's struggle was over the issue of who should control the government.

Similarly, the struggle between FARC and the Colombian government was over the issue of control of the government and Abu Sayyaf's intrastate conflict was over the issue of territory. This helps to account for variability concerning the context of the struggle.

The additional factors – listed above and in Appendix B – were selected for the following reasons. Variation in location would lend to supporting the external validity of the theory proposed. Often, scholars see the difference between quantitative, large cross-national studies and qualitative, limited case study approaches as being between gaining greater depth or greater breath.<sup>27</sup> Through choosing paired cases from a variety of regions of the world, this work will have both depth and breadth. The differences in time-periods account for variation in pre-Cold War, Cold War, and post-Cold War influence and the influences of other transformative events that could have influenced the trajectories taken by the guerrilla movements in their transformation. This is particularly important in the discussion of the physical resource needs of the guerrilla movements. The post-Cold War era often left guerrilla movements without their normal flow of weapons and cash.

In the paired comparison of the ANC and the PIRA, the types of electoral systems differ and the dominance of the new political parties associated with each former guerrilla movement is different between the two locations. In selecting cases that differ along these axes, one can discount how the structure of the political system and the role of the parties within this system may influence their development. In the case of the

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<sup>27</sup> John Gerring, "The Case Study: What It Is and What It Does," in *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, ed. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 105-06.

political system of South Africa, it is a democratic system, which has an electoral system that is seen as fair by outside observers.<sup>28</sup> According to International IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance), South Africa's electoral system is a list proportional representative (List PR) system. The system has been dominated by the ANC and political violence still occurs frequently during election cycles.<sup>29</sup> In the case of the political system of Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin (the Catholic republican party that is associated with the Provisional Irish Republican Army) has been allowed to participate in the British political system (Westminster), the Republic of Ireland's legislative assembly (Leinster) and the Northern Ireland Assembly (Stormont). Yet, it has had to work with a coalition of other political parties in the United Kingdom (e.g., the Ulster Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party) and currently has five members serving as members of parliament (MPs). The United Kingdom's electoral system is a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system. The Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland's electoral systems are a single transferable vote (STV).

In the paired comparison of Abu Sayyaf and FARC, how lucrative the criminal activities of each GM are different. In the case of Abu Sayyaf, the guerrilla movement has relied on kidnappings and piracy to further their resource needs. These activities have not been as lucrative as when compared to the illegal narcotics trafficking and production that FARC is involved in daily. The ASG has tended to be involved in

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<sup>28</sup> FreedomHouse, "South Africa (2006)," Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=7060>.

<sup>29</sup> Andrew Reynolds, Ben Reily, and Andrew Ellis, *Electoral System Design: The New International Idea Handbook* (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2005).

domestic criminal activity. They have kept their operations in the Philippines and the surrounding localities. On the other hand, FARC originally kept their activities local, but as they progressed towards becoming a criminal organization, they became more involved in transnational criminal activity. This can be seen in their greater foray into narcotics business in Colombia and beyond Colombia's borders. In selecting cases that are different along this axis, this study accounts for differences in the type of resources acquired by the guerrilla movements. The level of illegitimate resources may affect the transformation of the guerrilla movements to criminal organizations. In addition, controlling for third party intervention in the case selection allows this study to address a potential issue of how the environment and outside actors may influence the development of the guerrilla movement. This is particular true when examining changes in openings in the political arena. If the opening is caused by the intervention of third parties versus internal changes between the central government and the GM, then the proposed interactions may not be fully contributing to this transformation. Other variation amongst the cases can be seen in the differences in the government's military capability during the conflict stage between the parties. In the case of the paired comparison of PIRA/SF and ANC/MK, there is a difference in the power advantage of the state in comparison to the guerrilla movement. In the case of the PIRA/SF, the British government had a more powerful military capability when compared to the PIRA/SF. Prior to the opening of the political system to the PIRA/SF, it is evident (as will be discussed in Chapter 5) to any casual observer of the conflict that the British had a military/political advantage when compared to the PIRA/SF. Alternatively, the South African military and political

establishment was much weaker at the time of the opening of the political system. The ANC/MK had a military/political power advantage when compared to the South African military and government prior to the opening of the system and transformation of the guerrilla movement into a political party. The historical context of the Philippines and Colombia and how this influenced the development of the ASG and FARC is also different. Following the selection of the cases, information was gathered through a variety of methods.

#### APPROACHES TO DATA COLLECTION

The study of the selected cases includes a review of multiple forms of qualitative evidence. These forms of evidence comprise of the following: audio, video and print (i.e., journalist interviews) files of interviews with the leadership of and participants in the organizations, recruitment videotapes, letters, memorandums, and other forms of writing communiqués. In using content analysis of these documents, this study examines how the beliefs systems and related frames have changed over time and how that change has influenced the transformation of the organization. To duplicate the frames, two types of evidence were gathered – documents that are collectively produced by the movement (e.g., position statements) and statements and written documents by members of the movement (i.e., gained through interviews and archival research).<sup>30</sup> Further, these documents and other scholars' accounts of the historical development of the selected case

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<sup>30</sup> For more information concerning approaches to comparative frame analysis, see, Hank Johnston, "Comparative Frame Analysis," in *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective*, ed. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005).

studies, accounts of the change in the political opportunities for the guerrilla movement and the resource needs of the movement are examined.

Due to logistical difficulties (most notably, safety issues), field research was not conducted to study FARC, Abu Sayyaf, and the MK/ANC. Instead, a content analysis of the writings and speeches by various leaders and members of FARC, Abu Sayyaf, and the MK/ANC were conducted and compared against each other. To further the results of the field studies conducted in Northern Ireland and Ireland (see below), both writings and speeches and historical documents were also used to compare against the evidence gained in the field interviews. The use of multiple sources of evidence in the case study work lends to the construct validity of the project.

Field research was conducted in the case of the PIRA/SF. This included interviews with both the leadership and rank-and-file members of the movements. The PIRA/SF case was selected due to the ideal nature of the research site. Attempts were made by the author to conduct field interviews in South Africa. During the time of study, these interviews were not possible due to a lack of accessibility. In selecting case studies for field research, many items have to be accounted for in the selection process. An ideal site, as noted by some qualitative scholars, for field work would include the following characteristics: (1) entry for the researcher is possible; (2) high probability of variation in the people, processes, and structures that can be examined at the site; (3) the researcher can create a role for himself that allows long term presence at the site; (4) the quality of the data and the reliability of the study is maintained by avoiding inadequate sampling

measures.<sup>31</sup> The decision to conduct field research in Northern Ireland addressed each of these factors better than when compared to the other cases. Due to contacts, interviewing of former guerrilla movement members is possible and safe. With the variation amongst the guerrilla movement members and variation between the two localities, variation is ensured.

The author conducted the interviews in the fall of 2007 in Northern Ireland. Interviews were performed with former members of Sinn Fein, Sinn Fein politicians serving in the Northern Ireland Assembly (also known as Stormont) in the fall of 2007, and individuals who were involved in the republican movement (leadership, rank-and-file, supporters and sympathizers) in Northern Ireland before 2007. In the future expansion of this study, a similar approach will be used in the field interviews to be conducted in South Africa.

A list of the individuals interviewed in Northern Ireland can be seen in Appendix C. Neil Jarman, Director of the Institute for Conflict Research in Belfast, Northern Ireland, and Dr. Richard English of Queen's University were both contacted and assisted in gaining interviews for this study. These two individuals were also interviewed for this study. Individuals who served prison time for their activities associated with the IRA were also interviewed. An example of this type of respondent was Dr. Laurence McKeown from *Coiste na nIarchimí* in Belfast, Northern Ireland. Dr. McKeown was imprisoned in the 1980s for his activities protesting British occupation of Northern

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<sup>31</sup> Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, *Designing Qualitative Research* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1989).

Ireland. He was one of the many Irish political prisoners who went on a hunger strike during his imprisonment. Individuals who joined Sinn Fein in recent years and during its development in the 1960s were also interviewed. Two examples of these types of interviewees were Councillor Francie Molloy, current MLA (Member of Legislative Assembly and Deputy Speaker for the Northern Ireland Assembly) for the Torrent Electoral Area and Sinn Fein party member and *M* (a pseudonym for a respondent who did not want to be named), a former member of Sinn Fein.

The most read newspaper in amongst the Irish republican movement, *An Phoblacht*; the online voice of the African National Congress, *ANC Today*, and the *Sephadi*, the newsletter of the ANC in the South African parliament were used to collect data on the variables of this project. Various artifacts from the struggles in Northern Ireland – found in the Northern Ireland Political Collection at the Linen Library in Belfast, Northern Ireland were collected and scrutinized.

Prior to fieldwork, extensive study of the statements and activities by potential interviewees were conducted prior to the author's departure for Northern Ireland. This allowed for the construction of a series of open-ended questions that were used during interviews and discussions. All of the data from the interviews, written statements, and newspapers are being kept in a secured electronic database format. This will allow other researchers to be able to replicate this study.

## PROCESS TRACING AND ITS APPLICATION

Process tracing was used to outline how the independent variables are connected to the final transformation of the guerrilla movement. The causal mechanisms were

examined using process tracing. By using process tracing, this study unpacked the causal process between the independent variables and the final organizational form (i.e., the proverbially “black box” in political science). The causal chain that leads guerrilla movements to transform into political parties or criminal organizations was fully explored with the process tracing methodology.<sup>32</sup> Given the transformation of guerrilla movements is due to the interaction between many processes and mechanisms, the process tracing methodology lends itself to unpacking these processes and mechanisms.<sup>33</sup> The process tracing approach allowed this study to explore fully the antecedent conditions and the mechanisms that link the proposed independent variables and their relevant outcomes. As noted by Jack Goldstone in his argument for the use of process tracing, this will allow the researcher to gain a better understanding of how initial conditions are connected to other variables to create the observed outcomes.<sup>34</sup>

Process tracing comes in many different forms and it has many different uses.<sup>35</sup> Some of the uses of process tracing include theory development. According to George and Bennett, many current theories in comparative politics and the study of international relations are under specified. The theories are “[...] probabilistic statements that do not specify the causal process [...]” that lie between independent variables and outcomes.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 206.

<sup>33</sup> Peter A. Hall, "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics," in *American Political Science Association Annual Meeting* (Washington, D.C.: 2000), 14, 18.

<sup>34</sup> Jack Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 50-62.

<sup>35</sup> George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 209.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

As discussed in Chapter 3, this is very true when exploring theories involving collective political violence and rebellious organizations. The transformation of guerrilla movements into different entities during intrastate conflict is readily observable in the international environment. The use of process tracing to uncover the causal explanation behind these transformations is the next step in developing theories concerning the transformation of collective political violence. This is one reason why this approach was employed in the investigation.

Process tracing methodology comes in many different forms, ranging from the detailed narrative to the conversion of the historical narrative into an analytic explanation.<sup>37</sup> The most important thing to consider when using process tracing is the selection of a form that fits the type of casual process theorized to be occurring.<sup>38</sup> Given the complexity of the causal processes inherent in collective political violence and organizational transformation, the use of process tracing allows this study to understand fully this complexity. Additionally, the use of process tracing methodology will allow this study to uncover any alternative explanations not suggested in the original CPVT model.<sup>39</sup>

Given the complexity of this type of study, two forms of process tracing were employed. First, the historical narrative was developed for the transformative experience of all cases under study. This historical narrative was developed through the data

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<sup>37</sup> For more information on the various forms of process tracing methodology, see, *Ibid.*, 210-12.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 212.

<sup>39</sup> As noted by George and Bennett, one of the advantages of the use of process tracing is to uncover alternative explanations. See, *Ibid.*, 217-18.

collected through the various approaches discussed previously. Once this historical narrative was created for each case, it was then compared against the theoretical model proposed in Chapter 3, the CPVT model. In areas where the historical narrative did not match the proposed model, alternative causal mechanism and processes were acknowledged. For example, in the CPVT model, it was proposed political accessibility would result – in part – due to moderation in the behavior of the guerrilla movement towards the government. The model then suggests this moderation of behavior would lead to some linkages being built between government officials and more pragmatic members of the guerrilla movement. Yet, when Dr. Laurence McKeown was interviewed, he noted the hunger strikes and the death resulting from those hunger strikes (most notably, the death of Bobby Sands, who was elected a British MP shortly before his death) was one of the major influences in the British opening the political system to the republican movement in Northern Ireland.<sup>40</sup> This influence seems to contradict the proposed reason why a government would open access to a guerrilla movement. The application of process tracing allowed this study to uncover the alternative causation that leads to political accessibility.

#### COMPARISON AMONGST THE CASES: AN ADJUSTMENT

Given the disparity in data available across the cases, an adjustment in comparing the cases had to be made. Due to available communiqués, interviews with journalist and propaganda material produced by the guerrilla movement, and data on drug production in

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<sup>40</sup> Interview conducted with Dr. Laurence McKeown at *Coiste* offices (located on Beechmount Avenue in Belfast, Northern Ireland) on 1 November 2007.

Colombia by the movement, there was substantial more information on FARC than ASG. Similarly, due to the data collected during fieldwork in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland and a lack of fieldwork in South Africa (primarily caused by accessibility issues), there is substantial more data on the PIRA/SF than when compared to the data collected on the MK/ANC. These conditions have created a problem in parity in comparisons between the dyads.

To adjust for this parity issue, the case studies which are the largest in this study are FARC and PIRA/SF. Their dyadic partners (ASG and MK/ANC, respectively) are smaller and presented only as a mini-comparison against FARC and PIRA/SF. As more data becomes available, the mini-comparisons will be expanded in future projects concerning this transformative phenomenon.

## CONCLUSION

As has been previously discussed, a case study approach – along with process tracing – has been employed in this study of guerrilla movement transformation. Through the application of a modified dyadic case study approach and the use of process tracing to explore the causal processes, this study captures the complexity of this real world event. In the application of these methods and the variety of techniques of data collection, this analysis of guerrilla movement transformation addresses the *how* and the *why* of this phenomenon.

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**CHAPTER FIVE**  
**REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC-EP)**  
**& THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG)**

“[T]he band has degenerated into a criminal kidnap for ransom group...” –

Quote from Philippine presidential spokesman, Rigoberto Tiglao,

concerning the morphing of the ASG

**INTRODUCTION**

Throughout the previous discussions, a theoretical argument has been made that guerrilla movements will transform during conflict and sometimes in the post-conflict era. It has been suggested previously that one such transformation will be the change of guerrilla movements into criminal organizations. In these instances, portions of the once ideologically driven guerrilla movement will begin to be more enticed by the allure of physical resources (i.e., money). This may be connected to a difference in ‘who’ has a resource power advantage following full-scale conflict. Instead of acting out violently on behalf of the people in a state, the movement begins to use violence to secure monies, weapons and other physical resources for personal benefits. The guerrilla movement may use false rhetoric to justify these criminal acts (i.e., claim the action is necessary to further the struggle of the guerrilla movement). In previous chapters, there has been a theoretical argument proposed that illustrates how this transformation occurs. In this chapter, two case studies – the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia* or FARC-EP) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

– will be examined and compared.<sup>1</sup> Through comparison of historical developments, statements and writings by both groups, and data collected on these groups and their development by other scholars, this chapter intends to show how both groups have morphed from guerrilla movements into criminal organizations. Additionally, in examining these two case studies, this chapter will draw comparison between the development of these two guerrilla movements and the proposed mechanics and processes of transformation proposed by the collective political violence model.

#### COMPARING FARC-EP AND THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG)

Any historical research of the Latin American region and the Southeast Asian region finds multiple examples throughout the regions' histories of rebellious movements fighting against corrupt regimes (as the guerrilla movements perceive it) and/or occupying forces. For example, the FMLN (*Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional*, or Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front), waged a struggle against the El Salvadorian government from 1980 until 1992. The FMLN transformed into a political party in El Salvador following the cessation of hostilities. In the case of Peru, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), a guerrilla movement driven by Maoist ideology, struggled against the government from 1980 until 1992. In 1992, the leader of Sendero Luminoso - - Manuel Rubén Abimael Guzmán Reynoso – was captured and shortly thereafter, the

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout this chapter, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is referred to by its current acronym, FARC-EP. At the Seventh Conference of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the organization adopted the phrase, *Ejército del Pueblo* or People's Army, as an addition to the original FARC acronym. Thus, the organization became FARC-EP in 1982. From their perspective, this was to recognize the transition of the guerrilla movement into a more formalized military structure.

Shining Path began to fade into history.<sup>2</sup> In this latter case, the guerrilla movement was defeated in large part by the government and changes in the international system.

Similar struggles and transformation of those struggles can be seen in South and Southeast Asia. For example, a struggle between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government has existed since 1972. This struggle persisted until 2009 when the LTTE was decisively defeated by the Sri Lankan military. Regardless of the regional context, struggles by guerrilla movements seem to be a persistent part of international and regional politics. Additionally, regardless of the regional context, one can see some similarities in how guerrilla movements transform overtime. This can be seen when examining the development of FARC-EP in Colombia and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines.

#### A CASE STUDY: FARC-EP

To understand better the transition of FARC-EP, one has to understand their development within the historical development of Colombia. The history of Colombia is long and complex.<sup>3</sup> This history begins with the arrival of indigenous peoples from Mesoamerica approximately 1200 before the Common Era (BCE). This was followed by

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<sup>2</sup> The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or PCP-SL) still exist as a fragmented group as of 2009. For a in-depth discussion of the development of the PCP-SL, see, Marc Chernick, "PCP-SL: The Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Peru," in *Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts*, ed. Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O'Leary, and John Tirman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2007).

<sup>3</sup> For the feasibility of including two case studies in this chapter, Colombia's historical development has been truncated and only those historical points related to the development of FARC-EP have been included in this work. This same approach has been used when examining the Philippines in this chapter. In the Chapter 6, the same approach will be used in the examination of the development of the Provisional Irish Republican Army/Sinn Féin and the Spear of the Nation (MK)/African National Congress.

the arrival of the Spaniards in the early sixteenth century. The entire area, known as Colombia today, was established as a Spanish colony in 1549.<sup>4</sup>

The launching of Colombia as a Spanish colony meant the restructuring of the economy. With the restructuring of the economy came reorganization of society and a stratified political and economic system developed within Colombia. The top political positions within Colombia went to the individuals born in Spain who lived in the new Spanish colony. The middle level positions in the political and economic system were held by *criollos* – individuals of Spanish ancestry who were born in Spanish colonies. *Mestizos* – individuals of mixed European and indigenous ancestry – made up the lowest rung of the political and economic system when compared to Spanish-born ‘peninsulars’ and *criollos*.<sup>5</sup> An underclass was also created from the African slaves and ‘zambo’ slaves – those individuals of mixed African and indigenous ancestry).<sup>6</sup> This stratification of economic and political power is important to understand as it eventually led to struggles developing in Colombia.<sup>7</sup>

Struggles in Colombia started in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century with the rise of discontent by the *criollos*. Heavy taxation and greater desire for self-rule led

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<sup>4</sup> Denise Youngblood Coleman, ed., *Colombia: 2009 Country Review* (Houston: CountryWatch, Inc., 2009), 8-9.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 9. For a more detailed account of the early development of Colombian society, see, Marco Palacios, *Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002*, trans. Richard Stoller (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2006).

<sup>6</sup> Coleman, ed., *Colombia: 2009 Country Review*, 10.

<sup>7</sup> The stratification of Colombian society is often noted by scholars of Colombian politics as an antecedent condition of the *La Violencia* period. For more discussion of this phenomenon, see, Paul H. Oquist, *Violence, Conflict, and Politics in Colombia* (Burlington: Elsevier Science & Technology Books, 1980).

to this dissatisfaction. This instigated struggles against the Spanish crown and the proclamation of independence for Colombia in 1813. In 1813, the Spanish military moved to take back control over the area (which includes the present-day states of Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Ecuador). The struggle between the Spanish army and those fighting for independence – lead by Simón Bolívar – resulted in the defeat of the Spanish and the creation of the Republic of Greater Colombia in 1819.<sup>8</sup> From this initial struggle, the seeds for the future political divisions within Colombia were sown. In the aftermath of the struggle for Colombian independence, two distinct parties developed within the new government. These parties – *Partido Conservativo* or Conservative Party (PC) and *Partido Liberal* or Liberal Party (PL) – centered on the political differences between Simón Bolívar and Francisco de Paula Santander. (After independence, Bolívar was elected president of the new Republic and Santander was elected vice president.) These two parties are currently the two dominant political parties in Colombian politics.<sup>9</sup> The Conservative Party was founded in 1848 and the Liberal Party developed in 1849.<sup>10</sup> Eventually in the mid-twentieth century, differences between these followers of these two parties led to *la Violencia*.

As noted by Marc Chernick, the internal war in Colombia transformed from “[...] a partisan civil war in the 1940s and 1950s [...]” to “[...] a low-intensity guerrilla insurgency against the state in the 1960s and 1970s [...]” to the current stage of civil war

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<sup>8</sup> Grace Livingstone, *Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy, and War* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 36.

<sup>9</sup> Coleman, ed., *Colombia: 2009 Country Review*, 39.

<sup>10</sup> Livingstone, *Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy, and War*, 37.

between the various right wing and left wing groups and the Colombian government.<sup>11</sup> Nascent conflict started during the 1946 presidential election and it became inflamed following the assassination of the Liberal Party leader, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán on April 9, 1948. This resulted in a decade of warfare between followers of the two parties' ideologies, known as *la Violencia* ("The Violence"). This struggle resulted in between 200,000 and 300,000 deaths.<sup>12</sup> In 1958, the feuding parties created the National Front in an attempt to curb the violence before it "[...] could lead to a more profound social revolution."<sup>13</sup> This new arrangement allowed the two parties to share government office, but it did not solve the land disputes that existed.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, the violence that had occurred in the Colombian countryside persisted after the formation of the National Front.<sup>15</sup> From this period, the basis of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) was formed. This early history of Colombian politics was the predecessor to the conflict stage involving FARC-EP. (For an illustration of FARC-EP's development, see Figure 5.1)

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<sup>11</sup> Marc Chernick, "FARC-EP: From Liberal Guerrillas to Marxist Rebels to Post-Cold War Insurgents," in *Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts*, ed. Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O'Leary, and John Tirman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 51.


<sup>12</sup> Alfredo Molano, "The Evolution of the FARC: A Guerrilla Group's Long History," *NACLA: Report on the Americas* 34, no. 2 (2000): 26.

<sup>13</sup> Chernick, "FARC-EP: From Liberal Guerrillas to Marxist Rebels to Post-Cold War Insurgents," 53.

<sup>14</sup> Harvey F. Kline, "Colombia: Lawlessness, Drug Trafficking, and Carving up the State," in *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 164.

<sup>15</sup> Molano, "The Evolution of the FARC: A Guerrilla Group's Long History," 26.

Figure 5.1  
The Development of the FARC-EP



Even with the formation of the National Front, disparity concerning property ownership in Colombia persisted. During the period of 1930 to 1946, the Liberal Party dominated the government. During this time, they instituted land reform programs that would limit privileges set up under the old stratification of Colombian society. Under this system, a limited amount of individuals held a majority of the land. This difference over how the land should be distributed was the basis for a large majority of the violence in the *la Violencia*.<sup>16</sup> Following the end of *la Violencia* and the formation of the National Front, some peasants created a series of guerrilla movements to resist the new government and to secure greater economic and political equity. One of these peasants was Manuel Marulanda Velez (also known as “Tirofijo” or “Sure Shot”). Another – working on behalf of the Colombian Communist Party – was Jacobo Arenas.<sup>17</sup> In 1964, the army attacked the “Independent Republic of Marquetalia” by land and air and

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.: 23.

<sup>17</sup> Marulanda and Arenas would be the two founders of FARC-EP following the government attacks on Marquetalia.

captured the encampments. According to Molano, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was founded that same year.<sup>18</sup> This begins the military era of FARC-EP's development. Additionally, FARC-EP at this time found them involved in the limited warfare period of conflict and the organization's first involvement in militancy. Other scholars suggest the FARC was formed on the second anniversary of the military's assault on Marquetalia.<sup>19</sup> Regardless of the timing, some suggest "[i]f the government had spent a fraction of the money it used equipping soldiers to help needy farmers and build roads and schools, it might well have avoided decades of trouble with the FARC."<sup>20</sup> This struggle in Colombia was not exclusively fought by FARC. In 1964, National Liberation Army (ELN) and in 1967, the People's Liberation Army (EPL) was formed. Even though ideological basis for each guerrilla movement varied, all of these groups saw armed struggle as the only possible way to achieve greater economic and political equity for the masses (the primary goal of all these organizations).

#### An Alternative Route of FARC-EP Development: A Counterfactual Argument

It should be noted these early formative years of FARC-EP and their struggle in Colombia could have been averted if the government had made greater political opportunities available. The lack of providing political accessibility may be directly connected to a governmental advantage politically and militarily at this period. As noted

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<sup>18</sup> Molano, "The Evolution of the FARC: A Guerrilla Group's Long History," 26.

<sup>19</sup> Chernick, "FARC-EP: From Liberal Guerrillas to Marxist Rebels to Post-Cold War Insurgents," 55.

<sup>20</sup> This was noted by Pedro Marín, better known as Manuel Marulanda Vélez, the leader of FARC-EP for most of its history. See, Robin Kirk, *More Terrible Than Death: Violence, Drugs, and America's War in Colombia* (Jackson, Tennessee: PublicAffairs, 2004), 53.

by Chernick and other scholars who study Colombia, Marulanda attempted to negotiate with the National Front-run government. Yet, the government rejected each attempt and eventually, the armed communities (“Independent Republics”) were declared illegal.<sup>21</sup> Subsequently, action – known as *Soberanía* or Supremacy – was taken against the five independent republics – including Marquetalia, El Pato, Guyabero, Sumapaz, and Tequendama.<sup>22</sup> One has to question if these early approaches by Marulanda would have been accepted by the Colombian government, would have the future development of FARC-EP occurred? This question is important because multiple times throughout its history FARC-EP has attempted to work with the government. Political accessibility or signals of impending political accessibility becoming available have been limited or eliminated by actions of the Colombian government. Additionally, FARC-EP has rejected negotiations with the Colombian government or faulted on previous agreements.

#### Modern Development of FARC-EP: Land Struggles to Connection with Illicit Drugs

Following the era of formation of guerrilla movements (FARC-EP, ELN, and EPL), the organizations found themselves in the middle of an ongoing struggle between the peasantry in Colombia and the landowners. The guerrilla movements came to represent the counter to the Colombian government and economic elites who owned the majority of the land. Competition for land ownership, which often equated to competition for greater political power in Colombia between the landowners and the peasants, persisted in the 1970s. Under the Misael Pastrana administration (1970-1974),

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<sup>21</sup> Chernick, "FARC-EP: From Liberal Guerrillas to Marxist Rebels to Post-Cold War Insurgents," 54.

<sup>22</sup> Bert Ruiz, *The Colombian Civil War* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2001), 110.

the possibility of peasantry-owned lands was further diminished. Pastrana called for greater openness to “[...] free investment in the countryside.”<sup>23</sup> This led to an infusion of the city population with greater number of peasants from the rural areas. It also created greater friction between the landowners and the rural peasantry as the latter attempted to gain land through mass invasion and seizure of the large haciendas. The peasant movements were crushed by the government and often many of the peasantry was forced from their lands and sent to areas that were less populated. This assisted in providing greater human resources for the guerrilla movements as they often operated from these more remote areas of Colombia. This gave FARC-EP a growing human resource advantage when compared to the state. All of these conditions allowed FARC to gain a greater number of recruits from a variety of sectors of the Colombian population, including students, intellectuals, workers and peasants. This resulted in FARC growing – 1970 to 1982 – from 500 members to a force of 3,000. At the same time that FARC grew in human resources, they also solidified their command structure, created schools for military training and created a political program.<sup>24</sup>

Even with the growth of FARC, a portion of the peasantry remained in the less remote areas. These individuals did not have the institutional support from the guerrilla movements nor the government. Therefore, when the monies and other resources became available due to the growth in the cocaine trade, the populations did not have much choice. As noted by Molano, “[n]o legal crop offered them the advantages that coca still

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<sup>23</sup> Molano, "The Evolution of the FARC: A Guerrilla Group's Long History," 26.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

does.”<sup>25</sup> In the 1970s, the populations who were living off meager sums of monies were given some relief as drug monies were injected into the local economies.<sup>26</sup> Initially, FARC-EP openly forbade participation of its organization in the drug trade in Colombia. “Revolutionary taxes” were imposed on the population in the 1970s. In addition, FARC-EP received physical resources (money and military assistance) from the Colombian Communist Party and the Soviet Union.<sup>27</sup> Yet, as noted in earlier chapters of this work, the ultimate goal of an organization is its survival. Therefore, pragmatism persisted when looking at how to continue to gain recruits (human resources) and physical resources (weapons, monies, and other goods necessary for the struggle). Transformation was necessary for FARC-EP. This struggle over an organization based on pragmatism or an organization centered on maintenance of the original belief structure became larger as the conflict developed into a stalemate. As noted by Ortiz, “[t]his mutation from an ideologically motivated political and military activism toward one where the movement presents itself as an alternative public manager has been decisive in the survival of FARC as an organization.”<sup>28</sup> By the 1990s (as the conflict progressed from full-scale warfare to diminished warfare), contrary to their original beliefs against becoming involved in the

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid.: 27.

<sup>26</sup> Marcella Ribetti, "The Unveiled Motivations of Violence in Intra-State Conflicts: The Colombian Guerrillas," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 18, no. 4 (2007): 704.

<sup>27</sup> Chernick, "FARC-EP: From Liberal Guerrillas to Marxist Rebels to Post-Cold War Insurgents," 71.

<sup>28</sup> Román D. Ortiz, "Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25 (2002): 131.

drug trade, FARC-EP began to tax the drug traffickers and coca farmers. (This tax is known as *gramaje*.) The nexus between illegal drugs and FARC-EP was created.

Even with the nexus between guerrilla movement and drug trafficking being created, FARC-EP continued to insist that they were not narcotraffickers. In a January 1999 interview with Simón Trinidad (conducted by Garry Leech in Los Pozos), the former spokesman and FARC-EP commander claimed FARC-EP “[...] aren’t narcotraffickers and the *campesinos* [peasants] aren’t narcotraffickers.”<sup>29</sup> His claim is the real drug traffickers can be found among the economic elites in Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, and Barranquilla. Trinidad suggested these individuals are responsible for the drug trade along with the chemical companies whose chemicals are used in the processing of the plants into cocaine.<sup>30</sup> Additionally, there have been many accusations that *campesinos* have been forced to cultivate coca by FARC-EP. Trinidad suggested the cultivation is a necessity for the peasants because of the inequality in the current economic system of Colombia. It is suggested by his interview that the cultivation of the illicit crops are allowed by FARC-EP because it is the only way for the *campesinos* to survive.<sup>31</sup> Even as these types of statements were being released by FARC-EP, the organization is reported to have increased their role in the illicit cocaine trade.

This brings up a significant issue concerning “true rhetoric” and “false rhetoric.” True rhetoric – in this context – refers to the use of language and symbols that are

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<sup>29</sup> Garry Leech, "Interview with Simón Trinidad " <http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia15.htm>.

<sup>30</sup> Trinidad is currently serving a 60-year prison sentence in the United States.

<sup>31</sup> Leech, "Interview with Simón Trinidad ".

consistent with the actions of the guerrilla movement. False rhetoric is the use of language and symbols that are not consistent with the actions of the guerrilla movement. This is used to justify the actions of the guerrilla movement even though the actions are not consistent with the rhetoric being used. FARC-EP's argument that they became involved in the cocaine trade to help the masses may be an example of false rhetoric. Their criminal activities had a negative impact on the peasantry and tended to negate their actions as being only for the peasantry. Additionally, the organization became more involved in other forms of criminal activity – including, kidnapping and cattle rustling. For example, as noted in Table 5.1, in 2003, FARC-EP gained approximately 83.2 million in U.S. dollars from a combination of monies related to coca cultivation and cocaine production and other criminal activities. Even though some scholars, such as Chernick, suggest FARC-EP is not gaining a large amount of profits from the illicit cocaine industry, they are gaining a substantial amount of monies from the drug trade. Chernick suggest that FARC-EP is gaining fewer profits from the cultivation. The first phase of cocaine production gains less profits than when compared to an average street gang in Los Angeles in direct cocaine sales.<sup>32</sup> This would suggest the desire of FARC-EP is not only to allow the peasant population to gain a livelihood, but also to gain the physical resources they need to continue their struggle.

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<sup>32</sup> Chernick, "FARC-EP: From Liberal Guerrillas to Marxist Rebels to Post-Cold War Insurgents," 71.

Table 5.1  
 FARC-EP Income from Cocaine Industry & Other Illicit Activities<sup>33</sup>

Income Source	Amount, U.S. \$
Security tax coca cultivation	245,909
Coca harvest tax	433,181
Coca paste tax	402,727
“Gramaje,” tax on sale of coca paste	9,207,272
Tax on cocaine HCl production	1,191,363
Cocaine sales	3,251,818
Tax on use of clandestine airstrips	2,344,090
Subtotal, drug production	17,076,360
Kidnapping	40,254,545
Cattle rustling	23,940,000
Bank robberies	1,263,636
Extortion	681,818
<b>Total</b>	<b>83,216,359</b>

Data drawn from Chernick, 2007 (72)

Yet, one could question whether FARC-EP’s involvement in the illicit drug trade is to gain resources to further the movement’s cause or to profit some FARC-EP member in a personal manner. This is related to FARC-EP using false rhetoric. Without specific interviews being possible, the only approach is to compare what the movement is saying versus what they are actually doing. If they are continuing to argue the original cause of the movement, yet increasingly become involved in the drug trade, then one could argue the statements are false rhetoric. This is especially true since FARC-EP gave up on their prohibition against involvement in the drug trade in March 2000. (See discussion below concerning changes in FARC-EP’s belief system and associated frames.)

A variety of numbers exist concerning cocaine production in Colombia and also some estimated numbers are available concerning FARC’s role in this illicit industry. For example, in a 2005 *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, it was estimated that “FARC supplies half the world market in coke. Recent authoritative figures reflect FARC drug income as

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 72.

not less than \$600 million a year.”<sup>34</sup> Harmon notes that FARC could be making as much as two million dollars a day in 2002 from their involvement in the cocaine business.<sup>35</sup> FARC-EP has become directly involved in the drug business after providing protection to drug lords for many years. In more recent times, the movement has produced and transported drugs (normally cocaine) in “[...] various stages of refinement.”<sup>36</sup> Additionally, FARC-EP has made the continued claim they are fighting on behalf of the people, yet, in 2000, peasants in the Caquetá Department would ordered to grow cocoa by FARC-EP. They were then forced to sell the product to a monopoly controlled by FARC. Likewise, in April 2000, the Geopolitical Drug Observer, an independent French think tank, reported that FARC began to take over the role of *chichipatos* (trafficker intermediaries). These individuals buy the coca paste and cocaine base from growers and then sell it to the cocaine-processing lab.<sup>37</sup>

Given there is little to no data concerning the amount of monies being gained by FARC-EP in the cocaine business, one of the only ways to see if the movement was increasing their role in the cocaine business is to look data concerning cocaine harvesting and production in areas they are known to operate in Colombia. Given the coercive means that FARC-EP has at their disposal, one could suggest that a higher production

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<sup>34</sup> "Colombian Report Shows FARC Is World's Richest Insurgent Group," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, September 2005.

<sup>35</sup> Christopher C. Harmon, *Terrorism Today*, Cass Series on Political Violence (New York: Routledge, 2007), 75.

<sup>36</sup> Mark S. Steinitz, "The Terrorism and Drug Connection in Latin America's Andean Region," *Policy Papers on the Americas* 13, no. 5 (2002).

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

level of coca in FARC-EP regions would suggest some involvement in the harvesting by the organization. Even though peasant farmers may be doing the actual work, it would be hard to suggest this type of activity is occurring in FARC-EP areas without the movement's involvement. This involvement could include the taxing of the product by FARC-EP or running the actual business of refining the coca into coca paste for further refinement into cocaine. In examining data collected by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on coca cultivation by department in Colombia and then comparing it against known areas of FARC-EP operation, one can start to draw some preliminary conclusions about FARC-EP involvement in the cocaine business. A major issue arises when trying to draw these preliminary conclusions. In surveying the various literatures on FARC-EP, one will begin to realize there is no complete agreement concerning the area of operation for FARC-EP. Most maps show the organization being pervasive throughout the country. Other maps show FARC-EP being primarily based in the southern portion of the country and to a more limited degree along the Colombian-Venezuela border. All of the scholars agree portions of the departments of Meta and Caquetá from 1998 to 2001 were completely controlled by the movement. This was following the agreement by Pastrana to establish a demilitarized zone in those regions as a means to entice FARC-EP to disarm and end the struggle against the Colombian government. This region was used by FARC-EP, according to Cragin and Hoffman, to "[...] [stockpile] weapons, ammunitions, and other supplies and for directing attacks against the Colombian military."<sup>38</sup> To be careful as possible in the analysis, the reader

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<sup>38</sup> Kim Cragin and Bruce Hoffman, *Arms Trafficking and Colombia* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), 13.

will find in Table 5.2 a list of all departments in Colombia and the coca cultivation levels from 2001 to 2008.<sup>39</sup> At the end of the chart, there is a column that marks whether FARC-EP has been known to operate in those areas or not. One will discover in examining this data that in the mid 2000s, there was a substantial drop-off in the production levels of coca leaf in many areas of the country. In connecting these findings with the political history of Colombia in the 2000s, one can see this may have more to do with the effective measures being taken by the Uribe government against the cocaine industry and the paramilitaries. These findings do not suggest a purposeful diminishment by FARC-EP in the producing and trafficking of cocaine. In examining this Table 5.2, one can see some interesting patterns in areas that FARC-EP has been traditionally located since its inception. For example, Nariño from 2002 to 2008 kept their coca harvesting levels above 10,000 hectares. Since FARC-EP is operating in these areas with higher levels of coca harvesting, one can reliably suggest the FARC-EP has continued to be involved in this lucrative business. Given some accounts have suggested the farmers are being forced to farm for the movement, this raises the question of whether they have been involved in this criminal activity for the people or to line their pockets with monies. Without clear time-series data concerning the monies made by FARC-EP, one cannot draw complete conclusion concerning the intentions of their actions. However, if one is

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<sup>39</sup> This date was selected because it is right after FARC's public statement about the legalization of the consumption and production of drugs in Colombia and after the statement concerning taxation of the goods. The 2008 data was selected as the end due to the limitations of the data sets at the time of the writing of this study. In addition, these data sets do not currently go back before 2001 at the department level of analysis in Colombia.

trying to assist the people and then forces them to farm a produce that creates monies for those doing the forcing, we can assume the words of FARC-EP are just words and not supported by their actions.

