

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Committing to the Party: The Costs of Governance in East Asian Democracies

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of
the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science and International Affairs

by

Kuniaki Nemoto

Committee in charge:

Professor Ellis Krauss, Chair
Professor Stephan Haggard, Co-Chair
Professor Megumi Naoi
Professor Matthew Shugart
Professor Carlos Waisman

2009

Copyright
Kuniaki Nemoto, 2009
All rights reserved

The Dissertation of Kuniaki Nemoto is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

Co-Chair

Chair

University of California, San Diego

2009

To Nemoto Norikuni and Nemoto Tokiko

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SIGNATURE PAGE	iii
DEDICATION.....	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	v
LIST OF FIGURES	viii
LIST OF TABLES.....	x
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	xii
VITA.....	xv
ABSTRACT	xvi
Chapter 1. Introduction	1
1.1. Introduction.....	1
1.2. Definitional Issues	10
1.3. Japan and Korea.....	14
1.4. Plan of the Dissertation	25
Chapter 2. Committing to the Party: A Model of Party Discipline.....	29
2.1. Introduction.....	29
2.2. Leaders, Backbenchers, and Their Interactions.....	32
2.3. Implications and How to Test Them.....	52
2.4. Conclusion	60
Chapter 3. Quest for Power: Party (Un)development in Japan and South Korea.....	63
3.1. Introduction.....	63
3.2. Parties without Organization	69
3.3. Personalistic Electoral Competition.....	80

3.4. Ideological Diversity.....	98
3.5. Factional Struggles and Quest for Power.....	124
3.6. Quest for Power.....	135
3.7. Conclusions	151
Chapter 4. Party Discipline and Policy Dissension in Japan.....	153
4.1. Introduction.....	153
4.2. Theory	155
4.3. The Japanese Context	165
4.4. Data and Analysis	174
4.5. Conclusion	197
Chapter 5. Party Discipline and Policy Dissension in Korea.....	199
5.1. Introduction.....	199
5.2. The Three Different Incentives.....	202
5.3. Korean Context.....	204
5.4. Empirical Analysis	211
5.5. Conclusion	235
Chapter 6. Factional Politics and Budget Items in Japan	238
6.1. Introduction.....	238
6.2. Evolution of Party Rules in the LDP.....	240
6.3. Budget Making Process in Japan	244
6.4. Hypotheses and Data	250
6.5. Analysis and Discussion.....	262
6.6. Conclusion	266

Chapter 7. Distribution of Subsidies and Party Discipline in Korea	268
7.1. Introduction.....	268
7.2. Presidential Factor in Distributive Game.....	271
7.3. Korean Context.....	279
7.4. Data Analysis.....	289
7.5. Conclusion	303
Chapter 8. Conclusion.....	312
8.1. Summarizing the Findings.....	312
8.2. Research Ahead.....	317
References	328

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1: The LDP's Membership-to-Electorate (M/E) Ratio	73
Figure 3.2: Japanese Parties' Fee-Paying Membership-to-Electorate (fpM/E) Ratios.....	75
Figure 3.3: Korean Parties' Membership-to-Electorate (M/E) and Fee-Paying Membership-to-Electorate (fpM/E) Ratios.....	77
Figure 3.4: Answers to the question, "In deciding to cast a vote in this election, did you consider the party as more important, or the individual candidate as more important?"	93
Figure 3.5: Answers to the question, "In deciding to cast a vote in this election, which was the most important factor for you?"	94
Figure 3.6: Independent Candidates in Japan	97
Figure 3.7: Independent Candidates in South Korea.....	98
Figure 3.8: Ideological Positions of Japanese Diet Members, Kernel Density.....	104
Figure 3.9: Ideological Positions of Korean National Assembly Members, Kernel Density	107
Figure 3.10: Ideological Positions of Korean National Assembly Members, D-NOMINATE.....	110
Figure 3.11: Family Tree of Japanese Parties in the 1990s.....	115
Figure 3.12: Family Tree of Japanese Parties in the 2000s.....	116
Figure 3.13: Family Tree of Korean Parties in the 1990s.....	118
Figure 3.14: Family Tree of Korean Parties in the 2000s.....	119
Figure 4.1: Hypothesized Relationship between Seniority and Likelihood of Defiance Behavior.....	165

Figure 4.2: TERMS, ZOKUPOINT, and Simulated Probability	188
Figure 5.1: Family Tree of Korean Parties, 2000-2008.....	213
Figure 5.2: Probabilities of Defection	233
Figure 6.1: The Number of Factions and the Effective Number of Factions in the LDP	242
Figure 6.2: The Number of Threatening Factions and the Share of the LDP in the Lower House.....	243
Figure 6.3: Cabinet Balance of Factions.....	260
Figure 7.1: Simple Spatial Models for Negotiations between the President and Party....	276
Figure 7.2: Regional Distribution in Korea, 2005 (Total Subsidies per capita in Million Won).....	292

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: Cases of LDP Splits on Legislative Votes.....	5
Table 1.2: Passage Ratios of Bills	7
Table 1.3: Rice Index for Korean Parties.....	7
Table 1.4: Average AWU Scores for Americas	8
Table 3.1: Ideological Spectrum of Japanese Lower House Members	103
Table 3.2: Ideological Spectrum of Korean NAMs.....	106
Table 4.1: Factional Balance, June 2005.....	180
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics and Predicted Signs for Major Variables	183
Table 4.3: Basic Ordered Logit Estimates for ZOUHAN.....	185
Table 4.4: Ordered Logit Estimates for ZOUHAN, Interactions	194
Table 4.5: Logit Estimates for ZOUHAN	196
Table 5.1: National Assembly Election Results	207
Table 5.2: National Assembly Sessions, from December 2000 to May 2008.....	212
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Main Explanatory Variables.....	219
Table 5.4: Logit Estimations for Defection from Parties: All NAMs	223
Table 5.5: Estimated Probabilities of Defection from Parties: Regional Stronghold and Ruling Party.....	226
Table 5.6: Logit Estimations for Defection from Parties: SMD NAMs.....	228
Table 6.1: Expenditure Items Used in Analysis.....	253
Table 6.2: Postwar LDP Cabinets	257
Table 6.3: Summary Statistics for Main Independent Variables.....	262
Table 6.4: Estimation Results for Budget Items.....	263

Table 7.1: Presidential Candidates' Vote Shares, 1987 to 2002.....	284
Table 7.2: National Assembly Election Results	286
Table 7.3: Summary Statistics for Main Variables	298
Table 7.4: Tests for Greasing-the-Wheel Strategy.....	300
Table 7.5: Tests for Regional-Targeting Strategy.....	301

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have benefited from the support of many individuals over the course of my graduate education and the development and completion of this project. First of all, I would like to thank my dissertation chairs, Professors Stephan Haggard and Ellis Krauss. Professor Haggard thoroughly read my drafts and gave me very critical and useful comments. I always enjoyed working with Professor Krauss, who led me to dive into the world of Japanese politics through a number of research projects. I would also like to thank my dissertation committee members, Professors Matthew Shugart, Megumi Naoi, and Carlos Waisman. I learned a lot from Professor Shugart's Ph.D seminars on electoral systems and legislative/party organization, and they were indeed invaluable in shaping and reshaping my argument throughout the dissertation. Professor Naoi helped me sharpen the theoretical and empirical arguments of my work, and as a junior professor, she also gave me lots of useful advice on a graduate life. Professor Waisman's Political Sociology class that I took while I was preparing for the qualifying exam was indeed helpful in thinking about how political parties mediate between the state and society, one of the major topics in this work.

Beyond my dissertation committee, my gratitude should go to Professor Robert Pekkanen at University of Washington, Seattle, and Professor You Jong Sung, who continuously encouraged me throughout my study. I feel I was indeed lucky to work with Professor Pekkanen as a co-author for multiple interesting research projects, including the one published piece that I used in this dissertation. Professor You gave me a number of useful suggestions to improve my empirics for my Korean chapters, and I was really indebted to him and his family.

Fortunately I was able to work with professors in and outside School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, UCSD, as a research assistant to continue my stay in the US. I would like to thank Professors Takeo Hoshi and Ulrike Schaede at IR/PS, Professor Ethan Scheiner at UC Davis, and Professors Frances Rosenbluth and Saito Jun at Yale University. I would also like to thank people at IR/PS and Department of Political Science, UCSD.

I also immeasurably benefited from circles of friends and colleagues around the world. In the Japanese circle, I was able to get useful comments from Fujimura Naofumi, Horiuchi Yusaku, Lin Chao-Chi, Matsuo Akitaka, Saadia Pekkanen, Steven Reed, Daniel Smith, Sugawara Taku, Suzuki Yūji, and Yamamoto Teppei on one of the chapters and/or my work. I would also need to thank Professors Gregory Noble and Hiwatari Nobuhiro at University of Tokyo, and Professor Tsunekawa Keiichi at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies for making my graduate life in the US possible. I indeed enjoyed the friendships with Chiba Daina, Hirose Kentarō, Kagotani Kōji, Kimura Kazuhide, Maeda Kentarō, Umeda Michio, and other Japanese graduate students across the US. *Mata nomimashou.* In the Korean circle, I intellectually benefited from Professor Moon Woojin at Ajou University when I met him here in San Diego in the very first year of my doctoral study, the Korean social policy class by Professor Song Ho Geun at Seoul National University, and conversations with Professor Yang Jae-Jin from Yonsei University and Professor Lee Yoonkyung (*keun nuna*) at Binghamton University. My Korean friends and colleagues in and outside San Diego, including Mark Choi, Choung Jinhee, Melanie Feurey, Jeong Jihyeon, Lee Dongseong, Lee Soohyun (*eorin nuna*), Park Sang Young, and Shin Jaehyeok, are invaluable helpful in

discussing the political issues about South Korea. *Kamsa hamnida*. Beyond the East Asian circles, I would need to thank my friends and colleagues in our graduate program, including Rick Barrett, Aakash Dharmadhikari, Melanie Hart, Verónica Hoyo, Derek Tai-wei Liu, Justin Reeves, Pedro Riera, Karthik Vaidyanathan, Jessica C. Weiss, Stephen Weymouth, and Yu Zheng.

I would also like to acknowledge data support from Professor Kang Won Taek for Korean legislators and Professors Ellis Krauss and Robert Pekkanen for their J-LOD dataset. Part of their data is used in this dissertation. A librarian at the IR/PS library, Isozumi Sanae was very helpful in accessing many data and newspaper resources. I would also thank legislators and bureaucrats from Japan and South Korea for having very interesting interviews with me. Some of them, especially those from South Korea, did not want me to disclose their names, so throughout this dissertation, all the interviews that I conducted are anonymously cited.

A part of Chapter 4 appeared in Nemoto, Kuniaki, Ellis S. Krauss, and Robert Pekkanen. 2008. "Policy Defection and Party Discipline: The July 2005 Vote on Postal Privatization in Japan." *British Journal of Political Science* 38 (3): 499-525. I acknowledge my co-authors, Professors Ellis Krauss and Robert Pekkanen, for their generous permissions. The dissertation author was the primary investigator and author of this paper.

Last but not least, for their indispensable mental support, I would like to thank my parents in Yokohama, Nemoto Norikuni and Nemoto Tokiko. During the most difficult times, they were just there for me. This dissertation is dedicated to them.

VITA

- 2001 Bachelor of Arts. Dept. of Advanced Social and International Studies, University of Tokyo, Japan.
- 1999-2000 One-year exchange program called AIKOM (Abroad in Komaba). Dept. of International Relations, Seoul National University, South Korea.
- 2003 Master of Arts. Dept. of Advanced Social and International Studies, University of Tokyo, Japan.
- 2005 Master of Arts. Dept. of Political Science and the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IR/PS), University of California, San Diego.
- 2009 Doctor of Philosophy. Dept. of Political Science and the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IR/PS), University of California, San Diego.

PUBLICATIONS

2008. "Policy Dissent and Party Discipline: The July 2005 Vote on Postal Privatization in Japan." With Ellis S. Krauss and Robert Pekkanen. *British Journal of Political Science* 38 (3): 499-525. (Lead author)

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Committing to the Party: The Costs of Governance in East Asian Democracies

by

Kuniaki Nemoto

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and International Affairs

University of California, San Diego, 2009

Professor Ellis Krauss, Chair
Professor Stephan Haggard, Co-Chair

This dissertation explores party discipline and its policy consequences in two East Asian democracies: Japan and South Korea. Despite personalistic electoral competition, ideological diversity inside the ruling parties, frequent party splits and mergers and switching, and intraparty factional struggles, the leadership in the two countries has been able to maintain the high levels of party unity inside the legislatures and achieve collective goods of stable rule and legislation.

In order to solve this puzzling phenomenon, I develop a theory to argue that, in order to achieve high productivity in the legislature, the leadership in the two countries strategically distributes office perks, or various types of privileges available in the government or the party: cabinet minister posts, heads of state-owned corporations and agencies, and pork subsidies. I further argue that the contrasting patterns of allocation of office perks following from the constitutional difference – parliamentarism versus presidentialism – cause divergent consequences in party unity.

In order to support this theoretical claim, I utilize original datasets on legislators' roll call votes on the legislative floors and on fiscal spending in Japan and South Korea. First, data on roll call votes confirm that access to office perks is a significant factor in maintaining party unity: in Japan, when the leadership broke down the existing norm to sustain party unity, a group of backbenchers defected; and in Korea, ruling party members affiliated with the president tend to show higher unity, but such unity tends to decrease over time. Second, analysis at fiscal spending shows that pork is strategically used by the leadership to maintain party unity: in Japan, when the leadership incorporates intra-party factions into the cabinet, upward pressures on pork-related budget items are found; and in Korea, the president greases the wheels by allocating more money to presidential supporters when the ruling party has a majority in the legislature.

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Introduction

This dissertation is intended to explore party cohesion/discipline and its policy consequences in the context of East Asian democracies: Japan and South Korea. Party discipline and party cohesion are important themes in the literature of the comparative study of legislative and party politics. In parliamentary regimes, party cohesion is argued to be a precondition for responsible party government (Bowler et al. 1999). A cohesive, homogeneous political party in office can make governments stable and durable, while a political party that contains legislators with a divergent set of interests and policy preferences should expect to face difficulties in making collective choices. Under the latter conditions, continuous partisan support is difficult to maintain, and this could lead to unstable voting behavior and possibly to party splits and the further fragmentation of the party system. Thus the existing literature points to the negative consequences arising from legislative fragmentation, including party-system extremism (Cox 1990) and cabinet instability (Laver and Schofield 1998).

Beyond parliamentary regimes, party cohesion is also one of the most important issues in legislative politics. The concept has been used in the study of roll call voting, legislative organization, and other topics in the field of American politics (Cox and McCubbins 1994, 2005, 2007; Crook and Hibbing 1985; Maltzman 1997; Stratmann 2000), as well as in comparative legislative studies especially from Latin American cases (Ames 2002; Amorim Neto 2006; Amorim Neto and Santos 2001; Carey 2003, 2007; Figueiredo and Limongi 2000; Jones

2002; Samuels 1999). Many of these studies focus on the institutional and political factors conducive to cultivating intra-party cohesion and legislative heterogeneity that can harm a party's collective choice: electoral rules (Carey and Shugart 1995; Hix 2004); the existence of particularism (Ames 2001, 2002; Desposato 2006b; Samuels 1999); and factionalism, ideological diversity and other intra-party dynamics (Gaines and Garrett 1993; Tsebelis 2002).

If government leaders face fragmentation in the legislative body, they would be plagued by difficult decisions as to how to discipline rank-and-file legislators: how to force them to commit to the party line *ex ante* and whether to punish rebellion *ex post*. Which political and institutional factors are likely to promote party cohesion and effective discipline? How do political leaders achieve them with their limited resources? Are they costly? And what types of policy consequences can be expected with effective party cohesion? These are theoretical and empirical questions I seek to explore throughout this dissertation.

These general theoretical questions are all the more important in the East Asian context, because party and electoral competition in the region has been usually based on non-ideological platforms as discussed in depth in Chapter 3. In Japan, personal networks known as *kōenkai* are the most important vote mobilization machines in elections, rather than ideological platforms and/or ideologically-oriented party activists (Flanagan 1991; Krauss and Pekkanen 2004; Miyake 1998; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Taniguchi 2004). And the ruling party in Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party, is only seen as a group of ideologically diverse politicians without any clear-cut policy commitment (other than what can be loosely defined as being "conservative"); the persistent and rampant factionalism inside the party has led scholars to see it only as a group of factions (Leiserson 1968; Reed 2009).

The same phenomenon can be found in South Korea, where voters tend to vote for a National Assembly candidate according to his/her personalities and visibility, rather than, again, parties' ideological positions (Park 1988a, 1988b; Yoon 2002b). Although the ideological division between the two major camps has been getting bigger since the turn of the century (Kang 2005; Kim et al. 2008), Korean parties are still ideologically diverse inside (*Joongang Ilbo* August 31, 2004), and partly because of that, party switching is so widely observed.

These facts imply that, in trying to win office, Japanese and Korean parties cannot depend solely on consistent party platforms and that therefore parties in the region should look like the extreme forms of procedural coalitions in the legislative bodies (Aldrich 1995). This could make a great contrast even with the United States, where, although parties are in general considered to be weaker than Western European counterparts, various scholarly attempts have been made to explain party cohesion in roll-call votes in terms of the ideological polarization of parties and society especially after the 1980s (McCarty et al. 2006; Poole and Rosenthal 1997).

In light of the questions raised above, Japan and Korea also provide a good empirical puzzle as to how political leaders achieve party discipline inside their parties with their limited resources. Even with the personalistic electoral systems and the lack of ideological cohesion inside parties in the two countries, ruling party leaders have been able to dominate the legislative arena. In Japan, the government, with its "institutional power and political will to proceed without accommodating the opposition's complaints," has succeeded in taking advantage of its agenda-setting power to legislate bills favorable to the ruling coalition (Cox et al. 2000; Fukumoto 2000; Masuyama 2003). Indeed, the LDP was split only a few times on votes in the legislative floor when it was in power, and it stayed in power more than 50 years with only a

minor interruption in 1993-1994. Most of the splits on the floor were about appointment of the Prime Minister or no confidence votes on which factions could not agree. When the LDP was out of power for only eight months, indeed more frequent splits could be found (Table 1.1).¹ This suggests two things: first, LDP members could agree on almost all policy issues (except postal privatization that will be analyzed in Chapter 4), while in choosing the leader of the government, there were severe splits; and second, it seems that when the LDP is out of power (August 1993 to June 1994), unity is low, compared to when the LDP is in power (1955-1993, 1994).

¹ In creating the list I consulted newspaper search engine services (Asahi Shimbun's Kikuzo II and Nihon Keizai Shimbun's Nikkei Telecon) with a keyword "*zōhan* (defection)," "*tōgi* (party line)," and so on. I also consulted Kabashima Ikuo Seminar (2000), which contains all the roll-called bills between 1990 and 1998.

Table 1.1: Cases of LDP Splits on Legislative Votes

Vote	Date	LDP Members	Results
Vote of No Confidence against Fukuda (Minister of Foreign Affairs)	October 28, 1971	307	Yea: 0, Nay: 295, Abstention: 12
Vote to Appoint the Prime Minister	November 6, 1979	252	Ohira: 132, Fukuda: 123 (First round) Ohira: 135, Fukuda: 119 (Run-off)
Vote of No Confidence against Ohira	May 19, 1980	252	Yea: 0, Nay: 183, Abstention: 69
Vote of No Confidence against Miyazawa	June 18, 1993	274	Yea: 39, Nay: 217, Abstention: 18
Vote on the Political Reform Bill (by the LDP)	November 18, 1993	227	Yea: 221, Nay: 2, Abstention: 4
Vote on the Political Reform Bill (by the Hosokawa cabinet)	November 18, 1993	227	Yea: 15, Nay: 203, Abstention: 9
Vote to Appoint the Prime Minister	April 25, 1994	222	Hata: 13, Kohno: 205, Abstention: 4
Vote on the 1994 Budget	June 8, 1994	222	Yea: 13, Nay: 199, Abstention: 10
Vote to Appoint the Prime Minister	June 29, 1994	222	Kaifu: 39, Murayama: 167, Kohno: 5, Abstention: 11 (First round) Kaifu: 32, Murayama: 173, Abstention: 17 (Run-off)
Vote of No Confidence against Mori	November 20, 2000	234	Yea: 0, Nay: 192, Abstention: 42
Vote on the Bill to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq	January 31, 2004	246	Yea: 243, Nay: 0, Abstention: 3
Vote on the Postal Privatization Bill	July 5, 2005	248	Yea: 199, Nay: 37, Abstention: 12

Note: The bills that were voted when the LDP was out of power are shaded.

Under the separation-of-powers system in Korea, presidents have been able to legislate a comparably high percentage of government-initiated bills (80-90%) and often the National Assembly is called merely a rubber stamp of the president (O 2004; Park 2000a) (Table 1.2).² Much more surprising is the high level of party unity in South Korea, as shown

² Note that the passage ratio of the government-initiated bills for the 16th National Assembly

in Table 1.3. The table suggests that, especially in the 17th National Assembly, there seems to be a premium for the ruling party: the GNP, for example, had the average Rice Index of 0.944 when it was the opposition party from 2004 to 2008, but the index showed an increase to 0.967 after winning the presidency. The reverse happened to the United New Democratic Party. Compare this table with Table 1.4, where the party unity scores for some countries from Latin America and the US are shown.³

slightly declined to 72.4%, but most of the bills that were not passed were modified in committees and then submitted to the plenary sessions under the names of committee chairs.

³ Note that Table 1.4 only shows the average scores for all the parties, whether they are in power or not.

Table 1.2: Passage Ratios of Bills

National Assembly	Initiator	Bills Total	Passed	Passage Ratio
13th (1988-92)	Legislator	570	171	30.0%
	Government	368	321	87.2%
14th (1992-96)	Legislator	321	119	37.1%
	Government	581	537	92.4%
15th (1996-00)	Legislator	1144	461	40.3%
	Government	807	659	81.7%
16th (2000-04)	Legislator	1912	514	26.9%
	Government	595	431	72.4%
Total	Legislator	3947	1265	32.0%
	Government	2351	1948	82.9%

Note: Table 2 from O (2004: p.174).

Table 1.3: Rice Index for Korean Parties

Term	Party	Rice Index	Average Weighted Unity Scores
16	GNP (2000-2004)	0.9531	0.9382
16	MDP (2000-2003)	0.9505	0.9336
16	MDP (2003-2004)*	0.9506	0.9316
16	Uri (2003-2004)	0.9549	0.9364
17	GNP (2004-2008)	0.9436	0.9214
17	GNP (2008)**	0.9669	0.9548
17	UNDP (2007)***	0.9939	0.9575
17	UNDP (2008)**	0.9613	0.9473
17	Uri (2004-2007)***	0.9658	0.9520

Note: Ruling parties are shaded. GNP = The Grand National Party, MDP = The Millennium Democratic Party, UNDP = The United New Democratic Party. Rice Index measures the average Rice Index scores, defined by $(\text{Total Ayes}_i - \text{Total Nays}_i) / \text{Total Votes}_i$, where i and j represent a bill and a party, respectively. Average Weighted Unity scores are defined by $\Sigma(\text{Rice Index}_i * \text{Weight}_i) / \Sigma \text{Weight}_i$. See some other technical issues in Morgenstern (2004).

* The MDP became the opposition party when the pro-president faction left the party to form the Uri Party in 2003.

** The GNP became the ruling party and the UNDP became the opposition party, when the GNP's presidential candidate won the elections in December 2007.

*** The UNDP was born when the Uri Party was merged with one opposition party.

Table 1.4: Average AWU Scores for Americas

	Average AWU
Argentina	
House parties (1989-1990)	0.860
House parties (1990-1991)	0.899
Brazil	
House parties (1991-1994)	0.782
House parties (1995-1998)	0.745
Chile	
House parties (1997-1999)	0.843
Senate parties (1992-1998)	0.893
Uruguay	
Gen. Assembly parties (1985-1989)	0.957
Gen. Assembly parties (1990-1994)	0.687
US	
House parties (1965-1985)	0.523
House parties (1985-2001)	0.686

Note: Table 3.1 in Morgenstern (2004: p.46).

On the other hand, we know that outside the legislative bodies, the two countries have been plagued by internal factional struggles, party splits and mergers, and the highly personalistic nature of the elections, all theoretically constituting barriers to cohesive legislative behaviors on the floor. In other words, legislators' behaviors against party leaders really look different inside and outside their parties: They are almost perfect agents in the legislative floor while there are substantive institutional and political factors that should promote disloyalty. With these institutional barriers to party cohesion, how do party leaders in the two countries achieve party cohesion in the legislative arena? What are the mechanisms to gain legislators' loyalty on the floor?

The subsequent chapters will develop a theory and offer a series of empirical analyses to address these questions. My argument throughout the dissertation is that the leadership in the two countries resorts to office perks – ranging from pork barrel spending to posts in the

government, the ruling party, and state-owned enterprises that are useful for satisfying legislators' office-seeking incentives – to maintain party unity and solve the collective action problem. That is why, as shown in Table 1.1, we see party splits over who would assume the leadership that monopolizes the power to provide patronage in Japan, and as in Table 1.2, the presidential parties with better access to the president tend to show greater unity in South Korea.

I further argue that, if office perks are important tools to maintain party unity, institutional structures that would define the patterns of allocation of office perks would imply significant consequences in party unity. In fact, because of the crucial difference in the constitutional structures of the two countries – parliamentarism versus presidentialism –, how office perks are allocated is fundamentally different, resulting in a significant difference in party unity and its consequences. Specifically, in parliamentary Japan, mutual dependence between the executive and the legislature give rise to some norms and rules to commit to the stable, long-term equilibrium, in which access to office perks, support for the government, and the leadership's survival are all fused. In other words, the prime minister as a ruling party leader is an agent of the party, and the party is an organization to which members have staked their career. Therefore, when commitment to unity becomes unavailable, the loosening of party unity becomes likely.

In presidential South Korea, on the other hand, mutual independence discourages the president and ruling party members from committing to a long-term equilibrium. Still the president can align the incentives of legislators by offering various types of office perks, but as the presidential elections approach, electoral uncertainty over who is going to be the next

president leads legislators to join the bandwagon of a winnable candidate even from the opposition party and discount the value of affiliating with the president. The loosening of party unity necessarily becomes cyclical, and such a cycle is largely defined by the presidential elections.⁴

The rest of this introductory chapter will be devoted to the clarification of some of the phrases used throughout this dissertation and the discussions of definitional problems. And then I will discuss why the East Asian countries are chosen and how optimal they are to test the argument. The last section will outline the structure of the entire dissertation.

1.2. Definitional Issues

1.2.1. Party Unity, Party Cohesion, and Party Discipline

Party defection, discipline and cohesion, and dissension inside a party can be different concepts. For example, Bowler et al. (1999: p.5) define cohesion and discipline as the following:

⁴ Presumably, ideological and programmatic parties also provide some selective benefits to members, and this is a matter of degree, not either/or (Benedetto and Hix 2007). One of the implications is that non-ideological parties provide more of these targeted office-related benefits and this should be tested with a data that covers the large number of countries, while by far the most comprehensive cross-national study on party unity only covers 19 countries (Carey 2007, 2009). But, as will be discussed in Chapter 2 in depth, implications can be tested with even one single country; for example, it is still possible to confirm if ideologically dissatisfied members can be tamed with office benefits.

Below some minimal level of coherence, it is impossible, at least within the confines of democratic politics, to impose discipline. Above some relatively high level of coherence, the imposition of discipline is pointless, since the members agree anyway. Between these two extremes – where cohesion is high enough so that members agree to some sort of broad organizational goals and structure, yet falls far short of unanimity – party discipline has scope to act upon a legislative grouping to produce unified action.

Here, party discipline is conceived more as an act of inducing party cohesion, which is the extent to which party members attach to the shared principle of their party and act accordingly. In other words, party cohesion is the "extent to which...group members can be observed to work together for the group's goals," while discipline means that "followers regularly accept and act upon the commands of the leader or leaders" and that the leader has "ways and means of inducing recalcitrant members to accept and act upon commands" (Özbudun 1970: p.305). This dissertation will fundamentally take on these concepts: by "cohesion" or "unity," I mean the *status* of a party that is cohesive or unified; and by "discipline," I mean the *action* of the leadership designed to improve the cohesion or unity of the party.

However, it should be noted that party cohesion is not a dichotomous variable that has a clear threshold as implied in the above quotations. Rather, it has changing degrees, because we often observe rank-and-file members' dissidence against the party leadership can contain a continuum of possible behaviors. As Hirschman (1970) suggests, legislators can choose a range of behaviors from the extreme defection ("exit"), through public disagreement ("voice"), to going along with the party's wishes ("loyalty"), anticipating the costs associated with these behaviors. Similarly, actions taken by party leaders to discipline rank-and-file members

can range from a slight punishment, such as a word of reprimand, through displacement of some posts, to expulsion from the party.

These are important starting points for the argument, because it is difficult to assume that party cohesion and party discipline are monotonic inside the same party in different time periods; rather, as shown below, party cohesion should differ in a cross-section time-series way. First, different legislators, based on their different utilities they gain from staying loyal to or defecting from their parties, should have different degrees of loyalty. For example, we will see that some legislators should be more likely to take a disloyal behavior against a given issue if they have resources to do so, while those who overestimate the costs of defection, that is, whips on their defective behaviors by party leaders, should be more likely to endure the rule of the party leadership. Second, party discipline can show different degrees in different periods. A political party may lack certain types of governance mechanisms to make their members commit to the party in certain periods. Electoral cycles can give a rise to the opportunistic behavior by legislators (Mershon and Shvetsova 2008). The level of analysis in empirical chapters that will follow will be built on this idea.

1.2.2. Office Perks

There are a variety of ways that party leaders can tame would-be dissident backbenchers and solve the problem of collective action, despite the absence of other coordinating mechanisms. This dissertation focuses on "office perks" as one of these tools for party leaders to align the incentives of backbenchers. Office perks are defined as goods given exclusively to ruling party members; therefore they can encompass perks that are handed out to

politicians personally (career incentives within the party/government) and goodies that can advance electoral chances by swaying the electorate (pork).

Most discussions of party discipline focusing on the effects of these exclusive office perks on party cohesion are primarily interested in the distribution of pork to legislators (Alston and Mueller 2006; Evans 1994; Pereira and Mueller 2004). However, in this dissertation, the basic argument is that leaders also use incentives within the party organization or the government, which in turn allow politicians to leverage positions to get more for their constituents, improve their name recognition in their districts, and purely increase personal payoffs. By disaggregating these factors, this dissertation can differentiate some different types of defectors (Chapter 4), explain the declining value of affiliating with the president in South Korea (Chapter 5), and different patterns of pork allocation (Chapters 6 and 7).

It is also important to note here that some of these private office-related goods can be also a collective good for the party. For example, Pekkanen et al. (2006) show that individual legislators are disproportionately likely to hold legislative positions that help their individual reelection needs; the posts that are valuable for reelection are likely to go to vulnerable legislators; so the LDP leadership strategically allocates these office perks to maximize the party's seat share in the legislature. In other words, if the individual representative can "credit claim" because of the party's allocation of "office perks" like positions and pork, then it can enhance individual politicians' chances of reelection which is good for them as well as the party. In this way, the leadership and backbenchers can work as the same team and enhance "electoral fusion of purpose" (Samuels and Shugart 2009).

1.3. Japan and Korea

1.3.1. *Why Japan and Korea?*

Party systems necessarily reflect socioeconomic divisions inside society (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Mozaffar et al. 2003). It has been argued that in the process of European modernization, party systems were "locked in" with the divisions such as center and periphery, state and church, landowners and industry managers, and labor and capital. Parties started to work as agents between citizens and politicians, providing representative linkages to translate citizens' demands and preferences into policy terms (Kitschelt 2000). Under this circumstance, clear ideological divisions over policy issues began to appear in these societies.

Having ideological core supporters is one of the factors that enable parties to achieve internal cohesion, as the valence model on voting suggests (Adams et al. 2005; McGann 2002; Moon 2004). In this setting, each representative tends to work as a loyal agent of his/her constituents across different districts, and therefore party discipline might not pose significant problems to leaders, because members share the same policy incentives. Even in the US, where parties are considered more as procedural coalitions for legislations (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007), partisan ideology and identification are important factors in the general voter's choice as well as legislators' behaviors on the floor (McCarty et al. 2006; Poole and Rosenthal 1997).

This ideological cohesion of parties that one can find in Western democracies is not available in East Asian countries. Informal politics, patronage competition, and clientelism have been the norm in political competition (Dittmer et al. 2000; Kang 2002; Scheiner 2005).

As explored in depth in Chapter 3, parties in Japan and South Korea often lack consistent ideologies on which they campaign. Parties have diverse sets of members; the LDP for example is a group of loosely conservative members, ranging from centrists to extreme rightists. Party splits and mergers are frequent compared to other established democracies. Parties usually lack regional organizations that connect citizens and politicians. Mobilizing personal networks is more useful in collecting votes than solely relying on party label. Parties are regarded as unreliable political organs by the general voter. And statements like these can go on.⁵

It can be expected that, without a valuable party label in the elections and shared policy and ideological platforms that would unite their members internally, Japanese and Korean parties would have to rely on other devices to achieve party cohesion. Therefore, in explaining the problem of committing to the party, the material benefits that the party offers have much more importance in these two countries. In other words, in the context of rampant

⁵ On the general history of party politics, see Sato and Matsuzaki (1986) for Japan and Sim (2004) for Korea. On the ideological cohesion and voter's party identification issues, see Kabashima (2004) and Kabashima and Takenaka (1997) for Japan and Shin (1999) for Korea. On party splits and mergers, see Cox and Rosenbluth (1995), Kato (1998), and Reed and Scheiner (2003) on the 1993 case in Japan, and Kim (1997) on the 1990 case in Korea. On party organization and personal networks, see Flanagan (1991), Krauss and Pekkanen (2004), Miyake (1998), Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993), and Taniguchi (2004) on Japan, and Hanguk Cheongdang Cheongchi Yeonguso (2000), Hanguk Cheongdang Hakhwe (2004), Jeong (2000a), and Yoon (1999, 2002a, 2002b) on Korea.

clientelism and patronage competition, political competition in these two countries would be much more focused on material benefits from the government than in other contexts. Japan and South Korea, the two largest democracies in the East Asian region, would provide optimal cases to test the theoretical implications about the effects of party rules on legislators' behaviors and policy consequences. This point will be explored in detail in Chapter 3, but let me briefly review the similarities and differences of the two countries.

1.3.2. Similarities between Japan and Korea

Japan and South Korea share a number of political characteristics. First of all, Japanese and Korean parties are only poorly organized at the local level, except some ideologically extremist parties such as the Japan Communist Party and the Democratic Labor Party in Korea. In Japan, before the 1993-94 electoral reform, the Liberal Democratic Party could not develop any effective grass-root organs other than prefectural branches that are only loosely united associations of legislators elected on the same prefectures. As of 2005, the LDP's party membership to the total electorate is around only 1%, and the other parties excluding the communists fare no better. The Japanese parties' organization is fairly weak compared to European countries: the average membership-to-electorate ratio in Europe was around 5% as of the late 1990s (Mair and van Biezen 2001), compared to 1.6% in Japan. In terms of grass-root organization, Korean parties do no better. Korean parties now have 9.61% of the total electorate as their members, but most of them are only nominal members. Those party members who pay the membership fees only account for 1.06% of the total electorate as of 2007; in fact, a study on political finance in Korea finds that party membership

fees account for only small amounts in the total political funds (Kim and Kim 2003).

Second and relatedly, if one puts Japanese and Korean electoral systems in the continuum between candidate-centered and party-centered electoral systems, they both have strong personalistic elements (Carey and Shugart 1995). Under systems characterized by personalistic competition, the focus on providing constituency services and bringing pork barrel benefits to raise the visibility in their districts is one of the shortcuts to improve reelection possibilities (Cain et al. 1984, 1987). The former vote-gathering strategy is much more based on personal endowments, including wealth, popularity, and personal characteristics, all being relatively immune to the effects of parties. Thus under these systems, providing election-related selective incentives might not be sufficient to buy secure support from individual legislators, as some of them, utilizing their firm electoral bases and personal wealth, might run for reelection without party label. Party leaders might have to provide additional benefits that are related to other incentives, that is, office and/or policy.

In Japan before 1994, the electoral rule was single non-transferable voting (SNTV) under multi-member districts (MMDs), where the voter only cast one vote for one of the candidates in a district. In order to achieve a majority, the ruling party had to run multiple candidates in the same district, giving rise to the need for candidates to differentiate themselves. Consequently, candidates resorted to extensive personal networks called *koenkai*. Even after the 1994 electoral reform, which introduced a mixed-member system of SMDs and regional PR blocs, *koenkai* work as an effective vote-mobilizing machine for many (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004; McKean and Scheiner 2000).

In Korea, the electoral system was also reformed in 2004, when a straightforward

mixed-member majoritarian system was introduced.⁶ Before 2004, voters had one vote for 224 to 253 SMDs, while the remaining seats (46 to 75) were proportionally divided according to how many seats (in 1988 and 1992) or votes (in 1996 and 2000) each party won in SMDs. Therefore, essentially, the system has been a majoritarian system with a slight proportional element since the 1987 democratization, and the consequence is, again, the rise of the personal vote practice. Yoon's series of analyses show that Korean legislators are enthusiastic about building their personal networks in their districts, especially in their first term in the National Assembly, while the voter tends to vote for those candidates with personal affinity, rather than affiliations with certain parties (Yoon 1999, 2002a, 2002b). Thus rank-and-file legislators in the two countries are allowed to have more chances than otherwise to be reelected without depending on party label than party-centered electoral systems.

Third, this personalistic electoral system element becomes all the more important in the two countries, as Japanese and Korean parties generally lack ideological platforms to campaign for, at least not at the comparable level with Western counterparts (Choi 1993; Inoguchi 1981; Jaung 2000; Kabashima and Ishio 1998; Kim 2000a). This is partly because of, as argued above, the two countries' electoral systems do not necessarily accentuate party-based differences in elections, partly because of highly frequent splits and mergers of political parties,⁷

⁶ More accurately, Korean voters now have two votes, one for 243 local single-member districts (SMDs) and another for a nation-wide closed-list proportional representation bloc that has 56 seats.

⁷ Note, for example, that the largest opposition camp in Japan (the Democratic Party of Japan, or *Minshuto*) was launched by former LDP politicians.

and partly because of the countries' unique institutional and international settings: one thing is that the two countries shared the highly centralized fiscal structure with personalistic electoral systems, the two components that are deemed to be critical in nurturing clientelism (Scheiner 2005).⁸ Another thing is that the East Asian region experienced hot wars in the Cold War period, thereby effectively shrinking the ideological space for political leftists. Particularly in South Korea, which experienced a direct war with the communists in the peninsula, the leftist ideology was virtually banned under authoritarian governments. Leftist movements tried to gain momentum with the 1987 democratization, but civil society kept distance from the radicalized and therefore isolated labor movements (Mo 1996). Under these contexts, additional benefits might be required as selective incentives, in order for party leaders to encourage rank-and-file legislators to choose to vote the party line (Alston and Mueller 2006; Pereira and Mueller 2004). Again, this can be problematic in the context of personalistic electoral systems, as the vote-seeking incentives of legislators would be much harder to appease.

Fourth, the ruling parties in the two countries have experienced severe factional struggles that led to the collapse of the government, party splits, and the formation of new parties. Factions form in the two countries based on office-seeking incentives. In both countries, the heads of state (the Prime Minister and the President) as a party leader monopolize the exclusive constitutional power to appoint and dismiss ministers in the cabinet; and ministers in both countries are very prestigious positions to improve name recognition in

⁸ Note that the bureaucracy system in Korea resembles the Japanese system largely because of the legacy of the colonial era. On the Korean local finance system, see Jim (2000) for example.

districts, increase access to governmental resources (especially the budget), and offer the way to higher offices in the government. Therefore, politicians in the two countries like to align with those patrons who would be likely to win the next elections for the leadership. And in both countries, to win the leadership positions in the governments requires personal support from legislators, so potential leaders need to secure as many head counts as possible. This leads to the rise of intra-party factionalism.

1.3.3. Differences between Japan and Korea

Besides these similarities, Japan and South Korea also have an important difference that might deserve noting in some length: presidentialism and parliamentarism. In particular, this constitutional difference generates a significant contrast between the two countries, and the existing literature suggests that stable party government would be made much more difficult in presidential South Korea than in parliamentary Japan (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Huber 1996).

In Japan, where constitutionally any prime minister can continue his/her rule as long as he/she has support from a majority coalition⁹ and the loyalty of ruling party members is tied

⁹ Practically, this is not the case, as the ruling LDP stipulates that its president can have only two terms – that is, he/she can be reelected only once. However, he/she can be reelected more than once if the previous LDP president steps down in the middle of the term; in this case the succeeding president can have the rest of the predecessor's term in addition to two terms. The president is also allowed to extend his/her term by one year if a two-thirds majority in a party convention approves it. See the Constitution of the LDP, Article 80, Clauses 3-5.

to the survival of a government through the built-in mutual dependence mechanism, rank-and-file members know that present support for the leadership would result in government survival and future benefits in policy and office, and those benefits would ultimately help the members to pursue reelection goals. Leaders also have incentives to guarantee policy and office benefits to backbenchers as they know their survival is based on a majority's support.

This spiral mechanism would give a rise to a semi-automatic mechanisms intended to internalize the commitment problem inherent in party unity. In the Japanese context specifically, these mechanisms are seniority rule (*nenkō joretsu*) and factionally-balanced portfolio allocation (*babatsu kinkeō jinji*). First, legislators are allowed to specialize in particular policy issues, along with the ladder-like career structure in the LDP. Those who specialize in policy are known as *zoku gin*, accumulating policy knowledge through intensive participation in meetings of the Policy Affairs Research Council's (PARC, *Seimu Chōsakai*) divisions (*bukai*) and Diet committees as well as relevant governmental activities. This was elaborately tied to the ladder-like seniority rule, in which legislators developed their career from rank-and-file committee/division members, through vice ministers in the cabinet or vice chairs of divisions, to chairs of committees and divisions and finally ministers and leadership positions. In this way, party leaders could discipline, educate, and get their rank-and-file members into line.

Secondly, policymaking was effectively bottom-up and decentralized, in the sense that unanimity was required for passage in the party. Each of the members could have a potential veto power over any bill, as the norm was that, for the LDP to submit a bill to the Diet, it was necessary to pass the relevant division, the Policy Deliberation Commission (*Seichō Shingikai*)

inside the PARC, a general meeting of the PARC and the General Council (*Sŏmmukai*) beforehand. From the late 1960s, divisions gradually worked as sub-governments like committees in the US Congress, where specialized legislators exchanged legislative benefits to streamline the floor voting in the upper policy-making organizations.

Thirdly, personnel rule was complemented by another form of proportional portfolio management, factional balance, which also gradually appeared after the late 1960s. Since then, the allocation of posts has been based on the factional bosses' recommendations, as well as the overall balance of factional sizes. Through this tacit rule, bosses could maintain their factions for their own further promotion to party leadership positions, while intense factional conflicts were moderated.

On the other hand, in Korea, the constitutional provision of presidentialism inhibits the president from developing semi-automatic mechanisms that would otherwise give legislators the incentives to make long-term commitments to their parties. First, the South Korean president has a fixed term of five years and cannot be reelected, and Korean National Assembly elections occur every four years. This means that the president and the ruling party in the National Assembly are independent of each other for their survival, and therefore the loyalty of ruling party members is not constitutionally and directly tied to the fate of the executive office.

Second, the fact that the two elections are held in different cycles creates another incentive problem to legislators. Legislators usually face a new president in the middle of their terms, creating opportunistic incentives. As the next presidential election approaches, an increasing number of incumbent president supporters start to leave her to join the force of a possibly winning candidate. This behavior is largely driven by an expectation of benefits from

an election winner after the elections.

Third, the winner-take-all nature of one-shot presidential elections encourages office-seeking presidential candidates to use political parties merely as vote-mobilizing platforms, not as institutionalized organizations with clear policy attachments. Parties are highly "presidentialized" in that they are merged, split, and newly formed in almost every five years, and presidents and presidential candidates traditionally monopolize almost all party matters (Hale 2004, 2005; Jaung 2000, 2001; Kim 2000a; Samuels 2002; Samuels and Shugart 2009; Stockton 2001); and the occurrence of party switching and party formation is concentrated in the latter half of these cycles.¹⁰ The lack of ideological cohesion in Korean party systems is

¹⁰ Before the 1987 election, Kim Dae Jung left the United Democratic Party of Kim Young Sam to form the Party for Peaceful Democracy. In 1990, in a preparation for the 1992 election, the United Democratic Party agreed to merge with the ruling Democratic Justice Party of Roh Tae Woo. In 1992, Chung Ju Yeong, Chairman of Hyundai, launched the Unification National Party for the presidential election in the same year; in the same year, Lee Jon Chang and Park Tae Jun, in opposing the ruling Democratic Liberal Party's nomination of Kim Young Sam to a presidential candidate, left the party and later coalesced with Kim Dae Jung. In 1995, Kim Dae Jung launched the National Congress for New Politics to prepare for the 1997 election. In 1997, Rhee In-Je defected from the New Korea Party to create the New National Party for the election. In 2002, Chung Mong Joon and Park Geun-hye, ambitious political leaders, launched the National Unification 21 and the Korean Future Association, respectively; in the same year, Rhee In-Je also defected from the ruling Democratic Party to support an opposition candidate again. In January and February 2007, more than 30 legislators defected

the additional seedbed for this dynamics.

1.3.4. Summary

The lack of grass-roots party organization, personalistic electoral competition, the catch-all nature of parties, and rampant factionalism, all combined, offer us the theoretically least likely cases for party unity. However, as shown above, the LDP stayed in power with the high level of party unity and the Korean president has shown successful legislative performance. Therefore, in order to explore these puzzling cases, a new theory of party discipline is wanted. Japan and South Korea are the ideal cases to empirically test my argument that without a valuable party label in the elections and shared policy and ideological platforms that would unite their members internally, parties have to rely on other devices to achieve party cohesion – office perks.

The two countries also allow for an interesting comparison because the constitutional structures should make the patterns of allocating office perks different. A parliamentary system implies that office perks will be continuously provided as long as the legislature keep supporting the government; but presidentialism implies that the stable provision of office perks will not be possible as the uncertain, winner-take-all presidential elections can change the government all of a sudden. A corollary is that parliamentarism dependent on office perks for maintenance for party unity can be much stable for a long time, while presidentialism should see the loosening of party unity over time, especially before the presidential elections.

from the ruling Uri Party. This point will be elaborated in detail in the next chapter.

1.4. Plan of the Dissertation

The next theoretical chapter will discuss assumptions and theories of party cohesion based on the collective action and principal-agent framework. It will be assumed that the leadership as a principal, in an attempt to achieve stable rule and productive legislation, always faces collective action problems of how to appropriately align the incentives of backbenchers as agents. Based on the assumption that politicians have the three different incentives for vote, policy, and office, it is argued that the leadership needs to buy off support from agents with fringe benefits related to these incentives, calculating how they would perceive the value of these benefits. Given the budget constraints that the leadership faces and institutional settings that limit the leadership's choices, party leaders need to efficiently allocate selective benefits to backbenchers, who might value some types of goods but discount other types. Where a party cannot satisfy legislators' needs electorally and ideologically, a party in power would try to resort to office perks to maintain party unity and achieve its ultimate goals. The patterns of allocating office perks should be conditional upon the different constitutional structures: mutual dependence between the executive and the legislature under parliamentarism implies that the interactions between the leadership as a principal and backbenchers as agents can be infinitely repeated; and the "shadow of the future" can give rise to commitment to the Pareto-optimal, long-term equilibrium, in which the duration of the cabinet, access to office benefits, and backbenchers' support for the cabinet are all closely tied together. In a presidential regime, depending on circumstances, the executive and the legislature can work as the same team, with the president offering fair access to office benefits to align the incentives of legislators, but the

value of such benefits tends to decline over time, as the presidential elections approach. The result would be the loosening of party unity over time.

Built on this theory, Chapter 3 will offer thick descriptions of the Japanese and Korean parties. In both countries, party leaders' strategies to maintain party cohesion are much limited by several political factors: weak party organization, ideological disunity, personal vote, and party volatility. Despite all of these unfavorable factors for party cohesion, the party leadership in the two countries could maintain the high levels of party cohesion and achieve collective goods of stable rule and legislation, although party politics in South Korea can be much more fragile.

Based on these descriptions, Chapters 4 to 7 will use empirical data to test the hypotheses presented in the theoretical chapter. Chapter 4 will deal with why Koizumi provoked a massive defection in 2005. The LDP invented several rules to fairly equally allocate office perks to rank-and-file members as otherwise the personalistic electoral competition, ideological diversity inside the party, and factionalism would encourage party splits and defection from the party line on the legislative floor. However, what Koizumi did was, based on his exceptionally high approval ratings, rather unilaterally impose discipline on his party members in order to promote his pet policy (postal privatization), and to make the policymaking process more centralized, he even tried to break down the norms of seniority and factional balance in allocating posts.

In Chapter 5, I will analyze roll call votes by Korean National Assembly members. The Korean president has various types of office benefits to persuade presidential party members to toe the line: the exclusive power to make the budget, appoint and dismiss ministers,

and provide politicized patronage posts. These benefits should align the incentives of backbenchers to the president, so I would expect members from the ruling parties, whether or not they are party switchers with strong personal vote networks and/or extreme ideological beliefs, would be much more disciplined than the other members. However, it would also be expected that, as the value of these benefits declines over time, the ruling party should see the declining level of party unity.

Chapter 6 will test one implication for fiscal policy in Japan. Providing office benefits equally to factions would constrain the Prime Minister's decision making efficiency in the cabinet. There are now a larger number of decision makers in the cabinet from different factions demanding preferential treatments especially in pork-related areas, given that factions form based on exchange of clientelistic benefits. Coordination between decision makers in the cabinet would become more and more difficult, and the result might be the logrolling of spending priorities and the expansion of expenditures.

In Chapter 7, similarly, I will look at the budget-making process in Korea, specifically focusing on allocation of subsidies from Seoul to local municipalities. In order to streamline the legislative process inside the National Assembly, the Korean president utilizes her monopolize power to formulate the budget and therefore to buy support from legislators with regionally targeted spending. However, the president loses her power to maintain cohesion as the end of the single five-year term gets near, as evidenced by the increasing party splits/switching in the last years of presidential terms. When rank-and-file legislators can expect office benefits from the party – especially when the National Assembly elections precede the presidential elections – party unity should be higher and the president can be more

autonomous in making decisions as to distribution. Therefore the president can strategically target marginal districts to maximize the presidential party's seat share, as she can inflict the costs on extremely loyal regional voters.

Chapter 8 will summarize the empirical findings and offer some implications for future research.

Chapter 2. Committing to the Party: A Model of Party Discipline

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will focus on the interactive game played by leaders and backbenchers to develop a theory of party discipline. In doing this, I will delve into the incentive structures that encourage and/or discourage individual legislators to commit to the party and how leaders react to these legislators. Incentives that tie legislators to the party include material benefits from the party, or selective goods that improve legislators' capacities to mobilize votes, get their policies legislated, and promote their own careers – systematically corresponding to the three incentives of parties as described by Strom (1990). Most of the existing literature on party discipline usually starts with three core assumptions about legislators' behaviors, corresponding to the three types of incentives: first, they seek for reelection; second, they try to promote their desired policies; and third, they have career-related ambitions. In explaining how legislators vote in the assembly floor, therefore, the existing literature argues that legislators calculate the costs and benefits that they would gain from voting for or against sets of bills. Expecting some electoral sanction from their parties (i.e. they might lose endorsements in the next elections), electorally vulnerable legislators try to show their party loyalty (Ames 2002; Herron 2002; Hix 2004; Reed and Scheiner 2003; Samuels 1999; Thames 2007b); ideologically extreme legislators within parties may disagree on the party platform and refuse to obey party line voting (Gaines and Garrett 1993); and those legislators who see unfair disadvantage in terms of allocation of office benefits would be more discontent with party

management and therefore likely show their signs of dissatisfaction on the voting floor (Amorim Neto 2002; Benedetto and Hix 2007; Jones 2002; Kam 2006; Nacif 2002). This calls for an integrated model for party cohesion.

However, with some exceptions (Benedetto and Hix 2007; Jenkins et al. 2005; Kam 2001, 2006), the existing literature does not offer clear-cut answers to such questions as how these different incentives interact with each other and how and in which context any one of the three incentives can become salient in explaining party cohesion. Going back to the original framework by Strom (1990), I would argue that the three incentives work as substitutes for each other. Specifically, given that in the East Asian context party leaders may not be able to satisfy the vote- and policy-seeking needs of individual legislators, they would focus on distribution of office-related benefits to achieve high productivity in the legislature. These benefits would be various types of privileges available in the government or the party, including but not limited to, cabinet minister posts, agency heads, public corporation posts, and pork barrel benefits targeted at specific regions.

And I further argue that the constitutional difference in the two countries – parliamentarism versus presidentialism – should have divergent consequences in the patterns of allocating office benefits (Moe 1990; Moe and Caldwell 1994; Samuels 2002; Samuels and Shugart 2003, 2009). In a parliamentary system, the prime minister is an agent of the party, and the party is an organization to which members have staked their career. Therefore commitment to the Pareto-optimal, long-term equilibrium should be available, because of mutual dependence between the executive and the legislature. The life of the cabinet, access to office benefits, and ruling party members' loyalty to the leadership are all integrated together,

and the threat to sanction a defection behavior is credible: if legislators vote against the party line, then the prime minister may simply stop allocating office perks to them or dissolve the assembly, using her constitutional powers; or if the prime minister diverges from the ruling coalition's preferences, then legislators may try to change the leadership by legislating a vote of no confidence to oust the unaccountable cabinet. Therefore some norms and/or rules emerge to ensure that grievance against allocation of office perks would be minimized.

In a presidential regime, on the other hand, such a commitment mechanism to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium should not be available, because of mutual independence between the executive and the legislature. Even though still the president can offer ruling party members with access to office benefits to align their incentives, the value of those office benefits tends to decline over time, mainly because the term of the president is fixed. The winner-take-all nature of the presidential elections may pick up an opposition candidate as a winner, so ruling party members might fear all the governmental privileges will be gone overnight. Therefore there is no way credibly threatening to sanction a defection behavior as the presidential elections approach. The incentives of the president and legislators can be aligned in the first few years of the presidential terms, but the unity of the presidential party tends to get loosened in the last few years; and norms and/or rules to offset grievance against allocation of office perks would not emerge.

The rest of this theoretical chapter will provide in-depth accounts on what I showed above, by addressing the following questions in order: What party leaders' incentives are in the first place; what individual legislators' incentives are in deciding to commit (or not) to the party; what strategies are available to leaders in dealing with their members; how these strategies are

formed in different institutional and constitutional settings; and what types of implications are drawn and how they can be tested.

2.2. Leaders, Backbenchers, and Their Interactions

2.2.1. Starting Point: Party Leaders' Incentives

Like other analysts who analogize a party as an economic entity (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007), this dissertation starts with an assumption that a party as an organization seeks to maximize its production – stable party government and productive legislations. To achieve these collective benefits, the heads of the government as party leaders have to gain continuous and consistent support from individual legislators, who are assumed to have their own incentives based on vote, policy, and office (Strom 1990). These incentives rise from certain institutional and political contexts (as discussed below in detail). For example, certain types of electoral rules are known as cultivating personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995), and under these personalistic electoral systems, politicians may have more incentives to vote against the party line than other electoral systems, because personal vote may allow some popular politicians to be independent from party label in elections and increase the policy division between locally-oriented backbenchers and the public-regarded party leadership; or in other words, politicians as agents have competing principals that pull the incentives in different directions (Carey 2009; Maltzman 1997). Knowing this, party leaders as principals have to satisfy these incentives with some measures in order to make them want to stay in their party. Thus party discipline is well explained as an interactive game between leaders as principals and backbenchers as agents with different incentives.

Party leaders should have problems as agents' opportunistic behaviors or agency slacks might result in collective action problems (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Olson 1971; Ostrom 1990). Voting against the party line has negative impact on the maintenance of stable government: pursuing personalistic goals against a party's will can harm the legislative productivity and the party's reputation if it happens frequently and en masse; defection, party splits, and party switching might harm the majority status of the ruling coalition; and ultimately fragmentation in a party system might result in the voter's losing sight over the "clarity of responsibility" on which the voter depends to make voting decisions (Powell 2000).

To internalize these externalities and potential tragedy of the commons, party leaders aim to improve the commitment of backbenchers to the party line by offering a range of (negative or positive) fringe benefits to them. The costs can be high, but these are selective incentives that can make it possible for a political party to stay united. The unity of party members helps to improve the legislative productivity of parties, which, in turn, leads to stable party government with less fragmentation inside parties and greater policy consistency, which allow for better accountability of parties to the general voter. Stable party government is not only the core of parliamentary regimes but also allows for effective governance in presidential regimes, as long as presidents require a majority in the legislature to pass important legislations, especially the budget.¹¹

¹¹ True, in quite a few countries, presidents have the proactive authority in issuing executive decrees and the agenda-setting power in drafting important legislations, including budget proposals (Shugart and Carey 1992). However, this does not mean that presidents can bypass the legislature as a legitimate representative of the voter for ever; even the Brazilian president,

2.2.2. *Material Benefits Parties Offer*

Thus parties try to offer legislators with *material benefits* to win their support. These material privileges correspond to the three different types of politicians' incentives: financial and organizational support for election campaigning, legislation of preferred policy through the party, and government and party posts important to name recognition and policy benefits in their districts, each systematically corresponding to backbenchers' incentives for vote, policy, and office (Strom 1990). Such material benefits can include both collective and selective goods for party members, and the former represent typically party label and party reputation: for instance, the voter's recognition about the party's past achievements and future prospects (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007; Fiorina 1981). Selective goods designed to enhance individual members' chances of reelection are private in nature but also beneficial for a party as a whole, as reelection of a member is good for the party as well as the individual representative. In other words, backbenchers and leaders can work as the same team under "electoral fusion of purpose" (Samuels and Shugart 2009).

Election-related benefits include party endorsements in elections, rank-orders in the case of closed-list PR, and party-sponsored campaign support to candidates. They are material and excludable benefits given to those individual members who choose to vote the party line to gain more votes in elections. For example, if a legislator believes that staying in his/her party will

one of the most powerful president in the world, oftentimes cooperated with the legislature to streamline the reform process (Amorim Neto et al. 2003; Figueiredo and Limongi 2000; Treisman 2004).

improve his/her reelection possibilities – which is likely to happen in a typical closed-list PR system where party label is required in elections – then he/she may want to stay in the same party and show his/her consistent support for the party to maximize his/her possibility of reelection. Note that these benefits can be underestimated under certain conditions: For example, it is known that under an SMD electoral system, a candidate with greater personal recognition is more advantaged, *ceteris paribus* (Cain et al. 1984, 1987). In this case, a TV celebrity with great financial resources, for example, may tend to underestimate the benefits from voting the party line in terms of vote maximization, compared to a candidate with no personal resources at all.

Policy-related benefits are seen as how likely individual legislators are to achieve their desired policies through parties: obviously, ideologically cohesive parties would be more beneficial to their members as their desired policies are highly likely to coincide with party policies. Also, parties can open up the policymaking process to backbenchers, and/or distribute posts related to policymaking to them; these selective benefits again give the incentives for individual legislators to maintain their party membership and vote the party line because they provide access to the policymaking process. Meanwhile, some types of political systems can help legislators discount these policy benefits from the party; we can think of this as a powerful and independent committee system where even opposition party members and independents can have some say in the policymaking process (Powell 2000; Strom 1984).

Office-related benefits include government privileges, party posts, and legislative positions such as committee posts. Pork barrel benefits targeted at particular regions or electoral districts that do not pertain to the above policy-related benefits should be included in this

category, especially when these distributive and particularistic goods are exclusively allocated to ruling party members. If individual legislators have reasons to believe that keeping loyal to their party is the best way to achieve the higher career status in the future and/or gain access to regionally targeted goods, then they should tend to succumb to their party more likely. In Argentina, Mexico, and pre-Chavez Venezuela, for example, parties provide access to various types of office benefits to loyal party members (Coppedge 1994; Jones 2002; Nacif 2002).

The above descriptions imply that these benefits are basically positive, but they can be of course negative, in the sense that party leaders can also punish, or withhold, any benefits that they control. For example, the leadership can refuse to offer an endorsement to those members who frequently defect from the party line; parties can ignore the decentralized policymaking process to introduce a top-down decision-making system; and the prime minister or the president can demote some unloyal backbenchers (Benedetto and Hix 2007). For the leadership to tame elected incumbents in the legislature, threatening to withdraw their vested interests (endorsements, policy, or office benefits) would be a much more important tool.

In addition, as explored below, given the budget constraint, the leadership would like to make the most use of its limited resources and efficiently allocate these benefits. In doing so, the leadership can help individual representatives get reelected by allocating "office perks" that are useful for bringing particularistic benefits to their constituents and/or improving name recognition in their districts. This is especially important in a highly personalistic electoral system where party label does not matter much in voting decisions and therefore a party cannot offer much electoral support for its members.

2.2.3. *Costs Party Impose*

Legislators also calculate the costs associated with a party affiliation. Each of the legislators, with distinct personal endowments, makes a decision to obey or disobey the party line, based on the calculations of these costs and benefits. If they believe the costs outweigh the benefits from the party, they would disobey the party line or, in an ultimate case, leave the party; and if they believe the benefits are more than the costs, they would keep loyal to the party leadership.

Election-related costs are the costs that are incurred by the party in elections. Most intuitively, they include contribution of certain amounts of donations, for example party membership fees, to the party. In some countries, in order to become an electoral candidate, parties might require multiple screening processes, which might be very costly (Rahat and Hazan 2001); in other parties, the membership can be a pricy tradable good that requires little formal screening process. One anecdotal example can be actually found in Korea, where a candidate for the Grand National Party (*Hannara Dang*) purchased a party endorsement in the 2000 National Assembly elections at 200 million won (approximately 22 million US dollars) (*Donga Ilbo* August 12, 2003 p.26). In other cases, party members may have to provide their limited resources to electoral campaigning for other members.

