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From Users to Criminals: Creating, Pathologizing, and Killing ‘Drug Criminals’ in
Twentieth-Century China

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

by

Thomas Arthur Kwok Wah Chan

Committee in charge:

Professor Karl Gerth, Co-Chair
Professor Paul Pickowicz, Co-Chair
Professor Claire Edington
Professor Wendy Matsumura
Professor Victor Shih
Professor Erin Suzuki

2023

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University of California San Diego

2023

DEDICATION

To my father, who didn't live to see me become the wrong kind of doctor, and to my family.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
KMT	Kuomintang (Guomindang)
NAOA	National Anti-Narcotics Association
PRC	People's Republic of China
SMA	Shanghai Municipal Archives
ANC	Anti-Narcotics Campaign (1949-1952)
MPS	Ministry of Public Security

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

From Users to Criminals: Creating, Pathologizing, and Killing ‘Drug Criminals’ in Twentieth Century China

by

Thomas Arthur Kwok Wah Chan

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California San Diego, 2023

Professor Karl Gerth, Co-Chair
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How do governments create expendable populations as a historical process? This question underpins *From Users to Criminals: Creating, Pathologizing, and Killing ‘Drug Criminals’ in Twentieth-Century China*. My dissertation historicizes how governments create marginalized populations and convince people to enact violence against them by uncovering the social, medical, cultural, and political histories of narcotics treatment and suppression in China from the early modern to modern period.

My interdisciplinary work challenges accounts of mass campaigns in China as irrationally destructive and argues that governments used anti-narcotics campaigns to draw

ordinary people into the project of building new political communities. I show how the Qing (1636-1911), Republic of China (1912-1949) and People's Republic of China (PRC, 1949-) governments drew on scientific expertise and techniques of population management to create new senses of political and social belonging. The project analyzes how from 1906 to 1953 governments dehumanized drug users to create collective identity and promote state-building. Following China's defeat in the Opium Wars, narcotics became a symbol of national shame. Reformers during the Republican period authored plays, propaganda, songs, and medical studies that cast drug use as a marker of moral degeneracy and physical illness. While the Republican government saw itself as the agent of punishment, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) persuaded ordinary people to participate in emotional and physical violence against drug users and traffickers to define belonging in China's new political community and extend the reach of state power to the bodies and minds of citizens.

From Users to Criminals is the first study of violence in China that moves beyond accounts of casualties to explore how different governments used non-physical forms of violence. I depart from conventional studies that privilege violence's physical forms and focus on establishing state culpability or casualty numbers. Instead, I disaggregate violence and examine its different forms, be it discursive, ideological, clinical, emotional, or public. Rather than understanding violence simply as a destructive force, I historicize violence as a flexible and creative process of subject creation that forms a shared community identity based on hatred and exclusion.

Introduction

In December 1952, the head of China's security and police forces, Luo Ruiqing, made a remarkable statement to the highest leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including Chairman Mao Zedong. Luo was China's Minister of Public Security, the man charged with securing order across the People's Republic of China (PRC) founded in 1949. In the intervening three years, Luo and his police forces literally and figuratively fought against counterrevolutionaries, landlords, middle- and upper-class business owners, Kuomintang (KMT) and American spies, and the people that police forces saw as "bad elements" or social deviants. The category of bad element encompassed people of every stripe, from pimps, prostitutes, and gamblers to lazy workers, corrupt government officials and bandits to drug users and traffickers. For three years, Luo and his men had waged non-stop war against these "bad elements," even engaging the most dangerous of them in shootouts.¹ Two of the most wide-ranging and important mass campaigns during the first three years of the PRC were those against landlords and counterrevolutionaries, or those the Party accused of fighting against the CCP and its revolutionary goals.² In the campaigns against landlords, also designated as the Land Reform campaign (1949-1953), scholars estimate that nearly 2 million people died.³ For the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries (1950-1953), estimates range from 500,000 to 800,000 casualties.⁴ By contrast, the number of people police forces killed in the Anti-Narcotics

¹ Jeremy Brown, "From Resisting Communists to Resisting America: Civil War and Korean War in Southwest China, 1950–51," in *Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People's Republic of China*, ed. Jeremy Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 105-129.

² A mass campaign is a state-run campaign directed at enemies of the state that also involves significant participation from non-state or non-police actors.

³ Brian DeMare, *Land Wars: The Story of China's Agrarian Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019), 161-162.

⁴ Frederick Teiwes, "Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime," in *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 14, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 51-92,

Campaign (1949-1952) was what some scholars have misleadingly called a “relatively insignificant” 1,000.⁵

Against the backdrop of armed struggle against enemies of the state, Luo’s statement to the Central Committee on 18 December 1952 is extraordinary. Under the eyes of Chairman Mao and other leaders, Luo stated, “we gain more support and sympathy from the people when we kill drug criminals than when we kill counterrevolutionaries.”⁶ Luo’s remark suggests public support for state violence. How did the CCP convince people to not only tolerate intracommunal violence against their neighbors, but also, as I will show, to actively participate in it? Luo’s remark also shows that he believed people particularly supported violence against drug criminals and that the party-state and its police forces gained the most support and sympathy when they killed drug criminals. How and why did police forces think that people saw often non-violent drug criminals as more deserving of death than counterrevolutionaries? How did society and the state come to view drug criminals as a despised group of people who deserved death, when drug use had been a form of conspicuous consumption only half a century earlier?⁷ This dissertation traces the history of anti-narcotics movements in China from the early 20th century through the early PRC, from 1906 to 1953, to understand how Luo came to this position and its historical significance.

88. See also Andrew G. Walder, *China Under Mao: A Revolution Derailed* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015), 65.

⁵ Zhou Yongming, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History, and State-Building* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 105.

⁶ Luo Ruiqing, “Concluding Report on the Nation-Wide Anti-Narcotics Movement, (全國禁毒運動總結報告),” December 18, 1952, p1. Lit. “事实证明杀毒犯确比杀反革命还容易得到社会同情。群众已把禁毒的事真正当做是与自己利害有关的事，积极地行动起来协助政府同毒犯斗争。” A report from October 3, 1952, also instructed local authorities: “it is easier to get people’s sympathy by killing drug offenders than killing counter-revolutionaries...at least two percent of those arrested should be killed.”

⁷ Xavier Paulès, *Living on Borrowed Time: Opium in Canton, 1906-1936*, trans. Noel Castelino (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2017).

Both the Republican (1912-1949) and the PRC (1949-present) governments spent extraordinary amounts of time and manpower on anti-narcotics work, often with mixed results. The weaker Republican governments supported private social reform groups that produced anti-narcotics propaganda, created forced rehabilitation centers, and led police crackdowns to try and stem the tide of drugs flowing in and out of China. Even though the Republic failed to suppress drug use, anti-narcotics propaganda and scientific studies changed the meaning of drug use and imbued the figure of the drug criminal with popular stigmas.⁸ By 1949, people no longer associated drug use with social status, as they had during the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Instead, people saw drug users and traffickers as a subhuman and dangerous threat that had no place in a modernizing China.

After seizing power in 1949 and founding the PRC, the CCP used various types of physical, emotional, and psychological violence against drug users, whom the regime consistently labeled as criminals, in a nation-wide Anti-Narcotics Campaign. Through the campaign, Party leaders sought to bring the people and state together and to create a new form of social belonging rooted in a shared hatred for drug criminals. From the perspective of the state, police efforts in this area were remarkably successful. In the same statement noted above, Luo even told the Central Committee that “the people have actively risen up to help the government in the fight against drugs; they see this fight as something that deeply affects them personally.”⁹ As Luo indicates, and as I show in the following pages, the violence of the CCP’s Anti-Narcotics

⁸ Xavier Paulès, “Anti-Opium Visual Propaganda and the Delgamorisation of Opium in China, 1895-1937,” in *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, 7, no.2 (2008): 229-262.

⁹ Luo Ruiqing, “Concluding Report on the Nation-Wide Anti-Narcotics Movement, (全國禁毒運動總結報告),” December 18, 1952, p1. Lit. “群众已把禁毒的事真正当做是与自己利害有关的事，积极地行动起来协助政府同毒犯斗争。”

Campaign was not simply destructive but a formative and generative force that created new social identities through the dehumanization and physical eradication of deviant bodies.

Before 1949, persistent quasi-medical propaganda, social reformers' aspirations to scientific modernity, and clinical studies dehumanized drug users, as well anyone in proximity to narcotics, as disposable, unredeemable, and dangerous. Drug offenders became, in popular and political imaginations, dead men walking. Once it took power, the CCP executed these disposable bodies in visible and public ways to build popular support. The longer histories of discursive, ideological, and emotional violence against drug users enabled the CCP to use calculated and public acts of violence against the medically dehumanized and isolated figure of the narcotics criminal to legitimate the nascent socialist regime. The history of narcotics users and traffickers is thus not peripheral to the history of the modern state but integral to analyzing the formation of state power and the social body.

Rethinking Violence and Science in Histories of Modern China

This dissertation is one of the first historical studies of violence in China that moves beyond accounts of killings or calculations of casualties to explore how different governments used non-physical forms of violence and to what ends. Julie Skurski and Fernando Coronil define violence "as a complex set of practices, representations, and experiences...rather than...[simply] a tool of power and an asocial force."¹⁰ Building on their work, I focus on the distinct but mutually reinforcing rhetorical, structural, psychological, and physical aspects of

¹⁰ Julie Skurski and Fernando Coronil eds., *States of Violence* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 2.

violence instead of privileging violence as an exceptional use of physical force. In doing so, the dissertation makes three interconnected points.

First, it highlights how moments of physical violence build on pre-existing histories of rhetorical, emotional, psychological, and structural violence. Second, a focus on how violence pervades everyday social life corrects sanitizing narratives of progress and modernity that implicitly or explicitly define modernity through the state's monopoly over physical force and the gradual elimination of violence from social life. The history of anti-narcotics movements shows how modern governments have relied on both physical and non-physical forms of violence to create and enforce social categories, identities, and forms of belonging. Finally, this dissertation highlights the many ways people chose to participate in ordinary and extreme acts of intracommunal violence against those identified as drug criminals rather than merely conforming to victimizing narratives wherein the state imposes violence on an unwilling or unwitting populace.

This approach to violence facilitates three main historiographical contributions to the history of modern China. First, the dissertation argues that violence in the PRC remains misunderstood in scholarly works and that only through detailed examination of the conditions of production of violence in each specific historical instance can we arrive at a more complete understanding of the role(s) that violence has played in contesting, legitimating, and solidifying state power. Where historians of Communist China have examined the use of state violence, most either fixate on the sheer numbers of people killed or focus on violence as a top-down imposition of power, a direct outcome of political machinations or policymaking gone

disastrously wrong.¹¹ Thinking of violence in this manner obscures how people became targets of violence and misses why the Chinese state purposely used different types of violence.

A brief example highlights how Chinese political leaders used violence as a calculated and precise tool of statecraft, as a scalpel rather than a bludgeon. Take the three campaigns mentioned above, Land Reform, the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, and the Anti-Narcotics Campaign. Thinking of them only in terms of casualties or deaths misrepresents all three. It ignores why the Anti-Narcotics Campaign relied on public and ritualized killings rather than the wanton attacks and vigilante justice that featured throughout Land Reform and the Campaign to Suppress, and it further misses that the high casualty numbers of both Land Reform and the Campaign to Suppress served different purposes.

Land Reform was a campaign where state forces needed to kill widely and used widespread vigilante violence because they wanted the campaign to redistribute economic resources to poor rural people who would support the CCP and simultaneously eradicate social and economic classes that could block state actions in the countryside.¹² The Campaign to Suppress, by comparison, killed in great numbers but defined targets more loosely, because police wanted to communicate “paternalist care for those whom it deemed to be within the realm of revolutionary society, [and] terror unleashed against those beyond the pale of revolutionary

¹¹ Frank Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution, 1945-1957* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013). Andrew Walder, *China Under Mao: A Revolution Derailed*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). Børge Bakken, *The Exemplary Society: Human Improvement, Social Control, and the Dangers of Modernity in China*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2000). Michael Dutton, *Policing Chinese Politics: A History* (Durham: Duke University Press: 2005). Zhou Yongming, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History, and State-Building* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).

¹²Brian DeMare, *Land Wars: The Story of China's Agrarian Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019). Julia Strauss, "Morality, Coercion and State Building by Campaign in the Early PRC: Regime Consolidation and After, 1949-1956," *China Quarterly*, (2006): 891-912, 900.

society.”¹³ Defining targets loosely and killing in great numbers facilitated these goals by making people afraid and forcing them to turn towards the new state in their terror.

By contrast, the Anti-Narcotics Campaign killed fewer people than either of these campaigns but relied more on non-lethal, public, and ritualized forms of violence. Rather than eradicating troublesome social classes or communicating paternalism, the Anti-Narcotics Campaign sought to cultivate a shared hatred to get people to identify with the CCP. The Anti-Narcotics Campaign bolstered the CCP by rallying popular support, legitimating the new state’s moral authority to punish, and causing audience members to bloody “their hands in their collusion with the state’s violence.”¹⁴ Paying closer attention to violence clarifies how and why states define certain groups as disposable and eradicate them.

Second, the overwhelming scholarly focus on casualties and deaths prioritizes narratives of death or experiences of suffering and leaves less lethal campaigns understudied.¹⁵ While valuable, these works further the impression of the Mao-era as dominated by senseless violence that could appear out of nowhere at the whim of political leaders. By contrast, this dissertation shows that lethal violence in the Anti-Narcotics Campaign was rooted in a longer history of dehumanization and emotional violence towards drug criminals. Highlighting the centrality of political and ideological violence even in a mass campaign with comparatively low numbers of deaths corrects the common assumption in studies of Mao’s China that lower casualty numbers

¹³ Julia Strauss, “Paternalist Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the People’s Republic of China, 1950-1953,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44, no. 1 (2002): 80–105.

¹⁴ Strauss, “Morality, Coercion and State Building by Campaign in the Early PRC,” *China Quarterly*, (2006): 891-912, 907.

¹⁵ The land reform movement and campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries dominate scholarly discussion on the early consolidation of CCP rule in the 1950s. Similarly, narratives of other events remain dominated by casualty numbers and tabulations, in particular scholarship on the Great Leap Forward such as Zhou Xun, *Forgotten Voices of Mao's Great Famine, 1958-1962: An Oral History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). Frank Dikötter, *Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962* (New York: Walker and Co., 2010).

alone indicate less violence. In the campaign against drug use, Party leaders used lethal and less-than-lethal communal violence to gain sympathy from people, create social cohesion, and legitimate the power of the PRC state to define certain bodies and people as more expendable than others.

Third, this is the first work to comprehensively examine the effects of pre-1949 anti-narcotics movements on the CCP's narcotics suppression efforts. Existing scholarship on Chinese anti-narcotics campaigns and social reform movements focus on either the Republican or PRC periods.¹⁶ Scholars have also focused on political and institutional differences between the Republican and PRC periods and their approaches to narcotics suppression.¹⁷ My work builds on this scholarship by further highlighting the continuity between the Nationalist and PRC governments: people's changing views and responses to drug users and traffickers. Archival records from public trials in the 1950s reveal that people attending trials held such a visceral hatred toward narcotics that policing officials often had to restrain them from attacking accused criminals. These attitudes did not arise after the revolution and establishment of the PRC but rose out of propaganda, scientific studies, and discourses about drug use in the Republican period. Unlike many histories that draw lines between the two periods, I show how both states used anti-narcotics work to define notions of public health, subjecthood, social belonging, and to claim control over individual bodies, thereby extending the reach of state power into the village, household, and clinic.

¹⁶ Xavier Paulès, *Living on Borrowed Time: Opium in Canton, 1906-1936*, trans. Noel Castelino (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2017). Zhou Yongming, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History, and State-Building* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).

¹⁷ Timothy Brook and Bob Wakabayashi eds., *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). Ma Weigang, *禁娼禁毒* (Abolish Prostitution and Eradicate Narcotics), (Beijing: Jingguan Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1993). Zhou Yongming, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History, and State-Building* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).

My work contributes to the historiography of science and medicine in modern China by showing how deeply the Republican and PRC governments relied on the authority of science and medicine to stigmatize drug criminals and eradicate them. Historians of science have shown that science is inseparable from its political context and that Mao-era science made significant gains in areas such as disease prevention and agriculture.¹⁸ Sigrid Schmalzer and Ruth Rogaski have shown how scientific inquiry became a contested venue for scientists, laypeople, and the Chinese state to negotiate what it meant to be modern, Chinese, and human.¹⁹ I build on this work but depart from more positivist readings of Maoist science by showing that both Republican and PRC China used ideas of health and medical modernity to define proper subjecthood and justify violence against those who failed to fit that definition. I trace how scientists and doctors in China worked hand-in-glove with policing and political forces to dehumanize drug users as morally and scientifically degenerate, to find them, and to punish them.

My work examines not only scientific control over the physical body but on people's mental and moral health as well. Scholars of modern China have focused on the ways in which the Republican and PRC governments used science to regulate public health in a biological sense, through epidemic relief, virological control, and developing physical hygiene and culture.²⁰ While building on these scholars, my research highlights how 20th century Chinese governments used anti-narcotics science that individualized the problem of drug use as a personal moral failing to expand the state's ability to intervene in people's mental and moral

¹⁸ Miriam Gross, *Farewell to the God of Plague: Chairman Mao's Campaign to Deworm China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016). Sigrid Schmalzer, *Red Revolution, Green Revolution: Scientific Farming in Socialist China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).

¹⁹ Sigrid Schmalzer, *The People's Peking Man: Popular Science and Human Identity in Twentieth-Century China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

²⁰ Mary Augusta Brazelton, *Mass Vaccination: Citizen's Bodies and State Power in Modern China* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019). Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*. Andrew D. Morris, *Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

hygiene.²¹ Framed as a personal deficiency, the blame of addiction fell squarely on the individual, and ideologically severed the social and familial ties that established the individual as a part of their social, local, and national community. Anti-narcotics science constructed the individual drug user as a site of medical intervention and knowledge production, and as an object where the state could justifiably attempt to exert control over the individual's body and mind.

Finally, the dissertation also contributes to the small but growing body of studies in the medical humanities literature focused on non-Western societies. I reaffirm that science has never been an abstract set of concepts or principles that Western powers brought to the rest of the world but instead consists of a diverse set of practices, relations, and experiences that people negotiated and practiced in specific local contexts.²² Twentieth-century China did not simply import clinical definitions of narcotics addiction from the West. Rather, missionary and anti-narcotics societies used twentieth-century Chinese experiences with narcotics usage and regulation to inform global circuits of medical knowledge about narcotics and the nature of addiction. I examine what reformers, scientists, and state officials in China stood to gain from using science in narcotics suppression work and how that influenced the production of scientific and medical knowledge about drug use and addiction. Scientists saw their work as intensely personal, political, and overtly about questions of ethics and morals.

The global history of science and medicine is replete with violence against marginalized individuals; my work examines how scientific inquiry not only relied on violence against marginalized communities to produce scientific knowledge but the different ways scientific

²¹ Emily Baum, *The Invention of Madness: State, Society, and the Insane in Modern China*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018). Baum's work focuses entirely on the Republican period, and examines in particular, the invention of the concept of madness and mental illness. Her work further clarifies how deeply political power and broader social stigmas toward mental illness affected the development of scientific conceptions of insanity in China.

²² Grace Shen, "Murky Waters: Thoughts on Desire, Utility, and the 'Sea of Modern Science,'" *Isis* 98, no. 3 (2007): 584–596. Fa-ti Fan, "Redrawing the Map: Science in Twentieth-Century China," *Isis*, 98, no. 3 (2007): 524–532.

actors produced expendability and marginalization.²³ I build on scholarship within a global medical humanities literature by showing how science and medicine worked to create hierarchies of difference even in the absence of visible markers of racial or ethnic difference. Existing works have demonstrated how deeply science and medicine in Euro-American contexts rose out of experimentation on black and brown bodies to create new ways of stratifying society along lines of racial difference.²⁴ My work shows how science and medicine drew on historical trauma and memory to invent new categories of difference, at times even employing racializing rhetoric despite the absence of visible markers of phenotypical difference. Twentieth-century governments used science and medicine to invent the category of the “drug addict” to render certain populations as surplus and eradicate them. Rather than confining my discussion to China, I uncover how global anti-narcotics efforts in the 20th century paired Chinese treatment clinics’ conception of addicted people as mentally and morally damaged with scientific developments in medical pharmacology that privileged the brain, over the body, as the defining marker of what it meant to be human. Bringing these histories together shows how current stigmatizations of narcotics addicts as people who are permanently addicted because their brains are neurochemically different from “normal people” resulted from the convergence of China’s historical and cultural conceptions of addiction with the United States’ history of differentially policing drug use to reinforce hierarchies of race and class.²⁵

²³ For example, the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Study, or the detonations of nuclear weapons in the Pacific to test the effects of radiation on Pacific Islander communities in places like Guam or the Marshall Islands. Holly M. Barker, *Bravo for the Marshallese: Regaining Control in a Post-Nuclear, Post-Colonial World* (Belmont: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2004). Elizabeth M. DeLoughrey, “The Myth of Isolates: Ecosystem Ecologies in the Nuclear Pacific,” *Cultural Geographies* 20, no.2 (2013): 167-184.

²⁴ Harriet A. Washington, *Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present*, 1st ed (New York: Doubleday, 2006).

²⁵ For more on narcotics policing in the United States see David T. Courtwright, *Dark Paradise: A History of Opiate Addiction in America*, Enl. ed (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001); Nancy D. Campbell and Elizabeth Ettorre, *Gendering Addiction: The Politics of Drug Treatment in a Neurochemical World* (Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

By placing the case of twentieth-century China within a global context, I reveal a transnational effort to demonize the narcotics user as an anti-subject with deep personal failings to justify the increased militarization of society. The similarities among narcotics policing efforts in different national contexts illuminate how modern states combined the discourses of public health and the healthy individual body with overlapping forms of violence to define political belonging. States justified visible and overt violence against those identified as drug criminals by casting narcotics usage as an incurable moral failing and reframing narcotics addiction as an extraordinary and contagious threat to the past, present, and future health of the social body.

Reading Across and Between Silences

Michel-Rolph Trouillot has shown that silences are immanent to the production of historical narratives. In particular, he identifies four moments of silence: “the moment of fact creation (the making of *sources*); the moment of fact assembly (the making of *archives*); the moment of fact retrieval (the making of *narratives*); and the moment of retrospective significance (the making of *history* in the final instance).”²⁶ These moments of silence serve to remind the historian of how power influences every step of the creation of historical narratives and their interpretation. They “crystallize aspects of historical production that best expose when and where power gets into the story.”²⁷ In telling a history of violence against drug users and traffickers, how does the historian, using sources written from the perspective of the perpetrators of violence, minimize doing further violence to an already marginalized population?

²⁶ Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995) 26.

²⁷ Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, 28-29.

Silence is immanent to history, the historian's task is not to recover and break free from these silences through the discovery of ever-more sources, since the sources themselves produce silence, but to be aware of and listen to the silences as well as the sources. I use accounts of state policies, while trying to remain attuned to the silences immanent in these sources, such as how and why these sources survived, were curated, and presented to the historian. Similarly, I try to remain attuned to the different ways people asserted selfhood and agency even within hostile sources that sought to portray them as mindless addicted criminals, such as police files and interrogation records. No historian can avoid the silencing of the archive, but I have purposely tried to read transnationally across historical archives in various geopolitical contexts, from public and private archives in China to archives in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United States. Specifically, I draw from archives in Shanghai, Beijing, Suzhou, and Tianjin, the Hoover Institution at Stanford, the archives of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Academia Historica in Taipei, and archival, library, and special collections at East China Normal University, Fudan University, Hong Kong University, and the Chinese University of Hong Kong. I also draw primary source materials from several online research databases, such as the Database on the History of Contemporary Chinese Political Movements. This transnational archival process has provided an abundance of interdisciplinary and sometimes contradictory sources in many genres that I have tried to synthesize into a historical narrative that highlights the types of violence done to the people whom 20th century Chinese governments defined as drug criminals. In doing so, this work inevitably produces new silences.

The sources used include local police reports, cultural and propaganda bureau reports, upper-level Communist party circulars, local newspapers, posters, and comic books. I also examine medical studies, clinical reports, the scripts of anti-narcotics plays, interrogation

records, and confession files that together enable me to analyze how police forces, bureaucrats, and the medical community treated and viewed narcotics offenders. I discuss the dangers of using specific types of public security records in more detail when I introduce these sources and examine their presentation of events in relation to directives from central leadership to see how officials manipulated reports to fit broader campaign objectives. While historians must remain aware of the biases and often self-serving nature of public security documents, in general these records provide considerable insight into the inner workings of mass campaigns. These records clarify both how the CCP saw narcotics offenders and how they wanted the broader public to view narcotics offenders despite the complex task of getting people to buy into this view.

By combining this wide variety of sources, I show that the promulgation of anti-narcotics propaganda during the Republican period enabled the CCP to legitimize its new state by committing violence against the dehumanized bodies of narcotics offenders. These sources reveal that Party leaders, local police forces, and audience members understood the violence of the Anti-Narcotics Campaign as qualitatively different from the violence of other mass campaigns.

Regarding terminology, I use the terms “drug offender,” “drug criminal,” “narcotics offender,” and “narcotics criminal” interchangeably to refer to the Ministry of Public Security’s broad category for all people accused of drug-related crimes (毒犯)—producing, trafficking, smuggling, using—and “narcotics user” or “drug user” to refer specifically to people who smoked, injected, or took drugs in any fashion. The only time I use the term “drug addict” or “narcotics addict” is when it is a direct translation of the equivalent Chinese terms in the original sources. I use the term “drug criminal” to denote the top-down designation imposed by lawmakers and policing forces and to describe the popular perception among the people

attending mass rallies. My use of the term in no way indicates my acceptance of the negative connotations of the terms; I use these terms to highlight that police and public considered people who had personal association with drugs to be criminals. Furthermore, the term “Anti-Narcotics Campaign” refers specifically to the CCP’s 1949-1952 campaign. I also have anonymized the names of every accused drug offender or user who appears in the text, as well as the names of any audience members or CCP cadres whom I quote.

Chapter Breakdown

The following chapters are organized both chronologically and thematically to highlight the different ways governments, people, and organizations used violence. Each chapter focuses on one or two types of violence, such as rhetorical violence, dehumanization, reification, hatred and emotional violence, and ritualized public killings, at specific historical moments.

Chapter 1, “The Skeletal Body: Turning China’s Drug Users into Walking Skeletons,” begins in the early 1900s when medical experts and social reformers produced propaganda redefining narcotics addiction as an incurable condition resulting from any personal drug use. While there had been proper and improper ways to consume narcotics that demonstrated class status in late-nineteenth-century China, twentieth-century studies portrayed all narcotics usage as a permanent marker of personal moral depravity. Prior to its fall, the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) legally codified these medical discourses in a 1906 anti-opium edict that pathologized the narcotics user as a degenerate who, in the eyes of the clinic and the state, was already dead. Immediately after the fall of the Qing, medical associations in China produced propaganda that deglamorized the conspicuous consumption of opium. Republican-era propaganda likewise dehumanized narcotics users and rendered them a redundant population that demarcated worthy

life from unworthy. Popular depictions also directly called for violence by portraying opium users as beasts and incorrigible wretches whom society needed to kill to protect its future and whose inability to break the habit destroyed their families, communities, and selves.

Chapter 2, “Using Science to Define Morality: Creating the Pathological Body in 1920s China,” shows how propaganda demonizing narcotics users in Republican China selectively borrowed from the scientific authority of the latest medical studies on narcotics addiction from abroad. Anti-narcotics pamphlets and journals consistently featured testimony from Western and Western-trained Chinese doctors that framed narcotics as a “world evil” that caused extreme “degeneration,” as well as clinical studies designed to ascertain the impact of narcotics usage on China’s “willpower” and “moral integrity.” These studies both interwove medical discourses with social gospel Christianity and located the struggle against narcotics as a global one, with China as an integral testing site for old and new theories about narcotics usage and addiction. Through speeches and writings delivered amongst other medical professionals in China and in international conferences, medical professionals invoked global discourses of “medical modernity” to justify policing, incarceration, violence, and dissections of narcotics users. Physicians consistently highlighted their use of the latest medical treatments and scientific practices in the Chinese context to participate in and influence global discussions surrounding the meaning of addiction as a plague that spread like wildfire. Paradoxically, they blamed continued narcotics use on the irreparable and incurable degeneracy of users and their lack of hygiene rather than the inefficacy of the latest treatment methods.

After the CCP seized power in 1949, as Chapter 3 “Rendering Flesh: State and Clinical Efforts to Reify and Discipline Drug Offenders in 1950s China” highlights, the state’s anti-narcotics movement and drug rehabilitation clinics isolated narcotics users from their social

context by portraying drug use as solely a result of personal failure to control one's baser impulses. Clinical reports dovetailed with propaganda, policing, and registration efforts to atomize and pathologize narcotics users as an expendable, subhuman population. Clinical reports that accompanied police files from 1950s China show that carceral drug rehabilitation facilities focused on proving the individualized nature of drug addiction and establishing the guilt of the drug user as a scientific fact. These reports explicitly reaffirmed the medical authority of the doctor while reinforcing the idea that drug use marked a user as morally degenerate. Taken together, these measures foreclosed any possibility of rehabilitation and made the narcotics user solely responsible for their crimes. Supported by a half-century of medical, scientific, and propaganda discourses, the CCP based its new social order around pathologizing a group already seen as outside of society.

Chapter 4, “‘A Sea of Blood and Hatred’: Persuading People to Hate Drug Offenders in the CCP’s Anti-Narcotics Campaign, 1949-1952,” highlights how the new Ministry of Public Security (MPS) targeted narcotics users to promote social cohesion with the regime. The CCP believed that public participation in physical and emotional forms of violence against the dehumanized figure of the narcotics user would unite people behind the vanguard party. Propaganda officers and police forces worked hard to persuade people to hate drug criminals, writing anti-narcotics songs, plays, and skits to make hatred fun and interesting for audiences. The MPS’s Anti-Narcotics Campaign encouraged mass participation in ostracizing and killing narcotics producers, consumers, and traffickers to spawn shared social hatred of them. The chapter also considers how some drug criminals resisted the tide of public and state pressure and pushed back against accusations of drug crimes.

Chapter 5, “Using the Users: Sacrifice and the Politics of Death in China’s Anti-Drug Campaigns of the 1950s,” examines ritualized public killings of drug criminals by police and the public. I reveal how officials chose targets and timed each execution to maximize political and ideological impact. The lower casualties in the Anti-Narcotics Campaign show that the state understood the deaths of drug criminals as qualitatively different from those of other enemies, such as landlords and counterrevolutionaries. The MPS’s execution quotas and instructions on turning death into a public spectacle reveal killings staged and directed with clinical precision. The public and visible eradication of the incurable body reaffirmed the health of the watching public, who identified narcotics criminals as a threat to the health and stability of the new nation.

While each chapter focuses on a specific moment and type of violence, taken together they reveal how the state and the public turned one group of people, drug criminals, into an expendable population over the course of nearly fifty years. Their long experience with anti-narcotics propaganda ensured that audiences at public trials in the 1950s understood narcotics offenders as not only criminals but as subhuman criminals unworthy of life, whose very existence roused them to fury. Like scholarship on the more recent “War on Drugs” in the United States, my work reveals that anti-narcotics work has never been only about, or even mainly about, suppressing drug use and trafficking. Instead, violence that twentieth-century Chinese governments targeted at the bodies of narcotics criminals was a generative force used to construct a new social body based around a mutual hatred for and communal eradication of the narcotics offender. This story has profound implications not only for drug policy in the present moment, but also for historians interested in how groups of people are marginalized and made expendable over time.

Finally, my effort to understand how and why ordinary people decide to participate in intracommunal violence is particularly salient at the current historical moment, when drug users and accused drug criminals still face summary street executions and populist violence is on the rise across the globe. In the realm of drugs specifically, the specter of the “drug criminal” continues to haunt political and popular imaginations across the globe. From the Philippines’ ex-President Rodrigo Duterte’s vocal support for extrajudicial violence against supposed “drug users” to American police forces’ continued use of drugs as an excuse to attack and kill communities of color to the PRC’s recent crackdowns on drug users that indiscriminately collect biomatter to lay the foundation for new modes of policing and state violence, drugs remain a flashpoint for expressions of profound state violence. In the face of this continued violence against marginalized communities and those constructed as drug criminals, it is critical to think clearly about the different ways states construct these marginalized populations and do violence to them.

Chapter 1: The Skeletal Body: Turning China's Drug Users into Walking Dead

At the turn of the 20th century, Chinese intellectuals and elites sought to rescue China, materially, intellectually, and spiritually from the disasters wrought by Western and Japanese imperialism and the last years of the Qing dynasty. These catastrophes ranged from the symbolic annihilation of the Qing's cosmological order to imperial powers' physical occupation and destruction of China's port cities.²⁸ Facing charges that China was unscientific, backwards, and doomed to fail in the social Darwinian competition between nation states, Chinese intellectuals sprang into action to prove China's scientific modernity, the biological and mental health of its people, and the cosmopolitanism of its cities, even as some remained occupied by Western powers in the wake of the Opium Wars.²⁹

Amidst wide-ranging initiatives, from developing new forms of consumption and print culture, to land developments in urban and rural spaces, to sports and physical culture initiatives, science became a critical flashpoint for May Fourth intellectuals.³⁰ As historian Tong Lam states, Republican elites "were intensely addicted to the idea of science because science promised to offer a new kind of epistemological certainty to replace the crumbling cosmological order. They believed...the power of science could give rise to a modern state capable of resisting the

²⁸ Tong Lam, *A Passion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the Chinese Nation State, 1900-1949*, Asia Pacific Modern 9 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 14-16. Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China*, Asia--Local Studies/Global Themes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

²⁹ Benjamin Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (New York London: Harper & Row, 1969); Lam, *A Passion for Facts*; Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*.

³⁰ Daniel S. Asen, *Death in Beijing: Murder and Forensic Science in Republican China*, Science in History (Cambridge, United Kingdom New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Madeleine Yue Dong, *Republican Beijing: The City and Its Histories*, Asia--Local Studies/Global Themes 8 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Arunabh Ghosh, *Making It Count: Statistics and Statecraft in the Early People's Republic of China*, Histories of Economic Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020); Kate Merkel-Hess, *The Rural Modern: Reconstructing the Self and State in Republican China* (University of Chicago Press, 2015); Andrew D. Morris, *Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China*, Asia--Local Studies/Global Themes 10 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004).

intruding industrial powers in the great game of the survival of the fittest.”³¹ Similar to Western and Japanese colonial scientists, these Chinese intellectuals used science to produce and classify new sociological, medical, and ethnographic categories like peasants, ethnic and religious minorities, and unhealthy and diseased bodies.³² Science marked the reified Others of modernity as those who needed to be civilized, subjugated, or otherwise fixed by the modern state.³³ Reformers and intellectuals also did not define science simply as an idealized and monolithic Western construct. Rather, as historian Grace Shen reminds us, they used it to further their own concrete social, political, and intellectual agendas.³⁴ Shen shows that “for modern science to take root in China, it had to be new and fresh enough to make an impression and arouse interest, but it had to be familiar and relevant enough to make sense. Chinese had to desire science and see it as useful.”³⁵ As Tong Lam writes, these intellectuals used social science surveys “to produce the difference between themselves and those who were being investigated, making themselves the agents of modernity and progress and foreclosing the voices of those whom they sought to study, represent, and govern.”³⁶ Building on these works, I show that reformers gained their legitimacy through both the discursive and legal annihilation of alternative, local, and non-conforming

³¹ Lam, *A Passion for Facts*, 14.

³² Ruth Rogaski has also shown that colonial medicine’s developments and the growing popularity of the germ theory of disease meant that unprecedented new interventions into people’s daily lives and bodies began to become routine after 1900 in Tianjin. Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China*, Asia--Local Studies/Global Themes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 172–75.

³³ Lam, *A Passion for Facts*, 14.

³⁴ Grace Shen, “Murky Waters: Thoughts on Desire, Utility, and the ‘Sea of Modern Science,’” *Isis* 98, no. 3 (September 2007): 584–96, <https://doi.org/10.1086/521160>. For example, geologists used geology to frame Chinese land as the birthright of the Han people in order to support growing anti-Manchu sentiment.

³⁵ Shen, “Murky Waters,” 596.

³⁶ Lam, *A Passion for Facts*, 14.

modes of living and thinking in Republican China.³⁷ As they sought to enter the ontological universe of the modern, they needed something to kill, excise, or work against to get there.

This chapter highlights how elites demonized and dehumanized drug users and traffickers as dangerous anti-subjects and premodern relics to reaffirm their own modernity and legitimacy in leading Republican China's fractious political environment. Drug users and traffickers, or drug criminals, were particularly valuable to the project of Republican nation-building for two reasons. First, drug use provided a readily available and distinct visual marker of pathology in the form of an opium pipe, and it mobilized the acute historical trauma of the Opium Wars as signs of China's inability to compete in the social Darwinist struggle. The second factor, and my main argument in this chapter, is that elites' writing and propaganda depicted drug users as an already extinct population, a group of walking dead. More specifically, propaganda surrounding drug use sought to individualize drug use as a marker of personal depravity and sidestepped the larger structural conditions that led to the explosion of drugs in the first place.³⁸ Elite-produced and state-sponsored propaganda depicted drug addiction as a permanent and incurable condition and drug criminals as dangerous dead men walking that threatened the present and future health of Republican China. Dehumanizing drug criminals in this way legitimated state and populist violence against them and has underpinned state anti-narcotics efforts in China up to the present moment.³⁹

³⁷ Merkel-Hess, *The Rural Modern*. For example, when reformers wrote pamphlets condemning peasant illiteracy, Merkel-Hess notes how "writers created a dichotomy between literacy and illiteracy, inclusion in a modern society or exclusion, via humiliation, from it" and further how writers affirmed that "illiteracy was not only inexcusable; it was laughable and, moreover, incompatible with a modern world only accessible through the written word" p44.

³⁸ See Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, eds., *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).) for a longer overview and examples of the structural conditions that led to the proliferation of narcotics in China. These factors ranged from British foreign policy to weak and decentralized Republican warlord governments.

³⁹ Shanghai's 2019-2020 anti-narcotics campaign drew heavily on Republican-era tropes and messaging, as I discuss in the conclusion.

In the wake of the Opium Wars, opium consumption gradually increased across China.⁴⁰ As the trade and use of the drug spread, new techniques of consumption and use developed as well. Gradually, by the late nineteenth century a hierarchy of consumption formed, complete with proper and improper ways to consume narcotics that demonstrated social status. As historian Xavier Paulès has argued, a sophisticated opium culture developed that influenced broader society, rather than just opium users.⁴¹ In particular, people praised opium use for relieving the boredom of life and stimulating creativity and brain activity.⁴² Users also saw opium smoking as a social activity with a ritualized set of practices, rules, and skills that one had to abide by to show refinement, generosity, and a “set of human qualities.”⁴³ At a time when alternative forms of medicine and wellness sprang up overnight, opium users also stressed its medicinal qualities and ability to cure even the worst of diseases and ailments.⁴⁴ Just as new forms of medicine and ways of practicing wellness carried class connotations, so too did opium use. Paulès notes how well-to-do users preferred to consume imported opium over native Chinese varieties, used opium pipes made of rare varieties of bamboo and adorned with precious metals, and even bequeathed pipes down generations as an inheritance.⁴⁵ Crucially, however,

⁴⁰ Frank Dikotter, Lars Laamann, and Zhou Xun, *Narcotics Culture: A History of Drugs in China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

⁴¹ Xavier Paulès, “Anti-Opium Visual Propaganda and the Deglamorisation of Opium in China, 1895–1937,” *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 7, no. 2 (2008): 229–62, 230–231 <https://doi.org/10.1163/156805808X372430>.

⁴² Paulès, “Anti-Opium Visual Propaganda and the Deglamorisation of Opium in China, 1895—1937,” 230–231. Here Paulès draws from two sources: *Lingnan shehui yanjiusuo, Shan'an danmin diaocha baogao* (Report on the Inquiry about the Damin People of Shan'an) (Canton, 1934), p. 103; Royal Commission on Opium, Report of the Royal Commission on Opium, Vol. 5 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1894), 225–226.

⁴³ Paulès, “Anti-Opium Visual Propaganda and the Deglamorisation of Opium in China, 1895–1937,” 231.

⁴⁴ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*. Emily Baum, “Health by the Bottle: The Dr. Williams’ Medicine Company and the Commodification of Well-Being in Liangyou,” in Shen, Pickowicz, and Zhang eds., *Liangyou: Kaleidoscopic Modernity and the Shanghai Global Metropolis, 1926–1945*, 71–90. Paulès, “Anti-Opium Visual Propaganda and the Deglamorisation of Opium in China, 1895—1937,” 231–232.

⁴⁵ Paulès, “Anti-Opium Visual Propaganda and the Deglamorisation of Opium in China, 1895—1937,” 232–233.

users also recognized the dangers of excessive opium use, and in part, relied on social rules and rituals to moderate opium usage and stave off addiction. Opium use could only be enjoyed if one stayed free of addiction, which was recognized as a hellish burden. Experienced users, in particular, typically emphasized the importance of avoiding addiction to newer users and were supposed to guide them to use only the proper amounts of opium.⁴⁶



Figure 1: An upper-class woman smoking opium in her home in 1909.⁴⁷

The testimonies of opium users themselves bear out these different understandings of use and addiction. For example, Cai Erkang and Qian Zheng, who was at the time the editor of *Shenbao*, one of the earliest and most important Chinese newspapers, published the autobiographical account of a Chinese writer named Zhang Changjia, who wrote about his own experience with opium addiction in 1878.⁴⁸ Zhang's text is a melancholic rumination on the political and cultural disruptions in China and opium's place within these events. In the text, he identifies several

⁴⁶ Paulès, "Anti-Opium Visual Propaganda and the Deglamorisation of Opium in China, 1895—1937," 233.

⁴⁷ Sagimaro Kojima (儿岛鹭磨著), "Views and Custom of North China (北清大观)" (1909), 62.

⁴⁸ Zhang Changjia, "Yanhua (Opium Talk)," in Keith McMahon, *The Fall of the God of Money: Opium Smoking in Nineteenth-Century China* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield), 193-214.

distinct stages of use and addiction as well as opium's ability to provide new vantage points and understandings of historical time and place. In his writing, Zhang defined the difference between good and bad opium use, occasional consumption versus addiction, by highlighting that opium smoking should be incorporated into everyday life, rather than dominating one's existence.⁴⁹ Zhang also wrote that the marker of addiction was whether the opium smoker cleansed and prepared "his utensils before or after he smokes. Those who neaten up after smoking are definitely already addicted. Neatening up first and then smoking is a sign of one not yet addicted. Only those who have been through these things understand what I mean."⁵⁰ Zhang also mapped out the different markers of addiction for other smokers. Those who smoked opium only after they craved it were mildly addicted, but those who smoked before they craved it were already deeply afflicted with what he calls a "yearning of the heart" (*xinyin*).⁵¹ For recreational users, opium use provided pleasure or relieved pain; for those deeply addicted, Zhang wrote that the euphoric high was less important than forestalling the craving for the drug.⁵² While Zhang's experiences do not apply universally across all cases of drug use and addiction, they nevertheless revealed the ways in which people perceived opium use in the late Qing and the distinction that exists between drug use and drug addiction. In the late Qing, there were processes and markers that separated drug use from drug addiction, even if people differed in their understanding of what those markers might look like.

By the turn of the twentieth century, however, discourses on drug use rapidly changed and both clinical studies and visual and written propaganda portrayed any narcotics usage as a

⁴⁹ McMahon, *The Fall of the God of Money*, 118.

⁵⁰ Zhang, "Yanhua (Opium Talk), 199.

⁵¹ Zhang, "Yanhua (Opium Talk)," 202-203.

⁵² McMahon, *The Fall of the God of Money*, 122.

permanent marker of personal moral depravity. In contrast to scholars who have argued that these studies and propaganda simply deglamorized drug use, in this chapter, I argue that these cultural products merged the categories of drug user and drug addict.⁵³ Republican-era anti-drug propaganda, discourses, and medical photography created the figure of the “Drug User” writ large as a person who was impoverished, prone to gendered and domestic violence, irreparably diseased, complicit with imperialism, and, above all, something that was already dead that the Chinese state and society needed to fight against to save their present and future. Depictions portrayed drug users as beasts and incorrigible wretches whom society needed to kill to protect its future and whose inability to break the habit destroyed their families, communities, and themselves. More specifically, these depictions also spread the idea that drug users were a group of people living through their own extinction, a group of living dead fundamentally out of place and time in Republican China. In doing so, they naturalized war against drugs and drug users as a teleological progression towards modernity, defined in whatever way that suited their own interests. I underscore that dehumanizing drug users and criminals in this manner produced concrete and violent consequences for these people, both in the Republican period and under the CCP as well. This dehumanization was a form of rhetorical violence that laid the foundations for later attacks, incarcerations, and executions of so-called drug criminals.

Here, I open with a brief overview of the historical development of anti-drug measures during the late Qing and Republican period before discussing the institutional background of some of the key drivers of anti-narcotics propaganda. Moving forward, I analyze several different examples of propaganda and medical photography to show the different ways they

⁵³ Xavier Paulès, *Living on Borrowed Time: Opium in Canton, 1906-1936*, trans. Noel Castelino, China Research Monograph (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 2017).

worked to transform the drug user into the figure of the perpetually addicted drug criminal in Chinese popular and cultural imaginations.

The chapter draws from visual materials produced by the National Anti-Opium Association (NAOA) and various official anti-narcotics agencies. These organizations produced posters, reports, magazines, as well as other media such as plays, didactic texts, investigative reports, editorials, and children's educational materials. As Paulès has shown, these materials were widely disseminated across China and they produced far greater impact than simple written materials or editorials that depended on high degrees of literacy for their consumption.⁵⁴

Historical Context

Following a period of lax central government regulation, the Qing dynasty implemented a wide-reaching and ambitious policy of eradicating opium consumption in China in a 1906 edict. The edict reduced the land under poppy cultivation by 1/10 every year, banned opening new land for poppy growth, mandated that smokers register with local authorities, and limited consumption to permit holders.⁵⁵ Authorities shuttered many opium houses and imposed strict checks and controls on opium shops. The Qing persuaded local elites to participate by encouraging local anti-drug associations and permitting local elites to increase their power and influence over local society by holding demonstrations and organizing propaganda. The Qing made rapid progress in part due to the use of modern newspapers to spread anti-drug propaganda and the ability to get influential reformers and elites like Yan Fu to participate and link drug suppression with strengthening the nation in the wake of humiliating defeats by foreign powers.

⁵⁴ Paulès, *Living on Borrowed Time*, 226-228.

⁵⁵ Permits were heavy wooden slabs that aimed to create shame when a user went to a vendor to purchase more drugs.

Several prominent anti-opium societies also produced and amplified anti-drug rhetoric and mobilized people across China to suppress and reject narcotics.

Before the Qing had a chance to fully follow through on the policy, however, the dynasty collapsed with the 1911 Revolution and founding of the Republic of China, which soon split apart as different warlords claimed large tracts of land and the right to rule. Nevertheless, throughout China local governments and anti-opium associations continued to suppress narcotics and produce propaganda material on the dangers of drug use. Eventually, many of the warlord governments started setting up clandestine opium monopolies that controlled opium trafficking from Southwest China through ports like Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Macau to fund the mercenaries and military forces they needed in their struggles for political power. Even after Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalists regime centralized power in the Nanjing Decade (1927-1937), the government continued to rely on opium taxation to fund itself.

Against the backdrop of the government's dependence on opium revenues despite swaying public opinion against opium, two anti-narcotics associations rose to political and social prominence: the International Anti-Opium Association (IAOA) and the National Anti-Opium Association (NAOA). From its inception, the IAOA attempted to extend its political outreach to bring an end to Republican China's narcotics crisis. In 1918, a British physician named W.H. Graham Aspland brought together international and Chinese opposition to the drug trade to found the IAOA. The organization's proposed mission statement was to "secure restriction of the production and use of opium, morphia, heroin, cocaine and allied drugs to legitimate uses in all countries," and "to assist in procuring comprehensive legislation and its adequate enforcement,

prohibiting the planting and cultivation of poppy throughout Chinese territory.”⁵⁶ Over the course of the next year, the IAOA founded twenty branch organizations throughout eleven Chinese provinces, concentrating their efforts in trade hubs like Shanghai, Tianjin, Hankou, and Shenyang.⁵⁷ The association circulated an English-language quarterly with reports on China’s narcotics problems written by local branch organizations.⁵⁸ The IAOA used these publications to lobby international audiences to raise funds for its efforts, as well as focusing on domestically pressuring various warlord governments into passing laws against the sale and cultivation of opium.⁵⁹ In terms of anti-narcotics propaganda and education, however, the IAOA created English-language materials, rather than Chinese-language materials.

In response, members of China’s National Christian Council founded the Anti-Narcotics Commission (拒毒委员会) in June of 1923 to translate IAOA materials into Chinese under the broader mission of educating, shaping, and stirring up public opinion against narcotics.⁶⁰ In August of 1924, representatives from a variety of voluntary and professional associations gathered together to found the National Anti-Opium Association (NAOA).⁶¹ The organizations that gathered in Shanghai to found the NAOA included the National Christian Council, the National Committee of the YMCA, the National Medical Association, the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce, the Jiangsu Educational Association, the Association for the

⁵⁶ Edward R. Slack Jr., “The National Anti-Opium Association and the Guomindang State, 1924-1937,” in Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi eds., *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952*, 249. For the stated goals of the IAOA see, *Annual Report of the International Anti-Opium Association* 4, no.1 (May 1924): 18.