#### A Desire for Peace with Colombia: Repeated Opportunities for Political Accessibility

In our efforts to understand the transformation of FARC-EP, it is not enough to examine their initial founding and the linking of the organization to the drug trade. It is also important to see the repeated opportunities for peace that have existed between FARC-EP and the Colombian government. This is important for the purposes of this study because each failed attempt at the peace process means also a missed opportunity for political accessibility to the Colombian political system. The first step towards greater incorporation of FARC-EP into the Colombian political system occurred in the 1980s.

With the inauguration of Colombian President Belisario Betancourt's (whose term was from 1982-1986) administration, FARC-EP was presented with its first chance at political accessibility. This accessibility did not stay in place for very long. Through negotiations between Betancourt's administration and FARC-EP, the La Uribe Agreement was developed and signed by both parties in 1984. This created a cease-fire and laid the first step for political integration of FARC-EP into the Colombian political system. In 1986, FARC-EP joined the Communist Party and multiple other left-leaning

Table 5.2  
Coca Cultivation by Affected Departments in Known FARC-EP Areas of Operation (hectares)  
(2003-2008)

Department	Nov 2001	Dec 2002	Dec 2003	Dec 2004	Dec 2005	Dec 2006	Dec 2007	Dec 2008	FARC Area
Nariño	7,494	15,131	17,628	14,154	13,875	15,606	20,259	19,612	X
Putumayo	47,120	13,725	7,559	4,386	8,963	12,254	14,813	9,658	A
Guaviare	25,553	27,381	16,163	9,769	8,658	9,477	9,299	6,629	
Antioquia	3,171	3,030	4,273	5,168	6,414	6,157	9,926	6,096	A
Bolívar	4,824	2,735	4,470	3,402	3,670	2,382	5,632	5,847	
Meta	11,425	9,222	12,814	18,740	17,305	11,063	10,386	5,525	X
Cauca	3,139	2,120	1,443	1,266	2,705	2,104	4,168	5,422	A
Caquetá	14,516	8,412	7,230	6,500	4,988	4,967	6,318	4,303	A
Vichada	9,166	4,910	3,818	4,692	7,826	5,523	7,218	3,174	X
Norte de Santander	9,145	8,041	4,471	3,055	844	488	1,946	2,886	X
Chocó	354	n/a	453	323	1,025	816	1,080	2,794	
Valle del Cauca	184	111	37	45	28	281	453	2,089	X
Santander	415	463	632	1,124	981	866	1,325	1,791	A
Córdoba	652	385	838	1,536	3,136	1,216	1,858	1,710	A
Amazonas	532	784	625	783	897	692	541	836	X
Guainía	1,318	749	726	721	752	753	623	625	
Vaupés	1,918	1,485	1,157	1,084	671	460	307	557	
Arauca	2,749	2,214	539	1,552	1,883	1,306	2,116	447	X
Magdalena	480	644	484	706	213	271	278	391	A
Boyacá	245	118	594	359	342	441	79	197	
Caldas	n/a	n/a	54	358	189	461	56	187	
La Guajira	385	354	275	556	329	166	87	160	
Cundinamarca	22	57	57	71	56	120	131	12	

Key: A = Known location of FARC-EP in late 1970s<sup>40</sup> X=Known locations of FARC-EP in present-day

groups to create an electoral alliance called Unión Patriótica (UP).<sup>41</sup> The extension of an olive branch to FARC-EP from the Colombian did not last long. In 1986, the ceasefire between FARC-EP and the Colombian government was extended. Military action by Democratic Alliance/M-19 (AD/M-19), another leftist militant organization, occurred towards the end of Betancourt's administration. This began to unravel the previous

<sup>40</sup> Information on FARC-EP location was gained from: Eduardo Pizarro, *La Insurgencia Armada: Raíces y Perspectivas*, ed. Gonzalo y Penaranada Sanchez (Bogota, Colombia: Cerec, 1991).

<sup>41</sup> It should be noted herein that FARC-EP continued to expand its ranks even as it was negotiating for place in the Colombian political system. For a timeline of the peace negotiations between the Colombian government and FARC-EP, see: <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/colombia/chronology.php>

political accessibility granted to the various leftist militant organizations.<sup>42</sup> In subsequent administrations (President Virgilio Barco, 1986-1990 and President Cesar Gavira, 1990-1994), the previous openings to the political system were subsequently closed.<sup>43</sup> Another potential opening in the Colombian political system became apparent, as Andrés Pastrana became Colombian president in 1998.

With Pastrana coming to office, a change occurred again with the policy concerning how to address the struggle between FARC-EP and the Colombian government. In November 1998, Pastrana granted a large portion of demilitarized land to FARC-EP.<sup>44</sup> In January 1999, Pastrana attempted to meet with Marulanda in the jungles of southern Colombia but was snubbed.<sup>45</sup> This demilitarized zone was a 42,000-square-kilometer territory and was known as the withdrawal zone (*zona de despeje*).<sup>46</sup> In this region, FARC-EP created a base for coca cultivation and the first phase of cocaine

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<sup>42</sup> An attack occurred on November 6-7, 1985, at the Palace of Bogotá. In this assault, 115 people were killed and of this group, 11 Colombian Supreme Court justices were killed. See, Ruiz, *The Colombian Civil War*, 170-71. Even though this attack was by AD/M-19, it was later seen as an example of the violence leftist organization was willing to use to achieve their goals. FARC-EP was lumped by latter administrations with the actions by these other guerrilla movements.

<sup>43</sup> Ortiz, "Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia," 134.

<sup>44</sup> Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001), 73.

<sup>45</sup> Diana Jean Schemo, "New President of Colombia Meets Guerrilla Leaders," *New York Times*, July 10 1998, 3. & Marc Chernick, "Colombia: International Involvement in Protracted Peacemaking," in *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003), 254.

<sup>46</sup> The area granted to FARC-EP by Pastrana was San Vicente del Caguán in the Caquetá Department of Colombia. (Colombia is made up of 32 departments.) Edmundo Murray, "Explosive Journey: Perceptions of Latin America in the FARC-IRA Affair, 2001-2005," *Irish Migration Studies in Latin America* 4, no. 2 (2006): 70. & Chernick, "FARC-EP: From Liberal Guerrillas to Marxist Rebels to Post-Cold War Insurgents," 65.

production.<sup>47</sup> This decision was very controversial at the time and it resulted in the resignation of several government officials. However, it temporarily allowed a basis for further negotiation between FARC-EP and the Colombian government. Therefore, it allowed for another opportunity for FARC-EP to gain some accessibility to the Colombian political system.<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, one of the core components of the negotiations was the passage of a law by the Colombian government whereby FARC-EP was recognized as a political group.<sup>49</sup> The on-going negotiations did not remain stable given activities by the Colombian government and military, right-wing paramilitaries, and FARC-EP. Significant to this development of FARC-EP is their subsequent failure to uphold the conditions of the on-going negotiations. FARC-EP decided to pursue militancy instead of focusing on politics. This led to continual conflict between FARC-EP and the Colombian government. The power advantage between the state and the guerrilla movement varied throughout conflict. This has influenced its transformation.

In the years following the initial negotiations between FARC-EP and the Pastrana government, the opportunities for a permanent ceasefire between the guerrilla movement and Colombian government diminished. During the on-going peace process, FARC-EP continued to insist the Colombian government take greater action against the right-wing

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<sup>47</sup> Thomas Marks, "Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency," (Carlisle, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2002), 9.

<sup>48</sup> In addition to the "land-for-negotiation" process between FARC-EP and Colombia under the Pastrana administration, FARC-EP also asked for funds so they could end the peasants' reliance on coca cultivation. For more detail, see, Linda Robinson, "A Finish to the Fight?," *U.S. News and World Report*, July 22 1999.

<sup>49</sup> Chernick, "FARC-EP: From Liberal Guerrillas to Marxist Rebels to Post-Cold War Insurgents," 65.

paramilitaries.<sup>50</sup> As Pastrana was addressing these issues, he was also quelling a possible military coup against him. The military had increasingly become agitated with the lack of action being taken against FARC-EP and other guerrilla movements.<sup>51</sup> In the aftermath of this averted military takeover of the government, Pastrana had to give less to FARC-EP and his administration began to work against the guerrilla movement.<sup>52</sup> In addition to this domestic political issue, Pastrana was also faced with addressing the desires of the U.S., as *Plan Colombia* was developed and implemented. This additional interference by an outside actor in the approach being taken by Pastrana's administration with FARC-EP placed greater limitations on future political accessibility for FARC-EP. Further, it limited Pastrana's desire to provide these opportunities in exchange for peace in Colombia.<sup>53</sup>

Since this time, the previous desires to include FARC-EP in the Colombian government have disappeared. In the remaining years of the Pastrana administration, the political accessibility that was being presented to FARC-EP through the on-going negotiations was closed. This was largely as a response to FARC-EP military actions. In November 2000, FARC-EP announced it was suspending negotiations with the

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<sup>50</sup> The primary right-wing paramilitary group operating in Colombia was the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia or *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC).

<sup>51</sup> William M. LeoGrande and Kenneth E. Sharpe, "Two Wars or One? Drugs, Guerrillas, and Colombia's New Violence," *World Policy Journal* 17, no. 3 (2000): 4.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*: 6.

<sup>53</sup> Pastrana's desire to solve the struggle between the government and guerrilla movements (particularly, FARC) who claim to represent the people can be seen in the following statement: "We will not achieve this [peace] merely by silencing weapons[...]". Andres Pastrana, "Foreword," in *Colombia: Essays on Conflict, Peace, and Development* (Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2000), ix.

Colombian government due to a failure of Pastrana to control the right-wing paramilitaries (such as the AUC).<sup>54</sup> FARC-EP – on February 20, 2002 – hijacked a commercial airline and kidnapped Senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem Turbay, head of the Colombian's senate Peace Commission.<sup>55</sup> Additionally, as other leftist guerrilla movements were attempting to gain their own territory in Colombia (i.e., ELN), the AUC publicly decried this further establishment of demilitarized areas and seized some of these potential areas for greater demilitarization.<sup>56</sup> Even though this was not land held by FARC-EP, it may have been a signal to FARC-EP the Pastrana government was neither serious nor trustworthy in regards to its negotiations. Pastrana attempted to rectify the previous cease-fire agreements on multiple occasions, but in the end, a permanent ceasefire did not occur.<sup>57</sup> Regardless of the reasoning by FARC-EP, the initial phases of negotiations between FARC-EP and the Colombian government faded. In his last days in office, Pastrana's recognized the unwillingness of FARC-EP to reach a peaceful settlement when he stated, "'Now no one believes in their [FARC-EP] willingness to reach peace [...] It's not possible to sign agreements on the one side while putting guns to the head on the other.'"<sup>58</sup> FARC-EP – due to its own actions and its perceived lack of

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<sup>54</sup> Chernick, "Colombia: International Involvement in Protracted Peacemaking," 258.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 260. & Juan Forero, "Colombian Rebels Hijack a Plane and Kidnap a Senator," *New York Times*, February 21 2002.

<sup>56</sup> Chernick, "Colombia: International Involvement in Protracted Peacemaking," 254.

<sup>57</sup> For more discussion of these additional talks between FARC-EP and the Pastrana administration, see Ibid., 258-61.

<sup>58</sup> Forero, "Colombian Rebels Hijack a Plane and Kidnap a Senator."

action by the Colombian government and the outside influence of *Plan Colombia* – was again faced with a lack of accessibility to the political system.

#### Era of Uribe in Colombia and FARC-EP Today

As noted by Chernick, by February 2002, the previous negotiations between FARC-EP and the government were without substance. In addition, the public sentiment towards the peace negotiations had waned. In this context, Alvaro Uribe won the presidency with a campaign of taking a hard-line stance against all the guerrilla movements and reestablishing security within Colombia. Uribe won a decisive victory in the first round of the Colombian presidential elections. FARC-EP saw his tough campaign rhetoric as a signal of no progress in the future between itself and the government.<sup>59</sup> Initially, Uribe took a two-prong approach to dealing with the guerrilla movements. He revamped the negotiation efforts started by Pastrana but took a less flexible approach to negotiating with the various movements. For example, he required a cease-fire, a severing of the linkages with the illicit drug industry in Colombia, and he required the guerrilla movements cease all kidnapping and related activities aimed at the civilian populations.<sup>60</sup> In addition to the proposed further negotiations with the guerrillas, he also increased the prosecution of military action against the movements.<sup>61</sup> Violence

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<sup>59</sup> Uribe, during his campaign, stated he would escalate the military action against FARC-EP and other guerrilla movements struggling against the government. Cynthia J. Arnson and Teresa Whitfield, "Third Parties and Intractable Conflicts: The Case of Colombia," in *Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 235-37.

<sup>60</sup> This position assisted in the development of a July 2003 agreement with the AUC paramilitaries that called for demobilization of the paramilitary by the end of 2005. See, Colleen W. Cook, "Colombia: Issues for Congress," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Services, The Library of Congress, 2007), 4.

<sup>61</sup> Arnson and Whitfield, "Third Parties and Intractable Conflicts: The Case of Colombia," 236.

perpetrated by FARC-EP and other movements and paramilitaries diminished. This allowed Uribe to gain greater public support for his actions against FARC-EP and be elected to a second term in 2006. Actions continued against FARC-EP, including an assassination of a top FARC-EP leader in March 2008 (Raúl Reyes). Additionally, in the same year, a successful action was taken against FARC-EP, which secured the release of 15 hostages, including former Colombian presidential candidate, Ingrid Betancourt.<sup>62</sup> All recent indications are the Colombian government will not reopen negotiations with FARC-EP, as the guerrilla movement is perceived to be weakening.<sup>63</sup>

#### FARC-EP: MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES OF TRANSFORMATION

Having traced the historical development of the FARC-EP, one must now examine the mechanisms that lead this guerrilla movement to transform into criminal organizations. As suggested in Chapter 3, four major mechanisms interact to influence the transformation of guerrilla movements. This study will show how these various mechanisms have influenced the transformation of FARC-EP into the entity it is today. In the discussion of the historical development of FARC-EP, political accessibility and the amount of physical resources available to the guerrilla movement was discussed. In the following section, the changes to the FARC-EP belief system and associated framing

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<sup>62</sup> Colleen Cook and Clare Seelke, "Colombia: Issues for Congress," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Services, The Library of Congress, 2008), 1-5.

<sup>63</sup> In addition to the successful actions by the Colombian government against FARC-EP, one of FARC-EP's founders and leader, Marulanda, died of a heart attack in 2008. If a charismatic leader is necessary to maintain the structural integrity of an organization, then his death may lead to more transformation of the original guerrilla movement. This argument of the necessity of a charismatic leader in a revolution or a rebellious organization can be found in *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* by Max Weber. See, Max Weber, "Charisma, Bureaucracy and Revolution," in *Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*, ed. Jack A. Goldstone (Belmont, California: Wadsworth/Cengage Learning, 2009).

of those beliefs are traced. Furthermore, the changes of these beliefs and their associated frames are talked about as they relate to political accessibility available or not to the guerrilla movement. In addition, the role of resource (human and physical) needs is also discussed in this context.

#### FARC-EP and Changes to Its Belief System & Associated Frames

In exploring the transformation of FARC-EP and the Abu Sayyaf Group, one can see there have been transitions in the original belief system of the movements. Additionally, the manner in which these original belief systems have been framed has changed over time. These have subsequently changed as political accessibility and human and physical resources have changed.

As noted by Ortiz, concerning FARC-EP's original belief system, their "[...] political line [was] defined by a pragmatic ideological evolution and complex relationship with the Communist party."<sup>64</sup> At the same time, the framing of these beliefs did not strictly center on Marxist ideology. Instead, in the early years, FARC-EP restated their beliefs – for public consumption – in a frame that would gain support from the rural communities in Colombia.<sup>65</sup> In looking at the writings that predated the official formation of FARC-EP (early 1950s), one can see how the early guerrillas – including the early leaders of FARC-EP – started their struggle in the context of a social revolution. This social revolution was based on the belief that the current system was inequitable to

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<sup>64</sup> Ortiz, "Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia," 132.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

the people. In the early 1950s, Chispa, a *bandolero* in Colombia, made the following statement:

In the future our struggle will be that of the poor against the rich, of the oppressed against the oppressors; it will be a social struggle from which we will exclude all of those miserable abuses that the oligarchy is conducting through the army at its service, and that the media stimulates with its publications (...) Death to the oligarchy of every party. Hurray to the social revolution. – Chispa, a *bandolero*.<sup>66</sup>

As noted in the above statement, the pre-FARC-EP framing of the struggles in Colombia show it as a struggle between socioeconomic classes and between the masses and the government who are cast as “oppressors” of the people. Contrary to the latter call to arms by FARC-EP, this early statement seems to suggest prior to FARC-EP’s formation, there was a desire to not be involved in militant activity. This can be seen in the statement, “[...] we will exclude all of those miserable abuses that the oligarchy is conducting through the army at its service.”<sup>67</sup> In addition, it is evident from the statement the guerrilla saw the elite from both the Conservative and Liberal Party as a threat to equity for the masses of Colombia. From these antecedent positions and in the aftermath of the *La Violencia*, FARC-EP’s original belief system and their associated frames were founded.

#### Beliefs and Associated Frames during the FARC-EP Formation Phase

The early beliefs concerning the struggle against the Colombian government and military focused on a passive, non-violent resistance approach. Following “Operation

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<sup>66</sup> Gonzalo G. Sánchez and Donny Meertens, *Bandoleros, Gamonales y Campesinos: El Caso De La Violencia En Colombia [Bandits, Peasants, and Politics: The Case Of "La Violencia" In Colombia]* (Bogota, Colombia: El Ancora Editores, 1983), 110.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

Marquetalia” against the independent republics, this belief of non-violent resistance begins to shift. A master frame of the conflict as a struggle of the agrarian population (*campesinos*) against the government and the Colombian elite was constructed. In the 1964 Agrarian Reform Program, drafted by some of the original founding members of FARC-EP, the guerrillas establish this shift in tactics and beliefs behind the struggle. In the document, due to the actions of the Colombian military, the pre-FARC-EP guerrillas argue they had attempted to use “[...] peaceful, democratic means [...]” but the government and military prevented this type of struggle.<sup>68</sup> They further frame the new necessity of armed struggle against the military and government as a defensive action against a system which “[...] kill, persecute, and imprison people [...]” that struggle along with the guerrilla forces.<sup>69</sup> This would suggest the lack of political accessibility for those representing the people (i.e., guerrillas) made it necessary to use armed force against the government and military. This is further affirmed in the following statement: “So, this war has now assumed a genuine character, which necessarily includes the revolutionary armed struggle to the larger masses of our people against the military [...]”<sup>70</sup> They do not suggest in this document that the armed struggle will completely replace political solutions. They note the new struggle will be a “[...] political

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<sup>68</sup> FARC-EP, "Programa Agrario De Los Guerrilleros De Las FARC-EP (Agrarian Reform Program of FARC-EP)," FARC-EP, <http://bolivarsomostodos.org>.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

organization which includes military flags [...].”<sup>71</sup> This statement suggests the new guerrilla movement will be constructed as a political movement with a military wing.<sup>72</sup>

The struggle was further framed as a struggle between the government, the political and economic elites of the country (as a unified unit) and the peasantry. In the following statements, one can see how this early statement by the pre-FARC-EP guerrillas links the political and economic elite together: “We have been victims of the “blood and fire” advocated and carried out by the oligarchy that holds power. [...] We have been victims of the fury and latifundary military because here in this part of Colombia, dominated the interests of the great lords of the land [...]”.<sup>73</sup> This belief and associated frame is important to note here. It is persistent throughout communiqués and statements made by various FARC-EP members from 1964 to present. In addition to this frame, the core belief the early guerrillas seem to be presenting is changing the agrarian system of economics and politics in Colombia will solve the issues facing the country.

In this early document, the argument is made that a “Revolutionary Agricultural Policy” is the answer to the ills facing Colombia – in particular, the peasantry of Colombia.<sup>74</sup> Similarly, this document suggests multiple prescriptions for recreating the

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> This type of framing of how the armed struggle will be organized is a similar frame seen throughout all four cases in this study. All of the guerrilla movements in this work had political sections within the greater armed struggle or the guerrilla movements were linked with established political parties (as in the case of Sinn Fein and the PIRA).

<sup>73</sup> FARC-EP, “Programa Agrario De Los Guerrilleros De Las FARC-EP (Agrarian Reform Program of FARC-EP).”

<sup>74</sup> This can be seen in the following statement from the 1964 Agrarian Reform Program document: “Revolutionary Agricultural Policy is a prerequisite for raising the level of vertical material and cultural life

Colombian system. Given the ills facing the Colombian people have an effect on all, this early document calls for mobilization of all Colombians to overthrow the old system. The frame presented is the creation of this new system will only be successful is supported by the masses. The only differentiating means for whether you can be a part of the new struggle is whether you want to change the current system.<sup>75</sup> This is a consistent belief and related frame continuing throughout the development of FARC-EP. This consistent core belief of a unified people behind the struggle can be seen as recent as the FARC-EP-EP Manifesto issued in September of 2007.<sup>76</sup>

In 1966, at the Second Guerrilla Conference, FARC-EP announced to the world the unification of all of the previous guerrilla movements in Southern Colombia into a single organization. In addition to presenting this new organization, the original beliefs and associated frames that only focused on the hardships being created by the Colombian government and military shifted. As can be seen in the political declaration of the Second Guerrilla Conference of the constituent South Block of the Revolutionary Armed

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of all farmers, free of unemployment, hunger, illiteracy and endemic diseases that limit their ability to work to clear the obstacles and latifundismo encourage the development of industrial and agricultural production in the country." Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> These calls for mobilization of all Colombians who want to change the current system can be seen in point seven and point eight of the document. Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> This is apparent in the introductory statement of the Manifesto: "We invite to this dialogue the revolutionary leaders, to the democratic sectors of the parties, to people outpost of the clergy, to the patriotic and bolivarianos military, the working leaders and farmers, student, communal, indigenous, to the negritudes, the educators, the women... to all the popular leaderships, to join yearnings and to undertake together the way towards the New Colombia HSecretaryship of the Main Army Staff of the CRAF, "Manifesto of FARC-EP," FARC-EP, [http://web.archive.org/web/20080208125309/resistencianacional.net/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=90&Itemid=1](http://web.archive.org/web/20080208125309/resistencianacional.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=90&Itemid=1). Translation confirmed by Colombian national who is a native Spanish speaker, Ms. Natalia Carvajal-Hale.

Forces (1966), FARC-EP began to include the Western world – particularly, the United States – as one of the factor causing suffering for the Colombian people. This can be seen, most notably, in the following passages:

“[V]ictim of the of the Alliance for the Progress of the imperialistic Yankees who have invested a trillion dollars [...] the Yankees are installing bases of aggression not only against our town, but against all the Latin American towns. [...] In our country, the oligarchy and Yankee imperialism are mounting a vast reactionary offensive [...]”.<sup>77</sup>

The targets of these actions by the coalition of the Colombian government, landowning political and economic elites (oligarchs) and the West include all “[...] men and women of Colombia who do not want to die of hunger.” These core beliefs and associated frames have been consistently used from 1966 to present by FARC-EP. The emphasis on the role of the West in Colombian affairs has been increased overtime and eventually included a linkage between the illicit narcotics trade in Colombia and the role of the West in perpetuating this societal ill.

#### FARC-EP and Its Transition of Beliefs and Associated Frames

An analysis of various documents published by FARC-EP suggests they continued to emphasize the role of the established system as a hinder to the full development of the Colombian people. In documents in the early 1980s, there was a greater call to arms to address this unjust system by implementing laws in the FARC-EP controlled regions. In the 1982 Agrarian Reform Act (drafted at the Seventh National

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<sup>77</sup> FARC-EP, "Segunda Conferencia Guerrillera Del Bloque Sur Constitutiva De Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Second Guerrilla Conference of the Constituent South Block of the Revolutionary Armed Forces)," FARC-EP, [http://web.archive.org/web/20080211150007/resistencianacional.net/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=blogcategory&id=23&Itemid=48](http://web.archive.org/web/20080211150007/resistencianacional.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=23&Itemid=48).

Conference of FARC-EP), FARC-EP established a series of laws they implemented in Colombia in the regions that were under their control. It included FARC-EP stating they would take control and ownership of any properties of foreign companies and those lands owned by large hacienda owners. (In this document, they establish the criteria for the classification of a “[...] haciendas capitalists.”) According to the document, those principles outlined in this document are to be executed by FARC-EP under the leadership of the Central Secretariat of the General Staff of the FARC-EP.<sup>78</sup> This statement is referring to use of armed force to implement these laws.

In all of these early documents, the issue of cocaine production is not addressed. The issue of illicit narcotics production becomes a greater key issue of FARC-EP in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Based on changes in the frames of FARC-EP’s belief system in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it is apparent the guerrilla movement was still struggling against the government in their original organizational form. The core belief of a need to change the current system was present. Nevertheless, there were shifts toward a mixture of militancy and politics. They mentioned the issue of the narcotics trade but then focus on potential political solutions to their struggle against the state. This is evident by it being addressed at the Eighth National Conference of FARC-EP. At this meeting, the *Platform for a Government of Reconstruction and National Reconciliation* (1993) was created. This document includes a discussion concerning “[...] the production phenomenon, commercialization and consumption of narcotics and

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<sup>78</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "Programa Agrario De Los Guerrilleros De Las FARC-EP (Agrarian Reform Program of FARC-EP)."

hallucinogens [...].”<sup>79</sup> This is one of the first public documents produced to note specifically the illicit drug problem in Colombia. While staying with the same basic beliefs concerning how to fix the problems facing the Colombian people, FARC-EP argues for a “[...] political solution [...]” to the conflict in Colombia. Additionally, the guerrilla movement frames the illicit drug production and consumption in Colombia as a problem driven by the West. They argue the demand for drugs from the major powers of the world is the issue that needs to be addressed. Additionally, they further contend the illicit drug industry in Colombia “[...] cannot be treated by the military route [...].”<sup>80</sup> The beliefs and associated frames presented in this document seem to suggest FARC-EP has retained much of its original beliefs. Yet, it does suggest the issue of cocaine production and consumption has become an issue they need to address in their core belief system and address it publically. This was a reaction to the conditions on the ground in Colombia. One should note though this frame can also be interpreted as FARC-EP’s continuation of blaming the West of the ills facing Colombian society. By offering this blame and subsequent prescriptions for the drug issues, the frame allows the guerrilla movement to continue to frame themselves as the protector of the masses. This inclusion of the drug issue would suggest a certain amount of political pragmatism on the part of the leadership. Through including this discussion, it allows FARC-EP to continue to link

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<sup>79</sup> Seventh National Conference of FARC-EP, "Plataforma Para Un Gobierno De Reconstrucción y Reconciliación Nacional (Platform for a Government of Reconstruction and National Reconciliation)," FARC-EP, [http://web.archive.org/web/20080218141249/resistencianacional.net/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=blogcategory&id=24&Itemid=47](http://web.archive.org/web/20080218141249/resistencianacional.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=24&Itemid=47).

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

themselves with the armed struggle for those oppressed and to prevent a linkage with the drug problem facing the country. They continued to use true rhetoric in this earlier history of FARC-EP.

#### Justification of Kidnappings & the Issue of the Drug Trade

As FARC-EP faced changes in Colombia, the belief system and associated framing of those beliefs continued to shift from the grand revolutionary agrarian struggle ideal to a series of documents that suggests an organization needing resources. As the struggle between the government and FARC-EP began to stall and the government had a physical resource power advantage when compared to FARC-EP, one can see a shift in the prohibition of being involved in the drug trade. This is very evident in *Law 002: On Taxation*, a document written by the Central Staff of the FARC-EP in March 2000. The organization continued to blame the U.S. for the problems facing the Colombian people with particular emphasis being placed on *Plan Colombia*. FARC-EP noted the continuation of the struggle is necessary as no clear and final agreement was created with the Colombian government leadership.<sup>81</sup> Yet, the physical resources needed are “[...] insufficient to meet the requirements demanded by the struggle of the FARC-People’s Army.”<sup>82</sup> Similarly, the organization outlines how these resources will be obtained – through the collection of “[...] Taxes for Peace [...] from those who have assets which exceed one million USD. It is in the document FARC-EP justifies for the first time the

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<sup>81</sup> Central Staff of the FARC-EP, "Law 002: On Taxation," FARC-EP, <http://bolivarsomostodos.org>.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

use of kidnappings-for-ransom.<sup>83</sup> This FARC-EP document would suggest as the physical resources diminish and political opportunities shrink, FARC-EP began to resort to new means for acquiring resources – including activities like kidnapping-for-ransom. This is analogous to the interaction of physical resource needs and political accessibility delineated in the CPVT model (discussed in Chapter 3).

In a March 2000 published statement by the Central Staff of FARC-EP, the movement addresses the issue of coca farming, cocaine production and consumption. In this document, there is extensive explanation of ‘why’ the local farmers have to be involved in the farming of coca, poppies, and marijuana. There is the suggestion that global economic system – lead by capitalist countries – have made it impossible for Colombian farmers to grow crops other than those used for illicit drugs. Further, the demand in the U.S. and similar Western powers is the real reason for the growth in the illegal drug industry in Colombia. Vital to this argument by FARC-EP is both the blaming of the West for the problems and diverting attention away from their role in the drug trade. The movement attempts to divert the public’s eyes from their role in the drug trade by framing their role as being against the industry. This is a good example of the use of false rhetoric by a guerrilla movement to cover their criminal activities. FARC-EP states: “We reject the drug trade.”<sup>84</sup> Additionally, they suggest the Colombian

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<sup>83</sup> In *Law 002*, FARC-EP notes: “ARTICLE THREE: those who do not meet this requirement will be retained. Their release will depend on the payment to be determined.” Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Full Central Staff (FARC-EP), "Legalizing the Consumption of Drugs," FARC-EP, <http://bolivarsomostodos.org>.

government and the U.S. have made suggestions in the past to legalize the industry. Yet, this did not occur, because the governments could not gain enough monies from it.<sup>85</sup>

These previous statements are consistent with comments made by FARC-EP leadership in various interviews and with additional statements made post-2000. It is not consistent with the actions of FARC-EP. Given the statements are being made by the FARC-EP leadership, this may suggest that these individuals would be consistent with the *true believers* (TBs) labels discussed in Chapter 3. The actions we see (e.g., providing protection to certain drug lords, and taxation of the farmers involved in the farming) may be carried out by those *economic pragmatic members* (EPMs) who see this as necessary to gain physical resources (monies, weapons, etc.). This is consistent with the CPVT model. The political pragmatic members (PPMs) proposed in Chapter 3 may be working with the TBs. This would explain the consistent framing of the struggle as one against the Colombian government and drug lords. This coalition may be framing it in this context because it helps to promote greater increases in human resources (i.e., gaining more recruits, more supporters or sympathizers). In addition, this framing may be used because the core belief system for the TBs and PPMs has not shifted significantly and therefore, the frames are truly represented of what they believe.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> The author has to admit these are educated guesses given the information available. In future years, this project will be expanded and these documents will be supplemented with field interviews with FARC-EP members. This was the reason for the dual approach in Chapter 6 where documents were analyzed and supplemented with field interviews with PIRA/Sinn Fein members.

## The Frames of Today and FARC-EP's Position

An examination of documents released by FARC-EP in 2007 and 2008 finds some consistency when compared to previous belief systems and associated frames. In addition, there are some issues expanded upon in these statements. In particular, these more recent documents suggest a greater amount of blame for the ills of Colombian society being placed on President Uribe. This is most evident in the final communiqué of the Ninth Conference of the FARC-EP (*Ninth Conference of the FARC-EP for the New Colombia, the Patria Grande and Socialism*) written in May 2007 and the *Manifesto of FARC-EP*, issued on September 29, 2007. In the communiqué from the Ninth Conference, there is restatement of the justification for an armed struggle against the Colombian government. There is also a frame presented that links specific drug lords to Uribe. In the statement, FARC-EP insinuates there are “[...] deep roots of the drug lords Pablo Escobar Gaviria Don Berna and brothers Castaño Gil in regional politics when Álvaro Uribe was mayor of Medellin [...]”<sup>87</sup> Moreover, FARC-EP contends the drug lords, right-wing paramilitaries, the U.S., and the Colombian governments are all working together against the people of Colombia. With these arguments throughout the document, FARC-EP attempts to mobilize all those hurt by the government throughout various statements in this document.<sup>88</sup> This is a similar series of frames presented in the 2007 *Manifesto of FARC-EP*. Throughout this document, FARC-EP continues to frame the problem in Colombia as being promoted by interventionist policies of the U.S. (i.e.,

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<sup>87</sup> FARC-EP, "Ninth Conference of the FARC-EP for the New Colombia, the Patria Grande and Socialism," FARC-EP, <http://bolivarsomostodos.org>.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

*Plan Colombia*).<sup>89</sup> Unlike the previously discussed document, there is no discussion of a political solution. This may be a reaction to the lack of political accessibility for FARC-EP by 2007. Similarly, statement by Marulanda in early 2008 – prior to his death – note these same issues and framing of the issues.<sup>90</sup>

In the most recently available statements from FARC-EP, the organization seems to be moving away from kidnapping-for-ransom activities. In a *Letter to the Colombian FARC* (October 16, 2008), written by the Secretariat of the Central Staff of the FARC-EP to the rank-and-file FARC members and supporters and sympathizers of the organization, there is a clearly outlined desire to obtain a political solution to the conflict. This includes the exchange of prisoners. The latter is framed as being the most urgent action that needs to be taken.<sup>91</sup> Since this time, the actions by FARC-EP have seemed to be mirroring these statements. Following this statement, FARC has been in multiple on-going negotiations with the Colombian government and working with Hugo Chavez of Venezuela as a third party in the negotiations to exchange prisoners. These latter statement and actions may suggest the once criminal behavior (kidnapping-for-ransom activities) may be supplanted with political solutions. Would this suggest the FARC-EP guerrilla movement that began to transform into a criminal organization might now be transforming once again? If this is so, it is not something predicted in the CPVT model.

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<sup>89</sup> CRAF, "Manifesto of FARC-EP."

<sup>90</sup> Manuel Marulanda Velez, "Saludo De Manuel Marulanda Vélez Comandante En Jefe De Las FARC (Message from Marulanda, Commander-in-Chief, FARC)," FARC-EP, [http://web.archive.org/web/20080223131954/resistencianacional.net/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=106&Itemid=1](http://web.archive.org/web/20080223131954/resistencianacional.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=106&Itemid=1).

<sup>91</sup> Secretariat of the Central Staff of the FARC-EP, "Letter to the Colombian FARC: Supports the Political Solution to Problems of War and Peace," FARC-EP, <http://bolivarsomostodos.org>.

## Overview of the Changes in Beliefs and Frames of FARC-EP

One can use the two first published documents by the FARC-EP movement and its founding members as an initial position to measure change over time in beliefs and associated frames. As illustrated in Table 5.3, FARC-EP started as a political/armed struggle movement focused on changing the inequality in Colombian society. This inequality was seen because of corrupt government policies and the development of an oligarchic system consisting on the government and the economic and political elites of Colombia (i.e., *hacienda* owners). Additionally, the ills of Colombian society were promulgated by Western intervention into Colombian affairs. Furthermore, FARC-EP beliefs were based on a political solution to the conflict between the guerrillas and the government. However, after military action against the Colombian people, this struggle could not only be one of passive resistance. Armed opposition was a necessity. From these foundational beliefs and associated frames, FARC-EP began their struggle against the government. Overtime, some of the basic beliefs were retained. In some cases, newer beliefs and frames supplanted the original beliefs and frames.

As can be seen in Table 5.3, the desire to seek political solutions has been similar to a pendulum – swinging back and forth between desire for political solutions and a lack to desire to seek political solutions. In comparing this to the discussion above concerning political accessibility occurring, there seems to be a connection. The only exception is the most recent desires (in the mid to late 2000s) to seek a political compromise with the Colombian government. This is occurring during a time when political accessibility is very limited when compared to previous years and previous Colombian presidential

administration (i.e., comparing Pastrana to Uribe). This may suggest some of the FARC-EP beliefs and associated framing of those beliefs concerning political solutions may be a reaction by political pragmatic members (PPMs) to continue the struggle but in a different manner. Additionally, in looking at messages made by Marulanda and other

Table 5.3  
Beliefs and Associated Frames in the Development of FARC-EP

Time Period	Core Beliefs	Associated Frame
Late 1960s	Desire to change the inequality in Colombian society	Reason for inequality is corrupt government policies and the development of an oligarchic system. Western intervention into Colombian affairs caused the inequitable structure.
	Solution to the inequality in Colombia is a political solution	Political solutions have been prevented by the Colombian government
	Armed struggle as a tactic is necessary.	The use of the armed struggle is a result of the repression by the Colombian government. Armed struggle is the only tactic possible.
Early 1980s	Armed struggle is very necessary. Armed struggle against foreign companies & large <i>hacienda</i> owners is justifiable.	The expansion of armed struggle from only against the Colombian government to include foreign companies and large landowners is necessary. Only through taking foreign-owned lands and lands owned by the Colombian large landowners will the corrupt Colombian system be made more equitable.
Early 1990s	Drugs are a large problem in Colombia.	The drug problem facing Colombia is a result of Western demand for drugs.
	Political solutions to the problems facing Colombia are possible.	Political solutions are the best route to solving both the drug problems in Colombia and the armed struggle facing the Colombian government and people.
Early 2000s	The continuation of the armed struggle is necessary.	The Colombian government failed working with FARC-EP to obtain a political solution to the fight between the two entities.
	The use of force against individuals to obtain monies is permissible. This includes the use of kidnapping-for-ransoms.	Monies are needed to continue the struggle against the corrupt Colombian government and their Western allies.
	Drug production (farming of coca, poppies and marijuana) is permissible.	The farming of coca, poppies and marijuana is necessary given the inequitable economic system supported by the Colombian government and the U.S.
Mid to Late 2000s	Political solutions should be used.	The creation of political solutions is the best and most necessary method to end the struggle between the FARC-EP and the Colombian government.

FARC-EP leaders, one can see how the PPMs were potentially working with the TBs to continue the struggle but in a different manner. Then, if the documents being written by the guerrilla movement is any indication of physical resource needs, then the later justification for the use of kidnappings-for-ransoms (KFRs) activities and the justification of drug farming in Colombia is linked to the shifts in physical and human resource needs. Mobilization of the masses behind the FARC-EP struggle is done through the continuation of blaming the Colombian government and the U.S. for the ills facing the Colombian people. Further, FARC-EP continues to frame themselves as the protectors of the people. Yet, even as this call to arms and support of the struggle is done, the organization continued to justify actions that link them to criminal activity. This may suggest the EPMs had influenced some beliefs and frames, but eventually became their own organization.<sup>92</sup> This would be consistent with the mechanisms and processes outlined in the CPVT model.

