

UC Berkeley
IURD Working Paper Series

Title

PRECONDITIONS OF MAYORAL LEADERSHIP

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/14t7k869>

Author

Pressman, Jeffrey

Publication Date

1970-08-01

PRECONDITIONS OF MAYORAL LEADERSHIP

by

Jeffrey Pressman
Postgraduate Research Political Economist
Space Sciences Laboratory
University of California, Berkeley

August 1970

Working Paper No. 129

Prepared for a Meeting of the American Political Science Association
Los Angeles, California
September 8-12, 1970

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION: THE SEARCH FOR MAYORAL LEADERSHIP.	1
II. ENVIRONMENT.	8
III. THE MAYOR HIMSELF.	36
IV. RESOURCES.	47
V. THE MAYOR AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.	60
VI. CONCLUSION.	78
 EPILOGUE: MAYORAL LEADERSHIP AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM	 83
FOOTNOTES.	88

PRECONDITIONS OF MAYORAL LEADERSHIP*

I. INTRODUCTION: THE SEARCH FOR MAYORAL LEADERSHIP

After reviewing the series of problems which constitute the contemporary "urban crisis," most observers come to the conclusion that urban political leadership--usually mayoral leadership--is a crucial ingredient in a city's ability to deal with its problems. The President's Riot Commission was outspoken on this subject:

Now, as never before, the American city has need for the personal qualities of strong democratic leadership. Given the difficulties and delays involved in administrative reorganization or institutional change, the best hope for the city in the short-run lies in this powerful instrument. In most cities the mayors will have the prime responsibility.¹

For the Commission, the role of mayor is an awesome one:

As leader and mediator, he must involve all those groups--employers, news media, unions, financial institutions and others--which only together can bridge the chasm now separating the racial ghetto from the community. His goal, in effect, must be to develop a new working concept of democracy within the city.²

Proponents of mayoral leadership readily admit that few mayors have formal authority and resources which are adequate to deal with the enormous tasks facing them. But this is not considered to be an insuperable obstacle. Alexander George has written recently that:

*This paper is based upon three years of participation in--and observation of--the Mayor's Office in Oakland. The research was conducted under the auspices of the Oakland Project, headed by Aaron Wildavsky and funded by the Urban Institute. I would like to thank Professors Wildavsky, Robert Biller, and William K. Muir, Jr., for their comments.

The pluralistic structure of dispersed, decentralized power requires a political leader who can accumulate personal influence to supplement his limited formal authority. Studies of successful leaders in urban systems have led to the formulation of a simple, but incisive model of the "political entrepreneur"--a political activist adept at accumulating a variety of political resources and using them to gain influence and additional resources.³

An alert mayor can view political fragmentation as providing numerous opportunities for the "brokerage" function--mediating disputes, serving as a line of communication, and suggesting integrative solutions in which diverse groups can all gain. And in performing this function, of course, the mayor's own power is increased. "To the political entrepreneur, who possesses skill and drive, the pluralistic dispersion and fragmentation of power in democratic systems offer unusual opportunities for pyramiding limited initial resources into a substantial political holding."⁴ Thus, effective political leadership in a fragmented system is proclaimed to be a necessity in American cities. And political scientists have provided a model of the broker-entrepreneur who can fill that need.⁵

It is easy to advocate "mayoral leadership" and "political entrepreneurship." But what does successful "leadership" mean in a modern American city? Andrew McFarland has defined leadership in the following way:

A leader may be defined as one who has unusual influence. Influence may be viewed as one's capacity to make people behave differently than they would have otherwise. A leader may also be defined as one who has unusual power. Here we view "power" as a person's capacity to make others do something that they would not do otherwise and that the person specifically wants or intends.⁶

According to this social causation definition, a mayor may be said to exercise leadership when he alters human behavior in ways that

he himself desires. Thus, he must set goals and influence others to aid in the pursuit of those goals.

Model of Mayoral Leadership

For those who call for strong and progressive mayors, a model of effective mayoral leadership should include a specification of: (1) the goals toward which a mayor might strive; (2) those groups in his environment which he must influence in support of those goals; (3) the ways in which he may influence them; and (4) the resources required for an effective exercise of power.

The goals toward which a model mayor might devote his energies and lead his constituency are numerous, varied, and difficult to accomplish. They might include: effective and humane law enforcement; redevelopment linked to speedy relocation in decent housing of those displaced by redevelopment; expansion of a city's financial resources by increasing taxes or by attraction of new industry; improvement of educational quality and relationships between the schools and community; construction of low-cost public housing; generation of new jobs and creation of job-training and job-placement programs. Besides these substantive goals, the ideal mayor would strive to maintain within the political system a process of constructive dialogue between diverse groups which would contribute to harmony in the city. (Of course, there is no guarantee that mayors and their constituencies will choose liberal goals. Strong mayors could pursue segregationist or repressive policies. Therefore, it is important to ask: leadership for what?)

In pursuing his goals, a mayor would have to exercise control and direction over the city council and relevant city departments: schools,

redevelopment, housing, police, etc. The successful mayor would attempt to stretch his "legal" jurisdiction as far as possible. Furthermore, he would have to activate non-governmental groups in the community in support of his tasks by promising rewards and threatening sanctions. He would have to persuade businessmen to locate factories in his city, to initiate job-training programs and to develop jobs. He would have to persuade labor unions to open places in apprenticeship programs to minority groups. And he would have to persuade black community groups that he was carrying out programs that would benefit them and which deserved their support.

An ideal mayor would use his control of the mechanism of a political party to further his policy preferences, by supporting the nomination and election of candidates who were willing to support him. Those who worked for the mayor's choices would be rewarded with party office. Furthermore, the model mayor would be willing to use publicity in order to appeal to the public to support him against opponents by voting in elections or by trying to influence recalcitrant groups.

In order to exercise leadership over these various groups--in order to make them do what they would otherwise not do--the ideal mayor would require various resources. They would include:

- a) Sufficient financial and staff resources on the part of the city government.
- b) City jurisdiction in social program areas--such as education, housing, redevelopment, job training, etc.
- c) Mayoral jurisdiction within the city government in these policy fields.
- d) A salary for the mayor which will enable him to spend full time on the job.

- e) Sufficient staff support for the mayor--for policy planning, speech-writing, intergovernmental relations, and political work.
- f) Ready vehicles for publicity--such as friendly newspapers or television stations.
- g) Politically-oriented groups--including a political party--which the mayor can mobilize to help him achieve particular goals.

As this list suggests, the opportunities for mayoral leadership in a particular case may be limited by the political structure of a city (electoral system, parties, groups), by governmental structure, and by the lack of staff, jurisdictional and financial resources. Furthermore, the quality of mayoral leadership may be strongly influenced by the personality of the mayor himself. Although social forces and governmental structures set limits to what any man might be able to do as mayor in a particular city, personal variability should not be discounted.

Discussing the impact of personality on politics, Fred I. Greenstein has stated that the likelihood of personal impact:

- (1) increases to the degree that the environment admits of restructuring;
- (2) varies with the actor's location in the environment; and (3) varies with the personal strengths and weaknesses of the actor.⁷

For Greenstein, personal variability is most likely to manifest itself in "ambiguous situations" in which "political actors lack mental sets which might lead them to structure their perceptions and resolve ambiguities." In leadership positions which are typically "free from elaborate expectations of fixed content," personal variations will be more evident. McFarland also notes the importance of an ambiguous environment in providing opportunities for personal initiative; he views leadership opportunities in "conflicting

expectations among others about the person's behavior in a position."³

Thus, in examining the quality of mayoral leadership, we must ask to what extent a given Mayor's performance is influenced by social forces and governmental structure--and to what extent that performance is influenced by the Mayor's personality.

This paper will explore the politics of mayoral leadership--or non-leadership--in a particular city: Oakland, California, under the administration of Mayor John H. Reading. Part II examines the often hostile environment in which the Mayor works--the city of Oakland and its political structure, the city government, and the Mayor's own office. Part III describes the personality of the Mayor himself, using material drawn from speeches, interviews, newspaper articles, and personal observation. Part IV analyzes the Mayor's performance in light of the resources available (or potentially available) to him. Finally, Part V describes the Mayor's activities vis-a-vis federal government officials. The operation of federal programs has been the Mayor's chief concern during his time in office. His activities in this area illustrate some significant obstacles to mayoral leadership and provide examples of the mayor's methods of dealing with other political actors.

By examining mayoral leadership in a particular city, and by comparing that leadership to the model described above, this essay will suggest some of the difficulties surrounding urban leadership in an era of racial tension, confrontation, and low urban resources. By understanding these difficulties, we will be better prepared to chart the preconditions for successful mayoral leadership.

If some of the vital preconditions--financial resources, governmental authority, groups, etc.--are missing, a mayor may still attempt to

be a leader. But the style and consequences of his leadership depend to a large extent on the type of governmental and political system in which he operates. Furthermore, it may be argued that substantive goals such as improved education, humane law enforcement, and economic redistribution can best be achieved by strong organization in the poor minority community. Such organization might be impeded by a strong mayor and helped by a weaker one. Thus, students of city politics are considering alternative models of urban leadership, based on a countervailing force which is independent of City Hall.

The concluding section of this paper will discuss some of the connections between political environment and style of leadership. Also, it will examine the effect of City Hall leadership upon the organization of the poor.

II. ENVIRONMENT

The City

What are the characteristics of the population of Oakland, and what tasks do those characteristics suggest to the Mayor? In 1966, when the University of California's Survey Research Center carried out a "701" Household Survey of Poverty in Oakland, the total household population of the city was 365,490. The racial composition of the city is summarized in Table 1:

Table 1
Racial Composition of Oakland, California (1966)

<u>Ethnicity</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Total Persons	365,490	100%
White (excluding Spanish surname)	201,180	55%
White (with Spanish surname)	35,200	10%
Negro	110,050	30%
Other Non-White	19,060	5%

SOURCE: Survey Research Center, University of California, Poverty and Poverty Programs in Oakland. (Berkeley, 1967), p. 26.

Among people defined as below the "poverty level"--earning below \$2,500 per year for a single individual and below \$4,000 for a family of four--minority groups (black people and Mexican-Americans) were over-represented. Whereas black people made up 30 percent of the city's total population, they constituted 45 percent of the poverty population. Mexican-Americans, who made up 10 percent of the city's population, were 14 percent of the poverty population. From the beginning of his term, Mayor Reading has viewed poverty as the central problem of Oakland. For the Mayor, the

lack of buying power caused by poverty has caused losses to retail business and missed opportunities for expanding tax revenue.

One of the most discouraging statistics concerning Oakland--and, for the Mayor, the most important one--is the city's unemployment rate. Table 2 compares the Oakland and national unemployment figures:

Table 2
Oakland's Unemployment Rate is Significantly Higher than
the National Average

<u>Rates</u>	Percent of Civilian Labor Force Unemployed	
	<u>Oakland</u>	<u>United States</u>
<u>Crude Rates*</u>		
Total (all civilian workers)	8.4%	4.1%
Males, 20 years and over	4.8%	2.3%
Females, 20 years and over	8.3%	3.9%
Both sexes, 14 to 19 years	30.5%	13.0%
<u>Seasonally Adjusted Rates**</u>		
Total (all civilian workers)	7.7%	4.0%
Males, 20 years and over	4.6%	2.5%
Females, 20 years and over	7.5%	3.9%
Both sexes, 14 to 19 years	26.7%	12.4%

*For Oakland, the simple unemployment rate based on all cases included in the 701 survey. For the United States, the mean adjusted unemployment rate for May, June, July, and August.

**Mean seasonally adjusted rate for May, June, July, and August. For Oakland, an approximate seasonal adjustment was made for interviews completed in each month, based on U.S. seasonal adjustment figures.

SOURCE: Stanford Research Institute, Human Resources Development for Oakland: Problems and Policies. (Menlo Park, 1968) p. 10.

Among black people and Mexican-Americans, the unemployment rate was found to be 12 percent, as opposed to 5 percent among whites and 8 percent among "orientals and other non-whites."⁹ In the Oakland Hills, unemployment was 3.9 percent; in the West and East Oakland ghettos, the figures were 14.3 percent and 14.4 percent, respectively.¹⁰ For Mayor

Reading, this is the critical part of the environment which must be changed. Unemployment--particularly severe among minority groups--is the root of poverty. With jobs will come not only buying power but also self-respect and dignity.

Oakland, then, is the kind of city which is discussed at length in the news media and in the growing "urban crisis" literature. It is characterized by an increasingly large minority population, geographical separation, and emotional tension between races, and a high unemployment rate.

Political Environment: The Non-Politics of Oakland

One of the requirements postulated for successful mayoral leadership is the existence of "politically-oriented groups--including a political party--which the mayor can mobilize to help him achieve particular goals." Such groups and parties would give the mayor an opportunity to identify interests which had become aggregated by and articulated through organizations. Furthermore, groups and parties could perform the function of recruiting political leaders with whom the mayor could bargain. Finally, the mayor could use friendly groups as vehicles for political education in the goals toward which he was working and as organizing devices to bring citizens together in support of these goals.

In Oakland, a fundamental obstacle to mayoral leadership is the nature of the political environment itself. For this environment is characterized by a lack of interest in the electoral process and an absence of political parties and groups.

It often appears as though politics in Oakland does not exist. In 1969, when elections were held for Mayor, City Council, and the Board of Education, the candidate response was tepid at best. Two little-known

men emerged to challenge Mayor Reading's attempt for re-election, two new candidates filed against two of the three incumbents on the School Board, and all three City Councilmen who were up for re-election were unopposed.

In a city marked by serious divisions, what causes the avoidance of electoral politics? Many answers have been suggested: the lack of resources and power in city government; the middle and upper class white bias of the at-large election system, which makes candidacies expensive and extraordinarily difficult; the City Council's action in raising filing fees from \$20 to \$200; the paltry salaries of elected officials.

A further reason for the anemic condition of Oakland's electoral process has been the noticeable absence of political party activity in municipal elections. This absence has, no doubt, been encouraged by the non-partisan nature of the municipal ballot, which gives voters no indication of the party to which a candidate belongs. But formal non-partisanship is not a sufficient explanation for party inaction. In neighboring Berkeley, for example, a liberal Democratic caucus organized in the 1950's managed to win substantial majorities on both the city council and school board. Slates of candidates were endorsed and "Democratic Newsletters" were distributed--although the form of the ballot remained officially non-partisan. In formally "non-partisan" San Francisco, Democratic and Republican organizations have also been active.

If the form of the ballot is not an adequate explanation for the lack of party activity in Oakland, what factors can be identified upon which to base such an explanation? One factor is that party leaders in Oakland--who are active in national, state, and even county campaigns--seem to share the lack of interest exhibited by Oakland citizens (in 1969 Oakland Project interviews) in their city. They argue that opportunities

for success are small and that citizen indifference toward city affairs makes city government in Oakland unattractive to ambitious politicians.

