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Multiculturalism in the Age of Immigration: Diversity, Cultural Rights, and Potential
Conflict

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Sociology

by

Ronald C. Kwon

June 2018

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The Dissertation of Ronald C. Kwon is approved:

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The text of this dissertation, in part or in full, is a reprint of the material as it appears the *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* [Ronald Kwon and Michaela Curran 2016]. The co-author (Michaela Curran) listed in that publication provided data, formatted tables, and provided a brief explanation of country-level measures.

The text of this dissertation, in part or in full, is a reprint of the material as it appears the *Journal of International Migration and Integration* [Ronald Kwon, Brigitte Flores, and Haydee Yonamine 2018]. The co-authors (Brigitte Flores and Haydee Yonamine) listed in that publication calculated the index of dissimilarity for half the counties.

The text of this dissertation, in part or in full, is a reprint of the material as it appears *Ethnicities* [Ronald Kwon and Elizabeth Hughes 2018]. The co-author (Elizabeth Hughes) listed in that publication provided a brief explanation of measures.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Multiculturalism in the Age of Immigration: Diversity, Cultural Rights, and Potential Conflict

by

Ronald C. Kwon

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Sociology
University of California, Riverside, June 2018
Dr. Matthew C. Mahutga, Chairperson

In this dissertation, I examine the role of multicultural policies and how they intersect in three salient areas of support for social policy, residential segregation, and attitudes towards homosexuality. Multiculturalist policies emphasize cultural accommodation for immigrants through legal protections and can often take the form of constitutional recognition, dual citizenship, and multilingual education in schools for immigrant groups. Multiculturalism promises to facilitate integration and expand social boundaries to increasingly recognize immigrants as an important component of the national citizenry. However, the literature is far from clear about its effects. Indeed, it is incredibly contentious. Critics argue that multicultural policies encourage integration into ethnic over mainstream institutions. In turn, such policies have important effects for both natives and immigrant groups. Critics suggest that immigrants would not assimilate, live parallel

lives, and experience sharp cultural divisions from mainstream values. For natives, critics argue multicultural policies reify ethnic boundaries, and thereby reduce support for social policies. These concerns are particularly important in age where discourses of welfare retrenchment are highly visible.

Proponents strongly disagree. An opposing scholarship suggests that multiculturalist policies improve integration outcomes and promote a largely positive message of the impact of immigration for host societies. In turn, not only would multicultural policies facilitate integration, but also reduce the boundaries of “otherness” that immigrants face in host societies. There are strikingly few empirical studies that adjudicate between these two camps. This is unfortunate given the enormous space immigration occupies within modern political discourse. Overall, there remains mixed findings with multicultural policies increasing support for social policy but having little impact for residential segregation and attitudes towards homosexuality for immigrant groups. However, the findings are incongruent with narratives that suggest that multiculturalist policies facilitate negative social consequences.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The turn of the twenty-first century may be one increasingly shaped by the divisions over immigration. Nativity gaps in employment, educational attainment, and instances of social unrest involving large numbers of first and second-generation immigrants in the United Kingdom and France have rekindled debates over immigrant integration. The controversy surrounding immigration continues to generate lingering questions over access, inclusion, and the in/ability of the state to foster a strong sense of national identity in the face of rising immigration, shifts in migration patterns away from European countries, and relative declines in the skills of incoming immigrants in comparison to past periods of mass migration (Borjas 1995; Waldinger and Lichter 2003; Vertovec 2007).

Profound changes in immigration dynamics to rich democracies (Vertovec 2007), coincided with new policy scripts aimed to facilitate immigrant integration were in their early stages of development and implementation (Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Koopmans 2013). Rich democracies have historically devoted little time, energy, and policy directives to facilitate immigrant incorporation. Rather, host societies largely assumed integration would to a certain degree, inevitably unfold over time (Alba and Nee 2009; Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Gordon 1964). Today, nearly all affluent democracies institute some form of integration or civic policy with the explicit goal of expediting positive integration outcomes (Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Goodman 2015; Goodman and Wright 2015; Koopmans 2013; Mouritsen 2013).

Across rich democracies, immigrant integration has become a hot button issue within affluent democracies. Wide variation in immigrant outcomes stimulated two broad perspectives centered on the human and social capital immigrants bring to bear on the labor market (Borjas 1995; Chiswick and Miller 2002; Nee and Sanders 2001), as well as the context of reception to explain integration gaps (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997). First, human capital and classical assimilation theories implicate educational attainment and acculturation as important predictors of successful economic integration. Over time, immigrants are better able to parlay or acquire human capital within host countries, thereby more effectively leveraging their economic position within host societies (Chiswick and Miller 2002). A second line of reasoning suggests that the context of reception within host countries critically influence the experiences immigrants have with discrimination and prejudice in the labor market (Cohen and Kogan 2007). In this dissertation, I examine the relatively underexamined dimension of government policies, and how they may intersect with well-established individual and contextual mechanisms to shape integration outcomes.

The swift and unprecedented repositioning of the state's role within the integration process, along with relatively recent advances in comparative measures of integration policies, provide unique opportunities for researchers to assess the link between policies and outcomes across diverse domains. Prior studies have examined gender inequality (Kwon, Mahutga, and Admire 2017), trust/social policy (Citrin et al. 2014; Kesler and Bloemraad 2014; Kwon and Curran 2016; Sumino 2014), and political participation (Bloemraad 2006; Bloemraad and Wright 2014; Wright and Bloemraad

2012). These contributions theoretically outline and empirically support contentions that integration policies matter, for better or for worse, in shaping immigration outcomes (see Ng and Bloemraad 2015).

However, to the extent integration policies should matter for integration outcomes—scholars remain divided. Some scholars strongly suggest that integration policies, particularly multiculturalism, act to perpetuate an immigrant underclass and facilitates negative integration outcomes (Koopmans 2010). On one side of the debate, critics contend cultural policies entail “trade-offs” that foster negative externalities that unintentionally work against positive assimilatory forces that facilitate upward mobility for immigrants (Koopmans 2010).

Competing positions suggest that integration policies reduce discrimination and prejudicial attitudes towards immigrants, thereby facilitating positive integration outcomes (Kwon et al. 2017; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). Others further argue these gains are particularly important for immigrants who maintain a strong ethnic identity (Bisin et al., 2011). A final perspective suggests that integration policies, particularly those that emphasize punitive approaches, serve a largely symbolic gatekeeping function but have little real impact on employment levels (Goodman and Wright 2015).

Current studies provide mixed evidence; however, I argue they are limited in their scope and noticeably silent in three key areas. Although multicultural policies are often ostensibly argued to shape immigrant integration outcomes, much less empirical work has been devoted to examining how multiculturalism can shape natives’ attitudes (see, Sumino 2014).

In Chapter 2, I expand the focus of the current scholarship to show that perceptions of immigration are actively shaped by institutional contexts in differential ways. Drawing on theories of welfare chauvinism, native compensation, and multiculturalism literatures, I argue that multicultural policies can concurrently trigger underlying mechanisms of threat and protectionism, as well as altruism in ways that expand greater support for social policy. By introducing institutional context as a missing intervening factor, I argue that divergent findings in past research is in part potentially explained by differences in multicultural policies (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Banting et al. 2006; Brady and Finnigan 2014; Mau and Burkhardt 2009; Reese et al. 2013; Schmidt-Catran and Spies 2016; Walter 2010).

In Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation, I unpack the nexus between socio-cultural integration outcomes and multicultural policies. And while, there is a growing body of literature that examines how multicultural policies intersect with political integration outcomes (Bloemraad 2006; Bloemraad and Wright 2014; Wright and Bloemraad 2012), much less scholarly scrutiny has been devoted to socio-cultural outcomes, specifically residential segregation and attitudes towards homosexuality. At its core, critics problematize the inward focus that cultural policies cultivate, and argue they encourage ethnic in-group preferences along linguistic and cultural lines (Koopmans 2010). As a consequence, immigrants would live parallel lives within ethnic communities and experience sharp cultural divisions from mainstream values (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). There are strikingly few empirical studies that test these assertions. This is unfortunate given that segregation and gay rights figure centrally within fierce

contemporary sociopolitical debates over what role multicultural policies play in integration outcomes. I examine these two key areas of sociocultural integration in Chapters 3 and 4, which remains a source of disagreement among scholars.

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CHAPTER 2:

Immigration and support for redistributive social policy: Does multiculturalism matter?

Chapter Summary

In this article, we examine the impact of multicultural immigration policy on the degree to which immigration reduces support for redistributive social policy among natives. Arguments linking immigration to support for redistributive social policy are hotly contested. Some suggest that immigration reduces support for social policy, while others suggest that it increases such support. To make matters worse, the empirical evidence is equally mixed. We take this confluence as a puzzle in need of explanation. Our point of departure is to introduce institutional context and multicultural immigration policy, in particular, as a key intervening factor. From the growing literature on multiculturalism, we derive three unique hypotheses by which immigration has different effects on native support for redistributive social policy across multicultural contexts. To subject these to empirical scrutiny, we examine the degree to which the effect of immigration on native support for redistributive social policy (regarding jobs, unemployment, income, retirement, housing, and healthcare) varies across multicultural context. Our findings suggest that immigration flows appear to positively affect support for social policy in countries with a high degree of multiculturalism. For some types of social policy, immigration flows actually increase support for social policy in highly multicultural countries but reduces such support in assimilationist countries. However, cross-national variation in immigrant stocks is uncorrelated with support for social policy regardless of

the level of multiculturalism. We conclude by highlighting how our findings point to the need for more research on how multiculturalism impacts native perceptions of immigrants.

Introduction

Fears over immigration are starkly reflected in contemporary political discourse and stand center stage in the recent “Brexit” vote and the US presidential election of Donald Trump. These events highlight the unease over immigration and the emergence of right-wing parties that incorporate anti-immigrant rhetoric as a central component of their political platform across affluent democracies (Rydgren 2008). Nevertheless, international migration remains a structural characteristic of all postindustrial societies in the global North (United Nations Population Division (UNPD) 2013). As of 2013, foreign born residents on average constituted 13.2% of the population in affluent democracies, with no indication that these trends will change in the near future (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2013). Increasing political polarization coupled with upward trends in South/North migratory flows suggests that the politics of immigration and redistribution will continue to shape discourse for years to come.

Indeed, the rapid influx in South/North migration over the last 40 years spurred a great deal of scholarly scrutiny toward the development of theories linking immigration to support for social policy. The results culminated into an extensive but contentious literature (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Brady and Finnigan 2014; Reese et al. 2013; Schmidt-Catran and Spies 2016). Much of the extant scholarship suggests immigration

should decrease support for social policy (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Banting et al. 2006; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010) because ethnic and racial homogeneity served as a key source of social solidarity during the expansion of the welfare state within affluent democracies (Hechter 2004; Lipset and Marks 2000; Wilensky 2002). Among affluent democracies, the United States stands as an archetype of the tensions between greater immigration and declining support for social policy (Banting et al. 2006). Ethnicity, race, and immigration status play a central role in the negative construction of public identities for welfare recipients (Garand et al. 2015; Hancock 2004; Neubeck and Cazenave 2001). In fact, Alesina and Glaeser (2004, 180-181) posit that racial and immigrant stereotyping is one of the fundamental explanations of the divergent paths between the European and American welfare models today but caution, “Europeans have increasingly been susceptible to exactly the same form of racist, anti-welfare demagoguery that worked so well in the United States.” While welfare generosity remains higher in European countries (Esping-Andersen 1990), studies show that immigrants are consistently considered to be the least deserving of welfare benefits (Van Oorschot, 2006, 2008).

Despite a compelling theoretical narrative that rising immigration should decrease support for social policy in affluent democracies, empirical research does not widely support this narrative. That is, some studies find a negative relationship between greater immigration and support for social policy (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Mau and Burkhardt 2009; Schmidt-Catran and Spies 2016), other studies find no systematic relationship between the two (Banting et al. 2006; Brady and Finnigan 2014), while still others find a positive relationship (Burgoon et al. 2012; Reese et al. 2013; Walter 2010). Overlooked

within this scholarship is the role of institutions, specifically multiculturalist policies. We argue that this divergence is in part explained by differences in multicultural institutional contexts, which critically shape public perceptions of immigration (Banting et al. 2006; Callens and Meuleman 2016; Crepaz 2006; Kesler and Bloemraad 2010; Sumino 2014). Indeed, Sumino (2014, 440) implicates multiculturalist policies as the most “important contextual determinant” in determining whether or not “the positive or negative relationship between diversity and support for welfare politics hold.”

In this article, we revisit the work of Brady and Finnigan (2014) recently published in the *American Sociological Review*. In doing so, we contribute to the extant literature in two ways. First, we consider the institutional significance of multiculturalism in moderating the effect of immigration on redistribution attitudes. Second, we argue that understanding how multiculturalist policies moderate the immigration–redistribution link provides a potentially fruitful approach in resolving the long-standing immigrant–redistribution puzzle – immigration should decrease support for redistribution, but the theory lacks empirical consistency. We also weigh in on a timely issue at the forefront of political debates in affluent democracies: How multiculturalism and immigration impact popular attitudes about welfare?

To our knowledge, only one study examines the impact of multiculturalism on the link between immigration and redistribution attitudes (e.g., Sumino 2014). We expand on this previous study by examining a broad range of redistribution attitudes that may be more relevant to natives or immigrants and include measures of immigrant flow. Prior studies implicate the salience of both because (1) predominantly native-relevant domains

are more likely to receive support (Fox 2012) and (2) immigrant flows represent an analytically distinct dynamic of immigration relative to commonly used stock measures (Brady and Finnigan 2014; Hopkins 2010). Immigrant flows reflect the sudden influx of recent immigrants who are often qualitatively different from established immigrants because they are typically less socio-culturally acclimated, more reliant on social policies, and more likely viewed by natives as destabilizing (Hopkins 2010; Newman et al. 2012; Röder and Mühlau 2014).

To address our research question, we utilize pooled data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 1996, 2006) government module. ISSP data represent one of the most comprehensive data sets that explore a wide variety of attitudes toward social policy. Moreover, the data coincide with salient changes in respects to both immigration growth and the expansion of multiculturalist policies during the late 1990s (Castles and Miller 2003; Koopmans 2013). We utilize a pooled design that allows for longitudinal analyses, which is more methodologically appropriate in capturing the effect of changing levels of immigration and multiculturalism relative to cross-sectional designs (e.g., Sumino 2014). Substantively, longitudinal designs are more theoretically consistent with immigration dynamics that natives “react much more to recent changes in their environment than to actual levels” (Schmidt-Catran and Spies 2016, 243).

Welfare chauvinism, immigration, and native support for social policy

Support for redistribution critically hinge upon perceptions that recipients are the deserving poor, which necessitates a common identity as well as shared cultural values

and symbols (Hechter 2004). Accordingly, greater immigration fuels fears that diversity may weaken social solidarity and increase “welfare chauvinism” (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990; Kitschelt 1997; Raijman et al. 2003; Reeskens and Van Oorschot 2012; Van Oorschot 2008). Welfare chauvinism is a “system of social protection for those who belong to the ethnically defined community and who have contributed to it” and has the potential to shape attitudes along several facets (Kitschelt, 1997, 22). These include attitudes that oppose social policies entirely for immigrants or favor restrictions to benefits (Mewes and Mau 2013; Reeskens and Van Oorschot 2012), as well as attitudes surrounding the broader willingness of natives to support redistribution altogether (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). In this article, we examine attitudes on the latter, and the vigorous debate between opposing theoretical perspectives that link immigration to support for social policy.

