

UC Berkeley
IURD Working Paper Series

Title

THE DEVELOPMENTAL FEATURES OF GREAT CITIES OF ASIA

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1954b1hp>

Author

Meier, Richard L.

Publication Date

1969-12-01

THE DEVELOPMENTAL FEATURES OF GREAT CITIES OF ASIA

by

Richard L. Meier

University of California, Berkeley

December 1969

Working Paper No. 112

This paper was supported in part from a grant from the Economic Development Agency.

All Rights Reserved

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF TABLES	iii
INTRODUCTION	1
 Chapter	
I. A QUICK FIX ON THE FUTURES OF GREAT CITIES	7
II. BANGKOK: ITS TWENTY-SIXTH CENTURY	16
Thai Values in the Next Generation	17
The Stimuli for Bangkok's Development	24
The Developmental Effects of Japanization	31
Conclusions	35
III. A PROTOTYPE OF THE NEW MODERNIZATION	38
The Image of Seoul	43
The Educational Price in Korea	45
Builders and Planners of the New Korea	52
Is the Growth Process Unbalanced?	62
Conclusions	69

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
I. The Foreign Trade of Thailand, 1965	28
II. Permanent Immigrants to Thailand (1965) and Resident Aliens	29
III. Advertisements in Bangkok Classified Telephone Directory	29
IV. Thai Students Abroad	33
V. Changes in Land Price in Korea 1961-68	58
VI. Vehicular Use in Seoul	60
VII. Korean Commerce with Japan (U.S.\$)	66
VIII. Contribution of Bilateral Trade to Foreign Exchange Reserves Gain of Japan	67

INTRODUCTION

An astonishing transformation is under way in many of the great cities of Asia that will have a huge influence upon the future. These Oriental leviathans are finding ways of generating millions of new and productive jobs, acquiring ultramodern skills, digesting streams of immigrants, accelerating economic development, and maintaining public order. More remarkable yet, perhaps, is that the phenomenon is not being reported as a significant factor in development policy, nor are the strategies leading to apparent success being analyzed as components of a policy plan. Most social scientists still think in terms of political elites, of virtually static subcultures, village development schemes and of national economies. Nor are the urban geographers and city planners, the professions with the most direct interest in the phenomena, at work synthesizing some holistic schema that accounts for the development.¹

The work of the national economic planners in South Korea has been among the most successful in recent times, and we are fortunate enough to have a new report and comparative assessment on hand.²

¹They were chided in this also by W.L.C. Wheaton in the Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Regional Development, Tokyo, September 1969, when he observed that the autonomous cities of Singapore and Hong Kong showed remarkable capabilities for development and proceeded to describe the implications of their success for other Asian cities, "Singkong - A Parable on Regional Planning." Proceedings, in press.

²Irma Adelman, ed., Practical Approaches to Development Planning: Korea's Second Five Year Plan, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1969); see chapters 2,3,7,9 and especially chapter 11.

Careful reading suggests that the economic planners must have made repeated miscalculations in underestimating the dynamism and capabilities of Seoul. This showed up most strongly in its ability to generate productive proposals for light industry on short notice, and generate funds to finance them, so that these activities within the non-agricultural sectors ran far ahead of the others. The city and its harbor became exceedingly important again in the promotion of exports for the acquisition of scarce foreign exchange. It provided a backdrop that speeded up negotiations and had mobilized all the components of the kind of labor force needed to get into production quickly. Pragmatic project-by-project, year-by-year reviews were a feature of the planning process, and they overcame the impulse of the regional planners to slow the explosive growth of the capital city. Reports on Singapore's industrial progress during 1969 suggest that the same kind of heroics are being performed there as had occurred a few years earlier in Seoul.³ Taipei and Hong Kong had started along this path some time around 1960, Bangkok seems about ready to begin, and Saigon may well be ready within a few years.

Not long ago I noted that post-War Tokyo evolved the most marvelous "engine for development" the world has ever constructed.⁴ It created highly productive jobs and new organizational capabilities more rapidly than ever before by translating the most appropriate modern ideas into a Japanese format. Since that report, however, it has been superseded by still another Asian metropolis -- Seoul. The annual output

³"Singapore: The Robust Waif," Business Week, December 6, 1969, p.66.

⁴R. L. Meier, Space Design (Japan), December 1966 - May 1967, translated as "Notes on the Formation of an Efficient Megalopolis in Japan," Ekistics XXIII (1967), pp. 294-307.

from Greater Tokyo, made up primarily of the value added from manufacture and the attributed value of services provided by residents of the urban region as adjusted by the rate of local inflation, seems to have been rising at a rate of 18 to 20 per cent per year on the average for a period greater than two decades. These are very crude estimates of gross regional product; refinement of the data is made extraordinarily difficult because there has been a continuous extension of the boundaries of the commuter-dominated region. A rapid turnover of sojourners, with a heavy residuum staying on indefinitely, is another source of ambiguity. Perhaps in five to ten years a formal model will have been elaborated and the actual growth computed as well as the data permit. But by then a city such as Tokyo will have expanded its volume of activity again by two to four times! This growth rate appears to put the contemporary applied regional science into a ludicrous situation; present methods are far too cumbersome to cope with the accelerated development and still produce dependable proposals for guiding public decisions.

Until we comprehend better the forces that induce such extraordinary growth, the planning advice based upon experience with the much slower growing Western cities (when measured in a similar manner most exhibit increases in gross regional product of 6-12% per year) is more likely to act as a brake upon development rather than the intended lubricant or shock absorber, to carry the analogy forward. This means that we need better instruments for observation, especially a set of "snapshot indicators" that provide a fair representation of the vigor of a sector of the city or of the urban economy comparable to past conditions or to equivalent sectors elsewhere. The indicators need to be linked by a theory that transcends all of the academic disciplines and

still is explicit enough to deal in measurables. Thus any burst of economic growth would be considered to be a mere bubble, or borrowing against the future, if it rested upon the exploitation of a natural resource that would soon be depleted, or upon a windfall injection of industry, or upon running down the present capital stock and foreign credits without local replacement. Occasionally there may be good reasons for drawing down political assets or a stock of human resources so as to register economic expansion. However, a quick application of these other frameworks for assessing change in cities, suggests that the recent Asian urban experience is no "flash in the pan"; their development as balanced as any in the world that has preceded it.

Each investigator brings his own synthesis of relevant theories to a task of this magnitude. The modern socio-political historian would be particularly well equipped, for example, as would a political economist.⁵ My own is based upon the cybernetic features of communication theory and the aggregative qualities of social transactions.⁶ The geographer seems to be relevant, yet he may very well miss out because his methods are anchored to the analysis of the spatial components, especially such compound concepts as density or flux, under circumstances where the key stimuli may be the import of knowledge, acquisition of capital, hybridization of modern organizations with the traditional kind, mobilization of new incentives, or additions to popular culture.

⁵One sees this synoptic quality, for example, in the writings of Karl Deutsch, John Friedmann, Ralph Gakenheimer, Dennis Livingston, Norton Long, Ernst Haas, and Anselm Straus. A large number of trends and events are marshalled, irrespective of their pertinence to a discipline, and a simple forecasting model with policy concerns is constructed that has persuasive force.

⁶R. L. Meier, A Communications Theory of Urban Growth, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962); "The Metropolis as a Transactions-Minimizing System," Daedalus, Vol. 97, No. 4, Fall 1968, pp. 1292-1313.

The geographers may nevertheless be alert to the short range consequences of rapid development that show up as the elaboration of the urban transport network, the structural rationalization of the distribution of goods and services, and the factors affecting changes in land price. All of these may be used both as indicators of change or as indexes of performance.

The need for speed in observation and analysis, if ever one is to comprehend the features of a "metropolis in motion," cannot be denied. The problem then is one of formulating a technique that remains independent of interviews, editing, coding, card-punching, computer program debugging, and the final steps of a sequence that seem inevitably to stretch out into many months, or even years. I had an opportunity in 1966-67 to try out various suggestions for identifying sources of growth in urban environments where I was unable to read or understand the official language. It is in such situations that the risk of error for any kind of study is maximal. The locales included were Thessalonica, Athens, Tel Aviv, Teheran, Delhi, Calcutta, Hong Kong and Tokyo. The reports produced in the course of groping for techniques of acquiring information relevant to the futures of great cities were later reproduced for the benefit of colleagues and students because, from the beginning, they yielded surprising perspectives.⁷

It was astonishing to discover in the course of these investigations, the extent to which even the American scholarly thinking is conditioned by the formula for newsworthiness adopted by the New York Times.

⁷R. L. Meier, "Observations on the Developmental Character of Great Cities," Working Paper No. 94, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of California, Berkeley, March 1969.

With some lag, rarely less than a year, the formula itself is influenced by the reasoned arguments of scholars, nevertheless it remains captive to an extremely limited viewpoint. The business periodicals, especially the McGraw-Hill list and the Wall Street Journal, operate so as to fill in some of the blind spots for the technologically oriented public. Most other outlets seen by intellectuals, with the exception of the Atlantic and the New Yorker, carry versions of tourism blurbs put out with the express aim of selling airline seats and hotel reservations. Therefore, a principal objective of any quick assessment of an overseas metropolis is to find specific evidence that controverts the cliches and preconceptions shared by well-informed people in America. Such corrections in overview are needed before any new data can be understood.

The methodology that evolved was, as a result, as much a search for surprising economic, social, cultural, and political precedents as it was of the collection and analysis of locally available data. It was tested in the course of two nine week trips in the field in 1968-69. What follows is a slightly revised "quick fix" for navigating strange urban terrain, followed by two examples which provide the best clues to an explanation of the recent astonishing growth rates in certain metropolises. Parallel studies have been carried out on Bombay (five and a half million), Delhi (four million population), Kanpur (one and a half million), Calcutta (eight million), Hong Kong (four million), Taipei (two million), and Tokyo (twenty-three million). In the first few instances they describe the selective impact of ideology-based planning upon urban development and the difficulties to which it leads, while the others exhibit the properties of a pragmatic, trade-oriented policy.⁸

⁸R. L. Meier, "Observations on the Developmental Character of Great Cities II: Bombay, Delhi, Kanpur, Calcutta, Hong Kong, Taipei and Tokyo," Working Paper No. 124, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of California, Berkeley, May 1970.

I. A QUICK FIX ON THE FUTURES OF GREAT CITIES

Too often we forget that a city is great because it has created an information-rich environment. Capitals of nations store this information in the files of the bureaux and the memories of bureaucrats, port cities in the back rooms and knowhow of the major commercial enterprises, and manufacturing cities in the blueprints of the shop offices with the backup from development laboratories and marketing specialists. The urban environment circulates such information at an accelerating pace, and in normal times it must remain an open system, if it is to function efficiently, so it is possible for any curious bystander to plug in and educate himself. What would be the optimum strategy for learning about the future of a city, even if such a person may not be conversant with the principal spoken language?

It follows, almost automatically, from the opening statement that cities are braggarts; they polish up myths about themselves for delivery to their own citizens, as well as for the naive visitor. Each myth may have substantial factual basis; however, in accordance with local standards of asepsis, all possible dishonorable and unheroic connotations have been cleanly removed. This expurgated public relations version of past and present is the city's "best suit of clothes." Once the facile stranger penetrates that carefully prepared front he is able to perceive the bulk of the background communication in the city as a high decibel uproar, and the detailed stories on the back pages of newspapers about local personalities, or the opportunities presented by

flashing signs and shining display windows, appear as surface indicators of the operation of markets, utilities, cultural establishments, and miscellaneous other urban institutions. However, all but one part in a million or less must be tuned out before anyone can discriminate the local images that affect the future because they induce organized achievement. The game is one of observing-listening-reading-probing-referring-checking-revising-rechecking-synthesizing. It seeks useful propositions about potential directions of change and the rates likely to be achieved.

