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Ethnic Return Migration Policies and Asian American Labor in Japan and Korea

Jane H. Yamashiro

Abstract

Asian ethnic return migration policies are having an important impact on the lives of Asian Americans. By making it easier for later generation Asian Americans to work and invest in their ancestral homelands, these policies have affected the scale of Asian American migration and their economic, cultural, and social connections to Asia. However, ethnic return migration policies and their effects are not uniform across all Asian American groups. This paper analyzes how Asian Americans are being affected by ethnic return migration policies through comparative examination of the Immigration Control Act in Japan and the Overseas Korean Act in South Korea. The two policies in Japan and South Korea (hereafter Korea) are similar in their initial targeting of ethnic return migrants and in their privileging of skilled workers and investors in the 2000s to increase each country's competitiveness in the global economy. However, while Korea's policy has cast a net to include Korean Americans specifically, Japan's ethnic return migration policy has not been aimed at Japanese Americans in the same way.

Introduction

Asian American ethnic return migration is a significant phenomenon. Educated Chinese Americans, Indian Americans, Vietnamese Americans, Korean Americans and Japanese Americans are migrating to their ancestral homelands in Asia to live and work (PBS Newshour 2010; Louie 2004; Nomura 2006; Yamashiro 2011; Zhou 2007; Han 2010; Jain 2010). Migration policies that establish special visas and residency statuses for ethnic return migrants provide opportunities not only for financial gain, but also to connect or reconnect with homeland cultures, and familial and social

networks.¹ These policies are affecting the ways in which Asian Americans relate to their Asian homelands by encouraging not only symbolic—or imagined—connections but real firsthand experiences of migration.

To be clear, “ethnic return migration” is distinct from “return migration.” Return migration refers to the migration of someone back to his or her home country, that is, the physical return of a first-generation emigrant. Ethnic return migration refers to the movement of later generation foreign nationals to their ancestral homelands. They may have never been to the ancestral homeland before and may not speak the language or know the culture.

This paper comparatively examines how ethnic return migration policies in Japan and Korea are affecting Japanese Americans and Korean Americans. Both groups are overrepresented among the U.S. populations in their ancestral homelands. While Japanese Americans represent about .004 percent of the population in the United States (1.26 out of 304 million people reporting race), I estimate them to constitute approximately 13 percent of U.S. citizen residents in Japan (about 7,000 of 52,149 U.S. citizens).² Meanwhile, Korean Americans make up about .005 percent of the population in the United States (1.56 out of 304 million people reporting race) but comprise 28 percent of U.S. citizens reported to be residing in Korea (35,822 of 127,140) (Korea Immigration Service 2010; U.S. Census Bureau 2009).³ The establishment and revision of ethnic return migration policies in both countries makes it easier for Japanese Americans and Korean Americans to migrate to their ancestral homelands.

The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections. First, I comparatively discuss the ethnic return migration policies in Japan and Korea. Second, I comment on how revisions in the 2000s have led to some similarities, while also maintaining some differences between the immigration agendas. Finally, I provide statistical data on how the policies have affected ethnic return migration to Japan and Korea.

Ethnic Return Migration Policies

Within the past few decades, Japan and Korea have instituted ethnic return migration policies which have made it relatively easier for people with ethnic ties to immigrate, work, and reside in their countries.

Ethnic return migration visas in Japan and Korea allow for descendents of emigrant nationals up to the third generation to live and work in their ancestral homelands. These special visas provide additional migration opportunities for foreign nationals of shared ancestry that do not limit their residence status by occupation. This makes migration easier because these visas entitle ethnic return migrants to move flexibly from job to job, or even reside in their ancestral homeland legally while unemployed.

In 1989, the Japanese government passed revisions to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act of 1951 (hereafter Immigration Control Act) to include a new visa status that allowed for ethnic return migration.⁴ “Long-term resident (*teijusha*)” was one of ten new residence categories added by the revisions. This new visa category enabled foreign nationals of Japanese ancestry up to the third generation (proving at least one grandparent was a Japanese national) to enter Japan legally and reside there for one to three years (Yamanaka 2003, 133).