Immigration decreases support for social policies

On one side, two perspectives suggest immigration reduces support for redistribution: the generic and chauvinistic hypotheses. Proponents of the generic hypothesis suggest that as immigration increases, several dynamics occur (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Schmidt-Catran and Spies 2016). First, competition for resources intensifies and natives come to view increasingly scarce resources as belonging exclusively to them (Blalock 1967; Mayda 2006). Second, the specter of immigrant political mobilization to potentially reallocate how government resources are distributed emerges. Finally, natives come to view cultural pluralism as a challenge to long-standing ascribed notions of national

identity. In sum, these three processes trigger prejudice from natives (Blalock 1967; Thomsen and Birkmose 2015).

Here, prejudice is more likely activated by immigrant flows than stock for several reasons. Threats from immigrant flows are more likely acute because local labor markets have less opportunity to adjust to the sudden influx of immigrants, recent immigrants are typically less acclimated to mainstream norms, and are on average, more reliant on social benefits (Hopkins 2010; Newman et al. 2012; Röder and Mühlau 2014). On balance, the generic hypothesis suggests greater immigration monolithically lowers support for social policy, regardless of the *type* of policy. That is, immigration should negatively influence support for social policies ranging from unemployment to healthcare. Although numerous studies find a negative relationship between immigration and welfare attitudes (Fording 1997; Schmidt-Catran and Spies 2016; Soss et al. 2001), fewer studies differentiate between policy forums (e.g., Brady and Finnigan 2014; Eger 2010). Indeed, Pierson (2001, 11) laments the analytic ambiguity of the vast majority of existing studies which use the “[t]he Welfare State’ [as] an umbrella term covering a range of governmental activities that have distinct characteristics.”

The more circumscribed chauvinistic perspective suggests that the impact of immigration on social policies depend on the type of policy in question. That is, immigration negatively impacts support for particular programs that are “immigrationalized” or chiefly perceived to be abused by immigrants (Brady and Finnigan 2014; Careja and Emmenegger 2012; Fox 2012; Mewes and Mau 2012). These are typically viewed as zero-sum outcomes – immigrant transfers reduce transfers to

natives (Fox 2012). In particular, policies surrounding the creation of jobs, the reduction of income inequality, housing subsidies, and unemployment insurance were historically controversial and met stiffer resistance from natives (Fox 2012; Massey and Denton 1993). In recent years, the threat of immigrant abuse within healthcare increasingly fuel political calls to reduce support related to it (Castañeda 2012; Viladrich 2012).

Conversely, policies that are less frequently filtered through the “immigrationalized stigma” (Fox 2012) and more relevant to natives include social security. In sum, both perspectives to some degree suggest immigration reduces support for redistribution.

Immigration increases support for social policies

Opposing perspectives suggest that immigration increases support for social policy, specifically the compensation hypothesis. Proponents of the “compensation hypothesis” agree that immigration heightens perceptions of competition over scarce resources. However, rather than dampening public support for social policy, immigration increases *demand* for social protections to mitigate competition. In response, governments react by expanding social policy (Brady and Finnigan 2014; Burgoon et al. 2012; Ervasti and Hjerm 2012; Walter 2010).

Multiculturalism and the immigration–redistribution link

These theoretical debates over the immigration–redistribution link are fueled by incredibly mixed empirical findings (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Brady and Finnigan 2014; Schmidt-Catran and Spies 2016). We take the contentious debates about the impact of immigration on social policy, and the mixed empirical evidence mirroring this debate,

as our key explanandum. We argue that cross-national variation in a key type of institution – multiculturalism – may help to explain the divergent theoretical claims and empirical evidence to support them. Much of the scholarship ignores that recent waves of immigration occurred across highly varied immigrant incorporation regimes and presupposes immigration happened in an institutional vacuum (Koopmans 2013). Rather, the turn of the 20th century not only marked a period of rapid immigration (Castles and Miller 2003), but also a qualitative shift in policies for immigrant incorporation at the national level (Banting et al. 2006; Koopmans 2013).

Historically, states expected permanent settlers to adopt the values and cultural practices of their majorities, but such policies faced extensive criticism as ethnocentric (Glazer 2002; Kivisto 2005). In response, states to varying degrees adopted multicultural policies. “Multiculturalism,” refers to policies that attach greater value to the maintenance of home culture among immigrant groups. Such policies seek to reduce the pressures immigrants face to abandon their cultural heritage. Specific multicultural policies include legal accommodations for bilingual education, dress exceptions, dual citizenship, and so on (Kymlicka 1995, 2001; Modood 2013). However, affluent democracies substantially differ in their implementation of multiculturalist policies. Perhaps unsurprisingly, scholars suggest that multiculturalism is a key driver of the domestic perceptions of immigration (Banting et al. 2006; Citrin et al. 2014; Sumino 2014). In what follows, we explicate a number of interesting possibilities for how multicultural institutional contexts potentially intersect with immigration to influence attitudes of redistribution.

Multiculturalism exacerbates the impact of immigration on redistribution attitudes

Scholars disagree over *how* multiculturalism conditions the immigrant–redistribution link. Some suggest that multiculturalism policies reify boundaries by institutionalizing ethno-cultural differences between natives and immigrants (Barry 2002; Gitlin 1995). Here, support for redistribution critically hinges upon perceptions of deserving recipients. Scholars argue that this necessitates a common identity as well as shared cultural values and symbols (Banting et al. 2006). If immigration problematizes who is deserving of welfare benefits, then states should attempt to “reduce the public visibility and political salience of these ethnic/racial differences, rather than emphasizing and celebrating them as done by MCPs” (Banting et al. 2006, 49). Critics argue that the greater visibility of immigration through multiculturalist policies could then intensify any negative relationship between immigration and redistribution (i.e., the generic and chauvinistic hypothesis) (Barry 2002; Gitlin 1995; Sumino 2014).

For example, institutionalized multiculturalist policies mark a sharp redefinition of national identity that is no longer based on long-standing ascribed characteristics of nativism (Citrin et al. 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). This redefinition may not be widely accepted and the celebration of cultural diversity can exacerbate perceptions of cultural threat from immigration among natives – a key source of threat that triggers prejudice (Callens and Meuleman 2016; Citrin et al. 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Lucassen and Lubbers 2012). Indeed, much of the countervailing arguments against

multiculturalism seek to delegitimize policy claims by problematizing current waves of immigrants as “unassimilable” to the humanistic values of liberal democracies (e.g., Huntington 2004). Multiculturalist policies are centrally implicated in heated political and academic exchanges over the “cultural practices” of an immigrant group (e.g., forced marriages, honor killings, and Muslim traditional attire) and the liberal democratic values of destination countries (Bloemraad et al. 2008).

Second, the institutionalization of multicultural policies marks the political power of immigration to change existing immigration policy. That is, it “reaffirms” the threat immigration poses to reorient policy and potentially social policy, consistent with the tenets of the generic hypothesis (Citrin et al. 1990; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Citrin et al. (2014) posit multiculturalism amplifies these two dimensions of cultural and political threat for natives, triggering hostility toward immigration. We might then expect the following:

H₁: Immigration reduces support for redistributive social policy to a greater degree in more multicultural countries.

Of course, this hypothesis assumes that immigration reduces support for social policy in a uniform way. However, recall, some scholars suggest that immigration disproportionately impacts mostly immigrant-relevant types of policies. That is, multiculturalism may only amplify the negative effect of immigration with respect to particular kinds of spending that map onto social policies viewed to disproportionately support immigrants at the expense of natives. These policy domains may include the creation of jobs, the reduction of income inequality, housing and health subsidies, and unemployment insurance – which

are particularly controversial and more likely perceived to benefit immigrants (Castañeda 2012; Fox 2012; Larsen 2011; Massey and Denton 1993; Viladrich 2012). Thus, a more circumscribed version of this hypothesis is as follows:

H₂: Immigration reduces support for redistributive social policy to a greater extent in more multicultural countries but only with respect to policy domains that are more relevant to immigrants (i.e., job, income, housing, healthcare, and unemployment).

Immigration increases support for redistribution in multicultural countries

Conversely, multiculturalism may predispose natives to more strongly support social transfers as immigration proceeds through two different mechanisms. First, if the “compensation hypothesis” is correct, then immigration would increase demand for social policy. While perceptions of immigrant threat are central to the generic and chauvinistic hypotheses, recall, it also plays a potentially positive role in increasing support for redistribution. If multiculturalism exacerbates key sources of perceived threat (i.e., cultural and political) from immigration, then it may actually increase demand for social policy. That is, multiculturalism stimulates fears about immigration in ways that may (perhaps counterintuitively) generate more rather than less support for social policy among natives.

Second, proponents suggest that multicultural policies may gradually socialize the citizenry toward greater tolerance for immigration (Banting et al. 2006; Kymlicka 2001). Rather than piquing nativist alarm, multiculturalist policies communicate a positive message about the value, place, and deservedness of immigration within host societies (Kymlicka, 2001). In this way, these policies “acknowledge diversity in a way that makes

it less threatening to members of the dominant group, and that reduces the ‘otherness’ of ethnic and racial minorities, enabling members of the dominant group to view minorities as ‘one of us’” (Banting et al. 2006, 84). As multiculturalism is codified through policy, it positions immigration through a positive lens that reduces underlying prejudicial beliefs and depoliticizes social policies that are frequently portrayed as hotbeds of immigrant abuse (Larsen 2011). In turn, natives are less likely to perceive immigrants as culturally threatening and out-group members (Ben-Nun Bloom et al. 2015; Callens and Meuleman 2016). Callens and Meuleman (2016) posit this process is an iterative one – integrationist policies lower perceived threat, which in turn facilitates the incremental expansion of ever more integrationist policies.

Third, multiculturalism and integration policies may mitigate fears over economic sources of threat by conveying the broad availability of resources to all groups, easing anxieties that government resources are a zero-sum outcome (Callens and Meuleman 2016). Moreover, multiculturalist policies may help convey that immigrants bring unique skills and cultural values that aid the growth of the economy (Callens and Meuleman 2016; Nagayoshi and Hjerm 2015). Empirical evidence suggests that more inclusive integration policies for immigrants is associated with lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiment (Hooghe and De Vroome 2015) as well as reduce perceptions of threat among natives (Callens and Meuleman 2016; Kauff et al. 2013). Here, multiculturalist policies are unlikely to impact policy domains that are more relevant to natives because they are largely perceived to benefit natives and are relatively unpoliticized. Such a process would produce greater support for social transfers, per unit increase in

immigration, in highly multicultural countries. More formally, and contrary to hypotheses 1 and 2, both mechanisms suggest the following:

H₃: Immigration increases support for redistributive social policy to a greater extent in more multicultural countries with respect to policy domains that are more relevant to immigrants (i.e., jobs, income, housing, healthcare, and unemployment).

Data and methods

To assess the relationship between multiculturalism and the immigration–redistribution link, we utilize pooled data from the 1996 and 2006 government module provided by the ISSP. A key strength of the ISSP data is that it provides standardized survey modules among countries and between survey years. Following list-wise deletion, the data include over 34,000 respondents from 13 countries. Although immigration data are widely available for a large number of countries, measures of multiculturalism are currently only available for affluent democracies. The combination of limited multiculturalism data and countries with data from both time points limits our analysis to 13 out of the 45 total countries present in the ISSP data. In total, the sample of countries include a broad mix of both English settler and European countries and represent roughly 38% of all Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) classified and 83% of all G12 classified countries. Countries include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Dependent variable

In total, we examine six different attitudes toward social policy, including: Jobs, unemployment, income, retirement, housing, and healthcare. All ISSP modules begin questions with, “On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to ...” and subsequently conclude with “provide a job for everyone who wants one,” “provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed,” “reduce income differences between the rich and the poor,” “provide a decent standard of living for the old,” “provide decent housing for those who can’t afford it,” and “provide healthcare for the sick.” Initial responses were measured on a five-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree,” but were collapsed into a dichotomous variable of should be (1) and should not be (0).¹ We further divide group attitudes into two ideal types: Policy domains that are more relevant to immigrants and domains that are more relevant to natives. Predominantly, immigrant-relevant domains include jobs, unemployment, income, housing, and healthcare. The domain that is more relevant to natives is retirement. Support for government intervention across social policies ranged from a low of 62% agreeing for jobs and 67% for income, to near universal agreement of 95% for retirement. Support for unemployment, housing, and healthcare were 74%, 79%, and 95%, respectively.

We utilize questions of government responsibility over spending for several reasons. First, questions of spending often conflate notions of government efficiency,

¹ There is little variation between “probably” and “definitely should not be” in responses across redistribution attitudes and fails the proportional odds assumption of ordinal logistic regression.

efficacy, and tap into deeper country-specific meanings of social programs that may not be as cross-nationally comparable in the ways that generic questions of government responsibility are (Brady and Finnigan 2014; Svallfors 2007). Second, we seek to build on the prior study by Brady and Finnigan (2014). Utilizing different dependent variables that tap into alternative meanings makes the findings less comparable and the measures of government spending do not completely map over with the generic questions.

Country-level independent variables

In order to assess whether the link between immigration and attitudes on redistribution differs across levels of multiculturalism, our analysis focuses on two key country-level interactions. The first is a two-way interaction between multiculturalism and immigrant stock. The second is a two-way interaction between multiculturalism and immigrant flow. Below, we describe how each of the constituent terms is measured.

We utilized the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI), which covers 21 countries over time points: 1980, 2000, and 2010 (Banting et al. 2006).² Other sources of multiculturalism data include the Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) and the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). However, neither provides the same level of coverage for the ISSP survey years as the MPI. Utilizing ICRI data would constrain the number of countries in our sample to six countries and includes no English settler countries, while MIPEX data are not available in the relevant survey years. The multicultural index ranges from zero to eight, where higher values indicate greater

² MPI is linearly interpolated between years.

multiculturalism. According to Banting et al. (2006, 57), eight policy classifications compose the index and they include the following:

Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism, at the central and/or regional and municipal levels; the adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum; the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing; exemptions from dress codes, Sunday closing legislation, etc. (either by statute or by court cases); allowing dual citizenship; the funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities; the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction; and lastly affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.³

The MPI provides a comprehensive picture of multicultural institutions because it includes several policy dimensions – including political and citizenship rights, cultural awareness, and representation in education and the media – within a single measure. State support for multiculturalism in these various areas may impact the attitudes of natives, either by reinforcing the native–immigrant divide or by facilitating a positive attitude toward immigrants. Arguably, a high MPI score would correspond to a greater awareness of immigrants by natives.

Multiculturalism is then separately interacted with immigrant stock and immigrant flow. Consistent with prior studies, immigrant stock is measured as the percent foreign born of the total population (Banting et al. 2006; Brady and Finnigan 2014; Eger 2010; Sumino 2014). Immigrant flow is measured as net migration (the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants) as a percent of the total population (Brady and Finnigan 2014). Both measures are lagged one year. We obtained these data from the

³ The MPI index is used in several notable studies (see, Banting et al. 2006; Wright and Bloemraad 2012).

World Development Indicators (WDI 2014). As a method of triangulating our WDI data, we also estimate models using United Nations (UN) Migration data (available upon request).

Individual-level controls

Prior research suggests that a number of individual-level characteristics influence attitudes toward redistribution (Brady and Finnigan 2014; Mau and Burkhardt 2009; Sumino 2014; Svallfors 2007). Consistently, studies show “older, female, unmarried, less-educated, unemployed and lower-income respondents are more supportive of social policy” (Brady and Finnigan 2014, 21). Baseline individual controls include basic socio-demographic measures of age (years), age squared, and gender (female= 1). We control for the resources and the employment status of respondents including education (reference group – secondary degree, less than secondary, university, or above), employment status (reference group – private full-time, part-time, unemployed, not in the labor force, self-employed, and public employment) and country-year specific z scores of income.