⁵⁷ Slack, “The National Anti-Opium Association,” 249.

⁵⁸ Slack, “The National Anti-Opium Association,” 249.

⁵⁹ Slack, “The National Anti-Opium Association,” 249.

⁶⁰ Slack, “The National Anti-Opium Association,” 250.

⁶¹ “Shanghai News: Anti-Opium Mass Meeting,” *The North China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, August 30, 1924, 337.

Advancement of Education, and over thirty other local and national organizations.⁶² During this inaugural phase, the NAOA wrote a mission statement that it circulated to various organizations throughout China and to civil and military provincial governors and elected Cai Yuanpei as Chancellor, Wu Liande and Gu Ziren (T.Z. Koo) as delegates to the Geneva Conference in November of 1924. The NAOA also declared September 28 as “Anti-Opium Day,” which would later expand into Anti-Opium Week, and organized mass meetings, parades, and demonstrations across China to “show a united opposition to opium traffic.”⁶³ Despite the strong Christian presence in the NAOA, Edward Slack notes how many contemporaries saw the association as “the first step away from the darkness of conservative missionary domination toward...Chinese nationalism...the fight against opium...was at once a moral and nationalistic cause that all Chinese could rally around...it [the association] provided Chinese Christians with an important tributary into the mainstream of Chinese nationalism.”⁶⁴ Furthermore, unlike other reform organizations, the NAOA grew in size, influence, and power over the course of the Republican era, dissolving only at the very end of the Nanjing Decade in 1937.⁶⁵ Precisely because of the

⁶² “Shanghai News: Anti-Opium Mass Meeting.” *The North China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, August 30, 1924, 337. According to *Opium: A World Problem* vol. 2, no.4, July 1929, the various bodies that made up the organization were as follows: National Christian Council, National Committee of the Y.M.C.A., National Medical Association, Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce, Kiangsu (Jiangsu) Educational Association, Shanghai Students Union, National Women’s Federation of China, National Medical and Pharmaceutical Association, Shanghai Medical Practitioner’s Union, Women’s Christian Temperance Union, World Chinese Students Federation, Red Cross Society of China, Council on Health Education of China, Overseas Chinese Union, Welfare Association for Chinese Abroad, Buddhist Association of Shanghai, Limen Anti-Opium League, Chinese Rate-Payers Union of the International Settlement, Newspaper’s Union of Shanghai, Far East Association of Shanghai, Vocational Educational Association of China, China Christian Educational Association, Libraries Union of China, National Road Construction Association, Streets Union of Shanghai, Zhabei Chamber of Commerce, Fujian Association of Shanghai, Wenzhou Association of China, Shanghai Y.M.C.A., Shanghai Y.W.C.A., Young People’s Lecture Bureau of Shanghai, Nandao Christian Institute of Shanghai, Shanghai Preacher’s Union, Shanghai Merchants Union, Shanghai Women’s Union, Shanghai Farmers Union, and the All-Zhejiang Association.

⁶³ “Shanghai News: Anti-Opium Mass Meeting.” *The North China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, August 30, 1924, 337.

⁶⁴ Slack, “The National Anti-Opium Association,” 251.

⁶⁵ Slack, “The National Anti-Opium Association,” 251, 266.

central government's inability to act in a concerted manner against drugs, the NAOA increasingly assumed prominent roles in popular anti-narcotics movements.⁶⁶ To many of the political and social elite who participated in it, the NAOA also provided a venue for them to criticize the KMT government and contest political power.

The NAOA's broad membership base made it a strong political player in Republican China and facilitated its growth. Educated Chinese professionals and the business class heavily participated, while Christians formed another major membership block. In addition to influential philosopher and politician Cai Yuanpei and renowned physician Wu Liande, the NAOA's leadership was composed of highly influential political figures in Republican China, such as Xu Qian, Li Denghui, and honorary directors such as Xu Shichang and Li Yuanhong, who also served as presidents of the Republic of China.⁶⁷ This was an organization with influence and political reach; it dealt directly with the League of Nations during the Republican period. The NAOA also held membership drives throughout China, increasing from 188 branches in 1924 to 261 in 1926 and 450 by 1930.⁶⁸ The NAOA also worked closely with partner organizations, like the Chinese YMCA, which devoted three of its best party secretaries solely to anti-narcotics work and ran anti-narcotics campaigns out of every local branch.⁶⁹ By 1929, the general secretary of the NAOA wrote in a public letter to Alfred K.S. Sze, China's ambassador to Britain, the United States, and delegate at the League of Nations, that "this association, in the course of five years, has grown from an aggregate of a few enthusiasts to a national institution in

⁶⁶ Slack, "The National Anti-Opium Association," 251.

⁶⁷ Steffen Rimner, *Opium's Long Shadow: From Asian Revolt to Global Drug Control* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2018), 267–68. Xu Qian was one of the most prominent judicial scholars, Li Denghui was hugely influential in education and served as president of Fudan University.

⁶⁸ *Judu Yuekan* (拒毒月刊/*Opium: A National Issue*) 41 (February 1931): 50-52. Slack, "The National Anti-Opium Association," 253.

⁶⁹ "Anti-Foreign Move in the Y.M.C.A Last Week's Conference: Divided Feelings: A Movement to be Resisted." *The North China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, August 9, 1924, 215.

the real sense of the word, with now over 400 branch organizations and millions of active comrades.”⁷⁰

The NAOA not only excelled at mobilizing people and holding anti-narcotics demonstrations, but it also excelled at getting these demonstrations and propaganda covered by the press. For an anti-opium activity in 1927, for example, the association mobilized nearly 1.8 million people out of Shanghai’s population of 3 million to participate in anti-narcotics rallies, plays, and speeches. The association took advantage of its close connections to the Shanghai press, the center of Republican China’s media industry, to garner broad press coverage of its anti-narcotics activities. Local and national newspapers regularly covered the latest NAOA initiative and helped it communicate new anti-narcotics plans, like the association’s National Anti-Opium Week at the end of September, to a wide range of audiences.

As I further discuss in chapter 2, doctors and medical professionals also played prominent roles in the NAOA and received funding from the association to author studies on addiction and drug use. Many of these studies rose out of NAOA anti-narcotics activities or rallies, and doctors published them both in China and abroad. By publishing the studies abroad and circulating them to places like the League of Nations or Social Gospel churches in the United States, medical professionals obtained funding and global recognition, while also spreading images of China as diseased and opium riddled.

Education and Outreach: Producing Knowledge about Drugs

The NAOA focused much of their efforts on creating new knowledge about narcotics usage and trafficking. In a letter written by the acting general secretary of the NAOA, Garfield Huang

⁷⁰ Garfield Huang, “An Open Letter to Alfred S.K. Sze on Opium Suppression in China by National Anti-Opium Association.” *The North China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, May 19, 1929, C6.

to Alfred S.K. Sze, for example, Huang wrote that a major focus of the NAOA and its branch associations' work was to "make regular comprehensive surveys of the conditions of opium and other narcotics. The reports of these surveys have enabled the Association...to keep the Central Government constantly informed of the work of opium suppression in different provinces."⁷¹ In addition, the association also kept tabs on drug enforcement efforts and tried to trace the spread of drugs across the country. Huang noted, for example, "recently we have collected statistical reports on opium seizures....and we are now conducting a nation-wide survey of the spread of narcotic drugs...we hope the results of these surveys will be useful to our own country but also to the League of Nations and Governments of other countries."⁷² The NAOA saw the production of new knowledge about narcotics for use by governments and international organizations as critical in the fight against drugs.

Beyond producing new statistical knowledge, the NAOA focused on outreach and educational efforts to reach younger audiences. In a 1926 article on the NAOA officers' meeting in Shanghai, for example, the author noted that "recent work on educational lines included plans for an anti-opium film, scientific lessons for popular education and school text."⁷³ China's reformers quickly picked up on the use of films to reach rural and illiterate audiences, while the intertwining of anti-opium messaging with scientific literacy and primary schooling ensured the NAOA's message spread as widely as possible, including cross-generationally. Similarly, in a letter from Huang to Alfred Sze, in addition to laying out the huge growth of the organization in terms of branches and personnel, Huang devoted nearly half of the text to highlighting the

⁷¹ Huang. "An Open Letter to Alfred S.K. Sze on Opium Suppression in China," C6.

⁷² Huang. "An Open Letter to Alfred S.K. Sze on Opium Suppression in China," C6.

⁷³ "The Anti-Opium Association: Officer's Meeting in Shanghai: China's Vast Problem and How to Face It." *The North China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, January 16, 1926, 108.

NAOA's focus on education. He wrote that, "in all our work, we lay the greatest emphasis on anti-narcotic education...to acquaint people of all classes...with the harm of opium and other narcotics, the laws prohibiting its use, and the ways by which they should guard themselves against the lure of the drug."⁷⁴

The NAOA's focus on outreach and education also dovetailed with the KMT's efforts to use schools to inculcate a new mode of governmentality among its citizens. Elizabeth Vanderven has traced how the emergence of new schools in Republican China involved the creation of new organizational forms, implementing a fixed time schedule for students and parents, repurposing old buildings like temples to use as schools, opening the village and its denizens to state inspection and supervision, and transforming the rhythms of everyday life.⁷⁵ The NAOA similarly displayed an awareness of the need to transform both interpersonal relationships among people, and the relationship between people and the state. Huang for example, wrote in 1929 of the need to:

get the younger generation interested in the problem, and thus well on their guard against the opium we hold every year regular oration and essay contests among schools of different localities. Reports show that the number of youngsters and college students participating...is rapidly increasing. Furthermore we have helped and will do more to furnish anti-opium material to be inserted in school texts for minors.⁷⁶

Just as the KMT saw popular education as a vehicle for broadening its reach over Chinese society, Garfield Huang and the NAOA understood the next generation as the crucial component in the war against narcotics. The NAOA's focus on education derived from both the founding members' backgrounds as foreign-educated reformers who sincerely believed in the

⁷⁴ Huang. "An Open Letter to Alfred S.K. Sze on Opium Suppression in China," C6.

⁷⁵ Elizabeth R. VanderVen, *A School in Every Village: Educational Reform in a Northeast China County, 1904-31*, Contemporary Chinese Studies (University of British Columbia Press, 2013). Vanderven notes as well that these processes involved constant negotiation with villagers, for instance, villagers succeeded in getting their children back in the fields during the harvest time.

⁷⁶ Huang. "An Open Letter to Alfred S.K. Sze on Opium Suppression in China," C6.

transformative power of education and the spread of the school as an institution that transformed social relations.

Visual materials became a key component of the NAOA's work to bring their anti-opium call to urban metropolises, rural communities, and the illiterate alike. Huang himself stated that the NAOA's core methods involved the publication of Anti-Opium periodicals and pamphlets "on every phase of the opium problem," as well as plays, posters, and pictures that reached "every part of the country and every class of citizens, including the illiterate and farmers."⁷⁷ Similar to Republican-era reformers who sought to remake rural life, the NAOA worked hard to bring their message out of the city and into the countryside. Unlike rural reformers, however, the NAOA had concrete plans for including the illiterate under their anti-narcotics umbrella.⁷⁸ For instance, images such as Figure 2, published in 1924 by the NAOA, directly targeted rural farmers and juxtaposed the fates of a farmer who grew opium against one who did not. Compared to the happy and prosperous farmer on the left, police arrest the farmer on the right, as the caption reads, "growing opium harms others and harms yourself."

⁷⁷ Huang. "An Open Letter to Alfred S.K. Sze on Opium Suppression in China," C6.

⁷⁸ Merkel-Hess, *The Rural Modern*.

無快鴉不 片鴉種不國愛心熱 害害鴉種 己人片了




Figure 2: “If you really love your country, don’t grow opium!”⁷⁹

The NAOA worked closely with the KMT government to generate huge amounts of visual propaganda as part of its anti-narcotic outreach. The NAOA used its extensive press connections and focused its work around creating Chinese language propaganda and educational materials, as well as increasing public outreach to turn popular opinion against narcotics. The association published periodicals, bimonthly pamphlets, posters, books, and magazines, including publications such as *Opium: A World Problem*, 拒毒月刊 (*Judu Yuekan* / *Opium, A National Issue*), and annual reports on its work.⁸⁰ Slack notes that the NAOA “worked hard to get Chinese publishers to include information on drugs in their publications, including school primers, and sponsored essay and speech contests among Chinese students...the mobilization of public opinion that resulted from this work had a tangible impact.”⁸¹ Anthropologist Zhou Yongming also writes, “the NAOA established itself as the authoritative representative of China’s anti-

⁷⁹ *Opium: A World Problem* (拒毒季刊) 1, no. 4 (June 1928): 21.

⁸⁰ Slack, “The National Anti-Opium Association,” 253.

⁸¹ Slack, “The National Anti-Opium Association,” 253.

opium movement...the NAOA was a master of conducting propaganda in modern society.”⁸² As I demonstrate below, this propaganda not only collapsed the distinction between drug use and drug addiction, but also put forward a specific image of the drug criminal as violent, abusive, pre-modern, an agent of imperialism, and an already-dead monstrosity.

Creating Addiction: The Impossibility of Rehabilitation and the Role of the Doctor

Satirical depictions quickly and humorously captured the permanence of drug addiction and appealed to urban China’s rising intellectual and middle-classes. Cantonese artist Jin Mo wrote and drew the comic in Figure 3, which was published in 1935 in *Modern Sketch*, one of the longest running, widely circulated, and most influential pre-1949 Chinese magazines that often focused on social critique and ideas of modernity.⁸³ The comic provides a more humorous depiction of the impossibility of quitting drugs, and a collapsing of drug use and addiction together. The comic features three identical images of a man laying down smoking drugs, with the caption for each image changing. The first caption reads “smoking drugs”, the middle panel reads “quitting drugs,” and the last panel on the left reads “after quitting drugs.” In a succinct and entertaining way, the comic summarizes the prevailing contemporary view of drug use as something that was completely impossible to quit. Once a drug user, forever a drug addict. As a comic in a social critique magazine like *Modern Sketch*, the comic’s use of irony and the repetitive tension of the three sequential repeated images first frustrated and then amused readers

⁸²Yongming Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History, and State Building* (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 49–52. Paulès, *Living on Borrowed Time: Opium in Canton, 1906-1936*, 232. Paulès also writes that this propaganda was remarkably dense and efficient in communicating assorted negative connotations around drug use.

⁸³ John Crespi, “MIT Visualizing Cultures, “China’s Modern Sketch--1: The Golden Era of Cartoon Art, 1934-1937,” accessed April 30, 2022, https://visualizingcultures.mit.edu/modern_sketch/ms_essay01.html.




Figure 3: *Impossible to Quit*⁸⁵

Other images presented drug users' prospects more starkly and focused on death as the inevitable outcome of drug use. Figure 4 below is an image from the cover page of a 1930 publication from the NAOA titled "Drug Suppression Monthly" that presents the drug user as a matrix of death. The image tells readers that taking any type of drug dooms the drug user to die. The Chinese character for death in the middle of the image accentuates the visual imagery of the skull and crossbones. Each of the surrounding scenes depicts a different type of drugs, from smoking opium to injecting morphine, with the caption next to the skull "Perish Together." The image's sense of inevitability and the implication that all roads lead to the same skull communicated that drug users could not break free from drug addiction, and that the consequence of drug addiction was inevitably death. In effect, propaganda like this portrayed drug use as an incurable drug addiction and removed rehabilitation from the picture since drugs guaranteed death upon entering the body.

In addition to showing drug users as dead men walking, as a cover page, the image also presents and relies on some of the key visual hallmarks that recur throughout anti-narcotics

⁸⁴ Crespi, "MIT Visualizing Cultures, "China's Modern Sketch--1: The Golden Era of Cartoon Art, 1934-1937."

⁸⁵ Crespi, "MIT Visualizing Cultures, "China's Modern Sketch--1: The Golden Era of Cartoon Art, 1934-1937."

propaganda at the time. The use of these tropes ensured that the cover page would stand out to passersby even if they did not take the time to stop and read the entire issue. The obvious visual markers, from the skull to the opium pipe and morphine needle, also ensured that even illiterate readers would have little trouble understanding its attempt to collapse together any drug use with addiction and death. The drug user looks noticeably skinny, and he wears rags to show his impoverishment. Particularly in the image depicting morphine injections on the top right of the poster, the user is riddled with injection marks that try to show he is diseased and unclean, while the man next to him wears gloves and a lab coat to prevent the taint of drugs from spreading to him. Compared to photographs of drug users like Figure 1, this image presents an entirely different picture of drug use in which everything, down to even the drug user's wild and untamed hair, is different from the sleek, well-to-do woman reclining in her lavish surroundings.



Figure 4: Cover Page of November 1930 edition of "Opium: A National Issue."⁸⁶

Propaganda also drew on the authority of the doctor to portray addiction as a permanent and lethal condition. Figure 5, the last two panels from a four-panel comic titled “The Evils of Drug Use” was published in 1932 in a picture collection titled *Popular Education* issued by Hebei province’s education department. After the man falls into using morphine, the panel on the left shows him going to a doctor for help at his clinic. The doctor, dressed in fashionable Western clothes, holds him off with an out-turned palm and walks into the clinic’s treatment room. The caption reads, “once drugs enter the body, there is no treatment.” In the next panel, on the right, two well-to-do people pass by the dead body of the drug user in the street and the

⁸⁶ “拒毒月刊 (Opium: A National Issue),” 45 (November 1930), cover page.

caption remarks, “his body lying by the side of the road, those who come across it spit on and curse him.” The comic uses the authority of medicine and the doctor to literally close the door on rehabilitation and any hope the drug user may have had. It leaves the reader with the visibly diseased body, riddled with needle marks, lying in the street for passersby to spit and curse at. Here, propaganda presents addiction not only as permanent and incurable, but also suggests that, even in death, drug users deserve nothing but contempt and hatred.



Figure 5: The last two panels of "The Evils of Drugs" comic⁸⁷

Official health department propaganda also advanced narratives of incurable addiction but called explicitly for executions rather than death by exposure. Beijing's Municipal Public Health Bureau published Figure 6 in 1936 depicting the fall of a drug user. The comic is titled “Opium and drug using countrymen, please look!” In panel 1, to the top right, a man stands proud and straight, and the caption reads: “before ever using opium, he’s healthy in body and

⁸⁷ “The Evils of Drugs (毒品之害),” *Popular Education* (通俗教育画丛刊) 6 (1932), 3-4.

spirit.” Panel 2, directly below panel one on the bottom right, states: “after starting to smoke opium he bankrupts his family, loses his job, confuses his mind, and reduces his body to kindling.” Panel 3, in the top middle, tells the reader that because he smokes, police arrest him and force him to detox in a drug rehab clinic. Panel 4 shows that he detoxes successfully so the doctor discharges him. The man even regains his plump face from panel 1, but in panel 5, at the bottom middle, he starts smoking again. Panels six and seven show the user arrested by police and declare that “grabbed again by the police, the only thing we can do now is take him out and execute him.” The strip ends with the man’s imminent execution at gunpoint by a visibly angry policeman. The common story of anti-narcotics propaganda features front and center here: the fall from material and spiritual health into wasted wreckage. Drug use turns the man immediately into an irredeemable addict whose fate is execution.

In an added twist the comic valorizes the authority of the drug rehab clinic to literate readers who could follow the more text heavy story. The captions tell readers that the doctor successfully cures the addict, visibly restoring the weight to his body and the health to his complexion despite his immediate relapse in the next panel, a panel so close to the moment of cure that readers might even have mistaken them for being part of the same panel.

Foreshadowing the medical studies and institutions of chapter 2, Beijing’s Public Health Bureau used the comic to simultaneously valorize medicine’s authority while also using that same authority to dehumanize drug users. The addict here is so beyond help that even a successful rehabilitation ends with him being shot. Similarly, the drug user himself is solely to blame in the image, both doctors and police have tried everything possible to save him. Death for drug users



Figure 6: *Opium and Drug Using Countrymen, Please Look!*⁸⁸

Threatening Monstrosities: Normalizing State Intervention

Propaganda focused heavily on the theme of death to legitimize state intervention and turn drug users into threatening, grotesque monstrosities. In doing so, propaganda normalized the assumption that drug users not only deserved to die but that their habit inevitably and always linked them to death.

The following image, for example, naturalized the use of state violence as the solution to the drug problem while also claiming that drug use stripped people of their humanity. Figure 7, published in 1916 in the newspaper *Jiangxi Popular Daily*, presents one way for drug users to meet their end—at the barrel of a gun. The top panel is titled, “the happiness of smoking opium,”

⁸⁸ 北平市政府衛生局 (Beijing Municipal Public Health Bureau), “請吸食鴉片毒品同胞們看看 (Opium and Drug Using Countrymen Please Look!),” 禁烟半月刊 (*Suppress Drugs!*), 1936.

while the bottom text reads, “the fate of smoking opium.” While the anti-narcotics imagery of skinniness, skull-imagery, and the extended fall-from-grace narrative are not present in the comic, the stark dichotomy depicted in two panels underlines the inevitable deaths of drug users. While the drug user faces the reader in panel one and shows his face and humanity as he smokes the pipe, panel two, foreshadowing the future collapsing of drug users into a criminal category, strips humanity from him by turning his head away while the text above him just reads: “a drug offender.” The image not only legitimizes the execution of the drug user but presents it in a militarized context, with a soldier carrying out the execution under the supervision of his superior on the horse while the drug user looks backwards. The image communicates that because drug users turned away from modernity towards a premodern past, strong and uniformed soldiers should execute them in service of a better future.



Figure 7: *The Happiness and Fate of Using Opium*⁸⁹

Propaganda also portrayed the drug users as dangerous and threatening, even after death. A journal titled *Health Monthly* published Figure 8 in 1934. Titled “the Course of the Opium Smoker,” the comic depicts an extended fall from grace narrative of smoking and drug use. In the first panel, the caption tells readers that this is “a perfect and happy family.” By the second panel, things have started to change and the caption reads, “infected with opium addiction,” while the man’s wife and child are nowhere to be found. The third panel simply informs readers that, “his wife is sick, his child is hungry,” and the user’s pitiable son desperately tries to get his father’s attention while his wife lays prostrate in a patchwork bed amidst a ruined home. The drug user here visibly breaks the bonds of the basic social unit, the family. His wife and son serve as visual metaphors for anxieties about China’s present and future, alongside an idiom in

⁸⁹ “吸鴉片的快樂 (The Happiness of Smoking Opium)” 江西通俗旬報 (Jiangxi Popular News), 1916, Shanghai Library Archives.

the fourth panel that reads, “the day is waning and the road is ending.”⁹⁰ The fifth caption and centerpiece of the illustration reads, “the opium smoker’s final resting place.” Here, the skull iconography appears in force; there are mountains of skulls and skeletons supporting caskets full of skulls led by a skeleton wielding an opium pipe. The last panel turns the figure of the drug addict into someone who is a living dead, someone, a threatening and dangerous monstrosity. The skeletons are not just laying down or inert; they are not truly dead. Instead, the skeleton with the opium pipe stands above the rest of the horde of skeletons and directs the carrying of the caskets. Drug users here are not just neglecting their family, irreparably diseased, and doomed to die, but already walking skeletons. Devoid of the flesh and spirit that give life, the drug user in a sense cannot even die properly. They interrupt the proper human life cycle of birth and death, and have folded death into their own lives, a total rupturing from the natural order.

⁹⁰ The idiom is “日暮途穷”



Figure 8: *The Course of the Opium Smoker*⁹¹

Scientific Specimens: Mechanically, Objectively, Dead

While propaganda comics, illustrations, and posters could provide a narrative structure to convince readers, photographs provided more scientific and immediate authority to anti-narcotics messaging. From the 1840s and onwards, the photograph rose in importance as scientists sought to free “images from human interference” and “let nature speak for itself.”⁹² As historian Lorraine Daston writes, “the machine seemed to offer images uncontaminated by

⁹¹ 溥仁 韩 (Han Puren), “吸食鴉片者之過程 (The Course of the Opium Smoker),” *Health Monthly* (衛生月刊) 1, no. 2 (1934): 57.

⁹² Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, *Objectivity* (New York : Cambridge, Mass: Zone Books ; Distributed by the MIT Press, 2007), 120–21, 124.

interpretation...the machine stood for authenticity.”⁹³ Unlike comics or illustrations, photographs bridged the gap between representation and reality to viewers and stood in as a stable representation of truth. As Ari Heinrich has shown, in China in particular, despite its claims to objectivity medical photography stood at “the convergence of those colonial, commercial, ethnographic, and scientific ideologies that marked the indisputable entrance of the ‘Chinese specimen’ into global discourses of race and health: the racialized and pathologized Chinese identity” that accompanied the common stereotype of China as the “Sick Man of Asia.”⁹⁴ Photographs of drug users similarly claimed to represent the natural, unmediated truth about drug use and its consequences to viewers even as they advanced pathologizing and inaccurate tropes of narcotics use as an individual failing that marked people as diseased and dead relics of an already extinct, premodern past.

Photographs often borrowed from the longer tradition of disease treatment and autopsy when presenting drug users. Figure 9, for example, shows the common assumption that drug users’ habits would be their undoing and links drugs to cholera. Newspapers in Beijing and Tianjin published the image in 1920 with a caption that read, “Dead, not from cholera, but morphine.” In the early 1900s and onwards cholera and diseases like it also served as markers of Chinese deficiency and filth, particularly in places like Beijing and Tianjin where racialized standards of health and hygiene linked physical proximity to Chinese bodies as causing cholera.⁹⁵ By linking drugs with cholera in this manner, newspapers portrayed drug users as not just premodern but as dangerously contagious. The photograph also portrays the morphine user

⁹³ Daston and Galison, *Objectivity*, 139.

⁹⁴ Ari Larissa Heinrich, *The Afterlife of Images: Translating the Pathological Body between China and the West*, Body, Commodity, Text (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 76.

⁹⁵ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, 179-185, 203, 249–52. Cholera epidemics convinced Japanese administrators of the need to create public health bureaucracy and indoctrinate people in new practice of hygienic modernity, see 152-153.

in a more scientific and exhibitionist way than propaganda illustrations or comics. The man sitting next to the morphine user only features as a reminder of what a normal human body should look like, but the viewer cannot see his face or other distracting personal identifying characteristics. The morphine user's head is propped up on a brick or piece of rock as he lies sideways on a slab staring lifelessly into the camera. Combined with the healthy man's posture and position as if he was standing up from examining the morphine user, the user appears as a skeletal specimen that the healthy man has just finished examining. The conclusion of his examination confirms for the reader that the user's drug habit was what killed him. Unlike earlier medical photography or illustrations that focused on portraying a before and after where the human subject existed in the same frame as the disease, Figure 9 presents the man in a way that strips all biographical or contextual information from him.⁹⁶ The human has disappeared, only the disease of drugs remains, staring back hauntingly at the viewer from the unseeing eyes of what used to be a human.

⁹⁶ Heinrich, *The Afterlife of Images*, 108–10.



Figure 9: “Dead, not from cholera, but morphine”⁹⁷

By presenting drug users as specimens for healthy people to examine, photographs naturalized the deaths of drug users by portraying them as an already extinct population. Drug users’ existence as an already dying population helped the images communicate that drug users were subhuman threat to Chinese modernity. By portraying drug users as specimens, the photograph not only conveyed fetishized images of drug users as scientific and historical relics on display, but also made their deaths legible as a simple fact of nature.

In doing so, photographs like Figure 9 also reaffirmed the modernity and health of viewers. Republican Chinese modernity defined itself in part as the one getting up from the slab after completing an examination of the body rather than the diseased and deceased morphine user with his head propped up by a brick. The turning of drug users into specimens in photographs like Figure 9 shifted the temporality of the bodies of drug users, from a future orientation

⁹⁷ “A Morphine Victim,” 京津泰晤士报 (*Beijing and Tianjin Times*), April 5, 1920, 10.

towards rehabilitation back into a concluded past that marked the boundaries of the healthy, modern body.

Photographs also provided a stark reminder of the other end for drug users: the barrel of a gun. In 1936, a research fellow from a Nanjing-based research body published an anti-narcotics pamphlet that contained the photograph in Figure 10. The photograph depicts the execution of an accused drug offender in Qingdao, on the northeast coast of China, and the caption tells readers that police are marching the man to the execution ground. Unlike Figure 9, this photograph encompasses the police surrounding the accused and the photograph is shot from a direct frontal angle that resembles the man staring down a firing squad. The police on the right side of the photograph hold rifles and present a united front to the isolated offender bound and tied in the middle of the shot. The accused appears isolated in the center of the frame, bound and alone as police officials inspect him and stage him like a prop for the photograph. Photographs like this placed the viewer in a position of authority and control over the subject, but instead of placing the viewer in the position of the scientist examining a museum artifact or finishing an autopsy, the viewer stands united with the state in witnessing and punishing the isolated drug criminal.⁹⁸ The photograph's composition further lends support to this reading. Both lines of police proceed outwards unbroken from a central and flat horizon line to guide the viewer's focus towards the accused criminal and to locate the viewer as physically separated from the convict but in line with and in solidarity with the police. As art historian John Tagg has noted, central vanishing point perspective like the photograph below, "conjures up a world of sight that is both objectively external and, at the same time, 'given' to a singular, subjective point of view."⁹⁹ In

⁹⁸ John Tagg, *The Disciplinary Frame: Photographic Truths and the Capture of Meaning* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), xxiii-xxvi.

⁹⁹ Tagg, *The Disciplinary Frame*, 76-77. Tagg also notes that the genre of criminal photography more broadly—including images like Figure 10 relies on the violence of meaning—see xxiii-xxvi.

essence, this shot angle provides the viewer with a reassuring perspective of ‘objective’ external truth—that of the camera—while leaving open the possibilities for bringing personal viewpoints and interpretations to bear on the subject of the photograph.

While photographs borrowed from the tropes and imagery developed in other visual materials, they also provided new, authentic, and objective ways of dehumanizing drug users as diseased, premodern, and already extinct specimens for healthy people to inspect, study, and in some cases execute.



Figure 10: *The Execution of a Drug Criminal in Qingdao*¹⁰⁰

Violence Against Women: Women's Health in the Anti-Narcotics Struggle

Anti-narcotics propaganda also relied on and furthered fears about normative family values and sexual health.¹⁰¹ Figure 11, a comic published in *Modern Sketch* in the 1930s, touches

¹⁰⁰ Tse-hsiung Kuo, "Opium Suppression in China," *Opium Suppression in China* 1, no. 9 (August 1, 1936): 9.

¹⁰¹ Louise Edwards, "Policing the Modern Woman in Republican China," *Modern China* 26, no. 2 (2000): 115–47. Many scholars have written on the different ways that women became sites of debate and contestation about Chinese modernity. Tani Barlow and Yue Mingbao have also shown how modern girl discourses evolved and developed in service of a patriarchal nationalism and male-dominated state. Jun Lei has also shown how women's sexuality and beauty also were linked to conceptions of modernity and strong motherhood Jun Lei, "Producing Norms, Defining Beauty: The Role of Science in the Regulation of the Female Body and Sexuality in Liangyou and Furen Huabao,"

on one of the most common gendered tropes from anti-narcotics messaging: that users would sell their wives and daughters into sexual servitude. In the first panel on top, the smokers are looking fearfully out their window at the anti-opium demonstrations happening in the street below them. In the second panel, one of the smokers approaches his ghoulish looking drug dealer, who wears Western style clothes, and says “I’ve smoked your heroin, but I don’t have any money, can we work something out?” The dealer points at his wife and says, “Sell me your wife, then we’ll call it square!” Utterly ruled by his habit, the comic’s male drug user pawns his wife to his dealer while the other users in the background nonchalantly take drugs. This portrayal highlights the prevalence of such transactions as well as the damage that drug use causes by breaking apart the romantic, interpersonal and legal bindings that bring a family together. Presented in *Modern Sketch*, the comic with its sensationalized concepts of sex particularly appeals to middle-class and educated conceptions of familial ties. Beyond presenting women as simply passive and helpless victims, the comic also portrays the spectators as incapable of standing up to the Western dressed ghoul, who represents both the evils of drugs and the threat of Western imperialism. By passively watching on, the bystanders reaffirm their unsuitability to participate in modern life and their inability to help in the struggle for China’s health and modernity like the rally taking place outside their window in panel one or by standing up for the metaphorical health of China’s future by protecting the drug user’s wife in panel two.

in *Liangyou, Kaleidoscopic Modernity and the Shanghai Global Metropolis, 1926-1945*, ed. Paul Pickowicz, Kuiyi Shen, and Yingjin Zhang (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 111–32, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004263383_007.



Figure 11: “The Aftermath of Beijing’s Anti-Drug Work, Inside and Out”¹⁰²

Anti-narcotics propaganda also drew on anxieties about women’s sexual health and presented drug use as something that inflicted horrific and graphic violence against women. *Modern Sketch* published figure 12 in 1930. Unlike other propaganda, which commonly features women as passive bystanders, figure 12 shows a woman falling into drug addiction and a fate worse than that of men. She begins as a happy healthy teenager playing sports in the first panel on the top right, then falls into trouble because she decides to try opium. Almost immediately, the comic presents her as forced into prostitution; in the fourth panel viewers see a man savagely beating her with a whip as he stands over her half naked body. She continues to suffer from men

¹⁰² 洛宗宝(Luo Zongbao), “北平戒毒后的里里外外 (The Aftermath of Beijing’s Anti-Drug Work, Inside and Out),” *时代漫画 (Modern Sketch)*, nd.,13, Shanghai Municipal Archive.

viciously beating her and attacking her. Her surroundings get progressively worse until in the last panel she's left alone laying comatose on the floor of a destroyed house. She's reduced to a skeletal figure here, with her skin barely covering her bones.

The comic communicates to readers that by using drugs she brought this horrific violence upon herself and that there is no escape. The caption for the fourth panel with the man viciously beating her, for example, reads, "you've entered into this den of monsters (*moku*); don't imagine for a second that you can disobey the commands of people here." The next panel reads, "Fallen to the lowest levels of hell, the hand of the evil spirits holds power over her." Even with assistance, the woman cannot escape. The caption for panel 6 reads, "One man wanted to rescue her from the pits of hell, at the least he felt some compassion." But this hope is immediately dashed. The caption for the panel on the top left, panel 7, in which two men stand over her prostrate, injection riddled, naked body, a man holding a whip says, "everyone could tell she was thinking of trying to escape; now she looks like she's almost dead." Despite the good will of a benevolent male visitor who tries to rescue her from the depths of hell, the woman ends up in a worse situation than before. The panel here communicates to readers that trying to help a drug user was hopeless. In the comic, outside help only made the woman's situation worse. Finally, in the last panel, the caption somberly tells the reader, "her eyes no longer see the light of the sun. After morphine entered her bloodstream, she still wanted to trade the last drop of her blood, the last bit of her being, for more." She's reduced to a skeletal wreck laying in rags amidst ruins, unclear whether she's alive or dead. Even as the comic blames the woman herself for her own predicament it also drew on tropes of a prostitute as a "victimized, disorderly, dangerous embodiment of social trouble...[and] exploitation of women and a national shame."¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Gail Hershtatter, *Dangerous Pleasures: Prostitution and Modernity in Twentieth-Century Shanghai* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 9, 250–60.

Simultaneously, then, the comic capitalized on reformer's anxieties about women's sexual health and activity as metaphors for national health through sensationalized images of sex and violence, while reaffirming in a tortuous feat of mental gymnastics that the women herself was to blame for the actions of the men violently beating, sexually assaulting, and abusing her.



Figure 12: *The Illustrated Story of a Small Thing*¹⁰⁴

Photographs also affirmed to readers that drugs led women astray and linked drug use with prostitution. For example, the photographs in figure 13 are from an investigative report on the spread of drugs in Japanese-occupied areas conducted by Bingham Dai (戴秉衡) in 1929,

¹⁰⁴ 王 X 奇 (Wang X Qi), “一个小东西的画传 (The Illustrated Story of a Small Thing),” *时代漫画 (Modern Sketch)*, 1930, 28, Shanghai Municipal Archive.

who later earned a PhD from the University of Chicago in sociology in 1937 and taught at Duke University until his retirement in 1969.¹⁰⁵ The NAOA published his report in 1930. The caption for the photo on the left notes that the girl is only 15 years old and that girls like her are sold to Japanese proprietors of opium dens in Harbin and throughout occupied Manchuria. The report tells readers that girls have to work for their freedom as prostitutes or by serving as attendants for opium smokers in the dens. The photo on the right has a caption that notes that the woman is a prostitute serving opium to her patron in a den in Japanese-occupied Dalian. The caption mentions that opium smoking is widespread in the brothels and hotels of Dalian, but the Japanese authorities refuse to do anything about it. Beyond connecting drug use to prostitution and sexual slavery, viewers were also reminded of the linkages between drugs and Japanese colonialism in China. Both photographs, and most others from the time, presented women solely as passive victims of the evils of drugs and used women primarily as a device to show the harm that male drug users caused to their wives and daughters, and by extension to the health and future of the Chinese nation.

¹⁰⁵ Scholars have called Dai the “first Chinese psychoanalyst.” See Howard Chiang, “Translators of the Soul: Bingham Dai, Pow-Meng Yap, and the Making of Transcultural Psychoanalysis in the Asia Pacific,” *Psychoanalysis and History* 23, no. 2 (August 2021): 161–85, <https://doi.org/10.3366/pah.2021.0380>.



Figure 13: Pictures from drug dens in Manchuria ¹⁰⁶

Creating Community: Fight Against Drugs and Drug Users

Propaganda also emphasized that people needed to come together and fight against drug criminals. It was not enough to simply abstain from opium use and do nothing else because, according to propaganda discourses and scientific studies discussed further in chapter 2, opium endangered all humanity. In the NAOA's 1927 publication of *Opium a World Problem*, published in both English and Chinese, the article presents a photograph of a morphine addict accompanied by an article written by Dr. Frank Rawlinson, an influential Christian reformer in Republican China. Rawlinson's writing captures many of the prevailing attitudes among the NAOA and anti-narcotics reformers.

Rawlinson's text collapses together drug use with drug addiction, similar to the visual depictions discussed earlier in the chapter. For example, he writes, "men cannot be trusted to use drugs in moderation. Narcotic drugs have in themselves power to lead men into helpless

¹⁰⁶ Bingham Dai (戴秉衡), "Opium Condition in Manchuria: Report of an Investigation," *Opium: A World Problem* (拒毒季刊) 3, no. 2 (January 1930): 1-27.

slavery.”¹⁰⁷ Rawlinson makes drug use and addiction a mortal threat, something that not only China but humanity needs to actively fight and struggle against lest they lose their physical and spiritual wellbeing. Later he writes, “a rattlesnake cannot be converted into a good citizen. The nature of syphilis germs cannot be changed. Both are safe only when dead. Likewise the drug traffic! No people can be trusted to use narcotics drugs wisely!”¹⁰⁸ Drugs and drug users in Rawlinson’s text simply cannot be saved. He not only reduces the dangers of drugs to a biological fact, an absolute truth of nature like the dangers of rattlesnakes or germs, but also naturalizes any use of drugs as addiction. Just as syphilis germs cause syphilis, so too does drug use lead to lethal addiction.

Beyond collapsing the distinctions between drug use and addiction, Rawlinson’s text also turns drug use into a mortal threat not just to China but to the entire world. Rawlinson, somewhat ironically given the history of drugs in China, writes that, “what chance has civilization anywhere if this drug slavery is to be allowed thus to capture its future members...the ‘Imperialism’ of the poppy must end!”¹⁰⁹ Despite imperialist powers’ forceful flooding of Chinese labor markets with opium to help them work cheap Chinese labor to death in the service of empire, Rawlinson springs to action when faced with the idea that the imperialism of the poppy could rebound back upon the “civilized” world.¹¹⁰ Foreshadowing NAOA educational work and the Communist-era anti-narcotics campaign’s focus on hatred, he argues, “the emotion

¹⁰⁷ Frank Rawlinson, “The Lure of Opium: A Foe of Humanity,” *Opium: A World Problem (拒毒季刊)* 1, no. 2 (November 1, 1927): 28.

¹⁰⁸ Rawlinson, “The Lure of Opium: A Foe of Humanity,” 29.

¹⁰⁹ Rawlinson, “The Lure of Opium: A Foe of Humanity,” 28.

¹¹⁰ See the following for more details on the ways in which imperialist powers used opium to exploit and kill Chinese labor. Mark Driscoll, *Absolute Erotic, Absolute Grotesque: The Living, Dead and Undead in Japan’s Imperialism, 1895-1945* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Brook and Wakabayashi, *Opium Regimes*; Miriam Kingsberg, *Moral Nation: Modern Japan and Narcotics in Global History*, Asia : Local Studies/Global Themes 29 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014).

of men must be stirred until there is the same general revulsion and resentment against a narcotic drug peddler, trader or shipper as there is against a murderer...they are as dangerous to individuals and civilization as murderers and pirates.”¹¹¹ By equating drug peddlers with one of the most morally repulsive classes of criminal, murderers, Rawlinson tries to elevate the struggle for readers and shock them into taking more immediate and drastic actions against drug criminals. Further escalating the scale of the conflict, he writes, “drug addiction is in fact a gigantic submarine which aims to sink humanity in slavery. For drug addiction is nothing more than physical and spiritual slavery...Death is the only sure way to break the grip of drug addiction...drug addiction is a foe to humanity.”¹¹² Rawlinson’s use of a submarine metaphor here harkens back to the explosion of submarine warfare in WWI, and particularly the ability of submarines to infiltrate uncontested deep into enemy territory prior to the spread of anti-submarine radar in WWII. By portraying drugs as a direct and insidious threat not just to China but to all human life on earth, Rawlinson casts anti-narcotics efforts as a life-or-death struggle, an apocalyptic battle for the salvation of humanity both present and future.

Visually, anti-narcotics materials also communicated that the people needed to fight against drug criminals and helped spread anti-narcotics messaging to young people. The NAOA distributed Figure 14 as part of its anti-opium week outreach in 1927, which was held nationwide and included activities like plays, skits, lectures, demonstrations, and rallies. This image was part of their student outreach program and the association placed it on windows and shops across China. The young man here stabs the demonic opium user who’s wielding his pipe as a weapon while another user tries to attack the student with a syringe. This image shows us not

¹¹¹ Rawlinson, “The Lure of Opium: A Foe of Humanity,” 29. See chapter 4 for an in-depth discussion on the role of hatred in the CCP’s anti-narcotics campaign.

¹¹² Rawlinson, “The Lure of Opium: A Foe of Humanity,” 27.

only the frailty of the demonic users compared to the healthy young man, but also peasants, soldiers, and intellectuals supporting the student in the background.




Figure 14: A poster from the NAOA's student outreach campaign in 1927¹¹³

Foreshadowing CCP-era campaigns, propaganda showed that violence against drug criminals created community, as the next two figures demonstrate. In Figure 15 below, a poster from the 1930s titled “Come Together and Repel Drugs, It’s the People’s Responsibility,” viewers see differently labeled social groups, from farmers to students to shopkeepers, coming together to assault a monstrous snake. The snake is inscribed with the names of several different drugs and the skulls of its victims leak out of it down below. There is an urgency in the poster. The snake is killing people and trying to attack. In response, the people need to come together and fulfill their responsibility by attacking; they cannot just sit by and watch.

¹¹³ “Opium: A World Problem (拒毒季刊)” 1, no. 2 (November 1, 1927): 8. The image also mobilized anti-blackness and colonial sentiments towards indigenous peoples by depicting the opium user as black and wearing a tribal outfit.



Figure 15 (Left): “Come Together and Repel Drugs, It's the People's Responsibility” ¹¹⁴

Figure 16 (Right): Cover page of the NAOA's 拒毒月刊 ¹¹⁵

Figure 16 is the cover of 拒毒月刊 (*Opium: A National Issue*) from August 1928. The image shows two beasts being struck down on the bottom right, that are labeled as opium and morphine. Instead of the skeletal user, viewers see the animalized and vicious threat, demonic, snarling, angry and dangerous. However, viewers also see the unity of modern China in response to the drug threat. There are several different social classes present to support the strong, healthy young man who victoriously strikes down the animalized and savage threat of drugs while a young woman holds the revered Sun Yat-sen's writings condemning opium aloft behind the man.

¹¹⁴ Highest resolution image retrieved from: “中华国民拒毒会-禁毒历史-上海禁毒科普教育馆-上海禁毒科普教育馆,” accessed May 1, 2022, <http://www.shjdg.org/html/library/301.html>. The image was published as a poster by the NAOA in the 1930s.

¹¹⁵ 拒毒月刊 (*Opium: A National Issue*), no. 24 (August 1928), cover page.

Images like this argued that only through victorious struggle against drug criminals could China forge unity and ensure the health of its people.

Conclusion: Out of Place, Out of Time



Figure 17: Evolution vs Opium. China is inscribed on the boy, evolution on the angel on the left, and opium on the demon.¹¹⁶

Like this cover of *拒毒月刊* (*Opium: A National Issue*) in which China as a young child is pulled apart by an angel labeled as “evolution” and a demonic monster labeled “opium,” much of discussion surrounding opium in the turn of the 20th century focused on transfixing the nation

¹¹⁶ *拒毒月刊* (*Opium: A National Issue*), no. 24 (December 1928), cover page.

and the state onto the body of the individual. Demonizing drugs and dehumanizing the drug user, anti-opium propaganda and educational materials translated individual actions into a sensationalized national issue that deserved and required state violence to stamp out. At risk was China's progress and entry into modernity, or its "evolution" from the specters of the late Qing and Japanese colonial control into a state striving towards scientific modernity as a healthy, hygienic, and productive nation in the international arena.

This chapter has shown how anti-narcotics propaganda cast drugs as a societal ill that dismantled the humanity of drug users and turned them into a threatening group of walking dead, as it broke down familial and interpersonal ties and undermined the fabric of society. Drugs served as a vehicle for elites and intellectuals to express profound anxieties about personal and public health, women's sexuality, and China's strength and ability to enter the modern world in the face of Western and Japanese imperialism. New discourses pathologized drugs as a marker of personal, individual moral failing that placed the drug user beyond the help of modern medicine and cast drug use as something that destroyed the collective social body. These dehumanizing discourses pathologized drug users as profoundly unsuited to existing in modernizing China, whatever that might look like. Anti-narcotics work simultaneously legitimized state violence against drug criminals and valorized the authority of modern medicine. Imagery of the drug criminal as skeletal, diseased, impoverished, and a dangerous walking dead that threatened China's present and future spread across Republican China.

Propaganda and other discourses cultivating hatred against drug criminals developed in tandem with new ideas about health, hygiene, and modern medicine in China. The common conceptions of drug criminals as lazy, dirty, and diseased ran contrary to ideas of modern medicine that tried to produce clean, healthy, and productive individuals who could modernize

Chinese society under both the Republican and CCP states. In the following chapter, I connect the development of concepts of hygiene and health with drug treatment under the Nationalists to show how they focused on isolating and remaking the deviant and diseased bodies of drug users. I examine how doctors and reformers authored studies on drugs that advanced conceptions of drug users as plague-bearers and degenerated while characterizing the fight against drugs as a global struggle.

Chapter 2: A Global Plague: Instrumentalizing the Drug Using Body and Claiming Medical Authority in the Early Twentieth-Century

“As an epidemic, opium and its derivatives spread like fire and are never halted by national frontiers...the evil is in our midst, degenerating the people, causing war and famines, and striking straight at the coming generation of the nation. Surely opium is the one thing holding us back and dragging our nation down.”¹¹⁷ A 1931 article in the *China Weekly Review* by R.Y. Lo aptly summed up the prevailing image of drugs among Republican China’s educated elite. Lo’s quote captures two of the key points often made in specialist discussions of narcotics. First, opium actively degenerated people and threatened the hygiene and health of current and future generations of Chinese people. Second, while the propaganda discourses of chapter 1 highlighted the dangerous, contagious, and monstrous threat of drugs to China, here opium posed a global threat, not one constrained by national borders. By focusing on the global threat of narcotics, Lo, and intellectuals like him, pushed back against racialized narratives that Chinese people possessed a singular weakness to drugs and addiction. As Lo’s quote demonstrates, intellectuals and medical professionals cast drugs as an epidemic or plague that threatened to spread like wildfire. Continuing from the anti-narcotics propaganda of the previous chapter, here I examine how educated professionals wrote and talked about opium in specialist works aimed at other professionals, rather than the public. Staying with their chosen metaphor, the chapter examines how and why medical knowledge came to understand and define drugs as an intractable medical problem, as illness, epidemic, plague, and disease, rather than as social problem.

¹¹⁷ R.Y. Lo, “The Next Step in the Battle Against Opium,” *The China Weekly Review*, October 31, 1931, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

I argue the pathologizing of narcotics as an incurable and global plague resulted from Chinese doctors looking for a way to push back against the racial hierarchies of colonialism in early 20th century China, to claim difference from the unwashed and diseased masses, and their efforts to justify new claims of authority over not only society but also the individual body. Put differently, Chinese doctors who pushed back against racialized and imperialist discourses that portrayed China as drug addicted and weak did so by highlighting the drug user writ large as diseased and dangerous.

The early 20th century in narcotics history is a moment when the battle against narcotics became truly global because drugs became a flashpoint for new expressions of power. Studies on the political economy of drugs have shown how deeply empire, colonialism, and global trade shaped China's experiences with narcotics.¹¹⁸ Through consistent exchange with Western scientists and doctors, Chinese medical professionals' understandings of addiction and treatment also shaped understandings of drugs as an epidemic that threatened to sweep across the world. By focusing on drugs as a global threat, anti-narcotics reformers and politicians could justify new political, medical, and personal claims over drug users and the place of medical professionals in treating drug use, even while governments continued to monopolize and profit off the drug trade.¹¹⁹ Chinese and Western scientists, doctors, and government organizations explicitly understood and wrote about drug use as a global problem that justified the imposition of new forms of state power and violence. From justifying new forms of US imperialism in Asia to distancing Chinese physicians from the unhygienic masses to claiming the right to dissect and

¹¹⁸ David T. Courtwright, *Dark Paradise: A History of Opiate Addiction in America*, Enl. ed (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001); Frank Dikötter, Lars Peter Laamann, and Xun Zhou, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Peter Thilly, *The Opium Business: A History of Crime and Capitalism in Maritime China* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2022).