A bit more system can be put into that exercise. Earlier an emphasis was placed upon the acquisition of reliable information, free of typically American preconceptions, but henceforth, the data should also be as comparable to each other as possible. From it any planner should be able to pose crucial questions about the growth of great cities, both singly and collectively, that then deserve detailed on-the-spot investigation. A proposed ten step standard path for the whirlwind survey of such a metropolis follows:

1. At the portals: Tourist handouts are readily available in airports and major hotels. They portray the city's image of itself as it would like to be seen by outsiders. The same kind of material is used for the indoctrination of children in elementary schools.⁹ They are verities about past, present, and prospect, and the cliches maintained by the mass media. They should be catalogued quickly and then avoided, because such myths are so overlain by pretense no source of objective information is likely to be found. What is the proportion of nostalgic items? What fractions are dominated by the need for affiliation, power and achievement? What evidence is present that the current regime is

⁹D. C. McClelland, The Achieving Society, (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961).

manipulating symbols to legitimize itself? By taking up to a hundred of the most salient items (i.e., portraits, panoramas, tours, advertisements of cuisine, entertainments, etc.) the profile will become quite distinctive for each metropolis. What part of this persona is connected to the future?

2. Look closely at the English language dailies and weeklies that have been set up in every major metropolis that permits free enterprise. What editorial compromises does the foreign language newspaper need to make in order to survive: To whom are its advertisements directed? List the local political names that must appear daily in the local press that is dutifully translated by the foreign language press. From the stories construct the "political facade" to which pundits are so sensitive. Who is publicly what to whom? Note also the novel uses and abuses of the English language because they stem from the problems of translation and serve as flags for typical misunderstandings between natives and strangers. Finally, from both the advertisements and the stories, list the establishments at which both locals and foreigners are expected to be present (scratch the American Club but include almost any other) so as to gain insights into the cosmopolitan life that the metropolis sustains. Note the churches in particular because they indicate populations of believers who will lend a hand to the less sophisticated adventurers. What statistical series are recorded from overseas? They are surface indicators of prior trans-national agreements between mercantile firms and groups employing modern technology. Many inferences can be checked by referring to the telephone book, since organizations set up to communicate with foreigners will put forward a version of their name

and address in Latin characters and Arabic numerals. It will be close at hand in central hotels and university guest houses.

3. Acquire a map of the city. An enterprising tourist office will have made sure that a convenient map has been produced in color with the principal roads and sectors translated into English equivalents. Are they studied with classical terms drawn from the formal language and from history (a society in early phases of modernization) or a literal translation of the phones in the idiomatic popular language (a remarkably open society that propagates little xenophobia)? Ultrationalist societies will provide maps only in the official language. Where on this map are the monumental foci? Pedestrian explorations of the city should be organized so as to avoid these centers (one will be forced to dismount from vehicles often enough later on to admire them and their images will be numbered among the aforementioned cliches). Allowing for these constraints, drift with map in hand along the streets and in a crudely spiral path that takes one away from the hotel or the terminal. In this manner the contrasts between life styles on avenue frontage, lanes, and back courts are quickly sensed. The patterns of residential segregation can usually be deduced, even if one's stamina does not take him into some of the outlying ghettos. If taken during daytime, this walk leads one also into the English language bookshop. It will be within a hundred yards of the downtown airline offices or across the street from the major graduate school. Purchase there all available books on the history of the metropolis, the official tourist guides, and pay particular attention to the titles of the hardback novels kept in stock since they are often recommended reading by acculturated bilinguals to new long-term visitors. Multiple copies of paperback books may have

similar significance, but more likely they reflect the spent fads of local cosmopolites. Scan these books immediately for explanations about the sequence of events that have left their mark upon the metropolis, either as settlements, monuments, enterprises or scars.

4. Take the half-day city tour for strangers. In it the city is careful to put its best foot forward. The guides are trained to identify the principal landmarks and expound on the most treasured traditions. It provides economical contact with the great parks, waterfront and the prosperous suburbs. The spatial structure of the city becomes decipherable by the time the trip is completed, so one need never be lost for more than an hour thereafter when exploring on foot. Listen carefully to questions posed by fellow tourists and note how deftly the guide handles all evidences of culture shock and political curiosity. He is on the defensive in these issues and must know how to parry them or he will not keep his job.

5. Dig into the economic reports and statistical series, especially those pertaining to international trade, transport trends, and internal migration. In what sectors, industries, communities, and sub-cultures is unusual growth evident? Growth brings with it both opportunities and a trespassing of customary boundaries, therefore all kinds of alerts and alarms are set off. The status quo is being upset by innovations with unexpected influence, so talk is rife. Where on the map are these changes likely to be visible? The new suburbs, the corridors served by new roads, the industrial estates, or the central business district? The brief stories accompanying the statistics in the international trade periodicals that report on and interpret the trends will be very helpful because they

give names and locales that will already be familiar or can be tracked down with ease. Note also the sectors that are collapsing in the face of competition, because they generate strong political demands often beyond the capacity of the politicians to meet from the resources at their disposal.

6. By this time, two to three days after entry, visits with the people to whom one has introductions can be very rewarding. One's hosts will still be trying to express the standard cultural cliches, but the foregoing strategy will make that ploy obsolete, so it may be abandoned in favor of a frank approach. At this time a host of questions will have been raised by the prior enquiries, and they can be posed to the permanent residents. If at all possible the visitor should start with the most innocuous queries and then, after his host is disarmed and cooperative, move into the more sensitive areas. Avoid embarrassment if you wish to retain a dependable informant. One's first hosts deliver fair explanations of salient details but also they transmit the local intellectual myths as generalized explanations. The verifiability of general propositions obtained from early discussion is quite low.

These local contacts are most accurate in their descriptions of their own family and their neighbors. From their accounts it is possible to deduce a great deal about the techniques urbanites employ to enhance their status. For example, they are likely to speak at length on the difficulty on getting a son into the university or a prized professional school because it is a matter of great personal concern. These appraisals are expected to resemble to only a minor degree the reports on social structure available in the books and novels purchased earlier, mainly because the latter concentrate on a standardized traditional society

while one's host belongs to a marginal cosmopolitan component that has elected to be different about the time their most advanced education was completed and has already made a few compromises in order to earn a living.

7. All the time during the first furious days of exploration, the urban analyst should have been writing a few sentences and well digested paragraphs in the bits of free time he has at his disposal. Now the pieces need to be assembled. The guidebooks, histories, journals, maps and pictures should all be at hand because memory of first impressions can be quite imperfect. The image(s) of the future in this city need to be identified. How is this metropolis able to compete with other major metropolises? Is its competitive position readily improved by some achievable policy? What will happen when the internal metropolitan growth zones spill over into other established political units, such as states, provinces, prefectures, counties, or self-governing communities: A battle or a withdrawal? Which ethnic group or social class is becoming better organized? What kind of changes are in store for the city if the expanding communities take over the reins of power? Where will the metropolitan middle class overspill go? What spaces have been relegated to the squatters and the new immigrants from rural areas? What new spatio-economic structure for the metropolis is envisioned as a result of such projections? A camera may come in handy at this point because it can catch the backdrop of the stage upon which future urban dramas will be played while it is still being furbished.

8. Only then is one ready to be invited to the planning unit for the metropolis, which is as likely to be in the engineer's office as in a suite next to the chief executive's office where it belongs if it is to be effective. The young men in these units will be bilinguals and

often will have obtained overseas degrees. Notice how the planning unit will very often understand crises anticipated from this quick absorption of the information and will have already explored the strategies for development that occur to the visitor, but note also they are seldom permitted to plan in the way that seems logical. Work at this discrepancy because it is the first opportunity that an outsider has that allows him to understand the key interest groups and the power structures that operate behind the political facade portrayed in the newspapers. One should be alert to the tiniest hints in the least developed countries, because junior civil servants there must avoid all traces of treason and disaffection; they know that jealous old-timers are itching to catch them off base. At this stage, a number of political choice points opening up over the next several years are easily perceived; they determine diverging paths of development. The more apolitical transitions of the marketplace are easier to discuss and should lead to a quick review, aided preferably by a visit, covering the land use and transport patterns in the most congested areas. A brief quantitative assessment of the vehicular modes employed can be undertaken which clearly establishes the degree of modernization and level of capitalization.

9. Offer a reasoned, written analysis of the alternative futures for this metropolis to some expert on the local scene in such a way that he is free to criticize frankly. In the subsequent interchange insist upon evidence, whether typical situations, data or missing verifiable facts. What went wrong with the chain of inferences? Does that error affect other conjectures? Write a new draft that projects developments that are readily ascertainable by consulting reports carried in the international news. Then it should be possible to judge which of the alternative

paths is being taken, or whether, as with Havana and Djakarta, a clean break with the past is being made, so that local history and experience offer relatively few clues to the future.

10. What such reconnaissance of internally generated information ought to uncover at the level of theory building is the relevance of the comparative method. Is the fate of that metropolis bound up more in the decisions it makes about itself, by national scale developments, or by the hard realities of interregional and international trade? In what ways do the destinies of cities converge? (One of the implications of the communications theory of urban growth is that the cosmopolitan contingents in great cities should be expanding in number and influence more rapidly than any other and that their interests are convergent in large part so that the core of every metropolis will soon possess a representative, a deputation, or a colony from almost every other one.) These brief surveys should tell us where the investment of great effort in careful doctoral dissertations and systematic academic investigations in depth is likely to be worthwhile, since the latter are intended to test only the productive propositions.

II. BANGKOK: ITS TWENTY-SIXTH CENTURY

This is being written in August of the year B.E. 2512, a statement that reveals instantaneously much of the character of the metropolis of Bangkok. The calendar measures the passage of time in the Buddhist Era; all the fantasies in art and architecture, possessed by the people as a whole, have a Buddhist inspiration. The unique images, the displays to visitors by which the Thais most wish to be remembered, are the colorful temples, palaces, monasteries and gardens with the emerald Buddha serving as the leading prototype. Yet all is not of the spirit because the Arabic number in the date itself is an international standard and the English language is understood to some degree by just about everyone who gets through secondary school.

Bangkok must be regarded as an entrepot that lies between the Thai people and the world, between the contemplative past and the forceful present, and between the waterborne activities and those that are conducted on the land. Also, in a variety of ways, the extraordinary growth of trade and tourism is overlaying the evidences of military controls so much more prominent three years ago.

Sometime, about a decade back, a surprising number of specialists decided to write books about Thailand. Some were journalists, were historians, and collectors of exotica, but others were political scientists, economists, linguists, and ethnologists who put out serious works aimed at interpreting the present structure of a society now numbering 34 million who are ruled from Bangkok. Many of those books foundered,

but the past few years have been marked by a series of volumes that cover a wide spectrum of institutions and transitions, including some of the classics on the subject of political development. Thus the materials upon which I can base an account of the possible futures of Bangkok are much more extensive than three years ago when I was making a preliminary attempt.¹⁰ Interestingly enough, however, the materials on Bangkok itself are quite scarce. They still exist in raw form as water and sewage proposals, traffic plans, physical master plans, redevelopment projects, tourist guides and the like. The future of the metropolis is being worked out by the Thais on a piecemeal basis, one sub-system or neighborhood at a time, because the American-designed master plan has turned out to be an unworkable showpiece. Modern Bangkok can be thought of as a cultural garden containing many plants, from weeds to vegetables to shade trees and pampered ornamentals. In a number of instances farangs are brought in to analyze, advise, report and thereby assist in the growth of some of the features of this great city, but most are merely allowed to pursue their own specialized interests which most often are based in the countryside but have a Bangkok link. The ecological interdependence of the respective sub-cultures continues to grow untended and without overall documentation.