Country-level controls

Finally, we control for relevant country-level covariates: social spending, the national unemployment rate, and income inequality (Brady and Finnigan 2014; Eger 2010; Sumino 2014). Prior studies suggest that institutional differences in social expenditures create path dependencies. High spending countries create constituencies that are more likely to favor redistribution (Brady and Finnigan 2014; Eger 2010). To control for social spending, we include social expenditures as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP)

(OECDa various years). Second, studies suggest that economic downturns increase downward pressure on immigration and social policy, consistent with threat narratives (Jean and Jimenez 2011; Quillian 1995; Schmidt-Catran and Spies 2016). We include the national employment rate as a control variable. The national employment rate is measured as total employment as a percent of the working population (OECDb various years).⁴ Finally, prior studies suggest that income inequality increases perceptions of risk and support for social insurance (Finseraas 2009; Meltzer and Richard 1981). The Gini coefficient is included as a control, and estimates are derived from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt 2009). In Table 2.1, we display both individual and country-level descriptive statistics.

Analytic strategy

Our data consist of panel data at the country-level (level 2) and randomly sampled cross-sections at the individual-level (level 1). Such data require analytical techniques to address unmeasured country and period-specific heterogeneity, variability in the error term across countries, and a tendency for individual-level error terms to be correlated over time within countries. The two common approaches for addressing the first problem are random and fixed intercept models, while the latter two problems can be dealt with by way of corrections to the variance/co-variance matrix. For two primary reasons, the two-way fixed effects (FEs) models are most appropriate for our data.

⁴ The data are based on Brady and Finnigan's (2014) recently published paper in the *American Sociological Review* (ASR). Data and replication codes are publicly available.

Table 2.1 Individual and country-level descriptive statistics.

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Country Characteristics				
Immigrant Stock	12.57	6.24	1.08	22.30
Immigrant Flow	2.23	1.50	-0.03	5.76
Social Welfare Expenditure	21.04	4.86	14.50	31.60
Employment Rate	68.93	8.28	47.57	84.54
Gini Coefficient	30.18	4.18	21.57	39.62
Multiculturalism	3.60	2.47	0	8
Individual Characteristics				
Jobs	0.62	0.49	0	1
Income	0.67	0.46	0	1
Housing	0.79	0.41	0	1
Retirement	0.95	0.22	0	1
Unemployment	0.74	0.44	0	1
Health Care	0.95	0.21	0	1
Age	46.82	16.94	16	98
Age Squared	2479.97	1684.20	256	9604
Female	0.52	0.50	0	1
Never Married	0.24	0.43	0	1
Divorced	0.08	0.27	0	1
Widowed	0.05	0.23	0	1
Less than High School	0.38	0.48	0	1
University or Higher	0.17	0.38	0	1
Part-time Employment	0.13	0.33	0	1
Unemployed	0.03	0.18	0	1
Not in Labor Force	0.33	0.47	0	1
Self-Employed	0.11	0.31	0	1
z-scored Income	0.00	1.00	-4.50	24.06

Note: Descriptive statistics are weighted.

First, small samples can lead to overconfident standard errors involving level 2 covariates in random intercept/coefficient (RIC) models (Bryan and Jenkins 2015; Stegmueller 2011). The inclusion of interaction terms can further downwardly bias standard errors within a RIC design (Bryan and Jenkins 2015). Monte Carlo simulations show that confidence intervals using RIC maximum likelihood estimators are between 5 and 15% too narrow with fewer than 15 country observations (Stegmueller 2011). By comparison, limited numbers of level 2 units are less of a concern in FE designs relative to multilevel models because they tend to diminish rather than enhance statistical power (Wooldridge 2002). It is important to stress that sample size is a limitation of the study. FEs do not obviate the concerns associated with a small sample and include issues of generalizability, influential cases, and bias estimates (Stegmueller 2011).

Second, two-way FEs approaches additionally control for all unobserved stable differences that vary across countries and time. Prior research documents a host of salient stable differences that would impact average attitudes toward redistribution in a given country-year (see, Brady and Finnigan 2014 for a review). The alternative RIC require that right-hand side covariates are uncorrelated with the country-specific random error terms (Wooldridge 2002). Hausman specification tests find that it does not hold. Thus, we estimate conditional logistic regressions based on the model below:

$$\log\left(\frac{P_{ijt}}{1-P_{ijt}}\right) = Y_{ijt} = \beta_o + \beta_x X_{ijt} + \beta_m M_{jt} + \beta_q MXS_{jt} + \beta_c C_j + \beta_w W_t + \varepsilon_{ijt} \text{ va}$$

The log odds of holding a particular redistribution attitude $\log(P_{ijt} / (1 - P_{ijt}))$ of individual i in country j at time t is represented by Y_{ijt} . Y_{ijt} is a function of country-specific intercepts

(β_0), a vector of individual controls ($\beta_x X_{ijt}$), alternated country-level controls ($\beta_z Z_{jt}$), the main effect of multiculturalism ($\beta_m M_{jt}$), the main effect of stock or flow ($\beta_s S_{jt}$), the interaction between multiculturalism X stock/flow ($\beta_q MXS_{jt}$), country dummies ($\beta_c C_j$), a dummy for 2006 data ($\beta_w W_t$), and the error term ε_{ijt} . Due to the limited number of level 2 observations, we limit the number of level 2 covariates to no more than four covariates at one time: multiculturalism, immigrant stock or flow, the interaction term, and iteratively alternate between country-level controls ($\beta_z Z_{jt}$). ($\beta_z Z_{jt}$) represents social spending in our first models, the employment rate in our second models, and income inequality in our third models.

We do not include immigrant stock and flow into the same model ($\beta_s S_{jt}$) because they are correlated. Immigrant stock increases immigrant flows as new waves of immigrants are likely informed of destination choices by past levels of immigration. A negative and significant coefficient for the interaction term ($\beta_q MXS_{jt}$) for all attitudes would provide support for hypothesis 1. A negative and significant coefficient for the interaction term ($\beta_q MXS_{jt}$) for policy domains that are more relevant to immigrants would provide support for hypothesis 2. A positive and significant coefficient for the interaction term ($\beta_q MXS_{jt}$) for predominantly immigrant-relevant domains would provide support for hypothesis 3. The interaction coefficient in nonlinear models is not as readily interpretable as in linear models (Ai and Norton 2003; Allison 1999).

The interaction term cannot be tested with a simple t-test, the relationship may vary across levels of multiculturalism, and is conditioned by other independent variables (Ai and Norton 2003). For these reasons, we also assess the significance of the interaction


effect through plots of the average marginal effect of immigration as it varies across multiculturalism.

Finally, we correct for the likely dependence among observations within countries and surveys and cluster standard errors on the highest level of aggregation – countries (Cameron and Miller 2015). The analysis was carried out with the statistical platform STATA 13 (StataCorp. 2013).

Results

We begin by examining the bivariate association between immigrant stock and flow across all six social attitudes as they vary by multicultural context in Figure 2.1. To proceed, observations are country-mean deviated across all six social attitudes, immigrant stock, and immigrant flow. To facilitate interpretation, MPI is simplified and separated into “low” (below median) and “high” (median and above) multicultural contexts. Low multicultural contexts (LMCs) are graphically represented by solid lines while high multicultural contexts (HMCs) are represented by dashed lines. Immigrant stock is presented on the left panels, while immigrant flows are presented on the right panels. The differences in slope suggest that multiculturalism conditions the immigrant–redistribution link, consistent with Sumino’s (2014) insight.

Figure 2.1 Bivariate association between welfare attitudes and immigrant stock/flow across high and low multicultural contexts, ISSP 1996 and 2006.



Note: Solid lines refer to low multicultural countries ($MPI < \text{median}$) while dotted lines refer to high multicultural countries ($MPI \geq \text{median}$). Observations are country-mean deviated.

First, the bivariate association between agreement (jobs) and immigration (stock and flow) is negative in both HMCs and LMCs; however, the slope is flatter in HMCs. Within income inequality, immigrant stock and flow have opposing effects. Stock appears to increase support (income), while decreases it for flow. Within housing, immigrant stock appears to increase support in LMCs but decrease it for HMCs. Immigrant flow increases support (housing), however, more so in LMCs. Within unemployment, immigrant stock decrease support within HMCs and LMCs. The slope is

steeper in LMCs. Immigrant flow appears to increase support (unemployment) in HMCs but sharply decreases it in LMCs. Support for healthcare decreases with rising immigrant stock, but the slope is flatter in HMCs. Conversely support (healthcare) increases with immigrant flows in both HMCs and LMCs, but the increase is much sharper in LMCs. Immigrant stock appears to increase support for retirement in HMCs but decrease it in LMCs. In both HMCs and LMCs, immigrant flow increase support, but the slope is steeper in LMCs. In general, the bivariate analysis suggests that when immigration reduces support, the impact is less dramatic in HMCs (i.e., the slope tends to be flatter). Conversely, when immigration increases support, the impact tends to be more tempered in HMCs as well. In what follows, we examine whether the bivariate patterns hold across conservative two-way FE estimators and relevant controls.

Table 2.2 displays the results of the two-way interaction between multiculturalism and immigrant stock across 12 different models as odds ratios (ORs). All models control for baseline individual level characteristics and include country and year FEs. Individual controls are omitted for presentation purposes (available upon request) but behave in a manner consistent with the literature (Brady and Finnigan 2014; Mau and Burkhardt 2009; Sumino 2014; Svallfors 2007). Our models alternate among social welfare spending, the employment rate, and income inequality as additional level two controls to limit the number of country-level covariates. ORs greater than one represent greater support.

To begin, we examine models that include social welfare spending as a level 2 control. Results of the unconditional effect suggest that immigrant stock has a

significantly negative impact on attitudes about income (0.935) and significantly positive effects on attitudes about unemployment (1.138) and retirement (1.165) when multiculturalism is equal to zero. To answer our central research question, we turn to the interaction term between multiculturalism (MPI) and immigrant stock. The interaction term represents the change in the effect of immigrant stock for a unit increase in multiculturalism. In five of the six attitudes examined – jobs, income, housing, healthcare, and retirement – the interaction term is null, which is incongruent with all hypotheses. The sole exception is unemployment, which is only marginally significant (at the level of $p < .10$).

In the second set of models, we alternate to include employment rate as a level 2 control. Results are largely consistent with the prior analysis, and we find that none of the interaction terms between immigrant stock and multiculturalism are significant. When we control for employment rate, the negative and marginally significant interaction we observed in our first set of models diminishes.

In our third set of models, we include income inequality as a level 2 control. The results remain consistent and across all six attitudes, none of the interaction terms are significant. In sum, we find little support for hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 in our analyses including immigrant stock. In what follows, we examine the conditional effect of multiculturalism on immigrant flow. Results in Table 2.3 are presented as odd ratios and the focal interaction is the two-way interaction between multiculturalism and immigrant flow. In what follows, we examine the conditional effect of multiculturalism on immigrant flow.

Table 2.2 Two-way fixed effects coefficients of immigrant stock on welfare attitudes across levels of multiculturalism for highly industrialized countries in 1996 and 2006, odds ratios.

	IMMIGRANT-SPECIFIC					NATIVE-SPECIFIC
	Jobs	Income	Housing	Unemployment	Healthcare	Retirement
Multiculturalism	0.902 (-0.664)	0.796* (-2.248)	0.895 (-0.495)	0.800 (-1.498)	0.379*** (-4.590)	0.529*** (-3.418)
Immigrant Stock	0.954† (-1.845)	0.935** (-2.818)	1.001 (0.009)	1.138** (2.691)	0.982 (-0.543)	1.165** (3.209)
Multiculturalism X Immigrant Stock	0.987 (-1.391)	1.004 (0.507)	0.983 (-1.025)	0.982† (-1.765)	0.998 (-0.122)	1.001 (0.054)
Social Welfare Expenditures	0.865* (-2.522)	0.928† (-1.881)	0.807† (-1.874)	0.913 (-1.178)	0.800** (-3.213)	0.907* (-2.524)
Multiculturalism	1.007 (0.044)	0.836† (-1.660)	1.051 (0.231)	0.861 (-1.154)	0.404*** (-3.626)	0.520** (-3.012)
Immigrant Stock	0.916 (-0.860)	0.893* (-2.277)	0.975 (-0.208)	1.120 (1.158)	0.925 (-0.693)	1.105 (1.579)
Multiculturalism X Immigrant Stock	1.000 (-0.024)	1.012 (1.624)	1.001 (0.076)	0.989 (-1.080)	1.024 (1.566)	1.013 (1.115)
Employment Rate	1.003 (0.069)	1.015 (0.781)	0.973 (-0.549)	0.995 (-0.124)	1.011 (0.213)	1.044† (1.716)
Multiculturalism	1.058 (0.332)	0.892 (-1.368)	1.019 (0.0655)	0.881 (-0.623)	0.389* (-2.239)	0.475** (-2.987)
Immigrant Stock	0.944 (-0.967)	0.949 (-1.311)	0.932 (-0.590)	1.126 (1.405)	0.923 (-0.821)	1.093 (1.562)
Multiculturalism X Immigrant Stock	0.992 (-0.484)	1.000 (0.028)	1.008 (0.241)	0.986 (-0.605)	1.029 (0.728)	1.028 (1.604)
Gini Coefficient	1.033 (0.586)	1.045 (1.265)	0.975 (-0.230)	1.017 (0.210)	0.972 (-0.224)	0.927† (-1.653)
N	35,013	34,677	34,795	34,712	35,968	35,995

Note: Individual-level controls, country, and year fixed effects are omitted for presentation purposes (available upon request). Individual controls include: age, age squared, gender, educational attainment, employment status and country specific income z scores. †p<.10, *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (Two-tailed tests). Z-statistics presented in parentheses. Coefficients represent odds ratios.

As in the immigrant stock models, the first set of models controls for social welfare spending at level 2, the second set controls for employment rate at level 2, and the third set controls for income inequality at level 2. Compared with the immigrant stock models, results from the first set of models illustrate higher levels of support for redistribution in countries with higher levels of multiculturalism. In two out of the six redistribution attitudes—jobs and income – the interaction term is significant and positive. For every percent increase in net migration, the effect of multiculturalism increases the odds of favoring redistribution by a factor of 1.048 (jobs) and 1.049 (income) when controlling for social welfare spending. Healthcare (1.055) is marginally significant (at the level of $p < .10$). In sum, we find support that immigrant flows increase support for redistribution in policy domains that are more relevant to immigrants. The first set of models contradicts hypotheses 1 and 2 but provides evidence more congruent with hypothesis 3.

The results from the second set of models are very similar to the first set. Attitudes about jobs and income remain significant and positive. The odds of favoring redistribution in the form of healthcare increase by a factor of 1.064. Positive attitudes toward government involvement in housing increase by a factor of 1.044, albeit are only marginally significant (at the level of $p < .10$) when controlling for employment rate at the country-level.

Table 2.3 Two-way fixed effects coefficients of immigrant flow on welfare attitudes across levels of multiculturalism for highly industrialized countries in 1996 and 2006, odds ratios.