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<sup>92</sup> There is some evidence of this splintering effect by the formation of Ricardo Franco Front in early 1983. This dissident faction of FARC developed around the personalities of Javier Delgado (whose real name was Jose Fedor Rey) and Hernando Pizarro Leongomez. (Leongomez is the brother of the leader of the M-19 guerrilla movement.) Both of these men were former members of FARC's Sixth Front which operated in the Cauca Department of Colombia (located on the Southwest coastline of Colombia). This cluster was seen as a criminal organization more than a guerrilla movement by some involved in the conflict. According to Osterling, John Agudelo Rios, chairman of former Colombian President Betancur's Peace Commission, saw this dissident group as merely "[...] a criminal organization which lacks any kind of political goal and objective." It should be noted Delgado, prior to leading the faction of FARC, was the individual in charge of coordinating kidnappings and obtaining the ransoms for those kidnappings. Delgado left the organization in 1983 when FARC rejected his plan to expand FARC operations into urban centers. He claimed he left because FARC had abandoned the original goals of the movement. Eventually, the dissident group took actions on their own including kidnappings for ransom and attacking police stations in Cali. In addition, struggles between FARC and the Ricardo Franco Front began to occur including the kidnapping of each other's members. This resulted in the factional group being dismissed as "[...] a band of common delinquents hired by the army." According to some accounts of this dissident group, they may have become linked with narcotraffickers. See, Jorge P. Osterling, *Democracy in Colombia: Clientist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1989), 319-22. The dissident group eventually joined M-19 when a National Guerrilla Coordinating Group

## A CASE STUDY: THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG)

Similar to the history of Colombia, the Philippine's history is one of colonization and struggle by a segment of the population against a government perceived to be unjust towards the populous. Analogous to Colombia, the Philippines has a history of colonization by the Spanish crown. Unlike Colombia, the country has also been subject to influence by Japanese invasion and American colonization. Even with these differences, the Philippines have a long history of uprising against the central government, including activities by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

### Preconditions to Militancy in the Philippines

The Philippines's history begins with the crossing of Malay peoples from the Asian mainland. In the ninth century BCE, Chinese merchants began arriving in the Philippines, but their arrival did not signal the beginning of Chinese influence in the Philippines. In addition, Indian influence was limited in the Philippines. The expansion of Islam into the Philippine islands would have the greatest lasting effect on the historical development of the country. It would be the basis for the struggles leading to the development of the Moros National Liberation Front (MNLF), Moros Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). In 1500 CE, Islam spread from the Sulu Archipelago to Mindanao. As Islam continued to influence the development of the

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(CNG) was created by M19. This was following M-19 withdrawing from the peace process in 1985. See, Palacios, *Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002*, 270.

Philippines, the Spanish crown arrived.<sup>93</sup> The Spanish established the Philippines (named for Philip II of Spain) in 1565 CE as a permanent colony. With the arrival of the Spanish, a conflict began to develop between the expansions of Roman Catholicism into the southern Philippines, which was dominated by Muslims.<sup>94</sup>

The initial desire of the Spanish crown to expand Catholicism was not proceeded with armed conflict. Yet, a desire to limit bloodshed in the struggle between these two different cultures (indigenous and Islamic cultures and the Roman Catholic Spanish culture) did last for long. For over 300 years of Spanish rule, there were numerous uprisings by the Filipinos against their Spanish colonizers.<sup>95</sup> Following the defeat of the Spanish by the U.S. in 1898, the Philippines declared their independence from Spain. With this declaration of independence by General Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy (leader of the Filipino struggle against the Spanish Crown), the struggle of the Filipino people did not subside for very long.

Shortly after independence, the U.S. occupied the Philippines and in 1898 (under the Treaty of Paris), the Spanish relinquished control of the Philippines over to the Americans. This led to a new struggle (under the leadership of Aguinaldo) against an American occupier. This struggle did not last long as Aguinaldo was captured and

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<sup>93</sup> Denise Youngblood Coleman, ed., *Philippines: Countrywatch Review, 2009* (Houston: CountryWatch, Inc., 2009), 7.

<sup>94</sup> For a rich detailed history of the Bangsamoro people (which includes Muslim Moros in Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao, and Lanao Del Sur), see: Cesar Adib Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (Manila: University of the Philippines Press, 1999). This book is one also recommended by the Moros National Liberation Front on their website: <http://mnlf.net/index.htm>.

<sup>95</sup> Coleman, ed., *Philippines: Countrywatch Review, 2009*, 8.

shortly thereafter, the Philippines gave control of the islands over to the U.S. Self-rule became the intended goal for the Philippines and the U.S. began to work with the Filipinos towards this goal. Because of the Tydings-McDuffie Act (1934), the Philippines became a “[...] self-governing commonwealth [...]” in 1935. This resulted in the Philippines becoming an independent nation-state on July 4, 1946.<sup>96</sup>

Struggles within the Philippines were not merely contests between the occupying power and the populous as a whole. There was a large desire for the Muslim minority population to become a separate state. This scenario was even greater following the independence of the Philippines from American control. Through both Spanish and American occupation, the Muslim secessionist desires persisted. This 400-year old Muslim secessionist movement was based – in large part – out of western Mindanao, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and the Sulu Archipelago.<sup>97</sup> Some scholars argue a large reason for this desire for autonomy is due to the prevalence of poverty in the Muslim-areas of the Philippine islands. This is when compared to the more affluent areas that are dominated by Filipino Christians.<sup>98</sup> Additionally, the Philippine’s government also promoted the migration of Christians into lands traditionally occupied by Muslims and governed by

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid. It should be noted herein that the development of the Philippines as a new nation-state was interrupted in 1942 when the Japanese occupied the archipelago during World War 2. For a detailed discussion of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, see, Setsuho Ikehata, Ricardo Trota Jose, and Ikehata Setsuho, eds., *The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction* (Manila, Philippines: Ateneo De Manila Univ Press, 2000).

<sup>97</sup> Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 34.

<sup>98</sup> For more on this discussion of the connection between poverty and violence against the state (particularly, terrorism), see the following: Quan Li and Drew Schaub, "Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism, a Pooled Time-Series Analysis," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* (2004).

Moros (Muslim Filipinos) chieftains. This led to a great deal of intercommunal conflict and struggles against the Christian-dominated Philippines' government.<sup>99</sup>

In the late 1960s and 1970s, insurgencies began to grow in the Philippines. These insurgencies continued to attempt to unify the Moros in the Philippines.<sup>100</sup> These organizations were the predecessor to the MNLF, MILF, and its offshoot, ASG. The first pan-Moro movement to become involved in armed struggle against the Philippine government was Mindanao/Muslim Independence Movement (MIM).<sup>101</sup> Over time in Central Mindanao, various organizations arose competing “[...] to represent a pan-Moro movement demanding independence or autonomy from the Philippines state.”<sup>102</sup> The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) led the struggle in the early 1970s and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) directed the battle against the Philippines government in the late 1980s.<sup>103</sup> Yet, the secessionist struggles were not strictly against the Philippine government. In the late 1960s, the MNLF arose as a counterweight to the “[...]”

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<sup>99</sup> Steven Rogers, "Beyond the Abu Sayyaf," *Foreign Affairs* (2004): 16.

<sup>100</sup> Charles O. Frake, "Abu Sayyaf: Displays of Violence and the Proliferation of Contested Identities among Philippine Muslims," *American Anthropologist* 100, no. 1 (1998): 46. In addition, there are numerous works written on the development of the struggles between the Moros people and the central government of the Philippines, including struggles against Spanish and American occupation of the islands. One of the most comprehensive works on these struggles is *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* by Thomas M. McKenna. See, Thomas M. McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

<sup>101</sup> Frake, "Abu Sayyaf: Displays of Violence and the Proliferation of Contested Identities among Philippine Muslims," 46.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Eusaquito P. Manalo, *The Philippines Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group (Master's Thesis)* (Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 36.

traditional Muslim elites in Mindanao and Sulu.”<sup>104</sup> Led by Nur Misuari, the MNLF framed itself not as a religious movement, but a movement with an armed wing (Bangsa Moro Army or BMA).<sup>105</sup> It further framed the guerrilla movement’s belief system as one based on a pan-Moros ideal and one that did not distinguish between Muslim Filipinos or Christian Filipinos. As stated by Misuari, “[f]rom this very moment there shall be no stressing the fact that one is a Tausug, a Samal, a Yakan, a Subanon, a Kalagan, a Magindanao, a Maranao, or a Badjao. He is only a Moro.”<sup>106</sup> This unity of the Moros did not last long as the Philippine government took action against the guerrillas and this resulted in the eventual splintering of the MNLF. The formation of the MILF resulted.

#### Moros Islamic Liberation Front (MILF): Militancy by Islamists

Under the Ferdinand Marcos regime in 1972, the military of the Philippines devastated central Mindanao and Sulu. This set the stage for the development of a new guerrilla movement, MILF. In particular, the Philippines’ military ravaged the island of Basilan. In the aftermath of these events and the displacements of many people, the Marcos regime struck an agreement with the MNLF and MIM to create an autonomous region in the southwestern Philippines. Dissatisfied with this new political linkages being built between the MNLF, MIM, and the Marcos regime, a Magindanao leader, Hashim Salamat unsuccessfully challenged Misuari for leadership of the MNLF. Very

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
<sup>104</sup> Frake, "Abu Sayyaf: Displays of Violence and the Proliferation of Contested Identities among Philippine Muslims," 46.

<sup>105</sup> As suggested by Frake, “[...] the MNLF appropriated the ethnic slur “Moro” as a label of self identity.” Ibid.: 47.

<sup>106</sup> Al-Rashid I. Cayongcat, *Bangsa Moro People in Search of Peace* (Manila, Philippines: Foundation for the Advancement of Islam in the Philippines, 1986), 118.

shortly, after this failed attempt, Salamat formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).<sup>107</sup> Similar to the development of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the MILF occurred as true believers within the MNLF broke away. This occurred again when MNLF members broke away to form the Abu Sayyaf Group. In both cases, a split occurred over the discussion of survivability of the organization or staying true to the original beliefs of the organization. (See Figure 5.2)

Figure 5.2  
The Development of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)



<sup>107</sup> Frake, "Abu Sayyaf: Displays of Violence and the Proliferation of Contested Identities among Philippine Muslims," 47.

In 1986, Marcos was overthrown and Corizon Aquino became the new president of the Philippines. This led to negotiations developing between the MNLF and the government and the creation of an Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).<sup>108</sup> ARMM includes the following: the four provinces of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur. MILF stayed to its desire for an *independent* Mindanao and not merely an autonomous region. The shift towards peaceful negotiations was a pragmatic move by MNLF, because the support for MILF grew rapidly after the development of ARMM.<sup>109</sup> Yet, from its actions of giving up a goal of independence for the Moros people, MNLF inadvertently assisted with the development of the Abu Sayyaf group. From the moderated actions of MNLF, Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani took a small group of “[...] disgruntled members of the MNLF [...]” and created the guerilla movement the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).<sup>110</sup>

#### The Early Years of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

In most account of the development of Abu Sayyaf, ASG is noted as having come first into existence as a rebellious organization in 1989.<sup>111</sup> The founder of the guerrilla movement Janjalani created the organization based on the core goal of creating an independent Islamic Theocratic State of Mindanao. This core belief was in direct

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<sup>108</sup> Misuari – in 1996 – became the head of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development and the governor of the ARMM. Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror*, 41.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., 40-41.

<sup>110</sup> Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat," *Naval War College Review* (2005): 248.

<sup>111</sup> It should be noted there are a variety of accounts of the founding of the ASG. This study has compiled and outlined those facts which all of the accounts tend to have in common. The hope in this process of data collection is to gain the most accurate accounts of ASG's early development.

contradiction with the actions taken by MNLF (of which Janjalani had been a member) when they agreed to ARMM. This is ironic as Janjalani started as a follower of the MNLF and Misuari. Janjalani was sent to Libya by the MNLF to study at an Islamic university. These Islamic studies were supplemented by active service in the International Islamic Brigade in Afghanistan.<sup>112</sup> Following the end of the Afghan War (1978-1989), Janjalani returned to the Philippines. With his new ideology, his position on issues concerning the Moros in the Philippines presented an alternative to the MNLF's position (independent Islamic state for Mindanao versus an autonomous region still under the control of the Manila government).<sup>113</sup> This alternative set of core beliefs and the framing of those beliefs were a challenge to the MNLF and MILF. It also presented a new base to join for those disaffected by the positions taken by the MNLF or MILF.

In 1989, Janjalani formed a group called the *Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters* (MCFF). This was the predecessor to the Abu Sayyaf Group. The creation of the MCFF allowed Janjalani and his followers to break away from the MNLF. In Mindanao, the MCFF was known as "Janjalani's group." Given that he went by Abu Sayyaf during the Afghan War, his group eventually became known as the Abu Sayyaf

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<sup>112</sup> Mark Turner, "The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf," *Public Organization Review: A Global Journal* 3 (2003): 388. In addition, this connection to the struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan as it gave Janjalani additional education in the process of armed struggle. It also have him additional connection that would help to develop the ASG. Some early ASG members had been or created ties with the *mujahedeen* who fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Alfredo L. Filler, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing Menace to Civil Society," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14, no. 4 (2002): 139-40.

<sup>113</sup> Rommel C. Banlaoi, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism," *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2006): 248.

Group, instead of the MCFF.<sup>114</sup> The initial members of the ASG were sidelined or disaffected MNLF members. Many were former MNLF members who had disagreed with the more pragmatic decision taken by Misuari to negotiate with Aquino for only autonomy and not Moros independence. Consistent with the CPVT model, these were true believers who had belong to the MNLF and they felt the pragmatist within the MNLF had shifted too much away from the original beliefs of the guerrilla movement. The pragmatist had shifted away from the core beliefs as their struggle against the Philippine government stalled. In this instance, the MNLF had less of a power advantage (resource, military/political and social) when compared to the Philippine state. When political access was opened to the MNLF by Aquino, the pragmatist in the MNLF were motivated to shift on their core beliefs and associated frames to accommodate the wishes of the state. This led some of the true believers within the MNLF (Janjalani and his followers) to break away and form the ASG. Some of the disaffected members who joined ASG and became the leadership within the ASG were Ustadz Wahab Akbar and Abdul Ashmad.<sup>115</sup> The rank-and-file of the ASG were generally drawn from “disaffected youth in Basilan and nearby Zamboanga City.” Many were the children of MNLF members who had been killed in the early-armed struggles.<sup>116</sup> Additionally, many young Muslims who were returning from studying Islam in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Libya and

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<sup>114</sup> According to Banlaoi and other similar accounts, Janjalani’s *nom de guerre* was in honor of an Afghan resistance fighter and leader, Professor Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. The exact transliteration of Abu Sayyaf from Arabic to English is “Father of the Swordsman.” Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror*, 100.

<sup>116</sup> Turner, "The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf," 388.

Iraq were drawn to join the ASG.<sup>117</sup> This was in complete contradiction to the membership who made up the MILF and MNLF.<sup>118</sup> Therefore, the ASG provided an alternative armed movement for Moros to join.<sup>119</sup> This is very similar to FARC-EP when one looks at who joined its membership when compared to the other leftist groups in Colombia. Both FARC-EP and ASG seemed – in their formative years – to present an alternative set of beliefs and approaches to addressing the inequity they both saw in their respective states. Yet, FARC-EP was not an offshoot of a previous organization and the ASG was an offshoot. This may be an antecedent condition not accounted for in the CPVT model.

Regardless of ‘why’ individuals joined ASG, once it had been developed by Janjalani and his followers, the guerrilla movement worked against the government and also some civilian targets. Additionally, it gained physical resources (monies and supplies for their armed struggle) through unlawful activities. Under Janjanlani’s leadership, early targets were government targets and Christian targets (particularly religious authority figures) within the Philippines. As can be seen in Table 5.4, the number of incidents perpetrated by the ASG dramatically increased from 1995 (11 incidents) to 1997 (71 incidents). At the same time, the number of individuals killed during these attacks diminished greatly. Following Janjalani’s death, these numbers

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<sup>117</sup> Angel M. Rabasa, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terrorists (the Adelphi Papers 358)* (New York: Routledge Press, 2003), 54.

<sup>118</sup> Frake, "Abu Sayyaf: Displays of Violence and the Proliferation of Contested Identities among Philippine Muslims," 48.

<sup>119</sup> Rabasa, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terrorists (the Adelphi Papers 358)*, 53.

dramatically change. In particular, the incidences become less localized in the Philippines. The first targeting of individuals outside of the Philippines did not occur until after Janjalani's death.<sup>120</sup>

Table 5.4.  
Number of Incidents and Casualties from ASG Attacks<sup>121</sup>

Year	Number of Incidents	Killed	Wounded
1995	11	69	15
1996	66	13	56
1997	71	26	39
1998	20	20	21
1999	37	25	80
2000	66	32	79
2001	41	42	3
Total	312	227	293

Shortly after its founding, the ASG relied on criminal activity to raise funds to move towards the organization's goals of an independent Islamic Mindanao. During the period of 1991 to 2000, it is reported they were involved in 640 kidnappings activities (involving 2,076 victims).<sup>122</sup> Originally, ASG mainly kidnapped local residents. For example, in 1994, ASG kidnapped shipyard owner Ricardo Tong. Because of this action, ASG gained a five million peso ransom. Abu Sayyaf also relied on extortion in these early years under the leadership of Janjalani.<sup>123</sup> In the aftermath of the death of Janjalani, the ASG splintered into a variety of groups who strayed away from the original ideals of

<sup>120</sup> In April 2000, ASG abducted 21 people – ten foreign tourists and eleven resort workers – from an island resort in Malaysia. Filler, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing Menace to Civil Society," 139. These actions and subsequent actions followed the death of Janjalani who was killed in 1998.

<sup>121</sup> This table was recreated from data contained in: Ibid.: 142.

<sup>122</sup> Banlaoi, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism," 249.

<sup>123</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat," 68. A review of the historical development of FARC sees a similar path of development in relying on some criminal activities (i.e., taxes and protection for drug traffickers in the FARC-EP case and kidnapping and extortion in the Abu Sayyaf case) in its earlier years.

the group. This included resorting to the beheading of kidnapped individuals and the greater involvement in criminal activity.

In tracing the development of ASG, one can see that unlike FARC-EP, they resorted to criminal activities to gain physical resources earlier in their development. In this context, one could argue the ASG was a criminal organization from the beginning and therefore, no true transformation has occurred. One could suggest the MNLF was the real guerrilla movement and the ASG was a group of individuals who splintered off to pursue non-revolutionary ideals (e.g., criminal behavior). The only problem with this argument is the ASG had established a core set of beliefs and their early actions as a group were consistent with these ideals. To pursue a free Islamic state, the ASG fought against the Philippine government and religious elites from the Christian community in its very early days. They did pursue criminal activities to fulfill their resource needs, but the focus under Janjalani's leadership was the revolutionary activity. In the aftermath of his death, the group began to splinter into multiple groups. Many of these groups became criminal organizations who were only interested in pursuing economic resources for individual fulfillment. Therefore, the ASG during Janjalani's leadership could be considered a guerrilla movement who was struggling against the state. Yet, without its leader, the organization morphed into something completely different.

#### The Death of a Leader & Its Aftermath

From the late 1980s to 1998, Janjalani lead the ASG as its charismatic figurehead. During this time, he attempted to establish a “[...] highly organized, systematic and

disciplined organization.”<sup>124</sup> The idea was to have a hierarchical guerrilla movement that would have multiple components. Each of these components would be tasked with different activities. This included the conceptualization of an Islamic Executive Council (IEC) and two committees, the Jamiatul Al-Islamia Revolutionary Tabligh Group (fundraising and Islamic education committee) and the Al-Misuaratti Khutbah Committee (propaganda committee). Janjalani also planned to have a military wing for the ASG, Mujahideen Al-Sharifullah.<sup>125</sup> However, this was an unfilled dream of Janjalani as he was killed in December 1998. In the aftermath of his death, the ASG went into disarray and splintered into many different new components.<sup>126</sup> Each of these components had its own new leadership who each had a different idea of what the new ASG should do. In examining the ASG in the aftermath of Janjalani’s death, this chaos made it possible for the former guerrilla movement to transform into something very different. There was a resource power advantage and military/political power advantage for the Philippine government as the conflict stalled in the full-scale warfare period. This created a situation where the ASG needed physical resources and the political system was closed to the guerrilla movement. This may have influenced the decision by pragmatic members to continue to pursue criminal activities in the aftermath of Janjalani’s death. Following his

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<sup>124</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism," 252.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> In examining the development of FARC-EP after Marulanda death, the charismatic nature of Janjalani and Marulanda may have kept FARC-EP and ASG together on a different developmental path. This raises a question: what if these two leaders had not died. Would the current state of FARC-EP and ASG be different? In the case of FARC-EP, there may not have been much different as Marulanda was alive when FARC-EP became involved in greater amounts of criminal activity. The question remains unanswered in the case of the development of the Abu Sayyaf Group.

death, the various groups that formed were based on decisions concerning whether or not to continue these criminal activities. Additionally, decisions were made whether to pursue these activities to further the struggle against the state or create individual benefits for those who belonged to the group. As will be discussed below, ASG today is a name used by many of the various former subgroups of Janjalani's group, but many of them have strayed far away from the original principles and purpose of the movement.

Following Janjalani's death in December 1998, the Abu Sayyaf Group split into multiple factions. The death of Janjanli may have been an intervening variable not accounted for in the CPVT model. Given the ASG was involved in militancy in the full-scale warfare period at the time of his death, this may have stalled future development of the ASG into an organization involved in militancy and politics. This may suggest the actions and life of the charismatic leader of a movement could influence the development of the organization. In the aftermath of his death, ASG lost its direction as a guerrilla movement, stalled in its fight against the government and was at a power disadvantage when compared to the state. The quick degeneration of ASG into new groups controlled by economic pragmatic members (EPMs) or true believers (TBs) may be related directly to the death of their charismatic leader. An example of the ASG-related groups who were lead by EPMs was the group led by Galib Andang (also known as "Commander Robot"). This faction was centered on Jolo Island.<sup>127</sup> Khadaffy Janjalani, the younger brother of

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<sup>127</sup> According to Abuza, Andang was a former bodyguard for Nur Misuari who had "[...] been running a kidnapping racket for years." Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror*, 111.

the founder of ASG, lead another faction based on the island of Basilan.<sup>128</sup> This would be an example of a TB faction. As will be discussed below, Khadaffy attempted to continue the struggle started by his brother. Ahmad Salayudi (also known as, Abu Sabaya) led the largest faction of the ASG following Janjalani's death. Salayudi was killed in June 2002 during a joint operation by the U.S.-Philippine military.

As noted by Abuza, some of these new factions seem to be disconnected from the previous dedication of creation of an Islamic state in the southern Philippines.<sup>129</sup> Some of these various factions of the ASG became involved more in criminal activity and less in struggles against the Philippine government. Some of the new splinters of the ASG found themselves shifting away from the structure and beliefs of the original guerrilla movement. For example, Commander Robot and his faction of the ASG became notorious in the Sipandan Island kidnappings in April 2000. In May 2001, Abu Saya's faction kidnapped 20 hostages from Los Palmas Resort on the Philippine island of Palawan.<sup>130</sup> These types of criminal activities led many individuals to leave Abu Sayyaf. Concerning his reason for leaving, one former ASG member noted: "[I left] because the group lost its original reason for being. The activities were not for Islam but personal gratification. We abducted people not any more for the cause of Islam but for money."<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> For purposes of this study, Khadaffy Janjalani will be referred to as "Khadaffy" and Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani – the founder of ASG – will be referred to as "Janjalani." This is consistent with the usage by other scholars who study ASG.

<sup>129</sup> Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror*.

<sup>130</sup> Turner, "The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf," 389.

<sup>131</sup> Quotation by AS member contained in: Jr. Jose Torres, *Into the Mountain: Hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf* (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 2001), 41.

In recent years, portions of Abu Sayyaf have transformed even more into a criminal organization that has expanded their activities from kidnappings and extortion to include piracy. There is also an attempt by Khadaffy to bring ASG back as a viable rebellious force who continue to fight for Janjalani's original goals for the organization.

As was noted in the previous discussion on FARC-EP, the former guerrilla movement transformed from a unified revolutionary organization into a largely unified criminal organization. ASG seems to have been a former guerrilla movement who broke apart and some of those components have become criminal organizations. This may be related to the difference in the strength of the relationship ties between the various guerrilla movement members. In the case of FARC-EP, the movement has remained intact, yet the economic pragmatic members (EPMs) seem to be directing the organization. On the other hand, the Abu Sayyaf Group's (ASG) former subgroups seem to have disconnected from each other and triggered to a variety of separate new organizations to form. Some of these new organizations have become criminal organizations.

#### Abu Sayyaf Today

The modern Abu Sayyaf Group is far from just a unified criminal organization as some speculate. As stated by Abuza, some members of ASG are only interested in kidnapping-for-ransom activities. Many of these ASG members are in Sulu. Yet, there are "[...] some ASG members [who] continued to uphold the radical Islamist agenda."<sup>132</sup>

Following the death of Abu Sabaya, there was an attempt by Khadaffy Janjalani to

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<sup>132</sup> Banlaoi, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism," 253.

reunify the various factions of ASG. One faction remaining under the control of Commander Robot (Andang) hindered this reunification. This was remedied in December 2003 when Andang was captured.<sup>133</sup> Shortly, thereafter, Khadaffy began to revamp ASG and bring it “[...] back to its roots.”<sup>134</sup> This has resulted in a former guerrilla movement to arise from its fractionalized state to become many different new entities – including criminal groups and a terrorist organization. The Philippine government did not readily recognize this transformation. Evidence of this can be seen in the initial denial by the Philippine government that ASG was responsible for the 2004 bombing of SuperFerry 14, which resulted in the death of 194 people. (This was even after the group took responsibility for this attack.)<sup>135</sup> Each of the new groups tried to refer to them as Abu Sayyaf. The ASG began to exist only in name and not in the previous guerrilla movement form.

In recent years, according to Abuza, the new ASG has begun to shift towards urban warfare and bombing urban areas. At the same time, it appears some members have continued to rely on criminal activities to gain monies. According to some scholars, kidnappings – authorized by the ASG leadership – have ceased.<sup>136</sup> News accounts concerning kidnappings in the Philippines would suggest this previous statement is false.

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<sup>133</sup> In March 2005, he died during an attempted jailbreak. Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror*, 253.

<sup>134</sup> Zachary Abuza, *Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), viii.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

For example, as recently as October 17, 2008, Joed Anthony Pilangga, a 19-year old nursing student of the Ateneo de Zamboanga University, was kidnapped and this activity has been attributed to ASG members.<sup>137</sup> Additionally, some acts of maritime piracy have been credited to ASG members.<sup>138</sup> These different accounts would suggest that there exists an ASG (under those who took over the leadership of Khadaffy after his death in 2006) and collections of ASG members (former or current) who are acting on their own accord. This phenomenon would suggest the former ASG has transformed as the CPVT predicts. This is similar to the previous discussion concerning FARC-EP. This is further confirmed by interviews with former ASG members who suggest the former guerrilla movement has fractionalized again following Khadaffy's death. In this 2007 interview, Abu Khalid (former member of the ASG and cousin of Isnilon Toton Hapilon [also known as, Abu Musab], last remaining commander of ASG) noted "younger men are coming in and acting on their own."<sup>139</sup> This includes in some cases criminal activities, such as piracy and kidnappings.

#### ASG: MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES OF TRANSFORMATION

Having traced the historical development of Abu Sayyaf, this section will examine the mechanisms that led this former guerrilla movement to transform into criminal organizations. Through tracing the interaction of changes in its belief system and the framing of this belief system, the issue of political accessibility and resource

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<sup>137</sup> "Abu Sayyaf Releases Kidnapped Student," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, December 25 2008.

<sup>138</sup> Banlaoi, "Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat," 113.

<sup>139</sup> Marga Ortigas, "Abu Sayyaf Fighters Speak Out," (Doha, Qatar: Al-Jazeera Network, 2007).

needs (physical and human resources), one can see how ASG transformed over time into a fractionalized criminal organization.

#### ASG and Changes to Its Belief System & Associated Frames

In investigating the development of ASG's belief system and the associated framing of those beliefs, one immediately becomes aware of the limited information available. As noted by Banlaoi, "there is still little understanding of [Abu Sayyaf's] exact origin [and] ideological inclination [...]."<sup>140</sup> Yet, if the ideological foundation of ASG was from the beliefs (political and religious) of Janjalani, examining his early writings is a good foundation for this type of analysis.<sup>141</sup> Therefore, the "Four Basic Truths," by Janjalani between 1993 and 1994, may present the greatest insight into the founding belief system and associated frames of ASG. In these "Four Basic Truths," he focuses on three items: the necessity of the creation of ASG; the basic goals of ASG, and the justification for the use of violence to gain these goals. In looking at the two founding documents of FARC-EP, there is great similarity in what is contained. In the undated public proclamation by Janjalani, he outlines the "Four Basic Truths" in the following manner:

1. It is not to create another faction in the Muslim struggle, which is against the teaching of Islam, especially the Quran, but to serve as a bridge and balance between the MILF and MNLF whose revolutionary roles and leadership cannot be ignored or usurped;

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<sup>140</sup> Banlaoi, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism," 247.

<sup>141</sup> Banlaoi and other scholars (such as Nathan Quimpo) suggest the ideological foundation for ASG were derived from the religious and political beliefs of Janjalani. Ibid.: 250. As Quimpo suggest, Janjalani was the leader and ideological head for the ASG. Nathan G. Quimpo, "Dealing with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf: Who's Afraid of an Islamic State?," *Public Policy* 3, no. 4 (1999): 50.

2. Its ultimate goal is the establishment of a purely Islamic government whose “nature, meaning, emblem and objective” are basic to peace;
3. Its advocacy of war is necessity for as long as there exist oppression, injustice, capricious ambitions and arbitrary claims imposed on the Muslims; and,
4. It believes that “war disturbs peace only for the attainment of the true and real objective of humanity – the establishment of justice and righteousness for all under the law of the noble Quran and the purified [S]unnah.”<sup>142</sup>

As can be seen in the above statements, the core beliefs of ASG were it was an organization created to assist the MILF and MNLF in their struggles. In this context, there is a call to unify the Moros people regardless of locality or ideological preference. Additionally, the ultimate goal of the guerrilla movement was to create an Islamic government based on peace.<sup>143</sup> This put them at odds with the Philippine government who wanted to retain the unity of the Philippines. Lastly, he justifies the use of violence as a reaction to an oppressive and unjust system the Moros live within the Philippines. Violence is allowed as a means to creating greater humanity, according to Janjalani. Unlike the study of FARC-EP, there are limited statements by ASG and its leadership from the early 1990s until after the death of Janjalani. Yet, to understand the development of the ASG belief system and its associated frames after Janjalani’s death, one has only to look at the statement made by Janjalani’s brother, Khadafy.

In Banlaoi’s work, *Al-Harakatul Al Islamiyyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group*, Khadafy’s answers to common questions concerning ASG (another name for Al-

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<sup>142</sup> Quoted in: Samuel K. Tan, *Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle* revised ed. (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 2003), 96.

<sup>143</sup> It should be noted that Janjalani does not specify this government be based in a given geographical space, such as Mindanao, Basilan, or Zamboanga City. Instead, he suggests the form of government is more important than the geographical space.

Harakatul Al Islamiyyah) are recorded.<sup>144</sup> In his answers, one can see the further development of the founding belief system of ASG. In addressing the legitimacy of the armed struggle by ASG, Khadafy reaffirms his brother's argument for the use of violence. He suggests the *jihad* (struggle) is legitimate because the actions are in line with the will of God (*Allah*). This is because they fight to eliminate those who believe in anything other than God. Unlike the earlier call by Janjalani for a unified struggle, Khadafy justifies the killing of fellow Muslims because they are framed as not being "true" Muslims. On that issue, he states:

We don't kill MUSLIMS but rather we kill people who claimed themselves to be Muslims. They are called MURTADIN. This kind of people - we see them praying five times a day, performing all Islamic rites, but working with the enemy and with the Shaytan Forces against the Muslims, especially fighting Mujahideen. They submitted themselves to the Shaytan Philippine Government which is not Allah's [government].<sup>145</sup>  
(*Emphasis was in the original writings*)

Additionally, Khadafy justifies the targeting of both civilians and military personnel by stating they are one in the same if the civilians are providing any support to the military.<sup>146</sup> This may suggest the shift towards a terrorist organization or a hybrid terrorist and criminal organization.

In addition to these discussions concerning the use of violence, he also addresses kidnapping. Khadafy notes the use of kidnapping-for-ransom (KFR) activities is not for

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<sup>144</sup> For the full narrative by Khadafy Abu Bakr Janjalani, see, Annex A (pages 65-73) in: Banlaoi's work, *Al-Harakatul Al Islamiyyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group*.

<sup>145</sup> Writings by Khadafy Abu Bakr Janjalani, see, Annex A (pages 65-73) in: Rommel C. Banlaoi, *Al-Harakatul Al Islamiyyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group* (Quezon City, Philippines: Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, 2008), 70.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, 71.

personal gain. He does not deny ASG's participation in these types of activities. Instead, he suggests involvement in KFRs is to fulfill the resource needs of the movement. In comparing actions to statements, one could argue this new version of ASG is using false rhetoric. Additionally, Khadafy justifies the targeting of civilians in these kidnapping activities by stating: "Those whom we kidnapped are clear supporters of our ENEMY (they sympathized and support the PHILIPPINE KUFFAR GOVERNMENT by paying their taxes.)"<sup>147</sup> This is a very similar series of justification used by FARC-EP in explaining their decision to be involved in KFR activities. Resource needs to continue the original struggle and the targeting of those working with the government are the core argument for KFRs used by both ASG (post-Janjalani's leadership) and FARC-EP (during the leadership by Marulanda).

The position taken by ASG on the issue of drug consumption and production – based on the statements by Khadafy – is similar to FARC-EP's position. As noted by Khadafy, accusations that ASG members use drugs are false. He states Islamic law prevents them from consuming drugs and the accusations are meant to "[...] discredit the credibility of [the] mujahideen."<sup>148</sup> As was noted in the previous analysis of FARC-EP statements, FARC-EP also argues the accusations of participation in the drug trade are false and purposely misleading. Yet, Khadafy never speaks about the role ASG plays in

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<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 72.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 73.

Table 5.5  
Beliefs and Associated Frames in the Development of ASG

Time Period	Core Beliefs	Associated Frame
Early 1990s	Unified Struggle	The struggle against the Philippine government should be a unified one including the MNLF and MILF.
	Goal of establishing an Islamic government	The establishment of an Islamic government will bring peace to the people.
	Violent struggle is justified	The use of violence is justified, as it is the only means to peace and justice.
Early 2000s	Struggle ( <i>Jihad</i> ) is permissible.	Under Islamic law, the use of <i>jihad</i> is allowed given the conditions the Moros people face in the Philippines.
	Killing of fellow Muslims is permissible.	If fellow Muslims work with those who oppress the Muslim people, then they can be killed as co-conspirators to destroy the Moros people.
	Targeting of civilians is permissible.	The democratic government is made up of the people. A failure to do anything to help the Moros people is a failure of the people of the Philippines. Therefore, they can be held responsible and targeted by ASG.
	Kidnapping is permissible.	This type of activities is only being allowed because ASG needs to build the resources to continue the struggle now and in the future. ( <i>Note: This only focused on kidnapping. There is no discussion of whether or not maritime piracy is allowed by ASG.</i> )
	Drug consumption is not permissible.	The drug consumption is not allowed under Islamic law. Therefore, ASG members do not consume drugs. ( <i>Note: This only focuses on consumption and not involvement in the drug trade.</i> )

drug production in the Philippines. It has been suggested by scholars of ASG that the organization has been involved in the farming and trafficking of marijuana.<sup>149</sup> This would further suggest during this diminished warfare period of conflict the Khadafy-led ASG faction used false rhetoric to cover up their activities. The group may have started as an attempt to reinvent the original struggles by Janjalani's ASG, but like the other groups, they also degenerated into a criminal organization. Since the death of Khadafy in September 2006, the ASG has not released any new documents that would suggest their

<sup>149</sup> Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror*, 112.

current belief system. Many indications – including from former ASG member – suggest the militant organization has splintered again and only exist in name and not under a single leader.<sup>150</sup>

In comparing the original beliefs and associated frames of ASG to later statements made by Khadafy (see Table 5.4), one can see a persistent couching of all beliefs and their associated frames in an Islamic context. Yet, the call for greater unification of the Moros in the struggle against the Philippine government seems to have shifted. The shift – following Janjalani’s death – suggests some Moros may be targeted if they work with the government. This may suggest MNLF members could be targets given they have worked with the government for a peaceful political solution to the conflict. In addition, in the early years, there was no discussion concerning KFR activities. This is potentially a reflection of the greater need to use these activities to gain resources. As suggested by the CPVT model, a resource power disadvantage may have influenced an even greater need to gain resources. As suggested by the CPVT model, the physical resource needs of ASG may have influenced the inclusion of this issue in the newer beliefs of ASG. Additionally, in the latter statements by both the FARC-EP and ASG, there is less focus on the goals of the struggle and more emphasis on justifying the actions of each group. (The author would contend this is related to the desire to mobilize people behind the actions and not necessarily the cause of each group. This shows a greater use of false rhetoric.)

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<sup>150</sup> Ortigas, "Abu Sayyaf Fighters Speak Out."

## ASG and Political Accessibility to the Philippine Political System

Unlike FARC-EP, the Abu Sanyaf Group has not received invitations to join the government if they lay down their arms. Instead, political accessibility – throughout the historical development of ASG – has been prevented. The Philippine government has chosen instead to work with the other larger guerrilla movements in the region. This includes the Moros National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moros Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). In the case of the MNLF, the Philippine government worked with the organization to develop a peaceful political solution to the struggle between the two entities. This started with the Tripoli Agreement (1976) and ended with the 1996 Final Peace Agreement.<sup>151</sup> In both cases, the agreement allowed the MNLF to become a viable and legitimate governance partner with the Philippine government. In addition, the MILF had initially been in on-going peace negotiations with the Philippine government. In recent years, these peace talks have broken down and armed struggle between the two entities has continued. Yet, linkages between the Philippine government and MILF have continued as the government has attempted to gain MILF's assistance in eliminating ASG.<sup>152</sup> Yet, even as the Philippine government has attempted to bridge the political gap

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<sup>151</sup> For complete text of both agreements, see: "MNLF: Moro National Liberation Front," <http://mnlf.net/>.