Thai Values in the Next Generation

The scholars in comparative education started after World War I to trace the effects of the contents of textbooks in national educational systems. The passions of nationalism, simultaneously heroic, romantic and devastating, were directly traceable to lessons taught to the elite

¹⁰ The nature of my itinerary forced me to make comparisons with Osaka and Kobe, where commerce based upon a rice-growing region developed 30-40 years ahead of Bangkok. The draft was unfortunately lost.

and its bureaucratic followers.¹¹ Later McClelland showed that the motivation underlying the imagery in those books is likely to be transmitted to the students, as evidenced by their collective behavior later in life.¹²

The impact of textbooks is largely a function of their being taken seriously. In India today, for example, they are merely part of a game of passing examinations. If one can read well enough he can make first class honors and his future is assured, but one's status is still established if he gets the degree. The students remain skeptics, however, and their judgments are therefore only peripherally influenced by the content of lessons in books. Nevertheless, the accumulation of diplomas from secondary schools and teachers' colleges in the fourteen languages of India has led to political commitments and is creating a wellnigh insoluble problem for maintaining law and order in the face of communal tensions. In Thailand, particularly in its sophisticated metropolis, the content of the education is taken far more seriously than in India, Pakistan, Japan and even Taiwan, and is paralleled perhaps only by Hong Kong and perhaps China itself, at least those parts of it that are scrutinized by the "China watchers." It is significant to note, for example, that almost all of the Thai students overseas come back even though their talents are as badly misused as they are in Taiwan or Iran where only 10-30% return home.

The students who will become most influential in later life are those that study foreign languages, particularly English. Therefore, one must expect that special care must be taken to counteract the evil to

¹¹ Otto Klineberg, Tensions Affecting International Understanding, Social Science Research Council, New York, 1950.

Gladys A. Wiggin, Education and Nationalism, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962).

¹² D. McClelland, The Achieving Society, see ref. 7.

which they are exposed. Here in Bangkok this is done by providing a "catechism" of Thai nationalism in the English language so that fluency is reached by mastering the dogma of one's own culture. It also happens to make English much less strange and easier to learn. I found such a textbook entitled "140 Essays and Letters for Advanced Students" in a publishing house display window.¹³ It provides the most condensed treatment of Thai values available to an outsider, even though the announced purpose reviewed in the introduction is to demonstrate techniques of exposition, narration and description in the English language.

The first lesson asserts that Buddhism is the oldest of the great religions and based upon "Four Noble Truths" of "The Middle Way," one of which is the eightfold path. The message is laid out in twenty questions and answers with the following conclusion: "Under its good influence the Thais have become a peace-loving nation, with unrivalled tolerance and hospitality to people of different races and creeds. It is not too much to say that, in the past, this admirable characteristic of our nation helped a great deal in preserving our national independence while the neighboring countries all around us were losing theirs."

The second lesson continues this theme by describing the operation of the Wat, the Buddhist monastery-school-temple establishments. It commits the citizen to assist the priests in obtaining food, clothes, medicine, and shelter so as to perpetuate Buddhism "in our beloved country." The third abjures them to "Uphold the moral standard in this corrupted world" by observing the days of the waxing and waning of the moon called Wan Pra. The fourth takes up the ordination ritual for

¹³This was an official publisher of textbooks which significantly always represented its name in Thai script even if the text was in English. No English equivalents or addresses were provided.

young men at age twenty-one, where they learn "how to curb their passions at an age when these passions are strongest." The fifth takes up a new holiday declared especially for the twenty-sixth century. Asalaha Day commemorates the beginning of Buddha's teaching of the ascetics who became his disciples, a reminder of the "Triple Gems" principles.

Thereafter, the essays become more secular in character but no less serious. Nutrition is followed by traditional games, kite flying and takraw -- which uses a wicker ball. Then the famous Thai dramas, replete with dancing, are explained so that the popular version can be distinguished from the classical. The ritual of greeting, the wai, is justified on the basis that "it makes the Thai people look quite lovely and amiable . . ." Note the attention paid throughout to the image of the Thai national perceived by the rank outsider.

Lessons in government start with a brief history of the Thai precedents of constitutional monarchy, showing that for almost a thousand years the king and the Buddhist religion have been traditional symbols of the nation. On the tricolor flag of the country, the white stripe represents Buddhism, the blue the king and the red the nation. The election mechanics are reviewed so that Thais need not be "tempted or bribed to vote for a bad candidate."

Once the truly important lessons have been learned, the professor can relax somewhat and translate familiar aspects of life style into English: transport means, modes of communications, influences of weather, recreational opportunities (which draw upon the 4-H principles so familiar to American farm youth), etc. Then the role of education (which "makes a full man") and its two streams, intellectual and manual, is elaborated according to structure and function characteristics. That sets the stage for the progress of science, which glorifies technological developments

from James Watt's steam engine to the communication between earth satellites which will soon be realized. A hope is advanced that science will be used for the welfare of the people, and it leads to a special essay that attempts to define the welfare of the people. The latter is particularly important because the welfare in a state provides an index "of the efficiency and stability of the government." One sees that the argument is deadly serious because it recognizes that the future elite can be secure only if it is based within an environment that it is able to improve through the use of modern technology.

Newspapers and books are also given due attention. The journalist is exhorted to avoid any taint of exaggeration and prejudice -- he is responsible to the Minister of the Interior. Books are dissected -- title page, preface, table of contents, glosary, index, etc., with a homily added that books may be dull or exciting, good and evil and a faithful instructor.

The chief lessons about an automobile are that they cost more than a good house or two, so that few people can afford them, and many accidents are caused due to crazy driving.

The importance of athletics in the life of the nation is accepted, so inter-scholastic competition at the Gymkhana in Bangkok will maintain interest in learning English, although the following lessons, a piece about country life in which the authorities seem unable to defend that way of life except to say that it is necessary for the sustenance of the city, and a sermon on procrastination ("Life is a struggle against nature, against temptations and against other human beings; only the fittest and strongest will survive and prosper. Only a moment's delay will end in failure and defeat.") may encounter resistance on the part of students. Thus the Thai educational administrators apply common

sense approaches in their attempts to banish the traditional fatalism and apathy of the Orient. They anticipate creating a kind of society that might be called "urbane social Darwinism."

This abjuration is a preliminary to an essay on patriotism, another on SEATO, followed by a still longer one on the United Nations organization. The latter account clearly predicts that the Communists and the United States will engage in another great war which will set the whole world ablaze; yet I suspect that statement results more from clumsiness in the use of the English language because the authors are unable to introduce conditional phrasing of a kind that is not available in Thai grammar.

Then down from the heights of political abstractions to the methods of boiling rice, growing rice, making a kitchen garden and writing an autobiography, but back to nationalism with the king list: Ram Kam Heng and Chulalongkorn stand out. They are followed immediately by the identification of poets and heroines of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Naturally such stories raise questions about one's own career choice (such as the reasons for becoming a doctor) and the incidents that may determine it. Then, however, back to public affairs with the official history of the 20th October Revolution and the border incident with Cambodia where the United Nations "put things right", without a single mention that the contested Khmer hill fort was given to Cambodia.

The next thirty or so items appear to be deferring to the interests of sub-groups in the society -- the Red Cross Fair, mountains, the Grand Palace, lesser Buddhist holidays, evening contemplation, climate, Thai industries, foreign trade, taxes, radio, hobbies. War and the ideal citizen are followed by diseases and fire and fruits.

Superstition, thrift, and honesty are discussed as well as a number of "how to" notes referring to repairing bicycles, playing badminton, spending holidays, describing an accident, etc.

Letter writing in English presents some real challenges. Naturally it begins with the letters of schooldays, but then introduces a father's letter to a schoolmaster with phrasings for the schoolmaster to employ for either a favorable or an unfavorable reply, excuses provided by a mother, or a clerk of an employer. How to borrow money and how to decline politely is included with a distinction being made as to whether it is inside the family or not. Letters of application for employment and recommendation naturally must be represented, as are orders for books or goods, paying under protest, getting service from the landlord and complaining to the neighbors about a nuisance. The book finishes with a slightly sarcastic letter to the editor complaining about the inattention of the road repair administration to the sad state of the road in front of one's house. In such a manner are the proprieties of participation in urban and social affairs laid down. As yet there seems to be very little disenchantment with education in Bangkok, so the text would not normally be labeled as "preachy" or hypocritical by the students, but merely of use for conforming to modern ways of life, just as English is of use.

Views of popular culture in English-speaking countries are obtained by going to the cinema. There the favorites seem to be war epics, Walt Disney, Westerns and productions of literary classics. Melodramas were imported in Chinese from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, which makes them more understandable. The media do not transmit much of the rock and country music that has won the attention of the youth elsewhere

in the world, and sales of recordings of these themes are still subdued. Much of the popular culture comes through the advertisements in cinema, television, and store fronts, so that consumerism is what is promoted in the loosely controlled, largely commercial institutions engaged in modernizing and internationalizing the Thais.

The Stimuli for Bangkok's Development

Most of the reports reaching the United States about events in Thailand carry ominous undertones. This is particularly true for the correspondents of the New York Times, the featured columnists, such as Alsop, who must come in for a few weeks to "see the situation for myself," as they say, and the novelists such as Lederer (author of Sarkhan, a make-believe Thailand) who also writes for the monthlies such as the Atlantic. They must all begin with the basic fact that Thailand is run by a military junta, that the trappings of democracy are only aphorisms, and the bureaucracy must be corrupt in order to make a living because government salaries are not nearly adequate. The administrative and military response to organized robbery and assassination out in the further provinces is arbitrary and brutal. Yet this is not really a police or military-controlled state but merely a country that loves to display its attachment to Buddhism and traditional Thai virtues. More likely than not, however, such reports reflect careful attention being paid by the top Thai politicians to their public relations. The messages relayed to affect the environment of opinion are calculated so as to maximize the continuity of foreign aid from the United States without making political life at home too risky. Military aid is obviously preferred because it takes less trouble to manage the effects of the receipt of such equipment and the associated experts.

These periodic journalistic assessments of the present situation in Thailand presented by American publications are studded with scores of specific incidents and confirmatory facts. Curiously, the information flowing out to Hong Kong, as published in the Far East Economic Review and the newspapers, is interpreted very differently in their pages despite the fact that Hong Kong actually has more to lose than the United States. There is a whole corridor on Kowloon's Nathan Road whose fortunes are directly dependent on developments in Bangkok, with scores of people shuttling back and forth weekly. Nor is the scholarly work on Thailand at all confirmatory in broad outline, although the tardiness of its appearance leaves something to be desired. Therefore, I am forced to discount heavily what Americans are told about current trends when gauging future developments and depend instead upon a number of insights acquired in studying Asian cities.

The biggest single factor in Bangkok is international trade. Once it was merely the outlet for the "rice bowl for Asia" but now it is becoming a reprocessing center as well as a place for storing various commodities while speculating in their price changes. That means it is becoming something like Hong Kong and Singapore, but still trailing a long way behind. The airport is actually busier than either of those competitors due to its central location on the trip around China; air freight along with tourism is booming, showing growth rates of 20-30% per year. World trade as a whole has been lively, with a secular trend of expansion around 15% per year for the last two decades, so that any city that keeps its position in world trade has been riding on an escalator for economic activity, but Bangkok is walking up the steps as well. An item in last week's newspaper indicated that last year world trade increased by 20% in current prices and this year the expansion is even

stronger, due to simultaneous booms in the United States, Western Europe and Japan. This will have an amplified effect in Bangkok. All the incidental developments that flow from the growth of trade overcome the loss in value and volume of the main export commodity obtained from the interior -- rice.