Policy-related costs arise when party members have to give up their desired policies when the party's median or leadership has substantially different policy positions. One typical example is the connected coalition theory developed by Axelrod (1970): in his model, parties are only willing to join in a coalition with ideologically compatible parties, suggesting that legislators would like to leave their party when they see their policy divergent from the party. There is

ample empirical evidence that legislators with relatively extreme ideologies inside the party tend to dissent from the party line in legislative behaviors (Gaines and Garrett 1993; Hix et al. 2005). Legislators also tend to switch to a party whose policy positions are compatible with them (Desposato 2006b).

Office-related costs are the opportunity costs from adhering to the same party; legislators may miss external career opportunities when there are other parties that can provide better access to higher political careers. If certain institutional settings allow politicians to have other career-related chances outside their party and legislative body, as in the Brazilian case where governorships and other career ambitions are not necessarily tied to the party structure in the national assembly (Samuels 2003), then legislators may have the incentives to depreciate the importance of being affiliated with a party.

2.2.4. *Leaders' Strategies in Dealing with Their Members*

Having described rank-and-file legislators' costs and benefits of obeying or disobeying the party leadership, I am now delving into what strategies are available to leaders. Provided the costs and benefits, party leaders choose a set of strategies based on their predictions about how party members react to the leadership's actions. Leaders' choice is also dictated by their ultimate goals to solidify the ruling coalition and stabilize legislative production. Thus leaders would need to allocate efficiently the resources of their party to achieve and maintain party cohesion. This efficient allocation of party resources is all the more important in two regards.

First, the party leadership faces a budget constraint. The resources of the party cannot be infinite, so the party leadership cannot satisfy the needs of all the rank-and-file

members. For example, under closed PR systems, party endorsements are necessary goods for party members' reelection, so the party leadership in this case might want to use party endorsements as a tool to persuade otherwise would-be defectors to obey the party line. However, a party cannot promise to offer seats to all the candidates. Given that leaders themselves try to maximize their survival possibilities, safe seats, or top ranks on the list, are usually allocated to them, while rank-and-file members are often given marginal (or even hopeless) ranks. In other cases, competing policy interests inside the same party may force the party leadership to make a tough decision as to how to deal with radical members. If the leadership represents the moderates' interests, then the radicals might engage in anti-party activities. However, if the leadership succumbs to the radicals, the moderates might become more and more disloyal to the party. Therefore, leaders would most often face the situation in which they have to balance core members and swing members in their own party.

Second, the costs and benefits vary depending on institutional settings. As implied above, certain types of benefits from a party may be only marginal in some contexts. For example, under a highly personalistic electoral system like single non-transferable voting (SNTV), the value of party label is only marginal at best in terms of maximizing the reelection probabilities (Carey and Shugart 1995; Reed 2009). Therefore, rank-and-file party members with dominant personal vote mobilizing networks in their districts would underestimate the significance of a party endorsement, and therefore party leaders would have to provide additional benefits when encouraging them to vote the party line. And if the party is more like a procedural coalition that contains ideologically divergent members, then the problem gets more serious.

Thus if a party is seen as an economic entity trying to maximize its revenues (legislative productivity and stable legislation), leaders (directors and managers) need to provide their employees (rank-and-file members) with adequate posts, fringe benefits, and job responsibilities from the limited pool of resources, in order to persuade them to do the desired jobs and keep them within the firm. In some contexts, general skills are highly valued in the labor market, and employees may feel rather free to move across different companies, because they may have such skills that can be useful in finding better jobs in different companies (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). If directors and managers still need them to maximize the firm's profits, then they need to invent human resource rules to provide some additional fringe benefits to them, given the budget constraint.

This implies that the three incentives for vote, policy, and office necessarily work as substitutes for each other, in such a way that the party leadership would use its most abundant resources to compensate for rank-and-file members' incentives. To use the above example of SNTV, the value of party label is only marginal at best, so a party faces the problem of how to tame legislators with vote-seeking incentives. But it can still compensate them by providing governmental privileges as ministers and agency heads when in power; and the leadership can strategically offer the governmental privileges useful for reelection, such that staying in the party can be tied to rank-and-file party members' reelection incentives. Therefore, although the existing literature suggests that electorally invulnerable or ideologically extreme legislators are expected to defect from their parties more frequently than their colleagues on average (Ames 2002; Gaines and Garrett 1993; Herron 2002; Hix 2004; Reed and Scheiner 2003; Samuels 1999; Thames 2007b), they may still vote the party line if there are longer-term career benefits

from the government or party in the future. If a party is seen as a group of legislators with diverse ideological bents and therefore legislators do not weight policy benefits from the party, then the other two incentives (vote and office) would be more important in imposing party discipline. If an electoral system cultivates personal vote to the degree that legislators do not rely very much on party label for reelection, then the salience of office benefits would be further accentuated. Therefore in explaining the puzzling party cohesion in Japan and South Korea, where the party leadership appears to lack the tools to tame individual backbenchers electorally and ideologically, office benefits should have significant impact.

This leads to the argument that, in explaining party discipline, office-seeking incentives would be salient where electoral competition is highly personal and parties lack clear ideological commitment. Framed in this way, the argument developed here can address how and in which context any one of the three incentives can become salient in imposing party discipline. In addition to exploring these questions, it also helps to explain within-country variations: If, for example, measures of legislators' electoral invulnerability vary significantly under personal vote-cultivating electoral systems, the effects of such invulnerability on the incentives to obey or disobey the party line should be conditional on how much access to office benefits they have. In this case, the likelihood that electorally invulnerable or ideologically extreme legislators disobey the party line would be moderated when they have secure access to office benefits; on the other hand, when such access becomes insecure, then electorally invulnerable or ideologically extreme legislators might be far more likely to disobey the party line than otherwise.

2.2.5. Constitutional Structures and Consequences on Party Discipline

Above, I implied that in order for a party to maintain party unity, the leadership needs to ensure that longer-term career benefits will be available for backbenchers from the government or party in the future. Here, a constitutional difference – parliamentarism versus presidentialism – can make significant differences in the patterns of allocating office benefits and therefore in consequences on party discipline (Moe 1990; Moe and Caldwell 1994; Samuels 2002; Samuels and Shugart 2003, 2009). This is especially the case in the context of East Asia, where electoral competition is marked by weak party label and ideological party cohesion is low, because the leadership needs to rely on office perks to maintain party unity.

I argue that the levels of party unity built on office perks are conditional on the credibility of the leadership's ability to keep allocating them in the future. Unlike vote- and policy-related goods, office perks are available only when legislators are affiliated with extra-legislative actors that have resources to allocate: the prime minister, the president, state governors, mayors, etc. And in centralized systems, state/provincial governors and mayors do not have the significant amounts of resources to allocate; usually the pipelines of resources are tied to the central capital (Desposato and Scheiner 2008; Scheiner 2005, 2006).¹² Therefore the

¹² In federal presidential systems like Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, state governors can align the incentives of party members (Desposato 2004; Jones 2002; Jones and Hwang 2005; Jones et al. 2002; Nacif 2002; Samuels 2003). Therefore in comparing subnational legislators' party switching in Brazil and Japan, Desposato and Scheiner (2008) find that politicians in a federal system (Brazil) are oriented toward subnational political alliances and affiliate with the party controlling state-level resources, while politicians in a centralized system orient their party

office-seeking incentives of politicians are tied to how the leaders of the state, or the president or the prime minister, can commit to continuing to provide benefits. If the leadership cannot commit to the stable provision of office perks, then backbenchers would discount the value attached to them, and the eventual consequence would be the loosening of party unity as characterized by defection from party line voting and party switching.

In a parliamentary system, by definition, a government is accountable to a majority inside the legislature. This mutual dependence between the executive and the legislature allows the leadership to commit to the Pareto-optimal, long-term equilibrium, where the life of the cabinet, access to office benefits, and ruling party members' loyalty to the leadership are all integrated together. Backbenchers know that the leadership's capacity to provide fringe benefits hinges on their support for the government, and therefore as long as the leadership continues to provide those benefits to them, they will keep supporting the leadership. The leadership, on the other hand, knows that backbenchers' support is indispensable for staying in power, and that buying their support requires governmental privileges. In other words, ruling party members abide by "the shadow of the future" in the infinitely repeated game of cooperation: "the shadow of the future" in such a game is the credible threat of future retaliation to opportunistic defection from the Pareto-optimal outcome to seek private incentives.¹³ The common good is achieved where future retaliation is credible.

affiliation patterns around national alliances and resource control and give little attention to subnational party power alignments.

¹³ On repeated games in general, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: Ch.5). Even where mutual defection is a dominant strategy for the actors in a one-shot setting (e.g. Prisoners' Dilemma),

One feature in a parliamentary regime makes future retaliation credible and thus helps to sustain the Pareto-optimal, long-term equilibrium. If legislators engage in defection – voting against the party line –, then the prime minister may simply stop allocating office perks to them or dissolve the assembly, by using her constitutional powers to do so. Or, if the prime minister diverges from the ruling coalition's preferences, then legislators may try to change the

infinitely repeating interactions can lead to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium ("the Folk Theorem").

On political science applications of the Folk Theorem, see Axelrod (1981) and Axelrod and Keohane (1985). Even in the finitely repeated game, where the "shadow of the future" in a true sense is not available, still mutual cooperation is possible, if the actors have the sufficiently long time horizon (Benoit and Krishna 1985) or care about their own reputation (Kandori 1992; Kreps et al. 1982). It is true that, in a parliamentary regime, a single party may not be able to stay in power forever, because external shocks – national swings against the ruling party in the elections, corruption scandals, economic crisis, etc – can result in the electoral defeat of the ruling party and the collapse of the government, but the point here is that the government can stay in power as long as the legislature supports it and the actors in the ruling coalition can have the sufficiently long time horizon. And as I would argue below, this constitutional structure is fundamentally different from presidentialism.

leadership by legislating a vote of no confidence to oust the unaccountable cabinet.¹⁴

Additionally, as asymmetric information, transactions costs, and other types of market failures can happen under voluntary exchange (Coase 1937; Williamson 1981),¹⁵ some norms and/or rules emerge to ensure that both the leadership and backbenchers commit to the Pareto-optimal outcome in a way that would minimize grievance against allocation of office perks.¹⁶

The story is quite different in a presidential regime. In a stylized presidential system, by definition, a government is not accountable to the legislature; the president and the legislature

¹⁴ Therefore, as Chapter 4 shows, when the Prime Minister Koizumi diverged from the existing norms of seniority, factional balance, and decentralized policymaking, a group of backbenchers retaliated with defection from Koizumi; and as Chapter 6 suggests, only when a faction can credibly threaten to leave the LDP and form a non-LDP coalition government with the opposition, the prime minister is constrained by intra-party factional demands for posts.

¹⁵ For example, Keohane (1984) notes that, in order to prevent the rise of market failures that make the market less efficient than expected, states under anarchy consciously build institutions to make the cooperative equilibrium stable.

¹⁶ For example under the LDP's posts allocation norms, to offset factions' grievance against allocation of office perks, the leadership proportionally allocates posts in the cabinet to factions according to their sizes, based on the recommendations from the leaders of the factions. Therefore this seniority norm is, in a sense, the product of a compromise between the leadership that wants to maximize unity inside the party, and factions that seek for office benefits. This point is further explored in Chapter 3, 4, and 6.

are separately elected by different elections. And the president cannot dissolve the legislature for early elections, nor can the legislature remove the president in the middle of the term except extraordinary circumstances, such as serious violations of the constitution. This mutual independence between the executive and the legislature does not allow for the basis on which the Pareto-optimal, long-term equilibrium can emerge. There is no "shadow of the future" by which ruling party members abide.

Therefore, for the president, it is crucial to make legislators have the incentives compatible with the president, such that they can have the longest possible time horizon in affiliating with the president. One of the factors that affect the compatibility of the incentives between the executive and the legislature is electoral fusion/separation of purpose: the degree to which the political incentives of a party's executive candidate and its median legislative candidate are aligned (Samuels and Shugart 2009). Under electoral fusion of purpose, legislators and the candidate for executive office share the same vote base, while under electoral separation of purpose, legislators and the executive can be motivated by very different political incentives. In parliamentary regimes, by definition, electoral separation of purpose cannot exist, while under presidentialism with high separation of purpose, the party is more likely to confront challenges.

Fusion of purpose can be promoted by several factors, including the concurrence of the elections and the limits on the president's terms. As the literature on mid-term elections in the US suggests (Campbell 1985), presidential candidates enjoy the coattail effects in elections held concurrently, encouraging voters to think of presidential and legislative candidates as members of the same team; meanwhile, the mid-term elections or non-concurrent elections

serve as "referendums" against the incumbent president and therefore the incidence of divided government are greater in non-concurrent than in concurrent elections (Shugart 1995). The presidential term is also important, as legislators should have more incentives to support the incumbent president if she is allowed to run again for the next presidential elections than otherwise is the case. The incentives to support the incumbent president are conducive to a virtuous cycle under presidentialism: the president can maintain unity of her ruling coalition, which legislates the president's bills on the agenda as long as she offers fair access to office benefits that are useful for mobilizing votes, advancing careers, or both.

However, even under non-concurrent elections, the president can utilize some tools to align the incentives of legislators, at least until the legislative elections. This is because, utilizing her constitutional powers, the president can offer a wide variety of office perks to help her candidates get (re)elected, and in exchange for these perks, legislators can support the president's legislative agenda. In most of the presidential countries, the president is an exclusive actor in formulating the budget, so she can strategically allocate subsidies to maximize her seat shares in the legislature, as elaborated in detail in Chapter 7; the president is also an agenda setter with the powers to issue executive decrees or submit bills, so she can propose some policy benefits that are designed to cater to her own party members; and the president is vested with the exclusive powers to allocate various governmental posts that can satisfy legislators' incentives (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Shugart and Carey 1992). And, as in South Korea, the president can even promise to offer patronage positions in public corporations for losing candidates.

Therefore, even under the most unfavorable constitutional conditions for the

incentive compatibility between the president and the legislature – non-concurrent elections and the presidential term limit – at least before the assembly elections, there can be a virtuous cycle similar to a parliamentary regime; and the degree of the compatibility depends on the president's constitutional powers of formulating the budget, issuing decrees, submitting bills, appointing and dismissing ministers, and offering a wide variety of patronage positions. One of the most powerful presidents in the world, the Brazilian president can thus offer various types of office perks – pork and posts – to legislators to improve her legislative performance (Alston and Mueller 2006; Amorim Neto 2002; Lyne 2008; Pereira and Mueller 2004).

Sanctioning as found in a parliamentary regime is also available in a presidential regime during this period: the president can stop offering office perks to defectors, while the president may be punished for her opportunistic behaviors with defection. Indeed, as Amorim Neto (2002, 2006) and Amorim Neto et al. (2003) show, the changing degrees of party unity in Brazil are highly correlated with a time-variant element of how the president offers office perks. This presidential practice – appointing party members and legislators to cabinet posts to streamline the legislative process – is how Cox and Morgenstern (2001: pp.180-7) sees "executive integration in the legislative process" in Latin American presidential systems and put them as "intermediate between pure presidentialism and pureparliamentarism."

Note that this virtuous cycle stops working properly after the legislative elections and especially right before the presidential elections, where the elections are non-concurrent and the president is not able to run again. Legislators can never be sure if their support for the government would result in continuous provision of such benefits in the future, because the presidential term is constitutionally fixed, and the highly uncertain, winner-take-all nature of the

presidential elections might choose an opposition candidate in the future or entirely new partisan coalitions can form, in principle, around a new presidential candidate.¹⁷ The value of office benefits tends to decline over time after the legislative elections, as ruling party members might fear all the governmental privileges will be gone overnight; they may even dare to switch to the opposition parties with winnable presidential candidates, as the opportunity costs of supporting losing candidates are quite high and the institutional structure does not allow for the incumbent president to credibly threaten to sanction an opportunistic defection behavior – she will need to retire soon anyhow. Therefore Amorim Neto and Santos (2001) find that, as the president's term elapses, the value of the patronage dispensed by the president for the parties becomes lower and therefore their discipline rates also become lower.

In sum, in a presidential regime, exchange of benefits cannot be infinite; the game can be played a large but finite number of times and actors discount future payoffs, as implied by the increasing opportunity costs of affiliating with the president. As long as the office benefits that the president can provide outweigh the opportunity costs, the president can align the incentives of legislators, but once the value of the opportunity costs outweighs that of the office benefits, there is no way for the president to credibly threaten to retaliate in the future against opportunistic defection from the Pareto-optimal outcome. In other words, the incentives of the president and legislators can be aligned in the first few years of the presidential terms – or before the legislative elections under systems with non-concurrent elections –, but

¹⁷ In a parliamentary system, on the other hand, the threat of losing power to another party should force the executive and the legislature to re-align the incentives at the end of term, given that the party can only retain office by a collectively strong electoral performance.

the unity of the presidential party tends to get loosened in the last few years – or as the presidential elections approach.

2.2.6. Summing Up: What Is New Compared to What Is Out There?

The existing literature tends to treat the loyalty of backbenchers as determined by vote, policy, and office components (Aldrich and Bianco 1992; Ames 2001, 2002; Desposato 2006b; Gaines and Garrett 1993; Herron 2002; Hix 2004; Pearson 2005; Samuels 1999; Thames 2005, 2007b), while this dissertation is intended to contribute to this literature by shedding new light on the original framework by Strom (1990): these three different incentives can work as substitutes for each other.

In investigating party cohesion, a focus on the leadership's strategies can help to explain this trade-off relationship. I have argued that party leaders, in an attempt to achieve collective goods of stable party governance and productive legislation given the budget constraint, would try to provide various types of material benefits to legislators to buy off their consistent and continuous support. These benefits are systematically related to the vote, policy, and office incentives of legislators, and aimed at offsetting the costs associated with affiliating a party. But resources are limited within a party. Therefore, based on their resource portfolio, leaders need to efficiently allocate selective benefits to backbenchers, who might value some types of goods but discount other types of goods. Where vote- and policy-related benefits are discounted by legislators, a party in power would try to use its abundant resources in the government and offer them for its members in order to achieve its ultimate goals; and these office benefits would be designed to satisfy the vote- and policy-seeking incentives of individual

legislators, for example positions in the government that are useful for improving name recognition in districts, bringing particularistic benefits to constituents, or both.

Furthermore, I also look at the constitutional difference – parliamentarism versus presidentialism – that should have divergent consequences in the patterns of allocating office benefits (Moe 1990; Moe and Caldwell 1994; Samuels 2002; Samuels and Shugart 2003, 2009). In a parliamentary system, commitment to the Pareto-optimal, long-term equilibrium should be available, because of mutual dependence between the executive and the legislature: the duration of the cabinet, access to office benefits, and backbenchers' support for the cabinet are all closely tied together to maintain the stable outcome. In a presidential regime, on the other hand, such a commitment mechanism to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium should not be available, because of mutual independence between the executive and the legislature. Even though the president can offer ruling party members access to office benefits to align their incentives, the value of those office benefits tends to decline over time, mainly because the term of the president is fixed. Where office perks are important, this difference should matter very much for party unity: in a parliamentary country, defection is likely when the leadership cannot promise to offer fair access to office perks; and in a presidential country, defection is likely when the opportunity costs of affiliating with the president become quite high.

True, the argument that connects legislators' office-seeking incentives to party cohesion is abundant (Amorim Neto 2002; Benedetto and Hix 2007; Bowler 2000; Desposato 2006b; Jenkins et al. 2005; Jones 2002; Kam 2001, 2006; Mershon and Shvetsova 2008; Nacif 2002); however, with some exceptions (Benedetto and Hix 2007; Jenkins et al. 2005; Kam 2001, 2006), the existing literature does not offer clear-cut answers to such questions as how and in

which context any one of the three incentives can become salient in explaining party cohesion, and how unity of the same party changes across time.

The argument developed here offers solutions to the question raised above: even with institutional barriers to party cohesion, how do party leaders are able to achieve party cohesion in the legislative arena? Specifically in the East Asian context, how could leaders of Japanese and Korean parties – ones that have been consistently plagued by internal factional struggles, party splits and mergers, and the highly personalistic nature of the elections – maintain party cohesion in the legislative floor? Given that East Asian party leaders may not be able to satisfy the vote- and policy-seeking needs of individual legislators, they would focus on distribution of office-related benefits to achieve high productivity in the legislature. And the patterns of distribution of office-related benefits tend to change over time: the prime minister might change the rules of the game all of a sudden; the president cannot credibly threaten to sanction defectors when she will retire soon; intra-party factions' threat to oust the cabinet becomes only credible when they are really able to do so. These implications will be explored in the next section.

2.3. Implications and How to Test Them

The theoretical argument offered above have several implications that will be tested with the cases of Japan and South Korea in the following chapters. These include legislators' behaviors inside the legislative body and parties; the amounts of subsidies for which legislators can claim credit; and expansion of the budget. These variables are analytically advantageous in that they have levels and scales: For example, it is reasonable to assume that defecting behaviors

can range from "loyalty" to the party leadership, through "voice" against the leadership's discretionary policymaking and personnel management patterns, to "exit" from the party, allowing analysts to attribute these different behaviors to different levels of party loyalty. Fiscal policy, one of the most important policies that the government makes, is also advantageous in that the amounts are available in numerical terms so that, if properly set, a model can test the predictable implications of the theory and provide intuitive interpretations.

2.3.1. The Effects on Legislators' Behaviors

A straightforward prediction is that party discipline has influence over the behavior of legislators on the legislative floor. First of all, those legislators who have access to the three benefits from the party would be more likely to adhere to the party than otherwise. The existing literature on party discipline expects that electorally vulnerable legislators are more likely to vote the party line (Ames 2002; Benedetto and Hix 2007; Carey 2007; Haspel et al. 1998; Herron 2002; Hix 2004; Samuels 1999; Thames 2004, 2005, 2007a), legislators whose ideological bents are similar to the party median or the party leadership are more likely to support the party line (Benedetto and Hix 2007; Gaines and Garrett 1993; Garner and Letki 2005; Hix et al. 2005), and legislators with access to office benefits from their leaders are more likely to obey the party line (Amorim Neto 2006; Amorim Neto and Santos 2001; Benedetto and Hix 2007; Crook and Hibbing 1985; Jones 2002; Kam 2006; Nacif 2002). These theoretical predictions are also confirmed in the literature on party switching. For example, party switching between two parties is less likely to happen if legislators are elected on party-centered elections (e.g. closed-list PR), and/or if the two parties are ideologically distant

(Aldrich and Bianco 1992; Desposato 2006b; Heller and Mershon 2005; Mershon and Shvetsova 2008; Shabad and Slomczynski 2004). Thus these expectations should be tested as baselines:

Hypothesis Set 1: Party Defection Baselines

- a. Defection would be more likely from those who are electorally strong
- b. Defection would be more likely from those who have policy preferences different from the party median or party leaders
- c. Defection would be more likely from those whose office-related opportunity costs from the party are high
- d. Defection would be more likely to happen when members discount the value of office benefits

Hypothesis 1-d is one addition to the baseline expectations, and this can happen in two ways: first, if legislators have reasons to expect any change in the existing rule to result in discounted benefits from the party, they might decide to disobey the party line or leave the party; and second, if legislators expect the incumbent government to change relatively soon, they might lose the incentives to obey the party line. As explored above, the first situation can happen in a parliamentary regime, where the norms and/or rules to allocate office benefits emerge as commitment devices. Changing these existing commitment mechanisms can cause rebellious behaviors from those legislators who have vested interests in party matters, as the existing rules of the game shape the incentives of politicians, in a way they can optimize their

behaviors given these rules. Chapter 4 on Koizumi's recent efforts to centralize the ruling party will show that the dissidents in the 2005 vote on the post office privatization bill indeed included those who discounted their future party benefits from the party. The second situation can happen in a presidential regime, where the president cannot credibly threaten to sanction defectors toward the end of her term. As uncertainty over the next presidential elections mounts, for ruling party members affiliated with the president, the opportunity costs of supporting a ruling party candidate becomes higher, resulting in the loosening of party unity.

In addition, the three basic incentives can work as substitutes. So, for example, in the context where legislators receive too small benefits from the party to satisfy their vote- and policy-seeking incentives, office-related benefits would be more useful in buying off legislators' support and therefore a more significant factor in explaining party cohesion than otherwise. The subsequent chapter will analyze the (un)development of Japanese and Korean parties, leaders' efforts to unite the fragmented and factionalized internal party structures, and the mechanisms to allocate office-related benefits to discontent members.

Ideally, this general prediction should be tested with a larger context beyond the East Asian democracies, for example using a dataset covering a substantive number of countries with information on electoral systems, party systems, and how easy it is for rank-and-file legislators to access office benefits. But, the argument here can be also tested with within-country variations. Even within countries marked by personalistic electoral competition there should be substantial variations in terms of individual legislators' electoral strengths. Or, as Chapter 5 on legislative voting in Korea will show later, the effects of party label in the elections substantially vary between different regions inside the country, in such a way that an affiliation with a certain party

in a certain region guarantees almost 90% success in the elections. This implies that Japan and Korea are still useful cases to investigate how the effects of office benefits would moderate the negative effects of legislators' independence from party label on party cohesion.

Thus I would further predict that these office benefits should offset the costs inflicted by individual legislators' electoral strengths and ideological extremity on party cohesion. Specifically, access to office privileges would moderate the likelihood that electorally invulnerable and/or ideologically extreme legislators would defect from the party line. The flip side of this statement should be that those who discount office benefits from the party are more likely to defect than otherwise, especially if they are electorally able to do so and/or ideologically willing to do so.

Hypothesis Set 2: Party Defection Extended Expectations

- a. The likelihood of defection by electorally strong legislators would be moderated (accentuated) by access (denial) to office benefits
- b. The likelihood of defection by ideologically extreme legislators would be moderated (accentuated) by access (denial) to office benefits

2.3.2. The Effects on Fiscal Patterns

Another set of predictions is about how the party leadership would make a strategic decision as to allocating benefits to its members to maintain party cohesion. This can add a

new insight to the literature on government spending,¹⁸ political business cycles,¹⁹ and distribution.²⁰

First, following Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b), various scholars have attempted to explore the political factors affecting spending. One of the factors found to be significant is the weakness and centralization of the government, typically represented by minority and

¹⁸ Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b) first led off the literature on government spending in general. The subsequent models employ various insights into their model: the committee system (Crain and Muris 1995); veto players (Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006; Crepez and Moser 2004; Heller 1997; Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002; Tavits 2004); the referendum and direct democracy (Gilligan and Matsusaka 2001); and electoral rules (Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002; Persson and Tabellini 1999).

¹⁹ The classic model was first developed by Nordhaus (1975). The model was revised with partisan ideologies (Hibbs 1977); approval rates (Schultz 1995); and forward-looking expectations as to partisan policies (Alesina et al. 1997). See also the review by Franzese (2002).

²⁰ Early theoretical development was made by Cox and McCubbins (1986) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), and their models were refined by the later model focusing on swing voters (Dixit and Londregan 1996, 1998). The empirical analysis ranges from developing to developed countries (Ames 1987, 1995a; Bickers and Stein 1996; Bruhn 1996; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Case 2001; Castells and Sole-Olle 2005; Costa-i-Font et al. 2003; Dahlberg and Johansson 2002; Herron and Theodos 2004; Johansson 2003; Levitt and Snyder 1995; McGillivray 1997; Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon 1994).

coalition governments. If the government's decision making power is constrained by political forces, then it has to negotiate with other political actors and the result is the expansion of spending and deficits.

This insight can be expanded to the theory of party discipline developed in this dissertation. The basic argument developed above is that East Asian parties are ideologically diverse inside and therefore the party leadership needs to provide its members with office benefits, especially ones that pertain to such government privileges as ministers and agency heads, in order to maintain party unity; and these benefits are designed to promote legislators' reelection incentives, such that they are useful for bringing particularistic, targeted benefits to their constituents. These imply that the government tends to have the larger number of decision makers with different interests in pork; they constitute effective veto players. Coordination between decision makers would become more and more difficult, and the result might be the expansion of pork barrel expenditures. Meanwhile, when the party leadership should be able to monopolize the power to make policy and allocate government privileges with its discretion, there would be the small number of players in the government. Therefore the party leadership would be able to limit the expansion of pork spending when it has the more centralized power over their party.

Hypothesis Set 3: Budget Expansion

- a. More provision of office benefits could lead to the larger number of decision makers in the government, which would in turn constrain the party leadership's ability to limit the expansion of budget items pertaining to pork

- b. Less provision of office benefits could lead to the smaller number of decision makers in the government, which would in turn enhances the party leadership's ability to limit the expansion of budget items pertaining to pork

Second, a focus on party discipline should add an additional insight to the ongoing debate over regional distribution. One strand of authors argues for the loyal voter hypothesis that parties would tend to spend more selective goods in core districts; and another argues for the swing voter hypothesis that parties would tend to strategically allocate goods in marginal districts to maximize their seat shares (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996, 1998; McGillivray 1997). This could be rephrased as the relationship between leaders and backbenchers with different interests: in order to achieve a stable and comfortable majority inside the legislature, leaders have more incentives to target marginal districts than rank-and-file members, who, on the other hand, in order to maximize the reelection possibility, have more incentives for credit-claiming activities than party leaders. So, there is a conflict inside a party over distributive benefits, and how this conflict is mediated is a function of party discipline (McGillivray 1997): in high party discipline systems, the government will inflict costs on party loyal districts while providing benefits to marginal districts, while in low discipline countries, safe seats will receive the highest levels of distributive benefits.

Thus when rank-and-file legislators can expect office benefits from the party, leaders can be more autonomous in making decisions as to distribution, so marginal districts are more likely to be targeted; on the other hand, when rank-and-file legislators cannot expect office benefits from the party, leaders can be less autonomous in making decisions as to distribution.

Thus the theoretical gap in the literature can be bridged with a focus on the power balance between leaders and backbenchers.

Hypothesis Set 4: Allocation of Subsidies

- a. When rank-and-file legislators can expect office benefits from the party, marginal districts are more likely to be targeted
- b. When rank-and-file legislators cannot expect office benefits from the party, safe districts are more likely to be targeted

2.4. Conclusion

In this theoretical chapter, I start with the assumption that a party tries to achieve its collective action: maintaining its rule and maximizing legislative productivity. As an organization, a party always faces collective action problems of how to appropriately align the incentives of backbenchers as agents. Based on the assumption that politicians have the three different incentives for vote, policy, and office, and I have developed a theory to explain that the leadership as a principal tries to buy off support from agents with fringe benefits, calculating how they would perceive the value of these benefits. Given the budget constraints that the leadership faces and institutional settings that limit the leadership's choices, I have argued that party leaders need to efficiently allocate selective benefits to backbenchers, who might value some types of goods but discount other types of goods. Where a party cannot satisfy legislators' needs electorally and ideologically, a party in power would try to resort to office perks to maintain party unity and achieve its ultimate goals.

In addition, my argument is that the constitutional difference – parliamentarism versus presidentialism – should have divergent consequences in the patterns of allocating office benefits. In a parliamentary system, mutual dependence between the executive and the legislature implies that the interactions between the leadership as a principal and backbenchers as agents can be infinitely repeated; and the "shadow of the future" can give the rise to commitment to the Pareto-optimal, long-term equilibrium, in which the duration of the cabinet, access to office benefits, and backbenchers' support for the cabinet are all closely tied together. In a presidential regime, depending on circumstances, the executive and the legislature can work as the same team, with the president offering fair access to office benefits to align the incentives of legislators, but the value of such benefits tends to decline over time, as the presidential elections approach. The result would be the loosening of party unity over time.

I also offered several hypotheses to test in the following chapters. First, as a baseline, I hypothesized that those who are electorally strong, ideologically extreme, and denied access to office benefits would be more likely to defect from the party line, while any events that can reduce the value of office benefits – a sudden change of the existing norms/rules of allocating office perks, or the uncertainty over the next presidential elections – could result in the loosening of party unity. Second, as the three different incentives for vote, policy, and office are in the trade-off relationship, I hypothesized that access to office benefits can dampen the negative effects of personal vote and ideological extremity on party unity. Third, the fiscal policy hypothesis states that, as office benefits could lead to the larger number of decision makers in the government, they would in turn constrain the party leadership's ability to limit the expansion of budget items pertaining to pork. Fourth, as the literature on distribution

suggests, party unity can have impact on the leadership's regional targeting strategies: specifically, I hypothesized that, when rank-and-file legislators can expect office benefits from the party, marginal districts are more likely to be targeted.

Chapter 3. Quest for Power:

Party (Un)development in Japan and South Korea

3.1. Introduction

In light of the theoretical argument in the preceding chapter, this chapter now describes the party organization, ideological cohesion, electoral strategies, and other basic characteristics of Japanese and South Korean political parties. In doing so, it delves into the development (or undevelopment) of political parties in the two countries and sheds light on how party leaders maintain party cohesion inside the parties. My main argument throughout the chapter is that, given the weak organization of the ruling parties and the resultant ideological disunity inside the parties, party leaders needed to utilize political tools, mainly perks derived from the government, to keep buying support from rank-and-file members. Leaders resorted to pork barrel spending, posts in the government and state-owned agencies and enterprises, and other types of politicized patronage to align the incentives of their party members.

As argued in the preceding theoretical chapter, party leaders can utilize the power of giving endorsements to discourage members from defecting, especially if an electoral system requires that a member should be affiliated with a party in order to get reelected as in a closed-list PR system. However, if candidates can win the elections without much support from parties, then threatening not to give an endorsement cannot work as an effective whip against potential defectors. Leaders can also devise the candidate recruitment and selection process in a way that limits the membership to only those who are ideologically compatible.

However, again, if a party is open to an ideologically diverse set of members, then party leaders should have a hard time aggregating collective interests.

In Japan and South Korea, party leaders' strategies are limited by several political setting. First, the ruling parties in the two countries are so weakly organized that they do not have strong party activists to mediate between the voter and the representatives. The lack of party activists thus prevents candidates from engaging in programmatic electoral competition based on general policy issues and clear ideological dimensions. Second, given that parties lack local organizations and ideological cohesion and therefore candidates cannot focus on programmatic policy issues in electoral competition, candidates tend to spend great resources on personalistic, individual campaigning not necessarily based on party label. Individual candidates extensively use personal organizations called *koenkai* in Japan and *sejojik* in South Korea to cultivate personal vote, although party label can have some different impact in the two countries depending on time and space. Third, the ruling parties are therefore seen as groups of divergent members that only loosely share the same political ideology of center-conservatism; members from the same party show different attitudes even on quite critical issues, for example the rearmament issue in Japan. Fourth, the result of loose ideological unity and candidates' reliance on personalistic organizations in electoral competition is that members fairly freely move across parties: party volatility characterized by frequent switching, splits, and mergers is in fact the norm in the two countries. Coalitions are based on the calculations of staying in power, rather than ideological compatibility.

These conditions – weak party organization, ideological disunity, personal vote, and party volatility – are all unfavorable for party cohesion. The lack of programmatic party

competition turns party label into a highly unreliable signal for both voters and candidates: voters cannot depend on party label for determining the candidate who would best represent their interests; and candidates cannot use party label as an informational short-cut to show the voter the interests they would represent. Ideological disunity inside a party should imply a difficulty in aggregating different interests and achieving collective action without substantial amounts of fringe benefits to those extremists inside the party. Powerful personal vote networks give members some electoral leeway to act freely, possibly against the will of the party leadership. New members brought to a party through party switching and mergers only add to the complexity and difficulty of collective action. New parties emerging through party splits, especially under these conditions, would have hard times in differentiating themselves with the other parties, not necessarily forging a strong linkage between candidates and voters.

The theory of party discipline developed in the preceding chapter starts with the assumption that a legislator has three different incentives for vote, policy, and office, and argues that where vote- and policy-seeking incentives are insufficient in buying support from backbenchers, party leaders should resort to office-related incentives. In fact, leaders in the Japanese and Korean ruling parties relied on office perks – pork barrel spending, posts in the government and state-owned agencies and enterprises, and other types of politicized patronage that can be distributed under the discretion of the leadership – to maintain party cohesion. Note that these systems based on politicized patronage were not invented overnight; nor they have been stable throughout the period of our interest. Rather, the systems constantly changed and gradually formed in response to members' perpetual quest for power: the prime ministership in Japan and the presidency in South Korea. Almost all the intra-party factional

struggles in fact originated from competition over who would get the power to allocate office perks. This intense intra-party competition between the mainstream and anti-mainstream factions, or the "Ins" and "Outs," was further reinforced by the aforementioned conditions: weak party organization, ideological disunity, personal vote, and party volatility. Nonetheless, the two very similar systems have one single crucial difference. The constitutional structure of parliamentarism versus presidentialism has resulted in distinctively different consequences.

In Japan, the electoral method for how to choose the president of the LDP is a majority run-off system whereby most of the voters are Diet members. This system implies that the quickest way to get elected is to obtain secured support from individual Diet members and therefore presidential aspirants should have the incentives to enlarge their factions to the maximum. Size ultimately matters in the presidential elections, so factional bosses do not care much about their factions' ideological cohesion and, especially before the 1993-94 electoral reform, tried to support as many candidates as possible. This was possible because, given the LDP's weak party organization at the local level, as well as the highly personalistic electoral system that could not prevent factions from engaging in selfish behaviors, individual candidates could not rely on party label that much. Factional bosses also need to promise to give office perks to their members when they assume the party presidency, and the result is that the mainstream factions tended to monopolize those perks while the anti-mainstream always tried to bring down the government, threatened to leave the party to form a non-LDP coalition government with the opposition, or stepped up efforts to join in the mainstream factions. However, in parliamentary Japan, the ruling party can institutionalize intra-party rules that generate a Pareto-optimal solution for the "infinitely repeated game" of intra-party factional

competition. The LDP leadership in Japan devised several rules to fairly equally allocate office perks to backbenchers. First, the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) is designed to allow rank-and-file members to bring particularistic benefits to their districts by institutionalizing the norm of the consensus-based, log-rolling policymaking process. Second, the seniority rule was gradually formed to encourage members to make long-term investments in the party as it guaranteed semi-automatic promotion to a higher post in the government and/or the party that is directly tied to his/her policy and career incentives. Third, fragmentation inside the party resulting from factional antagonism was avoided by establishing the norm of factional balance in allocating posts in the government and the party.

In South Korea, the president as the highest executive has constitutional powers that can be used to provide political patronage to National Assembly members, leading to intra-party competition over who gets what and who will become the next president. Given that, as in Japan, the Korean parties have only weak ties to grass-root social groups, and that only about a quarter of the voters cast their votes based on political parties or policy issues in the presidential elections, presidential candidates need to gain support from individual National Assembly members who have personal networks in their local districts. Ambitious candidates therefore form factions to win the candidacy from their parties by promising to offer privileges from the government if they could win the elections. Some even leave their parties to run for the elections, partly because challenging and losing the candidacy can imply that the loser's future career prospects might decline due to a potential backlash from the winner, and partly because the simple plurality rule used to select the president in South Korea gives a fairly high chance for a third candidate to win. Therefore, after winning office, the president uses some of the

exclusive institutional powers in order to maintain party unity. First, in drafting the budget, the president uses the Party-Government Liaison Council to accommodate local interests arising from National Assembly members. Second, the president appoints some of the presidential party members, especially those influential and powerful ones who aspire to challenge the presidential seat in the next elections, to State Council members (or ministers) in order to maintain harmony within the party. Third, the president also offers or promises to offer posts in state-owned agencies and enterprises to National Assembly members after retirement. However, the term limit on the president and the presidential election cycles means that that legislators tend to discount the value attached to the office perks as the next presidential elections approach. In the last few years of the presidential term, as the presidential elections bring an opposition candidates to the fore, the value of staying in a ruling party declines. This is why the greater number of party splits, mergers, and switching, as well as the loosening of party unity, are observed as presidential elections approach.

What follows this basic description of party politics in Japan and South Korea are in-depth analyses of the five elements noted above: weak party organization, ideological disunity, personal vote, party volatility, and factionalism. In offering the analyses, special attention will be paid to how each of these elements is interconnected. The concluding section will offer some implications for legislative politics and policy consequences in the two countries that will be tested in the empirical chapters with quantitative data.

3.2. Parties without Organization

Grass-root party organization is an important factor in enabling parties to develop programmatic linkages to society. Local party chapters established in regions and districts oftentimes serve as windows for citizens and groups to make local demands to parties; and parties on the other hand can accommodate those local demands in formulating their policy platforms. Local party chapters can also serve as gateways for political aspirants; for example in New Zealand, the local chapters of the Labour and the National exert strong influence over the candidate selection process, as a committee consisting of representatives from the local electorate and the HQs choose nominal and list candidates (Miller 2004). Relatedly, party activists also play important roles in developing and managing political parties. They mobilize votes from the general voter through active campaigning and canvassing; they direct the ideological and policy positions of political parties, by selecting leaders and lobbying individual party members in legislatures; and they try to become party representatives in legislatures by winning endorsements and elections (Iversen 1994; Kitschelt 1989, 1994; May 1973; Moon 2004; Strom 1990). Therefore, well-established local party organization serves as an effective linkage between the party leadership and the general voter. Meanwhile, parties may have a hard time reaching the voter through party images and policy messages if they do not have any meaningful roots in society. The lack of linkages with society through local chapters and activists tends to discourage parties from engaging in programmatic competition. Parties without any significant grass-root party activities and activists can rather freely determine their policy platforms, potentially leading to fluctuations in commitment to a given policy. Lacking those activists who would give campaigning support in the elections, formulate policy platforms

for parties, and work as windows to communicate the parties' policy pledges to the voter, individual candidates in particular may have to resort to something other than party label in the elections. Especially under the electoral systems that promote the incentives to cultivate personal vote, as in Japan and South Korea, personalistic competition should be more intense than programmatic competition based on party label and policy platforms.

Japanese and Korean parties are only poorly organized at the local level, except some ideologically extremist parties such as the Japan Communist Party and the Democratic Labor Party in Korea. In Japan, before the 1993-94 electoral reform, the Liberal Democratic Party could not develop any effective grass-root organs other than prefectural branches that are only loosely united associations of legislators elected from the same prefectures. This was because, by the early 1960s, each of the individual candidates developed their own personal vote-mobilizing networks called *koenkai*, which will be discussed later in depth. The single non-transferable voting system forced politicians to differentiate themselves from the colleagues from the same party in the same district by using these personal vote-mobilizing networks.

It is true that the LDP did in fact step up many efforts to organize local chapters, but members did not want to share their *koenkai* members and even had conflicts with the LDP HQs' attempts to organize local networks. On November 15, 1955, the LDP announced the Organization Activity Outline (*Soshiki Katsudo Yōkō*), which urged rapid development of local organizations and modernization of the party structure to compete with the Socialists (Masumi 1964, 1967; Takahara 1959). Beginning from 1956, workshops were held several times to train local activists (*soshiki shido in*) who would communicate political ideologies and direct organizational activities, and the Central Institute of Politics was established in 1957 to train

party officials in the HQs and prefectural branches. In 1961, under the direction of the Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, the LDP launched the Organization Research Committee (*Soshiki Chosa Kai*), which called for, especially, assigning local resident organizers (*chihō chūzai shoshiki in*) and training them in Tokyo for two months (*Asahi* May 28, 1961: p.2). Miki Takeo, who headed the Organization Research Committee, emphasized the need to solidify local organizations in order to modernize the LDP, saying, "The LDP's current local organizations are no more than somebody's *koenkai*, which is not in fact a local party chapter" (*Asahi* October 13, 1962: p.2). He even considered *koenkai* as rotten apples in the LDP and therefore suggested that *koenkai* members should be incorporated into the LDP's local chapters (*Asahi* January 15, 1964: p.1). However, these efforts were far from successful. Ultimately, the party HQs needed to depend on individual legislators' *koenkai* for developing the party's local organizations, but legislators opposed the idea of integrating their own *koenkai* into the party. As of August 1964, a newspaper reported that the exact number of the LDP's party members was even unknown (*Asahi* August 5, 1964: p.2).

Therefore the LDP's party membership at the grass-root level only slowly grew in the 1960s; in fact, in 1967, the party could mobilize only less than 1% of the total electorate as party members (see Figure 3.1). The membership grew in the 1970s and the 1980s gradually, and the existing analysis and some newspaper articles point out that this was mainly because of the introduction of the primaries into its presidential elections in the late 1970s.²¹ The increase was

²¹ See Tsurutani (1980) on how the leadership introduced the primaries and how factions utilized individual legislators' *koenkai* to win the primaries. Also see *Asahi* January 16, 1980: p.2. The primaries were used when there were three or more candidates. The primaries were to

not brought about by those voters who wanted to have some chances to select the LDP president (who would become the Prime Minister given the majority status of the LDP); rather, presidential candidates, usually factional bosses, ordered faction members to incorporate their *koenkai* members into the party (Tsurutani 1980). Party membership started to decline in 1990. There could be various reasons to explain this decline, including increasing floating voters without party identification especially in urban areas; but it would be worth noting here that the primaries were abolished in 1990 and factional bosses would not have strong incentives to secure their own party members any more.

select top two candidates and the second round, in which only Diet members from the LDP could cast votes, was to choose the final winner.




Figure 3.1: The LDP's Membership-to-Electorate (M/E) Ratio

Note: Data from Jiyū Minshutō (2006).

The electoral reform in 1993-94 to a mixed-member majoritarian system was designed to eliminate personalistic electoral competition and promote party-oriented, policy-based competition in Japan (Christensen 1994; Reed and Thies 2001; Sakamoto 1999). Party-oriented, policy-based competition would develop hand-in-hand with the evolution of local party organizations, partly because now dependence on *koenkai* for electoral competition would become weaker, and partly because parties would now resort to local party organizations and party activists, rather than on individualistic, personalistic supporters, to formulate nation-wide policy platforms. In the first post-reform elections in 1996, however, individual candidates still largely depended on *koenkai* to mobilize votes and could not cooperate in

reorganizing their own *koenkai* into local party organizations (Otake 1997). As Krauss and Pekkanen argue (2004), *koenkai* continue to exist and they have not completely been subsumed into local LDP party branches, for several reasons: first, *koenkai* is still one of the very useful ways for candidates to reach the voter, given strict restrictions on candidates' campaign activities in Japan; second, candidates do not want to substitute a local party branch for *koenkai*, because local party branches are still weak; third, even losing candidates have strong incentives to collect as many votes as possible;²² and fourth, Japanese voters began to lose their party identity, so that the candidates can appeal to many voters through formation of *koenkai*.

²² The new mixed-member system allows candidates to be dual-listed in both the nominal and list tiers; and the party can list candidates in the list tier at the same rank, such that their vote margins with the winner (*sekihai ritsu*) determine their final ranks.




Figure 3.2: Japanese Parties' Fee-Paying Membership-to-Electorate (fpM/E) Ratios

Note: Data from Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (various issues). LDP: Liberal Democratic Party. DPJ: Democratic Party of Japan. SDP: Social Democratic Party. JCP: Japan Communist Party.

As of 2005, the LDP's party membership to the total electorate was around only 1%, partly because of candidates' unwillingness to consolidate their *koenkai* into the LDP's local party chapters, partly because of increasing floating voters without party identity, and partly because of the exclusive nature of the LDP's presidential elections. The other Japanese parties mirror this weak organization, except the Japan Communist Party, which has the most centralized/extensive party organization in Japan. The fee-paying-membership-to-the electorate ratios of all the other parties are around only 0.5% (see Figure 3.2).²³ All in all,

²³ It is important to note here that there is no objective data available on party members, so we need to rely on parties' self-reported figures, which are known for their upward bias (Mair and van Biezen 2001). The data in Figure 3.1 are taken from the LDP's history book that the party

excluding the communists, the Japanese parties' organization is fairly weak compared to European countries: the average membership-to-electorate ratio in Europe was around 5% as of the late 1990s (Mair and van Biezen 2001), compared to 1.6% in Japan.

In terms of grass-root organization, Korean parties do no better. As Figure 3.3 shows, Korean parties now have 9.61% of the total electorate as their members, but most of them are only nominal members. Those party members who pay the membership fees only account for 1.06% of the total electorate as of 2007; in fact, a study on political finance in Korea finds that party membership fees account for only small amounts of total political funds (Kim and Kim 2003). This weak organization at the grass-root level does not mean that Korean parties did not step up any efforts to develop social roots. In fact, Korean parties have local party chapters in various forms, and through these local chapters, candidates and legislators try to mobilize local constituents to their own camps. The problem with these local chapters, however, is that they only serve as personal organizations for specific candidates and legislators.

edited by itself, and Figure 3.2 is based on parties' self-reported annual income and expenditure reports to the government, which contain information on how many members give the membership fees to the parties.




Figure 3.3: Korean Parties' Membership-to-Electorate (M/E) and Fee-Paying Membership-to-Electorate (fpM/E) Ratios

Note: Data from the National Election Commission (various issues).

The origin of local party chapters (*jigudang*) can be traced back to the authoritarian period. A military junta led by the General Park Chung Hee, who organized a coup in 1961 to oust the Chang Myon cabinet, established the new Political Party Law (*Jeongdang Peop*) to impose a series of regulations on political parties. In order to achieve a hegemonic party system,²⁴ the law provided that a political party should be able to form only when local party chapters were to be established in one-third of the 131 electoral districts. In addition, the same law stated that each of the chapters should have 50 or more members. Therefore a party needed to secure more than 2,000 registered members across the country in order to engage in political activities. This was designed to discourage the rise of political parties, and as Kim (2001a) reports, these

²⁴ Park promised to restore democracy and introduce elections in a due course. The first democratic elections after the coup were scheduled in November 1963.

strict regulations were mainly targeted at leftist parties. As one of the few political groups with financial and organizational resources, the junta established its own political party, the Democratic Republican Party (*Minju Konghwa Dang*), under the direction of Kim Jong Pil.

As a result, local party chapters were only utilized by legislators as tools to regularize contact with constituents through personalistic connections in the authoritarian period. People did not join these grass-root organizations because they shared common ideological goals; rather, local party chapters were personal and particularistic bonds between a political boss and followers. Personal acquaintance, school connections, clan ties were dominant in maintaining the membership for these chapters, and legislators even provided various types of tangible benefits and favors, most notably staff positions in these chapters, in return for electoral support (Park 1988b).

This local party chapter system was maintained even after the 1987 democratization. After several rounds of revisions, the Political Party Law as of 1988 still required that a party should have local party chapters in one-fourth of the 224 districts. And their basic characteristics remained intact; the main function was to raise candidates' name recognition in their districts, by entertaining the voter and providing patronage to supporters. Candidates and legislators utilized local party chapters to hold various types of meetings and conferences under the name of "party activities." Jeong (2000a) reports that in these meetings and conferences party members rarely discussed policy issues and party platforms; rather, it was customary especially before the elections to invite popular people, especially celebrities in TV shows and pop singers, as well as business persons, professors, journalists, and party leaders, to their districts, and make them speak about candidates. For example, a candidate aiming for the

1992 elections in one of the Seoul districts invited a professor from a renowned university, saying that "In this district the educational level is relatively high, so we took it into account and invited the professor as a special guest speaker" (*Jugan Chosun*, March 15, 1992: pp.14-17). And local party chapters continued to hire several paid officials, usually local notables with dense and wide personal connections, to reach the voter.

The costs to maintain a local party chapter were therefore huge for a legislator. One branch in Seoul spent 6 million won monthly for personnel management, 2 million won as a rent for the office space, 2 million won for entertaining visitors and officials, 1.5 million won for meetings, and 6 million won for wedding ceremonies and funerals (Jeong 2000a). Given that only a few party members made financial contributions to parties (Kim and Kim 2003), almost all of these costs fell on the chapter chair, while the election laws prohibited a candidate from using more than 25 million won a month. Candidates and legislators had rational reasons to maintain these costly chapters as they were official and legal mechanisms to reach the voter, especially given that pre-election campaigning was strictly prohibited in Korea (described in the next section). Party members in these local party chapters were nothing more than "paper members" (*jongi dangwon*), but chairs still needed them at any rate because the Election Law allowed parties to distribute mail, pamphlets, and other documents only to "party members" (*Weekly Chosun* November 20, 2003: pp.76-7). Therefore local party chapters were still merely personal tools for legislators to pursue their political careers around their personal relationships, such as alumni associations. Chapter members did not join chapters because of party affiliation, as chapter members usually did not stay when their bosses changed party affiliations (Jeong 2000a; Park 1999b).

Facing the demand for clean electoral competition, especially from civil society,²⁵ parties stepped up efforts to consolidate these local party chapters, despite the opposition from those incumbent chairs who depended on chapters for the mobilization of votes and from those party officials who depended on chapters for the patronage jobs. In 2000, it was made illegal for a party to pay officials at the local level.²⁶ And finally in 2004, politicians agreed to abolish all the local party chapters. A sudden decline in the membership-to-electorate ratio from 13.99% to 5.42% in 2004 reflects the dissolution of local party chapters (see Figure 3.3). But parties are still allowed to have party councils (*dangwon hyeopuni hwe*) at the municipality level to reach local constituents, and most legislators assume chairs of these councils and simply use them as local party chapters as in the past (*Chosun Ilbo*, March 20, 2006: p.6).

3.3. Personalistic Electoral Competition

Given the lack of grass-root local organizations, party members, and therefore programmatic ties to the society, candidates in Japan and South Korea tend to spend great amounts of resources on cultivating personalistic, individualistic, and most often, clientelistic

²⁵ Beginning from 2000, civil groups started announcing the list of corrupt politicians who should not be given endorsements and voted on in the elections. See Kim (2006) and Shin (2003).

²⁶ It is still legal to have paid officials at the provincial level. And newspaper articles report that National Assembly members in fact still paid some personnel costs under the names of "organizational activities," "policy development," and "legislative activities" (*Chosun Ilbo*, June 8, 2001: p.25; June 18, 2001: p.5).

networks that are all not necessarily built on voters' party affinities. Individual candidates extensively use personal organizations called *koenkai* in Japan and *sajojik* in South Korea to cultivate a personal vote. If endorsed by parties, they further take advantage of legal and official party organizations established in districts to hold various types of party meetings and conferences under the name of "party activities," mostly for campaigning purposes, as reviewed in the previous section. *Koenkai* and *sajojik* are thus similar in their purposes: improving name recognition through personal networks, raising personal affinities to candidates, and most importantly, campaigning for candidates in elections. Through these personal networks and interactions with supporters, candidates also engage in constituency services and try to acquire information on voter demands for policy issues, mainly local issues in districts.

Koenkai in Japan first emerged in the Taisho era (1912-26), but they only began to appear as electoral organizations to mobilize personal votes from the early 1950s, as one Diet member recalled, "There was no *koenkai* like this before the war" (*Asahi* January 6, 1967: p.14). As of September 1952, a newspaper article reported that almost all the candidates from the conservative camp had *koenkai*, one of the *koenkai* already had 5,000 members, and especially in competitive districts, *koenkai* were very popular (*Asahi* September 18, 1952: p.1). In the early history of *koenkai*, they were mainly tools for pre-election campaigning, taking advantage of a legal loophole (*Asahi* September 23, 1952: p.3); pre-election campaigns were heavily regulated in Japan, so it was critical for candidates to have personal networks to expand their name recognition on a daily basis.

Koenkai became even more popular after the late 1950s (*Asahi* April 15, 1958: p.2). Largely because door to door campaigning, putting up posters outside of the official

campaigning periods, and other traditional electoral strategies are illegal in Japan, candidates started using the more reliable and stable personal networks. *Koenkai* began to have more formal structures and a permanent membership base, resembling pseudo-parties: newspaper reported in 1958 different candidates' *koenkai* had conflicts; and politicians at multiple levels vertically integrated (*keiretsu ka*) their *koenkai* from Diet members, local assembly members, and municipality heads (*Mainichi* April 24, 1958: p.9). By 1960 some *koenkai* had 100,000 to 200,000 members (*Asahi* November 9, 1960: p.11). Tanaka Kakuei's *koenkai* called *Etsuzankai* used to have offices in every single municipality in his Niigata 3 District, with the total membership of 95,000, which was said to include even opposition party supporters. *Etsuzankai* was imitated by his faction members, including Ozawa Ichirō and Nakamura Kishirō, as an exemplary personal network (Niigata Nippo Sha 2004).

Usual activities of *koenkai* included: holding large-scale meetings and conferences, entertaining the voter with food and drink, organizing tours to the Diet building in Tokyo or to hot springs in rural towns, and working as windows for local voters and interest groups to lobby politicians (Curtis 1971; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Thayer 1969). Therefore maintaining and expanding these personal networks was highly costly. Combined with this, extremely intense competition even with co-partisans in the same district made party label highly unreliable in the elections, leading individual legislators to resort to external financial resources, mostly from their factional leaders, and to even engage in the corrupt practices of buying votes (Cox and Thies 1998, 2000; Nyblade and Reed 2008). Corruption scandals abounded: a series of the "Black Mist" scandals in 1966; the Lockheed scandal involving the former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei in 1976 (Johnson 1986); the Recruit scandal in 1988-89;

and the Sagawa scandal in 1992-93. The latter two scandals gave rise to the momentum for political reform, and the result was that the LDP government finally stepped down for the first time since 1955, and the non-LDP Hosokawa cabinet reformed the SNTV electoral system to a mixed-member majoritarian system.

The switch to the mixed-member system, however, did not result in a quick turn to programmatic competition between parties. Given that the strict campaigning restrictions are still put in place, candidates still had the incentives to use their personal networks if they already had ones at any rate. Especially given the decreasing number of party members in Japan and the lack of a viable alternative party to the LDP at least until 2003, programmatic two-party competition has been slow to emerge and candidates still need to rely on personal appeals to mobilize votes. Furthermore, intra-party competition, although between candidates from different districts, is encouraged by the dual candidacy provision, encouraging PR candidates to gather as many votes as possible (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004; McKean and Scheiner 2000). Some scholars suggest that candidates still relied on the most reliable vote-mobilizing machines, or *koenkai*, whether campaigning under SNTV or as new candidates (Otake 1997; Park 2000b). Observing the first mixed-member elections in 1996, Yamada (1997) concluded that "So far, there has been no sign of a significant structural change brought about by the Hosokawa cabinet's political reform. Although there are some signs of party-oriented electoral campaigns. . . , there is no significant change in candidates' incentive system" (p.140).

Korean candidates also created a range of personal organizations (*sayjike*) to improve their name recognition and mobilize votes in their districts. The origin can be traced back to the authoritarian period (1972-87), when elections for National Assembly members were still

allowed under SNTV²⁷ but free and fair campaigns were very limited. Given the weak party organization at the grass-root level, especially opposition party members who had only limited access to support from the party leadership had to rely on loyal and personal but informal networks to mobilize votes. As Park (1988b) described, "Common examples of such informal groups are various friendship societies (*kye*), clan groups, alumni groups, hiking clubs, and other recreation groups" (p.1,054).

One of the most well-known *sajjik* was *Minju Sanak Hwe*, or the Democratic Hiking Club, created by Kim Young Sam. At its peak, the hiking club was said to have 302 branches throughout the country with 250,000 to 300,000 members (*Shin Donga* August 1992: pp.198-211; *Monthly Joongang* December 1992: pp.204-11). Before the 1992 presidential elections, the Kim Young Sam camp also launched an encompassing personal organization called the Center for Patriotic Movements (*Naru Sarung Silbeon Undong Bonbu*), with the

²⁷ For the 1973 and 1978 elections, there were 73 two-member districts where the voter could cast only one non-transferable vote, while the size of the entire National Assembly was 219, as 73 members were elected by an electoral college, the National Conference for Unification (*Yushin Jeongu Hwe*). After Park Chung Hee was assassinated and Chun Doo Hwan seized the power through a coup, the Constitution was revised in 1981, and the two-member SNTV system was maintained. The number of districts was increased to 92 and the electoral college was abolished, while there were 92 PR members. The allocation rule for the PR seats was designed to favor the largest party in the SNTV tier, as a half were given to it; and the rest were allocated based on the sizes of the other parties. See K.-Y. Lee (1999a); S.-C. Lee (1999b); Mo and Brady (1999).

administration, organization, and PR bureaus each headed by incumbent National Assembly members. The organization bureau was responsible for directing membership expansion activities through seven divisions: agriculture; small- and mid-size enterprises; labor unions; academic associations; leisure clubs; religious groups; and celebrities. As a whole, the personal organization was said to gather 2.5 million members across the country; this figure was in fact larger than the membership base of Kim's own Democratic Liberal Party as of 1990. A newspaper article reported that much more money was used for these *sajojik* in the 1992 presidential elections than the parties' official and legal organizations (*Chosun Ilbo* May 2, 1997: p.6).

The National Election Commission, an autonomous body to manage and monitor elections and campaigns in South Korea, made several attempts to eliminate these types of personal organizations because the election laws strictly prohibit candidates from contacting voters for electoral purposes before the official campaigning periods. Indeed, these personal organizations have been the seedbeds for the vote-buying practices. Based on recommendations from the National Election Commission, the Elections Law was revised in 1994 and now only the central party or local party chapters can have election strategy offices; and only volunteers are allowed to work for candidates during the time of elections to prevent distribution of money (*Chosun Ilbo* March 6, 1994: p.5; *Chosun Ilbo* June 10, 1994: p.4). However, these strict regulations further accelerated candidates' drive in developing their *sajojik*. One candidate said, "It will be difficult to find volunteers just before the elections, so I will prepare much earlier," while another pointed to the difficulty of finding volunteers without relying on personal networks: "It would be difficult to institutionalize volunteer-based election

movements; volunteers work for their preferred candidates in the UK, because there are two ideologically clear party alternatives. However in Korea, all the parties are conservative"

(*Chosun Ilbo* March 6, 1994: p.5).

Added to this is the fact that the incumbent has an advantage, as he/she can legally hold meetings to report legislative activities to the voter in his/her district (*Chosun Ilbo* December 10, 1999: p.29). Called *Enijeong Bogo Hwe*, these regular meetings are very commonly used tools for legislators to reach the voter (interview with a former National Assembly member on February 3, 2009). It is legal to provide refreshments costing less than 3,000 won. Preparing for the elections in April 2000, one legislator from Daegu said, "I already held report meetings more than 100 times where 30 people gather," meaning that he spent 100 million won before the campaigning period started (*Chosun Ilbo* February 7, 2000: p.3). Even one candidate requested that the constitutional court should review the constitutionality of the Election Law, which prohibits pre-election campaigning activities. He said, "Incumbents can engage in pre-election campaigning activities through legislative report meetings that are allowed by Article 111 of the Election Law, but new candidates have difficulties in campaign activities as Article 93-1 prohibits pre-election activities" (*Donga Ilbo* March 10, 2000: p.29).