Long-term resident visas enable migrants to live in Japan with slightly less regulation and for longer periods. These visas do not designate limitations on the kinds of activities allowed because they are based on a status, rather than an occupation. If U.S. citizens not of Japanese ancestry wanted to live in Japan, they would need to attain a visa based on an occupational category (e.g., artist, journalist, skilled labor) or on their “status” (e.g., spouse or child of a Japanese national). The long-term resident visa accepts applicants based on their status as ethnic Japanese who have at least one grandparent who was a Japanese national – there is nothing else they need to be doing and no relationship to contemporary residents of Japan that are required. While most occupational visas require an institutional guarantor (e.g., a company, a school), the long-term resident visa can be attained with any Japanese national willing to sponsor the migrant. (This is assumed to be a relative but does not have to be.) One benefit of the long-term resident visa, then, is that someone legally residing in Japan on this visa could be attending a school, working, or engaging in any lawful activity without restriction, giving them flexibility in terms of lifestyle and occupation in Japan. Moreover, the long-term resident visa is renewable, meaning that the period of stay can be much longer than three years.

Immigration scholars have interpreted this policy as legalizing the migration of ethnic return migrants for unskilled labor in Japan. (Roth 2002; Tsuda 2003; Yamanaka 1993) This is because revisions to the Immigration Control Act simultaneously included the creation of an ethnic return migrant visa and “criminal penalties for the recruitment and hiring of illegal unskilled foreign workers – three years imprisonment or a maximum fine of two million yen ([U.S.] \$15,400)” (Yamanaka 1993, 76).

The establishment of the new long-term resident category was motivated by competing desires to allow in more unskilled workers while also maintaining the perceived ethnic homogeneity of Japan. Interviews with Japanese government officials have revealed their assumptions that *nikkeijin* (foreign nationals of Japanese ancestry) immigrants would assimilate into Japanese society better than other foreign migrants, while also providing a source of much-needed unskilled labor (Tsuda 2010). While the long-term resident visa is often described as the “*nikkeijin visa*,” *nikkeijin* specifically from Brazil have used it the most.⁵ Despite not being the target of this visa, Japanese Americans have also been able to take advantage of it.

In Korea, approximately a decade later in 1999, the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans, (hereafter the Overseas Korean Act) was passed by the Korean National Assembly in August and promulgated in December of the same year. This legislation provides an F-4 visa that “grants quasi-citizenship rights to qualified overseas Koreans, including the rights to work, prolonged stay, and property ownership” (Park and Chang 2005).

Similar to the benefits of the long-term resident visa for ethnic Japanese foreign nationals in Japan, the F-4 visa allows overseas Koreans to legally reside in Korea regardless of employment status. In addition, F-4 visa holders are able to obtain most of the rights of citizenship, including access to medical care and the right to buy and sell real estate, while avoiding the obligation of military service (Shin et al. 2009, 57; Lee 2009, 76).⁶

When the Overseas Korean Act was established, the language used to define overseas Koreans gave preferential treatment to those residing in industrialized, core countries such as the United States, Canada, and Japan (Lee 2009, 76). Overseas Koreans (*jaeoe dongpo*) officially includes two groups: South Korean nationals residing abroad and “foreign nationality Koreans,” meaning

former South Korean citizens who have naturalized to another citizenship, or their descendents of foreign nationality (Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Knowledge Economy, and Ministry of Labor 2007).⁷ South Korean nationality did not exist until the South Korean state was established in 1948, and most migration to China and Russia took place before this.⁸ Hence, scholars point out that this act originally “excluded more than half of the overseas Koreans” (Park and Chang 2005), giving special treatment to those from countries such as the United States and Japan, and restricting those from the People’s Republic of China and the Commonwealth of Independent States (Rhee 2008, 112).⁹

The establishment of the Overseas Korean Act was motivated by three related political, economic and demographic situations that emerged in the 1990s. First, the Korean government’s growing interest in constructing policy toward the diaspora coincided with the discovery in the 1990s that the total number of officially recognized Koreans abroad jumped from 1.47 million in 1980 to 5 million (Yoon 2007, 91, as cited in Lee 2010, 235).¹⁰ This increase was due to the inclusion of ethnic Koreans with foreign citizenship, and the government ostensibly identified the potential for garnering political and economic support from abroad if they could mobilize it (whether in terms of labor or capital).

Second, Korean emigrants in the United States had supported opposition politicians in campaigning against authoritarian rule and in 1993, when Kim Young Sam (formerly an opposition politician) became president, in return, they demanded that Korea allow dual citizenship (Lee 2010, 236-7). Their request was denied because of strong public opinion in Korea against dual citizenship. Instead, however, the Kim Young Sam administration devised the “Plan for the Invigoration of Overseas Korean Society” which “included improvements to the visa status of kin-foreigners and liberalisation of their economic activity in Korea” (Lee 2010, 237).