Another cause of party inactivity in Oakland has been the lack of organized politically-interested groups in the city upon which a party or mayor could build. When the Associated Students Union of Oakland (an organization of liberal student activists) tried to form a "coalition" in 1968 and 1969 to work for changes in school procedure and curriculum, they found--as one leader put it--"that there was no one to coalesce with." Labor has not played a significant role in city politics since the 1940's. And business groups, though formally endorsing certain non-partisan causes like Charter Reform, have not heavily involved themselves in city politics. In Berkeley, university groups, PTA's, and civic organizations combined to form the Democratic caucus. Oakland does not have these kinds of groups upon which to build a party, and the party organizations themselves are less than healthy groups.

To complicate matters further, the politically-minded groups that do exist in Oakland tend not to communicate with other groups. Men of similar backgrounds and political views are usually found in enclosed organizations with few lines of communication to those of opposing backgrounds and views. Oakland Project studies of the 1968 Proposition J (Charter Revision) and Proposition M (District Elections) campaigns showed that the J campaign consisted almost exclusively of white Republican businessmen, while the M campaign was carried out by liberal Democrats--including numerous black leaders. Members of the two groups had extreme difficulty in communicating with each other, at least partially because they did not even know each other. The weakness and fragmentation of group life in Oakland makes the city-wide forging of political organization difficult.

(Although black organizations--particularly in West Oakland--have increased in number and activity, they have yet to make an impact on the electoral system.)

Whatever the reasons, it is clear that the electoral arena is not the scene of the "action" in contemporary Oakland. The City Manager, as we shall see, has certain important resources and powers within his sphere of city administration, and the local poverty agency has a significant resource in control over its federally-funded programs. Indeed, it is difficult to argue--given the present arrangement of incentives--that black people should give up good jobs in the Poverty Program to enter a difficult electoral arena in which eventual success may not gain much in terms of important policy changes.

But the costs of an empty electoral arena may be high. Campaigns and elections, if they mean something, do provide an opportunity for involving large numbers of people in the processes of government. Furthermore, the discussion of city issues and the building of constituencies could bring home to Oaklanders the realization that their city has problems around which certain cooperative efforts might be organized. If important public decisions are left to non-elected city administrators on the one hand, and to the Poverty Program, on the other--each acting in a separate sphere--there is little opportunity for dialogue between people of different races and different social and economic groups. A revitalized electoral arena might aid in performing the task of encouraging political dialogue and integration. But at the present time in Oakland, the arena lies in near disuse.

The absence of active parties and groups--and of city-wide politics itself--constitutes a grave limitation on mayoral leadership. For the

processes of interest aggregation, articulating political education and policy support are all made more difficult. The challenge that an informed political environment poses for any city government is enormous. Let us now examine the structure and process of Oakland city government itself.

Form of Government: The Limits of City Hall Control

Before discussing Oakland city government, it is well to understand the jurisdictional limits of that government. For only a few of the problem areas that we usually associate with the "urban crisis" are directly under the control of Oakland's City Council and City Manager. The school system, for example, is completely independent of City Hall--except for the provision that the City Council may pass a 5 percent "emergency tax" for the schools.

Another powerful independent body is the Oakland Board of Port Commissioners, which was established in 1927 as an independent department of the city with exclusive control and management of the Port of Oakland. This body is responsible for 19 miles of waterfront including major marine terminals, yacht harbors, the Metropolitan Oakland International Airport, the industrial park, and Jack London Square. The Port, which is not under the administrative and budgetary control of the City Manager, had total assets of \$82,035,596 in 1968.

Although redevelopment and housing have been two of the most controversial policy areas in Oakland, the commissions that have jurisdiction in these areas are also "autonomous." The Redevelopment Agency and the Housing Authority, funded by the Federal Government, have the power to hire and fire their own employees. Relations between the city government and these two autonomous boards have been strained in the past, with the

City Manager traditionally recommending reductions in the city's small "administrative" outlays to Redevelopment, and the Mayor attacking the Housing Authority's plans for a new \$2 million headquarters building.¹¹ In June 1969, tensions between the city government and Redevelopment Agency were exacerbated by a move on the part of the Council and Manager to transfer the planning for the City Center renewal project from the Redevelopment Agency to City Hall.¹²

Finally, the local poverty agency, the Oakland Economic Development Council, Inc., has been independent from City Hall since 1967. This agency, which operates important manpower programs and community action projects, received \$5.2 million from the Federal Government in 1968.

A City of Oakland publication states the rationale for autonomous commissions in the following way:

Running a city the size of Oakland is a big job for the City Council and the City Manager. A modern city must provide such a variety of services for its people and carry on so many types of projects that it would take many hours of each week for the Council to make all the decisions. Oakland meets this problem by having special boards and commissions make many decisions for the Council and carry through many projects for the City Manager. Some of these boards are called "autonomous" boards. This means they operate almost independently of the Council and the City Manager. They have the power to hire their own employees, under Civil Service rules, and plan and carry out projects. They are something like small city councils interested in only one part of city life.¹³

The implications of fragmentation for mayoral leadership--or city government leadership--are quite serious. A fundamental requirement for mayoral leadership was "city jurisdiction in the fields of education, redevelopment, housing, job training, etc." Without such jurisdiction, a mayor may be powerless to control outcomes in policy areas which are crucial to him. For example, this paper suggested a policy goal of "redevelopment linked to speedy relocation in decent housing of those

displaced by redevelopment." In Oakland, the Mayor has been disturbed both by the slow pace of renewal (under the jurisdiction of the autonomous Redevelopment Agency) and the lack of progress in the field of low cost public housing (under the jurisdiction of the autonomous Housing Authority). These policy areas seem logically linked to each other, but the Mayor has encountered difficulties in communicating with both of these agencies--let alone forging a bond of cooperation between them.

Finally, the City Manager, the Mayor, and a number of Councilmen, decided that the system of multiple "small city councils," with lack of central budgetary control, meant low efficiency and wasted money. Therefore, a Charter Revision Committee was created in 1967--and the City Council strongly suggested that the Committee's first recommendation be the elimination of autonomy for some commissions. The committee followed the Council's suggestion and recommended a new City Charter which would allow the City Manager to assume direct administrative and budgetary control of five previously autonomous departments-- Civil Service, Recreation, Parks, Library, and Museum. When the charter revision (Proposition J) was passed by the voters of Oakland in November of 1963, a measure of centralization had been accomplished. Still, as we have seen, a number of important local policy-making bodies remained independent of City Hall's direction.

Now that we have considered some of those governmental bodies in the city's environment which are outside City Hall, let us look more closely at the inside of city government itself.

The Separation of Politics from Administration

In a seminal article which appeared in 1887, Woodrow Wilson declared that "administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics."

Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices."¹⁴ Political actors should meet to debate, to give voice to public opinion, and to fashion a broad policy which will serve as a clear directive for subsequent action. But once those guidelines are established, the task of policy-making for the politician is ended. Now the problem is one of technical efficiency in carrying out the policy--and only a scientifically trained administrator is able to perform this task competently. Administrators are not to tamper with policy, for this would be a denial of democracy. And politicians must not interfere with administration, for efficiency would suffer.

This separation of politics from administration, a hallmark of the Progressive era in American politics, lies at the root of the Council-Manager form of government. In Oakland, according to the City Charter: "The Council shall be the governing body of the City. It shall exercise the corporate powers of the City and, . . . it shall be vested with all powers of legislation."¹⁵ However, the Charter goes on to state that the Council "shall have no administrative powers."

The Mayor, who is a member of the City Council, occupies a special place in the "political" side of Oakland city government. As described by the City Charter, his duties sound impressive:

The Mayor shall be the chief elective officer of the City, responsible for providing leadership and taking issues to the people and marshalling public interest in and support for municipal activity. He shall recommend to the Council such legislation as he deems necessary and shall encourage programs for the physical, economic, social and cultural development of the City. He shall preside over meetings of the Council, shall be the ceremonial head of the City, and shall represent the City in intergovernmental relations as directed by the Council.¹⁶

Once again, the line is clearly drawn between politics and administration: "The Mayor shall have no administrative authority, it being the intent of this Charter that the Mayor shall provide community leadership, while administrative responsibilities are assigned to the City Manager."

Thus, according to the Charter, the Mayor is to lead public opinion, the Council is to formulate policy, and the City Manager is to administer the policy. The Manager has the power "to execute and enforce all laws and ordinances and policies of the Council and to administer the affairs of the City."¹⁷ Under the City Manager's jurisdiction is the preparation and submission of the city budget and the administration of the city government's departments--Building and Housing, Electrical, Finance, Fire, Municipal Buildings, Police, Purchasing, Street and Engineering, Traffic Engineering, Civil Service, Parks, Recreation, Library, and Museum.

The separation of politics from administration is preserved by a section of the Charter entitled "Non-Interference." This section declares that, except for the purpose of inquiry, the Council and its members can deal with the administrative service only through the City Manager.

In theory, the Council sets policy and the Manager carries it out. However, in practice, the relationship between politics and administration in Oakland is strongly affected by the personalities of the men holding city offices and by the wide disparity in the levels of resources available to the politicians on one hand and the administrators on the other.

An examination of comparative resources helps to explain why there is a strong tendency in Oakland for administration to devour politics--for

the Mayor and Council to follow the Manager's lead in the policy-making process. First of all, the Mayor and Councilmen are not intended to serve full time at their jobs; the City Manager, on the other hand, is enjoined by the Charter "to devote his entire time to the duties and interests of the City."¹⁸ Salary levels underscore this difference: The Mayor earns only \$7,500 and each Councilman earns \$3,600 per year, but the City Manager's annual salary is \$38,940. It would be a rare Councilman or Mayor who could afford to spend full time on his job.

This imbalance between the political and administrative sides of Oakland city government is further increased by a disparity in the staff and informational resources available to the Council and Manager. For the entire City Council is served by just one secretary--who answers the phone, arranges appointments, types letters, and administers the Christmas program of the Municipal Employees' Choir. The Mayor is not much better off, with one administrative assistant and three secretaries. Among the staff members on the "political" side of Oakland government, only the Mayor's administrative assistant has the inclination or the ability to carry out policy-related research. And he is often too busy dictating letters and substituting for the Mayor at social and political gatherings to engage in research and writing.

The City Manager, in contrast, may utilize the manpower and informational resources of all city departments under his control. Furthermore, the Manager has three full-time staff assistants in his own office who help him keep abreast of departmental communications. The Finance and Budget Directors, who serve under the City Manager, provide him with information regarding departments' allocation and utilization of city funds.

As a result, the City Manager tends to know more than anyone else about city government structure, processes, and substantive policy. In the area of budgeting, for example, Councilmen tend to defer to the judgment of the Manager. Declaring that it would be a mistake for the Council to go into budgeting in any deep way, one Councilman remarked: "That's what we pay him for."¹⁹ Although the City Council has a Ways and Means Committee to consider the budget, the Chairman of that committee is consistently willing to defer to the Manager's judgment.

This sort of knowledge and expertise also helped the City Manager to dominate meetings of the Charter Revision Committee, which were conducted in late 1967 and 1968. The bankers, lawyers, and Councilmen who constituted that committee usually found themselves responding to-- and agreeing with--the City Manager's suggestions on "streamlining" the Oakland government (that is, giving the Manager more power).

Jerome Keithley: The Triumph of Administration²⁰

A potential monopoly on staff and informational resources is not, however, the only reason for City Manager domination of the Oakland governmental process at the present time. For Jerome Keithley, the current City Manager, is a man who is adept at dealing with the internal environment of city government. The City Council's power to fire the City Manager gives Councilmen an ultimate trump card to play against the Manager, but Keithley's performance in his job has gained him the solid and enthusiastic support of the Council, and the reasons for this support are numerous.

First of all, Keithley shares the views of most Councilmen as to what the goals of city administration should be: efficiency, cost-cutting,

and thus lower taxes. Unlike Wayne Thompson, his "social visionary" predecessor, Keithley sees the role of City Manager as that of an inside administrator--paying attention to departments which are formally under his jurisdiction.

Secondly, City Manager Keithley uses his access to departmental records to satisfy as quickly as possible Councilmen's requests for information. Recently, for example, there were complaints to the Mayor that the utilities tax was bearing most heavily on old people. The Council requested Keithley to look into the matter and a City Budget Analyst immediately began carrying out a study. (The City Manager has fulfilled similar Council requests with regard to zoning, turnkey housing, and repair of streets in the hill area.) Knowing that Councilmen worry about the travel expenses of city employees, the Manager prepared a special display concerning these expenditures.

When City Manager Keithley proposes an administrative innovation, he is careful to inform the Council of his actions far in advance of the change itself. Thus, when the City Manager decided to take automatic data processing out of the City Auditor's control, he talked to Councilmen for a year before the implementation of his plan--warning them that they shouldn't expect miracles overnight from more efficient supervision of the program. Through these discussions, the City Manager was able to keep the Council informed and to minimize his own risk by stressing that no startling gains should be expected.

A further way in which Keithley builds Council support is his practice of letting the Councilmen make decisions in areas in which they are particularly interested. For example, the City Manager allows the Council to have jurisdiction over the budget for "civic organizations"--

such as the Chamber of Commerce, the Elks Club, the Italian-American Federation, and the California Spring Garden and Home Show Committee. In 1969, this budget of "plums" amounted to \$319,999.

Finally, Keithley builds support on the Council by being "one of the guys." He is a regular attender at City Council dinners and at ball games at the Coliseum--events that the Mayor often avoids. Thus, the Manager uses personal friendship--as well as access to valuable resources and shared value orientations--to maintain City Council support.

With respect to the city departments, it must not be assumed that the City Manager's control flows automatically from his position in the Charter. Here again, Keithley has moved to solidify a position of strength by wise use of the powers and resources available to him.

Wherever possible, Keithley uses his power of appointment of city department heads to ensure that his men secure important jobs. Thus, the City Manager selected two city administrators with whom he had close rapport to head the new super-agencies for Public Works and Administrative Services.

It is also important to note that the City Manager controls the amount of salary raises given to key executives who are not under the standard comparative formula which governs the lower levels. High city officials are well aware of this power held by the Manager.

Keithley has also modified the budgetary process in order to ensure a greater measure of City Manager control. Under Wayne Thompson, the budget form sent to Council had an entry marked "Departmental Request." Now it simply says "City Manager Recommends." The City Manager presents the budget himself, on his own terms, and does not merely pass on departmental requests to the Council.

What is the social and political outlook of this man who has managed to create such a secure position for himself in Oakland's governmental system? Basically, Keithley does not see his role of Manager as political. He takes the Charter literally, and he is concerned primarily with the physically-oriented departments which are under his formal jurisdiction. He is interested in how the city looks; for example, he has long been advocating the development of a plan for streetsweeping.