A trip down the Phao Phya, the slow-moving river that loops around Bangkok about 40 km. before joining the Gulf of Thailand, reveals what kind of installations are being added. There one sees the standard go-downs for general cargo, but now enlarged to handle refrigerators and washing machines. Automobile and truck assembly becomes increasingly elaborate behind the quays, with the Japanese and Mercedes-Benz showing the most initiative. Two refineries, complete with catalytic cracking units and a half dozen or more gleaming silver distilling columns, stand side by side. One can detect an electric furnace for remelting old iron, a glass plant, plastics, solvents, etc. Paint is exceedingly important to the maintenance of the Thai Buddhist image so both the Japanese and I.C.I., the British chemical combine, are here in strength. Then, of course, the grain terminals have been modernized to become batteries of tall white silos.

The ships in the river are from all over the world, but Asian registries predominate. Most are tramps of less than 10,000 tons. Several naval vessels can be seen, mainly old destroyers, but the principal base has been taken out of the river. Broadbeamed wooden riverboats breast the tide in midstream awaiting cargo. Hundreds of small house barges are tied up at out-of-the-way docks suited only for coolie long-shoremen, each vessel containing a family that lives out its life on the water. A few still specialize on the side in the floating market, so they prepare fried bananas, ginger and chillie dishes, and other goodies

for the crews left on the ships, but this feature of old Bangkok seems to be declining rapidly. (I did not see the river at dawn when the movements by small boats reach a peak and the floating markets function as produce markets rather than serving to provide a bit of local color for loads of tourists.)

About 1960 the Japanese edged into a dominant position in Thai foreign trade. Since that time they have continued to increase their share so that it must by now be 30% of the total. The last complete data I could find were for 1965 (Table I). Except for the grain exports to Penang and a bit to Laos, all of that trade goes through Bangkok. Just this week very sensitive negotiations have been underway with the Japanese with the aim of pressing them to accept a larger amount of imports from Thailand. For the negotiations to succeed, both countries will have to give up some traditions, with the Japanese depending more than they wish upon Thai corn for their chicken and cattle feeding and the Thai government must allow Japanese to develop the wood resources to Japanese standards since the inefficient government enterprises have already given evidence that they are incapable of doing so. Also, more Japanese will be settling in Bangkok than in the past (Table II). Anyone who wishes to do business in Thailand must take up immigrant status. Since the Americans come in as missionaries, foreign aid, Peace Corps, educators and other non-business occupations, they take claims on Thai citizenship much less frequently. The Americans more than balance their trade with military and other forms of aid, but this is a policy to which the Japanese have been greatly reluctant to commit themselves. The Japanese should be supporting the bulk of the expense of the Asia Institute of Technology, an internationally oriented

graduate school for Asians, but thus far they have not participated at all, and have only promised to provide one of their own professors for the next year.

Another way of looking at the impact of foreign trade is to review the classified advertisements in the telephone directory according to the national origin of the trans-national firm (Table III). The cultural impact of the United States becomes very evident then because the primary role of Japan, Hong Kong and Italy has been to produce cut-rate imitations of the United States products that were introduced a few years earlier.

TABLE I
THE FOREIGN TRADE OF THAILAND, 1965
(in millions of Baht @ U.S. \$0.048)

	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Imports</u>
Japan	2,358	5,200
United States	834	3,015
W. Germany	636	1,550
United Kingdom	547	1,506
Hong Kong	856	403
Malaya	950	166
Netherlands	513	501
Penang (free port)	842	2
Italy	250	324
Australia	23	326

TABLE II

PERMANENT IMMIGRANTS TO THAILAND (1965) AND RESIDENT ALIENS

	<u>Permanent Immigrants</u>	<u>Resident Aliens*</u>
Chinese	240	?
U.S.	193	5,000(non-military)
Japanese	181	?
Indian	176	
British	174	190
Swedish	88	25
Filipino	84	
Dutch	80	
Danish	71	
German	69	200
French	57	300
Indonesian	45	
		(Portuguese: 200)
		(Italian: 160)

*David M. Davies, The Rice Bowl of Asia (London: Robert Hale, 1967), p.42.

TABLE III

ADVERTISEMENTS IN BANGKOK CLASSIFIED TELEPHONE DIRECTORY

(January 1969)

<u>Country of Firm's Origin</u>	<u>Number</u>
United States	68
Japan	28
United Kingdom	21
Germany	17
Hong Kong	9
Switzerland	7
Sweden	6
Italy	5
France	3
India	2
Australia	2

The Japanese now sell 80% of the motor vehicles in Thailand. My estimate of current registration based upon past trends is about 350,000 and the annual market is 50-60,000 vehicles, half passenger and half truck and commercial. Perhaps two-thirds of these are in and around Bangkok, which contains only 8% of the population. The Thai government is reasonably rational in its trade and excise policy. It has a duty of 125% on most passenger cars, but the growth in the number of vehicles is patently exceeding the capacity of the roads to carry them (although the situation is not yet as bad as that of Puerto Rico), therefore the excise and/or duty will have to be increased so as to curb the craze for automobiles.

Thus far the Japanese have invested only about \$100,000,000 in all of South and Southeast Asia, and much of that is in the production of raw materials or components for its own industry. The Japanization of trade was conducted with the aid of very careful commercial intelligence systems, lenient credit for inventory, aggressive marketing, and a lot of pragmatic "learning by doing," but no follow-through by ploughing the profits back into the country of origin as has been the predominant American and British pattern. Now they are beginning to see the necessity of defending the market they won which can only be done by building local factories. The overseas locations that Japan's M.I.T.I. (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) chose for intensive investigation of building costs, labor force, re-export possibilities and governmental regulation put Bangkok among the four leading sites. The promise of industrial peace and prosperity in Bangkok is comparable to that of Singapore and the upper and lower tips of Taiwan. Interestingly, these are all places where they are preceded a generation or more earlier by Chinese predominantly from Fukien province. A formidable development

"team" may be shaping up in the Orient based upon the relatively free flow of trade and the capacity of these two cultures to understand each other's institutions.

The Development Effects of Japanization

In the period 1953-1963, Thailand managed to increase its gross domestic product by an average of 6-1/2% per year in real terms. Since the population was growing by almost 3%, this means that the average per capita income would increase at a rate that implied doubling every two decades. This performance is significant as compared to its history, but it remains slow as compared to many neighboring countries.

I have not had a chance to obtain the most recent information but there is every indication that this pace of growth has continued in the interim despite a continued decline in the export of rice, which is Thailand's principal source of foreign exchange. There may even have been an acceleration in economic growth. Certainly, the rate of construction in the city has been vigorous, with at least four new hotel-shopping complexes completed in the past three years. Add to that three modern new cinema-shopping complexes and a number of string shopping developments two stories high along the main roads. The emphasis has been placed upon luxury and good quality buildings in the central city and the main corridors out of the metropolis. Some lower middle income apartments have been constructed to ease the process of urban redevelopment, but the so-called "substandard" housing on the outer soi (lanes) is undoubtedly increasing in quantity. Much of the money for the hotels and luxury real estate is said to have come from the illegal opium trade, and a good deal more from the entertainment of American servicemen. There are many other rackets that help the responsible civil servants

keep up with the rising cost of living and much of that money surfaces as land development. Only a fraction of it had originally been reported in the national economic accounts that registered the growth reported above..

Presumably, the underworld components in international trade have been growing as rapidly as the rest of world trade, and the illegal income of civil servants as rapidly as that of income generally, but we will never have very good evidence because many of these transactions are in gold and silver. The Japanese are said to know how to deal under these circumstances better than the Western-oriented trans-national firms but are still well behind the more unscrupulous Chinese family firms and their banks. Therefore, the Japanese have been able to grab vitually all of the new growth in legitimate trade and the Chinese in the illegitimate. The Thais manage to get their share in business, where their enterprises are growing rapidly in scope and in scale, but they achieve it mostly by making sure that members of the family or clan are occupying positions of responsibility and influence.

The Japanese have an advantage over their legitimate competitors in that they can install managers and technical personnel in the society at about 25-35% of the cost of a Western-based firm. Their men usually leave their families behind and live in simple apartments. Since the Chinese Mandarin language is one of the classics taught in Japanese secondary school, the language of business is much less a barrier. The Japanese overseas have also learned to read English, but have great trouble communicating to others in that language. Yet they must somehow learn because the future Thai elite, now studying overseas, will be 80-90% English-speaking (Table IV). The lunch tables at the four universities reveal a similarly high proportion of visiting professors from

English-speaking countries. Therefore, the current universal determination to learn English, particularly strong in Tokyo, is highly realistic and offers another clue for forecasting the future in Southeast Asia.

TABLE IV
THAI STUDENTS ABROAD

	<u>1956</u>	<u>1963</u>
United States	667	1096
United Kingdom	809	739
Australia & New Zealand	167	203
Europe	206	292
Japan	47	192
Philippines	23	117
India	66	88
Other Asia	<u>4</u>	<u>64</u>
TOTAL	1990	2796

One of the great difficulties the Japanese have had in the past is fitting into cosmopolitan English-speaking circles already in existence in Bangkok. The British Club stays pure, the Americans abandon their own club to the servicemen and flock to the Sports Club, and there are very few other places. Where would Japanese executives play golf? This is important because promotion in the zaibatsu still depends upon an adequate standard in golf, and remains more important in Tokyo than in New York or San Francisco. Generally they would need to be introduced via colleagues already in some other cosmopolitan organization, such as a trans-national corporation, a university, a church (Japanese are almost never Christian), or a very high level Thai who has spent much time overseas and needs the Japanese to meet his responsibilities, which again is exceedingly rare. Lack of access to established cosmopolitanism (A misnomer, because their exclusiveness puts these institutions into the category of colonialism or provincialism) forces Japanese overseas

into bohemian circles. I never found their hangouts while walking in Bangkok. They require further research on Saturday night.

Japanese visitors seem to have a good deal of trouble with the piquancy of the Thai cuisine, but various Chinese cuisines are available everywhere in Bangkok. Such dishes are appreciated by everyone, so common eating ground does exist.

Perhaps the Japanese will be forced to synthesize an Asian cosmopolitan culture which draws heavily upon Chinese classics along with Western technology and conveniences. They seem to be doing this in Hong Kong, where their television contributions are highly appreciated and competitive with the best from Hollywood. If so, this must start with a participation in the bohemian set but must be bolstered by university teaching. Just now Japan itself is desperately short of university teachers so it can ill afford to export them. This will change in another three to five years however because their baby boom will have passed through the university age and a strong emphasis upon improvement of quality of higher education will be set into motion. Comprehensiveness is one of the indexes of quality, so the Japanese universities will begin to pay much more detailed attention to the Thais because the Thai culture has much in it that the Japanese can respect, from its emphasis upon military attainments to its highly attractive Buddhist imagery that produces superb color photos.

One of the crucial steps in the next phase of development will be the establishment of a Japanese department store, such as the Daimaru in Hong Kong. The merchandising standards set by such Japanese institutions endear themselves to all kinds of consumers. The buyers and the advertisers of a Japanese department store could provide the same kind of link that was forged by Sears and Roebuck after it entered Latin America

and was quickly adopted as a meeting place for the middle classes and a convenience for the rich. Bangkok distribution is sufficiently well organized on a family enterprise basis that no department store with an international formula could break in without committing a major expenditure for land, inventory and promotional costs for start-up, perhaps about \$2,000,000 of which the majority would be Japanese government credits. It would be interesting to explore the possibilities of a department store complex with a city planner because very likely the urban ecology of Bangkok superimposed upon its traffic plans will allow only two or three sites. Indeed, it could well be that no satisfactory site will open up until a number of "flyovers" are installed that would provide access by car and bus to presently under-utilized land. The Japanese formula for using the air-rights over the metropolitan railroad station must, for example, be one of the first to be explored, and it would have many implications for modification of the recent master plan prepared by a Cambridge (Mass.) consulting firm.