¹¹⁹ Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, eds., *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

thus know the interiority of the human body, the particularly global and acute threat of drugs legitimated new forms of political power and medical authority.

This is not to say, however, that drug use shared the same meanings globally, the specter of the drug user haunted different places in historically specific ways. The historian David Courtwright has shown, for example, how in the United States the image of the drug addict shifted from upper and middle-class white women and war veterans to lower-class urban men in the early 20th century.¹²⁰ Many early 20th century approaches to drug use, however, shared a focus on affirming the mastery of medical professionals over alternative healing practices, from patent medicines to self-medicating with controlled substances. These approaches also affirmed medical authority over the human body in particular ways that depended on local historical contexts.

In section one, I show that by portraying the global threat of drugs and addiction, Chinese doctors opened a space whereby they could claim to belong to an international community of educated and expert medical professionals. As historian Daniel Asen has shown, educated professionals in Republican China, like doctors, began to make new kinds of claims to authority due to their experiences with higher education in Euro-American or Japanese institutions and their expertise in “modern Western science, a form of knowledge that was recognized to be of broad relevance...and thus gained a great amount of authority during this period.”¹²¹ Chinese doctors highlighted the global threat of narcotics to push back against the racialized charges that drug use in China proved that Chinese people were biologically inferior to Westerners or Japanese. Simultaneously, by showing the global threat of drugs, Chinese doctors increased their

¹²⁰ Courtwright, *Dark Paradise*.

¹²¹ Daniel S. Asen, *Death in Beijing: Murder and Forensic Science in Republican China*, Science in History (Cambridge, United Kingdom New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 11.

own credibility and expertise by casting themselves as part of an international medical community united against the evils of narcotics.

Section two shows that, in conceptualizing drug use, doctors and scientists focused on showing the degeneration of the drug user and on the drug user as an acutely unhygienic body. Ruth Rogaski has shown how deeply the desire for hygiene (卫生) as an always out of reach marker of modernity permeated Republican China.¹²² While the definition of hygiene shifted and changed over time and space, Chinese middle and upper-class elites used it as a marker of difference between themselves and the rest of society. Indeed, Rogaski writes, the “Chinese peasantry (and urban underclass) were left to carry the label of hygienic deficiency, while Chinese elites worked at negotiating their status between the unwashed masses and the more ‘senior members’ of the global hygienic order.”¹²³ Medical professionals saw the bodies of drug users, as I show below, not only as unhygienic, but also as degenerated. By focusing on the degeneration and filth of the drug using body, medical professionals implicitly affirmed their own hygiene and modernity through anti-narcotics work.

Section three shows how drugs also served as a vehicle for doctors to make new claims over bodies, both living and dead. During the Republican period, Chinese doctors practicing Western medicine “began to make new kinds of claims over Chinese bodies for purposes of healthcare, academic research into anatomy and other fields, and the new broad-ranging imperative to investigate the health and vitality of the “population” (*renkou*), now conceived as a biological entity.”¹²⁴ Drug users played a central role in not only affirming the hygiene of the

¹²² Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China, Asia--Local Studies/Global Themes* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

¹²³ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, 191.

¹²⁴ Asen, *Death in Beijing*, 11.

doctor performing the examination, but also in establishing the doctor's authority over the body of the patient. The increasing importance of the nation's public health, thought of as a biological composite of all the people, meant that portraying drug users as diseased marked them as targets for state and medical intervention to forestall disease outbreaks and advance the health of the next generation.

Finally, medical professionals turned drug users into specimens by focusing on them as contagious, irredeemable, and destined to die. After their inevitable and gruesome death, doctors claimed that it was essential to autopsy and catalogue every part of a drug user's body, from the brain to the blood vessels, to advance medical learning. Threatening to public hygiene in life, medical professionals tried to turn the drug using body into a useful specimen in death.

Among other sources, this chapter draws on writings and speeches made by Dr. Wu Liande (Wu Lien-teh). Wu was a Malaysian Chinese doctor who received a medical degree from Cambridge University and studied in Britain, France, and Germany with leading medical researchers.¹²⁵ Wu made his name as an expert in epidemiology in 1910-1911 through his work to prevent plague in northern Manchuria. Following the plague, he established China's first modern public health unit, the North Manchuria Plague Prevention Service, and in 1916 he founded the Chinese Medical Association. By 1930, Wu had become the director of China's National Quarantine Service.¹²⁶ In sum, Wu had strong and consistent ties to first the Qing, then the Republican governments throughout his career. Regarding Wu's work on the Manchurian plague and afterwards, microbiologist and historian of medicine William Summers has noted that "the National Quarantine Service, continued until 1934 to be China's premier medical

¹²⁵ Bridie Andrews, *The Making of Modern Chinese Medicine, 1850-1960*, Contemporary Chinese Studies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014), 1-2.

¹²⁶ Andrews, *The Making of Modern Chinese Medicine, 1850-1960*, 1.

organization. Wu was recognized internationally as *the* [italics in original] authority and wrote a monograph in 1926 on pneumonic plague, which is still a standard reference on that disease.”¹²⁷ Summers notes that “to this day, the publications of Wu Lien-teh and Robert Pollitzer based on this and subsequent outbreaks in Manchuria are still authoritative.”¹²⁸ In particular, Wu pioneered the use of face masks to stop the spread of plague and demonstrated the credibility and success of a Western educated Chinese physician in the face of skepticism from Western and Japanese doctors who doubted China’s ability to produce modern medical professionals.¹²⁹ For all these reasons, historian Bridie Andrews has called him, “China’s most celebrated MD.”¹³⁰

I draw on the writings and speeches about drug use that Wu presented to other medical professionals in the 1920s. Wu first presented a report, titled “Drugs and the Problem of Public Hygiene,” to Chinese colleagues in Harbin at the North Manchuria Plague Prevention Service in 1925 detailing the problems of drug use and its effects on public hygiene and health. He then delivered the report as chief government delegate at the Sixth Conference of the Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine in Tokyo in October of 1925 to a broad array of experts from China, the United States, Europe, and Japan, among other countries.¹³¹ I have chosen to analyze Wu’s work because he held considerable sway in both Chinese and international medical circles and was one of the first Chinese physicians to explicitly self-identify as part of a modern, international medical community. Wu also held considerable sway in the small but influential group of international anti-narcotics reformers that pressured governments from the United

¹²⁷ William C. Summers, *The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911: The Geopolitics of an Epidemic Disease* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 25.

¹²⁸ Summers, *The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911*, 160.

¹²⁹ Summers, *The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911*.

¹³⁰ Andrews, *The Making of Modern Chinese Medicine, 1850-1960*, 2.

¹³¹ Lien-Teh Wu, *Plague Fighter: The Autobiography of a Modern Chinese Physician* (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons Ltd., 1959), 371, 396-397.

States to China to international organizations like the League of Nations. And as historian Steffen Rimner has shown, within the League of Nations' anti-opium efforts, in this "foundational phase of global drug control," China occupied center stage in debates among representatives across the globe.¹³² Unlike chapter 1, here I focus only on works directed at other medical professionals, rather than the general public. In addition to propaganda narratives then, drug users faced consistent attacks from medical professionals that justified their incarceration within repressive clinical and carceral spaces. By examining Wu's reports and writings on drug use, I highlight some of the ways in which Wu defined modernity and hygiene in opposition to the drug user, and how he created and spread new types of medical authority by making claims of mastery over the drug using body.

A Global Threat: Using Drugs to Justify Medical Authority and State Power

The early twentieth century marked one of the first truly global moments in anti-narcotics work. Rather than confining my discussion below to China, I show how private and state organizations in the United States drew from Chinese experiences to justify their own anti-narcotics measures. The different ways that these anti-narcotics groups justified and approached their work underscores the deep ties between narcotics regulation and suppression and questions of modernity, national sovereignty, international influence, and markers of racial-hygienic difference. In the writings of medical professionals, the line between accepted and dangerous uses of narcotics had little to do with the amount consumed or the purpose of consumption. Rather, the dividing line was simply whether a medical professional had prescribed use or not. Narcotics regulation spread not only as a mechanism of governmental and social control. It also

¹³² Steffen Rimner, *Opium's Long Shadow: From Asian Revolt to Global Drug Control* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2018), 12.

created and disseminated new ideas about the authority of medicine and medical professionals in a global moment of profound change and uncertainty about the place of so-called universal and modern medicine vis-à-vis local medical traditions, the practicing of medicine by people unaccredited by academic institutions, and the quackery of patent medicine. To begin, I demonstrate how Chinese doctors used anti-drug measures to not only perform their own hygienic modernity, but also to position themselves as part of an international medical community. I then highlight the influence of China's experiences with narcotics by showing how United States' reformers and government bodies used Wu Liande's work to pursue domestic and imperial political projects. I conclude the section by showing how medical authorities created new forms of social and political authority by changing acceptable and unacceptable drug use from a question of treatment efficacy to a binary question of whether a medical professional prescribed use.

To Chinese writers in Republican China, highlighting the global threat of drugs helped them shift the terrain of anti-narcotics discourses away from social Darwinist narratives of Chinese deficiency vis-à-vis Western superiority. In a report from 1925 titled "Drugs and the Problem of Public Hygiene," Wu Liande stressed that opium and other drugs threatened not just China, but Westerners as well. He delivered the report at the Sixth Conference of the Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine in Tokyo in October 1925, and his report echoes common refrains from Republican narratives around drug use. In Wu's words, "we medical professionals have a responsibility to maintain the way of humanity and advance the hygiene of the people. We must sound the alarm and join forces to drive out drugs. If opium keeps

circulating...the harm caused by this won't just stop with Eastern people.”¹³³ Wu first linked hygiene with the maintenance and advancement of humanity and social progress both explicitly and by arguing that the dangers of drugs threaten the West as well as China. By casting drugs as a threat to the rest of the world, Wu pushed back against the idea that drug use was a particularly Chinese vice.

Drugs also gave Chinese doctors an opportunity to participate in an international medical community united against opium that advanced their own claims to medical and scientific authority. Wu's invocation of drugs not only justified his own claims to authority but also differentiated him from the unhygienic drug user. Moreover, Wu rhetorically created a fictive international medical community that stood above society and acted in its best interest. By invoking an international medical community Wu increased his credibility, while the rest of the report detailed the evils of drugs and their extreme danger to the hygiene of China's people. The report ended with a call to restrict and stop the production, sale, and distribution of drugs. By positioning himself with the medical community and against drugs, Wu presented himself as an expert who was part of Rogaski's "global hygienic order," rather than someone mired in China's premodern, unhygienic past. For Chinese scientists and doctors, the threat that drugs posed globally helped defuse charges that opium's prevalence showed a racialized Chinese weakness and inferiority compared to the colonial powers that imposed regimes of hygienic difference on China's port cities. Focusing on the global threat of addiction gave Chinese doctors and scientists the opportunity to invoke a fictive international medical community that simultaneously

¹³³ 连德 (Wu Liande) 伍, “毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene),” 1925, Shanghai Library Archives. Lit: “吾医学界负有维持人道。促进公众卫生之责任。诚宣大声疾呼。并力以驱除之。盖鸦片若任其继续流行。。。收其害者将不止东方民族也。”

distanced them from the unhygienic masses while also bringing them closer to an idealized hygienic modernity.

At the global level, US organizations used the threat and experiences of drugs in China and Wu's work to push for changes to domestic and foreign policy. US government organizations, for example, used the global threat of drugs to justify increased state intervention. A special committee of the United States Department of the Treasury issued a highly influential report in 1923 titled "The Traffic in Habit-Forming Narcotic Drugs" that made the case for narcotics regulation based on the threat of drugs to people globally.¹³⁴ As evidence of the dangers of narcotics, the report quoted an interview in the "Report of the Philippine Opium Investigating Committee." The interviewer asked a partner at a Singapore opium farm whether opium affected Chinese and Europeans differently. The interviewee responded, "It has the same effect on everyone, no matter what nation he belongs to. If you take a poison, it is bound to act on you as a poison."¹³⁵ Written in the context of the post-1914 shift in conceptions of the American drug using populations from middle- and upper-class white women to lower class urban men, the report's focus on the dangers of drugs more broadly was not evidence of open-minded charity but rather fit squarely in the socio-political conditions of the time.¹³⁶ Faced with pressure from Social Gospel Christianity, Temperance movements, and doctors who had, by 1923, come "to think of the average addict as somehow beyond the pale, an unstable and compulsive personality better left to the management of the police or other authorities," the US government began to call for the prohibition and criminalization of narcotics.¹³⁷ One of the most

¹³⁴ Courtwright, *Dark Paradise*, 31–33.

¹³⁵ United States Department of State, "The Traffic in Habit-Forming Narcotic Drugs: Statement of the Attitude of the Government of the United States With Documents Relating Thereto" (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1923), 7, Stanley K Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Institution Archive.

¹³⁶ Courtwright, *Dark Paradise*.

¹³⁷ Courtwright, *Dark Paradise*, 3.

common tactics in the debate around narcotics suppression was to exaggerate the threat of narcotics to the US population in order to justify increased state intervention.¹³⁸ Indeed, the report claimed without evidence that “in the United States alone there are not less than 1,000,000 drug addicts.”¹³⁹ Contrary to the report’s wildly exaggerated statistics, Courtwright has shown that the rates of drug addiction dropped substantially after 1900, and that “even allowing for 100 percent underreporting, the clinic records indicate a maximum of 209,866 addicts in 1920.”¹⁴⁰

The Treasury Department report also relied on scientific and medical experiences from China and other parts of Asia to inform its focus on narcotics as a truly global threat and call for increased intervention at home and abroad. The report, for example, characterized “controlling the cultivation of the poppy within the limits demanded by medicinal and scientific needs as the only rational and effective means of closing the door at home and abroad to opium addiction.”¹⁴¹ Quoting Wu Liande and “5,000 medical men in Great Britain,” the report claimed that science had proven that “the habit of opium smoking or of opium eating is morally and physically debasing.”¹⁴² To remedy this, the report, reflecting Wu Liande’s opinions, argued that opiate production should be strictly limited to medical and scientific use. Somewhat ominously, the report also stated that “the moment a country interferes directly or indirectly with the policy of those nations which hold to the findings of science it is their business to use every measure to

¹³⁸ Courtwright, *Dark Paradise*, 6.

¹³⁹ United States Department of State, “The Traffic in Habit-Forming Narcotic Drugs: Statement of the Attitude of the Government of the United States With Documents Relating Thereto,” 9.

¹⁴⁰ Courtwright, *Dark Paradise*, 33.

¹⁴¹ United States Department of State, “The Traffic in Habit-Forming Narcotic Drugs: Statement of the Attitude of the Government of the United States With Documents Relating Thereto,” 8.

¹⁴² United States Department of State, “The Traffic in Habit-Forming Narcotic Drugs: Statement of the Attitude of the Government of the United States With Documents Relating Thereto,” 8.

defeat the intrusion.”¹⁴³ Taking specific aim at India, Turkey, and Persia, the author then advocated for direct intervention in India, stating that “India, with her low-grade opium (8 ½ per cent morphia content and downward), does not pretend to provide the market with a medicinal product...it is obvious, without argument, that if we are to drive the use of opium within its proper boundaries it is necessary to check the supply at its sources, confining...the opium required to the ascertained world need.”¹⁴⁴ Leaving aside the ability to even determine the “world need” for opium, the report consistently used the authority of science and medicine and drew from Wu Liande’s experiences with anti-narcotics work in China to legitimate its calls for intervention abroad.

Following the colonization of the Philippines in 1898, American anti-narcotics reformers sought to increase US influence in Asia, and China’s experiences with narcotics treatment, suppression, and regulation played critical roles in American anti-narcotics legislation. In particular, after participating in the 1909 International Opium Conference in Shanghai, Charles Brent and Hamilton Wright, well-connected and powerful anti-narcotics reformers in the United States, lobbied President Roosevelt to pass the United States’ first national ban on importing opium.¹⁴⁵ The men were driven not out of a sense of altruism, but rather by a desire to increase the United States’ influence in East Asia and establish a position of moral authority that would enable the US to criticize the British for profiting from trafficking opium from India to China.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ United States Department of State, “The Traffic in Habit-Forming Narcotic Drugs: Statement of the Attitude of the Government of the United States With Documents Relating Thereto,” 8–9.

¹⁴⁴ United States Department of State, “The Traffic in Habit-Forming Narcotic Drugs: Statement of the Attitude of the Government of the United States With Documents Relating Thereto,” 9.

¹⁴⁵ Courtwright, *Dark Paradise*, 80–81; “Second International Opium Conference,” *The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal* CLXV, no. 22J (November 30, 1911): 846–47.

¹⁴⁶ Courtwright, *Dark Paradise*, 81.

Anti-drug work also provided fertile ground for doctors to demonstrate their advanced learning by juxtaposing themselves against the superstition of commoners. For example, in Wu Liande's report on "The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene," he spent several pages bemoaning the local beliefs and superstitions of people who used opium to treat epidemics and seasonal febrile diseases like cholera. He wrote that "commoners have the superstition that opium can prevent epidemics or say that opium can treat epidemic diseases. But in fact, this is utterly baseless speculation and we have much evidence to prove that opium actually helps spread epidemics."¹⁴⁷ A few lines later he remarked, "all the common people mistakenly think that opium can help protect the sick and resist disease...therefore, in times of widespread cholera they will give opium even to children. The dangers of this practice you can easily imagine!"¹⁴⁸ I will return to the claim that opium spread disease below, but here it should be emphasized that Wu's comments reflected a broader sentiment shared by medical professionals during the Republican period. In their view, common people simply did not know what was good for them and were ruled by superstitions about bodily health and traditional medicine. As scholars such as Emily Baum have shown, superstition ran counter to the Republican state's aspirations to scientific modernity and was a strong part of the Kuomintang state's lexicon of social control. In her study of madness in the Republican period, Baum writes, the "convergence between madness, vagrancy, superstition, and delinquency signaled that the bureaucratic construction of madness under the new republic was not entirely distinct from the bureaucratic construction of

¹⁴⁷ (Wu Liande) 伍, "毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene)," 12-13. Lit: "又普通人常迷信鸦片能预防瘟疫。或谓其能医治瘟疫。实则毫无根据。而吾人则有许多证据。证明鸦片能助长瘟疫之传播。"

¹⁴⁸ (Wu Liande) 伍, "毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene)," 12. Lit: "普通人每迷信鸦片能保护病人而抵抗疾病也。。。故凡以鸦片餵饲小孩者, 当霍乱症流行之时。其危险当可想见矣。"

deviance and criminality more broadly.”¹⁴⁹ While madness and drug use are not entirely equivalent categories, both blurred the lines between criminality, illness, superstition, and public health. In the case of drug use, doctors like Wu consistently highlighted and pushed back against the superstition of the masses to not only distance themselves rhetorically from them, but to justify their control and authority over them. In turn, the Republican state often invoked superstitious beliefs to justify increased state intervention and control over different facets of people’s everyday lives.

Wu aligned himself with the national and international medical community to strengthen his arguments against and distance himself from the superstitious beliefs of the common people. Despite common beliefs that used opium to treat malaria, he stated:

Today, generally those without any knowledge think that opium can be used to resist malaria. China’s people really believe this. Even those conservative students of ours who study abroad in Europe admit to this. But based on the observations of Suzhou’s Dr. Bai Yaowen, the more he sees opium smokers, the less he believes that opium has any use whatsoever. Dr. Bai has visited many patients and has a tremendous wealth of experience. He always speaks with evidence and can be trusted.¹⁵⁰

Reflecting the inherent racial tensions in the hierarchy of medical knowledge, to bolster Dr. Bai’s words Wu quickly added that a Dr. Otto from Xiamen agreed with Dr. Bai’s opinions.¹⁵¹ Wu also cited the work of Dr. Heinrich Botho Scheube, a German doctor known for his investigations of beriberi, a disease caused by vitamin B1 deficiency. Dr Scheube had found that smoking opium caused people to more easily contract malaria and that “when we conduct tests at times when malaria is rampant, using quinine and opium to treat the disease, on a closer look at

¹⁴⁹ Emily Baum, *The Invention of Madness: State, Society, and the Insane in Modern China* (University of Chicago Press, 2018), 57, <https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226580753.001.0001>.

¹⁵⁰ (Wu Liande) 伍, “毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene),” 13.Lit: “现在一般无知识者。多信鸦片能抵抗疟疾。吾国人尤深信之。甚至会游学欧西之旧派学生亦承认其说。然据苏州柏药文医士宣称。彼见吸鸦片者愈多。则愈不信鸦片有何种效能。柏医士临诊极多。经验宏福。其言当非无据。”

¹⁵¹ (Wu Liande) 伍, “毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene),” 13.

the results, opium is nowhere near as effective as quinine.”¹⁵² Not only was using opium to treat diseases useless, but it actually helped spread malaria in this instance.

On the international level, to counter the superstitious belief that opium could protect the sick and resist disease, Wu called on the authority of Dr. Robert Koch, the Nobel prize winning “father of microbiology,” who discovered the bacterial causes of tuberculosis and anthrax. To dispute common people’s idea that opium could help treat cholera symptoms, Wu pointed out that Koch “tested this by injecting cholera into guinea pigs. At the beginning no symptoms were found. Then, after injecting opium essence into the abdomen of the guinea pigs, he observed the peristalsis [movement of the gut walls] gradually losing control. Afterwards, cholera symptoms appeared.”¹⁵³ Like Dr. Scheube, Dr. Koch found that not only did opium not alleviate cholera, but his work implied the exact opposite, that opium somehow led to the onset of cholera symptoms.

Notwithstanding the methodological problems with applying Koch’s study on guinea pigs to famished peasants suffering from cholera, the study also contravened decades of established medical practice in both China and the United States with using opium to treat symptoms of cholera such as diarrhea.¹⁵⁴ An article by Dr. David Slack in *The New England Journal of Medicine* as early as 1830, for example, stated that doctors should prescribe opium more often even in cases of mild cholera and even provide it to children if possible. The author wrote,

a cholera mild in the beginning will often grow worse, so much so that no impression can afterwards be made by opium...*all writers upon the subject recommend the immediate use of opium, when the disease is alarmingly severe* [italics in original]...no

¹⁵² (Wu Liande) 伍, “毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene),” 13. Lit: “今试于疟疾盛行时。用鸦片与金鸡纳霜二药同治。而细察其功效。则鸦片必不敌金鸡纳霜也。”

¹⁵³ (Wu Liande) 伍, “毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene),” 12. Lit: “尝以霍乱病菌试验豚鼠, 其初未发见病状。后以鸦片酒注射豚鼠腹部。则见其肠蠕动之作用渐失。而霍乱之病状乃发。”

¹⁵⁴ Courtwright, *Dark Paradise*.

more is necessary to a complete cure than the administration of the opium, the water, and boiled milk.¹⁵⁵

This example is not intended to justify the indiscriminate use of opiates as a medicinal cure-all but rather to underscore that people had good reason to believe that opium was an effective way to deal with the symptoms of febrile diseases such as cholera and dysentery. Death often occurred due to dehydration from diarrhea that opium, as an antidiarrheal, could help treat. Despite decades of support from established medical practitioners, Wu twice dismissed the palliative use of opium as superstition because it occurred outside of the control of medical specialists like himself. His out of hand dismissal reflected, in turn, the increasing reliance on the authority of the specialist and doctor as the arbiter of medical truth and treatment in the Republican period. Put differently, the use of opium in a medicinal context, which Wu supported, and its non-medical use depended not on the use case and efficacy but on who prescribed the use.

Through the report, Wu used anti-narcotics work to portray himself as part of a wide-ranging international community of experts on hygiene and modernity, who stood apart from and above the superstition and inefficacy of past treatments. This is not to dismiss the sincerity of Wu's convictions about the harms that narcotics posed to people and social life, but to understand the rhetorical strategy of the report. While claiming to invoke an international fraternity of medicine in which ostensibly all stood equally on the strength of their learning, Wu cast Chinese people's use of opium as traditional, superstitious, and ignorant. Furthermore, even while invoking this idealized medical community, the only Wu mentioned Chinese doctors as

¹⁵⁵ David Slack, "Opium in Cholera, Dysentery and Diarrhoea," *The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal* 3, no. 33 (September 28, 1830): 530–32, <https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJM183009280033305>; Henrietta Harrison, "Narcotics, Nationalism and Class in China: The Transition from Opium to Morphine and Heroin in Early Twentieth-Century Shanxi," *East Asian History* December 2006/June 2007, no. 32/33 (2008): 157–58.

supplements to Western doctors. Acutely aware of discourses of Chinese hygienic deficiency, Wu's report used drug users and anti-drug work to pursue an unstable and uneasy place in the racialized hierarchy of hygienic modernity. Finally, the report further marked an important moment in global medical history. By bringing together the opinions of experts around the world to dismiss the superstitions and ignorance of common people, anti-drug work provided a platform to strip the diagnostic and treatment prerogative away from common people and centralize them solely in the authority of the medical professional or specialist.

Disease Bearers—Drugs and the Plague of 1910-1911

As part of their offensive against opium as a treatment, doctors particularly emphasized opium as something that not only spread epidemics, as shown above with Dr. Scheube's testimony about malaria, but as something that caused them. Wu Liande, drawing on his extensive history working with plague prevention, wrote that "from 1910 to 1911 and 1920 to 1921, there were two large epidemics. In both cases, opium dens were found to spread the plague. Russian epidemic prevention doctors in Siberia also said that an opium den was the origination point for the epidemic of 1921."¹⁵⁶ Here, Wu drew from his extensive experience and credibility in plague prevention to show that not only did drugs spread disease, but in this case actually served as the origin point for devastating plague. Wu made his name in the medical field with his work during the Manchurian plague of 1910-1911 that he references here, an outbreak of pneumonic plague with a near 100% mortality rate that ultimately killed roughly 60,000 people.¹⁵⁷ To supplement his point, he finally noted that, "In my investigations and examinations

¹⁵⁶ (Wu Liande) 伍, "毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene)," 13. Lit: "一九一〇至一九一一年与一九二〇至一九二一年之两次大疫。均发见鸦片烟寮为瘟疫传延之所。西伯利亚之俄国防疫会医士。且声言一九二一年该地瘟疫之首先发生出。为一鸦片坑。"

¹⁵⁷ Wu, *Plague Fighter*, 33.

of corpses of infected victims, I've found that morphine addicts are particularly numerous. Germany's specialists in epidemic prevention also have said that opium users and morphine users prolong epidemics, at the very least when compared with healthy people at similar ratios.”¹⁵⁸

Despite his claims that opium dens and drug users were responsible for spreading the plague, transmission had far more to do with Manchuria's exploitation by several imperial projects and its forcible integration into global markets for fur. Wu's autobiography, contemporary medical conferences on the plague, and historical research by other scholars have all found that the plague originated when hunters unfamiliar with the local area caught the plague from hunting Siberian marmots (tarbagans).¹⁵⁹ At the International Plague Conference in Mukden in April 1911, of which Wu served as chairman, Wu himself “traced the origin of the epidemic among the tarbagan hunters, some ten thousand of whom, mostly men of Shantung [Shandong], gathered in Northern Manchuria to procure furs.”¹⁶⁰ Summers further notes that “all available evidence supports the conclusion that the tarbagan was the original source of the plague.”¹⁶¹

The hunters, moreover, hunted marmots to profit from the explosion in demand for furs as part of new networks of global trade in commodities that began during the late Qing and

¹⁵⁸ (Wu Liande) 伍, “毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene),” 13. Lit: “在吾人所检验之染疫尸体中。发见染吗啡者甚多。德国防疫委员会亦谓吸鸦片者与食鸦片者之传延瘟疫。至少与身体健康者同一比例。”

¹⁵⁹ Wu, *Plague Fighter*, 4–5; Summers, *The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911*, 22; “The Mukden Plague Conference 1911,” *The North - China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, June 24, 1911, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/mukden-plague-conference/docview/1369475608/se-2>; Yubin Shen, “Pneumonic Plagues, Environmental Changes, and the International Fur Trade: The Retreat of Tarbagan Marmots from Northwest Manchuria, 1900s–30s,” *Frontiers of History in China* 14, no. 3 (November 9, 2019): 291–322, <https://doi.org/10.3868/s020-008-019-0016-1>.

¹⁶⁰ “The Mukden Plague Conference 1911.”

¹⁶¹ Summers, *The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911*, 22.

continued into the 20th century.¹⁶² Marmots in particular saw a tremendous increase in demand because German chemists in the 1890s had devised a way to cheaply dye marmot fur in ways that matched more expensive sable, otter, and mink pelts.¹⁶³ Summer shows, for example, that “Mongolian records of exports to Russia indicate that only thirty thousand marmot pelts were exported in 1865; by 1892 that number had risen to 1.4 million, and during 1906-1910 to 13 million....these data...do not reflect the full scope of the marmot hunting craze.”¹⁶⁴ Finally, the fact that these hunters were from Shandong and not local to Manchuria meant that they were unfamiliar with traditional hunting techniques that deliberately avoided sick marmots to prevent plague outbreaks.¹⁶⁵

These Shandong hunters only made it to far flung northern Manchuria because of the rapid growth of railway construction that happened from the 1890s to the early 1900s due to the imperial projects of Meiji Japan and the Russian Empire. Following the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Japan organized the South Manchuria Railway company to develop railways and colonize its newly conquered territories in Manchuria.¹⁶⁶ Similarly, the Russian court’s desire to project influence in the Pacific and secure more consistent access to Vladivostok led to a secret agreement in 1896 with the Qing to construct a railway through Manchuria, which was finished in 1903.¹⁶⁷ To curb the cultural and political influence of the Japanese and Russian empires, the Qing encouraged the colonization

¹⁶² Jonathan Schlesinger, *A World Trimmed with Fur: Wild Things, Pristine Places, and the Natural Fringes of Qing* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2017).

¹⁶³ Summers, *The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911*, 119.

¹⁶⁴ Summers, *The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911*, 119–20.

¹⁶⁵ Summers, *The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911*, 123–24, 128-29.

¹⁶⁶ Summers, *The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911*, 31–33; Bruce A. Elleman and Stephen Kotkin, eds., *Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China: An International History* (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2010).

¹⁶⁷ Summers, *The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911*, 34.

and “opening up of the Manchurian wilderness” by Han Chinese from the south.¹⁶⁸ People from the poor and natural disaster prone province of Shandong migrated in the greatest numbers.¹⁶⁹ Reflecting the influence of these imperial projects, migration increased drastically after 1895, with an average of over 400,000 people per year from north China flowing into Manchuria by 1909, the year before the plague.¹⁷⁰

Even if Wu’s claim is interpreted as only referring to the spread of the plague, rather than the origin of it, it still fails to stand up to scrutiny. The influx of fur traders and hunters to towns in Manchuria where transmission began and their subsequent travel in packed railway cars to return home for the New Year were far more important factors in the spread of the plague than drug dens.¹⁷¹ At the Mukden conference, for example, in his speech Wu said that “the progress of the epidemic showed that it followed the quickest lines of travel and corresponded exactly with the routes taken by the people in returning home for the New Year.”¹⁷² In his autobiography, he further wrote that once the disease began to take off many people “took fright and as many as could do so bought [railway] tickets to return east and south...the sick and feverish left the train at several points, thus spreading the plague *en route* [italics in original] among the healthy and unsuspecting.”¹⁷³ The point is not to dismiss out of hand the idea that drug dens helped spread the plague; on the contrary, it would be surprising if any gathering of

¹⁶⁸ Thomas R Gottschang and Diana Lary, *Swallows and Settlers: The Great Migration from North China to Manchuria* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 2000), 18–22, 36; Summers, *The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911*, 47–48.

¹⁶⁹ Gottschang and Lary, *Swallows and Settlers: The Great Migration from North China to Manchuria*, 33–34. There are complex reasons people moved from Shandong, but many chose to do so because of desperate poverty or the social upheavals caused by the Boxer uprising and its subsequent suppression by the allied imperial powers. See the following for details on the Boxer uprising: Joseph Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

¹⁷⁰ Gottschang and Lary, *Swallows and Settlers: The Great Migration from North China to Manchuria*, 57–58.

¹⁷¹ Summers, *The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911*, 124.

¹⁷² “The Mukden Plague Conference 1911.”

¹⁷³ Wu, *Plague Fighter*, 5.

people during an outbreak of plague did not result in further transmission. Rather, I want to underscore how Wu purposely and selectively put forward an incomplete picture of the plague's spread to cast drug users as an acute danger to public hygiene.

A closer look at the Mukden and Tokyo conferences help clarify why Wu put forward such different pictures of the role of narcotics in the plague. At Mukden in 1911, Wu was relatively unknown in the medical world, particularly compared to Japanese scientists, such as Kitasato Shibasaburo, who specialized in plague research. The conference had almost been sabotaged due to Japan's refusal to participate out of fear that recommendations made by the conference might limit their expansion in Manchuria and provide China a chance to increase its international standing.¹⁷⁴ Along with Wu, Alfred S.K. Sze, who played prominent roles in the NAOA and possessed both political backing and experience dealing with Westerners, and the Viceroy of Manchuria, Xi Liang, led China's delegation to the conference.¹⁷⁵ In the politically charged atmosphere of the conference, where he already had limited credibility and faced intense scrutiny from a Japanese delegation desperate not to be shown up by China in modern medical developments, Wu naturally focused on the modes of transmission and infection that were mostly responsible for the plague outbreak. Wu came out of the conference as a recognized worldwide expert in plague prevention. He helped found and later directed the North Manchuria Plague Prevention Service, which became a "worldwide center of plague research...[and] the de facto public health organization for China."¹⁷⁶ At Tokyo in 1925, Wu was a recognized and established authority in epidemiology. Moreover, even before the Mukden incident of 1931 and subsequent formation of Manchukuo in 1932, Japanese narcotics trafficking had steadily

¹⁷⁴ Summers, *The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911*, 91.

¹⁷⁵ Summers, *The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911*, 92–95. Graham Aspland, who founded the IAOA (see chapter 1) also participated in the conference. The conference also has XYZ countries participating.

¹⁷⁶ Summers, *The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911*, 105.

increased throughout the early 1900s. As historian Zhao Lang has shown, even when Japan set up anti-narcotics departments in Dalian, they served as a cover to smuggle drugs.¹⁷⁷ In the three years from 1914 to 1917 alone, the profits collected by the Japanese ministry of foreign affairs off of opium taxation rose 25 fold to over 5 million yen per year.¹⁷⁸ By the 1930s, officers of the Japanese military regime openly spoke about their racial hatred toward the Chinese and the use of drug trafficking as a deliberate strategy to reap huge profits.¹⁷⁹ Despite Wu's newfound stature in the field, he noted in his autobiography that "quite a number of my Japanese colleagues were surprised at my audacity in bringing such a matter before a medical conference, especially one held in Japan...the Japanese delegation abstained from voting, but all the other members present supported me and the resolution was passed, in spite of its political implications."¹⁸⁰

Linking narcotics suppression to his experiences in plague relief thus not only invoked Wu's authority in broader medical circles, but also provided an opportunity to critique Japanese imperialism in Manchuria in front of an international audience while in the Japanese heartland. Wu, for example, stated in his speech that "in 1921, at a coal mining neighborhood in Dalianuoer [Jalainur], a Japanese woman openly ran an opium den. Among the miners, many gathered to smoke opium because they thought it could prevent plague. One morning, a plague prevention officer found three corpses among the miners. Only then were they able to close down her opium

¹⁷⁷ Lang Zhao (赵朗), "日本在辽鸦片政策研究(1905—1945)" (A Study of Japanese Opium Policy in Liaoning 1905-1945)," *社会科学辑刊* (*Social Sciences Journal*), no. 4 (2009): 132.

¹⁷⁸ Zhao (赵朗), "日本在辽鸦片政策研究(1905—1945)" (A Study of Japanese Opium Policy in Liaoning 1905-1945)," 132. Profits steadily increased until Japan's defeat in the Pacific War.

¹⁷⁹ Mark Driscoll, *Absolute Erotic, Absolute Grotesque: The Living, Dead and Undead in Japan's Imperialism, 1895-1945* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 248–55. Driscoll notes, for example, how "the powerful Guangdong army staff officer Tanaka Ryūkichi no doubt spoke for some of the Japanese militarists in Manchukuo when he told a Tokyo reporter in May 1936 that, 'to be perfectly frank, the ways you and I look at the Chinese are fundamentally different. You seem to think of them as human, but I see them as pigs.'" P251.

¹⁸⁰ Wu, *Plague Fighter*, 491. Wu's resolution was to condemn and call for the suppression of drug manufacturing and trafficking more broadly.

den.”¹⁸¹ Wu’s inclusion of this story highlights the uneasy and unequal power relationships in Manchuria at the time by showing that it took the discovery of three dead bodies among the miners before his plague prevention officers could act against the Japanese woman. Furthermore, given that Imperial Japan derived tremendous amounts of revenue in Manchukuo from drug trafficking, and that Wu pointed out in his speech that Japan, Germany, and Switzerland manufactured the majority of the drugs trafficked into China, it is little wonder the Japanese delegation did not vote for his proposal to crack down on the production and distribution of narcotics.¹⁸²

In sum, at the Tokyo conference, Wu purposely and misleadingly cast drugs as something that were in many ways as harmful as an actual plague, or as something that caused plague. By using his credibility as a worldwide expert in plague prevention to highlight the dangers of drugs, Wu critiqued the Japanese empire, but in the process propagated baseless myths about drug users as people that posed as much of a threat as a virulent respiratory disease with a 99-100% mortality rate.

¹⁸¹ (Wu Liande) 伍, “毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene),” 13. Lit: “在大隈诺尔煤矿附近。有一日本妇人所开之鸦片烟寮。矿人多麇集其中吸烟。以为可以防免瘟疫。后经防疫会职员。于一日清晨。发见其中有三个尸体。始将其屋封闭。”

¹⁸² (Wu Liande) 伍, “毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene),” 14–15. The failure of Wu’s efforts to persuade the Japanese delegation in 1925 is visible in the increase in opium trafficking year on year throughout Japanese occupation. Driscoll notes that “in any one year in Manchukuo after 1935, approximately 50 to 55% of all earnings would have been generated from overt and covert drug sales.” Driscoll, *Absolute Erotic, Absolute Grotesque: The Living, Dead and Undead in Japan’s Imperialism, 1895-1945*, 260. Driscoll calculates this figure based on information from the Manchukuo Ministry of Information in 1940, testimony from welfare Minister Kaneda, and his own calculations that the Manchukuo regime underreported drug profits. Miriam Kingsberg similarly notes that by 1907 Japan had transformed the city of Dairen “into the premier drug depot of the early twentieth-century world” and that “taxes on drugs thus furnished a convenient slush fund for the covert strengthening of the army.” Miriam Kingsberg, *Moral Nation: Modern Japan and Narcotics in Global History*, Asia : Local Studies/Global Themes 29 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 101.

Uncontrollably Addicted and Diseased

To solidify their claims to authority over both drugs and the bodies of drug users, doctors perpetuated common propaganda narratives that any opium use inexorably led to addiction, even if people used it in an ameliorative capacity rather than a recreational one. Wu, remarked, “speaking of tuberculosis, we doctors have paid attention to using opium and other similar medicines to treat all kinds of symptoms from tuberculosis. The result is that everyone who tries becomes addicted to drugs.”¹⁸³ Even if a doctor prescribed opium and it helped with the disease, Wu still urged caution lest patients become addicted. Regarding the treatment of coughing up blood from the lower respiratory tract, or hemoptysis, he begrudgingly admitted,

that using opium to treat the lung disease and violent cough of hemoptysis can sometimes be effective. But I think that even for these types of disease the use of opium must be very cautious. There are few people who can withstand it. The number of Chinese people who become addicted because they smoke opium at the first onset of tuberculosis symptoms is too many to count.¹⁸⁴

Finally, returning to unsanctioned medical use, he bemoaned that “Chinese people strongly believe that opium can be used as a medicine to stop pain. So, every time they have a painful illness, most of them use opium to treat it...headaches...diuria, nephrosis, all stomach diseases, gynecological diseases, syphilis, etc. ... Every time the patient tries opium, they get addicted.”¹⁸⁵ Despite opium being used purely in a pain relieving capacity, in the same way a doctor might prescribe an opiate for pain relief, Wu saw addiction as the inevitable result because the consumption of the drug happened outside the purview of the medical professional.

¹⁸³ (Wu Liande) 伍, “毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene),” 13–14. Lit: “以言癆症。吾人常注意用鴉片氣同質藥品以療治各種癆病之弊害。其結果每使患者吸煙成癮。”

¹⁸⁴ (Wu Liande) 伍, “毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene),” 14. Lit: “吾人虽承鴉片用以治療 hemoptysis 肺疾及猛烈之咳嗽。有时能收良效。但吾以为对于此类疾病。使用鴉片宜绝对审慎。则固少有人能否认也。吾国人民因患肺癆初发症而吸煙成癮者尤多胜记。”

¹⁸⁵ (Wu Liande) 伍, “毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene),” 14. Lit: “吾国人民又深信鴉片为止痛之良剂。因而每遇痛症。多用鴉片治疗。如脑系痛, 头风。。。瘖尿症, 肾病, 腹部诸病, 妇科诸病, 梅毒等。每使患者吸煙成癮。”

Mirroring the propaganda discourses analyzed in chapter 1, medical discussions also focused on the links between drug use and death. For example, “among those who try morphine, every year thousands die from cold, hunger, and septicemia... Every winter you come across the corpses of the dead littering the road... Their skin is riddled with needle marks; that’s the souvenir of people who try morphine.”¹⁸⁶ Wu’s testimony here nearly mirrors the image and caption in figure 5 from chapter 1, highlighting again the inexorable link between drugs and death.

Even before they died, Wu spoke at length about the noxious and disgusting nature of drug users. He writes,

None of those who have tried drugs before are aware of how gross and vile they are. And often they boast to others that drugs are good for lifting their spirit. This causes them to be controlled by drugs. Drugs influence their environment too; it doesn’t just harm them individually. It harms their daily lives; they’re constantly filthy and unhygienic. Because of one person’s degeneration, the life of his whole family also gets worse. Any sons or daughters also must also be weak and frail.¹⁸⁷

Wu focuses here on the extreme lack of hygiene among drug users and how they harm their environments and family. Using drugs, in Wu’s eyes, always had social and political ramifications because it caused not only personal degeneration but social and familial degeneration as well. Drugs did not simply threaten individuals but spread contagiously to everyone around them while simultaneously weakening the next generation. Finally, building on his credibility and expertise in fighting disease and plague, Wu emphasized that

¹⁸⁶ (Wu Liande) 伍, “毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene),” 14. Lit: “尝吗啡之人民。每年死于冻馁及败血症者以数千计。。。每届隆冬。在路上倒毙之尸体。。。其皮上针痕累累。即尝吗啡之标记也。”

¹⁸⁷ (Wu Liande) 伍, “毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene),” 15. Lit: “凡尝好毒品之人。恒不自觉其卑污。且常以提激精神之效力夸衒他人。而使其入彀。是其影响及于环境。故不特个人受害已也。又染尝好者之起居。恒多不洁净, 不卫生。因一人堕落。其全家之生活亦因之而低落。所生子女亦必孱弱。”

the fight against drugs lay at the center of public health and was as important as the fight against yellow fever and typhoid fever.¹⁸⁸

Unlike standard propaganda narratives, however, Wu also advanced a class critique when he talked about who suffered the most from drug use. Rather than highlighting drugs' ability to drag rich people into destitution, Wu argued that the poor suffered disproportionately from their habit: "for the rich ones, with abundant shoes and thick mats who don't worry about food or clothing, the impact [of drugs] is not as great. But poor people, on the other hand, must sacrifice an entire family's clothing and food and needs to pay for the addicts' longings."¹⁸⁹ Despite propaganda narratives to the contrary, poor families had the least financial recourse to deal with the effects of drug use and one drug users' habit could derail the entire family's already precarious financial position.¹⁹⁰ Wu emphasized the point by stating that drugs "cause their lives to become ghastlier than you can imagine. Every time you see a poor person in their dismal hole, it's blighted with disease (like tuberculosis, syphilis, every type of fever). It's all dark and dingy. On the whole, it is because of being contaminated by drug addiction that they fall into such degeneration."¹⁹¹ While displaying an awareness of the disproportionate impact that drugs had on poor people, Wu also repeatedly emphasized the connections between drugs, disease, and degeneration that made narcotics such a powerful negative signifier in both propaganda and medical narratives.

¹⁸⁸ (Wu Liande) 伍, "毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene)," 16.

¹⁸⁹ (Wu Liande) 伍, "毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene)," 15. Lit: "富者履丰席厚。衣食无虞。影响尚少。贫民则必牺牲一家之衣食及需要。以偿其所欲。"

¹⁹⁰ Harrison, "Narcotics, Nationalism and Class in China: The Transition from Opium to Morphine and Heroin in Early Twentieth-Century Shanxi," 155.

¹⁹¹ (Wu Liande) 伍, "毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene)," 15-16. Lit: "故其生活不堪设想。每见贫民窟中。疾病浸淫。(如肺癆, 梅毒, 各種熱病) 景象黑暗。大抵由染嗜好而墮落也。"

Even though drugs may not have harmed rich people's bodies the same way they did poor people, drugs without fail degenerated people's character as well as their bodies. When discussing the dangers of heroin compared to morphine, Wu underscored the increased strength of heroin as well as the fact that people did not need to inject it. Furthermore, he noted that "even though its numbing properties are not as strong as morphine, its ability to influence the heart and mind are far greater. It causes people to change and become really impulsive and act recklessly. They no longer have a sense of responsibility. Because of this it's a stepping stone to committing crimes and doing evil things."¹⁹² Beyond the threat to individuals, drugs were linked to an alchemical ability to cause crime and evil doing more broadly.

Drugs also provided an opportunity for medical professionals to claim mastery and control over the diseased and addicted bodies of drug users, both living and dead. To ascertain the effects of drugs on the human body, Wu claimed, "we have to examine the living and inspect the dead and pay equal attention to both. For those who have died, we should use a microscope to examine and study every important organ, like the heart, lungs, liver, blood vessels, the nervous system, etc. Every part must be carefully inspected."¹⁹³ The use of medical autopsies was far from routine practice at the time. Daniel Asen has shown how even proceeding with autopsies in criminal homicide cases was a fraught process in which physicians had to navigate networks of claims on the deceased body. Police and judicial officials did not want to cede ground to new medical professionals as a valid part of judicial practice and bereaved family

¹⁹² (Wu Liande) 伍, "毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene)," 15. Lit: "其麻醉力虽不及吗啡之强。而于心里上之影响则远过之。能使人变为浮躁夸大。凡事轻与妄动。不复知有责任心。故为犯罪作恶阶梯。"

¹⁹³ (Wu Liande) 伍, "毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene)," 15. Lit: "吾人若欲查究毒品对于身体之影响。则于生前之诊察。与死后之检验。两者均须注意。关于后者必须用显微镜的考察, 凡重要之官器, 如心脏, 肺脏, 肝脏, 血管, 神经系等。皆须细加检视。抑又进者。"

members raised questions about the “moral implications of physically damaging the dead body.”¹⁹⁴ In fact, during the same year that Wu delivered his report on performing autopsies on deceased drug users at the Tokyo conference, a debate raged in the pages of *Shenbao*, perhaps the most influential newspaper in China, on the whether or not Shanghai’s procuracy should continue a contract with Tongji Medical School to perform forensic autopsies. Following months of virulent debate, the procuracy decided not to renew the contract, citing budgetary concerns that critics quickly claimed were merely a screen for caving to public outcry.¹⁹⁵ As a respected figure in the medical community, Wu would certainly have been aware of the debate, particularly since his report cited several statistics from neighboring Renji Hospital indicating that people who committed suicide often used opium.¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, Wu had firsthand knowledge of how controversial it was to conduct autopsies. During the Manchurian plague of 1910-1911, as Bridie Andrews writes, the Qing emperor granted Wu permission “to carry out two culturally repugnant measures deemed necessary to bring the plague under control: conducting autopsies on unclaimed plague corpses and cremating plague victims’ bodies.”¹⁹⁷ By casting drug users as autopsy subjects, Wu further cast them as an acute threat to public hygiene like an outbreak of plague.

Rather than a routine practice, autopsies of deceased drug users served to establish the physician’s authority over the body and build the credibility of medical professionals more broadly. David Luesink has shown that after the passage of the law permitting dissection in 1913 the “new knowledge about the human body obtained by the medical profession through active

¹⁹⁴ Asen, *Death in Beijing*, 159. *Shenbao* is also a Shanghai based newspaper.

¹⁹⁵ Asen, *Death in Beijing*, 160–62.

¹⁹⁶ (Wu Liande) 伍, “毒品问题与公共卫生 (The Drug Problem and Public Hygiene),” 11.

