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## **Promoting Patriarchy or Dual Equality? Multiculturalism and the Immigrant Household Division of Labor.**

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### **Abstract:**

In this article, we provide the first empirical analysis of the relationship between multicultural immigration policy and gender inequality within immigrant communities. A fierce sociological debate pits those who identify multiculturalism as a key obstacle to gender equality among immigrant families against those who believe multiculturalism and gender egalitarianism are “dual equality projects.” At the core of this debate are differences over the extent to which multiculturalism impedes or promotes the transmission of gender egalitarianism from host societies to immigrant communities. To adjudicate between these two perspectives, we examine whether micro foundations of the household division of labor—relative resources, time availability, and gender ideology—reduce the share of women’s labor to a greater or lesser degree in multicultural countries. We find multiculturalism increases the egalitarian effects of micro foundations among immigrant households. Both symbolic and material forms of multiculturalism contribute to its moderating effect, but immigrant women benefit the most in countries with both types of multiculturalist policies. In highly multicultural countries, rising incomes, greater employment, and more egalitarian gender ideologies can produce dramatic reductions in housework for immigrant women. We conclude by specifying the conditions where multiculturalism reduce inequalities *between* immigrants and natives, and *within* immigrant communities.

Key words: [inequality, culture, immigration, multiculturalism]

Word Count: 11,525

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## Introduction

Increases in South/North migration over the last forty years have generated extensive debate over how best to achieve immigrant incorporation.<sup>1</sup> Immigration policy varies tremendously in Western democracies (see Castles and Miller 2003; Joppke 2007). Historically, states expected permanent settlers to adopt the values and cultural practices of their majorities, but consonant policy choices have been criticized as ethnocentric (Glazer 2002; Kivisto 2005). An alternative policy approach is “multiculturalism,” construed broadly as policies that attach greater value to the maintenance of home culture among immigrant groups. Such policies often include the explicit goal of reducing the pressures immigrants face to abandon their cultural heritage; policies including legal accommodations for bilingual education, dress exceptions, dual citizenship, etc. (Kymlicka 1995, 2001; Modood 2013).

While these two types of immigration policy seem to have obvious implications for the relations *between* immigrants and host societies, their implications for gender inequality *within* immigrant communities are less clear. Indeed, multiculturalism has generated a set of debates over how multiculturalist forms of incorporation intersect with gender inequality, with some receiving countries instituting controversial programs aimed at acclimating incoming immigrants to the sexual and gender norms of Western liberal democracies.<sup>2</sup> What we term the “trade-off” thesis holds that multiculturalism may work against these efforts by culturally insulating immigrant communities (Koopmans 2010), reproduces gender inegalitarian aspects of home culture—e.g. forced marriages, honor killings, gendered religious attire, etc.—and thereby reinforces gendered power hierarchies within immigrant groups (Okin 1999; Song 2005, 2007). Others argue that multiculturalism is a “dual-equality project,” in that it both reduces anti-immigrant discrimination in host societies *and* promotes the selective adoption of gender

egalitarian attitudes that may increase the status of women within immigrant communities (Levy 2000; Phillips 2005). In short, the extant literature on multiculturalism and gender inequality suggests diametrically opposed expectations for how multiculturalism affects immigrant women.

Despite the rapid expansion of public and scholarly discourse on this issue, there have been no systematic studies on whether multiculturalism facilitates gender inequality in immigrant communities (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008; Koopmans 2013), leading some to conclude that "the paucity of empirical studies allows political actors on all sides to make strong claims based on little evidence" (Bloemraad et al. 2008:158).

As a point of departure, we examine the household division of labor (HHDL) among immigrant couples and assess the degree to which improvements in three micro-level determinants of the HHDL (the relative income of women, women's employment, and gender ideology) produce more or less egalitarian effects in multicultural countries. The egalitarian effects of the micro-level determinants are a strategic site in which to evaluate competing claims regarding the role of multicultural immigration policy. First, the gender and immigration literature centrally implicates micro-determinants as processes that change during the immigration process, often benefitting immigrant women and reducing gender inequality within immigrant households (Pessar and Mahler 2003; Zentgraf 2002). Moreover, micro-level determinants and the HHDL are an important measure of the private or domestic sphere, which Okin (1999) argues is critically impacted by multiculturalist policies, but is largely unchanged by legal protections afforded to women in affluent democracies. Finally, debates over multicultural immigration policy hinge critically on the impacts that such policies have on attitudes and behaviors of both immigrant and native communities that may impact the mechanisms linking the micro-level determinants to egalitarian outcomes. Succinctly, the "trade-off" thesis suggests

that multiculturalism should attenuate the egalitarian effects of the micro-foundations among immigrant households by insulating them from prevailing gender attitudes in host societies. Conversely, the dual-equality perspective suggests multiculturalism should strengthen the egalitarian effect of the micro-foundations by reducing both perceptions of cultural threat among immigrants and decreasing discrimination against immigrants.

To subject these arguments to empirical scrutiny, we conduct a longitudinal analysis of the HHDL in affluent democracies. Our findings are most consistent with the dual-equality perspective. That is, the equalizing effect of relative resources, time availability, and gender ideology produce greater reductions in household labor among immigrant women in highly multicultural countries. These results are robust to a host of alternative explanations, different measures of multiculturalism, and imply sizable impacts on the share of household labor performed by immigrant women. We conclude by implicating these results in debates about multiculturalism and gender inequality, and by suggesting directions for future research on the degree to which multiculturalism may be salient for immigrants at the micro level more generally.

### **The Micro-Determinants of the Household Division of Labor**

Before discussing multiculturalism, we begin by reviewing the literature on the micro-determinants of household labor (Batalova and Cohen 2002; Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, and Robinson 2000; Fuwa 2004; Hook 2010; Ridgeway 2011). Unsurprisingly, household tasks are incredibly gendered and women are more likely than men to do tasks that are less time flexible, more time consuming, and less pleasant (Bianchi et al. 2000; Coltrane 2000; Fuwa 2004; Hook 2010). Moreover, the gendered organization of the home remains the "wellspring for the system

of cultural beliefs and material arrangements that sustain gender inequality” and strongly resembles the division of labor between men and women in public spheres including the workplace (Ridgeway 2011:128). And while the gender segregation of household tasks has improved since the 1960s, this trend has leveled off in recent years (Hook 2010). Even in western countries like the United States, women remain four times more likely to do core household tasks (Bianchi et al. 2000).

Scholars recognize three primary micro-level determinants that account for the disparity in the HHDL: relative resources, time availability, and gender ideology. *Relative resource* arguments view the HHDL as the outcome of household level negotiations. The bargaining position of men and women is in part a function of differences in their contributions to household income (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010). Because wives historically bring less income to bear on these negotiations than men, they have less bargaining power to determine how household work is divided. As women’s income improves, their bargaining position improves because their contribution to household income becomes more visible, which allows for more favorable negotiations over their share of household labor (Bianchi et al. 2000; c.f. Goldscheider and Waite 1991; Gupta 2007).

While relative resources emphasize differences in the returns to labor market activity among husbands and wives, *time availability* arguments emphasize the opportunity costs between paid and unpaid labor. Here, households are characterized as joint utility maximizing entities, so the degree of housework among wives and husbands is strongly related to the amount of time spent in the formal labor market (Becker 1981, 1985). If wives are more active in the labor market, there is a rational incentive to delegate more household work to husbands. That is, where relative resources increase the bargaining position of women by making their resource-

contribution more visible, time availability increases their bargaining position by changing the incentive structure governing the bargaining process between women and men, where both men and women recognize the opportunity costs of inequality in the HHDL. Several studies have found an increase in women's employment reduces their share of household work (Bergen 1991; Brines 1994; Fuwa 2004; Pinto and Coltrane 2009; Shelton 1992).

Finally, *gender ideological* perspectives critique the neutrality of household work. Individuals are socialized to conform to “normative” gender roles, but normative gender roles are also filtered through an individual's gender ideology (Blair and Lichter 1991; Greenstein 1996; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010). Thus, more egalitarian housework arrangements reflect egalitarian gender ideologies among couples. Unlike relative resources and time availability, gender ideological perspectives recognize that the bargaining game between men and women is socially constructed. That is, negotiations between men and women take on an entirely different character, or do not exist at all, when either or both partners hold more egalitarian gender ideologies. Prior studies find that women perform less housework in more gender egalitarian households (Blair and Lichter 1991; Fuwa 2004; Greenstein 1996; Parkman 2004; Presser 1994).