	IMMIGRANT-SPECIFIC					NATIVE-SPECIFIC
	Jobs	Income	Housing	Unemployment	Healthcare	Retirement
Multiculturalism	0.820 (-1.142)	0.819* (-2.211)	0.856 (-0.607)	0.847 (-0.820)	0.355*** (-6.833)	0.684* (-2.079)
Immigrant Flow	0.890 (-1.349)	0.843*** (-4.449)	0.944 (-0.383)	1.071 (0.668)	0.874 (-1.573)	1.197 (1.381)
Multiculturalism X Immigrant Flow	1.048** (2.578)	1.049*** (5.274)	1.030 (0.956)	0.995 (-0.182)	1.055† (1.844)	0.979 (-0.706)
Social Welfare Expenditures	0.931 (-1.630)	0.955† (-1.941)	0.875 (-1.359)	0.957 (-0.629)	0.822*** (-4.172)	0.898† (-1.912)
Multiculturalism	0.978 (-0.377)	0.880† (-1.751)	1.090 (0.543)	0.894 (-1.119)	0.552*** (-4.679)	0.779** (-2.670)
Immigrant Flow	1.013 (0.167)	0.842*** (-3.479)	0.995 (-0.050)	1.048 (0.344)	0.988 (-0.128)	1.149 (1.093)
Multiculturalism X Immigrant Flow	1.043** (3.086)	1.053*** (5.559)	1.044† (1.678)	1.000 (-0.005)	1.064* (2.099)	0.988 (-0.453)
Employment Rate	0.933** (-2.921)	0.993 (-0.441)	0.923* (-2.210)	1.005 (0.120)	0.931† (-1.739)	1.023 (0.557)
Multiculturalism	0.893 (-0.913)	0.861* (-2.340)	1.037 (0.178)	0.900 (-0.783)	0.475*** (-4.517)	0.792† (-1.777)
Immigrant Flow	0.919 (-0.897)	0.878*** (-6.950)	0.914 (-0.614)	1.066 (0.799)	0.934 (-0.605)	1.279** (3.191)
Multiculturalism X Immigrant Flow	1.053** (2.763)	1.051*** (13.190)	1.047 (1.430)	0.999 (-0.042)	1.062† (1.787)	0.984 (-0.845)
Gini Coefficient	1.060 (1.187)	1.064*** (5.536)	1.021 (0.394)	1.010 (0.344)	1.085 (1.120)	1.105** (2.995)
N	35,013	34,677	34,795	34,712	35,968	35,995

Note: Individual-level controls, country, and year fixed effects are omitted for presentation purposes (available upon request). Individual controls include: age, age squared, gender, educational attainment, employment status and country specific income z scores. †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (Two-tailed tests). Z-statistics presented in parentheses. Coefficients represent odds ratios.

Results from the third set of models, which control for income inequality at the country-level, are similar to the previous two sets. Attitudes about jobs (OR: 1.053) and income (OR: 1.051) remain positive and significant with coefficients that are almost the same as the previous two models. Healthcare is marginally significant (OR: 1.062) in this case. Once again, we find that immigrant flows increase support for redistribution in four of the six attitudes but are confined to domains that are more relevant to immigrants. And thus, the results provide some support for hypothesis 3 and contradict hypotheses 1 and 2.

We assess the degree to which our results are robust to the composition of our level 2 sample. In particular, the limited number of level 2 observations (26 country-years) raises the possibility that our results are unduly affected by a particular country or country-year. That is, the coefficients on our interaction terms might suffer from biases owing to high leverage of a particular case. To address this, we re-estimated models from Table 2.3, removing one country from the analyses at a time, leaving $N - 1$ countries in the sample. The results are substantively consistent (available upon request). The ORs examining attitudes on jobs never decrease more than 3.32% and never increase more than 1.81% relative to parameter estimates in Table 2.3. ORs examining attitudes on income inequality never decrease more than 1.99% and do not increase more than 1.23%. In attitudes on housing, the ORs decrease no lower than 2.76%, nor increase more than 3.24%. In attitudes on healthcare, the ORs decrease no lower than 10.26% and no higher than 1.97%.


In what follows, we show the average marginal effect of immigrant flow across levels of multiculturalism in Figure 2.2 to resolve concerns about the substantive

conclusions from the interaction coefficients in nonlinear models (Ai and Norton 2003; Allison 1999).

We begin with the top pane, which includes attitudes involving jobs, income, and housing, respectively. The marginal effects suggest that the impact of immigrant flow on attitudes favoring government involvement in providing jobs is null at low levels of multiculturalism ($\sim 0-2.5$). Once multiculturalism passes this threshold, the positive effect is significant and constitutes roughly 54% of the sample of countries. Countries include Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The effect of immigrant flow on attitudes favoring government intervention in redressing income inequality is positive and significant at low levels of multiculturalism ($\sim 0-2$), null at low to moderate levels of multiculturalism ($\sim 2-6$), and once again significant and positive at high levels of multiculturalism ($\sim 6-8$), constituting roughly 46% of the sample of countries. Countries included in this low and high range are Australia, Canada, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

The effect of net migration on attitudes favoring government intervention in housing follows a similar outcome with jobs. That is, the effect is null when multiculturalism is low but is significant and positive once multiculturalism crosses a threshold of roughly three, representing roughly 38% of the sample of countries. The countries include all of the countries listed for jobs except Spain and the United States. On the bottom pane, we present the marginal effects of immigrant flow for healthcare.

Figure 2.2 Average marginal effect of immigrant flow on attitudes on jobs, income, housing, and healthcare across observed values of multiculturalism in highly industrialized countries, 1996 and 2006.



Note: Upper and lower bounds represent 95% confidence intervals. Based on Table 3 estimates, models labelled jobs, income, housing, and healthcare, respectively. Employment rate L2 control.


The effect for both begins to approximate a logistic curve, and at the lowest levels of multiculturalism, the effect is null. Once multiculturalism surpasses a threshold of roughly five, the effect of immigrant flow is positive and significant. Countries include Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Counterfactual analyses and the conditional effect of multiculturalism

We use counterfactual exercises to illustrate the differential impact of immigration across varying multicultural contexts. Counterfactual exercises provide insight into how agreement levels may change if immigration took place in different multicultural contexts. Given the relatively robust results of immigrant flow, we estimate 12 additional models for the significant effects (i.e., jobs, income, housing, and healthcare). We illustrate how support for social policy shifts if an influx of immigration were to hypothetically occur in a country where immigrant flow began at 0.06% (the lowest observed level in the sample) and suddenly increased to 5.76% of the total population (the highest observed level in the sample) across three levels of multiculturalism.

Figure 2.3 reports this maximum change in immigrant flow across low (MPI=0), moderate (MPI=4), and high (MPI=8) levels of multiculturalism when controlling for employment rate at the country-level. The bars represent the difference in the predicted probabilities of supporting social policy across this maximum change in immigrant flow. Taking income inequality, for example, if a rapid influx of immigration occurred (i.e., min→max in immigrant flow), the probability of supporting social policy to redress income differentials would increase by 0.27 or represent a 47% increase in HMCs (i.e., Australia and Canada). If the same sudden influx of immigration occurred in countries with no multicultural policies in place (i.e., Japan), the probability of supporting social policy to redress income inequality would decrease by 0.21 or represent a 26% decrease in support.

Figure 2.3 Change in support for social policies with maximum increase in immigrant flow by multiculturalism.



Note: Maximum change is measured as the difference between the predicted probabilities at the minimum and maximum value of immigrant flow, all other variables held at their mean. Estimates are based on Table 3, models labelled jobs, income, housing, retirement and health care, respectively.

More importantly, the differences in the predicted probabilities of agreement between LMCs and HMCs as they experience the maximum change in immigrant flow are substantial and represent a 47.5% increase. In attitudes surrounding housing, jobs, and healthcare, the differences in the probabilities of agreement between LMCs and HMCs represent a 13.2%, 37.1%, and 40.3% increase, respectively.

Several findings are important to note. In all four attitudes with significant or marginally significant effects, the predicted probabilities of support are greatest in high multicultural countries, followed by moderate and low multicultural contexts, consistent

with parameter estimates in Table 2.3. Interestingly, in three of the four attitudes – income, housing, and healthcare – the maximum change in immigrant flow has opposing directional effects contingent upon multicultural context. The maximum change in immigrant flow decreases support for social policies in low multicultural countries. In countries with moderate or high levels of multiculturalism, the maximum change in immigrant flow increases support for these social policies. The results suggest that multiculturalism conditions the immigration–redistribution link such that in low multiculturalist countries, that link is negative, while in moderate and high multiculturalist countries, that link is positive.

Discussion and conclusion

In this article, we consider the impact of multiculturalism as a key intervening institution at the national level. We argue that this omission plays a part in explaining the mixed empirical support that immigration should reduce support for redistribution. As a point of departure, we test three hypotheses by which immigration could have varying effects on support for redistributive social policy across multicultural contexts. Our findings suggest that immigration flows appear to increase support for domains that are more relevant to immigrants in countries with a high degree of multiculturalism. For some predominantly immigrant-relevant domains, particularly income inequality, immigration flows actually increase support in highly multicultural countries but reduces such support in low multicultural countries. However, we also find, regardless of the level of multiculturalism, immigrant stock is uncorrelated with support across both predominantly immigrant- and native-relevant domains. On balance, the results are most consistent with

hypothesis three and suggest that multiculturalism interacts with immigrant flows, but not necessarily immigrant stock.

The difference in findings between immigrant stock and flow models are telling. Perhaps in this context, the underlying mechanisms of threat and protectionism highlighted by the compensation hypothesis are activated by dynamic flows of recent immigrants rather than established, stable immigrant populations (Hopkins 2010). These mechanisms are either amplified or assuaged across higher multiculturalist contexts (hypothesis 3). We find evidence that immigrant inflows have different effects on social spending attitudes in countries with varying levels of multiculturalism. However, it remains unclear whether multiculturalist policies amplify perceptions of immigrant threat, triggering greater demand for social protections (i.e., the compensation hypothesis). Or, whether proponents of multiculturalist are correct in that multiculturalism reduces perceptions of threat by socializing the citizenry about the importance of immigration to national identity (Banting et al. 2006). The results do not obviate critics' claims that multiculturalism enhances perceptions of threat from immigration, rather challenges their conclusions that it results in declining support for social policy.

Hopkin's (2010) politicized places hypothesis suggests that national rhetoric around immigration frames natives' experiences of events like a sudden influx of immigrants in a political context. By politicizing demographic shifts, the multicultural context (which could impact this rhetoric) affects native attitudes. Multicultural institutions provide fertile ground for exploration of other native attitudes outside of

redistribution. Specifically, future research might explore how welfare chauvinism intersects with attitudes that oppose social policies for immigrants (Mewes and Mau 2013; Reeskens and Van Oorschot 2012) as well as other contextual factors including labor market policies that impact attitudes (Nagayoshi and Hjerm 2015). Finally, the small sample of countries is a limitation of the study. While this is a necessary limitation given the data availability, we encourage readers to take results with a degree of skepticism until more data become available and other studies confirm the results.

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CHAPTER 3:

Spatial Segregation and the Impact of Linguistic Multicultural Policies within the United States

Chapter Summary

In this article, we examine the impact of multicultural linguistic policy on the residential outcomes of Hispanic and Asian groups in the United States. Arguments linking multiculturalism to residential segregation outcomes are a hotly contested political issue. While spatial segregation is one form of social integration for immigrants, scholars are particularly concerned with residential outcomes because it is theorized to strongly facilitate a wide variety of other forms of integration including language acquisition, the convergence of socio-cultural gender and sexual norms, employment, friendship ties, and intermarriage. From data drawn from the 2010 U.S. Census, we calculate the dissimilarity index for these two groups. We find multicultural linguistic policies increase segregation levels between Asians and non-Hispanic whites, but not between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites. The results are robust to a host of alternative explanations and model specifications. However, the estimated positive effect of linguistic policy is modest at best and run contrary to fears multiculturalist policies drastically alter residential outcomes. We close by questioning normative accounts that problematize rising levels of

segregation within ethnic communities, which are a far cry from the minority ghettos that are politically portrayed as.

Introduction

Across Western democracies, receiving countries vary in their policy prescriptions for immigrants. In some host societies, incorporation strategies are strongly predicated upon assimilationist expectations (i.e., Germany), while others employ alternative multiculturalist strategies that seek to accommodate ethno-cultural differences (i.e., Australia and Canada). Multiculturalist strategies include the explicit goal of reducing the pressures immigrants face to abandon their cultural heritage and incorporate policies calling for access to bilingual education, dress exceptions, dual citizenship, etc. (Kymlicka 1995, 2001; Modood 2013). The continued increase in South/North migration coupled with differences between immigration regimes triggered a highly controversial debate over how best to incorporate ethno-cultural diversity (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Joppke 2007; Koopmans 2013; Kymlicka 2001). Despite a growing number of studies which have begun to examine the impact of multiculturalism on political outcomes (Banting et al. 2006; Citrin et al. 2014; Wright and Bloemraad 2012), few studies examine the role of multiculturalist policies on social integration, specifically the spatial segregation of immigrants (Koopmans 2010).

While spatial segregation is one form of social integration for immigrants, scholars are particularly concerned with residential outcomes for several reasons. For one, it plays a particularly salient role in the assimilation process, as it is theorized to

strongly facilitate a wide variety of other forms of integration including language acquisition, the convergence of socio-cultural gender and sexual norms, employment, friendship ties, intermarriage etc. (Bolt et al. 2010; Koopmans 2010; Mouw and Entwisle 2006; Phillips 2007). Some scholars argue multicultural policies facilitate the creation of parallel ethnic institutions and promote spatial segregation (Koopmans 2010), thereby exacerbating gaps between natives and immigrants across a broad swath of socio-cultural consequences.

Second, these findings buttress a broader literature in which high levels of segregation are generally perceived to be overwhelmingly detrimental for immigrants. Native suburbs are typically the sites of political power, better employment and educational opportunities (Lipsitz 2006; Kozol 2012). Higher levels of residential segregation from these sites are centrally implicated as key linchpins that reproduce the relative deprivation of immigrant neighborhoods and consequently social inequality. Although large percentages of immigrant groups have also suburbanized, those suburbs are typically less affluent and tend to have higher crime rates relative to suburbs that are majority native (Charles 2003; Friedman et al. 2014; Massey and Denton 1993).

Finally, in recent years, normative arguments increasingly problematize multiculturalist policies because they induce “self-segregation,” suggesting immigrants do not do enough to spatially integrate with natives (Bolt et al. 2010; Phillips 2006, 2007). Some scholars suggest multiculturalism exacerbate in-group preferences along linguistic and cultural divides whereby immigrants choose to remain in predominantly immigrant communities, even when outward mobility is economically feasible (Logan et

al. 2002). In light of recent terrorist attacks in France, Belgium, and the United States, the spatial segregation of immigrant groups has become the focal point of extensive criticisms by political pundits as hotbeds of domestic radicalism and further fueled acrimonious debates over how multiculturalist policies intersect with the politically charged spaces of immigrant communities.

Regrettably, testing whether multiculturalism facilitates spatial segregation within immigrant communities cross-nationally has been incredibly difficult given the varying statistical definitions of geographic units cross-nationally (Poulsen et al. 2002). Even more broadly, scholars are skeptical of results from comparative studies of multiculturalism, due to the potential of selection bias coupled with the dearth of immigrant respondents, leading to a degrees of freedom problem in large-cross-national surveys (Koopmans 2013). The confluence of limited empirical evidence and skepticism surrounding existing studies has given way to polarizing debates over multiculturalism allowing “political actors on all sides to make strong claims based on little evidence” (Bloemraad et al. 2008, 160).

As a point of departure, we examine residential segregation outcomes for Asians and Hispanics within the United States, two groups with large percentages of foreign born residents. In this article, we comprehensively examine whether linguistic multicultural policies increase the prevalence of residential segregation utilizing data from the 2010 Census and linguistic multiculturalist policy data drawn from the National Clearinghouse for English Language Acquisition and Language Instruction Educational

Programs (NCELA).¹ The use of within country analyses is strategic in that it obviates some of the methodological concerns posed by comparative studies by keeping constant selection effects that would otherwise vary in cross-national research (Koopmans 2013). Substantively, within country analyses add to the multiculturalism literature by examining how multiculturalist policies are applied within localized contexts, which is more congruent with the theoretical mechanisms that tie policy to the daily experiences of diversity. Finally, the study's focus on linguistic policies specify the types of multiculturalist policy that drive observed associations in social outcomes, which is largely missing from comparative studies that utilize aggregate measures of multiculturalism (Banting et al. 2006; Sumino 2014). Ultimately, multicultural linguistic policies appear to increase Asian-white, but not Hispanic-white segregation levels. The results are robust to a host of alternative explanations and model specifications.