¹⁹⁷ Andrews, *The Making of Modern Chinese Medicine, 1850-1960*, 100.

dissection was connected to the disciplining of bodies in government medical schools.”¹⁹⁸ This knowledge in turn spread to institutions such as hospitals, prisons, factories, and other spaces dedicated to asserting power over human bodies in service of the state.¹⁹⁹ These institutions, in turn, “became sites where elites and state agents could access these bodies to collect somatic measurements of height and weight and other statistical data to construct a new collective that would be known as the population. The goal was to create a healthy and productive citizenry.”²⁰⁰ As Rogaski argues, even in Wu’s own case, his autopsies of plague victims, both in 1910 and in later outbreaks involved a

thinking of humans and animals in a similar mode: both were ‘territories’ that the plague bacillus coupled occupy...Wu seemed immune to the horror lurking within his own actions...white-garbed physicians who crept up to corpses on the street, plunged in a dagger, and cut out pieces of spleen; autopsies that left bodies flayed and disemboweled; macabre experiments involving humans and animals.²⁰¹

To Wu, deceased drug users, as bodies that profoundly lacked hygiene, could be better used to advance both medical knowledge and the state’s ability to catalogue, discipline, and reshape unhygienic and deviant bodies. Subjecting corpses to the microscope also granted physicians sole claim to knowledge of the interiority of the human body. Doctors could make up for the productive potential that drug users lacked in life by examining and extracting knowledge from them in death.

Conclusion: Modern Medicine, From Mercury to Goat Feces

The roots of the common conception of drug users as disease bearing resulted from the confluence of historically specific factors in early twentieth century China, from Republican

¹⁹⁸ David Luesink, “Anatomy and the Reconfiguration of Life and Death in Republican China,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 76, no. 4 (November 2017): 1026–27, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911817000845>.

¹⁹⁹ Luesink, “Anatomy and the Reconfiguration of Life and Death in Republican China,” 1026–27.

²⁰⁰ Luesink, “Anatomy and the Reconfiguration of Life and Death in Republican China,” 1027.

²⁰¹ Ruth Rogaski, *Knowing Manchuria: Environments, the Senses, and Natural Knowledge on an Asian Borderland* (University of Chicago Press, 2022), 258–59, <https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226818801.001.0001>.

intellectuals' desire to refute narratives of Chinese deficiency vis-à-vis Japan and the West, to the United States' desire to pursue imperial projects in Asia amidst a rising Temperance movement domestically, to Chinese medical professionals' need to establish new forms of mastery and medical authority. When Wu invoked his authority to cast drug users as particularly diseased and plague bearing, he also justified increasingly drastic measures against them, from extreme quarantine and punishment in life to dissection, examination, and violation in death. The consequences of these efforts for drug users themselves were catastrophic.

Among other things, physicians' portrayals of drug users as deviant, diseased, and degenerated bodies in the Republican period influenced their medical treatment. As Jan Kiely has shown, drug rehabilitation provided an impetus for the KMT government to expand its "regime of reformation through the construction and planning of new prisons and new kinds of carceral rehabilitative institutions within and beyond the judicial apparatus."²⁰² Police often forcibly sent drug users to conventional prisons or drug suppression clinics, which were sometimes clinical spaces attached to hospitals, sometimes simple outdoor labor camps, and sometimes simple detention centers.²⁰³ Nearly all, however, "were in design and purpose unmistakably heirs of the modern prisons, incarcerative institutions committed to converting offenders through a highly moralistic process of reformation."²⁰⁴ Conditions in the clinics were poor; corruption and overcrowding were common obstacles on the drug users path to reform.²⁰⁵ Indeed, the severe overcrowding in prisons "made it nearly impossible to carry out instruction and guidance."²⁰⁶ Even when instructors sincerely attempted to reform inmates "the efforts were

²⁰² Jan Kiely, *The Compelling Ideal: Thought Reform and the Prison in China, 1901-1956* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 182.

²⁰³ Kiely, *The Compelling Ideal*, 181–85.

²⁰⁴ Kiely, *The Compelling Ideal*, 184.

²⁰⁵ Kiely, *The Compelling Ideal*, 179–85.

²⁰⁶ Kiely, *The Compelling Ideal*, 181.

futile.”²⁰⁷ Eventually, by the early 1930s, overcrowding placed such a strain on prisons and drug suppression clinics that many loosened their stringent parole requirements to deal with the problem.²⁰⁸ In some prisons, as inmate populations increased, “deaths from beriberi, tuberculosis, dysentery, and typhoid rose precipitously.”²⁰⁹ Following anti-drug work in 1936 in Nanjing, the population of Jiangsu’s No. 1 prison, with an inmate-capacity of 900, reached 2,210.²¹⁰ Prisoners slept on the ground, without uniforms, facing starvation, dehydration, and illness. Kiely notes that “even Gu Zhenglun, the battle-hardened Nanjing Garrison commander under whom so many had been arrested, lamented that these prisoners were not being punished with the ‘restriction of liberty, but rather the punishment of taking life, that is all...it is no different from a death sentence.’”²¹¹

Despite medical professionals’ claims that incarceration would lead to reformation for drug users, for many, entrance into these carceral spaces was a death sentence, as poor conditions directly contributed to spread of disease.²¹² In some spaces, “the death rate was estimated at 10 per cent, a figure explained not only by the poor health of inmates but also by the absence of adequate medical facilities.”²¹³ Despite claims that drug users spread disease, “neither police nor the judiciary made any distinction between sick and healthy smokers, those afflicted with tuberculosis often ended up in the same cells as healthy convicts, thus contributing to the spread of epidemics...many habitual users simply died in prison.”²¹⁴ Even when users did not face disease or poor conditions, they were put to work constantly to reform them into productive

²⁰⁷ Kiely, *The Compelling Ideal*, 181.

²⁰⁸ Kiely, *The Compelling Ideal*, 181.

²⁰⁹ Kiely, *The Compelling Ideal*, 184–85.

²¹⁰ Kiely, *The Compelling Ideal*, 185.

²¹¹ Kiely, *The Compelling Ideal*, 185.

²¹² Dikötter, Laamann, and Zhou, *Narcotic Culture*, 128.

²¹³ Dikötter, Laamann, and Zhou, *Narcotic Culture*, 128.

²¹⁴ Dikötter, Laamann, and Zhou, *Narcotic Culture*, 128–29.

citizens.²¹⁵ Drug suppression clinics, to say nothing of prisons, were highly militarized spaces where users lost all control over their own bodies and “violence, rather than controlled medical care and institutional discipline, often governed daily life.”²¹⁶ In an extreme case, “in parts of Shandong province, opium smokers were even tattooed with a 2-inch cross on the forearm [to prevent escape].”²¹⁷

Bolstering the impression of clinics as carceral spaces, clinics kept drug users confined and forbade any contact with the outside world once they entered. A mid-1930s report by Wu Tiecheng, the mayor of Shanghai and a prominent KMT politician, titled “General Survey of Anti-Narcotics Work in Shanghai: January 1932 to June 1935,” details that while undergoing treatment clinics had to “stop all visits with drug users, except for medical staff, no matter who they are, nobody is allowed to visit drug users.”²¹⁸

Besides forced labor, treatment of drug users by medical professionals also skewed closer to dangerous experimentation than anything else. Wu Tiecheng’s report detailed how treatment proceeded in Shanghai clinics. Clinics widely used a blister or serum method, where doctors forcibly applied a large plaster (in the case of Shanghai clinics it was made of cantharidin) to cause blisters. Then the doctor drew fluid from the blister and injected it intramuscularly back into the drug user’s buttocks.²¹⁹ Others used treatments that induced constant diarrhea and vomiting.²²⁰ Some clinics administered medicines that caused:

²¹⁵ Dikötter, Laamann, and Zhou, *Narcotic Culture*, 132.

²¹⁶ Dikötter, Laamann, and Zhou, *Narcotic Culture*, 134.

²¹⁷ Dikötter, Laamann, and Zhou, *Narcotic Culture*, 134.

²¹⁸ 鐵城 (Wu Tiecheng) 吳, “General Survey of Anti-Narcotics Work in Shanghai: January 1932 to June 1935 (上海市禁烟禁毒之概況: 二十一年一月至二十四年六月),” n.d., 16, Shanghai Library Archives. Lit: “在戒毒期內禁止一切探望除醫務負責人員外, 無論何人不准與犯人接談。”

²¹⁹ (Wu Tiecheng) 吳, “General Survey of Anti-Narcotics Work in Shanghai: January 1932 to June 1935 (上海市禁烟禁毒之概況: 二十一年一月至二十四年六月);” Dikötter, Laamann, and Zhou, *Narcotic Culture*, 138.

²²⁰ Dikötter, Laamann, and Zhou, *Narcotic Culture*, 138.

...nose bleeding, constipation, loss of appetite, tiredness, vomiting and diarrhoea: all of the subjects described the treatment as unbearable. Other opium smokers were used to test a mixture containing calomel, a mercury compound: the negative reactions were such that even the hospital had to admit that it only managed to increase pain in patients...the “goat shit cure” developed by Luo Lebin, a medical expert from Nanning, Guangxi province, was based on the chemical reaction between goat faeces and liquorice, to be administered for six days to opium addicts. His approach was heralded as a medical breakthrough by the local police...opium smokers died in detoxification centres either because the medical authorities failed effectively to treat the ailments for which opium was taken in the first place or because replacement treatments were poorly conceived and badly administered.

As the examples above demonstrate, despite their lofty goals, medical professionals treated the drug user as an experimental subject, often subjecting users to involuntary treatments despite having little to no idea of the effects of the treatment. Perhaps nothing better exemplifies the rapid rise in the authority of the physician over the body in the early twentieth century than official attitudes towards sanctioned and unsanctioned medicine. While doctors cast the unprescribed use of opium to treat diarrhea as superstitious nonsense, in the same breath they compelled the drug user to cure themselves by ingesting everything from mercury to goat feces.

In the fractured political and social environment of Republican China, anti-narcotics work provided fertile ground for medical and propaganda discourses to create new forms of collective identity and contest political and social power. While public facing propaganda and internal facing medical discussions differed in many ways, they also shared a consistent focus on demonizing drug use and drug users. Despite physicians’ claims that modern medicine could treat drug use, many users were far better off outside of clinics than inside them. Propaganda and medical narratives of drug users’ deficiency, filth, and degeneration not only justified their incarceration within carceral spaces like drug suppression clinics and prisons, but helped medical professionals make new claims of medical authority and advance their mastery over the human

body. Beyond bolstering the KMT state's attempts to drastically reshape deviant bodies into productive citizens, these medical and propaganda narratives laid the foundation for the policies of the Chinese Communist Party. In drug suppression clinics under the CCP, as I show in the next chapter, drug users faced growing scrutiny and pressure from both medical and policing forces, who for nearly half a century had been exposed to popular and expert narratives that cast drug users as a dangerous, incurable, and acute threat to public hygiene and social health.

Chapter 3: Rendering Flesh: State and Clinical Efforts to Reify and Discipline Drug Offenders in 1950s China

After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seized control of China in 1949, it undertook a nationwide Anti-Narcotics Campaign (ANC, 1949-1952). While initially the ANC appeared to follow a plan of attack focused on rehabilitation, a lack of funding, leadership, and consistency undermined this approach.²²¹ Following orders from the Central Committee, the second phase of the ANC increasingly relied on harsher forms of punishment to police drug offenders. Central leaders called for less focus on leniency and rehabilitation in favor of punishments, mass mobilizations stigmatizing drug users, intensive propaganda decrying the evils of drug use, and nationwide implementation of government anti-drug initiatives.²²² Mass rallies took place where officials publicly burnt confiscated drugs to demonstrate that the CCP was committed to combating the evils of opium use and was not simply running a resale racket.²²³ The second half of the campaign, beginning in 1952, was significantly more successful in stamping out drug use than the initial phase.²²⁴ Under a deluge of propaganda, mass surveillance, local coercion, and police violence, offenders often had no choice but to reform and stop using. While the CCP's ANC was more successful than the Kuomintang's (KMT) narcotics suppression efforts, this was because of a difference in execution. Fundamentally, both states had similar conceptions of drug offenders.

²²¹ Zhou Yongming, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 96. The Three and Five anti-s campaigns were social cleanup campaigns intended to get rid of corruption, socially bad elements, and generally to solidify CCP control.

²²² Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, 97.

²²³ Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, 104,105.

²²⁴ This success was in part due also to the CCP's newfound position of strength in society after the party consolidated power through the Land Reform and the 3 and 5 anti's campaigns.

In chapters 1 and 2, I demonstrated that during the Republican-era propaganda, clinical studies, medical professionals, and governmental policy reshaped the figure of the drug user from one who could conspicuously consume opium into an irreparably damaged moral degenerate. I showed that drug users were cast as evolutionary relics, contagious dangers to public health, vestiges of pre-modernity, animalized threats to the Chinese nation, unproductive bodies that placed a strain on the new Chinese state and society, visible and dangerous remnants of colonialism, and, underwriting all of the above, fundamentally subhuman.²²⁵ I showed how these dehumanizing discourses also increased the political and social credibility of medical and public health professionals by pathologizing drug crimes. KMT stigmatization efforts created the category of drug offender as someone that did not belong in a modernizing China, that the state needed to remake or eradicate.

This chapter highlights how the histories of violence that I traced in previous chapters provided the ideological justification for the specific form that the drug rehabilitation clinic took in the 1950s, and how the CCP treated and viewed drug users as subhuman and disposable. The point of this chapter is not to demonize or show a uniquely ‘Chinese’ brutality or violence in the drug rehabilitation clinic; indeed, as I have and will continue to argue, Chinese drug rehabilitation clinics mirrored the 20th century’s global reification of the “drug addict” as a uniquely immoral anti-subject that defined the boundaries of belonging and citizenship through their exclusion.²²⁶ Beyond highlighting the ways that the violence of the clinic functioned in 1950s China, the chapter shows the layers and moments of violence that inform later

²²⁵ In this chapter, I use the term “body” as a convenient shorthand to refer to efforts at conceiving of certain bodies as less than full participants in society, as less valuable, important, worth preserving, capable of labor, and not belonging in 20th century Chinese society. The meaning of this term of course shifted across time and space, chapters 1 and 2 as noted above discussed the various ways that this process worked in Republican China.

²²⁶ See Nancy Campbell, “The Metapharmacology of the “Addicted Brain,”” *History of the Present*, 1, no. 2 (Fall 2011), 194-218.

manifestations of violence and allow for the expansion of new forms of violence.²²⁷ Rather than viewing the discursive and ideological violence of chapters 1 and 2 as discrete or isolated moments, I see them as critical strands of a broad tapestry of violence that enshrouded drug offenders across 20th century China.²²⁸

This chapter explores how the PRC state's drug registration forms and regulations for drug suppression clinics in the early 1950s worked to define the category of drug offender.²²⁹ Rather than seeing 1949 as a radical break, I emphasize how the post-49 regime built on and extended efforts in the Republican-era to define the figure of the drug offender. To that end, I show how PRC policy linked the medical and carceral realms. The state pathologized drug offenders, objectified them as punishable bodies, and subjected them to psychological and bodily violence. This chapter is fundamentally a study of how the state reified people and the violence of this process. I understand reification here as abstracting someone from their socio-historical circumstances and freezing them in place, turning people into knowable objects, and, in this case, stripping people of the familial, social, and personal ties that people rely on to define their own humanity and existence.²³⁰

In this chapter I move forward to the early 1950s and demonstrate how police registration and the planning of drug suppression clinics reified drug offenders—abstracted them from their

²²⁷ In the same vein, moments of violence targeted at different groups can also affect others—the violence of land reform and the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries, and the experience that policing forces gained in those campaigns, undoubtedly affected their actions in the anti-narcotics campaign as well.

²²⁸ Similarly, the efforts of police forces to police and kill drug offenders that I discuss in Chapter 5 also built on the mortification and forcible erasure of the self that the clinics forced onto drug offenders.

²²⁹ I translate 戒烟所 and 毒犯 as drug suppression clinic and drug offender, respectively. I translate it as drug suppression clinic to call attention to how these so-called rehabilitation centers really were not about rehabilitation but more so about disciplining deviant bodies using clinical and medical authority.

²³⁰ I draw my understanding of reification from two sources here, first, Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Great Britain: Merlin Press, 1967), specifically the chapter entitled “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat.” I also draw this understanding from Achille Mbembe (trans. Libby Meintjes), “Necropolitics,” in *Public Culture*, 15, no. 1 (Winter 2003), 11-40, 18.

socio-historical context and reduced them to objects. The current historiography of anti-narcotics efforts in 1950s China only briefly discusses drug suppression clinics and notes only that rehabilitation took place in state-sponsored programs without examining what exactly this entailed.²³¹ I break from this neutral reading of rehabilitation and specifically examine the clinic's entrance process and the daily regulations for drug offenders. I argue that embedded within the very walls of the drug rehabilitation clinic was the assumption that drug users were irrevocably subhuman, fundamentally different from normal people, flesh that the state needed to discipline. While police and public health forces used Shanghai clinics as models for the rest of the country, when Shanghai's ANC committee planned these drug rehabilitation clinics they spent almost no time thinking about how to actually treat drug users. Rather, their reports, focused on how to find and certify the guilt of drug users by using the authority of scientific testing. I argue that the drug rehabilitation clinic's admission procedures and so-called treatment methods consistently attempted to eradicate a patient's sense of self and interiority. I argue that the state not only saw the drug user as flesh but also foregrounded and forced a violent mortification of the self onto drug offenders.

Here I build on the sociological definition of mortification as a loss of self-esteem, sense of self, and social identity, often through physical and psychological attacks.²³² In *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates*, Erving Goffman argues that mental institutions were designed to reconstruct the patient's subjectivity. Goffman argues that this process occurs in four stages, of which the mortification of the self comes first. For

²³¹ Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China*, p100.

²³² Erving Goffman, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates*, (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1961), p10-15. See also Madeline Karmel, "Total Institution and Self-Mortification," *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 10, no. 2 (June 1969), 134-141. See also Bernard Harcourt, *Exposed: Desire and Disobedience in the Digital Age*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), p221-224.

Goffman, the process entails a forced loss of self-esteem and stripping the patient of their social identity to predispose the patient to the asylum's efforts to redefine or reconstruct their subjectivity. In this chapter, I argue that the state, through the registration process and incarceration in drug suppression clinics, sought to make the problem of drug crimes an individual one, to use the authority of medicine to mark drug offenders as guilty, and to strip away drug offenders' sense of self. I further argue that these efforts tried to force drug offenders to recognize themselves as distinct and inferior to the rest of the social body, in effect losing part of their humanity, by constantly foregrounding their need to be controlled, surveilled, and violated.²³³ Even as the state attempted to reduce drug users to flesh, however, as I show in the next chapter, drug users consistently occupied the liminal space between citizen and flesh by resisting the state's efforts to categorize and attack them.

This chapter also contributes to the history of science in the PRC and to the history of medicine by highlighting the intersection of the medical and carceral realms. Previous scholars have noted how science always functions within contingent socio-historical circumstances.²³⁴ Scholars have shown that Mao's China was not completely dismissive of science and used new visions of science and what science was to build control over rural areas and to increase agricultural yields. I build on these works and show how the state used medical science as a tool of urban social control, a way to police society and discipline drug offenders. The CCP used medicine to both lay claim to the bodies of drug offenders and to turn these deviant bodies into

²³³ The state asserts sovereignty and power by creating spaces that strip all legal protections or rights. Sovereignty here is the production of rights-bearing life through the exclusion of dehumanized people who are reduced to flesh. Flesh thus is subject to any and all forms of violence, and the state defines normalcy and citizenship through excluding, managing, and, if necessary, eradicating flesh.

²³⁴ For example, see the work of Sigrid Schmalzer, *Red Revolution, Green Revolution* and Miriam Gross, *Farewell to the God of Plague*. Both establish that medicine and science never function as ahistorical forces but always operate within and for certain political circumstances and ends.

anti-subjects.²³⁵ I further contribute to the new wave of studies on the anthropology of medicine. Previous scholars have studied medicalization as the “subsumption of human problems under the specialist authority of the medical profession,” and have raised questions about medicine’s social and institutional power relations.²³⁶ However, most of these studies neglect the socialist and post-socialist states, with the exception of Eugene Raikhel and Michele Rivkin-Fish. They study alcoholism and women’s health, respectively, to show how in Soviet Russia, the physician’s authority in the clinic was not underpinned by the perceived professional autonomy or competence of physicians but rather by the fact that physicians directly represented the state.²³⁷ Unlike the medical problems studied by these scholars, the use of drugs in 1950s China was explicitly a criminal act, and one that various agencies and governing bodies had explicitly waged war against for the previous half century. This chapter not only reiterates that medicine in a socialist context drew its high-absolute authority from its association with the state but that medicine worked hand-in-glove with policing forces to define, certify, and discipline criminality. The CCP used medicine not only to control populations but also to characterize drug offenders as disposable flesh not included in conceptions of “the people” and to legitimate, and even facilitate, increased state violence and discipline against them.²³⁸

²³⁵ I discuss the exclusion, and execution of these bodies more in the following two chapters. This chapter is primarily concerned with how the state aspired to construct these bodies.

²³⁶ Eugene Raikhel, *Governing Habits: Treating Alcoholism in the Post-Soviet Clinic* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), pp. 6-7.

²³⁷ Raikhel, *Governing Habits*, p8-9. See also Michele Rivkin-Fish, *Women’s Health in Post-Soviet Russia: The Politics of Intervention* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005). Despite the titles of these works, both deal extensively with Soviet-era Russia.

²³⁸ This criminalization of a medical condition laid the foundation for the use of overt state violence against drug offenders that I discuss in Chapter 5. In the early 1950s, the state used the public executions of drug offenders to assert sovereignty and new forms of power. The criminalization and stigmatization of drug use also helped lay the foundations for the communal and emotional violence I discuss in Chapter 4, inciting people to truly hate drug users and offenders.

The drug suppression clinic itself existed as a medical and carceral space, and most patients were sent to the clinic by public security officers.²³⁹ In other cases, local neighborhood associations, local party cadres, or even family members coerced the patients into these clinics. In other words, the fact that patients almost never entered voluntarily compounded the violence associated with the clinic. In mental hospitals and other commitment programs, patients who commit themselves voluntarily maintain a degree of self-insulation and protection from the emotional, physical, and psychological violence of these spaces.²⁴⁰ Drug users committed to the rehabilitation clinics against their will did not enjoy the same protection and insulation. Within the walls of the drug suppression clinic in 1950s China, the doctor served as both the authority of a medical regime that claimed objective knowledge of and power over the pathologized bodies of drug users and as the representative of the party-state and policing forces that subjected drug users to a wide array of physical, emotional, and psychological violence.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the registering of drug users with their local public security branches. Chronologically, the state used registration as the first step in making the drug offender legible to policing forces. After registration, police would send drug users to drug suppression clinics, where users faced a variety of different attacks designed to undermine their senses of identity and self. When clinics released users, they released the user as an untrustworthy body who police could, and often did, surveil, test, and punish at will. After discussing the registration process, the chapter discusses the ANC's guidelines for constructing clinics to show how even when building clinics, the state saw drug offenders as bodies that

²³⁹ Jan Kiely briefly notes that pre-1949 drug suppression clinics were also “in design and purpose unmistakably heirs of the modern prisons, incarcerative institutions...” see Jan Kiely, *The Compelling Ideal: Thought Reform and the Prison in China, 1901-1956* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), p184. Throughout this chapter I try to also highlight some commonalities that drug suppression clinics shared with prisons to highlight this link between the medical and carceral realms.

²⁴⁰ Goffman, *Asylums*, chapter 2, for more details.

needed to be controlled and confined. Moving forward, I discuss the entrance procedures and regulations of daily life in drug suppression clinics to show how, from the very first planning stages, the clinic focused on breaking down drug users' sense of self and asserting the power of the state and the doctor over the user. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the role of science and scientific testing to show that even after a user left the clinic, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the state retained a direct claim over their bodies. Regarding terminology, I only use the term "addict" when the state sources use the word "烟民" and otherwise use the terms drug offender, drug user, or patient, as appropriate based on the situation.

In this chapter, I base most of my discussion around procedural guidelines from Tianjin and Shanghai's ANC committees. I focus on the guidelines from these locations because the MPS circulated the two sets of guidelines to every province and major city to guide each location in carrying out the registration of drug users and the construction and daily maintenance of drug suppression clinics. Shanghai was the epicenter of the ANC, and the place that the MPS wanted other locations to emulate. Of course, the practical application of the guidelines necessarily played out differently in different locations, but examining these state-issued guidelines clarifies the state's stances and attitudes towards drug offenders. The MPS explicitly forbade the public circulation of these documents and intended them for internal use only, meaning that the documents are less likely to exaggerate or mislead, since the state explicitly wanted other locations to emulate the guidelines. These guidelines are also some of the only remaining sources accessible on the internal workings of the ANC.²⁴¹ There is currently no way to access patient or medical records from the daily operations of drug suppression clinics, and I cannot provide any

²⁴¹ While in a perfect world, I would love to see how different locations responded to and adapted them to fit their local circumstances, in the current state of Chinese archival access, this remains impossible.

account of daily life, or lived experience in drug suppression clinics. While I understand that they do not tell the entire story, the institutional and state sources do allow me to analyze how state organizations and institutions saw and created offenders as a group of bodies that required policing, incarceration, and if necessary, punishment. They permit an analysis of the state's aspirations, if not always the realities on the ground. While this chapter may also at times seem one sided, because I do not have the sources to examine the acts of resistance on the part of drug offenders, the next chapter addresses in more detail how offenders at times reasserted claims to innocence and morality when faced with the overwhelming power of the state.

Registration—Reifying and Archiving the Drug Offender through Paper Pushing

Registration mechanisms and procedures marked the drug offender not only as guilty, but as left a permanent record in an individual's case file that marked them as primary targets for further surveillance and policing. Registration systems entered the drug offender into a sophisticated system of classification and monitoring, in which they remained subject to arbitrary search and monitoring at any point in the future, even if they stopped using drugs. The focus on establishing and maintaining guilt was part of the MPS's efforts to legitimate present and future violence against drug offenders. In the early PRC, registration marked a dividing line demarcating bare life from political belonging.²⁴²

The MPS carried out registration in large, repeated waves to minimize the number of drug offenders who slipped through the cracks, and also to present an image of Chinese society united against the isolated drug user.²⁴³ For example, a 1951 internal report on Tianjin's Anti-Narcotics Committee stated that police forces should register drug offenders by a specific day

²⁴² See Chapter 5 for a longer discussion on bare life and political belonging through the execution of drug offenders.

²⁴³ Chapter 5 of this dissertation discusses this in more detail.

but only after police forces thoroughly investigated and infiltrated into society and after spreading anti-narcotics propaganda as widely as possible.²⁴⁴ In Tianjin, according to the ANC committee's mandate, "every user, trafficker, producer, or seller of drugs in the municipality, by the determined day of registration (26th), should quickly head to a local police station and carry out registration" after campaign workers spread anti-narcotics education and propaganda.²⁴⁵ The MPS circulated this directive to locations across China because the MPS wanted the process to look relatively uniform across the nation.²⁴⁶ The MPS also made clear in internal police memos and public announcements that if offenders failed to present themselves by the mandated day, but their name came to official attention through either the confession of other offenders or a member of the public, they would receive severe punishment.²⁴⁷

Once an offender arrived at the police station, every part of the registration process aimed to treat them as guilty and archive their crime(s) for present and future policing efforts. Each local police station appointed a person to be responsible for the maintenance of drug registration reports and for forwarding these reports to Tianjin's central anti-narcotics committee.²⁴⁸ This system of registration consolidated drug offenders' personal data and ensured that the records followed the offenders for the rest of their lives. Similarly, the registration process ensured airtight documentation of offenders' personal details. Every registered offender needed to be

²⁴⁴ SMA B168-1-755, "烟民烟毒登記辦法實施細則," p16. (trans. "Detailed Rules and Regulations for Carrying out the Registration of [narcotics] Addicts and Narcotics," hereafter Detailed Rules and Regulations)

²⁴⁵ SMA B168-1-755, "烟民烟毒登記辦法實施細則," (trans. Detailed Rules and Regulations...) p16. Lit: "所有吸食運製售烟毒市民, 在指定日期 (26 號) 內, 迅速到公安分局進行登記." (trans. "Every user, smuggler, producer, and seller of narcotics, by the appointed day, (the 26th), quickly come to the police and carry out registration") While the four categories are distinct in name, in practice they function relatively similarly under the rubric of "drug offender." The only noticeable difference is that users are the ones that police are supposed to send to drug suppression clinics.

²⁴⁶ Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, p95.

²⁴⁷ SMA B168-1-755, "上海市禁烟禁毒登記規則," (trans. "Shanghai Municipality Anti-Narcotics Registration Guidelines") p33.

²⁴⁸ SMA B168-1-755, "烟民烟毒登記辦法實施細則," (trans. "Detailed Rules and Regulations") p16-17.

physically present to provide multiple copies of each detailed form they filled out to their local police station. For those drug offenders who brought along their drug paraphernalia, police immediately weighed their items in front of them and provided them with a formal (and standardized) receipt documenting all items and their weights.²⁴⁹

For the state's archive, the receipts certified guilt and reduced drug offenders to the material items that made them criminals. The creation of this paper trail allowed police forces, present and future, to point directly at the exact number and distinct weights of an offender's drug paraphernalia if they should ever protest their innocence. Offenders, in effect, swapped material possessions for material consequences. Furthermore, by providing a copy of the receipt to the offender, police forces created a system of confirmation in which the offender acknowledged their own guilt by accepting the receipt as indeed a correct inventory of their illegal paraphernalia. Emphasizing the importance of these instruments for certifying guilt, the ANC committee mandated that every police station appoint a specialized and reliable officer to take charge of the confiscated paraphernalia and underscored the importance of accurately recording the number, quality, and weight of the paraphernalia. The committee provided a standardized set of scales and weights, to further minimize discrepancies and maximize authority and credibility. Finally, police forces immediately packaged every piece of confiscated material, stamped it with an official seal, and together with its receipts, sent them all to the committee every five days.²⁵⁰ This centralized holding system in turn provided a stable framework to the entire registration process and fossilized the guilt of offenders into a newly created state archive.

²⁴⁹ SMA B168-1-755, “烟民烟毒登記辦法實施細則,” (trans. “Detailed Rules and Regulations”) p16

²⁵⁰ SMA B168-1-755, “烟民烟毒登記辦法實施細則,” p17. (trans. “Detailed Rules and Regulations”) This process was also intended to cut down on crooked cops taking home confiscated paraphernalia or drugs.

Users entered the archive as the collection of items they used to sell or use drugs, not as a person with a complex history behind their usage or trafficking, but as a needle or pipe.

Registration also marked the drug offender as a viable target for increased surveillance and monitoring. After an offender registered, police stations took the next five days to launch a thorough investigation of them.²⁵¹ For active drug offenders and addicts, Tianjin's Municipal Anti-Narcotics Committee instructed police to carry out immediate active criminal investigations and quickly submit reports.²⁵² For non-active drug users, after concluding their five-day investigation, police stations then forwarded one copy of the offender's registration form to Tianjin's Anti-Narcotics Committee for further investigation and archived another copy at the police station for future reference.²⁵³ Notably, the police did not notify drug offenders of any of the associated processes that began once an offender came forward to register. Even the offenders who came forward to register on their own volition were thus also in danger of being caught up in more detailed secondary investigations that could allege that they had not truly supplied all the details of their cases in their initial registration. Furthermore, even if offenders reformed, their names remained on record, placing them in danger if political circumstances changed—precisely what happened in the latter half of 1952, when mechanisms of surveillance and registration such as these facilitated waves of police raids and arrests.²⁵⁴

Once interred in the state archives, the registration form also morphed into a stable record that facilitated future policing measures. Police could, and often did, use these forms during

²⁵¹ SMA B168-1-755, “烟民烟毒登記辦法實施細則,” (trans. “Detailed Rules and Regulations”) p16-17

²⁵² SMA B168-1-755, “烟民烟毒登記辦法實施細則,” (trans. “Detailed Rules and Regulations”) p16-17.

²⁵³ SMA B168-1-755, “烟民烟毒登記辦法實施細則,” (trans. “Detailed Rules and Regulations”) pp16-17. Police also had to submit their materials every 5 days to the city's ANC, regardless of whether the materials or investigation was finished, see SMA B168-1-755, “烟民烟毒登記辦法實施細則,” p19.

²⁵⁴ This is an extremely common method of drug policing across various countries and times. For more examples see, Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).

interrogation as a confession or official establishment of guilt to pressure offenders with or include in their personal histories for use later. Interrogation records, for example, nearly always began by reading the key information from offender's registration form to them and having them directly confirm it, reminding the offender that the police possessed a large amount of information on them and implying that it was futile to protest one's innocence. Interrogators then followed this restatement of the registration form by directly asking the offender some variation of a question to confirm drug usage, such as, "when did you start using drugs," "how much heroin did you take?" "how much morphine did you use/sell?"²⁵⁵ Similarly, for example, a case file from a sexual assault case in Jingzhou city, Hubei province, (荊州市, 湖北省) from the 1960s spends a significant amount of space detailing the accused's "repulsive history of buying and selling drugs" as part of a longer record of the accused's untrustworthiness and evidence of his likely guilt.²⁵⁶ Registrations filled out under duress, by a well-meaning but ill-informed family member, or by a police officer for an illiterate drug offender all looked the same once placed in the police archive. The records are presumed to be stable representations of the truth of the accused's drug crimes because of their inclusion in the police archive. This presumption of archival truth elides not only the circumstances of one's drug crimes but also the dubious veracity of the initial registration form itself. The deplorable conditions that police held suspects in meant that many prisoners and drug offenders simply said or wrote what they thought would get them in the least trouble and bring an end to police pressure. For example, Jan Kiely notes that in the early PRC, "most prisoners evidently submitted to the requirement to perform their conversion. This was most evident in the process of struggle sessions wherein most participants

²⁵⁵ SMA Q131-5-6703, "上海市警察局關於調查嚴福云等吸販毒品案," (trans. Shanghai Policing Bureau on Investigating the Case of Yan Fuyun and others Using and Trafficking Drugs, p9-18, for example.

²⁵⁶ Hoover Institution, Chinese Communist Political Movement Collection, Box 3, No. 2014C24-247.

eventually “confessed” something, even fabrications, if only to bring an end to their ordeal.”²⁵⁷

The registration form thus took on a life of its own as part of a broader police archive that created a conception of the offender as already guilty and thus deserving of increased monitoring and state control.

The registration form itself contained several components that worked to identify and reduce the offender to physical characteristics and also to provide police enough information to track them down and investigate further. In a sample form from Shanghai, the offender first had to provide three two-inch upper body photographs, without any headgear.²⁵⁸ Two copies were to be pasted on the registration form itself and one on the certificate of registration.²⁵⁹ Police instructed registrants to fill out forms themselves; if they were illiterate, then an appointed worker at the station or a family member could fill in the forms for them. In addition to the pictures, a registration form required the following personal information in the following order: date of form submission, the offender’s full name, sexual identification, age, address, place of birth, family background, personal history, current occupation, working unit, number of family members (including their titles and occupations), economic situation (including personal articles and real estate and their savings and loans), when the offender started producing, trafficking, selling, or using drugs and their amounts, the name and quantity of drug paraphernalia turned

²⁵⁷ Kiely, *The Compelling Ideal*, p287. Kiely also shows at length how conditions in labor camps and prisons, as well as various re-education camps were dire. Inmates almost never had enough to eat and were put through hard labor, while a lack of medical supplies and expertise meant that many died daily from disease.

²⁵⁸ As I discussed in chapter 2, photographs of drug offenders were also used to convey an image of them as degenerate, diseased, and skeletal figures. See appendix one for a refresher on what photographs of drug offenders looked like in the 1920s. Regrettably I do not have a sample photograph of a police mugshot for offenders in the 1950s. Photography worked to create a stable image of the drug offender, freeze them in place, and use the image to stand in for the complexity of their lived realities. In essence, to compartmentalize, process, and make them knowable. Mugshots worked to objectify offenders as criminals.

²⁵⁹ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒實施辦法,” (trans. “Methods to Carry Out Shanghai Municipality Anti-Narcotics Work”) p76-77, one of hundreds of different reports within this much larger file. See also SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒登記規則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality Anti-Narcotics Registration Guidelines”) p29-30, for another guideline which requires two additional photographs to be presented to the ANC committee.

over, any illnesses they had, if they had quit using drugs before, the date of their voluntary cessation of drug use, and their personal opinion towards anti-narcotics work.²⁶⁰ If a family member filled out the form, they also had to state their address and relationship to the offender. Finally, a box at the bottom provided space for the inspecting personnel to write their notes after they conducted further investigations, the recommended date for future inspections, and a space for the municipality's anti-narcotics committee to set the date for drug use cessation and further testing/investigation, as well as any other annotations they wished to make.²⁶¹ After filling out the forms, offenders needed to stamp the form with their personal seal, or provide their right thumb print, after which the police issued them a copy of their registration form to present when questioned about registration.²⁶²

The contents of the form and their arrangement presupposed guilt and worked against offenders' efforts to protest their innocence or argue for extenuating circumstances. Notably, the registration form provides no explicit space for the offender to list how or why they began using, producing, selling, or trafficking drugs—a staple of the defense many accused users and traffickers offered in interrogations to try to get their punishments mitigated.²⁶³ The fact that certificates of registration did not contain a space for personal experiences further bolsters this

²⁶⁰ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒實施辦法,” (trans. “Methods to Carry Out Shanghai Municipality Anti-Narcotics Work”) p83—sample of a registration form attached to the measures report above. By providing family information, the offender also gave police a way to find family members and do further investigation work if needed. Family members also play an important role in the emotional violence of the campaign that I discuss in more detail in the next chapter.

²⁶¹ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒實施辦法,” (trans. “Methods to Carry Out Shanghai Municipality Anti-Narcotics Work”) p83.

²⁶² SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒實施辦法,” (trans. “Methods to Carry Out Shanghai Municipality Anti-Narcotics Work”) p77.

²⁶³ This is, of course, not to say that accused offenders did not utilize the form to perform and provide the extenuating circumstances that they thought would help, but it is to argue that it seems clear that the form itself does not provide space for them to that information. Case records from the 1950s also show that criminals almost never used the form to push for extenuating circumstances and in some cases actually made things worse for themselves.

reading.²⁶⁴ Similarly, the form automatically assumed offenders' guilt by providing no space for them to protest their innocence, phrasing questions as "when" rather than "if" drug association started.²⁶⁵ Finally, the registration form introduced a medical element into the record by containing a box for information about illnesses immediately after the first two boxes on drug use. The location of the illnesses box in the middle of the section on the registrant's involvement with drugs leads to an immediate connection between drug production, sale, or use and some type of medical illness or disease, which helped to justify future placement into a drug suppression clinic. The specific way the MPS organized these forms shows both their own assumptions about drug offenders and how the registration format influenced the institutional narrative surrounding drug offenders.

Structurally, the location of police notes on the registration form and their place within the case file also worked against offenders by justifying future disciplinary measures. Police used initial registration forms, and, where applicable, confessions, to preface every other document in an individual's case file. This order of the documents attempted to misleadingly make the investigation itself imply the offender's consent and admission of their guilt. Further bolstering this false impression of the offender's consent is the fact that the box for further police investigation and anti-narcotics committee comments are appended to the same form as the individual's personal thumbprint, stamp, and registration information, despite the registrant's complete lack of knowledge about and exclusion from the process. Finally, the appended portion that states the results of future investigations and committee opinions and recommendations

²⁶⁴ SMA B168-1-755, "上海市禁烟禁毒登記規則," (trans. "Shanghai Municipality Anti-Narcotics Registration Guidelines") p34.

²⁶⁵ SMA B168-1-755, "上海市禁烟禁毒登記規則," (trans. "Shanghai Municipality Anti-Narcotics Registration Guidelines") the blank on the form literally reads: "何時開始製運售吸及數量若干", (trans. "From when did [the accused] start producing, trafficking, selling, and using drugs, and in what amounts") p35.

remains undated, further giving the impression that the offender saw and consented to police opinions and recommendations when stamping the form initially. Within the appended portion, two of the boxes also mention medical testing, providing both scientific grounding for the offender's guilt and again justifying a future transfer to a drug suppression facility. Even within the registration form, then, police forces drew on medical authority to prove guilt.

Certificates of registration relied on medical authority to justify policing measures and further linked the ANC's carceral and medical elements. The certificates of registration began with an offender's name, sexual identification, address, date of registration, and registration file number, immediately followed by the third copy of their photograph. Underneath came a table that listed the medicines that they had bought to help them stop taking drugs, of course with permission from the police. The table required the dates purchased, the amounts, the cost, and the person who sold the medicines.²⁶⁶ The remaining four perforated and removable pages and the majority of the certificate are entirely devoted to medical testing results regarding an offenders' drug use.²⁶⁷ After the date--year, month, and day--the first page has a table for the agency that performed the examination, the offender's urine and excrement sample numbers, the date of the sample examination, the results of the examination, and additional comments. The table ends with spaces for the hospital's president to sign off, as well as for the doctor in charge of the chemical examination. The second, third, and fourth pages provide nearly identical forms but with boxes for the number assigned to the offender's urine and excrement by the municipality's ANC and local districts, with directions to send copies of the certificates to

²⁶⁶ SMA B168-1-755 pp84-85, title of the form is “上海市 XXX 區吸食烟毒登記證” (trans. Shanghai Municipality XXX District Narcotics User Registration Certificate”)

²⁶⁷ Police sent offenders' bodily samples to different hospitals/pharmacies to be determined by the ANC committee in each location.

Shanghai's ANC and other local districts.²⁶⁸ More clearly than any other form, the certificate directly linked an offender's criminality with the results of medical tests and subjected the drug offender to a large network of medical authority, foreshadowing their future experiences at drug suppression clinics.

The taking of urine and excrement samples paralleled the police's focus on seeing offenders through the material evidence of their drug usage and reduced offenders to testable components of their bodies. The process for taking the samples began by dehumanizing the drug offender through forcing them to provide samples under police supervision.²⁶⁹ After extraction, police sent samples sent to the local anti-narcotics committee for storage and reference.²⁷⁰ The local anti-narcotics committee then sent these samples to designated laboratories or hospitals for chemical examination.²⁷¹ Beyond reproducing the offender in the eyes of the state as simply the waste product of their bodies, these measures also highlight the intricate linkage of medical and policing authority. After the laboratory or hospital finished testing the samples, "the senior official at the laboratory or hospital director, and the doctor who carried out the testing provided their stamps [on an evaluation form], left one copy of it at the testing facility, then sent three

²⁶⁸ SMA B168-1-755, "上海市禁烟禁毒實施辦法," (trans. "Methods to Carry Out Shanghai Municipality Anti-Narcotics Work") p85. "烟民調驗鑒定書" is title of each form (trans. "Addict's [chemical/medical] Examination Documents/Evaluation Documents")

²⁶⁹ SMA B168-1-755, "上海市禁烟禁毒施戒調驗規則," (trans. "Shanghai Municipality Anti-Narcotics Chemical Examination Guidelines") p42. Lit "在監視下提取便溺, 分別編號, 密封, 由承辦人員加蓋私章后, 造具名冊連同便溺器送市禁會." (trans. "Under supervision, collect urine and excrement, separate [and assign them] serial numbers, seal up, and after being stamped by the appropriate staff member, draw up a list of names and together with the urine and excrement send to the municipality's anti-narcotics association")

²⁷⁰ SMA B168-1-755, "上海市禁烟禁毒施戒調驗規則," (trans. "Shanghai Municipality Anti-Narcotics Chemical Examination Guidelines") p38-44. The local ANC assigned a reference and catalogue number to these samples, before sending them to the hospital/drug suppression clinics responsible for testing them.

²⁷¹ SMA B168-1-755, "上海市禁烟禁毒施戒調驗規則," (trans. "Shanghai Municipality Anti-Narcotics Examination Guidelines") p42. Lit. "由市禁會, 另行編號, 送化驗所或醫院化驗." (trans. "have the municipality's anti-narcotics committee separately assign serial numbers and send to the testing laboratory and hospital laboratory")

copies to the municipal anti-narcotics committee.”²⁷² Medical testing also functioned as the final arbiter of truth of whether someone really had used drugs, despite the numerous flaws and inconsistencies inherent in drug testing to this day.²⁷³ If tests came back positive, state directives instructed police to punish offenders and force them to quit using drugs, justifying their incarceration within a drug suppression clinic.²⁷⁴ Taken together, the state mobilized police and clinics to identify and to archive drug offenders as the material representations of their drug use and render them as perpetually guilty flesh.

Clinical Spaces—The Walls Are Closing In

The institutional assumptions underpinning drug suppression clinic entrance procedures were apparent in the layout of the building itself. The structure isolated those inside from society and perpetuated notions of their inhumanity. A clinical facilities report from Shanghai’s ANC makes it clear that drug suppression clinics in the region were total institutions that, first in the structure of the building itself and then in entrance procedures, began the process of erasing the offender’s sense of self. The secondary literature on the effect of clinical spaces on patients affirms and deepens this understanding of the clinics.

²⁷² SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒施戒調驗規則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality Anti-Narcotics Chemical Examination Guidelines”) p42-43. Lit. “由化驗所首長或醫院院長及承驗醫師簽名蓋章，除留一聯存查外，其餘三聯送市禁會分別轉轉。” (trans. “have the chief of the laboratory and the hospital president and the doctor [supervising the examinations] stamp their seals, and leave one copy for reference, and send the remaining three copies to the municipality’s anti-narcotics association for transfer”)

²⁷³ The CDC notes that urine drug testing even now, “can be tricky to interpret and might require consultation with the laboratory or local toxicologist for proper interpretation. In addition, there is the potential for false-positive or false-negative results. Lastly, not every drug of interest is included in all UDT panels.”—<https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/training/reducingrisk/accessible/index.html>, accessed May 14, 2020. Regrettably I do not have further information on how exactly drug testing was carried out on a procedural/experimentation level.

²⁷⁴ SMA B168-1-755, “天津市烟民烟毒辦法,” (trans. “Tianjin Municipality Anti-Narcotics Methods”) p20, “上海市禁烟禁毒施戒調驗規則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality Anti-Narcotics Chemical Examination Guidelines”) p43.

The sources for this section are primarily the Shanghai municipality's ANC committee rules and regulations on drug suppression clinics. The committee did not publish the rules and regulations and specifically marked them as only for internal circulation. As internally-circulated documents, the sources are less likely to exaggerate and more reliable than outward facing ANC documents. While the sources do not indicate where exactly the clinics should be constructed, Jan Kiely notes that in the early 1950s many detention facilities and prisons were located outside of or on the outskirts of cities, and that conditions were dire.²⁷⁵ The sources do not permit an examination of daily life in the clinics, nor do they reveal exactly how each and every clinic functioned, indeed many may have adapted or changed these guidelines to suit their local conditions. However, the documents appear to reveal the Chinese state's assumptions and conceptions of drug offenders as dehumanized flesh that required direct state management and discipline. Specifically, this section further shows that the clinic also individualized the problem of drug use. Rather than seeing drug usage as connected to one's social or historical circumstances, the clinics traced drug usage to, measured from, and treated it by direct control and management of an individual's physical body.

Clinics helped advance the CCP's broader goals of the ANC to increase its control over urban centers and secure popular legitimacy by providing a dumping ground for the deviant bodies of drug offenders, removing them from society. The system showed that the CCP had the will and the power to forcibly cleanse the social body of dangerous elements. Administratively, the clinics divided work up between several main offices. Working under the director and vice director of the clinic were four main offices, medical affairs, education, general affairs, and security. Medical affairs took charge of examining and treating users; education "managed

²⁷⁵ Kiely, *The Compelling Ideal*, p267-271. Kiely also notes that essentially, many prisons were just rural hard labor camps.

addicts' thought reform and life guidance;" general affairs managed statistics, accounting, and other duties not covered by other offices.²⁷⁶ The security department managed the overall security of the clinic through patrolling and other safety measures.²⁷⁷ While individual doctors and even clinics may have believed that their mission was to "cure" drug use, the guidelines reveal that this was not the main purpose or effect of the clinics. Instead, drug suppression clinics in Shanghai operated as total institutions that did not try to "cure drug addiction" but erased drug offenders' sense of self and further rendered them a population vulnerable to increased police and state violence during the ANC and afterwards.²⁷⁸

Shanghai's ANC committee designed clinics as total institutions that isolated and disciplined drug offenders, and, in the process, rendered them vulnerable to state violence. The term "total institution" comes from Erving Goffman's fieldwork on mental asylums as a theoretical approach to institutional spaces, specifically how institutional spaces shape and change social arrangements and identities. Total institutions are spaces with an all-encompassing character "that is often built right into the physical plant, such as locked doors, [or] high walls."²⁷⁹ Furthermore, total institutions focus on breaking down the barriers between different spheres of life. Where normally one sleeps, works, and plays in discrete locations, in a total institution, everything occurs within the walls of the complex and under the complex's

²⁷⁶ SMA B168-1-755, "上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所組織規則," (trans. "Shanghai Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Rules and Regulations for Organizing Narcotics Quitting Clinics") p26-27. Lit, "辦理烟民思想改造, 生活指導." (trans. "Manage addicts' thought reform, and direct/guide their lives")

²⁷⁷ SMA B168-1-755, "上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所組織規則," (trans. "Shanghai Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Rules and Regulations for Organizing Narcotics Quitting Clinics") p27. Lit "辦理本所警衛, 巡邏, 安全等事項." (trans. "Manage the clinic's sanitation, patrols, safety and other matters")

²⁷⁸ Moreover, even if the clinics sought sincerely to turn drug users into more "productive" people through "curing" them of their addiction, this reveals that their conception of the proper citizen was someone who could partake in accepted forms of labor in service to the state.

²⁷⁹ Goffman, *Asylums*, 5. Goffman also lists natural features such as moors, cliffs and lakes as other physical features of some total institutions. This list is also not intended to be exhaustive but merely to provide a reference point and starting point.

authority.²⁸⁰ Such institutions also force inmates to carry out daily activities with a large group of other inmates, who are all treated roughly similarly, with authorities generally scheduling everyone's activities.²⁸¹ There is also a social division between staff and inmates of the institution, with both groups viewing the other in generally hostile terms.²⁸² A central feature of total institutions is that they bring together their activities "into a single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims of the institution...the handling of many human needs by the bureaucratic organization of whole blocks of people...is the key fact of total institutions."²⁸³ Total institutions necessarily do violence because they forcibly try to instill new social identities upon those within and foreground the power of the state to name individual bodies as deficient and reshape them accordingly. The salient point is this: the design of clinics as total institutions shows that the state cast drug users as damaged by their drug use to justify their incarceration within the institution, assumed that drug offenders needed direct disciplining in their everyday lives, and sought to isolate them from broader society.