In short, the micro-level determinants are seen as key household level mechanisms to promote a more equal HHDL in general.<sup>3</sup> An examination of the efficacy of these micro-determinants provides an ideal, if unidimensional, empirical case in which to assess the role multiculturalism plays in promoting or impeding gender egalitarianism among immigrants.<sup>4</sup> In what follows, we articulate contrasting hypotheses by which multiculturalism can promote or inhibit the equalizing effects of these micro-determinants.

## **Multiculturalism and the Effect of Micro-Level Determinants on the Immigrant Household**

### **Division of Labor**

#### *Trading Gender for Ethnic Equality*

Multiculturalism is “an ideology that attaches positive value to cultural diversity, calls for the equal recognition of different cultural groups, and calls upon the state to support such groups ...” (Miller 2006:326-27).<sup>5</sup> Some scholars argue multicultural incorporation strategies may promote gender inequality among immigrant communities. These scholars suggest that cultural values surrounding gender roles in immigrant communities tend to be less egalitarian than those found in Western liberal democracies. Within the gender and multiculturalism literature, the controversial arguments of Okin (1999:16-17) deserve special attention:

Western cultures, of course, still practice many forms of sex discrimination... But women in more liberal cultures are, at the same time, legally guaranteed many of the same freedoms and opportunities as men. In addition, most families in such cultures, with the exception of some religious fundamentalists, do not communicate to their daughters that they are of less value than boys, that their lives are to be confined to domesticity and service to men and children, and that their sexuality is of value only in marriage, in the service of men, and for reproductive ends. This situation, as we have seen, is quite different from that of women in many of the world’s other cultures, including many of those from which immigrants to Europe and North America come.

And thus, some scholars characterize South/North immigration as akin to “moving into a more liberated or enlightened or emancipated society than the one from which [immigrants] have come” (Carby 1982:217).

Here, critics often cite comparative research, which shows that public opinion regarding gender roles are more egalitarian and women generally hold more equitable management and political positions in Western liberal democracies (Inglehart and Norris 2003; UNDP 2009). Prior research suggests immigrant sexual and gender attitudes lie somewhere in between home and host countries (Norris and Inglehart 2012). According to critics, these differences in average attitudes have enormous implications for cultural types of policies in determining the integration



outcomes for immigrants (Okin 1999). By in large, much of the countervailing arguments against multiculturalism seeks to de-legitimize cultural policy claims, suggesting multicultural immigration policies “insulate” immigrant communities from purportedly more egalitarian gender norms of host countries (Okin 1999).<sup>6</sup> In short, advocates of the trade-off thesis suggest that multiculturalism isolates migrants from allegedly more gender egalitarian cultural norms in host societies, and thereby promotes equality *between* natives and migrants at the expense of inequality between men and women *within* immigrant communities.

The trade-off argument can be readily extended to the relationship between the micro-foundations and the HHDL among immigrant households. First, if multiculturalism insulates immigrant communities from the more gender egalitarian norms of host societies, it should undermine the *symbolic* value that both male and female immigrants place on the new resources that women bring to bear on their negotiations over the HHDL. That is, increases in relative resources should be less likely to increase the bargaining power of immigrant women in negotiations over the HHDL if the valuation of these resources remains overlaid with “less egalitarian” cultural expectations regarding the role of women in the family. Second, if multiculturalism makes traditional gender attitudes “stickier” among immigrant men and women, then immigrant women might self-select into more feminized occupations that bring lower pay, which would in turn undermine the *material* value that women bring to bear on their negotiations over the HHDL. Put differently, increases in women’s employment may have weaker effects on their bargaining power if the jobs they select into are lower paying.

Finally, multiculturalism could undermine the returns to improvements in gender ideology itself. Here, multiculturalism could promote a *decoupling of ideology from practice*, where immigrant women face competing pressures of assimilation to the gender norms of host

societies, as well as preservation of their cultural heritage (Meyer and Rowan 1977).<sup>7</sup> Such pressures could manifest as a gap between public ideology and private practice, insofar as women (and perhaps men) relieve these pressures by professing adherence to host gender norms in public, but continue to engage in gendered behaviors in the privacy of the household (Barajas and Ramírez 2007; Read and Oselin 2008).

[Figure 1 about here]

By way of summary, the trade-off thesis suggests that greater levels of multiculturalism may “mitigate power inequalities between groups [at the expense of] reinforcing power hierarchies within them...[such that] at-risk group members [immigrant women] are being asked to shoulder a disproportionate share of the risks of multiculturalism” (Shachar 2001:4-17). We argue that such a dynamic should be observable in the returns to improvements in the micro-foundations among immigrant women, and illustrate this argument in Figure 1. In Figure 1, multiculturalism weakens the egalitarian effects of micro-level determinants (i.e., relative resource, time availability, and gender ideology) by promoting the symbolic devaluation of women’s resources, selection into feminized occupations, and ideological decoupling. That is, the trade-off thesis predicts that the equalizing effects of relative resources, time availability, and gender ideology produce smaller reductions in women’s share of household labor in more multicultural countries. Consistent with this discussion and with Figure 1, we might expect:

**H<sub>1</sub>:** The effects of micro-level determinants (i.e., relative resources, time availability, and gender ideology) on the household division of labor for immigrant households are *less egalitarian* in countries with a high degree of multiculturalism.

#### *Multiculturalism as a Dual Equality Project*

Others problematize the trade-off thesis between gender and ethno-cultural equality (Levy 2000; Phillips 2005). In doing so, critics argue that it presupposes a zero-sum outcome,

whereby equality on one dimension (i.e., ethno-cultural) *must* exacerbate inequality along another dimension (i.e., gender). Instead, critics conceptualize multiculturalism and gender equality as “dual equality projects” whereby multicultural policies reduce inequality *between* immigrant and native groups, as well as inequality between men and women *within* immigrant communities (Levy 2000; Phillips 2005).

First, anti-multicultural (or assimilationist) immigration policy limits the cultural options of immigrants by establishing the majority’s language and culture as the societal norm, which immigrant groups may find threatening (Foner and Alba 2008). In more extreme examples, such as France’s legal prohibition of facial covering, non-multicultural immigration policy can be perceived as a direct assault on immigrant culture. As immigrants experience greater perceptions of cultural threat in countries without multicultural immigration policies, they may identify more strongly with their culture of origin than they would in the absence of cultural threat (Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2005; Kibria 2008).

Indeed, immigrants may engage in “reactive culturalism,” where “the defense of one’s culture becomes in large part the defense of that culture’s notions about what is appropriate for women to do” (Phillips 2005:114). In tandem, these processes could reinforce a more rigid adherence to, and/or a less egalitarian interpretation of, home culture values, traditions and/or boundaries in order promote “group self-preservation which takes as its goal the maintenance of a separate and distinct ethos” (Shachar 2001:11). Such a dynamic is exemplified within identity politics surrounding Muslim immigrants, which studies show can result in reactionary responses in which host values are conversely portrayed as morally decadent and individualistic (Connor 2010; Massad 2002). Because multiculturalism promotes a positive missive of the value, place, and deservedness of immigrant culture within the host society, it may reduce the prevalence of

reactivism among immigrant groups (Phillips 2005; Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut and Portes 2001).

Second, critics of multiculturalism premise their critique on the idea that it suppresses the transmission of Western ideals of gender egalitarianism from host to immigrant groups, which presupposes that assimilation is a “one-way street” where immigrants assimilate to Western norms but host societies do little to incorporate the cultural values and symbols of immigrant groups (Okin 1999; c.f. Barajas and Ramírez 2007). Instead, advocates of the dual-equality perspective conceptualize immigrant incorporation as a “metaphorical two-way street,” where national culture becomes an amalgam of immigrant and native cultural values (Massey and Sánchez 2010:2). If multiculturalism promotes a two-way cultural exchange between immigrant and native cultures, it could promote a more hospitable context of reception for immigrant communities. Indeed, Wright and Bloemraad (2012) find foreign residents in more multicultural countries tend to report less discrimination than immigrants in less multicultural countries.

In short, advocates of the dual-equality perspective argue that multiculturalism reduces the pressure immigrant communities might otherwise feel to maintain a strong preferential attachment to their cultural identity of origin, or interpret their culture identity in strongly gender-inegalitarian ways. Other scholars add that multiculturalism promotes a two-way process of assimilation, whereby host societies develop a greater appreciation of immigrant culture, which generates a more hospitable context of reception for, and reduces discrimination against, immigrant communities (Kymlicka 2001). Through both processes, multiculturalism may actually promote at least a *selective* diffusion of cultural gender-norms among immigrant communities, whereby immigrant communities simultaneously retain central aspects of their historic cultural identity and selectively embrace Western gender norms.