Within his area of jurisdiction and expertise, Keithley is devoted to efficiency. For Keithley, efficiency is not just cost-cutting, but the avoidance of duplication and the provision of better service. The City Manager is "conservative," but not in an ideological sense. (In 1966, he urged the Mayor, a Republican, not to endorse Ronald Reagan for Governor.) Rather, Keithley is "conservative" in that he defines his jurisdiction cautiously and carefully, never moving in a policy area unless he has prepared the way beforehand by careful study and seeking of support. Government is a slow and detailed process, reasons the manager; if Poverty Program people understood this, they would have more sympathy with the things he was trying to do.

For Keithley, the Federal Government has been a source of frustration. Although the city needs federal money, it sometimes seems that it's not worth the trouble to get these funds. The money never appears to come on time, and lack of communication between federal auditors and operators means that it is difficult to keep books efficiently. Furthermore, the City Manager resents what he considers undue federal pressure--like the time when the Department of Housing and Urban Development asked him not to fire two building inspectors or else he would face rejection of the city's "workable program" for federal redevelopment funds.

In the City Manager's view, city staff exists to "take the load off" public officials--who should meet people and perform ceremonial tasks. Politics and administration should not mix; thus, Keithley was opposed to appointing a city councilman to an administrative committee on automatic data processing.

Armed with his considerable advantages, the City Manager defines "policy" and "administration" in a manner in which "administration" is very large and "policy" is very small. When the Mayor complained in July 1968 that Police Chief Gain's stringent restrictions on policemen's use of guns (a decision in which the City Manager had concurred but about which the Mayor had never been consulted) constituted a dangerous policy decision which should be overturned by the Council, the City Manager disagreed. The Manager's reasoning was clear: "A policy decision would be that policemen in Oakland should carry guns. Administrative decisions would be when they should carry guns, where they should carry guns, and how they should use those guns."

Mayor Reading and City Manager Keithley have also disagreed about the extent to which a citizen's grievance against an administrator becomes a "policy" matter. The Mayor feels that performance of the ombudsman role is one of the few functions left to himself and the other Councilmen. But the Manager feels that an administrative injustice is obviously an administrative matter; thus, complaints against administrative officers should be taken up with the City Manager's office. Under such definitions, the area left for "policy" tends to be rather limited.

Although the Mayor sometimes feels frustrated by the dominance of the City Manager, he also respects the Manager's ability and knowledge of

the machinery of government. This aspect, combined with the Mayor's dislike of conflict, make him unwilling to challenge the City Manager.

The City Attorney

The City Manager's definition of "policy" and "administration" is usually supported by the City Attorney, Edward Goggin--who is appointed by the Council but who takes his lead from the City Manager.²¹ Goggin has a penchant for defining the area of permissible action by the city government as extremely narrow; within the government, Goggin tends to rule against expanded City Council jurisdiction.

For example, when Mayor Reading set up a Council Human Relations Committee to hear citizens' grievances, Goggin ruled that the committee could take no action that was not approved by the city administration. When the Mayor sought to investigate his supposed new powers under the Green Amendment to the Poverty Program, the City Attorney advised him that it was impossible--and illegal--for the city to keep control of the poverty board. (Even if the city created its own poverty board, reasoned the Attorney, it would eventually have to give complete independence to that board.)

When the Oakland Economic Development Council, Inc. (the Community Action Agency under the Poverty Program) asked the city for matching funds for the Neighborhood Youth Corps Program in August of 1968, the City Attorney ruled that the Charter prevented the city from giving funds to any private organization, no matter how laudable its goals. (Presumably, the "civic organizations" budget was money being used for "civic purposes.") The Mayor had to bear the brunt of the criticism for the city's failure to contribute the matching funds.

Of course, the City Council does not always heed the City Attorney's opinions. When the City's Traffic Engineer decided in March 1969 that Montclair Village's pastel-colored parking stripes would have to be repainted white by the city, the Montclair Business Association appealed to the Council for help. Although Goggin ruled in his "legal opinion" that it was not proper for the Council to "participate" in the administration of the city or to direct the street department on what to do, the Council overruled the administration's decision by a vote of 5 to 4.

Although "policy" emerged victorious in this case, the City Attorney's opinions--carrying the weight of legal judgment--are not usually passed off so lightly. Embodying a restrictive interpretation of the role of "policy" they constitute another obstacle with which mayoral leadership must contend.

How could an ideal mayor use the City Attorney? In our model of mayoral leadership, the mayor would have control over the appointment of the City Attorney; in Oakland, the Mayor must persuade a majority of the Council to join him in hiring or firing a City Attorney. But if the mayor of a city does control the City Attorney, such control can be useful. The Attorney can advise the Mayor of ways in which the Charter might be interpreted to facilitate goals toward which the Mayor is working--or he might suggest ways in which the Mayor could use Charter provisions as a reason for not carrying out policies which the Mayor finds distasteful. (Thus, the Mayor could use the "commitment" strategy suggested by Thomas Schelling:²² he would like to fulfill the request of some group or other, but he is unfortunately prevented by the Charter from doing so.) In Oakland, the absence of control excused by the Mayor over the City

Attorney allows the Attorney's opinions to fall on the Mayor as unexpected obstacles.

The City Council

The segment of the political environment closest to the Mayor is the City Council, of which he is a member. In the model of successful leadership, the Mayor exercises "control and direction over the City Council." In Oakland, where the Mayor has limited jurisdiction of his own and just one vote out of nine on the Council, his ability to influence Councilmen to act in accordance with his goals becomes extremely important. If the Mayor could persuade four Councilmen to go along with him, he could direct the City Manager and Attorney to follow his policy leadership--or he could fire the City Manager and hire a new man who would work toward his goals.

City Council: Process of Entry

Thus, the City Council is a critical potential tool (and potential obstacle) for mayoral leadership. Let us now move to a discussion of the processes by which the Council operates: how men come to serve on the Council and how the Council conducts its business.

Of the present members of the Council, six were originally appointed and only three were originally elected. According to a study made by the Oakland Citizens for Responsive Government, "appointment politics" has been a tradition in Oakland:

Table 3
Appointment Politics has been Common in Oakland, 1953-1968

<u>Office</u>	<u># of Changes</u>	<u>Originally Appointed</u>	<u>Originally Elected</u>
Mayor	2	1	1
Councilmen	17	9	8

SOURCE: Oakland Citizens for Responsive Government, "Effect of Appointments Upon the Oakland Governmental Structure." (Newsletter, June 1969).

Once on the Council, incumbents tend to be able to survive subsequent elections with ease. No "appointed incumbent" has lost the ensuing election in the past 16 years. Overall, in the period between the Spring elections of 1953 through the Spring elections of 1969, only a handful of incumbents have lost. Table 4 shows the enviable electoral record of Oakland incumbents:

Table 4
Incumbents have been Successful in Oakland Politics
1953-1969

<u>Office</u>	<u>Incumbents Running</u>	<u>Incumbents Winning</u>	<u>Incumbents Losing</u>
Mayor	6	5	1
Councilmen	34	29*	5

*Twelve of these were unopposed.

SOURCE: Oakland Citizens for Responsive Government.

All elections to the City Council are run on a city-wide basis-- although a candidate for Council must live in the district he wishes to represent. (Seven Councilmen represent districts, and there is one "Councilman at Large." The Mayor is elected independently on an at-large basis.)

Process of Business

Inside the Council, there are two standing committees: Ways and Means, which considers tax and budget questions; and Civic Action, with a vague jurisdiction in the area of human relations. Whenever the Councilmen engage in semi-intensive study, it is usually done through these committees. (Examples of such studies are the Civic Action Committee's investigation of conditions in East Oakland's Elmhurst section in April 1969 and the Ways and Means Committee's work on police pay issues in the Spring and Summer of 1969.)

Official City Council meetings take place at 7:30 p.m., on Tuesdays and at 10:30 a.m., on Thursdays, but most decisions are made at special "work sessions" before the Council meetings--in the Mayor's office on Thursdays and over dinner on Tuesday evenings. Both Mayor and Council have felt that they can be more honest with each other at such sessions, and also be shielded from pressure.

From time to time, citizens' groups have raised questions about the "publicness" of such meetings, since the seating room in the Mayor's office is limited. Although the meetings are announced in advance to newsmen, the public is not alerted and there is barely room at the meetings for the Council and a few newsmen--plus two or three taxpayer organizations or civic group representatives. While no formal votes are taken at these sessions, important discussions on city issues do take place. The ensuing vote on these questions takes place at public meetings.

At first, the "work sessions" were taped, as regular City Council meetings are. But as the informal sessions became more frequent, the taping stopped. And city clerk personnel, who usually record regular meetings of either the Council or its committees, do not attend "work

sessions." As a result, the "public" participation in such meetings becomes the participation of a handful of newsmen and interested observers.²³

The "work session" procedure went on in a relatively untroubled manner until June 26, 1969, when newsmen were barred from an executive session regarding the City Auditor's office. (Journalists did not mind being kept out of "personnel" sessions, but the City Auditor told them that this meeting was a "budgetary" session.) Incensed, the usually friendly Oakland Tribune gave the following advice to the Mayor and Council:

There will be greater public confidence in the activities of Oakland city government when the Council and Mayor cease holding "work sessions" in the Mayor's Office and hold them in the council chambers constructed for the purpose. . . . Gentlemen, the floor is yours. The Oakland City Council Chamber floor.²⁴

This debate over "publicness" of meetings is important for a number of reasons. First of all, it illustrates the preference of Council members for "quiet" discussions and for avoidance of public pressure and conflict. Also, it points up a basic dilemma facing the Mayor. On the one hand, he is aware that closed meetings facilitate "informal" discussion and agreement among Council members--and leadership of the Council is a fundamental task of his. On the other hand, it is difficult to mobilize outside groups--or even to communicate with them--if open discussion is lacking. For groups like the liberal Citizens for Responsive Government, the issue of publicness itself is a major concern. The model of mayoral leadership specifies that the Mayor must direct both the Council and public groups, but the debate over "publicness" shows that it may be difficult to do both at the same time.

Social and Political Attitudes of the Council

With the exceptions of two men--a moderate Democrat and a liberal Democrat who is the only black man on the Council--the social and political attitudes of the Councilmen tend to be conservative; these men are distrustful of government action in social areas and disturbed by the growing consciousness and militancy of black people. They feel that the main part of the poverty problem is the motivation of poor people themselves. To one Councilman, for example, the employment situation is a result of the workings of human nature: "Some ethnic groups just don't want to work, so there really isn't much use in training them. Sure, they'd be glad to keep getting trained and getting paid; they could spend their whole lifetime doing that. Now, don't misunderstand me; I'm not racially prejudiced. Maybe I should say some individuals, rather than some ethnic groups, don't want to work, but that's your main problem."²⁵

At times, the Council seems to pretend that Oakland's problems do not exist. In July 1968, the Coordinating Community Council (made up of 16 school-community councils) asked the City Council to levy a five cent "emergency" tax to lease portable classrooms and purchase land, if needed, so that 19 elementary schools in Oakland could eliminate double sessions. The Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee admitted that the City Council had the right to levy the tax, but he noted that "what constitutes an emergency is a matter of opinion." He pointed out that, historically, an emergency in the schools had meant a "fire or a catastrophe." Overcrowding and double sessions were not in that category, and the Council did not accede to the request.²⁶

City Council unwillingness to face up to the existence of urban problems poses a significant obstacle to mayoral leadership. In April

1969, Mayor Reading called the Council together in a "work session" to discuss an "affirmative action policy" on employment, which was needed to qualify the city for federal funds from the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration. The Mayor felt that the city should pledge to employ--and encourage others to employ--"Negroes and Mexican-Americans" who were in need of jobs. The Mayor was emphatic: "There's no question about it, Negroes and Mexican-Americans have double the unemployment rate of whites. If we are not willing to go along with this we're wasting our time talking to EDA."

The Councilmen, however, were not so sure; it wasn't right, they thought, to single out Negroes and Mexican-Americans for special mention. "Are we closing the door here?" asked one conservative. "We can't discriminate against anyone." Sadly, the Mayor gave in and told the Council to strike the phrase "Negroes and Mexican-Americans" from the document; the word "minorities" would be substituted. "But for the record," the Mayor remarked, "I think it should be included. The basic reason I think it should be included is because it's right." Still, the Council had won--and no groups were specifically mentioned in the document.²⁷ Once again, the Oakland City Council had managed to avoid mentioning an unpleasant problem.

Responses to Conflict: The "Retrenchment" or "Shrinking Violet" Syndrome

If there is one thing that Oakland City Councilmen do not like, it is conflict. For example, an easy-going Councilman mentioned controversy as the one part of Council life that he really did not like.²⁸ Another once argued at a Charter Revision Committee meeting that the Mayor ought to have the power to suspend the taking effect of ordinances temporarily--

thus allowing the Council to change its mind away from the glare of publicity and public pressure.

The process of conflict avoidance is discussed in the literature of organization theory. Anthony Downs describes the "shrinking violet syndrome," in which a bureau avoids conflict by narrowing its actions and affecting fewer external agents.²⁹ Matthew Hoiden, Jr., in an article on "'Imperialism' in Bureaucracy," states that:

Perhaps the most neglected cases are those in which there is a clear disposition toward retrenchment or self-limitation. It is not merely that the agency adopts kid-glove tactics in order to maintain a cooperative relationship with a constituency, but that it actually denies its powers.³⁰

In order to avoid the conflict, uncertainty, and turbulence of a hostile urban environment, the Oakland City Council goes beyond merely narrowing its actions and denying its powers. Indeed, the Council follows a consistent policy of actively giving up jurisdiction in areas which are considered troublesome. Problems are "farmed out" to other groups and to other levels of government.

When the city's Human Relations Committee was attacked by a critical Councilman in late 1967, as a "secret ombudsman," the City Council decided to deal with Oakland's administrative grievance problem in another way. For the low price of \$10,000, the city was able to enter into an agreement with Alameda County whereby the (powerless) County Human Relations Commission would add another member to its staff--with that individual concentrating his efforts on Oakland. The city government was out of the human relations business, the restrictions on the County Commission's activity made it unlikely that any administrator would be embarrassed or threatened, and the cost to the city was only \$10,000.