The Shanghai ANC committee's facilities guidelines for drug suppression clinics meet nearly all of the structural characteristics of total institutions. The staff of the clinics absolutely forbade any contact between offenders and the outside world, barring even family members who accompanied the offender to the institution from entrance.²⁸⁴ Further constructing the divide between outside and inside worlds, the ANC committee strictly forbade clinics from "continuously admitting patients" and instructed them that "each time clinics admitted patients

²⁸⁰ Goffman, *Asylums*, 6.

²⁸¹ Goffman, *Asylums*, 6.

²⁸² Goffman, *Asylums*, 6. Of course, not all institutions feature all of these characteristics. They necessarily adapt to their historical times and circumstances. Similarly, drug suppression clinics were not the only total institutions. Schools and prisons were also total institutions to some degree.

²⁸³ Goffman, *Asylums*, 6.

²⁸⁴ SMA B168-1-755, "上海市禁烟禁毒委员会戒烟所 X 事细则," (trans. "Shanghai Municipality's Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics") p23.

they must admit more than two hundred.”²⁸⁵ Batch admissions cut down the time that staff and patients interacted with the world outside the walls and foregrounded that the clinic existed as a separate disciplinary space. Clinics also focused on managing large groups of offenders together. The report states that, “addicts’ bedrooms should be entirely constructed as one large communal bed,” and clinics should have a huge communal kitchen that served 1,000 offenders and could serve as a gathering space for up to 2,000 offenders.²⁸⁶ The clinics specified that toilets must be constructed near the sleeping quarters, presumably for easier monitoring during the night.²⁸⁷ Similarly, clinics also constructed communal men’s and women’s shower rooms, a separate face and mouth-washing room, and a single haircutting room for the entire clinic.²⁸⁸ Even those sick with other illnesses were not exempt from the clinic’s laser focus on supervised group life—Shanghai’s ANC committee instructed clinics to construct a “200 person sick room” where doctors could treat and supervise all of them at once.²⁸⁹ Finally, the guidelines instructed clinics to construct a “laboratory that could perform experiments on [chemically examine/test] at least one hundred and twenty users’ fecal and urine samples every day.”²⁹⁰ Besides the recurring focus on users as diseased and in need of testing, and the valorization of scientific testing, which will be discussed below, even the clinic’s laboratory was built to efficiently process users’

²⁸⁵ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p23. Lit, “並不得連日收客” and “每次收客人數得超過二百人” respectively.

²⁸⁶ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p23. Lit, “烟民臥室全設一層統舖” (trans.

²⁸⁷ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p23.

²⁸⁸ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p23.

²⁸⁹ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p23. Lit, “二百人之病室”

²⁹⁰ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p22. Lit. “化驗室一處，足夠每日化驗至少一百二十個烟民便溺之用”

samples in large groups. Every structural component of the clinics was constructed to facilitate group management. While the ANC suffered from a lack of resources that no doubt forced it to focus on group management, the decision to organize the clinics for group management showed that authorities regarded drug users as suffering from a common defect that justified treating them not as individuals but as a group outside of acceptable society.²⁹¹ Rather than processing them as individuals with distinct and discrete reasons for their entrance to the clinic, the clinical structure stripped offenders of their individuality and elided the complex mosaic of personal and socio-historical reasons for drug usage by homogenizing offenders together in large manageable blocks.

Besides stripping offenders of their individuality, the clinic also made efforts to structurally separate staff from offenders and continuously reaffirm the social boundaries between the two groups. While not as dramatic as the open-air glass cages that some American mental hospitals used to supervise inmates while maintaining social divisions, the Shanghai clinics constructed separate dormitories and even an entirely separate kitchen for staff.²⁹² The lone exceptions to the separate kitchen rule were patients that doctors specifically indicated needed special diets to help them escape the sick bay. Within the sick bay itself, the report mandated construction of “a separate station/office where doctors could provide treatments, injections, and diagnosis.”²⁹³ The structurally enforced division between staff and patients

²⁹¹ On the ANC’s lack of funding, see Chapter 5 for more discussion. Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades*, p96 also notes, “the Communists simply lacked the resources necessary to carry out this project [the ANC] completely.”

²⁹² SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p23. These separations are of course found in other places in society as well, such as hospitals or some schools. In both of these other examples the separations also function to establish difference, hierarchy, and authority between different groups within the institution.

²⁹³ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p23. Lit. “病室內需設病狀一邊醫生注射診治.”

reveals that the clinics saw both groups of people as having preconceived traits and characteristics depending on which group they belonged to.²⁹⁴

More specifically, the construction guidelines and role of the doctor show a fear of drug users as contagious, which suggests that they were diseased. For example, the regulations stipulate that clinics must “construct a completely separate two-hundred-person room to serve as an isolation unit for users who enter the clinic but have yet to be examined by a doctor,” indicating an initial conception of drug users’ bodies as contagious or diseased.²⁹⁵ Meanwhile because the isolation unit was just a single shared space, if patients actually had a communicable disease, grouping them together in this unit practically guaranteed mass transmission, which in turn would support the clinic’s initial predisposition to treating users as contagious. For a discussion of the entrance exam in more detail, see below. Here, it should be noted that the doctor played a structural role by controlling movement within the clinic via certifying how contagious or clean a patient was. If the clinic as a whole worked to surveil and manage bodies, the doctor’s specific function here was to make the diseased body of the user knowable and controllable. The doctor’s authority turned the dangerously unknown bodies and diseases of users into flesh that was now known and thus manageable.

While the structural arrangements of the drug suppression clinics affirmed the constructed differences between staff and offenders, the structural guideline’s existence also

²⁹⁴ Goffman, *Asylums*, p111. This way of demarcating the world into knowable groups with preconceived traits and characteristics also informs other forms of CCP governance. See Michael Dutton, *Policing Chinese Politics: A History*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005) for more detail on how CCP policing operated on a friend/enemy dichotomy. For more specific examples, see also the historical examples of counter-revolutionaries and landlords. Anyone deemed an enemy of the state was assigned certain negative traits to justify actions taken against them. This example from the clinics is trying to show how that played out in the structuring of the building itself.

²⁹⁵ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p21. On isolated room, the document reads: “另設二百人的臥室為隔離部，為出入所未經醫生檢查” (trans. “separately construct a two hundred person bedroom to be a separate unit, for those who enter the clinic but have yet to be examined by the doctor”)

reveals the artificiality of this distinction. The fact that the clinics needed to affirm and build into the clinic the differences between the two groups highlights that drug usage and trafficking was a complex social problem related to a variety of factors and was not reducible to an essentialized conception of the inhumanity or moral degeneracy of drug offenders.²⁹⁶ Despite the clinics' ostensible goals of rehabilitating offenders through treatments and interactions with specialized staff, the structure of the clinic sought to minimize patient and staff interaction and reify the profound differences between the two groups. Structurally, the clinics built on the cultural discourses and conceptions discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 that cast drug offenders as fundamentally different from normal people, not quite humans who needed to be cordoned off and isolated within special spaces that ostensibly existed for their own benefit, if not outright disposed of.²⁹⁷ The drug suppression clinic existed as a space that helped create the conception of drug offenders as a homogenous group that was less human than regular society and thus deserved increased surveillance, confinement within specialized facilities, and if necessary harsh punishments.²⁹⁸

Entrance Proceedings—Isolation, Standardization, and Examination

The entrance procedures and daily regulations for drug users once they entered the space of the clinic reveal a specific example of the clinic's isolation of the problem within individual bodies and how this enacted violence onto the bodies of drug offenders.²⁹⁹ The entrance

²⁹⁶ On the propaganda of the ANC, see Chapter 4.

²⁹⁷ A pertinent example is the common trope of drug users as “things that evolution left behind” or as relics of a bygone age who simply had no place in the new China of the 20th century, an inexplicable aberration of the natural world that should no longer exist.

²⁹⁸ For more detail on the punishments inflicted on drug offenders, see Chapter 5.

²⁹⁹ Goffman notes how mental asylums relied on similar kinds of individualizing to justify their existence. The same could (and has) been said of prisons and other spaces of confinement. These spaces must retroactively justify incarceration within them lest they lose all reason for existence.

proceedings sought to transform drug offenders by forcibly inscribing their guilt onto them through direct violations of their bodily autonomy.

Unlike in interrogation rooms or mass struggle sessions, where offenders could and often did push back against state and police narratives about what being a drug offender meant, the format of the clinical entrance proceedings and life within the clinic used the medical authority of the doctor or specialist to destroy any alternative conceptions of what drug usage meant.³⁰⁰ Because police forced offenders into the clinics, once inside, offenders were subject to both legal and medical authority. There was far less room for offenders to push back precisely because they were already incarcerated within a space demarcated by legal forces as a confined dumping ground masquerading as a rehabilitation facility and because the authority of the doctor within the clinic was absolute. Their very entrance into the clinic served as confirmation of their guilt, thus making all of the mandates of the clinical staff both medically necessary and legally justified.

The regulations and actions of any institution help create a conception of the nature of those incarcerated in it. As Goffman notes, “prison management largely focuses on...the prevention of disorder and escape. An important aspect of prison management’s definition of the character of inmates is that if you give inmates the slightest chance, they will try to escape their legal term.”³⁰¹ Regardless of whether or not this is true, the institution acts as if it were, and, in doing so, communicates to prisoners that it expects them to try and break free, imparting this

³⁰⁰ On the struggle sessions, see Chapter 4. The state policing files and records show how offenders understood the terms of their arrest extremely well. They mobilized these same terms within struggle sessions and interrogations to argue that drug use and trafficking did not indicate subhuman moral degeneracy, but rather showed economic hardship, impossible social circumstances, alternative conceptions of modernity, complex socio-historical struggles, and in many cases victimization at the hands of the Japanese or KMT. The ANC, as noted in more detail later, was a campaign waged in part around defining and constructing a definition of drug use and what that means for people’s senses of self and their place in society.

³⁰¹ Goffman, *Asylums*, p186.

identity onto them even if prisoners had no intention of escaping in the first place. Similarly, the horrific conditions of many zoos show and perpetuate a conception of the animals as replaceable objects that exist only for the entertainment of people, rather than as sentient beings. In the case of the drug “treatment” clinics in China in the 1950s, the clinical space not only helped generate an identity of the drug offender for the broader public and policing forces but also tried to generate and project an identity of what drug use meant onto drug offenders themselves. Clinical regulations and guidelines for entrance, daily life, examination, and exit (including life post-exit) from the clinics expressed a conception of the drug offender as a sub-human form of life that needed to interiorize its inhumanity.

Entrance proceedings specifically looked to break down offenders’ sense of self and establish new power relations by isolating offenders from their social supports. According to regulations, “family or friends who accompany drug users to the clinic are forbidden from entrance.”³⁰² By forcing family members to depart after accompanying the drug offender to the door, the clinic stripped offenders of social and support networks and communicated to them their isolation within the clinic. People form their conceptions of the self in part through their engagement with social network. By stripping these away, the clinic called into question the entrants’ sense of self.³⁰³ Preventing friends or family from accompanying a user inside the clinic immediately communicated that the ties that provide meaning to conceptions of the self outside the clinic—someone’s son, brother, daughter, mother, father, friend— meant nothing once a person entered the clinic. The act of removing someone from their social and familial context in a sense unmakes a person, insofar as they derive senses of personal identity from those

³⁰² SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p23. Lit, “伴送烟民來所之親友不可入所內”

³⁰³ Goffman, *Asylum*, p13-15.

ties. Moreover, the act of barring entrance by family and friends forcibly asserted a new power relation between the offender and the clinic. The clinic immediately established its ability to control the bodies of users by controlling all visitation and access, highlighting that users no longer controlled any part of their present circumstances, even familial ties had no meaning to the clinic.³⁰⁴

The clinic's management of clothing and hair further sought to force offenders to confront the realization that they no longer controlled their own bodies. On arrival at the clinic, after forcing family members to depart, staff forced offenders to "change clothes, shaved their hair, and bathed them."³⁰⁵ Beyond a continued focus on the bodies of users as dirty and contagious, forcing offenders to change into the standardized clothes of the institution further divests the offender of another vestige of self and homogenizes them. People pour vestiges, feelings, and understandings of self into their possessions, the clinic's stripping of these physical possessions thus entailed, at least for some users, a curtailment and loss of selfhood.³⁰⁶ The clinical regulations also note that replacement clothing was to be of standard issue and supplied by the clinic.³⁰⁷ Scholarship on clinics discuss the effects of uniform and non-personal clothing on offenders. Goffman notes that these garments are, "uniform in character and uniformly distributed. These substitute possessions are clearly marked as really belonging to the institution and in some cases are recalled at regular intervals to be, as it were, disinfected of

³⁰⁴ Kiely notes how under the CCP prisons sought to break down existing social and power relations and forcibly assert new ones at the same time as it forced humiliation onto prisoners. See Kiely, *The Compelling Ideal*, p281-282. The similarities between these two institutions highlights again the close linkages of medical and disciplinary/carceral realms.

³⁰⁵ SMA B168-1-755, "上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則," (trans. "Shanghai Municipality's Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics") p23. Lit, "經更衣剃髮或脫髮，沐浴"

³⁰⁶ There is a large literature on how people invest parts of themselves into material possessions, even everyday ones such as clothes.

³⁰⁷ SMA B168-1-755, "上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則," (trans. "Shanghai Municipality's Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics") p23.

identifications.”³⁰⁸ Offenders were thus unable to invest any sense of self in their new possessions, because the clinic could recall and redistribute clothes at any time. Clinics also stripped individuals of their usual appearance by forcibly shaving them bald on entrance, further contributing to an individual’s disidentification with past senses of self. This process also immediately inculcated a new power relationship onto the drug offender by forcing them to submit to the clinic’s management and control over their body. By stripping inmates of their ability to locate the self via social networks, possessions, or the management of their own appearance, the clinics also forced them to confront the realization that they no longer possessed bodily autonomy.

Beyond breaking down social ties and bodily autonomy, entrance proceedings also located the blame and guilt for drug usage in the individual rather than his or her social circumstances by wiping out the drug users’ previous control over their physical being. After staff changed users’ clothes, shaved, and bathed them, a doctor arrived to perform a thorough bodily inspection, which the report specified must “include an anal and genital inspection,” and then filled in forms about their physical condition, decided their method and time limit for quitting drugs, and arranged them into work teams.³⁰⁹ The measurements of physical characteristics included base-line abstractions such as height, weight, and fingerprints, attributes that one possesses regardless of one’s conception of self. As Goffman puts it, “action taken on the basis of such attributes necessarily ignores most of his [the offender’s] previous bases of self-identification.”³¹⁰ Put differently, these measurements served to forcibly homogenize offenders

³⁰⁸ Goffman, *Asylums*, p19.

³⁰⁹ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p23. Link to Guantanamo Bay studies later maybe once I do more reading.

³¹⁰ Goffman, *Asylums*, p16.

by reducing them to a set of knowable and scientific measurements that stood in for the discrete characteristics and unique social circumstances that led to one's drug use. The vital statistics sheet erased familial, local, cultural, and social ties in its drive to distill people down to height, weight, and blood type. The clinics reduced and elided the complex histories behind people's drug usage through the prioritization of measurable physical facts as the way to recognize, understand, and treat drug use. In this way, the clinic also located drug usage only in the body of the individual. Rather than seeing drug usage as an issue of one's social or historical conditions, drug usage was traced to, measured from, and treated by direct control and management of the body.

The medical examination was a moment where the clinic's overpowering power over the body of the drug offender manifested itself in the form of the doctor. Even in medical consultations under normal circumstances, there are distinct power inequalities between patient and doctor. For example, the patient is almost always kept in the dark as to the true facts of their condition and sometimes about the possible consequences of treatment.³¹¹ At drug suppression clinics, offenders' complete inability to control their entrance or exit intensified these power dynamics, particularly given that the report mandated that the medical exam be thorough and "include an anal and genital inspection."³¹² While the entrance procedures systematically broke down offenders' various methods of defining and understanding one's self, the medical exam forcibly violated their bodily autonomy and forced them to understand that they existed simply as something that the state could manage, discipline, probe, shave, strip, control, manage, or

³¹¹ See for example, Peter Conrad, "Medicalization and Social Control," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 18 (1992), pp209-232.

³¹² SMA B168-1-755, "上海市禁烟禁毒委员会戒烟所 X 事细则," (trans. "Shanghai Municipality's Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics") p23. Lit. "包括检查及隧道"

dispose of at will.³¹³ The clinic's institutionalized violation of offenders' bodies sought to establish the offender as a form of bare flesh, entirely without rights and subject to the medical and legal authority of the state as manifested through the clinics and the clinical staff.³¹⁴

Taken together, entrance procedures sought to deprive offenders of their identity and force them into a situation in which they internalized that there was something deeply wrong with who they were before in order to make them amenable to the discipline of the clinic. In brief, they sought to create patients out of offenders, to medicalize a criminal body and thus legitimate direct psychological and physical disciplining of the offender. As Goffman notes, the "automatic identification of the inmate is not merely name-calling; it is at the center of a basic means of social control."³¹⁵ Moreover, the entrance procedures served to mark a point of no return for the drug offender, a point after which the legal and medical systems would always have tangible, medically-certified evidence of their offenses.³¹⁶ Clinical entrance procedures thus worked with policing forces to certify and archive the guilt of drug users. Entrance proceedings not only created a conception of the drug user as degenerate, diseased, and not in control of their own body but also tried to force the examinees to conceive of themselves as drug offenders, people whose condition was permanent and justified their incarceration within the clinic.

³¹³ People were not executed at clinics, but the point is that the procedures assumed and worked to create certain stigma and meaning about the bodies of offenders that legitimated future violence.

³¹⁴ Goffman also notes how many entrance procedures at mental asylums feature an element of "hazing" or breaking the will or spirit of patients by forcing them to show extreme deference to staff. See *Asylums* p89-90 for more detail.

³¹⁵ Goffman, *Asylums*, p84.

³¹⁶ The MPS placed all of the medical records and certifications of one's drug usage into personal history files which then were available for future policing forces to reference. In this way, the clinical procedures served to also archive the guilt of users.

Guidelines to Everyday Life—Creating and Controlling Politically Deficient Flesh

After passing through the entrance procedures and examination, staff arranged the newly christened patients into “small groups of 20-25 people, every three of these small groups formed a regular sized group, and three regular sized groups formed a team.”³¹⁷ Notable here is the focus on batch management and the elision of any personal circumstances, individuality, or autonomy on the part of the users. The constant focus on grouping users into ever larger groups and teams belies an underlying conception of users as fundamentally defined only by their drug usage. On a basic level, the clinic grouped users together in managing their everyday lives because it saw them all as just drug users, indistinct from one another and mutually interchangeable. The clinic saw users simply as flesh, objectified, interchangeable, and something to be arranged, ordered, and managed.

Specifically, clinical regulations indicate that the state saw drug users as politically deficient and thus as not belonging in post-1949 China. Daily life within the clinic focused on rearranging users’ social identities through activities and political study. Shanghai’s guidelines stipulated that “after being arranged into teams, addicts should simultaneously quit using drugs and carry out political study.”³¹⁸ A report from Harbin’s anti-narcotics committee in 1953 even states that “these people [addicts], when they enter the clinic, need a strengthening of political and ideological education, explaining policy, and freeing their mind of worries. [Only] Afterwards decide on the plan for quitting drugs. Every day organize appropriate studying and

³¹⁷ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p24. Lit. “二十至二十五人組成一小隊，三小隊為一分隊，三分隊為一中隊。”

³¹⁸ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p24. Lit. “烟民編隊后施戒與政治學習同時進行”

light physical labor, this way, addicts are really happy.”³¹⁹ Despite the report’s optimistic view that users enjoyed forced political education and labor, the Central Committee circulated Harbin’s report as a model to consult for other areas in China. Both local reports and the Central Committee, then, saw drug users as politically deficient, to the extent that, sometimes, correcting political deficiency took priority over curing drug usage. Drug users’ need to carry out further political study highlights the state’s conception of them as fundamentally not fitting into the post-49 social order that the CCP wanted to bring about. As in the case of counterrevolutionaries, landlords, and other class enemies, such a lack of political belonging justified and often directly led to overt physical violence.³²⁰ Unlike in the case of counterrevolutionaries, landlords, or other class enemies, however, the clinic also saw drug users as incapable of controlling even their basic bodily functions and thus open to invasive forms of control.

The focus on controlling the bodily functions and experiences of users highlights how the state’s biopolitical prerogative functioned through everyday forms of bodily management within the clinic and, in doing so, further reduced drug users to bare flesh. Regulations stipulated that “addicts’ food and drink [diet?], getting up and going to bed, and activities are all under the leadership of the small group leader, they [addicts] must strictly observe discipline.”³²¹

³¹⁹ SMA B1-2-887, “哈爾濱市戒烟工作總結,” (trans. “Harbin Municipality Anti-Narcotics Work Concluding Report”) p12. Lit “這些人入所時必須加強政治思想教育，交代政策，解除顧慮。之後訂立戒烟計劃。每天組織適當的學習與輕微勞動，烟民很高興” The report from Harbin was noted by the Central Committee as being especially useful, and it circulated the report to every large district administrative council, inner Mongolia’s autonomous region’s people’s government, every province, municipal governing body, and provincial administrative and governing body as an example to consider and consult.

³²⁰ For examples see 楊奎松, 中華人民共和國建國史研究 1, (江南：江南人民出版社, 2009). (Yang Kuisong, *Research on the Founding of the People’s Republic of China*, Vol. 1, Jiangnan: Jiangnan People’s Publishing House, 2009), and also Julia Strauss, “Paternalist Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the People’s Republic of China, 1950-1953.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44, no. 1 (2002): 80-105.

³²¹ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p24. Lit. “烟民之飲食起臥活動均由小隊長一人領導，嚴格的遵守紀律。”

Regarding cleanliness, the guidelines state, “addicts must bathe at least once a week, in the summer at least 3 to 4 times a week.”³²² Besides the recurring focus on the uncleanness of drug users, the strict regulation of daily life activities and the overt focus on maintaining discipline highlight a conception of the user as someone incapable of existing in normal society, that staff needed to constantly discipline. The state saw drug users not only as politically deficient, but also, because of their drug usage, as forfeiting the right to control their own bodies on a basic everyday level.

Clinics further saw the bodies of drug users as unclean and vectors of disease. From the moment of entrance onwards, the Shanghai clinics paid inordinate attention to preventing the spread of disease by acting directly on the bodies of drug offenders. For example, entrance proceedings specified not only that staff must bathe drug offenders but also that, before bathing, drug users had to “undergo a strict examination of articles they brought with them and use DD[T] sanitizer in order to prevent concealing drugs and to stop the spread of contagious diseases.”³²³ Users in the clinic who were seriously ill, meanwhile, should be transferred to the sick room, and if necessary sent to the hospital for radiation and other treatment.³²⁴ Similarly, regulations stipulated that drug users “must take turns washing clothes and doing cleaning work.”³²⁵ While a charitable interpretation could argue that clarifying policy surrounding

³²² SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p24. Lit. “烟民至少每星期沐浴一次（夏天則需至少三四次）。”

³²³ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p23. Lit, “入所時烟民自帶各物須經嚴格檢查並用 DD 消毒，以防偷藏烟毒及傳染疾病” DD in this sentence refers to DDT.

³²⁴ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p24.

³²⁵ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p24. Lit “洗衣及打掃清潔工作均需輪流員責【原則】”

sickness and working duties is a normal part of institutional life, the guidelines spend far more time focusing on keeping diseases at bay as opposed to treating drug usage. Taken together, the clinics wanted to sanitize drug users, bathe them, strictly require that they kept their clothes and living spaces clean, and had multiple contingency plans in the case of a disease outbreak, including the construction of an entirely separate sick ward and, if need be, the transfer of users to other facilities. The regulations thus reveal the clinic's assumption that drug users were likely to spread disease and thus justified aggressive cleaning measures on the part of the staff, up to and including micromanagement of users' bathing habits. Moreover, none of these regulations reflect a conception of these measures as for the good of the offender. All of them are framed as preventing the spread of disease, rather than of ensuring the best treatment for the sick user. Insofar as the clinic looked to manage disease, it did so in a way that reflected a conception of the user as diseased flesh, something to be isolated to prevent epidemic, with recovery a secondary concern.

Regulations also focused extensively on the untrustworthiness of drug users, while simultaneously asserting the authority of the doctor over the body of the user. For example, entrance proceedings and daily life regulations assumed that drug users would try to smuggle drugs into the clinic either on their own person or through the mail.³²⁶ The clinic's assumption that the drug user would smuggle drugs shows a view of the drug user as a medical and criminal subject, while also presuming that no user actually wanted to quit using drugs of their own accord but rather entered the clinic against their will and thus needed constant surveillance. The clinic saw users as always potential criminals, rather than simply as patients. Moreover, in the realm of everyday labor, regulations mandated that if users "bodily strength cannot bear it

³²⁶ SMA B168-1-755, "上海市禁烟禁毒委员会戒烟所 X 事细则," (trans. "Shanghai Municipality's Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics") p22-24.

[clothes washing, cleaning, and other work] and [they] need a break, they must first have a doctor's certification/proof.”³²⁷ Similarly, users had to have a doctor's certification that their physical health was not good enough if they wanted a temporary break from political education programs.³²⁸ Clinics thus saw drug users as, at best lazy, and thereby unfit for taking part in the construction of socialist China, and at worst as deceitful. Perhaps reflecting a cognizance of realities in society more broadly, clinics assumed users wanted to dodge both labor and political education. This assumption in turn legitimized the doctor's authority over the user. The users themselves did not know when they were tired or could no longer work. Only the doctor knew that and thus had authority to excuse inmates from work or education. These policies communicated to the user that they no longer even knew the limits of their own body and that the doctor knew them better than they knew themselves.

Finally, regulations evinced a conception of the drug user as something to be kept apart from the world outside. Specifically, the guidelines stipulated that “after entering the clinic, addicts must be absolutely isolated from the outside world. They cannot receive any contact from friends or family and also cannot correspond through letters, in order to stop the spread of drugs.”³²⁹ Besides the conception of the drug user as someone the clinic needed to strictly control, the regulations here convey the clinic's efforts to completely isolate the drug user from family and friends. This guideline encapsulated the clinic's attempt to ensure that they could break down drug users. By cutting off correspondence as well as physical contact with the

³²⁷ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality's Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p24. Lit. “因體力不能支持需要休息者經醫生證明可以例外”

³²⁸ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality's Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p24.

³²⁹ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality's Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p24. Lit. “烟民入所后須與外界絕對隔絕，不可接見親友，亦不可通信，以防授遞烟毒”

outside world, the clinic sought to kill off any ties drug users had to their previous selves, to unmake drug users and to open them up to the clinic's disciplining and remaking efforts. Moreover, the total severing of contact with the outside shows the clinic's conception of drug users as not belonging in the world outside the walls. The clinic rationalizes its guidelines here as a way to stop drug transfer, highlighting again a reduction of the drug user to only their drug usage, and a fear of contamination between the two worlds. Cutting contact not only kept drugs out of users' hands but also prevented the contamination of drug use from spreading back to a new China that the MPS was diligently purging of drugs.

Exit Proceedings—The State's and Science's Claim to the Archived and Objectified Flesh

In lieu of a conclusion, here I briefly examine the sheer extent to which drug users no longer remained in control of their own body through a closer examination of the clinic's exit proceedings and how the MPS mobilized scientific authority to certify and archive their guilt. Exit screenings call additional attention to the depth of the linkage between the medical and carceral realms and how the state used medicine and scientific testing to certify and then archive the criminality of drug users.

Guidelines on exiting the clinic underscore the clinic's existence at the intersection of the medical and carceral realms. When users left the clinic, they first had to "undergo a doctor's inspection to certify that they have stopped using drugs, then proceed to the managing and disciplinary departments to obtain permission," before the clinic would let them depart.³³⁰ Users not only had to quit using drugs but also had to obtain permission from clinical management and the committee in charge of their political re-education and discipline. The clinic thus had a built-

³³⁰ SMA B168-1-755, "上海市禁烟禁毒委员会戒烟所 X 事细则," (trans. "Shanghai Municipality's Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics") p25. Lit "烟民经医生证明瘾断毒除后, 可至总经组及管教组准许"

in mechanism to keep drug free, but politically uneducated or problematic members confined within the walls until the disciplinary department deemed them safe enough to let back into society. This mechanism also meant that patients had to prove they were fully reformed, to demonstrate compliance with the institution's and state's goals consistently throughout their stay.³³¹ Just as entrance proceedings worked directly in tandem with local police departments, exit proceedings again portrayed the user as a medical and criminal subject, someone the clinic should have remade in both body and mind before letting back out into society. To safeguard against any further malfeasance on the part of the user, they were instructed to “personally take their exit certificate to their police station and local district's anti-narcotics committee and report in.”³³² This measure both ensured police forces had the latest information on the user and also that suspected users had no proof of innocence if the police register did not contain their name. At the very least, they would be guilty of failing to report their exit from the clinic, and, at worst, of somehow leaving the clinic without approval and thus, in the eyes of the state, still addicted to drugs.

After users left the clinic, the medical-legal apparatus retained control over users' perpetually guilty bodies. The regulations make clear that policing forces remained deeply suspicious of users even after their departure from the clinic. For example, in the subsection on exit guidelines, the guideline states after leaving the clinic “local districts anti-narcotics committee should communicate closely with the anti-narcotics small working groups to help

³³¹ Jan Kiely notes an almost identical process at work in prisons and labor camps in the 1950s. The system focuses on extracting compliance to the state, rather than any real notion of reform. See Kiely, p286.

³³² SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality's Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p25. Lit “烟民出所后持出所證，親往派出所及各該區禁烟禁毒分會報告”

police surveil and control [addicts].”³³³ Further reflecting this suspicion of the user as perpetually guilty, regulations stated that “after leaving the clinic, at any time the district’s anti-narcotics committee can notify the addict to return to the clinic for testing and examination, with the examination not to exceed more than three full days.”³³⁴ The continued reference to the ostensibly cured drug user with the same term used before they entered the clinic, “addict,” highlights the state’s conception of users as perpetually marked by their drug usage. The guidelines further noted that the entrance procedures for these re-examinations should be the same as the regular entrance proceedings and that “the number of examinations should be prescribed by a doctor according to the individual circumstances, [and] do not approach addicts with direct proof/results.”³³⁵ After departure, then, the state not only considered the user as still potentially guilty but also reserved the right to force them back into the clinic for three days of examination and testing, over which the doctor held unilateral discretion. Clinics here did not use testing to ascertain how best to help users quit drugs. They used testing to certify users’ guilt while buying time for police to act by keeping users in the dark.³³⁶ Users’ exit from the clinic was not a moment of renewal or successful rehabilitation but merely marked the users’ entrance back into a broad network of surveillance and control. The state thus used medicine as a tool that

³³³ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p25. Lit “有區分會聯係禁烟禁毒小組協助派出所予以監督管制”

³³⁴ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p25. Lit “烟民出所后隨時可由區分會通知來所臨 X 調驗限期三整日”

³³⁵ SMA B168-1-755, “上海市禁烟禁毒委員會戒烟所 X 事細則,” (trans. “Shanghai Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Committee Detailed Regulations for Drug Quitting Clinics”) p25. Lit “調驗次數由醫師按照個別情形規定之，不向烟民具體證明”

³³⁶ According to a report from Tianjin’s ANC, if users tested positive for drug use at this stage, they were to be immediately sent to the people’s court and harshly punished, while also being forced to quit using drugs. SMA B168-1-755, “天津市烟民烟毒辦法,” (trans. “Tianjin Municipality’s Anti-Narcotics Methods”) p20.

worked hand in glove with police forces to reduce offenders to flesh and surveil, confine, and produce medically certified proof of their criminality.

Chapter 4: “A Sea of Blood and Hatred”: Persuading People to Hate Drug Criminals in the CCP’s Anti-Narcotics Campaign, 1949-1952

In September of 1952, in a scene mirrored across China, a crowd gathered in Chongqing to watch the public trial of several people accused of using or trafficking drugs. People rushed forward towards the prison transport and screamed insults, physically struck, and spat at the accused as police forces guided them towards the stage in front of the crowd. At the end of the public trial and mass struggle session, police forces pronounced the accused guilty, and, accompanied by waving flags, chanting slogans, and beating drums, shot several of them in front of the baying crowd. After witnessing the killings, an audience member remarked that coming to anti-narcotics rallies and watching the executions, “is more fun than eating popsicles!”³³⁷ How did police and government officials persuade ordinary people to not only accept intracommunal violence, but to celebrate it as entertainment? What happened in the moments after the accused stepped off the prison transport and before the killing that made their deaths so entertaining to the watching crowds?

This chapter discusses the long-term ramifications of the dehumanizing propaganda attacks on drug criminals explored in earlier chapters by focusing on mass rallies and large public trials like the one above. Propaganda, clinical studies, and governmental policy during the Republican-era (1912-1949) reshaped the figure of the drug user from one who could conspicuously consume opium into an irreparably morally-damaged degenerate. Together, these three efforts widely propagated images of drug users as underdeveloped evolutionary relics, contagious dangers to public health, vestiges of pre-modernity, animalized threats to the Chinese

³³⁷ Luo Ruiqing, “中共中央转发罗瑞卿关于全国禁毒运动第五号简报” (The Central Committee Forwards Luo Ruiqing’s Fifth Report on the National Anti-Narcotics Movement), September 14, 1952. Lit: “比吃冰棍还痛快.”

nation's past, present, and future, unproductive bodies that placed a strain on the new Chinese state, living, visible, and still dangerous remnants of colonialism, and, underwriting everything, as subhuman. These dehumanizing discourses valorized the authority of medicine, doctors, and public health officials by pathologizing drug crimes. The question that remained unanswered due to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese and Civil Wars was whether people would help or hinder government efforts to eradicate drug crimes and drug criminals.

After the CCP seized control of China in 1949, it put this question to the test and started a nation-wide Anti-Narcotics Campaign (1949-1952, ANC). Throughout the entirety of the campaign, officials forced offenders into a registration system and incarcerated them in narcotics suppression clinics, as I discussed in chapter 3. These two systems reified drug offenders as subhuman beings that deserved to be isolated, examined, and punished because their drug use forever marked them as untrustworthy and contaminated beings that had no place in a changing China. In this chapter, I shift from the institutional and systems-focused perspective of chapter 3 to examine the mass rally, the visceral and communal experience that underpinned the entirety of the anti-narcotics campaign, and nigh-all Mao-era policing efforts.

Mass rallies played a critical role in the CCP's efforts to elicit two intense emotional reactions from people towards drug offenders: rage and hatred. Local and high-level officials consistently focused on hatred in nearly every planning document of the anti-narcotics campaign. Indeed, in 1952, in a report to Chairman Mao and the Central Committee, Minister of Public Security Luo Ruiqing identified a lack of hatred as the cause of the campaign's failure in several cities and as a key thing to be rectified as the campaign moved forward.³³⁸

³³⁸ Luo Ruiqing, "Second Report on the Anti-Drug Movement (禁毒运动第二号简报)," August 24, 1952.

This chapter makes two main arguments. First, Party leaders saw instigating hatred against drug offenders as a crucial way for the PRC to consolidate power and secure popular support. Hatred was the reason that people celebrated and enjoyed watching and participating in intracommunal violence. Party leaders' focus on hatred is not necessarily unique to the anti-narcotics campaign; hatred and rage featured prominently in CCP rhetoric throughout the Mao era.³³⁹ Indeed, the consistent focus on hatred throughout the Mao era underscores the need for a scholarly analysis of how and to what effect the state instilled hatred towards designated enemies and how that affected the targets of their ire. Current scholarship on mass rallies and policing in Mao's China takes for granted that hatred featured at these rallies but does not examine in detail the effects of that hatred.³⁴⁰ This scholarship glosses over why Party leaders focused so heavily on that specific emotional response and how they elicited it.³⁴¹ The history of how police and public treated drug users during the early years of Communist Party rule shows that the hatred of the anti-narcotics campaign built on the past prejudices people held towards drug offenders. Indeed, campaign-planning documents reveal a consistent referral to the dehumanizing tropes of past propaganda work, such as the skeleton man, to instill hatred towards drug users as quickly and effectively as possible. Second, I argue that the state's incitement of hatred and rage constituted a form of emotional violence, or violence that aims, as a primary outcome, to

³³⁹ For example, campaign rhetoric on counterrevolutionaries, landlords, intellectuals, KMT sympathizers, and class enemies all feature hatred in some form or another.

³⁴⁰ For examples of scholarship on mass campaigns and policing see the works of Julia Strauss, Yang Kuisong, and Michael Dutton, *Policing Chinese Politics: A History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).

³⁴¹ Elizabeth Perry has noted how Mao consistently focused on the critical importance of emotional work in driving the CCP's revolution forward, from its inception all the way through to the end of the Mao-era (and even afterwards), but has not specifically discussed the specific role of hatred within this broader context. She and others have discussed some of the various ways that Mao-era rallies elicited a variety of emotional responses, but here I focus more specifically on how cadres incited hatred in the people over other responses. See, Elizabeth J. Perry, "Moving the masses: Emotion work in the Chinese revolution," *Mobilization* 7 no. 2 (2002): 111-128.

alienate, isolate, and dehumanize others.³⁴² Party leaders saw this emotional violence as a critical tool to help them create new senses of community and social belonging as the CCP sought to rebuild China out of the ashes of the Anti-Japanese and Chinese Civil wars.

Focusing on hatred during mass anti-narcotics rallies builds on new scholarship that has shown how the connection between hyper-visibility and vulnerability to hatred is unstable and mediated through specific physical spaces as well as social relations.³⁴³ Examining the cultivation of hatred at anti-narcotics rallies highlights how state actors produced symbolic, systemic, and everyday violence by using propaganda and cultural memory to mark drug offenders as hyper-visible, vulnerable, and socially acceptable targets of hate. While physical spaces and social relations play important roles in fomenting hatred, using familiar cultural products and specific ways of managing audiences played equally important roles in cultivating the searing hatred of the anti-narcotics campaign.

Hate generates and secures a collective identity by casting the ordinary or regular person as the victim of a real or perceived injury. As cultural theorist Sara Ahmed writes, “the emotion of hate works to animate the ordinary subject...by constituting the ordinary as in crisis, and the ordinary person as the real victim...the ordinary or normative subject is reproduced as the injured party; the one that is ‘hurt’ or even damaged by the ‘invasion’ of others.”³⁴⁴ In this broad

³⁴² As noted in the introduction, I understand violence in the broadest sense as a complex and evolving set of social relations, practices, representations and experiences that contest and legitimate political power. Each chapter focuses on broadening our understanding of the various ways the state uses violence to legitimate power and how it permeates different areas of life. Where chapter one focused on rhetorical violence, chapter two focused on propagandistic violence, chapter three on the violence of reification, this chapter focuses on emotional violence, and chapter five focuses on the ritualized violence of public killings. Fernando Coronil and Julie Skurski, (eds.) *States of Violence* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006).

³⁴³ Edward Hall, John Clayton, and Catherine Donovan, eds., *Landscapes of Hate - Tracing Spaces, Relations and Responses* (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2022). Edward Hall and Ellie Bates, “Hatescape? A Relational Geography of Disability Hate Crime, Exclusion and Belonging in the City,” *Geoforum* 101 (May 1, 2019): 100–110, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.02.024>.

³⁴⁴ Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion: Second Edition* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004, 2014), 43–44.

sense, hatred create the figure(s) of the other in a flexible and adaptable way based on perceived grievances or wrongs. Hatred also organizes social relations between groups and activities because it is directed at groups not only at specific individuals. As Ahmed writes, “Hate cannot be found in one figure, but works to create the outline of different...objects of hate, a creation that crucially aligns the figures together, and constitutes them as a ‘common threat’...Hate does not reside in a given subject or object. Hate is economic; it circulates between signifiers in relationships of difference and displacement.”³⁴⁵ Put differently, people hate individuals, but conflate together this hatred with a hatred of a perceived similar group, seeing them as a common threat. Because of this perceived common threat, hatred easily flows from one “threatening” individual to another and in doing so differentiates certain members of the threatening group as more threatening and worthy of hatred than others. In the context of 1950s China, policing and party officials saw hate as a crucial tool because it allowed them to align the various negative signifiers previous discourses assigned to drug usage into a shared and urgent threat to the PRC and its people.³⁴⁶ Hatred produces not only emotional or psychic consequences but also material and social ones. The goal of hate is not simply to mobilize individuals to hate individual drug users but also to bind people together and create a shared sense of social identity through a hatred of all drug offenders.

Hatred allowed the state to conflate the individual drug offender with the fearful specter of drugs writ large. The state’s conflation of the individual and the drug offender is critical because it turns an act of revenge or justice with a definite endpoint against one individual—I accuse my neighbor of selling drugs and he is punished accordingly—into an endless crusade

³⁴⁵ Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, 44.

³⁴⁶ These discourses and the signifiers they used were discussed in more detail in chapters 1 and 2. Images of drug users and traffickers as diseased, vectors of Western imperialism, and ever-present threats to the Chinese people were among the most common.

against a faceless bogeyman that the state can repeatedly cite as an existential threat and mobilize people against.³⁴⁷ Indeed, Ahmed writes that this figure of the bogeyman is

...a ghost-like figure in the present, who gives us nightmares about the future, as an anticipation of future injury...such figures of hate circulate, and indeed accumulate their affective value, precisely insofar as they do not have a fixed referent...the impossibility of reducing hate to a particular body allows hate to circulate in an economic sense, working to differentiate some others from other others, a differentiation that is never 'over,' as it awaits others who have not yet arrived...Such a discourse of 'waiting for the bogus' is what justifies the repetition of violence against the bodies of others in the name of protecting the nation.³⁴⁸

Hatred turned the specter of drug offenders into a direct threat to the Chinese people and the Chinese nation, creating a state of emergency in which the state's use of violence against drug offenders was both necessary and in service to the people. Because this hatred never had a defined, individual referent the state could also use it to mark certain bodies as more dangerous and deserving of harsher punishments than others. CCP leaders and policing officials attempted to forge new emotional and affective bonds between themselves and the Chinese people at mass rallies where they came together and inflicted emotional and physical violence against the accused individuals that they conflated with the hated phantom of drug crimes that had haunted Chinese cultural imaginations for over a century.³⁴⁹

The government's intention to incite rage and hatred of drug users is evident in both national and local reports on the anti-narcotics campaign. Shanghai provides most of the local documents here, because, as noted in the introduction, the city was a major site of action for the CCP's anti-narcotics campaign and a place that the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) wanted

³⁴⁷ I should note here that I define "justice" also as an act of revenge.

³⁴⁸ Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, 46.

³⁴⁹ In chapter 5, I explore further explore hatred as a modified/twisted form of "collective effervescence," the feeling of euphoria and solidarity (of purpose as well) that comes when you are in a crowd united in purpose and ideal. What Durkheim sees at the root of intense religious feeling and bonds, and at the root of deep social bonds. Émile Durkheim *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1912, English translation by Joseph Swain: 1915) The Free Press, 1965.

other locations to emulate. Also useful are a variety of propaganda planning documents from Shanghai's various propaganda bureaus about their efforts in the anti-narcotics campaign. Internal documents detailed the various strategies cadres used to get people angry and turn them against drug offenders. The MPS explicitly forbade the public circulation of these reports, intending them for internal planning use only, meaning that the documents are less prone to exaggeration or misinformation. These documents are particularly interesting because of their consistent use of language of emotion, in this case, hatred and anger, both as tools for the anti-narcotics efforts to use and as benchmarks to measure the effectiveness of the campaign.

To begin, the chapter discusses the specific policies and methods Party leaders and campaign officials used to whip people into a frenzy of hate. I examine ground-level campaign policy documents, the transcripts of campaign rallies, and high level CCP political documents to discuss the various ways that the campaign pitted people against drug offenders. I then analyze the various audience reactions to mass rallies to understand the various ways that the emotional violence of the crowd affected individual people and some of the specific ways that the crowd expressed their hatred and attacked individuals. Finally, I conclude the chapter by showing how ordinary people at times resisted the violence of the state and the masses, how they exerted their own agency in the face of enormous state and public pressure. Regarding terminology, I use the terms “drug offender” and “drug criminal” to refer to the MPS’ broad category for all drug related crimes—producing, trafficking, smuggling, using,—and drug user to refer specifically to people who smoke, inject, or take drugs in any fashion.³⁵⁰ I use the term “drug criminal” because that is the way that policing forces and many people attending mass rallies viewed these people. My use of the term in no way means that I agree with this designation, but I believe it is

³⁵⁰ The Chinese terms used in the sources are, 毒犯 and 吸毒者, respectively.

important to highlight that police and public considered people with personal association with drugs as criminals. I also have anonymized the names of every accused drug offender or user who appears in the text below, as well as the names of any audience members or CCP cadres that I quote.

“Every Wrong Has its Perpetrator”: Where, When, and Who to Hate

At the highest level, political leaders and policing officials wanted people to fight against and hate drug criminals. A July 1952 report from the Deputy Minister of Public Security, Xu Zirong, stated that “mobilizing the masses to thoroughly wipe out the pollution and scum [drug criminals, large traffickers] left over from the old society all at once is the key to eliminating the drug epidemic.”³⁵¹ The report later stated, “[campaign officials] must quickly convene an appropriate mass meeting...so that the masses fully understand the significance of the anti-narcotics campaign, arouse them to fight against drug criminals, report drug criminals, and actively assist the people’s government in anti-narcotics work.”³⁵² Officials here wanted to encourage people to turn in drug offenders and create solidarity between the state and the people by engaging people in the government’s anti-narcotics activities. Minister of Public Security Luo Ruiqing also noted, in his second report to the Central Committee on the anti-narcotics campaign, that state efforts were not successful in many places because officials “had not aroused the masses’ hatred for drug criminals and their zeal for turning in suspected

³⁵¹ Xu Zirong, “Xu Zirong’s Report on the Problems of the Anti-Narcotics Movement (徐子荣关于禁毒问题的报告), 1952.07.28. Lit: “充分揭露其罪恶事实, 发动群众, 把这些旧社会遗留下来的污毒和渣滓, 来一次集中的彻底的扫除, 这是肃清毒品流行的中心关键.” Implicit here is also the idea that drug users exist as someone out of time and development, belonging to the old, weak, foreign-dominated society. Similar to how drug users in the US that get targeted by the state are similarly those that are written out of “real (white, upper class) America”

³⁵² Xu Zirong, “Xu Zirong’s Report on the Problems of the Anti-Narcotics Movement” (徐子荣关于禁毒问题的报告), 1952.07.28. Lit: “必须迅速地召集适当的群众大会, 向群众全面地交清政策, 使群众充分了解禁毒运动的意义, 动员他们积极地与毒犯的罪恶活动作斗争, 检举毒犯, 积极地协助人民政府进行禁毒工作.”

criminals.”³⁵³ Luo’s third report to the committee the following month stated that to spur the campaign onwards, officials should continue to arrest large numbers of offenders and hold major public trials in places where people were particularly apathetic to the campaign’s messaging. At these trials, Luo stated,

Each city should put several major drug criminals, those most evil ones or the ones that people hate the most who haven’t repented, on trial and then kill them. At the same time, punish a separate group of them leniently, to communicate the [campaign’s] policy and bring the anti-narcotics movement to a climax, smash the arrogance of drug offenders, advance the education of the masses, and divide and demoralize drug criminals.³⁵⁴

Notable here is Luo’s focus on hatred and popular anger. Hatred functioned as a selection method for killing in these reports. Popular ire and rage in reaction to public killings directly impacted the Central Committee’s decision to target certain people over others for execution. These upper-level reports cast drug criminals as evil things that Chinese people should hate, scum that people and police should eliminate and fight against together. The mass rally also featured prominently in their reports, with both the deputy minister and minister identifying the mass rally as the key to inspiring people’s zeal and hatred, and to dividing, demoralizing and smashing drug criminals.