What explains the spatial mobility of immigrants?

This question has been central to sociological inquiry since at least the Chicago School and the first great wave of European immigration to the U.S. in the 1920s (Park and Burgess 1925). Since that time, scholarly scrutiny towards the development of theories that explain the spatial transition out of predominantly immigrant communities has seen a rapid expansion. In general, three theoretical perspective dominate the extant residential segregation literature: Spatial assimilation theory, place stratification and residential preferences. In what follows, we review these main theoretical perspectives on residential

¹ Office of English Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement, and Academic Achievement for Limited English Proficient Students (2008-2010).

segregation and proceed to bring together ideas from literatures centered on residential segregation and how they intersect with linguistic multiculturalist policies.

Spatial assimilation, place stratification, and residential preferences

One of the earliest and most influential theoretical perspectives of immigrant spatial mobility is forwarded by the spatial assimilation theory (Gordon 1964; Massey and Denton 1985). In general, spatial assimilation theories posit that new immigrants enter host societies through immigrant gateways predominantly located in central cities. Limited resources and the lack of cultural familiarity to host society norms act as barriers to spatial mobility. As immigrants build stronger social networks that increasingly incorporate natives and as their economic situation improves in host societies; they are better able to convert these newly acquired forms of socioeconomic capital to expand their choices about where to reside. These choices now include neighborhoods that include more natives, are more affluent and offer greater amenities to residents (Gordon 1964; Massey and Denton 1985; South et al. 2005; Pais et al. 2012).

However, spatial assimilation, or living where the native born reside, necessitates a high degree of acculturation (South et al. 2005). The acculturation process includes active participation in social institutions, a high level of language fluency, an understanding of cultural norms and the successive adoption of cultural patterns (Massey and Denton 1985). In turn, the combination of language skills, resources and experiences immigrants accumulate after arrival in host societies culminate into spatial mobility into predominantly native neighborhoods as well as greater social acceptance of foreign born members by natives (Charles 2003).

Much of the extant literature finds substantial support for both tenets of the spatial assimilation perspective (Fischer 2003; Iceland and Scopilliti 2008; Iceland and Wilkes 2006; Massey and Fischer 1999; South et al. 2005). At the aggregate level, studies find Hispanics with greater socioeconomic resources and language proficiency were more likely to live in neighborhoods that included natives relative to Hispanics with lower levels on both (Iceland and Wilkes 2006; South et al. 2005). For Asian households, Iceland and Wilkes (2006) find similar results across all metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). When controlling for income, education and acculturation related variables, the residential outcomes of Asian households even tend to be higher than that of non-Hispanic whites (Rosenbaum and Friedman 2007). These aggregate patterns are consistent in individual level analyses that congruently find substantial support that greater socioeconomic capital and acculturation characteristics translate into greater residential integration with whites (Logan et al. 1996; Alba et al. 1999).

Nevertheless, studies continue to show that affluent Hispanic households reside in lower quality neighborhoods than whites with comparable income (Friedman and Rosenbaum 2007; Rosenbaum and Friedman 2007; Pais et al. 2012). While spatial assimilation emphasizes differences in socio-economic and cultural capital, place stratification models in addition implicates the role of discrimination, racism and prejudice in shaping the limits of socioeconomic gains and acculturation (Charles 2003; Iceland and Wilkes 2006; Massey and Denton 1993; Roscigno et al. 2009). Racial and ethnic prejudices toward immigrants and minorities continue to persist within rental and sales markets nationwide (Ross and Turner 2005). Despite an upward trend towards

greater social acceptance of neighborhood integration (Charles 2006), studies consistently show whites exhibit some of the strongest preferences for same-race neighbors and hold the least favorable attitudes towards residential integration (Charles 2006; Farley et al. 1997).

Other scholars suggest residential patterns are also strongly influenced by cultural preferences (Clark 1991, 2002; Schelling 1971). Contrary to spatial assimilation theories, scholars argue preferences shape residential outcomes above and beyond limited resources alone, citing affluent Asian and Hispanic neighborhoods in California, New York, and Florida (Logan et al. 2002). Indeed, these patterns of residential outcomes are often differentiated as “ethnic communities” rather than “immigrant enclaves” in that in-group preferences are not shaped by constraints due to deficiencies in resources or acculturation, given the relative affluence and comparability of neighborhood amenities on par with whites (Logan et al. 2002). With the bifurcation in resources immigrants bring to bear upon arrival, Logan and colleagues (2002, 301) point to the increasing importance of preferences in dictating residential outcomes noting:

What makes it potentially more significant today is the presence of immigrant groups with high levels of human and financial capital, such as Asian Indians, who have the means to translate their preferences for residing in culturally familiar environment into residential niches in affluent areas.

Conversely, other scholars caution ethnocentric preferences are shaped by underlying processes of discrimination and limited alternatives to reside in predominantly white neighborhoods because of perceived prejudice and racial border patrolling within them (Dalmage 2000; Charles 2000). Here, critics point to open fears over white hostility, and

the competing desires to live in neighborhoods with greater amenities (Charles 2006; Krysan and Farley 2002). Ethnic communities relieve these dual pressures by providing both relative affluence coupled with the desire to reside in areas with more co-ethnics as a reaction to mitigate perceived prejudice from whites (Charles 2006; Krysan and Farley 2002).

In combination, these three perspectives dominate the residential segregation literature (Charles 2006; Friedman et al. 2014; Iceland and Wilkes 2006), however, few studies examine the impact of multiculturalism and how they intersect with residential outcomes. The general expansion of multiculturalist policies (Banting et al. 2006; Koopmans 2013) has renewed policy debates over the residential implications of such policies.

Theories of residential segregation and multiculturalist policies

In recent years, polarizing debates over immigration and language proficiency are a common issue of discontent within dominant political discourses that problematize current waves of immigrants as unassimilable and/or unwilling to learn English (Chavez and Provine 2009; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Espenshade and Haishan 1997; Huntington 2004). The historic growth in immigration experienced by the United States has been marked by a decisive shift away from regions outside Northern and Western Europe (Lee and Bean 2004). The confluence of greater immigration, qualitative shifts in immigration towards non-Western countries, as well as the relative decline in the average skills of incoming immigrants renewed discussions over the socio-cultural outcomes of immigrants (Borjas 1994; Kposowa 1998; Lee and Bean 2004). In particular, some

scholars suggest multiculturalist policies exacerbate negative socio-cultural outcomes by acting as an impediment to acculturation and ultimately spatial integration. In fact,

Koopmans (2010,10) suggests:

[M]ulticultural policies that emphasize the own language and culture of immigrants, and stimulate them to orient themselves on their ethnic community may have the unintended consequence of sustaining linguistic deficiencies and a lack of cultural ‘soft skills.’ Moreover, the emphasis in multicultural policies on the own group and the maintenance of its language and culture may be detrimental to the development of social contacts across ethnic boundaries with natives, thus depriving immigrants of an important source of social capital, since natives hold the keys to much of the knowledge and positional resources relevant for labour market integration.

First, critics argue multiculturalist policies overly maintain immigrant institutions which lowers the assimilatory pressures to develop soft skills like language acquisition (Koopmans 2010), which spatial assimilation theories strongly implicate as a key determinant for outward mobility (Alba and Nee 2009). Spatial concentration within immigrant communities lowers the need to become proficient in English by reducing encounters with native speakers and the associated costs with remaining monolingual (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Koopmans 2010).

A second line of reasoning suggests multiculturalist policies can shape in-group and ultimately residential preferences along ethnic and linguistic lines. That is, critics caution multiculturalism reifies racial/ethnic boundaries between natives and immigrants such that in-group preferences override considerations to spatially move into predominantly white neighborhoods (Banting et al. 2006; Bolt et al. 2010). Analyses across censuses find a declining salience of acculturation types of measures among immigrants with the rise of affluent ethnic suburbs (Alba et al. 2000; Logan et al. 2002).

In addition, other studies find the increasing salience of “cultural differences” along mostly linguistic divides for whites in shaping aversion to residing in neighborhoods with large numbers of Asian or Hispanic residents (Krysan 2002). Here, mounting political criticisms are levied toward immigrants that they do not do enough to integrate into mainstream institutions and normative discourses increasingly problematize the “self-segregation” approach (Bolt et al. 2010; Phillips 2007).

Third, multiculturalist policies may shape prejudice and hostility towards immigration. Recent studies suggest multiculturalist policies often challenge normative conceptualizations of national identity, thereby triggering increased prejudice towards immigrants and immigration from natives (Citrin and Sears 2014; Citrin et al. 2014). At its core, language proficiency remains a polarizing issue of discontent within dominant political discourses that problematize current waves of immigrants and multiculturalist policies (Chavez and Provine 2009; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Huntington 2004; Koopmans 2010). If multiculturalist policies increasingly make visible cultural pluralism and heighten antagonism towards immigrants, fears over white hostility in predominantly white neighborhoods may amplify desires of immigrants to live in neighborhoods that are composed of co-ethnics as a response to increasing prejudice.

In summary, the literature mostly advances a strong expectation that linguistic multicultural policies should amplify residential segregation from whites, however, for different reasons. One line of reasoning suggests linguistic multiculturalist policies act as an impediment for acculturation. A second perspective suggests they reify boundaries between natives and immigrants, thereby increasing in-group preferences for co-ethnics

(Banting et al. 2006). A final perspective suggest multiculturalist policies may amplify hostility towards immigration, and in response, immigrants may prefer residing in ethnic communities to offset native hostility. Consistent with these theoretical expectations, we might predict a positive relationship between segregation and linguistic multicultural policies such that:

H₁: Higher levels of linguistic multicultural policies increases segregation levels for Asians and Hispanics with non-Hispanic whites.

And while advocates of multiculturalism view it as a fundamentally egalitarian project that reduces the pressures immigrant feel to abandon their cultural heritage (Kymlicka 2001), critics implicate multiculturalism in compounding the relative deprivations that continue to exist between predominantly immigrant and native communities (Bolt et al. 2010; Koopmans 2010). Banting and colleagues (2006) refer to this trade-off as the “progressive’s dilemma.”

Data and methods

Dependent variable

In order to measure residential segregation from non-Hispanic whites (reference group), we utilize the most common measure of residential segregation—the dissimilarity index for Asian and Hispanic racial groups. Data comes from the 2010 Census Summary Files 1 (SF1), which provide 100% counts of Asian and Hispanic residents within each county. Previous studies on residential segregation use US Census data citing relatively low coverage error, comparable definitions of racial groups and stable definitions of neighborhood units (Massey and Denton 1988; Iceland and Wilkes 2006; Logan et al.

2004). SF1 variables come from the US Census Bureau's American Factfinder (<http://factfinder 2.census.gov>).

The dissimilarity index measures the unevenness in the residential distribution between two groups across census tracts. It is calculated by the following:

$$D(a,b) = 100 \times .5 \left(\sum \left| a_i / A - b_i / B \right| \right),$$

The notation a_i refers to Asians or Hispanics and b_i represents non-Hispanic whites of the i th census tract. Notation A is the total population of Asians or Hispanics, while B references non-Hispanic whites (henceforth whites) of the whole geographic area (Massey and Denton 1988). Scores can range from 0 to 100. Values between 0-30 indicate low levels of segregation, values between 31-59 indicate moderate segregation, and finally, scores 60 and above indicate high levels segregation (Massey and Denton 1993; Logan et al. 2004). Substantively, the scores can be interpreted as the percentage of members that would have to change residence across census tracts in order to be evenly integrated with whites. Only counties that include a minimum of 2,500 minority residents are included, because the dissimilarity index does not reliably converge when the population of a group is small relative to the number of census tracts (Bennett 2011; Logan et al. 2004).

Lastly, the dissimilarity index is calculated at the county level as the geographic unit of analysis for several reasons. Foremost, counties are the independent geographic and political entity that implement linguistic policy. Moreover, counties also formulate health and related population policies that impact residential outcomes. Finally, data on

social welfare and other services designed to benefit populations were readily available at the county level (Kposowa 2009).

County-level independent variables

To assess the link between multicultural policies and segregation levels, we utilize a composite measure of policy indicators drawn from NCELA (2008-2010) linguistic reports. The multicultural index ranges from 0 to 7, where higher values indicate greater multiculturalism. Seven policy classifications compose the index and policy specifications include: (1) the absence of English only laws, (2) state funding for Limited English Proficiency (LEP) programs, (3) two-way immersion programs, (4) transitional bilingual programs, (5) dual language programs, (6) developmental bilingual programs, and (7) heritage language programs. These indicators coincide with policies that emphasize bilingual approaches to language acquisition and endorses biculturalism relative to English as a second language (ESL) programs that predominantly emphasize language instruction primarily in English (August and Shanahan 2008; Thomas and Collier 2002). The index provides a comprehensive picture of both proactive multilingual policies, as well as the absence of assimilatory types of policies, available to states within a single measure (Koopmans 2013).

County-level controls

Prior research finds several salient county characteristics influence residential outcomes that must be controlled for. These include region, racial composition, socioeconomic status, nativity, and population density.

Segregation research has long established that segregation levels vary by region, with residential areas in the West and South being less segregated than those in the Northeast and the Midwest (Iceland et al. 2013). Legislation like the Fair Housing Act had a greater equalizing effect in newer neighborhoods typically located in the South and the West, where residential covenants that excluded minorities were comparatively less entrenched (Iceland et al. 2013). Farley and Frey (1994) further suggest overall declines in segregation levels nationally is driven in part by residential growth in the South and the West. Overall, recent studies estimate regional population shifts into Sun Belt states accounted for 15-16% of the decline in segregation nationally from 1970-2009 (Iceland et al. 2013). To control for regional variation, we include four regional dummies: South, West, Midwest, and the reference group Northeast.

Insights from the minority threat hypothesis also suggest the size of minority populations influence the residential patterns of whites. Here, natives come to view valuable but increasingly scarce resources as belonging exclusively to them. As racial diversity increases, competition for resources as well as the potential threat of political mobilization to dictate how scarce resources are allocated and trigger prejudice (Blalock 1967), including access to predominantly white neighborhoods (DeFina and Hannon 2009). We include county percentages for the three largest groups: Asian, blacks and Hispanics. Prior studies also suggest the threat narrative is more intense in times of economic stress (Quillian 1995), and thus, we control for the state of economic conditions by including percent under the poverty line.

To control for differences in segregation patterns owing to socioeconomic and nativity differences, we include group differences in SES from whites and acculturation variables consistent with prior studies. To measure group difference in SES from whites, we include the relative median income of Asians and Hispanics as a percentage of the median income of whites. For example, a value of 90 would indicate that a group's median income is 90% of the median household income of whites. Values above 100 reflect that the Asian and Hispanic median income exceeds that of whites (Logan et al. 2004; Bennet 2011). In addition, assimilation theories predict counties with higher percentages of foreign born residents will exhibit higher levels of segregation from whites than counties with lower levels of for due to gaps in acculturation. Here, we include the percentage of foreign-born residents within each county as a measure of nativity (Logan et al. 2004).

Finally, previous research indicates segregation levels are positively associated with population density (Logan et al. 2004). More urban counties typically have ecological structures more conducive to segregation. We include the logged value of population density, measured as the number of persons per square mile, as a control (Logan et al. 2004). Variables were drawn from SF1 variables and American Community Survey (ACS) 2010 five-year estimates. Table 3.1 displays the summary statistics of county level indicators across the Asian and Hispanic sample of counties. Descriptive statistics are weighted.