That is, multiculturalism could actually *increase* the egalitarian effects of the micro foundations through a reverse operation of the same mechanisms outlined under the trade-off thesis above. By reducing perceptions of cultural threat and experiences of discrimination, multiculturalism might lead to a *greater* incorporation of Western egalitarian gender norms and thereby produce hybrid cultural schemas that increase the symbolic value of female labor force participation within immigrant families. Similarly, if multiculturalism promotes a two-way adoption of cultural and gender equality, then immigrant women might be more likely to self-select into higher paying, less feminized occupations, and experience fewer external barriers to entering these occupations. Such a dynamic would increase the *material value* of labor force participation by raising the average wage among immigrant women. By increasing both the symbolic and material value of immigrant female labor force participation, multiculturalism could produce a larger boost to the bargaining power of immigrant women from increases in relative resources and time availability.

Finally, multiculturalism might ameliorate the dual pressure that immigrant women face vis-à-vis the host society and the family by allowing for a greater degree of convergence in gender egalitarianism between the host society and immigrant families. That is, multiculturalism could allow immigrants to simultaneously embrace important symbols of their home culture—dress, ceremony, custom, food, religion, etc.—*and* the gender and cultural norms of host societies. Multiculturalism could thus promote a tighter coupling between gender ideology and the actual practice of family reproduction among immigrant households. This would, in turn, produce a larger reduction in the female share of housework.

[Figure 2 about here]

We illustrate the dual-equality perspective by way of Figure 2. Contrary to Figure 1, multiculturalism strengthens the effects of the micro-foundations, which produces greater reductions in the female share of housework per increase in each. Thus, if multiculturalism both reduces discrimination against immigrant communities and facilitates the incorporation of Western norms of gender egalitarianism among these communities, we might expect

**H<sub>2</sub>:** The effects of micro-level determinants (i.e., relative resources, time availability, and gender ideology) on the household division of labor for immigrant households are *more egalitarian* in countries with a high degree of multiculturalism.

### **Data and Measures**

Cross national quantitative comparisons of the effect of multiculturalism are hampered by the need to control for variation in country and family composition with a limited number of immigrant cases (Koopmans 2013). To expand the number of immigrant cases, we utilize pooled samples from the 1994, 2002, and 2012 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP): Family and Changing Gender Roles. Nevertheless, due to the relatively small sample of immigrant households (roughly 8% of the total sample), we combine cases from native born households and employ immigrant interaction terms to reduce type II errors. ISSP data represents the most comprehensive data concerning the HHDL. This study is restricted to respondents who are married and at least 18 years old, with only one respondent for each household.<sup>8</sup> After list-wise deletion, 8,987 observations remain spanning 20 country years. Countries included: Australia (1994-2012), Canada (1994; 2012), Denmark (2012), France (2012), Germany (2012), Great Britain (1994-2012), Ireland (2012), New Zealand (1994; 2002), Norway (2012), Sweden (1994), Switzerland (2012), and the United States (1994-2012).<sup>9</sup>

*Dependent variable*

Previous work measures the HHDL in various ways, including time diaries and retrospective surveys employing both continuous estimates of the absolute number of hours worked by men and women and ordinal estimates of the relative amount of work done by men and women (Bianchi et al 2000; LaChance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010). Our dependent variable takes the latter approach.<sup>10</sup> It is a composite measure of four routine household tasks more likely to be performed by women: laundry, shopping for groceries, caring for sick family members, and deciding what to have for dinner. One respondent from each household was asked “who usually does these tasks on a scale of 1 to 5.” Higher values indicate these tasks are done by the wife while lower values indicate that the tasks are done by the husband. The values are recoded to range from 0 to 4 for greater interpretability, and the four responses are then combined and equally weighted to create a measure that varies from 0 to 4 in increments of .25. A score of four on the measure would indicate the wife always performs all four tasks, a score of zero indicates the husband always performs all four tasks, and a score of two would indicate an equal division. The relatively large number of increments in the scale (17) allows us to treat the ordinal dependent variable as continuous.

### *Independent variables*

*Relative resources* is measured as relative income on an ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 4. Scores of 0 indicate a husband earns much more than his spouse while scores of 4 indicate that a wife earns much more than her spouse. Unfortunately, ISSP 1994 does not have a measure for work hours as a measure of *time availability*. Thus, we include a dichotomous variable of wives' employment status as a proxy for time availability (see Fuwa 2004). Values of 1 indicate the wife is working full or part-time, and values of 0 indicate unemployed (reference group). *Gender*

*ideology* is a composite measure consisting of responses to four survey questions regarding gender roles. Respondents are asked to respond to the following statements:

- (1) A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children.
- (2) Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.
- (3) A man's job is to earn money; a women's job is to look after the home and the family.
- (4) All in all, family life suffers when a woman has a full-time job.

The responses are measured on a five-point scale ranging from (0) strongly agree to (4) strongly disagree. The four responses are then summed and equally weighted to create a composite measure and higher values reflect more egalitarian gender ideology.

#### *Socio-demographic individual level controls*

We include well-established controls from prior studies on the HHDL. These include gender, husbands' gender ideology, husbands' employment, presence of children, age, age-squared, educational attainment, period effects, and immigrant channels. Studies find women tend to underreport their contributions to the HHDL (Kamo 2000), and that husbands' gender ideology can also influence how housework is divided (Shelton and John 1996).<sup>11</sup> We include *gender* (male=1) and the interaction with gender ideology as controls. We also control for husbands' full-time employment and the presence of children (*child*=1), which often increases the amount housework needed (Bergen 1991; Berk 1985; Sanchez and Thompson 1997; South and Spitze 1994).<sup>12</sup> Prior studies have shown gender differences in housework increase with age, but the effect is nonlinear (Batalova and Cohen 2002; Fuwa 2004; South and Spitze 1994). We include *age* (centered) and *age squared* in the model as additional controls.



We also control for educational attainment because it is positively associated with egalitarianism in the HHDL (Batalova and Cohen 2002; Fuwa 2004). Detailed data on educational attainment is not available across all countries across survey years, so we include the variable *some college* where values of 1 indicate a respondent has some four-year college experience. Although the HHDL has become more egalitarian, Hook (2010) finds the decline has leveled off in recent years. Thus, we include fixed effects for survey year (2002, 2012; 1994 is the omitted category) to control for differences over time.

Finally, we control for important differences between immigrants owing to distinctive immigrant channels (i.e. Mexicans to the U.S., Chinese to Canada, Moroccan's to France, etc.). We incorporate a full set of unique "home-host dyads," and create dummy variables for each. In total, there were 60 unique sending/receiving country pairs in our sample. Including dyadic pairs controls for any unobserved, time-invariant differences among immigrant groups, host countries, and relationships between sending and receiving nations (Koopmans 2013). Time-invariant differences may include differences in origin country religion (i.e., more Muslim immigrants in European countries) or the educational attainment of immigrant groups (typically higher in Anglo-settler countries), which may select particular kinds of immigrants (either more egalitarian or inegalitarian than average) into particular countries, leading to omitted variable bias (Koopmans 2013). Individual level descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.

[Table 1 about here]

*Country level variable: Multicultural Policy Index*

We utilize the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI 1980-2010) as a measure of multiculturalism. The MPI measure accounts for changes in eight policy classifications within a

country over time. Those policy specifications include: 1) Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism, at the central and/or regional and municipal levels; 2) the adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum; 3) the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing; 4) exemptions from dress codes, Sunday closing legislation, etc. (either by statute or by court cases); 5) allowing dual citizenship; 6) the funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities; 7) the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction; and lastly, 8) affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups (Banting et al. 2006:57).<sup>13</sup> The measure is used in several notable studies (Kwon and Curran 2016; Wright and Bloemraad 2012).

#### *Country level control variables*

There are a number of national factors that may influence the HHDL. These include: female labor force participation (Blumberg and Coleman 1989), industrialization (Knudsen and Wærness 2008), gender empowerment (Fuwa 2004), and immigration (Min 1997). Female labor force participation was measured as the percentage female employment of the total labor force, while *industrialization* was measured as the log of GDP per capita (World Development Indicators 2014). Gender empowerment was measured by the gender empowerment measure (GEM) developed by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2009).<sup>14</sup> Finally, prior research suggests cultural values and norms may be more difficult to challenge or subject to change in cases where there are large numbers of co-ethnics (Min 1997). Thus, we controlled for immigrant stock within the host country, measured as the percentage of foreign born residents to the total population (World Development Indicators 2014).