At the local level, these official recommendations and directions to incite public fury and hate, combined with the campaign’s absolute prohibition against any form of written propaganda, such as newspaper articles or editorials, meant that the mass rally became the key vehicle for educating people on the dangers of narcotics. Political leaders instructed local

³⁵³ Luo Ruiqing, “The Central Committee Forwards Luo Ruiqing’s Second Report on the National Anti-Narcotics Movement” (中共中央转发罗瑞卿关于全国禁毒运动第二号简报), 1952.08.24. Lit: “没有激发群众对毒犯的仇恨心和检举毒犯的积极性”

³⁵⁴ Luo Ruiqing, “The Central Committee Forwards Luo Ruiqing’s Third Report on the National Anti-Narcotics Movement” (中共中央转发罗瑞卿关于全国禁毒运动第三号简报), 1952.09.01. Lit: “每个城市判上几个至十几个成分坏、罪恶和民愤极大又拒不坦白的大毒犯的死刑，同时从宽处理一批，全面交待政策，将运动推向高潮，以达到打下毒犯气焰、发动教育群众和分化瓦解毒犯的目的。”

officials to destroy any physical trace of the campaign or paper trail, in part due to U.S. accusations that China was smuggling drugs to Japan.³⁵⁵ Officials emphasized that the anti-narcotics campaign was a patriotic and nationalistic movement, a direct strike back against American imperialists and those who were simultaneously trying to poison China's image on an international scale and its people back home.³⁵⁶ After the conclusion of the campaign, local officials in Shanghai's Municipal Party Committee's Propaganda Office worked hard to ensure that any written remnants of the campaign were erased. In a report from June 1953, officials noted that several districts and work units had yet to return campaign materials and that, if not rectified quickly, they would have to provide a list of those who had lost campaign propaganda materials.³⁵⁷ Indeed, in one case officials judged a local propaganda bureau cadre who lost several documents relating to the campaign as "making a severe mistake" and the cadre himself asked for punishment and to "rectify his lack of responsibility," because his mistake "could have caused great harm to the Party's work."³⁵⁸ Some officials were so concerned about potential

³⁵⁵ Central Committee Propaganda Bureau "Instructions from the Central Ministry of Public Security on Anti-Narcotics Propaganda" (中央宣传部、中央公安部关于禁毒宣传的指示), 1952.07.00. Lit: "但为避免美国帝国主义利用我禁毒运动进行造谣污蔑（不久以前美国即曾在联合国污蔑我向日本输出鸦片），这次禁毒宣传只限于在人民群众中进行内部的口头的宣传，不在报纸、刊物、新华社及广播电台作公开的文字的宣传。一切公开的报纸、刊物、新华社及广播电台不得发表关于禁毒运动的任何消息，违者应受处分。” (English translation: "Because the US imperialists have used our anti-narcotics movement to spread rumors and slander (not long ago the US slanderously accused China of sending opium to Japan at the United Nations), this time anti-narcotics propaganda is limited to internal and verbal propaganda among the people. Do not use newspapers, publications, Xinhua news or radio stations to openly publish any propaganda work. All openly published newspapers, publications, Xinhua news, or radio stations are not allowed to circulate any information concerning the anti-narcotics movement, all violators will be punished." Also noted in Yongming Zhou *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China*, p100.

³⁵⁶ Central Committee Propaganda Bureau, "Instructions from the Central Ministry of Public Security on Anti-Narcotics Propaganda" (中央宣传部、中央公安部关于禁毒宣传的指示), 1952.07.00. The report notes that "the anti-narcotics campaign is a patriotic movement to combat the aggressive conspiracy of American imperialism, protect the interests of the people." Lit: "因此，禁毒运动乃是打击帝国主义的侵略阴谋、维护人民利益的爱国主义运动。围绕这一内容，凡帝国主义国家制造输入贩运毒品的案件，人民身受毒害的实例，历史上帝国主义强迫输入毒品的罪行，都应强调宣传。”

³⁵⁷ SMA A22-1-41-45 "通知，滬委宣辦" (Notice, Shanghai Committee on Propaganda), 1953.06.10, pp1-2.

³⁵⁸ SMA A59-1-40-39, "關於 Anonymized name 同志遺失“禁毒工作幾項佈置“文件初步處理意見” (Opinions on Comrade XX's loss of "anti-narcotics work arrangements" documents and first steps towards punishment). Second document, "關於遺失“禁毒工作幾項佈置“文件的報告” (Report on the loss of "anti-narcotics work

missteps that even in their written reports they substituted a circle for the character for “drugs” and a triangle for the one for “opium.”³⁵⁹ From the top-down, the anti-narcotics campaign was structured entirely around non-permanent modes of communication and propaganda.

Restrictions on campaign materials resulted in officials relying entirely on in-person or oral methods, such as loudspeakers, to spread the propaganda and messaging of the campaign.³⁶⁰ Rallies, ranging in scale from massive public trials and struggle sessions down to neighborhood rallies, became the default methods of the campaign. In a September 1952 survey report on one of Shanghai’s many local anti-narcotics work units, campaign officials noted that since the start of their work, shortly after they began the campaign on February 24, 1950, they had convened “large and small, all sorts of different rallies 190 times.” Of those who had attended the rallies, a suspiciously specific 35,664 people had “actually received education [on the anti-narcotics messaging].”³⁶¹ In particular, officials wrote that “ever since the city started holding mass public trials and local districts held public hearings, the campaign propaganda has spread everywhere and in more depth...and showed the government’s resolve against drugs.”³⁶² Rallies allowed people to personally come and witness the government’s crusade against narcotics, as well as to hear speeches, plays, presentations, and testimonies on the dangers of narcotics use.

arrangements” documents), 1953.06.21, p1-3. Lit, “嚴重錯誤” and “會造成對黨的事業的重大損失” and “可能會造成對黨的事業的損失和爲了使我能從這個事件上改 X 我的責任觀念不強的缺點。”

³⁵⁹ SMA A71-2-905, part 2, 大坊區西寶興路 00 運動中 9 號——14 號的宣傳情況報告 (Dafang District Xibaoxing road [the 00 here represents the original document’s censoring over the characters for “*jin du*” (*anti-narcotics*)] anti-narcotics movement the ninth to the 14th propaganda situation report), 1952.09.14, p67.

³⁶⁰ See also, Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, p104.

³⁶¹ SMA A71-2-905, part 2, “禁毒工作概況總結” (Complete Report on the Situation of Anti-Narcotics Work), 1952.10.05, pp52-53. Officials noted that these numbers also included 16 family members of drug offenders, and 60 drug users or families of drug users. Lit: 本區計召開了大小不同會議 190 次，參加會議實際得到教育的人數計有 35, 664 人，其中包括毒犯，毒犯家屬 16 人吸毒及吸毒家屬 60 人曾受到幾次的政策教育

³⁶² SMA A71-2-905, part 2, “禁毒工作概況總結” (Complete Report on the Situation of Anti-Narcotics Work), 1952.10.05, p53. Lit: “特別是自從市的公審大會和本區的開展了各種審訊會，使宣傳工作達到了普遍而深入...我們的政策與方針表示了政府對禁毒的決心。

Rallies helped stimulate public interest and investment in the campaign by making things personal and by highlighting ordinary people as victims of drugs. Even in people who at first did not care much about the anti-narcotics campaign, officials found success by making them feel aggrieved, victims of drugs, and, therefore, entitled to feel angry and demand punishment of drug offenders. For example, Shanghai officials noted that many rural people had a generally ambivalent attitude towards the campaign and felt that narcotics was more of a city problem than a rural one. After targeted countryside rallies, officials noted that rural people,

deeply understood how widespread drugs were, not only that they spread to the cities and towns but also to the countryside; many laborers have been harmed by drugs, suffered the breaking up and scattering of one's family and the tearing apart of wife and son.³⁶³ Consequently, the masses at each of the public trials fought to take the stage and denounce [drug offenders] and demand the government severely punish producers, smugglers, and big drug traffickers.³⁶⁴

Highlighting the threat to people's families and communities helped the state stir up flagging public interest and bridge the gap between the goals of the campaign and people's lived realities.

By making things personal, rallies also directly aimed to whip up hatred towards drug offenders. Rather than simply demanding punishment, officials specifically looked to increase people's hatred and rage against the accused. In a report from Shanghai, officials noted that drug offenders' public confessions and admissions of crimes particularly "increased the masses' hatred towards drugs and inspired the masses' determination to stamp out drugs."³⁶⁵ Anti-

³⁶³ The idioms used for breaking up and scattering one's family and tearing apart wife and son are the same ones that feature prominently in pre-1949 propaganda against narcotics, 家破人亡 and 妻离子散 respectively. See chapter 1 and 2 for more discussion on these two idioms.

³⁶⁴ SMA A71-2-905, part 2, "禁毒工作概況總結" (Complete Report on the Situation of Anti-Narcotics Work), 1952.10.05, p53. Lit: "扭轉了農村地區群眾對禁毒無所謂的思想認識, 他們深刻明確了毒品流行, 不光流行於市鎮也流行到 XX 的農村. 有許多的勞動人民受了毒品的危害... 遭受到家破人亡, 妻離子散, 因此群眾在各個審訊會上爭著上台控訴要求政府嚴厲到裁製, 運, 販的大毒犯"

³⁶⁵ SMA A71-2-905, part 2, "禁毒工作概況總結" (Complete Report on the Situation of Anti-Narcotics Work), 1952.10.05, p53. Lit: "尤其是聽到毒犯自己所講出的罪行, 增加了群眾對毒品的仇恨激勵群眾肅毒的決心"

narcotics guidelines from Dafang village near Shanghai instructed officials to “use real world examples in propaganda. [Use them to] explain the dangerous nature of drugs. This way, the masses will really easily be able to grasp and accept [the campaign and its measures], because many of the masses have seen it personally.”³⁶⁶ Similarly, a report from Dafang district’s propaganda bureau specified that after carrying out the requisite preparation, officials should carry out a public trial to “deepen people’s hatred/hostility for drug producers, smugglers, and traffickers. Among the masses, create a vigorous and strong anti-narcotics atmosphere to force offenders to be isolated and come and confess.”³⁶⁷ Visible here is the state’s use of hatred in both a personal and broader social sense. First, officials used real world examples to get reluctant or uninterested people personally invested in the anti-narcotics campaign. Officials then tried to use people’s anger and hatred to unite them together against the specter of the drug criminal. For these officials, hatred was critical because it brought people to the campaign and then wove together the individual and the collective.

To effectively stir hatred in both the individual and the collective, officials used a wide variety of cultural products to make hating people fun and entertaining.³⁶⁸ Officials, for example, often penned anti-narcotics lyrics for popular folk song genres, such as *fengyang* songs and folk songs for commonplace instruments such as the *erhu*.³⁶⁹ Officials paired these with the popular song-skits, or oral storytelling form known as *kuaiban*, where a performer uses a set of bamboo boards or bones to produce a beat or rhythm to which they chant or sing a story or didactic

³⁶⁶ SMA A71-2-905, part 2, 大坊宣傳工作總結, (Dafang Propaganda Work Concluding Report), 1952.09.15, p63.

³⁶⁷ SMA A71-2-905, part 2, 大坊區肅毒委員會報告, (Dafang District Anti-Narcotics Committee Report), 1952.09.11, pp56-57.

³⁶⁸ See appendix one for a table of the songs discussed below with links to examples.

³⁶⁹ See the following for a higher production value example of the rhythm of *Fengyang* folk songs: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Df6ARDIIFdI> See the following for an example of the type of *erhu*-based folk song officials wrote lyrics to: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zGLN9yuzZs0> SMA A22-1-59, “禁毒鳳陽歌調” (Tune for an Anti-Narcotics Fengyang Song) , undated (highly likely August of 1952), pp. 86-87.

lesson.³⁷⁰ Officials also wrote lyrics to be sung in songs performed with drums or other everyday percussion instruments similar to a tambourine.³⁷¹ Audiences could also attend anti-narcotics plays or short dramas and skits acted out on stage during rallies.³⁷² Officials also focused heavily on making sure they were appealing to local tastes. For example, officials in Shanghai focused extensively on writing lyrics for a popular local song-storytelling art form known as *pingtan* and had separate scripts and lyrics written in local dialects as well as standard Mandarin.³⁷³ Finally, comedic methods such as *xiangsheng*, or crosstalk, played a role in the campaign as well.³⁷⁴ Critically, all of these different storytelling methods and performances were relatively low-budget, already popular with most people, and, like nearly all forms of music, had a longer history of being used for political messaging.³⁷⁵ Through cultural products like songs, skits, and plays, officials attempted to make mass rallies not simply didactic, political indoctrination experiences, but fun, familiar, and entertaining attempts to elicit responses from audiences as well.

³⁷⁰ See the following link for an example of a *kuaiban* about alcoholism. *Kuaiban* are generally humorous and fun and can also often involve freewheeling or improvisation as well as adhering to more standardized conventions. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BpWkL74Vt2U>. SMA A22-1-59, 禁毒快板, (Anti-Narcotics *Kuaiban*), undated, (likely August of 1952), p82, 84, 85, 90. Some of these *kuaiban* are also written in local dialects to appeal as widely as possible.

³⁷¹ These songs are called 鼓調 (*gudiao*), see here for an example of what one might sound like:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wUmjtJY_8dQ SMA A22-1-59, 鼓調, 87-88.

³⁷² SMA A22-1-59, “禁毒雙簧” (Anti-Narcotics *Shuanghuang*), undated (likely August of 1952), p76-81.

³⁷³ See the following for an example: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HgzsEAyIrG4>. SMA A22-1-59, “揭發檢舉烟毒犯 (評彈或山歌調)” (Uncovering and Turning in Drug Criminals (*Pingtán* or *Shange* Song Tunes)), undated (likely August of 1952), p88-90.

³⁷⁴ See the following link for an example of crosstalk style comedy performance. The English language analogue to crosstalk is probably something like the famous “Who’s on First” skit.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HpJFdhMrpDc> SMA A22-1-59, “茲將上海市禁毒宣傳計劃報告于后, 請審查批示”, (Shanghai Anti-Narcotics Propaganda Plan Attached for Review and Approval), 1952.08.08, p27-28.

³⁷⁵ See Joshua Goldstein, *Drama Kings: Players and Publics in the Re-Creation of Peking Opera: 1870-1937* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007) for more examples on how music was shaped by and used to further political goals in Qing and Republican China. See Brian DeMare, *Mao’s Cultural Army: Drama Troupes in China’s Rural Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), for more examples of the PRC state using plays, skits, and song to spread their political messaging to Chinese people.

Even as audiences entertained themselves by singing or following along to whichever skit or song was being performed, the lyrics or script worked to dehumanize drug criminals and get people to hate and fight against them. For example, a song to the beat of a drum or other percussion instruments begins by noting that drugs and the bad customs of the old society have turned people into ghosts and ruined the country step by step, bringing it from rich to destitute.³⁷⁶ The song then focuses specifically on drug crimes and states that British and American imperialism used drugs to poison China and her people on purpose.³⁷⁷ The song laments the tragedies that have befallen the Chinese people because of narcotics—the sickly people, bankrupt families, and ruined lives. However, after Chairman Mao’s victory, the song claims, the people “really have the strength to kill them, imprison them, they [drug criminals] dare not run rampant any longer...they share a mother with the counterrevolutionaries who tried to poison our new China...we will zealously accuse them, [we] shout that they cannot hide, [we] won’t allow them to disturb the peace of our society, [we] won’t let them poison our health.”³⁷⁸ Here, the song not only focuses on killing and imprisoning drug criminals but also on creating and bringing to bear a collective, unified Chinese people who act zealously as one against their enemies. The song uses hatred for drug criminals to unify and direct people’s anger and actions, while attempting to pull in those who perhaps were not as enthusiastic by using a series of escalating directives in the second half of the song.

An example of a *pingtan* song similarly traces out the narrative of drugs brought to poison China by western imperialist powers, the traitor Chiang Kai-shek’s complicity and guilt,

³⁷⁶ SMA A22-1-59, “鼓調” (*Gudiao*), undated (likely August of 1952), p87-88.

³⁷⁷ SMA A22-1-59, “鼓調” (*Gudiao*), undated (likely August of 1952), p87-88.

³⁷⁸ SMA A22-1-59, “鼓調” (*Gudiao*), undated (likely August of 1952), p88. Lit: “，解放了的人民著實有力量，殺的殺，關的關，管的管他們不敢再猖狂...他們與那反革命分子本是一娘養，企圖毒害新中國人民一片壞心腸。同志們，我們的國家光輝萬丈，我們的力量銅壁鐵牆，我們的眼睛雪樣亮，大力檢舉叫他無法可隱藏，不許他擾亂社會治安施伎倆，不許他危害我們的身體健康。”

and the evil of those who helped spread the poison around China. The song ends by stating that “liberation has brought a new air, the government has issued an anti-narcotics order, we must thoroughly wipe out the remnants.”³⁷⁹ The references to Chiang Kai-shek both here and in other scripts also brought back not only the historical memory of shame and defeat in the Opium Wars but also linked drug criminals to public enemy number one of the early 1950s. These songs focused heavily on tying drug criminals to familiar tropes from earlier propaganda efforts, casting offenders as pawns of imperialism, traitors, and poisoners of China and noting liberation as a dramatic break, a fresh chance for the people to unite behind an incorruptible government and wipe out the evils of narcotics all at once. Here the anti-narcotics campaign is a patriotic and hopeful movement, a chance for China’s people to realize their strength, to act as one and to refuse to be poisoned and oppressed any longer. For example, a *kuaiban* script states that while the Chinese people have stood up against drugs since liberation, drug use persists. The script thus calls on people to “be more vigilant, eliminate drugs and banditry...Everyone must come forth and accuse; everyone has a responsibility to fulfill; we must not be paralyzed and negligent; wiping out drugs and drug offenders is just like fighting off the American ghosts back on the front lines.”³⁸⁰ These songs attempted to energize people and inspire them to rise up and stamp out narcotics and narcotics users by highlighting the strength and possibilities of their present moment, the radical potential present in the still-revolutionary moment of early 1950s China.

Other performances sought to spur people to action by underscoring the dangers that drugs posed to the still fragile Chinese people and nation. Many songs focused on emotionally

³⁷⁹ SMA A22-1-59, “揭發檢舉烟 毒犯,” Uncovering and Turning in Drug Criminals (*Pingtian* or *Shange* Song Tunes), undated (likely August of 1952), p89. Lit: “解放後一片新氣象//政務院公佈了禁毒令//消滅殘餘須徹底” The double slash represents a line break/separation between lyrics.

³⁸⁰ SMA A22-1-59, “禁毒快板” (Anti-Narcotics *Kuaiban*), undated (likely August of 1952), p85. Lit: “人民應該多警惕，肅清毒品除匪患 ...大家起來要檢舉，人人有責都應該，我們不可麻木來疏忽，只要肅清毒品犯，好比前綫打退美國鬼”

mobilizing people by showing the damage drugs could inflict on individual lives. For example, the lyrics to a five-line chant begin with: “I think back to the tears of my mother and father // how heroin deeply damaged their lives...drug dealers forced me into prostitution.”³⁸¹ The chant continues by stating, “Who can one so full of hate appeal to [?] The lamb already in the tiger’s jaws cannot resist...everyone must be more vigilant, report drug producers, smugglers, traffickers...do not miss this opportunity to save China.”³⁸² A *kuaiban* script similarly states that “many weak-willed people take drugs and become opium ghosts. Young people who take drugs fall into hooliganism and thievery; older people who take drugs die within a few years and become an ancestral tablet; women who take drugs, so many of them fall into prostitution it’s like a sea of suffering.”³⁸³ Here, narcotics pose a threat to every type of person in society, while hitting all the key propaganda tropes of the prewar years, such as prostitution, falling into hooliganism, and a rapid procession to death.

These stage performances echo both the scientific and threatening imagery and language that was characteristic of 20th century anti-narcotics efforts and the language of clinical reports that were discussed in Chapter 3. For example, another *kuaiban* script that featured throughout the campaign tells the audience that to cure the evils of drugs they must “cut off the cancerous tumor, chop off the devil’s hands, and free themselves from the ghost of those who have fallen into the tiger’s clutches.”³⁸⁴ Notably, the script here recalls three common anti-narcotics tropes

³⁸¹ SMA A22-1-59, “禁毒小調” (Anti-Narcotics Small Tunes), undated (likely August of 1952), p87. Lit: “想起爹娘淚汪汪，白粉毒深把命傷...毒販逼我做妓娼。” The use of the term heroin here is also possibly just a shorthand for drugs more generally.

³⁸² SMA A22-1-59, “禁毒小調” (Anti-Narcotics Small Tunes), undated (likely August of 1952), p87. Lit: “滿腹怨恨向誰訴，羊落虎口難反抗...大家提高警惕心，檢舉製，運，販...挽救的機會莫錯過。”

³⁸³ SMA A22-1-59, “禁毒快板” (Anti-Narcotics *Kuaiban*), undated (likely August of 1952), p85. Lit: “，不少意志薄弱人，吃仔上當變成鴉片鬼。年輕人吃仔毒品后，墮落下去做賊痞，年老人吃仔毒品后，不到幾年就要毒死變牌位，婦女吃仔毒品后，很多人墮落娼門入苦海。”

³⁸⁴ SMA A22-1-59, “禁毒快板” (Anti-Narcotics *Kuaiban*), undated (likely August of 1952), p85. Lit: “從此根治了毒害割去了這毒瘤，斬去了魔掌除去了虎俚。” Anti-narcotics associations in the 1920s consistently use the

used to demonize narcotics offenders during the Republican period. The *kuaiban*'s reference to "cancerous tumor" reflects cancer tropes used in both the early 1920s and 1950s clinics. The propaganda about such clinics cast narcotics, and proximity to narcotics, as an illness or tumor affecting the figurative body of China. Rather than a complex socio-economic problem with deep roots that cannot in fact be solved by simply cutting out a part of the body, the *kuaiban* casts drug use and trafficking as a metastasizing yet removable cancer. State officials here misleadingly portrayed drugs as a dangerous medical issue to mobilize people against drugs. The framing here also necessitates the use of violence. You cannot rehabilitate malignant and cancerous tumors; you can only cut them out. The following line also mirrors the moralizing and Christian-inflected social gospel language of many of the anti-narcotics associations discussed in chapter 1. Those associations promoted the view that opium was a tool of the devil to justify extreme actions against drug offenders.³⁸⁵

Finally, the ending line of the previous *kuaiban* directly references the animalistic portrayals of drug users in Chinese newspapers and propaganda posters discussed in chapter 2. Depicted as threatening beasts like tigers, drug users and traffickers here are something that must be violently fought against. China and her people must kill to avoid being overwhelmed and killed by the evils of drugs. Indeed, the *kuaiban* explicitly informs the audience that the failure of past efforts has doomed people to death when it invokes the ghosts of those fallen before. In state-led propaganda, then, narcotics criminals are not simply people to hate, but people to violently resist. Dehumanized as sinful, cancerous, and subhuman, drug criminals were also depicted as enemies of the people, predatory monsters who had killed and would kill again. Mass

characters “魔掌” to refer to the devil's clutches, rather than just an enemy's clutches. Some also translate the phrase as devil's grasp as well. See chapter 1 for more on this.

³⁸⁵ For example, one of the films most commonly shown at anti-narcotics association meetings in Shanghai was titled the “Devil's Needle.”

rallies thus attempted to bring the audience together through the crucible of shared combat against the hated, implacable, and deadly specter of narcotics.

Dehumanizing imagery of the drug user as a skeleton man or walking corpse also featured prominently in the campaign's propaganda work. For example, the script of a popular style of two-person skit called *shuanghuang* focuses on the story of two friends: Yi, an opium smoker who began to avoid social situations, and Jia, his non-smoking friend who came looking for Yi. As they broach the topic of Yi's opium smoking, Jia pretends not to be able to hear Yi when he says he has taken up using drugs and makes him repeat it louder and louder. Yi angrily asks Jia if he still cannot hear him now that he is shouting so loudly that the whole neighborhood can hear. Jia replies, "I heard a while ago. I was just afraid the rest of the neighborhood couldn't hear."³⁸⁶ Jia here models for the audience what responsible behavior looks like by informing the collective of his erstwhile friend's drug problem and prioritizing a collective shaming and punishing of drug users over helping his friend solve his issues. The two then discuss whether smoking opium makes you fatter or thinner, before Yi breaks into song about the dangers of opium:

Speaking about opium, opium, opium's harm to people is really deep; listen to me when I talk about its harms. When I wasn't addicted, I was in good spirits and healthy; when I wasn't addicted, I was so happy and full of joy; if you smoke and get addicted it's so difficult to deal with; the whole body aches, you can't drink tea or swallow food, sniveling, crying, yawning; shoulders can't bear anything, hands can't carry a basket; dispirited and listless, too lazy to even move, can't work at all, you're like a walking corpse...."³⁸⁷

³⁸⁶ SMA A22-1-59, "雙簧" (*Shuanghuang*), undated (likely August of 1952), p78. Lit: "我早聽見了，我就是怕他們諸位沒聽見。"

³⁸⁷ SMA A22-1-59, "雙簧" (*Shuanghuang*), undated (likely August of 1952), p78. Lit: "（唱說鴉片，這鴉片，鴉片害人真不淺，聽我把它的害處談一談。沒有鴉片癮，精神抖擻身體健，沒有鴉片癮，身心愉快真喜歡，要抽上癮可就不好辦，周身上下筋骨酸，茶不進口飯不下嚥，鼻涕眼淚打哈欠，肩不能擔擔，手不能提籃，精神萎靡懶得動彈，不事勞動，不能生產，像行尸走肉一般。"

Yi's song here demonstrates the myriad physical and spiritual problems thought to be caused by narcotics usage at the time. In particular, it echoes the common trope of narcotics users as less than human, skeletal remnants or shells whose humanity had been scraped out of them by their habit. Yi's listing of physical effects also focuses on his unsuitability for labor and by extension, his inability to contribute to building the CCP's vision for China. Jia replies that, "it really is like that, smoke opium once and you're addicted; your spirit and body both are damaged so much; [it] damages your health; you smoke till you're just a skeleton without any spirit left...afterwards your family is reduced to ruin and scatters everywhere; a family life that was happy and well is all destroyed completely."³⁸⁸ The physical effects of opium use are so damaging that they evacuate the very humanity from a person, leaving behind an empty husk. The play then continues narrating the trajectory of opium's history in China, and the different varieties it comes in, before talking about the CCP's glorious campaign to rid China of this evil. The play concludes with Yi, now cured of drug addiction after the CCP's intervention, asks where Jia is going now. Jia triumphantly replies, "I'm going to report my uncle!"³⁸⁹ While propaganda bureau cadres obviously intended the play to be humorous, it conjures up all the classic tropes mentioned in chapters 1 and 2 about opium smokers. Not only does it turn a once lively and strong man into a dead man walking, a living corpse, but it destroys his family in the process. Critically, however, the play leaves open the possibility of saving the drug user, and casts informing on users and getting them incarcerated in the clinics of chapter 3 as a positive, even life-saving act. The play portrays the unrepentant drug user, however, not only as a subhuman

³⁸⁸ SMA A22-1-59, "雙簧" (*Shuanghuang*), undated (likely August of 1952), p78-79. Lit: "可真是的，這鴉片煙一抽上了癮，精神上，肉體上都有很大的損失，損壞了健康，抽得骨瘦如柴，精神萎靡，...到後來傾家蕩產，妻離子散，把家庭的幸福生活都給破壞掉了。"

³⁸⁹ SMA A22-1-59, "雙簧" (*Shuanghuang*), undated (likely August of 1952), p81. Lit: "我去檢舉我舅舅。"

remnant unable to contribute to the collective, but also as someone who actively harms the collective through his actions.

Finally, some songs conjured up images of hatred and rage--seething, generational anger that made violence an appropriate response. For example, the *kuaiban* script mentioned above angrily declares, "speaking of drugs hurts my heart; I'm so filled with hatred I can't help but kill someone; words alone can't make the anger in my heart and head disappear; the harm caused by drugs is too savage...as the saying goes, every wrong has its perpetrator. Who will we settle this sea of blood and hatred with?"³⁹⁰ Rather than being a reminder of the dangers of drugs, this *kuaiban*'s lyrics and imagery seethe with rage and cries out for revenge. The script goes so far as to state that killing someone is necessary not only as a just punishment but also to relieve the hatred and anger that the speaker, and by extension the audience, feels because of the damage inflicted by the drug trade on China and its people. The speaker feels that he must kill someone or be consumed by his hatred and rage. Killing the target of hatred here becomes a transformative experience that rights a wrong and cleanses the speaker, and again by extension the audience, of their anger. This *kuaiban* attempted not only to get people angry and on the side of the state; it also specifically tried to get them to hate drug criminals so much that they had to take violent revenge against them. Cadres portrayed drug use and drug crimes as a direct emotional and physical attack against each person in the audience, as something so threatening and evil that the state should step in and violently take revenge on behalf of the aggrieved people. Moreover, the *kuaiban* sought to make everyone in the audience share the anger and rage

³⁹⁰ SMA A22-1-59, "禁毒宣傳 (快板)" (Anti-narcotics Propaganda (*Kuaiban*), undated (likely August of 1952), p90. Lit: "提起毒品心就傷, 不由殺人恨滿腔, 一言難消我心頭火, 毒品的禍害太猖狂...這血海的深仇跟誰來算賬." The idiom used here means a blood debt so large it's an ocean of blood, or a deep-seated and implacable hatred/ The script also states shortly afterwards that since drugs have come to China, it is like a sharp knife has been plunged into China's heart.

of the speaker and to unify people behind this anger and redirect it towards the bodies of drug users. Hatred here not only drove home the general anti-narcotics messaging of the campaign but tried to unify people and state together in communal acts of revenge against drug criminals.³⁹¹

“Even Killing Him Doesn’t Lessen My Hatred and Anger”: The Effects of Hate on Audience and Accused

What did all these official guidelines and techniques do to people who attended rallies? How did audience members and the accused feel after being whipped into a frenzy and constantly assailed? Internal investigative reporting from cadres and police officials who organized and attended massive anti-narcotics rallies reveals how audience members reacted. These sources are, of course, more likely to play up the beneficial effects of the work the cadres were doing. That said, the confidential nature of these reports, many of which are stamped either secret or top-secret, also means that they often provide frank assessments of the shortcomings of cadres’ work and areas for improvement. The reports also contain a large number of direct quotations from audience members themselves. The reports fall into what historian Neil Diamant has called the “investigative report” category, or reports “conducted in a reasonably objective manner” whose “verbatim quotes from officials and ordinary people provide a very candid and frank look at the interface between state and society.”³⁹²

Mass rallies brought strangers together by putting them through an intense and shared emotional crucible. The experiences of people at these rallies were of course not uniform or reducible to one common experience, but the shared experience of coming together and hating a drug criminal helped people of all stripes find common ground, at least for a brief and intense

³⁹¹ These acts of revenge will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

³⁹² Neil Jeffrey Diamant, *Embattled Glory: Veterans, Military Families, and the Politics of Patriotism in China, 1949-2007* (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2009).

moment. Hatred held the power to make people care about the drug-caused travails of strangers, feel sympathetic and aggrieved on their behalf, and form a shared community with them and the new state that fought against narcotics for them. The testimonies of people who witnessed large public anti-narcotics rallies reveal how people reacted when participants came to the stage and spoke bitterly against drug criminals and, in some cases, drug criminals themselves came forward and apologized to the furious crowds. The effects of these rallies on people varied widely, but the variety of responses did not diminish the power of the rallies to unite people in a shared emotional experience.

Some participants used the anti-imperialist messaging of the campaign to turn the mundanity of anti-narcotics work into an “us-against-them” crusade against perceived evil and inhumanity. Officials quoted a certain Mr. Lee, resident of Shanghai’s Dafang district, who stated, “some people in the past were close and friendly with the American imperialists. They said Americans help China, but in reality they’re murdering China. They [American imperialists] long ago brought drugs to China to poison China...Every day imperialism doesn’t die is a day that the people know no peace. Every person that thinks America is good, this person has no humanity.”³⁹³ Here Mr. Lee first links the KMT’s failure to control drugs with their closeness to the United States. He then states unequivocally that Americans are murdering China, and that they deceitfully brought drugs to China to poison the nation and its people. Notably, he characterizes the drug trade as a targeted attempt to murder China by targeting people like himself, rather than as an item of international trade. Moving forward, he explicitly links the

³⁹³ SMA A71-2-905, part 2, “關於 17 日各界代表擴大會議后群眾中的反映：8 市區 2 級人民擴大聯席會議” (Responses from the Masses after the Mass Rally of People’s Representatives on the 17th: 8 Municipal Districts and 2 of the People’s Mass Rallies), September 20, 1952, p68. Lit. “有的人過去對美帝很親善，說他們幫助中國，實則是殺害中國。他們老早就把毒品暈倒中國來毒化中國後來運槍炮給國民黨來叫我們自殺自只有與聯用科學建設來幫助我們才是真的好朋友。帝國主義一天不死，人民一天不安。個別人認為差國好，這人沒心肝。”

continued presence of imperialism and drugs to a lack of peace and harmony for people more generally, and then demonizes anyone who remains unconvinced as inhuman and evil. The critical takeaway here is Mr. Lee's expression of an "us-against-them" view. He conjures up a world where the virtuous people and the Party battle for the survival of China against the intertwined evils of America, imperialism, and drugs, with no room to consider how and why people used drugs. He conceives of the campaign in purely martial terms, noting that imperialism, and by extension drug criminals, must die. He thus rhetorically justifies all policing measures both as in service of an imagined unified "people" and as a strike against evil, murderous imperialists.

Other audience members at the rally reflected similar sentiments but criticized the KMT more explicitly than Mr. Lee while valorizing the new government. Mr. Lin, who in the past himself smoked drugs, stated, "under the leadership of the CCP, everything is impartial/incorruptible; before, the KMT were frauds and cheats. [They] forbid drugs from coming, forbid drugs from going, yet drugs never stopped. Because of this, they sold off our lands; if only liberation had come a few years earlier it wouldn't be like this."³⁹⁴ One particularly humorous and brave drug user inquired, "I thought liberation happened three years ago; [why are] there still drug offenders?"³⁹⁵ Mr. Lin's words reflect a fairly standard narrative in which the KMT deceived the people and sold China out to the imperialists, all while pretending to care about getting rid of drugs. But now that the CCP was in power, things were going much better.

³⁹⁴ SMA A71-2-905, part 2, "關於 17 日各界代表擴大會議后群眾中的反映：8 市區 2 級人民擴大聯席會議" (Responses from the Masses after the Mass Rally of People's Representatives on the 17th: 8 Municipal Districts and 2 of the People's Mass Rallies), September 20, 1952, p68. Lit: "今天在共產黨領導下真是大公無私，過去國民黨是掛羊頭賣狗肉禁來禁去禁不掉。結果把我們的地賣掉了，假如早幾年解放就不會如此了。" For frauds and cheats, he uses the common Chinese idiom for deception: "hang up a sheep's head but sell dog meat."

³⁹⁵ SMA A71-2-905, "擴大會情況報告" (Report on the Situation at the Enlarged Mass Rallies), August 21, 1952, 82. Lit: "【我】認為解放到現在三年了，現在還有毒犯嗎?"

Mr. Lin also reiterates a common trope of former smokers, specifically, wishing that liberation had come earlier. Often, when former smokers spoke up at rallies, they included a line to this effect in their testimonies, generally to try and excuse their own drug use or draw attention to the historical circumstances that forced them to turn to drug use. The line generally played a standard role, allowing for the necessary admission of guilt, but also played an exculpatory and defensive function: “Alas! If only the good guys had come in time to save me from the terrible circumstances that compelled me to use drugs.”

Mr. Lin’s testimony also points to one of the ways that accused criminals or reformed users tried to carve out space for themselves within the campaign. In addition to his attempted self-exculpation, he also opted for an attacking rhetorical strategy. He followed up on his original statements with the following charges: “From our district alone Dong Zhuo (the local leader under the false regime) himself smoked and sold drugs. Cao Cao was also the head of drug trafficking in the area.”³⁹⁶ Mr. Lin here strategically redirected any public anger towards him for his past drug use towards the much more heinous crimes of the two officials he accused. While he himself regretted that he used drugs in the past, he had been driven to it by these two men in positions of power who colluded with the false regimes of the KMT and Imperial Japan to sell drugs, use drugs, and exploit the people. He thus cast his crimes as crimes of desperation brought on by the former government and distanced himself from those who committed the same crime from positions of power, exhibiting reckless indulgence, greed, or evil collusion with false governments.

³⁹⁶ SMA A71-2-905, part 2, “關於 17 日各界代表擴大會議后群眾中的反映：8 市區 2 級人民擴大聯席會議,” (Responses from the Masses after the Mass Rally of People’s Representatives on the 17th: 8 Municipal Districts and 2 of the People’s Mass Rallies), September 20, 1952, p68. Lit: “單從本區 (anonymized name) (反派政府時大坊區的長) 自己又吸毒又賣毒, (Anonymized name) 也是販毒的偽區長.”

Many people formed bonds with others by expanding on the same messaging of pre-1949 propaganda, in particular that drug use destroyed one's family and home, often using the exact same phrases to describe the phenomenon in their statements.³⁹⁷ For example, Mr. Fu stated, "Smoking drugs is something that originally we knew was bad; after the meeting, it's even more clear. Selling one's wife, child, even disregarding one's ancestors, taking the bones out and selling the [ancestor's] coffin to buy drugs. It's really a big danger."³⁹⁸ Mr. Fu's testimony here sees drugs as something that severs existing social relations, including those of particularly high value and sanctity, such as selling children and violating an ancestor's grave. Drug crimes are not simply normal crimes, but crimes against some of the most fundamental human relations, those that help define and give meaning to one's conception of humanity—care for children and reverence for one's ancestors. Similarly, a Mr. Zhu stated, "my father smoked opium in the past; all our furniture and even the ground our home was built on were all sold off by him. The other day, the person speaking bitterness, everything they said about the dangers of taking drugs was right. I have a younger brother who I was told was given to other people, but actually he was also sold by my father. Listening to others speaking bitterness, I feel myself really sympathizing with them."³⁹⁹ Beyond building on the familiar imagery of drug users selling off furniture, home, land, and even their own family members to support their drug habits, Mr. Zhu's statements also indicated his newfound feelings of community with others who suffered at the hands of drug

³⁹⁷ The common phrases are 家破人亡, 妻离子散, and others like it.

³⁹⁸ SMA A71-2-905, part 2, "關於 17 日各界代表擴大會議后群眾中的反映：8 市區 2 級人民擴大聯席會議," (Responses from the Masses after the Mass Rally of People's Representatives on the 17th: 8 Municipal Districts and 2 of the People's Mass Rallies), September 20, 1952, p68. Lit: "吸毒本來是知道不好的, 開了大會后, 更知道清楚了, 賣女人, 賣孩子, 連祖宗都不要 X 拜了, 尸骨把棺材賣去吸毒, 真是危害不少."

³⁹⁹ SMA A71-2-905, part 2, "關於 17 日各界代表擴大會議后群眾中的反映：8 市區 2 級人民擴大聯席會議" (Responses from the Masses after the Mass Rally of People's Representatives on the 17th: 8 Municipal Districts and 2 of the People's Mass Rallies), September 20, 1952, p68-69. Lit: "我的父親過去也吸毒, 屋裏家具地皮都被他賣脫。那天訴苦的人所說的吸毒的 危害的確如此。我有一個弟弟說是過放給別人, 其實也是被父親賣給人家, 聽人家訴苦面想自己確很同情."

users and traffickers. Coming to the rally and hearing others speak of their shared bitterness towards drug criminals, listening to others with tales similar to his own, helped Mr. Zhu gain a sense of solidarity and common ground with others who had similar experiences, and feel a shared sense of sympathy toward them. Beyond highlighting the need for the CCP's anti-narcotics measures, the mass rally helped bring Mr. Zhu closer together with other participants through something other than shared hatred against drug offenders. Rallies united the people not only in anger but in sympathy. Sympathy is important here because it helped serve as the basis for a shared visceral anger towards drug criminals even though they may not have impacted everyone individually.

Rallies even held the power to engage people who were personally uninterested in anti-narcotics work and the new state's policies. A Mr. Lu stated, "before, I didn't know drugs were that harmful. Yesterday at the public mass trial I finally realized they're harmful enough to destroy homes and families. I listened to other people speaking bitterness and shed tears."⁴⁰⁰ Officials saw rallies as effective methods of getting even those who self-identified as uninterested in anti-narcotics efforts to sympathize with others at the rally and get behind the state's efforts to crack down on drugs.

Similarly, anti-narcotics rallies appealed widely across the social spectrum, reaching not only younger rural men and poorer people but also older people and women. For example, a report from Dafang district notes that at their latest rally an older woman who usually did not participate in political meetings of any kind actively sought out and joined the anti-narcotics rallies. The unidentified older woman reportedly stated, "I totally support the government's

⁴⁰⁰ SMA A71-2-905, part 2, "關於 17 日各界代表擴大會議后群眾中的反映：8 市區 2 級人民擴大聯席會議" (Responses from the Masses after the Mass Rally of People's Representatives on the 17th: 8 Municipal Districts and 2 of the People's Mass Rallies), September 20, 1952, p69. Lit: "過去不知道毒品如 X 危害，昨天去開了公審大會才曉得它害得家破，妻離子散，我聽了人家的控訴也流淚了。"

campaign. I had to come and listen.”⁴⁰¹ The brevity and vagueness of the older woman’s testimony here stands in contrast to the detail of many of the other testimonies recorded by officials. It is possible to read this either as a fictive transcript or as perhaps an indication of an older woman who did not want to talk or share much information about herself. However, even if read as entirely fictitious, the testimony highlights that the state wanted these rallies to appeal broadly across the social spectrum, to draw together a wide variety of different social groups in support of the new regime. Officials also noted how the rally reached younger women as well. Referring to a large number of local women, officials in Dafang district noted their testimonies as a collective. According to a report, these women stated, “Those who smoke drugs have no face. They sell their wives, their own coffins. They really don’t have any face. To marry a drug addict is really like striking your own brows.”⁴⁰² Beyond the officials’ refusal to consider local women as anything other than a large group and continuing refusal to name individual women in their reports, the reported testimony also highlights that officials wanted to communicate to their superiors that the rallies reached widely across society and brought people of all types and stations together in support of anti-narcotics movement. These reports use women in nearly the same way as earlier propaganda tropes, namely as a pitiable consequence of the male drug criminal’s actions. The reports try to use women as sympathetic victims but never as acting subjects. In these reports, men perpetrate drug crimes; women suffer the consequences. In a patriarchal society, focusing on the negative effects of drug crimes on pitiable dependents like

⁴⁰¹ SMA A71-2-905, part 2, “關於 17 日各界代表擴大會議后群眾中的反映：8 市區 2 級人民擴大聯席會議” (Responses from the Masses after the Mass Rally of People’s Representatives on the 17th: 8 Municipal Districts and 2 of the People’s Mass Rallies), September 20, 1952, p69. Lit: “政府這一運動我交關贊成，我要來聽。”

⁴⁰² SMA A71-2-905, part 2, “關於 17 日各界代表擴大會議后群眾中的反映：8 市區 2 級人民擴大聯席會議” (Responses from the Masses after the Mass Rally of People’s Representatives on the 17th: 8 Municipal Districts and 2 of the People’s Mass Rallies), September 20, 1952, p69. Lit: “吸毒的人不要面孔，賣了女人賣棺材，真不要面孔。嫁給吸毒人 X 其觸眉頭。”

women and children reinforced the idea of the drug criminal as the antithesis of the idealized productive and forward-looking citizen of the PRC. In this conception, a good citizen built up the nation through hard work and communal solidarity; a drug criminal harmed society's most vulnerable and disintegrated the basic economic unit of society—the family.

Hatred justified the killing of drug criminals for some audience members. For example, Mr. Zhou stated, “the anti-narcotics policies of the CCP are right. It's like a dream I couldn't even have imagined under the old false government. At these rallies we killed some [drug criminals], arrested some, and fought some. As far as I can see, after this anti-narcotics movement, nobody is left smoking drugs.”⁴⁰³ The campaign's work to inspire hate in audience members resonated so strongly with Mr. Zhou that he cast killing, arresting, and fighting against drug criminals at the mass rally as an unimaginable dream, something he not only saw as effective in stamping out drugs, but something that he longed and dreamed for.⁴⁰⁴ Mr. Ma was more dispassionate than Mr. Zhou, but he similarly stated, “Shanghai [recently] shot dead four big drug criminals; this is the only way to really stop the spread of drugs.”⁴⁰⁵ An rally-goer named Mr. Yu stated, “my father in the past smoked opium; when he ran out of money he would often go steal other people's things. Today he is dead, and there isn't anybody stealing things anymore. Production in the home is also good.”⁴⁰⁶ It is unclear from his testimony whether his

⁴⁰³ SMA A71-2-905, part 2, “關於 17 日各界代表擴大會議后群眾中的反映：8 市區 2 級人民擴大聯席會議” (Responses from the Masses after the Mass Rally of People's Representatives on the 17th: 8 Municipal Districts and 2 of the People's Mass Rallies), September 20, 1952, p68. Lit: “禁毒在共產黨領導下政策的正確。想反派政府時做夢也想不到。這次大會有殺的閔的敵的。我看經過這次禁毒運動 X 沒有人吸毒了。”

⁴⁰⁴ I discuss public execution rallies in more detail in the next chapter.

⁴⁰⁵ SMA A71-2-905, “禁毒宣傳工作情況簡報” (Summary Report on the Anti-Narcotics Propaganda Work Situation), September 30, 1952, p8. Lit: “上海槍殺了四個大毒犯，這樣才能徹底禁止毒品流行。”

⁴⁰⁶ SMA A71-2-905, part 2, “關於 17 日各界代表擴大會議后群眾中的反映：8 市區 2 級人民擴大聯席會議,” (Responses from the Masses after the Mass Rally of People's Representatives on the 17th: 8 Municipal Districts and 2 of the People's Mass Rallies), September 20, 1952, p69. Lit: “我父親過去吸大烟，沒了錢常去偷人家東西，現在他死了偷東西的人沒有了，家中生產也好了。” I have more examples of people just saying similar stuff to this, for example, one man says, “who knows how much this guy made off the misery of other people, he should be shot! It's killing him for the sake of everyone else, afterwards, people won't go doing stuff like this.”

father was killed as a result of the anti-narcotics movement, but Mr. Yu cast his father's death as a net positive.⁴⁰⁷ Not only did the theft of other people's things stop (a common pre-1949 propaganda trope as well), but now he and his family produced far more than before. The death of his father fixed both a social problem for the local community and an economic problem for Mr. Yu's household. Again, justifying the deaths of drug offenders through an economic lens, another Shanghai audience member named Mr. Xu, turned in four people as drug offenders and stated, "Who knows how much money these people have made, they should be shot! Killing them is for other people too. Afterwards, people won't go and do stuff like this anymore."⁴⁰⁸ For Mr. Xu, hatred and violence not only were justified, but were almost required in order to teach people the proper way to behave in post-1949 China. Statements similar to Mr. Zhou, Mr. Ma, Mr. Yu, and Mr. Xu's abound in these reports.

Beyond spurring audience members into attacking the accused, mass rallies increased the social and public pressure on drug criminals to make them feel isolated and cornered by the twin forces of state and society. A report from Shanghai's municipal anti-narcotics committee in October 1952 notes that mass rallies and trials were extremely effective ways of getting results and that in Shanghai alone, in addition to a rally attended by over ten thousand persons, officials had held over five hundred rallies and trials.⁴⁰⁹ Officials noted that the meting out of judgements (death, imprisonment, or release) terrorized many criminals into confessing and asking for leniency rather than trying to evade capture. The report in particular quotes one offender who, after witnessing judgement being passed, said, "I was going to wait and see how things played

⁴⁰⁷Moreover, authorities portrayed his death as a result of the anti-narcotics campaign, even if he was not directly killed on stage.

⁴⁰⁸SMA A71-2-905, part 2, "禁毒工作總結" (Summary Report on Anti-Narcotics Work), September 9, 1952, p60-61. Lit: "這種人不知道給他括了多少錢票, 這樣槍斃掉是應該的。也殺為別人。以後不再去做這種事體了。"

⁴⁰⁹ SMA A22-1-59, "關於禁毒運動宣傳工作的初步總結報告" (Summary Report on the Anti-Narcotics Movement's Preliminary Propaganda Work), October 22, 1952, p41.

out, see which way the wind was blowing, but after seeing them kill those who wouldn't confess, I can't wait anymore; I have to confess."⁴¹⁰ Officials reported that "most drug offenders, under this pressure, decide to confess; more than 1.5 times as many have confessed and registered than we had before [in the first half of the campaign]."⁴¹¹ However, with this success came consequences. Some officials noted that sometimes people were actually so angry at drug users that they were not following official guidelines to be merciful to those who confessed. Officials had to reassure users not to be afraid and come forward.⁴¹² Other offenders were so scared of what would happen to them that they committed suicide, and officials particularly wanted to stop the trend of offenders jumping from buildings.⁴¹³

Rallies inspired such extreme anger in some participants that they wanted to kill drug criminals, and in some cases even that was not enough. For example, a Mr. Chen stated, "Those four people who were shot to death, one of them was a 28-year-old young man; he cried really pitifully. But listening to his crimes and how he hurt around eight families, even killing him doesn't lessen my hatred and anger."⁴¹⁴ The rally and testimonies from those hurt by drug

⁴¹⁰ SMA A22-1-59, "關於禁毒運動宣傳工作的初步總結報告" (Summary Report on the Anti-Narcotics Movement's Preliminary Propaganda Work), October 22, 1952, p41. Lit: "原來我要看看苗頭，望望風色的，看到拒不坦白的殺掉頭，再不坦白不行了。" My translation here is not as directly literal, but more captures the spirit of what the offender is saying here. A more literal translation would read more like: "Originally I wanted to wait and see the new trends [of the campaign], to see which way the wind blows, [but] looking at those who don't confess getting killed, to not confess just can't be done"

⁴¹¹ SMA A22-1-59, "關於禁毒運動宣傳工作的初步總結報告" (Summary Report on the Anti-Narcotics Movement's Preliminary Propaganda Work), October 22, 1952, p42. Lit: "多毒犯在此壓力下向政府坦白登記者亦較前增加一倍半。"

⁴¹² SMA A22-1-59, "郊區十二個市鎮禁毒運動宣傳工作開展情況的檢查報告" (Inspection Report on Starting Anti-Narcotics Propaganda Work in Twelve Suburban Cities and Towns), September 3, 1952, p22. Lit: "也即很容易把群眾的注意力引導到這些人身上。因為當群眾還沒有接受黨的政策以前，對吸毒者意見是很大的。"

⁴¹³ SMA A71-2-905, "擴大會情況報告" (Report on the Situation at Enlarged Mass Rallies), August 21, 1952, p81. In part, they wanted to stop the suicides because they wanted to kill them in specific ways—controlling the setting, so that the executions sent a message—see ch.5.