There are other examples of retrenchment and jurisdiction disposal. When Mayor Reading suggested to the Council that it might consider taking over the local Poverty Program under the 1967 Green Amendment, there was little enthusiasm for such a move--particularly in light of the City Attorney's legal warnings. A cautious Councilman even proposed that the entire problem be given up to the state.³¹

If a problem is intractable, the Council responds by trying to give it away. Recently, a member of the Council suggested that the City of Oakland should study whether its notoriously inefficient library system could be turned over to the public school district to operate.³²

Avoidance of conflict should not be confused with passivity or openness to mayoral leadership. For some mayoral initiatives--for example, a move for more control of the Poverty Program--would mean more responsibility, more conflict, and more hostility for the Council members. Besides, the Council tends to be resentful of any independent prestige enjoyed by the Mayor. Thus, the Council Ways and Means Committee recommended in 1968 that the Mayor's Manpower Commission be cut from the city budget. The Mayor's staff (meaning his Administrative Assistant) is also resented by the Council. When an anti-Reading Councilman sharply criticized Administrative Assistant Price for making an "unauthorized" speech in January 1969, the Councilman received warm support from two of his colleagues.³³

This, then, is the difficult political environment that confronts the Mayor: a city with poverty, employment, and racial problems; a city government whose jurisdiction does not include schools, redevelopment, housing, or a wealthy Port; a relationship within the government in which

the "policy" side is hopelessly outmatched by the "administrative" side; and a City Council which habitually deals with problems by giving them away.

The Mayor's Office itself is not necessarily friendly terrain. One of Mayor Reading's secretaries, who was in charge of greeting visitors to the office, had voiced her strong disapproval of the Mayor's quiet style and of his "too liberal" policies relating to minorities. Therefore, in the fall of 1967, the Mayor decided to transfer this disloyal secretary to another department. But the City Manager's office advised caution in taking this step, and Civil Service moved slowly in arranging a transfer. Meanwhile, Councilmen complained that they disapproved of the change. It was not until the spring of 1969--a year and a half later--that the City Manager and Civil Service told the Mayor that the secretary could be transferred. This incident is important, because it shows both the Councilmen's resentment of independent mayoral moves and the lack of staff resources and freedom in the Mayor's Office.

Such an environment would test the mettle of any mayor. But what manner of man is John H. Reading? Section III addresses itself to that question.

III. THE MAYOR HIMSELF

As we have seen in Section I, political scientists have suggested that personality can have an important impact on political outcomes--particularly if the political actor is located at a critical point in the environment and if that environment is flexible enough to admit of restructuring. Flexibility is increased by conflicting or ambiguous expectations among others about the leader's behavior in his position. Section III examines Mayor Reading's personality, while Section IV focuses on the way the Mayor uses the resources available to him. Then, by comparing Mayor Reading's actions with those of his predecessor, John C. Houlihan, we can suggest the extent to which personality makes a difference in the Oakland Mayor's Office.

John H. Reading's life has been marked by a number of significant successes. From 1940 to 1946, Reading was an Air Force pilot; having served in various command capacities, he attained the rank of Lt. Colonel. Reading then returned to civilian life and entered his family's food processing business--which expanded greatly under his direction. He is now President of Ingram Food Products, Inc., Red's Early California Foods, Inc., and several subsidiary companies.

In 1961, Reading was appointed to the City Council. (Mayor Houlihan had noticed Reading's attendance at, and participation in, meetings concerned with various neighborhood and civic issues. Feeling that Reading's comments were sensible and his enthusiasm for "civic

involvement" was strong, Houlihan asked Reading if he would like to join the City Council. Reading was reluctant at first, but he felt that his advocacy of civic involvement meant that he should take the responsibility. The appointment of a man who was not active in party politics or political groups--but just "an interested citizen"--is indicative of the non-political, non-active-group nature of the Oakland system.) In the spring of 1966, when Mayor Houlihan resigned in the wake of an embezzlement scandal, Reading was chosen by the Council as the new Mayor. He was overwhelmingly reelected in the elections of 1967 and 1969.

A Private Man in a Public Office

Discussing the "purist" style in American politics, Nelson Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky state that such a style "represents a virtually complete privatization of politics" in which:

The private conscience of the leader--rather than his public responsibilities--becomes the focal point of politics. Internal criteria--possession of, devotion to, and standing up for private principles--become the standards of political judgment. Constituents disappear, and we are left with a political leader determining policy on the basis of compatibility with his private principles.³⁴

For John H. Reading, standards of conduct which are applicable to men's behavior in private life, embodying values of truthfulness, etiquette, and respect, should also be applicable to the public sphere. If absolute openness is desirable in private life, then it is also desirable in politics. When a black community leader agreed with Mayor Reading on certain issues in private and then attacked the Mayor in a public meeting before a black constituency, the Mayor felt constrained to remind the community leader--publicly--of all he had said in the "private" meetings.

After all, reasoned the Mayor, there should be no dividing line between private and public.

Mayor Reading finds himself facing a fundamental dilemma: He is a political leader who does not like politics. Talking about his experience at the University and afterward, the Mayor remarked: "I was never interested in political science, or any aspect of the political arena at all. But I am very interested in business and modern management techniques--you know, span of control and that kind of thing. I wanted to put business management in practice in government, and I made a lot of noise about the problems of government. Mayor Houlihan said that if I felt strongly about it, I ought to get into politics. And so I got on the City Council." Thus, Mayor Reading, as an anti-political politician, decided to resolve his dilemma by bringing business methods and standards to politics. But the going has not been easy; Reading once confessed that "as Mayor, I've found that there isn't enough information or control to run government like a business. All we can do is just muddle through."³⁵

The Consequences of a Businessman's Approach to Politics

Mayor Reading's attempt to bring private and business standards to bear on politics has had a number of consequences for his behavior as Mayor. First of all, this approach has led him to try to simplify politics, to attempt to make governmental action clearer and more rational. Thus, the Mayor has consistently argued for the formation of "super-agencies" within the city government--which could "coordinate" the tasks of existing departments. For example, the Mayor would like to see the creation of a "Human Resources" superagency, which could oversee all of the city's activities in Model Cities, employment, housing, etc. With so

many diverse federal programs, the Mayor has remarked, "the great need becomes one of coordination. In fact, coordination has often been the chief task of the Mayor's office." (As we shall see, "coordination" is a phrase which the Mayor never really defines, and its operational meaning--without consideration of questions of resources, jurisdiction, and control--remains a mystery. A "public" mayor might take the view that "coordination" is not merely a technical problem--that it sometimes involved choosing one set of preferences over others and then enforcing those preferences on other people;)

A second consequence of the Mayor's private-business approach to public life is his tendency to view urban poverty as an economic, not a political, problem. In 1967, he told the United States Civil Rights Commission:

I am convinced that employment is a factor of economics much more than of civil rights. Granted, there may be areas of discrimination directly or inadvertently and we should continue breaking barriers, urging realistic employment standards and emphasizing full opportunity. But in my experience many of the unemployed are just not adequately prepared to take advantage of those opportunities. They are not equipped either in basic education or in vocational training or in some instances in their attitude toward work.³⁶

In the Mayor's view, employment is the key to ending poverty, and the solution to the unemployment problem lies in better education (with vocational counseling to improve the motivation of the poor) and better job-training and job-development programs. Throughout his terms in office, Mayor Reading has made employment programs his chief area of concern. A more "public" mayor might view poverty as at least partially a political problem--the lack of power among poor people to gain access to the political arena and to influence other political actors.

Another outgrowth of the Mayor's private attitude to politics is his tendency to deal with political problems in a moralistic way. People who commit non-moral social actions (and the Mayor's definitions are strict) should be punished for them. When City Manager Keithley discussed the possibility in 1969 of levying a tippler's (bar drinker's) tax to help pay the costs of additional Oakland policemen, the Mayor responded: "That's only fair. This links the issues nicely! People who drink at bars should bear the costs for protection from crime."

On law and order, the Mayor is uncompromising. Crime is a serious threat to our society, and those who are tolerant of criminals--or critical of police--are wittingly or unwittingly aiding and abetting the spread of crime. Responding harshly to demands for decentralization and community control of the Oakland Police Department, the Mayor declared:

Some persons. . .talk of harassment and brutality by police-men who are sworn to defend and protect this community with their lives. They call for creation of locally elected police control commissions which would be empowered to patrol and control the police. What they really are asking is the elimination of the police, for the proponents of this plan obviously advocate anarchy. Let me tell you this: The Mayor's office does receive many protests from citizens, but these protests are demands for greater police vigilance in face of increasing crime and vandalism and disregard of law and order and human rights by a small, selfish group of dissatisfied agitators.³⁷

In the spring of 1968, when black activists boycotted Housewives Market in downtown Oakland as a protest against police action in the slaying of Black Panther Bobby Hutton, Mayor Reading indignantly condemned the boycott as "blackmail." The Mayor's pronouncements on law and order are unequivocal and marked by moral fervor.

Although Mayor Reading often defends the status quo, it should not be thought that he is insensitive to individuals' grievances against the government. In fact, his private-business orientation leads him to be sus-

picious of unrestrained government power. Speaking to a National League of Cities meeting in 1967, the Mayor stated:

"Big Brother Government" touches the people in many ways, both formally through its laws and ordinances, and informally through administrative rulings and everyday clerical decisions. It is this authority which brings the citizen to his knees when he is at odds with the system. . . . Our City departments, ably directed by a highly competent manager, carry out their assignments in an extremely capable manner. This fact, however, does not exempt them from errors and misunderstandings which result in harm to the rights and dignity of an individual citizen.³⁸

To rectify this situation, Mayor Reading proposed an ombudsman system for Oakland's city government. When this proposal was defeated by the City Council in February 1967, the Mayor moved to create a Council Human Relations Committee to perform a similar function. As we have seen, this Committee met an equally sad fate. But these attempts show that Mayor Reading's orientation toward politics does not always lead him to defend the status quo and to oppose the underdog. The Mayor feels that if a person is willing to act morally in accordance with the law, then government--which exists to serve the individual--must treat him as rationally and humanely as possible.

Responses to Conflict

Like the City Council, Mayor Reading does not like conflict. "I'm thankful that there's no dissent on our Council. When you look at Berkeley, there are enormous divisions." Even without conflict, the task of working with a group tends to be somewhat of a strain for the Mayor. "Councilmen criticize me, say I tend to take them for granted and make decisions without the Council. Well, I was a loner and an individual entrepreneur--I made decisions alone after weighing the pros and cons.

But now I have to work with the Council--maximum feasible participation of the Council, you know."

The question naturally arises: Why is it that a man who operates so successfully in the competitive world of business finds it difficult to deal with conflict in politics? Some tentative explanations may be suggested: Mayor Reading's success in his food business was caused in great part by his discovery of a method of manufacturing tamales that was significantly cheaper than his competitors'. Thus, he won a technological competition, not an interpersonal one. Also, when the Mayor talks of finding customers for his tamales during his early days in the business, he relates how he drive long distances and worked long hours to contact store-owners and build up his market. Thus, Reading may have been able to out-match his competition by thinking quickly and working harder--on his own--rather than be winning in interpersonal conflicts.

The Mayor also remarks that he feels much freer in dealing with people in business than in politics. If a factory employee's work is faulty, Reading can fire him. But if a city employee performs inadequately, there are usually reasons why the man cannot be dismissed--Civil Service protections, recalcitrance of the Council, etc. Therefore, in political (as opposed to business) conflict, the Mayor often feels that he has one hand tied behind his back.

Recognizing that differences of opinion do exist in public life, Mayor Reading tries to deal with them by using what might be called the "Big Round Table" method. If people could just get together on a personal level, around a table, and talk over their differences, then everything could be settled. In a recent speech before the hostile OEDCI, the Mayor remarked that "attitudes have polarized not only between city officials

and OEDCI leadership but among numerous community groups. In most cases I suspect we must all accept responsibility for the losses as well as the gains of the poverty program. It seems to me we should set aside past arguments and defeats and should agree to focus attention on potential successes of the poverty program in Oakland. . . . Let us hold a general meeting to discuss our strategy to help the poor; and let's stop using so much energy and brainpower fighting each other."³⁹ In speech after speech, the Mayor calls for "total community involvement and cooperation"--among rich and poor, black and white, business and labor. If all groups would just sit down and talk out their differences, the just and reasonable solution would emerge.

A "public" mayor--one who wishes to exercise leadership in accordance with the model in Section I--might have much to gain from the recognition of the fact that conflicts exist and may be taken advantage of by leaders. McFarland⁴⁰ views leadership in a pluralistic system as an individual's response to multilateral conflict. When conflict increases, set expectations break down and the environment may be manipulated by the leader. A mayor may serve as mediator between conflicting groups; he may seek to "upgrade the common interest" (as Mayor Lee did in New Haven by creating an urban renewal program that unified otherwise conflicting interests); or he may take advantage of a conflict situation to support the party with whom he agrees. (Thus, if a black citizens' group is making what the Mayor considers valid employment demands on a business, labor, or government organization, the Mayor may wish to admit that conflict does exist and support the group's position--perhaps in return for that group's support of something he wants.)

In this way, participation in conflict can aid bargaining; in fact, the ability to recognize and deal with conflict effectively seems crucial to the "bargaining" that a mayor must perform. For in offering rewards and threatening penalties, he will necessarily encounter hostility--both among other groups and toward himself. Unless group conflict is faced, it is difficult for a mayor to discover what incentives to offer to competing groups.

The problem of current city politics, according to Mayor Reading, is that certain groups--most notably black militants--will not agree to set aside their own selfish interests and work for the community interest. (The Mayor was also shocked to find that pro-education groups would not support a school tax unless their "demands" on the allocation of the money were met. He felt that these groups should have as their primary goal an increase in the financial resources available to the schools.) As the Poverty Program's "maximum feasible participation" has become, in the Mayor's eyes, "domination" by black militants, the whole social fabric is threatened. In July 1968, a saddened Mayor told a business convention about his troubles in office:

When first assuming the office of Mayor, I was convinced that the basic problem was not racial but economic. I believed that if we provided meaningful jobs--jobs involving skills that provide responsibility and dignity, jobs which command good wages--then we in turn would solve those problems connected with poverty, crime, poor housing, and even racial discrimination. To this end I devoted my energies.⁴¹

However, said the Mayor, it turned out that black activists were not really interested in the kinds of employment programs he was designing. "The militant Negro is no longer basically interested in jobs. His demand is no longer for civil rights, or for better housing. The new revolution is a power struggle for political and economic control of the destiny of this

country." Opposed to the "total community interest," black militants were pressing their own "group interest" and threatening the peace and harmony of the city.

If black militants are "dominating" certain policy areas, it is clear from the Mayor's viewpoint, that other groups are losing out. One such group is the "large, inactive majority. . .who would like to see real, lasting, and reasonable solutions to our problems." These people "go about their business, raise their family, take their tax lumps" and are currently "taking a back seat" to the militants in public dialogue.⁴² Within the "silent majority," the old people of Oakland--living on fixed incomes and terrorized by crime--have problems which evoke the Mayor's sympathy. There are groups--the silent, the old, the taxpayers--the Mayor sees as "forgotten" by current social policy, and he feels a responsibility to defend their interests.