## Methods

Prior studies often utilize hierarchical linear models (HLMs) for nested data (e.g. Crepaz 2006; Sumino 2014). In our case, the HLM approach is problematic due to the small number of level 2 observations (country-years), which can lead to overconfident standard errors involving level 2 covariates (Bryan and Jenkins 2015). The problem is exacerbated when cross-level interactions are included (Bryan and Jenkins 2015). To obviate these methodological concerns, we utilize two-way fixed effects estimators (FE), which also requires a less restrictive set of assumptions about the correlation between unobserved processes and independent variables (Wooldridge 2002).<sup>15</sup>

Moreover, countries likely exhibit a host of salient stable differences, which may be correlated with our independent variables (see Koopmans 2013 for a review). Two-way FE estimators control for all unobserved country (e.g. culture or history) and year invariant processes (e.g. world-economic shocks) (Brady and Finnigan 2014). Finally, we implement a variance-covariance matrix that yields standard errors robust to both arbitrary correlations within countries, and heteroskedasticity (Cameron and Miller 2015). Consistent with prior studies, we clustered standard errors on the highest level of aggregation—countries (Cameron and Miller 2015).

To test our central hypotheses, we include three-way interactions between each micro-level determinants, immigrant status, and multiculturalism, along with all constituent terms (micro-level determinant, immigrant status, multiculturalism, micro-level determinant X multiculturalism, immigrant status X multiculturalism, and micro-level determinant X immigrant status). Because higher values on the HHDL variable corresponded to a more unequal HHDL (i.e., women are more likely to do routine tasks), positive and significant coefficients on the

three-way interactions would provide evidence that greater levels of multiculturalism *weaken* the egalitarian returns of micro-level determinants on the HHDL for immigrant households, as suggested by the trade-off thesis. Conversely, a significant negative coefficient would suggest that multiculturalism *strengthens* the egalitarian returns of the micro-determinants on HHDL among immigrant households, as suggested by the dual equality projects. The analysis is carried out with *STATA 13* (StataCorp 2013).

## Results

[Table 2 about here]

Table 2 displays the correlations between the HHDL and micro-level determinants across among immigrant households at high ( $MPI \geq 5$ ) and low ( $MPI < 5$ ) levels of multiculturalism. In all three cases, there is a stronger negative association between the micro determinant and the HHDL countries with “high” multiculturalism, though the difference is less extreme in the case of relative resources. The stronger negative associations imply that improvements in the micro-process produce greater reductions in household labor among immigrant women in multicultural countries. Thus, these correlations suggest a degree of skepticism regarding the trade-off perspective, insofar as one would expect a stronger, or more positive, association in countries with high levels of multiculturalism. Do these results hold in more conservative models of the HHDL?

[Table 3 about here]

Table 3 reports the results of our main analysis. In models 1, 2, and 3, we examine the degree to which the effects of the micro-foundations among immigrant households vary across levels of multiculturalism when controlling for individual factors, as well as fixed country and

period effects. The baseline individual-level controls behave in a manner consistent with the literature and remain substantively consistent across models (Batalova and Cohen 2002; Fuwa 2004; Hook 2010). We therefore focus our discussion on the effects of the micro-determinants among immigrant households, and how this effect varies by multiculturalism. We estimate separate models for each micro-foundation because combining the three-way interactions in a single model would require a large number of constituent terms and tacit interactions that would over-saturate the model.<sup>16</sup>

To adjudicate between contending claims, model 1 includes a three-way interaction between immigrant status, relative income, and multiculturalism. Requisite constituent terms are reported at the bottom of the table. Coefficients are net of the effects of the other two micro-level determinants (time availability and gender ideology), individual level covariates, and all country and time invariant processes, including those correlated with multiculturalism. The cross-level interaction with multiculturalism is negative and significant ( $\beta = -0.018$ ;  $p < .05$ ), suggesting immigrant families receive a *more equalizing* effect of relative resources in countries with higher levels of multiculturalism.

In model 2, we examine the effect of time availability among immigrant households. The results are similar to the findings for relative resources in that the three-way interaction involving employment ( $\beta = -0.075$ ,  $p < .01$ ) is negative and significant (column two, row four). In model 3, we include the three-way interaction involving gender ideology (column three, row six). Once again, we find a negative and significant interaction ( $\beta = -0.046$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The equalizing effect of gender ideology among immigrant households appears to be greater in more multicultural countries. To assess whether the findings are robust to alternative country-level explanations of the HHDL, we include the full set of country-level controls—GEM, female labor force

participation, GDP per capita, and immigrant stock—to our original baseline model in models 4-6.<sup>17</sup> Introducing these country-level controls to our two-way FEs framework controls for time-varying country-level processes that may be correlated with multiculturalism and affect the HHDL. For ease of presentation, we suppress the coefficients on the level-2 controls. The additional country-level controls slightly improve the fit of these models, and the coefficients for the three-way interaction attenuate vis-à-vis models 1-3, but remain negative and significant.

Finally, models 7-9 introduce controls for important differences between immigrant households owing to distinctive immigrant channels. Such differences may include the higher prevalence of immigrants from Muslim countries in Europe, greater educational attainment of immigrants in Anglo-settler countries, etc. (Koopmans 2013). These and other differences may select particular kinds of immigrants (either more or less egalitarian) into particular countries, which could bias our estimates of the moderating effect of multiculturalism. For ease of presentation, we make these coefficients available upon request. Consistent with arguments about the importance of immigrant channels, these dyads improve the overall fit of the model (Röder and Mühlau 2014). Nevertheless, the three-way interactions remain negative and significant, and even increase in size after removing the effects of these and any unobserved time-invariant processes associated with immigrant channels.

[Figure 3-5 about here]

To better understand the substance of these results, Figures 3-5 display the marginal effects of each micro-foundation among immigrant households as they vary across levels of multiculturalism (0-8), along with 95% confidence intervals. These marginal effects are estimated with models 7-9 of Table 3. In each figure, the Y axis is the predicted effect of the focal micro-foundation and the X axis is the level of multiculturalism. Figure 3 suggests that

relative resources has no effect on the HHDL among immigrant households in countries with multiculturalism scores less than ~3.5, but reduces the share of housework for immigrant women in countries with greater multiculturalism scores. In the sample of countries, 55% have multiculturalism scores above 3.5, including Australia (1994-2012), Great Britain (1994-2012), Sweden (1994), New Zealand (1994-2002), Canada (1994 and 2012), and Norway (2012).

The marginal effects plotted in Figure 4 suggest that increases in women's employment reduce their share of household labor in countries with multiculturalism scores equal to ~4 on the index.<sup>18</sup> Roughly 50% of the countries we observe fall within this range, including all of the countries listed above except Norway. Finally, the marginal effects of gender ideology in Figure 5 suggest that more gender egalitarian ideologies reduce the share of housework for immigrant women in countries with multiculturalism scores ~3. A full 60% of the sample falls within this range of significance. Both Ireland (2012) and the U.S. (1994-2012) join the list of countries in which this particular micro-foundation reduces the share of housework done by women in immigrant households.<sup>19</sup>

The findings reported in Table 3 and graphed in Figures 3-5 are consistent with hypothesis 2 and the dual equality perspective. Immigrant women experience a greater reduction in their share of household labor per increase in each micro-foundation, on average, in countries with more multiculturalist policies. These results are robust to additional country-level factors for the HHDL, as well as all time-invariant processes associated with links between particular home-host countries. In what follows, we assess the degree to which these results are robust to alternative measures of multiculturalism, as studies have shown results may vary based on the selection of policy indices (Goodman 2015).

### *Alternative Measure of Multiculturalism*

[Table 4 about here]

We utilize an alternative measure of multiculturalism provided by the Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) (Koopmans 2013). The ICRI measure includes 23 indicators on a five-point scale ranging from -1 to 1, where higher values indicate more multicultural immigration policy (Koopmans and Michalowski 2015). The ICRI measure differs from the MPI index in that it emphasizes religious group rights and includes indicators reflecting the absence of assimilatory policies, in addition to proactive multicultural policies (see Koopmans 2013 for a review). The ICRI measure of multiculturalism yields a smaller number of households and country-years (5,158 and 12, respectively), and thus is a cross-sectional analysis. Because of this loss in statistical power and our prior results which lead us to expect negative three-way interactions, we utilize one-tailed hypothesis tests. The resulting cross-sectional dataset obviates the survey year fixed effects, but we include all of the individual and country-level controls from Table 3, as well as the dyadic pairs. While the ICRI measure is perfectly collinear with the fixed effects and thus drops from the equation, the three and two-way interactions are estimable because both immigrant status and the micro foundations vary within countries (Allison 2009).