⁴¹⁴ SMA A71-2-905, part 2, "關於 17 日各界代表擴大會議后群眾中的反映：8 市區 2 級人民擴大聯席會議，" (Responses from the Masses after the Mass Rally of People's Representatives on the 17th: 8 Municipal Districts and 2 of the People's Mass Rallies), September 20, 1952, p69. Lit: "幣的那四個人中一個 28 歲的青年哭了是很可惜，但聽到他的罪惡害了八家多少，殺掉也不解恨。"

criminals made Mr. Chen so angry that he participated in the communal viewing of the police publicly executing four drug users. Moreover, even though one of the accused was a young man who pitifully cried and likely begged for his life, Mr. Chen not only still wanted him to die but also felt that even his death was not enough. Mr. Chen's testimony highlights the success of the CCP's efforts to create a community of hatred. Despite not being personally affected by the accused drug users, Mr. Chen felt so angry on behalf of his fellow citizens after hearing the account of the crimes that he felt a visceral and personal hatred for the drug criminals on stage. To people whipped into as much of a frenzy as Mr. Chen, the drug offenders ceased to exist as individual people with complex histories and reasons for their crimes. Mr. Chen and others like him saw the accused as an object of hatred because he hurt China and its people. The accused drug users were enemies who the society, through its authorities, needed to kill. Even an attempt by one of the criminals to assert his own humanity by piteously wailing and protesting his innocence did nothing to shake Mr. Chen's resolve. Not only did Mr. Chen watch these people die, he found that even their deaths left him unsatisfied.

These examples demonstrate clearly how the CCP used hatred to depict drug crimes as threats to society and all its members, and how hatred turned individual crimes into a threatening specter hanging over people's heads. Not only did the rallies bring people together to collectively inflict violence against a hated enemy, but they justified repeating that violence in the future by getting people so angry that they perceived an injury against anyone else at the rally as a personal attack against themselves. The rallies thus not only worked to punish drug criminals, but to unify the people. They created an emotional crucible where people felt aggrieved on behalf of others, participated in taking collective revenge on individual criminals who had no connection to them personally, and felt grateful to and identified with the new government that

helped them take this revenge. Hatred played a central role here as something that justified the violence of the rally and bound people from all walks of life together in a shared emotional experience.

“I Don’t Know What to Do to Make It Right”: Individual Attempts to Resist

How did the accused respond to the concerted pressure that policing officials and the gathered masses placed on them at these rallies? What did they feel when faced with the pressure of the baying crowds? If they were not executed at the rally, how did they respond and resist the charges hurled against them? Accused drug criminals, particularly those brought forward for public arraignment at the mass rallies, generally suffered from harsher punishments than any others in the campaign. There are far fewer testimonies from the accused than there are from participants at the rallies, a drop within an already small pool of historical sources. Moreover, testimonies from the accused in their own words, rather than as represented in a cadre’s or policing official’s notes included in a report, are rarer still. In this section, among other sources, I read one of the very few surviving first-hand records from an accused drug user. She detailed her experiences in the anti-narcotics campaign and pushed back against state and society to protest her own and her husband’s innocence. This document only survives because she submitted it officially as a complaint to her local government office, and a local cadre included the original document when he forwarded the documents up the chain of command. The document takes the form of a letter, written by an indignant accused, protesting her and her husband’s innocence and asking the government to get her local police officials and the people to leave them alone.

In this section, I argue three interconnected points. First, I highlight the aftereffects of earlier moments of violence on accused users in the 1949-1952 campaign. I demonstrate that once a person was accused or found guilty of drug use or trafficking, despite their best efforts at

reform or at quitting drugs altogether, they remained perpetually suspect and always potentially guilty. No matter how much time had passed from their first accusation, police suspected anyone with a history of drug crimes of guilt in perpetuity.⁴¹⁵ Second, I argue that in the post-1949 period the emotional violence of the mass rallies created an us-against-them moment in which drug criminals felt completely isolated and alienated from a social and policing body united in their desire to punish drug offenders. Accused criminals suffered not only the physical violence inflicted on them at these rallies and afterwards, but the emotional violence of the audience haranguing them at rallies and feeling completely cut off from everyone around them. Moreover, rallies forced the accused to realize that police could always accuse them again in the future and force them into another grueling ordeal where they had to argue their innocence against an angry crowd that saw them as intrinsically untrustworthy and as an enemy of the people and the state. Finally, the sources show that even when confronting a unified front of state and society certain of their guilt, some accused offenders still found ways to protest their innocence and push back against their accusers. While I cannot state with certainty the exact numbers or percentages of those who resisted, cadre reports and interrogation records make clear that many accused offenders protested their innocence and pushed back throughout the campaign. Unlike other examples earlier in the chapter in which former drug users strategically redirected the focus of the crowds away from their own crimes towards the more offensive crimes of others, in the case of Mrs. Zhu below, the accused directly refuted the charges against her and her husband.

Mrs. Zhu's letter clarifies that policing officials saw anyone with prior drug use or proximity to drugs as worthy of suspicion and perpetually under the shadow of guilt. In her letter, Mrs. Zhu notes that police directed her and her husband Zhu Yuanzhang to join an anti-

⁴¹⁵ This suspicion could directly lead to further measures such as surveillance, interrogation, rearrest, or a host of other policing measures if officials deemed it necessary.

narcotics meeting on September 14, 1952. She attended this first meeting, and the chairman asked her husband to present himself. Zhu Yuanzhang did not attend the first meeting because he was busy and had applied for leave already. As Mrs. Zhu reported this to the chairman and said she would represent her husband, the chairman replied, “how can you yourself represent two drug smoking criminals?”⁴¹⁶ She responded by telling the chairman that her husband never even touched cigarettes or alcohol, let alone drugs, and that while she herself used to smoke drugs she had stopped eighteen years ago. She also attempted to prove that she had reformed by referencing the state’s own official system of healthcare and by emphasizing the passage of nearly two decades. She presented her stay in Tongde Hospital as an official verification of her being clean from drugs, stating that she was an inpatient because she was “poisoned” by injections when she stopped using drugs, reminding officials they could check and verify her dates of stay.⁴¹⁷ She emphasized that 18 years have passed since she quit using drugs. She also noted that her dealer, who worked at a hotel and then a teahouse, had died of illness long ago and that there was no way for her to provide further information to police in the present.⁴¹⁸

Despite her claims, officials remained doubtful and forced her to attend a series of subsequent meetings, first with her residents’ committee and a CCP Cadre Li, where she explained her story again and provided the receipts for her stay at Tongde Hospital.⁴¹⁹ After this meeting, police made Mrs. Zhu attend a public mass trial on September 27, and on October 20 a Cadre Luo notified her to attend a meeting at 7pm that day. At the meeting, Cadre Luo declared:

⁴¹⁶ SMA B1-2-1323, “報告 一九五二年, 十廿七” (Report, October 27, 1952), p96. Lit: “妳一個人怎可代表得起兩個吸毒犯呢?”

⁴¹⁷ SMA B1-2-1323, “報告 一九五二年, 十廿七” (Report, October 27, 1952), p97. Lit: “我 從前 會吸過鴉片烟, 已戒除十八年了, 戒烟時曾因打針中毒, 在同德醫院住了很久, 這是可以調查的。”

⁴¹⁸ SMA B1-2-1323, “報告 一九五二年, 十廿七” (Report, October 27, 1952), p97.

⁴¹⁹ SMA B1-2-1323, “報告 一九五二年, 十廿七” (Report, October 27, 1952), p97.

“You people have not confessed enough; today you must provide additional information.”⁴²⁰ He then told Mrs. Zhu to speak up, and she dutifully reported the same story that she had told at the many other rallies and meetings that cadres forced her to attend. Unsatisfied, Cadre Li told her to, “bring supplementary information to the resident’s committee or the women’s association, or the police station within three days, or we’re going to really punish you.”⁴²¹ A day later, Cadre Li visited Mrs. Zhu again and told her: “if you’ve got any smoking paraphernalia still, you better turn it over soon.”⁴²² She replied, “I already quit eighteen years ago; I destroyed all my smoking paraphernalia; I really don’t have anything to give you.”⁴²³ The following day, according to her letter, she thought back again to her past and remembered the names of two of the people that used to sell her drugs, one named Yuan Shao who died long ago and one named Lu Bu who died last year. She promptly went to her resident’s committee and reported it to Cadre Luo and asked him to report it to the general office. She ends the paragraph by noting that this is really the whole truth of her situation.⁴²⁴

The cadres’ actions and attitudes towards Mrs. Zhu reveal how little they trusted not just drug users, but anyone close to suspected users, such as her husband. Notably, the two cadres never state a reason for suspecting Mrs. Zhu and her husband of using drugs other than her previous drug use. At the very first meeting she was called to, despite her husband never smoking cigarettes, let alone using drugs, the person leading the meeting referred to the two of

⁴²⁰ SMA B1-2-1323, “報告 一九五二年，十廿七” (Report, October 27, 1952), p96. Lit: “你們這件的人都是坦白不夠的，今天要再補充材料。”

⁴²¹ SMA B1-2-1323, “報告 一九五二年，十廿七” (Report, October 27, 1952), p97. Lit: “限三天內將補充材料送至居委會或婦聯，派出所，否則，要從嚴處理。”

⁴²² SMA B1-2-1323, “報告 一九五二年，十廿七” (Report, October 27, 1952), p97. Lit: “你現在如存有烟具，應早日交出”

⁴²³ SMA B1-2-1323, “報告 一九五二年，十廿七” (Report, October 27, 1952), p97. Lit: “戒除已十八年了，所有烟具早已銷毀，實在沒有烟具可交。”

⁴²⁴ SMA B1-2-1323, “報告 一九五二年，十廿七” (Report, October 27, 1952), p97.

them as “two drug-smoking criminals.”⁴²⁵ Despite Mrs. Zhu telling cadres that people in their neighborhood could vouch for her husband’s total abstinence, his association with Mrs. Zhu, and her past crimes, meant that officials immediately classed him as a drug user as well.⁴²⁶ Mrs. Zhu’s use of drugs in the past not only marked her as perpetually guilty but also, in the eyes of cadres, contaminated her husband and marked him as guilty as well. Cadres saw Mrs. Zhu not only as a guilty body, but as a contagious one, someone whose guilt spread to those around them, despite evidence to the contrary.

Similarly, Cadres Li and Luo remained deeply suspicious of Mrs. Zhu herself, calling her repeatedly to a series of meetings, mass rallies, and public trials. At each event, the cadres forced Mrs. Zhu to repeat her story in front of a hostile audience in an attempt to make her feel isolated and under attack by the combined forces of state and public. At each event, the cadres harangued her despite having proof that Mrs. Zhu had stayed at a hospital for an extended period in the past, her testimony that she had quit using drugs, and their failure to dig up any evidence to the contrary. The two cadres repeatedly accused her of withholding information about her past drug use and continuing to hold onto her smoking paraphernalia, which implied that she was still smoking. Cadre Li went so far as to declare that if she did not come forward with more information officials would have no choice but to punish her harshly. Every time Mrs. Zhu brought up testimony or proof of her story, the cadres dismissed it or ignored it outright and continued to ply her with questions. To the two cadres, her past drug use meant that nothing she said could be trusted, and they approached her assuming that she was guilty. In the eyes of the

⁴²⁵ SMA B1-2-1323, “報告 一九五二年，十廿七” (Report, October 27, 1952), p96. Lit: “妳一個人怎可代表得起兩個吸毒犯呢?”

⁴²⁶ SMA B1-2-1323, “報告 一九五二年，十廿七” (Report, October 27, 1952), p98.

state, drug use thus marked users not only as untrustworthy but also as perpetually guilty and incapable of quitting the habit.⁴²⁷

This view of drug users as guilty from the moment they started using drugs worked to justify the state's imposition of various punishments and types of violence on drug users. The cadres' efforts forced Mrs. Zhu to relive the violence of her past in a hostile context and communicated to Mrs. Zhu that no matter what she did she would remain suspect in future investigations as well. The campaign thus forced narcotics users to confront not only the emotional and physical violence of the baying crowds but also the knowledge that the state could, at will, put them through the same grueling ordeal repeatedly in the future.

Like other offenders who carved out space for themselves, Mrs. Zhu pushed back against the cadres by casting her guilt as something that was firmly in the past. Throughout the letter, Mrs. Zhu consistently locates her drug use far in the past and well before the arrival of the CCP. Even when she finally remembers a bit of additional information to tell the cadres, the information is useless to the present-day campaign, because both the dealers she recalls are deceased. Her strategy here is similar to that of Mr. Lin mentioned above. He blamed the KMT for his past drug use and cast his usage as a result of their governing failures. Here, their strategies capitalized on the campaign's rhetoric of "before today, punish lightly; after today, punish harshly," which cadres repeatedly emphasized to obtain more confessions and reassure reluctant drug users. Despite the seeming leniency of this strategy, from Mrs. Zhu's testimony it is clear that campaign officials had considerable leeway in interpreting and applying it to drug users, in her case directly threatening to punish her harshly despite the evidence that she had quit using drugs 18 years before.

⁴²⁷ An even more cynical interpretation of these events is that the two cadres did not care overly much about her innocence but calculated that attacking people like Mrs. Zhu would further the goals of the campaign anyways.

Mrs. Zhu pushed back against the actions of the two cadres by highlighting the collateral damage caused by the over-zealous cadres. Beyond protesting her own mistreatment, her central complaint in the letter regards her husband and the cadres' treatment of him. In her letter she writes, "My husband, Zhu Yuanzhang, is already 65 years old. He's never even touched cigarettes or alcohol. Our neighbors can verify and prove this. During the campaign, he was accused of being a drug user and made to enter a drug user's small group."⁴²⁸ Beyond highlighting his advanced age and long history of abstinence, she calls attention to the fact that their neighbors could vouch for his behavior. During the anti-narcotics campaign, officials routinely called upon neighborhood associations and residents to inform on their neighbors and root out any drug usage in their midst. Mrs. Zhu here reverses the typical dynamic of the campaign by using these same systems of informing and ratting out to prove her husband's innocence rather than guilt.

Finally, Mrs. Zhu praises the CCP for their efforts but then uses their own campaign rhetoric against them. Mrs. Zhu's letter begins by stating her support for the new government's "mighty anti-narcotics campaign" and her certainty that "under the government's vigorous implementation and the people's energetic help they [drugs] will certainly be thoroughly destroyed; every citizen's most ardent hope is that this mighty campaign achieves great success."⁴²⁹ Then she notes that "in carrying out the anti-narcotics campaign, the situation is very complex because individual mistakes are unavoidable."⁴³⁰ After setting herself up as

⁴²⁸ SMA B1-2-1323, "報告 一九五二年，十廿七" (Report, October 27, 1952), p98. Lit: "我丈夫 (anonymized name) 現已六十五歲，香烟酒類從不沾口，裏弄居民可以證明，這次被指為吸毒犯，把他列入毒犯小組。"

⁴²⁹ SMA B1-2-1323, "報告 一九五二年，十廿七" (Report, October 27, 1952), p96. Lit: "目前本年已展開偉大的禁毒運動，百多年未使我們國家人民受害無窮的烟毒，在政府的大力執行和人民的積極幫助下必然可以徹底潰滅，這一偉大運動獲得重大成就這是全市人民最熱烈期望的。"

⁴³⁰ SMA B1-2-1323, "報告 一九五二年，十廿七" (Report, October 27, 1952), p96. Lit: "在禁毒運動進行中，情況是很繁複的，因為個別的誤會是在 X 難免的。"

appropriately sympathetic to the campaign and its zealous managers, she states that the cadres consistently told people to “master the material and handle the cases according to the facts” and then inquires:

is this [accusing her and her husband] mastering the material and handling the cases according to the facts? In the past I did smoke drugs, but I already quit 18 years ago. All the people I used to deal with before are dead; I have no way of testifying [against] and reporting on them. My drug using paraphernalia is long destroyed; I really can't turn anything over. Now Cadre Li wants me to turn over supplementary materials even though I have nothing to turn over. No matter what I do, I don't know what to do to make it right. I want the large meeting of the people's representatives to stand in for the people and solve the problems, especially to report the true facts. Please investigate.”⁴³¹

Here, Mrs. Zhu directly turns one of the campaign's mottos against the cadres and calls attention to the way their actions contravened the campaign's supposed focus on present-day offences and on using evidence as the basis for punishment. Her testimony also shows how hopeless and isolated she feels and how deeply her past drug usage marked her as a target for the cadres during the campaign.

Despite the overwhelming forces arrayed against them, accused drug users were not entirely without recourse and some like Mrs. Zhu even directly pushed back against the campaign. While these methods of protest were likely ineffective on the whole (a note appended to Mrs. Zhu's letter asks cadres to investigate and, if her claims are true, to apologize to her), these accused people did not simply sit back and let the campaign wash over them. Some accused fled, some fought, some tried to hunker down and wait out the campaign, and some confessed to lighter crimes in hope of leniency.

⁴³¹ SMA B1-2-1323, “報告 一九五二年，十廿七” (Report, October 27, 1952), p98-99. Lit: “辦事處朱同志常說，【掌握材料確據實辦理】，這就是掌握材料據實辦理嗎？我過去是吸過烟毒的，但在十八年前就已戒除，從前經手的人都已死亡，無法檢舉，烟具也早已銷毀，實在交不出來，現在朱同志連要跟我補充材料，我再沒有什麼可補充的，想來想去，不知怎樣是好。我想人民代表大會政協會議是替人民解決問題的，特地把事實經過報告。即請查辦。此上”

Conclusion: Hatred, Violence, and Resistance

The CCP saw hatred and emotional violence as critical tools of their anti-narcotics crusade. Party leaders saw mass rallies as the perfect vehicle for people to come together and unify around a shared hatred of drug criminals. The CCP attempted to unify people by bringing them together to hate and commit communal acts of emotional and physical violence against drug criminals. I have argued that experiencing this shared emotional crucible helped people take the personal negative experiences they had with narcotics and translate those into a broader collective anger against a phantom of drug criminals. At these mass rallies, officials worked hard to conflate the crimes of individual drug criminals with the terrible evils of drugs outlined in both CCP campaign propaganda and the KMT propaganda efforts I discussed in chapters 1 and 2. The anti-narcotics campaign thus took the personal enmity of many people towards drugs and drug criminals and used it to legitimate the state's imposition of violence onto the dehumanized bodies of drug criminals.

In particular, I showed that high-level directives emphasized hatred as a way to choose appropriate targets for public killings and wanted mass rallies and trials to be places where people congregated and unified through a shared hatred of drug criminals. At the grassroots level, local cadres used a wide variety of techniques to get people to hate drug criminals. These techniques ranged from highlighting how drugs and drug criminals detrimentally affected people's local and personal lives and then tying that personal struggle back to the national level campaign to eradicate narcotics to making hatred a fun experience for audience members. Cadres relied on a variety of cultural productions that made hating drug criminals both more familiar and more enjoyable for the assembled crowds.

Audience members displayed a variety of responses when attending these rallies, ranging from acceptance of the anti-imperialist messaging on display to wholehearted support for the

campaign's violent actions against narcotics criminals. Despite this, drug offenders at these rallies carved out space for themselves throughout the anti-narcotics campaign. Accused criminals used a selection of strategies, from pointing out the worse crimes of another to highlighting their own desperation and poverty to directly challenging party officials using campaign slogans. In particular, the case of Mrs. Zhu demonstrates how deeply the campaign affected accused criminals, but also how the accused did not simply lie down and let the events of the campaign wash over them.

In this chapter, I briefly touched upon some reactions to the killings of drug criminals, some were scared while others celebrated their deaths. In the coming chapter, I think through these public killings as deliberate and stage-managed sacrifices, ritualized performances designed and calibrated for maximum emotional resonance and audience impact. In the following chapter I argue that these longer histories of violence I have traced throughout the preceding chapters turned drug criminals into a form of bare life, bodies that the new state selectively killed to create new forms of social order and assert political legitimacy.

Table 1: Examples of songs used in anti-narcotics propaganda

Type of Song	Youtube example	Instruments used
Fengyang (鳳陽)	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Df6ARDIIFdI	N/A
Erhu songs	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zGLN9yuzZs0	Erhu
Kuaiban (快板)	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BpWkL74Vt2U	Clappers/ things to clap together
Gudiao (鼓調)	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wUmjtJY_8dQ	Percussion instruments
Pingtán (評彈)	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HgzsEAYIrG4	Various depending on performance
Xiangsheng/crosstalk (相聲)	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HpJFdhMrpDc	N/A

Chapter 5: Using the Users: Sacrifice and the Politics of Death in China's Anti-Drug Campaigns of the 1950s

A fictional account of a very real event recounts that on 7 July 1952, during the second half of an anti-drug campaign, Public Security officers released Chen Guohua from his cell in a southern Beijing prison. Government officials had selected Chen, accused of being an unrepentant narcotics user and trafficker, to die. As he stepped out of the police station into the bright sunlight and packed square, Chen may have wondered why so many people had shown up to see his execution. Officials paraded Chen through the frenzied crowd, many of whom screamed epithets, spat, or struck him as he passed by. As he ascended the dais towards his inevitable death, the masses chanted in anticipation, their cries growing ever more frenzied as officials denounced him before raising a gun and executing him for all to see.⁴³²

Deaths like Chen's in 1952 came near the end of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) three-year battle against illicit drugs, a campaign that increasingly resorted to public executions towards the end of the movement. Chen and others like him constituted the last 900 or so drug offenders executed between April and December of 1952 alone, when the second phase of the campaigns officially wrapped up.⁴³³ Compared to the CCP's anti-counterrevolutionary campaign (1950-1952) when the state executed anywhere from 500,000 to 800,000 people, the figure of

⁴³² Fictional account based on real details. The name has also been changed, fictional characters are 陳國華.

⁴³³ Zhou Yongming, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, p98, 100. The number of estimated deaths comes from Luo Ruiqing, "Summary Report on the National Anti-Drug Movement (全國禁毒運動總結報告)," December 14, 1952, p1. The phrase Luo uses here is that there are 880 most evil drug offenders who have aroused the greatest wrath amongst the people, "罪惡和民憤極大的毒犯八百八十名," a phrase he often uses when discussing the executions of drug offenders. Luo notably, however, nowhere states that only 880 people were executed or killed. Zhou Yongming has interpreted this number as the total amount of people executed, but this claim is subject to debate. What is clear, however, is that the number of deaths total is much lower than counter-revolutionary and other anti-s campaigns. Statistics on the exact and total number of deaths in the anti-drug campaigns remain elusive.

900 seems relatively insignificant.⁴³⁴ A central historical question underlying both of the campaigns, however, asks what motivated people to call for, and participate in, the public killing of their fellow citizens, especially those neighbors, relatives or local shopkeeper, who happened to use narcotics.⁴³⁵ Furthermore, the lower number of deaths and Party leaders' awareness that the deaths of drug offenders were, in certain aspects, more useful than the deaths of counter-revolutionaries or other targets of mass killings, mark the deaths of drug offenders as different and begs the question of why the state saw their deaths as more productive.⁴³⁶ Offenders such as Chen could not have known that his death was more than just punishment for his crimes; it was a public spectacle, a reaffirmation of public morality and justice through purifying violence.

The nascent Chinese state used public violence against accused drug addicts and traffickers like Chen as a way to try to garner sympathy from, mobilize, and thus restore order to a society thought to be in chaos and flux. The CCP discursively constructed drug offenders as a specific, expendable biopolitical pool, from which they selected bodies to perform a kind of public sacrifice. Anthropologist Zhou Yongming and historian Ma Mozhen have both noted that the Chinese state did not simply kill all drug offenders in their efforts to eradicate the narcotics trade. This chapter takes the ones they did kill as a point of entry, which lays bare how the nascent socialist state created and solidified boundaries around who counted as a citizen and who was expendable. This chapter investigates how the anti-drug campaigns in 1950s China

⁴³⁴ Frederick Teiwes, "Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime," in *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 14, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp51-92, p88. See also Andrew G. Walder, *China Under Mao: A Revolution Derailed*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015, p 65.

⁴³⁵ Participation is a tricky word here, but people do turn others in and inform on offenders, though generally speaking they do not actively/personally kill them.

⁴³⁶ While there is a difference between productive and useful, and the CCP sees the deaths of drug offenders as both more productive and more useful in certain aspects.

transformed figures of the “drug addict” or “drug trafficker” into a population that constantly had to face the threat of state-sanctioned violence and sacrifice.

In the 1950s, the Chinese state constructed the figure of the drug addict or trafficker as distinctly separate from the social fabric, as dregs of the old society that the CCP—with its revolutionary rhetoric—wanted to clean up as quickly as possible. As such, drug offenders embodied an ideal sacrificial figure, the site where political ritual could use ‘good violence’ against people whose deaths prompted no revenge or political outcry.⁴³⁷ Sacrifice here refers to the specific concept theorized by anthropologist René Girard, who defines the term as “an act of violence inflicted on a surrogate victim” that serves to “restore harmony to the community, to reinforce the social fabric.”⁴³⁸ A sacrifice is someone or something that exists outside a given community but that the community selects as an acceptable victim.⁴³⁹ The distinction between in- and out-community is critical because a “sacrifice is primarily an act of violence without risk of vengeance.”⁴⁴⁰ In order to fulfill its proper function, a sacrifice must be similar enough to the audience to invoke feeling and provide a practical lesson, but it also must be different enough so that the audience can rationalize its death as acceptable, and even, right or just.

Deaths of drug offenders were more than just another notch in the long record of collective killings in the PRC. I posit that they are sacrifices, deaths that marked certain populations as expendable and solidified the boundaries of post-‘Liberation’ society.⁴⁴¹ Unlike

⁴³⁷ I draw specifically from Julie Skurski and Fernando Coronil’s understanding of violence here, violence “as a complex set of practices, representations, and experiences...rather than...[simply] a tool of power and an asocial force.” Julie Skurski and Fernando Coronil eds., *States of Violence*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005, p2, see also p3-7. Good violence here refers to violence that the state accepts and allows to regulate civil society or reify social norms, as opposed to ‘harmful violence’ which is violence that either violates social norms or contravenes the agenda of the state.

⁴³⁸ René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, p 5, 8.

⁴³⁹ Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, p 12.

⁴⁴⁰ Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, p13.

⁴⁴¹ Frank Dikotter is particularly noteworthy for this tendency; see also Daniel Vukovich’s critique of Walder, Wasserstrom, and others for more on this issue. Michel Foucault’s notion of modern states as those shying away

collective killings, where a person's family could also be killed to prevent retribution, the anti-drug campaign in some instances divided families, with children and parents informing on one another.⁴⁴² The state used the deaths of drug offenders to produce social capital and garner "sympathy" from the populace.⁴⁴³ To the CCP, drug offenders were critical in their expendability, rejected as living bodies but productive as sacrifice-able ones. When considering the public, collective, and mass killings that occurred in the cleanup campaign of the 1950s, the scholarly literature often lumps them together based on the generally violent nature of these acts. Grouping these different campaigns together elides how the state intentionally used a specific form of violence in the anti-drug campaigns to generate sympathy, mobilize, and demarcate the limits of citizenship.⁴⁴⁴

Behind the sacrifice of drug offenders lay a complex array of surveillance, coercion, and policing. Rather than considering the sacrifice a relic of 'primitive' societies as in Girard's formulation, the deaths of these drug offenders helped create what sociologist Michael Dutton has termed "mass-line policing," a system in which public security forces became "the key nodal points in a system that ultimately relied upon neighborhoods and work units to do the

from the use of open, public violence also overdraws this distinction. See Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*. I use term 'Liberation' here as convenient shorthand to refer to the CCP's seizure of power in 1949. This is how police understood and discussed this moment at the time.

⁴⁴² For more on collective killings see Yang Su, *Collective Killings in Rural China During the Cultural Revolution*. Family members turning one another in during the anti-drug campaign will be discussed later.

⁴⁴³ The Chinese term used is '同情' the order will be discussed in more detail later.

⁴⁴⁴ While scholarship such as Andrew Walder's *China Under Mao* is helpful for providing a broad overview of the mass mobilization campaigns undertaken in the 1950s, it often lumps the different campaigns together in terms of how they were carried out, differentiating them only in terms of what they were intended to achieve. Walder, for example, splits the early 50s campaigns into three categories, the first to "enhance their [the CCP's] political control," the second "to change behavior and attitudes in targeted populations" and the third "to mobilize the urban bureaucracy to complete specific tasks," Walder, *China Under Mao*, p62. Walder here differentiates based on the goals of the respective campaigns, rather than on the methods employed. This tendency is replicated by the consistent use of the term execution or killing to refer to any collective, mass, or public killing of someone across many different campaigns, which elides the different ways the state and officials employed violence. Here, however, I understand the anti-drug campaign as different in both intention and in method, and further attempts to understand exactly how the state intended to use execution and the sacrifice to not only change the behavior of drug addicts and traffickers, but to shape society as a whole as well.

legwork.”⁴⁴⁵ By sacrificing these drug offenders in public executions and mass rallies, officials intended to create a new social fabric, one that had no place for drug offenders and relied on popular participation to maintain order and control.⁴⁴⁶ Furthermore, sacrificial victims could only come from a certain group of people and the state specifically protected them from spontaneous vigilante justice because the state wanted to use their deaths.⁴⁴⁷ Far from being simply a holdover from a pre-modern society or evidence of the Communist state’s predilection for brutality, the sacrifices of drug offenders reveal how and why a centralized, modern state decided to inflict and use purposeful, productive, and targeted violence on a group of people in pursuit of social cohesion.⁴⁴⁸ Party leaders wanted the sacrifices of drug offenders to matter; they saw the deaths of so-called counter-revolutionaries, rightists, or landowners as both different from and less useful than drug offenders in securing people’s allegiance by engendering sympathy for and identification with the new regime.

Not every person picked up by party sweeps was a sacrifice; rather, CCP campaigns marked drug offenders as an excess, expendable population, a group that served as a pool of candidates from which to select sacrifices. I argue that the state figured drug users as a modified version of Giorgio Agamben’s notion of the sacred man, *homo sacer*, a concept he used to make sense of the horrors of the Holocaust. Agamben notes that states, as modern political institutions, take the management of citizens, including their bodies, as a central task of governance.⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁵ Dutton, *Policing Chinese Politics*, p161. Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, p22-23. For Dutton, mass-line policing is necessary because the CCP simply lack the manpower, infrastructure, and funding to have an officer stationed on every corner.

⁴⁴⁶ See also, Yang Su, *Collective Killings in Rural China During the Cultural Revolution*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, for more details on how collective killings required popular participation, and in some cases the state had to step in to stop collective killings in rural areas.

⁴⁴⁷ Campaign orders circulated to the central committee expressly state this.

⁴⁴⁸ See Dikotter again for how killings and mass death equal brutality. For specifically the 1950s, see Dikotter’s discussion of campaigns in the *Tragedy of Liberation*.

⁴⁴⁹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p6. Modern in this discussion pertains to primarily 20th century states.

Intimately related to the intertwining of politics and biological life is Agamben's resurrection of a concept from Roman law, the sacred man. The sacred man is someone "who may be killed and yet not sacrificed...in which human life is included in the juridical order solely in the form of its exclusion (That is, of its capacity to be killed)."⁴⁵⁰ *Homo sacer*, then, is a political being that citizens can kill without retribution, but may not sacrifice.⁴⁵¹ It is a life that anyone can assert their sovereignty over by freely killing it, bare life subject to the full force of power relations.⁴⁵² The life of the sacred man thus lies completely bare in a conceptual state of exception.

The state of exception provides the philosophical justification for political institutions to rationalize and legitimate state control over the biopolitical life of the citizenry. The state of exception is a space the sovereign political power conjures forth by suspending the rule of law, usually invoking some external crisis, in this case the prevalence of narcotics in Chinese society, to justify its actions. The creation of a state of exception, however, is a political matter as well as a national security one. That is, the state of exception does not involve just the suspension of laws, but also re-defines the limits of the law and legal precedence as well.⁴⁵³ In doing so, the sovereign creates a juridical zone wherein any measure of violence is legitimate because all laws are open to re-definition. The sovereign thus creates a space filled with a population of sacred men who are living a life while destined to die.⁴⁵⁴ Similar to how Edward Said identifies the Western subject by its relationship with the Oriental "Other," Agamben notes the necessity of this state of exception by demonstrating how the legal, political body of the populace defines

⁴⁵⁰ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, p8.

⁴⁵¹ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, p47.

⁴⁵² Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, p57.

⁴⁵³ Giorgio Agamben, *The State of Exception*, trans. Kevin Attell, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. P7. Crudely speaking, by suspending the law, the sovereign opens the law up to redefinition because the law has to be re-implemented and re-demarcated.

⁴⁵⁴ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, p19-20.

itself through its oppositional and superior relationship to the excluded sacred men.⁴⁵⁵ Using the case study of the anti-drug campaigns, I argue that the sacred man is actually sacrifice-able, but in a secular rather than religious sense. His death restores social order, rather than balance between man and god.⁴⁵⁶

Anti-drug campaigns in 1950s China are a historical example of a fusion between Agamben's ideas on the state of exception and *homo sacer* with Girard's writing on the sacrifice. The sacrifice, the public death with which this chapter began was thus only the spectacular culmination of a much deeper process that marked some people as expendable in relation to others. The CCP's anti-drug campaigns created a state of exception that constructed drug offenders as sacrifice-able bare life.⁴⁵⁷ The campaigns rendered drug addicts a specific, expendable population of sacred men. Policing methods and mass mobilization strategies relied on isolating drug offenders and marking them off as distinct from the rest of Chinese society. Meanwhile, high-level campaign directives ordered the sacrifice of drug offenders to solidify the limits of citizenship and try to create a new sense of hegemony for the nascent CCP regime. The sacrifices of drug offenders also had to be public in order to be effective. Public security forces selected certain offenders, usually, but not always, high-volume traffickers or unrepentant repeat offenders as splendid sacrifices, deaths to create social meaning, a productive force that marked certain populations as expendable and solidified boundaries who counted as a Chinese citizen. The anti-drug campaigns of the 1950s provide one example of how a modern state used executions and sacrifice to try to consolidate its hegemony. By hegemony, here I refer to

⁴⁵⁵ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Random House, Inc., 1979, p3, 6.

⁴⁵⁶ The original Roman use of the sacred man—where Agamben borrows and modifies the concept from, involves restoring balance between gods and men through the figure of the sacred man.

⁴⁵⁷ By bare-life here I refer to life that is exposed to death, life that lies bare/naked before the power of the sovereign to inflict violence.

Gramsci's complex and shifting continuum between sheer outright domination by the state and willing consent, where dominant classes, alliance of classes, or the state, has "succeeded in transcending its own narrow...interests, and has incorporated at least some of the interests of subordinate classes so that it appears to represent the interests of society as a whole."⁴⁵⁸

There is one section in this chapter titled "Addicts and Liars," this is deliberate and meant to highlight how the CCP discursively constructed drug offenders. This chapter also uses CIA reports written for internal consumption and intelligence gathering purposes only. Their authors thus have fewer reasons to exaggerate and demonize the 'red peril' of Communist China.⁴⁵⁹ Furthermore, these reports contain a high level of specificity, with many acknowledging the CCP's successful efforts to end drug usage in certain areas. To be explicitly clear, I in no way intend for these CIA reports be read as an arbiter of truth regarding what really happened, or the reality, of the anti-drug campaign. The CIA reports used in this chapter are simply a reflection of how the CCP's anti-drug campaign, and the measures enacted during this campaign, looked to an outside observer. They should be read as no more and no less than that.

State as Supplier

The anti-drug movement of the 1950s was about more than combating drug usage and trafficking. These two intractable problems posed serious financial and organizational challenges to the Qing, Kuomintang (KMT) and the CCP. All undertook anti-drug campaigns as both a way to curb a negative social habit and establish social control and hegemony over the urban

⁴⁵⁸ Furthermore, by achieving this notion of hegemony, the dominant class, group of classes, or the state "has, that is, 'become organized [sic] as a State' so that its de facto dominance is embodied in the formal institutions of the state." Kate Crehan, *Gramsci, Culture, and Anthropology*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002, p96.

⁴⁵⁹ I acknowledge, however, that even if the reporters are not consciously trying to replicate red peril discourses, the reports are produced within the historical milieu of the Cold War and US anti-communism. I have used my best judgment when evaluating which reports to include but am currently in the process of supplementing the section that relies on these reports with newly gathered materials from Chinese archival sources.

population.⁴⁶⁰ This section uses the case of a rehabilitation clinic to show how KMT-era policy relied on significant funding from the United States. This foil supplements the work of Dutton who claims that CCP-era anti-drug policing methods increasingly privileged the stick over the carrot when dealing with offenders due to serious financial difficulties.⁴⁶¹ I further trace the CCP's continued profiteering off the narcotics trade even during the height of the anti-drug crusades to argue that these campaigns were as much about solidifying social control as about combating the evils of drug usage. To be clear, I am not interested in demonizing the CCP for failing to control corruption or possibly continuing to profit off narcotics trafficking. Rather, these reports simply demonstrate that the anti-drug campaign had alternate goals besides just stamping out the twin evils of narcotics usage and trade.

The CCP began its anti-drug movement in earnest in 1949 and originally appeared to follow a more lenient and rehabilitation focused plan of attack, but a lack of funding partially undermined this approach. Carried out in tandem with the Land Reform and Three and Five Anti's campaigns, the initial attack on traffickers and users also lacked leadership, focus, and consistency.⁴⁶² While I agree with Zhou and Dutton's assessments that the Communists lacked the funding for rehabilitation and treatment centers, particularly after the withdrawal of United States financial and technical aid to hospitals post-Liberation, it is also worth noting that these rehabilitative modes of treatment did not fit the CCP's agenda as well as more visible modes of punishment.

⁴⁶⁰ Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, 3. Both the KMT and the CCP also trafficked in narcotics as a way to make money as well. I regrettably do not have the space to discuss the efforts of all 3 regimes to combat the drug trade, for more on this see Timothy Brook and Bob Wakabayashi, *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000.

⁴⁶¹ Michael Dutton, *Policing Chinese Politics: A History*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005, p157.

⁴⁶² Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, 96.

Documents from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) archives highlight the amount of funding the KMT received from the United States to run rehab-style narcotics reform programs and illustrate by contrast the economic constraints the CCP experienced following the withdrawal of this funding. In a dispatch dated March 1946, the United States Commissioner of Narcotics notified the deputy director of the UN's medical and sanitation supplies division that in order to continue supplying hospitals in China with medical equipment and supplies, their Chinese counterparts needed to provide more than 20,000 pounds of crude opium.⁴⁶³ Further bolstering this impression, Chinese hospitals requested US army field rations to feed patients, and 15,000 white cloth sheets to furnish their rehabilitation centers from their American counterparts.⁴⁶⁴ This snapshot illustrates how at least some rehab-style drug reform centers significantly depended on foreign support.

The second phase of the anti-drug campaign increasingly used violent forms of punishment to police drug offenders. While spurred on partially by a lack of funding, the second, phase also benefited from the new regime's more stable position in society due to the successful conclusion of the aforementioned social cleanup campaigns, and could devote both more resources and better management to anti-drug efforts. Central leaders called for less focus on leniency and rehabilitation, in favor of harsher punishments, mass mobilizations, intensive propaganda, and nationwide implementation of government initiatives.⁴⁶⁵ Mass rallies took place where officials publicly burnt confiscated drug hauls to demonstrate that the CCP was committed to combatting the evils of opium use and was not simply running a resale racket.⁴⁶⁶ The second

⁴⁶³ United Nations Archives and Records Management Section, Box S-0528-0152: UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (hereafter UNRRA), Folder 304.16, page 38, March 22, 1946.

⁴⁶⁴ United Nations Archives and Records Management Section, Box S-0528-0152: UNRRA, Folder 304.16, pp 53-57, February–March, 1946.

⁴⁶⁵ Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, 97.

⁴⁶⁶ Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, 104,105.

half of the campaign, beginning in 1952, enjoyed significantly more success in stamping out drug usage than the initial phase. Under a deluge of propaganda, mass surveillance, coercive force and state violence, offenders often had no choice but to reform and stop using. Indeed, Zhou notes, “during the campaign, there were numerous cases of daughters being mobilized against their drug-trafficking fathers, or sisters against opium-smoking brothers, or wives against husbands. Social control was so strong that it could break connections even between family members.”⁴⁶⁷ The second phase of the CCP’s anti-drug campaigns was wildly successful. Rather than retell this same narrative, this section homes in on two aspects of Zhou’s account that need further clarification. First, to what extent was the CCP ideologically committed to stamping out drugs. Secondly, why did the movement resort to increasingly violent modes of policing and punishment?

Of the CCP’s initial struggles implementing successful reform programs, Zhou writes, “even though ideologically the government was determined to solve the problem, in reality the Communists simply lacked the resources necessary to carry out the project completely.”⁴⁶⁸ CIA foreign intelligence reports from the 1950s, when placed alongside existing scholarship, show that both the cash-strapped CCP organization and local cadres continued their pre-1949 policy of controlling trade and selling narcotics to fund their activities. Pre-1949, Chen Yung-Fa has demonstrated how the CCP relied on the use of opium growing and trafficking to fund their activities in the Shaan-Gan-Ning area, a practice that continued, at least in part, after the Party seized power following Liberation.⁴⁶⁹

⁴⁶⁷ Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, 110.

⁴⁶⁸ Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, 96.

⁴⁶⁹ Chen Yung-Fa, “The Blooming Poppy Under the Red Sun: The Yan’an Way and the Opium Trade,” in Timothy Brook and Bob Wakabayashi eds., *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000, p264, 281. See also Miriam Kingsberg, *Moral Nation*, p137.

An internal case report from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from April 1951 illuminates how the CCP tried to maintain the power to decide when and where selling narcotics was acceptable, rather than stamp out the trade completely. According to the report, Shanghai customs officers and members of the Public Security bureau arrested a woman traveling by rail who had packed her luggage with 12,500 USD worth of heroin.⁴⁷⁰ When detained, she protested her arrest, telling officers that she “had acquired the heroin in Hong Kong from a Communist government office.”⁴⁷¹ Rather than dismissing her out of hand and confiscating the drugs, customs officers felt her claims “made the case too difficult to handle...and therefore turned [it] over to the Public Security Office.”⁴⁷² Considering Communist customs arrested her it is also unlikely that the woman simply told officials what they wanted to hear. Similarly, in that same year, the Shanghai customs service picked up Zhu Guanghong (朱光宏) for trafficking opium. Zhu subsequently informed officers that he had purchased his product in Tianjin after negotiating the price with an unnamed government official. This official informed him that after selling the product, the “government disclaimed all responsibility for opium purchased by private citizens after it had been loaded on a vessel for some port outside of China.”⁴⁷³ After his arrest in Shanghai, an unfazed Zhu asked officers “if a shipment of opium could not be discharged outside China because of unforeseen circumstances, would the government protect the shipment on its return to the port of origin.”⁴⁷⁴ Customs officials decided that Zhu’s case amounted to smuggling

⁴⁷⁰ CIA-RDP82-00457R007200780006-8, “Functions of the Shanghai Customs Service,” Date distributed 12 April 1951, page 2. This is equivalent to \$117,116.83 USD in 2017 dollars according to the bureau of labor statistics. https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.html

⁴⁷¹ CIA-RDP82-00457R007200780006-8, “Functions of the Shanghai Customs Service,” Date distributed 12 April 1951, page 2.

⁴⁷² CIA-RDP82-00457R007200780006-8, “Functions of the Shanghai Customs Service,” Date distributed 12 April 1951, page 2.

⁴⁷³ CIA-RDP82-00457R007200780006-8, “Functions of the Shanghai Customs Service,” Date distributed 12 April 1951, page 2.

⁴⁷⁴ CIA-RDP82-00457R007200780006-8, “Functions of the Shanghai Customs Service,” Date distributed 12 April 1951, page 2.

narcotics into China, and therefore fined him around 2,000 USD.⁴⁷⁵ In Zhu's case, it is important to note that customs officers faulted him for bringing drugs *into* China, rather than punishing him for harming public morality or indulging in illicit profiteering. For some traffickers, the CCP's ascendance meant business as usual, but on a different scale. Selling drugs was acceptable as long as it brought them out of, rather than into China. The anti-drug crusades were thus concerned not just with the moral valence and total prohibition of an 'evil' drug, but also with preserving the CCP's unilateral ability to decide when and where selling narcotics was acceptable, over the new nation. It is little wonder, then, that officials encountered difficulty enacting stringent anti-drug policies.

Beyond simply permitting local smugglers export narcotic, the CCP continued to engage in the active trafficking of opium into 1951. According to a CIA report in 1951, "the sale of opium, which is an important source of income for the Chinese Communist Government, is controlled by the People's Opium Suppression Bureau."⁴⁷⁶ Another report notes that a special commodity sales bureau "received 28 metric tons of opium from Northeast China. This was stored in the Bureau's warehouse... [the] deputy director of the Bureau went to Hong Kong and Macao to sell the opium."⁴⁷⁷ While personal use and sale for profit was unacceptable on an individual and small scale level, large scale trafficking to procure state profits was another matter. In a manner reminiscent of the United States' own War on Drugs, in the CCP's anti-drug campaigns of the 1950s, the deciding factor in whether opium trafficking was acceptable depended on who was selling it and to whom despite official rhetoric to the contrary.

⁴⁷⁵ Approximately \$19,196 USD as of 2017.

⁴⁷⁶ CIA-RDP82-00457R007500390013-0, "Chinese Communist Government Opium Regulation," Date Distributed May 9, 1951. This report also contains a list of opium stockpiles, places, amounts, lists the brands, the tonnage, the morphine content, etc... Also lists the heads of the opium suppression bureau. Highlights Tianjin and Guangzhou as key export sites with most going to HK and Macao.

⁴⁷⁷ CIA RDP82-0045R007800240012-4, "Shipment of Opium from Northeast China," Date Distributed June 25, 1951, p1.

Running in tandem with stringent anti-opium crusades, however, meant that the CCP had to take pains to mask its continued profiteering off the sale of narcotics. In 1951, the CCP set up a corporation in Beijing to mask the Party's continued patronage of opium trafficking. The company, known as the Lin Chi Company, had its head office and main distribution center in Beijing, along with local branches scattered throughout the rest of China and in Manchuria. Organizationally, the Lin Chi Company fell under the jurisdiction of the central government's Committee of Finance and Economics. The head office graded and prepared opium for shipment before sending it out across the country, usually packaged in the form of medicinal herbs and remedies to avoid the prying eyes of customs officials.⁴⁷⁸ When it came to the nuts and bolts of packaging and selling their products, individual traffickers and official government channels had much more in common with one another than either side may have realized.

Local officials and cadres also abused their positions to sell opium illegally, despite the prohibition against it. A CIA report from August 1952 notes that many local cadres in Guangxi "used their positions for personal gain by participating in smuggling activities, selling gold, opium...thus robbing the wealth of the nation."⁴⁷⁹ The problem in Guangxi was so severe that the Guangxi military district organized a compulsory one month "Senior Cadre Political Training Class" at the People's Revolutionary University at Nanning.⁴⁸⁰ The point here is not to demonize the CCP for failing to control corruption in its ranks, or continuing to engage in illicit trafficking, but to highlight that the anti-drug campaigns of the 1950s were never simply about stamping out drug use, a phenomenon also not limited to only the PRC's anti-drug efforts.⁴⁸¹ The anti-drug

⁴⁷⁸ CIA RDP82-00457R007700420011-6, "Chinese Communist Opium Traffic," Date Distributed 10 May 1951, p1. The report unfortunately does not provide the characters for this company name.

⁴⁷⁹ CIA-RDP82-00457R013300010007-0, "Political Training Class for Cadre Personnel, Kwangsi," Date Distributed August 10, 1952, p1.

⁴⁸⁰ CIA-RDP82-00457R013300010007-0, "Political Training Class for Cadre Personnel, Kwangsi," Date Distributed August 10, 1952, p1.

⁴⁸¹ See Miriam Kingsberg, *Moral Nation*, and scholarly literature on the US's War on Drugs.

campaigns of the 1950s were, rather, a site for the new regime to assert and enact its own claim to legitimacy in a highly visible space.

State as Classifier--Addicts and Liars

This section traces the history of some drug users within the broader campaigns of the 1950s and demonstrates that narcotics users did not see themselves as part of any type of broad, national campaigns or goals, but rather existed as atomized individuals marked different from the social politic by virtue of their drug habit. The accounts of users and traffickers chosen for analysis below are in no way intended to be representative of the experiences of all Chinese drug users and dealers and should expressly not be read as such. Indeed, my point here is exactly the opposite, that users and traffickers existed as a fractured and atomized population, a diverse cluster of people who often shared only one common trait—their narcotics usage. Paradoxically, the CCP mobilized society by presenting these disparate individuals as a unified community that represented a broader social problem. It is precisely because of this shared association with narcotics that the CCP was able to mobilize public sentiment against these isolated individuals through the vehicles of mass campaigns and public executions. The state used addicts and dealers' shared habit to mark them as expendable, indelibly separate from the normalized social fabric of what 'New China' should look like. The term "drug offender" became an all-encompassing signifier that homogenized them and erased any other traits or characteristics these people may have possessed. This in turn rendered them the perfect subjects for the state to sacrifice in spectacular public executions and mass rallies in order to create and rationalize a new system of social order and new modes of policing the Chinese state.⁴⁸²

⁴⁸² The new modes of policing refers to Dutton's mass line policing system here.