In the National Assembly elections, almost all the candidates therefore launched their own *sajojik*, although the Election Law prohibits campaigns based on personal organizations: "No one can launch research institutes, hobby clubs, friendship clubs, hiking clubs, succor clubs, external party bodies, and other personal organizations for electoral purposes, regardless of their titles" (Article 89-1). In the 1996 elections, every candidate was said to have two or three, or even ten personal organizations. For the 2000 elections, *Chosun Ilbo* found that there were

1,013 *sajojik* for 227 districts well before the campaigning period (*Chosun Ilbo* December 10, 1999: p.29), and the Election Commission disclosed that candidates from all the parties had personal organizations that could be deemed as illegal (*Chosun Ilbo* February 16, 2000: p.5). In the 2004 elections, too, the Election Commission in the Gyeonggi province disclosed that candidates running in the province had 250 personal organizations (*Chosun Ilbo* March 20, 2004: p.12). Despite the illegality issues, candidates are adroit in avoiding the eyes of the National Election Commission; they never say in these meetings with the voter that they will run in the coming elections (*Chosun Ilbo* December 10, 1999: p.31); and participants in a hiking tour organized by a candidate for the 2000 elections said, "The organizers only talked about the next general elections and who would lead local development of our district. We did not talk about specific candidates, but all of us actually understood whom we should vote for" (*Shin Donga* April 2000: pp.148-169).

The functions and structures of *sajojik* are thus very similar to those of *koenkai*: holding large-scale meetings and conferences, entertaining the voter with food and drink, organizing hiking tours to mountains, and so on. The most popular types of these organizations are hiking clubs (*sanak hwe*), as it is easy to disguise them as just clubs organized for leisure purposes, not for electoral and campaigning purposes.²⁸ A former National Assembly member said, "Everyone aiming for the National Assembly is busy on weekends as they are going to mountains" (interview with a former National Assembly member on February 9, 2009). Usually participants go to the mountains by bus with 10,000 won or so as

²⁸ Indeed, hiking is the most popular leisure for Koreans, especially the elderly.

the participation fee; but hiking club organizers usually pay the transportation, drink, food, and other costs. Sometimes singers, comedians, and other TV entertainers welcome participants. Participants can even draw lots to win refrigerators, TV sets, rice cookers, radios, and other free giveaways. In the end of the tour, candidates finally appear in front of participants, greet them, and say that they will work hard for local development, or in order to avoid the Electoral Commission's monitoring, organizers announce candidates' names a few days after the event. Other *sajojik* include alumni associations, research institutes, and simply friendship clubs (*Shin Donga* April 2000: pp.148-169).

Like *koenkai* and local party chapters, *sajojik* are also extremely costly to maintain. Reportedly, candidates spend twice as much money before the official campaigning periods than during the periods. A first-term legislator from Gyeongbuk said in 2000, "After the official periods begin, there will be few opportunities to use money because competitors, the Election Commission, and civil organizations are watching us; if you spend money in a wrong way, you will lose reputation" (*Chosun Ilbo* December 25, 2003: p.4). For the 2000 general elections, a typical candidate from Honam for example spent 100 million won to maintain his organizations, 100 million won for entertaining people and making donations, 30 million won to hold concerts, and 50 million won to distribute pamphlets (*Chosun Ilbo* February 7, 2000: p.3). Some voters even demand money from candidates (*Chosun Ilbo* December 25, 2003: p.4). While the Article 89-2 of the Election Law states that "No one can provide money, treatments, and other benefits to persons belonging to associations unrelated to elections in order to influence election results, and no one can campaign for parties or candidates," the National Election Commission found before the 1996 elections that 622 personal organizations engaged

in illegal election activities, such as providing monetary gifts to voters. Candidates spent great amounts of money to these organizations because they believed that parties and other legal organizations did not help their electoral prospects, but *sajojik* could bring clear effects (*Chosun Ilbo* April 3, 1996: p.3).

Sajojik are even more important in getting nominations from parties, as parties emphasize name recognition, approval ratings, and organizations in districts as the most important factors to give endorsements (*Chosun Ilbo* February 7, 2000: p.1), further encouraging candidates to spend money before official campaigning periods. This competition for party endorsements is especially harsh in parties' regional strongholds where an endorsement is automatically translated to a seat in the National Assembly or other offices (Jeong 2004). Although some Korean scholars see that the introduction of primary elections to choose candidates beginning from the 2004 elections has promoted decentralization and democratization of the party structure (Jaung 2005; Jeon 2005),²⁹ in fact many candidates

²⁹ Jaung (2005) even argues that the decentralization led to significantly weakened party discipline, but evidence suggests that this is not the case. First, the Korean parties introduced the primaries to only selected districts: the Uri Party and the Grand National Party, the two major parties in the 2004 elections, held the primaries in only less than a quarter (or, 24.4%) of the districts. Second, these primaries were rarely open to all the general voters residing in districts: for example, the Uri Party held a primary in 2004 for the Mokpo district, but only 1,500 general voters were allowed to participate in this process (compared to 2,800 Uri Party members in the district), and the 1,500 participants were actually selected from a pool of the 6,000 supporters of six primary candidates themselves (Kim 2004b). Third, as the empirical

simply use their own *sayojik* to buy supporters with money and treats. A candidate in Seoul said before the 2004 elections that one would need 200 to 300 million won to win the primary (*Chosun Ilbo* December 4, 2003: p.5). Therefore, those who have money tend to be dominant in the primaries; one potential candidate for the 17th general elections said, "Organizations under local party chapters are in fact mercenaries mobilized only by money. . . If the primaries are held, then 90% of the incumbents will win" (*Weekly Chosun* December 4, 2003: pp.56-7).

One way of estimating the extent of the personal vote in a country is how the voter weighs party and candidate factors in casting votes (Marsh 2007). The existing literature on Japanese and Korean voters' behaviors in polls is confirmatory of the above picture. In explaining how voters decided to cast their votes, their personal affinities with individual candidates, controlling for their ideological bents and partisan orientations, are still found to be a significant predictor (Imai 2004; Kabashima 1986; Kang 2008b; Kim et al. 2008; Kwon 2008; Miyake 1985; Miyake and Nishizawa 1992; Richardson 1988).³⁰ Figure 3.4 shows rounds of a


analysis in Chapter 5 shows, the legislators elected in 2004 were actually less likely to defect from the party line than those elected in 2000.

³⁰ Based on the finding that ideological bents are significant factors in predicting voters' vote choice, some Korean scholars even conclude that, for example, South Korean politics had become fairly polarized as the two major parties defined themselves quite differently from each other and engaged in programmatic competition (Hahm 2005; Kang 2005, 2008a, 2008b; Kim et al. 2008). I am not going to challenge the view that some voters, in casting their votes, take ideological bents and partisan orientations into account; however, I would argue that in order for programmatic party competition to take place in a full-fledged manner, individual candidates

random survey of voters conducted in Japan from 1972 to 2003. It shows how voters answered the question, "In deciding to cast a vote in this election, did you consider the party as more important, or the individual candidate as more important?" Around 40% of the LDP supporters consistently answered that the party was more important, while around 60% put equal or more weight on the candidate. This trend did not significantly change after the 1993-94 electoral reform, which was designed to promote party-oriented competition. A similar survey was conducted in South Korea from 1988 to 2004, which is shown in Figure 3.5. It shows how voters responded to the question, "In deciding to cast a vote in this election, which was the most important factor for you?" The answers that clearly indicated candidate-oriented voting ("Candidates" and "Personal Affinities") accounted for 30-55%, compared to 20-35% of the respondents that implied they did party-based voting ("Party," "Stability," and "Checks and Balances"). Those who mentioned "Policy" accounted for 10-20%, but it would be impossible to estimate how many of the respondents pointed to parties' programmatic policy platforms or individual candidates' particularistic pork-barrel projects to districts. The "Party" factor notably increased in the 2004 elections, which led some scholars to believe that programmatic party competition started to emerge (Hahn 2005; Kang 2005, 2008b; Kim et al. 2008); however, it may be simply due to the temporary effects of need to endorse their parties' policy platforms and clearly signal them to the voter. What primary documents and interviews convey here is that candidates for the National Assembly fail to differentiate themselves in terms of their policy issues and therefore simply focus on their personal traits; and some scholars find that the Korean parties are not so polarized as assumed (Chae and Kim 2008; Dalton and Tanaka 2007).

the anomalous events of 2004, when President Roh Moo Hyun explicitly announced support for his Uri Party in a press conference and the opposition parties mounted criticisms against the president for his unduly supporting a specific party and even impeached him a month before the elections (Cho 2005). Citizens and civil groups created the momentum for the Uri Party, as tens of thousands of them gathered in front of the National Assembly building every day, rallying against the impeachment and the malfunctioning of the legislative body. Therefore voting for "Party" in the 2004 elections meant simply supporting President Roh and protesting against politicians' (and especially the opposition's) opportunistic behavior.

a) All the voters



b) LDP supporters




Figure 3.4: Answers to the question, "In deciding to cast a vote in this election, did you consider the party as more important, or the individual candidate as more important?"

Note: Data from Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyōgikai (various issues).




Figure 3.5: Answers to the question, "In deciding to cast a vote in this election, which was the most important factor for you?"

Note: Data from Korea Gallup (1996, 2000, 2004).

Another way to estimate the degree of the personal vote in a country is how likely independent candidates or party outsiders are to gain seats in assemblies (Brancati 2008). In his analysis of independent candidates' representation, Brancati (2008) reports that in 52 democracies from 1945 to 2003, independent candidates accounted for 6.94% of all the candidates, collected 1.73% of all the votes cast, and gained 1.03% of the seats in assemblies. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show how well independent candidates in Japan and South Korea perform in elections.³¹ Compared to the international average, Japanese and Korean independents performed fairly well without party affiliations. In Japan, on average, 8.09% of all the candidates had no party affiliation. Japanese independents gathered 5.04% of the total votes

³¹ Note that these figures exclude those affiliated with any parties, including parties that have no or only one seat in assemblies.

and 3.40% of the total seats.³² And interestingly, the electoral reform in 1993-94 did not result in the elimination of these independents. In South Korea, independent candidates are much more widely seen and successful. On average, 18.33% of the total candidates were independents, and those independents gained 8.86% of the votes and won 5.41% of the seats.³³ There was a sharp decline in 2004, but independents' vote and seat shares returned to the 1992-96 levels in the 2008 elections. In the plurality presidential elections, political outsiders have done much better (although no one won the presidency without a party affiliation). Chung Ju Young, the chairperson of the Hyundai group, surprised Koreans as he announced he would challenge the presidency in the 1992 elections. He launched before the 1992 National Assembly elections in April his own Unification National Party, which took advantage of rich financial resources from the largest conglomerate in South Korea and won 31 out of 299 seats (10.4%) in the assembly. He then ran for the presidential elections held in December, and gained 16.3% of the votes (Kang 1998). After the defeat, he suddenly retired from politics, and the Unification National Party soon ceased to function and many of its members switched to the other parties. Before the 1997 presidential elections, Lee In Je left the ruling New Korea Party to form his own party (People's New Party, or *Kukemin Shin Dang*) as he lost intra-party competition with Lee Hoi Chang for the New Korea Party's presidential candidacy. With only a few fellow members in the National Assembly, Lee could win 19.2% of the votes. Soon after the defeat, he dissolved his party to join the National Congress for New Politics led by Kim Dae Jung, who won the presidency. In 2007, Lee Hoi Chang, who won the

³² For the elections in 1996 and after, the total seats refer to only the nominal tier.

³³ Again, the total seats refer to only the nominal tier.

presidential candidacy in 1997 and 2002 from the Grand National Party, left the GNP³⁴ to run in the presidential elections. Also Moon Kook Hyun, a renowned business manager for his firm Kimberly Korea, established in October the Renewal of Korea Party and joined the presidential race. In the December elections, the two candidates gained 15.1% and 5.8% of the votes, respectively.

³⁴ The New Korea Party changed its name to the Grand National Party in 1998, when it was merged with the Democratic Party.




Figure 3.6: Independent Candidates in Japan

Note: "Independent Seats" refers to the ratio of seats won by independents only in the nominal tier for 1996 and after.




Figure 3.7: Independent Candidates in South Korea

Note: "Independent Seats" refers to the ratio of seats won by independents only in the nominal tier.

3.4. Ideological Diversity

The previous sections have shown that Japanese and Korean parties are only weakly rooted in society as evidenced by the lack of active party members and local party organizations, and candidates and heavily dependent on their personal networks for election. The flip side of these factors is that parties do not represent clear-cut ideological cleavages in society. It is true that party politicians in Japan and South Korea are united under somewhat similar ideological bents, and voters take these ideological bents into accounts in making voting decisions. But it is also true that politicians from different parties overlap ideologically. Conservative politicians from "progressive" parties are sometimes much more conservative than average members from "conservative" parties, and the reverse can also hold true.

Part of the reason why political parties in Japan, except for some ideological

extremists like the Communists, are internally very diverse could be found in the history of East Asia's international relations after World War II. After the Korean War (1950-53), all the Communist sympathizers were purged and excluded from the public sphere in both Japan and South Korea.³⁵ The South Korean government legislated in 1948 the National Security Law (*Kukka Boan Peop*) to strictly regulate any Communist who "joins or launches anti-state groups to overthrow the government" (Article 3) and the law provides even the death penalty for these activities.³⁶ Even in Japan, in 1950 the Japan Communist Party had to face the Red Purge, in which many of the Communist leaders and legislators were banned from any political activities. After the purge, the party could not get even 5% of the seats in the lower house until the 1970s.

Relatedly, labor unionists in Japan and South Korea have been highly marginalized into a largely neglected group in political society (Choi 1989; Deyo 1989; Pempel and Tsunekawa 1979; Shinkawa 1999). The union density rate in Japan was as high as 50% right after the war, but kept declining to well below 20% in 2008. In South Korea, density suddenly increased after the 1987 democratization to more than 20%, but now it is around only 12-13%. Therefore it is not surprising that political parties representing labor's interest are fairly weak in

³⁵ On Japan, see Nishi (1982); and on South Korea, see Cumings (1981, 1990).

³⁶ The definitions of "anti-state groups" are never clear, but the authoritarian governments used this law to control any "anti-state groups." Kim Dae Jung was sentenced to death based on this law for his alleged involvement in the 1980 Gwangju Movement. The law is still alive, and politicians have discussed the revision of the law, but they have been never able to reach any agreement yet.

Japan and South Korea.³⁷ The Japan Socialist Party, a leftist party supported by one of the peak associations for labor (the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (*Sobyo*)), could be in the government for only short periods in the postwar period (1947 and 1993-6). In 1994, when the JSP formed a coalition government with the LDP, the JSP had to radically transform its policy platforms and accept the US-Japan Security Alliance and the Self Defense Force, resulting in the massive defection of legislators and party members to the other parties. The party was renamed the Social Democratic Party, which only won seven seats (or 1.4%) in the 2005 lower house elections. The Japanese Trade Union Confederation (*Renso*), a peak association for labor in Japan as of 2009, now supports the DPJ, which has been plagued by intra-party factional competition between the former Socialists and much more conservative groups (Shiota 2007). In South Korea, no labor-supported party was allowed until the 1998 labor reform by Kim Dae Jung.³⁸ With the ban on political participation lifted, labor unionists launched before the 2000 National Assembly elections a new party called the Democratic

³⁷ Some revisionists argue that labor unions could influence the policymaking process through participation in advisory councils (Knoke et al. 1996; Kume 1998), but it is empirically very difficult to argue that this was indeed the case for several reasons: first, participation in advisory councils does not guarantee any policy inputs into bills (Noble 2003); second, even if there are any policy inputs into bills, bills need to be supported by a majority of the legislators; and third, it is hard to find a rational reason why the LDP supports any pro-labor policy anyhow as LDP candidates do not rely on labor for reelection.

³⁸ The deal was to exchange the lifting of the political participation ban for more flexible labor market regulations (Haggard et al. 1999).

Labor Party, which is still one of the smallest parties in South Korea with only five seats (or 1.7%) won in the 2008 elections.

Therefore, anti-communism, politically weak labor, and weak labor-based parties in Japan and South Korea excluded the leftists' participation in the policymaking process and shrank the range of political competition. The result is that, especially after the Cold War, the leftists and labor unionists lost electoral competitiveness and political competition was now centered on the conservative parties, whose catch-all, diverse membership made it difficult to differentiate themselves in terms of policy platforms. The difficulty in differentiating policy platforms is also highly correlated with very frequent party splits, mergers, and switching, and party coalitions focused on office-seeking incentives.

To measure the ideological diversity of the membership in Japanese and South Korean parties, I rely on questionnaire surveys of legislators. Beginning from 2003, *Asahi Shimbun*, one of the major newspaper companies in Japan, and Japanese political scientists regularly conducted surveys of members in the Diet.³⁹ These Asahi-Todai Elite Surveys (ATES) boast high collection rates (82.4% for the 2003 survey, for example) and are good sources to estimate legislators' positions in the ideological spectrum. It asked all the Diet members to locate their own ideological positions, from 1 ("progressive") to 10 ("conservative").

The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3.1 and the kernel densities for the two major parties (the LDP and the DPJ) are shown in Figure 3.8. The first thing to mention is

³⁹ The data are available at <http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html>. The codebooks for these data are available in Kabashima and Yamamoto (2005, 2008).

that the two parties widely overlap with each other, mainly because each of the parties indeed has diverse membership. It can be said that the LDP is more skewed to the right (or conservative), especially in 2003, but many of the members are located in the middle, and in fact some progressive members inside the LDP are on par with the Communists. A series of *t*-tests shows that the difference between the LDP and the DPJ was statistically significant in 2003 and 2005 at the 5% level, but still the graph actually shows the difference was somewhat moderated in 2005.

Table 3.1: Ideological Spectrum of Japanese Lower House Members

a) November, 2003


	Median	Mean	Min	Max	SD
LDP	7	6.72	1	10	1.83
Komeito	6	5.5	3	6	1.10
Conservatives	8	7.5	6	8	1
DPJ	5	5.24	1	8	1.76
Liberals	5	5.20	1	8	2.07
SDPJ	1	1.88	1	4	1.25
JCP	1	1	1	1	0

b) September, 2005

	Median	Mean	Min	Max	SD
LDP	6	6.02	1	10	1.92
Komeito	6	5.75	4	8	1.08
DPJ	5.5	5.52	1	10	1.79
SDPJ	2	2.43	1	4	0.98
JCP	1	1	1	1	0

Note: Ruling parties are shaded. LDP = The Liberal Democratic Party, DPJ = The Democratic Party of Japan, SDPJ = The Social Democratic Party of Japan, JCP = The Japan Communist Party

a) November, 2003



b) September, 2005




Figure 3.8: Ideological Positions of Japanese Diet Members, Kernel Density
Note: LDP = The Liberal Democratic Party, DPJ = The Democratic Party of Japan

Joongang Ilbo, one of the major newspaper companies in South Korea, conducted a similar survey over National Assembly members in 2002, 2003, and 2004, together with political

scientists in Korea. The response rates were also high (80.0% for the 2004 survey, for example). Like the counterpart in Japan, it asked all the National Assembly members to locate their own ideological positions, from 0 ("progressive") to 10 ("conservative").

The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3.2 and the kernel densities for the major parties are shown in Figure 3.9. First, the most notable fact is that, as in Japan, the major two parties (the Democratic Party, the Uri Party, and the United Democratic Party, and the Grand National Party) are widely spread from the left to the right. Conservative members from the progressive parties (the DP, the Uri, and the UDP) are in fact much more conservative than average members from the conservative party (the GNP), while progressive members from the GNP are much more progressive than average progressive party members. Second, consequently, the parties cannot differentiate from each other in terms of ideology, in contrast to the claim that South Korean politics had become fairly polarized (Kang 2008b). A series of t-tests between the ruling parties and the main opposition parties suggest that, except the DP and the GNP (2000-03), the two major parties cannot show statistically significant differences.

Table 3.2: Ideological Spectrum of Korean NAMs

a) December, 2000

	Median	Mean	Min	Max	SD
DP	4	4.18	1	8	1.40
GNP	5	5.46	1	8	1.28
ULD	7	6.33	3	8	1.44

b) March, 2004

	Median	Mean	Min	Max	SD
Uri	4	3.84	1	8	1.34
DP	4	4.18	1	7	1.34
GNP	5	5.46	2	9	1.39
ULD	7	6.33	4	8	1.41

c) June, 2004


	Median	Mean	Min	Max	SD
DLP	1	1.14	1	2	0.38
Uri	4	4.01	2	8	1.15
DP	4	4	3	5	0.82
GNP	5.5	5.4	2	8	1.15
ULD	6	6	5	7	1

d) May, 2008

	Median	Mean	Min	Max	SD
DLP	1	1.2	1	2	0.45
UDP	4	3.96	2	8	1.14
GNP	5.5	5.40	2	8	1.21
LFP	5	5.33	5	6	0.52

Note: Ruling parties are shaded. DP = The Democratic Party, Uri = The Uri Party, UDP = The United Democratic Party, GNP = The Grand National Party, ULD = The United Liberal Democrats, DLP = The Democratic Labor Party, LFP = Liberty Forward Party

a) December, 2000



b) March, 2004





Figure 3.9: Ideological Positions of Korean National Assembly Members, Kernel Density

c) June, 2004



d) May, 2008




Figure 3.9: Ideological Positions of Korean National Assembly Members, Kernel Density (Continued)

Note: DP = The Democratic Party, Uri = The Uri Party, UDP = The United Democratic Party, GNP = The Grand National Party


I also used 621 roll call votes between 2000 and 2008 to estimate D-NOMINATE

coordinates in two dimensions and the scatter-plot results are shown in Figure 3.10.⁴⁰

Interestingly, these scatter-plots show that, especially for 17th National Assembly members (2004-2008), ideal points estimated by roll call votes were much more cohesive than left-right ideological self-placements. This suggests that, despite ideological diversity, the leadership used some tools to unite legislators on the floor to maintain party cohesion; this point will be further explored in Chapter 5.

⁴⁰ On NOMINATE and its variants, see Poole (2005). NOMINATE coordinates range from -1 to 1, spatially indicating the two-dimensional ideal positions of legislators estimated by how they voted on different bills. "D" stands for "dynamic," and D-NOMINATE allows for time-series comparisons across different sessions.

a) December, 2000



b) March, 2004





Figure 3.10: Ideological Positions of Korean National Assembly Members, D-NOMINATE

c) June, 2004



d) May, 2008




Figure 3.10: Ideological Positions of Korean National Assembly Members, D-NOMINATE (Continued)

Note: DP = The Democratic Party, Uri = The Uri Party, UDP = The United Democratic Party, GNP = The Grand National Party, ULD = The United Liberal Democrats, DLP = The Democratic Labor Party, LFP = Liberty Forward Party

Another piece of evidence suggesting parties do not represent clear-cut ideological cleavages in society can be found in very frequent party splits, mergers, and switching. It is important to note here that the causal relationship can go in both ways: because politicians frequently change their party affiliations, parties might have much more diversified members; or, perhaps because parties are internally very diverse, politicians are ready and willing to change parties. But the point is that if one finds very frequent party splits, mergers, and switching in a country, then party label should have a very limited and unreliable role in the voter's voting decisions.⁴¹

In Japan, since the LDP was formed in 1955, there were not so many party realignments and party switchers in the conservative camp until the 1990s, except the launch of the small New Liberal Club in 1976.⁴² However, in a series of events that finally led to the collapse of the LDP government in 1993, groups of legislators left the LDP and an era of

⁴¹ For example, Desposato (2006b: p.63) argues that, "[p]arties are the primary mechanism linking voters and politicians in modern mass democracies. Meaningful and stable party labels enable voters to make identify optimal candidates and cast appropriate ballots: party switching, however, violates the basic electoral pact and effectively makes party labels meaningless."

⁴² At the height of the Lockheed corruption scandal, five junior members calling for political reform left the LDP to form the NLC. The NLC gave some new sensation to the voter and somewhat won the 1976 elections as it could triple its seats to 17 (or 3.3%), but it could never recover its seats, and it was finally merged into the LDP in 1986, as it could not offer any significant policy alternative to the LDP (*Asahi* July 15, 1986: p.2).

massive party realignment began.⁴³ There were 814 lower house members between January 1990 and December 1998, and 331 of them (or 40.7%) experienced a change in their party affiliations at least once. On average, a legislator changed his/her party affiliations 2.34 times in the same period (Kabashima Ikuo Seminar 2000).⁴⁴

Even after the 1990s, there are some smaller-scale party splits/mergers and switching in Japan. One of the splitters from the NFP, the Liberals split in 2000, when the party leader Ozawa chose to leave the coalition government with the LDP and the Komeito; those who wanted to stay in the government newly formed the Conservative Party. The Liberals later in 2003 decided to merge with the DPJ. And in 2002, some DPJ members switched to the

⁴³ On the split of the LDP in 1993, see Cox and Rosenbluth (1995), Kato (1998), Reed and Scheiner (2003), and Reed and Thies (2001). On the party realignment in the 1990s, see Ito (2003).

⁴⁴ Ishiba Shigeru is the one who changed/switched his parties most frequently: he was first elected to the lower house in 1986 with an endorsement from the LDP, and left the LDP right before the 1993 elections in July; he joined the LDP right after the elections, but as soon as a non-LDP coalition government was formed in August, he again left the LDP; he then joined in April 1994 the Japan Renewal Party formed by LDP defectors to be in part of the government, and as the JRP was integrated into the New Frontier Party in December 1994, he also joined the NFP. But he could not stay long in the NFP: he left the party before the 1996 elections in September, won the elections as an independent, and came back to the LDP in December of the same year. He has stayed in the LDP since then and assumed minister positions several times (2002-2004, 2007-2008, and 2008-).

Conservatives to form a new party named the New Conservative Party and join the coalition government,⁴⁵ and after the 2003 elections, the New Conservative Party was integrated into the LDP. Before the 2005 elections, there emerged some new parties again, including the People's New Party, mainly because Prime Minister Koizumi did not give endorsements to those who voted against the party line on the vote for the postal privatization bill.⁴⁶ One of these new parties, the PNP is mainly composed of former LDP members, but for the 2007 upper house elections it reached an extensive pre-electoral alliance with the DPJ (see Figures 3.11 and 3.12).

⁴⁵ Some of the Conservatives did not join the New Conservative Party and switched to the LDP.

⁴⁶ On the process of the 2005 postal privatization bill, see Chapter 4. Some former LDP candidates won the elections as independents and came back to the LDP in December 2006; the other former LDP independents lost and some of them joined the DPJ and the PNP.




Figure 3.11: Family Tree of Japanese Parties in the 1990s

Note: Only major splits and mergers are shown. Individual legislators' switching is not shown. LDP = The Liberal Democratic Party, SDL = The Socialist Democratic Federation, JNP = The Japan New Party, DSP = The Democratic Socialist Party, JSP = The Japan Socialist Party, JCP = The Japan Communist Party, JRP = The Japan Renewal Party, NPH = The New Party Harbinger, LP = The Liberal Party, NFP = The New Frontier Party, DPJ = The Democratic Party of Japan, SDP = The Social Democratic Party of Japan, SSP = The Sunshine Party, F5 = From Five.

* There were two "Liberal Parties" (*Jiyūto*) formed in the 1990s.




Figure 3.12: Family Tree of Japanese Parties in the 2000s

Note: Only major splits and mergers are shown. Individual legislators' switching is not shown. CP = The Conservative Party, NCP = The New Conservative Party, PNP = People's New Party, NPN = The New Party Nippon.

In South Korea, of the 1,003 National Assembly members in total between 1988 and 2007, 608 (or 60.6%) experienced a change in party affiliations at least once.⁴⁷ On average,

Korean legislators experienced party affiliation change 1.01 times, and the oft-cited example for

⁴⁷ This is from my original dataset on Korean National Assembly members, from 1988 to 2007.

Note that this does not include those who were in the National Assembly only for a short term (less than three months). And also note that this does not include a number of party splits and mergers that occurred in 2007-08.

a Korean party switcher – called *cheolse* in Korean⁴⁸ – is Lee In Je, who changed his party affiliations 11 times (*Hangyeore* April 10, 2008, p.9).⁴⁹ As Figures 3.13 and 3.14 suggest, Korean parties have shown much more frequent mergers and splits. Oftentimes, seemingly ideologically incompatible parties can merge.

⁴⁸ The word *cheolse* literally means a "migratory bird."

⁴⁹ He was first elected to the National Assembly in 1988 with an endorsement from the United Democratic Party; and as the UDP was merged with two other parties into the Democratic Liberal Party, he also joined the DLP in 1990. Then the DLP changed its name to the New Korea Party in 1996, and as he could not gain the NKP's nomination for the 1997 presidential elections, he left the NKP to form a highly presidentialized party called the People's New Party. After finishing the race in the third place in the 1997 elections, he decided to join the presidential winner, Kim Dae Jung, by accepting KDJ's offer to merge the People's New Party with the National Congress for New Politics, which newly became the ruling party. The National Congress for New Politics was also renamed to the Millennium Democratic Party in 2000, and Lee could not get the MLP's nomination for the 2002 presidential elections again. Lee thus left the MLP to join the United Liberal Democrats. As the ULD was merged to the Grand National Party in April 2006, Lee did not choose to join the GNP, and formed a new party called the People First Party. However, as the 2007 presidential elections approached, he left the PFP and joined the Democratic Party in May 2007, and ran for the presidential elections but ended up in the fifth place. After the presidential elections, Lee left the DP, and ran for the National Assembly as an independent and won a seat.




Figure 3.13: Family Tree of Korean Parties in the 1990s

Note: Only major splits and mergers are shown. Individual legislators' switching is not shown. NDRP = The New Democratic Republican Party, DJP = The Democratic Justice Party, UDP = The United Democratic Party, PPD = Party for Peace and Democracy, DLP = The Democratic Liberal Party, DP = The Kkoma Democratic Party (*Keoma Minju Dang*), NDUP = The New Democratic United Party (*Shin Minju Yeonhap Dang*), NKP = The New Korea Party (*Sae Hanguk Dang*), UNP = The Unification National Party, UDP* = The Unified Democratic Party, NDP = The New Democratic Party (*Shin Minju Dang*), ULD = The United Liberal Democrats, NKP = The New Korea Party, PNP = The People's New Party (*Kukemin Shin Dang*), NCNP = The New Congress for National Politics, GNP = The Grand National Party.




Figure 3.14: Family Tree of Korean Parties in the 2000s

Note: Only major splits and mergers are shown. Individual legislators' switching is not shown. DLP = The Democratic Labor Party, MDP = The Millennium Democratic Party, DNP = The Democratic National Party (*Minju Kukmin Dang*), Reform = The Reformist National Party (*Gaehyeok National Party*), Uri = The Uri Party, CR = The Central Reformist New Party (*Chungdo Gaehyeok Tongbap Shin Dang*), PFP = The People First Party, CUDP = The Central United Democratic Party (*Chungdo Tongbap Minju Dang*), UNDP = The United New Democratic Party, LFP = The Liberty Forward Party, PPC = The Pro-Park Coalition, RKP = The Renewal of Korea Party, NPP = The New Progressive Party.

It would be important to note here that, in many of these party split/merger/switching cases, the lure of office outweighs politicians' other incentives, especially policy-seeking incentives. In the 1993 defection from the LDP, except for some of the legislators who indeed preferred political reform, electorally vulnerable senior members tended to stay in the LDP (Reed and Scheiner 2003), suggesting the need to maintain the pipelines of pork to stay electorally competitive was also important in their party switching calculations (Desposato and Scheiner 2008; Scheiner 2005). And in fact, of the 36 defectors from the LDP to form the Japan Renewal Party, 11 retired by the end of 1998; and of the remaining 25, a majority (13) came back to the LDP as the LDP came back to office. The same phenomenon happened after the 2005 elections: of the 37 defectors in the 2005 vote on postal privatization, 3 retired before the elections and 7 formed new parties; and of the remaining 27, 13 won elections as independents, 11 of which were allowed to return to the LDP in 2006. Of the 14 defeated independents, two eventually came back to the LDP in 2007 now as upper house members.⁵⁰ Thus as Reed (2009) argues, the LDP is only seen as a "franchise party" where "if you win, you are LDP," meaning that anyone with a seat in the legislature can switch to the LDP.

As the story of Lee In Je suggests, a Korean politician's career is heavily defined by the lure of the presidential office. He was once very popular as the governor of Gyeongg-do, and challenged the presidential candidacy for the 1997 elections based on his popularity. But

⁵⁰ Of the remaining 12, three went to the DPJ, two joined the People's New Party, and the others retired or still prepare for the next elections as independents.

as the New Korea Party gave an endorsement to Lee Hoi Chang, Lee In Je left the party and ran for the election. He fared well in the presidential elections with 19.2% of the total votes, but his party was highly presidentialized as his party could not win a single seat in the subsequent elections for local governments; the party was soon merged with President Kim Dae Jung's party.

Relatedly, party coalitions in Japan and South Korea tend to form based on the calculations of staying in power, rather than ideological compatibility. The most symbolic phenomenon in Japan happened in 1994, when the LDP came back to office in less than a year. The 1993 elections resulted in the non-LDP coalition government by eight parties, but the leadership/policymaking style within the coalition created a great schism between the Socialists and the New Party Harbinger and the others. The LDP, which was short of a majority but could gain it with a help from the JSP and the NPH, approached the JSP, its long-term rival, and formed a coalition government. In South Korea as well, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil, an aide to the authoritarian leader Park Chung Hee, signed a historical alliance for the 1997 presidential elections; this "DJP" alliance between the democratization leader and the authoritarian military symbol gave Kim Dae Jung a victory in the race but could not last long. By the April 2000 National Assembly elections, Kim Jong Pil's United Liberal Democrats left the coalition.

Despite ideological disunity, frequent party splits/mergers/switching, and coalitions focused on office-seeking incentives, the major parties try to differentiate themselves, in some of the critical issues. For example in the 2005 elections for the Japanese lower house, the opposition DPJ tried to offer a clear alternative to the Prime Minister Koizumi's electoral

strategy of focusing exclusively on the privatization of the post office, by claiming that some other policy issues, including social security and pensions and tax policy, should be prioritized over post office privatization. But the DPJ failed to gain the voter's support, as more than 80% of the LDP voters said they voted for the LDP because they were most interested in postal privatization. The DPJ was, ultimately, in favor of post privatization and could not adhere to the protection of local post office networks in any rate (Taniguchi et al. 2005). Probably learning from this experience, the DPJ could win the upper house elections in 2007 mainly because it could succeed in mobilizing those rural voters who were discontent with Koizumi's and his successor's structural liberalization reform. A series of analyses on the 2007 elections shows that in rural areas where primary-industry and construction workers were concentrated, voters shifted their support from the LDP to the DPJ (Imai and Kabashima 2008). Now the DPJ puts more emphasis on public investments, fiscal expenditures, and redistribution, all targeted at rural areas, making some researchers say that "the DPJ is becoming more like the old LDP" (Uenohara et al. 2007: p.59).

Korean parties also try to differentiate themselves and some authors argue that this move reflects the fact that Korean society is getting ideologically polarized and voters make their voting decisions along ideological lines (Hahm 2005; Kang 2005, 2008a, 2008b; Kim et al. 2008; Kwon 2008). However, as Kang (2005) shows, the most important factor that divides the leftists and the rightists in South Korea is the security issue, and in the issues of welfare, tax, and redistribution – the traditional left versus right issues – the two major political parties in 2004 (the Uri Party and the Grand National Party) were not make significantly different: "[the] ideological differences between the Uri Party and the Grand National Party have little to do with

the 'left vs. right' ideological dimension in regard to issues related to the distribution of economic resources" (Kang 2005: p.78). And even on the security issue, some of the authors, based on the results of a survey over randomly sampled voters, show that the progressive camp is much more complex and nuanced than commonly assumed, concluding that South Korean society is not so polarized (Chae and Kim 2008). In fact, the security issue did not have significant impact on the Korean elections; for example, right before the National Assembly elections in April 2000, President Kim Dae Jung suddenly announced that he would have a summit meeting with Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang in June. This was one of the most significant historical events in Korean diplomatic history, as this was the first time for the heads of the two governments in the Korean Peninsula to have a meeting, and Kim Dae Jung won the Nobel Prize later for this meeting. However, the voter's response was cold at best: a survey showed that only 17.0% of the total voters said that it had an impact on their voting decisions. The supporters of the Democratic Party, a party established by Kim Dae Jung, was not sympathetic with the Sunshine Policy and North Korea either, as only 23.0% of them said the North-South summit had any impact. Rather, voters said that some issues related to candidates' personal traits were more important: 42.2% said a candidate's criminal records were important and 45.9% said the *Nakcheon/Nakseon* movement was important (Korea Gallup 2000).⁵¹ A former National Assembly member confirmed in an interview that the general voter is not interested in policy issues; but they are rather interested in some issues that only directly affect their lives

⁵¹ In the 2000 and 2004 elections, some civil groups organized the "blacklisting campaign" movement against allegedly corrupt, incompetent, or anti-reform politicians (Jeong 2000b; Kim 2006; Yu 2000)

(interview with a former National Assembly member on February 3, 2009).

3.5. Factional Struggles and Quest for Power

The ruling parties in the two countries have experienced severe factional struggles that led to the collapse of the government, party splits, and the formation of new parties. Factions form in the two countries based on office-seeking incentives. In both countries, the heads of the government (the Prime Minister and the President) monopolize the exclusive constitutional power to appoint and dismiss ministers in the cabinet; and ministers in both countries are very prestigious positions that improve name recognition in districts, increase access to governmental resources (especially the budget), and offer the way to higher offices in the government. Therefore, politicians in the two countries like to align with those patrons who would be likely to win the next leadership elections. And in both countries, to win the leadership positions in the government requires personal support from legislators. This leads to the rise of intra-party factionalism.⁵²

In Japan, the LDP's leadership selection process forced influential and powerful politicians to secure as many head counts as possible. The LDP's current party rules state that the party president shall be elected under a majority run-off system, whereby Diet members are

⁵² There are some functional explanations about the rise of factionalism: for example, Kohno (1992) and Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993) argue that SNTV gave a rise to factionalism. However, factionalism can be found in other countries without the electoral systems that encourage intra-party competition: South Korea (explained below); Venezuela (Coppedge 1994); and even post-reform Japan.

given significant positions in electing the party president. Factions needed to resort to coalescing with the other factions before the race, but coalitions were highly unstable (Leiserson 1968). In order to ascertain support from their own members and the other factions, factional leaders required huge sums of money (Thayer 1969). The presidential race was very costly to run; Fujiyama Aiichiro, a businessman and one of the ambitious leaders, even drove his companies into bankruptcies. The size of a faction greatly mattered in the presidential race, encouraging ambitious factional leaders to expand ever more.

Factional competition for head counts was further aggravated by the electoral system. Under SNTV that was put in place from 1947 to 1993, the LDP's party label was only worth about 12-13% of the votes required for a seat on average (Thayer 1969) and candidates from the same party label had to differentiate themselves from the other co-partisans. Thus they had to emphasize their own personal attributes, such as their ability to bring selective benefits to local districts, or they had to create and maintain personal vote-mobilizing networks, *koenkai*, on their own, as explained above. In the elections, the party HQs did nothing but distribute policy pamphlets and the minimum amount of campaign funds to candidates (Thayer 1969); it could not support candidates because the party leadership itself was a group of the mainstream factions – the leadership was discouraged from openly supporting particular candidates in a district, while the leadership was also unwilling to support rival factions in the same district. So factions intensively supported quality candidates by providing campaigning speeches by factional leaders and/or celebrities and popular athletes who had connections with the leaders, as well as money to launch *koenkai* and finance campaigns (Asahi Shinbun Seijibu 1968; Thayer 1969). The quickest way to the prestigious party presidency was to expand the size of a

faction, and this could be done by supporting as many candidates as possible and encouraging them to formally join the faction after the elections, even at expense of ideological and/or policy unity inside. As Thayer (1969) notes, "A faction leader preparing to make a bid for the prime minister's job is often very eager to add more followers to his stable, and the more actively he searches out new candidates the less he can be concerned with ideological affinity" (p.48).⁵³

In addition to campaigning support, factions also played an important role in providing their members with office benefits: posts in the government and the party. In order to maintain the loyalty of fellow members, factional bosses needed to promise future career benefits in exchange for support for the party presidential elections. Especially in the 1950s, 1960s, and the early 1970s, a faction's defecting from the LDP was not credible enough threat to oust the government, so the winning coalition in the presidential race – the mainstream factions (*shuryūha*) – tended to monopolize the office benefits (Kawato 1996b), making factional struggles all the more intense. For example, in August 1960, Kōno Ichirō and his faction members explicitly announced that they would defect from the party to launch a new conservative party (*Asahi* August 11, 1960: p.1), mainly because they were disaffected by the results of the presidential elections held in July, the same year: one of Kōno's allies, Ōno Bamboku, was forced to withdraw his candidacy and the newly born Ikeda cabinet excluded the

⁵³ McCubbins and Thies (1997) try to refute the conventional wisdom about factionalism in Japan, arguing that the movement of specific factions in and out of the party's governing mainstream coalition had systematic and consistent effects on spending policy outputs; this claim is tested with a more comprehensive data in Chapter 6.

three anti-mainstream factions (the Kōno, Miki-Matsumura, and Ishibashi factions) out of any of the cabinet and party leadership posts (*Asahi* August 11, 1960 (Evening Edition): p.1). In order to gain bargaining leverage, Kōno needed support from the other antagonistic factions, especially the Miki and Ōno factions, but they explicitly rejected the idea of launching a new party with Kōno (*Asahi* August 13, 1960: p.1; *Asahi* August 16, 1960 (Evening Edition): p.1). Kōno's faction had 35 members, but as the LDP maintained 287 members and the lower house had 467 seats in total as of 1958, his faction was not enough to change the government. Kōno was finally persuaded by the leadership to stay in the LDP, but the leadership did not give any posts in the cabinet and the party to the Kōno faction anyways (*Asahi* August 19, 1960: p.1). In 1974, as the Prime Minister Tanaka's shady financial dealings were exposed by the media and the public criticisms mounted, the Fukuda faction, which lost the presidential elections in 1972, implied it would defect from the LDP and form a new party (*Asahi* October 13, 1974: p.1). He and his ally in the anti-mainstream, Miki, were reportedly once serious about defecting from the party and form a coalition government with the opposition parties (*Asahi* January 29, 1975 (Evening Edition): p.1; *Asahi* February 23, 1975: p.4). But as Tanaka suddenly retired from the Prime Minister in December 1974 and Miki succeeded it, the new party plan also suddenly disappeared; as one of the mainstream factions now, the Fukuda faction got three important cabinet posts, including the Vice Prime Minister.

Therefore the quest for power, or powerful politicians' ambitions to monopolize prestigious governmental privileges, create intra-party factional struggles in the LDP. Indeed, there were several factional attempts to kick the leadership out of the cabinet, primarily driven by the desire to gain office. The Fukuda faction again allied with the Miki faction to oust the

Prime Minister Ōhira out of office in 1979 and 1980; in the latter case, the Fukuda and Miki factions indirectly supported the vote of no confidence submitted by the opposition when they abstained from voting, and eventually the vote was passed and the lower house was dissolved.⁵⁴ In 1984, the Suzuki, Fukuda, and Kōmoto factions tried to oust Nakasone together with the Kōmeitō and the Democratic Socialists. In 1993, the Ozawa-Hata faction, together with some junior members, voted for the vote of no confidence submitted by the opposition; the Miyazawa cabinet dissolved the lower house and in the following elections the LDP could not maintain a majority, leading to the birth of a non-LDP coalition government containing the Ozawa-Hata faction's new party, for the first time in nearly 40 years.⁵⁵ In 2000, Katō Kōichi, who lost the presidential elections in the previous year and was left out in the cold in terms of posts allocation, disclosed his plan to oust the very unpopular Mori cabinet; but the plan ultimately failed, as the LDP leadership leveraged its power to give endorsements to threaten each of the Katō faction members (Takenaka 2006a). And as the next chapter will show, a large-scale revolt against the Prime Minister occurred in the 2005 vote on postal privatization; and one of the main groups that led the revolt was senior members who desired to become next LDP leaders and were antagonistic about Koizumi's leadership style.

⁵⁴ The Prime Minister Ōhira suddenly died during the campaigning period, and the LDP gained lots of sympathetic votes and won the elections.

⁵⁵ As some argue (Otake 1995; Reed and Scheiner 2003; Tatebayashi 2004), the Ozawa-Hata faction voted for ousting the Miyazawa cabinet probably because of its policy-seeking incentives especially for political reform; but as Kohno (1995) argues, Ozawa needed to position himself as a reformist in the party to seize the initiative.

It would be important to note here that intra-party factional struggles to oust the leadership did not disappear after the electoral reform in 1993-94. It is true that the electoral reform changed the electoral incentives of individual candidates, factions, and the party leadership. As there should be only one candidate from the same party, individual candidates should be more dependent on the party, factions cannot implicitly or explicitly support a candidate other than the party's official candidate, and the party leadership can now offer wholehearted support to the party's official candidate. Thus there is less intra-party factional competition for nominations and elections (Cox et al. 1999), while the party leadership exerts more power in giving endorsements to candidates (Asano 2006). Relatedly, the decisive role that factions could play in the LDP presidential elections is loosened, as junior party members now had less incentive to rely on electoral support from factions and thus needed a strong party president that could build a popular party image to appeal to the mass public (Cox et al. 1999; Krauss and Nyblade 2005; Krauss and Pekkanen 2004). But, as explored in detail below, factions continue to control an important resource within the LDP: posts. As Krauss and Pekkanen (2004) report, allocation of posts and career advancement is still determined by factions.⁵⁶ And as long as these office benefits are useful for the electoral purposes, members should still maintain the incentives to join factions and support factional leaders. In this sense,

⁵⁶ The exception is cabinet-level appointments during the Koizumi era (2001-2006), but at the sub-cabinet-level, vice ministers were still proportionally allocated to factions. The post-Koizumi Prime Ministers, especially Abe, tried to mimic Koizumi's leadership style of excluding factional influence over posts allocation, but as his approval ratings plummeted, he needed to cater to factions (Uesugi 2007; Yomiuri Shimbun Seijibu 2008).

the factional coalition bargaining process would be still important, if not decisive, in the leadership selection process.

In South Korea, factions are much loosely organized but still they are marked by the similar type of intense factional competition for office. Factions form in line with future presidential candidates; if there is one single winnable candidate in a party, such as Kim Dae Jung in his Democratic Party (1992) or National Congress for New Politics (1997), there should be no intense factional competition. However, if a party lacks a charismatic and popular leader and has several candidates for the next presidential elections, there emerge factions.

Unlike the LDP in Japan, there is no clear rule in Korean parties as to how to select presidential candidates. Usually it is only ceremonial when a party has a clear leader. When there are several candidates in a party, however, the party needs to set up a rule to determine its candidate. Before 2002, a party's presidential candidate tended to be chosen by party delegates, including National Assembly members and local party chapter chairs. From the 2002 presidential elections, Korean parties started to open up the process to party members; the Millennium Democratic Party, to appeal to the voter for its reform-oriented, open-minded candidate selection process, held primary elections across the country, in which each of the party members and the registered voters could cast a single transferable vote, or an "alternative vote" as used in Australia, for seven candidates.⁵⁷ And in the 2007 presidential elections as well,

⁵⁷ The MDP's elected candidate, Roh Moo Hyun, won the presidency in the December elections, while the Grand National Party did not open up the process, and its candidate, Lee Hoi Chang, lost. This electoral success was part of the reason why Roh Moo Hyun's Uri Party tried to open up the candidate selection process in the 2004 National Assembly elections.

the major parties (the United New Democratic Party and the Grand National Party) again allowed party members and registered voters to participate in the selection process to some extent.

However, given that many of the legislators have dense personal networks called *sajojike* in their local districts to mobilize votes from personal supporters – as explained above –, and that popular National Assembly members are valuable resources for presidential candidates in public relations to the voter (interview with a former National Assembly member on February 3, 2009), future presidential candidates need to cater to rank-and-file members to win the candidacy and ultimately the presidency.⁵⁸ This can be mainly done in the form of exchange of mutual material benefits just like in Japan: rank-and-file members' personal support for the presidential candidate selection process and the presidential elections, while presidential candidates, in exchange for personal support, make sure that rank-and-file members would assume local party chapter chairpersonships and promise to offer future governmental privileges after winning the presidency.

Factional members financially, organizationally, and personally support presidential election campaigning. Before a party chooses its presidential candidate through the primaries, presidential aspirants' aides try to expand support networks by approaching legislators, local

⁵⁸ In the 2002 open primary for the Democratic Party's presidential candidate, 35,000 general voters could openly join. However, the primary candidates tried to send their own supporters using their personal organizations, local networks, and alumni associations. For example, Lee In Je, one of the primary candidates, was reported to encourage 100,000 members of his hiking club to join the Democratic Party (*Chosun Ilbo* January 17, 2002: p.5).

party chapter chairs, and party members in districts, mainly from the opposing camp (*Chosun Ilbo* April 9, 1992: p.2; *Chosun Ilbo* April 19, 1992: p.3). After a party chooses its candidate, aides mobilize their own personal networks in districts, manage and operate the presidential candidate's *sajojik*, and develop campaigning strategies.⁵⁹ For example, in the December 1992 presidential elections, Kim Young Sam's camp utilized his personal supporters in the National Assembly, Choi Hyung Woo, Seo Seok Chae, and Park Kwan Yong to manage his *sajojik* called *Minju Sanak Hwe* (*Monthly Joongang* December 1992: pp.204-11). They were the administration bureau head, the organization bureau head, and the PR bureau head, respectively, for *Minju Sanak Hwe* in the 1992 presidential elections. Soon after the KYS administration was launched in February 1993, they got the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Government Administration, the Chief Secretary to the President, respectively, most likely in exchange for their extensive campaigning support.

Factional bosses, on the other hand, promise to offer governmental privileges after winning the presidency. In addition, as head counts matter in the presidential candidate selection process, it is crucial for future presidential candidates to make sure that their supporters would assume local party chapter (*jigudang*) chairs that are useful for reaching the voter leagally and ultimately getting endorsements for the next elections. As explored in Chapters 5 and 7, in certain regions, Korean parties can guarantee almost surely reelection with their party names, so affiliating with certain bosses is one of the crucial factors for election.

⁵⁹ As explained above, a presidential candidate is often more dependent on his/her own personal networks rather than his/her party, which may have quite a few antagonists against him/her.

Faction leaders thus harshly compete with each other over how to allocate local party chapter chairs (*jibun namugi*) and factional friction most often happens when the party needs to give nominations to its candidates before the National Assembly elections. In 1999, for example, Lee Hoi Chang, a leader of the Grand National Party, reportedly announced that he would not allow factional bosses the right to give endorsements and he would introduce a new endorsing criterion that would exclude those bosses. The criterion would be focused on candidates' freshness and expertise, suggesting that Lee favored loyal amateurs with good personal traits so that he could win the candidacy for the next presidential elections. The factional bosses of course disclosed their dissatisfaction with Lee's plan, even threatening to leave the party to compete with the GNP's official candidates in the general elections (*Weekly Chosun* October 14, 1999: pp.33-4; *Weekly Chosun* December 23, 1999: pp.20-21).⁶⁰

The flip side of this factional competition is that one of the most hotly debated issues when different parties try to merge is how to allocate local party chapter chairs (*jibun namugi*), rather than policy agreements or programmatic platforms. In 1990, right after the Democratic Justice Party, the United Democratic Party, and the New Democratic Republican Party were merged to form the Democratic Liberal Party, the DLP started facing intra-party factional struggles over who would take local party chapter chairs. Factional leaders, on the surface, agreed on minimizing intra-party frictions and giving chairs to incumbents, but where there

⁶⁰ Indeed, several factional bosses, including former Seoul Mayor Cho Sun, former Vice Prime Minister Han Seung Su, former New Korea Party President Kim Yun Hwan, and former Democratic Party President Lee Ki Taek left the Grand National Party to form the Democratic People Party before the 2000 National Assembly elections.

were no DLP incumbents, there was no agreed rule. The ex-DJP faction, which had the largest number of members, insisted on giving chairs to the best losers, because the party fared well in the 1988 elections compared to the others.⁶¹ Meanwhile, the other factions insisted that personal traits should be important and each of the three factions should get one-third chairs (*Weekly Chosun* February 25, 1990: pp.10-15). This factional competition over who were to assume local party chapter chairs lasted for several months (*Chosun Ilbo* April 24, 1990: p.3). The Democratic Party, born from the merger between Kim Dae Jung's Party for Peaceful Democracy⁶² and the United Democratic Party⁶³ in 1991, also had the same problem. The ex-PPD and ex-UDP factions wanted to expand their own seat shares in the next National Assembly elections, because the ex-PPD faction led by Kim Dae Jung needed to make sure that Kim would become the party's presidential candidate, while the ex-UDP faction was even looking ahead of what would happen after the next presidential elections (*Chosun Ilbo* January 21, 1992: p.3). And some of the party merger efforts collapsed due to the failures to reach agreements on how to allocate patronage (Sim 2004). Jeong Dong Yoeng, a presidential candidate from the United New Democratic Party for the 2007 elections, approached the Democratic Party before the elections to run a single candidate against Lee Myung Bak, the

⁶¹ The DLP was launched in 1981 by Chun Doo Hwan, an authoritarian leader and the president (1981-87). With its vast financial and political resources, it won the plurality of the National Assembly seats (125 seats, or 41.8%) in the 1988 elections.

⁶² The PPD was renamed to the New Democratic Party in 1991.

⁶³ Some members, including the late former President Roh Moo Hyun, did not join the DLP when Kim Young Sam and his UDP merged with the DJP and the NDRP in 1990.

frontrunner of the race. The UNDP and the DP had several discussions for a merger, but they could reach no agreement, because the DP insisted on the "equal" merger, claiming that any benefits should be divided in half. Jeong almost accepted this request, as he wanted to gain as many votes as possible for the presidential elections, but he could not gain consensus from his own party. As of November 2007, the UNDP had 140 seats, compared to the DP's 8 seats (*Chosun Ilbo* November 23, 2007: p.5).

3.6. Quest for Power

I have shown up to this point how the political systems of Japan and Korea are characterized by ideological diversity, personalism, weak party organization, and factionalism. However, still a puzzle remains: why and how party leaders in the Japanese and Korean ruling parties could maintain high levels of cohesion, despite weak party organization, ideological disunity, personal vote, party volatility, and factionalism. There were several attempts by Japanese factions to oust the LDP cabinet, but there was only one successful case in 1993; the LDP could maintain its rule for more than 50 years, with only a short interruption. And there were only a few cases in which legislators voted against the party line en masse. In South Korea, despite the party fragmentation and governability crisis (Mo 2002), the president can actually get most of the government-initiated bills approved by the legislature, based on the extremely high levels of party cohesion for a presidential regime (O 2004).

Throughout this dissertation, the main argument is that leaders in the Japanese and Korean ruling parties relied on office perks to maintain party cohesion. Leaders, as the heads of the government, appoint ruling party members to ministers in the cabinet to improve their

name recognition in districts, increase access to governmental privileges (especially the budget), and open the pathway to higher offices, in exchange for support in the leadership selection process. Other benefits include institutionalized windows for legislators to lobby the government's budget-making authority for pork barrel spending, and other types of politicized patronage, such as posts in state-owned agencies and enterprises, which can be distributed under the discretion of the leadership. The leadership in Japan and South Korea tries to fairly equally allocate these different types of office benefits exclusively to ruling party members in order to achieve collective benefits, or stable rule and legislation of favored policy.

However, it must be emphasized here that the two very similar systems with one single crucial difference – the constitutional structure of parliamentarism versus presidentialism – have resulted in distinctively different consequences. Parliamentary Japan can institutionalize rules inside the party and therefore there could emerge a Pareto-optimal solution for the "infinitely repeated game" of intra-party factional competition.⁶⁴ The norms and rules that formed within the LDP – the PARC, seniority, and factional balance – are devices for LDP members to commit to the Pareto-optimal outcome of staying in power. This was made possible by the constitutional structure of parliamentarism: the executive and the legislature are mutually dependent and therefore as long as the ruling party stays in power, the goodies that can be used to satisfy the incentives of legislators are would be available; and as long as the incentives of legislators are satisfied, party unity that allows the ruling party to be in power is available.

⁶⁴ Kohno (1997) also explains that the LDP president started to fairly allocate posts to the mainstream and anti-mainstream factions for fear of future retaliation by rival factions.

Meanwhile, in presidential Korea, the term limit on the president and the presidential election cycles imply that legislators tend to discount the value attached to office perks as the next presidential elections approach. To repeat the point, in a parliamentary system like Japan, legislators' unity is directly tied to the duration of the government; but in a presidential regime like South Korea, legislators' unity is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to win the presidential elections although it might be useful for helping their presidential candidates mobilize votes. To put it differently, ruling party members in the National Assembly tend to keep their incentives aligned with the president in the first few years of the five-year presidential terms, especially before the National Assembly elections, as the president has lots of resources to help them get reelected and promoted. However, the presidential elections are highly uncertain, partly because of the simple plurality rule of the Korean presidential elections, partly because of there have been a number of viable third-party (and even independent) candidates for the presidential elections as reviewed above, and partly because, especially in Seoul and its surrounding areas, there are a large number of floating voters without party affiliations as evidenced by the lack of party organization rooted in society.⁶⁵ Ruling party members might lose all the governmental privileges overnight, as the highly uncertain presidential elections might select a winner from the opposition; therefore the value of staying in a presidential party

⁶⁵ If the size of the prize (the presidential powers) is large, then the number of candidates tends to increase (Hicken and Stoll 2008). In fact, none won the presidential elections with more than a majority of the votes after 1987: 35.9% in 1987, 41.4% in 1992, 39.7% in 1997, 48.5% in 2002, and 48.4% in 2007; and the effective number of candidates tends to be high for a simple plurality rule (2.22 in 2002 to 3.56 in 1987).

tends to decline over time. It might be rational for ruling party members to switch to another party and support its candidate, expecting future career benefits; and this is evidenced by more frequent party splits and switching as the presidential elections get near.

3.6.1. Equilibrium in Japan

The LDP could institutionalize rules inside the party and therefore there could emerge a Pareto-optimal solution for the "infinitely repeated game" of intra-party factional competition. The first of these rules in Japan is found in the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). As any policymaking organ found in parties across different systems, the PARC was originally designed to encourage policy deliberations inside the Japanese ruling parties, and the same type of institution can be traced back in the prewar period (Mukoono 2006). But as the leadership needed to constrain the massive rise of legislator-initiated bills in the 1940s and 1950s, most of which were designed to bring benefits to local districts, the leadership in the ruling party reached an agreement with rank-and-file members in which individual legislators should first consult the government when submitting any bills increasing the budget, while the government should get its bills approved by the party beforehand (Kawato 1999). This required that any government-initiated bills should be passed by the ruling party's policymaking organ, or the PARC, before being submitted to the Diet. This preliminary review process (*jūzen shinsa sei*) was said to start in 1961, if not perfectly (Fukumoto 2000); since then the norm has gradually appeared that each division (*bukai*) in the PARC, corresponding to the government's ministries and agencies, closely reviews bills in its policy area and consensus is required to get bills passed. Thus every division participant could have a veto over a bill,

virtually allowing all the members to work as an effective gatekeeper of given policy. Each of the LDP members is allowed to participate in several divisions, and through active participation in divisions, they develop expertise to become so-called "policy tribes" (*zoku gin*), broaden networks to bureaucrats and interest groups, and devise policy designed to bring benefits to local districts. Especially for those participating pork-related divisions, such as construction, agriculture, and commerce and industry, the PARC allows rank-and-file members to bring particularistic benefits to their districts by institutionalizing the norm of the consensus-based, log-rolling policymaking process (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993).

Second, the seniority rule was gradually invented to encourage members to make long-term investments in the party as it guaranteed semi-automatic promotion to a higher post in the government and/or the party that is directly tied to his/her policy and career incentives. Just as the lifetime employment practice in the stylized Japanese firm encourages a worker to stay in the same organization for future career promotion (Aoki 1990), a seniority system forces legislators to commit to the party in the long term, because their benefits from staying in the party, such as access to the policy-making process and private pork-barrel goods, are strictly linked to their loyalty in the past (Crook and Hibbing 1985). For legislators to become *zoku gin*, they had to accumulate policy knowledge by intensive participation in meetings of the PARC's divisions and Diet committees as well as relevant governmental activities. This was elaborately tied to the ladder-like seniority rule, in which legislators developed their career from rank-and-file committee/division members, through vice ministers in the cabinet or vice chairs of divisions, to chairs of committees and divisions and finally ministers and leadership positions. In this way, party leaders could discipline, educate, and get their rank-and-file members into line

(Krauss and Pekkanen 2004).

Third, fragmentation inside the party resulting from factional antagonism was avoided by establishing the norm of factional balance in allocating posts in the government and the party to each of the factions. Fairly proportional portfolio management mediates fragmentation. By allowing proportional participation in decision making through various means, this rule can mitigate the grievances of otherwise would-be dissidents (Amorim Neto and Santos 2001). In the LDP, the allocation of posts has been based on factional bosses' recommendations, as well as the overall balance of factional sizes. Through this tacit rule, bosses could maintain their factions for their own further promotion to party leadership positions, while bloody factional conflicts were moderated (Kawato 1996b; Sato and Matsuzaki 1986).

As reviewed in Chapters 4 and 6, these norms gradually appeared in the LDP from the 1960s to the early 1980s, in order to satisfy the office-seeking needs of the anti-mainstream factions that were excluded out of the winning coalition supporting the party president. These office benefits, ranging from ministers in the cabinet to the party's policymaking committee chairs, were closely tied to rank-and-file members' electoral incentives in the sense that the Minister of Construction, the Agricultural Division Chair of the PARC, and other positions related to pork barrel were very useful for legislators to draft and screen bills designed to cater to their own districts and to have contacts with particularistic interest groups (Pekkanen et al. 2006). The allocation of benefits was semi-automatic according to the seniority of members, so, as long as they could continuously get reelected, they could maintain the incentives to stay in the LDP for future office benefits.