<sup>152</sup> For evidence of this linkages, see the following article published on the MILF Central Committee website: MILF Central Committee on Information, "MILF to Sen. Pangilinan: Asg's 'Menace' Is Also Due to Unjust System," (2009), [http://www.luwaran.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=532:milf-to-sen-pangilinan-asgs-menace-is-also-due-to-unjust-system&catid=81:moro-news&Itemid=197](http://www.luwaran.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=532:milf-to-sen-pangilinan-asgs-menace-is-also-due-to-unjust-system&catid=81:moro-news&Itemid=197).

between themselves and the MNLF and MILF, they have not attempted to do the same with the ASG.

#### ASG and Physical and Human Resource Needs

Any examination of the development of ASG finds limited verifiable information concerning their resource needs (monies, arms, and members). Most accounts state donors outside of the Philippines funded the early years of ASG. In particular, there is linkage that has been drawn between al-Qaeda and ASG. Some accounts place ASG as an organization that is beholden to the al-Qaeda network. Other accounts associate these two violent organizations through a series of individuals, including the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. According to Abuza, in 1988, Khalifa was sent to the Philippines by bin Laden. He was to recruit fighters for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.<sup>153</sup> In a 2000 report in the *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, a defector from ASG noted the Philippine branch of Islamic International Relief Organization (IIRO) funneled funds to ASG. This was to buy weapons and to address other logistical needs needed by the group. The ASG defector stated, “Only 10 to 30 percent of the foreign funding goes to the legitimate relief and livelihood projects and the rest go to terrorist operations.”<sup>154</sup> In addition, in its early years, the ASG received funds from Libya (approximately 6 million USD in 1991).<sup>155</sup> In recent years, the ASG physical resource needs has grown, as indicated by Khadafy’s statements concerning kidnappings.

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<sup>153</sup> Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror*, 91-92.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, 93.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, 101.

In addition, defectors of ASG indicate this same phenomenon.<sup>156</sup> According to Rohan Gunaratna, there is limited evidence now that ASG receives any physical resources from any organizations or individuals.<sup>157</sup> This greater need for resources and the shifting to criminal activities (such as KFRs, involvement in drug production and trafficking, extortion, and maritime piracy) is consistent with the modeling of the transformation of guerilla movements into criminal organizations (see CPVT Model in Chapter 3). Criminal activity was used from the early days of ASG. What has changed over time is the increased use of these activities and a shift away from the original struggle.

In addition, in examining the various statistics concerning membership, there is consistency from the founding years of ASG to recent years (early 2000s) concerning human resource needs. From 1996 to 2000, the membership of ASG grew at a fast rate. In those four years, it is estimated they grew at 14 percent every year.<sup>158</sup> This would suggest why in those years they did not need to be worried about creating an organization that would appeal to a larger group of people. Yet, by September 2002, there was an estimated 200 to 400 core fighters in ASG. During those years, more monies were being offered to individuals to join the organization.<sup>159</sup> This may an indication that economic pragmatic members (EPMs) were gaining greater ground inside the organization and

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<sup>156</sup> Ortigas, "Abu Sayyaf Fighters Speak Out."

<sup>157</sup> For more discussion of the current resource needs of ASG, see, Rohan Gunaratna, "The Evolution and Tactics of the Abu Sayyaf Group," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 2001.

<sup>158</sup> Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror*.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.

could dictate the actions to be taken by ASG. Through greater involvement in criminal activities, ASG would have the physical resources to entice more individuals to join the organization and its activities. As of the writing of this work, no current statistics exist concerning ASG membership.

## CONCLUSION

As has been seen in the preceding discussion of FARC-EP and ASG, both organizations began at different periods and based in different historical context. Yet, as indicated in the discussion, there appears to be similar mechanisms and processes occurring that have lead to each guerrilla movement to transform into a criminal organization. As both guerrilla movements have progressed through conflict stage and stalled in their fights against the government, each organization has taken a new trajectory of development. These differences and similarities will be further explored in the conclusion of this overall work, along with comparing the PIRA and ANC from Chapter Six.

The following highlights some issues not modeled in the CPVT model in Chapter 3. First, when comparing the two guerrilla movements, one can see an eclectic group of individuals who then became a highly centralized and unified group involved in criminal activities (FARC-EP). One can see another group (ASG) that started as a relatively homogenous and highly unified and centralized community that then became increasingly fractionalized. In the latter case, factions of the original group then became involved in greater amounts of criminal activities. This may suggest – prior to its transformation – the profile of the membership of the guerrilla movement may influence how it transforms

over time. More in-depth study of both ASG and FARC-EP should be conducted to explore this potential antecedent condition. Second, in both cases, the leadership of the movements seems to have a large impact on the activities of the group and its longevity. In the case of ASG, the death of the founder of the group tended to influence the fractioning of the movement into various independent criminal organizations. In the case of FARC-EP, the death of the founder of the group seems to have led not to greater fractionalization of the organization. Yet, one needs to note the death of Marulanda has occurred recently (when compared to the period of the death of Janjalani) and therefore, fractionalization of FARC-EP may occur in the future. Third, in both cases, each movement seems to be disintegrating in recent years. This may suggest these guerrilla movements transformed into criminal organization, but have continued to transform into no unified organization or movement.

These two important findings may have had an additional impact on the development of each guerrilla movement. Regardless of the future of FARC-EP and ASG, this chapter has presented some evidence the original processes and mechanisms sketched in the CPVT model may be at work. The interaction of these components may be leading these once guerrilla movements to transform into something very different.

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## CHAPTER SIX

### PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY/SINN FEIN (PIRA/SF) & SPEAR OF THE NATION/AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (MK/ANC)

*“The day that grass grows on the H&W [Harland and Wolf] shipyards  
will be the day that all of Ireland is ours.”<sup>1</sup>*

*“Never, never, and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will  
again experience the oppression of one by another.”<sup>2</sup>*

#### INTRODUCTION

In the examination of guerrilla movements throughout the global community, two of the most often researched conflicts are the Troubles of Northern Ireland and the fight to demolish the apartheid system in South Africa. A quick glance at scholarly literature and journalistic accounts of these two conflicts finds a plethora of information. In tracing the development of these two conflicts, one can see a clear series of processes and mechanisms that led the guerrilla movements to transform overtime into viable and legitimate political parties in Northern Ireland and South Africa. In this chapter, the development of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the associated political party of the Irish republican movement, Sinn Fein, will be investigated in detail.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Quote from M's mother concerning the conflict in Northern Ireland (words in brackets added by author). M [pseudonym], interviewed by the author, West Belfast, Northern Ireland, 28 October 2007. M was a former Provisional Sinn Fein Party member who grew up in Belfast during the 1960s and 1970s.

<sup>2</sup> Quote by Nelson Mandela on the day of being sworn as the first African president of South Africa, see, Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 620-21.

<sup>3</sup> Throughout this paper, the Provisional Irish Republican Army will be referred to as PIRA and as the “Provos” in an interchangeable manner. When referring to the Irish Republican Army or IRA, the author is referring to the original IRA or the organization that remained after the splinter in December 1969.

Using archival documents, historical accounts and through interviews with active and former Sinn Fein party members and former PIRA members, this section will explore the mechanisms and processes that have influenced the PIRA and SF to transform from a guerrilla movement with a political wing to a political party who participates in Northern Ireland's political system. As a means of comparison, a more limited examination of the development of *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation or MK) and its related political party, the African National Congress (ANC) is studied and presented in this chapter. In the case of this case study, the information provided is primarily from ANC and MK archives and information from scholars of South Africa and the ANC and MK. Of the four cases presented in this work, the ANC shows development of a guerrilla movement through the conflict stage and post-conflict stage. (As was discussed in Chapter 4, field interviews were not possible as of the writing of this work. Future expansion of this work hopes to include field interviews from South Africa.)


#### CASE STUDY: PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) AND PROVISIONAL SINN FÉIN (PSF)

An overview of the history that led to the conflict in Northern Ireland finds hundreds of years of conflict and turmoil in the isle of Ireland. There are varieties of works that detail this early history. The largest impact of this early history is the historical occupation of Ireland by the British and the establishment of the Scottish planters in Northern Ireland. The historical concerns that led to the partitioning of Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland (often referred to as “the South” or “the Republic”) is a more modern phenomenon beginning in the aftermath of the Easter

Rebellion of 1916. From this rebellion, the original IRA (the predecessor to the Provos) and the original Sinn Féin (the predecessor to the Provisional Sinn Féin) developed and along with it, a new approach to Irish republican ideology.

Even though the development of the PIRA did not begin until 1969, the PIRA was an outgrowth of another guerrilla movement – the IRA. Similarly, the modern day organization known as Sinn Féin (or also known as the Provisional Sinn Féin) was the faction that developed over internal arguments within the original Sinn Féin in the late 1960s. (This is similar to the development of the ASG that was described in Chapter 5). (See Figure 6.1) A variety of studies has traced the development of the IRA and the original Sinn Féin in the past. This study will focus on its successors, the PIRA and PSF.

Figure 6.1  
The Irish Republican Army & the Development of the PIRA



## THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROVISIONALS AND THE “TROUBLES”

A tracing of the development of the Provisionals (i.e., Provisional Sinn Féin and the Provisional Irish Republican Army) starts in 1969 with the schism that developed in the Irish Republican Army and Sinn Féin. The IRA had developed in the aftermath of the 1916 Easter Rebellion in Dublin, Ireland and Arthur Griffith had created Sinn Féin in 1905. Unlike its predecessor, the Provisional IRA's development and eventual transformation was intersected with the development of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), the tragic events of Bloody Sunday in 1972, and the hunger strikes in the 1980s.<sup>4</sup> In examining each of these historical events, it becomes apparent they each indicate who had the power advantage during various stages of the conflict in the North. According to those involved in 'The Troubles,' these events sometimes shifted the balance in power between the guerrilla movement and the state (i.e., the British government). As suggested by the CPVT model, these variations in the power advantage (an antecedent condition) influenced long-term changes in the PIRA and PSF. The Provisionals developed from an organization focused on the violent overthrow of an occupying power to an organization focused on the ballot box and no longer on the Armalite. Due to the opening of political opportunities in Westminster, Stormont and in the local political system of the North, changes in physical and human resource needs and overall changes in the belief systems and associated frames of the Provisionals, a once-

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<sup>4</sup> Each of these events is mentioned herein as they effected the development of the PIRA and PSF, but it should be noted they are addressable in their own right. Numerous works have been done on all of these events and movements.

guerrilla movement has developed into a viable political party in Northern Ireland and Ireland.

#### The Struggles of the late 1960s and 1970s

In understanding and tracing the development of the PIRA and Provisional SF, one has to understand the environment the guerrilla movement and its political counterpart developed in the 1960s. By the mid-1960s, in the North, the Catholic community was attempting to become more assertive in the economic and political arena. In particular, the community was moving towards becoming more involved in the political process of the North. For example, the Northern Nationalist Party (a party representing the Catholic community in the North, which has developed from the Irish Parliamentary Party) entered the Northern Irish Assembly (Stormont) in 1965. This was a great change in policy, as the party had not taken their seats in Stormont since 1930. In addition to the shift towards participation in electoral politics, many organizations formed in the North to address social injustice issues. For example, Con and Patricia McCluckey formed the Campaign for Social Justice. Then, in 1967, the NICRA was formed as an organization to push for greater civil rights in Northern Ireland. A component of this struggle was the adoption of civil disobedience.<sup>5</sup>

In every sphere of life (economic, political and social), Catholics in the North were marginalized.<sup>6</sup> This is important to understand as this marginalization led to

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<sup>5</sup> A significant example of this adoption of a civil disobedience approach was the incident at Caledon.

<sup>6</sup> English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 98-99. Various articles which analyzes the various forms of discriminations that the Catholic community faced in the North can be found throughout social science literature. For example, Christopher Hewitt, "Catholic Grievances, Catholic Nationalism and Violence in Northern Ireland During the Civil Rights Period: A Reconsideration " *The British Journal of*

conflict between the Protestant and Catholic communities and the development of the civil rights movement. In both cases, these situations triggered reactions from and further development of the PIRA.

It should be noted this marginalization was due to a variety of factors. First, ratios of Catholics to Protestants varied from place to place in the North. This led to a misdistribution of goods and services across the Catholic community in Northern Ireland. Catholics in Northern Ireland were 36.8 percent of the population in 1971.<sup>7</sup> Within this population, nine district council areas in the North had Catholic majorities (i.e., over 51 percent of the population). These areas included: Derry, Down, Dungannon, Fermanagh, Limavady, Magherafelt, Newry and Mourne, Omagh, and Strabane.<sup>8</sup> It should be noted the district council areas of Armagh (44.50%) and Cookstown (49.20%) had Catholic communities that were nearly half of the population in those areas in 1971.<sup>9</sup> In response to these disparities, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), the Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland (CSJNI), the Derry Citizens' Action Committee (DCAC) and the People's Democracy (PD) became a unified civil rights movement in the North.

As the civil rights movement grew, loyalist organizations began to respond and as these responses against the Catholic community became more violent, the call for IRA

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*Sociology* 32, no. 2 (1981), Denis O'Hearn, "Catholic Grievances, Catholic Nationalism: A Comment," *The British Journal of Sociology* 34, no. 3 (1983).

<sup>7</sup> Data was drawn from : Paul Compton, *Northern Ireland: A Census Atlas* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1978).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

response grew. In the midst of this call for greater civil rights, some republican movement participants argued at the time, they “[d]id not even know what the word democracy or civil rights meant.”<sup>10</sup> The Protestant loyalist of the North – according to English – “[...] had occasioned deep anxiety among many northern Protestants that their state was under attack [...]”<sup>11</sup> These perceptions were important. It led a segment of the Protestant population to seek the formation of organizations to defend themselves from this perceived threat. In 1966, Augustus “Gusty” Spence founded the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).<sup>12</sup> With the UVF formed and movements by extremist in both the Protestant community and the Catholic community growing, it was just a matter of time before the British government became involved. As battles between the IRA and the UVF grew and tension and conflict increased rapidly between the Catholic and Protestant communities in the North, Westminster still hoped to have not to intervene. This can be seen in a statement offered Home Secretary James Callaghan at the time of the growing violence in the North: “In London we were debating whether we should intervene, but hoping and praying that we would not have to.”<sup>13</sup> As greater violence grew in cities in the North – for example, Belfast and Derry, the British government eventually sent military troops. The beginning of a 36-year struggle (1969 to the decommissioning of the PIRA in 2005) between the British and the Provos had begun. The sending of British

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<sup>10</sup> M [pseudonym], interviewed by the author, West Belfast, Northern Ireland, 27 October 2007.

<sup>11</sup> English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 96.

<sup>12</sup> Coogan, *The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal 1966-1996 and the Search for Peace*, 58, "Augustus (Gusty) Spence," in *Conflict in Northern Ireland: An Encyclopedia* ed. Sydney Elliot and William D. Flackes (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1999).

<sup>13</sup> James Callaghan, *A House Divided: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland* (London: Williams Collins, 1973), 15.

military troops can be seen as the beginning of the conflict. More specifically, this is the limited warfare period of the conflict in Northern Ireland. The behavior of the PIRA and PSF during this period can be termed as militancy.

#### The Bloody Events of the 1970s & 1980s


With the development of loyalist paramilitaries, the Provos, and the introduction of British military troops into Northern Ireland, the 1970s and 1980s would become one of the bloodiest eras in the struggles of Northern Ireland. This is the full-scale warfare period illustrated in Figure 6.1. The deaths from the conflict in the North – as can be seen in Figure 6.1 – exponentially grew from the late 1960s through the 1970s. According to data collected by Malcolm Sutton, 59 percent of the deaths that transpired from 1969 to 2001 occurred in the decade of the 1970s.<sup>14</sup> As illustrated in Figure 6.1, there were a limited number of deaths in the early days of “The Troubles.” This changed rapidly as the conflict intensified. Most of the deaths from 1969 to 2001 were the result of republican and loyalist activities.<sup>15</sup> As the British troops were stationed in the North

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<sup>14</sup> The data presented on the deaths during the Troubles can be found online at the CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet) Web Service, an online database of information concerning the conflict in Northern Ireland. The service was originally founded by the University of Ulster, Queen’s University of Belfast, and the Linen Library in Belfast. (It is additionally funded by INCORE (International Conflict Research), and ARK (Northern Ireland Social and Political Archive). The database is combination of data collected by Malcolm Sutton and published as a book in 1994 and updated information from Sutton and Martin Melaugh. For the originally data from 1969 to 1994, see, Malcolm Sutton, *Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland: 1969-1993* (Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications, 1994). For the complete data set from 1969 to 2009, see, Malcolm Sutton and Martin Melaugh, "An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland," (CAIN Web Service (Conflict Archive on the Internet), 2009).

<sup>15</sup> In examining data collected by Sutton, one can see most of the deaths were a result of republican activities (2057 deaths were attributed to the republican paramilitaries). Loyalist paramilitaries’ activities caused the second largest portion of deaths from 1969 to 2001 (1019 deaths). The data also reveals that of the 2057 deaths attributed to republican paramilitary activities, 1708 deaths can be credited to the Provos (in Sutton’s data he labels the guerrilla movement as the Irish Republican Army and separates out the activities by those who stayed with the original IRA [called Official IRA] in the dataset.) See, Sutton and Melaugh, "An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland."

Figure 6.2 – Deaths Due to “The Troubles” (1969 to 2001)



in the late 1960s, they became the central target of the Provos. This can be seen in the data collected on those who were killed from 1969 to 2001 and who were responsible for the deaths. As can be seen in Table 6.1, the largest group killed by the Provos was British military troops followed by civilians. Alternatively, civilians were the largest group of people killed by the British Army followed by members of the various republican paramilitaries. (These numbers do not include those groups of people killed by the Royal Ulster Constabulary [RUC]). This is important as the RUC was often dominated by Protestants linked to loyalist ideology and is seen by many scholars of the Troubles as an indirect arm of the British Army. The significance of the increased conflict between the Provos and the British Army in the 1970s had multiple impacts on the development of the Provos. In the case of gaining greater human resources, the conflict influenced more people from the Catholic community to side with the Irish instead of the British.<sup>16</sup> This gave an advantage to the PIRA in regards to a social power advantage. The actions of the British military pushed more individuals to give support to

<sup>16</sup> English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 134.

the social arguments put forth by the guerrilla movement. This would have a later effect on the human resource needs of the movement. The impact of the British government and its army in the North on the development of the Provos' recruitment was noted

Table 6.1 – Deaths Caused by the PIRA & British Army (1969-2001) <sup>17</sup>

	Provisional IRA	British Army
Civilian Deaths	516	151
British Army Deaths	1013	9
Republican Paramilitary Deaths	140	125
Loyalist Paramilitary Deaths	32	12
Irish Security Services Deaths	7	0

by Seán MacStiofáin, the first Chief of Staff of the PIRA in the following manner: “It has been said that most revolutions are not caused by revolutionaries in the first place, but by the stupidity and brutality of governments. Well, you had that to start with in the north all right.”<sup>18</sup> Even though the British government did not retain a social power advantage when compared to the PIRA, they retained a significant military/political power advantage when compared to the PIRA. This allowed them to dictate later the manner in which the guerrilla movement gain accessibility to the British and Northern Ireland political system.

As noted by participants and scholars, alike, about the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the events of Bloody Sunday was a major turning point early in the conflict.<sup>19</sup> As

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<sup>17</sup> The data contained in this chart was gained from: Sutton and Melaugh, "An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland."

<sup>18</sup> Seán MacStiofáin, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary* (Edinburgh: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975), 115.

<sup>19</sup> Due to limitations of time and space, a detailed account of the incident of Bloody Sunday is not recounted in this work. At this event, fourteen individuals were killed during an encounter between British military troops and Irish civil rights marchers in the Bogside area of Derry (Londonderry), Northern Ireland. Following this incident, the British government (Widgery report) launched an investigation that held that the British soldiers were justified in their actions. This was because they came under attack but not by those who were shot and killed. For a more detailed account of the events of Bloody Sunday, see:

noted by Laurence McKeown, two major events had the most impact in the development of conflict in the North and development of the PIRA and SF. These were the events of Bloody Sunday and the hunger strikes of the early 1980s.<sup>20</sup> The significance of Bloody Sunday in the development of the Provos was further recognized by another figure in the Troubles, Patrick Magee.<sup>21</sup> The events of this day made it more apparent that a political solution for the Troubles was less likely than ever before in the history of the conflict.<sup>22</sup> This event stalled the struggle between the PIRA/SF and the British and Northern Ireland governments during the full-scale warfare period. Additionally, the aftermath of Bloody Sunday had an impact on the development of the republican movement. As noted by McKeown, the failure of the British government to sanction those involved in the events of Bloody Sunday were just as hurtful, if not more, as incident itself.<sup>23</sup>

Events, like Bloody Sunday, may have led to a lack of confidence – among the members and leaders of the PIRA – in a political approach. As noted by Councillor Francie Molloy, Deputy Speaker and Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) for Mid-Ulster in the Northern Ireland Assembly (Stormont) and Sinn Féin party member,

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Peter Pringle and Philip Jacobson, *Those Are Real Bullets: Bloody Sunday, Derry, 1972* (New York: Grove Press, 2002), & Don Mullan and John Scally, eds., *Bloody Sunday: Massacre in Northern Ireland, the Eyewitness Accounts* (Lanham, MD: Roberts Rinehart, 1997).

<sup>20</sup> Dr. Laurence McKeown, interviewed by the author, West Belfast, Northern Ireland, 1 November 2007.

<sup>21</sup> Patrick Magee, *Gangsters or Guerrillas? Representations of Irish Republicans in 'Troubles Fiction'* (Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications, 2001), 65.

<sup>22</sup> English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 151.

<sup>23</sup> McKeown noted to the author, “[t]he Queen practically blessed them,” referring to the lack of accountability for the British soldiers involved in the Bloody Sunday Massacre. Dr. Laurence McKeown, interviewed by the author, West Belfast, Northern Ireland, 1 November 2007.

the republican movement stayed away from the political process for many years. This may have been because of a:

“[...] lack of confidence in the political process to be able to deliver. [...] All along there was a lack of confidence that the normal political process could actually change because of the amount of change [it] needed to happen and it was not going to be delivered by normal constitutional politics. And so the armed struggle had to clear the way for the political struggle to begin.”<sup>24</sup>

Even though there were secret meetings occurring between segments of the PIRA and the British government, continued armed struggle seem to limit greater political accessibility.<sup>25</sup> This meant a shift away from political accessibility for the PIRA, yet greater support for their actions (i.e., gain of human resources). This barricade to political accessibility grew as the policies of the British concerning Irish republican paramilitary prisoners (including the Provos) shifted dramatically in 1976.<sup>26</sup> The British government limited the potential for political accessibility. Given their military/political power advantage during this period of the conflict, the British could determine the political accessibility that would be provided to the PIRA and SF.

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<sup>24</sup> Malloy, according to the official Sinn Féin website, has been deeply involved in the republican movement since its civil rights days in the 1960s. Further, “[d]uring the 1981 Hunger Strike Francie was Director of Elections for Bobby Sands and Owen Carron, both of whom won a Westminster seat in Fermanagh/South Tyrone. [...] Francie is a member of Sinn Féin’s Ard Chomhairle (National Executive) and the party’s negotiations team.” Councillor Francie Malloy, MLA, interviewed by the author, Northern Ireland Assembly, Sinn Féin party offices; Stormont, Northern Ireland, 6 November 2007.

<sup>25</sup> David Beresford, *Ten Men Dead: The Story of the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987), 24. Additionally, in 1975, the Army Council of the PIRA issued a communiqué, noting a temporary cease-fire agreement between the British government and the PIRA. See, “Easter Statement 1975: From Leadership of the Republican Movement,” (Belfast, Northern Ireland: Housed in the Northern Ireland Political Collection; Linen Library, 1975).

<sup>26</sup> For detailed account of the shift from “special category status” for some Irish republican paramilitary prisoners to the labeling of them as “criminals,” see: Beresford, *Ten Men Dead: The Story of the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike*, 13-16.

In the midst of greater barriers to political accessibility, there was a rise to power of the future leader of Sinn Féin, Gerry Adams. Adams rose to become Provo's adjutant general by 1977. Adams was very critical of the 1974-1975 cease-fire between the IRA and the British military. He noted that – at the time – that “[...] there would be no more cease-fires, no repeat of the disaster of 1974-75.”<sup>27</sup> In 1978, according to Moloney, Adams became the PIRA's Chief of Staff.<sup>28</sup> As the Provos developed, Adams would become the de facto leader of the republican movement. This would be significant in the development of the PIRA and SF. As noted by McKeown, one of the significant influences on the transformation of the republican movement was due to Adams and his charismatic leadership.<sup>29</sup> Under his early leadership, the PIRA and SF tended to be dominated by the leadership of the true believers from the original IRA.

The blanket protest, dirty protest, and hunger strikes marked the end of the full-scale warfare period. In the aftermath of this period, the PIRA and SF would find themselves being transformed by shifts in power advantages. According to Tom Hartley of Sinn Féin, “[t]he hunger strike *is* a watershed” in the development of the Irish republican movement and the struggles in the North.<sup>30</sup> In 1976, the British government

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<sup>27</sup> Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 169.

<sup>28</sup> He eventually lost that important position within the Provos on February 18, 1978. This was seventy-eight days following his appointment to the position. The contention is he lost the position because of the bombing of the La Mon House hotel in 1978 that led to the death of 12 individuals – all Protestants, but seven were women. He was arrested shortly after the bombing and was replaced by Martin McGuinness, as COS for the Provos. After he was released – following his case being dismissed, Adams became the Northern commander for PIRA and he ran the daily operations of the Provos in the North. *Ibid.*, 172-73.

<sup>29</sup> Dr. Laurence McKeown, interviewed by the author, West Belfast, Northern Ireland, 1 November 2007. A similar comment was also made by Dr. Richard English, Professor of Politics, Queen's University Belfast, to the author in October 2007, in Belfast, Northern Ireland.

withdrew their special category status that was previously given to Irish republican prisoners. This label was akin to a de facto prisoner-of-war status given to those interned or imprisoned at Long Kesh.<sup>31</sup> Following March 1976, any republican prisoners convicted were required to wear prison uniforms and therefore, be labeled as criminals. In an act of defiance against the labeling of their struggle as criminal behavior (and not a struggle against occupation), the prisoners refused to wear the uniforms. They instead wore only their blankets and thus, the “blanket protest” began. By April 1978, the blanket protest had progressed to the “no-wash protest” and later, the “dirty protest.”<sup>32</sup>

In October 1980, these protest escalated into seven republican prisoners beginning a hunger strike. This first hunger strike ended in December 1980 after confusion over whether the prison officials had made some concessions. The prisoners had been protesting to gain back their special category status.<sup>33</sup> Following the failure of the first hunger strikes, another hunger strike began on March 1, 1981. This hunger strike would lead to the death of ten men (from May 5 to August 20) – Bobby Sands, Francis Hughes, Raymond McCreech, Patsy O’Hara (member of the Irish National Liberation Army or INLA), Joe McDonnell, Martin Hurson, Kevin Lynch (INLA), Kieran Doherty, Tom McElwee, and Michael Divine (INLA).<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Quote in English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 203.

<sup>31</sup> Kevin Toolis, *Rebel Hearts: Journeys within the IRA's Soul* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 137.

<sup>32</sup> The “no-wash” protest began when prison officials refused to give prisoners a second towel to wash themselves. This protest “[...] escalated into the ‘dirty protest’ where IRA prisoners refused to leave their cells, and urinated and defecated in them.” *Ibid.*, 137-38.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 139-40.

According to McKeown, the hunger strikes and overall prison experience of the 1980s were significant in the development and transformation of the republican movement for two main reasons. It had impact on the inside of the prison, which would influence the transformation of belief systems and their associated frames. Furthermore, the hunger strikes had an impact on the outside in gaining more sympathy for the struggles of the Provos and wider republican movement in the North. A resource power advantage grew for the PIRA and SF in the aftermath of the hunger strikes. On the inside of Long Kesh, the hunger strike leveled everyone to the same level. “There is no real command structure as such[...] there was someone in charge” but they just directed some of the daily activities.<sup>35</sup> Additionally, education occurred within the prisons and with it, a great deal of introspection. As noted by McKeown, “[s]tripped of that other stuff and denied of that other stuff, you have to look within yourself and what you are about [...] there was a process for them [republican prisoners] to look critically what they were involved in.”<sup>36</sup> One major epiphany from the hunger strike era and the prison experience was the need to work from the inside of the government system and not just try to effect change from the outside. According to one former Provos member, this tactic found its way into the modern approach to politics in Northern Ireland.<sup>37</sup> Later, this education

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<sup>34</sup> In addition to the ten men who died during the 1981 hunger strikes in Long Kesh, thirteen additional prisoners began the hunger strike yet survived. They generally were taken off of the hunger strike by their family members or they were taken off because of a medical condition (e.g., obstructed kidney). These individuals included the following: Brendan McLaughlin, Paddy Quinn, Laurence McKeown, Pat McGeown, Matt Devlin, Liam McCloskey, Patrick Sheehan, Jackie McMullan, Bernard Fox, Hugh Carville, John Pickering, Gerard Hodgkins, and James Devine.

<sup>35</sup> Dr. Laurence McKeown, interviewed by the author, West Belfast, Northern Ireland, 1 November 2007.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

within the prison may have influenced which subgroup each individual coalesced towards within the PIRA and SF.

Furthermore, the hunger strikes had an impact on the world outside of Long Kesh. Various political leaders began to mention the hunger strikes in their speeches to the international community. For example, Fidel Castro mentioned the hunger strikes in his speech at the United Nations opening ceremonies (1981). Dockworkers refused to load ships at some ports in the U.S. in support of the hunger strikes. Additionally, sympathy hunger strikes developed among Palestinian prisoners in Israel and among the political prisoners of the apartheid regime in South Africa. As suggested by McKeown, the movement for support of the hunger strikers developed into “[m]anifestations of support worldwide as a struggle against the Empire [British]. These people [supporters and sympathizers] had suffered under the Empire or some other empire.”<sup>38</sup>

Because of the prison experience during the late 1970s and 1980s, reorganization of the republican movement and the development of a different type of struggle occurred. The future leadership of the republican movement (the Provos and Sinn Féin) had been imprisoned. Martin McGuinness had been imprisoned in the Republic of Ireland because of his membership in the PIRA. Gerry Adams, Brendan Hughes and Ivor Bell had been

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<sup>37</sup> J [pseudonym], interviewed by the author, West Belfast, Northern Ireland, 2 November 2007. J was a former republican political prisoner who was involved in Irish republican activity prior to his detention. He grew up in Derry (Londonderry) during the 1960s and 1970s. It should be noted even though he noted the ‘inside approach’ was something always intended to be used by the Provos and Sinn Féin (SF), he was not happy with the new approach to politics being used by SF.

<sup>38</sup> Dr. Laurence McKeown, interviewed by the author, West Belfast, Northern Ireland, 1 November 2007.

imprisoned in Long Kesh before the construction of the H-block.<sup>39</sup> As noted by McKeown, Gerry Adams coming out of jail catapulted the republican movement forward.<sup>40</sup> In the aftermath of the death of Bobby Sands (5 May 1981), Sinn Féin held an annual party conference (*ard fheis*) in November 1981. It was at this meeting that the party adopted a dual strategy (political struggle and armed struggle). Danny Morrison -- SF's director of publicity -- presented this strategy at the *ard fheis* in the following manner: "will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in this hand, we take power in Ireland?"<sup>41</sup> From this statement came the famous 'Armalite and ballot box' strategy that became the new approach to the struggles in the North. A new era in the development of both the Provos and Sinn Féin began. As the conflict began to shift into the diminished warfare period of the conflict, the PIRA and SF began to adopt a dual strategy of militancy and politics.

#### The Change in Approaches by the Provos and Sinn Féin

As noted by Eamon MacManis, Press Secretary for Sinn Féin at Stormont, "[p]eople knew as far back as the 1980s and 1970s and from the prison struggle that the

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<sup>39</sup> Richard Bourke, *Peace in Ireland: The War of Ideas* (London: Pimlico, 2003), 154-55. McGuinness was elected in 1997 as the MP for Mid-Ulster in the British parliament (Westminister). Additionally, he currently serves as the Deputy First Minister for the Northern Ireland Assembly. He is also the Chief Negotiator of Sinn Féin. Adams was elected in 1997 as the MP for West Belfast in Westminister. He currently serves as the President of Sinn Féin. Ivor Bell was allegedly the Chief of Staff for the Provos from 1982 to 1983. He was eventually rejected as a Provos member when he publically opposed the dual 'Armalite and the ballot box' approach. Hughes served as the Officer Commanding (OC) of H-block during the hunger strikes until he stepped down to allow Bobby Sands to serve as OC. Eventually, he became a dissenter of the political approach used in the modern era of Irish republican politics in the North.

<sup>40</sup> Dr. Laurence McKeown, interviewed by the author, West Belfast, Northern Ireland, 1 November 2007.

<sup>41</sup> Quote by Danny Morrison in Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, *The Provisional IRA* (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1987), 301.

war could not be won [in] an armed way or on an armed basis.”<sup>42</sup> This shows that the republican movement recognized the British government had a military/political advantage in the 1970s and 1980s. Therefore, a shift in beliefs may have been influenced by this antecedent condition. Empowering people to work through their local governments was a “[...] huge tool, a huge weapon.”<sup>43</sup> This position is further supported by a document published by the Provos in 1970 where they stated, “[a]rmed struggle must be linked with, must be integrated with all other forms of struggle. [...] We have realized that armed struggle on its own, or as an end in itself, is doomed to failure.”<sup>44</sup> The 1980s and early 1990s saw a continuance of armed struggle but also the future development of another Provos and SF weapon – political participation.

In the aftermath of the bloody events of the 1970s and the hunger strikes in the early 1980s, the republican movement had began to focus more on a political process as an alternative approach. Some argue this early argument for an electoral approach to the struggles got its start in the electoral success of Bobby Sands in gaining a MP seat in Westminster in 1981.<sup>45</sup> Charles Haughey, Taoiseach (Prime Minister of the Republic of

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<sup>42</sup> Eamon MacManis, interviewed by the author, Offices of Sinn Féin, Northern Ireland Assembly, Northern Ireland, 6 November 2007.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> *The I.R.A Speaks*, (Dublin: National Book Service, 1970). [Housed in the Northern Ireland Political Collection; Linen Library, Belfast, Northern Ireland]

<sup>45</sup> On March 5, 1981, Frank Maguire – an independent who represented the constituency of Fermanagh-South Tyrone in the British House of Commons – died. A by-election was held to fill the seat. Sinn Féin’s Executive Committee met shortly after Maguire’s death and decided to see if Bobby Sands would run for the seat. Sands had begun his hunger strike a few days prior to this decision being made. A few days after the meeting, Gerry Adams, Jim Gibney, David O’Connell, and Ruairí Ó Brádaigh publically supported the decision for Sands’ candidacy. On April 9, 1981, Sands beat Harry West – former leader of the Ulster Unionist Party. Sands died shortly thereafter on hunger strike – May 5, 1981. For more detail, see, Bourke, *Peace in Ireland: The War of Ideas*, 149.

Ireland's parliament), requested that elections be held in June 1981. Under the auspices of the National H-Block/Armagh Committee and with support from the Provisional Sinn Féin, nine republican prisoners ran for seats in the Irish parliament. Kiernan Doherty and Paddy Agnew won seats in the election.<sup>46</sup> As a sign of the growing political power of SF in the North, in the 1983 Westminster elections, SF was able to gain 43 percent of the nationalist vote in Northern Ireland.<sup>47</sup> Yet, the republican movement continued to hold onto the 'Armalite and ballot box' strategy. This was even as the extreme violence of the 1980s by the Provos was affecting public support for the strategy.<sup>48</sup> This was particularly true when civilians were killed. As suggested by those involved in the struggle, many noted to their fellow members, when civilians were killed that it would be counter-productive to the movement.<sup>49</sup> To garner greater support in the Republic, SF held an *ard fheis* in 1986 and voted to abandon their policy of abstention from serving in the South (Leinster). They retained the policy to abstain from taking their gained seats in either the North or Westminster. The transformation of SF from a political wing of an armed movement towards a legitimate political party began in 1986. The change was not without casualties. Ruairi O'Bradaigh and Daithi O'Connell walked out of the *ard fheis* and created a new SF – the Republican Sinn Féin. (This splinter eventually also resulted

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 150-51.

<sup>47</sup> Peter Shirlow and Mark McGovern, "Language, Discourse and Dialogue: Sinn Fein and the Irish Peace Process," *Political Geography* 17, no. 2 (1998): 171.

<sup>48</sup> In the mid-1980s, SF was eventually only able to retain a core 10-13 percent of the voters within the North's nationalist community. For more discussions of the problem, see, Henry Patterson, *The Politics of Illusion: Republicanism and Socialism in Modern Ireland* (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989).

<sup>49</sup> M [pseudonym], interviewed by the author, West Belfast, Northern Ireland, 28 October 2007.

in the formation of the 'Real IRA.')<sup>50</sup> As later observed by Gerry Adams, “[o]ur struggle, faced with the armed forces of the imperial power, had limited itself for long periods to an almost exclusively military perspective and failed to build a political alternative.”<sup>51</sup> This shift in beliefs and associated frames and its connection to the antecedent condition is consistent with the modeling proposed in the CPVT model. In deciding to become involved as seated members of Leinster, Sinn Féin had begun to build that political alternative and started to become the dominant player of the Irish republican movement.

#### A Lasting Peace in Northern Ireland?

In the aftermath of the hunger strikes and with the growth in support for SF and “[...] the growing knowledge that the PIRA could not be defeated militarily [...],” the British government and the Republic’s government began to work together in the mid-1980s. This was not a concession by the British government. There was recognition the British government could continue to fight the PIRA, but they may never decisively defeat the movement. Since the state had a military/political advantage, it was better for them to approach the PIRA and SF with the potential for political accessibility. This would allow the Republic, the British government, and the Northern Ireland government to determine how the guerrilla movement could enter the government.

John Hume, leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) – the largest nationalist party in the North in the 1980s, worked with Margaret Thatcher, Prime

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<sup>50</sup> Ian McAllister, “the Armalite and the Ballot Box’: Sinn Fein’s Electoral Strategy in Northern Ireland,” *Electoral Studies* 23, no. 1 (2004): 128.

<sup>51</sup> Gerry Adams, *Before the Dawn: An Autobiography* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1997), 318.