Third, by the late 1990s, the Korean government was reacting to their political and economic situation with a number of policy reforms. Soon after the 1997 Financial Crisis, the Kim Dae-Jung administration encouraged the liberalization of the Korean economy, including the labor market. This led to the increased migration of ethnic Koreans looking for work and investment opportunities in Korea. The government decided to further encourage this migration through “favourable policies toward overseas Koreans

and foreigners in general to attract their presence,” including the Overseas Korean Act (Rhee 2008, 111).¹¹ The earlier Plan suggested by the Kim Young Sam administration became the blueprint for the Overseas Korean Act, as Kim Dae-Jung also felt under “pressure to demonstrate his commitment to improving the situation of emigrants, particularly at a time when foreign investment was badly needed” (Lee 2010: 237). While the Korean government had encouraged unskilled labor migration in the late 1980s, by the late 1990s they were shifting to instead “induce investment – as well as to recruit English-speaking, internationally competitive professionals from overseas Korean populations” (Park and Chang 2005).¹²

Policy Revisions in the 2000s

In 2009, the Japanese and Korean governments both revised their ethnic return migration policies to account for demographic shifts that they had been experiencing for the past two decades. Decreasing birthrates, aging populations, and the need for more labor to support the growth of the economy have been issues that plague both nations as they each strive to be competitive in the global marketplace. Statements on plans for immigration control from each government point to similarities in policy goals despite targeting different sectors of the ethnic global community. These shared agendas include lengthening periods of stay, reducing bureaucratic procedures for long-term residents, and increasing skilled migration. In addition, the Korean government is rewarding foreign investors with special visas and related privileges and targeting Korean Americans (as part of the overseas Korean population from highly industrialized nations) as potential migrants.

In 2009, the Japanese government partially amended the Immigration Control Act, making it easier for Japanese Americans and other long-term resident visa holders to stay in Japan. The amendment raised the upper limit for a period of stay from three years to five years and alleviated the necessity of re-entry permits. By allowing ethnic return migrants to live in Japan longer and with reduced bureaucratic burden, the government hoped that they would better support the economy. In addition, the amendment introduced a system of “presumed permit of re-entry,” which “essentially exempts the need to file an application for permission for re-entry when re-entering Japan within one year of departure”

(Immigration Bureau 2009). This will relieve not only the burden of time, but also the cost required for long-term residents to leave and return to Japan only to fulfill a legal requirement.

Also in 2009, the Korea Immigration Service announced revisions to the Overseas Korean Act. Among other changes to take place between 2008 and 2012 is that permanent resident status will be granted to F-4 visa holders (i.e., ethnic Koreans) who have lived in Korea for at least two years and if a person meets any one of the following criteria: a) has an income at least twice as much as the per-capita Gross National Income; b) is at least sixty-years-old and receives a pension as much as the per-capita Gross National Income or more; or c) pays a [monthly] property tax of at least 500,000 won" (Korea Immigration Service 2009, 68; 2008). Moreover, a foreign investor – of any ancestry – who makes an investment of at least U.S. \$500,000 and employs at least five Koreans becomes a permanent resident immediately, regardless of the residence period (Korea Immigration Service 2008).¹³

In addition, the Korean government will take appropriate actions to improve the living environment for ethnic return migrants. This includes extending the maximum period of stay per visa issuance from two to three years, as well as providing a variety of migrant support services (Korea Immigration Service 2009, 70). These improvements suggest the government's concern for migrant well-being and significant systematic reform of immigration institutions and services for migrants.

Japanese and Korean immigration policies appear to be converging regarding a shared desire to increase the importation of skilled labor. In the fourth edition of the Basic Plan for Immigration published in 2010, the Japanese government expressed their intent to proactively accept foreign nationals who possess specialized knowledge, technology, or skills (Ministry of Justice 2010, 21). In a similar vein, in the First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy published in 2009, the Korean government stated, "Access to Korea will be improved for professionals, foreign investors, international students, and other highly-skilled people." More blunt than the Japanese government statements, however, the Korean Plan for Immigration Policy continues on to state that unskilled labor will be restricted and, "the Korean diaspora will receive preferred treatment over other foreigners when all the other conditions are the same" (Korea Immigration Service 2009, 11).