In an effort to find out what citizens are thinking, the Mayor has followed an "open door" policy in the Mayor's Office and has encouraged citizens to come to see him. Reading spends approximately half a work week in his City Hall office, and most of that time--except for public and private City Council meetings--is taken up by visits from Oakland citizens. Although the Mayor would like to stimulate visits by some of the "quiet middle class" in Oakland, he is more often called upon by aggressive "spokesmen" of the "quiet middle class"--like Mrs. Joan Sparks, the conservative opponent of the OEDCI.

Perhaps most discouraging of all to the Mayor is the style of contemporary public debate itself. He has remarked that "we have heard quite a bit from the angry voices of dissent. Officials, governments, schools and even private organizations have been targets of demonstrations and

name-calling. . . . I am sure that most citizens are sick and tired of the big game going on that might be called 'non-negotiable roulette.' You spin a wheel of complex demands, and your chance of really satisfying anybody is virtually non-existent."⁴³ Confrontation politics, with threats, demands, and insults--which the Mayor took as private personal attacks--took a tremendous emotional toll on the Mayor in the poverty, police, and Model Cities disputes of 1968. Disenchanted and depressed, he tentatively decided not to seek re-election in 1969. An extremely modest man, Reading would have been glad to give up his job to someone who could do it better.

However, the passage of the new Charter, the election of fellow-Republican Richard Nixon to the Presidency, and--perhaps most importantly--"a look at the alternative candidates," convinced the Mayor to run again. Although there is much about public life that this quiet, private man does not enjoy, a sense of civic responsibility--and a feeling that no one who now wants his job could do better--keep John H. Reading in the Mayor's Office. But what can he do as Mayor? And what could a different kind of man do, given the governmental and political structure? Section IV deals with the resources available to Oakland's chief elected officer and the ways in which he uses them.

IV. RESOURCES

As we have seen in Section I, students of mayoral leadership have focused on the wise use and "pyramiding" of resources as ways in which an urban political leader can gain power. Dahl notes that:

Although the kinds and amounts of resources available to political man are always limited and at any given moment fixed, they are not. . . permanently fixed as to either kind or amount. Political man can use his resources to gain influence, and he can then use his influence to gain more resources. Political resources can be pyramided in much the same way that a man who starts out in business sometimes pyramids a small investment into a large corporate empire. To the political entrepreneur who has skill and drive, the political system offers unusual opportunities for pyramiding a small amount of initial resources into a sizable political holding.⁴⁴

Because of its structural and staff limitations on the Mayor--and perhaps even more because of the lack of organized parties and other political groups available to a political leader--the Oakland political system seems to offer few "unusual opportunities" for a Mayor to pyramid political resources. But a Mayor of Oakland does have some resources, or at least potential resources. They are:

1. The Mayor's Position as President of the City Council: As Mayor, Reading presides over public Council meetings and private "work sessions." He also appoints Council committees. Thus, he has an opportunity to exert a strong influence on the choice of subjects that come up before the Council and the ways in which they are discussed and decided.

Former Mayor Houlihan enjoyed this power and exploited it. A careful counter of Council votes, he set about to secure outcomes

favorable to himself. Houlihan often dispensed favors to friendly Councilmen; for example, he gave certain members of the Council the opportunity to borrow the Mayor's limousine. Once, in order to please a Councilman whose chief interest lay in an airport golf course, the Mayor created a Golf Course Committee and made the Councilman its Chairman and only member.

Unlike City Manager Keithley, who uses informal Council gatherings to strengthen his position with that body, Mayor Reading avoids Council dinners and ball games at the Coliseum. He appoints Council committees on the basis of interest and expertise, and he makes little attempt to influence their deliberations. At an executive session of the Council in May 1969, both the Civic Action Committee and the Ways and Means Committee were eager to study the question of compulsory arbitration for policemen's and firemen's fringe benefit demands. The Mayor broke in to ask: "What about the poor Mayor? If it goes to either or both Council committees, then I'd be left out because I'm not on either committee." The Council decided to have the matter taken up eventually by the full body.

The Mayor is generous in his regulation of the Council agenda. At the same meeting, Reading told the Council: "In the future, the committees should speak up if they have a report. I've heard complaints that I haven't notified committees that they may give reports but it's your initiative and any time you have a report, just speak up."

One Councilman had a solution which totally by-passed the Mayor: "When we have a report, we'll give it to the City Manager's staff for inclusion on the agenda." The Mayor agreed. (In sharp contrast, Mayor Houlihan's practice was to give Councilmen specific assignments and call upon them for reports.)

Further complicating the Mayor's task in leading the Council is his unwillingness to count votes and to persuade Councilmen to see things his way. For example, when an alert Councilman noticed that there were insufficient votes to pass a motion placing Proposition M (District elections) on the ballot, the Councilman moved to table, so as to be able to bring it up again. But the Mayor, who shared the Councilman's desire to put M on the ballot, was shocked by this sudden move, and voted against tabling. (In the instances in which the Mayor has wanted to influence votes, he has often enjoyed success. After East Oakland was included in the Neighborhood Development Program over the Mayor's objection, he talked a majority of Councilmen into reversing the decision. Reading's anger had been aroused by the activities of a citizen's planning council there. But, by the next week, Reading had changed his mind--and so did Council.) In the Council debate on Reading's ombudsman proposal of 1967, an anti-ombudsman Councilman was able to make an end run around the Mayor and bring the matter to a vote two days early--before a crucial pro-ombudsman editorial in the Tribune could appear. The proposal was defeated 6-3.

Although Mayor Reading enjoys a considerable degree of respect on the part of the City Council, his unwillingness to count votes, to persuade, and to control Council committee work, have led him to an underutilization of his political resource of City Council leadership.

2. Power of Appointment: The Mayor appoints (with the approval of a majority of the Council) members of city boards and commissions--including the Housing Authority, the Redevelopment Agency, and the Port of Oakland. He also appoints members of various "Mayor's Committees," the most active of which is the Citizens' Advisory Committee on Housing.

Throughout the Mayor's administration, certain appointees have disappointed him by voting against his favored positions--most notably the Port Commissioners, whose intransigence on employment policies has helped to delay federal EDA projects. "When I first came in," the Mayor relates, "I tried to appoint people from opposite points of view." But after three years, he has become "much more cynical." Now, "I appoint people who represent my point of view."

When the Mayor has decided on those people who represent his point of view, he still has to get them approved by the City Council. And Council approval is by no means automatic. In July of 1968, the City Council refused to approve the Mayor's reappointment of two members of the Planning Commission--including the chairman. At the same time, the Mayor's move to replace an anti-Reading Councilman's business associate as head of the Housing Authority failed when the man refused to leave his post and was backed up by the Council. In 1969, the Council considered a severe restriction of the Mayor's power to appoint his own "Mayor's Committees." A Councilman suggested that the Mayor be prohibited from appointing current members (some of whom had been controversial) of the Housing Committee to a reconstituted, smaller committee. "We'd only be helping you, John," insisted the proponent of this measure.

In none of these cases was Mayor Reading willing to fight on the Council or in the newspapers for his appointments.

3. Prestige: Describing the success of Mayor Lee of New Haven, Dahl shows how the Mayor was able to use his personal popularity and prestige to extract concessions from other political and business leaders.⁴⁵ Richard Neustadt suggests that "popular prestige" in the form of "public standing" is a source of influence for a President in his dealings with

men in Washington. This is because political actors depend on the public for votes and support.⁴⁶ Mayor Reading has had an enviable electoral record--amassing over 30 percent of the vote in his re-election campaign of 1967 and gaining over 63 percent in 1969. The prestige, as well as the democratic legitimacy, that results from electoral success in the highest elective office in the city could constitute an important resource. (It must be admitted, however, that the lack of interest in electoral politics in Oakland renders this resource somewhat less valuable. For leaders to be influenced by the resource of popular prestige, they must be convinced that public opinion can somehow have an impact on them. With low participation in electoral activity, public opinion appears a less important determinant of behavior.) The Mayor has used the prestige of his office to good advantage in certain instances: in organizing business leaders into a campaign for a school tax, in promoting support for a downtown hotel and convention center, and in giving support to the Proposition J (New Charter) campaign.

Once again, however, the Mayor has tended to underutilize a potential resource. For the existence of prestige without the willingness to use the next resource--publicity--may not be sufficient to accomplish crucial mayoral goals.

4. Publicity: In a discussion of "Protest as a Political Resource," Michael Lipsky demonstrates how important publicity is to "low resource" political actors who lack money, staff, and stable organizational foundations:

The communications media are extremely powerful in city politics. In granting or withholding publicity, in determining what information most people will have on most issues, and what alternatives they will consider in response to issues, the media truly, as Norton Long has put it, "set. . .the civic agenda." Like the

tree falling unheard in the forest, there is no protest unless protest is perceived and projected.^{4/7}

In a similar manner, there is no mayoral leadership in Oakland unless that leadership is perceived and projected. Although the Mayor is obviously in a better position than most protest groups to influence policy, his limited jurisdictional and staff resources make him dependent--to a great extent--on media publicity to make his views known and to influence people to follow them. Thus, the use of publicity is crucial to the "goal-setting" and subsequent "influencing" roles of the Mayor in our leadership model. The Mayor has certain advantages in using publicity. Unlike most protest groups, he has a consistently high legitimacy and an automatic visibility. Furthermore, in Oakland, John Reading has a friendly newspaper in the Tribune. Thus, the environment does provide the mayoral leadership requirement of "ready vehicles for publicity--such as friendly newspapers or television stations."

However, the Mayor's essentially private nature and his preference for quiet and rational discussion make him less than eager to take his case on public matters to the people through the news media. In one frustrating case in May 1969, this failure to use publicity cost the Mayor an important tactical advantage and prevented him from gaining considerable credit as a mediator (credit which could have opened up new possibilities for mayoral initiative in negotiation). When the Oakland School Board broke its own pledge and by-passed a bi-racial screening committee in the selection of a new superintendent (who turned out to be involved in a conflict-of-interest case), the black community--along with many whites--was in an uproar. With the school tax election approaching and adverse public reaction to the appointment threatening to destroy any chance of

the tax passing, Mayor Reading suggested to the School Board that it cancel the election and initiate a series of meetings with community groups to try to rectify the situation.

Although the Mayor offered to appear before the Board to make his plea, he told the Board President that he would not do so unless the Board first voted in secret session to ask him to come. At that session, three of the seven members of the School Board voted with the Mayor; four voted against. Even though it would probably have been impossible for those four members to persist in their opposition after a public plea by the Mayor, Reading was not willing to make a public statement. Acting at the outgoing superintendent's request, the County Attorney added the coup de grace by ruling that cancellation of the election would be illegal. The school tax was defeated by more than a two-to-one margin. As in the case of the commission appointments, the Mayor chose not to employ the resource of publicity to gain his preferred policy goal.

Only in the area of "law and order" has the Mayor made extensive use of publicity. Commenting on the "incredible position" of powerless mayors, Aaron Wildavsky has suggested that "a major possibility is that mayors will learn to concentrate on the one area in which they might do well and reap credit from some segments of the population--suppression of rebellions."⁴⁸ But Mayor Reading does not have control of the Oakland police or the responsibility for law enforcement in the city. Therefore, he has set his sights beyond city government and attacked courts for being too "permissive." In April 1969, the Mayor made headlines⁴⁹ by declaring that "many persons believe sentencing and bail procedures encourage arrogance and repeated offenses by the delinquent." To deal with this problem, Reading requested a meeting with local judges. Frustrated and depressed

by his attempts to make progress in the employment area and blocked from control of the Oakland Police Department, the Mayor has used his resource of publicity most often to condemn criminals and the courts who "coddle" them.

Publicity is a resource which is not severely limited by considerations of formal structure and jurisdiction, and an enterprising Mayor can make good use of the media. Mayor Houlihan had a ten minute weekly radio program on KNBR, through which he told Bay Area listeners about his activities and the governmental issues in Oakland. When the City Council refused to endorse a bond issue for Bay Area Rapid Transit, Houlihan came out publicly for the issue anyway. (His cause was successful. A switch of 2,000 votes in Oakland would have defeated the issue.) In this resource area, a "public" personality can make a difference.

Underutilization and Dispersion of Resources

Operating in a low-resource environment, Mayor Reading has tended to underutilize the political resources he has. For example, the Mayor's failure to count votes and to use persuasion has caused him to gain less than full advantage from his role as President of the Council. Instead of pyramiding resources, it often appears that the Mayor is engaged in a practice of resource dispersion, failing to combine his resources with each other. Thus, his power of appointment has been blocked by his failure to lead the Council and to use publicity; the Mayor's personal prestige has also been underutilized because of his unwillingness to take issues to the public. Except for occasional pronouncements on law and order, the Mayor's "private" style has led him to avoid the public spotlight. For a

"low-resource" political actor with high legitimacy, such avoidance seems extremely unwise.

Mayoral Difficulties: Structure or Personality?

Mayor Reading's performance falls short of the model of mayoral leadership, in which the mayor sets goals and then influences other governmental and non-governmental actors to alter their behavior in accordance with his preferences. Now the question arises: How much of the Mayor's difficulties are dictated by the structure of government and by "general social forces," and how much are caused by his personal performance in office? After all, he does operate in a difficult governmental and political environment. Without formal powers, staff, and the existence of potentially usable parties and groups, what can any Mayor of Oakland do?

Although it is not possible to answer this question quickly and definitively, we may suggest--on the basis of Mayor Houlihan's experience, studies of successful leadership elsewhere, and observation of Oakland politics--some of the ways in which a mayor can increase and utilize his leadership resources in Oakland.

The problems and possibilities of leadership with low resources are discussed in James Sterling Young's study of The Washington Community, 1800-1828.⁵⁰ The situation Young describes in the national capital at the time appears remarkably similar to Oakland politics;⁵¹ a lack of active political groups and associations; apathy and indifference among the populace; fragmented social sub-groups formed around separate branches of government, with few integrating forces; weak Congressional parties; an anti-political ideology, even among politicians; and an absence of Presidential

staff. What could a President do to exercise governmental leadership under such circumstances?

Here, according to Young, personality made a difference. For "the President had to improvise out of wit and ingenuity, as his political talents, circumstances, statutes, and good fortune permitted."⁵² During the period studied, only Jefferson was successful enough at "statecraft" to be able to provide leadership. One of Jefferson's prime tools of statecraft was "social lobbying"--the wining and dining of legislators at the White House. Personal charm and persuasion could triumph, even in a situation where the President had few resources. Jefferson also utilized publicity, through the medium of a Presidential "newspaper"--a journal published by a friend of the President, which faithfully carried the President's views.