The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4. For ease of presentation, we report only the two and three-way interaction terms, and make the full set of results available upon request. The results in Table 4 are substantively identical to those in Table 3. The three-way interactions remain negative and significant, albeit women's employment is now only marginally significant. Thus, the results from Table 4 suggest that the gender-equality enhancing effect of multiculturalism observed in Table 3 is robust to alternative measures of multiculturalism.



### *Symbolic or Material Mechanisms?*

Scholars argue studies should better identify the types of policies that drive observed associations between multiculturalism and social outcomes (Sumino 2014). In particular, multicultural immigration policies vary by the degree to which they are primarily symbolic or material in their prescriptions for host societies. Some policies, such as the parliamentary statements regarding the value of multiculturalism or the relaxing of dress codes for religious minorities, are purely symbolic in nature. They convey that immigrant cultures hold value in the host society, as well as promote an ontological equality between host and immigrant culture. Other multiculturalist policies include explicit financial commitments from the state, and thus include both a symbolic and material component. Moreover, states do vary in their preferences for materialistic or symbolic forms of multiculturalism, where some implement materialistic policies (i.e. Norway), others implement primarily symbolic policies (i.e. New Zealand), and still others employ both (i.e. Canada and Australia). Thus, a natural question to ask is to what extent are the moderating effects of multicultural policies driven by their symbolic or material indicators?

To answer this question, we disaggregate the MPI index into “symbolic” and “material” policies. Policies with a primarily symbolic emphasis include indicators 1-5 while indicators 6-8 are have a primarily materialistic emphasis.<sup>20</sup> We then replicate the analyses in models 7-9 of Table 3 after replacing the aggregate multiculturalism index with the material and symbolic subcomponents.

[Table 5 here]

The results are reported in Table 5. Column 1 reports the results of three models including the three-way interaction between each micro-foundation and the materialistic set of policies, while column 2 reports the results for the interactions involving the symbolic policies. Each model includes the full battery of controls in models 7-9 of Table 3, but we omit them from the table for ease of presentation (available upon request). Interestingly, only the interaction terms including symbolic indicators of multiculturalism are significantly different from zero, though those involving material forms of multiculturalism are just shy of significance at conventional levels.

[Figure 6 about here]

Indeed, material commitments from the state do seem to matter. Figure 6 graphs the marginal effects of each micro-foundation as they vary across aggregate, material, and symbolic operationalizations of multiculturalism. The marginal effects of relative resources and time availability increase more steeply across the symbolic measure of multiculturalism than the material measure, but the effect of gender ideology increases more steeply with material than symbolic multicultural policies. Moreover, the marginal effects increase most steeply across the aggregate measure of multiculturalism. Together, these results suggest that cultural commitments to immigrant communities on the part of host societies can be particularly beneficial to immigrant women, but that material policies also play a significant role. But clearly, the *combination of material and symbolic commitments to multiculturalism produce the biggest benefits to immigrant women.*

#### *Sample Composition and Influential Cases*

[Table 6 about here]

Finally, we address the degree to which our results are robust to the composition of our level 2 sample. In particular, the limited number of level two observations (20) raises the possibility that our results are unduly affected by a particular country or country-year. That is, the coefficients on our interaction terms might suffer from biases owing to high leverage of a particular case. To address this, we first re-estimated models 7-9 after removing one country from the analyses one at a time. The results are substantively consistent (available upon request). Then, we conducted hypothesis tests with jackknife resampling on the country-year (20). Here, we re-estimated models 7-9 in Table 3 on all possible unique level-2 samples, leaving N-1 country-years in the sample. The coefficients from these jackknife samples produce a distribution to which we can compare our observed coefficients.<sup>21</sup> Hypothesis tests based on jackknife coefficients and standard errors are reported next to the parametric coefficients and standard errors in Models 1-3 of Table 6. Each three-way interaction remains significant at conventional levels using Jackknife tests statistics, and the jackknife coefficients are very close to the parametric statistics reported in Table 3.

### *Substantive Significance*

[Figure 7 about here]

How substantively important are these varying effects for the actual share of housework among immigrant women? To answer this question, Figure 7 reports the maximum change in the distribution of housework among immigrant women in countries with low (MPI = 0), medium (MPI = 4), and high (MPI = 8) levels of multiculturalism. The maximum change is that which would occur with a transition from the lowest to the highest observed level of each micro-foundation. To contextualize these multiculturalism scores, Denmark is the only country with an

MPI score equal to zero, Sweden (1994) and Great Britain (1994) have MPI scores equal to 4, and only Australia (2002; 2012) has an MPI score equal to 8. Surprisingly, immigrant women living in countries like Denmark do *more* housework when they experience the maximum possible improvement in relative resources and time availability, and a negligible reduction (- .008) in housework with the maximum egalitarian change in gender ideology. The increases are non-trivial, as they correspond to 21 and 17 percent of one standard deviation (.813) in the HHDL, respectively. This is consistent with arguments linking heightened perceptions of cultural threat and consequent “cultural reactivism” to the absence of multiculturalism (Phillips 2005:114).

In countries with even moderate levels of multiculturalism like Great Britain and Sweden, immigrant women experience significant reductions in their share of household labor with a maximum improvement in each micro-foundation. Immigrant women who experience the maximum increase in their relative resources, employment, and in the gender ideological-egalitarianism experience reductions in their share of housework equal to 22, 14, and 76 percent of one standard deviation, respectively. At the opposite extreme, immigrant women living in countries like Australia experience substantial reductions in their share of housework with maximum improvements in the micro-foundations, equal to 54, 37, and 122 percent of one standard deviation, respectively. Not only does multiculturalism matter for the effect of the micro-foundations on the share of housework done by immigrant women, but it can produce fairly dramatic reductions in the amount of housework immigrant women endure.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

The extent to which multicultural immigration policies promote or impede gender equality has been controversial, but few have examined this question empirically. This paper takes a first step toward addressing this empirical gap. First, we articulate individual level mechanisms by which multiculturalism can promote or impede gender equality by impacting the effect of relative resources, time availability, and gender ideology on the share of housework done by women in immigrant households. Second, we empirically evaluate two divergent positions on the relationship between multiculturalism and gender inequality in immigrant communities by analyzing three highly cited micro-level determinants of the HHDL (relative resources, time availability, and gender ideology) among immigrant households in 12 highly industrialized countries that vary in the extent of multicultural immigration policy. Several tentative conclusions emerge from our analysis.

First, our findings suggest that immigrant women may experience greater reductions in household labor with improvements in the micro-foundations in highly multicultural countries than in less multicultural countries. The results are robust to alternative explanations associated with gender empowerment, particular immigrant channels, female labor force participation, the size of the immigrant population, as well as different measures of multiculturalism (Table 3 and 4). These findings are uniformly consistent with the dual equality project perspective.

Moreover, the magnitude of this moderating effect appears rather substantial. Not only are the egalitarian effects of each micro-foundation among immigrant women orders of magnitude larger in more multicultural countries like Australia than they are in countries like Denmark (see Figures 3-5), but these effects translate into substantial reductions in the household division of labor for immigrant women with rising incomes, greater employment, and more egalitarian gender ideologies (Figure 7). Because advocates of multiculturalism as a dual

equality project also suggest that multicultural immigration policies are likely to increase the *levels* (as opposed to just the effects) of the micro-foundations for immigrant women, we may be under-estimating the value of multiculturalism for the equality of immigrant women, at least with respect to the HHDL.<sup>22</sup>

Second, our findings suggest that both the symbolic and materialistic component of multiculturalism may play a particularly important role in actuating the macro-social mechanisms by which these policies boost the distributional effects of the micro-foundations. Nevertheless, while the three-way interactions involving the materialistic components fell just short of significance at conventional thresholds, they also appear to play an important role. This is evinced most clearly by the fact that the aggregate measure of multiculturalism produces the largest increase in the distributional effects of the micro-foundations. Indeed, robust multicultural regimes that incorporate both symbolic and material support for immigrant communities appear to produce the largest gains per unit increase in the micro-foundations for immigrant women.