3.6.2. Disequilibrium in Korea

The Korean president also resorts to a wide range of governmental privileges and with these powers the president works as a de facto party leader for the ruling party.⁶⁶ The governmental privileges that the president can utilize are divided into three categories: the

⁶⁶ Presidents Roh Tae Woo (1988-1993), Kim Young Sam (1993-1998), and Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) were literally the presidents of their own presidential parties. The two presidents after the turn of the century (Roh Moo Hyun and Lee Myung Bak) did not assume the party presidency on paper, but the constitutional powers given to the Korean president allowed them to intervene in party matters and work as de facto party leaders, as the case of Lee's and his aides' intervention in the nomination process for the 2008 National Assembly elections suggests below. This is because of the moral hazard problem (the inability of legislators and party members to control the president's behavior in office) (Samuels and Shugart 2009), in addition to the president's own desire to align the incentives of legislators.

budget for pork; cabinet ministers; and posts in public corporations.⁶⁷

First, drafting the budget is the job exclusively given to the president, while the president and its budget-making authority (*Yesan Sil* or *Yesan Cheo*) use the Party-Government Liaison Council (*Dangjeong Hyeopeni Hwe*) to accommodate local interests arising from National Assembly members, especially ruling party members. The Party-Government Liaison Council

⁶⁷ Korean parties provide some office perks, such as endorsements in the elections and posts in National Assembly committees. But, the value of these party posts is limited in South Korea compared to Japan for several reasons. First, as argued above, in parliamentary Japan, party norms and rules developed as tools to commit to the stable equilibrium such that posts in the party, such as Division Chairs in the PARC, allowed backbenchers to have some policy influence and bring particularistic benefits to their districts. Meanwhile in presidential Korea, the unavailability of such a stable equilibrium inside a party prevented the rise of important party posts. Second, a legislator can simply bypass a party, as the president has enormous resources in the government. An affiliation with the president or a presidential aspirant matters much more than an affiliation with a certain party in developing future careers. Third, Korean parties are highly ephemeral. Many of the parties are disbanded after the presidential elections, as they are born simply as presidential aspirants' vote-seeking tools to win the presidential elections. Fourth, excluding Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do, where affiliations with certain parties guarantee the 90% chance of electoral victory, endorsements have limited impact on candidates' electoral fortune. Fifth, committees in the Korean National Assembly can exert only a marginal impact on the policymaking process (Jeong 1995; Kim 1999a; Kim 1999b; Kim 2004a; Park 1999a; Park 1998a, 1998b, 1999b, 2002).

is a regular meeting held annually between government and party leaders behind the closed doors to discuss and deliberate budget items until the government finally submits the final budget in September (*Chosun Ilbo* November 3, 1996: p.4). In the council, party leaders usually demand increase in the budget especially for local development projects, such as construction of highways (*Chosun Ilbo* June 26, 1997, p.7).

In the budget making process, the president first outlines policy orientations and investment preferences in order, and then the Budget Bureau Director (*Yesan Sil Jang*) at the Ministry of Finance (*Jaeyeong Kyeongje Won*) adjusts the budget upon receiving proposals from each ministry around June. In adjusting and drafting the budget, various political forces lobby the Budget Bureau: mainly, vice ministers hoping to expand their budget and ruling party members hoping to bring some public investment projects to their districts. Political lobbying increases until the budget draft is finalized at the Government-Party Liaison Council in September (*Chosun Ilbo* November 2, 1996: p.4). Then the budget is submitted to the National Assembly and its Budget Committee, where representatives from each of the parties deliberate the budget under directions from party leaders (*Chosun Ilbo* October 31, 1996: p.4). Further lobbying to co-partisans in the Budget Committee happens at this stage every year, to make sure that budget items should remain in place (*Chosun Ilbo* November 29, 1991: p.3; *Chosun Ilbo* December 14, 1999: p.5; *Donga Ilbo* December 31, 2004: p.4). After deliberations and investigations, the Budget Committee reports the budget to the plenary meeting of the National Assembly for the final vote.

It is said that, when the Government-Party Liaison Council makes final adjustments in the budget for submission to the National Assembly, important local projects for the ruling

party's strongholds are included in the budget. As Kim (1999b) argues, ruling party members have much greater advantage in that they have access to the council, and even before these final adjustments for final submission, they can utilize connections to the president and presidential aides to directly approach high-level bureaucrats to make requests (*Chosun Ilbo* December 17, 2001: p.5); according to a former National Assembly member, "You make phone calls to bureaucrats working in the Budget Bureau to make sure that your budget items should be actually reflected in the budget draft" (interview with a former National Assembly member on February 3, 2009). In fact, usually no large-scale revisions are made to the budget after it is submitted to the National Assembly, despite intensive lobbying occurring in the Budget Committee: For example in 1993, the budget was not revised at all; and on average, only 0.5% of the budget is revised. This is because the Constitution says that "The National Assembly shall, without the consent of the Executive, neither increase the sum of any item of expenditure nor create any new items of expenditure in the budget submitted by the Executive" (Article 57). Park (2003b) indeed administered an interesting questionnaire in 2000-2001, showing that more than three-fourths of the respondents identified the president as being an essential budget-maker, compared to 44.2% feeling negatively or very negatively about the legislature's influence over the budget. But, it is actually all the more interesting that there are sharp contrasts between the ruling and opposing parties: a majority of the ruling party members (63.2%) said they could influence the budget, while 66.6% of the opposition members said they could not; and 31.6% of the ruling party members are somewhat satisfied with the budget, while 95.3% of the opposition members expressed their dissatisfaction. All of these are confirmatory to the view that, while monopolizing the budget-making process, still

the president and its aides open some windows for ruling party members to make some demands for their local districts. This issue is further elaborated in Chapter 7.

Second, the president appoints some of the presidential party members, especially those influential and powerful ones who aspire to challenge the presidential seat in the next elections, to State Council members (or ministers). This is the source for National Assembly members to join the bandwagon of a winnable presidential candidate and even switch to a party that might win the presidency, while this is also a useful tool for the elected president to maintain party cohesion by treating supporters with great governmental privileges. One interesting feature of the Korean cabinet is that, even after assuming the ministership, National Assembly members do not need to give up their seats in the legislature; so when the president reshuffles the cabinet and replaces the ministership, the former minister can go back to the National Assembly as a formal member.⁶⁸ This unique feature for a presidential regime sometimes calls for harsh criticisms, as it might break the norm of checks and balances between the executive and the legislature in a presidential regime (for example, *Chosun Ilbo* June 16, 2004: p.27), but it allows for much greater integration between the two branches. As confirmed by a former National Assembly member, assuming a minister is one of the easiest but most important ways to raise nation-wide name recognition: "For those who aspire to become the next president, it would be highly important to become a minister" (interview with a former National Assembly member, on February 3, 2009). It is also beneficial for the president to

⁶⁸ Technically, the Constitution says that "Members of the National Assembly may not concurrently hold any other office prescribed by law" (Article 41), but there is no law prohibiting National Assembly members from becoming ministers.

have these politically popular and powerful National Assembly members in the cabinet, as these National Assembly members are good at coordinating inside parties (interview with bureaucrats, on May 6, 2009), while these influential ministers (*silse jangwan*) can use their ministerial positions for their own purposes, such as expansion of the budget for the ministry and improvement of their name recognition (interview with bureaucrats, on April 13, 2009).

Third, the president also offers or promises to offer posts in state-owned agencies and enterprises to National Assembly members after retirement. The president's personnel power extends to various jobs in public corporations (*Kong Kieop*), semi-public organizations (*Jun Jeongbu Kigwan*), public investment organizations (*Jeongbu Tuja Kigwan*), and government-funded research organizations (*Yeongu Kigwan*), all responsible for administering certain narrow policy areas, ranging from energy and welfare to construction and diplomacy. The president appoints heads (*Sajang*) and controllers (*Kamsa*) of public corporations among candidates chosen by Management Committees (*Unyeong Wivonhwe*), advisory boards that monitor the management and operations of public corporations.⁶⁹ Directors (*Isa*) of public corporations are also appointed by the heads of relevant ministries, who are in turn appointed by the president.

⁶⁹ Indeed, the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ, or *Gyeongsilhyeon*), one of the most powerful civil groups in South Korea, investigated how new posts in public corporations were allocated. Three corporations did not have any criteria on how to select presidents; and seven did not have minutes on how they selected their presidents. The CCEJ thus concludes that president selection committees just approve what the president decides (*Donga Ilbo*, March 20, 2001: p.45).

Called "parachute personnel management" (*Nakkeasan Insa*), the practice of allocating these types of patronage resembles the "Descent from Heaven" (*Amakudari*) in Japan, but the biggest difference between the two countries is that Korean parachutes are much more politicized appointments given to presidential supporters (Lee 1997, 2001; Lee and Rhyu 2008). News articles report that giving parachutes to party politicians rapidly increased after the 1987 democratization, suggesting that the government now had to provide electoral and political supporters with material benefits (*Sisa Journal* May 24, 2001, pp.20-23). An official from the presidential party explained in 2000 that "We are planning to offer public corporation posts to those who supported our party and the president for long time" *Sisa Journal* June 15, 2000, pp.22-24). This practice did not change in the Roh Moo Hyun administration; the government gave various public posts to over 140 pro-Roh persons, a majority of whom were Uri Party members (*Sindonga* February 2008, pp.232-43).

An oft-cited example can be found in the Korea Racing Authority, an organization to operate horse racing under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. On November 21, 2005, the president promoted Kim To-Hun from the organization's regional manager for Gyeongsang Nam-do to the vice chair of the headquarters, and this called for harsh criticism from the public, especially from the labor union of horse racers and trainers. The public accused the presidential office for its rewarding a political supporter with a patronage: in the 2002 presidential elections, Kim directed campaign activities in Gyeongsang Nam-do for Roh Moo Hyun. The government and Lee Woo-Jae, who was once an opposition party member in the NA, switched to the presidential Uri Party in 2003, and assumed the Korea Racing Authority chair right after stepping down from the NA in April

2004, explained that there were no political intentions for Kim's promotion, despite the fact that Kim could get the regional manager job in 2003 and the promotion to the second highest job in the organization within only two years even though he had no experience in the horse racing business before (*Weekly Donga* February 21, 2006, pp.38-9).

These office privileges are used by the president to maintain the ruling party's unity, while they also call for intra-party factional struggles – ultimately, every politician aspires to become the president with such enormous powers. Every politician also wants their factional patron to become the president and take care of them. In order for presidential aspirants to win the candidacy and the presidency, head counts matter, so bosses promise to offer these office privileges to their supporters after the elections and try to secure support from loyal clients. This results in factional competition, and such competition for head counts can happen at two stages: the National Assembly elections and the presidential elections. The president can largely contain grievance against the candidate nomination process for the National Assembly elections, but there is nothing the president can do about grievance against the candidate nomination process for the presidential elections.

There are two ways for the president to avoid the factional friction before the National Assembly elections. First, the president, as the leader of the ruling party, can monopolize the powers to nominate candidates, by either directly intervening in the nomination process or using close aides. President Kim Young Sam, for example, indeed directly intervened in the nomination process to pick up his own candidates for every district (Kim 2001b). In the 2008 National Assembly elections, President Lee Myung Bak's aides – Lee Jae O, Lee Sang Deuk, Lee Bang Ho, and others – monopolized the endorsement process in the

Grand National Party. The aides tried to isolate and weaken the faction led by Park Keun Hye, a leading candidate for the next presidential elections in 2012, and to contain potential intra-party factional friction in the future; one member from the Park faction said, "The candidate selection committee is a 'robot' that the presidential office manipulates" (*Chosun Ilbo* March 15, 2008: p.5).⁷⁰ Second, the president even takes care of ruling party members who could not get endorsements for the legislative elections by using some of the tools raised above: giving them patronage posts in public corporations. In 2000 for example, it was said that there was an informal organization coordinating requests for patronage appointments. Called "Il-o-hwe," this informal organization was mostly comprised of those ruling party members who did not run for the 2000 elections or lost (Lee and Rhyu 2008); one of the close presidential aides, Kwon No Gap, worked as a window for losing candidates to transmit appointment requests to the presidential office (*Weekly Chosun*, February 24, 2000: pp.22-3).

However, the term limit on the president and the presidential election cycles imply that legislators tend to discount the value attached to them as the next presidential elections approach. Ruling party members might lose all the governmental privileges overnight, as the highly uncertain presidential elections might select a winner from the opposition; therefore the value of staying in a presidential party tends to decline over time. The natural consequence is that, especially when there will be no clear winner for the candidate selection process, there are severe intra-party factional struggles. Even when a party settles on one single candidate for the

⁷⁰ However, the end results were harmful to the president, as those pro-Park faction members launched their own party named the "Pro-Park Coalition" (*Chinbak Yeondae*), which eventually won 14 seats in the National Assembly.

presidential elections, it is still possible that the results of the presidential elections may be unclear, and those excluded from the presidential candidate selection process sometimes leave the party with fellow members to launch new parties, as already seen in the case of Lee In Je above.

For rank-and-file members, it is crucial to find right patrons who are going to win the next presidential elections; therefore they often leave their parties to join the bandwagon regardless of their ideological bents and/or party affiliations. For example in 1992, Lee Jon Chang and Park Tae Jun, in opposing the ruling Democratic Liberal Party's nomination of Kim Young Sam to a presidential candidate, left the party and later coalesced with Kim Dae Jung. In 1997, the New Korea Party was divided into the ex-DJP and ex-DP factions, and the latter tended to support Lee In Je, who ultimately left the party to challenge the presidency. As Lee Hoi Chang was selected for the NKP's candidate, anti-Lee Hoi Chang legislators left the party (*Chosun Ilbo* November 2, 1997: p.5). In 2002, Kim Min Seok left the ruling Democratic Party to join Chung Mong Joon, an independent National Assembly member who launched the National Unification 21 to run for the presidency. And in January and February 2007, more than 30 legislators defected from the ruling Uri Party. Thus party splits and switching should be expected to be more likely as the presidential elections get near: in the first two years of presidential terms (1988-1989, 1993-1994, 1998-1999, and 2003-2004), there were 139 cases (or 5.9%) of any change in party affiliations out of 2,363 legislator-years in total, while in the last two years of presidential terms (1991-1992, 1996-1997, 2001-2002, and 2006), there were 343

cases (or 16.8%) out of 2,036.⁷¹

3.7. Conclusions

The above descriptions of the Japanese and Korean parties are designed to support the main argument throughout the chapter that, given the weak organization of the ruling parties and the resultant ideological disunity inside the parties, party leaders needed to utilize political tools, mainly perks derived from the government, to keep buying support from rank-and-file members. In both countries, party leaders' strategies to maintain party cohesion are much limited by several political settings: weak party organization, ideological disunity, personal vote, and party volatility. Despite all of these unfavorable factors for party cohesion, the party leadership in the two countries could maintain the high levels of party cohesion and achieve collective goods of stable rule and legislation, giving a theoretical and empirical puzzle of why.

The theory of party discipline developed in the preceding chapter starts with the assumption that a legislator has three different incentives for vote, policy, and office, and argues that where vote- and policy-seeking incentives are insufficient in buying support from backbenchers, party leaders should resort to office-related incentives. The LDP leadership in Japan devised several rules to fairly equally allocate office perks to backbenchers: first, the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) is designed to allow rank-and-file members to bring

⁷¹ These figures are from my original dataset on Korean National Assembly members, from 1988 to 2007. Note that this does not include a number of party splits and mergers that occurred in 2007.

particularistic benefits to their districts by institutionalizing the norm of the consensus-based, log-rolling policymaking process; second, the seniority rule was gradually invented to encourage members to make long-term investments in the party as it guaranteed semi-automatic promotion to a higher post in the government and/or the party that is directly tied to his/her policy and career incentives; and third, fragmentation inside the party resulting from factional antagonism was avoided by establishing the norm of factional balance in allocating posts in the government and the party to each of the faction.

The Korean leadership, which should be read as the president, also uses some of the constitutional powers exclusively given to the president to allocate office perks: first, in drafting the budget, the president uses the Party-Government Liaison Council to accommodate local interests arising from National Assembly members; second, the president appoints some of the presidential party members, especially those influential and powerful ones who aspire to challenge the presidential seat in the next elections, to State Council members (or ministers) in order to maintain harmony within the party; and third, the president also offers or promises to offer posts in state-owned agencies and enterprises to National Assembly members after retirement. However, unlike parliamentary Japan, where the duration of the cabinet, provision of office perks, and individual legislators' incentives to keep loyal to the ruling party are all integrated with each other, in presidential Korea, provision of office perks is only the "discounted game," in the sense that the value of staying in the ruling party tends to decline as time goes by, and the ultimate results are the loosening of party unity as the presidential elections approach.

Chapter 4. Party Discipline and Policy Dissension in Japan

4.1. Introduction

As in some previous analyses of the phenomenon of rebellion against the party leadership (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995; Kato 1998; Reed and Scheiner 2003), this chapter explores the party rebellion over postal privatization in 2005. In terms of party cohesion, as the preceding chapters explained, Japan is an interesting and puzzling case. The structure within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been known to be very fragmented with factionalism and diverse policy preferences, both at least partially deriving from the country's unique electoral system before 1993: a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts (MMDs). Under this system, legislators were preoccupied with constituency services and bringing "pork" to local districts, and factional bosses engaged in competition over the party leadership. The electoral reform in 1993-94 introduced a mixed member system with single-member districts (SMD; 300 seats) and proportional representation (PR; 180 seats) into the most important chamber, the House of Representatives. This reform was expected to promote party-oriented voting and policy-based cohesive parties, but the factional fragmentation inside the LDP and particularism have never disappeared (Cox et al. 1999; Krauss and Pekkanen 2004; Scheiner 2005, 2006). Despite these factors, however, legislators in the LDP have been sufficiently cohesive since 1955 to maintain their continuous rule for fifty years, with only a ten-month interruption in 1993-94, when a party split led to an opposition coalition taking power briefly and passing the electoral reform. The present analysis also tries

to explain why, in 2005, for the first time since 1993, LDP legislators showed their dissension in a legislative arena en masse, in a way that led the party leadership to resort to the severest action it could take: splitting the party by expelling the dissenters.

This chapter examines in greater depth the importance of party rules (especially the seniority rule and policy specialization for district rewards) as intervening variables between election rules and party dissension in a decentralized and diverse party undergoing transition. I would argue that the literature ignores the potential intervening variable of party organizational and institutional rules that provide incentives for members of the party to vote with the party and to stay in it. Further, the existing literature does not specify *how* legislators optimize their behaviour according to their given resources and institutionally defined incentives. By focusing on party rules, I can forecast the exact conditions in which backbenchers are likely to be in conflict with the party leadership and what types of members would actually defy the leadership.

Even where party labels matter little for elections and potentials for intra-party fragmentation are large, party rules can prevent possible defection if they serve as bilateral exchange contracts in which each holds the other hostage. For example, backbenchers may make long-term commitments to the party in exchange for party leaders' providing them with access to policy-making posts. Each side's commitment is conditional upon continued "good behavior" (the hostage aspect). In this case, backbenchers get access to higher posts only if they continue to be loyal to the party and leaders get loyalty from backbenchers only if they continue to provide them with secure and semi-automatic promotion up the career ladder.

In such a situation, it is suggested that conflict over the loyalty issue would become

significant when party leaders try to change the existing rules of the game. Leveraging this theoretical insight, this chapter then specifically discusses the various incentives of representatives at different stages of their careers, and applies my hypotheses to the Japanese case.

4.2. Theory

4.2.1. *Personal Vote, Fragmentation and Party Rules*

As argued in the theoretical chapter, this dissertation models individual legislators' defiance behavior as an outcome of interactions between leaders and backbenchers (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Huber 1996). When party leaders and backbenchers find themselves in conflict, the tension can lead individual legislators to choose from a range of actions on a continuum: they may simply succumb to the leadership, either because of potential punishment or reward; they may only indicate disapproval, privately or publicly, with the leadership's position; they may choose to take various types of stronger and more visible action, including voting against the leadership and risking punishment; or they may leave the party (i.e., defection) (Hirschman 1970; Kato 1998). In the empirical analysis below, I build aspects of this continuum of backbencher responses to their dissidence into my dependent variable.

I assume that the expected costs associated with these types of actions are common knowledge to all the members from past experience, and that they should usually expect reactions from the leadership to be proportional to what they had done. Being loyal to the party could be rewarded with a shortcut to better posts; minor types of defiance may result in some minor punishment, including less advantageous allocation to posts; and voting against the

leadership in an important vote could result in the severest form of punishment, including expulsion from the party.⁷² The leadership's threat of punishment may or may not be credible, but it is natural to assume that members may want to express their strong dissension by running the risks of sanctions from the party.

How legislators calculate the risks is based upon the expected costs and benefits from rebelling, and these calculations should depend on their strategies to achieve a range of goals: vote maximization in their constituencies, legislation of their preferred policies, and career promotion to desired offices. The general theoretical idea behind the existing literature assumes that legislators have unique utility functions based on different preferences that arise from some institutional arrangements.

First, being loyal to a party can improve the electoral prospect of a candidate if the party label matters greatly to voters in making voting decisions. However, under certain types of electoral rules, it does not necessarily improve the electoral prospects of a candidate. This occurs when personal support is highly relevant for voting decisions.⁷³ Where electors vote for individual candidates rather than party lists, cultivating personal support among the electorate becomes the most salient activity. One example is an open-list PR system employed in Brazil, where intra-party competition makes party labels only marginal in elections (Ames 2001; Desposato 2006b; Samuels 1999).

⁷² See Kam (2006) on trade between party line voting and posts.

⁷³ The literature on personal electoral connections is large (Cain et al. 1987; Carey and Shugart 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2001; Crisp and Desposato 2004; Crisp et al. 2004; Ingall and Crisp 2001).

Secondly, fragmentation inside a party matters. Given budget constraints, legislators with different interests should engage in turf wars for policy; and the result may be a policy division, for example between legislators elected from different regions (Weingast et al. 1981). A legislator may simply oppose or attempt to stop an unwanted bill submitted by the leaders for voter accountability and policy preference reasons; however, in an extreme case in which legislators see little prospect for the legislation of priority policy(-ies), they might want to find opportunities in other parties to legislate it, i.e. to defect (Axelrod 1970). Such a dilemma may be aggravated by some organizational features that promote fragmentation inside parties, including factionalism (Gaines and Garrett 1993).

Here, I emphasize the incentives derived from the third and most important factor, that is, how parties offer party and government posts, legislative benefits and other types of privileged goods to their members through their rules (Jones 2002). Party rules can serve as bilateral contracts, whereby backbenchers and party leaders jointly achieve their disparate goals by mutually taking "hostages" – long-term commitments to the party, on the one side, and access to privileges, on the other.⁷⁴ Such long-term commitments are available (i) when opportunities for career promotion are allocated to legislators along with a seniority rule, and (ii) when fragmentation-related grievances are addressed by fair portfolio management.

First, just as the lifetime employment practice in the stylized Japanese firm encourages a worker to stay in the same organization for future career promotion (Aoki 1990), a seniority system forces legislators to commit to the party in the long term, because their benefits from

⁷⁴ On bilateral contracts and the notion of mutual hostage-taking, see Williamson (1983).

staying in the party, such as access to the policy-making process and private pork-barrel goods, are strictly linked to their loyalty in the past (Crook and Hibbing 1985). Secondly, fairly proportional portfolio management mediates fragmentation. By allowing proportional participation in decision making through various means – for example, in a bottom-up decision-making process – this rule can mitigate the grievances of otherwise would-be dissidents (Amorim Neto and Santos 2001).

However, there are some factors that would shorten the legislators' time horizons. One is uncertainty regarding posts: for example, if leaders discretionarily handpick favored legislators for some important posts, then junior legislators in particular could fear that long-term commitment to the party might not profit them (Kam 2006). Another is the existence of a viable alternative for career promotion: for example, a strong opposition party that is ideologically close enough might allow a potential rebel to be a "pivotal actor," either by joining it or by forging a coalition with it.⁷⁵

Thus, the theory is that dissension can be contained to the extent to which leaders can utilize these three types of incentives: vote, policy and office – systematically related to Strøm's (1990) categorization of the three major goals of political parties. This chapter further argues that with the third incentive, office, the "party rules" factor works as a crucial intervening variable between the incentives to cultivate a personal vote and policy/ideology dissensus inside a party, on the one hand, and defiance on the other. Even under electoral systems with persistent personal-vote elements, if coming back to a legislature means further access to

⁷⁵ Those members who assume "pivotal positions" in a legislature are more likely to change their voting positions (Krehbiel 1998).

government privileges, then sticking to the same party label can matter; if legislators are promoted for certain posts directly related to their local interests, then policy-seeking incentives can be internalized to the career structure.

I would also point out that it is only by focusing on party rules that I can resolve the existing literature's theoretical and empirical difficulties in explaining legislators' defiant behavior. One of these is that the existing literature tends to ignore how different factors work when combined. That is why the previous work by Cox and Rosenbluth and Kato could not show that variables like the electoral strengths of legislators and factional affiliations work in predicted ways (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995; Kato 1998).⁷⁶ Reed and Scheiner carefully show that how these variables work is conditional upon the characteristics of legislators' districts (urban or rural) and their number of terms in the parliament (junior or senior) (Reed and Scheiner 2003).

Related to the above, the approach here differentiates similar but different concepts in the existing literature on the personal vote: incentives to cultivate the personal vote through a strategy of constituency services, on the one hand, and those with a strategy to specialize in policies to bring benefits to local districts, on the other.⁷⁷ Much of the personal vote literature assumes that they have the same origin – certain types of electoral systems in which intra-party

⁷⁶ The insignificance of electoral variables is further puzzling because they look only at the extreme case of dissension – defection in 1993, when personal vote should have mattered most.

⁷⁷ One exception is made by Tatebayashi (2004), who implies that there was a trade-off between the constituency servicing and policy specialization strategies in pre-1994 Japan. He reveals the negative correlation between politicians' region-based vote-dividing strategy and the policy specialization likelihood in the same district.

competition is dominant and party labels matter less (Carey and Shugart 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2001). But in fact they are different, in that the latter are conditional on the access politicians may have to policy making. That access must be ultimately dependent on party rules providing a window of opportunity for politicians to convey their local interests to a national policy-making system. By contrast, constituency services and personal networks are distinctively different from pork-barrel benefits in that constituency services and personal networks require no access to policy-making mechanisms in the party. Rather, they are based on legislators' personal characteristics, such as personal assets, financial resources and local name recognition.

Finally, my approach will address a somewhat more Japan-specific empirical question: although the literature suggests that a highly fragmented party like the LDP should always be concerned about the problems of collective choice (as explained below), the LDP has achieved a high level of stability since its birth in 1955. This conservative party has been in office for 50 years, with only a minor interruption in 1993-94, while extreme cases of dissension have occurred only a few times.⁷⁸ The 2005 vote on postal privatization was exceptional in that a group of legislators voted against the LDP leadership en masse, for the first time since 1993. This is all the more notable considering the fact that, only five years ago, a similar event almost happened but the leadership was able to tame the would-be defectors led by Katō Kōichi with

⁷⁸ Extreme cases that actually happened before 2005 are only 1976 and 1993. Only the 1993 event resulted in the fall of the LDP from the government. In 1960, 1974, 1979-80 and 2000, the dissidents in the LDP had opportunities to show dissension, but in these cases they were just persuaded and/or they managed to show their grievances at best.

the threat to expel them from the party; LDP members also knew that the costs were very high, as Katō and subsequently his followers had a hard time getting access to posts at least until Koizumi became prime minister. Why did the 2005 event occur? My answer is that the transformation of the existing party rules caused tension between party leaders and backbenchers.

4.2.2. Proposition

The model on dissension has three implications. The first is about the different incentives contained in a seniority-based structure: I argue that, given a seniority rule and proportional portfolio management, different legislators – juniors, those in mid-career and seniors – have different incentives to maximize their electoral fortunes and political careers:

- 1) Juniors: In their first or second terms in a legislative body, juniors concentrate on mobilizing votes as an investment in future higher policy positions. They can expect benefits from being loyal to the party, in so far as they can survive reelections and the leadership guarantees in the foreseeable future promotion to policy-making posts that may help to improve their reelection prospects. Thus, they would rather focus on building personal networks in their districts to accumulate seniority.
- 2) Those in mid-career: These moderately secure representatives concentrate on policy specialization, using their current policy positions to increase their electoral security and seniority even further. Being in

mid-career, they can make more efficient use of their political resources, with substantial amounts of investment into some specific policy areas that might increase their electoral prospects. Thus, they would rather focus on policy activities.

- 3) Seniors: These very electorally secure veteran politicians are likely to concentrate on their offices and party management to maintain their leadership. With their potential power to change and maintain institutions, they should try to sustain the status quo, as they have been promoted by the existing rule that now qualifies them for the party leadership. Thus they would rather focus on internal party and factional affairs.

The second implication is about timing: a conflict over party cohesion is most likely to arise when party leaders try to centralize the policy-making process and change the strict seniority rule. I argue that the change of rules can be endogenous to the choice of those leaders who want to streamline the implementation of their own policy, and that such a change to the existing system would necessarily cause political tension between the leadership and those who have vested interests in it.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Therefore, I would add to a bit functional "party aggregation" argument that exogenous shocks to a system would eventually cause coordination of local politicians whose reelection and policy incentives would not otherwise coincide with the leadership, because a "provincialized" structure does not require party aggregation at the national level (Chhibber and

Thirdly, in accordance with the above two points, different calculations arise when the rules change. I hypothesize that the group of dissidents in this case is likely to be a coalition of the three different types of legislators:

- 1) "*Ambitious juniors*," who see the opportunity costs of investing in their party increasing, when loosened seniority creates greater uncertainty regarding posts. Further, especially if there is a viable competing party whose ideology is not incompatible, there is an "insurance" of a sort in that if the worst came to the worst, they could cross the aisle; the costs of sanction are also small because, being less integrated with the party, they have least to lose. Those electorally strong enough can afford to take the risk.
- 2) "*Mid-career policy seekers*," who have already made substantial investment in the party, so they know any negative consequences that might result from their dissidence would mean a huge loss. They dare to rebel only if they expect such high costs from the change that the value of the sunk costs in their campaigning strategies based on policy specialization and pork from their office-holding in the party would be undermined.
- 3) "*Antagonistic seniors*," who face decreasing career-related benefits from

the party because their career is reaching saturation point; thus, they oppose to any institutional change that might harm their oligopolistic positions in party management. Especially if they are electorally secure, they have strong incentives to fight to preserve the status quo.

These considerations of how seniority combines with incentives lead to hypothesis that the relationship between dissension against the party leadership on key legislation and seniority is curvilinear: more junior and more senior legislators are more likely to rebel against the party leadership if it tries to change the "rules of the game." This is because juniors and seniors have greater incentives for career advancement (juniors outside the party and seniors within) and are less dependent on access to party posts for the resources to mobilize secure votes in their constituencies. However, "mid-career policy seekers" are the ones whose future electoral prospects depend most heavily on being able to influence policy based on their party positions, compared to the other two types. Thus, other things being equal, they are more integrated within the party and less likely to defy the leadership, but will try to oppose it when they see it pushing through a policy decision that undermines their key policy preferences (See Figure 4.1).




Figure 4.1: Hypothesized Relationship between Seniority and Likelihood of Defiance Behavior

4.3. The Japanese Context

4.3.1. *Personal Vote, Fragmentation and Party Rules in Japan*

In this section I first show that the institutional potential for party dissension is significantly large in Japan. The incentives to cultivate personal vote and intra-party fragmentation have been rampant even since the electoral reform in 1993-94. However, as I argued above, two types of party rules – seniority and proportional portfolio management – effectively kept down these externalities.

Before 1994, personalistic voting and clientelism were very salient in the Japanese electoral system, in which voters cast one single non-transferable vote to one of the candidates in multi-member districts (MMDs). This system forced a large party like the LDP to run

multiple candidates to win a majority, and because several candidates from the same party were running in the same district candidates had to appeal as individuals to their constituency.

Intra-party competition and unreliable party labels, combined with the strict regulations on electoral campaigning, forced each candidate to develop his/her own personal organizational networks, known as *koenkai* (Flanagan 1991; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993).

Another consequence of this unique electoral system was the need to specialize in policy areas where legislators could bring private policy benefits to targeted constituents. Many developed their policy expertise so that they formed "policy tribes" (*zoku gin*) and became influential in the policy-making process (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993). Politicians utilized various tools to intervene in industry, provide favourable regulations and protective measures, and distribute pork benefits to districts. This local orientation of each legislator was the source of conflict over the public/private balance with party leaders, who had more public-regarded policy considerations (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993).

This fragmentation inside the LDP was further aggravated by factionalism. Political factions in Japan became salient when the two conservative parties (the Liberals and the Democrats) merged in 1955 and aspiring leaders needed to get a majority of votes at a party convention to win. Thus factional bosses needed to sign up as many new members as possible, and they tried to do so by offering new candidates endorsements, campaign finance and access to posts if they could assume leadership positions (Cox and Rosenbluth 1993, 1996).

Despite these factors promoting the disloyalty of backbenchers, party leaders in the LDP contained their grievances through the seniority rule and proportional portfolio management related to posts and the policy-making process, especially in the Policy Affairs

Research Council (PARC), the LDP's most important policy deliberation body. First, for legislators to become *zoku gin*, they had to accumulate policy knowledge by intensive participation in meetings of the PARC's divisions (*bukai*) and Diet committees as well as relevant governmental activities. This was elaborately tied to the ladder-like seniority rule, in which legislators developed their career from rank-and-file committee/division members, through vice ministers in the cabinet or vice chairs of divisions, to chairs of committees and divisions and finally ministers and leadership positions. In this way, party leaders could discipline, educate and get their rank-and-file members into line (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004).

Secondly, policymaking was effectively bottom-up and decentralized, in the sense that unanimity was required for passage in the party. Each of the members could have a potential veto power over any bill, as the norm was that, for the LDP to submit a bill to the Diet, it was necessary to pass the relevant divisions, the Policy Deliberation Commission (*Seichō Shingikai*) inside the PARC, a general meeting of the PARC and the General Council (*Sōmukai*) beforehand. From the late 1960s, divisions gradually worked as sub-governments like committees in the US Congress, where specialized legislators exchanged legislative benefits to streamline the floor voting in the upper policy-making organizations (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986).

Thirdly, the fixed personnel rule was complemented by another form of proportional portfolio management, factional balance, which also gradually appeared after the late 1960s. Since then, the allocation of posts has been based on the factional bosses' recommendations, as well as the overall balance of factional sizes. Through this tacit rule, bosses could maintain their factions for their own further promotion to party leadership positions, while bloody factional conflicts were moderated (Kawato 1996a, 1996b; Sato and Matsuzaki 1986).

The entire system survived the electoral reform in favor of a new mixed-member system, which theoretically called for policy-oriented, non-personal competition in elections (Curtis 1999; Reed and Thies 2001). In fact, various attempts were made to put an emphasis on the role of the cabinet office and the leadership so as to bring in nation-wide, public-oriented policies, but no reform could be successful without changing the internal structure of the party.⁸⁰ With the new electoral system still allowing for personal votes,⁸¹ the unchanged party rules continued to provide the same old incentives for legislators to bring parochial benefits through policy-making organs, factional affiliations and various tools defined by their seniority-based posts.⁸² Furthermore, at least until 2003 non-LDP parties were too

⁸⁰ They are summarized in Shimizu (2005) and Takenaka (2006a). Also see Aurelia George-Mulgan (2000, 2003) for weak Prime Minister in Japan.

⁸¹ Theoretically SMD systems do not necessarily completely eliminate the need for candidates to mobilize a personal vote. See Cain et al (1987). There is also ample empirical evidence that *kōenkai* survived (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004; Miyake 1998; Taniguchi 2004). The PR portion of the mixed-member system only encouraged PR candidates to act as local candidates; except pure PR members, a loser in a SMD can be saved as a so-called "zombie" by the PR portion, where the rank is determined by his/her vote margin with the SMD winner. For more elegant descriptions on this complicated system, see McKean and Scheiner (2000) and Pekkanen et al. (2006).

⁸² See Scheiner (2005, 2006) on how locally-oriented legislators maintained their clientelistic networks through the centralized fiscal structure of Japan, even after 1993-94. A bit journalistic account is available in Iwai (2002). Also see Mishima (1998) for how *zoku gūin*

fragmented to threaten the continuous rule of the LDP, giving very few incentives for potential dissidents in the LDP to consider switching.⁸³

4.3.2. *The 2005 Vote*

The situation changed in the 2003 elections, the third election since the electoral reform. In this election, the new main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), a relatively centrist party partially composed of former defectors from the LDP in 1993, increased its seats by 50 per cent to 177 seats, or 36.9% of the total lower-house seats. This was a particular challenge to the LDP because, unlike the old system where the chief opposition party had been quite ideologically leftist, the DPJ's policies as revealed in its party "manifestos" were often not far from those of the LDP and appealed to "median voters" especially in the urban areas.⁸⁴ The DPJ thus constituted a potential alternative as an option of last resort for those thinking of defecting or who had been punished for dissidence by expulsion, especially junior representatives who had few "sunk costs" in the LDP and occupied secure electoral

interrupted and ultimately halted Hashimoto's administrative reform initiative. On the continuous importance of factions, see Cox et al. (1999).

⁸³ The largest opposition party in 1996 was the New Frontier Party, which gained 156 seats, or 31.2% of the total lower-house seats, but the party was soon disunited. The Democratic Party of Japan emerged as a new force, but it also failed to gain a substantial portion in the 2000 election: 127 seats, or 26.5%.

⁸⁴ In fact, individual members were ideologically similar to the LDP as explained in Chapter 3. See also Miura et al. (2005).

districts.⁸⁵

Against this background of the increased competition with the rising DPJ led Koizumi, a new LDP leader, who became prime minister in April 2001, started to pursue his own structural reform. Like his predecessors, he embarked on reform to centralize the power of the cabinet office, but in this case he also changed the internal structure of the LDP. Two strategies can be distinguished. First, he bypassed the policy-making organs in the LDP. Utilizing the Council on Fiscal and Economic Policy (CFEP, or *Keizai Zaisei Shimon Kaigi*), a cabinet-led agenda-setting body established in 2000 but which had become dysfunctional, Koizumi, his team, and the government coalition party, the Kōmeitō (Clean Government Party), discussed and shaped the most important policies in the cabinet without the influence of backbenchers. Several policies were then formalized without any input from backbenchers and were sent to the LDP's formal policy-making bodies for *ex post facto* passage (Takenaka 2006b; Takenaka 2006a).

Secondly, to streamline the party and policy matters further, Koizumi loosened the old system of personnel management. Some of the important party/government posts were allocated relatively independently of the influence of factions to Koizumi's favorite legislators. Some of the young members were thus allowed to jump up the career ladder,⁸⁶ while members

⁸⁵ And indeed some of the defectors in the 2005 vote on postal privatization went to the DPJ.

⁸⁶ The average number of terms served by LDP members in the cabinet was radically decreased from 7.41 (the 1997 Hashimoto cabinet) and 7.45 (the 2000 Obuchi cabinet) to 5.18 (the 2002 Koizumi cabinet). Four of the important party posts were distributed to his favourites, including Shinzō Abe, who assumed Secretary-General when he experienced only

with strong factional affiliations in local areas were intentionally avoided.⁸⁷

It was no wonder that these moves were greeted by a rising chorus of opposition from backbenchers, especially from *zoku giin* and the senior members of big factions. *Zoku giin* felt their sunk costs in their specialized policy areas had been eroded by Koizumi; and the big-faction members felt the new type of politics was undermining their career-related privileges. But, utilizing the popularity he had gained among the general public, fostered by the growing importance of television (Krauss and Nyblade 2005), Koizumi could force many dissatisfied members to accept the changes.⁸⁸

The culmination of the conflict between Koizumi and traditional members finally came when Koizumi's reforms touched upon the Post Office, one of the policy issue areas in which some LDP legislators specialized as *zoku giin* (Maclachlan 2004), Koizumi's own personal long-term pet reform project. Specifically, post office *zoku giin* would never accept privatization: first, local post officers provided one of the strongest vote-catching networks; and, secondly, the tremendous amount of money deposited as postal savings had been traditionally operated under the "Fiscal Investment and Loan Programs" (*Zaisei Tō Yūshū*), often targeted at

three terms in the lower house, although only the senior-most members could assume this most powerful post traditionally.

⁸⁷ The Hashimoto faction, the biggest faction, did not get any of the big four posts in the LDP until 2003, for the first time since the late 1970s.

⁸⁸ Koizumi even strategically used the mass media to label the antagonistic force inside his own party as the "resistance force" (*teikō seiryōken*) obstructing the reform. Many feared being labelled so, for the electoral reasons.

unproductive public works projects that were essentially political "pork," as explained in Chapter 6. The Koizumi cabinet argued that the reform would pump trillions of yen into private markets and ultimately reduce public investment.

In September 2004, Koizumi's economic-policy team and bureaucrats drafted a bill on privatization, without input from LDP backbenchers. The postal *zoku gin* and factional bosses formed the Postal Service Forum (*Yūsei Jigyō Komukai*) with more than ninety legislators in an attempt to act collectively against Koizumi. But Koizumi continued to ignore the dissident group inside the party, and the bill was finalized and sent to the General Council of the LDP for passage in April 2005. Not surprisingly, the Council could not unanimously accept the privatization bill, but a final vote was suddenly taken despite the lack of consensus and it was submitted to the Diet for legislation. Simultaneously, to put pressure on the resisters who threatened to defeat the bill, an outcome that would force Koizumi from office, he signaled he would sanction dissidents.⁸⁹

The final vote was called on July 5, 2005 in the Lower House of the Diet. The bill got through the Diet with only a slight majority: 233 to 228. The bill was then sent to the upper house, but defectors prevented the bill's passage there and Koizumi carried out his promise to dissolve the lower house and deny party endorsements to the defectors. He even sent endorsed "assassins" (*shikyaku*) to the defector's districts to try to defeat them in the

⁸⁹ Koizumi continued to imply that he would dissolve the lower house (*Sankei Shimbun*, April 2, 2005: p.1; *Sankei Shimbun*, May 17, 2005: p.1), and two-thirds of LDP members believed that he would surely dissolve it (*Sankei Shimbun*, June 4, 2005: p.1).

elections.⁹⁰ Those who had voted against the bill expressed shock and indignation at these moves,⁹¹ so giving an impression that the dissidents did not expect any sanction from the party. If so, one might argue, their voting had really been sincere in terms of policy preferences and not based on strategic calculations of votes and office. True, it is virtually impossible to know what was in their minds at the time of the vote, but there is a fair amount of evidence that they could have been expected to know that the possible consequences of their action included being ousted from the party and even that assassins would be sent to their districts.⁹² In addition, my model is based on calculated risks and differentiates behaviors other than the two

⁹⁰ Koizumi dissolved the HOR even though the bill passed the HOR and could not pass the HOC, because Japanese prime minister can only dissolve the HOR. The rationale for this move was to offer the general voter with a yes-or-no vote on the bill and Koizumi.

⁹¹ For example, *Mainichi Shimbun*, August 9, 2005: p.2.

⁹² As the vote approached, the leadership implied that it would give no endorsement in the next election (*Mainichi Shimbun*, June 27, 2005: p.2; *Sankei Shimbun*, July 2, 2005: p.4). I know that at least some possible rebels received specific threats from LDP leadership: some changed their mind and voted for the bill because they knew expulsion or other types of sanction would be the huge loss (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 2, 2005: p.2; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 5, 2005: p.3). One defector even revealed in an interview that the party leadership told him in the very morning of July 5 that the party would not give him an endorsement and send the party's candidate in his district (*Tokyo Shimbun*, July 10, 2005: p.3). Since these were reported in the media, it is plausible to believe that all or at least many potential rebels were aware of these threats, and thus the possible consequences of their actions.

extreme outcomes: resolute defection or not, and therefore should apply whether the rebels knew for certain that they would be punished or not.

The following analysis focuses on the lower-house dissidents. Of the 248 members of the LDP at the time of the vote, thirty-seven voted against the bill, and twelve abstained.⁹³ Of the dissident members who joined in the anti-Koizumi forum, forty-four were finally persuaded to vote for the bill.⁹⁴ So, interestingly, I can see that the dissidents' motives were different: some did not mind being expelled from the party; others only showed their opposition implicitly, and others calculated their expected costs from dissension as very high. My theory on different incentives will be tested to predict these different behavioral patterns.

4.4. Data and Analysis

4.4.1. Hypotheses:

The previous section has reviewed how the Japanese electoral system generated externalities, how the LDP tried to internalize those externalities by using some party rules, and how Koizumi destroyed those rules. The theoretical argument first predicts that the likelihood of defiance should be a curvilinear function of seniority: it should be high for junior and senior members.

⁹³ *Asahi Shimbun*, July 6, 2005: p.1. Technically, the LDP had 250 Lower-House members in total in July 2005, but two could not be in the floor because one was bed-ridden (Nakamura Seisaburō) and the other was in a foreign country (Saitō Toshitsugu). I exclude them in the analysis.

⁹⁴ *Asahi Shimbun*, July 6 2005: p.4.

Hypothesis 1. The likelihood and intensity of defiant behavior should be a curvilinear function of seniority, keeping the other factors constant.

I further argue that defiance is likely to arise from different incentives. As I identified, a group of the dissidents may be composed of three different types: ambitious juniors, mid-career policy seekers, and antagonistic seniors. Specifically:

Hypothesis 2. If junior legislators were electorally strong and belonged to the anti-Koizumi factions, then the likelihood and intensity of their defiant behavior would be greater.

Hypothesis 3. If mid-career legislators had great amounts of policy investments in the Post Office, then the likelihood and intensity of their defiant behavior would be greater.

Hypothesis 4. If senior legislators led the anti-Koizumi factions, then the likelihood and intensity of their defiant behavior would be greater.

4.4.2. Data and Methods

I utilize Krauss and Pekkanen's J-LOD database⁹⁵ which includes all the 248 LDP House

⁹⁵ Krauss and Pekkanen's Japan Legislative Organization Database [J-LOD]. It covers all LDP Diet Members from 1980-2004, including their constituency characteristics, personal

of Representative members who participated in the July floor voting. Of these, 181 were elected to SMDs in the 2003 elections, while sixty-seven were elected in closed-list PR blocs. Of the sixty-seven, thirty-five were "zombies" who revived in the regional PR portions of the elections. Of the remaining thirty-two pure-PR candidates, fifteen had *koenkai* in SMDs: some signed "Costa Rica" agreements with other candidates, whereby they alternate SMDs and PR.⁹⁶ Others were allowed to run in PR blocs because of the redistricting in 2003. Therefore, in 2005 the LDP had only seventeen PR-elected members in the pure sense.

The dependent variable is ZOUHAN, which means "rebellion" in Japanese and measures a member's response to the privatization bill. Based on the notion that dissension is in a continuum, it scores 3 if the member voted against it; 2 if the member abstained; 1 if the member showed his/her oppositional attitudes by participating in the anti-Koizumi Postal Service Forum but was later persuaded to vote for it; and 0 otherwise. My dependent variable is ordinal with clear ranking and mutual dependence, ranging from strong defiance (voting against Koizumi) to no defiance (just following Koizumi); so ordered logit models are appropriate to estimate the effects of my explanatory variables (Greene 2003: pp.736-40).

The structural model can be written as:

backgrounds, election results, and all their party, legislative, and executive posts from 1986-2004.

⁹⁶ The 1994 electoral reform and the resultant redistricting created the coordination problem. The problem was easily solved if some candidates had few regional overlaps in the old district, while it was hard if candidates' *koenkai* were regionally overlapped. In some of the latter cases, two candidates agreed that one would run in an SMD and the other in PR in one election and vice versa in the next.

$$y_i^* = x_i\beta + \varepsilon_i$$

where x are certain measurable factors, y^* denote unobservable dependent variables, and i is the observation, with a vector of the estimators (β) and random errors (ε). I estimate the probabilities that y_i is in a certain range within the four ordinal categories. Specifically,

$$\text{Prob}(y=0 | x) = \Phi(\mu_1 - x\beta),$$

$$\text{Prob}(y=1 | x) = \Phi(\mu_2 - x\beta) - \Phi(\mu_1 - x\beta),$$

$$\text{Prob}(y=2 | x) = \Phi(\mu_3 - x\beta) - \Phi(\mu_2 - x\beta),$$

$$\text{Prob}(y=3 | x) = 1 - \Phi(\mu_3 - x\beta).$$

where $\Phi(\cdot)$ is a cumulative distribution function assumed to be logistic and $\mu(i=1,2,3)$ are unknown threshold parameters that are to be estimated with β .

In the light of the hypotheses, my primary independent variables should proxy legislators' electoral strength, policy incentives on the post office, and career prospects. As to the electoral strength, I will use STRENGTH and PR. STRENGTH measures the electoral strength of each member, calculated as the log of a member's vote share divided by the best competitor's vote share.⁹⁷ I use primarily the data on the preceding elections to create this variable. However, as shown above, there were many members elected under PR in 2003 who were not PR candidates in the pure sense. For them, I use the electoral results in 2000 to calculate STRENGTH. As I cannot construct equivalent data on the seventeen pure-PR candidates, I run separate models that include a PR dummy variable. The coefficient for

⁹⁷ Therefore, for a SMD winner, STRENGTH represents the margin between him/her and the best loser. For a "zombie" saved by PR, STRENGTH becomes negative, meaning the distance between him/her and the winner.

STRENGTH should be positive, and the size of the coefficient should increase for junior legislators; PR should be negative as party leaders monopolize the power to endorse and rank pure-PR candidates.

To measure the policy deviance from Koizumi on the Post Office issue, I have created ZOKUPOINT. ZOKUPOINT measures the extent of policy specialization in the postal services. This was calculated as follows: (1) I traced the records on all the posts that the 248 members had assumed in the past; (2) they received the score of 1 if they had served as Post Office Standing Committee Vice Chair, PARC Post Office Division Vice Chair, and Post Office Vice Minister at some time in the past, and similarly, the score of 2 if they had been Post Office Standing Committee Chair, PARC Post Office Division Chair, and Post Office Minister; and (3) I simply added all the scores. As the ministry structure was changed in 2001, I looked at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and the corresponding committee and division when calculating the post-2001 scores. Technically, the variable can range from 0 to 9, but nobody scored more than 6 – Jimi Shozaburo scored 6, as he had held all the two-point posts: PARC Post Office Division Chair in 1993, Post Office Standing Committee Chair in 1995, and finally Post Office Minister in 1997.⁹⁸ I predict that this variable should have a positive impact on ZOUHAN, but mid-career legislators with the larger policy commitment should show the greater likelihood and intensity of defiance behavior.

The career prospects are measured by ANTIKOIZUMI and TERMS. A dichotomous variable, ANTIKOIZUMI is coded 1 if a member belonged to one of the big

⁹⁸ And Jimi in fact voted against Koizumi.

three factions (Kamei, Hashimoto and Horiuchi); 0 otherwise.⁹⁹ I expect that, while this variable can have an independent effect on ZOUHAN, it should also work in two ways. First, the bosses of these large factions who had had advantages in career promotion should be frustrated by Koizumi's anti-factional politics. Secondly, juniors should be more uncertain about their expected posts, both because they would have to wait fifteen to twenty more years to get posts and because their anti-Koizumi affiliations should further increase the discount ratios of the future posts. Therefore, the effect should be strengthened for junior and senior legislators.

⁹⁹ In fact, the big three were the Hashimoto, Mori, and Horiuchi factions as of June 2005, but I do not define the Mori faction as the big three as it was the mainstream – Koizumi was from the Mori faction.

Table 4.1: Factional Balance, June 2005

Faction Name	# of Members	% of Members	# of Loyalists	# of Persuaded	# of Abstained	# of Defected
Hashimoto	50	20.16%	15	17	2	16
Mori	50	20.16%	48	1	0	1
Horiuchi	34	13.71%	18	8	5	3
Kamei	29	11.69%	10	6	1	12
Yamasaki	26	10.48%	20	3	2	1
Kōmura	12	4.84%	8	3	1	0
Ozato	12	4.84%	11	1	0	0
Kōno	9	3.63%	7	1	0	1
Nikai	4	1.61%	3	1	0	0
Ind	22		15	3	1	3
Sum	248		155	44	12	37

Note: Ind = Independents who did not belong to any factions

TERMS is also used for measuring a member's career possibilities inside and outside the LDP. TERMS simply measures the number of terms served by a member in the Diet. To test the curvilinear hypothesis, I will also include TERMS². The curvilinearity hypothesis suggests that the coefficient for TERMS should be negative, while TERMS² should have the positive coefficient. In addition, where appropriate, I use simple dichotomous variables: YOUNG (1 if TERMS is three or less, and 0 otherwise); SENIOR (1 if TERMS is seven or more, and 0 otherwise).

It is important to repeat here that I am interested not only in the individual effects of these explanatory variables, but also in the conditional effects. In other words, each explanatory variable will work differently depending upon a legislator's given situation: for example, young politicians will care less about their policy investment than the electoral prospects. To test these implications, I employ interactions terms. I also show graphical outputs based on simulation results to clarify complex relationships.

Control variables include AGE (in years), DID, LOCALPOLITICS, and NISEI. Physically young legislators may be more able to take advantage of mobility in the political market. To capture the rural bias of the LDP, DID is included (Scheiner 2005, 2006). It measures the level of urbanization of a legislator's SMD: the percentage of the population residing in "densely inhabited districts" as defined by the Japanese government's census bureau.¹⁰⁰ The value ranges from 0 to 1, and a higher score means that the district is more urbanized. For the pure-PR candidates, I calculated the DID ratio of each PR bloc. A dichotomous variable, LOCALPOLITICS measures 1 if a member previously served as either a member of a local assembly or a local governor; 0 otherwise. Local politicians could be advantaged in terms of their close connections with voters, as well as their names being recognized by local voters. Another dichotomous variable, NISEI, is included: it is coded 1 for members who inherit *keōenkai* in their districts as hereditary assets from their father, brother, or other relative who had previously served in the Lower House; 0 otherwise. As *keōenkai* is so costly, establishing them from scratch requires great amounts of money and energy; members are advantaged when they already have their own *keōenkai* (Ishibashi and Reed 1992; Taniguchi 2008).

¹⁰⁰ Technically, DIDs are those areas that satisfy two conditions: first, they should have the population density of more than 4,000 people per squared km; and second, they should have the population of more than 5,000 people. The DID ratio is now a commonly used urbanization index, for example as used by Scheiner (2006). The data is available at Taku Sugawara's website (http://freett.com/sugawara_taku/data/2003did.html). I thank Taku Sugawara for making this data public.

Summary statistics and predicted signs are provided in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Summary Statistics and Predicted Signs for Major Variables

Variable Name	Obs	Mean	Median	S.D.	Min	Max	Predictions
STRENGTH	233	0.16	0.10	0.19	-0.54	0.86	+, and the coefficient would increase if 'TERMS is low (1-3)
ZOKUPOINT	248	0.45	0	0.95	0	6	+, and the coefficient would increase if 'TERMS is in the middle (4-6)
ANTI KOIZUMI	248	0.45	0	0.50	0	1	+, and the coefficient would increase if 'TERMS is low and high (7+)
TERMS	248	4.16	3	2.80	1	15	Curvilinear; and the curve would get steeper if ANTI KOIZUMI is 1
AGE	248	55.82	56	9.77	29	79	-
DID	248	0.55	0.53	0.28	0.08	1.00	-
LOCAL POLITICS	248	0.31	0	0.46	0	1	+
NISEI	248	0.38	0	0.49	0	1	+

4.4.3. Analysis

Table 4.3 reports the results of my basic models. In Models 1 and 2, I use the members who ran in the 2003 and/or previous elections as SMD candidates, while in Models 3 and 4 I include all the members. 'TERMS' and 'TERMS²' are used as career variables in Models 1 and 3, while Models 2 and 4 use YOUNG and SENIOR dummies. As these models show, 'TERMS' and 'TERMS²' show better fits than the simple dichotomous variables in terms of the significance of the variables and the explicability of the entire models, so I will use the former

variables in the next models.

Table 4.3: Basic Ordered Logit Estimates for ZOUHAN

	Model 1 (Excluding the pure-PR members)	Model 2 (Excluding the pure-PR members)	Model 3 (All the members)	Model 4 (All the members)
STRENGTH	1.32 (0.89)	0.72 (0.83)		
PR			-0.16 (0.51)	0.073 (0.50)
ZOKUPOINT	0.40** (0.16)	0.30* (0.15)	0.36** (0.15)	0.28* (0.15)
ANTIKOIZUMI	2.01*** (0.32)	1.89*** (0.31)	2.09*** (0.31)	1.99*** (0.30)
TERMS	-0.76*** (0.20)		-0.63*** (0.19)	
TERMS ²	0.045*** (0.015)		0.038*** (0.014)	
YOUNG		0.97** (0.40)		0.81** (0.38)
SENIOR		0.14 (0.47)		0.13 (0.46)
AGE	0.057*** (0.021)	0.032* (0.019)	0.044** (0.019)	0.025 (0.018)
DID	-0.22 (0.58)	-0.44 (0.57)	-0.48 (0.53)	-0.55 (0.53)
LOCALPOLITICS	-0.56 (0.36)	-0.49 (0.36)	-0.47 (0.34)	-0.46 (0.34)
NISEI	-0.22 (0.34)	-0.23 (0.33)	-0.13 (0.32)	-0.17 (0.32)
1	2.76 (1.09)	3.60 (1.27)	2.12 (1.00)	3.01 (1.18)
2	3.82 (1.11)	4.64 (1.28)	3.25 (1.02)	4.11 (1.19)
3	4.23 (1.11)	5.03 (1.29)	3.64 (1.02)	4.50 (1.20)
Observations	231	231	248	248
Pseudo R2	0.15	0.13	0.15	0.13
Log likelihood	-198.25	-203.42	-217.69	-221.73

Standard Errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Most of the main explanatory variables show the expected signs: electorally strong

legislators were likely to defy; the policy investments in the past negatively affected party cohesion; members from disadvantaged factions were likely to defy; and the relationship between seniority in the party and defiance behavior is curvilinear. The variable PR does not work, as its coefficients are inconsistent in terms of the signs and are insignificant. This is partly because the variable ANTIKOIZUMI predicts almost perfectly the defiance behavior for the pure-PR members: Of the seventeen pure-PR members, three voted against Koizumi and one abstained. These four defiant members were not postal *zoku gin* but all belonged to the Hashimoto and Kamei factions.

Note that the electoral variables are insignificant, while the policy and career variables show significance. However, as explained above, have theoretical reasons to believe that the electoral strength should have mattered, and how it actually does so should be conditional upon legislators' terms. This will be revealed in the next models utilizing interactions.

Before proceeding to interaction models, it is worth looking at the curvilinear relationship and how it mediates the effects of the other explanatory variables graphically. I performed 1,000 simulations based on Model 1 in Table 4.3, using CLARIFY (Tomz et al. 2001). What I try to do is to see how change in some explanatory variables affects $\text{Pr}(\text{ZOUHAN}=3)$, with the other variables kept constant at median. The lines in Figure 4.2 indicate the 95 per cent intervals.

First, Hypothesis 1 is graphically confirmed. As can be seen in Figure 4.2a, the likelihood of voting against Koizumi is the highest among legislators with only one term (mean = 0.15), gradually decreases to the local minimum – legislators with eight terms (mean = 0.018) – and goes up if a legislator is in the ninth term or more. Secondly, the curvilinearity is

conditional upon the other explanatory variables: As shown in Figures 4.2b and 4.2c, STRENGTH and ANTIKOIZUMI have the effect of making the curve steeper. This is more than the effects of treatment, as for example shown in Figure 4.2c, where the shallow curve of a control group gets deeper: The average anti-Koizumi first-term legislator now votes against Koizumi with probability 0.54, while the average anti-Koizumi eighth-term legislator does so at 0.11. Thirdly and relatedly, the figures show the predicted interaction effects. Figure 4.2b suggests that the variable STRENGTH pushes the probability of voting against Koizumi upward, especially among legislators with one to three terms. The variable ANTIKOIZUMI has similar effects, but this time they are larger among junior and senior members.

The variable ZOKUPOINT also has the expected effects, as shown in Figures 4.2d and 4.2e. Keeping the other variables constant at the median value, zoku giin overwhelms young legislators in terms of the likelihood of voting against Koizumi (Figure 4.2d). Senior zoku giin are more likely to vote against Koizumi than junior legislators, although there is no significant difference between mid-career and senior zoku giin (Figure 4.2e). This point, which sounds somewhat unsatisfactory in light of Hypothesis 3, will be tested with refined models incorporating interaction terms.

a) General Prediction




Figure 4.2: TERMS, ZOKUPOINT, and Simulated Probability

b) The Effects of Change in STRENGTH from Median (●) by Two S.D.s (■) on TERMS




Figure 4.2: TERMS, ZOKUPOINT, and Simulated Probability (Continued)

c) The Effects of Change in ANTIKOIZUMI from 0 (●) to 1 (■) on TERMS




Figure 4.2: TERMS, ZOKUPOINT, and Simulated Probability (Continued)

d) The Effects of Change in TERMS from 1 (●) to 5 (■) on ZOKUPOINT




Figure 4.2: TERMS, ZOKUPOINT, and Simulated Probability (Continued)

e) The Effects of Change in TERMS from 5 (●) to 10 (■) on ZOKUPOINT




Figure 4.2: TERMS, ZOKUPOINT, and Simulated Probability (Continued)

Note: The lines indicate the 95% intervals, based on 1,000 times of simulations that I performed with CLARIFY, using Model 1 in Table 4.3. Other variables are set at the median value. Note that, as all the legislators with only one term in the Diet have 0 ZOKUPOINT in my sample, the graph d) shows only the 95% intervals of $\Pr(\text{ZOUHAN}=3 | \text{ZOKUPOINT}=0, \text{TERMS}=1)$ for comparison.

With these graphical findings in mind, I proceed to models incorporating interaction.

Models 5 to 8 in Table 4 add interaction terms between the three explanatory variables

(STRENGTH, ZOKUPOINT and ANTIKOIZUMI) on the one hand and TERMS and

TERMS² on the other. Throughout the models, the interaction terms are statistically

significant. This suggests that the theoretical considerations are confirmed: How the electoral,

policy and career variables worked for legislators' calculations was conditional upon their

career-ladder positions in the party.