Table 3.1 County-level descriptive statistics.

Variables	Asian				Hispanic			
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Dissimilarity 2010	40.71	7.51	17.45	65.14	45.67	12.48	1.73	68.72
Dissimilarity 2000	39.94	7.66	15.80	66.90	46.56	12.78	0.10	71.80
Multiculturalism	5.27	1.49	0.00	7.00	4.82	1.85	0.00	7.00
South	0.18	0.39	0.00	1.00	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00
Midwest	0.10	0.31	0.00	1.00	0.09	0.28	0.00	1.00
West	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00
Northeast	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
Percent Black	15.02	12.31	0.40	75.50	16.58	14.18	0.10	75.50
Percent Hispanic	23.28	14.44	1.60	90.60	33.86	20.62	0.90	95.70
Percent Asian	17.00	12.57	0.70	46.80	10.35	9.26	0.10	46.80
Percent Poverty	9.10	3.95	1.90	30.50	11.79	5.31	1.40	39.40
Relative Income	77.71	14.48	24.56	144.22	66.35	10.66	30.99	139.11
Percent Foreign Born	23.22	11.04	1.97	51.07	21.02	11.35	1.36	50.02
Logged Density	3.23	0.57	1.33	4.85	2.92	0.72	0.15	4.85

Notes: Descriptive statistics are weighted.

OLS, LDV, & TRMs

To test hypothesis 1, we regress values of the dissimilarity index (2010) on linguistic multicultural policies utilizing ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. Overall, the sample of counties in the U.S. included 365 counties for Asians and 1,039 counties for Hispanics after list-wise deletion. In order to assess the robustness of results, we follow OLS analyses with a host of alternative model specifications including: Lagged dependent variable (LDV) and truncated regression models (TRMs).

LDV models effectively estimate the impact of linguistic multicultural policy on the change in segregation at the county-level.² One of the key strengths of this analytic strategy is that it reduces the threat of reverse causality between multiculturalism and

² Dissimilarity scores are drawn from Reynolds Farley's 'Racial Residential Segregation Measurement Project' (www.psc.isr.umich.edu/residentiaalsegregation).

segregation (Allison 1990). Some scholars argue the causal arrow between multiculturalism and segregation is reversed such that the growth and political influence of ethnic communities (i.e., higher residential segregation) may stimulate demands for the expansion of multicultural policies to protect linguistic heritages (Crawford 2000). Second, given the controversy surrounding studies of multiculturalism (see, Koopmans 2013), LDV models provide a conservative statistical test of the effect of linguistic multiculturalist policies because the lagged levels of the dependent variable can explain as much of variation in 2010 levels of segregation (Hannan 1979).

In addition to LDV models, we assess whether results are robust to sample truncation (left-side) owing to the exclusion of counties with less than 2,500 minority residents. Prior studies suggest truncated regression models provide parameter estimates that are consistent and unbiased in light of a truncated-dependent variable (Greene 2003). Overall, the effect size and significance of the focal variable remains substantively unchanged. As a final note, all analyses are weighted by the relative size of Asians or Hispanics to show segregation levels that are typical for those groups.

Results

Descriptive results

To proceed, we examine the zero-order correlations between the dissimilarity index in 2010, the lagged dependent variable, linguistic multicultural policies, and other controls for Asians and Hispanics in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, respectively.

Table 3.2 Zero-order correlations and p-values between the 2010 Asian dissimilarity index, multiculturalism, and county-level controls.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1. Dissimilarity 2010	1.00									
	0.00									
2. Dissimilarity 2000	0.92	1.00								
	0.00	0.00								
3. Multiculturalism	0.35	0.34	1.00							
	0.00	0.00	0.00							
4. Log Density	0.35	0.32	0.12	1.00						
	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00						
5. Percent Black	0.12	0.09	-0.26	0.38	1.00					
	0.02	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.00					
6. Percent Hispanic	0.40	0.40	0.20	0.06	0.07	1.00				
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.19	0.00				
7. Percent Asian	0.47	0.41	0.37	0.30	-0.31	0.26	1.00			
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00			
8. Percent Foreign	0.51	0.42	0.23	0.57	0.06	0.60	0.71	1.00		
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.24	0.00	0.00	0.00		
9. Percent Poverty	0.38	0.42	-0.06	0.26	0.59	0.49	-0.15	0.18	1.00	
	0.00	0.00	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
10. Relative Income	-0.11	-0.23	0.09	-0.41	-0.22	-0.13	-0.13	-0.25	-0.37	1.00
	0.03	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00

(N=365)

Notes: Top values represent correlation coefficients and lower values indicate p-values. Correlations are weighted and factor variables are omitted (Region). Reference categories for the dissimilarity index are non-Hispanic whites.

Table 3.3 Zero-order correlations and p-values between the 2010 Hispanic dissimilarity index, multiculturalism, and county-level controls.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Dissimilarity 2010	1.00									
	0.00									
2. Dissimilarity 2000	0.94	1.00								
	0.00	0.00								
3. Multiculturalism	0.22	0.25	1.00							
	0.00	0.00	0.00							
4. Log Density	0.65	0.64	0.07	1.00						
	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00						
5. Percent Black	0.34	0.31	-0.30	0.52	1.00					
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00					
6. Percent Hispanic	0.17	0.15	0.06	-0.10	0.05	1.00				
	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.13	0.00				
7. Percent Asian	0.45	0.42	0.39	0.43	-0.09	0.15	1.00			
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00			
8. Percent Foreign	0.54	0.48	-0.02	0.50	0.36	0.53	0.64	1.00		
	0.00	0.00	0.46	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
9. Percent Poverty	0.10	0.11	-0.01	-0.01	0.26	0.70	-0.10	0.22	1.00	
	0.00	0.00	0.65	0.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
10. Relative Income	-0.48	-0.52	-0.13	-0.39	-0.21	-0.18	-0.12	-0.22	-0.24	1.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

(N=1,031)

Notes: Top values represent correlation coefficients and lower values indicate p-values. Correlations are weighted and factor variables are omitted (Region). Reference categories for the dissimilarity index are non-Hispanic whites.

P values are displayed below the correlation coefficient. Beginning with the Asian sample of counties ($N=365$), the correlation between current (2010) and the lagged levels of segregation (2000) are strikingly strong and close to one ($r=0.92$, p value <0.001). A similar pattern emerges for the Hispanic sample of counties ($N=1,031$)—prior levels of segregation ($r=0.92$, p value <0.001) account for a substantial amount of the variation in current levels of segregation. Further inspection of the correlations suggests a moderate and positive relationship between linguistic multicultural policies and segregation ($r=0.35$, p value <0.001 for Asian; $r=0.22$, p value <0.001 for Hispanic), consistent with hypothesis 1. Remaining county level correlations with the dependent variable are correctly signed and significant at conventional levels.

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions

In Table 3.4, we present parameter estimates from four OLS regression models of 2010 segregation levels. The table is organized such that models 1 and 3 examine the bivariate regression between linguistic multiculturalist policies on Asian-white and Hispanic-white segregation levels, respectively. In models 2 and 4, we sequentially include the full battery of county level controls to account for alternative explanations.

Consistent with descriptive results, parameter estimates from model 1 suggest the relationship between multiculturalism and Asian-white segregation levels is positive and significant ($\beta=1.77$, $p<0.001$). In model 2, we add county-level controls (region, racial composition, poverty, socioeconomic status, nativity, and population density). With the inclusion of county level controls, several notable changes occur.

Table 3.4 OLS regression results Asian-white and Hispanic-white segregation levels, 2010.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent Variable				
Linguistic				
Multiculturalism	1.773*** (5.207)	0.675* (2.177)	1.468* (2.175)	-0.236 (-0.664)
County Controls				
West		-0.677 (-0.377)		2.545 (1.238)
South		-1.816 (-1.083)		-7.234*** (-4.427)
Midwest		2.128† (1.677)		2.574 (1.226)
Northeast		-		-
Percent Black		0.0399 (0.897)		0.157*** (3.503)
Percent Hispanic		0.0273 (0.394)		0.148*** (4.312)
Percent Asian		0.282*** (3.405)		0.111 (0.822)
Percent Poverty		0.806*** (5.348)		-0.193† (-1.650)
Relative Income		0.0665* (1.972)		-0.345*** (-8.113)
Percent Foreign Born		0.038 (0.353)		0.001 (0.011)
Logged Density		0.668 (0.442)		7.451*** (7.054)
Constant	31.370*** (24.050)	15.990** (2.879)	38.600*** (15.820)	42.660*** (8.342)
N	365	365	1,031	1,031
R-squared	0.123	0.504	0.048	0.637

Notes: Northeast the reference category. †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (Two-tailed tests). Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses and results are weighted.

First, the overall fit of the model unsurprisingly improves. Second, the size of the coefficient substantially declines by roughly 62% ($\beta=0.67, p<0.05$), but nevertheless remains positive and significant. Examining model 3, the bivariate relationship between multiculturalism and Hispanic-white segregation is also positive and significant ($\beta=1.47, p<0.05$). However, once we include county-level controls in model 4, the effect is no longer significant and becomes negative ($\beta=-0.24, p>0.05$). More specifically, regional effects appear to mediate the relationship between multiculturalism and Hispanic-white segregation levels, such that once we include region into the model, the significant positive relationship we observe in the bivariate model (model 3) disappears. In sum, we find mixed support for hypothesis 1. Multiculturalist policies appear to increase Asian-white segregation levels but not Hispanic-white segregation levels.

OLS, LDV and TRMs

In Table 3.5, we present parameter estimates of multiculturalism across OLS, LDV and TRMs, respectively. Recall from Table 3.2 and 3.3, prior levels of segregation account for nearly all of the variation in current levels of segregation, and thus, LDV parameter estimates represent conservative estimates of multiculturalism, while accounting for reverse causality and non-stationarity in the dependent variable.

Table 3.5 OLS, LDV and TRM regression results of Asian-white and Hispanic-white segregation levels, 2010.

Independent Variable	Asian-white			Hispanic-white		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Linguistic						
Multiculturalism	0.675*	0.244*	0.675*	-0.236	-0.177	-0.236
	(2.177)	(2.078)	(2.211)	(-0.664)	(-1.160)	(-0.668)
N	365	365	365	1,031	1,031	1,031

Notes: All parameter estimates include county-level controls but are omitted for presentation purposes (available upon request). County-level controls include: Region, racial composition, poverty, socio-economic status, nativity and population density. †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (Two-tailed tests). Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses and results are weighted. OLS=Ordinary least squares; LDV=Lagged dependent variable; TRM=Truncated regression model.

TRMs provide an additional layer of robustness by accounting for left side truncation in the dependent variable. The table is organized such that models 1, 2, and 3 display the effect of multiculturalism on Asian-white segregation levels, while models 4, 5, and 6 represent Hispanic-white coefficients across estimators. All six models include county-level controls, but are omitted for presentation purposes (available upon request).

Beginning with Asian-white segregation levels, coefficients of multiculturalism from LDV models (model 2) are substantially smaller than those from OLS parameter estimates (model 1). Parameter estimates from LDV models ($\beta=0.24$, $p<0.05$) are roughly 64% smaller than OLS estimates. Nevertheless, the effect remains positive and significant at conventional levels, consistent with hypothesis 1. OLS estimates and t statistics are nearly identical to estimates from TRMs (model 3). In sum, the positive relationship between multiculturalism and Asian-white segregation levels hold across estimators; however, estimates from LDV models are substantially lower than that of OLS and TRMs.

Examining the results of Hispanic-white segregation levels, the coefficients of multiculturalism remain largely consistent across estimators. LDV estimates (model 5) are roughly 26% smaller than OLS (model 4) and TRMs (model 6). Nevertheless, the negative effect is not statistically significant across estimators and the results are inconsistent with the expectations of hypothesis 1. We find no evidence multiculturalism increases Hispanic-white segregation levels.


Substantive significance

The findings beg the question of how substantive are the positive significant effects we observe for Asian-white segregation? To answer this question, Figure 3.1 reports the maximum change in linguistic multicultural policies from the lowest (0) to the highest observed levels (7). If a hypothetical state was to change its policy orientation from having no policy to fully embracing linguistic multicultural policy, how would Asian-white segregation levels change? To contextualize, low multicultural states include states like Alabama, Arkansas, and Kentucky. High multicultural states include states like Minnesota or New Jersey.

In Figure 3.1, we plot the predicted change in Asian-white segregation levels with the maximum increase in linguistic policy described above across OLS, LDV, and TRMs. OLS and TRMs suggest the predicted change to increase segregation levels by 4.7 points. More conservative estimates from LDV models suggest the predicted change to hypothetically increase segregation levels by roughly 1.7 points. To put these changes into context, benchmarks studies consider differences in segregation levels in the range of 10 or more percentage points as significant, differences in the range of 5 to 10 percentage

points are considered moderate, and differences in the range of 0 to 5 are considered low (Charles 2003). If compared to these benchmarks, predicted changes in segregation levels due to multiculturalism are at best considered low.

Figure 3.1 Predicted change in Asian-white segregation levels across OLS, LDV and TRMs, 2010.



Notes: Estimates are derived from Table 5, Models 1, 2 and 3. The maximum change in multiculturalism represents a shift in multicultural scores from 0 (the lowest observed values) to 7 (the highest observed values). OLS=Ordinary least squares; LDV=Lagged dependent variable; TRM=Truncated regression model.

Discussion and conclusion

The 2010 Census provides an opportunity to evaluate a politically and academically contentious topic of whether linguistic multicultural policies impact segregation levels.

This study is one of the few to utilize within country analyses to assess the effect of

multicultural policies, thereby removing the methodological concerns surrounding selection effects that plague comparative studies (Koopmans 2013). Substantively, this study more validly measures how multiculturalist policies are applied within localized contexts. Moreover, we more concretely identify domestic linguistic policies, rather than relying on national aggregate measures of multiculturalism (Banting et al. 2006; Sumino 2014). Ultimately, the results of the study are mixed. We find multicultural linguistic policies appear to increase Asian-white but not Hispanic-white segregation levels. These results are robust to a host of alternative explanations and model specifications. The uneven outcomes found in the study should warrant more caution over presumptive claims of a monolithic effect of multiculturalism on segregation levels.

While normative arguments problematize rising levels of segregation, a growing chorus of scholars increasingly question these evaluations and advocate for a more neutral position surrounding segregation (Brubaker 2001; Bolt et al. 2010; Phillips 2006). For one, scholars point to affluent communities that foster ethnic institutions that more readily serve the needs of immigrant residents relative to predominantly native neighborhoods. These communities often have comparable or even greater neighborhood amenities than areas that are predominantly whites (Charles 2003; Logan et al. 2002). Here, ethnic neighborhoods more closely resemble Logan et al.'s (2002) archetype of "ethnic communities" rather than "minority ghettos." Rather than problematizing immigrant segregation, Brubaker (2001, 541) argues "one can study assimilation in its various domains and directions without being an assimilationist; one may be agnostic about its destinations and ambivalent or even skeptical about its desirability." Indeed, our

analysis suggests even if segregation is viewed normatively as a negative outcome, the impact of linguistic multiculturalist policies appear to be racially specific to the Asian population, but the effect is marginal.