Conclusions

The future for Bangkok is indissolubly linked to Buddhism. This is not only attributable to the returns likely to be derived from tourism, which are considerable, but also due to the values inculcated into the middle classes of the next generation. Buddhism is an integral part of their national identity, the idea of being a Thai. The local Chinese have been cut off from China so long that they too are being cremated in the burial grounds adjacent to the Wats with relatively Western stone markers and Buddhist inscriptions but still allowing traditional ancestor worship. Thus the Thai people have an increasing capacity for absorbing the previously alien Chinese, a characteristic that is less certain for

Malays, and is still less true of Burmese and Indians. This is surprising because one would have expected that hostility on the borders, combined with a commitment to SEATO, would have generated deep suspicions and increasingly uneasy relations.

The values being taught to the bi- and tri-lingual secondary students are conservative, nationalistic and participatory at the neighborhood and community level. There is strong evidence that these lessons are still being taken at face value, because little talk is heard as yet about a "generation gap." For example, almost all Bangkok marriages are still arranged, as contrasted to Hong Kong, where it seems strange to observers that this tradition still hangs on in the middle class to a minor degree.

The metropolitan society is becoming increasingly open to new tastes, technologies and styles due to the expansion of tourism, international programs on television and of cosmopolitan higher education. American culture generates the greatest respect and is making the heaviest inroads. It has done so primarily by expanding the channels of contact pioneered by the British. More multi-national firms originating from the United States are operating in Bangkok than the next three countries (Japan, United Kingdom, Germany) combined. The United States is also getting an increasingly dominant share of Thai overseas students who will become the political and technological elite of the country. The principal role of the Japanese, Germans and Italians is to introduce smaller, cheaper versions of American manufactured products. The Japanese have been so successful that their trade far exceeds that of the United States. Its dominance of electronics and automotive vehicles is so great, as compared to its imports of Thai raw materials, a huge bilateral imbalance

has resulted which cannot continue. The reorganization will require a more intimate combination of Japanese business organization and methods with Thai institutions.

In the future Japan will have to invest much more in Thailand to maintain its commercial penetration. It will have to sponsor contact at the level of scientific and technological studies as well as cultural experiments, such as in television programming. Unofficial means of exchange, such as in the milieu of contemporary arts, must expand greatly. Industrial estates adjacent to the Bangkok harbor are already being explored. There is a niche for Japanese department store merchandising in central Bangkok.

All of this seems to mean that Bangkok in the future will be adopting a cosmopolitan culture that is American in outlook, but using artifacts designed by Japanese, manufactured by newly urbanized Thai workers and distributed by Chinese to an increasingly sophisticated Thai middle class.

III. SEOUL: A PROTOTYPE OF THE NEW MODERNIZATION

Nowhere else in the world today are the processes of urbanization so intense, so compressed in time, as in the capital of South Korea. The flow of people to Seoul has been at flood stage for sixteen years. It has had Korean competitors, mainly in inland centers, that have also swelled mightily in this interval, but none to compare with this primate city of Korea. Its nearest equivalent in recent history is in Japan where the surge began eight years earlier and has by now transformed almost all rural people into urbanites. Japan had, however, started with a much higher degree of industrialization. This willingness to adopt new ways in a new environment creates a pressure cooker for modernization in the metropolis.

The process by which Seoul accreted population is very normal; it is only the pace that is seen to be unusual. In the first three years, the refugees returned and the population began to rebuild what had been destroyed. It was then supporting its pre-War population. Thereafter, the refugees from North Korea, who could not tolerate life under communism, continued to move from camps and makeshift housing to the metropolis. Retrospectively, it is seen now that Seoul profited from having been rather thoroughly destroyed because it was then able to obtain the highest priority when South Korea was reconstructed with massive foreign aid. During the completion of reconstruction its population increase was 9 to 10 per cent per year, with an extra million people added. In 1961 national development planning was instituted, which

distributed the capital investments all over the country. However, immigrants continued to prefer Seoul, so the city added another million population at a rate of growth of 7 to 8 per cent per year, although a number of small cities exceeded Seoul's power of attraction during this period. Since 1966, the people in those smaller cities have been moving on to Seoul, thus opening up niches for their successors from the countryside, but most migrated directly from the village. Seoul still grows by about 8 per cent per year, which means absorbing 250,000 to 300,000 immigrants each year and there is no sign as yet of a diminished demand for entry.

Why do they come? No longer are their urgencies compounded by homelessness or incompatibility with an alien administration, as in the 1950's. More than 80 per cent of the immigrants indicate economic motives when they are surveyed, the remainder primarily mention educational opportunity and medical facilities. The villages no longer seem to be able to accommodate the population explosion that has occurred in the countryside, even after extensive land reform. The second and third sons volunteer for the Army, or work on contract for construction gangs, some even in Japan. They begin to experience what the city has to offer and acquire confidence that they can put their newly acquired skills to work. Many, of course, have a brother or an uncle already in the metropolis, so one need only bring them presents and hope that they can help a man "looking for work" to find something that offers better prospects than the village.

A remarkably rapid acceleration of construction employment was assured by foreign aid in the beginning, yet support from overseas has been less important than in other countries such as Israel, and now has

a declining role as a stimulus to economic growth. Internal markets and foreign trade have risen to take their places as job creators.

At the time of writing, the "Special City" of Seoul has an estimated population of 4,800,000 people. The planners believe that it may level off at 15 million within two to three decades. This means that it is aiming at the dimensions of the New York City metropolitan area, as measured in population, although the income is expected to be about a fifth of current American levels and the physical equipment needed to sustain the residents will be an even smaller fraction. Foreseeing population equilibrium is reasonable, because the family planning program is beginning to have success, so that family size in Seoul itself seems to be under control already in more than half the city's households, and the crude birth rate is now close to 18 per 1000, or not much above that of California. Moreover, the eventual proportion of the capital region to the whole population of a small country -- a fifth or a quarter at equilibrium -- seems quite reasonable in the light of European, Latin American and Japanese experience with primate cities. The projections of the planners seem to be quite realistic when using all the tests we know how to apply.

Considering the average scale of development in South Korea, Seoul maintains an extraordinarily high level of income and standards for urban services. Reports to the countryside of the pay available to the full-time employee in Seoul probably trickle out in a more credible fashion than do the prices people pay. The level of per capita income is about 1.9 times that of the rest of the country and about three times that of the villages and towns. This means that Seoul has managed to produce jobs for the immigrants at least as rapidly as they have been arriving. Prices for services in Seoul are almost as high as in Japan,

and generally exceed those in places that have developed further, such as Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong and Taipei.

A number of reasons can be advanced for the high incomes and high prices in the Capital. Foremost, perhaps, has been greater rationality in pay scales for civil servants and governmental contractors than in other places. Salaries were so low as to require independent income or corruption, but 30 per cent raises have been instituted across the board in the past two years. Another is that the rate of inflation has been tolerable during the past fifteen years, so that salary structures have not been completely upset. One other factor has been the absurdly high cost of rent due to the extreme increases in land value (about 40% per year). In addition, a dualistic society has been maintained, whereby many hundreds of thousands of people living in areas just outside the old city walls who were delegated the dirty jobs in the city -- operating abattoirs, tanning hides, salvage and dung collection -- exist at levels more or less at equilibrium with agriculture. Its population is made up of hereditary outcasts, criminals, ex-communists and illiterates. This substratum does not seem to be growing as rapidly as the city itself.

Yet these arguments are quite unsatisfactory. They do not explain the extraordinary differential in earning power between metropolis and village that is maintained despite the remarkable immigration. Some bias must be built into the national development plan that favors the maintenance of high incomes for established people. It may only be the consequence of "economic rationality," since Seoul continues to generate the best benefit-cost ratios on new projects and to put forward the most competent entrepreneurs. Therefore, projects in and around Seoul continue to be selected, even though there are political pressures from other regions for development projects. These are guesses, and

further inquiry aimed at confirming them leads to confusion among the people I interrogated. Even the intellectuals here think in terms of cliches as produced by the government or by its loyal opposition. What is worse, they are usually recognizable as derivatives of American cliches, and so even less persuasive.

The Image of Seoul

The new immigrants see Seoul as the "fish in the rice bowl." (Because fish is exported to Japan it tends to be more expensive than meat, and much more expensive than fish in the United States; rice is allowed to be served only five days a week, so it too has premium value.) It is also the place to collect a prestigious diploma. For those who took history in middle school, it is known as the capital of the Yi Dynasty, which had ruled Korea continuously for over 500 years before it was finally subjugated by Japan in 1910. The royal palaces have been carefully maintained.

Many of the royal gardens became city parks but have recently been invaded by government offices. The park facilities were rebuilt to accommodate masses of children so that the parks themselves are now more serviceable than before, but only vestiges of the traditional images are left. Mt. Nam in Namsan Park remains, however, as the place from which one can see a panorama of Seoul. Its publicity boasts about a cableway up to the shrine at the peak. There is also a zoo in the hills to the north of the city on the grounds of a second place.

The national capital has a dome, as all capital buildings of its era should, but it states only that it is government, and has nothing sublime or mystical about it. The solid gray trapezoidal Seoul City Hall says much the same thing for itself. Other government buildings are places to work and nothing more. I have seen not a single piece of exciting architecture here, old or new. Even Taipei has more lasting modern imagery than Seoul, although Seoul's ordinary standard for new housing is higher.

What does the tourist see? Again we find that even a minor export industry, such as tourism, is well organized in Korea. The

conscientious visitor can find a number of volumes of first class photographs -- the kind that treat a cultural object so well that it is hardly recognized later when viewed in situ. Because the truly popular images must be portrayed repeatedly, they should show up in the tourism monthly. Its publisher has had the initiative to bring in three Peace Corpsmen to find and catalog the events of the month, lecture to countrymen about polite behavior in Korea and straighten out tangled syntax. It records the following: colorful Buddhist temples, Confucian shrines and visits to the palace museums are highlighted as tourist features. The latter appear to the unsophisticated to be designed in a kind of colonial Chinese style and not without reason, because for thousands of years Korean rulers paid tribute to the Emperor of China who legitimized appointments but did not interfere militarily. The cultural deference shown during this period was much greater, so official and sacred buildings conformed to the accepted tastes in Peking at the time. The forts at the gates of the old city have been preserved and are noted in the passing. On a standard short tour of the metropolis, the defenseless tourist is also shown a brassware factory, an exhibition hall (railroad progress this September), the Korea trade promotion office, a Freedom Center and a women's university. During September, with its many brilliant autumn days and afternoon temperatures in the high 70's, produces the suggestion that the tourist should not even be in Seoul when the mountains to the east are so beautiful. Seoul is a delight only to the person who is thrilled by the prospect of progress and by rising structures that have been quite successfully planned and coordinated. The true image of Seoul today is change; since virtually all of it is in the process of becoming, it is anticipated that practically none has yet arrived.

The Educational Prize in Korea

Educational achievement is greatly stressed in Korea for reasons that are more similar to those in China than in Japan. In China, the formal examinations for the civil service were highly classical and required a great deal of time and discipline on the part of a reasonably apt student, but a village often sponsored one of its bright boys during his studies so that the new entrants were not all drawn from the 1 to 2 per cent that constituted leisured classes. In Japan, education was the most common function of the retired samurai, and ordinary villagers, even girls, were educated along with the children of the samurai and the landowners, so that education became widespread in Japan as a direct outgrowth of the rise of a nation-state from a fragmented feudal population. In the absence of revolution, the warrior class was free to teach. In Korea the acquisition of education led traditionally to the yangban status, a kind of mandarinship achieved by passing an examination (kwako). However, access to the examination was rather early restricted to persons who could demonstrate no illegitimacy in the family line for four generations. A Japanese invasion in 1592 somewhat modified this ruling by allowing access by achievement, e.g., bringing in the head of a Japanese general or providing arms for the troops. Those excluded from the examination demonstrated repeatedly over the centuries, arguing that they should also be admitted. Finally, just before the successful Japanese invasion (1910), the reform was legally achieved.