Despite a similar interest in strengthening and internationalizing their skilled labor workforce, the Japanese and Korean governments target different demographics. The Korean government is explicitly attempting to attract overseas Koreans from industrialized, core countries; the largest population is found in the United States. Since the ethnic Korean population in the United States is estimated at 1.56 million, Korean Americans would certainly be a viable source of English-speaking, college-educated workers to help build the Korean economy. Indeed, a policy report produced by Stanford professor Gi-Wook Shin and his colleagues advocated that the Korean government target two groups for its economic development: second- and third-generation Korean Americans and foreign students living in Korea (Shin et al. 2009).

Meanwhile, the Japanese government is not directly or explicitly targeting Japanese Americans (or ethnic Japanese in highly industrialized countries). The initial Immigration Control Act of 1990 targeted Japanese Brazilians as a potential source of unskilled labor in Japan. Despite later policy revisions that have focused on attracting skilled labor, no attempt has been made to look specifically at Japanese Americans (or other ethnic Japanese populations overseas that could provide skilled labor). As a result, fewer numbers of Japanese Americans have used the long-term resident visa, most likely since they tend to have other options for living in Japan, whether visas based on occupation (e.g., student) or status (e.g., spouse or child of a Japanese national). Most Americans are residing in Japan on “Permanent Resident,” “Spouse of Child of a Japanese National” or “Specialist in Humanities/International Services” visas (Immigration Bureau 2005, 187).¹⁴

Japanese Americans and Korean Americans in Their Ancestral Homeland: Statistics

Ethnic return migration policies have shaped migration patterns to Japan and Korea, subsequently leading to the development of ethnic return migrant populations in each country. While the motivations behind the two policies have been similar, they have resulted in divergent effects.

It is difficult to compare ethnic return migrant populations in Japan and Korea due to the fact that the Japanese government does not collect data on ethnic return migrants. Japanese statistics include visa status and nationality but not ethnic or racial

background. So there are statistics and figures on how many U.S. citizens are in Japan and their status of residence but not on how many are ethnically Japanese. On the other hand, the Korean government collects and reports statistics on overseas Koreans residing in Korea by visa status and nationality, making the reported demographics very clear.

I estimate the number of Japanese Americans living in Japan to be about 7,000, roughly 13 percent of U.S. citizens living in Japan.¹⁵ Japanese Americans, similar to other U.S. citizens, migrate to Japan on a variety of visas. The long-term resident visa has increased opportunities for Japanese Americans to live in Japan but has not greatly affected the scale of migration. As shown in Table 1, the number of U.S. citizens reported residing in Japan (not including U.S. military personnel and their dependents) is only 52,149. Since that number did not increase greatly after the promulgation of the Revised Immigration Act, it can be inferred that the numbers of Japanese Americans also did not change too significantly.

Since the enactment of the Immigration Control Act revisions in Japan, the most significant change in the ethnic return migrant population has been an increase in the number of Japanese Brazilians (and a much smaller number of Japanese Peruvians) (See Tsuda 2003; Yamanaka 1993, 2003; Roth 2002; Linger 2001; Lesser 2003). Japanese Brazilians have taken advantage of the long-term visa, largely migrating to work in factories and living in company housing complexes, developing noticeable communities particularly in industrial areas as a result.

Table 1 shows the increase in the Brazilian population since 1989 reported to be residing in Japan. In 1989, before the Revised Immigration Control Act was implemented, there were only 14,528 Brazilian national residents reported in Japan. The number more than doubled in 1990 to 56,429 and again more than doubled in 1991 to 119,333, continuing to rise for over a decade, peaking in 2007 with 316,967 Brazilian residents in Japan.¹⁶ Table 2 shows the number of Brazilian nationals registered in Japan with long-term resident as their status of residence between 2000 and 2009. The decline in the number of Brazilian nationals seen in both tables from 2007 can be explained by the onset of the economic recession in Japan.¹⁷

As of 2010, the foreign resident population in Korea is 1,261,415 (Korea Immigration Service 2010, 272), an increase since the 2009 report of 1,145,660 (Korea Immigration Service 2009). Reported U.S.