Minister of the UK, and the Republic of Ireland's Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald to construct an agreement.<sup>52</sup> From this collaboration, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed in 1985. This agreement did many things to prevent further human resource gains by the Provos and Sinn Féin. Primarily, the agreement worked to prevent those who would use violence from becoming involved in the political process. This would potentially marginalize the true believers (TBs) within the PIRA and SF who wanted to maintain the struggle. It also would encourage more pragmatist members (PMs), who were in favor of a political solution, views to direct the guerrilla movement. It allowed for the creation of an intergovernmental conference between the governments of the Republic and the U.K. to address concerns in the North. It also suggested the future possibility of reversing the rule of the British in the North and the devolution of power.<sup>53</sup> Yet, it would limit the involvement of the Provos and other paramilitaries in the North (e.g., Ulster Defence Association and Ulster Volunteer Force) in the political process.<sup>54</sup> By the time of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, Munck argues the new agreement opened political accessibility in the Republic's political system. This was important in the development of SF as it steered its course towards a more political approach. This was influenced due to the Anglo-Irish Agreement and "[...] with the stagnation of both the

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<sup>52</sup> Paige Whaley Eager, *From Freedom Fighters to Terrorists: Women and Political Violence* (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008), 57.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Shirlow and McGovern, "Language, Discourse and Dialogue: Sinn Fein and the Irish Peace Process," 175.

PIRA's military and SF's political campaign by the late 1980's [.]”<sup>55</sup> In addition to this slight opening in political accessibility, the republican movement saw support amongst the nationalist community of the North for the military struggle began to evaporate. This has an increasing impact on SF's electoral successes. Human resource needs were growing and only a new approach may have addressed this problem.

The continuance of the armed struggle was not going to result in peace or the achievement of other states core beliefs and goals. In continuing to use the dual strategy of armed conflict and electoral participation, the violence was potentially eroding the support for the Provos' and SF's behavior.<sup>56</sup> An example of this can be seen in the decrease in electoral support for SF in both the Northern Ireland Assembly (NIA) elections and the United Kingdom's general election. In 1982, SF garnered 10.1 percent of the vote in the NIA elections. By 1985, SF's electoral success jumped to 11.8 percent in the NIA elections, yet, by 1989, SF's electoral success in Stormont decreased slightly to 11.2 percent. Additionally, in the Westminster elections of 1983, SF gained 13.4 percent of the vote, but by 1987, this support had eroded to 11.4 percent.<sup>57</sup> All of these conditions led to a rethinking of the 'dual strategy' and the decision to work with the other nationalist parties in the North.

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<sup>55</sup> Ronnie Munck, "Irish Republicanism: Containment or New Departure?," in *Terrorism's Laboratory: The Case of Northern Ireland*, ed. Alan O'Day (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1992).

<sup>56</sup> For more discussion of this phenomenon, see, M. McClelland and C. Dowd, "British Strategy in Northern Ireland," *Starry Plough* 1992, 10-17.

<sup>57</sup> Cornelius O'Leary, Sydney Elliott, and R.A. Wilford, *The Northern Ireland Assembly 1982-1986: A Constitutional Experiment* (London: C.Hurst and Company, 1988), Appendix B.

## A Meeting of the Minds and the Future of the Conflict

As the 1990s progressed in Northern Ireland, the violence between the British military forces, the Provos and Protestant paramilitary groups continued. In the background, the leaders of the republican movement were beginning to move towards a greater unification of the nationalist community in the North. One of the most significant events that transpired from this event was meetings between John Hume, leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) in the North, and Gerry Adams, as the leader of Sinn Féin. Adams and Hume had been secretly meeting between 1988 and 1993. In the 1988 meetings, the leaders (Gerry Adams, Tom Hartley, Danny Morrison, and Mitchel McLaughlin from SF and John Hume, Seamus Mallon, Sean Farren, and Austin Currie from SDLP) of both sides of the nationalist meet but no final agreements were reached between the two sides. Hume retained throughout all of the talks, his disdain for the Provos' use of violence to achieve their goals of a unified Ireland.<sup>58</sup> Even though these talks were kept from the public, the British government and the Republic's government were very aware of the ongoing meetings between the two parties.

Even as the meetings progressed, violence continued in the North. Militancy and politics persisted together. A PIRA bomb exploded on November 8, 1987 (Remembrance Day), in Enniskillen, Northern Ireland. In this bombing (also known as the Poppy Day Massacre), 11 Protestants were killed and 63 individuals were injured.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 264. It should be noted that on one occasion the Provos attacked Hume and his family.

<sup>59</sup> Later, the Provos issued a statement apologizing for the innocent people who were killed in the bombing. They claimed the bomb was meant for British military forces in the area that day. This bombing was seen

Additionally, during the time of the meetings between Hume and Adams, further sectarian violence and violence between the Provos and the British military and government persisted – including the killing of Conservative MP Ian Gow in Sussex, England by the IRA (1990) and the killing of Pat Finucane, a solicitor in Belfast who was killed by loyalist.<sup>60</sup> Yet, steps towards a solution to the conflict continued. By 1990, the British government saw an opportunity to approach members of the republican movement about moving away from violence and towards political participation. In October 1990, Michael Oatley – a British representative – met with Martin McGuinness.<sup>61</sup> British intelligence suggested that there were some inside of the republican movement who wanted to move away from armed conflict and towards to peaceful settlement.<sup>62</sup> Yet, even as a more political approach to solving the troubles of the North was being sought, Adams and others continued to frame the armed struggle as a necessity:

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as a major error by the Provos as it made the war in the North about sectarianism and not about a liberation struggle, according to English. For more discussion of this issue, see, *Ibid.*, 254-56.

<sup>60</sup> Both of these killings had impact on the conflict due to the importance of these figures to those involved in the conflict. In the case of Gow, he was a close friend and confidant of Margaret Thatcher and served as her parliamentary private secretary from 1979 to 1983. He had advised Thatcher on Irish policy and later resigned over the Anglo-Irish Agreement. For a discussion concerning Gow's resignation over the Anglo-Irish Agreement, see, "On This Day, 15 November: 1985: Anglo-Irish Agreement Signed," *BBC News* (2008), [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/15/newsid\\_2539000/2539849.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/15/newsid_2539000/2539849.stm). Pat Finucane was a solicitor in the North and had successfully challenge many important human right cases against the British government. He had represented Bobby Sands and many other hunger strikers who died in 1981. His family was connected to the republican movement in a multitude of ways. His killing was controversial because of the connection between those who killed him and the security services in the North. See, ———, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 267. A detailed discussion of Finucane and the aftermath can be seen in: Toolis, *Rebel Hearts: Journeys within the Ira's Soul*, 84-191.

<sup>61</sup> This is very consistent with the CPVT modeling of guerrilla movements transforming into political parties. The development of the connection between the GM and a member of the state or occupying power is instrumental in the future transformation of the GM. See Chapter 3, pages 75-81, for more discussion of the development of this connection.

<sup>62</sup> English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 267. & Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 406.

“[W] here you have an occupation force, Sinn Féin believes, whether it be here or South Africa, that people have the right to engage in armed resistance. That is our political opinion. [...] The Sinn Féin position is that, when you have the conditions for conflict, how you end the conflict is to change the conditions. [...] The nineties is the decade in which peace can be agreed and we can start building a future.”<sup>63</sup>

The conditions he spoke of were talks between all parties, including the unionist leaders. Moreover, the 1990s would be the beginning of the cessation of violence in the North and the further transformation of both SF and the PIRA.

The struggles in Northern Ireland still persist today. The conflict stage was still present in the 1990s and early 2000s. It was progressing towards the end of the diminished warfare period by the 1990s. In 1993, Adams was seen visiting the home of Hume and the following day, the *Sunday Tribune* reported about the secret meetings that were occurring between the two segments of the nationalist community. Over the next few weeks in April 1993, Adams and Hume would issue their first joint statement and by September, a second joint statement was issued that became known as the Hume/Adams Initiative.<sup>64</sup> From this initiative, the seeds for eventual Provo’s disarmament were sown. In return for Provo’s disarmament and the renouncement of an armed struggle approach, Sinn Féin would be allowed a seat at the peace talks table.<sup>65</sup> One can see this as a shift towards politics and a shift away from an era of militancy and politics. Subsequently in

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<sup>63</sup> Quote by Adams published in the Irish News on 1 February 1991.

<sup>64</sup> "The Irish Peace Process - Chronology of Key Events (April 1993 - April 1998)," CAIN (Conflict Archive on the INternet) -- University of Ulster, <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/pp9398.htm>. & English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 271.

<sup>65</sup> M.L.R. Smith, *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement* (London: Routledge, 1997), 199.

October 3, 1993, the Provos issued a statement that recognized that the necessary political will was in place for peace to progress in the North.

Initially, John Major, the Prime Minister who replaced Margaret Thatcher in Westminster, was not receptive of the statements issued by Hume and Adams.<sup>66</sup> Yet, on December 15, 1993, the British government and the Republic's government issued a joint initiative, the Downing Street Declaration.<sup>67</sup> The potential reasons behind the development of the Declaration are numerous. But, Smith suggest there are three major reasons: British embarrassment over discovery that they had ongoing secret talks with the Provos before 1993 and a desire to capitalize on the opportunity to push the talks forward; a need by the British government and Republic's government to offer their own version of the Hume/Adams Initiative; and the belief that the Provos or segments of the guerrilla movement could be persuaded to give up violence.<sup>68</sup> The document reaffirmed the British government's pledge to "[...] uphold the democratic wish of a greater number of the people of Northern Ireland on the issue of whether they prefer to support the Union or a sovereign united Ireland."<sup>69</sup> The principle of self-determination for the community in Northern Ireland (Protestant and Catholics) had been established in the politics of the North. Additionally, in the mind of the Provos and Sinn Féin, there were substantial

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<sup>66</sup> It should be noted this was all transpiring as violence between the Provos and the loyalist paramilitaries continued, including a bombing of a fish shop on Shankill Road (the main road in the Protestant community in Belfast) in October 1993. Revenge killings ensued.

<sup>67</sup> English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 271.

<sup>68</sup> Smith, *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement*, 206.

<sup>69</sup> Point Four of the Downing Street Declaration. See, Albert Reynolds and John Major, "Downing Street Declaration," Northern Ireland Office, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-ireland/downing-street-declaration.php>.

moves towards a more lasting peace in the North. This was most aptly noted in Point Twelve of the Downing Street Declaration: “The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister are determined to build on the fervent wish of both their peoples to see old fears and animosities replaced by a climate of peace. They believe the framework they have set out offers the people of Ireland, North and South, whatever their tradition, the basis to agree that from now on their differences can be negotiated and resolved exclusively by peaceful political means.”<sup>70</sup> Then, in the fall of 1994, the Provos issued the following statement:

“Recognising the potential of the current situation and in order to enhance the democratic peace process and underline our definitive commitment to its success the leadership of Óglaigh na hÉireann have decided that as of midnight, Wednesday, 31 August, there will be a complete cessation of military operations. All of our units have been instructed accordingly. [...] We believe that an opportunity to create a just and lasting settlement has been created. We are therefore entering into a new situation in a spirit of determination and confidence [...]”<sup>71</sup>

The declared ceasefires by the Provos and the Combined Loyalist Military Command are often seen as a watershed moment in the history of the Troubles.<sup>72</sup> Some see it as the moment of the end of the Troubles.<sup>73</sup> Gerry Adams saw it as a “[...] opening of a new phase of the struggle.”<sup>74</sup> The ceasefire of 1994 continued with statements by the Provos in 1995 noting ‘why’ the conflict had persisted for so long. Yet, they also reaffirmed the need to give all parties the space needed for negotiation. On March 7,

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> "IRA Statement," *An Phoblacht/Republican News*, 1 September 1994.

<sup>72</sup> The Combined Loyalist Military Command was the umbrella organization for the loyalist paramilitaries operating in Northern Ireland.

<sup>73</sup> Neil Jarman, "From War to Peace? Changing Patterns of Violence in Northern Ireland, 1990-2003," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 3 (2004): 422.

<sup>74</sup> Adams, *A Farther Shore: Ireland's Long Road to Peace*, 179.

1995, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Patrick Mayhew outlined the steps that needed to be taken for Sinn Féin to be allowed to enter peace talks. These three steps were centered on the decommissioning of the republican movement weapons. SF and the Provos reacted angrily and saw these demands by the British government as wanting the republican movement to admit defeat or surrender to the British.<sup>75</sup>

This development is consistent with the CPVT model. As was discussed in Chapter 3, a political/military advantage may develop for the state during conflict. This allows the state to determine whether the guerrilla movement can have political accessibility. It also influences if political accessibility occurs and the conditions of that accessibility. Even though the British government may have not decisively defeated the PIRA and SF, they were aware of this advantage. As can be seen by the steps outlined by Mayhew, the British government used this advantage to influence the PIRA to decommission and end their struggle. It is apparent their advantage influenced the political accessibility afforded to the PIRA and SF. In turn, both entities saw the necessity of shifting their belief structure and its associated frames away from militancy and politics and more towards a pure political (non-violent) approach. Additionally, these changes were able to address the human resource needs that had begun to develop in the mid-1980s. With the end of the Cold War and diminished supporters, the physical resource need grew as support for the PIRA and SF shrank. Turning into a political party was both an outcome of these interactions and a means of survival.

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<sup>75</sup> English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 289.

The international community became involved and setup a decommissioning commission. George Mitchell, an American politician, headed this commission. Additionally, former Prime Minister of Finland, Harri Holkeri, and former Chief of Canadian Defense Forces, John de Chastelain joined him. The commission noted in January 1996 that the decommissioning should occur at the same time as peace talks.<sup>76</sup> The desires by the Provos and SF for the British to come to the talks table without any preconditions led both parties to claim London did not want progress. In the case of the Provos, it launched a break in the 1994 ceasefire.<sup>77</sup> Further, a statement by Gerry Adams, published in *The Guardian* (12 February 1996), noted that multiple obstacles had been constructed by the British government and the unionist to prevent progression in the peace talks. “Inclusive negotiations, without preconditions or vetos, [are] the key to advancing the peace process to a peace settlement. This was the commitment given by the two governments, publicly and repeatedly [...]”<sup>78</sup> Adams argued this was the context the IRA ceasefire had occurred but since 1994, there had no real progression towards negotiations. Yet, even as Adams criticized the lack of progress towards negotiations that included the Provos and SF, he did reaffirm Sinn Fein’s commitment to a lasting peace solution for the North.<sup>79</sup> The meeting between the various parties

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> On February 9, 1996, the PIRA issued a statement announcing a break in the 1994 cease-fire due to: “[...] [t]he British government acted in bad faith, with Mr. Major and the unionist leaders squandering this opportunity to resolve the conflict.” “IRA Statement,” *An Phoblacht/Republican News*, 15 February 1996. On that same day, a bomb planted by the Provos exploded near London’s Canary Wharf and two people were killed. See, ———, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 289-90.

<sup>78</sup> Reprinted in English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 290.

occurred in Stormont in June 1996, but Sinn Féin were excluded from the talks.<sup>80</sup> A continual renewal of SF's position of a desire for peace and the continuing use of violence by the PIRA persisted until 1997.

The introduction of Tony Blair of the British Labour Party as British Prime Minister in May 1997 brought a new shift and another political opening for SF and the Provos. Blair pushed the Northern Ireland peace process to the front of British politics and with it, SF were given an opportunity for becoming a partner in the peace process, if the Provos stopped their violent struggle.<sup>81</sup> From these early steps, the Good Friday Agreement (the Belfast Agreement) developed and the conflict was shortly to end.

Good Friday Agreement, Decommissioning, and a Different Future for the North

On Saturday, July 19, 1997, the Provos announced another ceasefire. Additionally, Martin McGuinness reaffirmed publically that it was the desire of SF to work towards peaceful negotiations.<sup>82</sup> From these first steps, the current stage of conditions in Northern Ireland was set. The last moves towards the beginning of a post-conflict stage. By September 1997, SF had endorsed the standards established in the Mitchell report and they were allowed to become a part of the political talks at Stormont. The opening of political accessibility for SF and the Provos grew symbolically in October

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid. He may have been using false rhetoric to appease some within the republican movement. This was especially important in light of diminishing human and physical resources.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 292.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 294.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 295.

when Blair met with Adams in Belfast.<sup>83</sup> Eventually from this meeting and other subsequent discussions, on April 10, 1998, the Good Friday Agreement (also known as the Agreement or Belfast Agreement) was reached between the various parties. On May 22, 1998, a referendum was held in Northern Ireland to vote on the endorsement of the Agreement. It resulted in an 81 percent voter turnout and 71 percent of the voters voted in favor of the Agreement.<sup>84</sup> The agreement created three sets of institutions in the North – power-sharing legislative and executive bodies; a North-South Ministerial Conference (NSMC) between the North’s executive and the Irish government; and an intergovernmental conference between the government of the U.K. and the Republic. Additionally, an Equality Commission and Human Rights Commission were created under the Agreement. These bodies would examine the criminal justice and policing arrangements in the North and allocate monies to help victims of the violence.<sup>85</sup> In creating this document, clear political accessibility was created for SF and the Provos. The Agreement came close to failure many times from 1998 to the complete decommissioning of the Provos in 2005. Most of the obstacles concerning implementation of the Agreement were due to suspected ongoing activity by all the paramilitaries in the North (loyalist and republicans, alike). Each group accused the other group of not moving forward on their promises outlined in the Good Friday Agreement.

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<sup>83</sup> This was the first time since Michael Collins, one of the founders of the early IRA, and Arthur Griffith, one of the early presidents of Sinn Féin, had met with Lloyd George in 1921 that a leader of the republican movement had met with the Prime Minister for the U.K. Ibid., 296.

<sup>84</sup> Initially, reports were that a majority of the unionist community in the North had voted against the Agreement. Later polling showed that a majority of both the nationalist and unionist communities had voted in favor of the Good Friday Agreement. Rick Wilford, "Epilogue," in *Politics in Northern Ireland*, ed. Paul Mitchell and Rick Wilford (New York: Perseus Publishing, 1998), 285.

<sup>85</sup> "The Agreement," Northern Ireland Office, <http://www.nio.gov.uk/the-agreement>.

This resulted in a temporary resort of political power back to the British in Northern Ireland in 2002. In October 2002, the Northern Ireland Assembly and the power-sharing executive were suspended and London took back control over the North.<sup>86</sup> The march towards a new era for the North continued in 2004, as the Democratic Unionist Party (founded by Ian Paisley) and SF created the Comprehensive Agreement. This document was meant to make some changes to the Good Friday Agreement. The talks failed but in 2005, the final step was made towards a lasting peaceful settlement in the North and also in the final transformation of the Provos and SF.

As noted by Gerry Adams in 1995, “[e]ven conflicts that appear to be intractable can eventually be brought to an end.”<sup>87</sup> In 2005, that statement became true with the final decommissioning of Provos weapons.<sup>88</sup> Most of the weapon caches had not been used for years. In fact, most of these weapons had been placed ‘beyond use’ by the PIRA in 2004. The fact they retained the weapons until 2005 shows the Provos and SF did not shift from their hybrid status of militancy and politics fully until after 2005. This had been a substantial shift over a short time from the desire to retain their weapons to the decision to decommission all Provos weapons. In January 2000, the Independent International Commission (IICD), the commission setup by Mitchell, reported that the Provos had not begun to decommission and the IICD had not received any information of

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<sup>86</sup> Bourke, *Peace in Ireland: The War of Ideas*, 304.

<sup>87</sup> Gerry Adams, *Free Ireland: Towards a Lasting Peace*, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin Group (USA) Incorporated, 1995), 191.

<sup>88</sup> Tonge, *Northern Ireland*, 207.

when this would begin.<sup>89</sup> Some attribute the final decision to disarm and permanently cease the armed struggle as a reaction to the events of September 11, 2001.<sup>90</sup> As suggested by Jarman, in the post-9/11 environment, the ethos were changing. Prior to this time, armed struggles – such as the ones in Northern Ireland – were seen as a national liberation struggle. This gave some legitimacy to the struggles in the North. After 9/11, the question that arose was: what classifies as a ‘legitimate’ struggle?<sup>91</sup> Yet, the conflict has seen the once-entrenched views of the Provos and SF become more flexible. As noted by Councillor Mickey Brady, Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) for Newry and Armagh in the Northern Ireland Assembly (Stormont) and Sinn Féin party member, SF can be seen as more multidimensional today, unlike the one-dimensional character that most people saw them in previous years.<sup>92</sup> One participant in the Troubles suggested that after the transformation of the movement that those coming out of prison did one of two things: become involved in the new political system of the North or “[they] sit in the bar, drink and reminisce about the old times.”<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Christopher McCrudden, "Northern Ireland and the British Constitution since the Belfast Agreement," in *The Changing Constitution*, ed. Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 240.

<sup>90</sup> Dr. Richard English, interviewed by the author, Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland, 31 October 2007.

<sup>91</sup> Neil Jarman, interviewed by the author, North Belfast, Northern Ireland, 5 November 2007.

<sup>92</sup> Councillor Mickey Brady, MLA, interviewed by the author, Northern Ireland Assembly, Sinn Féin party offices; Stormont, Northern Ireland, 6 November 2007. Mr. Brady was a community activist prior to being elected as the representative for the Newry and Armagh constituency in Northern Ireland. He is a new generation of SF party members who was not previously detained or imprisoned in previous years. Yet, he and others were some of those individuals involved in the civil rights movement.

<sup>93</sup> M [pseudo.], interviewed by the author, West Belfast, Northern Ireland, 28 October 2007. This comment by M was repeated by many different individuals the author encountered in Northern Ireland in 2007.

The grass has finally begun to grow over the H&W shipyards. For the Provos, SF, and those involved in the Troubles, transformation of once-violent organizations into peaceful political actors may signify that their day of a unified Ireland is not far away. One could argue the PIRA and SF find themselves in the transitional peace period of the post-conflict stage as of the writing of this study (2009). The status of mixed militancy and politics has shifted to a status of politics.

#### PIRA/SF: MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES OF TRANSFORMATION

In examining the transformation of the Provos and SF throughout the period known as the Troubles, it becomes evident that all three series of processes and mechanisms illustrated in the CPVT model had an impact on the transformative process. These components of the CPVT model have been further influenced by ‘who’ has a power advantage and ‘what’ type of power advantage. As suggested by some scholars of conflict studies, one should look as conflict transforming and not necessarily resolving itself.<sup>94</sup> Violence may never be completely done in Northern Ireland, as the shooting by republican dissidents of the British barracks in the North (2009) suggest.<sup>95</sup> Instead, the former guerrilla movements of the Provos and its political wing, SF, may just transform into new entities over time. As was sketched in the tracing of the historical development of the Provos and SF from 1969 to 2005, it becomes evident that changes in the original belief system and the framing of those beliefs, changes in political accessibility and

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<sup>94</sup> This is noted by Clark and Simpson in their works on Kosovo, South Africa, and other conflict-ridden areas. See, Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo* (London: Pluto Press, 2000). & Graeme Simpson, "Rebuilding Fractured Societies: Reconstruction, Reconciliation, and the Changing Nature of Violence in South Africa " (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconstruction, 2000).

<sup>95</sup> Jarman, "From War to Peace? Changing Patterns of Violence in Northern Ireland, 1990-2003," 421.

changes in resource availability led to the transformation of the guerrilla movement into a political party with a passive military component. (One can note that since the decommissioning in 2005, the PIRA only exist today in name. They are no longer active.)

#### PIRA/SF and Changes to Its Belief System & Associated Frames

In examining the transformation of the PIRA and SF, the following timeline can be applied: a) 1969 to 1971 – Limited Warfare Period (militancy status); b) 1972 to 1981 – Full-Scale Warfare Period (militancy status); c) 1981 to 1994 – Diminished Warfare Period (militancy and politics status); and 1994 to 2009 – Transitional Peace (militancy and politics status shifting towards politics [post 2005]).

Even though one of the core beliefs (a unified Irish state without British occupation) of the Irish republican movement has persisted throughout the history of conflict and politics in Northern Ireland, other related beliefs and framing of that core belief has changed over time. This is especially true when looking at the development of the beliefs and associated frames of the PIRA and SF. For an overview of the transformation of the Provos and SF's belief system and associated frame from 1969 until 2005, see below, Table 6.2.

Table 6.2  
Beliefs and Associated Frames in the Development of the PIRA & SF

Time Period	Core Beliefs	Associated Frame
Late 1960s to Early 1970s (PIRA)	Removal of the existing system was necessary.  A political solution was not possible. <sup>96</sup>  Marginalization of the Catholic community had to be stopped.	The use of peaceful politics would be ineffective in trying to gain a unified Irish state.  The PIRA exist as a defensive organization that can protect the Catholic population in the North from aggression by the British military who favor the unionist, loyalist paramilitaries, and partisan police. <sup>97</sup>
Early 1970s (SF)	Swear only allegiance to the Irish Republic declared in 1916	There is only one Republic state which every Irish man and woman should pledge allegiance to and that it the one proclaimed in 1916 Easter Rebellion.
Early 1970s (SF)	Support for the British government is prohibited (i.e., abstentionism policy).	The SF candidates must swear not to sit in a legislative assembly unless it is “[...] the Parliament of the Irish Republic representative of the entire 32 Counties of Ireland.” <sup>98</sup>
1970s to 1980s (PIRA)	The political prisoners have to be released for a peaceful solution to be reached.	“It is futile also to expect normal political development while the jails, North and South, are full of political prisoners. [...] Until all the political prisoners regain their freedom, there is no question of a permanent ceasefire.”
1981 to 1994 (SF)	A dual approach – militancy and politics – will be used. A policy of abstention should be lifted when it comes to the Republic.	“Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in one hand and the Armalite in the other, we take power in Ireland?” <sup>99</sup>
(PIRA)	Political participation in the Republic’s political system is allowed.	“The second removed a ban on supporting successful republican candidates who take their seats in Leinster House.” <sup>100</sup>

<sup>96</sup> These early statement were consistent with statements made to the author by many sources while in Belfast. One example is where MLA Francie Malloy noted that armed struggle was necessary to clear the way for the later political struggle. Councillor Francie Malloy, MLA, interviewed by the author, Northern Ireland Assembly, Sinn Féin party offices; Stormont, Northern Ireland, 6 November 2007.

<sup>97</sup> O’Leary, "The IRA: Looking Back; Mission Accomplished?," 200.

<sup>98</sup> PSF, "Sinn Fein Bunreacht Rialacha (Constitution and Rules)," 1.

<sup>99</sup> Statement by Danny Morrison at the 1981 *ard fheis* of Sinn Féin. Quoted in Feeney, *Sinn Fein: A Hundred Turbulent Years*, 303.

<sup>100</sup> Statement issued by the Provos on October 14, 1986, following the first-ever general army convention for the PIRA. *Ibid.*, 331.

Time Period	Core Beliefs	Associated Frame
1981 to 1994 (SF)	Political participation in the Republic' political system is necessary for gaining support for the overall republican struggle.	"We are not at war with the government of the twenty-six counties – the reality of this fact must be recognised by us all. And, in accepting this reality, we must also accept that after sixty-five years of republican struggle, republican agitation, republican sacrifice and republican rhetoric, we have failed to convince a majority in the twenty-six counties [the Republic of Ireland] that the republican movement has any relevance to them."
	There is a desire to cease all hostilities and end the war. (from <i>A Scenario for Peace</i> )	"Sinn Féin seeks to create conditions which will lead to a permanent cessation of hostilities, an end to our long war and the development of a peaceful, united and independent Irish society." <sup>101</sup>
1994-Present (PIRA)	Peaceful negotiations are possible but there are obstacles to the process.	"British intransigence was of course a cause for concern, yet hope remained. That hope and expectation was slowly and relentlessly strangled by a British government which squandered the historic opportunity presented to it. The British, rather than seize the moment, sought only to avoid any meaningful engagement in the Irish peace process. [...]The IRA, of course, remains ready to help in developing the conditions which will allow for a meaningful negotiations process, free from preconditions of any kind. The current position of the British, however, prevents all those in Ireland with a democratic mandate from sitting around the negotiating table." <sup>102</sup>
Early 1990s (SF)	Peaceful negotiations are the solution to the conflict. (Consistent with previous statements and with the Provos)	"We are firmly committed to democratic and peaceful means of resolving political issues and to the objective of an equitable and lasting agreement." <sup>103</sup>
(SF)	Peaceful negotiations are necessary and can be achieved with a set of goals. One of these goals is to create a normal relationship between the British and Irish people. (Goals are noted throughout <i>A Bridge to the Future</i> .)	"In this context 'A Bridge to the Future' also identifies the central importance which Irish nationalists place on an alliance between Irish political parties and opinion, pursuing the objectives which look to the interests and the well being of the Irish nation. And which seek to normalise the relationships between the people of Ireland and the people of Britain." <sup>104</sup>

<sup>101</sup> Sinn Fein, "A Scenario for Peace: A Discussion Paper," (Dublin: Sinn Fein Ard Chomhairie, 1987), 3.

<sup>102</sup> Irish Republican Publicity Bureau (P.O'Neill), "Irish Republican Army (IRA) Easter Statement, 7 April 1996."

<sup>103</sup> Quoted in English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 291.

<sup>104</sup> Sinn Fein, "A Bridge to the Future: A Discussion Paper," 1.

Time Period	Core Beliefs	Associated Frame
Early 1990s (SF)	Partition is still not acceptable.	“Any kind of new Stormont or any effort to underpin partition is unacceptable.” <sup>105</sup>
	Disarming all parties in necessary and violence activity has to end for peace to progress.	“The Omagh bombing was the most terrible example of this but other killings and beatings have also occurred. Sinn Féin is opposed to all such incidents and we recognise that they make the task of the political parties more difficult.” <sup>106</sup>
2000s (SF & Provos)	Provos (2000) – Disarmament is a necessary step in the peaceful solution of the conflict.	“We remain prepared to initiate a process which would completely and verifiably put IRA arms beyond use and to do so in a way to avoid risk to the public, misappropriation by others and ensure maximum public confidence.” <sup>107</sup>
	Provos (2005) – Armed struggle is over and will no longer be used. Only a peaceful approach to the conflict will be employed.	“The leadership of Oglaiigh na hEireann has formally ordered an end to the armed campaign. [...] All IRA units have been ordered to dump arms. [...] All Volunteers have been instructed to assist the development of purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means. Volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever.” <sup>108</sup>
	Provos (2007) – Continued support for the peace process.	“We firmly believe that our republican goal of a united Ireland is achievable through purely peaceful and democratic means.” <sup>109</sup>

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>106</sup> ———, "Defending the Good Friday Agreement: Sinn Fein's Submission to the Mitchell Review."

<sup>107</sup> ———, "Irish Republican Army (IRA) Statement on the Arms Issue, 5 December 2000," (Derry: Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), University of Ulster, 2000). Can be found at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira051200.htm>

<sup>108</sup> ———, "Text of Irish Republican Army (IRA) Statement on the Ending of the Armed Campaign, (28 July 2005)," (Derry: Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), University of Ulster, 2005). Can be found at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/ira280705.htm>

<sup>109</sup> Irish Republican Publicity Bureau (P.O'Neill), "Text of Irish Republican Army (IRA) Easter Statement, (Released 5 April 2007)," (Derry: Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), University of Ulster, 2007). Can be found at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/ira050407.htm>

## PIRA/SF and Their Belief System and Associated Frames (1960s & 1970s)

In the early days of the development of the Provos and SF (1969 and 1971, respectively), one can see that many of those who broke away would be considered as “true believers” (TB) within the republican movement and specifically within the IRA. This was noted early in the development of the Provos by the Chief of Staff of the IRA, Cathal Goulding. He noted that “[...] foot-dragging [...]” by individuals who eventually became part of the Provos held back the development of the republican movement.<sup>110</sup> He referred to the Provos as “[...] retrograde [and] their activities have had a retrograde effect on the situation in the North.”<sup>111</sup> The Provos and SF were formed as a reaction to sectarian violence.<sup>112</sup>

### The Limited Warfare Period: 1969 to 1971

The basic beliefs of the Provos in its earliest days (1969) centered on the following: inequality and Catholic marginalization in the North; no political solution to the struggle, and the necessity of the armed struggle.<sup>113</sup> This was framed to the outside world as a belief that the Provos were fighting against suppression that existed from 1922

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<sup>110</sup> "Inside the IRA: Interviews with Cathal Goulding," 18.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>112</sup> Shirlow and McGovern, "Language, Discourse and Dialogue: Sinn Fein and the Irish Peace Process," 174.

<sup>113</sup> Michael P. Arena and Bruce A Arrigo, *The Terrorist Identity: Explaining the Terrorist Threat* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 113.

until present day that was supported by the British.<sup>114</sup> They portrayed themselves as defenders of the Catholic community in the North.<sup>115</sup>

As the PIRA and SF shifted from a period of limited warfare to a full warfare period, the core beliefs and their associated frames became more centered on the destruction of the old system. By 1972, the Provos had more formally outlined their beliefs (which included a list of desires focusing on a 'New Ireland.')

In the Provos book, *Freedom Struggle*, a structure for a New Ireland is proposed. At the core of this belief was the absolute necessity of abolishing the old system and replacing it with a new system "[...] based upon the unity and sovereignty of the Irish People."<sup>116</sup> Additionally, the Provos outlined their beliefs of what social and economic development should look like in a united Ireland.<sup>117</sup> The Provos outlined through *Freedom Struggle*, their argument behind an armed struggle in the North. In particular, they outlined why armed force was justified against the British. They established the principle that their armed struggle would only be done with the support of the people.<sup>118</sup> They also called for a unified struggle with Catholics and Protestants working together.

Prior to the statements made in 1973, Provisional SF (which eventually became the SF political party) established a constitution and rules (*Sinn Féin Bunreacht*

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<sup>114</sup> "IRA Statement," *Irish News*, December 29 1969.

<sup>115</sup> Brendan O'Leary, "The IRA: Looking Back; Mission Accomplished?," in *Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts*, ed. Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O'Leary, and John Tirman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 200.

<sup>116</sup> Neill, "Freedom Struggle," 94.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 94-98.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, 54-92.

*Rialacha*). The document noted it had allegiance to the “[...] sovereign Irish Republic proclaimed in 1916 [and] that the sovereignty and unity of the Republic are inalienable and non-judicial.”<sup>119</sup> In addition, it noted one of the core beliefs of both the Provos and SF until the 1980s. This was the principle of abstention from the political process. SF candidates could run but they would not take any legislative seats they won in the elections. This was consistent with the Provos argument against a political solution. To take one’s seats would recognize the legitimacy of the system.

#### Full-Scale Warfare to Diminished Warfare: 1970s to 2000s

In the aftermath of the events of Bloody Sunday and other events of extreme violence, the Provos and SF would begin to explore more the possibility of political solutions versus armed struggle in the 1980s. This may have been a reaction to the power advantage – particularly, the military/political advantage that the British government and the Northern Ireland government had over the PIRA and SF. The late 1980s would see a major shift towards a belief in political solutions to armed struggle.

In the aftermath of the hunger strikes, SF adopted the new dual struggle strategy of ‘Armalite and ballot box.’ Some argue this adoption of a new belief system was nothing new for the Provos or SF. Individuals like Adams, McGuinness, and Morrison (once TBs who had shifted to the PM perspective) had begun to take over leadership of the republican movement. With the takeover of the SF and Provos leadership by those from the North, these new series of beliefs were adopted by the movement by the 1980s, framed, and publicized for everyone at that time. This was a reaction to the growing

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<sup>119</sup> PSF, "Sinn Fein Bunreacht Rialacha (Constitution and Rules)," (Belfast: Housed in the Northern Ireland Political Collection; Linen Library, 1970).

questions supporters and sympathizers had regarding the use of force. After the successful bid of Bobby Sands for the Westminster seat, it made it easier for the new movement leaders to push forward on the ‘Armalite and ballot box’ strategy.<sup>120</sup> With the announcement of the adoption of this new strategy at the *ard fheis* in 1981, the transformation of SF (and shortly thereafter, the Provos) had grown. Even as warfare progressed, there was a shift to militancy and politics. By late 1986, the Provos had also changed their belief system and associated frames away from complete abstentionism and towards a limited engagement of the political systems in London and the North and full engagement of the political system in the South (Republic of Ireland). SF further supported this position in 1986 when Martin McGuinness gave a speech at the *ard fheis* for SF. He stated that to be non-involved in politics in the Republic is to limit how individuals living there are relevant to the struggle by the republican movement.<sup>121</sup>

In the 1990s, the further transformation of the Provos and SF into organizations who wanted peace more than continuation of an armed struggle was evident. Throughout the 1990s, the Provos issued multiple statements and each one shifted their original belief system and associated frames away from a focus on the armed struggle and more of a focus on peaceful negotiations. Yet, just prior to the cease-fire statement of August 1994, the Provos was still continuing to promote the necessity of an armed struggle but also arguing that a peaceful solution was possible if the British would agree to it. An example of this can be seen in the following statement (1993), by Mitchel McLaughlin, a

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<sup>120</sup> Ibid., 291.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 332. He additionally reassured those in the republican movement (including those in the Provos) that lifting the ban against political participation in the Republic or to run for office in Westminster does not mean the struggle against the British would not go forward.

representative of the Provo's General Headquarters Staff: "The obstacle to peace in Ireland is the British presence and the partition of Ireland. [...] The British government attitude seems set to condemn us all to continued conflict."<sup>122</sup> At this point, the PIRA was clearly a hybrid case of militancy and politics. This may have been necessary framing to retain some diminishing human resources.

The ceasefire statement of 1994 by the Provos was turning point in the conflict. A shift towards the transitional peace period of the post-conflict stage had begun. Additionally, it was a decisive moment in the further transformation of the Provos. In a majority of subsequent statements by the Provos, there seem to be further reaffirmation of the need for peaceful negotiations. This would include all parties and "[...] free from preconditions of any kind."<sup>123</sup> Sinn Féin kept to their position of peaceful negotiations between all parties throughout the 1990s, but added an additional component. All parties would need to disarm, the British, the loyalist paramilitaries and the republican movement before peace could occur.<sup>124</sup> This could suggest the power advantage the British government had was influencing the shifts in Sinn Féin's belief system. In this case, SF shifted their beliefs to adjust to eventual entrance into the political accessibility provided by the British government.

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<sup>122</sup> Quoted in English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 280.

<sup>123</sup> Irish Republican Publicity Bureau (P.O'Neill), "Irish Republican Army (IRA) Easter Statement, 7 April 1996," (Derry: Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), University of Ulster, 1996). Can be found at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira070496.htm> Similar framing of these beliefs can be seen in: —, "Irish Republican Army (IRA) Statement, 29 February 1996," (Derry: Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), University of Ulster, 1996).

<sup>124</sup> This was noted in Gerry Adams statement reprinted in the *Guardian* newspaper in February 1996. See, English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 291.