Our argument specifies individual level mechanisms by which multiculturalism changes the attitudes and behaviors of both immigrants and natives to generate the more egalitarian effects of the micro-foundations in multicultural countries. However, it is possible that our findings could also be driven by an alternative process where more gender egalitarian immigrants select multicultural countries as destinations. While it is impossible to rule this out with available data, we suggest much concern over these selection effects is probably misplaced. First, such a selection process pre-supposes a high degree of agency among immigrant communities in terms of their ability to shop around for immigrant destinations. The ability of immigrants to choose where they immigrate to is limited by a myriad of factors include familial

income, geography, immigrant policy in the destination country, pre-existing immigrant communities, etc. (Geddes 2003). These country level factors are controlled to some extent in our models with the country and immigrant channel fixed effects.

Second, it is not obvious to us that multicultural countries would be more attractive destinations to gender egalitarian immigrants than they would be to gender *inegalitarian* immigrants. Indeed, one would expect that if preferences for multicultural destinations play an enticing role, multicultural countries would be more attractive destinations for *all* immigrants (see Ng and Metz 2015). Put differently, we would expect that increases in multiculturalism would produce increases in immigration. However, we do not observe any significant association between multiculturalism and immigrant stock or flow once unit roots have been reduced or removed (see Figures A1 and A2). Thus, while future work would do well to examine the degree to which multiculturalism selects more gender egalitarian immigrants, the theoretical and empirical basis of this concern is in doubt.

Finally, future work can address some of the limitations of this article. For example, it may address the extent to which multiculturalist policies facilitate the adoption of other attitudes toward gender and/or sexuality within immigrant communities, given the prominence of gay rights within the controversies and disagreements over the negative externalities of multicultural policies (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Koopsman 2013; Levy 2005; Okin 1999; Rahman 2014). Normative arguments suggest Western liberal democracies have not only more egalitarian gender norms but also stronger traditions of tolerance of different sexual orientations relative to incoming immigrants (Puar 2007). If multiculturalism can help to nurture more egalitarian gender norms among immigrant communities, it may have the same impact on norms regarding sexual orientation and thereby improve the lives of LGBT members of immigrant communities.

Similarly, future research should consider the role of multiculturalism as a moderator of the integration processes for immigrant communities more generally (see Wright and Bloemraad 2012). Because discrimination theories predict that prejudices and other forms of institutional discrimination impact the economic fortunes of immigrants, the “trade-off” and “dual-equality” project perspectives yield contrasting predictions regarding the way in which multiculturalism may impact upward mobility among immigrants, particularly intergenerationally (Barajas and Ramírez 2007). Thus, future work might consider the degree to which individual predictors of incorporation—national origin, education, social capital, network embeddedness, etc. (Killian 2006; Parreñas 2001)—have more beneficial effects in multicultural countries.

And finally, future work might examine the degree to which variation in multicultural policies *within* countries matters for processes of immigrant incorporation. For example, there was a high level of geographic variation in voting patterns in the last U.S. presidential election, where Southern and mid-Western voters were more comfortable voting for an explicitly xenophobic and sexist candidate than those in other regions. One possible explanation for this is that highly populated states on the coasts (California and Washington) have experienced greater exposure to the aforementioned “two-way” cultural exchange that multiculturalism affords. Indeed, the Western and North-Eastern parts of the United States tend to implement more multicultural types of policies than those geographic regions that voted for Trump (Hero and Preuhs 2006).

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> By South/North migration, we refer to migration between developing countries in the global South to highly developed countries in the global North.

<sup>2</sup> Norway offers migrants a lesson in how to treat women. *New York Times*, December 19, 2015.



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<sup>3</sup> The impact of relative resources and time availability on the HHDL can be controversial (see Bianchi et al. 2000; Hochschild and Machung 1989). However, meta-analyses across quantitative studies find the coefficients of micro-level determinants remain largely consistent (Davis and Wills 2014).

<sup>4</sup> While the HHDL does not capture every dimension of gender inequality, it has been shown to be consequential for inequalities between women and men even in arenas outside the home (Cohen 2004; Cohen and Huffman 2003; Ridgeway 2011).

<sup>5</sup> Prior studies highlight the critical importance of other state policies including child care services and gender affirmative action in shaping egalitarian outcomes in the HHDL (e.g. Fuwa and Cohen 2007).

<sup>6</sup> These arguments are consistent with our own data, which shows that immigrants hold less gender-egalitarian ideologies than natives (on average), even when controlling for a host of socio-demographic and country variables (available upon request). Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that Western societies are far from perfectly gender egalitarian (e.g. Coltrane 1997; Kimmel 2000; Schafer, Caetano, and Clark 1998). Moreover, the roots for North-South differences in gender egalitarianism are tied to variation in economic development, of which unequal global power relations between the North and South are a key explanation (Mahutga and Smith 2011).

<sup>7</sup> Decoupling—i.e. gaps between formal policy and actual practice—is most often theorized at the organizational level. However, parallel processes of “identity decoupling” have been observed at the individual level (DeJordy 2008). Dasgupta (1998) finds similar results of “judicious biculturalism” among Asian-Indians in the United States whereby immigrants actively adjust and negotiate their behaviors and identities across ethnic and native spaces.

<sup>8</sup> It could be possible respondents live on their own instead of with their partners, which would necessarily lead to scores of either 0 or 4. However, the majority of cases are a mix of tasks done by the husband and wife. We observe 6.69% of cases where husbands of immigrant respondents do all the tasks (i.e. scores of 4). Only 0.56% of households with immigrant respondents report a division of labor where the wife completes all tasks (i.e. scores of 0). Removal of these cases does not substantively alter the results.

<sup>9</sup> Although several countries participate in all relevant waves, only countries with immigrant respondents were included.

<sup>10</sup> Time diaries undoubtedly provide more accurate estimates of total hours worked on different types of tasks than retrospective surveys, but we are unaware of any cross-nationally comparative datasets employing them that approach the coverage of the ISSP. Some suggest that retrospective survey questions asking how many hours of housework husbands/wives perform give more detailed estimates of the relative amount of household done by husbands and wives (LaChance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010). The ISSP data includes retrospective accounts of the absolute amount of work done by each partner in waves 2002 and 2012, but not in 1994. Because our question requires maximal observations of multiculturalism (country-years) and immigrants, we utilize relative over absolute measures of the HHDL—the 1994 data accounts for roughly a third of our sample.

<sup>11</sup> Previous work suggests that the division of household labor may be more equal in households in which the husband is native (Blau, Kahn, and Papps 2011). Unfortunately, the ISSP only captures the immigrant status of the respondent, which is based on reported national origin.

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However, this interaction likely captures the primary mechanism linking egalitarian divisions of labor to the native status of husbands (gender ideology).

<sup>12</sup> Although the age and number of children would be the ideal measure to include in the model, prior surveys from ISSP 1994 do not directly ask the respondents for the number of children. Rather, respondents are asked “Did you work outside the home when a child was under school age?” Available responses included “yes (worked full-time),” “yes (worked part-time),” “no (stayed at home),” or “does not apply.” We coded any of the first responses as 1, (have children) and the last response as 0 (no children).

<sup>13</sup> On average, countries within our pooled sample scored 4.33 on the multicultural scale. The measure can be accessed at <http://www.queensu.ca/mcp>. This measure necessarily averages across regions *within* countries that may vary greatly in their degree of gender egalitarianism, which should attenuate any moderating effects of multiculturalism we observe.

<sup>14</sup> Values ranged from 0 to 100 and higher scores on the GEM index indicate greater gender empowerment. The index score of GEM is based on the average score across four equivalent percentage indices: 1) the male and female percentage share of parliamentary seats; 2) the male and female shares of positions as legislators, senior officials, and managers; 3) the male and female shares of professional and technical positions; and 4) women and men’s estimated earned income, to capture multiple dimensions of socio-political power.

<sup>15</sup> Results are substantively identical using HLM estimators, which leverage between country variation.

<sup>16</sup> For example, estimating a model including interactions between multiculturalism and all the three micro-level determinants simultaneously would necessitate controlling for all 8 of the constituent terms in Table 3, as well as the following “tacit” interactions: Relative resources × gender ideology, relative resources × time availability, gender ideology × time availability, relative resources × gender ideology × time availability, relative resources × gender ideology × time availability × multiculturalism (Braumoeller 2004).

<sup>17</sup> Models replacing immigrant stock with immigrant flow (measured as net migration as a percent of the total population) produced similar results and are available in Table 1A (models 1-3) in the appendix.

<sup>18</sup> Measuring time availability as full time employment and part-time employment (reference group: unemployed) produce substantively similar results which can be found in the Table 1A of the appendix (models 4-6).