Japanese influence then tended to lay down a prestige pathway through the schools, with critical examinations at every step. Some schools maintained a significantly higher performance, so that students had an inside track to government posts. Thus, competition for the preferred schools became extreme, and many sacrifices were made by family

and student alike to gain entry. Virtually all of these schools were in Seoul itself. The future social status of the family depended upon the school from which its sons matriculated; the situation was said to be far worse than the public school system of England. Thus the paragraph in the Annual Report of the Minister of Education stating that the examination for entering the middle school was abolished and students would move freely into middle school was as radical a change as repealing the "elevens's" examinations in England and fraught with even more political peril. But the Minister had the evidence to show that the stress at the age of eleven in Korea caused a lag in physical development and led to a slighter and more nervous citizen. This has changed the power structure in the school system, since it is now the middle school teachers who get extra "tuition" by coaching slower students in their homes. They are now making more money than University teachers.

Despite the rapid growth of Seoul, the capacity of the schools is keeping up, perhaps at the expense of the quality of education in the rest of the nation because teachers scheme to get appointed in Seoul even though the cost of living is so much higher. The school construction program seems well organized, so that average class size is slowly declining. Statistics show that 96 per cent of all students of elementary school population are in school, which leaves a standard number of blind, deaf and feeble-minded outside the system. There is also an interesting excess of about 5000 boys in each age class which must have been sent from the countryside to live in boarding schools or with relatives so as to get a head start in Seoul schools.

Junior high school is divided into two kinds, middle and technical. In 1967 about 71% of the students in the appropriate cohorts were

enrolled. Surprisingly, the girls have a slight edge in enrollment over boys, even when night technical school is taken into account, which means that a major shift has occurred in the status of women within the metropolis. This is particularly significant because even the public schools are expensive to attend, so the family must invest cash in the education of their daughters without hope of receiving adequate return.

Enrollment in the senior ("general") high schools now means that the student has serious intentions of proceeding to the university. The entrance examination is currently the big hurdle that every ambitious student must anticipate, but here the boys are still favored by a 55:45 ratio. About 32 per cent of the cohorts were admitted to senior high school in 1967, a figure likely to be raised in succeeding years.

A close look at the cohorts yet to come in Seoul indicates that the recent successes in family planning are about to pass on a dividend that will probably be spent raising the quality of education provided by the system.

<u>Year of Birth</u>	<u>Cohort Size (000's)</u>
1961	107
1962	115
1963	101
1964	97
1965	85

The two succeeding years (1966, 1967) appear to be faulty due to confusions between the lunar calendar and the official, and to the traditional way of counting age as being one year at birth, but supposedly corrected for in the tabulation. Nevertheless, the cohort size seems to be down to about 70 to 75 thousand. Schools must be rebuilt, however, because the students are now much larger for their age than before, achieving almost European rates of growth in stature in this generation;

also, educational standards are being raised and that will require a reduction in noise levels as well as the addition of playing fields.

Half of the students in institutions of higher education in Korea are living in Seoul. This number (86,000 in 1967) is now levelling off but continuous additions are being made to the teaching staff and new graduate enrollment is concentrated in the capitol.

This impressive level of educational attainment suggests that Seoul's schooling is not behind that of Tokyo when it was at the same level of income (but twice the size), and Tokyo has hitherto been preeminent in this respect in world history (although if we had the numbers for Moscow, they would be expected to be comparable).

Decisions about the pace of educational development in Korea were reached by Koreans, but the strategy is a result of extensive consultation with Americans. The Ministry of Education is one of the departments in the Korean government that puts out an annual report in English. It has also created a Central Education Research Institute (CERI) which has undertaken a program of international exchange on matters of educational administration and has assigned the CERI the task of planning the improvement of quality throughout the whole system.

Most unexpected, however, is the recent establishment of an Institute for Research in Behavioral Sciences. Its duties are to expedite talent identification, but its terms of reference include "research on child development, social development, organization development and test development." The major studies it has already launched are in the construction of tests for science aptitude, validation of tests for differential aptitude, creative ability measurements and critical thinking. They are also concerned with the effects of cultural deprivation on cognitive development -- a cross-cultural check on studies surrounding

Operation Headstart in American ghettos. Behavioral science is expected to take the stress out of the examinations, thus permitting measurements of something more than stamina.

A publication for instruction in the English language was obtained for about the same level as the new collection found in Thailand several weeks ago. Entitled "The Monthly English" (October 1969), this magazine has a Van Gogh cover showing a golden pastoral scene. Something like 80 per cent of the print is in Korean, as compared to 10 per cent Thai in the recent publication from Thailand. Thus, it is not surprising that English generated by Koreans is troubled by multiple lapses, mostly explained by the inadequacy of direct translation from the mother tongue.

Koreans nevertheless demand far more sophistication. For instance, their squibs of news deal with the Miss World contest, race relations in the U.S., political hooliganism in Moscow and cartoons about moon men discussing American litter. The poem published is a romantic frill by Shelley; the political item is concerned with the assassination of Rasputin; the western classics are represented by commentaries on the role of grasshoppers in the life of the Greek gods and the invention of the term "bad egg" by Shakespeare; the contemporary scene shows a newspaper story with picture and headline of the eighth coed slaying in Michigan this summer; the comic strips are The Flintstones and Emmy Lou; the gossip column treats of actor Lee Marvin's Las Vegas divorce and litigation, Ringo Starr of the Beatles on the matter of landscaping his mansion; a fable from Aesop; and lectures on manners with quite satisfying explanations as to the "reasons why." The aphorisms chosen for explanation are curious:

"Alexander himself was once a crying baby."

"Don't count your chickens before they are hatched."

"Talk of the devil and he will appear."

"A living dog is better than a dead lion."

"Good wine needs no bush."

"Never say die."

"Politics is no more a game than war."

About a hundred phrases are explained so that I see all our cliches springing up bold face and surrounded by Korean characters; e.g., "blind alley", "blue blood", "first lady of the land", "black sheep", "building castles in the air", "hot line", "cock and bull story", "Pentagon", "Scotland Yard". Slang is identified by choosing Korean forms such as "No, no, yes", "Don't six box", "five sun", "sandwich date", "10-10 do", "143 (I love you)". The short story with much clever talk is from Teen, published in the United States. Thereafter, a selection from Virginia Woolf is followed by "Lotus Blossom and Moon Flower," a piece from Reader's Digest on the disappearance of the Spanish gold into the Soviet Union after the Civil War. It closes with a discussion of the problem of career selection for girls and four pages of "word cards" to be used for studying or for contests like spelling bees -- beside, besides, beneath, benefit, best, bestow, block, black, blank, bold, bolt, etc. These are difficult discriminations for Koreans doing their best to master "the English."

The content of such a course in the general high school indicates that the Koreans have gone much further than anyone in Asia to make their education relevant to the times and to the popular culture. Perhaps the authorities have been conscious of the need to compete with a private enterprise, English Monthly, with the same bilingual ratio that caters to the young male culture. It teaches the double entendre, the various

forms of POW! expressed in words and simulated sounds and revels in shocks implicit in American racial conflict phenomena. Thus, English for the Korean offers an entry into a cosmopolitan world with all of its attractions and contradictions and not into a colonial Victorianism as in Hong Kong or Kuala Lumpur, the world of officialdom as in India and Pakistan, or the vistas of science as in Taiwan.

I can see now why the international firms such as Fairchild, Motorola, or Toshiba can build up production so rapidly in the Seoul area. This kind of education is raw material for effective organization. The reforms were massively introduced following the Military Revolution and the assembling of the administration President Park in 1962. The fruits should now be visible in the form of high productivity -- almost equal to the Japanese. It will also show up, however, in the formation of labor unions and in student politics. The present strong dependence upon authority to coordinate activities in a large organization, such as a bureau, agency, or a corporation, must be displaced very quickly by a policy of continuous consultation.

In Seoul, about a quarter of the high schools are closed at present, because students have been discovered agitating against the government and teachers have not been able to use their authority to restrain them. This inability to control students has been interpreted by the Minister of the Interior as unwillingness, so about forty of the most respected teachers were arrested last week for anti-government activities. The issue is merely the style by which the majority in the Parliament voted to have a referendum on Park's third term. However, since the parties are not allowed to disagree on matters of policy, the style of governing has become the principal support of legitimacy. Knots of soldiers, military policemen and plainclothesmen are standing around

all the paths by which one might reach the Ministry of Communications and the Capitol. There is no large-scale activity, but it is not as unobtrusive either as it was a few days ago, shortly after I arrived.

A new charter setting up goals for the reform of national education has been promulgated (Korea Journal, August, 1969, p. 5) and, as elsewhere in Asia, the order in the wording is important. Appearance of the key terms occurs as follows: sincere mind, strong body, develop innate faculty, national progress, creative power, pioneer spirit, public good, order, efficiency, quality, mutual assistance, love, respect, faithfulness, cooperation, individual growth, responsibility, freedom, rights, participate, building the nation. Then love of country, love of countrymen, democracy against communism, ideals of the free world, industrious, confidence, pride, make new history, collective wisdom. It was framed after a series of community meetings followed by a conference of leading professionals and is intended to effect a transition from "slaves of change" to "masters of progress."

Builders and Planners of the New Korea

The Ministry of Construction moves at a feverish pace. Responsibility for the installation of infrastructure for Seoul has been assigned to this highly organized body of engineers and planners. One can get a glimpse of what is in store for the "Special City" by going to the City Hall and viewing the stirring photos and renderings stretched along two sides of the building. There one can see weary slums displaced by white apartment blocks, roads that break through rocky ridges leaving spectacularly blasted cliffs on both sides of the future right of way and most incredible of all, is the intersection of a ring road with a radial road inside a mountain, so that the traffic exchange is carried out in tunnels.

(Apparently, the price of land has gone so high and the technology of tunnelling has improved so much, this is now an economical solution, particularly when the value as a bomb-shelter contributes to the "benefits.") Then there is the Mayor ("Bulldozer Kim" in yellow helmet) with his own pet project, the "new town in town" that will be constructed upon a rocky island and a reclaimed sand bar in the Han River.

But this is not "pie in the sky." The money is being found somewhere (government securities with a three-year term are paying 36% per year!), bids are let and the job goes ahead. Many strategies have been found for overcoming difficulties encountered with similar projects in other countries. For example, most cities are embarrassed by the fact that slums must be destroyed two years or more before the replacement housing can be ready. In Korea, most slums are on the hillside, where there is some access to water from wells. Therefore, the solution is to build a road to the top, construct the apartments there with greater accessibility than the slums highest on the hillside and work downwards. This means that for the people being moved there is no necessity to hunt for transitional homes. Because election year is next year many more apartments are scheduled for completion than ever before.

The predecessor of the Ministry of Construction in Japanese times was designated as the agency for implementing projects. This role was reinterpreted after World War II by the Corps of Engineers of the U.S. Military Government to include the planning of reconstruction. Thereafter, full claims were made for the physical planning effort in the Five Year Plan. Strong men occupying the post of Minister have accumulated powers for this agency that make it a prime force in planning as well as designing the projects. I was fortunate to obtain the "Guidelines for National Physical Plan" in English of sorts, put out by the Ministry in June 1969.

From the data employed it is evident that the original document was prepared two years ago and apparently has been in use over the intervening period.

For Seoul, the President, the Mayor and the economic planners decide what goes into the capital improvement budget and then the Mayor and the Minister decide on what jobs are to be done and when. The Koreans do not bother with a city council, because it would slow down the action. The physical planners then cost out alternative means for getting the job done and the project design with the best benefit-cost ratio is usually accepted.