Throughout the late 1990s, both SF and the PIRA continued to progress in their thinking. Based on reviews of statements from 1997 to 2000, one can see a very consistent set of beliefs and associated frames. The focus during the late 1990s was on a final peaceful solution to the conflict in the North. Additionally, in their 1998 paper, *A Bridge to the Future*, SF continues to focus on this peaceful approach to an end to the conflict and it outlines how these aspirations are not just of the republican movement. They are the desire of all nationalists in the North.<sup>125</sup> This frame may suggest SF had finally begun to believe the armed struggle was no longer viable. Consistent with beliefs and frames from previous years, SF argued against continued partition of the North from the Republic and therefore argued against participating in Stormont.<sup>126</sup> With the development of the Good Friday Agreement (May 1998), the Provos agreed the principles were a “[...] significant development.” Yet, they argued this did not result in a series of principles that matched up with republican ideals. Additionally, the Provos continued to argue against decommissioning.<sup>127</sup> Two additional statements released by the Provos in January and March 1999 continued this same framing, particularly, the issue of decommissioning. Then, in September 1999, SF published a document titled, *Defending the Good Friday Agreement*. One important component of this document was

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<sup>125</sup> It should be noted in the SF document there was a void of the discussion about the republican movement needing to disarm. There is consistent frame of the need for the other parties to disarm. Sinn Fein, "A Bridge to the Future: A Discussion Paper," (Dublin: Sinn Fein, 1998), 1-2. The full report can be found at: <http://www.sinnfein.ie/files/ABridgetotheFuture.pdf>

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>127</sup> Irish Republican Publicity Bureau (P.O'Neill), "Irish Republican Army (IRA) Statement on Decommissioning (30 April 1998)," (Derry: Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), University of Ulster, 1998). Can be found at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira30498.htm>

the discussion concerning the need to disarm all those involved.<sup>128</sup> This decision to review publically the decommissioning process may have been a reaction to more of a shift towards a political solution.

Two months later (1999), the Provos issued a statement where they acknowledge the necessity of the Good Friday Agreement and how its implementation would “[...] contribute to the achievement of lasting peace.”<sup>129</sup> In that same document, the Provos – who had previously always argued against decommissioning – stated they would enter into discussions with the IICD.<sup>130</sup> This meeting would seem to indicate the Provos had finally decided to move towards a complete shift towards a peaceful struggle without any aspect of militancy attached. This statement and subsequent disarming and termination of all armed activity in 2005 seems to indicate the Provos was giving over leadership of the republican movement completely to the SF. Given greater political accessibility was being offered to SF by the states involved in the conflict and preconditions of disarming were established by these governments, the PIRA shift to a non-armed struggle perspective may have been influenced by SF leadership. The former days of the ‘Armalite and ballot box’ strategy would be replaced with only the ballot box. This would also be the final stage in the transformation of the Provos into a dormant guerrilla wing of a legitimate political party, Sinn Féin. Sinn Fein would continue to develop their political agenda throughout the early 2000s and in promote full implementation of the

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<sup>128</sup> Sinn Fein, "Defending the Good Friday Agreement: Sinn Fein's Submission to the Mitchell Review," (Dublin: Sinn Fein, 1999).

<sup>129</sup> Irish Republican Publicity Bureau (P.O'Neill), "Irish Republican Army (IRA) Statement, Issued 17 November 1999," (Derry: Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), University of Ulster, 1999).

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

Good Friday Agreement. As noted by Adams in his 2006 *Ard Fheis* Presidential Address, "I have made it clear from the republican perspective - the war is over."<sup>131</sup> This declaration was clearly a frame of a belief that SF and the PIRA had held for a few years. The frame was not used until 2006 to prevent any further defection of individuals from the side of the SF. Additionally, he noted to the various dissident republican groups that they should consider their options and debate those options.<sup>132</sup> This seems to note that the dissidents should adopt a manner similar to SF and the Provos.

#### PIRA/SF and Political Accessibility to Northern Ireland's Political System

From 1969 until present day, there has been major shifts in the political accessibility provided to the PIRA and SF. From a complete barring of political accessibility to inclusion of Sinn Féin in Westminster, Leinster and Stormont, there has been many reasons to encourage and discourage the republican movement to transform into a political party. This is directly linked to the antecedent condition of a power advantage discussed earlier in this case study and modeled in Chapter 3.

Throughout previous discussions, it was noted that a lack of political legitimacy and trust tended to keep the PIRA and SF away from a political solution to the struggles of the North.<sup>133</sup> Instead of repeating the historical development of the Provos and SF in a discussion of the political accessibility, this conversation will focus on the highpoints of both closure of accessibility and openings in accessibility that led to transformation of the

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<sup>131</sup> Gerry Adams, "Gerry Adams MP Presidential Address Ard Fheis 2006," (Dublin: Sinn Fein, 2007). An electronic copy of the speech can be found at: <http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/15206>

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> See previous statements by MLA Malloy concerning 'why' republicans tended to stay away from the political approach for so long.

movement. Many of the openings in the political system, in either London, the Republic or in the North, came primarily after 1980. One could argue this was because the struggle between the parties had stalled, but the government had retained an advantage when compared to the PIRA and SF.

In the early years of the Troubles, there was a perception amongst many republicans, including those who belong to the Provos or SF, the political systems were closed to republicans. In this context, one should highlight the point that whether or not an opening for a guerrilla movement to take advantage of is often based on the perception of the conditions by the movement. These perceptions of the open or close nature of the system may be influenced as the changing belief and associated frames shift. This is not to say that there are not sometimes clear signals from the state or occupying power concerning whether the system is open or not.

It is apparent from some of the condition on the ground during the late 1960s (e.g., massive discrimination against the Catholic community in both the political and economic spheres) that very little opportunities for political accessibility existed. As suggested by Bourke, the government of the North “[...] had never sought nor secured allegiances of its Catholic population [...]”<sup>134</sup> Likewise, Northern Ireland Prime Minister, Terence O’Neil (1963-1969), specifically, illustrates this lack of concern about the Catholic community as a whole, or the republican movement in the following statement: “If you treat Roman Catholics with due consideration and kindness, they will

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<sup>134</sup> Bourke, *Peace in Ireland: The War of Ideas*, 49.

live like Protestants in spite of the authoritative nature of their Church.”<sup>135</sup> From 1969 until the 1970s, there was little to no movement on opening up the system to the Provos or SF. This may have been due to the nature of the conflict from 1969 to 1981. This was a period of full-scale warfare. Neither the Provos or SF shifted on their desire to be a part of the political system. Instead, the desire to eliminate the old system and start a new was very prevalent in actions and words. With the events of Bloody Sunday 1972, the potential for openings in the system evaporated.<sup>136</sup>

In the post-Bloody Sunday era of the conflict, the release of the Widgery Report and the British deciding to directly rule the North from London (on March 24, 1972) sent another signal that political openings were not forthcoming. Given the advantage of the British government, they did not need to signal a potential for an opening in the political system. The SDLP gained political opening in November 1973 in which a power-sharing executive was created that included the Ulster Unionist Party, the SDLP and the Alliance Party.<sup>137</sup> However, even as the nationalist community was gaining political access, the republican community was being barred. Contacts between particular members of the Provos and the British government continued, but they would not immediately result in political openings.<sup>138</sup> Yet, these contacts may have had an impact on the development of

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<sup>135</sup> Quote was originally in the *Belfast Telegraph* on May 10, 1969. It was quoted in: *Ibid.*, 50.

<sup>136</sup> This was noted by Patrick Magee in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday. He noted whatever possibilities had existed for change through political means vanished in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday. Magee, *Gangsters or Guerrillas? Representations of Irish Republicans in 'Troubles Fiction'*, 65.

<sup>137</sup> This eventual resulted in the Sunningdale Agreement in December 1973. The agreement eventually failed in 1974 because of unionist opposition to the agreement and violence by loyalist groups.

the ‘political approach ethos’ that began to develop within the Provos and SF. (This is consistent with the CPVT modeling of how a guerrilla movement transform into a political party.) The reaction of those present during the times of the Troubles may also indicate a lack of political openings in the system. In interviewing individuals involved in the Provos and SF during the Troubles, the interviewees indicated their did not seem to be an opening in the political accessibility. The only comments concerning the 1970s by those involved was either about Bloody Sunday, the change in internment policy by the British, and greater occupation of the North by the British.<sup>139</sup> With the change in internment policy, initial greater closure to the system and then opening of the system (post-hunger strike period) occurred.

With the change in internment policy (1976) and failed meetings between SF and members of the Northern Ireland Office, the beginning of the 1980s did not look favorable to the Provos and SF. Yet, with the election of Bobby Sands, a political opening had been created for SF and the Provos. This would suggest a political opening had to occur before Sands ran for office. The PIRA and SF took advantage of this opening. It was temporarily closed when Westminster passed a law preventing those jailed from running for political office. Yet, the initial opening gave enough impetus to those in SF and the Provos who favored a political approach that transformation of the

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<sup>138</sup> On March 13, 1972, Harold Wilson, leader of the British Labour Party, and the shadow Northern Ireland Secretary Merlyn Rees, met with Daithi O’Connell (the Adjutant-General of the PIRA) and Joe Cahill, a leader figure in the Provos. Bourke, *Peace in Ireland: The War of Ideas*, 156.

<sup>139</sup> In the case of greater occupation by the British, a woman who lived in Belfast during the Troubles, who was not directly involved in republican activity, recounted how the military would come into homes at four and five in the morning and get people out of their beds. They would then search the home claiming they were searching for Provos members, weapons or other related materials. T [pseudo.], interviewed by the author, West Belfast, Northern Ireland, 29 October 2007.

guerrilla movement and its political wing was inevitable. (This would indicate the pragmatic members of the movement began to gain more control of the organization and the Irish republican movement.) Even with the opposition of SF and the Provos to the Anglo-Irish Agreement and their perception that it was trying to close off the political approach, the movement continued to transform its beliefs and the framing of those beliefs.

With the end of the Cold War, there came a new era for the Provos and SF. Some could argue that as physical resources were diminishing in the post-Cold War era that there was no alternative than a political approach. Given the limited amount of information concerning actual physical resources available to the Provos and SF in the early 1990s, this basis cannot be completely verified. Yet, English argues that by the late 1980s, the Provos were losing members, civilians were being killed, and British authorities were finding PIRA weapon caches.<sup>140</sup> Therefore, even if the physical resources did not immediately end at the end of the Cold War, the decrease of both human and physical resources in the late 1980s may have pushed the Provos and SF to push harder for a place in the political system in the early 1990s.

It is evident to any scholar of the Troubles that the 1990s was the decade in which SF and the Provos had the greatest advancement of their political approach. In tracing the political openings available to the Provos and SF, one can see that occasionally it intersects with various British political leaders being in office. It also coincides with the shifts in power advantages during the conflict. For example, the 1980s generally posed a

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<sup>140</sup> English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 260.

problem for the Provos and SF as Margaret Thatcher did not want to provide any accessibility to the political system for the republican movement. In the 1990s, the Labour Party came to dominate British politics. Even though they had previously blocked republican movement participation in the political process, Blair would be a good change for the Provos and SF. As modeled in Chapter Three, political accessibility may occur as government actors begin to build relationships with actors within the guerrilla movement. Blair's meetings with Adams is an example of this situation. Through his promotion of the Good Friday Agreement, political accessibility for SF would eventually open more than previously. As this potential for an opening interacted with the shifting belief system and associated frames of the Provos, greater political accessibility continued. With the permanent ceasefire of 2005, the political accessibility grew and SF and the Provos were transformed into a new entity. In examining these interactions, it is evident that the theoretical explanation for transformation of GMs is consistent with the story of the Provos and SF. The question remains is what role did resource availability play in its transformation.

#### PIRA/SF and Physical and Human Resource Needs

As suggested in Chapter 3 (Table 3.1), two of the issues that influence the transformation of a guerrilla movement (GM) into a new entity is the need for human resources and physical resources. As a GM transforms into a political party, according to the CPVT model, there already exist is a need for both types of resources. In examining the transformation of the PIRA and SF, these types of organizations have waivered back and forth in their resource needs. Much like the study of other politically violent groups

(e.g., FARC and ASG), exact numbers of membership, supporters and sympathizers for SF and the Provos is limited. Additionally, known number of weapons, monies and other physical resource held by the Provos and SF is virtually non-existent. Given the limitations of the data available, one can draw some generalizations. Most of the following discussion will focus on the Provos as this is the data that is most available. Additionally, given SF membership tended to overlap with the membership of the Provos, it is hard to distinguish between membership numbers between two entities.

By the end of the 1980s, both types of resources were decreasing rapidly. This was vastly different when compared to the early days of the Provos and SF. Prior to the split of the IRA and the Provos, there was a substantial decline in the membership and funds available to the IRA.<sup>141</sup> Yet, when the Provos were created in 1969, the IRA Quartermaster went with the new guerrilla movement and so did a portion of the IRA funds.<sup>142</sup> As the violence increased in the North in 1969 and the early 1970s, external funds increased for the Provos. The budget for the Provos during the 1980s is estimated to have been around £6.5 million to £15 million.<sup>143</sup> These monies were primarily used “[...] weapons and munitions, wages, training of paramilitaries, payments to the owners of safe houses and welfare payments for the families of activists serving prison sentences,

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<sup>141</sup> J. Bowyer Bell, *The Gun in Politics: An Analysis of Irish Political Conflict* (Edison: Transaction Publishers, 1987), 106.

<sup>142</sup> Dr. Richard English, interviewed by the author, Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland, 31 October 2007

<sup>143</sup> Tim Parkman and Gill Peeling, *Countering Terrorist Finance: A Training Handbook for Financial Services* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, Limited, 2007), 57.

as well, as for supporting the political activities of Sinn Féin.”<sup>144</sup> The sources of funds were from the Irish Catholic diaspora community in the U.S. Examples of organizations who provided and/or did fundraising for the Provos and SF were Clann na Gael, the U.S. branch of the Irish Republican Brotherhood and Noraid.<sup>145</sup> Additional monies were gained when Provos members posed as legitimate farmers from the Republic and took monies from the European Economic Community (EEC). These monies were meant to subsidize southern Irish farmers so they could send produce to the United Kingdom. During the 1980s, the Provos were able to raise £8,000 per week using this scheme.<sup>146</sup> Libya also provided small arms and explosives to the Provos from 1968 to the mid-1980s. In addition to the weapons, it is estimated that at least \$20 million were provided during the same period. Both legal moneymaking plans (real estate investment in the Republic) and some criminal activity (particularly, extortion) were used also to raise funds.<sup>147</sup> These numbers would suggest the Provos had substantial physical resources in the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, the late 1980s and 1990s saw a dramatic decrease in the funds and other physical resources going to the Provos and SF. Funding from Noraid and Libya both began to decrease.<sup>148</sup> With the September 11 terrorist attacks, funds and weapons from outside of Northern Ireland dramatically decreased. As greater emphasis

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<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., 58. According to records provided to the U.S. Department of Justice by Noraid, three million U.S. dollars were raised and sent to Northern Ireland by them (1970 to 1986). An additional \$600,000 USD were sent between 1986 and 1999.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 58-59.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 60.

was placed on tracking funding going to terrorist groups, the Provos and SF's physical resources were most probably greatly reduced or eliminated.<sup>149</sup> In comparing shifts in the belief system and associated frames and greater political openings in the 1990s, one maybe able to draw connection between drops in physical resources and the changes in these other variables. From these interactions, the transformation of the PIRA/SF into a political party seems consistent with the CPVT model.

As noted earlier, some have argued that human resources, the need for human resources (rank-and-file, supporters, and sympathizers) diminished significantly towards the end of the 1980s.<sup>150</sup> Without specific numbers, no one can be completely sure how much the membership diminished. However, if the decrease in aid from the Irish Catholic diaspora community is an indication in the shift in the number of sympathizers than one can suspect a decrease did occur in the late 1980s and 1990s. There has been some decrease for SF and Provos support since the Good Friday Agreements and the decommissioning in 2005. Without clear data, one cannot completely conclude that a decline in human resources occurred in the 1990s and 2000s. One can conclude that shifts in the other variables under study did lead some members, supporters and sympathizers to leave the mainstream republican movement. This is evident in the

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<sup>149</sup> In August 2001, three members of the republican movement were arrested at the Bogotá Airport. The claim by the Colombian government was they were training FARC members in explosives. In 2004, they were cleared of those charges and deported from Colombia. There were originally claims by the Colombian government and others the Provos was attempting to raise monies by having these men train the FARC. For more details of their release and the charges against them, see, Sibylla Brodzinsky, "Colombia Clears IRA Suspects," *The Guardian*, 27 April 2004.

<sup>150</sup> English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 260.

breakaway of groups of “true believers” and the formation of armed violent groups (e.g., the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA).

As can be seen from this discussion, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and Sinn Féin have transformed themselves over their seventy-year history. Changes in their beliefs and associated frames, political accessibility, and resources have lead to that transformation. To gain a better understanding of how these processes and mechanisms interact and lead to the transformation into a political party, one additional case should be used as a comparison. In looking at guerrilla movements, which have transformed over time into political parties, one should look at the transformation of the African National Congress and its armed wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK). Similar to the transformation of the Provos and SF, the case of the ANC/MK presents a shift from armed struggle to a peaceful settlement of conflict.


#### CASE STUDY: AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC) AND SPEAR OF THE NATION (MK)

Similar to the conflict in Northern Ireland, conflict in South Africa came from a long colonial conflict. In each case, the British Empire did play a role. Yet, some would argue the eventual transformation of the ANC/MK into the dominant political party in South African politics is different because of their overall context.<sup>151</sup> One significant difference of the ANC/MK case is its transformation through both the conflict and post-conflict stage. The FARC and ASG cases are still involved in the diminished warfare period. PIRA/SF is currently in the transitional peace period of post-conflict. The ANC

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<sup>151</sup> Adrian Guelke noted to the author that the past and the more recent context create a different scenario of transformation when comparing the ANC/MK and the PIRA/SF. Dr. Adrian Guelke, interviewed by the author, Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland, 31 October 2007.

and MK have progressed fully into the permanent peace period. Some of its transformation occurred early in the post-conflict era (see Figure 6.3).



If one wants to see the position of Africans within South Africa prior to the creation of the Union, one just has to examine the meeting and subsequent constitution for the Union that came from the meeting. The African population did not have representatives at the National Convention in October 1908. Sixteen delegates of British ancestry and fourteen Afrikaners were left with the job of creating a draft constitution for the new Union. Vacant from the room were representatives of the African population of the various republics.<sup>152</sup> The individuals focused on four main issues in this meeting: the adoption of a unitary or federal form of government, which people within the new Union should be franchised, and how would English and Dutch (the two dominant languages of the White populations in the new Union) fit into the new country. There was no Bill of

<sup>152</sup> Roger B. Beck, *The History of South Africa* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000), 98.

Rights included in the new constitution. A simple majority in both the House of Assembly and the Senate could change changes to constitution. This latter point – the method of changing the new constitution – is important because the manner of electoral system in the Union later allowed the National Party to go almost unchecked in their legislation. This is particular important after 1948 – according to Beck and other scholars of South Africa – because it allowed the National Party to implement fully their apartheid system after 1948.<sup>153</sup> In the subsequent years following the creation of the Union of South Africa, the conditions for the African and Coloured populations did not get better. Conditions deteriorated with growing institutionalized discrimination. These conditions would lead to the creation of a variety of political organizations, including the African National Congress (ANC).

#### South Africa after Union & the Growth of the Political Struggle (1910-1948)

In looking at the early development in the political, economic, and social sphere of life in South Africa, one becomes acutely aware that institutionalized discrimination and marginalization of non-Whites was present from the beginning. This was even more problematic as the populations that were being singled out for this discrimination were the majority. In 1910, the new Union of South Africa had a population of 1,275,000 Whites as compared to an estimated collective population of 4.6 million non-Whites.<sup>154</sup>

Under the new constitution, non-Whites were prevented from becoming involved in a

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<sup>153</sup> Following the Union of South Africa constitution, a “winner-take-all” system in the legislative body was created. This allowed the political party that was in the majority to go virtually unchecked in their legislative-making. Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> This included the following groups (with their population numbers): 150,000 Indians; 500,000 Coloureds; and 4 million Africans. Julie Frederikse, *South Africa: A Different Kind of War* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986), 4.

direct manner in the political system of the new state. To accommodate the various former Republics' method of including non-Whites into the political system, a compromise was struck.<sup>155</sup> Men were only allowed to vote (therefore, initially barring women from voting) and white men were only allowed to sit as members of the legislative bodies. A provision in the constitution allowed for the appointment of some senators that would represent the opinions of the African population.<sup>156</sup> Even with this provision, the future for the non-White population was not positive.

In the general election of 1910, Louis Botha and Jan Smuts were brought into the lead the country. Even though early discussions about the "racial question" tended to focus on the "[...] ethnic cleavage between Afrikaners and English-speaking white South Africans [...],"<sup>157</sup> it was clear from early statement by Smuts and others how both groups tended to view the non-White population's role in the politics of South Africa. Prior to the establishment of the Union, when asked by J.X. Merriam, Prime Minister in the Cape Colony, how those residing in Transvaal would address how to deal with the native population, Smuts replied in the following: "I sympathize profoundly with the Native races of South Africa whose land it long before we came here to force a policy of dispossession on them...But, I don't believe in politics for them. [...] I would, therefore, not give them the franchise, which in any case would not affect more than a negligible

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<sup>155</sup> Prior to the Union, each Republic had its own way of addressing non-Whites participating in their political systems. In all of the Republics, only white men were allowed to vote. In Natal, this had been the system in place, yet some blacks were able to vote under discriminatory rules. The Cape Colony had a system which allowed voting rights for those who met certain economic requirements. Robert Ross, *A Concise History of South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 81-82.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, 82.

<sup>157</sup> Leonard Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 157.

number of them at present.”<sup>158</sup> Subsequent legislations passed during the reign of both Botha and Smuts began to set the stage for the apartheid state. It further reaffirmed the statements and beliefs concerning non-Whites.

The Land Act of 1913 would prove to be one of many pieces of legislation that further created a state of segregation and discrimination. As noted in an ANC document, *A History of the African National Congress*, it was the “[...] most severe law [...]” passed in the early days of South Africa.<sup>159</sup> Prior to the enactment of this legislation, many Africans had been shifted from farming their own lands to farming the lands of white farm owners. They had become tenants or sharecroppers. In some cases, the African population attempted to produce for the market but was challenged by white farmers. The Land Act limited the amount of land that could be owned by the African population (i.e., no more than twelve percent of the land and Whites could own the rest).<sup>160</sup> The land that the African population was allowed to buy or rent was “[...] in a few small reserves consisting largely of wasteland.”<sup>161</sup> In effect, this legislation began to

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<sup>158</sup> It should be noted the initial questioning of how Transvaal would address the question of the native population also provides insight into the thinking of the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony. He stated in his initial letter to Smuts: I do not like the Natives and I wish we had no black men in South Africa.” W.K. Hancock and Jean Van Der Poel, eds., *Selections from the Smuts Papers*, vol. Two (June 1902-May 1910) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 240-41.

<sup>159</sup> "Umzabalazo: A History of the African National Congress," The Mayibuye Centre, <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/about/umzabalazo.html>.

<sup>160</sup> Tim J. Jukes, *Opposition in South Africa: The Leadership of Z.K. Matthews, Nelson Mandela, and Stephen Biko* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1995), 19.

<sup>161</sup> Solomon Tshekisho Plaatje, *Native Life in South Africa before and since the European War and the Boer Rebellion* (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing Company, 1911; reprint, 2004), 2.

relegate the African population to a life of economic marginalization. As noted by the ANC, this act created “[...] overcrowding, land hunger, poverty and starvation.”<sup>162</sup>

These actions from the new Union would result in the founding of multiple political organizations to address the concerns of the non-White population. The most notable of these was the African National Congress (ANC). The organization came into existence in 1912 as the South African Native National Congress (SANNC). This organizations was later renamed the ANC. The ANC presented a unified political organization for Africans across South Africa. This organization allowed Africans to voice their concerns against the growing power of the White establishment in the new Union.<sup>163</sup> The early leaders of the ANC tended to favor a constitutional approach against the discriminatory laws and government practices used by the Union government. This generally consisted in the use of petitions and sending African delegations to meet with government officials.<sup>164</sup> This was prior to a limited warfare period for the ANC. Yet, this approach was not very effective. There was very little effective action by the ANC in the 1920s. There was an attempt at revitalization of the organization in the 1920s as government policies became harsher. Yet, the ANC was not able to effect change

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<sup>162</sup> "Umzabalazo: A History of the African National Congress."

<sup>163</sup> Juckes, *Opposition in South Africa: The Leadership of Z.K. Matthews, Nelson Mandela, and Stephen Biko*, 23. & Sheridan Johns and Jr. R. Hunt Davis, eds., *Mandela, Tambo, and the African National Congress: The Struggle against Apartheid, 1948-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 5.

<sup>164</sup> "Umzabalazo: A History of the African National Congress," The Mayibuye Centre, <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/about/umzabalazo.html>.

again.<sup>165</sup> It would not be until the advent of the Hertzog Bills in 1936 and the growth of Afrikaner nationalism the ANC would change their approach.<sup>166</sup>

The educated African population who had been attempting to change the politics and economics of South Africa had failed to realize the basis for many of the conditions. There were racial superiority arguments behind many of the policies that had been adopted in the early years of South Africa.<sup>167</sup> There were many forms of legislations, which were debilitating to the African population. Even as the ANC were attempting to address these issues in the 1920s, 1930s and early 1940s, more discriminatory legislation was passed. This included: the Urban Areas Act of 1923, which led to creation of slums for Africans; the Color Bar Act of 1926, which banned Africans from practicing skilled trades; the Native Administration Act of 1927, which placed the British Crown as the supreme leader of all African tribes; and the Representation of Natives Act, “[...] which removed Africans from the Common Voters’ Roll in the Cape, thereby shattering any illusion that whites would allow Africans to have control over their own destiny.”<sup>168</sup> The last of these pieces of legislation would be a part of a legislative agenda known as the ‘Hertzog bills.’ Inherent in these pieces of legislation was the desire to unify the White population in South African and to make the African population irrelevant. As noted by Hertzog, in allowing Africans to be on the voting rolls, it would potentially lead to a

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<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> Jukes, *Opposition in South Africa: The Leadership of Z.K. Matthews, Nelson Mandela, and Stephen Biko*, 44.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., 43.

<sup>168</sup> Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, 99-100.

division of the white population into various political factions. Some of these would potentially ally themselves with the African population and therefore, the desires of the white population would never be met.<sup>169</sup> In reaction to the Hertzog political agenda, a younger group of the ANC began to push the organization to take a stronger and less measured approach to changing the system in South Africa. This group of young ANC members formed the ANC Youth League (YL).<sup>170</sup> From the YL, the future leaders of the ANC would emerge and a new trajectory would be taken by Africans in their attempts to change the system. Mandela would be one of those young leaders who wanted to change the approach of the ANC.

#### The Development of a 'New' ANC (1948-1960)

In 1948, the results of the South African general elections would change the face of the struggle of non-Whites forever. In the 1948 general elections, the National Party (NP) came to power. It was indicative of the growth of white nationalism. NP won seventy seats and the Afrikaner Party (AP), who had entered into an election pact with the NP, won eight seats. This was in comparison to the sixty-five seats won by the United Party (UP) and the Labour Party who won six seats. From 1948 to 1994, the NP would rule as the dominant party in South African politics. DF (Daniel François) Malan led the NP and he would serve as Prime Minister of South Africa (1948-1954). With his rise to power, many argue this can be seen as the beginning of the apartheid state in South

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<sup>169</sup> James Barber, *South Africa in the Twentieth Century: A Political History - in Search of a Nation State* (Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley, John & Sons, Incorporated, 1999), 94.

<sup>170</sup> Jukes, *Opposition in South Africa: The Leadership of Z.K. Matthews, Nelson Mandela, and Stephen Biko*, 51.

Africa.<sup>171</sup> The rule of Malan and Strijdom saw the consolidation of Afrikaner rule. They focused on the political power through disenfranchising non-Whites. Likewise, further economic marginalization occurred during the early days of the apartheid state. An example of the consolidation of White rule over the economy can be seen in the NP's policy of reserving jobs for Whites. The Job Reservation Determination No. 3 (1958) reserved fifteen different operations for Whites and therefore, dictated who could use certain machinery.<sup>172</sup> The brutality of the apartheid regime in the early years was most apparent in 1955. ZK (Zachariah Keodirelang) Matthews – a prominent leader in the ANC in the 1940s and 1950s – noted the following about the brutality of the apartheid state in 1955:

“[There was] the forceful removal by soldiers and police armed to the teeth, of people from western areas of Johannesburg to the much vaunted Meadowlands in February 1955 [...] the introduction of ethnic grouping into urban African townships which will promote tribal antagonism and internecine disputes, thus seeking to undermine the growing spirit of unity among the African people for which organisations like the ANC stand [...]”<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> Hentz divides the apartheid state era of South Africa into five periods. Each of which were led by a member of the NP. The first period is Malan's administration (1948-1954) and Strijdom's administration (1954-1958). The second period is Verwoerd's administration (1958-1966). The third period is Vorster's administration (1966-1978). The fourth period was P.K. Botha's administration, which began in 1978 and ended in 1989 when he resigned as South Africa's first state president. F.W. de Klerk served as the last leader of the apartheid era (1989-1994). See, James J. Hentz, *South Africa and the Logic of Regional Cooperation* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2005), 20.

<sup>172</sup> Prior to this law, most businesses hired African labor because they were cheaper than White labor. In 1959, in response to the Job Reservation Determination law, the Industrial Council – who represented workers when it came to job reservations and employers who opposed job reservations – vetoed the law. The government then amended the Industrial Council Act, which then allowed them to overrule decisions by the council. See, *Ibid.*, 21-22.

<sup>173</sup> ZK Matthews, *Freedom for My People: The Autobiography of ZK Matthews, South Africa 1901 to 1968* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1981), 182-83.

Yet, the brutality of the apartheid state did not stop the struggle by the ANC that had started in 1912. Instead, it gave the organizations a renewed sense of purpose.

As has been noted earlier from its inception until the rise of the NP, the ANC had attempted to struggle against the state by using a gradual insider process (a political, non-violent approach). This had not worked as more and more discriminatory law was passed by each subsequent administration since the formation of the Union. A more militant stance had to be taken by the ANC. Previously the organizations representing Coloureds and Indians did not always work with African organizations. In the aftermath of the 1948 elections this began to change. Due to the ongoing oppression against the Indian population, in 1947, the ANC and the Indian Congresses signed an agreement whereby they would support each other's campaigns.<sup>174</sup> In 1949, three members of the Youth League were elected to the ANC executive committee: Walter Sisulu, Oliver Tambo, and Nelson Mandela. Subsequently, a new approach was officially adopted by the ANC. This new approach came in the use of strikes, boycotts, and civil disobedience.<sup>175</sup> These approaches triggered the 1952 Defiance Campaign. These were public violations of laws that were discriminatory.<sup>176</sup> This era of the ANC's development was prior to the move into the limited warfare period.

This new set of beliefs and the framing of those beliefs can best be seen in the 1949 Program of Action. On 17 December 1949, a *Programme of Action* was adopted at

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<sup>174</sup> "Umzabalazo: A History of the African National Congress."

<sup>175</sup> Beck, *The History of South Africa*, 139.

<sup>176</sup> Julian Kunnie, *Is Apartheid Really Dead? : Pan-Africanist Working-Class Cultural Critical Perspectives* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 17-18.

the ANC Annual Conference. At the core of this document was the goal of political independence and freedom from White domination. The document called for “[...] direct representation in all governing bodies of the country [...].”<sup>177</sup> The Programme called for the use of “[...] immediate and active boycott, strike, civil disobedience, [and] non-cooperation [...].”<sup>178</sup> It also called for a day of work stoppage to protest the current policies of the state. The document began to establish the need to raise funds for the future struggle against the state and the need to use propaganda to gain support and raise awareness of the issues faced by the non-White population.<sup>179</sup> In effect, the ANC had shifted from a movement wanting to work within the system to a passive resistance organization who wanted to struggle against the system. This in shifts beliefs may have been a result of realizing the apartheid state had a power advantage.

The ANC continued along their path of passive resistance in 1952, along with the South African Indian Congress, in the Defiance Campaign (also known as the Campaign for the Defiance of the Unjust Laws). This started at Port Elizabeth on June 26, 1952. As the various communities began to join in across the country, the number of protestors grew at a rapid rate. For example, there were only 36 protestors at Port Elizabeth in the morning of June 26 and by the afternoon, in Johannesburg, there were 106 individuals defying the unjust laws. By the end of 1952, approximately 8,500 individuals had participated in the campaign and been arrested and they came from every community in

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<sup>177</sup> African National Congress, "Programme of Action: Statement of Policy Adopted at the ANC Annual Conference," <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/progact.html>.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

South Africa. In addition, they were not all Africans. Coloureds, Indians, and some Europeans joined in the protest.<sup>180</sup> Human resources needs were small during this period. In action and in words (Mandela noted in his address, “[t]he entire country was transformed into battle zones where the forces of liberation were locked in immortal conflict against those of reaction and evil [,]” the Defiance Campaign was a direct reflection of the changing belief system and associated frames of the ANC.<sup>181</sup> One can see this growth in the passive struggle was a reaction to the further closure of political accessibility to non-Whites and their affiliated organizations. The 1952 campaign helped to gain sympathizers and supporters from the international community and there was a large increase in ANC membership following the Defiance Campaign.<sup>182</sup> It is estimated during the Defiance Campaign the ANC’s membership grew to over 100,000, yet within a year of the campaign the numbers had plummeted to 30,000.<sup>183</sup> By 1953, the South African government had passed multiple new laws against the passive resistance

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<sup>180</sup>Quote from Mandela’s Presidential speech in 1953 when he accepted the position of President of the Transvaal ANC. He did not actually give the speech, as he was banned from attending or giving speeches at any gatherings. Instead, Robert Resha read the speech to the crowd on behalf of Mandela. See, Nelson Mandela, *No Easy Walk to Freedom: Articles, Speeches, and Trial Addresses*, Revised ed. (Johannesburg: Heinemann Educational Publishers, 1990), 21.

<sup>181</sup> A great example of how Mandela specifically frame the new beliefs of the ANC can be seen in his burning of his passbook (the document that Africans needed to have before they could enter into White Only areas to work). He purposely found a place and time that he could be photographed committing this act of passive resistance against the apartheid system. For more details of this event, see, John Carlin, *Playing the Enemy: Nelson Mandela and the Game That Made a Nation* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2008), 25-26.

<sup>182</sup> A more in-depth discussion concerning the rise in ANC membership following the Defiance Campaign can be seen in the following: Thomas Karis, Gwendolen M. Carter, and Gail M. Gerhart, eds., *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964*, vol. 1-4 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977).

<sup>183</sup> Bernard Magubane, "Introduction: The Political Context," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, ed. Theresa Papenfus (Cape Town, South Africa: Zebra Press, 2004), 33.

approach and there were severe penalties attached.<sup>184</sup> To enforce those laws and prevent future growth in the passive resistance movement the Public Safety Act, No. 3 (1953) was passed. It gave more power to the police to stop the actions of the ANC and related organizations throughout the country.<sup>185</sup> With the growth of the ANC and their passive resistance movement and the furtherance of the oppressive nature of the apartheid state, the state and the ANC were on a collision course that would lead to the adoption of violent struggle. This early limited warfare period led to a full-scale period between the two parties.

The late 1950s saw two important developments in the development of the ANC. In 1955, *The Freedom Charter* was adopted by the Congress of the People.<sup>186</sup> In adopting *The Freedom Charter*, the ANC established themselves as a multiracial organizations and not just an African organization. This multiracial stance would allow the ANC to gain more human and physical resources. In 1959, a group of ANC members splintered off and formed the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). The PAC members opposed multiracial tactics that were adopted by the ANC.<sup>187</sup> Unlike previous attempts to address the issues facing non-Whites in South Africa, this document moved the ANC

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<sup>184</sup> Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, 208.

<sup>185</sup> Leo Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 63.

<sup>186</sup> Readers should be careful to confuse not the Congress of the People Summit with the Congress of the People political party that developed during the 2008 South African elections. This political party was made-up of previous ANC members and there was great controversy about them using the name from the summit in 1955. The Pretoria High Court dismissed the legal contestation over their use of the name.

<sup>187</sup> Johns and R. Hunt Davis, eds., *Mandela, Tambo, and the African National Congress: The Struggle against Apartheid, 1948-1990*, 6.

from being “[...] proactive rather than reactive.”<sup>188</sup> In examining *The Freedom Charter*, a series of themes are present. These themes include: a call for South Africa to belong to everyone of every race; the promotion of democratic governance that would include all peoples; the securing of rights where all people can use their own language and develop their own culture; discriminatory practices or the promotion of those practices should be a “[...] punishable crime [...],” freedom of travel for all citizens; equality in economics and education; and freedom to live in housing of one’s choosing (i.e., ghettos and fenced locations would be demolished).<sup>189</sup> The last line of *The Freedom Charter* reaffirmed the proactive stance the ANC and others would take in their struggle.<sup>190</sup> The last line of the document states: “These freedoms we will fight for, side by side, throughout our lives, until we have won our liberty.” (This is a very similar stance taken by the PIRA/SF in the 1970s in their reaction to British internment and other repressive policies in Northern Ireland.)

The second largest development in the struggle in the 1950s in South Africa was the rise of Verwoerd to Prime Minister and the struggle between the ANC and PAC over human resources (i.e., members, supporters and sympathizers). Prior to him becoming Prime Minister, Verwoerd had been the head of the Native Affairs Department. Through his actions as the Minister of Native Affairs, it was apparent the apartheid state would

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<sup>188</sup> Magubane, "Introduction: The Political Context," 33. & Ismael Vadi, *The Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter* (New Delhi, India: Sterling Publishers, 1998), 68-165.

<sup>189</sup> Congress of the People, "The Freedom Charter," <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/charter.html>.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

grow and become more oppressive.<sup>191</sup> In this context, the PAC and ANC worked against each other to gain members for their organizations. Some PAC members – particularly, the younger members – felt the ANC needed to be more confrontational with the apartheid state.<sup>192</sup> By this time, the apartheid state had banned the movement of many members of the Congress of the People and many were banned from belonging to the ANC. Additionally, charges were being leveled at the ANC Executive Committee that the organization had lost touch with the people they were supposedly supporting.<sup>193</sup> Some of the ANC leadership were arrested in 1956 and charged with treason by the apartheid state. Mandela was one of the men arrested and charged. He was along with a total of 105 Africans, 21 Indians, 23 Whites and 7 Coloureds.<sup>194</sup> In the midst of the treason trial and the struggle for power between the ANC and the PAC, strikes and antipass campaigns had grown. This culminated on March 21, 1960 with the Sharpeville massacre – the turning point for the struggle in South Africa. With this event, the ANC would transform from a political movement using passive resistance to an underground movement with a militant wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation or MK).

#### THE BEGINNING OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE OF THE MK

In a similar fashion as the developments of the PIRA/SF following the events of Bloody Sunday (1972), the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 would push the ANC and its

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<sup>191</sup> This was the position of the ANC Working Committee in 1958. Quoted in: Magubane, "Introduction: The Political Context," 34.