Table 1. Percent Changes in Numbers of Registered Japanese Americans and Japanese Brazilians Residing in Japan (1989-2009)

| Year | Number of U.S. Citizens Registered in Japan | Percent Change in Population | Number of Brazilians Registered in Japan | Percent Change in Population |
|------|---|------------------------------|--|------------------------------|
| 1989 | 34,900 | | 14,528 | |
| 1990 | 38,364 | 9.03% | 56,429 | 74.25% |
| 1991 | 42,498 | 9.73% | 119,333 | 52.71% |
| 1992 | 42,482 | -0.04% | 147,803 | 19.26% |
| 1993 | 42,639 | 0.37% | 154,650 | 4.43% |
| 1994 | 43,320 | 1.57% | 159,619 | 3.11% |
| 1995 | 43,198 | -0.28% | 176,440 | 9.53% |
| 1996 | 44,168 | 2.20% | 201,795 | 12.56% |
| 1997 | 43,690 | -1.09% | 233,254 | 13.49% |
| 1998 | 42,774 | -2.14% | 222,217 | -4.97% |
| 1999 | 42,802 | 0.07% | 224,299 | 0.93% |
| 2000 | 44,856 | 4.58% | 254,394 | 11.83% |
| 2001 | 46,244 | 3.00% | 265,962 | 4.35% |
| 2002 | 47,970 | 3.60% | 268,332 | 0.88% |
| 2003 | 47,836 | -0.28% | 274,700 | 2.32% |
| 2004 | 48,844 | 2.06% | 286,557 | 4.14% |
| 2005 | 49,390 | 1.11% | 302,080 | 5.14% |
| 2006 | 51,321 | 3.76% | 312,979 | 3.48% |
| 2007 | 51,851 | 1.02% | 316,967 | 1.26% |
| 2008 | 52,683 | 1.58% | 312,582 | -1.40% |
| 2009 | 52,149 | -1.02% | 267,456 | -16.87% |

Source: Director-General for Policy Planning (Statistical Standards) & Statistical Research and Training Institute, 2010.

Table 2: Changes in the Number of Brazilian Nationals Registered in Japan with “Long-Term Resident” Status (2000-2009)

| Year | Brazilian nationals with long-term resident status |
|------|--|
| 2000 | 137,649 |
| 2001 | 142,082 |
| 2002 | 139,826 |
| 2003 | 140,552 |
| 2004 | 144,407 |
| 2005 | 153,185 |
| 2006 | 153,141 |
| 2007 | 148,528 |
| 2008 | 137,005 |
| 2009 | 101,250 |

Source: Japan Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice, 2005, 2010.

citizens number 127,140, 10 percent of the total foreign resident population. They are second only to Chinese citizens, who make up 48.3 percent of the total reported foreign resident population at 608,881 (Korea Immigration Service 2010, 272).

Within the larger population of foreign national residents, the Korean government also keeps statistics on overseas Koreans. From 2006 to 2010, the overseas Korean population in Korea has risen from 267,436 to 477,029 (Korea Immigration Service 2010, 616). As evident in Table 3, the numbers rose dramatically over the five-year period. In 2010, overseas Koreans comprised 37.8 of the reported foreign resident population in Korea.

Korean Americans are the second largest group of overseas Koreans in Korea (after ethnic Koreans from China), with a reported population of 35,822, making them 7.5 percent of the total ethnic return migrant population in Korea (Korea Immigration Service 2010, 620). In addition to these reported statistics, there may be thousands – perhaps tens of thousands – of Korean Americans with dual citizenship who may not be counted (See Rhee 2008, 111).¹⁸

Table 3: Number of Overseas Koreans Residing in Korea (2006-2010)

| Year | Overseas Korean Residents |
|------|---------------------------|
| 2006 | 267,436 |
| 2007 | 365,732 |
| 2008 | 421,155 |
| 2009 | 430,104 |
| 2010 | 477,029 |

Source: Korea Immigration Service, Ministry of Justice, 2010.

In 2010, there were 84,912 people residing in Korea who were on the long-term F-4 visa that the original Overseas Korean Act provided. This is 6.7 percent of the total foreign resident population and almost 18 percent of the total overseas Korean resident population in Korea (Korea Immigration Service 2010, 268). As shown in Table 4, this number has steadily risen since 2006.

Table 4: Overseas Koreans Residing in Korea on F-4 Visas (2006-2010)

| Year | Overseas Koreans with F-4 Visas |
|------|---------------------------------|
| 2006 | 29,574 |
| 2007 | 34,695 |
| 2008 | 41,732 |
| 2009 | 50,664 |
| 2010 | 84,912 |

Source: Korea Immigration Service, Ministry of Justice, 2010.