Specifically, the coefficients for the interaction terms suggest that the effects of

STRENGTH, ZOKUPOINT and ANTIKOIZUMI on TERMS reach the extremal points when TERMS is around four to six – the middle of the career. Given the coefficients, I can interpret the findings as follows: the effects of the electoral strength on ZOUHAN, conditional on TERMS, are positive when TERMS is one and two; the effects of policy investments on defiance behavior are only marginal among legislators with one to two terms, but substantially increase if they experienced three to seven terms in the Diet; and, although legislators in the three big anti-Koizumi factions were likely to defy the leadership whoever they were, they were much more likely to do so, if they had experienced only one or two terms, or, ten or more terms, in the Diet.

Table 4.4: Ordered Logit Estimates for ZOUHAN, Interactions

	Model 5 (All the members except pure-PR)	Model 6 (All the members except pure-PR)	Model 7 (All the members except pure-PR)	Model 8 (All the members except pure-PR)
STRENGTH	7.66*** (2.68)	7.73*** (2.69)	1.31 (0.92)	9.59*** (3.06)
ZOKUPOINT	0.45*** (0.16)	-1.31 (1.13)	-2.01* (1.16)	-2.42*** (1.20)
ANTI KOIZUMI	1.96*** (0.32)	2.02*** (0.33)	3.22*** (0.96)	3.16*** (0.99)
TERMS	-0.30 (0.27)	-0.37 (0.26)	-0.73** (0.29)	-0.21 (0.38)
TERMS ²	0.0011 (0.024)	0.0092 (0.022)	0.037* (0.022)	-0.017 (0.036)
STRENGTH* TERMS	-3.43*** (1.23)	-3.51*** (1.23)		-4.37*** (1.50)
STRENGTH* TERMS ²	0.31*** (0.11)	0.32*** (0.11)		0.39*** (0.14)
ZOKUPOINT* TERMS		0.81* (0.44)	1.20** (0.47)	1.38*** (0.49)
ZOKUPOINT* TERMS ²		-0.082** (0.041)	-0.13*** (0.045)	-0.14*** (0.047)
ANTI KOIZUMI* TERMS			-0.86* (0.44)	-0.88* (0.47)
ANTI KOIZUMI* TERMS ²			0.11** (0.041)	0.11** (0.045)
AGE	0.060*** (0.021)	0.059*** (0.021)	0.049** (0.021)	0.053** (0.021)
DID	-0.44 (0.59)	-0.42 (0.59)	0.086 (0.60)	-0.073 (0.61)
LOCAL POLITICS	-0.71* (0.37)	-0.76** (0.37)	-0.52* (0.36)	-0.71* (0.37)
NISEI	-0.30 (0.34)	0.41 (0.35)	-0.47 (0.36)	-0.54 (0.36)
Observations	231	231	231	231
Pseudo R2	0.17	0.18	0.19	0.21
Log likelihood	-193.21	-190.58	-189.73	-184.64

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

These interpretations confirm the hypothesis that there are three types of legislators.

Ambitious juniors, seeing their electoral strength as providing opportunities to seek a new career outside the party, would be more likely to challenge the leadership; policy commitments were irrelevant for this calculation, while being in the disadvantaged factions further enhanced their career-related grievances. Mid-career policy seekers, more integrated to the party's career ladder, were likely to rebel if they felt that their shaky voter bases built on local post office networks were being further eroded by Koizumi's courageous reform. Highly conscious about their career prospects within the party, antagonistic seniors realized that, under Koizumi's current government, leading the anti-mainstream factions made it unlikely that the largest spoils would be theirs. Trusting voter networks in their local kingdoms, they voted against Koizumi.

As alternative specifications, I ran logit models with different dependent variables.

As in the ordered logit models, I employed interactions along with the explanatory variables. Table 4.5 reports the estimates. Model 9, 11 and 13 suggest the curvilinear hypothesis holds, although in Model 11 *TERMS* and *TERMS*² are significant only at the 10 per cent level. As to interactions (Models 10, 12 and 14), although *STRENGTH*'s conditional effects in Model 14 and some of the component variables (i.e. *ZOKUPOINT* in Models 12 and 14) lose significance, the curvilinearity is again proven to be conditional on the electoral, policy and career variables throughout the models. In addition, the size of these interactions indicates that the extreme points of the effects of *STRENGTH*, *ZOKUPOINT* and *ANTI-KOIZUMI* on *TERMS* are the same as the models in Tables 3 and 4, around the mid-career – four to six – and this finding is again consistent with my hypothesis that there were three types of dissidents. Overall, the results are a bit weaker in these alternative models, but still largely confirm the theory.

Table 4.5: Logit Estimates for ZOUHAN

	DV: Pr(ZOUHAN ≥ 1)		DV: Pr(ZOUHAN ≥ 2)		DV: Pr(ZOUHAN ≥ 3)	
	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
STRENGTH	0.69 (1.00)	9.99*** (3.53)	2.24** (1.06)	11.05*** (3.83)	2.04* (1.23)	8.37* (4.49)
ZOKUPOINT	0.46*** (0.17)	-3.82*** (1.41)	0.38** (0.19)	-1.63 (1.40)	0.75*** (0.21)	-1.58 (1.52)
ANTI KOIZUMI	2.08*** (0.34)	3.35*** (1.19)	1.94*** (0.42)	4.92*** (1.53)	2.32*** (0.54)	5.94*** (2.18)
TERMS	-0.82*** (0.22)	-0.47 (0.41)	-0.47* (0.58)	0.63 (0.56)	-0.77*** (0.30)	0.51 (1.03)
TERMS ²	0.046*** (0.016)	0.00049 (0.037)	0.034* (0.018)	0.054 (0.047)	0.052** (0.021)	-0.069 (0.10)
STRENGTH*		-4.55*** (1.66)		-4.26** (1.76)		-3.39 (2.28)
TERMS		0.40*** (0.15)		0.36** (0.16)		0.32 (0.22)
STRENGTH*		2.01*** (0.59)		1.02* (0.55)		1.16* (0.61)
TERMS		-0.20*** (0.057)		-0.11** (0.052)		-0.12** (0.058)
ZOKUPOINT*		-0.88 (0.56)		-1.52** (0.63)		-2.02** (0.99)
TERMS		0.12** (0.054)		0.14** (0.056)		0.21** (0.10)
ZOKUPOINT*						
TERMS ²	0.061*** (0.022)	0.065*** (0.023)	0.034 (0.027)	0.030 (0.029)	0.053* (0.032)	0.042 (0.035)
AGE	-0.033 (0.63)	0.35 (0.67)	-0.83 (0.74)	-0.64 (0.80)	-1.30 (0.87)	-0.66 (0.94)
DID	-0.41 (0.39)	-0.58 (0.42)	-0.84* (0.47)	-1.10** (0.50)	-0.71 (0.52)	-1.02* (0.55)
LOCAL POLITICS	-0.21 (0.37)	0.044 (0.40)	-0.75* (0.44)	-1.10** (0.49)	-1.38** (0.54)	-2.00*** (0.65)
NISEI	-3.01** (1.17)	-3.86*** (1.38)	-2.99** (1.38)	-5.14*** (1.95)	-3.84** (1.61)	-5.84** (2.59)
Constant	231	231	231	231	231	231
Observations	0.22	0.31	0.20	0.28	0.27	0.35
Pseudo R2	-117.42	-103.95	-91.53	-82.13	-70.74	-62.46
Log likelihood						

Note: The sample is all the members except pure-PR members. Standard Errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that politicians have different benefits from loyalty to a party. Staying in a party may not improve reelection prospects if party labels matter little in the elections. Policy benefits from a party can go against legislators, if their policy preferences are not close to those of the party leader. However, the benefits of posts, translated by party rules, can mediate these potential factors for dissension. In particular, a seniority rule linked to policy-making posts can mediate legislators' personal-vote incentives and distinctive policy preferences. So, even under personalistic electoral systems that would promote fragmentation inside parties, legislators' dissidence can be mitigated. Accordingly, to maximize their reelection and career promotion prospects, legislators have different incentives: juniors try to develop personal vote networks to go up the career ladder, mid-career members make efficient use of policy-making influence, and seniors concentrate on maintaining the status quo. Seeing party leaders trying to reform the existing rules and threatening a priority policy area from which they derive benefits, legislators with policy preferences and discounted career prospects will be likely to defy the leadership by forging a coalition.

I have tested this with the recent case in Japan, where the practice of the personal vote, bringing pork to local districts and intra-party fragmentation were the norm. The ruling LDP elaborately developed organizational rules to internalize the negative externalities of the personal vote and policy-seeking incentives on party cohesion. But Koizumi's massive support from voters because of his television image and rhetoric of reform allowed him to step up his efforts to centralize the party structure. Then in an attempt to facilitate his favored policy reform, postal privatization, the conflict between Koizumi and the dissidents exploded

when Koizumi ignored conventional party politics to pursue his objective. The empirical test based on ordered logit models support the argument. Specifically, it is shown that electorally strong, young anti-Koizumi faction members would be likely to vote against Koizumi, because they had less investment in party posts and believed that in the worst case scenario they had a political future even outside the party in the centrist DPJ. Mid-career members were reluctant to use the options of exit or voice, as they were dependent on party posts for access to policymaking to deliver to their constituents. But still they dissented if they were *zoku gin* with vested interests in the postal policy area. At the peak of their career, seniors were likely to rebel, as they could expect promotion to the highest positions in the party or the government if they could oust Koizumi. If they were frustrated with Koizumi's anti-traditional politics, the likelihood and intensity of their defiant behavior was greater.

A part of Chapter 4 appeared in Nemoto, Kuniaki, Ellis S. Krauss, and Robert Pekkanen. 2008. "Policy Defection and Party Discipline: The July 2005 Vote on Postal Privatization in Japan." *British Journal of Political Science* 38 (3): 499-525. I acknowledge my co-authors, Professors Ellis Krauss and Robert Pekkanen, for their generous permissions. The dissertation author was the primary investigator and author of this paper.

Chapter 5. Party Discipline and Policy Dissension in Korea

Any assemblyman shall vote according to his own conscience as a representative of the nation, without being bound by the intention of a political party whereto he belongs.¹⁰¹

5.1. Introduction

This chapter is designed to explore the puzzle of party unity in South Korea. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the South Korean president's powers to satisfy individual legislators vote- and policy-seeking incentives are limited, given the personalistic electoral competition and ideological disunity inside the parties. However, the president has been able to maintain a high level of legislative productivity: on average, 80-90% of the government-initiated bills could get through the National Assembly (Park 2000a). How do party leaders in a country like South Korea mediate the negative effects of personal vote and ideological diversity on party cohesion?

First, I show that even though party label does not generally have strong effects in South Korea, the *value of party label* can vary even within the same country. *Where party label is seen as almost a sufficient condition for reelection*, legislators find their reelection fortune nearly completely dependent on party endorsements and thus they should vote the party line. On the other hand, *where party label is not seen as such a critical asset*, legislators' electoral strength would

¹⁰¹ The National Assembly Act of the Republic of Korea, Article 114-2.

allow or encourage them to act more freely from their party patrons on the legislative floor; dependence on party label for reelection in this case is proportional to electoral vulnerability.

Second, and more importantly for the purpose of this dissertation, *access to office benefits* also matters. If extra-legislative ruling elites can define legislators' career paths, legislators should keep loyal to their parties as long as they can expect fair distribution of office benefits. The cabinet led by the prime minister, the presidential office, or other extra-legislative brokers can provide such office benefits to buy legislators' loyalty.

By framing the theory in this way, this chapter argues that the puzzling party cohesion in Korea can be explained. First, Korean political parties have extremely strong regional bases to the extent that an endorsement from a certain party in a certain region fundamentally means nearly a 90% victory in elections, while in Seoul and surrounding urban areas, where *party label does not necessarily guarantee reelection*, legislators' perceived benefits from party label are proportional to their electoral vulnerability; thus winning a seat in these areas with a large margin gives some leeway for a legislator to act more independently, while an electorally weak legislator should see party label as a more important asset than his/her colleagues do. Second, the executive office in Korea can use a variety of resources to buy support from legislators: the president has the exclusive power in budget making and personnel management to distribute to presidential supporters in the legislature governmental privileges ranging from subsidies, cabinet ministers, and posts in public and semi-public corporations and organizations. Thus members from a presidential party have a much greater premium in access to office benefits.

One theoretical caveat is that, as explained in Chapter 2, a presidential regime like South Korea cannot institutionalize a stable internal party structure whereby the leadership is

kept accountable to backbenchers and backbenchers reliably delegate to the leadership. This marks a great contrast to parliamentary Japan: as reviewed in Chapter 4, the LDP gradually invented personnel management norms (seniority and factional balance) to maintain party unity. Meanwhile, in South Korea, as explored in Chapter 3, the relationship between party leaders and backbenchers are relatively unstable, especially before the presidential elections: party splits and mergers and switching tend to become widespread as the presidential elections approach, as backbenchers tend to bandwagon on winnable presidential candidates who most often launch their own new parties only designed for the presidential elections. This calls for attention to how ruling party members perceive access to benefits: they should discount access to office benefits as the presidential elections approach, as their existing access to office benefits might be gone after the next elections, which might pick up an opposition candidate. Therefore we shall see that the party cohesion of ruling party members will decline as time goes by, especially when presidential elections approach.

An empirical analysis will utilize an original database that covers how members in the National Assembly voted on more than 600 bills and legislative motions between December 2000 and May 2008. The results are confirmatory to the theoretical predictions. First, *where party label is a crucial asset* and/or if legislators have *access to office benefits*, party cohesion is significantly higher and defection from the party line is less likely. Second, the negative effects of electoral invulnerability and ideological extremity on party cohesion are significantly moderated by the two precious goods. And third, party cohesion in ruling parties in fact declines as presidential elections get closer.

5.2. The Three Different Incentives

5.2.1. *Party Label as a Critical Asset*

The literature sees party label as a common good for party members and argues that it could raise the nation-wide public reputation of a party and therefore party members would share interests in improving the performance of their parties to increase their own reelection prospects (Cox and McCubbins 2007). Except certain electoral systems under which members from the same party have to compete with each other for personal votes, party label is a necessary good under closed-list PR systems and a highly valuable, if not definitely required, asset for winning elections under single-member district (SMD) systems (Carey and Shugart 1995). An implication that can be drawn from this literature is that, under SMD systems, unless legislators have powerful vote-mobilizing networks in their local districts, they are discouraged from anti-party behaviors for electoral reasons.

However, as research on party systems has shown, the direct effects of electoral systems on parties and legislators are necessarily mediated by other factors, in particular social cleavages (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997). Similarly, the effects of party label are also mediated by social cleavages; in India, for example, ethnic parties send signals to constituents by using distinctive party label and succeed in winning votes and seats, but they are in general regionally limited in the sense that they can win seats in only a few regions of the country, given the distributed nature of ethnic groups (Chandra 2004). This rise of ethnic, regional parties also forces nation-wide parties to form pre-electoral coalitions with these local parties in winning seats where ethnic minorities are concentrated (Chhibber 1999). Thus even if the same SMD systems are up and running across a country and some seemingly nationalized parties succeed

in gaining seats in different regions, there should be significant regional variations in how *party label is perceived* in elections.

In explaining legislators' behaviors on the assembly floor, this point would make a significant difference. *Where party label is perceived as a critical asset such that an affiliation with a certain party is almost a sufficient condition for reelection*, even if legislators win by large margins, they would know that many of the votes they got were cast for the party label. Therefore, for fear of losing endorsements in the next elections, they would need to keep loyalty and obey party line voting. In addition, this can happen at the costs of sacrificing their personal beliefs, because legislators know that the quickest way to make their policies is to survive the elections, stay in the legislature, and go up the career ladder inside their parties. Even if their ideological bents are extreme compared to fellow members in the party, legislators would need to maintain unity.

5.2.2. *Access to Office Benefits*

Access to office benefits, by itself, can convince legislators to switch parties and vote for the party line: the promise to promote a member to a higher office, give patronage, and allocate pork-barrel benefits to local districts (Amorim Neto 2002; Benedetto and Hix 2007; Desposato 2006b). Built on the theoretical argument in Chapter 2, this chapter contends that the effects of *access to office benefits* would be salient virtually everywhere, either in parliamentary or presidential regimes, under two conditions: legislators credibly depend on extra-legislative ruling elites, including the president, the prime minister, provincial governors, and local political patrons for their career paths; and these ruling elites can credibly commit to providing such access in the foreseeable future.

In parliamentary regimes, office privileges exclusively belong to a ruling coalition whose performance is ultimately dependent upon backbenchers' loyalty (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Huber 1996). In presidential regimes, the president or other extra-legislative brokers can in fact provide various types of office benefits to fellow members in the legislature to purchase support, as in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico (Amorim Neto 2002; Jones and Hwang 2005; Nacif 2002). Particularly in a centralized presidential regime, the president is the sole actor capable of offering *access to office benefits*, and such capability should vary depending on the president's constitutional powers – budget making, personnel management, agenda setting, etc – as well as the concurrence of the elections and the term limits on the president, as discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Especially under presidential systems with non-concurrent elections and the term limit on the president, the president's powers to give away office benefits are constrained by the very fact that the president must necessarily be replaced by the presidential elections. Therefore for presidential party members, *access to office benefits* could be comparably high if the president has a wide range of resources defined by the constitution, but it could have decreasing effects, as their existing *access to office benefits* might be gone after the next elections, which might pick up an opposition candidate.

5.3. Korean Context

South Korea meets the two conditions to test the above theoretical propositions. First, *party label* has significantly different effects across the country. Korean political parties have extremely strong regional bases to the extent that an endorsement from a certain party in a certain region fundamentally means nearly a 90% chance of victory in elections. Second,

legislators' *access to office benefits* also significantly varies depending on their ties to the president. The Korean constitution gives the president the exclusive power to distribute governmental privileges. Thus members from a presidential party have much greater premiums in access to office benefits. Third, however, ruling party members discount this *access to office benefits* as the presidential elections approach. Electoral uncertainty over a presidential election winner and the five-year term limit imposed on the president lead individual legislators to join the bandwagon of winnable presidential candidates even across the party line; the result is loosened party cohesion.

Korea's current electoral system for the unicameral legislature (the National Assembly, NA) is a mixed-member majoritarian one, in which around 80% of the legislators are elected on SMDs. From 2004, voters have two votes, one for one of the 243 SMDs and another for a nation-wide closed-list proportional representation bloc that has 56 seats.¹⁰² It is known that Korean legislators elected on SMDs, especially those first elected to the NA, spend substantial time on offering constituency services and developing personal networks in districts, as in other SMD systems (Yoon 2002b). Various analyses on electoral campaigns in Korea show that candidates in SMDs rarely differentiate themselves from others in terms of policy issues; rather, they tend to mobilize personal networks ranging from kinships and alumni associations to hiking and other entertainment clubs to focus on their own personal appeals and traits, such as age and education, personal connections to political leaders (especially the president), and the ability to bring pork-barrel benefits to districts (Cho 2000; Jeong 2000b; Kim 2000c; Kim

¹⁰² From 2008, there are 245 SMD seats and 54 PR seats.

2004b; Lee 2004; Lim 2008; Park 2004; Song 2000, 2004; Yu 2000, 2004).

However, the patterns of candidates' reliance on personal votes significantly vary across the country. This is because in Korea, a severe regional cleavage is one of the most significant factors that define political dynamics since it allows certain parties to promise electoral victories to their candidates in certain regions (Kim 2003; Kwon 2004; Moon 2005; Park 2003a). As Table 5.1 shows, the "conservative" camp (Democratic Liberal Party, the New Korea Party, and the Grand National Party) has been so dominant in Gyeongsang-do as well as Busan and Daegu, the two metropolitan cities in the region, while the "progressive" camp (the Democratic Party, the National Congress for New Politics, the Millennium Democratic Party, and the Uri Party) dominated Jeolla-do and Gwangju, a central city in the region. The United Liberal Democrats and its descendants (the People First Party and the Liberty Forward Party) have been relatively dominant, though to the lesser extent, in Chungcheong-do and Daejeon; for example in the 2008 elections, the LFP got 15 out of 23 seats in the area. Meanwhile, Seoul and the surrounding province (Gyeonggi-do) have been much more hotly contested areas, where swing voters make electoral prospects much uncertain.

Table 5.1: National Assembly Election Results

	1992				1996			
	DLP	DP	UPP	Others	NKP	NCNP	ULD	Others
Seoul	16	25	2	1	27	18	0	2
Busan	15	0	0	1	21	0	0	0
Daegu	8	0	2	1	2	0	8	3
Incheon	5	1	0	1	9	0	0	0
Gwangju	0	6	0	0	0	6	0	0
Daejeon	1	2	0	2	0	0	7	0
Gyeonggi-do	18	8	5	0	18	10	5	5
Gangwon-do	8	0	4	2	9	0	2	2
Chungcheongbuk-do	6	1	2	0	2	0	5	1
Chungcheongnam-do	7	1	4	2	1	0	12	0
Jeollabuk-do	2	12	0	0	1	13	0	0
Jeollanam-do	0	19	0	0	0	17	0	0
Gyeongsangbuk-do	14	0	2	5	11	0	2	6
Gyeongsangnam-do	16	0	3	4	17	0	0	6
Jeju-do	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	0
PR	31	23	7		18	13	9	6

	2000				2004			
	GNP	MDP	ULD	Others	GNP	Uri	DLP	Others
Seoul	17	28	0	0	16	32	0	0
Busan	17	0	0	0	17	1	0	0
Daegu	11	0	0	0	12	0	0	0
Incheon	5	6	0	0	3	9	0	0
Gwangju	0	5	0	0	0	7	0	0
Daejeon	1	2	3	1	0	6	0	0
Gyeonggi-do	18	22	1	0	14	35	0	0
Gangwon-do	3	5	0	1	6	2	0	0
Chungcheongbuk-do	3	2	2	0	0	8	0	0
Chungcheongnam-do	0	4	6	1	1	5	0	4
Jeollabuk-do	0	9	0	1	0	11	0	0
Jeollanam-do	0	11	0	2	0	7	0	6
Gyeongsangbuk-do	16	0	0	0	19	0	0	1
Gyeongsangnam-do	20	0	0	1	15	3	2	1
Jeju-do	1	2	0	0	0	3	0	0
PR	21	19	5	1	21	23	8	0

Note: DLP = Democratic Liberal Party; DP = Democratic Party; UPP = Unification People's Party; NKP = New Korea Party; NCNP = National Congress for New Politics; ULD = United Liberal Democrats; GNP = Grand National Party; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; Uri = Uri Party; DLP = Democratic Labor Party.

Thus in Korea, party label has different effects on incentives for party cohesion in different regions. In Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do (and Chungcheong-do to the lesser extent), party label is almost a sufficient condition for reelection; and therefore, even if a legislator wins the election with a large margin, such electoral strength may be simply attributed to persistent

regionalism and an affiliation with a certain party. Therefore, for legislators elected in these regional strongholds, endorsements from the same party would be highly critical to their electoral fortune in the next elections. Given that Korean parties are highly centralized in the hands of a few leaders, including the president, and a large majority of candidates are still endorsed in a top-down manner (Jeon 2005; Kim 2000a),¹⁰³ it is expected that, in order to get an endorsement, they would try to show their loyalty to the party on the legislative floor, even at the cost of their policy preferences.

In addition to the effects of regionalism, the Korean president has a range of institutional tools to align the incentives of legislator, as explained in Chapter 3. First, the president has the enormous lawmaking powers defined by the constitution. Using this fiscal

¹⁰³ Although some Korean authors point out that the nomination process was decentralized especially after 2004 and therefore party discipline was significantly weakened (Jaung 2005), evidence suggests that this is not the case. First, the Korean parties introduced the primaries to only selected districts: the Uri Party and the Grand National Party, the two major parties in the 2004 elections, held the primaries in only less than a quarter (24.4%) of the districts (Jeon 2005). Second, these primaries were rarely open to all the general voters residing in districts: for example, the Uri Party held a primary in 2004 for the Mokpo district, but only 1,500 general voters were allowed to participate in this process (compared to 2,800 Uri Party members in the district), and the 1,500 participants were actually selected from a pool of the 6,000 supporters of six primary candidates themselves (Kim 2004b). Third, as the empirical analysis below suggests, the legislators elected in 2004 were actually less likely to defect from the party line than those elected in 2000.

power, the president is known to allocate government privileges (namely, subsidies) preferentially to presidential party members (Horiuchi and Lee 2008; Kwon 2005).¹⁰⁴ Second, the president has a wide array of personnel appointments that can satisfy legislators' incentives. The president appoints ministers or members of the State Council, the highest administrative organ led by the president, with recommendations from the Prime Minister, who is also appointed by the president.¹⁰⁵ Third, the president's personnel power extends to various jobs in state-owned enterprises. As explored in Chapter 3, the president allocates these patronage posts exclusively to ruling party members to align the incentives of legislators.

However, these powers are also constrained by the very fact that the Korean president's term is constitutionally given as five years. And as seen in Chapter 3, these enormous powers of the Korean president can cut two ways: they can buy support from individual legislators, but individual legislators also vie for these powers, resulting in factionalism and the rise of ephemeral presidentialized parties. To receive financial and personal support from legislators for the presidential election campaigning, leaders as potential winners of the presidential elections must promise to provide those supporters with office benefits after the elections. Therefore it is crucial for rank-and-file members to find right patrons who are going to win the next presidential elections; a corollary of this is that, especially when there will be no clear winner for the candidate selection process, there are severe intra-party factional struggles.

¹⁰⁴ Chapter 7 explores this point in depth.

¹⁰⁵ The Republic of Korea Constitution, Article 86-7 and 94. "Recommendations" are not obligatory and the Prime Minister is not considered as having the veto power over the president's personnel management in practice.

Rank-and-file members often leave their parties to join the bandwagon regardless of their ideological beliefs and/or party affiliations.

For the president, this is a crucial problem. *Access to office benefits* may be still an important tool to keep the party line, but it would be highly discounted as the presidential elections approach; ruling party members discount the value of affiliating with the current president as the next presidential elections might pick up an opposition candidate as a winner. The result would be the loosening of party cohesion in ruling parties.

In sum, it has been shown that Korea is one of the optimal cases to test the effects of the different incentives for party cohesion. In Korea, party label has significantly different effects across the country, with political parties having extremely strong regional bases and dominating the endorsement process. The constitutional and other legal provisions give the president the exclusive powers to distribute governmental privileges, and some evidence suggests that these privileges are preferentially given to presidential supporters. However, as the presidential elections approach, ruling party members discount the value of affiliating with the current president, and the presidential powers become gradually obsolete. Thus *party label* and *access to office benefits* would discourage legislators from voting against the party line and, furthermore, they would mediate the effects of the vote and policy incentives on how legislators behave on the NA floor; but, the gradually discounted nature of *access to office benefits* would loosen the unity of ruling parties as the elections approach. Specifically, this chapter will test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1. A legislator's defection likelihood would be low in general if he/she is elected on his/her party's regional stronghold and/or if he/she is from a ruling party.

Hypothesis 2. The negative effects of a legislator's electoral strengths and ideological extremity on party cohesion are moderated, if he/she is elected on his/her party's regional stronghold.

Hypothesis 3. The negative effects of a legislator's electoral strengths and ideological extremity on party cohesion are moderated, if he/she is from a ruling party.

Hypothesis 4. The unity of ruling parties declines as the elections approach.

5.4. Empirical Analysis

5.4.1. *Observation Unit, Observation Period, Models*

The observation period starts from December 2000 and ends in May 2008 and covers two entire National Assembly terms (from 2000 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2008). The data covers all the bills in this period that were voted on with less than 97 percent of yeas, a commonly used threshold in the literature on roll call votes. Of the total of 2,695 bills and motions that have electronic records on how legislators voted, 621 meet this criterion and all of these will be included. Available at the NA website, records contain information on which legislators were present on a specific day and how they voted.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ <http://likms.assembly.go.kr/record/>. Note that electronic voting started in 1999 but only one vote was roll-called in the same year. Therefore the data only start from December 2000, when electronic voting became much common.

Table 5.2: National Assembly Sessions, from December 2000 to May 2008

Session #	Session Type	Start Date	End Date	# of Bills Roll-called	# of Bills Used
216	Extraordinary	December 11, 2000	January 9, 2001	3	3
226	Extraordinary	December 14, 2001	January 12, 2002	2	2
234	Ordinary	September 2, 2002	December 10, 2002	52	7
235	Extraordinary	December 30, 2002	January 28, 2003	7	2
236	Extraordinary	February 5, 2003	February 28, 2003	11	1
238	Extraordinary	April 1, 2003	April 30, 2003	73	11
239	Extraordinary	May 1, 2003	May 30, 2003	1	1
240	Extraordinary	June 2, 2003	July 1, 2003	49	16
241	Extraordinary	July 2, 2003	July 31, 2003	14	3
242	Extraordinary	August 1, 2003	August 30, 2003	11	1
243	Ordinary	September 1, 2003	December 9, 2003	72	12
244	Extraordinary	December 10, 2003	January 8, 2004	158	36
245	Extraordinary	February 2, 2004	March 2, 2004	60	19
246	Extraordinary	March 6, 2004	March 12, 2004	5	4
247	Extraordinary	June 5, 2004	July 4, 2004	3	3
248	Extraordinary	July 5, 2004	July 15, 2004	10	5
249	Extraordinary	August 23, 2004	August 27, 2004	2	0
250	Ordinary	September 1, 2004	December 9, 2004	128	54
251	Extraordinary	December 10, 2004	January 1, 2005	80	35
252	Extraordinary	February 1, 2005	March 2, 2005	129	30
253	Extraordinary	April 6, 2005	May 5, 2005	91	23
254	Extraordinary	June 1, 2005	June 30, 2005	117	33
255	Extraordinary	July 6, 2005	July 6, 2005	5	2
256	Ordinary	September 1, 2005	December 9, 2005	172	35
257	Extraordinary	December 12, 2005	January 10, 2006	20	9
258	Extraordinary	February 1, 2006	March 2, 2006	91	24
259	Extraordinary	April 3, 2006	May 2, 2006	33	6
260	Extraordinary	June 19, 2006	June 30, 2006	19	3
261	Extraordinary	August 21, 2006	August 29, 2006	43	13
262	Ordinary	September 1, 2006	December 9, 2006	231	43
263	Extraordinary	December 11, 2006	December 22, 2006	104	44
264	Extraordinary	December 26, 2006	January 24, 2007	14	8
265	Extraordinary	February 5, 2007	March 6, 2007	79	11
266	Extraordinary	March 12, 2007	April 2, 2007	41	18
267	Extraordinary	April 3, 2007	April 30, 2007	89	7
268	Extraordinary	June 4, 2007	July 3, 2007	145	27
269	Ordinary	September 1, 2007	December 9, 2007	202	37
270	Extraordinary	December 10, 2007	January 8, 2008	34	10
271	Extraordinary	January 28, 2008	February 26, 2008	241	21
272	Extraordinary	February 29, 2008	March 29, 2008	13	1
273	Extraordinary	April 25, 2008	May 24, 2008	41	7

The data covers all the parties with three or more members who cast votes on each bill: the leftist Democratic Labor Party, the "progressive" Millennium Democratic Party and its descendants, the "conservative" Grand National Party, and the United Liberal Democrats and its descendants (see Figure 5.1).




Figure 5.1: Family Tree of Korean Parties, 2000-2008

Note: Minor parties with less than three members excluded. Seats in parentheses. Ruling parties are shaded.

The analysis assumes the following logit function:

$$\text{logit}(z_{i,t,m}) = aX_{i,t,m} + \beta L_i + \gamma M_{i,t} + \delta Z_i + \zeta T_m + e_{i,t,m}$$

where i is a legislator, t a National Assembly session, m a bill or motion legislated on the floor, z how the legislator behaved on the floor, X a set of explanatory variables of interest, L a set of controls pertaining to legislator i 's personal characteristics that do not change over time, M a set of controls pertaining to legislator i 's personal characteristics that change over time, Z a set of periodical controls, T a set of bill-specific effects, e an error term, and $a, \beta, \gamma, \delta,$ and ζ sets of

parameters to be estimated. The main observation unit is thus a legislator-bill.

5.4.2. Dependent Variable

Before explaining the coding rules for the dependent variables, it is necessary to introduce how to code "yeas" and "nays" first. A Korean NA member (NAM) has a choice of three options in voting: yea, nay, and abstention. And there are two types of abstention: a NAM can push the abstention button (an active abstention) or a NAM can also choose not to push any buttons (an inactive abstention). A bill is passed when a majority of those who pushed their buttons said yeas to the bill. Therefore, a bill can be rejected even when yeas exceed nays – for example, when 90 said yeas, 80 said nays, and 30 pushed the abstention button. An active abstention is virtually the same as saying no to a bill and thus it should be coded as a "nay."

Coding both nays and abstentions in the same way as "nays" might ignore nuanced differences between them, but there are a few reasons for this. First, the variable could be coded as an ordered categorical variable, but for the sake of consistency and simplicity to construct the data, interpret the results, and conduct simulations based on them, a dichotomous coding rule was chosen. Second, there should be an important difference between pushing the button to cast an abstention vote and not doing so. How legislators vote on a bill is immediately shown in the front screen inside the floor with their names and choice, so that party leaders can monitor the behaviors of their members. And the voting record is kept and stored now at the NA website.

It is also important to note that inactive abstentions are viewed as missing. Again,

these could be treated as abstentions and thus defections, but it is impossible to tell whether a legislator did not make votes because he/she only temporarily left the floor when he/she needed to push the button, or because he/she simply did not want to push the button.

Thus the dependent variable (δ) is a dichotomous variable representing whether a legislator defected or not from his/her party on a given bill or motion: it is coded 1 if his/her vote is different from the majority of his/her party, and 0 otherwise. If more than a half of the total members in the same party voted yea on a bill, then the party line is viewed as in favor of the bill, and all the "nay" voters are considered in this analysis as defectors.¹⁰⁷

5.4.3. *Independent Variables*

The vote incentives are measured by two variables: *PR* and *Electoral Strength*. *PR*, a dichotomous dummy coded 1 if a legislator is elected on PR. As the existing literature suggests, legislators elected on SMDs may be less likely to obey the party line than those elected on closed-list PR (Haspel et al. 1998; Herron 2002; Kunicova and Remington 2008; Thames 2005). Based on several selected bills, the existing literature on Korea could not find consistent results on this variable (Jeon 2006), but this study uses the much more comprehensive dataset to test this claim. For SMD members, *Electoral Strength*, a margin between a legislator's vote share in his/her district minus the best loser's vote share, is also created. The data were taken from the National Election Commission website.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ The results do not change when different thresholds (2/3 and 3/4) are used and active abstentions are regarded not as "nays" to determine the party line.

¹⁰⁸ <http://www.nec.go.kr/>.

The policy incentives are measured by *Ideological Distance*. This variable is based on three waves of a survey conducted jointly by *Joongang Ilbo* and Korean political scientists between 2002 and 2004 (*Joongang Ilbo* February 4, 2002; *Newsweek* Korean Edition November 19, 2003; *Joongang Ilbo* August 31, 2004). The survey asked all the NAMs to locate themselves on an ideological spectrum ranging from 0 (progressive) to 10 (conservative), and 252 members from the 16th NA (2000-2004) and 226 members from the 17th NA (2004-2008) made their responses. The median score is calculated for each of the parties, and then the distance from this median score is calculated for each of the members.

The effects of party label are captured by a dichotomous dummy *Regional Stronghold* coded 1 if a member is elected from the party's stronghold. Note that this study is interested in the interactive effects of *Regional Stronghold* on *Electoral Strength* and *Ideological Distance*, the interactive terms will be included. The office incentives are measured by a dichotomous dummy *Ruling Party*, coded 1 if a member is from the presidential party. This dummy is also interacted with the main independent variables to see its intervening effects on party cohesion.

Ruling Party may sound a little crude as a measure to code *access to office benefits*, as it assumes that everyone in the ruling party has equal access to office perks. Of course, office perks may not be available to everyone, and some pro-president factions inside the presidential party may want to and therefore try to monopolize them; and the history of Korean political parties' splits and mergers suggests this may be the case (Sim 2004). However, it is also important to note here that, in order to maintain legislative coalitions and achieve collective action in the legislature, the president would need to promise fair and equal access to office perks for everyone in the ruling coalition. And it is also important to note here that during the

period there were three types of events that could change legislators' ruling party status: presidential elections, splits and mergers, and party switching. First, in December 2007, Lee Myung Bak from the Grand National Party was elected as a new president, making the GNP the new ruling party. Second, in September 2003, a pro-Roh group left the Millennium Democratic Party to form the Uri Party and the MDP became an opposition party.¹⁰⁹ In March 2007, some anti-Roh members left the ruling Uri Party to form the Centrist United Reformers (*Jungdo Kaebyeok Tonghap Shindang*). The CUR, after merging the Democratic Party, came back to the ruling party status when it was merged to the Uri Party to form the United New Democratic Party in September (see Figure 5.1). Third, quite a few NAMs switched their party affiliations during the period: for example, six members left the MDP to join the GNP in 2002; and six members left the GNP to join the Uri Party in 2003. The *Ruling Party* dummy can check how these changes in legislators' ruling party status would affect their behaviors on the floor, controlling for their vote and policy incentives, as well as party-specific effects.

The declining effect of *access to office benefits* should be measured by how soon the next presidential elections would be: I created *Days until the Elections*, defined by the natural log of the number of days left until the next presidential elections.¹¹⁰ As Hypothesis 4 states that ruling party members would discount the value of *access to office benefits*, the variable *Days until the Elections* should be interacted with *Ruling Party*.

¹⁰⁹ The MDP in fact voted for the move to impeach President Roh in March 2004.

¹¹⁰ Alternatively, I used different measurements, including a dichotomous dummy variable for the final year of the presidential terms. The results did not significantly change.

Descriptive statistics for Electoral Strength and Ideological Distance are available in Table 5.3. Some readers might wonder if distribution of the independent variables may be conditional especially on the regional strongholds (i.e. party leaders may pick up ideologically compatible candidates and disproportionately allocate them to the safe seats), but this is not the case. A series of t-tests shows that, except Electoral Strength, there is no significant statistical difference between members elected on the safe seats and those from the other areas. And even within a group of those safe-seat members, there are still significant variations.

Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Main Explanatory Variables

	Obs	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
<i>Electoral Strength</i>					
If <i>Ruling</i> = 1	451	0.15	0.15	0.0012	0.82
If <i>Ruling</i> = 0	524	0.17	0.15	0.000061	0.82
If <i>Regional Stronghold</i> = 1	324	0.27	0.19	0.00019	0.82
If <i>Regional Stronghold</i> = 0	496	0.11	0.092	0.000061	0.55
<i>Ideological Distance</i>					
If <i>Ruling</i> = 1	482	0.94	0.80	0	4
If <i>Ruling</i> = 0	755	0.96	0.83	0	4
If <i>Regional Stronghold</i> = 1	378	0.92	0.81	0	4
If <i>Regional Stronghold</i> = 0	696	0.99	0.84	0	4

Note: The total numbers of observations do not equal across the different groups due to the changes in the ruling party status and NAMs' party switching.

5.4.4. Controls

To offset the potential omitted variable bias, several types of controls will be included.

The first set of these includes characteristics specific to individual legislators. *Experience*, a continuous variable, measures the number of terms served by a legislator in the NA. The longer a legislator serves in the NA, the more integrated to his/her party and thus the more likely to lead a majority decision he/she may be. To measure the professional backgrounds of a legislator, a set of dummies will be included: *Lawyer* is coded 1 if a legislator has the legal career as a registered attorney, a prosecutor, or a judge; *Bureaucrat* is coded 1 if a legislator once worked in the central bureaucracy; and *Professor* is coded 1 if a legislator once worked as a university professor as a permanent job. These professional backgrounds may give legislators expertise and information on policies that might encourage them to act more freely from what

their parties would expect them to do.¹¹¹ To control for the potential effects of district characteristics on legislators' policy preferences, *Agricultural Land*, or the ratio of the geographical size of agricultural land (rice paddy and dry field) to that of an electoral district, is included.¹¹²

The second set of controls covers legislators' individual characteristics that changed as time went by. *Leader* is a dummy coded 1 if a legislator served as a party leader on the date when a bill was legislated.¹¹³ *Ex-Leader* is a dummy coded 1 if a legislator once served in the past as a party leader. *Ex-Minister* is a dummy coded 1 if a legislator once served as any of the ministers in the past.¹¹⁴ These leadership positions signify how influential legislators are within the parties to form policy platforms. Also included are dichotomous dummies indicating individual legislators' party affiliations¹¹⁵ and *Party Size*, the size of the party relative to the

¹¹¹ The data on personal characteristics are taken from *Kukhwe Eunwon Seongo Chongnam* and *Kukhwe Eunwon Chongnam*, various issues.

¹¹² The data are taken from the Korean National Statistical Website (<http://www.nso.go.kr/>).

¹¹³ Party leaders include: *Euijang* (supreme council chair); *Daepyo* (party representative); *Chwego Wivon* (supreme council member); *Samu Chongjang* (secretary-general); *Jeongchaek Wivonhwe Euijang* (policy affairs council chair); and *Wonnae Chongmu/Daepyo* (party whip).

¹¹⁴ Active ministers who were also NA members could be present on the NA floor and make votes. But as none of them defected from their parties, a minister dummy was not included.

¹¹⁵ <The Millennium Democratic Party and the Democratic Party>, <the Centrist Reformers and the Centrist Reform Democratic Party>, <the United New Democratic Party and the United Democratic Party>, and <the United Liberal Democrats, the People First Party, and the Liberty Forward Party> are categorized as the same parties.

assembly size (299) on the date when a bill was voted on.

The third set of controls is included to control for the effects of the timing: dichotomous dummies for each of the sessions will be included to control for any fluctuations in political and legislative circumstances (see Table 5.2). To test the claim that party cohesion became significantly weaker in the 17th NA (2004-2008) (Jaung 2005), *17th NA*, a dichotomous dummy coded 1 for 17th NAs, will be also included.

The fourth and final set of controls includes characteristics specific to bills and motions. All of the bills and motions were divided into six categories: (1) 177 *Government-Initiated Bills* that were drafted and submitted by the government¹¹⁶; (2) 108 *Ruling-Initiated Bills* that were drafted and submitted by presidential party members; (3) 81 *Opposition-Initiated Bills* that were prepared by legislators from the opposition; (4) 198 *Committee-Initiated Bills* that were submitted by the chair of one of the NA committees; (5) 24 *Legislative Rules* that were about setting the agenda, scheduling when to deliberate which bills and motions, and changing technical legislative rules; and (6) 33 *Motions* that include legally non-binding motions (*Dongjeui An*), petitions (*Cheongwon*), recommendations (*Geoneui An*), and resolutions (*Gyeoleui An*). Before reaching the floor, any bills must pass relevant committees, whose members are proportionally chosen from all the parties. In committees, a majority of members can simply report bills to the floor without any amendments, or make amendments on bills and report them to the floor under the name of the chairs. Therefore

Committee-Initiated Bills include much more amendments than government- or legislator-initiated

¹¹⁶ The annual budget and any legally binding motions (such as treaty ratifications) submitted by the government belong to this category.

bills, and would be more acceptable to all the members. Thus *Committee-Initiated Bills* are set as the baseline and five dichotomous dummies are created for the other categories. In addition, these dichotomous dummies are interacted with *Ruling Party* as the ruling party members would be much more disciplined when legislating *Government-* and *Ruling-Initiated Bills*, while opposition members would be more disciplined when making votes on *Opposition-Initiated Bills*.

Furthermore, 621 dichotomous dummies will be created for each of the 621 bills and motions and included to models, to control for the idiosyncratic variations of votes that cannot be measured with the above vote types.

5.4.5. Results and Discussions

With different sets of controls, Models 1 to 8 in Table 5.4 cover all the individual legislators whether they were elected on the nominal or list tiers. Model 1 and 5 control for the six different characteristics of bills; Models 2 and 6 further control for party-specific effects; Models 3 and 7 includes periodical dummies (Table 5.2); and the fixed effects of each of the 621 bills are included in Models 4 and 8. The results are almost identical in terms of the main explanatory variables of interest.

Table 5.4: Logit Estimations for Defection from Parties: All NAMs

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Explanatory Variables				
<i>Regional Stronghold</i>	-0.10*** (0.027)	-0.16*** (0.027)	-0.15*** (0.027)	-0.17*** (0.029)
<i>Ruling Party</i>	-0.99*** (0.050)	-0.58*** (0.068)	-0.42*** (0.077)	-0.51*** (0.081)
<i>PR</i>	-0.044 (0.034)	-0.052 (0.034)	-0.040 (0.034)	-0.038 (0.036)
<i>Ideological Distance</i>	0.066*** (0.014)	0.049*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.015)	0.053*** (0.015)
Controls				
<i>Experience</i>	-0.079*** (0.014)	-0.11*** (0.014)	-0.12*** (0.014)	-0.13*** (0.015)
<i>Lanyer</i>	0.14*** (0.038)	0.15*** (0.038)	0.17*** (0.038)	0.17*** (0.040)
<i>Bureaucrat</i>	0.081** (0.032)	0.046 (0.032)	0.038 (0.032)	0.037 (0.033)
<i>Professor</i>	0.063* (0.034)	0.038 (0.034)	0.050 (0.034)	0.043 (0.036)
<i>Leader</i>	-0.15*** (0.045)	-0.20*** (0.069)	-0.26*** (0.070)	-0.30*** (0.072)
<i>Ex-Leader</i>	-0.15*** (0.045)	-0.068 (0.046)	0.0022 (0.047)	0.0052 (0.049)
<i>Ex-Minister</i>	0.042 (0.045)	0.057 (0.045)	0.060 (0.045)	0.072 (0.047)
<i>Party Size</i>	-0.34*** (0.10)	-1.53*** (0.18)	-2.32*** (0.18)	-2.50*** (0.18)
<i>17th NA</i>	-0.22*** (0.028)	-0.22*** (0.033)	0.12 (0.30)	0.14 (1.76)
Bill Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party Dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Periodical Dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects for Bills	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	-1.64*** (0.062)	-3.22*** (0.31)	-2.93*** (0.34)	-2.69* (1.49)
Obs	93,468	93,468	93,468	91,641
Log Likelihood	-27,686.91	-27,537.15	-27,085.36	-24,085.41

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 5.4: Logit Estimations for Defection from Parties: All NAMs (Continued)

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Explanatory Variables				
<i>Regional Stronghold</i>	-0.11*** (0.027)	-0.16*** (0.027)	-0.15*** (0.027)	-0.17*** (0.029)
<i>Ruling Party</i>	-0.18 (0.15)	-0.12 (0.051)	-0.16 (0.14)	-0.28* (0.15)
PR	-0.044 (0.034)	-0.051 (0.034)	-0.043 (0.034)	-0.040 (0.036)
<i>Ideological Distance</i>	0.064*** (0.014)	0.049*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.015)	0.053*** (0.015)
<i>Days until the Elections</i>	0.14*** (0.014)	0.13*** (0.015)	0.14 (0.11)	0.10 (0.30)
<i>Ruling Party*</i> <i>Days until the Elections</i>	-0.13*** (0.023)	-0.10*** (0.023)	-0.050** (0.023)	-0.043* (0.024)
Controls				
<i>Experience</i>	-0.084*** (0.014)	-0.11*** (0.014)	-0.12*** (0.014)	-0.13*** (0.015)
<i>Lawyer</i>	0.13*** (0.038)	0.15*** (0.038)	0.17*** (0.038)	0.17*** (0.040)
<i>Bureaucrat</i>	0.078** (0.032)	0.044 (0.032)	0.039 (0.032)	0.038 (0.033)
<i>Professor</i>	0.068** (0.034)	0.044 (0.034)	0.052 (0.034)	0.044 (0.036)
<i>Leader</i>	-0.17** (0.069)	-0.21*** (0.069)	-0.26*** (0.070)	-0.30*** (0.072)
<i>Ex-Leader</i>	-0.14*** (0.046)	-0.052 (0.046)	0.0010 (0.047)	0.0042 (0.047)
<i>Ex-Minister</i>	0.043 (0.045)	0.057 (0.045)	0.061 (0.045)	0.073 (0.047)
<i>Party Size</i>	-0.43*** (0.11)	-1.60*** (0.18)	-2.32*** (0.19)	-2.49*** (0.19)
<i>17th NA</i>	-0.12*** (0.030)	-0.13*** (0.035)	0.68 (0.74)	-1.16 (1.70)
Bill Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party Dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Periodical Dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects for Bills	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	-2.55*** (0.11)	-3.93*** (0.32)	-3.78*** (0.80)	-4.24** (1.95)
Obs	93,468	93,468	93,468	91,641
Log Likelihood	-27,628.30	-27,489.26	-27,082.42	-24,083.76

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Regional Stronghold and *Ruling Party* show the negative signs consistently throughout the models. Based on the results in Model 1, simulations are conducted 1,000 times using

CLARIFY to calculate the probabilities of defection from parties under different conditions (Tomz et al. 2001). The estimated probabilities are reported in Table 5.5. Under the least likely condition where a legislator from a ruling party was elected in his/her party's stronghold, the likelihood of his/her defecting was 4.28% on average, compared to 11.73% under the most likely condition. *Ruling Party* seems to have a stronger effect on party defection than *Regional Stronghold*, but there is clearly an interactive effect between the two. The negative signs for the variable *PR* suggest that list-tier members are less likely to defect. This is confirmatory to the existing literature on legislative behaviors under mixed-member systems, but they are not statistically significant throughout the models.

Table 5.5: Estimated Probabilities of Defection from Parties: Regional Stronghold and Ruling Party

<i>Regional Stronghold</i>	<i>Ruling Party</i>	Estimated Probability
1	1	4.28% (3.90% - 4.68%)
1	0	10.71% (10.10% - 11.33%)
0	1	4.71% (4.36% - 5.11%)
0	0	11.73% (11.07% - 12.43%)

Note: Based on the results in Model 1, Table 4. Calculated with 1,000 simulations using *CLARIFY*. All the other variables set at the median values. **Bold** if $p < 0.05$.

Let us look further at Models 5 to 8, where I included *Days until the Elections* and its interactive term with *Ruling Party*. Models 5 and 6 show that the variable *Days until the Elections* show the statistically significant positive signs, suggesting that opposition party members tend to be united as the presidential elections approach. This could imply that legislators from opposition parties are more likely to see their presidential candidates' electoral fate closely tied to their future benefits, as their winning the presidency is by far the most important goal in a very strong presidential regime like South Korea, although the statistical significance disappears when periodical controls are included. On the other hand, the interactive term between *Days until the Elections* and *Ruling Party* is consistently significant and negative across the models (although only at the 10% level in Model 8), even controlling for time dummies; so I can confirm that the premium of being in a presidential party declines over time, although the size of the coefficients is fairly small, indicating that the president's tools are still important.¹¹⁷ Affiliating with the president is highly valuable in the first few years of presidential terms, but as time goes by and

¹¹⁷ Note that *Days until the Elections* has the mean of 2.79 and the standard deviation of 0.44.

electoral uncertainty as to the next presidential elections mounts, presidential party members tend to discount *access to office benefits* and this tendency is reflected in their voting behaviors on the legislative floor.

To further test my Hypotheses, Models 1 to 12 in Table 5.6 focus on legislators elected on SMDs as samples. Like the models reported in Table 5.4, Models here include different sets of controls. Again, the results do not change significantly across the models.

Table 5.6: Logit Estimations for Defection from Parties: SMD NAMs

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Explanatory Variables				
<i>Regional Stronghold</i>	-0.11*** (0.032)	-0.16*** (0.032)	-0.16*** (0.033)	-0.17*** (0.034)
<i>Ruling Party</i>	-0.96*** (0.057)	-0.65*** (0.076)	-0.52*** (0.087)	-0.62*** (0.091)
<i>Electoral Strength</i>	0.083 (0.11)	0.11 (0.11)	0.12 (0.11)	0.11 (0.11)
<i>Ideological Distance</i>	0.078*** (0.016)	0.066*** (0.016)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.069*** (0.018)
Controls				
<i>Experience</i>	-0.070*** (0.015)	-0.10*** (0.015)	-0.12*** (0.016)	-0.13*** (0.016)
<i>Lawyer</i>	0.17*** (0.041)	0.20*** (0.041)	0.20*** (0.041)	0.21*** (0.044)
<i>Bureaucrat</i>	0.10*** (0.033)	0.074** (0.033)	0.068** (0.034)	0.068* (0.035)
<i>Professor</i>	0.070* (0.042)	0.071* (0.042)	0.081* (0.042)	0.075* (0.045)
<i>Agricultural Land</i>	-0.59*** (0.12)	-0.38*** (0.12)	-0.38*** (0.12)	-0.43*** (0.13)
<i>Leader</i>	-0.15** (0.073)	-0.17** (0.073)	-0.23*** (0.073)	-0.27*** (0.076)
<i>Ex-Leader</i>	-0.19*** (0.050)	-0.11** (0.051)	-0.036 (0.052)	-0.032 (0.055)
<i>Ex-Minister</i>	0.14*** (0.049)	0.14*** (0.049)	0.14*** (0.050)	0.16*** (0.052)
<i>Party Size</i>	-0.54*** (0.12)	-1.59*** (0.19)	-2.23*** (0.20)	-2.42*** (0.21)
<i>17th NA</i>	-0.25*** (0.032)	-0.24*** (0.036)	-1.93*** (0.74)	1.04* (0.62)
Bill Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party Dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Periodical Dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects for Bills	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	-1.49*** (0.070)	-2.54*** (0.18)	-2.31*** (0.21)	-2.69* (1.47)
Obs	75,998	75,963	75,963	72,810
Log Likelihood	-22,222.27	-22,113.79	-21,757.37	-19,143.22

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 5.6: Logit Estimations for Defection from Parties: SMD NAMs (Continued)

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Explanatory Variables				
<i>Regional Stronghold</i>	0.37*** (0.058)	0.27*** (0.059)	0.29*** (0.060)	0.32*** (0.063)
<i>Ruling Party</i>	-0.81*** (0.076)	-0.47*** (0.095)	-0.34*** (0.10)	-0.42*** (0.11)
<i>Electoral Strength</i>	1.29*** (0.23)	1.26*** (0.22)	1.33*** (0.23)	1.49*** (0.24)
<i>Ideological Distance</i>	0.23*** (0.025)	0.21*** (0.025)	0.21*** (0.026)	0.22*** (0.027)
<i>Regional Stronghold *</i>	-1.40*** (0.25)	-1.29*** (0.25)	-1.34*** (0.25)	-1.53*** (0.27)
<i>Electoral Strength *</i>	-0.32*** (0.035)	-0.28*** (0.035)	-0.29*** (0.035)	-0.30*** (0.037)
<i>Ideological Distance *</i>	-0.45* (0.24)	-0.60** (0.24)	-0.68*** (0.24)	-0.72*** (0.24)
<i>Ruling Party *</i>	-0.078** (0.040)	-0.090** (0.039)	-0.092** (0.040)	-0.097** (0.042)
<i>Ideological Distance *</i>				
Controls				
<i>Experience</i>	-0.063*** (0.015)	-0.092*** (0.016)	-0.11*** (0.017)	-0.12*** (0.016)
<i>Lawyer</i>	0.16*** (0.041)	0.18*** (0.041)	0.19*** (0.042)	0.19*** (0.044)
<i>Bureaucrat</i>	0.083** (0.033)	0.055* (0.033)	0.049 (0.034)	0.048 (0.035)
<i>Professor</i>	0.087** (0.042)	0.081* (0.043)	0.088** (0.043)	0.082* (0.045)
<i>Agricultural Land</i>	-0.66*** (0.12)	-0.43*** (0.13)	-0.42*** (0.13)	-0.47*** (0.13)
<i>Leader</i>	-0.12* (0.073)	-0.14** (0.073)	-0.20*** (0.074)	-0.24*** (0.077)
<i>Ex-Leader</i>	-0.26*** (0.051)	-0.18*** (0.051)	-0.10* (0.050)	-0.10* (0.055)
<i>Ex-Minister</i>	0.19*** (0.050)	0.17*** (0.050)	0.18*** (0.050)	0.20*** (0.053)
<i>Party Size</i>	-0.57*** (0.12)	-1.55*** (0.19)	-2.20*** (0.20)	-2.39*** (0.21)
<i>17th NA</i>	-0.29*** (0.032)	-0.27*** (0.036)	-1.97*** (0.74)	1.56 (1.80)
Bill Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party Dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Periodical Dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects for Bills	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	-1.74*** (0.081)	-2.73*** (0.18)	-2.43*** (0.24)	-4.04** (2.07)
Obs	75,998	75,963	75,963	72,810
Log Likelihood	-22,169.18	-22,070.21	-21,712.10	-19,094.83

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 5.6: Logit Estimations for Defection from Parties: SMD NAMs (Continued)

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Explanatory Variables				
<i>Regional Stronghold</i>	-0.11*** (0.032)	-0.16*** (0.032)	-0.16*** (0.033)	-0.17*** (0.034)
<i>Ruling Party</i>	-0.14 (0.17)	-0.087 (0.17)	-0.19 (0.16)	-0.30* (0.17)
<i>Electoral Strength</i>	0.083 (0.11)	0.099 (0.11)	0.12 (0.11)	0.11 (0.12)
<i>Ideological Distance</i>	0.076*** (0.016)	0.065*** (0.016)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.069*** (0.018)
<i>Days until the Elections</i>	0.13*** (0.016)	0.12*** (0.016)	0.16 (0.12)	0.17 (0.28)
<i>Ruling Party* Days until the Elections</i>	-0.13*** (0.026)	-0.11*** (0.026)	-0.064*** (0.026)	-0.060** (0.027)
Controls				
<i>Experience</i>	-0.075*** (0.015)	-0.10*** (0.015)	-0.12*** (0.016)	-0.13*** (0.016)
<i>Lawyer</i>	0.17*** (0.041)	0.19*** (0.041)	0.20*** (0.041)	0.21*** (0.043)
<i>Bureaucrat</i>	0.10*** (0.033)	0.073** (0.033)	0.069** (0.034)	0.070** (0.035)
<i>Professor</i>	0.073* (0.042)	0.074* (0.042)	0.082* (0.043)	0.077* (0.045)
<i>Agricultural Land</i>	-0.61*** (0.12)	-0.39*** (0.12)	-0.39*** (0.12)	-0.44*** (0.13)
<i>Leader</i>	-0.16** (0.073)	-0.17** (0.073)	-0.23*** (0.073)	-0.27*** (0.076)
<i>Ex-Leader</i>	-0.18*** (0.050)	-0.10** (0.051)	-0.041 (0.052)	-0.037 (0.054)
<i>Ex-Minister</i>	0.15*** (0.050)	0.14*** (0.050)	0.14*** (0.050)	0.16*** (0.052)
<i>Party Size</i>	-0.60*** (0.12)	-1.65*** (0.19)	-2.24*** (0.20)	-2.44*** (0.21)
<i>17th NA</i>	-0.16*** (0.073)	-0.16*** (0.038)	0.81 (0.81)	1.01 (1.71)
Bill Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party Dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Periodical Dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects for Bills	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	-2.34*** (0.13)	-3.03*** (0.19)	-3.34*** (0.81)	-4.04** (2.07)
Obs	75,998	75,998	75,998	72,841
Log Likelihood	-22,183.40	-22,084.49	-21,755.25	-19,142.40

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Models 1 to 4 show that the electoral incentives could not gain significance in

explaining the variations, like the previous analysis on Korean legislators' behaviors (Lee 2005). However, this is not surprising; as discussed in the theoretical propositions and the Korean case, the electoral incentives should have different meanings conditional on *party label* and *access to office benefits*, and one of the main contentions of this chapter is that more refined models should take into account these interactive effects. And in actuality, this is the case, as models with the interactive terms (Models 5-8) clearly show. Almost all of the interactive terms are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, controlled for personal career backgrounds, the types of the bills and motions, party affiliations, and the specific effects of all the 621 bills. The negative signs indicate that even if a legislator was electorally invulnerable and/or ideologically extreme, the negative impact of these electoral and policy incentives becomes negligible, *where the regionalism makes party label a critical asset for reelections*; and similarly, ruling party members with much more *access to office benefits* were less likely than colleagues from the opposition parties with the same level of electoral strengths and ideological extremity.

On the other hand, from Models 9 to 12, where I included the interaction between *Days until the Elections* and its term with *Ruling Party*, I can again confirm that the effects of *access to office benefits* on party unity is indeed conditional on timing. *Days until the Elections* tends to show the statistically significant positive signs, implying that the opposition tends to become united as the presidential elections approach. The negative signs of the interactive term are confirmatory with the view that the value of *access to office benefits* as defined as an affiliation with the president tends to decline over time, because of the president's constitutionally given term limit, although the size of the coefficients is, again, relatively small compared to the other variables of interest.

Based on the results of Model 5 in Table 5.6, simulations were again conducted 1,000 times using *CLARIFY*. Figure 5.2 shows how *Electoral Strength* and *Ideological Distance* work under different conditions. The negative effects of electoral and policy incentives on party cohesion are accentuated if a legislator did not have a link to the president and/or he/she was elected on a contested area (Figure 5.2(b) and (d)). On the other hand, legislators elected on regional strongholds in general tend to obey the party line even if they would be electorally able and ideologically willing to defect; they should know *party label* is a crucial asset for their reelections (Figure 5.2(a) and (c)). And for ruling party members, the electoral leeway and ideological extremity do not encourage them to defect from the party line; for them, *access to office benefits* offsets the costs inflicted by undesired party policy on them.




a) Legislators Elected on Regional Strongholds: *Electoral Strength*b) Legislators Elected on Contested Areas: *Electoral Strength*

Figure 5.2: Probabilities of Defection

c) Legislators Elected on Regional Strongholds: *Ideological Distance*



d) Legislators Elected on Contested Areas: *Ideological Distance*




Figure 5.2: Probabilities of Defection (Continued)

Note: Based on the results in Model 5, Table 5.6. Calculated with 1,000 simulations using *CLARIFY*. All the other variables set at the median values. The lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals and the markers in the middle of the lines indicate the mean scores. The dotted lines and the hollowed markers are hypothetical values based on the simulations.