The differing results between racial groups are interesting. We find no effect of multicultural linguistic policy for the Hispanic population. The divergent results appear to be due the greater geographic heterogeneity in residential pattern for Hispanics. That is, the effect of multicultural linguistic policy for Hispanics is mediated by region. Prior studies show that Hispanic residential distributions are more geographically disperse than the Asian population, with increasing numbers of foreign born Hispanics residing in new destinations located in the Midwest and South (Fischer and Tienda 2006; Tienda and Fuentes 2014). Much of this geographic scattering appears to be driven by the demand for low-skilled labor (Fisher and Tienda 2006; Massey and Capoferro 2008). We posit that it may be local labor conditions in these new destinations that confound the relationship between linguistic multicultural policy and Hispanic-white segregation levels. Once we control for region in our model, the initial positive bivariate association disappears (Table 3.4).

Overall, despite the prominence of backlash discourse against multicultural policies (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010), we find they have a largely limited effect on segregation outcomes from native. Our findings are more consistent with a growing body of literature that suggest that immigrant incorporation policies are too diffuse and incoherent to impact integration outcomes (Freeman 2004; Grillo 2007). For instance, Freeman (2004, 946) suggests “one finds ramshackle, multifaceted, loosely connected

sets of regulatory rules, institutions and practices in various domains of society that together make up the frameworks within which migrants and natives work out their differences.” On the ground, prior research highlights a highly varied and complex process through which multiple factors including teacher accountability and the racial composition of students impact how linguistic policy is interpreted and ultimately enacted (Palmer and Rangel 2011).

The limited effect of linguistic multicultural policies may also suggest that racial categorizations of Asian and Hispanic groups belie the increasing heterogeneity with them (Fong 2008; Kim and Mar 2007; Sakamoto and Woo 2007; Tienda and Mitchell 2006). Indeed, new immigrant waves across Western democracies are distinctive from past epochs of immigration in terms of the sheer extent newcomers vary in their national origin, legal status, and socioeconomic capital (Vertovec 2007). And while, researcher and the public at large in the United States tend to treat broad racial categories of “Asian” and “Hispanic” as having self-evident sociological meaning when it comes to explaining residential outcomes, the label encompasses a wide range of divergent experiences from highly skilled Asian Indian immigrants with the necessary socioeconomic capital to transition to middle class neighborhoods, relative to Hmong, Cambodian, and Laotian refugees, with very low levels of education and poor achievement in terms of social mobility (Kim and Mar 2007). And thus, we caution readers to bear in mind the underlying cultural and socioeconomic heterogeneity within racial groups, as well as the geographic heterogeneity between racial groups, when interpreting results. Future studies may further disentangle how differences in ethnic social capital and immigration histories

intersect with local educational and labor market institutions in ways that further and/or challenge established assimilation perspectives (Crul 2016).

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CHAPTER 4:

Multiculturalist policies in an age of immigration: Do multiculturalist policies influence negative immigrant attitudes towards homosexuality?

Chapter Summary

In this article, we provide an empirical analysis of the relationship between multiculturalist policies and immigrant attitudes towards homosexuality. Normative discourses implicate multiculturalism as a key obstacle to the socio-cultural integration between immigrants and natives within affluent democracies. At the core of this controversial debate are differences over the extent to which multiculturalism impedes or promotes the adoption of sexual norms from host societies to immigrants. However, a dearth of empirical studies has allowed political actors to levy broad, but largely speculative claims that multiculturalist policies aggravate cultural conflicts between incoming immigrants and the values of host societies. We begin to address this issue by examining whether immigrants' attitudes towards homosexuality vary in any direction across multicultural contexts. We find no evidence that multicultural policies exacerbate negative attitudes towards homosexuality or facilitate the greater acceptance of socio-cultural norms surrounding homosexuality for immigrant and Muslim immigrants. The findings are consistent across alternative measures of multiculturalism and two large cross-national samples: The European Social Survey and the World Values Survey. Interestingly, we find some support that multiculturalist policies may be correlated with

greater acceptance of homosexuality among natives rather than immigrant respondents. However, further research is necessary to develop and unpack this potential relationship.

Introduction

In recent years, multiculturalist policies have increasingly come under attack within affluent democracies. Political leaders from Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel to British Prime Minister David Cameron have famously denounced multiculturalist policies as a "grand delusion," while conversely advocating for a more unified sense of national identity through "muscular liberalism."¹ Moreover, terrorist attacks in France and Belgium have further fueled debates over whether a stronger stance towards incoming immigrants to assimilate to the cultural values of receiving countries is necessary. Some scholars argue these sentiments are fast becoming the new policy directive within the European Union (Joppke 2004), but is also notably gaining political traction in both Australia and Canada, two countries with a history of staunch advocacy for multiculturalist policies (Banting and Kymlicka 2010; Ley 2010; Moran 2011).

Many of the countervailing arguments against multiculturalism have sought to delegitimize policy claims by problematizing current waves of immigrants as "unassimilable" to the humanistic values liberal democracies (e.g., Huntington 2004).

These arguments are particularly acute for Muslim immigrants (Inglehart and Norris

¹ Cameron criticizes "multiculturalism" in Britain. *New York Times*, 6 February 2011. "Muscular liberalism" refers to the increasingly illiberal means of employing aggressive integration policies and stringent immigration requirements to purportedly facilitate cultural integration (Triadafilopoulos 2011). In doing so, rich democracies thereby attempt to "protect" Western liberal values of tolerance, equality, and acceptance of nonconformity from incoming immigrants who are often labeled as destroying it (Triadafilopoulos 2011).

2003a; Kundnani 2012; Modood 2013; Rahman 2014). Mainstream narratives that frame host-immigrant relations as irreconcilable cultural conflicts suggest that multiculturalist policies hinder integration and exacerbate cultural dissonance between newcomers and natives (Grillo 2007; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). These narratives feed into widespread perceptions that (1) there is a backlash against multiculturalism and (2) there is an assimilation-multiculturalism trade-off for immigrants.

Despite a plurality in perspectives surrounding multiculturalism (Grillo 2007; Meer and Modood 2009), mainstream narratives continue to be mired in heated disputes that multiculturalism leads to unfavorable integration outcomes (Koopmans 2010; Okin 1999). Perhaps in no place has this juxtaposition unfolded more acutely than in the Netherlands (Puar 2007). The Netherlands stands out as an exemplar case of the tensions that may arise between multiculturalism and gay rights (Fassin 2006; Foner 2008; Foner and Alba 2008; Mepschen et al. 2010). To date, public opinion research has consistently shown the Netherlands ranks as the most supportive of all Western democracies relative to attitudes on homosexuality, prostitution, and drug legalization (Kraaykamp 2002). Moreover, it was formerly one of the most culturally accommodating European countries towards immigrants (Koopmans 2010). However, following the 2002 and the 2004 murders of gay right-wing politicians, Theo van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn, a host of multicultural policy reversals were implemented to facilitate civic integration (Duyvendak and Scholten 2012; Entzinger 2014; Van der Veer 2006). The immigrant demagoguery that has exemplified political discourse in the Netherlands has found greater political traction across Western liberal democracies (Kundnani 2012; Modood,

2013; Rahman 2014). Several countries have responded in kind by instituting programs aimed at acclimating incoming immigrants to the sexual norms of receiving countries, which critics argue are controversially predicated on assumptions that lionized “more egalitarian” Western values.²

Despite broad condemnatory conclusions by political pundits that multiculturalism spurs radicalism and inegalitarianism in immigrant communities (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Wright and Bloemraad 2012), there have been limited empirical studies supporting such interventions (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Koopmans 2013). This is unfortunate, given gay rights centrally figure into fierce contemporary sociopolitical debates over the negative consequences of multicultural policies (Ewing 2008; Fassin 2006). Although there is a burgeoning body of literature detailing the economic and political integration of immigrants across multicultural contexts (Koopmans 2010; Wright and Bloemraad 2012), this study is one of the few that examines sociocultural outcomes (Kwon et al. 2017).

In this study, we interrogate the consequence of multiculturalist policies on immigrant attitudes toward homosexuality as a particularly salient form of socio-cultural integration between immigrants and natives. We use two-way fixed effects (FEs) regression models on pooled samples from the European Social Survey (ESS) (2002-2010). The comparative focus of the study allows for broader appraisals of policy effects across 16 affluent European democracies. On balance, we find null results for both first-generation immigrants and Muslim first-generation immigrants. Our findings suggest a

² Norway offers migrants a lesson in how to treat women. *New York Times*, 19 December 2015.

degree of skepticism that national multiculturalist policies affect immigrants' attitudes toward homosexuality in any direction. The null findings are consistent between the two most commonly utilized measures of multiculturalism, as well as from survey data drawn from the World Values Survey (WVS) (1995-2006).

The civic-multiculturalist trade-off

International immigration is a central feature of globalization and Western democracies increasingly face a diverse citizenry. On average, foreign-born residents now compose over 13% of the population in highly developed countries (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2013). Although immigration is not a new social phenomenon, current waves of migrants may qualitatively differ from past waves in distinctive ways. For one, some scholars argue that migration is now “super-diverse” (Vertovec 2007). That is, there is much more heterogeneity in migrants' entry status, economic resources, and/or linguistic diversity than past periods – even among immigrants from the same ethnic group (Vertovec 2007). This explosion of diversity both within and between immigrant groups pose challenging questions for the state over how best to incorporate newcomers from ever more diverse backgrounds (Crul 2016).

In recent years, states have increasingly turned to civic policies as the primary policy instrument to facilitate immigrant integration (Mouritsen 2013). Currently, nearly all European countries institute some form of civic requirement for newcomers (Goodman 2015). Civic policies usually include a mix of linguistic assessment, knowledge of the host country's history and cultural values, oaths of allegiance, and/or declarations to reject extremism (Goodman and Wright 2015; Kundnani 2012). Unlike

multicultural policies that focus on cultural accommodation and rights for immigrants (Goodman and Wright 2015), civic policies emphasize obligatory integration to mainstream institutions and liberal principles (Joppke 2004). Some scholars view this rise in civic integration policies to signify a backlash or retreat from multiculturalism (Joppke 2004). Although this narrative is popular, it is not entirely correct.

First, some scholars suggest that the civic–multiculturalism trade-off is largely confined to political rhetoric (Grillo 2007; McGhee 2008; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Here, McGhee (2008, 145) argues “that the term ‘multiculturalism’ has been driven underground, while some of the strategies associated with multiculturalism continue to influence policy and practices.” Indeed, the rhetorical ubiquity of multiculturalism’s demise paradoxically occurs even in countries that largely do not implement multicultural types of policies to begin with (i.e., Germany) (Goodman and Wright 2015).

Second, political discourses often shape public misconceptions of the content of multicultural policies (Grillo 2007). Prior studies find multiculturalist policies are talked about and perceived in their strongest form within political rhetoric—as institutionalized statues for religious schools (Grillo 2007, 2008). More often in practice, it is much weaker. In the European context, multicultural policies are “closer to cultural recognition but assimilation in mainstream labor institutions, education, and welfare” (Grillo 2007, 987). Some scholars posit normative discourses shape this disconnect between actual policy and public perceptions of policy that allows for backlash narratives to flourish (Bouchard and Taylor 2008; McGhee 2008).

Third, policy outcomes are more complex and are not limited to a zero-sum, civic–multiculturalism trade-off. Some scholars identify hybrid models which synthesize aspects of both civic integration and multiculturalism in country-specific ways. In this way, countries often experience a rebalancing of multiculturalism rather than a wholesale retreat (McGhee 2008; Meer and Modood 2009). For instance, Meer and Modood (2009, 479) show how shifts in:

British multiculturalism which, although lacking an official ‘Multicultural Act’ or ‘Charter’ in the way of Australia or Canada (CMEB 2000), rejected the idea of integration being based upon a drive for unity through an uncompromising cultural ‘assimilation’ over 40 years ago.

This view is consistent with studies that examine concrete multicultural policies rather than discourses cross-nationally. Indices show an expansion of multicultural policies during the 1980s and 1990s, but relatively static growth during the height of backlash discourses (Banting and Kymlicka 2013; Koopmans 2013). In fact, Denmark, Italy, and the Netherlands are the only countries to show a decline over time (Banting and Kymlicka 2013). And of these countries, only the Netherlands shows any substantial decline that could credibly be characterized as a retreat from multiculturalism (Banting and Kymlicka 2013).

The dissonance between multicultural discourse and concrete policies highlight how multiculturalism has come to occupy multiple meanings, which are not entirely congruent (Bloemraad and Wright 2014). For example, some scholars refer to multiculturalism as the demographic diversity due to rising immigration (Brady and Finnigan 2014; Vertovec 2007). For other scholars, the term refers to a political philosophy of equality that critiques Western liberalism (Kymlicka 1995, 2001; Modood

2013; Taylor 1992). In this paper, we specifically focus on multiculturalism as a set of concrete policies to accommodate religious and ethnic diversity. In doing so, we hope to add to a broadening empirical literature that seeks to disentangle normative political debates (which often espouse sweeping claims) into empirical research (Bloemraad and Wright 2014; Kwon and Curran 2016; Kwon et al. 2017; Wright and Bloemraad 2012).

Multicultural policies and their implications for immigrant attitudes toward homosexuality

As populist cries to roll back multicultural immigration policies have swept through rich democracies, political mobilization for the equal rights of lesbian–gay–bisexual–transgender–queer (LGBTQ) persons within Western liberal democracies have gained greater traction. For some scholars, this newfound trend is attributable to rising secularity and the greater social acceptance of sexual plurality (Takács and Szalma 2013; Weeks 2007), even as other scholars suggest the opposite—a religious revival and a return to religion to the public sphere (Roy 2014; Turner 2011). The liberal values of secularity, gender equality, and sexual freedom have come to define the European identity and become the primary basis through which the immigrant “other” is constructed, particularly for Muslim immigrants (Kundnani 2012). In fact, Kundnani (2012, 160) argues that “this liberal discourse has displaced an older conservative nationalism and does the same work of marking out racial difference, now through a notion of British [Western] values counterposed to a Muslim communal identity.” In this way, Kundnani (2012) argues multiculturalism face challenges from both the political right, and increasingly the political left.

These dynamics unfold in heated policy debates surrounding the “home–host dichotomy,” wherein host countries (i.e., Western liberal democracies) are characterized as more equitable vis-a-vis home (i.e., countries of origin) countries (Barajas and Ramirez 2007; Kundnani 2012). Contemporary political discourses (1) cast immigrant identities as outside the West and (2) espouse the civilization exceptionalism of affluent democracies and their long history of tolerance toward sexual diversity (Mepschen et al. 2010; Puar 2007; Rahman 2014). However, contemporary political discourse in affluent democracies, belie the relative nascence of legal protections and burgeoning social acceptance for LGBTQ members (Rahman and Jackson 2010; Weeks 2007). These dynamics are particularly acute for Muslim immigrants (Kundnani 2012; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Rahman 2014).

Historically, homosexuality within the West was met with intense sociopolitical repression. Deviations from heterosexual norms were stigmatized as criminal, deviant, or perverse (Rahman 2014; Van de Meerendonk and Scheepers 2004; Weeks 2007). In fact, as recent as the 1980s, surveys from the WVS show that over 40% of respondents in affluent democracies reported that homosexuality was never acceptable, or had the lowest level of support (Inglehart 2008; Inglehart and Norris 2003b). Several decades later, public opinions toward homosexuality have shown a dramatic and continued liberalization in affluent democracies, led by the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries (Avery et al. 2007; Hicks and Lee 2006; Yang 1997).

A large body of literature implicates the role of modernization and postmaterialist attitudes as key determinants explaining this gradual shift within and the difference

between affluent democracies and other countries (Inglehart 2008; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003b). Urbanization, industrialization, and mass education have weakened traditional structures of sexual regulation, while facilitating the expansion of individualism (Inglehart and Norris 2003b). These structural transformations altered perceptions of sexuality and consistent with the post-materialist perspective, attitudes toward homosexuality are generally more liberalized in affluent democracies relative to other countries (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003b; Weeks 2007).