A Mayor of Oakland can also use "social lobbying" and personal persuasion as a technique to influence Councilmen to follow his leadership. Mayor Houlihan attended Council social occasions and provided favors--like the use of the mayoral limousine--that Councilmen could appreciate. City Manager Keithley now does this kind of social lobbying with the Council: attending dinners, sports events, and talking to Councilmen personally. When Mayor Reading has talked to Councilmen personally and at length, the results have not been disappointing. (For example, the Mayor was able to influence Councilmen to follow his lead on the question of East Oakland participation in the Neighborhood Development Program--first excluding East Oakland, then including it.) But "social lobbying" is not an activity Reading enjoys.

If the Mayor can gain a majority on the Council, then he can direct the work of the City Manager and Attorney. When Mayor Houlihan was

involved in drawing up a contract for Oakland participation in building the Coliseum Complex, he had the City Attorney deliver legal opinions which supported the Mayor's preferences. (It is not fair, however, to contrast Houlihan's relationship to City Manager Wayne Thompson and Reading's relationship to Keithley. For Thompson lacked Keithley's aggressiveness and his desire for administrative control. Still, Houlihan's leadership of administrators shows that--if a Mayor has a majority on the City Council--the city administration may be made to work for him, rather than against him.)

As we have seen, Houlihan also used publicity to take his case to the citizens of Oakland--even when he could not get the City Council to go along with him. The Mayor's radio program was the counterpart to a Presidential newspaper.

Faced by the limitations of the city's low resource position, an aggressive Mayor of Oakland can attempt to use his persuasive power on outside governmental bodies in an attempt to expand city resources. Thus, Mayor Houlihan persuaded the Alameda County Supervisors to grant \$350,000 from County Highway funds to build a tunnel under the new Oakland Museum. Houlihan appeared to delight in testing his art of persuasion on anyone who could bring more resources to Oakland or to him. There is no formal rule which either enables or prohibits the Mayor from engaging in this kind of extra-territorial persuasive activity. In this sort of unstructured situation, the personality of the leader is important.

But what about the lack of parties and political groups in Oakland? Is it not true that the non-political nature of politics in the city is a tremendous obstacle to leadership? This is unquestionably the case, but it is possible to suggest certain actions which could be taken. When

Mills College trustees informed Mayor Houlihan that construction of the MacArthur Freeway would force the college out of Oakland, the Mayor decided to forestall the college's move by seeking a ban on freeway truck traffic. He formed a citizen's committee, steered an ordinance through City Council, and pressed the case at hearings before the State Highway Commission. Finally, the state decided to ban trucks, the Federal Government confirmed the decision, and Mills College stayed in Oakland. In a "non-group" situation, Houlihan had formed a group which would support his interests.

Even in the absence of political parties, it should be possible for a popular Mayor--which Mayor Reading certainly is--to support Council candidates pledged to work and vote with him. In building such a slate, the Mayor could provide himself with an opportunity for increasing his strength on the City Council--and thus strengthen himself also vis-a-vis the City Manager. (The Mayor could follow the same practice with regard to the School Board.)

Although Mayors of Oakland are limited both by governmental structure and political disorganization, there are still opportunities for an inventive political man to make the most of the situation. A Mayor can engage in "social lobbying" to persuade the Councilmen to support his views--Mayor Houlihan did this, and City Manager Keithley does it now. Also, a Mayor with a "public" personality can utilize mass media to influence his constituency to support his programs. Furthermore, to supplement strained city resources, a Mayor can seek funds from outside; once again, success in this field is facilitated by an aggressive, persuasion-oriented personality. Finally, although Oakland's political system does not easily lend itself to mayoral leadership, groups can be formed on specific issues

by the Mayor himself, and the Mayor can form a slate of Council candidates pledged to support him.

These kinds of activities will not necessarily enable a Mayor of Oakland to approximate the model of leadership described in Section I, but they are ways in which a leader without many resources can operate. However, the tasks of social lobbying, persuasion, publicizing, and political slate-making can be very difficult--and distasteful--for a basically private person like John Reading. Thus, the current Mayor has not engaged heavily in social lobbying and has turned down suggestions that he form an election slate. His personality has made a difference in his ability to exert leadership in the Mayor's Office.

V. THE MAYOR AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Federal Government has provided the Mayor with his greatest tensions and frustrations in office. Federal programs have seemed to hold out opportunity, but they have resulted in no substantial gains for the Mayor. With city financial resources severely strained, the Federal Government is a critical source of money for social programs. (Most city funds are tied up in personnel for on-going traditional activities.) But, just as foreign aid has caused political problems for recipient nations, federal programs have not come as unmitigated benefits to the occupants of Oakland's City Hall. Perhaps the most important--and time-consuming--duty of the Mayor is his responsibility to "represent the city in inter-governmental relations as directed by the Council."⁵³ In practice, the City Manager and the Council have left the Mayor with most of the task of handling federal-city and state-city contacts. As we have seen, the City Manager regards federal programs as both outside his jurisdiction and inefficient. The Mayor has remarked: "The City Manager is a good administrator--good with nuts and bolts--but I am more interested in new social programs and so they just tend to fall into my lap." Inter-governmental relations, then, is one of the areas in which mayoral leadership is relatively free to operate and in which the Mayor can make a difference.

During Mayor Reading's administration, his contacts with state government have been limited. In 1967, he suggested to the State Housing Commission that the State of California might initiate a program of

financing public works in deteriorated city areas and might also make available low interest loans for rehabilitation of housing.⁵⁴ Furthermore, the Mayor has been active in persuading the state to continue the truck ban on scenic MacArthur Freeway.

However, it has been federal agencies and federal programs which have taken most of the Mayor's time and consideration in the area of inter-governmental relations. The federal impact on Oakland, in terms of dollars, is considerable. In 1968, when the city budget totaled \$57.9 million, the total non-defense federal spending in Oakland was \$95.5 million. If defense expenditures are added, the figure jumps to \$437.4 million. (Of this total, the city government itself--those departments under the control of the City Manager--received \$1.0 million. The independent poverty agency, OEDCI, received \$1.7 million under the Community Action Program.)⁵⁵ Federal programs in Oakland include the Poverty Program, Model Cities, Neighborhood Development Program, Concentrated Employment Program, public housing, highways, and Compensatory Education--as well as the celebrated Economic Development Administration program for the construction of employment-generating public works.

Although the Mayor has a businessman's suspicion of government programs, he has become reconciled to the necessity of federal involvement in Oakland. "Oakland's biggest problem today," he remarked shortly before taking office in 1966, "is the lack of employment for so many of the Negroes who moved here in such numbers during and after the War. I used to be opposed to big federal spending on aid programs, but in my five years on the Council, as I have learned what Oakland faces, with the big influx of unskilled Negroes who can't get jobs, and the exodus of well-to-do taxpayers to the suburbs, I have changed my mind. Oakland will never

solve its problems without federal aid, a lot of it, for economic development, for training, for housing, and urban renewal."⁵⁶ (When, in 1966, gubernatorial candidate Ronald Reagan refused to visit the East Bay Skills Center because it was federally-funded, Mayor Reading got on the candidate's bus to urge him to drop his doctrinaire opposition to federal programs.)

Having accepted the necessity of federal programs, Mayor Reading feels that they should be run as rationally as possible. What the Mayor sees in the present federal structure is fragmentation, confusion, and frustration. (This is not just the response of a "private" man to governmental complexity. Even so seasoned a public practitioner as Hale Champion mentioned the frustrating nature of the "Rube Goldberg" federal grant system as one reason why he recently resigned as Boston's Redevelopment Director.) Indeed, a recent federal study stated that: (1) there is little consensus among different federal agencies as to the problems facing Oakland; (2) agency officials tend to define Oakland's problems in terms of their own agency's area of responsibility; (3) problem definitions are influenced by a program's clientele; and (4) basic differences among federal agencies exist with regard to regional organization, jurisdiction, and processing procedures and requirements.⁵⁷ Concerned about this excessive "fragmentation" of federal programs, the Mayor sees "coordination" as the great administrative need. In this case, coordination would mean the designation of one man--a Federal Czar--in a region who could speak for all the departments and agencies of the Federal Government.

The Task Force Experiment

Because he knew that the "Federal Czar" idea would not be realized in the near future, Mayor Reading enthusiastically supported a project

which would establish a Federal Task Force (representing federal departments in Oakland) and a local Task Force (representing local agencies). These groups, according to the plan, would meet to define Oakland's problems and priorities--and then try to design policies for the city.

Unfortunately, from the Mayor's point of view, progress on the Task Force plan was slow. The Federal Executive Board, which sponsored the program, was chiefly interested in examining the processes of federal agencies, rather than studying local problems. Furthermore, city input was never sought in a thorough way. The lack of a "local viewpoint" was a chief cause of complaint by local officials. All this appeared to confirm City Manager Keithley's low opinion of federal outsiders and of the consultants who worked with them.

In the end, the product was a disappointment for the rationalistic Mayor. On the definition of Oakland's problems, the final report noted that: "Although consensus was reached in most problem areas, differences in outlook between the two groups (local and federal) remain in the health, welfare, and education areas."⁵⁸ Further, there was "little consensus" on priorities. And the most that the Federal Executive Board could hope for in "coordination" was not central direction but "adaptation" and "adjustment" reminiscent of the theories of Charles E. Lindblom.⁵⁹

How did the Federal Task Force view the shortcomings of the experiment? If the Mayor was confused by the complexity and fragmentation of the Federal Government, federal officials were equally frustrated by the dispersion of authority within Oakland. The Task Force report states:

The fragmentation of authority among the many departments and authorities within the City, and the fact that both welfare and health are the responsibility of County rather than City departments, makes it almost impossible for the City to speak with a unified voice, or to develop across-the-board

objectives and priorities which would be acceptable to each autonomous or semi-autonomous section of government. In addition, conflicts over objectives (or the way by which they might be reached) are manifest between citizen groups (the CAA, the Model Cities group) and "the City."⁶⁰

Both the city and Federal Government are far from being monolithic. Rather, federal-city relations in Oakland consists of a series of negotiations and adjustments between diverse parts of two highly fragmented systems. Neither a federal "czar" nor a city "czar" can define overall problems and priorities.

Another reason given by the Task Force for shortcomings of the experiment was that the city had agreed to prepare an independent statement of priorities but later requested help from the consultant's staff.⁶¹ This decreased the opportunity for "local viewpoint." Finally, the federal and city participants had conflicting objectives: "the Federal Task Force was directed to analyze, criticize, evaluate, and recommend; the Local Task Force was motivated by a very practical consideration--to get on with action programs which would bring tangible results."⁶² Participants in the experiment observed that federal and local officials had a difficult time relating to each other. And, as we have seen, fragmentation within each group was intense.

It is possible that the Mayor--who appeared to care more than other city officials about the success of the Task Force--could have tried to bring federal and city officials together by personal mediation. If they could not agree immediately on a formal report, at least federal and city officials could have continued to meet informally to discuss mutual problems. But the Mayor felt that his time was too limited to involve himself in the experiment; only the City Manager had the time and knowledge necessary to head the City Task Force. Mayor Reading did offer to

contribute a part-time staff member to the Task Force, but by then, both sides were interested in publishing a report and concluding the experiment as soon as possible. The limits of mayoral resources--in time, staff, and information--had once again prevented the exercise of leadership.

Federal Programs Cause Mayoral Problems

For the Mayor, the most irrational feature of federal programs has been the use made of "citizen participation." Discussing the "social revolution" in his speech to a group of food distributors in 1968, the Mayor declared:

Ironically, the Federal Government itself, leaning heavily on business for tax sources, has encouraged and aided this new revolution. Most federal grants in the last several years for social programs have contained provisions calling for, "maximum feasible participation of the poor." No one can argue that the poor should not have a voice in programs relating to their welfare but mere participation is no longer the goal. What is now happening is complete domination of these programs by aggressive, ambitious, self-proclaimed militant leaders who presume to speak for the poor people. Local elected officials are⁶³ severely restricted in their authority for these programs.

Financed by federal funding, the Oakland Economic Development Council, Inc. (Poverty Program), the West Oakland Planning Committee (Model Cities), and the East Oakland-Fruitvale Planning Center (Neighborhood Development Program)--which are community-based organizations--have laid down independent challenges to City Hall control of federal programs. The Mayor sees these groups as "special interests" who are opposed to the "total community interest" and he blames the Federal Government for giving them the resources with which to act.

At times, the Mayor sees himself as defending Oakland's interest against intransigent federal officials on one side, and intransigent local actors on the other. When the EDA and the Port of Oakland could not agree

on a program through which the Port would hire unemployed minorities to work on federally-financed construction projects, the Mayor (who was trying to mediate between the two groups) felt that neither side wanted to reach agreement. The much-heralded EDA program, which in 1966 promised to spend \$23 million on public works in the city, has been moving at a snail's pace. By November 1968, only about \$2.5 million had actually been spent, much of that on architects' and planners' contracts. The Mayor spent hours on the phone with EDA head Ross Davis and various Port officials, trying to bring the two sides to agreement on an employment plan. Furthermore, he offered to make his own Manpower Director the "enforcer" of any contract agreed upon. But the Mayor never used his resource of publicity to tell Oakland citizens why the EDA project had hit a snag and what he was doing about it. Even the threat of publicity might well have been enough to make the Port--and the EDA--more conciliatory.

Fragmentation and Cross-Cutting Alliances

The federal intervention in Oakland has created a series of shifting alliances among organizations--community, city, and federal--which cut across levels of government. As we have seen, the federal and city governments do not confront each other as two monolithic forces, but rather as fragmented groups in which the individual units have differing perspectives and constituencies. When the new poverty groups are added to the lists of participants in inter-governmental relations, the number of possible alliances grows still larger. Certainly, it is not always the case that all federal agencies, or all Oakland agencies, or all community groups will stick together.

This pattern of alliances which cut across levels of government is clearly illustrated by the 1966 dispute over the Neighborhood Centers Pilot Program.⁶⁴ The program was launched as the result of a Presidential directive to HUD's Secretary requesting him to establish "in every ghetto in America" a neighborhood center to service the people who live there. HUD, as convening agency, called together four other federal agencies--HEW, OEO, Department of Labor, and Bureau of the Budget--to mount a pilot program in 14 cities, including Oakland. A joint steering committee, composed of representatives of the agencies involved, was organized in Washington; a similar committee was formed of regional federal officials.

As indications grew that the OEDC would be designated as the local sponsor of the Neighborhood Center program, the HUD regional representative--who was also chairman of the regional steering committee--sent a letter to HUD in Washington warning of the dangers of insisting on OEDC sponsorship. The letter expressed fears that the Mayor might elect to withdraw the city government from participation in the Task Force experiment. But the Washington steering committee decided in favor of the OEDC anyway, unless there were "compelling reasons to the contrary." At this point, relations between the regional OEO and regional HUD representatives became strained, with OEO ranged on the side of the OEDC and HUD appearing to side with the Mayor. (Conflict over city sponsorship was paralleled by a difference of opinion between HUD and OEO staff as to which federal agency should be convening the program.) With so much at stake, the Mayor reluctantly agreed to accept the federal decision, although he made several conditions (which were taken under advisement and later rejected) which would have limited OEDC's powers. The alliance between the Mayor and regional HUD had been defeated by an alliance of national HUD, regional OEO, and the OEDC.