Conclusion

The legal opportunities for Japanese Americans and Korean Americans to live and work in their ancestral homelands have increased since the 1990s through the establishment of special visas. These visas represent Asian interests in building social and economic connections with co-ethnics abroad.

While ethnic return migration policies benefit Asian Americans, the Asian governments instituting them have not necessarily targeted Asian Americans. The Japanese government anticipated the ethnic return migration of Japanese Brazilians, not Japanese Americans, when it revised this legislation in the early 1990s to encourage unskilled labor migration. More recently, as Japanese interests have shifted to encourage skilled migration, Japanese Americans, even though they come from a highly industrialized country, have still not been directly targeted.

Meanwhile, the Korean government has welcomed the immigration of Korean Americans since the enactment of the Overseas Korean Act. The Korean policy explicitly aims to attract overseas Koreans from industrialized, core countries as part of the growing white collar workforce and as foreign investors in Korea. Korean Americans are the largest overseas Korean population that meets these needs.

This targeting of particular segments of the Korean diaspora has been controversial. By omitting those in China and the former Soviet Union through the terminology used in the Overseas Korean Act, the Korean government has hierarchically classified its ethnic Korean brethren overseas. Korean Americans continue to be valued as skilled laborers and investors from economically powerful nations while ethnic Koreans from less industrialized nations struggle to attain similar rights in Korea.

Since encouraging the ethnic return migration of Korean Americans and other overseas Koreans from more developed economies, the Korean government appears to be continually expanding the rights and support services provided for these migrants as well as broadening the categories of who can access special visas, including retirees and investors. As Korean officials strive to keep Korea competitive in the global marketplace, these policies will most likely continue to be important in that endeavor.

The future of the situation in Japan is less clear. As the Japanese birthrate continues to decrease and the population continues to age, the Japanese government will need to make some vital decisions about how to revise their immigration policies to address their labor shortages. Japanese Americans are able to take advantage of the long-term resident visa in Japan, but have yet to be courted more explicitly by the Japanese government and enticed to work in Japan. Perhaps as a response to this hesitancy on the

part of Japanese officials, in 2009, Japanese American leaders established the U.S.-Japan Council, a U.S.-based non-profit organization with the mission of bringing together Japanese Americans to work towards strengthening U.S.-Japan relations.¹⁹ However, only time will tell if this effort will lead the Japanese government to rethink its ethnic return migration policies toward Japanese Americans.

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Notes

1. Indeed, the growing influence of and interest in Asian foods and popular cultures (e.g., Japanese anime, Korean dramas) in the United States certainly contribute to Asian American interest in experiencing life in Asia firsthand.
2. (Director-General for Policy Planning (Statistical Standards) & Statistical Research and Training Institute 2010; U.S. Census Bureau 2009).
3. The population estimates for Japanese Americans and Korean Americans included here are for the ancestry group alone or in any combination, thus including mixed race populations.
4. The revised act was implemented in 1990.
5. Japan's need for unskilled labor in the 1980s coincided with the Brazilian economic crisis that was driving people out of Brazil to look for work in a more stable situation. Brazil was already home to a thriving ethnic Japanese population. So among these migrants from Brazil were a number of ethnic Japanese of varying generations. First-generation migrants from Japan could easily go back to Japan where they held citizenship. Some second-generation Japanese Brazilians had Japanese citizenship through their parents, but others did not. Japan already had a visa for children or spouses of Japanese nationals, so the foreign-born second generation could still legally migrate to Japan. Thus, the long-term resident visa extended the ability to legally work and reside in Japan to third-generation ethnic Japanese and attracted nikkeijin mostly from Brazil.