<sup>19</sup> One anonymous reviewer wondered if multiculturalism promotes gender egalitarianism among natives. In the sample of natives for which complete data is available, we observe a positive but non-significant partial association between multiculturalism and gender-egalitarian ideology. We also observe non-significant effects of multiculturalism on the slope of the micro-foundations. Multiculturalism appears to play a more important role in the gender performance of immigrant households than those of natives.

<sup>20</sup> To be sure, the distinction between “material” and “symbolic” is not entirely crisp, since many policies that provide explicit material support (e.g. funding) are in and of themselves symbolic. Nevertheless, policies 6-8 involve explicit financial commitments of the state, while the others do not.

<sup>21</sup> The Jackknife point estimate is simply the mean of the coefficients estimated across each Jackknife sample. Jackknife standard errors are equal to  $\left\{ \frac{k-1}{k} \sum (\hat{\theta}_i - \bar{\theta})^2 \right\}^{1/2}$ , where  $\theta$  is the coefficient calculated with the  $i$ th jackknife sample, and  $k$  is the number of jackknife samples.

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## Tables

**Table 1: Individual and Country-level Descriptive Statistics**

Variable	Means	SD	Min	Max
<b>Individual-Level Variables</b>				
Division of housework	2.63	0.81	0	4
Relative Income	1.09	1.12	0	4
Time availability	0.65	0.48	0	1
Gender ideology	2.29	0.84	0	4
Male	0.47	0.50	0	1
Presence of Child	0.66	0.47	0	1
Age	49.21	13.58	18	93
Some College	0.40	0.48	0	1
Husband Employed Full-time	0.69	0.46	0	1
Immigrant	0.08	0.27	0	1
<b>Country-Level Variables</b>				
Multiculturalism	4.32	2.19	0	8
GEM	78.53	10.58	46	100
Log GDP per capita	4.56	0.12	4.32	4.82
Female Labor Force Participation	50.62	6.92	42.28	62
Immigrant Stock	14.78	5.17	7.07	22.52
Total L2 N	20			
Total L1 N	8,987			

*Note.* Descriptive statistics for dyadic pairs are omitted to ease presentation (available upon request). Descriptive statistics are weighted

**Table 2:** Correlations between Country-level Household Division of Labor (HHDL) with Relative Resources, Time Availability and Gender Ideology for Immigrant Households across Low and High Levels of Multiculturalism.

	Low Multiculturalism	High Multiculturalism
Relative Resources	-0.145 (-1.850)	-0.155** (-3.040)
Time Availability	-0.082 (-1.390)	-0.179** (-3.050)
Gender Ideology	-0.064 (-1.100)	-0.210*** (-4.160)

*Note.* Low Multiculturalism (<5); High Multiculturalism (>=5); \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$  (Two-tailed tests).



**Table 3:** Fixed Effects Coefficients for Three-way Interactions, Constituent and Individual Level Variables of the Household Division of Labor in 12 Highly Industrialized Countries.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<b>Level 1 and Cross-Level Interactions</b>									
Immigrant*Relative Resources	0.086 (2.073)			0.086 (2.151)			0.137* (2.896)		
Immigrant*Relative Resources*Multiculturalism	-0.018* (-2.614)			-0.018* (-2.849)			-0.029** (-3.656)		
Immigrant*Employed		0.267* (2.887)			0.255* (2.754)			0.321* (2.413)	
Immigrant*Employed*Multiculturalism		-0.075** (-4.324)			-0.073** (-4.124)			-0.084** (-3.705)	
Immigrant*Gender ideology			0.132 (2.183)			0.124 (2.007)			0.143 (2.170)
Immigrant*Gender ideology*Multiculturalism			-0.046*** (-5.118)			-0.044*** (-4.709)			-0.049*** (-4.715)
<b>Base effects</b>									
Relative Resources	-0.094*** (-6.875)	-0.065*** (-6.557)	-0.065*** (-6.649)	-0.094*** (-6.633)	-0.065*** (-6.756)	-0.0653*** (-6.852)	-0.0941*** (-6.300)	-0.0652*** (-6.399)	-0.0650*** (-6.456)
Employed	-0.098*** (-5.251)	-0.187** (-3.683)	-0.099*** (-5.173)	-0.101*** (-4.881)	-0.184** (-3.053)	-0.102*** (-5.183)	-0.101*** (-4.815)	-0.185** (-3.058)	-0.102*** (-5.085)
Gender Ideology	-0.106*** (-5.693)	-0.105*** (-5.696)	-0.145*** (-5.109)	-0.105*** (-5.560)	-0.104*** (-5.554)	-0.145*** (-4.994)	-0.106*** (-5.438)	-0.106*** (-5.407)	-0.145*** (-4.875)
<b>Level 2</b>									
Multiculturalism	-0.181*** (-20.420)	-0.177*** (-25.030)	-0.195*** (-29.270)	-0.235*** (-6.083)	-0.228*** (-5.535)	-0.247*** (-6.680)	-0.336** (-3.908)	-0.329** (-3.566)	-0.348** (-3.992)
<b>Level 1 Controls</b>									
Male	-0.903*** (-5.248)	-0.897*** (-5.241)	-0.903*** (-5.263)	-0.902*** (-5.194)	-0.897*** (-5.187)	-0.903*** (-5.205)	-0.911*** (-5.144)	-0.907*** (-5.132)	-0.912*** (-5.153)
Male*Gender Ideology	0.097* (2.700)	0.094* (2.622)	0.097* (2.690)	0.096* (2.663)	0.094* (2.589)	0.097* (2.651)	0.100* (2.644)	0.097* (2.568)	0.100* (2.630)
Presence of Child	0.070 (2.166)	0.076* (2.351)	0.074* (2.289)	0.072* (2.254)	0.078* (2.419)	0.076* (2.378)	0.071* (2.219)	0.077* (2.379)	0.075* (2.373)
Age (Centered)	0.005*** (6.109)	0.005*** (6.468)	0.005*** (6.433)	0.005*** (6.035)	0.005*** (6.472)	0.005*** (6.399)	0.005*** (5.968)	0.005*** (6.293)	0.005*** (6.248)
Age Squared	-0.000** (-3.363)	-0.000** (-3.411)	-0.000** (-3.282)	-0.000** (-3.560)	-0.000** (-3.584)	-0.000** (-3.471)	-0.000** (-3.539)	-0.000** (-3.563)	-0.000** (-3.413)

**Table 3: Continued**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Some College	-0.053** (-3.361)	-0.051** (-3.133)	-0.054** (-3.506)	-0.055** (-3.326)	-0.053** (-3.113)	-0.055** (-3.471)	-0.053** (-3.392)	-0.051** (-3.138)	-0.054** (-3.489)
Husband Employed Fulltime	0.104** (3.532)	0.099** (3.643)	0.104** (3.599)	0.102** (3.326)	0.098** (3.436)	0.102** (3.409)	0.105** (3.119)	0.101** (3.216)	0.104** (3.185)
<b>Constituent Terms</b>									
Immigrant	-0.352*** (-5.281)	-0.436*** (-6.185)	-0.539*** (-4.903)	-0.323*** (-4.810)	-0.403*** (-5.484)	-0.495** (-3.957)	-0.639* (-2.249)	-0.688* (-2.345)	-0.760* (-2.628)
Immigrant*Multiculturalism	0.059** (4.415)	0.089*** (7.757)	0.140*** (8.316)	0.053** (3.949)	0.083*** (6.144)	0.131*** (6.427)	0.106* (2.951)	0.128** (3.450)	0.172** (4.353)
Relative Resources*Multiculturalism	0.006 (1.787)			0.007 (1.827)			0.007 (1.837)		
Time Availability*Multiculturalism		0.022* (2.535)			0.021* (2.288)			0.021* (2.262)	
Gender Ideology*Multiculturalism			0.011** (3.882)			0.011** (3.842)			0.011** (3.599)
2002	-0.419*** (-13.710)	-0.427*** (-12.52)	-0.421*** (-13.11)	-0.398 (-1.032)	-0.332 (-0.844)	-0.359 (-0.944)	0.436 (0.507)	0.509 (0.549)	0.482 (0.541)
2012	0.182** (3.886)	0.174** (3.945)	0.176** (3.939)	-0.390 (-0.776)	-0.277 (-0.527)	-0.324 (-0.636)	0.219 (0.322)	0.336 (0.457)	0.263 (0.374)
R-Squared	0.293	0.294	0.294	0.294	0.294	0.295	0.298	0.299	0.299
Country Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Additional Level 2 Controls	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Dyadic Pairs	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes

*Note.* Home-host dyads, which are suppressed for ease of presentation (available upon request). Additional level 2 controls include: GEM, logged GDP per capita, female labor force participation and immigrant stock. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$  (Two-tailed tests). T-statistics are presented in parentheses. N=8,987 in all models.