Among autonomous "city agencies," disagreement is not a rare occurrence in negotiations surrounding federal programs. In an early Model Cities meeting, John B. Williams--who as Director of the Oakland Redevelopment Agency sat on the city's Model Cities Task Force--indicated his agreement with the West Oakland Planning Committee, rather than the city, on a particular point. His request for a roll call vote of city agencies on the matter was turned down by City Manager Keithley. Instances of alliance between the Redevelopment Agency and community groups have been numerous. Fragmentation of city agencies, buttressed by jurisdictional autonomy, differing views, and differing constituencies, makes it difficult for the Mayor to use "the city" as a unified force in dealing with the Federal Government.

Among the federal programs in Oakland, the Poverty Program and the employment programs have constituted the areas in which the Mayor has been most interested. Let us now consider his activity in each area.

Poverty Program: Maximum Feasible Participation for the Mayor?

The federal Poverty Program, which has brought new financial resources into Oakland, might be expected to contribute opportunities in mayoral leadership. However, Mayor Reading's experience in this area indicates some of the environmental and personal obstacles to such leadership in Oakland.

When the OEDC decided in 1967 to divest itself of its legal relationship to City Hall and to become a private, non-profit organization, Mayor Reading was deeply depressed. He felt that business support for the poverty agency, which was necessary for effective job development, would not now be forthcoming.

As the independent poverty board--under its new and militant director Percy Moore--started moving away from a "service" orientation and toward a "political organization" orientation, the Mayor became even more concerned. But the passage of the "Green Amendment" in Congress on December 7, 1967,⁶⁵ appeared to give the Mayor an opportunity for increased leverage over the Poverty Program. Under that amendment, local governments were given the power to "designate" a Community Action Agency for their community--or to run the program themselves. Furthermore, one-third of the poverty board would consist of local officials.

Although the Mayor never seriously considered taking over the local Poverty Program, he hoped that these new provisions would give him sufficient bargaining power to demand some influence over policies such as manpower, in which he had a particular interest.

At this point, the "shrinking violet-retrenchment" orientation of Oakland city government reasserted itself to block the Mayor's plans. Neither the City Council nor the Manager wanted anything to do with taking over the turbulent poverty agency, and they responded coolly to the Mayor's discussion of the Green Amendment as an "opportunity." As we have seen, Attorney Goggin advised the Mayor that the Green Amendment could not really be used to take over the Poverty Program. He argued that, even if the City chose to operate the program itself, it would have to appoint a board which would then become independent anyway. Besides, the Charter says that the Council shall have no administrative powers; therefore, reasoned the Attorney, it would be impossible for the elected officials of Oakland to operate a poverty program under the amendment. Despondent, Mayor Reading wrote to Congresswoman Green to tell her of the difficulties involved in implementing her amendment.

(Thus, the Mayor, who is interested in an expanded social role for the city, could not do anything to implement that concern. The City Manager, who would have to administer a city poverty program, had a majority of the Council supporting his view that the City should not take on such a program. And the City Attorney, instead of searching for legal support for the Mayor, threw up legal roadblocks to the Mayor's plan instead. A mayor who had gained a solid majority on the Council--by social lobbying or by electoral slate-making--would be able to give direction to both City Manager and Attorney.)

Fighting resistance from within the government itself, the Mayor made one last attempt to use the designation power of the Green Amendment to his own advantage. In May 1968, he asked the City Council to withhold designation "until OEDC has solved its leadership problems"--that is, until the OEDC fired Executive Director Percy Moore. However, this move only served to shore up Moore's somewhat shaky position on the OEDC Council by making his retention a question of agency pride, independence, and racial solidarity. Once again, Mayor Reading had acted in a straightforward way; he felt that the OEDC should fire Percy Moore and he had said so. But the Mayor failed to recognize that his opposition to Moore would only weaken Moore's opposition among the black and poverty communities. The Mayor's openness in announcing his feelings had caused him to lose ground in pursuing a public goal.

On Tuesday, May 21, 1968, the City Council--without fanfare--designated the OEDCI as the Community Action Agency of Oakland:

President Reading: This is the issue of the designation of the CAP agency, the issue which we had a work session on about two weeks ago in which we held over for two weeks, we are up against a deadline and my recommendation on this would be to designate the present OEDCI as the CAP agency. I feel that we have to,

even though there's been no decision on some of the critical things that are facing them, I think that we have to have confidence in the group that they will do whatever is best for the community. And it would be my recommendation that we officially designate the OEDCI as the CAP agency for the City.

Councilman Rose: So move.⁶⁶

The motion passed 7-0, and the battle over designation was over.

In the summer of 1968, Percy Moore won a vote of confidence in the poverty council by the small margin of 14-12. A Councilman who was one of the Mayor's "public official" appointments to the council, voted for Moore because he "didn't feel it was an important vote." If he had known it was important, the Councilman told the Mayor, he "might have changed." And, if the Mayor had counted and attempted to influence votes in this case, it is quite possible that the result might have changed. Still, Mayor Reading learned from this experience. In July 1969, the Mayor was careful to appoint as his representatives to the OEDCI only people who would pledge to vote to fire Percy Moore. Included in the Mayor's selections were the Chairman of the West Oakland Planning Committee who was not an enemy of Moore's; certain representatives of the Mexican-American community who opposed "black domination" of the council; and Mrs. Joan Sparks, the woman who operates the Good Samaritan Home and--as we have seen--claims to speak for the "silent majority." Dropped from the list of mayoral representatives were Superior Court Judge Lionel Wilson, Chairman of the OEDCI, and Lawrence Joyner of the East Oakland-Fruitvale Planning Center, who had run for mayor in the 1969 elections.⁶⁷ After this action, it is not surprising that many OEDCI members responded to the Mayor's July 23 "unity and understanding" plea with hostility.⁶⁸

After a summer of conflict within the OEDCI council over the retention of Percy Moore and alleged intimidation of council members by Moore's

staff, Mayor Reading and a number of other poverty council members wrote to Donald Rumsfeld, national director of OEO. They asked him to assume direct control of the Oakland poverty council and investigate maladministration charges against Moore. A new alliance was being formed, consisting of Mayor Reading and his OEDCI appointees together with anti-Moore elements of the poverty community. This group hoped to add the national OEO to their alliance. (Once again, the Mayor's hopes were dashed. OEO redesignated OEDCI in the spring of 1970 with certain "conditions" attached. But Percy Moore stayed on.) Mayor Reading's leadership in the Poverty Program area had been blocked by the hostility of the political environment, both within the government and outside it.

Manpower

Because of his feeling that employment is the key to solving the poverty problem, and because he feels that he is in a good position to serve as a communication link between those who need jobs and those who can offer them, the Mayor has taken an intense interest in federal employment policies in Oakland. In January of 1967, the Mayor appointed a Manpower Commission to "coordinate" job programs in the city. Although this definition of its task was anything but operational, the Commission staff--temporarily funded by EDA--did compile a central directory of job listings and did attempt to encourage businessmen to "develop" jobs for Oakland's unemployed. The Manpower Commission also supervised the City's Youth Opportunity Campaign, which provides employment and recreational opportunities for the city's disadvantaged young people.

When the Department of Labor's Concentrated Employment Program--containing funds for job training, job placement, and remedial education--

came to Oakland, the Mayor felt that his Manpower Commission should be the contracting agency for the program. However, federal policy favored Community Action Agencies as prime sponsors of the program (a concession given by Labor to OEO in return for Labor's gaining administrative responsibility for the program), and the OEDC was given control of the CEP program in Oakland. Lacking authority over this central employment effort, members of the Manpower Commission eventually lost interest in their own organization and it began to wither away, leaving only a skeleton staff.

During the last two years, the Mayor has met with numerous federal officials in an effort to gain a useful role in the manpower field. So far, his experience has been one of consistent frustration. When fellow-Republican Nixon was elected President in November 1968, Mayor Reading (who had headed California Mayors for Nixon) hoped for a change for the better. In February 1969, the Mayor wrote to Vice President Agnew, HEW Secretary Robert Finch, and Urban Adviser Daniel Moynihan, appealing for aid in building a viable Manpower Commission. Two months later, the Mayor made his plea in person by traveling to Washington.

Based on his Cabinet-level conversations, the Mayor felt that there was a good chance that federal officials would: (a) change the guidelines that made the Community Action Agency the presumptive prime sponsor of CEP; and (b) provide the city with the administrative staff necessary to supervise a manpower program. However, on May 28, the Mayor received an unfavorable letter from Arnold R. Weber, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Manpower. Weber pointed out that: (a) current federal guidelines favor the OEDCI as prime sponsor; and (b) the city did not have the administrative capacity necessary to run the program. The Mayor, feeling that the argument was becoming circular, flew east to lodge a complaint with Labor Secretary

George Schultz. To the Mayor's chagrin, Schultz's response was that "if Weber ruled that way, then I guess he's got a good reason for it." (Here again, the Mayor might have used publicity--as San Francisco's Mayor Alioto does regularly--to shake loose money from the Federal Government. But Reading did not pursue this course of action.)

Meanwhile, to add to the confusion, Regional Manpower Director Ken Robertson had written to Mayor Reading,⁶⁹ announcing that he had decided--with the concurrence of the Regional OEO Director--to designate Alameda County as the "Community Program Area" which would have jurisdiction over the CEP program for Oakland and the county. Although the county prime sponsor would be a body representing the City of Oakland, City of Berkeley, County of Alameda, business, labor, community action agencies, and the poor, subsequent conversations between Mayor Reading and Robertson failed entirely to uncover any hard clues as to how the commission would be formed and the ways in which it might operate. When the Mayor asked who would convene the meeting that would set up the Commission, Robertson replied that Mayor Reading himself might do so--since he had been interested in manpower for such a long time. The Mayor thanked Robertson but remarked that the OEO Regional Director was probably telling Percy Moore that he should convene the meeting that would form the Commission. The OEO Regional Director had assured the OEDCI that there would be a majority on the Commission of poor people and Community Action Agencies, but Manpower Director Robertson told the Mayor that this was not at all certain. Once again, the Mayor felt himself in an irrational and inexplicable federal maze.

It is possible that President Nixon's newly-announced "decentralization" of job-training programs could provide Mayor Reading with some opportunity for action in this field, but the President's announced

reliance on states and "metropolitan areas"⁷⁰ should caution Mayor Reading against expecting too much.

Because federal policies have prevented Mayor Reading from undertaking significant action in the manpower field, it is difficult to analyze his leadership in this area. But if federal policies should change and the city is given resources for manpower programs, the Mayor will still have to contend with the obstacles to his leadership in Oakland's political environment. The Mayor will have to have the cooperation of the City Manager in creating office space for a Manpower Department, in hiring staff, and in day-to-day administration. And this cooperation will only be forthcoming if the Mayor can build sufficient support in the Council for a manpower program. Council support, in turn, could be influenced by public interest in a City Manpower effort. But public interest will not be stirred unless Mayor Reading is willing to use publicity. Thus, even with a change in federal guidelines, Mayor Reading will still need to establish a firmer basis of strength if he is to establish a worthwhile manpower program.

Planning Instead of Power: An Answer for the Low-Resource Politician

In his relations with federal agencies, the Mayor feels himself in an impossibly weak position. At the Council debate on Model Cities in April 1968, the Mayor asked federal representatives to come to the microphone to explain to the West Oakland leaders that he had no control over federal programs in the city and therefore could not give them a veto over such programs. Hampered by federal guidelines and by the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Council and Manager in the manpower area, the Mayor finds himself alone--with a Manpower Director, a Manpower Secretary, and

a Youth Opportunity Center. Lacking significant jurisdiction, staff, and financial resources, what can the Mayor do? The answer most often given to the Mayor is: Planning. A Stanford Research Institute report done for the city urged the creation in city government of a body which would develop comprehensive objectives and strategies in the manpower field, identify programs and funds available from all levels of government, develop a set of priorities and evaluate all programs with respect to those priorities.⁷¹ "When you have a good planning unit," an SRI representative told the Mayor, "you can easily get control from people."

EDA officials have also urged the Mayor to enter the planning field. They have asked that the Mayor appoint a committee to draw up an "Overall Economic Development Plan" (OEDP) for Oakland. (Coincidentally, an OEDP-- which is a comprehensive plan covering projected economic growth, business patterns, and employment opportunities--is a prerequisite for obtaining EDA funds.)

For a Mayor hemmed in by federal regulations and lacking substantial jurisdiction and staff of his own, the motto seems to be: "If you don't have power, then make a plan." But without power, the value of such a plan is extremely doubtful.

Although federal programs bring millions of dollars into the city of Oakland every year, they also bring problems for the Mayor. Only about 1 percent of the money goes to City Hall, and part of the rest of the federal outlay is used to fund groups who are openly fighting City Hall. Federal policies have limited the Mayor's activities in the manpower field, which is most important to him. But even if City Hall were to gain jurisdiction over programs like Concentrated Employment, the Mayor's troubles would not be over. For he would still have to convince the City Council

and City Manager to take advantage of the programs and to implement them. Federal resources can aid mayoral leadership, but they cannot build leadership where it does not exist.

(In June of 1970, Mayor Reading let it be known that he had nearly resigned because of OEO's decision to refund OEDCI. He declared, "I'm still greatly disenchanted with the Federal Government. . . . I had gone through the Johnson Administration when federal agencies completely by-passed city governments in spending huge sums. I had expected a change with the new Administration, but it has not occurred. The OEO and the Department of Labor continue to by-pass elected municipal governments. . . . It's extremely frustrating in dealing with the Federal Government.")

VI. CONCLUSION

Although calls for "mayoral leadership" fill the literature on city politics, an understanding of such leadership in any given city requires an examination of the political environment, the personalities involved, and the ways in which the mayor uses the resources available to him.

It is clear that the leadership exercised by Mayor John H. Reading of Oakland does not closely approximate the model of leadership described in Section I--the model of a mayor who sets goals and then uses a wide variety of means to influence others to act according to the mayor's own preferences. This is due both to environmental and personal factors.

Section I listed seven environmental requirements for effective mayoral leadership, and it is obvious that the Oakland governmental and political structure provides little comfort for any mayor. Let us review the requirements, noting Oakland's performance on each:

- a) Sufficient financial and staff resources on the part of the city government. Like most cities, Oakland faces a financial strain. The greatest part of its budget--about 80 percent--is tied up in personnel for traditional city services. City financial resources for innovative social programs are almost nonexistent.
- b) City jurisdiction in social program areas--education, housing, redevelopment, job-training, etc. The above substantive "urban

crisis areas" are outside City Hall control in Oakland. The Oakland Unified School District is separate from the city government. Redevelopment is under the jurisdiction of the autonomous Oakland Redevelopment Agency; housing is in the jurisdiction of the autonomous Oakland Housing Authority. Job-training is carried out primarily by the independent OEDCI and the Peralta Junior College District (which operates the East Bay Skills Center).