<sup>192</sup> Gail Gerhart, *Black Power in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 203.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, 173-80.

<sup>194</sup> Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, 200.

members towards a campaign of violent struggle. As noted by Mandela, “[t]he massacre at Sharpeville created a new situation in the country.”<sup>195</sup> Prior to the massacre, Mandela had foreseen the possibility of the struggle becoming violent.<sup>196</sup> On March 21, demonstrators had congregated outside various police stations around Vereeniging and most of these crowds were dispersed with low-flying jets and police baton charges. Yet, this approach was not used on the 5,000 people who had congregated in Sharpeville. At the gate, a fight broke out and the demonstrators began to surge. In response, an estimated 300 police officers began firing into the crowd, 69 people were killed, and 180 were wounded. To make the incident even worse, it was later found that many people were shot in the back.<sup>197</sup> In the aftermath of this event, Mandela, Walter, Duma Nokwe, and Joe Slovo met to decide what type of response the ANC should have to this event.<sup>198</sup> In a series of protest – including the burning of passbooks before the media, the ANC had made their point. This future would be a more militant struggle against the apartheid state. In response, the state declared a State of Emergency and closed any openings to the political system for the ANC or other related organizations.

Following the massacre at Sharpeville and the subsequent declaration of martial law, the apartheid state took additional steps against the ANC and PAC. This included

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<sup>195</sup> Ibid., 238.

<sup>196</sup> Juckes, *Opposition in South Africa: The Leadership of Z.K. Matthews, Nelson Mandela, and Stephen Biko*, 101.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid., 95. & Tom Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945* (New York: Longman Publishing, 1983), 271-72. For more details concerning the lead-up to the Sharpeville massacre, the incident and the aftermath, see, Philip H. Frankel, *An Ordinary Atrocity: Sharpeville and Its Massacre* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

<sup>198</sup> Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, 239.

the banning of the ANC and PAC under the Suppression of Communism Act.<sup>199</sup> Following this banning, it became apparent to the leadership of the ANC that it was time to implement the 'M-plan.' Nelson Mandela created this plan prior to the banning of the ANC and PAC. The M-plan called for a reorganization of the ANC into a cellular structure. Each township street would have one cell. Each cell would be further divided into 'blocks.' Each block would be made-up of seven households. Seven cells would constitute a zone and four zones would be a 'ward' that was headed by a 'prime steward.' When these prime stewards met, this would be a branch secretariat of the ANC.<sup>200</sup> (This was a very similar approach employed by Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness and others when the PIRA was reorganized to prevent destruction of the movement.) Once the ANC thought they had enough support to wage an armed struggle against the apartheid state, the time had come for the forming on the *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation). After presenting the case before 60 delegates at the National Executive Committee of the ANC, Mandela and others had received permission to create a new military organization. He then convinced some of the ANC's allies from the Indian, Coloured and White community of the need for the new military organization.<sup>201</sup> The move towards armed struggle had begun.

This shift towards the use of violence and the creation of the MK occurred as the full-scale warfare period began. As the ANC authorized the use of force and the creation

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<sup>199</sup> Karis, Carter, and Gerhart, eds., *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964*, 339-40.

<sup>200</sup> Tom Lodge, *Mandela: A Critical Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 57-58.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, 90.

of the MK, it is apparent the true believers (TBs) in the organization were driving the ANC. Mandela and the others saw the insider solution of the past and the passive resistance as ineffectual to the cause. In attempting to remain true to the original belief system and its associated frames, the TBs saw an armed struggle as the only way. With no political accessibility and growing human and physical resources, full-scale warfare was inevitable.

The *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation or MK) was an organization that was jointly founded by the ANC and the SACP (South African Community Party). It was agreed the MK would use only non-lethal sabotage because it would allow better conditions to reconcile with the White population and the apartheid state in later years.<sup>202</sup> The new command of the MK was made up of Joe Slovo, as the Chief of Staff, Walter Sisulu – a former secretary general of the ANC (held until 1954) and Raymond Mhlaba. Many of the original rank-and-file of MK were taken from the membership of the SACP. According to Lodge, the reason for this approach to filling the MK's roster was SACP members "[...] were better prepared for clandestine work and they tended to be more disciplined than ANC rank and file."<sup>203</sup> By December of that year, the MK had established four regional commands in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, and Port Elizabeth. The MK drew more support from the Eastern Cape. During the building of the ideological foundation of the MK, which came from the various writings of Che Guevara, Mao Tse-tung, and various other guerrilla fighters, the MK began to build their

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<sup>202</sup> Ibid.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid., 91.

physical resources – primarily bombs. MK members using chemical and industrial explosives constructed these weapons.<sup>204</sup> With a solid belief system and human and physical resources available, the MK chose an important day to Afrikaners to make their mark on the history of South African struggles.

#### Saboteurs Begin – The Early Days of the Armed Struggle

On December 16, 1961, the MK exploded their first series of bombs at electric power stations and government offices in Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth. This was an especially poignant day for the apartheid state as it was the day that celebrated the Afrikaners victory over the Zulus at Blood River in 1838.<sup>205</sup> The MK left leaflets at the bombed targets that outlined the beliefs of the MK and the shift of the ANC in their struggles. As noted in the *Manifesto of Umkhonto we Sizwe*, members of the MK supported the national liberation movement being commanded by the ANC and many members of the MK belong to both the MK and the ANC or the SACP. Similar to the SF and PIRA, membership in one organization was indistinguishable from being a member in the other organization. The shift toward the use of force against the South African government can be seen in the following statement:

“The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom.”<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> Ibid., 93-95.

<sup>205</sup> Michael Burleigh, *Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009), 143.

<sup>206</sup> Umkhonto we Sizwe, "Manifesto of Umkhonto We Sizwe," <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/manifesto-mk.html>.

This necessary shift to the use of violence in the struggle was blamed on the apartheid state. The MK noted in their manifesto that the choice to use violence was “not [their choice]; it has been made by the Nationalist government [...]”<sup>207</sup> They further noted that peaceful means had been attempted to address the concerns of the people, yet these were ignored. They further framed their argument for violent action as a temporary measure, which could be abandoned when the government decides to take positive action. Lastly, in the *Manifesto*, the MK outlined their violent struggle was for all South African people.<sup>208</sup> This frame was used to justify the more violent actions of the MK. In this frame and the subsequent call for support, the MK hoped to draw more human resources to their cause.

During the full-scale warfare period, the MK stayed to the agreement they had made with the NEC of the ANC during the MK’s inception. They relied on the use of sabotage operations to continue their struggle.<sup>209</sup> From December 1961 to July 1963, the MK carried out an estimated 194 attacks. These attacks tended to cause little damage, as the average cost of damage by an MK attack was \$125 USD.<sup>210</sup> These targeting of non-lethal targets was consistent with the belief that the armed struggle was a temporary extension of the political struggle. In adopting the idea of using an armed struggle, Oliver Tambo, who served as Secretary General of the ANC in 1955 and as Deputy

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<sup>207</sup> Ibid.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> Rocky Williams, "The Other Armies: A Brief Historical Overview of Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), 1961-1994," *Military History Journal* 11, no. 5 (2000): 4.

<sup>210</sup> Burleigh, *Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism*, 143.

President of the ANC in 1958, noted the use of violence is “[...] an extension of, not a substitute for, the forms of political action employed in the past.”<sup>211</sup> The furtherance of these ideas can be seen in Mandela’s statement that the armed struggle “[...] was not terrorism.”<sup>212</sup> Later, Mandela would further reaffirm this focus on non-lethal forms of violence (as a core belief of the MK and ANC) during the Rivonia Trial, where he was being tried for treason. During his statement to the court, he noted that there were multiple forms of violence that could have been employed by the MK. These forms were sabotage, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and open revolution. The decision was made to use the least violent of the forms, sabotage. As Mandela suggested, “[s]abotage did not involve loss of life, and it offered the best hope for future race relation.”<sup>213</sup> The use of this non-lethal form of armed resistance as core belief would be maintained due to the command structure that the MK had. In addition to the command structure, Mandela made the point that discipline would be maintained. This was because many individuals in the command structure had been members of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, who had been involved in the armed struggle in the Palestine Mandate from 1944 to 1948. In addition to the adoption of non-lethal armed struggle by the MK, Mandela argued the ANC should continue to pursue its political approach.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>211</sup> Johns and R. Hunt Davis, eds., *Mandela, Tambo, and the African National Congress: The Struggle against Apartheid, 1948-1990*, 90.

<sup>212</sup> This is adapted from the following quote he made in his courtroom statement in April 20, 1964, at the Rivonia Trial: “But the violence which we chose to adopt was not terrorism.” *Ibid.*, 117.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, 121.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, 122-25.

Similar to the ‘Armalite and the ballot box’ approach adopted by the PIRA and SF in the 1980s, the ANC continued to use a mixture of militancy and politics to pursue to their goals. This approach was based on the same core principles outlined in *The Programme Action* and *The Freedom Charter*. Therefore, in a similar fashion to the development of the PIRA and SF, the ANC would continue to push the political approach while the MK pushed the armed struggle approach. Yet, the reaction of the British and Northern Ireland government to the PIRA/SF’s actions and rhetoric would be the same reaction the ANC and MK would find in South Africa. The reaction would be further oppression and measures to destroy the movements. This reaction by the South African state would be the General Law Amendment Act No 76 (also known as the Sabotage Act).<sup>215</sup> In this act, the South African government would take a similar approach as the British in the internment of the leaders of the movements in attempts to crush them.

#### Prison and the Struggle Continues

As a repercussion of the initial acts by the MK, the South African apartheid government developed the Sabotage Act in June 1962 and General Law Amendment Act No 37 (May 1963). These new laws allowed the South African government to detain individuals in an indefinite manner. Furthermore, the new law banned individuals from social gatherings that had more than one visitor at a time.<sup>216</sup> The General Law Amendment Act No 37 allowed the previous restrictions against the ANC and the PAC to

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<sup>215</sup> Williams, "The Other Armies: A Brief Historical Overview of Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), 1961-1994," 4.

<sup>216</sup> For an overview of the various pieces of legislation passed by the South African apartheid state, see, "Umzabalazo: A History of the African National Congress."

be applied to the MK and Poqo, the armed wing of PAC.<sup>217</sup> In addition, in reaction to the development of MK and Poqo, the apartheid state began to develop, train and deploy intelligence units. The Republican Intelligence – a covert branch of the South African government’s Security Branch was created in 1963.<sup>218</sup> These South African units used extra-legal means to repress the MK, Poqo, ANC, and PAC in the 1960s. This included the torturing of detainees and the use of small-scale sabotage. For example, a security operative Craig Williamson told the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that South African security services were most probably behind two arson attacks in Bechuanaland. All of these tactics were attempts by the government to gain power advantages over the ANC/MK and PAC/Poqo. In addition, some individuals who had fled South Africa into neighboring states were kidnapped from those states and brought back to South Africa by security services.<sup>219</sup> Even as the repression continued by the state, the MK continued along their armed struggle path and the ANC continued along its political approach path. During the full-scale warfare period, both the South African state and the ANC and MK fought to gain decisive power advantages.

The MK “remained the instrument of the liberation movement and was driven by [the ANC’s] political programmes.”<sup>220</sup> In 1962, the Lobatse Conference was convened to dispel the confusion that had developed amongst the ANC members concerning the MK

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<sup>217</sup> Muriel Horrell, *Laws Affecting Race Relations in South Africa: To the End of 1976* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1978), 416.

<sup>218</sup> This unit was the forerunner to the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), which was created in 1969. Madeleine Fullard, "State Repression in the 1960s," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, ed. Theresa Papenfus (Cape Town, South Africa: Zebra Press, 2004), 349.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, 350.

<sup>220</sup> Williams, "The Other Armies: A Brief Historical Overview of Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), 1961-1994," 4.

and its connection to the ANC. Even though a decision to allow the MK to take on an armed struggle against the state was decided in early years, there was still confusion on the actual approval of this by the ANC leadership. In a statement issued by the ANC in 1963 (on the proceedings at the Lobatse Conference), it became public record that the liberation struggle consisted of the ANC as the political wing and the MK as the military wing. Additionally, the statement reaffirmed the political approach in the struggle.<sup>221</sup> In publishing this statement, the ANC had publically confirmed its connection in the armed struggle against the state. This was a similar approach used in the linking of the Sinn Féin and the Provos. In both cases, during this full-scale warfare period, both guerrilla movements were a hybrid of political organizations and militant organizations.

Near Pietermaritzburg, in August 1962, the state captured Mandela.<sup>222</sup> With a raid on the Lilliesleaf Farm in July 1963, the South African government had captured most of the MK leadership, including Sisulu Govan Mbeki and Wilton Mkwayi, the commander of the MK until 1964.<sup>223</sup> Due to the overlapping memberships between the MK and ANC, nineteen ANC leaders were captured in the raid. In October 1963, the trials against the captured leaders of the ANC and MK proceeded (i.e., *The State versus the National High Command* or as was later known as *The State versus Nelson Mandela and others*.)<sup>224</sup> During the trial, the case centered on charges that Mandela and others

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<sup>221</sup> Bernard Magubane et al., "The Turn to Armed Struggle," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, ed. Theresa Papenfus (Cape Town, South Africa: Zebra Press, 2004), 135-36.

<sup>222</sup> Beck, *The History of South Africa*, 145.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid. & Burleigh, *Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism*, 143.

<sup>224</sup> Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, 351.

were attempting to format a guerrilla campaign against the state. To prove these charges, the South African government focused on a document they had acquired during the Rivonia raid. The document was a draft of an operation called Operation Mayibuye. (The operation was a plan for guerrilla operations and how that plan could lead to a “[...] mass armed uprising against the government.”<sup>225</sup>) The attempt by the government was to use the document to argue that the ANC executive had approved the plan and it was to be made operational by the MK.<sup>226</sup> In using the approach, the state hoped to permanently close all political access to the ANC and MK and permanently stop their struggle. In the end, the approach led to life sentences on Robbings Island for those on trial. However, just as the Provos and SF had operated from prison and through those not caught by the British, the imprisoned members of the ANC and MK still influenced the ‘outside world.’ Additionally, Oliver Tambo had been sent out of the country and he was able to continue the struggle for a free South Africa.

#### Struggle from Outside and Inside

With the sending of Mandela and others to Robbings Island, the South African government most probably thought the struggle against the political and guerrilla movement was at an end. Tambo had escaped being arrested and had fled first to Tanzania. During the Tambo’s time in Tanzania, he was able to begin to rebuild the guerrilla movement. Some of the military cadre were sent to Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Morocco for military training. A group of 500 hundred MK members went to

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<sup>225</sup> Ibid., 358.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

Odessa in the Soviet Union for training for a year. In 1965, the president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere allowed the ANC/MK to create its own training camp in Dodoma.<sup>227</sup> Tambo and the MK eventually went into exile in Lusaka, Zambia in 1967. During this same year, Albert Lutuli (Luthuli), President of the ANC since 1952, died and Tambo filled the vacancy of President of the ANC.<sup>228</sup> Even as they trained abroad, the ANC and MK was limited in their activities in the mid-1960s. They did involve themselves in operations outside of South Africa including joint operations with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) to penetrate northwest Rhodesia (1967-1968).<sup>229</sup>

The lack of operations in South Africa by the ANC or the MK led to disaffection amongst the various rank-and-file, supporters and sympathizers. As it looked dire for the national liberation in South Africa, in 1969, a meeting was called and a new approach (beliefs and associated frames) was adopted. The resource power advantage and military/political power advantage was held by the South African state during this period of full-scale warfare. This had an influence on creating resource needs and preventing political accessibility for the ANC/MK. Consistent with the modeling proposed in Chapter 3, as human resources needs begin to grow, a guerrilla movement may be influenced to shift on their belief systems and their associated frames. This would lead to a new life for the ANC and the MK.

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<sup>227</sup> Burleigh, *Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism*, 144.

<sup>228</sup> Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, 211.

<sup>229</sup> Johns and R. Hunt Davis, eds., *Mandela, Tambo, and the African National Congress: The Struggle against Apartheid, 1948-1990*, 182.

In the context of a weakened national liberation movement, seventy representatives of the ANC, the SACP (black, white, Coloured and Indians members) and similar organizations met in April 1969 in Morogoro, Tanzania. Prior to this meeting, the ANC and MK in the late 1960s and 1970s had a reduced role in the struggle in South Africa.<sup>230</sup> The reason was to bring new life into the struggle in South Africa. At the First National Consultative Conference of the ANC, it was decided that the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) would be cut in size. A new Revolutionary Council was created to oversee the MK and re-establish ANC presence in South Africa. The ANC membership was also opened to non-Africans while reserving the leadership roles (the NEC) for Africans. The document that outlined these and other changes in the ANC/MK's approach to the struggle is the *Strategy and Tactics of the South African Revolution*. The document outlined the reason for the continuation of the armed struggle. It showed to the reader the continuation of the beliefs and associated frames that the armed struggle is a component of the overall political struggle against an unjust state.<sup>231</sup> The document noted that the future of strategy and tactics in South Africa had to address class divisions and racial divisions. It is clear from the document that an approach had to be taken which would mobilize people from every lifestyle. The focus only on the

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<sup>230</sup> Nigel Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa*, 3rd ed. (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, Ltd., 2000), 131.

<sup>231</sup> In the document, the conference noted the following: "When we talk of revolutionary armed struggle, we are talking of political struggle by means which include the use of military force even though once force as a tactic is introduced it has the most far-reaching consequences on every aspect of our activities. It is important to emphasise this because our movement must reject all manifestations of militarism which separates armed people's struggle from its political context." See, African National Congress, "Strategy and Tactics of the ANC," <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/stratact.html>. This clearly shows how the political approach was the dominant theme for the ANC in the 1960s and the armed struggle was just meant to be a part of that approach.

problems of the African population would not allow the ANC and MK to grow the human resources they needed.

During this period, those detained on Robben Island were continuing to struggle, but in a different manner. In a similar fashion to the prison protest of Northern Ireland in the late 1970s, the ANC and MK members who had been detained were fighting for the rights of the political prisoners in South Africa. As noted by Mandela, the ANC created a command structure while imprisoned on Robben Island. The High Organ (also known as the High Command) was made-up of the former leadership from the ANC (e.g., Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki, and Mhlaba). The High Organ was led by Mandela and only tried to address the concerns of the prisoners. The prisoners had agreed that it would not be appropriate to effect policy with the ANC outside of prison.<sup>232</sup> This was dissimilar in comparison to the Provos and SF case because some leadership in Long Kesh directed some of the policy and operations outside of prison.<sup>233</sup> Similar to the prison experience for republican political prisoners, those on Robben Island gained an education inside of the prison. The older members taught many of the younger prisoners about the history of the ANC and the uneducated ones gained college degrees in many cases.<sup>234</sup> By the late 1970s, the conditions in South Africa would continue to get worse for non-Whites. This would spark the growth of struggle and a renewal of the ANC and MK.

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<sup>232</sup> Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, 442.

<sup>233</sup> This was generally done with 'comms' as they became to be known in Northern Ireland.

<sup>234</sup> Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, 467.

## THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ANC AND THE MK

The early days of the 1970s saw ebb in the activities of the ANC and the MK. As the organization was attempting to reorganize and remobilize, the movement could not be overly active for fear of further oppression and the potential for elimination of the struggle in South Africa. The South African state had a growing military/political power advantage and a resource advantage when compared to the ANC and MK. The guerrilla movement recognized this situation and was being affected by these conditions. The belief system and associated frames of the MK began to be influenced by Soviet military tactics and various ideological influences from classic guerrilla movement writings (e.g., the writings of Che Guevara and Mao Tse-tung). In the mid-1970s, the conditions for the MK and ANC would change. Changes in policies concerning education in South Africa and changes in the economic conditions of the state began to drive individuals towards joining the MK.<sup>235</sup> The human resource need began to diminish. In addition, the rise of 'Black Consciousness' began to influence the approach and beliefs of the struggle in South Africa.

In the 1970s, the ANC and MK would continue to try to develop their struggle in the midst of the 'Black Consciousness' era. This era would also see the rise of Stephen Biko within the national liberation struggle and the Soweto uprising. The Black Consciousness movement focused on the liberal opinion of Whites in South Africa. Some argue it was partially an imitation of the Black Power Movement in the U.S. in the same period. This movement, which was led by Stephen Biko, was initially invited by

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<sup>235</sup> Williams, "The Other Armies: A Brief Historical Overview of Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), 1961-1994," 6-7.

the apartheid state. This was because of the rejection of violence by the movement and its focus on raising consciousness amongst non-Whites.<sup>236</sup> The Black Consciousness movement posed an alternative solution to the struggles of non-Whites in South Africa. In 1968, Biko had led a group of African students to split away from the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) to form the exclusively black organizations, South African Students Organization (SASO). This organization was focused on uniting all victims of white racism and to get those individuals from relying on white organizations that claimed to work on their behalf. As Biko would write,

“Black consciousness is in essence the realization by the black man of the need to rally together with his brothers around the cause of their operation – the blackness of their skin [...] Blacks no longer seek to reform the system because so doing implies acceptance of the major points around which the system revolves. [...] Blacks are out to completely transform the system and to make of it what they wish.”<sup>237</sup>

In examining this statement and other similar statements by Biko and other leaders within the Black Consciousness movement, there was great similarity between the belief systems of the ANC and MK and the Black Consciousness movement. This similarity was primarily on the desire to change the system. The biggest difference in these two groups was the Black Consciousness movement’s focus on gaining only black human resources. The ANC and MK were open to having whites who were against the apartheid South African state become members of the movements.

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<sup>236</sup> Burleigh, *Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism*, 145.

<sup>237</sup> Quoted from *The Definition of Black Consciousness*, see, Steve Biko, *I Write What I Like: A Selection of His Writings* (Oxford: Heinemann Educational Publishers, 1987), 49.

Due to conditions in South Africa, the ANC would begin to gain back their needed human resources. This would also be a result of the South African government losing the social power advantage to the movements, as the state become more oppressive. The ANC rapidly gained more members, supporters and sympathizers. One significant shift was the Black Consciousness followers deciding they could work with the ANC. This would combine the resources of two groups for a common purpose – elimination of the apartheid state. The arrest, torture and death of Biko in 1977 were a reaction from the apartheid state to stop the joining of forces between the ANC/MK and the Black Consciousness Movement.<sup>238</sup>

The subsequent uprising in Soweto would help this further acquisition of resources. The ANC and MK would begin to gain a resource and social power advantage (see Chapter Three for discussion of these antecedent conditions) over the state. The year prior to Biko death, the apartheid state had mandated that instruction had to be done in Afrikaans. In defiance of this law, on June 16, 1976, thousands of school students in Soweto demonstrated against the enforcement of this law. Twenty-five to one-hundred were shot on that day by government forces. Over the next twenty months, this led to a countrywide uprising against the state and the death of 600 people by 1977.<sup>239</sup> Similar to the banning of the ANC, PAC, MK, and Poqo in early years, the Black Consciousness movement was banned and many of its members fled to surrounding states. In doing so, the ANC's membership outside of South Africa soared and the newer members of both

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<sup>238</sup> Julie Frederikse, *The Unbreakable Thread: Non-Racialism in South Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana State University Press, 1990), 129.

<sup>239</sup> Burleigh, *Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism*, 146.

the ANC and MK were younger. In the aftermath of these events, the MK would begin increasing its operation in South Africa from 1977 to 1982.<sup>240</sup>

#### A Shift from Sabotage to Something Much More Violent (Full-Scale Warfare Period)

From 1977 to 1989, the MK conducted 1416 attacks against a variety of targets. Of these attacks, according to Lodge and Nasson, the largest amount occurred after 1985.<sup>241</sup> Of the attacks from 1977 to 1989, an estimated 80 percent occurred from 1985 to 1989. Given the rate of conflict at the time, it is clear this period can be defined as a continuation of full-scale warfare between the South African state and the MK and ANC. In addition to an upswing in the rate of violence by the MK, the targeting had changed. The targets ranged from South Africa's oil-synthesizing plants, industrial installations, South Africa's nuclear power station, and the administrative offices of the townships. In some cases, innocent civilians were bombed. This was a radical shift from the ANC's and MK's policy of 'sabotage-only' from the early 1960s. Yet, these actions were consistent with the changes in the beliefs and associated frames in 1985. At the Kabwe Conference (the Second National Consultative Conference of the ANC), two radical changes in the ANC and MK's belief system occurred – whites would be allowed into ANC leadership roles, and the MK operations would be stepped up. The aversion to targeting "soft targets" and avoiding civilian casualties was abandoned. The chief of staff of the MK, Chris Hani, actually proposed that attacks on white civilians might be

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<sup>240</sup> Ibid.

<sup>241</sup> Tom Lodge and Bill Nasson, *All, Here, and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1991), 178.

useful in the overall struggle.<sup>242</sup> It is evident the ANC and MK had begun to transform into an organization who was going to use more violence to achieve their goals. To support this argument, one must examine the writings and statements of the President of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, during this same period.

An examination of various statements made by Oliver Tambo at this same time sees a similar shift in direction for the ANC. In a public statement made at the UN in 1981, Tambo continued to frame the ANC belief in the armed struggle, as a reaction to the repression by the apartheid state. He further noted to the audience that the decision to use armed force was not something that the organization came to easily. It was a necessity. He stated, "Quite clearly, so deeply embedded had the cult of violence become that a just peace could not be had until the Frankenstein of racist violence had been cauterised with burning steel. [...] Twenty years ago, we picked up the gauntlet that the enemy had been throwing at our feet and went back to arms."<sup>243</sup> In that same speech, he reaffirmed the linkage between the MK and the ANC as both part of the same struggle. He also furthered the idea of a "people's power" movement and framed for the audience how this approach to the struggle was already occurring throughout the population in South Africa.<sup>244</sup> In these public statements, it is not evident the ANC was supporting the increased activities by the MK. However, in an interview three years before the

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<sup>242</sup> P. Eric Louw, *The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of Apartheid* (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 135.

<sup>243</sup> Oliver Tambo, "Statement at the Meeting Organised by the African Group of States at the United Nations Headquarters in Observance of the 20th Anniversary of Umkhonto We Sizwe and 70th Anniversary of the African National Congress," African National Congress, <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/or/or81-20.html>.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

statement at the UN, Tambo cited the necessity for intensifying the armed struggle.<sup>245</sup> In a statement to the people of South Africa on December 16, 1981, Tambo seem to reaffirm the belief in intensified armed attacks against the regime.<sup>246</sup> This shows some consistency with the previous statements from the late 1970s. The statement at the UN may have been void of this framing of a ‘need for intensified struggle’ due to the audience he was speaking to and where he was making the statement. Similar to statements made often by Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness in the PIRA/SF case study, guerrilla movement leaders often use false rhetoric to justify their actions.<sup>247</sup>

Regardless of the connection between the ANC and MK, by 1990, both organizations were going through a large transformation. The ANC was going from banned organization to unbanned (February 2, 1990). The MK was trying to redefine itself. With the release of Nelson Mandela from prison on February 11, 1990, a new phase awaited the once-guerrilla movement and its political counterpart.

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<sup>245</sup> In an interview with Tambo in 1978, he noted the following concerning the armed struggle in South Africa: “The ANC now has to put all its weight into maintaining the momentum of the struggle, the offensive against the regime. Armed action must be intensified, blows must be struck at the enemy from every possible direction.” See, “South Africa after Soweto,” *World Marxist Review*, February 1978. Can be found at: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/or/or78-1.html>

<sup>246</sup> ———, “Message to the People of South Africa on the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Formation of Umkhonto We Sizwe,” African National Congress, <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/or/or81-19a.html>.

<sup>247</sup> Williams, “The Other Armies: A Brief Historical Overview of Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), 1961-1994,” 8. More credibility may be given to this claim as the statement at the UN and to the people of South Africa were given on the same day. Additionally, evidence that may support this claim of a change in ANC beliefs can be seen by the reader in the warning the ANC issued in the early 1980s concerning the possibility of civilian deaths due to activities by the MK.

## POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA & THE ANC AND MK

Following the events of the late 1970s, many Afrikaner leaders were disturbed by what they had seen concerning government violence against the African population. These individuals argued that compromise needed to be a part of the state's approach in dealing with the non-White population. Some minor lessening of segregationist policies occurred, but the overall structure of the apartheid state would continue. Additionally, then-Defense Minister Botha argued that a winning of the hearts and minds of the non-White population was necessary to counter the growing violence directed at the state.<sup>248</sup> Following the rise of Botha to Prime Minister, the state used this same premise in a two-prong strategy. The first prong of the new approach was to give new prospects to legal black trade union activity, the decrease in some segregation and influx control measures that were present in the major urban centers, the provision of residency and freehold rights to non-Whites living in urban areas, and promises to open the system up for non-White participation. This opening of the political system to Africans may begun to occur as the South African state realized they were in a stalemate with the ANC and MK. Additionally, given the ANC and MK had multiple power advantages (military/political, social and resource) over the state, the opening of the system was inevitable. The second prong of this approach would be the expansion of security and defense measures. This was the attempts to destroy the ANC and MK.<sup>249</sup> In adopting this approach, the South African state was attempting to limit the base from which the ANC and MK could draw

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<sup>248</sup> Beck, *The History of South Africa*, 162-63.

<sup>249</sup> Johns and R. Hunt Davis, eds., *Mandela, Tambo, and the African National Congress: The Struggle against Apartheid, 1948-1990*, 192.

from in the future. At the same time, the state was attempting to destroy the guerrilla movement that already existed. This had less of an impact than the state predicted.

A subsequent constitutional change (1983) reconstructed the bicameral South African parliament into a tricameral legislature – a House of Assembly for Whites (178 members), a House of Representatives for Coloureds (85 members), and a House of Delegates for Indians (45 members).<sup>250</sup> The new changes did not include any representation for the African population, which was around 75 percent of the population in the early 1980s. The African population was allowed to elect their own authorities in the townships. The national liberation movement, led by the ANC, saw the move as another tactic to splinter the non-Africans from the movement. The United Democratic Front (UDF) was created to unite all non-Whites against these changes and the continuation of the apartheid state. The UDF created a unified body of struggle against the apartheid state by joining the forces of the ANC, PAC, leaders of the Black Consciousness movement and many other organizations. As the power of UDF and the related organizations grew, the ANC's membership and supporters grew. As this posed a threat to the state, extreme repression was carried out against ANC, MK, PAC, and other similar organizations. This repression included the use of hit squads outside of South Africa against various banned groups. Prominent supporters of the ANC were assassinated in Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Mozambique, and Zambia.<sup>251</sup>

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<sup>250</sup> Voters would elect each of these legislative assemblies from their own communities and with the use of separate ethnic voting rolls. It should also be noted that the office of State President was created and the office was given wide-ranging powers that the Prime Ministers' office did not have prior to that time. Beck, *The History of South Africa*, 169.

As the 1980s progressed, the MK had continued to garner support (physical resources) from the Soviet Union. This continued to assist the MK in carrying out its operations. The MK found problems garnering the upsurge in resistance that occurred in the 1980s. Without being able to use this growing population of anti-apartheid activist to add to their ranks (i.e., add to their human resource need), the MK would not be able to grow beyond its 1980s size.<sup>252</sup> Instead of joining the MK, which was still in exile, many protestors started to focus on the creation of “[...] locally based defence units, grenade squads, and street committees.”<sup>253</sup> Yet, even as the human resources were diminishing for the MK, the ANC’s resources were continually growing with the successes of the UDF. This is very similar to the conditions the Provos found themselves in by the 1990s in Northern Ireland. According to accounts by participants in the Irish republican struggle, the 1990s found SF growing but fewer individuals joining the Provos. Like the MK, many former Provos members found themselves joining trade unions in the North and becoming involved in the struggle through community activism.<sup>254</sup> In South African, the MK may have had problems with gaining more human resources in the late 1980s, but political accessibility would begin to grow in the late 1980s and blossom into the 1990s. This would occur as the conflict would shift to a diminished warfare period of the conflict stage and then to a transitional peace period in the post-conflict stage.

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<sup>251</sup> Juckes, *Opposition in South Africa: The Leadership of Z.K. Matthews, Nelson Mandela, and Stephen Biko*, 158.

<sup>252</sup> Williams, "The Other Armies: A Brief Historical Overview of Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), 1961-1994," 12.

<sup>253</sup> Stephen Ellis and Tsepho Sechaba, *Comrades against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile, 1966-1990* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 101.

<sup>254</sup> M [pseudo.], interviewed by the author, West Belfast, Northern Ireland, 7 November 2007.

## The First 'True' Openings – A Shift towards the Diminished Warfare Period

Connections between the MK, ANC, and sympathizers for the anti-apartheid struggle began to grow rapidly in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Throughout the late 1980s, the MK had been able to infiltrate the intelligence apparatus of the state. In the South African self-defense forces, the MK and ANC found individuals who were sympathetic to their cause. As suggested in the CPVT model, the guerrilla movement was gaining more resource power advantage and this would influence their eventual transformation. An example of this can be seen between 1987 and 1994. In 1987, General Bantu Holomisa and disaffected members of the Transkei Defence Force (TDF) ousted Stella Sigcau, the first Prime Minister of the Transkei and a minister within the South African government. From 1987 to 1994, the MK governed the Transkei with the Holomisa administration. The TDF forces trained with the MK forces in the Transkei.<sup>255</sup> South African economic elites (prominent businesspersons) and white intellectuals began to travel to Lusaka and other locations to meet with ANC leadership, including Tambo.<sup>256</sup>

These developments of connections between political and economic elites within the country were not confined to just a small group of Afrikaners. In the mid-1980s, Botha administration had begun to meet with Mandela concerning the possibility of releasing him from jail. These openings may have occurred because of the various power advantages were gaining through this period of diminished warfare. This led to Botha

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<sup>255</sup> Williams, "The Other Armies: A Brief Historical Overview of Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), 1961-1994," 12.

<sup>256</sup> Ross, *A Concise History of South Africa*, 181.

offering to release Mandela. Mandela would have to renounce the use of violence.<sup>257</sup> Mandela argued he could not negotiate as long as the ANC was banned and he was in prison. Even though, he continually rejected calls by Botha to renounce the armed struggle, Botha eventually allowed Mandela and other national liberation leaders off Robben Island for medical treatment. In 1988, Mandela was transferred to a hospital for medical treatment for tuberculosis and then to a private multiracial private clinic for further recuperation. Additionally, Zephania Mothopeng, the president of PAC, and Harry Gwala, an elder ANC veteran were released without conditions. The shift in South Africa had begun for two bitter opponents – the apartheid state led by Botha and the ANC – towards some form of openness and reconciliation.

#### A Move to the Post-Conflict Stage (Transitional Peace Period in South Africa)

At the end of the decade, Botha had a stroke and a leadership struggle broke out within the National Party. This led to Frederik Willem de Klerk to rise to be the leader of the National Party and the new State President of South Africa. He would remain in office from 1989 until 1994 when he was succeeded by Mandela. During the struggle over leadership, the ANC would see more opportunities for connections with government leaders grow. Botha attempted to gain back political power from de Klerk by traveling to various African countries and meeting with their leaders (i.e., Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi, and Zaire). He also engaged in direct conversation with Mandela in July 1989. Mandela reaffirmed his position that a peaceful solution to the conflict in South Africa could be

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<sup>257</sup> This quote comes from a statement by Mandela read by his daughter Zini to a mass meeting in Jabulani Stadium, Soweto, on February 10, 1985. See, Johns and R. Hunt Davis, eds., *Mandela, Tambo, and the African National Congress: The Struggle against Apartheid, 1948-1990*, 215.

obtained but that any discussions would have to include a legitimate representative of the national liberation movement, particularly the ANC.

The ANC and MK had a military/political advantage over the South African government by this period. Mandela was in a good bargaining position to dictate what the conditions would be for the ANC's entry into the South African political system. F.W. de Klerk reaffirmed the South African state's desire to work with the opposition when he became the formally elected president.<sup>258</sup>

The ANC began to transform from a component of a guerrilla movement to a political organization that was more willing to negotiate. Mandela had presented a document to Botha before their July 1989 meeting where he stated:

The deepening political crisis in our country has been a matter of grave concern to me for quite some time and I now consider it necessary in the national interest for the African National Congress and the government to meet urgently to negotiate an effective political settlement.<sup>259</sup>

He also notes the position of the ANC on the use of violence is they had "[...] no vested interest in violence."<sup>260</sup> Even though this statement was not the official policy of the ANC at the time, given the stature of Mandela within the ANC, this document suggested shift further towards elimination of the use of violence and the complete use of a political approach.<sup>261</sup>

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<sup>258</sup> Ibid., 206.

<sup>259</sup> Nelson Mandela, "The Mandela Document: A Document Presented by Nelson Mandela to P.W. Botha before Their Meeting on 5 July 1989," African National Congress, <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/64-90/doc890705.html>.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid.

<sup>261</sup> It was noted at the bottom of the document that the NEC had approved the steps that outlined that would lead to a dialogue between the ANC and the state.

There was a shifting from pure militancy to a mixture of militancy and politics to a desire to move towards a purely political approach. Gerry Adams adopted this similar approach when he was meeting secretly with British officials and John Hume to open dialogue on the conflict in Northern Ireland. The ANC outside of Africa continued to develop their contacts within the White community in South Africa. These conditions all led the ANC to support the Harare Declaration in August 1989. In the document, the ANC supported negotiations with the South African government. Six preconditions were outlined: 1) the lifting of the state of emergency; 2) the ending of restrictions on political activity; 3) release those who were jailed without trial; 4) the legalization of all political organizations; 5) the release of political prisoners; and 6) the granting of clemency for those on death row. Armed struggle would continue but the ANC noted it would be preferred to have conditions arise whereas the armed struggle could no longer need to occur.<sup>262</sup>

To further support the implementation of the Declaration and the agreements made with Botha, protest were held throughout South Africa. The Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), the anti-apartheid movement that had developed in the late 1980s, mainly directed these protest. To ease tensions, de Klerk gave permission for peaceful antigovernment marches in the center of Cape Town and in other locations. Various political prisoners including Sisulu were released from prison and members of the clergy – including Archbishop Tutu – began to work to bring the anti-apartheid opposition and

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<sup>262</sup> For more details concerning this shift, see, Organization of African Union Ad-Hoc Committee on South Africa, "Harare Declaration: Declaration of the OAU Ad-Hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the Question of South Africa," African National Congress, <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/oau/harare.html>.

the state to the peace talk tables. In mid-January 1990, ANC reiterated its position that armed struggle would continue but they reaffirmed their preference for a political solution to the problems in South Africa.<sup>263</sup> After the publication of the Mandela Statement in January 1990, the final steps had been put into place for a new era in South African politics.