6. Korean citizens are expected to serve in the military. It is possible to postpone military service or be exempted from it; see (Regulation Reform & Legal Affairs Division 2009) for more information, especially on dual citizens and second-generation South Koreans.
7. That is, “overseas Korean nationals (*jaeoe gungmin*)...are those who have permanent resident status in a foreign state or live in a foreign state with a view towards permanent residence. They may still retain Korean citizenship, but have been removed from Korea’s Resident Register.” (Rhee 2008, 112) Meanwhile, “Koreans of foreign nationality (*oeguk gukjeok dongpo*)...are or have been abroad on a short- or long-term basis but may well continue to hold residency and culturally remain closely tied to South Korea, thus maintaining *de facto* dual citizenship” (Rhee 2008, 112).
8. Park and Chang point out that “those who left the Korean peninsula during the Chosŏn period were the Chosŏn kings’ subjects, and those who left during the colonial period were the Japanese colonial subjects.” See (Park and Chang 2005, 4). Lee, however, asserts that the problem was not that ethnic Koreans in China and the former Soviet Union were never Korean citizens. Rather, he asserts that they were not able to have their Korean citizenship “ascertained before acquiring the citizenship of their country of residence [as the law requires], since ascertainment meant registration as a non-resident citizen in a diplomatic or consular mission of the Republic of Korea” (Lee 2010: 238).
9. While most Korean migration to Japan was before 1948, because of the citizenship laws in Japan that do not provide birthright citizenship, most ethnic Koreans born in Japan claim Korean citizenship. Though migration from the Korean peninsula was before the political divide between north and south, most ethnic Koreans in Japan claim South Korean citizenship because Japan does not have diplomatic relations with North Korea and, therefore, does not recognize North Korean citizens – they are considered “stateless” in Japan.
10. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not collect data on foreign nationals of Korean ancestry before 1991 (Kim 2009, 152).
11. Other reforms included the 1997 and 2005 amendments to the Korean Nationality Act, the 1998 Aliens Land Act, and the 2002 Domicile Notification Act (Rhee 2008).
12. Similar to Japan, in the late 1980s Korea needed cheap unskilled labor to work in medium- and small-sized businesses. As a result, the government instituted the “Industrial Technical Trainee Program (ITTP)” which brought in foreign “trainees” (not workers) for short-term stays (Shin et al. 2009, 13). As a way to privilege overseas Koreans, the government also established the Working Visit (H-2 visa) program, under which ethnic Koreans from China

and the former Soviet Union can legally visit relatives and find unskilled employment in Korea (Shin et al. 2009, 15). Since the institution of this visa in 2007, the overseas Korean population from China in Korea has grown significantly.

13. Previously, a foreign investor needed to spend at least U.S. \$2 million and employ at least five Koreans.
14. As of 2005 (the most recent data available), most U.S. citizens in Japan are permanent residents. Prior to becoming permanent residents, these people had different statuses of residence, but it is unclear what they were.
15. This number is based on combined estimates of the percentages of Japanese American college exchange students, participants on the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program, and skilled workers.
16. To be clear, these numbers convey the reported Brazilian nationals legally residing in Japan – and do not include dual nationals not reported or those illegally residing in Japan. Since the Brazilian population has grown so much after the promulgation of the Revised Immigration Act, most scholars assume that the Brazilian national population is comprised primarily of ethnic Japanese. Thus, the number of Japanese Brazilians is based on the number of Brazilian nationals shown in Table 1.
17. The sudden decline in the Brazilian population in 2009 can further be explained by the ethnic Japanese repatriation program initiated by the Japanese government between April 1, 2009 and March 31, 2010. Nikkeijin in Japan who returned to their home countries were given 300,000 yen each and 200,000 yen per dependent (Ministry of Health 2009). The program specifically targeted ethnic return migrants and not other foreign nationals. As a result of this program, 21,675 foreign residents left Japan, including 20,053 to Brazil, 903 to Peru and 719 to other countries (Ministry of Health).
18. It is worth noting that there are ten times as many ethnic return migrants from China than there are from the United States, even though the number of overseas Koreans in China is only 1.3 times that of those in the United States. Sixty percent of overseas Koreans in Korea have a residence status of “Work-Visit,” also known as the H-2 visa (Korea Immigration Service 2010, 618). The Work-Visit visa was introduced in 2007 and is only for “overseas Koreans with some classifications. An overseas Korean with some qualifications but no job enters the country under the Employment Management Visa, and then changes his or her visa status to Non-professional Employment after getting a job” (Park 2008, 431). In 2010, there were 286,586 people residing in Korea on H-2 visas (Korea Immigration Service 2010, 265). This makes up 22.7 percent of the total foreign resident population in Korea (Korea Immigration Service 2010, 268).

19. Among their activities is an annual Japanese American Leadership Delegation where Japanese Americans representing diverse occupational fields and geographic regions of the United States meet with top Japanese officials and business leaders to learn about Japanese society and promote not only U.S.-Japan relations, but specifically Japanese American-Japan relations.

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
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