**Table 4:** Fixed Effects Models for Three-way Interactions using ICRI Measures of Multiculturalism in 10 Highly Industrialized Countries.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<b>Level 1 and Cross-Level Interactions</b>			
Immigrant*Relative Resources	0.046 (1.343)		
Immigrant*Relative Resources*Multiculturalism	-0.353* (-2.375)		
Immigrant*Time Availability		0.023 (0.172)	
Immigrant*Time Availability*Multiculturalism		-0.686† (-1.309)	
Immigrant*Gender ideology			0.006 (0.125)
Immigrant*Gender ideology*Multiculturalism			-0.498* (-2.093)
R Squared	0.260	0.261	0.261
<b>Controls</b>			
Individual Controls	yes	yes	yes
Constituent Terms	yes	yes	yes
Country Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes
Dyadic Pairs	yes	yes	yes

*Note.* For ease of presentation, Table 4 reports only the two and three-way interaction terms as estimated in three separate models (available upon request). Individual controls include: gender, husband gender ideology, children, age, age squared, educational attainment and husband full time employment. Country (level-2) controls reported above are omitted because of perfect collinearity with country fixed effects. † $p < .10$ ; \* $p < .05$  (One-tailed tests). T-statistics presented in parentheses. N=5,159 in all models.

**Table 5:** Two-way Fixed Effects Models for Cross-level Interactions using Split MPI Measures of Multiculturalism in 12 Highly Industrialized Countries.

	Materialistic	Symbolic
	(1-3)	(4-6)
<b>Level 1 and Cross-Level Interactions</b>		
Immigrant*Relative Resources	0.071 (1.385)	0.098 (2.201)
Immigrant*Relative Resources*Multiculturalism	-0.046† (-1.675)	-0.034* (-2.666)
Immigrant*Time Availability	0.231 (1.016)	0.258** (3.515)
Immigrant*Time Availability*Multiculturalism	-0.184† (-1.664)	-0.109*** (-5.246)
Immigrant*Gender ideology	0.074 (0.999)	0.087 (1.447)
Immigrant*Gender ideology*Multiculturalism	-0.091† (-1.845)	-0.058** (-4.114)
<b>Controls</b>		
Individual Controls	yes	yes
Constituent Terms	yes	yes
Additional Level 2 Controls	yes	yes
Country Fixed Effects	yes	yes
Time Fixed Effects	yes	yes
Dyadic Pairs	yes	yes

*Note.* For ease of presentation, Table 5 reports only the two and three-way interaction terms as estimated in six separate models. Individual controls include: gender, husband gender ideology, children, age, age squared, educational attainment and husband full time employment. Additional level two controls include: GEM, female labor force participation, logged GDP and immigrant stock. † $p < .10$ ; \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$  (two-tailed tests). T-statistics presented in parentheses. N=8,987 in all models.


**Table 6:** Jackknife resampling.

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
<b>Level 1 and Cross-Level Interactions</b>	Parametric	Jackknife	Parametric	Jackknife	Parametric	Jackknife
Immigrant*Relative Resources*Multiculturalism	-0.029 (-3.656)**	-.027 (-3.291)*				
Immigrant*Employed*Multiculturalism			-0.084 (-3.705)**	-0.088 (-9.918)***		
Immigrant*Gender ideology*Multiculturalism					-0.049 (-4.715)***	-.050 (-3.552)**
<b>All else from Table 3</b>		yes		yes		yes


*Note.* Coefficients and standard errors in left-hand columns come from models 7-9 of Table 3. Coefficients and standard errors in right-hand columns come from jackknife replications of models 7-9 of Table 3. All other coefficients included in models 7-9 were included in jackknife replications, but have been suppressed for ease of presentation.

## Figures


**Figure 1:** Theoretical Model of the Moderating Effect of Multiculturalism: Trade-off Perspective.



**Figure 2:** Theoretical Model of the Moderating Effect of Multiculturalism: Dual Equality Perspective.




**Figure 3:** Average Marginal Effect of Relative Resources by Levels of Multiculturalism for Immigrant Households.



*Note.* Y axis is country-specific slope of relative resources for immigrant households estimated with model 7 of Table 3. Upper and lower bounds of the effect of multiculturalism on country-specific slopes are 95% confidence intervals. Negative slope indicates immigrant women do less housework per increase in relative resources in more multicultural countries.




**Figure 4:** Average Marginal Effect of Time Availability by Levels of Multiculturalism for Immigrant Households




*Note.* Y axis is country-specific slope of time availability for immigrant households estimated with model 8 of Table 3. Upper and lower bounds of the effect of multiculturalism on country-specific slopes are 95% confidence intervals. The reference group is unemployed. Negative slope indicates employed immigrant women do less housework in more multicultural countries.

**Figure 5:** Average Marginal Effect of Gender Ideology by Levels of Multiculturalism for Immigrant Households.




*Note.* Y axis is country-specific slope of gender ideology for immigrant households estimated with model 9 of Table 3. Upper and lower bounds of the effect of multiculturalism on country-specific slopes are 95% confidence intervals. Negative slope indicates immigrant women do less housework per unit increase in egalitarian gender ideology in more multicultural countries.

**Figure 6:** Average Marginal Effects of Micro-level Determinants for Immigrant Households across Aggregated and Disaggregated Multiculturalism Indices.



*Note.* Y axis is country-specific slope of micro-level determinants for immigrant households on the HHDL. The X axes are the standardized multiculturalism indices. Slopes capture the change in the marginal effect of each micro-foundation across the multiculturalism indices as estimated in models 7-9 of Table 3 (aggregate) and in Table 5 (material and symbolic). Negative slope indicates women do less housework per unit increase in focal micro-foundation in more multicultural countries.

**Figure 7:** Change in Immigrant Women’s Share of Household Labor with Maximum Increase in Micro-Foundation by Multiculturalism.



*Note.* Maximum change is measured as the difference between the predicted HHDL score at the minimum and maximum value of the focal micro-foundation.


## Appendix

**Table A1: Sensitivity of Table 3 Results to Immigrant Flow Measures and Alternative Measures of Time Availability.**

	(1-3)	(4-6)
<b>Level 1 and Cross-Level Interactions</b>		
Immigrant*Relative Resources	0.123* (2.761)	0.132* (2.724)
Immigrant*Relative Resources*Multiculturalism	-0.027** (-3.641)	-0.029** (-3.543)
Immigrant*Employed	0.334* (2.726)	-
Immigrant*Employed*Multiculturalism	-0.086** (-4.012)	-
Immigrant*Gender ideology	0.144 (2.159)	0.146* (2.342)
Immigrant*Gender ideology*Multiculturalism	-0.049*** (-4.654)	-0.049*** (-4.920)
Immigrant*Part-time	-	0.560* (2.347)
Immigrant*Full-time	-	0.264* (2.300)
Immigrant*Part-time*Multiculturalism	-	-0.107* (-2.944)
Immigrant*Full-time*Multiculturalism	-	-0.082** (-3.645)
<b>Unreported Coefficients</b>		
Individual Controls	yes	yes
Constituent Terms	yes	yes
Additional Level 2 Controls	yes	yes
Country Fixed Effects	yes	yes
Time Fixed Effects	yes	yes
Dyadic Pairs	yes	yes


*Note.* For ease of presentation, Table IA reports only the two and three-way interaction terms as estimated in six separate models. Models 1-3 substitute immigrant flow (measured as net migration as a percentage of the population) for immigrant stock. Models 4-6 alternatively measures time availability as full-time and part-time employment (reference: unemployed). Individual controls include: gender, husband gender ideology, children, age, age squared, educational attainment and husband full time employment. Additional level two controls include: GEM, female labor force participation, logged GDP, immigrant flow (models 1-3) and immigrant stock (models 4-6). \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$  (two-tailed tests). T-statistics presented in parentheses. N=8,987 in all models.

Figure A1: Association between Multiculturalism and Immigration



*Note.* To minimize unit roots, panel and cross-sectional means have been removed. *Source:* Multicultural Policy Index, <http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/> (Accessed 09/23/2014), World Development Indicators, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/> (Accessed 12/23/2014).

Figure A2: Association between Multiculturalism and Immigration



*Note.* To eliminate unit roots, variables are expressed in first-differences. *Source:* Multicultural Policy Index, <http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/> (Accessed 09/23/2014), World Development Indicators, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/> (Accessed 12/23/2014).