On February 2, 1990, the slight openings in the South African political system being created for the ANC in previous years were fully realized. The bans against the ANC, PAC and SACP were lifted by the de Klerk administration. Various emergency regulations were relaxed on February 11, 1990. The leader of the ANC and its most notable figure, Nelson Mandela was released from Victor Verster prison.<sup>264</sup> With the unbanning of the ANC and MK, a *de facto* cease-fire between the MK and security services occurred. The ANC and MK found themselves moving away from a hybrid militant and political organization to a future political party. With this shift towards politics, the ANC and MK found themselves moving into a transitional peace period of the post-conflict stage of South African history.

Over the next few years, two types of negotiations would be held in South Africa. One was between the ANC and the South African government concerning political integration. The second would start in November 1993 between the MK and the South African Defense Force (SADF). The former would lead the ANC – an organization that had previously supported an armed struggle against the apartheid state – to become a

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<sup>263</sup> Johns and R. Hunt Davis, eds., *Mandela, Tambo, and the African National Congress: The Struggle against Apartheid, 1948-1990*, 209-10.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid.

political party in the new South African political system. In the first elections of the new South African (April 1994), the ANC won 62.65 percent of the vote. It also captured seven of the nine provinces in the elections. The National Party would win 20.04 percent of the vote. This led to F.W. de Klerk from the National Party and Thabo Mbeki from the ANC to be sworn in as the two new vice president of the Republic of South Africa. Mandela would then assume office as the first president of the new state. To address the human rights violations that occurred during the apartheid state era, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, chaired by Desmond Tutu, were formed. It allowed any individual who committed human rights violations before May 10, 1997, to gain amnesty for their actions if they admitted to them.<sup>265</sup>

In the case of the negotiations between the MK and the SADF, measures were adopted that allowed MK members to be integrated into the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF). This should not be confused with the MK becoming a security apparatus of the state, as discussed concerning potential outcomes of guerrilla movement transformation (see Chapter 3). A security apparatus of the state – in this context – would be a separate military unit attached to the state (e.g., ‘self-defense’ units or militias attached to the state). In this context, the MK remained a fighting force yet they became a part of the military of the new post-apartheid South Africa. A Transitional Executive Council was created in 1993 and its job as the integration. This resulted in the creation of a Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (JMCC) that would be chaired by the Chief of the

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<sup>265</sup> Ross, *A Concise History of South Africa*, 189-99. For a discussion on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and the concept of transitional justice, see, Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, "Judging the Past: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation from Nuremberg to South Africa" (Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2002).

SADF and the Chief of Staff of the MK. The MK ceased to exist on April 27, 1994, as the SANDF was officially established. This elimination of the MK marked the transition of the former guerrilla movement into the permanent peace period of the post-conflict stage.<sup>266</sup> This once-violent guerrilla movement had adopted the political solution approach outlined by the ANC and became a part of the government in the process.

Since the creation of a new South Africa, the ANC has gone onto be the dominant political party in the state. Several leaders of the ANC and MK have made their way into leadership positions within South Africa. This has included Jacob Zuma, Nelson Mandela, Kgalema Motlanthe, and Thabo Mbeki who served as presidents of South Africa. These two components of a guerrilla movement – similar to their counterparts in Northern Ireland – have transformed their beliefs and associated framing over time, have gained more political access and gained more resources over time. In doing so, they transformed themselves from rebels to politicians and policymakers.

#### MK/ANC: MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES OF TRANSFORMATION

As has been illustrated in tracing the development of the ANC and MK, these organizations have faced very similar shifts in their belief systems and the associated frames, accessibility to the South African political system, and resource needs as when compared to the case of the PIRA and SF. Each of these shifts in both cases has led the once-guerrilla movements to transform into a political party and being assimilated into the military of the state. The largest difference in this case's development occurred in two areas. In the case of the MK, the armed wing of the ANC was integrated into the

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<sup>266</sup> Williams, "The Other Armies: A Brief Historical Overview of Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), 1961-1994," 14-15.

new state. As no new state has been created in the post-conflict environment of Northern Ireland, the PIRA just disarmed. Just as the case of the MK in South Africa, some former members of the Provos have found their way into Northern Ireland politics. For example, Adams was a former member of the PIRA and Motlanthe is a former member of the MK. In both cases, these individuals went to lead their respective parties, SF and the ANC.

The following sections will re-examine briefly the shifts in beliefs and associated frames and the resource needs. The discussion concerning openings in political accessibility was thoroughly examined in the previous discussion and therefore, does not need repeating. Concerning the issue of political accessibility, it is apparent in tracing the development of the ANC that a transformation in approach significantly increased contacts to develop within the businesses and intellectual community of South Africa and with members within the government, including Botha and de Klerk. As was discussed in the previous tracing of the history of the ANC and MK, political accessibility was closed for most of the history of the ANC and MK. In the later phases of the conflict, as the ANC and MK gained a power advantage (resource and military/political advantage), the political system was opened. The ANC had some advantage concerning the requirements of entry.

#### MK/ANC and Changes to Its Belief System & Associated Frames

The belief system and the associated framing of that belief system has transformed as the conditions in South Africa transformed. In Table 6.3, a selection of various statements from speeches, interviews, and declarations can show this shift over

Table 6.3  
Beliefs and Associated Frames in the Development of the ANC & MK

Time Period	Core Beliefs	Associated Frame
Late 1940s (ANC)	Participation in the political system is necessary. Civil disobedience is the preferred tactic.	<p>“The right of direct representation in all the governing bodies of the country - national, provincial and local”</p> <p>“It should be competent for the council of action to implement our resolve to work for: the abolition of all differential political institutions, the boycotting of which we accept, and to undertake a campaign to educate our people on this issue and, in addition, to employ the following weapons: immediate and active boycott, strike, civil disobedience, non-cooperation and such other means as may bring about the accomplishment and realisation of our aspirations [...]”</p>
Mid-1950s (ANC)	South Africa should be multiracial. The need for creation of a democratic political system as opposed to the current system. Every community can develop its own culture. Discrimination should be a crime. Equality within every facet of society is necessary. Destruction of the current system of housing in South Africa and be allowed to live where you want to live.	A call for South Africa to belong to everyone of every race; the promotion of democratic governance that would include all peoples; the securing of rights where all people can use their own language and develop their own culture; discriminatory practices or the promotion of those practices should be a “[...] punishable crime [...],” freedom of travel for all citizens; equality in economics and education; and freedom to live in housing of one’s choosing (i.e., ghettos and fenced locations would be demolished). “These freedoms we will fight for, side by side, throughout our lives, until we have won our liberty.” <i>The Freedom Charter (paraphrase and selections from the document)</i>
Early 1960s (MK & ANC)	Armed struggle is necessary.  The political approach and the armed struggle approach will be used in South Africa.	<p>“The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom.” <i>Leaflet left by the MK at first bombing</i></p> <p>“[...] an extension of, not a substitute for, the forms of political action employed in the past.” <i>Quote by Oliver Tambo</i></p>
1970s (ANC)	The political approach and the armed struggle approach will continue to be used. Extremism by the armed struggle will not be tolerated.	“When we talk of revolutionary armed struggle, we are talking of political struggle by means which include the use of military force [...] [O]ur movement must reject all manifestations of militarism which separates armed people’s struggle from its political context.” <i>Strategy and Tactics of the South African Revolution</i>

Time Period	Core Beliefs	Associated Frame
Mid-1980s (MK & ANC)	<p>Targeting of soft targets would be allowed and civilian casualties are a possibility.</p> <p>The use of violence is still a necessary part of the struggle.</p>	<p>To continue the struggle it would be necessary to target more than just hardened targets and if civilians could be killed during the struggle, it should not stop the struggle from attacking those targets. (Paraphrase document from the Kabwe Conference in 1985)</p> <p>“Quite clearly, so deeply embedded had the cult of violence become that a just peace could not be had until the Frankenstein of racist violence had been cauterised with burning steel.” <i>Statement by Oliver Tambo at the UN in 1981 as President of ANC</i></p>
Late-1980 (ANC)	<p>Negotiations between the ANC and the apartheid South African government is necessary. A series of conditions need to be met prior to negotiations. Armed struggle would be maintained but eliminated if a political solution to the conflict arose.</p>	<p>“[...] I now consider it necessary in the national interest for the African National Congress and the government to meet urgently to negotiate an effective political settlement.” <i>Statement by Mandela</i></p> <p>The lifting of the state of emergency, the ending of restrictions on political activity, release those who were jailed without trial, the legalization of all political organizations, the release of political prisoners and the granting of clemency for those on death row. (Points that had to be met according to <i>The Harare Declaration</i>)</p>
Mid-1990s	<p>A peaceful political approach will be used in the future to develop a new South Africa.</p>	<p>“We have, at last, achieved our political emancipation. We pledge ourselves to liberate all our people from the continuing bondage of poverty, deprivation, suffering, gender and other discrimination.</p> <p>We succeeded to take our last steps to freedom in conditions of relative peace. We commit ourselves to the construction of a complete, just and lasting peace.” (<i>Selection from Mandela Inauguration Speech in 1994</i>)</p>
Mid-2000s	<p>A political struggle to make South Africa a better place is beginning.</p>	<p>“Strategically, and of direct relevance to our movement, this new phase of the national democratic revolution consists in the imperative that we should use our political power to accelerate the advance towards achieving the goal of a better life for all.” <i>Statement Of The National Executive Committee of the African National Congress on The Occasion of the 94th Anniversary Of The ANC, 2006</i>)</p>

time. From an approach of passive resistance to armed struggle back to peaceful negotiations and integration, the ANC and MK’s belief structure has changed over time.

In tracing the development of both organizations, it appears this movement's change in belief system and associated frame was directly related to the lack of political access afforded to the movements and the non-White population as a whole. Additionally, these openings did not seem to exist except when the ANC and MK gained a power advantage as compared to the South African apartheid state. Even though the framing of their beliefs have some discussion of a political approach, it was not until making contacts within the apartheid state and community that the idea of peaceful negotiation and integration occurred. Even though individuals, like Mandela, may address the issue occasionally prior to the 1990s, the ANC and MK as organizations tended to stay away from the discussion. Their actions overtime seem to indicate even when they suggested political approaches it may have been false rhetoric. It was not until the conditions were to the advantage of the ANC and MK that actions and rhetoric seem to match.

#### MK/ANC and Physical and Human Resource Needs

Throughout the development of the ANC and MK, the human and physical resources varied over time. In its early years, the ANC tended to have a limited group of members (rank-and-file), supporters and sympathizers. As the apartheid state became more oppressive – particularly, after the Sharpeville massacre, there was a small upswing in the size of the ANC. The greatest jump in membership occurred after Soweto uprising. As noted by Maria Ottaway and similar scholars on the MK and ANC, the membership of the MK before 1976 was an estimated 1,000. By 1985, the MK had approximately 14,000 fighters. Other scholarship suggest between 1967 and 1987, the

MK had force strength of 12,000 members.<sup>267</sup> In the late 1980s, the potential of drawing members from South Africa was very limited. The amount of sympathizers for the MK may have been limited at the same time. According to Ronnie Kasrils, a founding member of the MK, “Yet, despite the tremendous upsurge of mass resistance over the past three years, we were unable to take full advantage of the favourable conditions that materialised. [...] our cadres still found big problems in basing themselves amongst the people; our underground failed to grow sufficiently.”<sup>268</sup> This may have suggested a drop in human resources for the *Umkhonto* by the time of peace negotiations. Yet, in 1994, the MK had publically expected to contribute 22,000 soldiers to the new SANDF. Given that only about 12,000 MK members went into the armed forces, it is hard to determine whether the force was extensive in the late 1990s, or if it was the same size it had been in the late 1980s. Without specific numbers, a clear conclusion could not be drawn in this case. One important note should be made here concerning human resources. The CPVT model suggests there should be a human resource need to motivate guerrilla movements to move towards becoming political parties. In the case of both the SF and PIRA, the case was consistent with the theory. In the ANC and MK case, the human resource needs did not exist at the time the ANC fully shifted to becoming a political party. A decrease in MK membership may explain their shift. However, the ANC was gaining more and more members, supporters and sympathizers. It is estimated that human resources for the

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<sup>267</sup> Marina Ottaway, *South Africa: The Struggle for a New Order* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 1993), 46.

<sup>268</sup> Williams, "The Other Armies: A Brief Historical Overview of Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), 1961-1994," 11. This was also noted by a MK commander in an address by the MK Commander, Joe Modise in Lusaka, in 1990. For full discussion of the perceived problems facing the MK, go to: [http://www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/index.php?option=com\\_displaydc&recordID=spe19900400.026.021.000](http://www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/index.php?option=com_displaydc&recordID=spe19900400.026.021.000)

ANC peaked in the 1952 Defiance Campaign where the membership rose to 100,000 members.<sup>269</sup> Following the apartheid state's crackdown following the Defiance Campaign, the ANC membership began to decrease rapidly. Yet, by June 1991 when the National Conference was held in Durban, the ANC had an estimated 289,320 members. After some problems with growing the organization initially at the township level in the mid-1990s, the ANC made a dramatic return and exceeded its previous membership numbers. By 2007, the ANC membership swelled to 621,237 card-carrying members.<sup>270</sup> This may have given them an advantage and bargaining room for entering the political system. Additionally, even though it had a growing human resource base, the organization may have seen the necessity of moving towards politics to gain even more members, supporters and sympathizers. For an organization to survive, you must choose to maintain your base or grow your base of members, supporters, and sympathizers.

A large portion of the physical resources came from outside donors (particularly, the Soviet Union) and resources acquired within South Africa. The MK could often draw on those resources from the Soviet Union. Prior to the end of the Cold War, many MK fighters went for training in communist countries. Given the fall of the Soviet Union and its satellites at the end of the 1980s, a large portion of the funding from outside began to dissipate in the early 1990s. Even without specific numbers of membership, one can speculate that given the end of the Cold War, the MK may have had a limitation placed on its physical resources.

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<sup>269</sup> Vincent Darracq, "The African National Congress (ANC) Organization at the Grassroots," *African Affairs* 107, no. 429 (2008): 591.

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid.*: 593.

Throughout the struggle in South Africa, the ANC similarly was able to gain a large number of physical resources (funding). Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal all gave a minimum of \$1 million USD during the 1980s. Even international organizations assisted the ANC in getting funds during the apartheid era of South Africa. For example, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) channeled monies from the Soviet Union to the ANC. The Soviet Union was the most important source of funds for the ANC in the early 1980s. More sources came from Western Europe and North America as widespread support for the ANC grew. A variety of social-democratic organizations in Western Europe and governments ruled by social-democratic parties (especially the Scandinavian countries) contributed funds to the ANC. Even the UN provided some funding for the ANC office at the United Nations headquarters in New York City. The ANC claimed that by 1986 that more than half of their funds came from non-Soviet sources.<sup>271</sup>

If this latter statement is true, then unlike the MK, the sourcing for the ANC did not diminish at the end of the Cold War. This would seem to pose a problem when comparing this case against the proposed theoretical model. The ANC may not have had a problem in resources for its political approach. Yet as suggested by Szayna, the non-Soviet donors in the post-Cold War era would not have given funding for armed struggles.<sup>272</sup> Funding for the MK did diminish at the end of the Cold War. Therefore,

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<sup>271</sup> Thomas S. Szayna, *Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application of a Process Model* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2000), 163-64.

<sup>272</sup> *Ibid.*, 177.

possibly a greater focus on the political approach by the ANC in the 1990s may have been in part a reaction to a limitation in funds for a continued armed struggle.

## CONCLUSION

Guerrilla movements can transform over time into political parties who participate in the state's political system. Each of the former guerrillas movements have transformed at their own pace. Many of the same reasons for transformation and the processes of transformation have been similar. As was stated in Chapter 6 of this work (the comparative case studies on FARC and ASG), these differences and similarities will be reviewed in the conclusion of this work. Unexpected findings from this comparison can be seen in the following discussion.

From this comparative case study and similar to the study of FARC and ASG, the role of the leadership of a movement has a large impact on its transformation. Unlike FARC-EP and ASG where the death of the charismatic leaders tended to leave the group in disarray, the longevity of Mandela and Adams and their fellow leaders in both cases have influence the transformation of these movements. It appears Adams and Mandela may have initiated changes in the belief system and associated frames. The state reacted to these changes with providing openings in political accessibility for the movements. Reacting to these openings, the movement continued to change their belief system and associated frame. In this context, the needs for physical and human resources for the military wings of the movements (MK and PIRA) grew. Yet, the human and physical resources for the political component of the movement (ANC) grew. There was less need. This may have been a result of the changes in the beliefs and the framing of those

beliefs. It could also have been linked to the possibility of the movements being able to become a part of the state political system.

The findings in tracing the processes and mechanisms in the development of the PIRA/SF and the MK/ANC are very similar to the proposed CVPT model. This may pose a possibility of effecting change in current or future guerrilla movements and insurgencies. In looking at the past of these two movements and how they have transformed from violent groups to peaceful political groups, a better understanding of politically violent groups may emerge.

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## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **CONCLUSION**

Throughout the previous work, how guerrilla movements transform through conflict and sometimes post-conflict eras has been explored. In scrutinizing the international community since 1945, there are many examples of former guerrilla movements transforming into other organizations. There has been scant scholarship that traces the mechanism and processes that influence this organizational transformation. In this work, a theoretical understanding of this phenomenon has been proposed. Additionally, four case studies from throughout the international environment have been discussed to show how the theoretical modeling – the Collective Political Violence Transformative Model – can be seen with real-life examples. Through exploring these cases, some additional variables that could explain this transformative process have been found.

#### **ALTERNATIVE VARIABLES – LEADERSHIP**

The original CPVT model suggested that there were four variables (mechanisms) and the antecedent condition of power advantage (who has it and what type of power advantage) that lead guerrilla movements to transform. In examining the development of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Provisional Irish Republican Army/Sinn Féin (PIRA/SF), and the African National Congress/Spear of the Nation (ANC/MK), the importance of the leadership of the guerrilla movements was found.

In every case, these individuals played a role in the survival of the movement and transformation of the movements. This can be seen by looking at the historical development of the movements and what occurred during the leaders' death. In the case of the FARC-EP and ASG, it appears in both cases the death of the founding leader led to the shift away from the original basis of the organization. In these two cases, the organizations shifted even more towards criminality following the leader's death. In the case of the PIRA/SF and MK/ANC, it has been noted by many scholars of both organizations the longevity of the life of Mandela and Adams created stability. This stability allowed the guerrilla movement to continue to develop. It also allowed the movements to retain a certain amount of their core beliefs as they transformed into a political party. In the PIRA/SF case study, major players within the Irish republican movement noted this fact to the author during fieldwork.

Related to this finding, one can see the leadership may have played an intervening variable that influences how much of a shift could occur with the GM's belief system and associated frames. As the leaders gave approval for the shift (through words or their own actions), it appears the movement generally followed. For example, even though Adams was keeping to the 'Armalite and ballot box' approach publically (frames), he and McGuinness were secretly meeting with British and officials from the Republic of Ireland. When these meetings were found out by the media and publicized, the movement as a whole seems to move more towards a political approach. Without having more information about the inside discussions in the PIRA and SF, we cannot reliably

state there was a cause and effect situation. Yet, from the findings in Chapter Six, it does appear there is strong correlation between these factors.

Competition for leadership of the movements between the true believers and pragmatist seem to occur. Even though not originally discussed in the theoretical writings, this may be related to the subgroups that form within the movement. In this case, the role of a leader may be to build those relational ties between the members of the movement. In deciding to move towards one view over the other view could result in complete organizational failure. Leaders often have to create a balancing act between these subgroups until the one they favor has more members and more support within and outside of the movement. Failure to recognize this could result in a leader losing his role within the movement. This may also explain why a death of a leader could result in significant splintering and a different development trajectory being taken by the guerrilla movement. For example, Janjalani – prior to his death – did favor the use of some criminal activities to support the activities of ASG. After his death, the group splintered and many new groups under the ASG name began forming criminal organizations. There is not enough data to suggest Janjalani's role, but one could theorize these criminal subgroups existed within ASG prior to Janjalani's death. He may have tried to balance the interest between the economic pragmatic members (EPMs) and the rest of the movement. However, with his death, there was no longer someone to keep this balance and the various factions morphed into criminal activity. Khadafy attempted to resurrect this balancing act for a new ASG, yet it was too late.

With this finding concerning the role of leadership, future research will look closer at the influence of individual leadership on the development of guerrilla movements. This will require greater information being collected on these former guerrilla movements through field interviews. Without some primary sources, the exact role of the leadership in the GM's transformation will never be exactly known.

#### ALTERNATIVE VARIABLES – MEASUREMENT OF RESOURCE NEEDS

As suggested in the CPVT model and noted in the four case studies of this study, human and physical resource needs play a significant role in the development of guerrilla movements. One problem with this variable is how best to create a measure of resource need. As further data is collected in the future and this project is developed more, it will be possible to apply quantitative measures to the CPV model. It can then be applied across the study of even more cases of guerrilla movement transformation.

Yet, as found in this work, the physical and human resource need of an organization is always influenced by the perception of the movement members and their leadership. Perceptions of leaders concerning needs of the movement may vary from movement to movement. It may vary over time as the guerrilla movement compares themselves to the state. Therefore, future expansions of this work must recognize this issue and create a way to measure perception of resource need versus actual resource need, as outlined by the researcher. This will be problematic, as more information from within the group will be needed to develop this measure. Similar to the leadership factor, accessibility to the guerrilla movements' members will always create a problem for creating a clear model of guerrilla movement transformation.

## ALTERNATIVE VARIABLES – ISSUE OF RHETORIC

As case study comparisons were performed, it became apparent the use of rhetoric by guerrilla movements is a common technique. As this is related to the framing of beliefs, the CPVT model attempted to address this issue. This was done by separating out in the four cases a difference between actual beliefs of the movement as compared to what is being said. In future similar studies, researchers will need to include a further discussion of true rhetoric and false rhetoric. In some cases, guerrilla movements will resort to the use of false rhetoric to justify their actions, which are not consistent with the movement's core beliefs. If a researcher takes the frames presented by the movement as a means to understand the core beliefs without understanding the use of rhetoric, some false conclusions may be met. For example, if one was only to look at what FARC states concerning the reason for kidnappings-for-ransoms (KFRs), the conclusion may be they are using these activities to gain resources for the movement. Yet, understanding this as false rhetoric may allow a researcher to understand better the true intentions of a movement. And if these intentions influence the organization's transformation, it is a necessity to understand this better.

One manner to understand how guerrilla movements use rhetoric may be to gain more statements (from a variety of resources – e.g., interviews and statements to members versus statements to the public). This can also be further compared to the actions of the movement. Where one sees a discontinuity between the two, false rhetoric may be used. This has to be accounted for in further development of the CPVT model.

## QUESTIONS RAISED BY THIS STUDY

No theory-building work is without problems and missing variables. In trying to gain a better understanding of 'how' guerrilla movements transform over time, it is apparent to the author that more questions may have been raised than answered. Some of these questions as related to the CPVT model are: a) is the transformation of guerrilla movements inevitable if the variable interact in the manner outlined in the CPVT model; does the CPVT model suggest path dependency for guerrilla movements or can other unknowns change the trajectory of the movements; and c) could a guerrilla movement – as the conditions change in the conflict stage and the post-conflict stage – transform from one organizational outcome to another form? Additionally, does the form of a guerrilla movement (i.e., the organizational structure) influence its organizational outcome? For example, if the FARC and ASG would have had a related political wing (like the MK and PIRA), would they have moved towards politics instead of criminal activity? This work has helped to create some preliminary answers to these questions. It also has helped to open up this phenomenon that has went virtually under-studied.

## FUTURE EXPANSION OF RESEARCH PROJECT

This work – as comprehensive as it attempts to be – is only the beginning. Besides answering the questions raised by this project, the future of this project is broad. One future project that can be developed from this study is to create a quantitative version of the CPVT model. This would allow researchers to take a guerrilla movement which current exist and predict with some accuracy how they will develop in the future. For example, the CPVT model may allow other researchers to determine how HAMAS

and Hezbollah may develop within the Middle East. Another future project would be to take this theoretical work and use it as a basis for understanding the development of insurgencies. As more and more insurgencies develop in Afghanistan and Iraq and other states, this will become a major focal point for future studies.

This work may also help policymakers and practitioners. If a better understanding can be gained concerning how guerrilla movements and insurgents develop over time, states may be able to influence the trajectories taken by these groups. This may lead to the saving of lives on both sides of the conflicts.

## CONCLUSION

In the social science, there continues to be an attempt to create a unifying theory for various social phenomenon – such as collective political violence. As of the writing of this work, these attempts have failed. Yet, in the attempts to create grand theory for the social science, it has led to more information and explanations being gained. If the pursuit of science (social or hard sciences) is more about the journey than the end, then this project has added to this growing understanding of the world.

APPENDIX A  
Civil Wars from 1945 to 2004  
(Duration Greater than 1 Year)

LOCATION	OPPOSING ORGANIZATION	DATES OF CONFLICT
Afghanistan	Various organizations	1978 – 2004
Algeria	MIA/FIS/AIS, GIA, & GSPC	1991 – 2004
Angola	UNITA, FNLA, MPLA Faction	1975 – 2002
Argentina	ERP, Montoneros	1970 – 1980
Azerbaijan	Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh	1991 – 1994
Bangladesh	JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini	1975 – 1997
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian irregulars	1992 – 1995
	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia	1993 – 1995
	Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Croatian irregulars	1993 – 1994
Burundi	Palipehutu, CNDD	1991 – 2004
Cambodia (Kampuchea)	KR, FUNK	1967 – 1975
	KR, FUNCINPEC, KPNLF	1978 – 1998
Central African Republic	Military faction, Forces of Francois Bozize	2001 – 2003
Chad	Various groups & MDD, FARF, MDJT	1965 – 2002
China	Peoples Liberation Army	1946 – 1949
	Tibet	1950 – 1973
Colombia	FARC , ELN , EPL , M-19	1965 – 2004
Congo	Cobras, Ninjas, Cocoyes, Ntsiloulous	1993 – 2003
Congo, Democratic Republic of (Zaire)	Katanga	1960 – 1964
	Independent Mining State of South Kasai	1960 – 1962
	CNL	1964 – 1965
	FLNC	1977 – 1978
	AFDL, RCD, RCD-ML, MLC, Rwanda, Uganda	1996 – 2002
Croatia	Serbian irregulars, Serbian Republic of Krajina	1992 – 1995
Cuba	Forces of Fidel Castro & Movimiento 26 De Julio: 26th of July Movement	1953 – 1959
Djibouti	FRUD & FRUD-faction	1991 – 2000
Egypt	al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya	1991 – 1998
El Salvador	ERP , FAL, FARN, FPL, PRTC, FMLN	1979 – 1991
Eritrea	EIJM	1993 – 2003
Ethiopia	EPRP, TPLF , EPDM, OLF	1974 – 1991
	ELF , ELF factions, EPLF	1962 – 1991
	WSLF (Ogaden)	1976 – 1984
	ONLF (Ogaden)	1996 – 2004
	ALF (Afar) & ARDUF (Afar)	1975 – 1997
	al-Itahad al-Islami (Somali)	1996 – 1999
	OLF (Oromiya)	1989 – 2004
France	OAS	1961 – 1962

LOCATION	OPPOSING ORGANIZATION	DATES OF CONFLICT
Georgia	Anti-government alliance, Zviadists	1991 – 1993
	Republic of Abkhazia	1992 – 1994
	Republic of South Ossetia	1991 – 1992
Ghana	Military faction (Jerry Rawlings)	1981 – 1983
Greece	DSE	1946 – 1949
Guatemala	MR-13 , FAR , EGP , PGT , ORPA, URNG	1966 – 2004
Guinea	RFDG	2000 – 2001
Guinea-Bissau	Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice	1998 – 1999
India	CPI	1948 – 1951
	CPI (-Marxist)	1967 – 1972
	PWG, MCC	1990 – 2004
	NNC (Nagaland)	1955 – 1968
	NSCN (I-M) (Nagaland)	1988 – 2003
	MNF (Mizoram)	1966 – 1969
	TNV (Tripura) & ATTF, NLFT (Tripura)	1978 – 2004
India (continued)	PLA, UNLF, KNF (Manipur)	1979 – 2004
	Sikh insurgents (Punjab/Khalistan)	1981 – 1995
	Kashmir Insurgents	1988 – 2004
	ULFA (Assam), & ABSU, NDFB (Bodoland)	1990 – 2004
Indonesia	Darul Islam Movement, PRRI, Permesta movement, & Darul Islam Movement	1953 – 1961
	OPM	1965 – 1978
	Fretilin (East Timor)	1975 – 1999
	GAM (Aceh)	1989 – 2004
Iran	KDPI	1967 – 1968
	KDPI	1979 – 1996
	Mujahideen e Khalq	1979 – 2001
	APCO (Arabistan)	1979 – 1980
Iraq	SCIRI	1982 – 1996
	Al Mahdi Army, Jaish Ansar Al-Sunna, TQJBR	2003 – 2004
	KDP & PUK	1961 – 1996
Israel	Palestinian insurgents	1948 – 2004
Ivory Coast	MPCI, MJP, MPIGO, Forces Nouvelles	2002 – 2004
Korea, Republic of	Leftist insurgents (e.g. Inmin-gun: Peoples Army, military faction)	1948 – 1950
Laos	Pathet Lao, Neutrals	1959 – 1973
	LRM	1989 – 1990
Lebanon	Lebanese Army (Aoun), Lebanese Forces, Syria, Israel	1975 – 1990
Liberia	NPFL, INPFL	1989 – 1995
	LURD	1999 – 2003
Malaysia	CPM	1957 – 1960
	CPM	1974 – 1981
	CCO	1963 – 1966
Mali	MPA (Azawad) & FIAA (Azawad)	1990 – 1995

LOCATION	OPPOSING ORGANIZATION	DATES OF CONFLICT
Morocco	POLISARIO	1975 – 1991
Mozambique	Renamo	1976 – 1992
Myanmar (Burma)	KNU, Gods Army (Karen)	1948 – 2003
	BCP, leftist organisations	1948 – 1988
	ABSDF	1988 – 1994
	ARIF, RSO (Arakan) Arakan Insurgents	1948 – 1994
	Various Insurgents (Mon)	1948 – 1963
	NMSP, BMA	1990 – 1996
	PNDF (Kachin)	1949 – 1950
	KIO (Kachin)	1961 – 1993
	KNPP (Karenni)	1992 – 1996
	SSA, SSIA; SSNPLO, SSRA, PSLO, MTA; & MTA, SSA/s	1959 – 2004
Nepal	Nepali Congress	1960 – 1962
	CPN-M/UPF	1996 – 2004
Nicaragua	FSLN; Contras/FDN	1974 – 1990
Niger	FLAA, CRA; & UFRA	1992 – 1997
	FDR, FARS	1995 – 1998
Nigeria	Republic of Biafra	1967 – 1970
	Ahlul Sunna Jamma	2003 – 2004
Oman	PFLOAG/PFLO	1965 – 1976
Pakistan	Baluchi separatists	1973 – 1977
	MQM	1990 – 1996
Papua New Guinea	BRA (Bougainville)	1989 – 1998
Peru	MIR, T-pac Amaru, ELN	1965 – 1966
	Sendero Luminoso, MRTA	1981 – 2000
Philippines	HUK	1946 – 1954
	CPP, Military faction	1972 – 2004
	MNLF, MILF (Mindanao) & ASG, MILF (Mindanao)	1970 – 2004
Russia (Soviet Union)	Forest Brothers (Estonia); LTS(p)A, LNJS, and LNPA (Latvia); & BDPS (Lithuania)	1946 – 1956
	UPA (Ukraine)	1946 – 1953
	Republic of Chechnya (Ichkeria)	1994 – 2004
Rwanda	FPR & PALIR	1990 – 2004
Senegal	MFDC (Casamance)	1983 – 2004
Sierra Leone	RUF, AFRC, Kamajors	1991 – 2000
Somalia	SNM, SPM, USC, SSDF, USC-faction; & SRRC (Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council)	1981 – 2002
South Africa	SWAPO	1966 – 1988
	ANC, PAC, Azapo	1976 – 1990
Former Soviet Union	Republic of Armenia, ANM	1990 – 1991
Spain	ETA	1968 – 2004
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	JVP	1989 – 1990
	LTTE, TELO, PLOTE	1976 – 2003

<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>OPPOSING ORGANIZATION</b>	<b>DATES OF CONFLICT</b>
Sudan	Anya Nya/SSLM	1963 – 1972
	SPLM, SPLM-faction, SAF, NDA	1983 – 2004
	SLM/A, JEM	2003 – 2004
Suriname	SLA/Jungle Commando	1986 – 1989
Syria	Muslim Brotherhood	1979 – 1982
Tajikistan	UTO, Movement for Peace in Tajikistan	1992 – 1998
Thailand	CPT	1968 – 1982
Turkey/Ottoman Empire	PKK/Kadek/KONGRA-GEL	1984 – 2004
	Devrimci Sol	1991 – 1992
Uganda	UDCA/LRA, WNBF, ADF, UNRF II	1994 – 2004
United Kingdom	PIRA & Real IRA	1970 – 1999
Uruguay	MLN/Tupamaros	1970 – 1973
Uzbekistan	IMU & JIG	1999 – 2004
Vietnam, Republic of	FNL	1955 – 1964
Yemen (Arab Republic of Yemen)	Royalists	1962 – 1970
	National Democratic Front	1980 – 1982
Yugoslavia (Serbia)	UCK	1996 – 1999
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)	ZANU , ZAPU	1966 – 1979

Appendix B  
Case Selection Criteria

CASES	IV <sub>1</sub> ; IV <sub>2</sub> ; & IV <sub>3</sub>	DVs	LOCATION OF GM	FOUNDING OF THE GM/CURRENT STATUS OF GM	TYPE OF POLITICAL SYSTEM	INTERVENTION BY THIRD PARTIES IN ORIGINAL CONFLICT
ANC/MK	Y,Y,Y	Political Party	South Africa	Founded in 1912 (Operations until late 1980s)	List PR System (One party domination)	No Direct Intervention (International Pressures)
PIRA/SF	Y,Y,Y	Political Party	Northern Ireland	Founded in 1969 (Operations until late 2005)	FPTP System (Two dominant parties & coalitions of smaller parties)	Peace Agreement Brokered by Third Party (2005: Self- imposed disarmament)
CASES	IV <sub>1</sub> ; IV <sub>2</sub> ; & IV <sub>3</sub>	DVs	LOCATION OF GM	FOUNDING OF THE GM/CURRENT STATUS OF GM	LUCRATIVE NATURE OF RESOURCES AVAILABLE WHERE GM OPERATES	INTERVENTION BY THIRD PARTIES IN ORIGINAL CONFLICT
FARC	Y, N, N/Y	Criminal Org.	Colombia	Founded in 1964 (Operations as a criminal organization is on-going)	High (Coca & Marijuana)	U.S. Advisement and Assistance with <i>Plan Colombia</i>
ASG	Y, N, N/Y	Criminal Org.	Philippines	Founded in 1991 (Operations as a criminal organization is on-going)	Low (Kidnappings & Piracy)	U.S. Advisement (Counter- terrorism Advisers)

Note: To control for other plausible factors, this case selection includes those variables that could potentially influence the trajectories of guerrilla movement transformation. Cases are selected on the basis of similar independent variables and dependent variable and where variation occurred in these same plausible factors. This “most-different” approach to case selection is similar to work by (Gerring 2001), and (Przeworski and Teune 1970). The other plausible factors included above are based on discussion in the social movement literature and civil war literature concerning factors that influence the trajectories of civil wars and social movements.

APPENDIX C  
RESPONDENT LIST

Interviews were conducted with the following individuals in October and November of 2007. These interviews were semi-structured. The author had a series of questions that became the focus of the discussions between the author and the respondents. These questions can be found in Appendix D. These interviews were conducted in a variety of locations, including the homes and the offices of those who were interviewed.

In some cases, the interviews were recorded electronically and in other cases, notes were taken during the time of the interviews. In some limited cases, notes concerning the discussions were recorded shortly after the dialogues between the author and the respondents. This approach was used when it was determined the respondent would not be comfortable with the author recording the conversations either electronically or through taking notes.

Interview Respondent	Job Title/Previous Association	Location of Interview	Date of Interview
M (Pseudonym)	Previous SF Party Member	West Belfast, Northern Ireland	October 27, 2007 – November 6, 2007
T (Pseudonym)	Local Belfast resident not directly in republican movement (sympathizer)	West Belfast, Northern Ireland	October 29, 2007
C (Pseudonym)	Local Belfast resident related to M, yet not as political	West Belfast, Northern Ireland	November 1, 2007 – November 6, 2007
J (Pseudonym)	Former H-block prisoner	West Belfast, Northern Ireland	November 2, 2007
KM (Pseudonym)	Previous supporter of SF	West Belfast, Northern Ireland	

Interview Respondent	Job Title/Previous Association	Location of Interview	Date of Interview
Neil Jarman	Director, Institute for Conflict Research	North Belfast, Northern Ireland	November 5, 2007
Dr. Richard English	Professor & noted expert on the PIRA's development	Queen's University, Belfast, Northern Ireland	October 31, 2007
Dr. Adrian Guelke	Professor & Northern Ireland/South African specialist	Queen's University, Belfast, Northern Ireland	October 31, 2007
MLA Francie Molloy	Member of Sinn Fein Party & MLA, Dungannon and South Tyrone	Northern Ireland Assembly Stormont, Northern Ireland	November 6, 2007
MLA Mickey Brady	Member of Sinn Fein Party & MLA, Newry and Armagh	Northern Ireland Assembly Stormont, Northern Ireland	November 6, 2007
Dr. Laurence McKeown	Former hunger striker/political prisoner on H-block & Research Director, <i>Coiste</i>	West Belfast, Northern Ireland	November 1, 2007

In addition to these specific individuals, the author spoke with other individuals in group settings. These include conversations between these individuals and many of the listed respondents.

## APPENDIX D

### QUESTION LIST USED IN FIELD INTERVIEWS

The following series of questions were the foundation for the semi-structured interviews conducted in the Northern Ireland. Some variations of these questions were used according to the respondent being interviewed.

- Q1: What is your current position within Sinn Fein (or, the PIRA)?
- Q2: What previous positions did you hold within the organization?
- Q3: Do you believe the original beliefs of the movement have changed overtime?
- Q3(a): If you believe the original belief structure of the movement has changed, how has it changed?
- Q4: What were the founding principles of the movement?
- Q5: What are the beliefs of the organization today?
- Q6: Did the political opportunities available to the movement change since its founding?
- Q6(a): How did the political opportunities change?
- Q7: What type of resources did the movement need during its beginnings?
- Q8: Did the resource needs change over time and how did they change?
- Q9: Do you think the organizational changes have been caused by changes in the belief structures and frames presented by the movement?
- Q10: Do you think the organizational changes have been caused by changes in the political opportunities presented by the movement?
- Q11: Do you think the organizational changes have been caused by changes in the resource needs of the movement?