In sum, the analysis presented here confirms all of the hypotheses. A legislator's defection likelihood would be low in general if he/she is a member is elected on his/her party's regional stronghold and/or if he/she is from a ruling party. However, benefits from a ruling

party are declining over time, especially when the presidential elections approach, resulting in the loosening of party cohesion. A legislator's electoral strengths and ideological extremity would have negative impact on party cohesion, but such impact is moderated, if he/she is elected from the district from regional strongholds and/or if he/she is from a party that can offer *access to office benefits*. And when these two moderating effects are combined, the likelihood of defection is minimal. On the other hand, the negative impact on party cohesion is accentuated, if he/she is elected from the district from Seoul and the surrounding areas and/or if he/she is from a party that cannot possess *access to office benefits*. And when these combined, the likelihood of defection is maximal.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter started with the core assumption in the study of legislative behaviors that legislators in general have three different incentives for vote, policy, and office. An integrated model for party cohesion would thus need to incorporate the three different mechanisms: first, legislators would avoid voting against the will of their parties if they know such anti-party behaviors would result in no endorsement and little chance to win in the next elections; second, when legislators vote for their parties, they need to accept the costs associated with voting against their own personal beliefs or constituent demands; and third, they would try to show their loyalty for their parties if they know that they would get rewarded with governmental privileges and other office benefits.

However, little attention has been paid to how these different incentives interact with each other. Under certain settings, the effects of the defection-encouraging factors – for

example, electoral invulnerability and ideological divergence from the median – would only work conditionally. This chapter focused on two settings: *party label* and *access to office benefits*. If an endorsement from a certain party is almost automatically translated to an electoral victory, or if a party can offer access to office benefits, then even an electorally invulnerable and/or ideologically extreme legislator would need to show his/her consistent party loyalty to leaders. In other words, these two mechanisms would moderate the negative impact of the electoral and policy incentives.

The argument was tested with the Korean case, as the presidential democracy has both of the two conditions with its extremely region-based parties and the president's monopolized power over allocation of various types of public patronage, although the presidential term limit of five years forces presidential party members to discount the value of such patronage over time, especially as the next presidential elections approach. The empirical analysis using a database that covers more than 600 bills and motions and all the NAMs between 2000 and 2008 confirmed the theoretical predictions. First, a legislator's defection likelihood would be low in general if he/she is a member elected on his/her party's regional stronghold and/or if he/she is from a ruling party. Second, however, the effects of being affiliated with a ruling party tend to decline, because of the president's term limit, although not to the extent that the office benefits become completely negligible. Third, even if a legislator was electorally invulnerable and/or ideologically extreme, the negative impact of these (otherwise defection-encouraging) electoral and policy incentives was moderated, *where party label is perceived as a critical asset for reelection* and/or if *access to office benefits* is available. Even with ideologically fragmented parties engaging in personalistic electoral competition, the Korean

president is able to achieve the high levels of legislative productivity, by helping her fellow legislators get reelected through the extremely regionalistic party system, and by providing them with various types of office benefits, ranging from pork to posts and patronage.

Chapter 6. Factional Politics and Budget Items in Japan

6.1. Introduction

Thus far in this dissertation I have argued that, in order to party unity, the leadership in the two countries resorts to the strategic allocation of governmental privileges or office perks. Chapters 4 and 5 looked at how office perks mediated the negative externalities deriving from personalistic electoral competition, ideological diversity, and factionalism, on party cohesion. In Chapters 6 and 7, I look at the policy consequences of party cohesion, specifically pork spending as another type of governmental privileges. Chapter 6 is about how the parliamentary party leadership copes with a factionalized party using development of rules and norms, while Chapter 7 is about how a presidential leader copes with separation of presidential and legislature branches.

In Chapter 4, I argued that the LDP's unique party rules are the key to understanding the puzzling party unity in Japan. Seniority, factional balance, and the PARC allowed LDP backbenchers to have the lawmaking powers, participate in the policymaking process, and allocate policy benefits to their constituents. As long as backbenchers can keep getting reelected, they are allowed to rise up the career ladder in the government and the party to assume better positions designed to improve their capacity to bring more to their districts, as well as their fame and name recognition. These office benefits are also tied to the LDP's staying in power, so by nature, this mechanism is built on the constitutional structure of a parliamentary system, that is, mutual dependence between the legislature and the executive. In

other words, the LDP's party rules worked as a structural bond that ties the leadership with otherwise would-be defectors in the party (Cox and McCubbins 1994).

The existing literature on the LDP also sees the intra-party dynamics as the principal-agent relationship between leaders and backbenchers (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993). They argue that the relationship was efficiently managed, as backbenchers and factions without any policy preferences only delegate the authority for drafting national policy issues. Meanwhile, leaders could effectively control backbenchers, by utilizing the tightly structured career promotion ladder. This view correctly points to how leaders and backbenchers behaved in the equilibrium, but the problem inherent in it is that it is very static. The history of the intra-party politics of the LDP suggests that, in the 1950s and 1960s, backbenchers most often complained about leaders' tyrannical nature of policymaking and personnel management, while leaders most often ignored the career ladder and picked up their favorites to the highest posts (Watanabe 1958). Kawato (1996a, 1996b) points out the career ladder only emerged gradually after the late 1960s and was finally stabilized in the late 1970s to the early 1980s. Therefore the more correct story is that the monopolized control by party leaders over policy and personnel issues in the 1950s was gradually replaced by the stable career ladder.

As explored in Chapter 3, the introduction of the fair and proportional rule was a response to backbenchers' ongoing pressures on party leaders. How these pressures can constrain the leadership is defined by the power balance between leaders and backbenchers. When backbenchers can credibly threaten to oust the incumbent government, leaders need to cater to backbenchers by opening up access to office benefits. Given that LDP backbenchers have a high level of demands for particularistic benefits targeted at their districts, opening up

access to office benefits to would-be dissidents in the party results in upward pressures on spending especially in pork-related budget items.

The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses historical events that led to the rise of the LDP's unique party rules designed to mitigate factional conflicts. Then in reviewing Japan's various types of budget accounts, I show the politicization of the budget-making process started around the 1970s, when factions were increasingly becoming threats for party leaders. The empirical analysis section offers some hypotheses, introduce an original panel dataset on Japan's different budget items, and test the hypotheses with the dataset, followed by the concluding section.

6.2. Evolution of Party Rules in the LDP

As reviewed in Chapters 3 and 4, party leaders inside the LDP had to open up access to office benefits and decentralize the policymaking process to allow rank-and-file backbenchers to exert parochial interests for two reasons. First, there was the need to offset a range of factors unfavorable for maintaining party unity: the personalistic electoral system, the catch-all nature of the party, and so on. The electoral system of SNTV used between 1947 and 1993 in particular encouraged legislators to develop local and parochial interests for the reelection purpose. Second, factions were increasingly becoming threats for party leaders. When the LDP had enough seats to maintain its majority before the 1970s, defection of one big faction was not a credible threat. But, increasingly after the 1970s, when the seat margin between the LDP and the opposition force got thin, big factions' threats to defect from the party and launch a non-LDP government became more and more credible.

The party leadership in the early periods (the 1950s and 1960s) monopolized posts in the cabinet and the party to bypass antagonistic factions inside the party and never allowed backbenchers to have the influential voice in the policymaking process. Legislators from the anti-mainstream factions kept challenging the leadership through a variety of filibustering measures, including sending many legislator-initiated bills to the floor and boycotting deliberations in standing committees. Even some antagonistic factions, such as the Kōno faction as introduced in Chapter 3, tried to defect from the LDP and launch a new party in protest against the mainstream factions' monopolization of important posts in the cabinet and the party (Watanabe 1958). But the party president's faction and allied factions, or "mainstream" (*shūryūha*) factions, could keep ignoring pressures from antagonists, as they were too small to be threatening.

However, as shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, after the 1970s, when the LDP's entire seat share declined and factions' size enlarged, each faction could have the power to threaten the stability of the party leadership (Kohno 1992, 1997). After the 1976 elections, each of the big five factions – Fukuda, Miki, Nakasone, Ōhira, and Tanaka – could be a threatening force to the cabinet. Every faction except tiny ones became large enough to defect the LDP and make a non-LDP coalition government with opposition parties excluding the communists. As signaling to defect was now credible, party leaders now had to institutionalize fair personnel systems even for the anti-mainstream factions. Thus factional balance in allocating posts to rank-and-file members was designed to maintain members' loyalty to the party and moderate factional conflicts (Kawato 1996a, 1996b; Sato and Matsuzaki 1986).




Figure 6.1: The Number of Factions and the Effective Number of Factions in the LDP

Source: Leiserson (1968) and Watanabe (1958) for 1957; Sato and Matsuzaki (1986) for every election year from 1955 to 1983; Asahi Shimbun Sha (various years) for the years after 1983.




Figure 6.2: The Number of Threatening Factions and the Share of the LDP in the Lower House

Source: See Figure 6.1.

Note: The "Threatening" factions are defined as those factions whose size is larger than a [bare majority minus non-communist opposition parties]; that is, such factions are large enough to defect the LDP and make a non-LDP coalition government with opposition parties excluding the communists.

Another change occurred in the 1960s to the 1970s in the policymaking process.

The party leadership demanded in 1960 that rank-and-file members should be prohibited from submitting any bills without the party's endorsements. If they would submit their own bills to the Diet, those bills should be approved by the General Council, Secretary-General, General Council Chair, PARC Chair, and Diet Affairs Committee Chair (*Kokutai Incho*) beforehand (Fukumoto 2000; Kawato 1999). As a compromise, the government had to promise in 1962 that it should refer to the party before submitting government-initiated bills and budget plans to the Diet. After this incident, any cabinet-initiated bills had to pass subdivisions in the PARC,

which became virtual veto points for legislation (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986). PARC subdivisions became effective sub-governments where backbenchers could exchange their local interests to streamline the policymaking process in the Diet. Only after this practice appeared gradually after the end-1960s, policy tribes could exert their influence over policymaking.

Therefore by the mid-1970s, a set of institutions had been established to allow policy tribes and dissidents from the anti-mainstream factions to have voice in policymaking bodies inside the party and fair access to posts directly related to policy privileges. This came with large costs: with the increasing power of legislation, politicians now intensively sought for private goods that would improve their electoral fortunes. Many items in various budgets became the target for allocating benefits to local districts. The next section reviews the existing literature on Japan's budget-making process and how politicians from the LDP intervene in the process.

6.3. Budget Making Process in Japan

6.3.1. Regular Budget

The fiscal year in Japan starts on April 1. From then on, the preparation of requests starts in spending ministries. In July, the cabinet issues guidelines to all spending ministries for ceiling. By the end of August, further discussions in spending ministries result in a consolidated request, which is submitted to the Budget Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (MOF).

The Bureau reviews the requests from ministries and recommendations from various advisory councils inside the MOF from September. The MOF drafts a preliminary budget

around December 20. Any amendments and consolidation of these intense requests are finalized by the MOF and the cabinet as the final government draft budget proposal by the end of December.

The final draft is then sent to the MOF, which prepares an official budget bill by the end of January. After the bill is sent to the Diet, the Budget Committees of the Lower and Upper Houses discuss the budget. After approved by the committees, the bill is finally sent to the floor voting and legislated by the end of March.

Although the cabinet was a primary agenda-setter up until the 1960s (Makihara 2003), in this process of regular budget making, rank-and-file politicians make every effort to intervene through a wide range of channels especially after the 1970s (Campbell 1977; Noguchi 1991). First, requests for budget items are closely discussed between politicians and spending ministries. Most often, bureaucrats' interests in maximizing their budget and extending authority over policy issues coincide with politicians' interests in spending more for public and private goods to buy the voter's support (Niskanen 1975). Bureaucrats from spending ministries intensively participate in the meetings of the ruling party's most authoritative policymaking organ – the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) –, where bureaucrats try to get political backing from politicians for their policy issues, while listening to politicians' demands for their local districts. Second, even after a final request is consolidated and sent to the MOF, until December, MOF bureaucrats face intense lobbying by spending ministries and pressure groups backed by some LDP legislators for expansion of their favorite budget items. Requests for further revisions are reviewed at various levels inside and outside the MOF, as well as at the PARC. Third, although it is relatively rare to find amendments to a final government budget bill, still politicians

have opportunities to make a voice on it, for example by trying to delay the submission to the Diet (McCubbins and Thies 1997). In addition, as argued below, the amendments to the budget were further made possible by the politicization of the supplementary budget.

6.3.2. Supplementary Budget

Even after the original budget is submitted to and approved by the Diet, it can still legislate "Supplementary Budgets" to modify the original budget. The rationale behind these budgets is that the government has to respond to any sudden economic fluctuations due to downturns or unexpected fiscal demands from natural disasters. The cabinet creates budget proposals for approval by the Diet, and modification of the original budget may simply involve transfers among items without any increase of the entire budget, or increases in some items with additional funding, which usually come from issuance of bonds. Usually before the 1990s, the net additional spending in this supplementary budget was only about 3-4% to the main regular budget. As such, the MOF has tended to hold Supplementary Budgets in low regard, as they tend to be only counter-cyclical (Campbell 1977).

However, even this slight increase was politicized, especially after 1972, when "Prime Minister Tanaka used the supplement as the opening wedge in an attempt to break down Finance Ministry defenses" (Campbell 1977: p.206). As Meyer and Naka (1998) show, the LDP had a significant impact on the formation of supplementary budgets: in particular when the LDP had a larger share in the Diet and more legislators in the LDP were from rural areas, the LDP could change priorities in budget items.

With increasing frequency since the 1990s, supplementary budgets have been enacted

to fund economic stimulus efforts. These counter-cyclical economic packages in the 1990s have become more and more ineffective: increasing public investment in the 1990s crowded out private investment to some extent and did not increase private consumption much (Ihori et al. 2003). In addition, the Keynesian effect was not observed in the 1990s: the adverse effect was often observed in recent years, with expansion of the Keynesian fiscal policy having a negative impact on Japanese economic performance. This is partly because of the further politicization of supplementary budgets, of course in addition to the Japanese economy's structural malfunctioning (Ihori et al. 2003). The government's expenditures are increasingly targeted as unproductive rents before elections as legislators in the Diet, pressured by local interest groups as principals, cannot form an effective collective action to reduce spending (Grimes 2001; Patterson and Beason 2001).

6.3.3. Special Accounts

Special Accounts are those accounts for special public programs administered and managed by the government, such as national forestry projects and public pension schemes. They are "special" in the sense that, according to an official description, the government has to separately manage them from the general revenue and expenditures, in order to clarify the relationship between the beneficiary and costs-bearers. As of 2005, there are 31 special accounts, which total 387 trillion yen. Some of them are more or less financially independent: for example, the Motor Vehicle Inspection program is mainly financed by inspection fees and registration taxes from car owners. Others are much more dependent upon the government, as the national pension plan is financially supported partly by the regular budget.

Several of these special accounts are notoriously politicized. One typical example is the coal program, in which the government subsidized coal production and passed the costs of adjustment onto the petroleum industry and ultimately the taxpayer. The program, which was launched in 1962, just after the political turmoil in the 1960 Mitui Miike labor strike, was essentially taxing imported heavy crude oil to help subsidize the domestic coal industry, which was no longer internationally competitive by the late 1950s. The petroleum refining industry also had to pay the costs of spurring economic demands in the local industries based on coal-mining companies; for example, the government gave subsidies for firms employing job-less coal-miners. The program continued through 2001 to delay adjustments for 40 years (Lesbirel 1991; Samuels 1987; Uriu 1996).

Lesbirel (1991) argues that imposing heavy taxes on the consumer to save uncompetitive firms was possible because some members from the LDP intervened in the process for electoral reasons. The Special Coal Policy Committee in the PARC, established in the 1960s, was a response to the political need to protect the interests' of the coal sector. The committee was dominated by Diet members from Kyushu, where most of Japan's coal production is located.

6.3.4. FILP

In addition to regular and supplementary budgets, the government has the Fiscal and Investment Loan Program (FILP), or what is called the second budget. Launched in 1953, the FILP mainly uses postal savings accounts to loan financial resources to a range of public institutions. As of 1953, the number of recipients was only 15, while into the late 1990s, the

number was increased to 70. Recipients range from highly public-regarded institutions like Pension Welfare Service Public Corporation and Japan Scholarship Foundation to the roads construction project, which is known as an example of the inefficient and sometimes corrupt iron triangle (Woodall 1996). Of 3.1 trillion yen (as of 2005) of loans poured into this road-making project, Japan Highway Public Corporation and its local affiliates receive most.

Because of the nature of the program – i.e., recipients have to return loans and MOF bureaucrats at Trust Funds Bureau had relative autonomy in deciding how to allocate resources – some argue that the FILP is exempt from parochial political pressure.¹¹⁸ But, two things are of importance to note. First, as Patterson (1994) points out, public financial institutions receiving the FILP loans had to have their annual budgets and plans approved by the Diet. The Diet's monitoring was further strengthened in 1973, when a law was passed that required the FILP get Diet approval for investing five-year or longer assets managed.¹¹⁹ After that, each element of the FILP has been made part of the budget plan subject to legislators' demands. Second, loans from the FILP through public banks to private sectors were not productive (Beason and Weinstein 1996). Showing that loans from the Japan Development Bank, one of the largest recipients of FILP loans, were not diverted to the high growth industries, Beason and Weinstein (1996) conclude that this is partly because the government could not target

¹¹⁸ See the review by Patterson (1994): p.438.

¹¹⁹ The law was titled "Law Concerning Special Measures for Long-Term Investment of the Trust Fund Bureau Funds and Funds Accumulated from Postal Annuities and Postal Life Insurance Annuity," or *Shikin Unyobu Shikin narabini Kan'i Seimei Hoken oyobi Yubin Nenkin no Tsumitate Kin no Chōki Un'yō ni Taisuru Tokubetsu Sochi ni Kansuru Horitsu*.

properly, and partly because industrial policy considerations were dominated by the desire to aid declining sectors or protect the interests of large unproductive industries.

The debate over the efficiency of industrial policy being aside,¹²⁰ it is clear that a certain portion of the FILP was directed toward sectors that are known as corrupt or have been not necessarily productive throughout the postwar period. A typical example of the latter is public financial institutions specializing in loaning money to small and mid-size enterprises (SMEs) (Calder 1988), including: the People's Finance Corporation (*Kokumin Kin'yū Kōka*), the Small Business Finance Corporation (*Chūshō Kigyō Kin'yū Kōka*), and the Small Business Credit Insurance Corporation (*Chūshō Kigyō Shin'yō Hoken Kōka*). Patterson (1994) shows that the LDP's support rate among SMEs has a negative impact on the amount of loans from these SME-specialized institutions, arguing that the ruling party responded to losses of support from members of its small-business constituency with increased amounts of financial help. This clear politicization of a portion of the FILP is due to the fact that SMEs constitute the core support group of the LDP.

6.4. Hypotheses and Data

Based on the theoretical framework discussed above, I will hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1. If the personnel rule guarantees fair and proportional access even to the anti-mainstream faction members, then spending will increase in budget items.

¹²⁰ The best summary of the debate is available in Noble (1989).

Hypothesis 2. The upward pressure of such fair and proportional access to the anti-mainstream faction members on spending will be strong in pork categories.

Note that these hypotheses are built on the argument throughout this dissertation that legislators tend to form factions to challenge the presidency and get better access to office perks, including pork. But, some authors argue that intra-party factions can be based on their own policy platforms (Bettcher 2005; McCubbins and Thies 1997). If this is the case, the party leadership may want to exclude the anti-mainstream factions from the core of the coalition simply because it cannot allow ideologically distant factions to get in to the policymaking process.¹²¹ The implication of this "faction-as-principle" assumption is that, as Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b) and others hold, the more veto players, the more spending. Therefore the null hypothesis is that:

Null Hypothesis: If the number of factions increases, then spending will increase.

My sample covers 63 regular-budget items authorized by 13 different ministries, from 1956 to 2003. The sample coincides those items used by McCubbins and Thies (1997). Their strategy is to collect data on various budget items to include a broad range of substantive types – small and large ones and public and pork types – from all the major spending ministries.

¹²¹ As McCubbins and Thies (1997) raise almost the same point (fn.23), that this differentiation of factions of interest and factions of principle may not result in different conclusions makes research design much difficult.

The items have to cover no fewer than 10 consecutive years (see Table 6.1). I modified their data in two ways. First, to maintain the consistency of those budget items that changed only their titles, splintered some functions to newly created items, or integrated different items, I closely looked at Ōkurashō Shukeikyoku (various years) to check the subcomponents of items and added functionally equivalent items to the sample. For example, there was a legal change in 1982 to splinter an item newly created, "National Supplement to Employees' Pension Fund," from the item "National Supplement to Social Insurance Fund." To maintain the consistency before and after 1982, I added these two items after 1982. Second, I expanded the observation periods. Their observation starts at 1961 and ends at 1984, but I added available information on the items before and after their periods. Now my data covers the period between 1956 and 2003 for some of the items. The panel is unbalanced, as some items have observations throughout the period, while others are not.

Table 6.1: Expenditure Items Used in Analysis

Agency	Item	Available Years	Type
General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet	Pension Expenditures	1956-2003	Public
Ministry of Education / Okinawa Dev't Agency	Okinawa Education Promotion	1972-2003	Pork
National Land Agency	National Integrated Land Development Coordination	1974-2003	Semi-Public
Hokkaido Development Agency	Hokkaido Road Construction Expenditure	1956-2003	Pork
Hokkaido Development Agency	Hokkaido Fishing Port Facilities	1969-2003	Pork
Hokkaido Development Agency	Hokkaido Housing Construction Industry	1956-2003	Pork
Defense Agency	Weapons and Vehicles	1969-2003	Pork
Defense Agency	Aircraft	1961-2003	Pork
Defense Agency	Shipbuilding	1957-2003	Pork
Defense Agency	Maintenance of Facilities	1957-2003	Pork
Defense Agency	Research and Development	1961-2003	Pork
Ministry of Education	Subsidies for Educational Expenses for the Handicapped	1957-2000	Semi-Public
Ministry of Education	Educational Promotion	1956-2003	Public
Ministry of Education	Maintenance of Public Educational Facilities	1956-2003	Semi-Public
Ministry of Education	Scholarship Expenses	1956-2003	Semi-Public
Ministry of Education	Science Promotion	1956-2000	Public
Ministry of Health and Welfare	Research and Development	1956-2003	Public
Ministry of Health and Welfare	Subsidy to National Health Insurance Plan	1956-2003	Public
Ministry of Health and Welfare	Aid to Bereaved Families and Families of Internees	1956-2003	Semi-Public
Ministry of Health and Welfare	Maintenance of Environmental Health and Sanitation Facilities	1956-1999	Pork
Ministry of Health and Welfare	Expenditure for Atomic Bomb Victims	1957-2003	Semi-Public
Ministry of Health and Welfare	Sanitation Expenses	1956-2003	Public
Ministry of Health and Welfare	Public Assistance (Lifestyle Protection) Expenditure	1956-2003	Public
Ministry of Health and Welfare	Support for the Disabled	1956-2003	Semi-Public
Ministry of Health and Welfare	Welfare to the Elderly	1963-2000	Semi-Public
Ministry of Health and Welfare	Support for Women	1957-2003	Semi-Public
Ministry of Health and Welfare	Support for Children	1956-2003	Semi-Public
Ministry of Health and Welfare	National Supplement to Social Insurance Fund	1956-2003	Public
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	Agricultural Promotion	1967-1999	Semi-Public
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	Strategic Restructuring of Agriculture	1961-1999	Pork
Ministry of Labor	Employment Security Office	1956-1999	Public

Table 6.1: Expenditure Items Used in Analysis (Continued)

Agency	Item	Available Years	Type
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	Agricultural Pensions and Related Expenses	1970-1999	Semi-Public
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	Silk Cultivation and Horticulture Promotion	1956-1999	Semi-Public
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	Diffusion of Agriculture Improvement	1956-2001	Semi-Public
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	Strengthening of Wet Rice Agriculture	1969-1999	Semi-Public
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	Promotion of Animal Husbandry	1956-1999	Semi-Public
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	Sugar Price Stabilization	1965-2003	Semi-Public
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	Strategic Planning of Food Product Distribution	1974-1999	Public
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	Promotion of Forestry	1956-2003	Semi-Public
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	Promotion of Fisheries	1956-2003	Semi-Public
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	Fishing Harbor Facilities	1956-2000	Semi-Public
Ministry of International Trade and Industry	Promotion of Industrial Relocation	1972-2000	Semi-Public
Ministry of International Trade and Industry	Promotion of the Computer Industry	1972-1998	Semi-Public
Ministry of International Trade and Industry	Industrial Plumbing Facilities	1956-2003	Public
Ministry of International Trade and Industry	Promotion of Mining and Manufacturing Technology	1956-2003	Semi-Public
Ministry of International Trade and Industry	Large-Scale Industrial Research and Development	1966-1992	Public
Ministry of International Trade and Industry	Agency of Industrial Science and Technology Experimental Research Lab	1969-2000	Public
Ministry of International Trade and Industry	Underground Resources Strategy	1962-2003	Semi-Public
Ministry of International Trade and Industry	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Strategy	1956-2003	Semi-Public
Ministry of Transportation	Subsidies to Accounts of Japan National Railways Corporation	1968-1986	Semi-Public
Ministry of Transportation	Subsidies to Japan National Railways Construction Corporation	1965-1991	Semi-Public
Ministry of Transportation	Railroad Track Maintenance	1956-1991	Public
Ministry of Transportation	Coastline Enterprises	1960-2004	Public
Ministry of Transportation	Subsidies for Maritime Transportation	1965-2004	Public

Table 6.1: Expenditure Items Used in Analysis (Continued)

Agency	Item	Available Years	Type
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications	Integrated Telecommunications Research Lab	1956-2003	Semi-Public
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications	Local Telecommunications Administration Bureau	1956-1995	Public
Ministry of Labor	Unemployment Expenditure	1956-1995	Semi-Public
Ministry of Labor	Career Change Planning	1966-2003	Semi-Public
Ministry of Labor	Labor Protection Office	1956-1999	Public

Source: Ōkurashō Shukeikyoku (various years).

My dependent variable is the share of the absolute money spent each year for each item in the GDP. Fixed-effect models with a lagged dependent variable would be appropriate. Thus my structural model for an individual budget item i at t is:

$$\text{Item}_{it} = b_0 + b_1 * \text{Item}_{it-1} + b_2 * X_t + b_3 * C_t + a_i + e_{it}$$

where X is a vector of political variables of interest, C is a vector of economic controls, a_i is a group-specific constant term for i , and e_{it} is an error term.

Political independent variables include the cabinet balance, the LDP seat share in the Lower House, the effective number of factions in the LDP, and the number of the mainstream factions. A cautious note is required here about how to code these political variables. As the budget is legislated in the end of March every year, these variables have to represent the values as of March every year (see Table 6.2). I primarily used Satō and Matsuzaki (1986) to calculate these variables, but as it covers only before 1986, I used *Asahi Nenkan* (various years). In addition, as factional affiliations were highly fluctuated before 1963, I also used Leiserson (1968) and Watanabe (1958) to check if there is any inconsistency in the data. On how cabinets are

coded, see Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: Postwar LDP Cabinets

Year	Cabinet	Mainstream
1956	Hatoyama C	Hatoyama; Kishi; Miki-Matsumura; Ohno; Ishii
1957	Ishibashi	Ishibashi; Miki-Matsumura; Ono; Ishii; Ikeda
1958	Kishi A	Kishi; Sato; Ohno; Kohno
1959	Kishi B	Kishi; Sato; Ohno; Kohno
1960	Kishi C	Kishi; Sato; Ohno; Kohno
1961	Ikeda B	Ikeda; Sato; Kishi
1962	Ikeda C	Ikeda; Sato; Fukuda; Kawashima
1963	Ikeda D	Ikeda; Kohno
1964	Ikeda E	Ikeda; Kohno; Ohno
1965	Ikeda F	Ikeda; Ohno; Kohno; Miki; Kawashima
1966	Sato A	Sato; Fukuda; Funada; Murakami; Miki; Mori; Kawashima; Ishii
1967	Sato C	Sato; Fukuda; Kawashima; Ishii; Funada; Sonoda; Miki
1968	Sato D	Sato; Fukuda; Kawashima; Ishii; Funada; Sonoda; Miki
1969	Sato E	Sato; Fukuda; Kawashima; Ishii; Funada; Sonoda
1970	Sato F	Sato; Fukuda; Kawashima; Ishii; Funada; Sonoda
1971	Sato F	Sato; Fukuda; Kawashima; Ishii; Funada; Sonoda
1972	Sato G	Sato; Fukuda; Ohira; Shiina; Ishii; Funada; Mizuta; Nakasone; Sonoda
1973	Tanaka B	Tanaka; Ohira; Nakasone; Miki; Shiina; Ishii; Funada; Mizuta
1974	Tanaka C	Tanaka; Ohira; Nakasone; Miki; Shiina; Ishii; Funada; Mizuta
1975	Miki A	Miki; Fukuda; Nakasone; Shiina; Ishii; Funada; Mizuta
1976	Miki A	Miki; Fukuda; Nakasone; Shiina; Ishii; Funada; Mizuta
1977	Fukuda A	Fukuda; Ohira; Tanaka; Shiina; Ishii; Funada; Mizuta
1978	Fukuda B	Fukuda; Ohira; Tanaka; Shiina; Ishii; Funada; Mizuta
1979	Ohira A	Ohira; Tanaka
1980	Ohira B	Ohira; Tanaka
1981	Suzuki A	Suzuki; Tanaka; Nakasone
1982	Suzuki B	Suzuki; Tanaka; Nakasone
1983	Nakasone A	Suzuki; Tanaka; Nakasone
1984	Nakasone B	Suzuki; Tanaka; Nakasone
1985	Nakasone C	Suzuki; Tanaka; Nakasone; Komoto; Fukuda*
1986	Nakasone D	Suzuki; Tanaka; Nakasone; Komoto; Fukuda*
1987	Nakasone E	Miyazawa; Tanaka; Nakasone; Komoto; Fukuda*
1988	Takeshita A	Miyazawa; Takeshita; Nakasone; Komoto; Abe*
1989	Takeshita B	Miyazawa; Takeshita; Nakasone; Komoto; Abe*
1990	Kaifu B	Takeshita; Nakasone; Komoto; Abe
1991	Kaifu C	Takeshita; Watanabe; Komoto; Abe
1992	Miyazawa A	Takeshita; Miyazawa; Komoto
1993	Miyazawa B	Obuchi; Miyazawa; Komoto
1994	Hosokawa	
1995	Murayama A	Miyazawa; Obuchi; Mitsuduka
1996	Hashimoto A	Obuchi; Watanabe; Komoto; Miyazawa (Kato)
1997	Hashimoto B	Obuchi; Watanabe; Komoto; Miyazawa (Kato)
1998	Hashimoto C	Obuchi; Watanabe; Komoto; Miyazawa (Kato)

Table 6.2: Postwar LDP Cabinets (Continued)

Year	Cabinet	Mainstream
1999	Obuchi B	Obuchi; Komoto; Miyazawa (Kato); Watanabe (Yamazaki)
2000	Obuchi C	Mori; Kamei; Komoto; Kono; Obuchi
2001	Mori C	Mori; Kamei; Hashimoto; Komoto; Kono; Horiuchi
2002	Koizumi A	Mori†
2003	Koizumi B	Mori†

Source: Satō and Matsuzaki (1986) and *Asahi Nenkan* (various years).

Note: * It is difficult to define the mainstream factions from Nakasone's second reshuffled cabinet (1985) to Takeshita's reshuffled cabinet (1989) as grand coalitions of all factions (*Sō Shuryūha*) occurred. So every faction is defined as the mainstream.

† Koizumi cabinets (2002-2004) are exceptional in that usual factional coalitions up to the presidential elections cannot be observed. I assign the mainstream-ship only to the Mori faction.

The variable *Cabinet Balance* measures how fair and proportional allocation of posts in the cabinet is. This is measured as:

$$Cabinet\ Balance = \sum_N |EP_j - P_j|, N=1, \dots, j,$$

where EP_j is an *expected* share in the cabinet of faction j , that is, total available posts in the cabinet times j 's percentage size in the LDP; and P_j is an *actual* share in the cabinet of faction j . If *expected* and *actual* shares of all the factions closely coincide, the variable *Cabinet Balance* gets close to 0, while if there is a skewed balance among factions, then the variable becomes distant from 0. The history of LDP cabinets starts with the Hatoyama cabinet launched in late 1955, which was highly exclusive in that he did not allocate any posts to ex-Liberals except Ohno faction members – especially, Yoshida's affiliates (members from Ikeda and Sato factions) got no post in the cabinet.¹²² After the Hatoyama cabinet, the general trend is that party leaders gradually

¹²² Ohno was treated really well because he, together with Taketora Ogata, ousted Yoshida

introduced fair proportion to all the factions, while Koizumi is apparently trying to destroy this practice. How this variable looks like is shown in Figure 6.3.

from the Liberal president, closely contacted with Nobusuke Kishi and Bukichi Miki for a Democrats-Liberals merger, and consistently supported Hatoyama as the first president of the LDP (and therefore as the Prime Minister).




Figure 6.3: Cabinet Balance of Factions

Source: See Figure 6.1.

The variables *LDP Seat Share* and *Effective Number of Factions* are intuitive as the names suggest. *LDP Seat Share* is measured by the LDP's seats in the lower house, divided by the entire size of the lower house. This variable is designed to test the crisis and compensation argument by Calder (1988), who argues that the LDP coped with the political crisis as indicated by its declining seat share in the Diet by expanding expenditures. *Effective Number of Factions* measures the number of parties weighted by the size of each party as proposed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). As McCubbins and Thies (1997) do, I will also include *Mainstream Change*, a dummy representing whether or not there was any change in the mainstream coalition inside the LDP from the previous year. If factions have their own preferences, then a change in the composition of the mainstream coalition would have some impact on spending tendencies.

Economic controls include *Growth Rate*, *Deflator*, *Unemployment Rate*, and the government's *Budget Surplus*, all taken from Sōrifu Tōkeikyoku (various years).

As the LDP was ousted from the government temporarily in 1993-94 and during this period the Hosokawa and Hata cabinets drafted the budget, I include a dummy for the year 1994 (*y1994*). In addition, to check if there are any effects of the 1994 electoral reform, a dummy for the years after 1994 (*Post-Reform*) is also included. Furthermore, the effects of coalition cabinets (1984-6, 1994-6, and 1999-) will be checked with the number of parties in the government (*Coalition*). The variable *Coalition* is coded 1 if the LDP is a single party in the government.

Summary statistics is given in Table 6.3, with predicted signs.

Table 6.3: Summary Statistics for Main Independent Variables

IV Name	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Predicted Sign Public	Pork
<i>Cabinet Balance</i>	0.32	0.21	0	1.19	0	-
<i>LDP Seat Share</i>	0.55	0.064	0.39	0.64	-	0
<i>Effective Number of Factions</i>	7.11	1.66	4.86	13.63	0	0
<i>Growth Rate deflator</i>	0.051	0.038	-0.012	0.12	-	-
<i>Unemployment Rate</i>	0.035	0.042	-0.024	0.19	+	+
<i>Budget Surplus</i>	0.024	0.011	0.011	0.055	+	+
	0.052	0.093	-0.14	0.27	+	+

6.5. Analysis and Discussion

The results of fixed-effect cross-section time-series estimation models are presented in Table 6.4. First of all, the lagged dependent variable shows very strong significance throughout the models, suggesting that there is a strong path-dependent effect in budget items. This is consistent with the literature on incrementalism for example found in Widlavsky (1964).

Table 6.4: Estimation Results for Budget Items

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
		Sample: All	Sample: Public	Sample: Pork
lagged		0.98***	0.98***	0.97***
DV		(0.0045)	(0.0052)	(0.0093)
Primary	<i>Cabinet</i>	-0.000050	-0.000048	-0.000053**
IVs	<i>Balance</i>	(0.000032)	(0.000043)	(0.000026)
	<i>LDP Seat</i>	-0.00024**	-0.00033**	-0.000017
	<i>Share</i>	(0.00011)	(0.00015)	(0.000085)
	<i>Effective</i>	0.000011***	0.000012**	0.0000084***
	<i>Number of</i>	(0.0000038)	(0.0000050)	(0.0000030)
	<i>Factions</i>			
	<i>Mainstream</i>	0.0000063	0.0000087	0.000000041
	<i>Change</i>	(0.0000066)	(0.0000088)	(0.0000051)
Econ	<i>Growth Rate</i>	-0.00064***	-0.00073***	-0.00040***
Controls		(0.00013)	(0.00017)	(0.00010)
	<i>Deflator</i>	0.00034***	0.00043***	0.00011
		(0.00012)	(0.00016)	(0.000097)
	<i>Unemployment</i>	0.0015*	0.0017	0.00082
	<i>Rate</i>	(0.00086)	(0.0012)	(0.00068)
	<i>Budget</i>	0.00023***	0.00027***	0.00011**
	<i>Surplus</i>	(0.000054)	(0.000072)	(0.000043)
Pol	<i>Post-Reform</i>	0.00000050	0.0000011	0.0000043
Controls		(0.000015)	(0.000020)	(0.000012)
	<i>Coalition</i>	-0.000031***	-0.000040***	-0.0000080
		(0.0000087)	(0.0000088)	(0.0000068)
	<i>y1994</i>	0.00010**	0.00014**	0.0000073
		(0.000046)	(0.000061)	(0.000036)
Constant		0.00010	0.00016*	-0.000017
		(0.000068)	(0.000092)	(0.000053)
obs		2646	1932	714
R2		0.9828	0.9822	0.9891

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard Errors are in the parantheses.

Second, the economic controls show that the Japanese fiscal policy patterns are countercyclical. Economic growth encourages the government to moderate expansion of the budget, while the economic hardships such as unemployment lead to fiscal measures to boost the economy. The sign of the variable *Budget Surplus* is positive and significant, suggesting that

the government tends to expand budget items when it has the fiscal capacity to do so. Overall, combined with the above finding about the path dependent effects in budget items, the Japanese budget items tend to be incremental and functional to some degree.

But the third and more important finding is that the political independent variables of interest show statistical significance, indicating that still political dynamics matters significantly in explaining variations in this incremental and functional process. The variable *Cabinet Balance* shows the negative sign throughout the models, as expected. In Models 1 and 2 – the models for all the budget items and public-policy items – the variable is not significant, suggesting that competing factions were not concerned with budget items related to public goods, whose benefits by definition are non-exclusive and non-rival. Rather, the significant and negative sign of *Cabinet Balance* in Model 3 suggests that the goods that are exclusive in nature – pork-related items – are targeted as the goals of factional competition.

This finding overall suggests that as the party leadership opened up the once monopolized personnel system to the antimainstream factions, budget items increasingly faced the upward pressures; this corresponds with the argument that policy tribes could exert more influential power to expand fiscal policy especially after the 1970s. On the other hand, as the party leadership tightened up the system again especially after Koizumi cabinets, budget allocation to private goods was significantly cut – this finally reached the revolt from a coalition of policy tribes and antagonistic factional bosses in the 2005 elections.

The variable *LDP Seat Share* is significant in the public goods model (Model 2), as expected. Statistically significant at the 5% level, this variable shows that the party leadership tried to buy off support from the general voter by expanding public policy budget items in the

times of the political hardships. Pork-related items are not related to the seat share of the LDP, indicating that improving the seat share through distributing pork was not an option to the party; this suggests distributing pork was a matter of intra-party dynamics (as indicated by the significantly negative sign of *Cabinet Balance*) and legislators' individual reelection goals, more than the party leadership's decisions – consistent with Hypothesis 3, as well as the literature on personal vote and clientelism in Japan (Scheiner 2005, 2006).

The effective number of factions is significant throughout the models. These suggest that the degree of factional fragmentation inside the LDP is a significant determinant for decisions to expand expenditures. To put it differently, buying support from veto players inside the LDP with expansion of budget items was required for streamlining the budget making process and, ultimately, the stability of the government. This is confirmatory to Null Hypothesis that we wished to refute; we cannot negate the assumption that factions have their own policy preferences and the logical corollary that there are upward pressures for the costs of coordinating the differences in these preferences. On the other hand, the dummy *Mainstream Change* is not significant throughout the models, suggesting that the change of the winning coalition inside the LDP does not matter for spending patterns. This is an encouraging finding for the argument that factions are more like non-ideological entities.

Overall, the Japanese budget system is highly path-dependent and functional. However, even in this process, political variables are important in explaining the variations. Specifically, when leaders monopolize cabinet positions, the leadership could reduce expansion of spending in pork-related items. Meanwhile, factions were relatively unconcerned about public policy items that are non-exclusive and non-rival in nature. The LDP leadership,

concerned about its nation-wide reputation, tended to expand public-regarded items to buy support from the general voter, but its bare majority status was not significant for pork spending, which was not necessarily effective in improving the party's national image.

6.6. Conclusion

Looking at the party structure – especially some party rules that stipulate the power balance between party leaders and backbenchers and therefore determine the degree of constraints on the party leadership – can help to understand political logic behind the decisions to increase/decrease spending. I argue that the decision making process, proxied by how fair and proportional allocation of posts is, influences the degree of the internal constraints on party leaders. If party leaders have to allow would-be dissidents inside the party to have louder voice, then fiscal consequence will become more encompassing and expansionary. I have shown this argument with some empirical evidence. Specifically, given that factions inside the LDP form along with their desires to compete for governmental privileges, when the cabinet has to open up access to office perks to factions, there are upward pressures on budget items pertaining to pork.

I also tried to shed a new light on the debate over whether or not factions inside the LDP are really ideological and have their own unique policy preferences. Evidence is mixed with both positive and negative results. First, there is the sign showing that factional competition only matters in pork-related items, suggesting that factions may be in fact only factions of interest. Second, on the other hand, as I have shown in the empirical section, factional fragmentation inside the party did result in expansion of the budget, conducive to the

existing theory on the relationship between coalition governments and fiscal performance.

One way to show whether or not factions are ideological should require more refined

predictions on directions in different budget items.

The case in this study is budget items under authority of 13 different ministries.

The finding in this study is more consistent with the recent literature on the politicization of

policymaking process than the traditional bureaucrat-dominant view that bureaucrats were highly autonomous in deciding how to allocate limited financial resources to productive and

promising sectors. Substantial amounts of money went to some sectors that were not

necessarily efficient and productive; rather, the decision to allocate money to these sectors was at

least to some degree influenced by the internal dynamics of the LDP. The results of my

models also suggest that, as the party leadership started to regain monopoly over personnel

issues after Koizumi cabinets, allocation of now extremely limited financial resources to

unproductive rents is being cut down.

Chapter 7. Distribution of Subsidies and Party Discipline in Korea

7.1. Introduction

How political factors affect the patterns of allocating selective benefits to selected geographical regions has been increasingly drawing scholarly attention. A wide array of theoretical and empirical literature has devoted a considerable effort to the study of this process: Albania (Case 2001); Argentina (Calvo and Murillo 2004); Brazil (Ames 1995b); Illinois (Herron and Theodos 2004); Japan (Horiuchi and Saito 2003); Mexico (Bruhn 1996; Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon 1994); Sweden (Dahlberg and Johansson 2002; Johansson 2003); and the US (Balla et al. 2002; Bickers and Stein 1996; Evans 1994; Lee 2003b; Levitt and Snyder 1995). It is not surprising that the existing literature has placed its analytical focus exclusively on the legislative body, which in general governs the overall lawmaking process, especially in parliamentary regimes.

However, the executive office in a presidential regime could also play a very crucial role in the budget making process. Presidents in Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay formulate and prepare annual budgets, while presidents in Brazil and Colombia are allowed to introduce bills that deal with potentially pork-related issues, including distribution of public jobs. Even in the US, where the presidential power over legislation of fiscal policies is much more restricted than other presidential countries, the president can direct fiscal policy to more favorable outcomes by utilizing his veto power to reject appropriation requests from the Congress (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988). Presidents can also promote their legislative influence by mobilizing public appeals from society; presidents can increase the budget share for their pet policies when they promote the issues in a nationally televised speech (Canes-Wrone 2001). Despite these insights, there have been few

theoretical models and empirical analyses on presidential influence over regional distribution patterns in the literature, with a few rare exceptions (Larcinese et al. 2006; McCarty 2000). How can the executive office exert its influence over budget making and distribution? Are there any regular patterns? What political factors give impact on those patterns, if any? These are fundamental research questions to be explored in this chapter.

In line with the theory developed throughout this dissertation, I start with the assumption that the president would try to achieve stable legislation of her pet policies. Based on this realistic assumption, I argue that, in order to achieve this goal, arguably the most important goal during her term, a president would try to overcome legislative obstacles by strategically allocating benefits to certain municipalities. Given that Korean parties are ideologically not cohesive inside and electoral competition is highly personalistic as reviewed in Chapter 3, the Korean president's exclusive powers to formulate the budget and allocate subsidies to municipalities are indeed important tools to align the incentives of individual legislators.

In line with the existing literature on distribution, I argue that there should be two ways to do this: First, the president would utilize the *greasing-the-wheel strategy* to provide presidential parties members with some material benefits and buy them off, when the presidential party enjoys a majority in the legislature (Alston and Mueller 2006; Evans 1994); and second, the president would utilize the *regional-targeting strategy* to maximize or maintain the share of her party's seats (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996). The second strategy should be particularly useful if the executive and legislative elections are non-concurrent; the president would focus on regional targeting before the legislative elections to improve the reelection prospects of her fellow members.

This argument will be tested with the sample from all the local municipalities in South Korea between 1990 and 2005. As explored in Chapter 3, South Korea has the centralized financial structure, and the executive office exclusively holds the power to draft and propose the annual budget to the legislature, which only approves it and has to receive permission from the president in order to make upward revisions. In addition, the country provides good settings for quasi-natural experiments to test the aforementioned theoretical expectations: first, divided government with a single opposition party holding a majority (2003-04), divided government with the opposition fragmented (1990 and 2001-02), and unified government (1991-2000 and 2005) alternated; and second, the presidential and parliamentary elections happen in every five years and every four years, respectively, and this non-concurrent election cycle enables me to analyze different phases in which the president sees her members change in the middle of the term (1990-92, 1994-96, 1999-2000, and 2004).

The results are confirmatory to my theoretical predictions. First, when a presidential coalition dominates the legislative body with a majority, the incumbent president's strongholds receive more funding than otherwise. Second, monetary benefits from Seoul are directed to those areas politically crucial to the president: before the National Assembly elections, municipalities get more funds if they are swing districts.

This chapter is comprised as the following. The second section will review theoretical arguments on distribution, and how the presidential factor should come in to this process will be presented. The third section will delve into the Korean context, shedding the light on which factors should be significant under which occasions. Theoretical predictions will be presented and

tested in the fourth section, followed by the concluding section.

7.2. Presidential Factor in Distributive Game

One of the major themes in the study of legislative politics is the executive influence over the budget-making process. In fact, presidents around the world possess various types of constitutionally defined legislative powers to influence the formulation of budgets: exclusive rights to propose bills, especially budgets; veto and overriding; partial veto; and executive decree authority (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988; Shugart and Carey 1992). For example, quite a few presidents in Latin America possess the exclusive right to introduce annual budgets (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). Beyond these powers, a president may be able to set the agenda and therefore achieve substantial gains in her policy areas through mobilizing the general public (Canes-Wrone 2001). However, there is little empirical analysis on how the executive office could affect regional distribution patterns.

There is one attempt to formalize a distribution bargaining game based on a president's veto power (McCarty 2000). The model shows that, in order to direct spending to her regions mainly for electoral reasons, the president tries to veto budget proposals that would hurt her constituents and therefore can attain more favorable distributive consequences. There is also another study that employs the similar assumption that the president would pursue her reelection, and empirically finds that the states that gave heavy electoral support for the incumbent president tend to receive more fiscal benefits than the others (Larcinese et al. 2006).¹²³

¹²³ Other studies that use presidential candidates' vote shares as explanatory variables to estimate the

In a real-world setting, this reelection assumption can be suspect. Seen from the comparative perspective, presidents are rarely allowed to be elected for more than two consecutive terms; some are in fact forced to retire in a single term, as in South Korea. If the president knows he is going to retire soon or later without further reelection possibilities, it is very difficult to hypothesize that she would try to favor her constituents throughout her term for electoral reasons. Therefore the relationship between the president's regional strongholds and federal outlays as argued by Larcinese et al. (2006) can be in actuality more complicated.

I thus stand apart from the previous studies on the presidential politics of distribution and start with a more realistic assumption: The president values legislation of her pet policies in her term. Consequently, leveraging various types of constitutional and institutional powers in hand, the president should try to achieve this goal, arguably the most important goal during her term. One of these powers is the subject of this chapter: the budget-making power to influence distributive outcomes.

In achieving her legislative goals, one of the most important issues is how to manage the executive-legislative relationship (Shugart and Carey 1992): It is necessary for the president to forge

inter-governmental transfers include Treisman (1996) and Kwon (2005), but their theoretical underpinnings are not well specified. In interpreting their empirical finding – the U-shaped relationship between vote and money –, Horiuchi and Lee (2008) argue that South Korean presidents try to secure "graceful retirement" because they want to avoid the next government's discrediting them and investigation into political scandals, but such discrediting (and even investigation and prosecution) has been the norm in South Korea.

an agreement with a majority in the legislature to legislate any policy proposals, given that the legislature has the ability to reject bills.¹²⁴ Thus the president would have to maintain a good relationship with the legislature. In line with the existing literature on distribution, I argue that there should be two ways to do this. First, when the ruling coalition maintains a majority in the legislative body, the president would utilize the *greasing-the-wheel strategy* to provide presidential party members with some material benefits to align incentives (Alston and Mueller 2006; Evans 1994; Pereira and Mueller 2004). Second, the president would utilize the *regional-targeting strategy* to maximize or maintain the share of her party's seats (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996).

7.2.1. *Greasing the Wheel*

Even if the president has the agenda-setting power, she should have difficulties in legislating policies, simply because of the constitutional structure of presidential systems: unlike parliamentarism, where the legislative performance of the government is directly tied to ruling party members' incentives, in presidentialism, the president's legislative performance does not lead to a change of the government, dissolution of the legislature, or legislators' losing office. Ultimately, the president and the legislature have separate origin and survival, implying that even presidential party members can reject the president's legislative proposals. The legislature's ability to reject the president's proposals can lead her to make some concessions: revising policy content, providing

¹²⁴ One caveat is that Latin American presidents often leverage their executive prerogatives (decree authority) to by-pass the legislature; but these decrees are susceptible to a majority in the legislative body or decree authority is only granted by the consent of the legislature.


some fringe benefits to *grease the wheel*, or both. Particularly where parties are not united under shared policy platforms, fringe benefits to *grease the wheels* are important tools for the president. In Brazil, where party cohesion is relatively loose, it is known that the president utilizes the *greasing-the-wheel* strategy to maintain support for legislation (Alston and Mueller 2006; Pereira and Mueller 2004).

I further argue that, in such a context, a presidential party should have some leverage in negotiating the budget with the president, when it contains a majority in the legislature. It can be reasonably assumed that, even in a fragmented party system, a presidential party is still the first negotiation partner for the president in terms of the policymaking process. And the president should require a reliable legislative partner in the legislature who has a majority to pass the president's policy. Therefore the president can be vulnerable to fiscal demands from her own party members when it has a majority.

A simple spatial model is shown in Figure 7.1, where there is assumed to be a two-dimensional policy space: Policy and Pork. "P" denotes the president's preferences for Policy and Pork and "R" for the ruling party's preferences. In a usual setting, where an actor puts equal weights on Policy and Pork, an equilibrium should be where the indifference curves for the president and the ruling party contact (EQ) (see Figure 7.1(a)). However, if the ruling party puts more weight on Pork, the indifference curve for the ruling party should take the form of an ellipse (the dotted line in Figure 7.1(b)), as the ruling party does not care much about policy differences as long as it can get more on pork. The new equilibrium should be on the contract curve (R-EQ'-P), where the president's and the pork-seeking ruling party's indifference curves contact. In this

example, now at EQ' , the president can achieve Policy closer to her ideal, while providing more Pork benefits to the ruling party.

a) Party Puts Equal Weights on Policy and Pork



b) Party Puts More Weights on Pork




Figure 7.1: Simple Spatial Models for Negotiations between the President and Party

However, a worse situation for the president can happen in the situation of divided government. Using the same assumption that the spatial distance from the president to the median member of the opposition is greater than the distance to the median member of a presidential party, in the case of divided government, the president would need to negotiate with the opposition, resulting in more concessions in policy, more fringe benefits to the opposition, or both.¹²⁵

7.2.2. *Regional targeting*

In order to avoid a minority government, the president would also have the incentives to create or maintain a majority in the legislature. Thus certain regions should be targeted in an attempt to increase or maintain the seat share of the presidential coalition in the assembly. A president with non-concurrent elections may take advantage of different electoral cycles: as the elections for legislators occur in the middle of her term, before the legislative elections, the president would try to leverage her budget-making power to improve the reelection prospects of her fellow members and create an assembly favorable to her. But, after the legislative elections, the president

¹²⁵ In fact, there has been no empirical and theoretical consensus on the consequences of divided government in the US context (Binder 1999; Coleman 1999; Kelly 1993; Mayhew 2005; McCubbins 1991). However, I see that this gap between the intuitive theoretical prediction and empirical patterns is partly caused by the definitional problem of what "important" legislations are. It might be simply the case that legislations are passed because the president makes concessions.

would lose such incentives, especially if her reelection is prohibited by the constitution.

A risk-averse president would focus distributive benefits on the core voter, according to the loyal voter model (Cox and McCubbins 1986); meanwhile, the swing voter model suggests that marginal districts would be better targets (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987). This *regional-targeting* strategy is particularly useful where the incentives to cultivate a personal vote are strong (Carey and Shugart 1995): if legislators are elected under single-member plurality systems or other systems where a personal vote matters more, then the president would be able to help her supporters claim credit for local selective goods.

A choice of these two models varies depending on the levels of party cohesion. In high party discipline systems, party leaders will inflict costs on loyal districts while concentrating benefits to swing constituents in marginal districts. However, in low discipline countries, policymakers cannot ignore safe seats, as they are crucial for maintaining their legislative coalitions. Therefore, for example in the US, marginal seats are the least likely to receive favorable levels of parochial goods, while safe seats will receive the highest levels of benefits; in the UK, where party cohesion is significantly higher, the party leadership tends to target marginal districts (McGillivray 1997). This suggests that, even in the same country, if party unity wanes and waxes depending on time, then different distribution models may be found; the swing voter model should be found when the level of party cohesion is high.

In sum, I can now make my theoretical propositions.

P1. In order to achieve stable legislation of her pet policy, the president should offer fringe benefits to the members of a presidential party when it has a majority in the legislature; however, under divided government, the president should need to make some compromise with the opposition force and/or to buy off legislative support from part of the opposition.

P2. The president would allocate more benefits to targeted districts to create or maintain a majority. Swing voters are targeted in high party discipline systems, while loyal voters are targeted in low party discipline systems. If party unity varies depending on time, then the swing voter model is found when party unity is higher.

7.3. Korean Context

With the two theoretical propositions in mind, I now move on to the Korean presidency and its relevance to the propositions. This section will address the presidential influence over the budget making process and how the president should utilize it in the Korean context.

7.3.1. Greasing the Wheel in Korea

The first question to be asked is whether the South Korean president can intervene in the legislative process, especially in the budget-making process. My answer would be positive. The South Korean Constitution states that a bill has to be supported by a majority of the National Assembly (Article 53), while the president can initiate bills through the State Council (Article 88 (3)). In other words, the South Korean president can propose any policy, but it is subject to the consent

from the National Assembly and thus she would have to create a majority favoring her policy proposals in getting legislation passed. As to the president's role in the budget-making process, she actually has the constitutional advantage in strategically maneuvering the patterns of distribution: The South Korean Constitution provides that the president has the exclusive power to formulate an annual budget, while the National Assembly can only approve it with a majority (Article 54), as the legislature cannot neither increase the budget nor create any new items submitted without consent from president (Article 57). Thus the institutional conditions for the president to utilize her budget power to promote legislation of her pet policies are set in the South Korean context.

Despite these executive powers, as reviewed in Chapter 3, the budget-making process is opened to ruling party members. In fact, the constitutional provision that allows the National Assembly to approve the budget with a majority gives a majority party in the legislature strong leverage in negotiating the budget with the president. That is why the presidential office and its budget-making authority (*Yesan Sil* or *Yesan Cheo*) use the Party-Government Liaison Council (*Dangjeong Hyeopeui Hwe*) to accommodate local interests arising from National Assembly members, especially ruling party members. When the Government-Party Liaison Council makes final adjustments in the budget for submission to the National Assembly, important local projects for the ruling party's strongholds are included in the budget. As Kim (1999b) argues, ruling party members have much greater advantage in that they have access to the council, and even before these final adjustments for final submission, they can utilize connections to the president and presidential aides to directly approach high-level bureaucrats to make requests (*Chosun Ilbo* December 17, 2001: p.5).

Therefore, to *grease the wheel*, the president opens up a window for legislators, in particular ruling party members, to make some inputs to the budget through an institutionalized channel. This is indeed revealed in Park's (2003b) questionnaire conducted in 2000-2001 over legislators: a majority of the ruling party members (63.2%) said they could influence the budget, while 66.6% of the opposition members said they could not; and 31.6% of the ruling party members are somewhat satisfied with the budget, while 95.3% of the opposition members expressed their dissatisfaction. All of these are confirmatory to the view that, while monopolizing the budget-making process, still the president and its aides open some windows for ruling party members to make some demands for their local districts.

Meanwhile, as implied in the above questionnaire, divided government (*bunjeom jeongbu*) in South Korea seems to indeed bother the president (Jaung 2000, 2001), as partisan competition between the ruling and opposing forces in the legislature becomes highly contentious, especially in distributive policy areas (Park and Kim 1997). Thus in occasions, the president with the minority status actually had to step up efforts to gain a majority. For example, when Roh Tae Woo could not secure a majority in the National Assembly, in order to address this legislative problem, Roh merged his party with the two opposition parties to form a united majority. Similarly, when the National Assembly elections resulted in minority government in 1992 and 1996, presidents Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam approached independent legislators and succeeded in drawing them to make a majority. When Kim Dae Jung, a newly elected president, saw his coalition with the United Liberal Democrats did not reach a majority threshold in 1998, he also approached some legislators in the opposing Grand National Party and made them switch to the governing coalition, by giving

electoral and career favors.¹²⁶

Despite these presidential efforts to construct a majority in the legislature, there is a study showing that there is no significant relationship between the president's legislative productivity and divided government (O 2004). Indeed, as shown in Chapter 5, the president has been able to get most of the government-initiated bills approved by the National Assembly, even when the presidential parties lacked the majority status. This is because, as I argued, the president has a wide range of the exclusive powers to allocate office perks, including subsidies from Seoul to local municipalities. If the president were in fact plagued by the governability crisis of divided government as commonly assumed (Jaung 2000, 2001; Mo 2001, 2002), the result would be legislative gridlock; or if the president could manage to *grease the wheel*, then the opposition force should have more fringe benefits in the times of divided government. This is a testable empirical question.

7.3.2. Regional Targeting in Korea

Another question that needs to be addressed is whether the South Korean president can indeed develop regional targeting strategies in allocating selective goods. My answer would be, again, yes. As already shown in Chapter 5, regionalism has been one of the critical factors in

¹²⁶ In total, 24 switched to the ruling coalition from the GNP in 1998. Of the 24, 18 got endorsements from party leaders in the 2000 elections. Of the 6 members who did not receive endorsements, one defected from the ruling coalition before the 2000 elections to join the GNP; three got public posts, including the minister of labor; and two just restarted their private business.

shaping political cleavages in South Korea (Cho 1998; Choi 1993; Moon 2005). Empirical findings on regional allocation of selective goods to date, although limited compared to other countries, are confirmatory to the assumption that the president has regional preferences in allocating monetary benefits (Horiuchi and Lee 2008; Kwon 2005).

The actual electoral results vividly show that regionalism is persistent in voting behaviors. Table 7.1 shows the vote shares of the two leading presidential candidates in each metropolitan city (*teukbyeolsi* and *kwangyeoksbi*) and province (*do*) from the 1987 to the 2002 presidential elections. The table shows that Kim Dae Jung continued to gain overwhelming shares of around 90% in his regions – Gwangju and Jeolla-do –, while his opponents only gained meager shares of less than 5% in the same region.¹²⁷ On the other hand, the table shows that conservative candidates (Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam, and Lee Hoi Chang) successfully gained concentrated support in Busan, Daegu, and Gyeongsang-do. These overall regional patterns did not disappear in the 2002 elections, even though Roh Moo Hyun, the successor of Kim Dae Jung, emphasized the advantage of his Busan origin. The table also shows that Seoul and the surrounding metropolitan areas (Incheon and Gyeonggi-do) are hotly contested areas compared to the other regions.

¹²⁷ Although not shown, KDJ run in the 1987 election and similarly gained 85-90% of votes in his regions.