It is hard to discover how the people react to this arbitrariness, but the planners resent it and allow their pique to show through on many occasions in their working documents. The policy planning is not being carried out by the principles learned at Syracuse, Pitt, Penn and other places in the United States. The people themselves have rarely had it better, since they have always been victims of those in power who wished to build monuments. Never before have the monuments resulted in such an improvement of creature comforts. Their sentiments are tapped by frequent small-scale polls conducted at the universities. Otherwise, they do submit petitions when conditions get bad. In the cost-benefit studies, it is interesting to note that their time is valued at 35¢ per hour as a bus passenger (or bicyclist) and 70¢ per hour for riders in cars. This is to be compared with \$3 to \$4 per hour for city people in the United States, based upon empirical study. Even at 35¢ per hour, human time is too valuable to force them to walk any distance to work or school. Calculations show that transportation systems can produce a lot of welfare.

Physical planning is coming into being by stages because suitable land-use data were not available before. Until recently, land was viewed

by government as a tax resource and not something to be conserved and developed. The first of the regional plans was the Seoul-Inchon Special Regional Plan designated in 1965, with the toll road and the harbor development as major projects. Since then, four other regional plans have been launched covering 22 per cent of the country, but the outline for the whole nation is also available. Therefore, the plans for Seoul can now be envisaged in the context of the development of the entire country.

What can I say about the document or the approach? Although it is a poor, misspelled translation, the text seems to apply clumsily what leading American universities have been teaching for the last ten years. Proper respect and credits are given to leaders, historical precedents and the sturdiness of the people, while the Japanese and the Communists are reviled for what they had done in the past, but then the guidelines get down to work by setting goals in terms of standards of living and targets for 1986. A national spatial order is elaborated, based upon four river basins. The urban-rural mix arrived at sets the number to be urbanized in the 1966 to 1986 period at 15 million people, thus calling for a "positive urban development policy."

One interesting problem encountered in Korea for land-use planning is the allocation of land to graves, since it restricts the growth of cities. Thus, a policy of land conservation includes encouraging cremation in funerals and the design of "cemetery parks." The land in Seoul used for burial urns required very careful clearing procedures with payments to families for removal, while extinct families were transferred to temples constructed for the purpose. Even then, the original land was said to be haunted and was slow to be developed. Land scarcity is so great, however, that the stranger cannot detect any differences in land-use

resulting from this history. Upon closer inspection, one might possibly find that many more Christians are residing there and doing business because they are not disturbed by Buddhist and mixed ritual spirits.

Everywhere in the document one sees comparisons with Western European countries and sometimes the United States -- the standards, the consumption levels, the organizational framework. This is the way both their advisers and their foreign-trained students had been taught and it does not often lead to error because that road to development has been heavily travelled and the traps previously encountered can be bypassed. This tendency to follow faithfully leads to a special problem, which Korea, particularly Seoul, will have to face in the 1970's -- the demand for "My-Car". The term is a Japanese neologism transmitted to Korea a few years ago (1964 ?) through advertising. It reflects the intense feeling of a materialistic society for the prize possession of all -- a private automobile. Most of the land readjustment is intended to raise circulation space in cities from 7.2 per cent at present to 20 per cent or more to accommodate the coming "My-Car" days. Because Korea has no petroleum of its own and the coal is quite expensive to convert to liquid fuels, foreign exchange problems are expected to frustrate this hope. At present they assemble their own taxis and cars, called Shinjin, with a line of buses and trucks as well, from about 70 per cent imported Japanese components.

Another kind of designed scarcity applies to the water and sanitation field, where it is planned to put flush toilets in 30 to 50 per cent of all buildings by 1986, despite water supply difficulties in dry seasons. Seoul is supposed to get a sewer system in the second five-year plan. This is realistic because the night soil-collection system will be breaking down then, due to the superiority of synthetic fertilizers for

growing food. Japan's experience provides a very helpful guide in this direction for development. Due to the cold winters in Seoul, Oswald's high-rate algae-culture ponds are not likely to work well here for sewage treatment and conversion, unless waste heat is available.

Emerging from these guidelines, a number of pieces of expediting and regulatory legislation affecting the organization of land use have been drafted. Included in them, with second priority, is a City Planning Act; a Road Act, as third; a Building Act as sixth; and provisions for Water Supply and Sewerage as seventh. Most of these acts will be tested in the courts, which remain quite independent of the executive, so the quality of the drafting is exceedingly important.

It would be interesting to see if the planners we now train, even those with Ph.D.'s, could assemble a significantly better program than the one the Ministry has prepared. Construction this year is up 117 per cent over last year and last year did not represent a slump. (These notes are written to a symphony of blasting air drills, clinking pick axes and percussive hammers in mid-Seoul; the physical evidence for those statistics is everywhere.)

One factor that has gone out of control is the land price level. Wholesale prices have moved upward during the periods of maximum growth at a steady rate but land has skyrocketed. Speculators seem to be assuming already the values implicit in a metropolitan size of 15,000,000 persons (Table V).

I carried out an analysis of the transport use in connection with land that had a mixed residential-commercial-manufacturing use. This is part of the city that is very similar to parts of Taito-ku in Tokyo,

TABLE V
CHANGES IN LAND PRICE IN KOREA 1961-68
Won/Pyung*

	Seoul			Pusan			Rural		Wholesale Price Index
	Commercial	Residential	Industrial	Commercial	Residential	Industrial	Field	Paddy	
1961	21,650	5,062	-	9,088	3,275	-	-	-	51.2
1962	49,063	5,719	-	28,444	4,626	-	-	-	56.0
1963	64,187	6,800	-	29,555	5,860	2,960	108	158	67.5
1964	120,545	13,016	2,500	41,388	11,250	6,375	144	182	90.5
1965	117,000	19,777	-	54,900	9,033	5,800	236	263	100.0
1966	-	-	3,000	-	-	-	-	-	108.8
1967	-	41,555	-	114,500	19,425	13,400	328	506	115.8
1968	313,181	50,111	5,500	124,660	32,166	12,250	350	348	123.1

Source: Monthly Construction Statistics, Vol. 1, No. 1, Ministry of Construction, Seoul, Korea, August 1968, p. 97.

*1 pyung = 1 Japanese tsubo = 35.6 square feet = 3.3 square meters, so that one divides the above figures by 6361 in order to get dollars per square feet at existing exchange rates. The peak payments for land in Seoul in 1969 seem to be \$472 per square foot for commercial land, \$80 per square foot for residential land.

which were studied by Hoshino and myself three years ago.¹⁴ The land value then would be the equivalent for Seoul of today (\$10 to \$20 per square foot). It is also comparable to parts of New Delhi, Taipei and Kanpur that were analyzed over the last year, at least with respect to function if not land value. Seoul is distinguished by the mixing of the role of the bicycle so that it operates both a passenger vehicle and as a two-wheel cart that carries up to 300 kg. in a trip. A higher proportion of the passengers use the bus in Seoul since bus capacity does manage to keep up with demand most of the time. Climate is a factor that also favors bus transport, although one must also remember that only a few years ago Koreans were almost without buses yet kept an urban economy stumbling ahead. Thus, a strong cultural factor seems to be involved in the choice of vehicular mode (Table VI).

There are some notable differences between Seoul and other metropolises. In the observed area, at least a third of all bicycle use appeared to have light goods delivery as its prime purpose. Motor-bicycles appeared to be operated by a young owner of a shop or someone with a responsible position. In Korea it did not appear to be proper for young women to ride the second seat. The backpack coolie is unique to Korea because women carry loads on their heads, but men have a sturdy wooden A-frame pack rack, sometimes with a folding basket attached, which allows them to deliver goods even in a crowded market place. The coolie seems to be far more prevalent than is indicated by the statistics, perhaps because he is encountered as a pedestrian rather than a vehicle. The three-wheel truck is the same as the kind that was popular in the 1950's

¹⁴R. L. Meier and Ikumi Hoshino, "Adjustments to Metropolitan Growth in an Inner Tokyo Ward," Journal of the American Institute of Planners XXXIV, July 1968, pp. 210-222; ibid, XXXV, January 1969, pp. 2-9, "Cultural Growth and Urban Development in Urban Tokyo."

TABLE VI
VEHICULAR USE IN SEOUL
(Adjacent to Wholesaling Area)

<u>Passenger Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Proportion</u>	<u>Share of Capacity</u>	<u>Relative¹ Unit Cost</u>	<u>Index of Capitalization</u>
Bicycles	150	60%	31%	1	30
Motorbikes	24	10	8	10	80
Passenger Car	75	30	62	30	<u>1860</u>
TOTAL:					2000 ²

<u>Goods Movement</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Proportion</u>	<u>Share of³ Capacity</u>	<u>Cost per Vehicle</u>	<u>Capital per ton-mile-day Capacity</u>
Backpack Coolie	17	10	2	\$ 5	\$ 5
Bicycle (allocated)	50	-	8	20	4
Cart	119	70	31	60	10
Truck 3-Wheel	6	4	9	3,000	13
Light Van or Jeep	15	9	10	2,000	16
Truck, heavy	12	7	38	5,000	7

1. Multiples of a bicycle valued at \$20.
2. Compare with an equivalent index for the advanced parts of Seoul and Western Europe, where the index is 2500-3000 Old Delhi at 800 and subsistence level market towns at 250.
3. This sets the coolie's capacity at 100 kg for 20 km, the cart at 300 kg for the same distance, the 3-wheeler at 1500 kg for 150 km, the light van at 500 kg for 250 km and the heavy truck at 5000 kg for 150 km.

in Japan but has now virtually disappeared there; the most common version is equipped with a large bed about a foot deep that can be used for building materials. The enclosed "jeepu" is exceedingly popular in Seoul and is used even more than the light van because it is much more an all-weather vehicle.

The two-wheeled cart has been left to the end because it is a far more efficient vehicle for drayage in restricted areas, perfectly designed for settlement patterns with 7 to 12 per cent circulation space. It is basically a steel pipe frame for a box that could be as large as a cubic meter, but is usually half that size. It has wire wheels the same diameter as a bicycle but the rim width is twice the diameter. Although less graceful than the Tokyo version, it is better suited to hills, because the tail can be dragged as a brake. It is normally pulled, but is readily pushed by a second person when a hill must be overcome. It offers an ideal form of goods transport for those parts of the city built up earlier to a one-to-two floor average.

The decision to plan a subway for the central section of Seoul has apparently been reached at the time of this writing. Most documents have treated the subject very gingerly, partly because it will be a feather in the cap of the Ministry of Construction. Again it appears that the new efficiency of tunnelling in homogeneous rock is the deciding factor. It will be a short subway that will cross in midtown, one corridor being extended to the harbor and the back-of-the-port industries to the west and the other to the satellite town of Suwon on the main route south. Very likely it was the problem of finding outside capital that held the project in abeyance for so long. The presence of the subway, together with the very new housing estates, will create new subcenters in Seoul. The Ministry has the power to use the profits from subcenter

development for financing the subway because the precedent has been established by the Ministry's advertised sale of luxury houses with lots on a lakeside tract near Suwon to help finance the toll road to the south. The subway will require much more attention to integrate urban design than has taken place thus far in the Ministry.

Is the Growth Process Unbalanced?

One of the indirect, but potent, reasons for the increase in migration to cities has been the radical reduction in morbidity during the 1960's. A survey in 1964 found 23% ill, while a similar survey in 1968 identified only 10% in the sick category. The death rate among workers dropped from 22 to 9 per thousand. Although a cholera epidemic was raging while I was in Seoul, the casualties were very light. The reduction in the prevalence of dysentery, worms and other intestinal diseases, together with tuberculosis, accounts for most of the improvement. Thus, physical pathology has been strikingly reduced over the past few years and probably social pathology as well, because we know that there are close linkages between them. This vastly improved health of the masses might then reveal certain intractable conditions which refuse to diminish and may easily rise to serious levels of incidence. For example, families may be breaking up in the course of urbanization so that the traditional social security system may fail for an important fraction of the population. To check on these aspects of urbanization, I was able to obtain an English version of a document entitled "Major Policies on Health, Social Welfare and Labor Affairs" put out by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (July 1969).