- c) Mayoral jurisdiction within the city government in these policy fields. Because the city does not have jurisdiction in these fields, the Mayor doesn't either. Moreover, in Oakland, the Mayor is just one of nine Councilmen--and the Council selects a City Manager who has administrative authority in the city. The Manager selects city department heads.
- d) A salary for the Mayor which will enable him to spend full time on the job. In Oakland, the Mayor's salary is \$7,500 per year.
- e) Sufficient staff support for the Mayor--for policy planning, speech writing, inter-governmental relations, and political work. The Mayor of Oakland has one administrative assistant, three secretaries, and one part-time staff member from the University of California. Because of the press of office business, there is almost no time available for policy planning or concentrated work on intergovernmental relations.
- f) Ready vehicles for publicity--such as friendly newspapers or television stations. Mayor Reading does have the advantage of the support of the Oakland Tribune, the city's only major newspaper.

- g) Politically-oriented groups--including a political party--which the Mayor can mobilize to help him achieve particular goals.

Oakland politics is characterized by a lack of active political groups, by political parties which do not exert their efforts in city politics, and by a moribund electoral system.

This forbidding environment would make leadership difficult for any mayor. Without jurisdiction in key policy areas, it is hard for a mayor to direct--or even influence--the actions of officials in those areas. Without administrative authority within the government, a mayor cannot significantly influence city departments unless he is able to convince a majority of the Council--and then the City Manager--to go along with him. Without sufficient salary or staff, a mayor has little incentive to spend full time on the job and little opportunity to familiarize himself sufficiently with issues to be able to deal with them in more than a cursory manner. And without active groups or political parties in his constituency, it is hard for a mayor to mobilize support for his programs. Cities which can fulfill these requirements more adequately provide their mayors with a head start.

However, it is not true that leadership is impossible in Oakland or that it does not matter who the Mayor is. For the Mayor does have certain resources: his position as President of the City Council; the power of appointment; prestige and legitimacy; publicity. John Reading, who is essentially a private man in public life, has occasionally been successful in bringing people together to support significant goals: Charter Revision, a school tax, or the building of a convention center in downtown Oakland. But his distaste for conflict and his preference for quiet discussion have led him to underutilize his resources--particularly that of publicity.

When the Mayor was on the verge of an important breakthrough in a School Board dispute in 1969, Reading's refusal to state his case publicly was a crucial factor in the eventual defeat of his cause. Avoidance of conflict and publicity have also led the Mayor to underutilize his resources of Council leadership and power of appointment. Like the City Council, which makes a habit of denying and giving away its powers, the Mayor has often pursued a "retrenchment" strategy in order to avoid the pain of controversy. (It is difficult to see how any mayor can lead or bargain effectively without the ability to recognize and deal with conflict.)

A mayor of Oakland is not in an entirely hopeless position. He can use social lobbying and committee assignments (as Mayor Houlihan did) to gain a firm majority on the City Council--and thus be able to control the actions of (or fire) the City Manager and City Attorney. He can use publicity to build support for his programs--as Houlihan did with BART and Reading did with Charter reform. He can construct a slate of council candidates who are pledged to his cause. And he can work to create his own political groups.

If a mayor of Oakland--or any other city--has started to build a leadership position on the local level, he can use federal resources to strengthen that position and to initiate and carry out social programs. However, even if federal policy is changed to favor the city in areas now favoring the independent poverty board, the changed policies will be of limited value unless the mayor can persuade his own "partners" in city government to implement those programs.

Thus, mayoral leadership in Oakland faces enormous obstacles in the governmental structure and the non-political environment of the city. Still, it would appear that the environment could be moved in certain ways

by a personality adept at persuasion, vote-counting, management of conflict, and publicity. In Oakland, a mayor's lot is not a happy one--but it is not a hopeless one, either.

EPILOGUE: MAYORAL LEADERSHIP AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

In Oakland, as in other cities, the Mayor is the product of the political system. The nature of that system has a significant influence on the kinds of people who become Mayor and the forms of leadership they can exercise as Mayor. In the non-group, non-partisan, non-interested, and non-electoral political system of Oakland, it is entirely possible for a "non-political" civic reformer like John Reading to attain the position of Mayor without really trying for it. No groups, parties, or politicians could make an effective claim on the office.

(Even John Houlihan, who stands out among recent Oakland Mayors as an ambitious politician, was promoted for the office by a loose coalition of citizens' groups representing many political views. Although Houlihan sought to be a full-time Mayor, the low mayoral salary forced him deep into financial trouble and his eventual downfall. Thus, the Oakland governmental system penalized him for trying to exert sustained leadership.)

Not only does the political and governmental system have an influence on what kind of person becomes Mayor and how much time he can spend on his job; that system has an impact on the forms of mayoral leadership that are possible.

The lack of administrative authority, financial resources, and staff which is a part of the governmental system means that the leadership most often possible is hortatory in nature (encouraging voters to pass a bond issue, Charter Reform, etc.). In the absence of administrative

authority, the exercise of hortatory leadership can ultimately be frustrating to the Mayor. (Thus, Mayor Reading successfully urged the voters to approve Charter Reform, but he had little voice in the critical implementation of that reform.)

Even more important in determining the nature of mayoral leadership is the nature of the political arena in the city itself. The neighboring City of Berkeley, which has a formal governmental system similar to Oakland's, has witnessed the formation, passage, and implementation of an extensive program of municipal legislation--covering the fields of public works, health care, and equal employment opportunity, among others. This program was framed by a political caucus which gathered together a number of strong liberal and civic groups and supported municipal candidates pledged to a particular program. (It took a number of hotly-contested elections to achieve victory.)

In Oakland, by contrast, the lack of strong groups and parties means that the Mayor does not have sustained and consistent backing in the public for policies he advocates. Furthermore, because business and labor leaders have shown so little interest in city affairs, the Mayor has little opportunity to discover their thinking on various issues. As a result, leadership becomes not only hortatory, but sharply divorced from the policy preferences of relevant urban leaders. Thus, in the spring of 1970, when Mayor Reading suggested that National Guard troops might be called to operate buses in the midst of a strike, the proposal was sharply criticized by both labor and management. The absence of involvement in city politics cuts the Mayor off from both support and information. Hortatory leadership in these circumstances can have the effect of increasing confusion and tension.

If electoral competition is non-existent, there is no incentive for groups of Councilmen to join together in framing a program. If no boats are rocked, then no competition may surface. Contested elections, which can have the effect of defining alternatives and building support for those alternatives, can provide both a start and a direction for the victors. The exercise of leadership in a virtually non-electoral system runs the risk of being rudderless.

Of course, the lack of leadership in the Mayor's office does not mean that no leadership is being exerted in the urban political system. It could be argued that City Hall weakness may encourage the development of alternative power centers in the poor, black community. Based on her intensive study of political development in the ghetto community of West Oakland, Judith V. May has written that the Federal Government--through Model Cities--has precipitated

. . .the creation of a second government for the West Oakland community. West Oakland residents, in effect, declared their independence from the authority of the local government and established new institutions which they vested with legitimacy. Led by newly sanctioned leaders in their battle over Model Cities planning, they won the right to govern their community in concert with city officials--to share authority on a large number of important matters.⁷²

A number of the West Oakland residents' victories have been aided by City Hall's weakness or indifference. Thus, if organization of the poor and the black is considered to be a goal of urban policy, a model of strong mayoral leadership may not be as conducive to this development as a weaker City Hall which permits the creation of a challenging "counter-government." Such a counter-government may well be more disposed to advocate programs which directly aid the poor.

But there are problems with this approach, too. A counter-government which confronts a weak City Hall may find that, no matter how worthy its demands, City Hall is so poor in resources and leverage that it has nothing to give. Thus, demands create tension--but the fulfillment of those demands may be an impossibility. (The leaders of the Oakland Poverty Program have been able to organize against the Mayor as an opposition target, but his ability to provide them with resources or to hurt them has always been limited.) Furthermore, the dependence of "counter-government" upon federal grants means that the independence of such counter-governments leans on a somewhat tenuous reed. Finally, for those who advocate policies which will redistribute resources to poor people and minorities, it may not be wise to substitute a strong counter-government for a strong government in a model of urban leadership. For there are other potential counter-governments in cities besides poverty organization--business, labor, newspapers, for example.

Electoral activity can provide a vehicle for mobilizing the resources of numbers against other resources like money or social standing or control of communications media. The lack of power on the part of elected officials may lead to more power for those who presently hold these other resources. (In Oakland, federal officials found that the independent Port was the only institution financially and administratively strong enough to sponsor an economic development program. The Port has been less willing than the City to hire minorities.)

Rather than merely advocating strong leadership on the part of that organization within a city--the Mayor's office, the Poverty Program, etc.--which happens to be well-disposed toward certain desired goals, we ought to give some attention to the strength and openness of the process of city

politics itself. For without interested and active political groups in a city, any mayor will find it difficult to gain support for programs and to gain information about policy preferences. Without contested elections, there will be little incentive for city politicians to join together in creating programs. Campaigns could serve the purpose of highlighting alternative policies for dealing with city problems, and also encourage politicians to build active constituencies in the electorate. (Instead of occupying a City Council seat that no one else wants or a Poverty Program position under the control of Washington, an urban leader would have to prove himself by building a majority in his locality.)

Because the nature of urban leadership is so strongly influenced by the political systems, we ought to study the elements of that system which appear to be a precondition for the exercise of leadership. What factors tend to encourage--or inhibit--the building of politically-interested groups in cities? What effect do non-partisanship and at-large elections have on electoral participation? What factors encourage men to seek elective office in cities? Finally, because elective office appears to offer a focus for running campaigns, building city-wide coalitions, and constructing programs which may be implemented, we ought to examine some of the ways in which City Hall may be made more worth having (by increasing its resources) and more accessible (by increasing the openness of the electoral process). Before advocating mayoral leadership, we ought to give some thought to the political preconditions of such leadership.

FOOTNOTES

1. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. (New York: Bantam edition, 1968), p. 298.
2. Ibid., p. 299.
3. Alexander L. George, "Political Leadership and Social Change in American Cities," Daedalus. Fall 1968 (Vol. 97, No. 4 of the Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences), p. 1197.
4. Ibid.
5. For further discussion of political entrepreneurship and the pyramiding of resources, see Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 225-27, 308; Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The Free Press, 1961), Ch. 8 and pp. 17, 309, 312-13, 320-21; Aaron Wildavsky, Leadership in a Small Town (Totowa, N. J.: Bedminster Press, 1964), pp. 244-45, 248; H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 109; and Andrew S. McFarland, Power and Leadership in Pluralistic Systems (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 153-219.
6. McFarland, p. 154.
7. Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," The American Political Science Review, LXI (1967), pp. 623-41.
8. McFarland, p. 203.
9. Stanford Research Institute report, p. 12.
10. Ibid., p. 16.
11. Oakland Tribune, November 8, 1968.
12. Oakland Tribune, June 4, 1969.
13. City of Oakland: Its Organization and Functions, p. 12.
14. Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," Bobbs-Merrill Reprint PS-299, p. 494.

15. Proposed New Charter of the City of Oakland (Adopted November 5, 1968), p. 12.
16. Ibid., p. 14.
17. Ibid., p. 18.
18. Ibid.
19. Interview, August 24, 1967.
20. I am indebted to Arnold Meltsner for insights into the City Manager's methods of operation.
21. For a fascinating description of the crucial role in policy-making that can be played by a City Attorney, see "The Cambridge City Manager," in Harold Stein, ed. Public Administration and Policy Development: A Case Book (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1952).
22. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Books, 1963), p. 19.
23. See Oakland Tribune, June 27, 1969.
24. Oakland Tribune, June 30, 1969.
25. Interview, August 24, 1967.
26. Montclarion, July 24, 1968.
27. Montclarion, April 16, 1969.
28. Interview, August 24, 1967.
29. Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967), p. 217.
30. Mathew Holden, Jr., "'Imperialism' in Bureaucracy." The American Political Science Review, Vol. LX (1966), p. 945.
31. Oakland Tribune, May 29, 1968.
32. Oakland Tribune, July 30, 1969.
33. Oakland Tribune, January 31, 1969.
34. Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Presidential Elections (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 180.
35. Informal remarks at meeting of S. F. Bay Area Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration, October 5, 1967.
36. Remarks before U. S. Civil Rights Commission, May 6, 1967.

37. Remarks at City Council meeting, April 23, 1968.
38. "Ombudsman: Citizen Representative," Boston, July 30, 1967.
39. Remarks to Oakland Economic Development Council, Inc., July 23, 1969.
40. McFarland, pp. 177 ff.
41. Remarks to the National Food Distributors Association, San Francisco, July 16, 1968.
42. Inaugural Address, July 1, 1969.
43. Ibid.
44. Dahl, Who Governs?, p. 227.
45. Ibid., pp. 308-10.
46. Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960), pp. 86 ff.
47. Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXII (1968), p. 1151. Aaron Wildavsky has pointed out that most Oakland political actors are in a "low-resource" position.
48. Aaron Wildavsky, "The empty-head blues: black rebellion and white reaction," The Public Interest, No. 11, (spring 1968), p. 14.
49. Oakland Tribune, April 10, 1969; Montclairion, April 16, 1969.
50. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.
51. My thanks to William K. Muir, Jr., for this helpful insight.
52. Young, p. 159.
53. City Charter, Section 219.
54. Comments to State Commission on Housing and Community Development, October 3, 1967.
55. Digest of Current Federal Programs in the City of Oakland (1968).
56. Quoted in Amory Bradford, Oakland's Not for Burning (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1968), pp. 86-87.
57. Oakland Task Force, San Francisco Federal Executive Board. An Analysis of Federal Decision-Making and Impact: The Federal Government in Oakland, Vol. 1 (August 1968), pp. 17, 19, 23.
58. Ibid., p. 13.

59. See Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 162.
60. Task Force Report, p. 48.
61. Ibid., p. 34.
62. Ibid., p. 33.
63. Remarks to National Food Distributors Association.
64. The following description is based on the Task Force Report, pp. 122-29.
65. Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967, Section 210 ff.
66. Oakland City Council Minutes, May 21, 1968.
67. Oakland Tribune, July 2, 1969.
68. Ibid., July 24, 1969.
69. Letters of March 7, 1969, and June 17, 1969.
70. The New York Times, August 13, 1969.
71. Human Resources Development for Oakland.
72. Judith V. May, "Two Model Cities: Political Development on the Local Level," (prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Convention, New York, 1969), pp. 1-2.