For drug users such as Chen Zhulian and Ren Luosi, participation in state-led anti-drug campaigns was a chance to settle old scores and play out their own personal drama, rather than participate in any amorphous attempt to “build the new nation.” According to case files collected by Hubei Province’s Shashi (沙市) municipality’s public security bureau, in early 1951, police responded to a disturbance at a household on Jiefang road. In their report on the incident, police noted that they searched the home of Ren Luosi and Chen Zhulian, a husband and wife, and discovered ten counterfeit silver dollars, leading to the arrest and interrogation of Ren Luosi. A thirty three year old pauper (貧民), Ren made his living as a worker who fluffed cotton before starting to illegally sell silver dollars the year prior, in 1950.⁴⁸³ In interrogation, the police investigator asked Ren if he sold narcotics. Ren replied that he did not, but that his wife, Chen Zhulian, constantly took drugs, and that his efforts to get her to stop smoking caused her to quarrel with him, leading to the disturbance that brought the police to the couple’s doorstep in the first place. Ren further affirmed that his street leader could vouch for him and that he was now willing to reform.⁴⁸⁴ Finally, Ren told the investigating officer that he had stopped selling silver dollars in 1950, and for the whole of 1951 had not engaged in any illegal trafficking, of either drugs or any other products.⁴⁸⁵ Investigators noted that Ren had a history of frequenting prostitutes outside the home, and this, combined with his wife’s morphine habit, had led to frequent conflict between the two.

⁴⁸³ Hoover Institution Archive, Communist Chinese Political Movement Collection, Box No.3, Accession No. 2014C24-247, folder 20, “Court File: Chen Zhulian, Ren Luosi, Drug Dealing,” p6. Translation of his job title is lit “彈花工人”. I have anonymized both of their names.

⁴⁸⁴ Hoover Institution Archive, Communist Chinese Political Movement Collection, Box No.3, Accession No. 2014C24-247, folder 20, “Court File: Chen Zhulian, Ren Luosi, Drug Dealing,” p6.

⁴⁸⁵ Hoover Institution Archive, Communist Chinese Political Movement Collection, Box No.3, Accession No. 2014C24-247, folder 20, “Court File: Chen Zhulian, Ren Luosi, Drug Dealing,” p6.

Continuing the investigation, officers brought Chen Zhulian into the interrogation room. An illiterate thirty-year old classified as a poor peasant, Chen lived with her husband and joined him working as a cotton fluffer. Chen confessed that she started taking opium after the Japanese invaded China, stopped for a few years and then started taking morphine in 1949. When asked whether she illegally sold drugs, Chen said, “I have never sold morphine, it’s my husband Ren Luosi, he wants to divorce me, so I told the police that he was selling counterfeit silver dollars. Then he falsely accused me of taking morphine, we had a fight, and then the police accused me of selling morphine.”⁴⁸⁶ After her case was resolved in court, police locked Chen up at the local police station. Ten days later, following the intervention of her work group leader and her local women’s representative, Ren told police that his wife had stopped using narcotics. Furthermore, Ren told investigators that he had only seen Chen take morphine but had never seen her sell it, affirming her earlier confession.⁴⁸⁷

The two testimonies, while occasionally supporting one another, ultimately blame each other for the disturbance that led to their interrogation, isolating the husband and wife pair from themselves. Rather than simply stating that he did not sell narcotics, Ren volunteered that his wife was a habitual user, deflecting blame for the household infighting away from himself. Ren also strategically told officers that he had ceased all illegal activities by 1950. Intentionally or not, he located his alleged wrongdoing within the first half of the anti-drugs and trafficking campaigns, when punishments were still more lenient. Chen, on the other hand, portrayed her drug usage as an attempt to deal with two traumatic social upheavals—first Japanese invasion and then regime change in 1949. Furthermore, Chen blamed her husband’s actions as a major

⁴⁸⁶ Hoover Institution Archive, Communist Chinese Political Movement Collection, Box No.3, Accession No. 2014C24-247, folder 20, “Court File: Chen Zhulian, Ren Luosi, Drug Dealing,” p13.

⁴⁸⁷ Hoover Institution Archive, Communist Chinese Political Movement Collection, Box No.3, Accession No. 2014C24-247, folder 20, “Court File: Chen Zhulian, Ren Luosi, Drug Dealing,” p13.

factor leading to her attempt to get back at him by turning him in to the police, which in turn led to him accusing her of allegedly taking morphine. Her drug habit, in other words, played a significant role in rendering her an isolated figure, in conflict with her own husband, and disavowed by society.

Chen's testimony regarding her attempt to quit her habit further illustrates the extent to which her habit marked her as distinctly different from the social fabric, a negative element to distrust and disregard. Under interrogation, Chen regretfully told officers that although she stopped all narcotics use in January of 1951, nobody believed her because strangers (外人) already associated her with drug use, and consequently her husband wanted to divorce her.⁴⁸⁸ Chen's reputation as an addict automatically marked her as untrustworthy to investigators and directly led to her husband's attempt to divorce her. Despite her attempts to reform, her habit indelibly stamped her as different, undeserving of the public's trust or understanding. The attitude of investigators towards the pair further bolsters this impression.

Despite the duplicitous nature of Ren's crimes, investigators deemed Chen the more untrustworthy of the pair because of her drug habit. In a letter to the court, officers recommended releasing Ren on bail and guaranteed that henceforth he would not engage in illicit activities. Concerning Chen, however, investigators wrote, "because she consistently takes drugs, often takes things from the house and pawns them, we had to send her to do reform labor."⁴⁸⁹ Even though Ren actively sold counterfeit currency, he was more trustworthy than Chen because she "consistently takes drugs." Furthermore, investigators cited her pawning of household goods as incriminating evidence against her, but did not examine whether the pawned goods were indeed

⁴⁸⁸ Hoover Institution Archive, Communist Chinese Political Movement Collection, Box No.3, Accession No. 2014C24-247, folder 20, "Court File: Chen Zhulian, Ren Luosi, Drug Dealing," p13.

⁴⁸⁹ Hoover Institution Archive, Communist Chinese Political Movement Collection, Box No.3, Accession No. 2014C24-247, folder 20, "Court File: Chen Zhulian, Ren Luosi, Drug Dealing," p8. The term used is "勞改."

her own goods or whether she even really did use them to fund a habit she claimed she had kicked long before the investigation began. One doubts whether investigators would have been quite so lenient on Ren if he had used the profits from counterfeit currency to fund his own drug habit. The point here is not to offer a purely revisionist reading of the investigator's verdict, but to point out the extent to which the police saw the figure of the drug addict, here personified by Chen, as untrustworthy and deserving of quarantine and punishment.

Chen's dual punishments again reinforce the impression that official policies during the anti-drug campaigns used on a psychic othering of the addict in order to reify a social norm. As punishment for her habit, police locked Chen up in a station and kept her physically isolated from the general population. This physical quarantine mirrors the ideological goal of the campaigns to exclude offenders from new China's social fabric. While Chinese police regularly used imprisonment to punish criminals, enforced withdrawal through detention differs because it simultaneously isolates while masking the violence it inflicts with rhetoric of turning over a new leaf, being productive and "being a good person."⁴⁹⁰ Isolating an addict without proper medical attention and care produces a range of physically and mentally anguishing symptoms, including nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, depression, sweats, anxiety, fever, muscle aches, depression, an inability to sleep, and others. Symptoms such as these begin anywhere from 6 to 30 hours of non-ingestion, peaking at 72 hours.⁴⁹¹ Approximately three days after incarceration, individuals such as Chen thus experienced acute levels of withdrawal, isolated from friends, family, and any type of medical support staff. Furthermore, for people accustomed to high doses of narcotics, sudden and total withdrawal followed by release after merely ten days makes them particularly

⁴⁹⁰ Hoover Institution Archive, Communist Chinese Political Movement Collection, Box No.3, Accession No. 2014C24-247, folder 20, "Court File: Chen Zhulian, Ren Luosi, Drug Dealing," p9. Lit: "現在他們都努力生產從新做好人云云"

⁴⁹¹ <http://americanaddictioncenters.org/withdrawal-timelines-treatments/opiate/>. Accessed May 11, 2017.

likely to relapse. Relapse, in turn, can easily have fatal results if the addict takes the same amount as before their enforced ‘rehab’ because their bodies are unprepared for such a high dose of narcotics.

Offenders such as Chen embodied *homo sacer*, the figure that exists in legal suspension, a dreg of society that may be incarcerated, isolated, or done away with altogether at any time. The figure of the sacred man exists to define by opposition the proper mode of citizenship in modern states, a figure the general population can point to and confidently assert their difference from it, and thus affirm that they belong to society. Similarly, policing measures enacted during the anti-drug campaigns atomized and isolated individuals such as Chen Zhulian as distinct from the proper social body because of their habit, figures forever at risk of feeling the righteous wrath of state violence at any moment, despite any personal attempt to reform or change their habits. Use once, marked forever.

The format of the case file and confession also discursively rendered criminals as an expendable population. Case files for drug offenders such as Chen’s followed a similar format, beginning with an autobiography that acknowledged their misdeeds while usually attempting to find some extenuating circumstances in the past, such as the trauma of the Anti-Japanese War. Offenders signed and dated this confession to verify its integrity and then the police included what they deemed relevant evidence afterwards. By prefacing the report with the confession, however, officials both prejudiced readers as to the guilt of the accused and reinforced that offenders differed from the rest of the populace because they had something to confess in the first place. Confessions by nature assume that offenders have committed an offence against society and need to both acknowledge and repent of their misdeeds. As Foucault notes, confessions are “the act by which the accused accepted the charge and recognized its

truth...through the confession, the accused himself took part in the ritual of producing penal truth...through the confession, the accused committed himself to the procedure; he signed the truth of the preliminary investigation.”⁴⁹² While the offender has space to operate and attempt to show they suffered from extraordinary circumstances when they write or dictate the confession, ultimately any maneuvering they attempt happens under a rubric of assumed guilt and confessions must be approved by the signatory officer before entering official record. The details and specifics of drug offender’s circumstances thus disappear under the sign of confession and the implications it carries regarding their presumed guilt.

State regulatory policies also attempted to group people together as an expendable population based on their proximity to drug usage. According to the “General Order on Elimination of Opium and Narcotics,” issued by the Central Administrative Council in 1950, one of the seven key criteria for carrying out the anti-drug campaign was the categorization and registration of drug traffickers, users, and producers in official registries.⁴⁹³ Reducing the complex problem of drug usage and addiction to statistics and figures further dehumanized addicts and users by rendering them as simply another data point to authorities while also creating a useful set of records for later policing work. Furthermore, during the second phase of the campaigns in late 1952, officials relied heavily on classification data and reconnaissance information collected on drug offenders during the Three and Five-Antis movements.⁴⁹⁴ After

⁴⁹² Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan, New York: Random House, Inc., 1995, p38-39.

⁴⁹³ Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, p95. The other key principles of the campaign are using propaganda to mobilize the masses; wipe out poppy cultivation where possible; prohibit production, trafficking and sale of narcotics; ask people to hand over what narcotics are in their possession; register offenders as noted above; make medication and treatment available but in limited quantities and under strict control (this is still during first half of the campaign); and set up rehab centers in cities with severe narcotics problems. The second half of the campaigns, as noted earlier involves a much greater focus on punishment and stricter measures than the ones put forth here.

⁴⁹⁴ Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, p98.

collecting enough information, officials then carried out arrests in waves to minimize the number of escapees and preempt offenders from warning others by arresting huge numbers of people during a short time frame.⁴⁹⁵

Arresting in broad waves further contributed to the presentation of Chinese society acting as one against the hapless drug offenders. Categorized as a distinctly separate disposable group, even though many were by the nature of their addiction isolated individuals, users and traffickers then faced systematic and coordinated efforts to round up and arrest them by an unstoppable tide of the general public and public security forces. The policing apparatus and masses used the information gained through surveillance and earlier cleanup campaigns to ferret out and round up drug-affiliated populations.⁴⁹⁶ By isolating and mobilizing popular sentiment against these non-normative groups, anti-drug efforts reduced them to sacrificial humans, a population subject to whatever form of surveillance, punishment, and incarceration deemed appropriate by the state. The state demarcated the limits of polite society through the persecution of drug offenders, while simultaneously disavowing and discarding the role played by this expendable population.

Officials in Guangzhou even resorted to simple color-coding in order to differentiate drug offenders from the rest of the population: *homo sacer* from proper society. Beginning in mid-June of 1951, authorities began to issue residence certificates to residents. All residents over the age of sixteen were required to apply for these residency permits. Certificates were color-coded cloth-covered booklets, roughly two by four inches and divided into several categories. Laborers, farmers, students and working professionals received red covered booklets and party officials

⁴⁹⁵ Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, p100.

⁴⁹⁶ The campaigns here can also be connected with the construction of a broader statistical gathering apparatus by the Chinese state in the early 1950s but more work is needed on that front. For more detail on this statistical gathering apparatus see Arunabh Ghosh, *Making it Count: Statistics and State-Society Relations in the Early People's Republic of China, 1949-1959*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 2020).

blue ones. Drug users, by contrast, received black covered booklets and instructions to break their habit or be subject to incarceration and enforced ‘rehabilitation.’⁴⁹⁷ In order to obtain a certificate, residents had to file an application with the municipal government, usually at their local police station, consisting of an autobiography covering the applicants’ life after age 16, and two photographs. Certificates were valid for three years from the date of issue, and police inspected them annually. Moreover, the heads of families had to report to the police all guests without certificates on pain of execution in serious cases. In less serious cases, authorities collected fines and forced residents to write letters of regret, attach their photo to them, and paste copies along street walls.⁴⁹⁸ Thus compelled by the state and police forces, people contributed to the archiving of potentially damaging personal information that could be used against them later.

Surveillance and registration mechanisms classified populations based on artificially determined notions of usefulness to the state and facilitated the punishment of drug offenders. Furthermore, while at the time offenders were not necessarily subject to immediate state violence and incarceration, officials entered them into a system where they were highly visible because of their difference from the rest of the population. This also gave a sense of commonality to non-offenders, who shared the common trait of not having black covered certificates. Moreover, entrance into registration systems placed drug offenders into a contingent state of existence. Even if they reformed, their names remained on record, placing them in danger if political circumstances changed—precisely what happened in the latter half of 1952, when mechanisms of surveillance and registration such as these facilitated waves of police raids and arrests.⁴⁹⁹ Finally, even a simple registration system such as this one carried a built-in disciplinary measure

⁴⁹⁷ CIA-RDP82-00457R008800470008-0, “Residence Certificates, Canton,” Date distributed October 8 1951, p1.

⁴⁹⁸ CIA-RDP82-00457R008800470008-0, “Residence Certificates, Canton,” Date distributed October 8 1951, p2.

⁴⁹⁹ See also, Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Phillippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State*, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009.

for so-called addicts. Registration placed them on a timeline to reform. No matter their personal history or situation, they had six months to break their habit or be subject to detention.

The temporal aspect of the registration system demonstrates how registration of drug offenders reinforced the notion of normal, appropriate, social time and further served to eradicate drug offenders' modes of existence. Judith Halberstam writes, "within the life cycle of the Western human subject, long periods of stability are considered to be desirable, and people who live in rapid bursts are characterized as immature and even dangerous. But the lucid temporality created by drugs reveals the artificiality of our privileged constructions of time and activity."⁵⁰⁰ Because drug users experience time in a fashion entirely different from the rest of society, their continued existence challenges the notion of respectable time, and reveals how a 'normal' life is a socially constructed artifice. The registration of drug offenders, and the enforced timeline imposed upon them, thus reinforced a 'normal' or stable temporality and mode of existence. Part of what made drug offenders such a threat to the incipient state was that their continued existence exposed the CCP's idea of a normalized society as a myth by providing a vision of what an alternate mode of existence would or could look like.

The relegation of drug users and traffickers to the figure of *homo sacer* through registration systems thus served multiple purposes. It reified a new vision of society by erasing—metaphorically killing off—alternate ways of living, and created a surplus population of expendable life that was literally color-coded as different and distinct from the regular citizenry. Drug offenders in 1950s China lived a contingent existence, registered and marked as different from the rest of society because of their habit, which in turn legitimized the use of all forms of state violence upon them.

⁵⁰⁰ Judith Halberstam, *In A Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives*, New York University Press: New York, 2005, p4-5.

State as Executioner

The complexity of the drug problem and financial shortfalls facing CCP officials meant that the Party had to assert political sovereignty through mass campaigns. This led them to co-opt atomized users and traffickers as expendable life, sacrifices to unite the broader Chinese *polis* under the nascent regime. A close textual analysis of official memoranda concerning the punishments of drug offenders, demonstrates that drug offenders writ large embodied the figure of the sacred man, a pool of excess bodies from which the state could and did select sacrifices.

The state possessed the sole mandate to inflict punitive violence against drug offenders. A central part of the anti-drug crusade involved waiting until the appropriate time to act against offenders, with local authorities being “asked to delay any action against known traffickers until receiving orders from the Ministry.”⁵⁰¹ While this method of policing had practical motivations, namely enabling sweeping pickups of offenders and limiting the number of escapees by acting all at once and covering more ground than non-centralized sweeps could, it also highlights the underlying logic of *homo sacer* at work. The sacred man, by definition, is someone who can be killed but not murdered, a distinction made visible in the express order to not act until orders were received from the Ministry of Public Security. The subtext of this order is that drug offenders are not fair targets for unsanctioned violence or vigilante justice from non-state actors. Drug offenders, that is, may not be murdered by regular people, but may be killed by the state when officials deem it necessary. Not just anyone could kill drug offenders. Offenders here live a contingent existence, protected from the fury of the masses generally but at the state’s mercy as potential sacrifices in pursuit of a sober society.

⁵⁰¹ Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China*, p99.

National level campaign goals, as stated in memos such as People's Liberation Army General Luo Ruiqing's "Second Report to the Central Committee," in 1952 state that officials should execute a few of the worst offenders at the right moment in order to whip up public fury against drug traffickers and bring anti-drug crusades to a climax. After detailing how the campaigns are not making enough headway in some unnamed provinces and cities, Luo states that this failure to mobilize the masses properly in pursuit of drug offenders makes it impossible for the government to show its resolution and determination regarding anti-drug measures.⁵⁰² Luo further laments that people were afraid the government was just catching offenders and letting them go again, so they saw no point in turning in offenders that they knew. Indeed, some offenders did threaten people around them, menacing, "[if] you say I am a repeat offender, then I'll tell them you're currently offending," and "Whoever turns me in, I'll just as quickly turn and inform on them, or else kill them myself."⁵⁰³ Turning in someone they knew just to have them come home a mere week or two later and continue using was both a waste of time and exposed them to reprisal from their erstwhile comrade. Furthermore, Luo states that this led to an inability to inspire the masses to hate drug offenders, which again meant fewer cases of people turning in offenders.⁵⁰⁴ Here, Luo identifies a lack of hatred and a lack of real strictness as critical reasons for the anti-drug movement's failure. The emotion of hate, as Critical Theorist Wendy Chun notes, produces community. Chun writes, "the 'we'—as communal...emerges through a hatred of the other, which aligns both the subject who hates and the despised object with others. Those

⁵⁰² Luo Ruiqing, "Second Report on the Anti-Drug Movement (禁毒运动第二号简报)," August 24, 1952.

⁵⁰³ Luo Ruiqing, "Second Report on the Anti-Drug Movement (禁毒运动第二号简报)," August 24, 1952. ("禁毒只是一阵风，很快就会刮过去。""我二十来岁就干，头发都干白了，法院我像走平道一样，把我抓进去，几天就会放出来的。"有的威胁群众说："你说我是惯犯，我就说你是现行犯。""谁检举我，我就把谁咬上，再不就把他弄死。")

⁵⁰⁴ Luo Ruiqing, "Second Report on the Anti-Drug Movement (禁毒运动第二号简报)," August 24, 1952. (没有激发群众对毒犯的仇恨心).

who hate...need their objects, because they become part of a community through this attachment.”⁵⁰⁵ It is insufficient to understand this call to hatred as anything less than an attempt to create community and social cohesion through a visceral othering of drug offenders. The movement needed to become a crusade, fueled by proper hatred and a will to punish, for both officials and the masses.

Luo’s proposed solution was to use the sacrifices of some drug offenders as a productive, hatred generating, and unifying force. His statement on the matter reads, “between the last ten days of August to the first ten days of September, at the appropriate opportunity, in all kinds of locations, publicly and grandly execute some of the highest profile/guiltiest [drug offenders], arouse the people’s great anger towards drug offenders, and push the [anti-drug] movement to a climax.”⁵⁰⁶ Luo’s reminder to select an appropriate opportunity renders the act of execution purposeful, as does his call for a public and grand ceremony. Furthermore, Luo explicitly links these acts to the arousal of public fury in order to spur on the anti-drug crusades.

The concept of the sacrifice helps make sense of the deaths of these drug offenders. Girard’s sacrificial victim has two interwoven characteristics, relatability and harmlessness. Sacrificial victims must bear some resemblance to the community yet remain different enough for their death to hold some meaning.⁵⁰⁷ As detailed above, the policing of drug offenders relied upon and discursively constructed them as distinctly separate from the social fabric. Drug offenders therefore were both relatable; every city saw instances of relatives turning in family

⁵⁰⁵ Wendy Hui-Kyong Chun, *Updating to Remain the Same: Habitual New Media*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2016, p157. See also Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, Edinburgh University Press and Routledge: New York, 2004.

⁵⁰⁶ Luo Ruiqing, “Second Report on the Anti-Drug Movement (禁毒运动第二号简报),” August 24, 1952. “(在八月下旬至九月上旬的适当时机, 在各重点区大张旗鼓地杀几个罪大恶极、民愤极大的毒犯, 把运动推向高潮).”

⁵⁰⁷ Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, p5, 7, 8, and 38.

members or friends handing over friends, yet exiled from the social fabric proper because of their proximity to narcotics.⁵⁰⁸ Drug offenders were distinguishable from the social body proper by “one essential characteristic: between these victims and the community a crucial social link is missing, so they can be exposed to violence without fear of reprisal. Their death does not immediately entail an act of vengeance.”⁵⁰⁹ The separation of drug offenders from society proper in turn meant that their deaths would not provoke any form of vengeance. In the eyes of the state, it was utterly impossible for anyone to take revenge against the state and mobilized masses for the death of a friend or family member involved in the drug trade.

The sacrifice must also be productive; it must produce or restore a point of meaning for society to cohere. Girard writes, “the rites of sacrifice serve to polarize the community’s aggressive impulses and redirect them... [it] furnishes an outlet for...violent impulses...the sacrificial process prevents the spread of violence by keeping vengeance in check.”⁵¹⁰ Phrased differently, the function of the sacrifice is to arouse, orient, and direct the anger of society against a person or group of persons who have transgressed social norms: in the present case, drug offenders. Indeed, returning to Luo’s speech explicitly demonstrates the productive function of these sacrifices. The selection of high profile, unrepentant, and repeat offenders from the available *homines sacri* ensured that there would be no reprisal or vengeance for their deaths. The reminder to select an appropriate time and grandly and publicly sacrifice these disposable bodies in turn emphasizes that their deaths were meant to be visible in order to provide a common point of social reference, in this case to rouse anger against drug offenders while unifying the rest of society around the commonality of being drug free.

⁵⁰⁸ Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, p110.

⁵⁰⁹ Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, p13.

⁵¹⁰ Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, p

A public security bulletin presented to the CCP Central Committee on September 8, 1952 highlights how the sacrifice directly increased the number of drug offenders arrested, underscoring the state's productive and intentional usage of their deaths as a strategy of policing and mobilization. The bulletin notes that since the beginning of the second phase of the campaign, every city in the Northeast and Guangzhou has held mass rallies to publicly try drug offenders and execute several bad and evil elements.⁵¹¹ Consequently, Luo notes that the masses were enraged; they rejected unrepentant offenders, and warmly supported the campaigns, an “excellent reaction” according to the Public Security Minister.⁵¹² The state used the public sacrifices of drug offenders here again to incite public fury, to the extent that participants in mass rallies turned against the accused and excised them from the social fabric. Luo meticulously highlights how public sacrifices produced an instant reaction among viewers, noting that after killing three major drug offenders in Beijing, “that afternoon, [officials] immediately received two thousand, two hundred and seventy-four secret accusations against drug offenders, and that two hundred and forty-one drug offenders came forward to register.”⁵¹³ Furthermore, after the rallies, participants reportedly said that the “government’s judgment was sound, the right people were killed,” and that “everything is now clear, good and bad are clearly separated.”⁵¹⁴ Regardless of whether the accounts are factual, Luo’s inclusion of them in the report at the least demonstrates how he intended to use sacrifices. Participants at the public trials of drug offenders

⁵¹¹ Luo Ruiqing, “Fourth Report on the National Anti-Drug Movement (全国禁毒运动第四号简报).” September 8, 1952. “公审毒犯的大会” is the phrase used. P1.

⁵¹² Luo Ruiqing, “Fourth Report on the National Anti-Drug Movement (全国禁毒运动第四号简报).” September 8, 1952. “群众热烈拥护，反映极好.” P1.

⁵¹³ Luo Ruiqing, “Fourth Report on the National Anti-Drug Movement (全国禁毒运动第四号简报).” September 8, 1952. “北京在公审毒犯大会上杀了三个大毒犯，当天下午，即收到群众检举密告二千二百七十四件，有毒犯二百四十一名坦白登记.” P1.

⁵¹⁴ ⁵¹⁴ Luo Ruiqing, “Fourth Report on the National Anti-Drug Movement (全国禁毒运动第四号简报).” September 8, 1952. Lit: “政府判得穩，殺得准。” and “一清二楚，黑白分明.”

should have come away with a sense of certainty that the unfortunate offender deserved to, and even needed to die. Only by witnessing these deaths could people fully comprehend the difference between right and wrong and thus the boundary between the citizenry and the sacred man. The Minister of Public Security intended and saw the sacrifices of drug offenders as having an immediate and tangible effect, a critical weapon in the state's arsenal in the war on drugs.

Public sacrifices not only increased the number of accusations and arrests, but also, in the eyes of the state, created a climate conducive to the success of the anti-drug campaigns. In September 1952, around one month after his call for more public sacrifices, Luo writes, “most cities took advantage of the favorable situation created by large waves of arrests and the public sacrifices of some of the big drug offenders to hold thousands of...propaganda meetings, producing a great experience and receiving great results... most cities can fundamentally solve the [drugs] problem.”⁵¹⁵ In this instance, the sacrifice produced social capital and public sympathy with the new state to facilitate the spread of anti-drugs propaganda meetings and disseminate campaign messages throughout society. Luo's call one month prior for officials to wait until the appropriate time and publicly and grandly sacrifice drug offenders had begun to pay off.

Officials also used the sacrifice as an ultimate solution when they ran into trouble carrying out their anti-drug mandate. A report from the Lanzhou city public security office on September 14, 1953 shows that at the start of the anti-drugs campaign, the state hauled offenders through the streets in cars to demonstrate its resolve and demonstrate offenders' guilt to the public. Officials further convened massive public trials with thousands in attendance, and had senior cadres give speeches on the evils of drug use. The report notes however, that these efforts

⁵¹⁵Luo Ruiqing, “Fourth Report on the National Anti-Drug Movement (全国禁毒运动第四号简报).” September 8, 1952. “创造了很好的经验, 收效良好” p1. “大部城市可以基本解决问题” p1 .

unfortunately did not attract enough publicity and lacked momentum because National Day and Sino-Soviet Friendship month activities distracted people and lowered their enthusiasm for the anti-drug campaigns. In order to rectify this momentary lapse in attention and emotional investment, officials hauled out six more drug offenders, pronounced judgment, and sacrificed them.⁵¹⁶ The report, however, notes that these sacrifices actually failed to spark the movement back into a fire and lacked the desired effects.⁵¹⁷ Thus while it may not always have proved an efficacious solution to the problems officials faced, in this instance they nonetheless resorted to the sacrifice in order to both re-stoke the flames of public hate and get the anti-drug campaigns back on track.

Public sacrifices also reasserted the supremacy of a violated social norm—being drug free—by taking violent revenge upon transgressors, here, drug offenders.⁵¹⁸ The elaborate political ritual that was the sacrifice of drug offenders distinguished beneficial, or good, violence from harmful violence. Drug offenders embodied harmful violence because of the danger they posed to the new social order, while the policing and sacrifice of these *homines sacri* demonstrated the power and use of good violence. By policing harmful violence using state-sanctioned, good violence, the CCP publicly and visibly reasserted both its social hegemony and its monopoly over the means of revenge.

⁵¹⁶ Lanzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau, “Lanzhou Municipality Summary Report on the Anti-Drug Movement (兰州市禁毒运动总结报告),” p1. Lit: “致群众情绪低落，因之二次宣判虽处死六人。”

⁵¹⁷ Lanzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau, “Lanzhou Municipality Summary Report on the Anti-Drug Movement (兰州市禁毒运动总结报告),” p1. Lit: “但发动不大，效果不明显。” See also 中共西康省委办公厅西康区党委给各地关于肃毒运动工作及剿匪工作的指示--1952.03.23 – 10.30 on the need and use of executions and killings in Xikang. The provincial committee here lays out guidelines for when to kill, how many to kill, and how many to kill as well.

⁵¹⁸ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 33, 35, 41, 45, 49, 55. “to make everyone aware, through the body of the criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign. The public execution did not re-establish justice; it re-activated power”

Governmental policy documents also make clear that Luo's call to arms was not idle political bluster or simply following conventional propaganda rhetorical tropes. The Minister of Public Security was deadly serious. As Zhou notes, "on October 3 [1952], the Central Committee instructed local authorities that 'it is easier to get people's sympathy by killing drug offenders than killing counter-revolutionaries...at least 2 percent of those arrested should be killed.'"⁵¹⁹ Furthermore, in a summary report on the anti-drug campaigns presented to Chairman Mao and the Central Committee in December 1952, Luo reported again that, "the facts prove killing drug offenders is more effective than killing counter-revolutionaries at getting sympathy from society. The masses already genuinely consider the anti-drug efforts as something that concerns their personal welfare and interests; they actively help the government battle drug offenders."⁵²⁰ The logic of the sacrifice is clear here. Central leaders are explicitly aware of the usefulness of killing drug offenders to pursue social cohesion, mandating that officials sacrifice drug offenders because their deaths easily garner public sympathy. While acknowledging the possibility that the rationale for selecting victims may have been banal, both the lower numbers of deaths noted above and the state's specific, intentional usage of their deaths to try to generate public sympathy indicates that the state saw drug offenders as qualitatively different from counterrevolutionaries and other targets of mass campaigns.⁵²¹ The instructions make clear that drug offenders exist in a separate conceptual space from simple counter-revolutionaries; their deaths are more useful and

⁵¹⁹ Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, p107. Here Zhou is directly quoting from a public security directive in his text.

⁵²⁰ Luo Ruiqing, "Concluding Report on the Nation-wide Anti-Drug Movement, (全國禁毒運動總結報告)," December 18, 1952, p1. Lit: "事实证明杀毒犯确比杀反革命还容易得到社会同情。群众已把禁毒的事真正当做是与自己利害有关的事, 积极地行动起来协助 政府同毒犯斗争."

⁵²¹ The function of the quota here is interesting, because, as Walder notes, in the anti-counterrevolutionary campaigns the presence of the quota actually forced local officials to sometimes find individuals to fill their deaths quota even when out and out counterrevolutionaries were not available. This indiscriminate killing to fulfill a quota does not appear to have been replicated in the anti-drug campaigns, however. See Walder, *China Under Mao*, p65-66.

productive for the new state. Reduced to simply a usable statistic on Luo's data sheet; they are disavowed in life yet productive in death.

When considered in tandem with the instruction to hit a quota of sacrifices, the directive also lays bare the conceptual framework of *homo sacer* and sacrifice that undergirded the new state's policy toward drug offenders, particularly during the latter, harsher half of the anti-drug crusade. The directive provides no specific instructions here for how local officials should select people to execute, other than stipulating that they should come from the pool of incarcerated drug offenders. After officials picked up an offender, it did not matter, at least in theory, what the particularities of their individual case were. Once the state constructed offenders as sacred men, they all faced the possibility of officials arbitrarily sacrificing them on the twin altars of social unity and public health.

Conclusion: Mobilization and the Production of Awe

The anti-drug campaigns of 1949-1952 relied upon surveillance, mass mobilization, classification, and the sacrificing of drug offenders. The CCP's policing of drugs in the early 1950s was never simply concerned with getting rid of a moral ill or combating a notion of amorphous, 'evil' drugs. Instead, the anti-drug campaigns and the public execution of drug offenders reveal how the state policing apparatus intended to inflict violence to generate sympathy for the state and garner support from the public. In its battle against drugs, the state transformed the marginalized population of drug offenders into a highly visible yet expendable biopolitical population, bare life existing outside the boundaries of the proper social order, embodying Agamben's figure of the sacred man. The anti-drug campaigns consciously excised drug offenders from the Chinese social fabric, thereby demarcating the limits of acceptable citizenship and behavior. Paradoxically, while drug offenders' habits did not necessarily produce

a sense of community or unity among themselves, the state used these same habits to reduce all of their differences and render them both legible and expendable under the signs of ‘addict’ or ‘trafficker.’⁵²² Furthermore, state directives and policy documents specifically and deliberately single out drug offenders for sacrifices because their deaths garnered a more positive response from the public, and thus produced social capital for the new state. The sacrifices of drug offenders thus demonstrates how the nascent socialist regime attempted to use the classification of non-normative populations and the public use of ‘good violence’ in order to create social hegemony.⁵²³ In this final section, I discuss how the Chinese party-state relies on the use of a ‘balance of awe’ to ensure public participation in policing measures. I further suggest that the 1950s anti-drug campaigns provide a concrete historical precursor of how the state produced this ‘balance of awe,’ here through the usage of the state of exception and the sacrifices of drug offenders.

Where other policing campaigns relied on producing and replicating a ‘balance of awe,’ the state used the 1950s anti-drug campaigns, among other cleanup campaigns, to produce social hegemony and awe. In his discussion of the 1983-86 ‘Stern Blows’ anti-crime campaign, political scientist Murray Scot Tanner argued that the decision to launch the crackdown stemmed from Party leader’s fears that they were “losing control over...the ‘balance of awe’ between the Party-state and criminals. They feared that without a decisive show of state force, not only would criminals not be deterred from crime, but ordinary citizens would be unwilling to give the state the popular assistance it needs to maintain social order.”⁵²⁴ Here, the balance of awe refers to the

⁵²² Miriam Kingsberg has also demonstrated that offenders do not identify as a community purely because of their habits in her work *Moral Nation*.

⁵²³ Hegemony here again refers to the Gramscian sense.

⁵²⁴ Murray Scot Tanner, “State Coercion and the Balance of Awe: The 1983-1986 ‘Stern Blows’ Anti-Crime Campaign,” *The China Journal*, No. 44, Jul., 2000, pp93-125, p94. Tanner translates “嚴打” as Stern Blows, although it is also known as the “Strike Hard” campaign. In the interests of being faithful to Tanner’s text, I have left it as Stern Blows even though I believe Strike Hard is a more apt phrasing.

Party-state's need to mobilize the population to effectively police society. To ensure the effectiveness of Dutton's mass-line policing system for maintaining social control, the Chinese state needed to awe citizens into compliance.⁵²⁵ Børge Bakken has similarly noted that the Communist Chinese state did not maintain order by simply repressing everyone, but actually by providing a space for dissent and resistance. By providing a space for deviant behavior, the state simultaneously has a space to *correct* transgressions of social norms and laws. Thus, Bakken notes, "in China, power still explodes into 'moments of truth' on the scaffold and in the heroic deed...the Chinese brand of power as 'extravagantly visible.'"⁵²⁶ From time to time, the state must visibly and vividly display its power in order to convince people that cooperating with state forces and voluntarily performing various policing functions are in their best interests.⁵²⁷ In 1950s China, the state attempted to use the public sacrifices of drug addicts and traffickers as both a way to demarcate the bounds of acceptable citizenship and coerce society into policing itself.

While eyewitness accounts verifying the direct, correlative effect that watching the public sacrifice of drug offenders had on audiences are lacking, the campaigns were successful in mobilizing society against offenders. Local residents and neighborhood committees, for example, regularly participated in efforts to stamp out the narcotics habit. In the Jiangnan district of Wuhan, over 4,000 residential cadres and activists held propaganda meetings with residents of the district on the evils of narcotics use.⁵²⁸ Over 800,000 people in Tianjin were similarly

⁵²⁵ The bulletin from Lanzhou used on page 38 also notes that cadres and police gained valuable experience during the anti-drug campaigns. "干部和警察在运动中也受到了一次实际的教育和锻炼, 进一步重视了走群众路线与调查研究的工作方法, 政策策略观点较前明确了." P1

⁵²⁶ Bakken, *The Exemplary Society*, p237-238

⁵²⁷ Tanner, "State Coercion and the Balance of Awe," p94-96.

⁵²⁸ Chen Shouqian, "Wuhan's Anti-Drug Campaign (武漢禁毒運動)," in *Abolish Prostitution and Eradicate Narcotics (禁娼禁毒)*, Ma Weigang, ed., pp229-246. Beijing: Jingguan Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1993, p237.

educated through various forms of propaganda, including police-led literacy classes explaining state policies towards drug offenders.⁵²⁹ Newspaper reading groups, women's groups, neighborhood committees, and door-to-door propagandists all worked in tandem to ensure that everyone was aware of state policies regarding narcotics usage. In Wuhan, for example, Chen Shouqian traces several cases of daughters turning in fathers and wives turning in husbands.⁵³⁰ A similar situation occurred in Henan in 1952, when officials recorded more than 680 instances of a son turning in his father and wives turning in their husbands.⁵³¹ These cases speak to the success of the state in convincing at least part of Chinese society that the interests of the state were also their own best interests, even if the price to pay was turning in a family member or friend.

The public sacrifices of drug offenders also produced awe among both civil society and other drug offenders. A report from the Lanzhou public security branch notes that after officials held a mass rally and sacrifice offenders, other guilty parties, some already incarcerated, came forward to confess additional crimes, exclaiming, “they’re really shooting them! I should really just confess everything that happened in the last twenty years” and “now it is different than before, resistance is punished so severely, it is better to confess and be treated leniently.”⁵³² After hearing or watching police sacrifice someone else for one’s own crime, some drug offenders

⁵²⁹ Xiang Baosheng, “Opium and Narcotics in Old Tianjin and the Anti-Drug Campaign in 1952 (舊天津的煙毒及1952年的禁毒運動),” in *Abolish Prostitution and Eradicate Narcotics (禁娼禁毒)*, Ma Weigang, ed., pp336-362, p356.

⁵³⁰ Zhou, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China*, p110. And ⁵³⁰ Chen Shouqian, “Wuhan’s Anti-Drug Campaign (武漢禁毒運動),” in *Abolish Prostitution and Eradicate Narcotics (禁娼禁毒)*, Ma Weigang, ed., p238-239.

⁵³¹ Luo Ruiqing, “Excerpts from Luo Ruiqing’s Summary Report on the Nation Wide Anti-Drugs Movement, Forward from the Southwest District, (西南局转发的罗瑞卿关于全国禁毒运动的总结报告),” p1 of Luo’s report, p61 of the report from the Southwest District.

⁵³² Lanzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau, “Lanzhou Municipality Summary Report on the Anti-Drug Movement (兰州市禁毒运动总结报告),” p1 Lit: “這回真是槍斃呀！乾脆，我把二十年來的事全交了吧”

clearly felt it more expedient to preemptively confess rather than risk the police finding out later and suffering harsher punishment.

The state's figuring of drug offenders as an expendable population, a group of sacred men against which society defined itself, and the use of splendid public sacrifices to reinforce these boundaries contributed to both the formation of mass-line policing, and successfully turned society's wrath against the non-normative lifestyles of drug offenders. The institutions of the sacred man, the state of exception, and the sacrifice were indispensable tools for the incipient PRC to create and consolidate social control. These efforts should not be understood as ahistorical aberrations or as simple holdovers from 'primitive' or 'pre-modern' society. The question is not whether violence and the sacrifice are inherent in modern states, but rather how the state, with the complicit acceptance or active participation of society, decides what groups of people are suitable targets, and uses violence against them as a productive force.

Conclusion: Erasures and Memories of Violence

Throughout the preceding pages I have drawn an incomplete picture of attempts to demonize, regulate, suppress, and attack drug users and traffickers in 20th century China. From Republican-era propaganda posters, photographs, and comics to medical studies and discussions to Mao-era clinics, police registration, mass rallies, and public executions, drug users and traffickers formed a flashpoint for debates about health, class, national weakness, and social belonging. Individuals, private organizations, and government bodies in the Republican and PRC states have contested, legitimated, and spread new forms of political power and social belonging by targeting drug users with different types of violence, from rhetorical to lethal.

The early 20th century marked a particular moment in global history when policing illicit substances took on new political and personal importance. Faced with the eradication of older cosmological and intellectual orders, Republican elites desperately sought out ways to show their modernity and difference from the destruction and devastation of the Late Qing. The historical trauma of the Opium Wars, the rise of new medical professions that needed to assert their authority to make claims of mastery over the human body, a flourishing print culture, and international exchanges with reformers who targeted drugs as a spiritual evil made anti-narcotics work a particularly potent signifier of health and modernity. Even as various warlord, and later the Kuomintang, governments made fortunes off of the drug trade, public discourse and discussion around drugs consistently highlighted their deleterious effect on the individual and social bodies. After the CCP assumed power, they developed their ability to mobilize people around the communal hatred and eradication of shared enemies through attacks on one of the most potent signifiers of poverty, backwardness, and disease, the drug criminal.

Genealogically, this project unfolded backwards from Luo Ruiqing's 1952 statement that killing drug users and traffickers was so beneficial to the Chinese state. I could not make sense of Luo's statement if I looked at it only within the context of Communist policing in the 1950s. As I struggled to understand how and why he came to hold that view, I realized that I had to think of state violence more heterogeneously than studies of state power in Mao's China have usually done, to examine and articulate how different forms of non-physical and non-lethal violence worked in particular historical moments and afterwards. I have purposely thought of violence expansively and considered not only its direct effects but also how it underpins and lays foundations for later moments of violence perpetrated in different forms by different actors.

Chapter 1 examined the epistemological violence of Late Qing and Republican-era anti-narcotics work. While developments in printing, thriving urban culture, and a growing sense of nationalism meant that propaganda grew in sophistication over the course of the Republican period, fundamentally, anti-narcotics messaging portrayed the drug user and trafficker as an obstacle to China's entrance into the modern world. At a time when individual bodies and health became increasingly subject to state intervention under the guise of public health and hygienic modernity, proximity to drugs transformed from a marker of class and consumption into a signifier of social threat, disease, national backwardness, and an acute danger to China's future.

Medical discussions around drug use in the 1920s, as I showed in chapter 2, marked a moment when early 20th century medical professionals, from China to the US to Japan, created and circulated inter-imperial structures of difference. Physicians sought to create and spread new types of medical authority through everything from public health initiatives to autopsies to race science. While these structures of difference appeared in varied and distinct ways globally, control of narcotics stands out as an area of particular concern for many medical professionals.

At international conferences, China's experiences with narcotics use, treatment, and suppression, played a critical role in informing discussions on the dangers of drugs and drug users as a plague or wildfire that threatened to sweep the globe. By tracing the evolution of Dr. Wu Liande's thoughts about drug users, I demonstrated how Wu called on his authority as a world-renowned expert in plague prevention to cast drug users as plague bearers and thus subject to invasive and violent forms of medical and state authority, from quarantine to bizarre medical experiments to forced autopsies.

After the founding of the PRC, the CCP's anti-narcotics campaign focused first on registration and forced incarceration in drug suppression clinics, before turning increasingly towards mass rallies and public executions in the second half of the campaign. Using previously unused registration forms and construction reports, I showed in chapter 3 how police registration and drug suppression clinics reified drug criminals as punishable bodies that the state needed to physically remove or isolate from society and discipline. The drug suppression clinic, far from being a space of treatment, was constructed as a physical space that helped produce stigmatized views of drug users—that they were diseased, lazy, deceitful, backwards, and incurable. The violence of the clinic lay not only in what happened within the walls and in their links to the police, but also in what entrance into a clinic communicated about the patient to everyone else.

Drawing on a half-century of dehumanizing and stigmatizing anti-narcotics messaging and activities, the CCP's mass rallies focused on cultivating community by persuading people to participate in a shared hatred and attacking of drug criminals. Cadres used everything from songs to skits to overtly didactic speeches to find the most effective ways of getting people to come together and hate drug criminals, and by doing so, build community and a sense of togetherness with one another and with the new state. Finally, after stoking the flames of communal hatred, as

I showed in chapter 5, police officials took great care to stage the executions of drug criminals in ways that they thought would produce senses of community and belonging among the audience. Rather than killing indiscriminately, police carefully chose targets based on who they thought local people would hate the most, and whose death they would respond to the most.

While my narrative ends after the execution and is confined to the realm of drugs, that does not mean that these histories of violence ended there. Just as decades of rhetorical, epistemological, and spatial violence informed the execution process from target selection to staging, the effects of the executions reverberated long after the campaign concluded. Far from being isolated and contained incidents, the executions of drug criminals and other accused counterrevolutionaries or bad elements constantly spill over into people's lives long after the moment of death. Regarding Land Reform, for example, anthropologist Erik Mueggler, has shown how, "more than forty years later, many who had been children then could still mark with a tossed stone the precise spots where the three men had stood" and were executed by the state during Land Reform.⁵³³ Sociologist Jingsui He has shown similarly how the killing of a local landlord during the Cultural Revolution for many villagers who participated in the killing "is not merely a story, but a personal moral torture" that haunts them long after the murder was committed.⁵³⁴

Beyond the execution itself, looking at anti-narcotics efforts in the PRC today, recent campaigns blend the characteristics of previous movements with sophisticated new techniques of surveillance and monitoring. An enhanced version of the registration forms for drug criminals of

⁵³³ Erik Mueggler, *The Age of Wild Ghosts: Memory, Violence, and Place in Southwest China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 164.

⁵³⁴ Joseph Esherick, Paul Pickowicz, and Andrew G. Walder, eds., *The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History*, Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 149–50.

the 1950s, for example, governs how the police approach even those who voluntarily enter drug suppression clinics today. Anthropologist Nicholas Bartlett's work on recovery and addiction centers in contemporary China, for example, has shown how, since 2006, the Ministry of Public security has implemented a nationwide monitoring system for drug users. The system, containing the data of close to two million registered drug users, alerts police whenever anyone in the database uses their identity card to check in at a hotel (required at nearly all establishments for overnight stay) or railway station.⁵³⁵ Police forces can then, at their discretion, immediately force the person to undergo a drug test and immediately detain those who test positive for up to three years in "a compulsory labor center, generally without a trial. Many of the people with heroin use history I knew who traveled had experienced a 'summons' (*chuanhua*) instigated by this system."⁵³⁶ One interviewee detailed how "in the middle of the night he would hear a knock on the door by police waiting to escort him to the station to provide a urine sample...he was especially incensed by the fact that people like himself who had been heroin-free for years and passed many urine checks kept being stopped and detained."⁵³⁷ When Bartlett asked some of his interviewees how they might return (回歸) to society, some grew frustrated with his phrasing of the question. The interviewees stated, "[I must] now find a new way of living or a new perspective on life, to go live and work...if you were to say, 'What about going back to how things were before?', that would be empty talk! How could that be possible?"⁵³⁸ Similar to cases like Mrs. Zhu in chapter 4, once police enter people into the state's registration systems, drug

⁵³⁵ Nicholas Bartlett, *Recovering Histories: Life and Labor after Heroin in Reform-Era China* (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2020), 132.

⁵³⁶ Bartlett, *Recovering Histories*, 132.

⁵³⁷ Bartlett, *Recovering Histories*, 133.

⁵³⁸ Bartlett, *Recovering Histories*, 62.

users find themselves perpetually subjected to state violence and the looming threat of incarceration and forced labor.

While the preceding pages have shown a picture of drug suppression and regulation in China, examples of state and public violence against accused drug users and traffickers has spanned the globe. As anyone remotely interested in narcotics history knows, throughout the 20th century alone, drugs have been a critical flashpoint in global debates about health, wellness, race, class, gender, citizenship, belonging, and creating and articulating new forms of policing, state power, and empire. Debates and policies about drugs and drug suppression, as other scholars have shown, are never, and often not even primarily, just about the suppression of illicit substances.⁵³⁹ Drug suppression remains a justification for unilateral expressions of profound state violence. By paying attention to the less obvious forms of violence against drug users and traffickers, I have highlighted some of the normalized ways in which violence against drug users and traffickers continues to appear in our present moment.

There is, of course, nothing uniquely Chinese about the infliction of state violence against marginalized populations. While state inflicted or sponsored violence appears differently in particular historical contexts, one of the hallmarks of modern governance is not the disappearance of violence, but rather its institutionalization, normalization, and its use against marginal groups or targets that lay on the liminal edges of national or imperial spaces. Scholars

⁵³⁹ Miriam Kingsberg, *Moral Nation: Modern Japan and Narcotics in Global History*, Asia : Local Studies/Global Themes 29 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014); David T. Courtwright, *Dark Paradise: A History of Opiate Addiction in America*, Enl. ed (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001); David T. Courtwright, *The Age of Addiction: How Bad Habits Became Big Business* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019); Nancy D. Campbell and Elizabeth Ettorre, *Gendering Addiction: The Politics of Drug Treatment in a Neurochemical World* (Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Diana S. Kim, *Empires of Vice: The Rise of Opium Prohibition across Southeast Asia*, Histories of Economic Life (Princeton ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2020); Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, eds., *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Peter Thilly, *The Opium Business: A History of Crime and Capitalism in Maritime China* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2022).

from Benjamin to Foucault to Agamben to Weheliye have shown how profound expressions of violence underpins modern life, from jurisprudence to discipline to extermination to slavery. Violence, as a flexible set of practices, relationships, and exploitation that aims to create, spread, or communicate forms of power, becomes not invisible, but so hyper-visible that people either become desensitized or even welcome its appearance. What I have shown in this work is that making intra-group violence palatable, hyper-visible, and in some cases welcome, is a long-form and contingent historical process. By refusing to accept the normalization or hyper-visibility of violence, and instead interrogating how, why, and when states decide to inflict lethal violence, there remains room to promote a radical politics of solidarity that refuses the dehumanization, exclusion, and eradication of some for the sake of the few.

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