One index to be reviewed is the amount of juvenile delinquency. The data show a steep rise up to 1963, then a two-year plateau, followed

within two years by a remarkable dropoff to about half. The improvement is ascribed to the improvement in economic conditions in the cities. Reports of runaway children also declined significantly in the 1964-67 period. Normally, one looks at data like this very skeptically, because the figures are highly susceptible to subtle changes in reporting behavior or in orders given to police rather than the objective condition of the society. However, the internal evidence adds to the credibility of the data. For example, in the relatively prosperous year of 1967, as much as 34% of delinquency was ascribed to poverty, which means that the youth were caught stealing or going into prostitution when they were in rags or threatened with hunger. Breakup of the home due to death, remarriage, conflict, criminal conviction and abandonment was held responsible for 44% of the delinquency. Very likely the increased availability of technical high schools during the 1960's was partly responsible for the reduction in delinquency, because it kept the boys off the streets at a critical age. Therefore, one may conclude with a fair amount of confidence that the improvement in economic conditions combined with the further elaboration of educational institutions should bring about extra reductions in teenage delinquency. The licensed "fallen women" are mostly from rural areas and constant in number. One may conclude, therefore, that the growth has been reasonably well-balanced if it is judged by means of data on family breakdown.

Nor is crime considered a problem. Professional people do not seem to be seriously concerned about crime. For example, the elaborate measures employed by Hong Kong apartment dwellers in self-defense (barbed wire barriers to prevent the climbing of poles and trees, etc.) were not in evidence. Fights break out on the streets at least as often as in America, but they are between people who have known each other for some time.

A small item in the paper indicating that a roundup of hoodlums had netted 12,000 arrests in the previous month is a good indication that crime data are worthless as a basis for assessing the health of the society and will only reflect law enforcement policies.

Sometimes, when a powerless portion of the population is neglected in the course of development, they resort to spiritualism or the use of the supernatural. In Seoul the practitioners are licensed and must renew annually. So we see a gradual increase in witches, wizards, diviners, palmists, physiognomists, graveyard selectors and sutra-chanters, but not in proportion to population increase. Certainly no significant change is detectable. An alternative is retreat into narcotics, but the statistics in law enforcement show an erratic decline in arrests in that area.

Traffic accidents have multiplied, however, although the data appear in part to be due to improved organization of the police from 1966 onward. Deaths have dropped off since then, although lesser casualties continue to build up slowly. The risk of injury per mile travelled appears to have declined by a factor of four or five in the 1960-67 interval.

Transport bottlenecks had been met by a variety of measures. A major program for pedestrian overhead and underpass crossings of busy streets is now almost complete. The street cars were retired last year. The tollroad to Inchon is working, as is the expressway to the South. The railroads provide a Japanese standard of service, but this is now becoming old-fashioned and requires careful operations research and redesign. Such a project is nearing completion. The number of automobiles on the road is becoming unbalanced but it is rumored that a new tax bill is in the making and a higher excise tax on cars could easily

be justified (as elsewhere it is about 100% at present). The annual growth in telephones in service is currently proceeding at a breakneck 20-25% pace. Electric power is now sufficient, so no tendency to produce blackouts at peak periods is noted, but new plants must be started almost yearly.

A glance at the economic indicators did give a few twinges of alarm. The amount of money in circulation was rising at the rate of 2% per month. Virtually all the coinage had disappeared so that a tremendous number of 10 won notes (worth 3.5¢) were changing hands. Inflation seemed to be barely under control. One hoped that the people in the Economic Planning Board were not making any miscalculations, yet everyone admitted that they were highly competent in using the tools of the quantitative economists.

The principal imbalance applies to the country as a whole, rather than Seoul, although the region of Seoul will bear the brunt of the readjustment. The data were found in Tokyo (Economic Statistics Monthly, July 1969, p. 105) but are revised to be applicable to Korea (Table VII).

It should be promptly pointed out that "invisible" flows due to three-way trade, tourism, remittances of overseas workers, reparations, insurance and other factors that normally restore a balance are not significant in this relationship. The difference is made up from services to foreign troops, foreign aid, foreign loans and extensions of credit from Japanese suppliers -- but mostly from the latter, due to certain automatic provisions in the Japanese MITI guarantees of bank loans for financing foreign trade.

The Japanese Economic Planning Agency has constructed a series of very sophisticated indicators of conditions and prospects in the economy of Japan which are called "warning signals", where the indicators

TABLE VII
KOREAN COMMERCE WITH JAPAN (U.S.\$)

	<u>Exports to Japan</u>	<u>Imports from Japan</u>
Total 1968 (Calendar Year)	\$101,630	\$602,653
December 1968	10,075	72,574
January 1969	7,118	32,545
February	6,171	40,712
March	7,653	68,145
April	7,015	90,504
May	9,290	83,516
Est. 1969	120,000	750,000
	<u>Unfavorable Balance</u>	
Fiscal Year 1968	\$501,023,000	
Fiscal Year 1969	630,000,000 (est.)	

are red if some kind of constraining action needs to be taken, orange if borderline, and green if some lifting of restraints on business is required. This agency has even superimposed an index of the indexes. In the last monthly report the Japanese planners have identified none of this imbalance by their system of indicators and their summary signals say "Don't rock the boat. We're all right, Jack!", as they have for five quarters in a row. Yet their figures show an extraordinary rise in Japanese foreign exchange reserves from July 1968 to July 1969 of \$962 million, more than the accumulation of the preceding five years (Economic Statistics, Vol. 12, Japan, July 1969, p. viii).

The surplus has been built up by granting credits to firms in just those metropolises I had detected earlier as being boosted by "Japanization," a process which has greatly accelerated this year beyond the levels it had achieved when its local impact was first identified as

a phenomenon worth more thorough study (Table VIII). The trends in trade in the first half of 1969 are exacerbating the imbalance that had suddenly become very large last year.

TABLE VIII
CONTRIBUTION OF BILATERAL TRADE
TO FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES GAIN OF JAPAN
(Calendar Year 1968)

	<u>Per Cent</u>
Korea	56
Hong Kong	45
Thailand	24
Philippines	-2
Malaysia & Singapore	-27
Indonesia	-12

(Total: \$836 million)

Solutions to the difficulty based upon theory are readily proposed. However, they will require some drastic local readjustments and some severe reorganizations of institutions. The initiative really must rest with Japan which must decide at some point that it will no longer extend credit to countries unable to expand exports. At the rate things are going they must blow the whistle in less than a year. A team from MITI is working on the problem of increasing Japanese imports from these countries. Its diplomatic contingent was in Bangkok in August and will no doubt face up to the most difficult problem in Seoul shortly. For the most part, however, the Japanese were still thinking along traditional lines and spent most of their effort trying to boost raw materials production for the expanding industries of Japan. Any analysis of commodity price trends in food stuffs, wood and natural fibers, as

compared to manufactured products, will demonstrate that there is little to be gained in that direction.¹⁵ The lags in getting output of sufficient quality (as in bananas, for example) are something like five years. In Korea they may be even greater. At any rate, one concludes from the public statements that Japan feels much less urgency at the moment than do the deficit countries.

This may mean that a revaluation of the yen is likely to be undertaken later this year to bring Japan's overall trade closer to balance. An increase in value of about 10 to 15 per cent seems reasonable. Such an adjustment will not solve the problem of Korea, however, nor those of Thailand and Taiwan, particularly in the light of the prospective American withdrawal from Vietnam. After ticking off all the other potential remedies, two remain as likely strategies:

1. Direct investment in Korea.
2. Marketing products made with Korean labor.

The German-Swiss-Swedish solution, that of bringing in foreign nationals to operate the home industries and allowing them to send remittances from earnings, seems to be ruled out by cultural considerations. The Japanese were obviously happy to get rid of their Korean workers a few years ago and do not want them back.

Carrying out the first policy implies Japanese investments in hotels (this has begun), refineries, petrochemicals, fertilizers, power plants, steel fabrication and computers instead of expanding facilities on the Japanese islands. They also imply setting up labor-intensive assembly plants in electronics, garments and household equipment, which can be exported not only to Japan but elsewhere in the world via Japanese

¹⁵This conclusion is confirmed independently by the Far East Economic Review, Vol. 38, September 18, 1969, pp. 692-3.

marketing organizations. More than that, the fierce independence of the Koreans will force them to invent new institutional arrangements that keep the Japanese banks and managers far in the background with even fewer controls over operations than are maintained by U.S.-based transnational corporations.

The second policy is already being expedited in conjunction with Japanese electronics and food-processing firms. Fortunately, the expansion of these labor-intensive technologies will be spurred on by new developments just emerging from the R&D laboratories.

These are organizational innovations that must be invented and learned very quickly. If the Japanese fail, or the Koreans start quarreling among themselves and are unable to accept the new role vis-a-vis Japan, construction in Seoul would come to a near standstill, unemployment would jump, real estate sales would stop, banks would need shoring up and the immigration would halt. It is the sort of jolt that Hong Kong went through in 1965 and again in 1967, although for different reasons, yet managed to recover from very quickly. Seoul's planning has been more balanced than Hong Kong's so I give better-than-even odds that it will come through the crisis successfully and actually achieve the kind of status projected for it by the physical planners.

Conclusions

Seoul is a metropolis that has reduced to practice the combination of physical planning, human resource development and economic evaluation that is advocated in theory by American graduate schools. The principal deviation from theory, its slowness to develop community participation in the planning, has probably accelerated the rate of growth in regional income. Some leaders in Korea recognized that in a society with an

Asian tradition, personal authority and responsibility combined with some charisma would gain more cooperation from the urban masses than the experience of full participation in policy choices. This means that other forms of feedback to the decision-makers must take the place of community-generated support. In Seoul a comprehensive body of statistics covering behavior and performance of the population has provided such a substitute. Thus, despite the record-breaking growth in income in Seoul-Inchon (an annual increase in gross regional product in excess of 25% per year for the last two years, after six years at 13-20% growth levels!), the internal structure of the development is reasonably well-balanced. Every society has its developmental blind spots, but in the Seoul region these have been so small or trivial that they are not readily detected.

The recent acceleration in urban and regional development is ascribed to a "Japanization" stage superimposed upon the American-led international influence on Korean affairs. That phase seems to be leading to a serious imbalance in international payments. Redressing the balance will require much greater initiative on the part of the Japanese than they seem willing thus far to take. Thus, the most serious factors governing the future of Seoul lie outside the control, or even influence, of its planners. If the Japanese delay as much as a year, Seoul is expected to experience a sharp crisis, along with loss of confidence, unemployment and cessation of immigration.

Two policies, when taken together, seem to have potentials for minimizing the impact upon welfare and stimulating a recovery. The first is large-scale capital investment by Japanese firms in Korea, particularly in capital-intensive manufacturing and services. These investments must have a lag of only months between the time a decision is

made and the time that the period of heavy investment begins. The second presumes a continuing labor shortage in Japan that allows its firms to sub-contract in Korea on labor-intensive light manufacturing and services. No limitation can be found in the developing infrastructure of Seoul that prevents rapid adoption of these policies. The gravest foreseeable difficulty is the fervent nationalism in Korea, but this can be met by making small improvements upon the organizational methods of holding companies of American and European transnational corporations that insure the relative independence of the Korean manager on day-to-day affairs. Thus, Seoul may pay a price for its record rate of expansion but problems on the horizon appear soluble.