Table 7.1: Presidential Candidates' Vote Shares, 1987 to 2002

	1987 Elections			1992 Elections		
	RTW	KYS	Margin	KYS	KDJ	Margin
Seoul	29.43%	28.64%	0.80%	35.99%	37.31%	1.32%
Busan	31.65%	55.18%	23.53%	72.65%	12.41%	60.24%
Daegu	69.80%	23.97%	45.83%	58.86%	7.73%	51.13%
Incheon	38.74%	29.53%	9.21%	36.76%	31.32%	5.44%
Gwangju	4.77%	0.51%	4.26%	2.11%	95.12%	93.01%
Daejeon	25.34%	21.66%	3.68%	34.69%	28.33%	6.36%
Gyeonggi-do	40.66%	27.02%	13.64%	35.80%	31.50%	4.30%
Gangwon-do	57.94%	25.50%	32.43%	40.79%	15.24%	25.54%
Chungcheongbuk-do	45.67%	27.50%	18.18%	37.53%	25.55%	11.98%
Chungcheongnam-do	25.50%	15.62%	9.88%	36.15%	27.94%	8.21%
Jeollabuk-do	13.71%	1.46%	12.25%	5.61%	88.01%	82.40%
Jeollanam-do	7.96%	1.12%	6.83%	4.15%	91.07%	86.92%
Gyeongsangbuk-do	64.83%	27.51%	37.32%	63.57%	9.45%	54.12%
Gyeongsangnam-do	40.38%	50.27%	9.90%	71.46%	9.13%	62.34%
Jeju-do	48.47%	26.08%	22.39%	39.32%	32.38%	6.94%
Standard Deviation	0.19	0.16	0.13	0.22	0.30	0.34

	1997 Elections			2002 Elections		
	KDJ	LHC	Margin	RMH	LHC	Margin
Seoul	44.30%	40.40%	3.90%	51.00%	44.70%	6.30%
Busan	15.10%	52.60%	37.50%	29.60%	66.30%	36.60%
Daegu	12.40%	71.70%	59.30%	18.50%	77.10%	58.60%
Incheon	38.00%	35.90%	2.10%	49.50%	44.30%	5.20%
Gwangju	96.30%	1.70%	94.60%	94.70%	3.60%	91.10%
Daejeon	44.40%	28.80%	15.60%	54.70%	39.50%	15.20%
Ulsan	15.20%	50.70%	35.50%	35.00%	52.40%	17.50%
Gyeonggi-do	38.70%	35.00%	3.70%	50.30%	43.90%	6.40%
Gangwon-do	23.30%	42.40%	19.10%	40.90%	51.80%	10.80%
Chungcheongbuk-do	36.70%	30.20%	6.50%	49.80%	42.40%	7.40%
Chungcheongnam-do	47.20%	23.00%	24.20%	51.40%	40.60%	10.80%
Jeollabuk-do	90.70%	4.50%	86.20%	90.70%	6.10%	84.60%
Jeollanam-do	92.90%	3.10%	89.80%	92.20%	4.60%	87.60%
Gyeongsangbuk-do	13.40%	60.60%	47.20%	21.30%	72.20%	50.90%
Gyeongsangnam-do	10.80%	54.00%	43.20%	26.70%	66.60%	39.90%
Jeju-do	39.80%	35.90%	3.90%	55.30%	39.40%	15.90%
Standard Deviation	0.29	0.2	0.32	0.24	0.23	0.31

Note: RTW = Roh Tae Woo, KYS = Kim Young Sam, KDJ = Kim Dae Jung, LHC = Lee Hoi Chang, RMH = Roh Moo Hyun

Reflecting these regional voting patterns for the presidential elections, the party composition of the National Assembly is also highly skewed in terms of regions.¹²⁸ As Table 7.2

¹²⁸ The electoral system for the South Korean National Assembly is a mixed-member majoritarian

shows, conservative parties led by Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam, and Lee Hoi Chang (DJP, RDP, DLP, NKP, and GNP) are dominant in Busan, Daegu, and Gyeongsang-do, while Kim Dae Jung's parties (PPD, DP, NCNP, and MDP) are concentrated in Gwangju and Jeolla-do. The table again shows that the balance of representation is relatively fair in Seoul, Incheon, and Gyeonggi-do, compared to the other regions.

one, in which around 80% of the legislators are elected on SMDs and therefore tend to cultivate personal votes. Before 2004, voters had one vote for 224 to 253 SMDs, while the remaining seats (46 to 75) were proportionally divided according to the seat shares (1988-92) or the vote shares (1996-2000) of parties in SMDs. From 2004, voters have two votes, one for 243 local single-member districts (SMDs) and another for a nation-wide closed-list proportional representation bloc that has 56 seats. South Korean legislators elected on SMDs, especially those first elected to the National Assembly, spend substantial time on offering constituency services and developing personal networks in districts (Yoon 2002b). In this context, claiming credit for bringing publicly financed local projects to districts helps legislators increase their possibilities for reelection.

Table 7.2: National Assembly Election Results

	1988				1992			
	DJP	PPD	RDP	Others	DLP	DP	UPP	Others
Seoul	10	17	10	5	16	25	2	1
Busan	1	0	14	0	15	0	0	1
Daegu	8	0	0	0	8	0	2	1
Incheon	6	0	1	0	5	1	0	1
Gwangju	0	5	0	0	0	6	0	0
Daejeon	-	-	-	-	1	2	0	2
Gyeonggi-do	16	1	4	7	18	8	5	0
Gangwon-do	8	0	3	3	8	0	4	2
Chungcheongbuk-do	7	0	0	2	6	1	2	0
Chungcheongnam-do	2	0	2	14	7	1	4	2
Jeollabuk-do	0	14	0	0	2	12	0	0
Jeollanam-do	0	17	0	1	0	19	0	0
Gyeongsangbuk-do	17	0	2	2	14	0	2	5
Gyeongsangnam-do	12	0	9	1	16	0	3	4
Jeju-do	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	3
PR	38	16	13	8	31	23	7	

	1996				2000			
	NKP	NCNP	ULD	Others	GNP	MDP	ULD	Others
Seoul	27	18	0	2	17	28	0	0
Busan	21	0	0	0	17	0	0	0
Daegu	2	0	8	3	11	0	0	0
Incheon	9	0	0	0	5	6	0	0
Gwangju	0	6	0	0	0	5	0	0
Daejeon	0	0	7	0	1	2	3	1
Gyeonggi-do	18	10	5	5	18	22	1	0
Gangwon-do	9	0	2	2	3	5	0	1
Chungcheongbuk-do	2	0	5	1	3	2	2	0
Chungcheongnam-do	1	0	12	0	0	4	6	1
Jeollabuk-do	1	13	0	0	0	9	0	1
Jeollanam-do	0	17	0	0	0	11	0	2
Gyeongsangbuk-do	11	0	2	6	16	0	0	0
Gyeongsangnam-do	17	0	0	6	20	0	0	1
Jeju-do	3	0	0	0	1	2	0	0
PR	18	13	9	6	21	19	5	1

Note: DJP = Democratic Justice Party; PPD = Party for Peaceful Democracy; RDP = Reunification Democratic Party; DLP = Democratic Liberal Party; DP = Democratic Party; UPP = Unification People's Party; NKP = New Korea Party; NCNP = National Congress for New Politics; ULD = United Liberal Democrats; GNP = Grand National Party; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party.

Therefore, as already shown in Chapter 5, legislators elected from parties' strongholds tend to show much stronger loyalty, as endorsements from certain parties are almost sufficient conditions

for reelection and the leadership's virtually monopolized power of giving endorsements (Hong 2000; Jeon 2005). For the president, it is easy to align the incentives of ruling party members before the National Assembly elections, as she could directly select candidates for the legislative elections or use office benefits available in the presidential office to indirectly influence the party leadership that selects candidates.¹²⁹ Therefore, as confirmed in Chapter 5, party unity tends to be higher in the first few years of the presidential terms, so for the president to maximize seat shares in the National Assembly, the Dixit-Londregan *regional-targeting* strategy would be appropriate in the Korean context (Dixit and Londregan 1996; McGillivray 1997). In targeting districts, the South Korean president may impose costs on the areas where she would expect only a meager level of support (and therefore only the bare possibility of electing her candidates to the National Assembly)

¹²⁹ For example, for the 1996 National Assembly elections, the President Kim Young Sam intervened in every district to choose his own candidates (Kim 2001b). The president even takes care of ruling party members who could not get endorsements for the legislative elections by giving them patronage posts in public corporations (*Weekly Chosun* February 24, 2000: pp.22-3). Even if the president does not wield direct influence over the candidate selection process, still she can use her exclusive personnel appointment powers to influence the leadership. This is what happened in the 2008 National Assembly elections: the President Lee Myung Bak's aides – Lee Jae O, Lee Sang Deuk, Lee Bang Ho, and others – monopolized the endorsement process in the Grand National Party. This was designed to isolate and weaken the faction led by Park Keun Hye, a leading candidate for the next presidential elections in 2012; one member from the Park faction said, "The candidate selection committee is a 'robot' that the presidential office manipulates" (*Chosun Ilbo* March 15, 2008: p.5).

and the more than sufficient level of support (and therefore the near certainties of electing her candidates). Rather, hotly contested regions would become the target for allocation of pork barrel projects.

In sum, the South Korean president is allowed to make any policy proposals, but she needs the consent from the National Assembly to legislate them. At the same time, she enjoys the constitutional advantage in terms of making annual budgets, as the exclusive power to formulate an annual budget is granted to her. Thus the institutional conditions for the president to utilize her budget power to promote legislation of her pet policies are put in place in the South Korean context. In addition, regionalism has been persistent in South Korean voters' voting behaviors: ruling and opposing parties always have their own strongholds, while there are contested regions that would have much more swing voters. Given the president's powers to satisfy her party members with the persistent regionalism and personnel management, the president would target swing voters in hotly contested regions before the National Assembly elections, taking advantage of the majoritarian electoral system and the non-concurrent electoral cycles. Here I reach two hypotheses to test:

H1. *Greasing-the-Wheels Strategy*. The South Korean president with a majority in the legislature would allocate more money to her presidential members, while under divided government, the president would offer the larger amounts of money to the opposition's strongholds.

H2. *Regional-Targeting Strategy*. The South Korean president would target certain regions in

allocating subsidies, especially before the National Assembly elections. The smaller the incumbent president's vote margin with her best competitor in an area, the larger amounts of money the area should receive.

7.4. Data Analysis

7.4.1. Unit of Analysis and Methods

Unit of analysis (i, t) is defined here as a municipality-year: i is city (*sh*), county (*gm*), or ward (*gw*, of metropolitan cities); and the observed period (t) is from 1990 to 2005.¹³⁰ As of 2005, there are 232 municipalities. In the sample, 139 municipalities experienced during the period mergers, abolitions and consolidations, and separations. Some municipalities disappeared during the period because of mergers or abolitions, while other municipalities were newly created during the period. Thus the panel is unbalanced in nature. Refer to the Appendix 1 for how units are defined.

Hausman tests confirm that the coefficients estimated by the random effects estimator are significantly different from the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator, suggesting the omitted variable bias exists in unit-specific errors. The data analysis will therefore assume the following fixed-effect time-series cross-section equation:

$$Y_{it} = aY_{it-1} + \beta X_{it} + \gamma Z_{it} + \delta_i + e_{it}$$

¹³⁰ This is the fiscal year, whose budget is legislated in the end of the last calendar year.

where Y is my main dependent variable to be explained below, X is a set of my major independent variables, Z is a set of controls, α , β , and γ are sets of parameters to be estimated, δ is the unit-specific fixed effect, and e is the residual. As testing confirms the presence of autocorrelations (Wooldridge 2002), standard errors will be clustered on each municipality, and a lagged dependent variable is included to control for the autocorrelations (Beck and Katz 1996; Keele and Kelly 2006).

Regardless of its convenience in correcting for the presence of autocorrelations, a lagged dependent variable in fixed-effect panel estimation is known for notoriously leading to biased results (i.e. the coefficient of a lagged dependent variable may be biased upwards and a lagged dependent variable can dampen the real effects of independent variables). The bias is decreasing in t , which is 16 at maximum here, so there is a concern about the bias, but I employ a conservative test here: If I could find the significant impact of my main independent variables despite the potential dampening effects of a lagged dependent variable, then my findings would be robust.

Also note that here I would like to test one specific type of distributed lag models, which would be generally written as:

$$Y_{it} = \rho Y_{it-1} + \beta_0 X_{it} + \beta_1 X_{it-1} + \dots + \beta_k X_{it-k} + \gamma Z_{it} + \delta_i + e_{it}$$

However, I limit my specifications to models with a one-year-lagged dependent variable and without lagged independent variables, for theoretical and methodological reasons. First, it is true that political effects may take time, but it is theoretically hard to hypothesize that in formulating the annual budget the annually changing political situations can have lasting effects. Second,

methodologically, the independent variables of my primary interest do not change for years as explained below, so lagged independent variables would be not efficient in this case; for the same reason, the Arellano-Bond dynamic model is not appropriate here.

7.4.2. *Dependent Variable*

The main dependent variable to be tested is the logarithm of the total amount of subsidies (CPI-adjusted) per capita each municipality received from Seoul in a given year for both general and special accounts (*ilban* and *teukbyeol hwegye*). The data is from various issues of *Jibang Jaejeong Yeongam* [Local Finance Yearbook] published annually by the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs. As Figure 7.2 shows, the amounts weighted with the total population in the municipality have great variations. In 2005, the top beneficiary in this distributional game was Jangsu-gun in Cheollabuk-do, which received 6.51 million won per capita, followed by Ulleung-gun, a county made of small islands 270km away from Pohang with only 9,550 residents receiving 6.42 million won per capita. The worst was Seocho-gu in Seoul, where one person received only 43,000 won. As the distribution is somewhat skewed – a majority of the municipalities received less than one million won per capita while only a handful gained more than two million won per capita –, the value is logarithmically transformed. I also weight this variable with the CPI index (2005=100), to control for the annual inflation effects.¹³¹

¹³¹ The CPI data is from the National Statistical Office website (<http://kosis.nso.go.kr/>). Note that the CPI index is available for metropolitan and large cities, but not for each municipality. Thus I used the CPI index of the cities representing each province: Suwon-si for Gyeonggi-do;




Figure 7.2: Regional Distribution in Korea, 2005 (Total Subsidies per capita in Million Won)

Chuncheon-si for Gangwon-do; Cheongju-si for Chungcheongbuk-do; Daejeon-si for Chungcheongnam-do; Jeonju-si for Jeollabuk-do; Gwangju-si for Jeollanam-do; Daegu-si for Gyeongsangbuk-do; Masan-si for Gyeongsangnam-do; and Jeju-si for Jeju-do.

7.4.3. *Independent Variables*

The main independent variables are (i) the president's vote share; (ii) the vote margin between the winner and the best loser in the presidential elections; (iii) the number of presidential party members elected in a municipality; (iv) a dichotomous dummy for a divided government year; and (v) dichotomous dummies indicating whether a given year precedes or succeeds the National Assembly elections within a presidential term.

A fairly straightforward measure, the president's vote share is the share of the incumbent president's votes in a given municipality. The presidential elections were held in every five years (1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002) so the values reflect the most recent one in a given year and do not change for five years. To allow for consistency in this variable for four different presidents, the relative value is used: the vote share in a municipality minus the nation-wide average. To calculate the vote margin between the presidential election winner and the best loser, I first subtracted the best loser's votes from the winner's votes, divided this difference by the total number of votes cast in a municipality, and took its absolute value. These data come from the National Election Commission of South Korea (<http://www.nec.go.kr/>).¹³²

The number of presidential party members elected in a municipality is also straightforward.¹³³ The data is also from the National Election Commission

¹³² I conducted necessary transformations on those municipalities which experienced mergers, abolitions, and consolidations.

¹³³ Districts can be divided into four categories: (1) a single municipality directly corresponds to a single electoral district; (2) a municipality is divided into several districts; (3) several municipalities

(<http://www.nec.go.kr/>), as well as various issues of *Kukhwe Kongho*, a daily newsletter that contains information on legislators' new entry to the assembly through by-elections, retirement from the assembly, and termination (mainly due to decease), as well as party switching.¹³⁴

A dichotomous dummy for divided government takes the value of 1 if the ruling party was in a minority. Presidential coalitions were in the minority status when they legislated the budget for 1990, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Another set of dummies indicates whether a given year precedes or succeeds the National Assembly elections within a presidential term. The variable "Before NA Election" is coded 1 if the year is 1990-1992, 1994-1996, 1999-2000, or 2004. As the hypotheses state that the presidential factors should be conditional upon divided government and the election cycle, the interactions between these dummies and the above independent variables will be also incorporated.

compose a single district; and (4) several municipalities are mixed up and then divided into several districts. For the type (2) municipalities, I combined districts to assume that one municipality has multiple legislators; for the type (3) municipalities, I assume different multiple municipalities have one single common legislator. For the type (4) districts, see the Appendix 2 for the coding rule. I also used different measures, for example the ratio of presidential party members in a given municipality (the number of presidential party members divided by the total number of legislators elected in the same municipality), but the number of presidential party members showed the best fit.

¹³⁴ The president's strongholds tend to elect more presidential followers. Thus I run separate models to avoid the multicollinearity problem.

7.4.4. Control Variables

A range of controls will be included in the model. Political controls include: the average of terms served by National Assembly members elected on a given district; and a dichotomous dummy for whether a legislator elected on a municipality had experienced a party leader¹³⁵ or a governmental minister before. These variables are to control for the political influence of senior legislators. Some other dichotomous dummies for committee membership will be also included: a dichotomous dummy for whether a legislator belongs to the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts (*Yesan Kyeolsan Teukebyeol Unvonhwe*) is added to test the claim that interest groups and legislators intensively lobby members of the committee to increase the budget amounts for their desired policy areas (Park 2003b); and another dichotomous dummy for whether a municipality contains a member in pork-related committees (Commerce and Industry, Construction and Transportation, Agriculture). The data is taken from committee minutes recorded during the deliberation period from October 1, when usually the government submits its budget proposal to the assembly, to December 31, the final day for legislating the budget.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ Party leaders include: *Chongjae* (party president); *Daepyo* (party representative); *Chwego W'won* (supreme council member); *Samu Chongjang* (secretary-general); *Jeongchaek Euijang* (policy affairs council chair); and *Wonnae Chongmu/Daepyo* (party whip).

¹³⁶ The constitutionally given deadline is sometime around early December, but since 2001 the deliberation process has taken much longer time and usually the legislation of the budget cannot occur until late December. Committee minutes are available at the Korean National Assembly website (<http://likms.assembly.go.kr/record/>).

Socio-economic controls include: the dependency ratio (the population aged 14 and under and the population aged 65 and over, divided by the working-age population); the population density (per km², logged); the average number of family members; the ratio of agricultural land in a municipality; the fiscal capacity (the independent revenue source of a municipality divided by the total revenue); the bond dependency ratio (the local bond ratio to the total revenue); a dummy variable for metropolitan cities (*teukbyeol-shi*, *kwangyeok-shi*, and *jikbal-shi*); and a dummy for the year 1999. Coded 1 if a municipality belongs to Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Gwangju, Daejeon, or Ulsan, the metropolitan dummy is included, as a different formula in calculating subsidies applies to metropolitan cities (Kim 2000b).¹³⁷ The year 1999 is controlled for the fiscal distress caused by the Asian financial crisis. The socioeconomic controls are taken from the National Statistical Office website (<http://kosis.nso.go.kr/>) as well as *Si, Kum, Ku Juyo Tonggye Jipyo* [Major Statistical Indicators of Municipalities] published by the NSO and various issues of annual yearbooks published by provincial governments. The fiscal variables are taken from the aforementioned *Jibang Jaejeong Yeongam*.

I will also control for different presidents by including period dummies: Roh Tae Woo (1990-3), Kim Young Sam (1994-8), Kim Dae Jung (1999-2003), and Roh Moo Hyun (2004-5).

¹³⁷ As the analysis below is an unbalanced panel with fixed effects for each of the municipalities, basically the metropolitan dummy tests if there was any impact on the fiscal structures of the two cities that experienced promotion to the metropolitan cities between 1989 and 2005 (Daejeon in 1990 and Ulsan in 1997). Excluding metropolitan cities from the sample does not change the results.

Summary statistics is presented in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3: Summary Statistics for Main Variables

	Obs	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	Expected Sign
Total Subsidies per capita (log)	3,784	12.39	1.20	7.02	16.34	
President's Vote Share	3,784	0.082	0.24	-0.39	0.57	+ - (When interacted with Divided Government dummy)
Vote Margin	3,784	0.32	0.28	0.0000 27	0.95	- (When interacted with Before NA Election dummy)
Presidential Members	3,784	0.64	0.64	0	4	+ - (When interacted with Divided Government dummy)
Average Number of Terms	3,784	2.12	1.23	0	9	
Former Leader and/or Minister	3,784	0.30	0.46	0	1	
Pork Committee Membership	3,784	0.37	0.48	0	1	
Budget Committee Membership	3,784	0.22	0.41	0	1	
Dependency	3,784	0.42	0.062	0.26	0.64	
Density	3,784	2.80	0.90	1.26	5.09	
Family Members	3,784	3.16	0.38	2.25	5.37	
Agricultural Land	3,784	0.20	0.12	0	0.66	
Fiscal Capacity	3,784	0.41	0.19	0.078	0.99	
Bond Dependency	3,784	0.028	0.051	0	0.76	
Metropolitan	3,784	0.28	0.45	0	1	

7.4.5. Results

Results are given in Tables 7.4 and 7.5. First of all, many of the socio-economic controls showed statistical significance and their signs are reasonable. The signs for the variables "Density" and "Family Members" suggest less populated (and therefore more rural) areas tend to receive more funds from the capital, while the positive (but statistically insignificant) sign of the variable

"Agricultural Land" is also confirmatory to this. The fiscal situations of a municipality matter in a way that fiscally unhealthy local governments tend to be more dependent upon transfers from the central government. More debts lead to less subsidies, implying that two ways to finance expenditures – issuing bonds and receiving subsidies – might be in the trade-off relationship. The sign for the "Dependency" variable looks slightly puzzling, but this is due to the natural growth of population in a more actively growing city; although not shown here, decomposing the dependency ratio to two variables (i.e. the ratio of the population aged 14 and under, and the ratio of the population aged 65 and over) suggests that "younger" municipalities tend to get less money, while "aging" municipalities tend to get more money.

Table 7.4: Tests for Greasing-the-Wheel Strategy

	Fixed-Effect, Clustering on Municipality	Fixed-Effect, Clustering on Municipality
Lagged DV	0.38*** (0.019)	0.38*** (0.018)
President's Vote Share	0.056*** (0.024)	
Presidential Members		0.037*** (0.010)
Divided Government	0.089*** (0.023)	0.046*** (0.014)
President's Vote Share * Divided Government Presidential Members * Divided Government	-0.17*** (0.040)	-0.054*** (0.018)
Average Number of Terms	-0.0044 (0.0064)	-0.0040 (0.0065)
Former Leader and/or Minister	0.0015 (0.015)	-0.0032 (0.016)
Pork Committee Membership	0.0058 (0.011)	0.0047 (0.011)
Budget Committee Membership	0.0070 (0.012)	0.0071 (0.012)
Dependency	-0.80*** (0.24)	-0.82*** (0.24)
Density	-0.81*** (0.14)	-0.81*** (0.14)
Family Members	-0.41*** (0.061)	-0.39*** (0.060)
Agricultural Land	0.20 (0.53)	0.21 (0.53)
Fiscal Capacity	-1.74*** (0.14)	-1.74*** (0.14)
Bond Dependency	-0.79*** (0.19)	-0.80*** (0.19)
Metropolitan	-0.041 (0.044)	-0.040 (0.044)
1999	0.080*** (0.024)	0.079*** (0.024)
Obs	3784	3784
Adjusted R ² (Overall)	0.88	0.88

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Period dummies not shown. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 7.5: Tests for Regional-Targeting Strategy

	Fixed-Effect, Clustering on Municipality	Fixed-Effect, Clustering on Municipality	Fixed-Effect, Clustering on Municipality
Lagged DV	0.36*** (0.017)	0.36*** (0.017)	0.36*** (0.017)
Vote Margin	-0.068 (0.044)		-0.093* (0.050)
President's Vote Share		-0.0086 (0.045)	0.014 (0.035)
Before NA Election	-0.095*** (0.017)	-0.12*** (0.013)	-0.092*** (0.017)
Vote Margin *	-0.075*** (0.030)		-0.086*** (0.031)
Before NA Election		0.013 (0.036)	0.014 (0.035)
Average Number of Terms	-0.0053 (0.0063)	-0.0066 (0.0065)	-0.0046 (0.0064)
Former Leader and/or Minister	0.0073 (0.015)	0.0088 (0.016)	0.0069 (0.015)
Pork Committee Membership	0.0055 (0.011)	0.0063 (0.011)	0.0071 (0.011)
Budget Committee Membership	0.0047 (0.012)	0.0069 (0.012)	0.0056 (0.012)
Dependency	-0.61*** (0.23)	-0.58*** (0.24)	-0.63*** (0.23)
Density	-0.92*** (0.15)	-0.89*** (0.14)	-0.92*** (0.15)
Family Members	-0.23*** (0.063)	-0.22*** (0.064)	-0.22*** (0.063)
Agricultural Land	0.59 (0.54)	0.57 (0.53)	0.62 (0.53)
Fiscal Capacity	-1.69*** (0.14)	-1.69*** (0.14)	-1.69*** (0.14)
Bond Dependency	-0.70*** (0.19)	-0.70*** (0.19)	-0.70*** (0.19)
Metropolitan	-0.11*** (0.039)	-0.075** (0.036)	-0.10*** (0.041)
1999	0.12*** (0.020)	0.12*** (0.021)	0.12*** (0.021)
Obs	3784	3784	3784
Adjusted R2	0.88	0.88	0.88

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Period dummies not shown. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Second, none of the political controls showed statistical significance, suggesting that legislators' posts in the National Assembly or parties play only marginal roles in formulating annual

budgets for subsidies. This is consistent with the view that South Korean legislators tend to work as loyal agents for the executive office and party leaders in the policymaking process (Kang 2003; Kim and Jang 2001; Lee 2002; Lim 2005; O 2004; Park 2000a, 2003b). Committees determining fiscal policy and pork-barrel projects rather work as partisan competition arenas where loyal party agents vie for partisan interests, not for personalistic interests (Park and Kim 1997).

Third and most importantly, the presidential factors do significantly matter throughout the models. Controlling for the autocorrelations, unit-specific errors, and socioeconomic variables relevant to fiscal allocation, the independent variables of interest all show statistical significance at the 5% level. First, the president's vote share is statistically significant at the 5% level, showing the positive sign, while the interactive terms show statistically significant negative signs at the 1% level. This is confirmative with Hypothesis 1: The president has to offer subsidies to its supporters, while she has to allocate more money to the opposition's strongholds, when her party is in the minority status in the National Assembly.

In terms of presidential followers, the result also verifies the hypothesis, with the general trend being that the president treats presidential party members well during the times of unified government but compensates the opposition parties when her party is in the minority status in the National Assembly.

Second, the results shown in Table 7.5 confirm the swing voter model, conditional on the timing. The incumbent president's vote margin with the best loser has significantly negative impact on the amount of subsidies only before the National Assembly elections. This suggests that, before the elections, the president can indeed take advantage of the constitutional power to propose

the budget and strategically allocate money to those areas that are crucial in generating a majority. Meanwhile, based on the higher levels of party unity in the first few years of her term, she tends to neglect those areas where her party already has strong supporters or only has a meager chance of winning a seat. The insignificance of the variable "Vote Margin" indicates that, after the assembly elections are over, the president now loses these incentives, as she knows she will have resigned by the time when the next assembly elections will be held.

Overall, panel estimations are confirmatory to both of the hypotheses. Specifically, I have found that, when the president has a majority in the assembly, she provides more money to her supporters, while when she is in the divided government situation, she needs to care about the opposition, by cutting monetary benefits to her supporters. In an attempt to maximize the seat share of her party in the legislature, the president can strategically allocate money to swing areas before the National Assembly elections.

7.5. Conclusion

I started this chapter with discussing the presidential factor in distribution. I pointed out that this relative ignorance about the president may be partly because of the literature's focus on the US case. However, there is a reason to believe that the executive can be an influential figure in this politics: The president needs to achieve stable legislative outputs and tries to do this by using strategic allocation of monetary benefits. There are two strategies available to the president. First, the *greasing-the-wheel* strategy can be used to compensate legislators: ruling party members when a ruling party has a majority; and opposition party members in the times of minority governments. Second,

the *regional-targeting* strategy can be effective in maintaining or maximizing the seat share in the legislature, especially when the presidential and assembly elections are non-concurrent. These two strategies would become attractive if the president has various types of political powers to intervene in the budget making process.

This theoretical implication is tested with the South Korean context. In South Korea, people oftentimes complain about the nature of the "imperial presidency" resulting from the formal powers given to the president and the lack of expertise in legislators, but the actuality might be different when I pay attention to a policy area where a zero-sum conflict would be expected. As long as a majority is required to legislate budgets, the president has rational reasons to forge consensus with the legislature: a ruling party with a majority has some bargaining leverage in negotiating with the president, so the president needs to satisfy presidential party members; and during the times of divided government, she needs to care about the opposition. When the National Assembly elections approach, the president acts strategically by targeting electorally crucial districts to maximize seat shares. These strategies are all the more important in South Korea, where the regionalism and the president's personnel management powers allows the president to keep legislators' incentives aligned especially before the National Assembly elections.

With all the municipalities throughout the country from 1990 to 2005, I have found that my panel estimations are in general confirmatory to both of my hypotheses. Specifically, I have found that the Korean president could exert influence over distributional spending patterns. When the South Korean president is in the united government situation, she needs to care about the ruling coalition; but under divided government, she needs to cut monetary benefits to his supporters –

both voters and legislators. In an attempt to maximize the seat share of her party in the legislature, the president strategically allocates money to swing areas before the National Assembly elections.

Appendix 7.1. On Mergers, Abolitions and Consolidations, and Separations of Municipalities

In Korea, 139 municipalities experienced mergers, abolitions and consolidations, and separations from 1989 to 2005. Those municipalities which experienced abolitions and consolidations and separations are in Appendix Table 1.

On merged municipalities. Their observation ends in the year prior to the mergers and a new observation of the merged unit starts from the year of the mergers. For example, Gyeongju-si in Gyeongsangbuk-do was merged with Gyeongju-gun in 1995. In this case, Gyeongju-si prior to 1995, Gyeongju-si after 1995, and Gyeongju-gun prior to 1995 are all regarded as separate units of analysis.

On abolished and consolidated municipalities. Their observation ends in the year prior to the abolitions and consolidations and a new observation of the merged unit starts from the year of the abolitions and consolidations. For example, Boryeong-si in Chungcheongnam-do was born in 1995 from the merger of Dacheon-si and Seosan-gun. In this case, Boryeong-si started the observation in 1995 as a separate unit of analysis, while both Dacheon-si and Seosan-gun end the observation in 1994.

On separated municipalities. The original municipalities' observation ends in the year prior to the separations, while the observation of the new municipalities starts from the year of the separations. For example, Yeonje-gu in Busan was born from part of Dongnae-gu in 1995. In this case, Yeonje-gu starts its observation from 1995, while Yeonje-gu prior to 1995 and Yeonje-gu after 1995 are regarded as separate units of analysis.

The independent variables (the president's vote share and the number of presidential party members) reflect these transformations. In the case of Gyeongju-si, the president's vote share for 1995-98 is calculated based on the combination of the incumbent president's votes in Gyeongju-si and Gyeongju-gun in the 1992 elections. In the case of Yeonje-gu, the corresponding part of the incumbent president's votes in Dongnae-gu in the 1992 elections is subtracted.

Appendix 7.2. The Coding Rule for the Cases in which Multiple Municipalities Are Mixed up and then Divided into Multiple Districts

In Korea, districting is based on administrative municipalities. However, some of electoral districts for the National Assembly do not directly correspond to municipalities. As I noted in the chapter, if a district has multiple municipalities, then each of the municipalities is simply assumed to have a single common legislator. If a municipality contains multiple districts, then the municipality is assumed to have multiple legislators. The case I have to discuss is what to do with multiple municipalities that are mixed up and then divided into multiple districts. Those municipalities are listed in Appendix Table 2.

Actually those are the cases in which a single municipality does not have enough residents to constitute an electoral district and thus a portion of neighboring municipality is added to form an electoral district. For example, Gangseo-gu is a scarcely populated ward in Busan, and thus the election commission added a portion of Buk-gu to Gangseo-gu to form a district dubbed "Buk-gu=Gangseo-gu Eul." Therefore I assume a legislator elected from Buk-gu=Gangseo-gu Eul to be accountable for both Buk-gu and Gangseo-gu. Similar adjustments are made to other municipalities.

Appendix Table 7.1

Year	Municipalities	City/Province	
1995	Seongdong-gu	Seoul	Separated Gwangjin-gu
1995	Gwangjin-gu	Seoul	Born from Seondgond-gu
1995	Gangbuk-gu	Seoul	Born from Dobong-gu
1995	Dobong-gu	Seoul	Separated Gangbuk-gu
1995	Guro-gu	Seoul	Separated Geumcheon-gu
1995	Geumcheon-gu	Seoul	Born from Guro-gu
1995	Dongnae-gu	Busan	Separated Yeonje-gu
1995	Nam-gu	Busan	Separated Suyoeng-gu
1995	Buk-gu	Busan	Separated Sasang-gu
1995	Yeonje-gu	Busan	Born from Dongnae-gu
1995	Suyeong-gu	Busan	Born from Nam-gu
1995	Sasang-gu	Busan	Born from Buk-gu
1995	Gijang-gun	Busan	Born from Yangsan-gun
1995	Nam-gu	Incheon	Separated Yeonsu-gu
1995	Yeonsu-gu	Incheon	Born from Nam-gu
1995	Seo-gu	Gwangju	Separated Nam-gu
1995	Nam-gu	Gwangju	Born from Seo-gu
1995	Pyeongtaek-si	Gyeonggi-do	Merged with Songtan-si and Pyeongtaeg-gun
1995	Chuncheon-si	Gangwon-do	Merged with Chuncheon-gun
1995	Wonju-si	Gangwon-do	Merged with Wonju-gun
1995	Gangneung-si	Gangwon-do	Merged with Myeongju-gun
1995	Samcheok-si	Gangwon-do	Merged with Samcheok-gun
1995	Chungju-si	Chungcheongbuk-do	Merged with Chungwon-gun
1995	Jecheon-si	Chungcheongbuk-do	Merged with Jecheon-gun
2003	Goesan-gun	Chungcheongbuk-do	Separated Jeongpyeong-gun
2003	Jeongpyeong-gun	Chungcheongbuk-do	Born from Goesan-gun
1995	Cheonan-si	Chungcheongnam-do	Merged with Cheonan-gun
1995	Gongju-si	Chungcheongnam-do	Merged with Gongju-gun
1995	Seosan-si	Chungcheongnam-do	Merged with Seosan-gun
2003	Nonsan-si	Chungcheongnam-do	Separated Gyeryong-si
2003	Gyeryong-si	Chungcheongnam-do	Born from Nonsan-si
1995	Gunsan-si	Jeollabuk-do	Merged with Oggju-gun
1995	Iksan-si	Jeollabuk-do	Merged with Igsan-gun
1995	Jeongeup-si	Jeollabuk-do	Merged with Jeongeup-gun
1995	Namwon-si	Jeollabuk-do	Merged with Namwon-gun
1995	Gimje-si	Jeollabuk-do	Merged with Gimje-gun
1998	Yeosu-si	Jeollanam-do	Merged with Yeochon-gun
1995	Suncheon-si	Jeollanam-do	Merged with Seungju-gun
1995	Naju-si	Jeollanam-do	Merged with Naju-gun

1995	Pohang-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Yoengil-gun
1995	Gyeongju-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Gyeongju-gun
1995	Gimcheon-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Geumleung-gun
1995	Andong-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Andong-gun
1995	Gumi-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Sonsan-gun
1995	Yeongju-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Yongpung-gun
1995	Yeongcheon-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Yoengcheon-gun
1995	Sangju-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Sangju-gun
1995	Gyeongsan-si	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Merged with Gyeongsan-gun
1995	Changwon-si	Gyeongsangnam-do	Merged with part of Changwon-gun
1995	Masan-si	Gyeongsangnam-do	Merged with Geoje-gun and part of Changwon-gun
1995	Jinju-si	Gyeongsangnam-do	Merged with Jinyang-gun
1995	Gimhae-si	Gyeongsangnam-do	Merged with Gimhae-gun
1995	Miryang-si	Gyeongsangnam-do	Merged with Miryang-gun
1995	Ulsan-si	Gyeongsangnam-do	Merged with Ulsan-gun
1995	Yangsan-gun	Gyeongsangnam-do	Separate Gijang-gun

Appendix Table 7.2

Year	Legislator(s) elected at this (these) district(s)...	In this city/province...	Should be accountable for this (these) municipality(ies)
2004	Buk-gu=Gangseo-gu Gap	Busan	Buk-gu
2004	Buk-gu=Gangseo-gu Eul	Busan	Buk-gu, Gangseo-gu
2004	Haeundae-gu=Gijang-gun Gap	Busan	Haeundae-gu
2004	Haeundae-gu=Gijang-gun Eul	Busan	Gijang-gun, Haeundae-gu
2004	Seo-gu=Ganghwa-gun Gap	Incheon	Seo-gu
2004	Seo-gu=Ganghwa-gun Eul	Incheon	Seo-gu, Ganghwa-gun
2004	Pohang-si Nam-gu=Ulleung-gun	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Pohang-si, Ulleung-gun
2004	Jeju-si=Bukjeju-gun Gap	Jeju-do	Jeju-si
2004	Jeju-si=Bukjeju-gun Eul	Jeju-do	Jeju-si, Bukjeju-gun
2000	Buk-gu=Gangseo-gu Gap	Busan	Buk-gu
2000	Buk-gu=Gangseo-gu Eul	Busan	Buk-gu, Gangseo-gu
2000	Haeundae-gu= Gijang-gun Gap	Busan	Haeundae-gu
2000	Haeundae-gu= Gijang-gun Eul	Busan	Haeundae-gu, Gijang-gun
2000	Seo-gu=Ganghwa-gun Gap	Incheon	Seo-gu
2000	Seo-gu=Ganghwa-gun Eul	Incheon	Seo-gu, Ganghwa-gun
2000	Pohang-si Nam-gu=Ulleung-gun	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Pohang-si, Ulleung-gun
1996	Buk-gu=Gangseo-gu Gap	Busan	Buk-gu
1996	Buk-gu=Gangseo-gu Eul	Busan	Buk-gu, Gangseo-gu
1996	Haeundae-gu= Gijang-gun Gap	Busan	Haeundae-gu
1996	Haeundae-gu= Gijang-gun Eul	Busan	Haeundae-gu, Gijang-gun
1996	Gyeyang-gu=Ganghwa-gun Gap	Incheon	Gyeyang-gu
1996	Gyeyang-gu=Ganghwa-gun Eul	Incheon	Gyeyang-gu, Ganghwa-gun
1996	Mokpo-si=Sinan-gun Eul	Jeollanam-do	Mokpo-si, Sinan-gun
1996	Pohang-si Nam-gu=Ulleung-gun	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Pohang-si, Ulleung-gun

Chapter 8. Conclusion

8.1. Summarizing the Findings

This dissertation explores the puzzles of party cohesion in East Asia: why, in Japan and South Korea, do party leaders can maintain the high levels of party unity and achieve collective benefits of stable rule and productive legislation, despite a number of unfavorable conditions for unity? As explained in detail in Chapter 3, Japanese and South Korean parties have only weak roots in society, as evidenced by the membership and financing structures of party organization. Their candidates heavily depend on personal networks called *keenkai* in Japan and *sajojik* in Korea for electoral competition, while parties do not offer much reliable support. Japanese and Korean parties have hard times differentiating themselves in terms of clear-cut policy platforms, partly because the Cold War and the hot war has largely shrunk the political competition space. The result is that the highly diverse membership inside parties, as evidenced by self-reported ideological positions and rampant party splits and mergers and switching.

My chapter was developed in Chapter 2, in which I started with the assumption that a party as an organization needs to solve its collective action problem by appropriately aligning the incentives of backbenchers as agents on the legislative floor, in order to enjoy the collective benefits. Politicians are assumed to have the three different incentives for vote, policy, and office (Strom 1990), and in aligning the incentives of backbenchers, leaders as principals choose to offer sets of selective fringe benefits. As politicians can have different personal endowments and under certain institutional settings politicians can underestimate some benefits, it is crucial for party leaders to

calculate how backbenchers perceive the costs and benefits from the party. Where a party cannot satisfy legislators' needs electorally and ideologically, a party in power would try to resort to office perks to maintain party unity and achieve its ultimate goals.

If this theory is valid, then we might further want to look at the institutional characteristics that make differences in allocating office perks. The difference between parliamentarism and presidentialism should result in significant divergence in the patterns of such allocation, because, depending on different conditions, the leadership is or is not able to credibly commit to the long-term, Pareto-optimal outcome. A parliamentary system's mutual dependence between the executive and the legislature implies that the interactions between the leadership as a principal and backbenchers as agents can be infinitely repeated; and the "shadow of the future" can give the rise to commitment to the Pareto-optimal, long-term equilibrium, in which the duration of the cabinet, access to office benefits, and backbenchers' support for the cabinet are all closely tied together. In a presidential regime, depending on circumstances, the executive and the legislature can work as the same team, with the president offering fair access to office benefits to align the incentives of legislators, but the value of such benefits tends to decline over time, as the presidential elections approach. The result would be the loosening of party unity over time.

This was partly made clear in Chapter 3's section on the factional struggles and quest for power. I showed that the LDP in Japan and the presidential parties in Korea have been similarly plagued by intra-party factional struggles over who would assume the leadership that constitutionally monopolizes the personnel management powers. The LDP in parliamentary Japan could elaborately develop organizational rules to internalize the negative externalities of the personal vote

and policy-seeking incentives on party cohesion: especially, the seniority rule allowed backbenchers to invest in the party, as getting promoted was tightly tied to their reelection efforts and continuous support for the government; and the factional balance rule also encouraged would-be dissident factions to keep committing to the party as long as fair allocation of office perks was guaranteed. However, in presidential Korea, the president cannot stop dissident factions from engaging in opportunistic behaviors, because the highly uncertain, winner-take-all nature of the presidential elections can result in a governmental collapse overnight and presidential supporters therefore tend to discount the value of affiliating with the president. Some popular politicians dare to leave the presidential party to challenge the presidency with those who want to join the bandwagon of winnable candidates.

In Chapter 4, I analyzed what would happen if the parliamentary leadership break down the commitment to the stable allocation of office perks. Koizumi, based on his massive support from voters, stepped up his efforts to centralize the party structure. In an attempt to facilitate his favored policy reform, postal privatization, the conflict between Koizumi and the dissidents exploded when Koizumi ignored conventional party politics to pursue his objective: he intentionally picked up more junior (and loyal) members from his allied factions to posts in the cabinet, while ignoring seniors from the large factions. The empirical test shows that electorally strong, young anti-Koizumi faction members would be likely to vote against Koizumi, because they had less investment in party posts and believed that in the worst case scenario they had a political future even outside the party in the centrist DPJ. Mid-career members were reluctant to use the options of exit or voice, as they were dependent on party posts for access to policymaking to deliver to their

constituents. But still they dissented if they were *zoku jin* with vested interests in the postal policy area. At the peak of their career, seniors were likely to rebel, as they could expect promotion to the highest positions in the party or the government if they could oust Koizumi. If they were frustrated with Koizumi's anti-traditional politics, the likelihood and intensity of their defiant behavior was greater.

In Chapter 5, I analyzed how all the NAMs voted on more than 600 bills and motions between 2000 and 2008 to test if the president is able to maintain the party line with her monopolized power over allocation of various types of public patronage, and if the presidential term limit of five years forces presidential party members to discount the value of such patronage over time, especially as the next presidential elections approach. First, a legislator's defection likelihood would be low in general if he/she is a member elected on his/her party's regional stronghold and/or if he/she is from a ruling party. Second, however, the effects of being affiliated with a ruling party tend to decline, because of the president's term limit, although not to the extent that the office benefits become completely negligible. Third, even if a legislator was electorally invulnerable and/or ideologically extreme, the negative impact of these (otherwise defection-encouraging) electoral and policy incentives was moderated, *where party label is perceived as a critical asset for reelection* and/or if *access to office benefits* is available. Even with ideologically fragmented parties engaging in personalistic electoral competition, the Korean president is able to achieve the high levels of legislative productivity, by helping her fellow legislators get reelected through the extremely regionalistic party system, and by providing them with various types of office benefits, ranging from pork to posts and patronage.

In the subsequent chapters, I focused on the policy consequences of party unity, especially budget outcomes. Chapter 6 looked at budget items under authority of 13 different ministries in Japan. The working hypothesis was that the LDP leadership needed to allocate office perks equally to would-be antagonistic factions and thereby open up the policymaking process in order to contain defection. Proportional representation of intra-party factions in the cabinet implies an increase in the number of veto players in the cabinet, which further implies an upward pressure on some budget items; especially given that factional struggles were characterized by quest for governmental privileges, budget items pertaining to pork should see such an increase. Indeed, substantial amounts of money went to some sectors that were not necessarily efficient and productive; rather, the decision to allocate money to these sectors was at least to some degree influenced by the internal dynamics of the LDP. The results of my models also suggest that, as the party leadership started to regain monopoly over personnel issues after Koizumi cabinets, allocation of now extremely limited financial resources to unproductive rents is being cut down.

Chapter 7 looked at distribution of subsidies to local municipalities in Korea. Based on the assumption that the president needs to legislate her own policy, she would require the stable relationship with the legislature; and as long as a majority in the legislature is required to pass policy, the president has rational reasons to forge consensus with the legislature. A ruling party with a majority has some bargaining leverage in negotiating with the president, so the president needs to satisfy presidential party members; and during the times of divided government, she needs to care about the opposition. In addition, the president should have the incentives to create and/or maintain a majority for her party in the legislature, so when the National Assembly elections

approach, the president acts strategically by targeting electorally marginal districts to maximize seat shares. These strategies are all the more important in South Korea, where the regionalism and the president's personnel management powers allows the president to keep legislators' incentives aligned especially before the National Assembly elections. With all the municipalities throughout the country from 1990 to 2005, I have found that my panel estimations are in general confirmatory to both of my hypotheses. Specifically, I have found that the Korean president could exert influence over distributional spending patterns. When the South Korean president is in the united government situation, she needs to care about the ruling coalition; but under divided government, she needs to cut monetary benefits to his supporters – both voters and legislators. In an attempt to maximize the seat share of her party in the legislature, the president strategically allocates money to swing areas before the National Assembly elections.

8.2. Research Ahead

8.2.1. Party Discipline in Comparative Perspective

The findings summarized above imply several research directions going forward. In explaining legislative behaviors, it would be necessary to take into account the potential interactions between the different incentives a legislator has. This dissertation is focused on the effects of office perks, especially the leadership's commitment to fair allocation of them and how legislators perceive their value. The LDP's party rules that define the career paths of a party member are very important in the Japanese context, because they are nicely designed to internalize the negative externalities arising from personalistic electoral competition and intra-party fragmentation; therefore

I closely analyzed their mechanisms and consequences. There should be other institutional settings that might mediate how the different incentives work, including but not limited to: federalism that offers different career routes for members of the national assembly (Samuels 2003); the candidate recruitment and selection process that defines candidates' different behaviors in campaigning, personal vote seeking, representative orientation, type of goods pursued, and legislative voting (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008); and the roles played by local constituents and party activists that constrain legislators' behaviors (Moon 2004; Stone and Maisel 2003).

Developing an integrated model for legislative behaviors would require a look at the roles played by these important and unique institutions; and as I implied in Chapter 2, the existing literature does not necessarily pay close attention to the relationship between these competing principals. Who are the main actors? What are the powers of these actors? What types of resources do they have? Under which conditions are they able to wield their powers? These are the questions not answered in the literature; and especially the very complex relationship between different electoral systems, legislative organization, the openness of candidate recruitment and selection process, party organization, and campaigning is indeed unexplored and the existing theory is still underdeveloped (Lundell 2004; Patzelt 1999; Rahat and Hazan 2001; Rahat et al. 2008; Siavelis 2002; Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008).

Relatedly, in line with the recent literature on party systems, this dissertation suggests that the linkages between electoral systems on the one hand and parties, party members, and party systems on the other are not always direct; rather, they would be mediated by financial and political decentralization (Chhibber and Kollman 2004), ethnic and social cleavages (Amorim Neto and Cox

1997; Golder 2006; Hicken and Stoll 2008; Mozaffar et al. 2003; Zielinski 2002), and other factors. SNTV is known as one of the most personalistic systems (Carey and Shugart 1995), and a highly personalistic system like SNTV is considered as having negative impact on party unity (Carey 2007, 2009), but the Japanese case analyzed in this dissertation suggests that the direct causal mechanism between party disunity and a personalistic electoral system should be much more cautiously scrutinized.¹³⁸ An SMD system is usually expected to offer the incentives for legislators to cultivate personal votes (Cain et al. 1984, 1987), but, as shown in Chapter 5, such incentives would be a function of how *party label matters* in different regions. In Korea, a severe regional cleavage between Jeolla-do and Gyeongsang-do makes party label work significantly differently from region to region; and this different working of party label can necessarily affect legislators' behaviors. It would be important to explore which types of economic, social, and political cleavages give what impact on legislative behaviors in different contexts.

8.2.2. *Presidentialism*

This dissertation somewhat challenges the conventional wisdom about party unity in a presidential system. True, the existing literature has shown that party cohesion is in general lower in a presidential regime (Carey 2007, 2009). A parliamentary regime has a built-in mechanism to

¹³⁸ On this point, Desposato (2006a) compares Brazil's different chambers and indeed suggests that Brazil's electoral system of open-list PR, which has been seen as the main source for party fragmentation and indiscipline (Mainwaring 1993, 1999; Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 1997), may be not the driving force in the Brazilian legislative/party dynamics.

ensure that the executive and the legislature are mutually dependent (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Huber 1996), meaning that legislators from the ruling party need to maintain unity to entertain governmental privileges. Mutual independence between the two branches in a presidential regime, on the other hand, means that the president can survive without unified support from the legislature and vice versa, implying that legislators do not need to maintain unity. In addition to this, as Carey (2007, 2009) argues, legislators as agents may be pulled by different principals – constituents and the president – that may have different preferences: local constituents for example care about local issues in their districts, while the president cares about the national welfare, which might go against local interests.

However, there is the accumulating literature suggesting that party unity can be high even under presidential regimes in some conditions: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are notable examples (Amorim Neto 2002; Amorim Neto et al. 2003; Amorim Neto and Santos 2001; Calvo 2007; Figueiredo and Limongi 2000; Jones 2002; Jones and Hwang 2005; Jones et al. 2002; Lyne 2008; Nacif 2002). Added to this list is of course South Korea, where, as Chapter 5 revealed, legislators, especially those from the ruling parties, are highly united, especially when legislators have the sufficiently long time horizon. Therefore looking only at presidentialism is not sufficient in explaining these cases.

In countries like Argentina and Mexico, party leaders and local party bosses outside the Congress control the future careers of legislators: Mexican parties' unity depends on the potential sanctions to uncooperative behavior in terms of opportunities to advance careers to the Senate, governors, and/or mayors, as each of these external alternatives should have to depend on party

affiliations (Nacif 2002); in explaining the high levels of party cohesion in Argentina, Jones et al. (2002) show that legislators must maintain a good relationship with their local party bosses in order to pursue their desired career paths; their legislative behaviors in committees and the legislature are mainly designed to be in good standing with the provincial party leadership. In Brazil, presidents buy support from legislators by offering patronage and pork (Alston and Mueller 2006; Amorim Neto 2002; Amorim Neto et al. 2003; Amorim Neto and Santos 2001; Lyne 2008; Pereira and Mueller 2004), while subnational political actors can give significant impact on individual legislators in the federal legislature (Cheibub et al. 2009; Desposato 2004; Samuels 2000a, 2000b, 2003).

Therefore it would be important to clarify who are the main principals in a presidential system. And in doing so, it would be necessary to tease out the political relationship between those actors and the president. In some countries, the president may not be the main principal to intervene in party politics as in Argentina (Jones 2002; Jones and Hwang 2005; Jones et al. 2002); in a country like Brazil, the president can use her constitutional powers to try to align the incentives of ruling coalition members (Alston and Mueller 2006; Amorim Neto 2002; Amorim Neto et al. 2003; Amorim Neto and Santos 2001; Lyne 2008; Pereira and Mueller 2004), while the competing forces from the subnational level can negate the impact of the president (Desposato 2004; Samuels 2000a, 2000b, 2003). However, Cheibub et al. (2009) find that the impact of state governors on federal legislators in fact looks small compared to that of the president, suggesting that it could be the case that sometimes principals may compete but in other times one principal (state governors) can be the agent of the other principal (the president).

Indeed, the assumption behind the competing principal model is that principals are equally

powerful to influence agents' behaviors. However, the relationship between principals can be defined by the constitutional and institutional structure in a country, as such structure determines which principals possess which resources. Those resources can be unequally allocated to different principals: in a federal setting for example, local actors may possess the significant amounts of resources, but the president might have much greater powers and want to utilize them to align the incentives of state governors. Or in a centralized presidential system like South Korea, the president is only the main principal; and utilizing the constitutional powers – the exclusive right to formulate and submit the budget, appoint and dismiss ministers in the cabinet, and grant a wide variety of patronage posts –, the Korean president as the single principal can fairly efficiently intervene in the legislative process, at least before the National Assembly elections.

It would be also important to pay careful attention to which constitutional and institutional structure constrains the tools available to principals. As the single principal, the Korean president possesses enormous powers, but this fact can cut two ways. As the president is so powerful, every politician tries to seek office, calling for struggles over who would win the candidacy and eventually the presidency. The provision prohibiting reelection significantly harms the president's ability to contain such intra-party factional struggles, as party members' opportunity costs of affiliating with the president gets larger and larger as the presidential elections approach. That is how we observe the loosening of party unity in South Korea; party unity is time-variant, especially depending on how many days left for the president.

8.2.3. Implications for Institutional Reform

My dissertation sounds a little pessimistic about institutional reform in Japan and South Korea. Especially in Chapter 3, I argued that Japanese and Korean parties lack social roots, ideological cohesion, and policy platforms, encouraging candidates to engage in personalistic electoral competition. And an implication in Chapters 6 and 7 on fiscal policy is that the two democracies are costly to maintain, as evidenced by upward pressures on pork spending; this point indeed goes back to the general theoretical questions raised in Chapter 1: Which political and institutional factors are likely to promote party cohesion and effective discipline? How do political leaders achieve them with their limited resources? Are they costly? And what types of policy consequences can be expected with effective party cohesion? Indeed, the empirical chapters throughout this dissertation suggest that promoting party cohesion and effective discipline in the East Asian democracies is the costly business; and even the normative implication for this costly structure is a little gloomy, as the ruling parties may not want to reform this clientelistic political structure as long as they would like to, and need to, stay in government. Clientelism and patronage can be, in turn, the seedbeds for corruption, rent-seeking, and inefficient governance. Deadweight losses can be huge.

However, there are some signs of change. In Japan, after the defeat of the postal privatization bill in the upper house, Koizumi dissolved the lower house, and the elections resulted in Koizumi's overwhelming victory. The LDP got 296 seats out of 480, while only 17 of the 34 rebels won.¹³⁹ After the elections, many of the rebels even voted for Koizumi as prime minister

¹³⁹ Of the 37 rebels, 3 retired before the elections as Koizumi did not give endorsements.

and for the postal privatization bill that was resubmitted to the Diet. Koizumi and party leaders made efforts further to strengthen central control over the LDP's legislators, policy process and local branches.¹⁴⁰ The lesson gave huge impact. Now Japanese parties put heavier emphasis on policy platforms and actively draft policy pledges called "manifestos" before the elections. Party leaders' image is now perceived to be much important in the elections, largely due to the growing importance of television (Krauss and Nyblade 2005). That is why the LDP has changed its leaders three times in three years after Koizumi; members now know that their electoral fates are closely linked to leaders' popularity. The 1994 electoral reforms focused voters on party image more than previously and the 2001 administrative reform enhanced the powers of the prime minister in policymaking (Asano 2006; Shimizu 2005; Takenaka 2006b; Takenaka 2006a).

This change has been only gradual at best, however. In order for a true "Westminster system" to take root in Japan, ruling party members would have to delegate much authority to the prime minister, who would direct the policymaking process in a top-down manner. This requires support from the ultimate principal, the general voter, but the Prime Ministers after Koizumi – Abe, Fukuda, and Asō – have been all plagued by the declining popularity and never freed from factional pressures in personnel management.¹⁴¹ Newspapers and journalists reported that a series of the reform attempts by Abe to centralize the decision making structure was only a complete failure (Uesugi 2007; Yomiuri Shimbun Seijibu 2008). It will be not impossible to implant a "Westminster

¹⁴⁰ On these developments, see Estevez-Abe (2006).

¹⁴¹ Especially Abe heavily used in the cabinet those who supported him in the presidential elections, but it turned out that many of them were found to inappropriately use their political funds.

system," but it requires someone like Koizumi, who strongly believed the power of the general voter without any party affiliations.¹⁴²

It would be much difficult for South Korea to have a responsible party government model in the near future. The ultimate sources for Korean parties' fragmentation are, as I argued, the five-year term limit on the president and the enormous constitutional powers given to her. Constitutional reform to parliamentarism was once seriously proposed, especially by Kim Jong Pil, a long-term advocate of parliamentarism. In fact, when he was allied with Kim Dae Jung for the 1997 presidential elections, one of the policy agreements between them was reform to parliamentarism; but, once elected, Kim Dae Jung totally ignored Kim Jong Pil's proposal.¹⁴³ The result was Kim Jong Pil's departure from the coalition government.

A reform proposal to introduce a renewable presidential term was also considered several times. An advisory council to the President Kim Young Sam, the 21st Century Commission announced in 1994 a report proposing the reform, but it was not seriously debated. Even one of the most influential newspapers in Korea, *Chosun Ilbo*, argued that "It would not be the time to place the issue on the national agenda" because "We need to be cautious about the potential chaotic

¹⁴² Even Otake (2006) argues that Koizumi succeeded in pursuing his structural reform agenda because of only his personality.

¹⁴³ Indeed, it is difficult to have the president stick to campaign pledges compared to parliamentarism; Kim Dae Jung even announced his will to renegotiate the IMF conditionality amid the crisis, but soon after he was elected, he launched a series of sweeping reforms (Haggard et al. 1999; Samuels and Shugart 2003, 2009).

conflict that the constitutional revision issue might bring about" (*Chosun Ilbo*, May 12, 1994: p.3).

The issue had been completely ignored until January 2007, when the late President Roh Moo Hyun suddenly proposed the introduction of the four-year, renewable presidential term to make the presidential and legislative elections concurrent. The reaction was mixed at best: the largest opposition party, the GNP announced that it would be "political maneuvering designed to ridicule the Korean people" and demanded that the constitutional revision debate should be stopped right away. Possibly seeing this reaction by the GNP, the general voter was cynical: 64.4% of them answered in a survey that it would be "The President Roh's political maneuvering designed to influence the next presidential elections." (*Chosun Ilbo* January 10, 2007: p.1). As Roh's approval ratings suddenly declined after this announcement, even the presidential party members started to criticize Roh and his move (*Chosun Ilbo* January 12, 2007: p.4). Deliberations in the National Assembly were postponed several times, and the parties finally agreed in April 2007 to discuss the issue after the next National Assembly elections to be held in April 2008; but one legislator said, "It would be not practical to reconsider this issue sometime in the next year. It is only political rhetoric" (*Chosun Ilbo* April 12, 2007: p.5).

In addition to this single five-year term, as my theory and empirical evidence suggest, another pillar of the Korean party fragmentation problem is rooted in the enormous constitutional powers given to the president. Reforming the existing Korean system would require, first of all, some cuts in the president's constitutional power, including transfers of the budget-making, policymaking, and personnel management powers to the currently only titular Prime Minister and/or the National Assembly. However, obviously, the incumbent president, her aides, and

presidential aspirants for the next presidential elections do not want to lose their vested interests in the existing constitutional structure. The National Assembly may independently start the initiative for reform, but, given that legislators' future careers are heavily dependent on the president and presidential aspirants, such initiative can be easily halted. Indeed, the National Assembly still builds on the authoritarian past, when it only worked as a rubber stamp for dictators; the Korean people in general believes in the norm of democracy, freedom, and political competition, but largely lacks trust in the existing political institutions, especially the National Assembly and parties (Lee 2003a; Shin 1999; Shin and Van Der Slik 1997). "Change is short, but continuity is long" (Park 2002).

References

- Adams, James F., Samuel Merrill III, and Bernard Grofman. 2005. *A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai. various issues. *Shugūin Gūn So Senkyo no Jittai*. Tokyo: Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai. [in Japanese]
- Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Aldrich, John H., and William T. Bianco. 1992. "A Game-Theoretic Model of Party Affiliation of Candidates and Office Holders." *Mathematical and Computer Modeling* 16 (8/9):103-16.
- Alesina, Alberto, Nouriel Roubini, and Gerald D. Cohen. 1997. *Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Alston, Lee J., and Bernardo Mueller. 2006. "Pork for Policy: Executive and Legislative Exchange in Brazil." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 22 (1):87-114.
- Ames, Barry. 1987. "The Congressional Connection: The Structure of Politics and the Distribution of Public Expenditures in Brazil's Competitive Period." *Comparative Politics* 19 (2):147-71.
- _____. 1995a. "Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress." *Journal of Politics* 57 (2):324-43.
- _____. 1995b. "Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* 39 (2):406-33.
- _____. 2001. *The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- _____. 2002. "Party Discipline in the Chamber of Deputies." In *Legislative Politics in Latin America*, ed. Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 185-221.

- Amorim Neto, Octavio. 2002. "Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles, and Coalition Discipline in Brazil." In *Legislative Politics in Latin America*, ed. Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 48-78.
- _____. 2006. "The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas." *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (4):415-40.
- Amorim Neto, Octavio, and Gary W. Cox. 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1):149-74.
- Amorim Neto, Octavio, Gary W. Cox, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2003. "Agenda Power in Brazil's Camara dos Deputados, 1989-98." *World Politics* 55 (4):550-78.
- Amorim Neto, Octavio, and Fabiano Santos. 2001. "The Executive Connection: Presidentially Defined Factions and Party Discipline in Brazil." *Party Politics* 7 (2):213-34.
- Aoki, Masahiko. 1990. "Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm." *Journal of Economic Literature* 28 (1):1-27.
- Asahi Shinbun Seijibu. 1968. *Seito to Habatsu* [Parties and Factions]. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha. [in Japanese]
- Asahi Shinbun Sha. various years. *Asahi Nenkan*. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Sha.
- Asano, Masahiko. 2006. *Shimin Shakai ni okeru Seido Kaikaku: Senkyo Seido to Kobosha Rikuruto* [Institutional Reform in Civil Society: Electoral Rules and Candidate Recruitment]. Tokyo: Keio Daigaku Shuppankai. [in Japanese]
- Axelrod, Robert. 1970. *Conflict of Interest*. Chicago: Markham.
- _____. 1981. "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists." *American Political Science Review* 75 (2):306-18.
- Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics* 38 (1):226-54.

- Balla, Steven J., Eric D. Lawrence, Forrest Maltzman, and Lee Sigelman. 2002. "Partisanship, Blame Avoidance, and the Distribution of Legislative Pork." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (3):515-25.
- Bawn, Kathleen, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2006. "Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (2):251-65.
- Beason, Richard, and David E. Weinstein. 1996. "Growth, Economies of Scale, and Targeting in Japan (1955-1990)." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 78 (2):286-95.
- Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. 1996. "Nuisance vs. Substance: Specifying and Estimating Time-Series-Cross-Section Models." *Political Analysis* 6 (1):1-36.
- Benedetto, Giacomo, and Simon Hix. 2007. "The Rejected, the Ejected, and the Dejected: Explaining Government Rebels in the 2001-2005 British House of Commons." *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (7):755-81.
- Benoit, Jean-Pierre, and Vijay Krishna. 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games." *Econometrica* 53 (4):905-22.
- Bettcher, Kim Eric. 2005. "Factions of Interest in Japan and Italy: The Organizational and Motivational Dimensions of Factionalism." *Party Politics* 11 (3):339-58.
- Bickers, Kenneth N., and Robert M. Stein. 1996. "The Electoral Dynamics of the Federal Pork Barrel." *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (4):1300-26.
- Binder, Sarah A. 1999. "The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock." *American Political Science Review* 93 (3):519-33.
- Bowler, Shaun. 2000. "Parties in Legislatures: Two Competing Explanations." In *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, ed. Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 157-79.
- Bowler, Shaun, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz. 1999. "Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and Parliaments." In *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*, ed. Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell and Richard S. Katz. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 3-22.

- Brancati, Dawn. 2008. "Winning Alone: The Electoral Fate of Independent Candidates Worldwide." *Journal of Politics* 70 (3):648-62.
- Bruhn, Kathleen. 1996. "Social Spending and Political Support: The "Lessons" of the National Solidarity Program in Mexico." *Comparative Politics* 28 (2):151-77.
- Cain, Bruce E., John A. Ferejohn, and Morris P. Fiorina. 1984. "The Constituency Service Basis of the Personal Vote for U.S. Representatives and British Members of Parliament." *American Political Science Review* 78 (1):110-25.
- _____. 1987. *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Calder, Kent E. 1988. *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Calvo, Ernesto. 2007. "The Responsive Legislature: Public Opinion and Law Making in a Highly Disciplined Legislature." *British Journal of Political Science* 37 (2):263-80.
- Calvo, Ernesto, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2004. "Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market." *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (4):742-57.
- Campbell, James E. 1985. "Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections." *Journal of Politics* 47 (4):1140-57.
- Campbell, John Creighton. 1977. *Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2001. "A Theory of Presidents' Public Agenda Setting." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13 (2):182-208.
- Carey, John M. 2003. "Discipline, Accountability, and Legislative Voting in Latin America." *Comparative Politics* 35 (2):191-211.
- _____. 2007. "Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting."

American Journal of Political Science 51 (1):92-107.

_____. 2009. *Legislative Voting and Accountability*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carey, John M., and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." *Electoral Studies* 14 (4):417-39.

Case, Anne. 2001. "Election Goals and Income Redistribution: Recent Evidence from Albania." *European Economic Review* 45 (3):405-23.

Castells, Antoni, and Albert Sole-Olle. 2005. "The Regional Allocation of Infrastructure Investment: The Role of Equity, Efficiency, and Political Factors." *European Economic Review* 49 (5):1165-205.

Chae, Haesook, and Steven Kim. 2008. "Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea." *Washington Quarterly* 31 (4):77-95.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cheibub, José Antonio, Argelina Figueiredo, and Fernando Limongi. 2009. "Political Parties and Governors as Determinants of Legislative Behavior in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2006." *Latin American Politics and Society* 51 (1):1-30.

Chhibber, Pradeep K. 1999. *Democracy without Associations: Transformation of the Party System and Social Cleavages in India*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Chhibber, Pradeep K., and Ken Kollman. 2004. *The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cho, Kisuk. 1998. "Regionalism in Korean Elections and Democratization: An Empirical Analysis." *Asian Perspective* 22 (1):135-56.

Cho, Seong Dae. 2000. "Jiyeok Jueui wa Inmul Tupyoo: Busan-si Buk-Kangseo Eul Seongeogu."

[Regionalism and Personal Vote: The Buk-Kangseo Eul District at Busan.] In *4.13 Chongseon: Kaempein Sarye Yeongu wa Jaengjeom Bunseoek*, ed. Hanguk Cheongdang Cheongchi Yeonguso. Seongnam: Munhyeong, 123-51. [in Korean]

- Cho, Wonbin. 2005. "The General Election in South Korea, April 2004." *Electoral Studies* 24 (3):525-30.
- Choi, Jang Jip. 1989. *Labor and the Authoritarian State: Labor Unions in South Korean Manufacturing Industries, 1961-1980*. Seoul: Korea University Press.
- _____. 1993. "Political Cleavages in South Korea." In *State and Society in Contemporary Korea*, ed. Hagen Koo. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 13-50.
- Christensen, Raymond V. 1994. "Electoral Reform in Japan: How It Was Enacted and Changes It May Bring." *Asian Survey* 34 (7):589-605.
- Coase, Ronald H. 1937. "The Nature of the Firm." *Economica* 4 (16):386-405.
- Coleman, John J. 1999. "Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness." *American Political Science Review* 93 (4):821-35.
- Coppedge, Michael. 1994. *Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Costa-i-Font, Joan, Eduardo Rodriguez-Oreggia, and Dario Lunapla. 2003. "Political Competition and Pork-Barrel Politics in the Allocation of Public Investment in Mexico." *Public Choice* 116 (1/2):185-204.
- Cox, Gary W. 1990. "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 34 (4):903-35.
- Cox, Gary W., Mikitaka Masuyama, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2000. "Agenda Power in the Japanese House of Representatives." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 1 (1):1-21.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1986. "Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game."

Journal of Politics 48 (2):370-89.

- _____. 1994. "Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 19 (2):215-31.
- _____. 2001. "The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes." In *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy*, ed. Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 21-63.
- _____. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. 2007. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. 2nd Edition ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cox, Gary W., and Scott Morgenstern. 2001. "Latin America's Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents." *Comparative Politics* 33 (2):171-89.
- Cox, Gary W., and Frances Rosenbluth. 1993. "The Electoral Fortunes of Legislative Factions in Japan." *American Political Science Review* 87 (3):577-89.
- _____. 1995. "Anatomy of a Split: The Liberal Democrats of Japan." *Electoral Studies* 14 (4):355-76.
- _____. 1996. "Factional Competition for the Party Endorsement: The Case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party." *British Journal of Political Science* 26 (2):259-69.
- Cox, Gary W., Frances McCall Rosenbluth, and Michael F. Thies. 1999. "Electoral Reform and the Fate of Factions: The Case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party." *British Journal of Political Science* 29 (1):33-56.
- Cox, Gary W., and Michael F. Thies. 1998. "The Cost of Intraparty Competition: The Single, Nontransferable Vote and Money Politics in Japan." *Comparative Political Studies* 31 (3):267-91.
- _____. 2000. "How Much Does Money Matter?: 'Buying' Votes in Japan, 1967-1990." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (1):37-57.

- Crain, W. Mark, and Timothy J. Muris. 1995. "Legislative Organization of the Fiscal Policy." *Journal of Law and Economics* 38 (2):311-33.
- Crepaz, Markus M. L., and Ann W. Moser. 2004. "The Impact of Collective and Competitive Veto Points on Public Expenditures in the Global Age." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (3):259-85.
- Crisp, Brian F., and Scott W. Desposato. 2004. "Constituency Building in Multimember Districts: Collusion or Conflict?" *Journal of Politics* 66 (1):136-56.
- Crisp, Brian F., Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon, Bradford S. Jones, Mark P. Jones, and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. 2004. "Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies." *Journal of Politics* 66 (3):823-46.
- Crook, Sara Brandes, and John R. Hibbing. 1985. "Congressional Reform and Party Discipline: The Effects of Changes in the Seniority System on Party Loyalty in the US House of Representatives." *British Journal of Political Science* 15 (2):207-26.
- Cummings, Bruce. 1981. *The Origins of the Korean War*. Vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- _____. 1990. *The Origins of the Korean War*. Vol. 2. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Curtis, Gerald L. 1971. *Election Campaigning Japanese Style*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- _____. 1999. *The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Dahlberg, Matz, and Eva Johansson. 2002. "On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments." *American Political Science Review* 96 (1):27-40.
- Dalton, Russell J., and Aiji Tanaka. 2007. "The Patterns of Party Polarization in East Asia." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 7 (2):203-23.
- Desposato, Scott W. 2004. "The Impact of Federalism on National Party Cohesion in Brazil." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 29 (2):259-85.

- _____. 2006a. "The Impact of Electoral Rules on Legislative Parties: Lessons from the Brazilian Senate and Chamber of Deputies." *Journal of Politics* 68 (4):1018-30.
- _____. 2006b. "Parties for Rent? Ambition, Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (1):62-80.
- Desposato, Scott W., and Ethan Scheiner. 2008. "Governmental Centralization and Party Affiliation: Legislator Strategies in Brazil and Japan." *American Political Science Review* 102 (4):509-24.
- Deyo, Frederic C. 1989. *Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Diermeier, Daniel, and Timothy J. Feddersen. 1998. "Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure." *American Political Science Review* 92 (3):611-21.
- Dittmer, Lowell, Haruhiro Fukui, and Peter N.S. Lee. 2000. *Informal Politics in East Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dixit, Avinash, and John Londregan. 1996. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics." *Journal of Politics* 58 (4):1132-55.
- _____. 1998. "Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 113 (2):497-529.
- Estevez-Abe, Margarita. 2006. "Japan's Shift toward a Westminster System: A Structural Analysis of the 2005 Lower House Election and Its Aftermath." *Asian Survey* 46 (4):632-51.
- Estevez-Abe, Margarita, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2001. "Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State." In *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage* ed. Peter A. Hall and David Soskice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 145-83.
- Evans, Diana. 1994. "Policy and Pork: The Use of Pork Barrel Projects to Build Policy Coalitions in the House of Representatives." *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (4):894-917.

- Figureiredo, Argelina Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. "Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil." *Comparative Politics* 32 (2):151-70.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Flanagan, Scott C. 1991. "Mechanisms of Social Network Influence in Japanese Voting Behavior." In *The Japanese Voter*, ed. Scott C. Flanagan, Shinsaku Kohei, Ichiro Miyake, Bradley M. Richardson and Joji Watanuki. New Haven: Yale University Press. 143-97.
- Franzese, Robert J., Jr. 2002. *Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. 1991. *Game Theory*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Fukumoto, Kentarō. 2000. *Nihon no Kokkai Seiji: Zen Seifu Rippō no Bunseki* [Politics in the Japanese Diet: A Statistical Analysis of Postwar Government Legislation]. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai. [in Japanese]
- Gaines, Brian J., and Geoffrey Garrett. 1993. "The Calculus of Dissent: Party Discipline in the British Labour Government, 1974-1979." *Political Behavior* 15 (2):113-35.
- Garner, Christopher, and Natalia Letki. 2005. "Party Structure and Backbench Dissent in the Canadian and British Parliaments." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 38 (2):463-82.
- George-Mulgan, Aurelia. 2000. "Japan's Political Leadership Deficit." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 35 (2):183-202.
- _____. 2003. "Japan's 'Un-Westminster' System: Impediments to Reform in a Crisis Economy." *Government and Opposition* 38 (1):73-91.
- Gilligan, Thomas W., and John G. Matsusaka. 2001. "Fiscal Policy, Legislature Size, and Political Parties: Evidence from State and Local Governments in the First Half of the 20th Century." *National Tax Journal* 54 (1):57-82.

- Golder, Matt. 2006. "Presidential Coattails and Legislative Fragmentation." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (1):34-48.
- Greene, William H. 2003. *Econometric Analysis*. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.
- Grimes, William W. 2001. *Unmaking the Japanese Miracle: Macroeconomic Politics, 1985-2000*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Haggard, Stephan, Daniel Pinkston, and Jungkun Seo. 1999. "Reforming Korea Inc.: The Politics of Structural Adjustment under Kim Dae Jung." *Asian Perspective* 23 (3):201-35.
- Hahm, Chaibong. 2005. "The Two South Koreas: A House Divided." *Washington Quarterly* 28 (3):57-72.
- Hale, Henry E. 2004. "The Origins of United Russia and the Putin Presidency: The Role of Contingency in Party-System Development." *Demokratizatsiya* 12 (2):169-94.
- _____. 2005. "Why Not Parties? Electoral Markets, Party Substitutes, and Stalled Democratization in Russia." *Comparative Politics* 37 (2):147-66.
- Hanguk Cheongdang Cheongchi Yeonguso, ed. 2000. *4.13 Chongseon: Kaempin Saryeongu na Chaengjeom Bunseoek* [The April 13 General Elections: Campaign Case Studies and Analysis on Issues]. Seongnam: Munhyeong. [in Korean]
- Hanguk Cheongdang Hakhwe. 2004. *17dae Chongseon Hyeonjang Ripoteu* [The On-Site Reports on the 17th General Elections]. Seoul: Pureungil. [in Korean]
- Haspel, Moshe, Thomas F. Remington, and Steven S. Smith. 1998. "Electoral Institutions and Party Cohesion in the Russian Duma." *Journal of Politics* 60 (2):417-39.
- Heller, William B. 1997. "Bicameralism and Budget Deficits: The Effect of Parliamentary Structure on Government Spending." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22 (4):485-516.
- Heller, William B., and Carol Mershon. 2005. "Party Switching in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1996-2001." *Journal of Politics* 67 (2):536-69.

- Herron, Erik S. 2002. "Electoral Influences on Legislative Behavior in Mixed-Member Systems: Evidence from Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 27 (3):361-82.
- Herron, Michael C., and Brett A. Theodos. 2004. "Government Redistribution in the Shadow of Legislative Elections: A Study of the Illinois Member Initiative Grants Program." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 29 (2):287-311.
- Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy." *American Political Science Review* 71 (4):1467-87.
- Hicken, Allen, and Heather Stoll. 2008. "Electoral Rules and the Size of the Prize: How Political Institutions Shape Presidential Party Systems." *Journal of Politics* 70 (4):1109-27.
- Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hix, Simon. 2004. "Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting-Defection in the European Parliament." *World Politics* 56 (2):194-223.
- Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury, and Gerard Roland. 2005. "Power to the Parties: Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979-2001." *British Journal of Political Science* 35 (2):209-34.
- Hong, Deukpyo. 2000. "Jeongdang eul Kongjik Hubo Kyeoljeong Mohyeong e Kwanhan Yeongu: Hanguk Jeongdang eul Jungsim euro." *Hanguk Jeongchi Hakbwebo* 34 (3):173-91.
- Horiuchi, Yusaku, and Seungjoo Lee. 2008. "The Presidency, Regionalism, and Distributive Politics in South Korea." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (6):861-82.
- Horiuchi, Yusaku, and Jun Saito. 2003. "Reapportionment and Redistribution: Consequences of Electoral Reform in Japan." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (4):669-82.
- Huber, John D. 1996. "The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 90 (2):269-82.

- Ihori, Toshihiro, Toru Nakazato, and Masumi Kawade. 2003. "Japan's Fiscal Policies in the 1990s." *World Economy* 26 (3):325-38.
- Imai, Ryosuke. 2004. "Chu Senkyoku Sei Saiko: Tohyo Kodo to Kohosha Yoin." [Re-considering the Mid-size District System: Voting Behaviors and Candidate Factors.] *Nihon Seiji Kenkyu* 1 (2):86-107. [in Japanese]
- Imai, Ryosuke, and Ikuo Kabashima. 2008. "The LDP's Defeat in Crucial Single-seat Constituencies of the 2007 Upper House Election." *Social Science Japan Journal* 11 (2):277-93.
- Ingall, Rachael E., and Brian F. Crisp. 2001. "Determinants of Home Style: The Many Incentives for Going Home in Colombia." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26 (3):487-512.
- Inoguchi, Takashi. 1981. "Explaining and Predicting Japanese General Elections, 1960-1980." *Journal of Japanese Studies* 7 (2):285-318.
- Inoguchi, Takashi, and Tomoaki Iwai. 1987. *Zoku Giin no Kenkyu* [The Study of Policy Tribes]. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha. [in Japanese]
- Ishibashi, Michihiro, and Steven R. Reed. 1992. "Second-Generation Diet Members and Democracy in Japan: Hereditary Seats." *Asian Survey* 32 (4):366-79.
- Ito, Atsuo. 2003. *Seito Hokai* [Party Collapse]. Tokyo: Shinchosha. [in Japanese]
- Iversen, Torben. 1994. "The Logics of Electoral Politics: Spatial, Directional, and Mobilizational Effects." *Comparative Political Studies* 27 (2):155-89.
- Iwai, Tomoaki. 2002. "Shin 'Zoku Giin no Kenkyu'." [The New 'Study of Policy Tribes'.] *Ekonomisuto*, March 12, 33-7. [in Japanese]
- Jaung, Hoon. 2000. "Electoral Politics and Political Parties." In *Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea*, ed. Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 43-71.
- _____. 2001. "Hanguk Taetongryeongje eui Bulanjeongseong eui Kiwon." *Hanguk Jeongchi Hakhwabo*

35 (4):107-27.

- _____. 2005. "Foreign Policy and South Korean Democracy: The Failure of Party Politics." *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 1 (2):49-68.
- Jenkins, Jeffery A., Michael H. Crespin, and Jamie L. Carson. 2005. "Parties as Procedural Coalitions in Congress: An Examination of Differing Career Tracks." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30 (3):365-89.
- Jeon, Jin-Young. 2006. "Kukhwe Euiwon eui Kalteungjeok Tupyro Hyeongtae Bunseok: Je 16-Dae Kukhwe Jeonja Pyogyedol eul Jungsim euro." [A Study of Members' Conflictual Voting Behavior in the 16th Korean National Assembly.] *Hanguk Jeongchi Hakbwebo* 40 (1):47-70. [in Korean]
- Jeon, Yongjo. 2005. "Hubo Kongcheon Kwajeong eui Minjuhwa wa Keu Jeongchijeok Kyeolgwa e Taehan Yeongu: Je 17-dae Kukhwe Euiwon Seongo reul Jungsim euro." [Democratization of Candidate Selection in Korean Parties and Its Implication: A Case Study on the 17th General Election of 2004 in Korea.] *Hanguk Jeongchi Hakbwebo* 39 (2):217-36. [in Korean]
- Jeong, Byeong Joon. 2004. *Chuijae Pail, 2002: Gwangju Sijang Seongeo* [News File, 2002: Gwangju Mayor Election]. Seoul: Sanhae. [in Korean]
- Jeong, Yeongguk. 1995. "Cheongukku Euiwon eui Kukhwe Sangim Wiwonhwe Hwaldong Bunseok." [A Study on List Members' Activities in National Assembly Committees.] *Hanguk kwa Kukje Jeongchi* 11 (1):53-78. [in Korean]
- _____. 2000a. "Hanguk Jeongdang eui Jigudang Jojik kwa Kineung." [The Organization and Functions of Korean Parties' Local Branches.] *Hanguk kwa Kukje Jeongchi* 16 (1):225-49. [in Korean]
- _____. 2000b. "Jiyeokku Seongeo eui Isyu Gwalli: Seoul Yangcheon Kap Seongeo." [Issue Management in a Local District: The Yangcheon Kap District at Seoul.] In *4.13 Chongseon: Kaempein Sarye Yeongu wa Jaengjeom Bunseok*, ed. Hanguk Cheongdang Cheongchi Yeonguso. Seongnam: Munhyeong. 15-40. [in Korean]
- Jim, Cheonghun. 2000. *Kukko Bojogeum eui Gaepyeon Bangan* [Reforming Measures for National Disbursements to Municipal Governments]. Seoul: Hanguk Chose Yeonguwon. [in Korean]

- Jiyū Minshutō. 2006. *Jiyū Minshutō 50-nen Shi* [The 50-year History of the Liberal Democratic Party]. Tokyo: Jiyū Minshutō. [in Japanese]
- Johansson, Eva. 2003. "Intergovernmental Grants as a Tactical Instrument: Empirical Evidence from Swedish Municipalities." *Journal of Public Economics* 87 (5/6):883-915.
- Johnson, Chalmers. 1986. "Tanaka Kakuei, Structural Corruption, and the Advent of Machine Politics in Japan." *Journal of Japanese Studies* 12 (1):1-28.
- Jones, Mark P. 2002. "Explaining the High Level of Party Discipline in the Argentine Congress." In *Legislative Politics in Latin America*, ed. Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 147-84.
- Jones, Mark P., and Wonjae Hwang. 2005. "Party Government in Presidential Democracies: Extending Cartel Theory Beyond the U.S. Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (2):267-82.
- Jones, Mark P., Sebastian Saiegh, Pablo T. Spiller, and Mariano Tommasi. 2002. "Amateur Legislators - Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (3):656-69.
- Kabashima, Ikuo. 1986. "Soten, Seito, Tohyo." [Issues, Policy, and Voting.] In *Nibonjin no Senkyo Kodo*, ed. Joji Watanuki, Ichiro Miyake, Takashi Inoguchi and Ikuo Kabashima. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai. 237-67. [in Japanese]
- _____. 2004. *Sengo Seiji no Kiseki: Jimintō Shisutemu no Keisei to Henryō* [The Trajectory of Postwar Japanese Politics: The Formation and Change of the LDP System]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. [in Japanese]
- Kabashima, Ikuo, and Yoshito Ishio. 1998. "The Instability of Party Identification among Eligible Japanese Voters: A Seven-Wave Panel Study, 1993-6." *Party Politics* 4 (2):151-76.
- Kabashima Ikuo Seminar. 2000. *Gendai Nihon no Seijika Zō* [Modern Japanese Politicians' Images]. Tokyo: Bokutakusha. [in Japanese]
- Kabashima, Ikuo, and Yoshihiko Takenaka. 1997. *Gendai Nibonjin no Ideogō* [The Ideology of

Current Japanese]. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai. [in Japanese]

Kabashima, Ikuo, and Koji Yamamoto. 2005. "2003-nen Tokyo Daigaku, Asahi Shimbunsha Kyodo Seijika Chosa Kodo Bukku." [The 2003-04 University of Tokyo/Asahi Shimbun Politicians' Survey Codebook.] *Nihon Seiji Kenkyu* 2 (2):392-418. [in Japanese]

_____. 2008. "2005-nen Tokyo Daigaku, Asahi Shimbunsha Kyodo Seijika Chosa Kodo Bukku." [The 2005 University of Tokyo/Asahi Shimbun Politicians' Survey Codebook.] *Nihon Seiji Kenkyu* 5 (1/2):283-97. [in Japanese]

Kam, Christopher. 2001. "Do Ideological Preferences Explain Parliamentary Behaviour? Evidence from Great Britain and Canada." *Journal of Legislative Studies* 7 (4):89-126.

_____. 2006. "Demotion and Dissent in the Canadian Liberal Party." *British Journal of Political Science* 36 (3):561-74.

Kandori, Michihiro. 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement." *Review of Economic Studies* 59 (1):63-80.

Kang, David C. 2002. *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and The Philippines*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kang, Inje. 2003. "Ye Kyeolsan Simeui." *Enujeong Yeongu* 16:84-107.

Kang, Won-Taek. 1998. "The Rise of a Third Party in South Korea: The Unification National Party in the 1992 National Assembly Election." *Electoral Studies* 17 (1):95-110.

_____. 2005. "Ideological Clash of Progressives and Conservatives in Korea." *Korea Focus* 13 (5):63-80.

_____. 2008a. "Hanguk Jeongdang eui Dangwon Yeongu: Inyeom jeok Jeongcheseong gwa Dangnae Minjujueui." [Ideological Feature of Party Members and Intra-party Democracy in South Korea.] *Hanguk Jeongchi Hakbo* 42 (2):109-28. [in Korean]

_____. 2008b. "How Ideology Divides Generations: The 2002 and 2004 South Korean Elections." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 41 (2):461-80.

- Kato, Junko. 1998. "When the Party Breaks Up: Exit and Voice among Japanese Legislators." *American Political Science Review* 92 (4):857-70.
- Kawato, Sadafumi. 1996a. "Jimintō ni Okeru Yakushoku Jinji no Seidoka." [The Institutionalization of Rules Governing Promotion in the LDP.] *Hogaku* 59 (6):933-57. [in Japanese]
- _____. 1996b. "Sinioriti Rulu to Habatsu: Jiminto ni okeru Jinji Haibun no Henka." [Seniority Rule and Factions: The LDP's Posts Allocation and Its Change.] *Reviasan Rinji Zokan*:111-45. [in Japanese]
- _____. 1999. "1950-nendai Giin Rippo to Kokkaiho Kaisei." [Legislator-initiated Bills in the 1950s and the Revision of the Diet Law.] *Hogaku* 63 (4):481-518. [in Japanese]
- Keele, Luke, and Nathan J. Kelly. 2006. "Dynamic Models for Dynamic Theories: The Ins and Outs of Lagged Dependent Variables." *Political Analysis* 14 (2):186-205.
- Kelly, Sean Q. 1993. "Divided We Govern? A Reassessment." *Polity* 25 (3):475-84.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1988. "Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions." *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (3):713-36.
- _____. 1991. *The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Kim, Andrew Eungi. 2006. "Civic Activism and Korean Democracy: The Impact of Blacklisting Campaigns in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections." *Pacific Review* 19 (4):519-42.
- Kim, Byung-Kook. 2000a. "Party Politics in South Korea's Democracy: The Crisis of Success." In *Consolidating Democracy in South Korea*, ed. Larry Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 53-85.
- Kim, HeeMin. 1997. "Rational Choice Theory and Third World Politics: A Case Study of the 1990

Party Merger in Korea." *Comparative Politics* 30 (1):83-100.

Kim, HeeMin, Jun Young Choi, and Jinman Cho. 2008. "Changing Cleavage Structure in New Democracies: An Empirical Analysis of Political Cleavages in Korea." *Electoral Studies* 27 (1):136-50.

Kim, Hyeon U. 1999a. "Kukhwe eui Jojik kwa Unyeong." [The National Assembly's Organizations and Operations.] In *Hanguk Euibwe Jeongchi Ron*, ed. Hanguk Jeongchi Hakhwe. Seoul: Keonguk Taehakkyo Chulpanbu. 119-50. [in Korean]

Kim, Hyeonggi, and Inbong Jang. 2001. "Kukhwe Euiwon e Yesan Simeui Hwaldong e Kwanhan Siljeungjeok Yeongu." *Hanguk Jeongchaek Kwahak Hakmebo* 5 (3):169-200.

Kim, Jeonghoon. 2000b. *Kukko Bojogeum eui Kaepyeon Pangan*. Seoul: Hanguk Jose Yeonguwon.

Kim, Meen Geon. 2004a. "Ippop Kwajeong eui Kaehyeok." [Reforming the Legislative Process.] In *Kukhwe eui Seonggong Jeokeon: Yulli wa Cheongchaek*, ed. Chan Wook Park, Byung-Kook Kim and Hoon Jaung. Seoul: Tong Asia Yeonguwon. 269-92. [in Korean]

Kim, Meengeon. 1999b. "Ye Gyeolsan Simeui wa Kukjeong Gam Josa." [Budget and Account Deliberations and Legislative Oversight.] In *Hanguk Euibwe Jeongchi Ron*, ed. Hanguk Jeongchi Hakhwe. Seoul: Keonguk Taehakkyo Chulpanbu. 183-216. [in Korean]

Kim, Won Bae. 2003. "The Evolution of Regional Economic Disparities in Korea." *Korea Journal* 43 (2):55-80.

Kim, Yeong Tae. 2004b. "Tanhaek Jaengeom gwa Jiyeok Jueui, keurigo Inmul Tupyo: Jeonnam Mokpo." [The Impeachment Issue, Regionalism, and Personal Vote: The Mokpo District at Jeonnam.] In *17-dae Chongseon Hyeonjang Ripoten*, ed. Hanguk Cheongdang Hakhwe. Seoul: Pureungil. 99-123. [in Korean]

Kim, Yong-ho. 2001a. *Hanguk Jeongdang Jeongchi eui Ibae* [Understanding the Korean Party Politics]. Seoul: Nanam. [in Korean]

Kim, Yong Ho. 2000c. "Donong Bokhap Seongeogu eui Seongeo Gwajeong: Kangwon-do Chuncheon-si Seongeogu." [Electoral Process at a Suburban District: The Chuncheon

District at Kangwon-do.] In 4.13 *Chongseon: Kaempein Sarye Yeongu wa Jaengjeom Bunseok*, ed. Hanguk Cheongdang Cheongchi Yeonguso. Seongnam: Munhyeong. 41-69. [in Korean]

Kim, Young Rae, and Euysung Kim. 2003. "Reforming Korea's Political Finance System: What Does the Official Data Tell (not Tell) Us?" *Pacific Focus* 18 (2):133-57.

Kim, Young Sam. 2001b. *Kim Young Sam Daetongryeong Hwedorok* [President Kim Young Sam's Memoir]. 2 vols. Seoul: Chosun Ilbo Sa. [in Korean]

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1989. "The Internal Politics of Parties: The Law of Curvilinear Disparity Revisited." *Political Studies* 37 (3):400-21.

_____. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____. 2000. "Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (6/7):845-79.

Knoke, David, Franz Urban Pappi, Jeffrey Broadbent, and Yutaka Tsujinaka. 1996. *Comparing Policy Networks: Labor Politics in the U.S., Germany, and Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kohno, Masaru. 1992. "Rational Foundations for the Organization of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan." *World Politics* 44 (3):369-97.

_____. 1995. "93-nen no Seiji Hendo: Mo Hitotsu no Kaishaku." [The 1993 Political Change: An Alternative Interpretation.] *Reviisan* 17:30-51. [in Japanese]

_____. 1997. *Japan's Postwar Party Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Korea Gallup. 1996. *Je 15-dae Kukhwe Eunwon Seongeo Tupyoo Haengtae* [Voting Behaviors in the 15th National Assembly Elections]. Seoul: Korea Gallup. [in Korean]

_____. 2000. *Je 16-dae Kukhwe Eunwon Seongeo Tupyoo Haengtae* [Voting Behaviors in the 16th National Assembly Elections]. Seoul: Korea Gallup. [in Korean]

- _____. 2004. *Je 17-dae Kukhwe Euwon Seonge Tupyong Haengtae* [Voting Behaviors in the 17th National Assembly Elections]. Seoul: Korea Gallup. [in Korean]
- Krauss, Ellis S., and Benjamin Nyblade. 2005. "'Presidentialization' in Japan?: The Prime Minister, Media and Elections in Japan." *British Journal of Political Science* 35 (2):357-68.
- Krauss, Ellis S., and Robert Pekkanen. 2004. "Explaining Party Adaptation to Electoral Reform: The Discreet Charm of the LDP?" *Journal of Japanese Studies* 30 (1):1-34.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kreps, David M., Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson. 1982. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma." *Journal of Economic Theory* 27 (2):245-52.
- Kume, Ikuo. 1998. *Disparaged Success: Labor Politics in Postwar Japan*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kunicova, Jana, and Thomas Frederick Remington. 2008. "Mandates, Parties and Dissent: Effect of Electoral Rules on Parliamentary Party Cohesion in the Russian State Duma, 1994-2003." *Party Politics* 14 (5):555-74.
- Kwon, Hyeok Yong. 2005. "Targeting Public Spending in a New Democracy: Evidence from South Korea." *British Journal of Political Science* 35 (2):321-41.
- _____. 2008. "A Dynamic Analysis of Partisan Voting: The Issue Salience Effect of Unemployment in South Korea." *Electoral Studies* 27 (3):518-32.
- Kwon, Keedon. 2004. "Regionalism in South Korea: Its Origins and Role in Her Democratization." *Politics and Society* 32 (4):545-74.
- Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. 1979. "'Effective' Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 12 (1):3-27.
- Larcinese, Valentino, Leonzio Rizzo, and Cecilia Testa. 2006. "Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the States: The Impact of the President." *Journal of Politics* 68 (2):447-56.

- Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield. 1998. *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Lee, Aie-Rie. 2003a. "Down and Down We Go: Trust and Compliance in South Korea." *Social Science Quarterly* 84 (2):329-43.
- Lee, Frances E. 2003b. "Geographic Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives: Coalition Building and Distribution of Benefits." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (4):714-28.
- Lee, Hyun Woo. 2005. "Kukhwe Euiwon eui Pyogyel Yoin Bunseok: Jeongdang, Inyeom keurigo Jiyeokku." [A Study of Legislators' Voting Decisions: Party, Ideology, and District.] *Hanguk kwa Kukje Jeongchi* 21 (3):187-218. [in Korean]
- Lee, Hyunchool. 2004. "Jigudang Eomneun Seongo Undong: Seoul Gwangjin (Eul)." [Electoral Campaigning without a Local Party Branch: The Gwangjin Eul District at Seoul.] In *17-dae Chongseon Hyeonjang Ripoteu*, ed. Hanguk Cheongdang Hakhwe. Seoul: Pureungil. 242-64. [in Korean]
- Lee, Jaewon. 2002. "Je 16-dae Kukhwe eui Yesan Kyeolsan Simeui e Taehan Junggan Pyeonga." [Midterm Evaluation of the 16th National Assembly's Budget and Accounting Deliberations.] *Euijeong Yeongu* 13:77-104. [in Korean]
- Lee, Kap-Yun. 1999a. "The Votes Mattered." In *Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote*, ed. Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin A. Winckler and Brian Woodall. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 252-65.
- Lee, Myungsuk. 1997. "Jeongbu Tuja Kigwan Imwon eui Chungwon e Kwanhan Yeongu." [Study on the Selection of the Executive Officers of Government Owned Enterprises.] *Hanguk Haengjeong Hakebo* 31 (3):295-311. [in Korean]
- _____. 2001. "Jeongbu Tuja Kigwan Imwon eui Jeongchijeok Imyong gwa Kyeongyeong Siljeok." [Political Appointment and Management Performance of Executive Officers of Government-Invested Enterprises.] *Hanguk Haengjeong Hakebo* 35 (4):139-56. [in Korean]
- Lee, Seungjoo, and Sang-Young Rhyu. 2008. "The Political Dynamics of Informal Networks in South Korea: The Case of Parachute Appointment." *Pacific Review* 21 (1):45-66.

- Lee, Sung-Chull. 1999b. "Politics of Electoral Reforms and Practices: The Case of Korean SNTV Elections under the Yushin Constitution." In *Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution*, ed. Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin A. Winckler and Brian Woodall. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 51-64.
- Leiserson, Michael. 1968. "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games." *American Political Science Review* 62 (3):770-87.
- Lesbirel, S. Hayden. 1991. "Structural Adjustment in Japan: Terminating 'Old King Coal'." *Asian Survey* 31 (11):1079-94.
- Levitt, Steven D., and James M. Snyder. 1995. "Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays." *American Journal of Political Science* 39 (4):958-80.
- Lim, Seong-Ho. 2005. "Neither Gridlock nor Moderation, but Administrative Recharge." *Kuokehe Cheongchi Nonchong* 45 (5):231-57.
- Lim, Sunghack. 2008. "Je 18-dae Chongseon gwa Seoul Jongno-gu Chamyeo Gwanchal." [The 18th General Election and Participation Observation on the Jongno-gu at Seoul.] *Hanguk Cheongchi Yeongu* 17 (2):55-72. [in Korean]
- Lindbeck, Assar, and Jorgen W. Weibull. 1987. "Balanced-budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition." *Public Choice* 52 (3):273-97.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. New York: Free Press. 1-64.
- Lundell, Krister. 2004. "Determinants of Candidate Selection: The Degree of Centralization in Comparative Perspective." *Party Politics* 10 (1):25-47.
- Lyne, Mona M. 2008. "Proffering Pork: How Party Leaders Build Party Reputations in Brazil." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2):290-303.
- Maclachlan, Patricia L. 2004. "Post Office Politics in Modern Japan: The Postmasters, Iron Triangles,

and the Limits of Reform." *Journal of Japanese Studies* 30 (2):281-313.

Mainwaring, Scott. 1993. "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination." *Comparative Political Studies* 26 (2):198-228.

_____. 1999. *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Anibal Perez-Linan. 1997. "Party Discipline in the Brazilian Constitutional Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22 (4):453-83.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds. 1997. *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mair, Peter, and Ingrid van Biezen. 2001. "Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980-2000." *Party Politics* 7 (1):5-21.

Makihara, Izuru. 2003. *Naikaku Seiji to "Ōkurashō Shibai": Seiji Shudō no Jōken* [Cabinet Politics and "MOF Dominance": Conditions for Politicians' Initiative]. Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha. [in Japanese]

Maltzman, Forrest. 1997. *Competing Principals: Committees, Parties, and the Organization of Congress*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Marsh, Michael. 2007. "Candidates or Parties?: Objects of Electoral Choice in Ireland." *Party Politics* 13 (4):500-27.

Masumi, Junnosuke. 1964. "1955 Nen-no Seiji Taisei." [The Political Structure of the 1955 System.] *Shisō* 480:55-72. [in Japanese]

_____. 1967. "Jiyū Minshutō-no Soshiki-to Kinō." [The Organization and Functions of the LDP.] *Nenpō Seijigaku*.34-77. [in Japanese]

Masuyama, Mikitaka. 2003. *Gikai Seido to Nihon Seiji: Giji Un'ei no Keiryō Seijigaku* [Agenda Power in the Japanese Diet]. Tokyo: Bokutakusha. [in Japanese]

- May, John D. 1973. "Opinion Structures of Political Parties: The Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity." *Political Studies* 21 (1):135-51.
- Mayhew, David R. 2005. *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking and Investigations, 1946-2002*. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- McCarty, Nolan M. 2000. "Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics." *American Political Science Review* 94 (1):117-29.
- McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- McCubbins, Mathew D. 1991. "Government on Lay-Away: Federal Spending and Deficits under Divided Party Control." In *Politics of Divided Government*, ed. Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell. Boulder, CO: Westview. 113-53.
- McCubbins, Mathew D., and Michael F. Thies. 1997. "As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan's LDP." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22 (3):297-328.
- McGann, A. J. 2002. "The Advantages of Ideological Cohesion: A Model of Constituency Representation and Electoral Competition in Multi-Party Democracies." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 14 (1):37-70.
- McGillivray, Fiona. 1997. "Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs." *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (2):584-607.
- McKean, Margaret, and Ethan Scheiner. 2000. "Japan's New Electoral System: La plus ca change..." *Electoral Studies* 19 (4):447-77.
- Mershon, Carol, and Olga Shvetsova. 2008. "Parliamentary Cycles and Party Switching in Legislatures." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (1):99-127.
- Meyer, Steven A., and Shigeto Naka. 1998. "Legislative Influences in Japanese Budgetary Politics." *Public Choice* 94 (3/4):267-88.

- Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, Roberto Perotti, and Massimo Rostagno. 2002. "Electoral Systems and Public Spending." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (2):609-57.
- Miller, Raymond. 2004. "Who Stood for Office, and Why?" In *Voters' Veto: The 2002 Election in New Zealand and the Consolidation of Minority Government*, ed. Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, Jeffrey Karp and Raymond Miller. Auckland: Auckland University Press. 85-103.
- Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. *Seiji Shikin Shushi Hokokusho* [Income and Expenditure Reports on Political Funds]. Tokyo: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. [in Japanese]
- Mishima, Ko. 1998. "The Changing Relationship between Japan's LDP and the Bureaucracy: Hashimoto's Administrative Reform Effort and Its Politics." *Asian Survey* 38 (10):968-85.
- Miura, Mari, Kap-Yun Lee, and Robert J. Weiner. 2005. "Who Are the DPJ?: Policy Positioning and Recruitment Strategy." *Asian Perspective* 29 (1):49-77.
- Miyake, Ichiro. 1985. *Seito Shiji no Bunseki* [Analyzing Partisan Support]. Tokyo: Sobunsha. [in Japanese]
- _____. 1998. *Seito Shiji no Kozō* [The Structure of Partisan Support]. Tokyo: Bokutakusha. [in Japanese]
- Miyake, Ichiro, and Yoshitaka Nishizawa. 1992. "Nihon no Tohyo Moderu ni okeru Seito Hyoka Yoin." [The Party Evaluation Factor in Japan's Voting Models.] *Senkyo Kenkyu* 7:63-79. [in Japanese]
- Mo, Jongryn. 1996. "Political Learning and Democratic Consolidation: Korean Industrial Relations, 1987-1992." *Comparative Political Studies* 29 (3):290-311.
- _____. 2001. "Political Culture and Legislative Gridlock: Politics of Economic Reform in Precrisis Korea." *Comparative Political Studies* 34 (5):467-92.
- _____. 2002. "Reforming Korea's Presidential System." In *Cooperation and Reform on the Korean Peninsula*, ed. Korea Economic Institute. Washington, D.C.: Korea Economic Institute. 65-76.

- Mo, Jongryn, and David Brady. 1999. "The SNTV and the Politics of Electoral Systems in Korea." In *Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote*, ed. Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin A. Winckler and Brian Woodall. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 227-51.
- Moe, Terry M. 1990. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 6 (Special Issue):213-53.
- Moe, Terry M., and Michael Caldwell. 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems." *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 150 (1):171-95.
- Molinar Horcasitas, Juan, and Jeffrey A. Weldon. 1994. "Electoral Determinants and Consequences of National Solidarity." In *Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico: The National Solidarity Strategy*, ed. Wayne A. Cornelius, Ann L. Craig and Jonathan Fox. San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California. 123-41.
- Moon, Woojin. 2004. "Party Activists, Campaign Resources and Candidate Position Taking: Theory, Tests and Applications." *British Journal of Political Science* 34 (4):611-33.
- _____. 2005. "Decomposition of Regional Voting in South Korea: Ideological Conflicts and Regional Interests." *Party Politics* 11 (5):579-99.
- Morgenstern, Scott. 2004. *Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll-Call Voting in Latin America and the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mozaffar, Shaheen, James R. Scarritt, and Glen Galaich. 2003. "Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 97 (3):379-90.
- Mukoono, Shinji. 2006. "Gian Shinsa: Gian Jizen Shinsa Seido no Tsusetsu ni Ayamari Ari." [Bill Investigation: The Conventional Wisdom about the Preliminary Review Rule Is Wrong] *Gikai Seiji Kenkyu* 80:12-6. [in Japanese]
- Nacif, Benito. 2002. "Understanding Party Discipline in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies: The Centralized Party Model." In *Legislative Politics in Latin America*, ed. Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 254-84.

- National Election Commission. *Jeongdang eui Hwalgong Gaebwang mit Hwerye Bogo* [Parties' Activities and Financial Reports]. Seoul: National Election Commission. [in Korean]
- Niigata Nippo Sha. 2004. *Za Etsuzankai* [The Etsuzankai]. Niigata: Niigata Nippo Jigyo Sha. [in Japanese]
- Nishi, Toshio. 1982. *Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
- Niskanen, Willam A. 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians." *Journal of Law and Economics* 18 (3):617-43.
- Noble, Gregory W. 1989. "The Japanese Industrial Policy Debate." In *Pacific Dynamics: The International Politics of Industrial Change*, ed. Stephan Haggard and Chung-in Moon. Boulder: Westview. 53-95.
- _____. 2003. "Reform and Continuity in Japan's Shingikai Deliberation Councils." In *anese Governance: Beyond Japan Inc.*, ed. Jennifer Amyx and Peter Drysdale. London: RoutledgeCurzon. 113-33.
- Noguchi, Yukio. 1991. "Budget Policymaking in Japan." In *Parallel Politics: Economic Policymaking in the United States and Japan*, ed. Samuel Kernell. Washington: Brookings Institution. 119-41.
- Nordhaus, William D. 1975. "The Political Business Cycle." *Review of Economic Studies* 42 (2):169-90.
- Nyblade, Benjamin, and Steven R. Reed. 2008. "Who Cheats? Who Loots? Political Competition and Corruption in Japan, 1947-1993." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (4):926-41.
- O, Seung-Yong. 2004. "Hanguk Bunjeom Jeongbu eui Ippeop Kwajeong Bunseok." *Hanguk Jeongchi Hakhwobo* 38 (1):167-92.
- Ōkurashō Shukeikyoku Chōsaka. various years. *Zaisei Tōkei*. Tōkyō: Ōkurashō Shukeikyoku Chōsaka.
- Olson, Mancur. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Otake, Hideo. 1995. "Jiminto Wakate Kaikaku Ha to Ozawa Gurupu: 'Seiji Kaikaku' wo Mezashita Futatsu no Seiji Seiryoku." [Two Currents toward Political Reform within the LDP: Young Reformist Dietmembers and Ozawa Group.] *Revuasan* 17:7-29. [in Japanese]
- _____. 2006. *Koizumi Junichiro Popyurizumu no Kenkyu: Sono Senryaku to Shubo* [A Study of Koizumi Junichiro's Populism: His Strategies and Methods]. Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimpo Sha. [in Japanese]
- _____, ed. 1997. *Seikai Saiben no Kenkyu* [The Study of Political Realignment]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku. [in Japanese]
- Özbudun, Ergun. 1970. *Party Cohesion in Western Democracies: A Causal Analysis*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Park, Bae-Gyoon. 2003a. "Territorialized Party Politics and the Politics of Local Economic Development: State-led Industrialization and Political Regionalism in South Korea." *Political Geography* 22 (8):811-39.
- Park, Chan Pyo. 1999a. "Ippeop Kineung gwa Ippeop Kwajeong: Jedo, Silje, Teukjing." [The Legislative Function and Legislative Process: Rules, Practice, and Characteristics.] In *Hanguk Eulhwe Jeongchi Ron*, ed. Hanguk Jeongchi Hakhwe. Seoul: Keonguk Taehakkyo Chulpanbu. 151-82. [in Korean]
- Park, Chan Wook. 1988a. "Constituency Representation in Korea: Sources and Consequences." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 13 (2):225-42.
- _____. 1988b. "Legislators and Their Constituents in South Korea: The Patterns of District Representation." *Asian Survey* 28 (10):1049-65.
- _____. 1998a. "The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea." *Journal of Legislative Studies* 4 (4):66-82.
- _____. 1998b. "The Organisation and Workings of Committees in the Korean National Assembly." *Journal of Legislative Studies* 4 (1):206-24.

- _____. 1999b. "Hanguk Euihwe Jeongchi eui Teukseong." [The Characteristics of the Korean Legislative Politics.] In *Hanguk Euihwe Jeongchi Ron*, ed. Hanguk Jeongchi Hakhwe. Seoul: Keonguk Taehakkyo Chulpanbu. 61-87. [in Korean]
- _____. 2000a. "Legislative-Executive Relations and Legislative Reform." In *Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea*, ed. Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 73-95.
- _____. 2002. "Change Is Short but Continuity Is Long: Policy Influence of the National Assembly in Newly Democratized Korea." In *Legislatures: Comparative Perspectives on Representative Assemblies*, ed. Gerhard Loewenberg, Peverill Squire and D. Roderick Kiewiet. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 329-51.
- _____. 2003b. "Budget Review in the National Assembly of Democratic Korea." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 3 (3):493-521.
- Park, Chan Wook, and Jin-Guk Kim. 1997. "Je 14dae Kukhwe Sangim Wiwonhwe Jedo wa Geu Euisa Kyeoljeong e Kwanhan Yeongu." [A Study on the 14th National Assembly's Standing Committee System and Its Decision Making.] *Hanguk Cheongchi Yeongu* 7:449-88. [in Korean]
- Park, Cheol Hee. 2000b. *Daigishi no Tsukurare Kata: Shō Senkyoku no Senkyo Senryaku* [How to Create a Diet Member: Electoral Strategies in an SMD]. Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū. [in Japanese]
- Park, Myoung-ho. 2004. "Tanhaek Yeokpung kwa Sudokwon Sindosi eui Chongseon: Koyang-si Deokyang (Kap)." [The Adverse Wind of the Impeachment and the General Elections at a New Metropolitan City: The Deokyang Kap District at Koyang City.] In *17-dae Chongseon Hyeonjang Ripoteu*, ed. Hanguk Cheongdang Hakhwe. Seoul: Pureungil. 21-64. [in Korean]
- Patterson, Dennis. 1994. "Electoral Influence and Economic Policy: Political Origins of Financial Aid to Small Business in Japan." *Comparative Political Studies* 27 (3):425-47.
- Patterson, Dennis, and Dick Beason. 2001. "Politics, Pressure, and Economic Policy: Explaining Japan's Use of Economic Stimulus Policies." *World Politics* 53 (4):499-523.
- Patzelt, Werner J. 1999. "Recruitment and Retention in Western European Parliaments." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24 (2):239-79.

- Pearson, Kathryn L. 2005. *Party Discipline in the Contemporary Congress: Rewarding Loyalty in Theory and in Practice*, Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley.
- Pekkanen, Robert, Benjamin Nyblade, and Ellis S. Krauss. 2006. "Electoral Incentives in Mixed-Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan." *American Political Science Review* 100 (2):183-93.
- Pempel, T. J., and Keichi Tsunekawa. 1979. "Corporatism without Labor?: The Japanese Anomaly." In *Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation*, ed. Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch. Beverly Hills: Sage. 231-70.
- Pereira, Carlos, and Bernardo Mueller. 2004. "The Cost of Governing: Strategic Behavior of the President and Legislators in Brazil's Budgetary Process." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (7):781-815.
- Perotti, Roberto, and Yianos Kontopoulos. 2002. "Fragmented Fiscal Policy." *Journal of Public Economics* 86 (2):191-222.
- Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 1999. "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians." *European Economic Review* 43 (4-6):699-735.
- Poole, Keith T. 2005. *Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Rahat, Gideon, and Reuven Y. Hazan. 2001. "Candidate Selection Methods: An Analytical Framework." *Party Politics* 7 (3):297-322.
- Rahat, Gideon, Reuven Y. Hazan, and Richard S. Katz. 2008. "Democracy and Political Parties: On the Uneasy Relationships between Participation, Competition and Representation." *Party Politics* 14 (6):663-83.

- Ramseyer, J. Mark, and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. 1993. *Japan's Political Marketplace*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Reed, Steven R. 2009. "Party Strategy or Candidate Strategy: How Does the LDP Run the Right Number of Candidates in Japan's Multi-Member Districts?" *Party Politics* 15 (3):295-314.
- Reed, Steven R., and Ethan Scheiner. 2003. "Electoral Incentives and Policy Preferences: Mixed Motives Behind Party Defections in Japan." *British Journal of Political Science* 33 (3):469-90.
- Reed, Steven R., and Michael F. Thies. 2001. "The Causes of Electoral Reform in Japan." In *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*, ed. Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 152-72.
- Richardson, Bradley M. 1988. "Constituency Candidates Versus Parties in Japanese Voting Behavior." *American Political Science Review* 82 (3):695-718.
- Roubini, Nouriel, and Jeffrey Sachs. 1989a. "Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial Countries." *Economic Policy* 4 (8):99-132.
- _____. 1989b. "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies." *European Economic Review* 33 (5):903-38.
- Sakamoto, Takayuki. 1999. "Explaining Electoral Reform: Japan versus Italy and New Zealand." *Party Politics* 5 (4):419-38.
- Samuels, David J. 1999. "Incentives to Cultivate a Party Vote in Candidate-Centric Electoral Systems: Evidence from Brazil." *Comparative Political Studies* 32 (4):487-518.
- _____. 2000a. "Concurrent Elections, Discordant Results: Presidentialism, Federalism, and Governance in Brazil." *Comparative Politics* 33 (1):1-20.
- _____. 2000b. "The Gubernatorial Coattails Effect: Federalism and Congressional Elections in Brazil." *Journal of Politics* 62 (1):240-53.
- _____. 2002. "Presidentialized Parties: The Separation of Powers and Party Organization and

- Behavior." *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (4):461-83.
- _____. 2003. *Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Samuels, David J., and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 2003. "Presidentialism, Elections, and Representation." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15 (1):33-60.
- _____. 2009. *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: A Framework for Analysis*. book manuscript.
- Samuels, Richard J. 1987. *The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Sato, Seizaburo, and Tetsuhisa Matsuzaki. 1986. *Jiminto Seiken* [The LDP Administration]. Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha. [in Japanese]
- Scheiner, Ethan. 2005. "Pipelines of Pork: Japanese Politics and a Model of Local Opposition Party Failure." *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (7):799-823.
- _____. 2006. *Democracy without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-party Dominant State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 1995. "The Politics of the Political Business Cycle." *British Journal of Political Science* 25 (1):79-99.
- Shabad, Goldie, and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski. 2004. "Inter-Party Mobility among Parliamentary Candidates in Post-Communist East Central Europe." *Party Politics* 10 (2):151-76.
- Shimizu, Masato. 2005. *Kantei Shudo* [The Cabinet Office Initiative]. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha. [in Japanese]
- Shin, Doh Chull. 1999. *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shin, Doh Chull, and Jack R. Van Der Slik. 1997. "The Democratization of Legislative Politics in

Korea." *Korea Journal* 37 (4):39-64.

Shin, Eui Hang. 2003. "The Role of NGOs in Political Elections in South Korea: The Case of the Citizens' Alliance for the 2000 General Election." *Asian Survey* 43 (4):697-716.

Shinkawa, Toshimitsu. 1999. *Sengo Nihon Seiji to Shakai Minshu Shugi: Shakaitō Sohyō Burokku no Kōbō* [Social Democracy in Postwar Japanese Politics: The JSP-Sohyo Bloc's Struggles]. Kyoto: Hōritsu Bunkasha. [in Japanese]

Shiota, Ushio. 2007. *Minshuto no Kenkyū* [The Study of the Democratic Party of Japan]. Tokyo: Heibonsha. [in Japanese]

Shugart, Matthew Soberg. 1995. "The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government." *American Political Science Review* 89 (2):327-43.

Shugart, Matthew Soberg, and John M. Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Siavelis, Peter. 2002. "The Hidden Logic of Candidate Selection for Chilean Parliamentary Elections." *Comparative Politics* 34 (4):419-38.

Siavelis, Peter M., and Scott Morgenstern. 2008. "Candidate Recruitment and Selection in Latin America: A Framework for Analysis." *Latin American Politics and Society* 50 (4):27-58.

Sim, Chi-yeon. 2004. *Hanguk Jeongdang Jeongchisa: Wigi wa Tonghap eui Jeongchi* [The Political History of Korean Parties: Politics of Crisis and Integration]. Seoul: Paeksan Seodang. [in Korean]

Song, Ki Do. 2000. "Jiyeok Jueui wa Kongcheon Kalteung, geurigo Seongeo Kampein: Jeonnam Namwon-Sunchang Seongeo-gu." [Regionalism and the Endorsement Conflict, and Electoral Campaigning: The Namwon-Sunchang District at Jeollanam-do.] In *4.13 Chongseon: Kaempein Sarye Yeongu wa Jaengjeom Bunseok*, ed. Hanguk Cheongdang Cheongchi Yeonguso. Seongnam: Munhyeong, 95-122. [in Korean]

_____. 2004. "Tanhaek Isyu e Aptodanghan Seongeo: Jeonbuk Namwon-Sunchang." [The Elections Overwhelmed by the Impeachment Issue: The Namwon-Sunchang District at Jeonbuk.] In *17-dae Chongseon Hyeonjang Ripoteu*, ed. Hanguk Cheongdang Hakhwe. Seoul: Pureungil.

65-98. [in Korean]

Sōrifu Tōkeikyoku. various years. *Nihon Tōkei Nenkan*. Tokyo: Sōrifu Tōkeikyoku.

Stockton, Hans. 2001. "Political Parties, Party Systems, and Democracy in East Asia: Lessons from Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 34 (1):94-119.

Stone, Walter J., and L. Sandy Maisel. 2003. "The Not-So-Simple Calculus of Winning: Potential U.S. House Candidates' Nomination and General Election Prospects." *Journal of Politics* 65 (4):951-77.

Stratmann, Thomas. 2000. "Congressional Voting over Legislative Careers: Shifting Positions and Changing Constraints." *American Political Science Review* 94 (3):665-76.

Strom, Kaare. 1984. "Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Nonwinning Cabinet Solutions." *Comparative Political Studies* 17 (2):199-227.

_____. 1990. "A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 34 (2):565-98.

Takahara, Masao. 1959. "Hoshu Seitō-no Soshiki Katsudō." [The Organizational Activities of the Conservative Party.] *Shisō* 420:91-9. [in Japanese]

Takenaka, Harukata. 2006a. *Shusbo Shibai* [Prime Minister's Rule]. Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha. [in Japanese]

Takenaka, Heizo. 2006b. *Kōzō Kaikaku no Shinjitsu: Takenaka Heizō Daijin Nisshi* [The Truth of the Structural Reform: Minister Takenaka's Diary]. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha. [in Japanese]

Taniguchi, Masaki. 2004. *Gendai Nihon no Senkyo Seiji: Senkyo Seido Kaikaku no Kenshōsuru*. [Electoral Politics in Contemporary Japan: Analyzing the Electoral Reform]. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai. [in Japanese]

Taniguchi, Masaki, Taku Sugawara, and Ikuo Kabashima. 2005. "Jimin ni Swingu Shita Yawarakai

Kozo Kaikaku Ha." [Soft Structural Reform Supporters Swinging to the LDP] *Ronza*, November, 93-104. [in Japanese]

- Taniguchi, Naoko. 2008. "Diet Members and Seat Inheritance: Keeping It in the Family." In *Democratic Reform in Japan: Assessing the Impact*, ed. Sherry L. Martin and Gill Steel. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 65-80.
- Tatebayashi, Masahiko. 2004. *Giin Kodo no Seiji Keizai-gaku: Jiminto Shibai no Seido Bunseki* [The Logic of Legislators' Activities: Institutional Analysis of LDP Dominance in Japan]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku. [in Japanese]
- Tavits, Margit. 2004. "The Size of Government in Majoritarian and Consensus Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (3):340-59.
- Thames, Frank C. 2004. "Party and Personal Preference in Post-Soviet Legislatures." *Social Science Quarterly* 85 (2):478-96.
- _____. 2005. "A House Divided: Party Strength and the Mandate Divide in Hungary, Russia, and Ukraine." *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (3):282-303.
- _____. 2007a. "Discipline and Party Institutionalization in Post-Soviet Legislatures." *Party Politics* 13 (4):456-77.
- _____. 2007b. "Searching for the Electoral Connection: Parliamentary Party Switching in the Ukrainian Rada, 1998-2002." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 32 (2):223-56.
- Thayer, Nathaniel B. 1969. *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King. CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results 2.0. Harvard University, Cambridge.
- Treisman, Daniel. 2004. "Stabilization Tactics in Latin America: Menem, Cardoso, and the Politics of Low Inflation." *Comparative Politics* 36 (4):399-420.
- Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton: Princeton University

Press.

- Tsurutani, Taketsugu. 1980. "The LDP in Transition? Mass Membership Participation in Party Leadership Selection." *Asian Survey* 20 (8):844-59.
- Uenohara, Hideaki, Chihiro Okawa, and Masaki Taniguchi. 2007. "Abe Seiken no Shikaku, Shin Seiken no Kadai." [Abe Cabinet's Dead Angle, New Cabinet's Challenges.] *Ronzu*, November, 50-60. [in Japanese]
- Uesugi, Takashi. 2007. *Kantei Hokai* [Cabinet's Collapse]. Tokyo: Shinchosha. [in Japanese]
- Uriu, Robert M. 1996. *Troubled Industries: Confronting Economic Change in Japan*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Watanabe, Tsuneo. 1958. *Habatsu: Hoshuto no Kaibo* [Factions: Analyzing the Conservative Party]. Tokyo: Kobundo. [in Japanese]
- Weingast, Barry R., Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen. 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics." *Journal of Political Economy* 89 (4):642-64.
- Wildavsky, Aaron. 1964. *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Williamson, Oliver E. 1981. "The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach." *American Journal of Sociology* 87 (3):548-77.
- _____. 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange." *American Economic Review* 73 (4):519-40.
- Woodall, Brian. 1996. *Japan under Construction: Corruption, Politics, and Public Works*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. *Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- Yamada, Masahiro. 1997. "Noson Gata Senkyoku ni okeru Seikai Saihen oyobi Senkyo Seido Kaikaku no Eikyo: Ibaraki Shin 2 Ku, Nukaga Fukushima wo Rei to shite." [Political Realignment and the Impact of the Electoral Reform in a Rural District: An Example of Ibaraki 2 District and Nukaga Fukushima.] In *Seikai Saihen no Kenkyu*, ed. Hideo Otake. Tokyo: Yuhikaku. 113-42. [in Japanese]
- Yomiuri Shimbun Seijibu. 2008. *Shinku Kokkai* [Vacuum Diet]. Tokyo: Shinchosha. [in Japanese]
- Yoon, Jong-Bin. 1999. "Hanguk Kukhwe Euiwon eui Chiyeokku Hwaldong Cheongdo eui Kyeoljeong Wonin Bunseok: Keorieo Dangye reul Chungsim euro." [Analyzing the Determinants of Korean National Assembly Members' Constituency Activities: Focusing on Career Stages.] *Hanguk Jeongchi Hakhwabo* 33 (4):145-63. [in Korean]
- _____. 2002a. "Hyeongjik Euiwon eui Chiyeokku Daepyo Hwaldong kwa 16dae Chongseon." [Incumbents' Constituency Activities and the 16th General Elections.] In *Hanguk eui Seongo IV*, ed. Yeongjae Jin. Seoul: Hanguk Sahwe Kwahak Deiteo Senteo. [in Korean]
- _____. 2002b. "Kukhwe Euiwon gwa Seongo Kumin eui Gwangye Yeongu." [A Study on Legislator-Constituency Relations in Korea: Focused on the Evaluation of Incumbent Assemblymen.] *Hanguk Jeongchi Hakhwabo* 36 (4):177-92. [in Korean]
- Yu, Jae Il. 2000. "Jiyeok Jueui wa Nakseon Undong, Sedae Kyoche Ron eui Kyeongjaeng: Daejeon-si Seo-gu Kap Seongeogu." [Regionalism and the Blackmail Movement, and the Competition of the Generation Change: The Seo-gu Kap District at Daejeon.] In *4.13 Chongseon: Kaempein Sarye Yeongu wa Jaengeom Bunseok*, ed. Hanguk Cheongdang Cheongchi Yeonguso. Seongnam: Munhyeong. 71-93. [in Korean]
- _____. 2004. "Chungcheong Jiyeok Jueui eui Byeonhwa: Daejeon Jungu." [Changing Regionalism in Chungcheong: The Jung-gu District at Daejeon.] In *17-dae Chongseon Hyeonjang Ripoteu*, ed. Hanguk Cheongdang Hakhwe. Seoul: Pureungil. 127-52. [in Korean]
- Zielinski, Jakub. 2002. "Translating Social Cleavages into Party Systems: The Significance of New Democracies." *World Politics* 54 (2):184-211.