Within affluent democracies, there is evidence to suggest that immigrants, on average, generally hold less tolerant views toward homosexuality than natives (Gerhards 2010; Norris and Inglehart 2012). Prior studies suggest attitudes lie somewhere in between those of natives and origin countries for immigrants (Norris and Inglehart 2012). Over time, assimilation theory posits, immigrants gradually acculturate, and begin to inculcate the cultural values of host societies (Alba and Nee 2003; Arends-Tóth and Van der Vijver 2009), albeit not necessarily in a straight-line fashion (Portes and Zhou 1993). The acculturation process and successive adoption of cultural patterns necessitates adequate language fluency and a degree of active participation in mainstream social institutions (Koopmans 2010). These processes facilitate formal labor participation and migration away from ethnic enclaves, facilitating upward mobility (Koopmans 2010). In turn, greater structural assimilation of immigrants into mainstream social institutions expedites and reinforces sociocultural integration (Alba and Nee 2003). Congruent with the assimilation thesis, studies have shown first-generation immigrants may hold less egalitarian attitudes toward homosexuality (Röder 2014). However, attitudes shift over

the length of residence and by the second generation, there is no significant difference in attitudes toward homosexuality or in the rate of acceptance with natives (Langstaff 2011; Röder 2014).

Here, some scholars suggest multiculturalist policies hinder the straight-line process of sociocultural integration with natives. By allowing for legally protected differences along cultural lines, multiculturalism facilitates the creation of parallel ethnic institutions. For instance, Koopmans (2010, 10) argues:


[M]ulticultural policies that emphasize the own language and culture of immigrants, and stimulate them to orient themselves on their ethnic community may have the unintended consequence of sustaining linguistic deficiencies and a lack of cultural ‘soft skills.’ Moreover, the emphasis in multicultural policies on the own group and the maintenance of its language and culture may be detrimental to the development of social contacts across ethnic boundaries with natives, thus depriving immigrants of an important source of social capital, since natives hold the keys to much of the knowledge and positional resources relevant for labour market integration.

It is these deficiencies in structural integration into mainstream institutions that, critics argue, limit the exposure of immigrants to mainstream norms, which exposure-based explanations suggest are catalyzing agents toward more equitable norms or values (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Davis and Greenstein 2009). And thus, multiculturalist policies may culturally insulate immigrant communities, which often come from countries where homosexuality is less socially accepted, illegal or at its extreme, results in the death penalty (Norris and Inglehart 2012; Rahman 2014; Röder 2014). Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010, 12–13) succinctly outline the multiculturalism–sociocultural link in three steps:

(a) multiculturalism fosters accentuated or preserved cultural differences, (b) such differences lead to communal separateness, and (c) separateness deepens socio-economic standing, intensifies the breakdown of social relations and provides an incubator for extremism and possibly terrorism.

If multiculturalist policies act as barriers to sociocultural integration, such a dynamic should be observable by examining whether immigrants' attitudes toward homosexuality are systematically less positive in countries that have more multiculturalist policies in place. We illustrate this argument in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1 Theoretical model of the moderating effect of multiculturalism: Trade-off perspective.



In Figure 4.1, we summarize the mechanisms of the trade-off thesis which argues multiculturalism weakens assimilation and acculturation pressures by culturally insulating immigrant communities. And thus, we might expect:

H₁: Immigrants' attitudes in countries with higher levels of multiculturalism are less accepting of homosexuality.

Multiculturalism reduces cultural "reactionism" and discrimination

Some scholars problematize the trade-off thesis between sexuality and ethnocultural equality. First, it presupposes a zero-sum outcome for immigrants (Levy 2000; Phillips 2005, 2009). That is, equality along ethno-cultural lines through multiculturalist policies necessitates a decline in greater acceptance of homosexuality (Banting et al. 2006). Critics argue that discourses that rely on home–host dichotomies do more to fuel the negative imagery of immigrant cultures as monolithically patriarchal or homophobic, while denying those same elements that exist in affluent democracies (Barajas and Ramirez 2007; Mepschen et al. 2010; Rahman 2014). In turn, the polarizing dynamics of identity politics may promote perceptions of cultural threat and reactionism within immigrant communities. And thus, a rigid interpretation of sexual values comes to exemplify adherence to an immigrant identity in order promote “group self-preservation which takes as its goal the maintenance of a separate and distinct ethos” (Shachar 2001, 11).

These dynamics are exemplified within identity politics surrounding Muslim immigrants. As a response to cultural discrimination, host values are conversely portrayed as morally decadent, individualistic, and frame homosexuality as a Western disease (Connor 2010; Massad 2002). Some scholars suggest multiculturalist policies reduce the prevalence of reactivism among immigrants, because multiculturalism largely promotes a positive message of the value immigrant cultures bring to host societies


(Branscomb et al. 1999; Phillips 2005, 2009). That is, the sociocultural outcomes of immigrants may be more successful when states employ strategies that recognize cultural difference without demonizing immigrant cultures as incongruent with liberalism (Levy 2000; Phillips 2005, 2009).

Second, critics argue normative discourse construe assimilation and acculturation as largely a “one-way street” in which immigrants are expected assimilate to host society norms. In return, host societies do little to incorporate the cultural values and symbols of immigrant groups (Okin 1999; cf., Barajas and Ramirez 2007). By contrast, some scholars argue the degree of sociocultural integration critically depends on the context of reception (Portes and Zhou 1993). The process of sociocultural integration is more complex than normative arguments suggest, and the more accurate characterization is a “metaphorical two-way street” (Massey and Sánchez 2010). If multiculturalist policies reduce perceptions of cultural discrimination and promote a hospitable context of reception as proponents argue, such a dynamic could counterintuitively promote sociocultural integration. Indeed, prior studies have found that immigrants report less discrimination in more multicultural countries (Wright and Bloemraad 2012).

In sum, advocates argue that multiculturalism reduces the assimilatory pressures immigrant communities might otherwise experience. In turn, this eases the double bind immigrants face in choosing between two institutions “normatively defined as opposites” within prevailing political discourses: the immigrant family and the assimilative state (Guénif-Souilamas 2006). By reducing perceptions of cultural threat and experiences of discrimination, multiculturalism might facilitate more rapid sociocultural convergence

between natives and immigrants. Such a dynamic would lead to greater acceptance of homosexuality in more multicultural countries. We illustrate this argument in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2 Theoretical model of the moderating effect of multiculturalism: Multiculturalism facilitates socio-cultural integration.



In Figure 4.2, we illustrate the mechanisms of the multiculturalism–reactionism thesis. Multiculturalism strengthens assimilation and acculturation sociocultural outcomes by easing cultural discrimination and reducing reactionary responses to cultural threat within immigrant communities through incorporating important culture symbols—dress, ceremony, custom, food, religion, etc.—within mainstream institutions. Congruent with Figure 4.2, we might expect:

H₂: Immigrants' attitudes in countries with higher levels of multiculturalism are more accepting of homosexuality.

The possibility of a null effect

Although civilizing debates often compare the relative gender and sexual values between natives and immigrants as incongruent, it remains unclear whether acceptance of homosexuality is as unambiguously supported as gender equality (Gerhards 2010; Phillips and Sahrso 2008; Rahman 2014). That is, do mainstream values in affluent democracies equally value acceptance of homosexuality as does gender equality? Some scholars argue the acceptance of homosexuality and sexual plurality is largely absent, except within civilizational debates that criticize incoming immigrants as backward (Rahman 2014). Moreover, civilizing debates often ignore that a substantial portion of the population in affluent democracies continue to hold a negative view toward sexual plurality (Rayside 2008; Rayside and Wilcox 2011). Even within the European Union, LGBTQ rights have faced considerable political opposition (Gerhards 2010), and remains a relatively nascent political movement, when compared to gender equality (Rahman 2014). In fact, Phillips and Sahrso (2008, 293) suggest it may not—commenting, “[i]t can be more readily assumed that ‘we’ in the majority group all support gender equality, but not so easily asserted that ‘we’ all regard homosexuality as fine.” Finally, some scholars argue that national immigration policies, including multiculturalism, are too incoherent and diffuse to impact sociocultural outcomes (Crul 2016; Freeman 2004; Grillo 2007; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Rather, sociocultural outcomes are influenced by local educational and labor institutions, and thus, the focus of national immigration policies may be misplaced (Crul 2016).

Data and methods

We test our research hypothesis using data from the ESS. ESS data consist of nationally representative samples and harmonized survey modules across countries. ESS core modules were first collected in 2002, and were repeated biannually by the European Science Foundation. Due to the limited number of immigrant cases (e.g., roughly 9% of the total sample), we combine cases from both native-born and immigrant respondents to increase our statistical power. Respondents in this study were limited to at least 18 years old, with only one respondent per household. Following list-wise deletion, the study draws on a sample of 126,883 individuals, covering the years 2002–2010. Sixteen European countries were included in the sample: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. On average, national samples had roughly, 1,840 respondents per country year, and ranged from a low of 1,060 respondents in Italy (2002), to a high of 2,816 respondents in Germany (2010). The descriptive data and subsequent analyses are weighted according to the recommendations provided by the ESS.

Dependent variable

Cross-national measures of attitudes toward homosexuality are very limited. The majority of comparative studies utilize a single module from the WVS. Respondents are asked, on a scale of 1–10, whether homosexuality was “Never justified” (1) to “Always justified” (10) (Adamczyk 2017; Andersen and Fetner 2008a, 2008b; Finke and Adamczyk 2008; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Jäckle and Wenzelburger 2015). This item measures

participants' general attitude toward homosexuality and was grouped among other social and political issues in the WVS. Despite the contributions of the module, it fails to differentiate between gay men and lesbians. Prior research suggests "homosexuality" is often interpreted in nongendered ways—almost exclusively for gay men (Herek 2000). Feminist scholars point out how lesbians are often subsumed under this category, ultimately contributing to the erasure of women's same-sex identity, experiences, and desires (Stein 1997).

The key outcome variable of this study is a core module of the ESS which asks respondents whether, "Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish." Responses vary on a five-point scale ranging from (1) "Strongly agree" to (5) "Strongly disagree." The social categories of gay and lesbian are culturally and historically contingent, structured, and organized by institutions. They are in fact, relatively new labels for ways of thinking about same-sex sexuality (Foucault 1978; Katz, 1996). Today, the labels gay and lesbian are best understood in the broader culture as sexual identities (Rupp et al. 2013; Ward 2015). That is, "who you are" (Foucault 1978; Ward 2008). The ESS module more broadly captures attitudes toward gay men and lesbians' "way of life" and nonheterosexual identities (Foucault 1978; Halberstam 2005). This is an advantage over the WVS module as "life" in the ESS module presumes a same-sex relationship and non-heterosexual identity, while more inclusively capturing both gay men and lesbians.

However, the ESS module is not without limitations. It is possible groups hold different levels of comfort toward lesbianism and male homosexuality. That is, under


hetero-patriarchy, men's violation of heterosexuality confers greater social sanctions and stigma as men risk losing their masculine status if marked as gay (Bem 1993; Connell 1992; Kimmel 1994; Pascoe 2007). On the other hand, women's same-sex relationships may not garner the same degree of social sanction. That is, lesbians may not receive as much resistance because women hold less social power and therefore, do not destabilize the gender hierarchy by engaging in same-sex relationships (Bem 1993). By including both identities in the same measure, the ESS module potentially obscures the way in which these varying social constructions are perceived.

Secondly, some respondents may demonstrate abstract support for gays and lesbians to live their lives, but also approve of sexual discrimination in terms of restricting gays and lesbians' civil rights and liberties (Herek 2000). Or, respondents may grant greater social tolerance to gays and lesbians who assimilate to White, middle-class, and monogamous values (i.e., "homonormativity") as opposed to nonconforming gays and lesbians (Ward 2008; Ward and Schneider 2009). This single item of the ESS module measure likely may not capture these distinctions. This is a limitation of the study and readers should bear in mind these complexities when reading results. As cross-nationally comparable measures of attitudes toward homosexuality become more textured and sophisticated, future research should employ several measures to assess sexual attitudes and sexual prejudice (within various contexts) to better capture the multidimensionality of such attitudes.

In Figure 4.3, we display the country means of the dependent variable for all

respondents, Muslim immigrant respondents, all immigrant respondents, and native-born respondents.

Figure 4.3 Country means of attitudes on homosexuality for native born, immigrants, Muslim immigrants, and all respondents in 16 European countries, European Social Survey (ESS) 2002-2010.



Notes: Bars represent country means of the response variable and higher values denote less acceptance of homosexuality; AT=Austria, BE=Belgium, CH=Switzerland, DE=Germany, DK=Denmark, ES=Spain, FI=Finland, FR=France, GB=Great Britain, GR=Greece, IE=Ireland, IT=Italy, NL=Netherlands, NO=Norway, PT=Portugal, and SE=Sweden. Muslim immigrant respondents do not include observations from Western liberal democracies (i.e., Immigrants from the U.S. living in Belgium) and are first generation immigrants.

Denmark and the Netherlands have the greatest acceptance of homosexuality, while Portugal and Greece have the lowest average acceptance. On average, immigrant respondents (black bars) have more negative attitudes toward homosexuality relative to native-born respondents (light gray). Notable exceptions in the sample of countries

include Greece, Italy, and Portugal. What is striking is that differences between natives and immigrants are nevertheless very slight. The mean score on the dependent variable tends to hover roughly around a score of 2, no matter (1) the country being considered or (2) whether the respondent is native-born or an immigrant. Secondly, we notice that Muslim immigrants have higher than average scores than immigrants more generally. Albeit, even here, country-aggregated scores are on average, less than one response higher on the dependent variable than that of all respondents or native respondents.

Individual-level independent variables

We include a dichotomous variable immigrant, to denote immigrant status. Respondents were asked whether “Where you born in this country?” Respondents who answered yes were coded 1 for immigrant, while native-born respondents were coded 0 (reference group). Prior research suggests that attitudinal differences surrounding homosexuality are most salient among first-generation immigrants, with no significant differences between second and later generations of immigrants and natives (Langstaff 2011; Röder 2014). And thus, we include second and higher generations within the native sample. Across our sample of countries, immigrant respondents composed a high of 11.5% of the sample in Switzerland and a low of 2.3% of the sample in Italy.

Sociodemographic individual-level controls

Prior research establishes that several sociodemographic factors can influence attitudes on homosexuality. Consistent with prior studies, we include the following individual controls: gender, age (un-centered), age squared, educational attainment, marital status,

children, religiosity, religion, employment status, and financial satisfaction (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Finke and Adamczyk 2008; Inglehart 2008; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003b; Scheepers et al. 2002; Yuchtman-Yaar and Alkalay 2007). Gender was coded (0 = male, 1 = female), and age was measured in number of years. Educational attainment was recoded as a dichotomous variable. Primary education to upper secondary was coded as 0, while postsecondary and tertiary educational attainment were coded as 1.³ Marital status included the following groups: married (reference group), divorced or legally separated (1), single (2), and other (3). The presence of a child in the household was measured as a dichotomous variable (0 = no children and 1 = has children).

Religious affiliation is one of the strongest “socializing agents” of sexual attitudes, chiefly by exposing individuals to conservative values (Scheepers et al. 2002). Religion was measured as a nominal variable and included: Catholic (reference), Eastern Orthodox (1), Other Christian denomination (2), Jewish (3), Islamic (4), Eastern religions (5), other non-Christian (6) denomination, and (7) Non-affiliation. Religiosity was measured on a 10-point scale, with 1 indicating “not at all religious” and 10 indicating “very religious.” Employment status was measured as employed (reference group), self-employed (1), and not in the work force (2).

Prior studies suggest economic security may also influence attitudes. That is, perceptions of relative financial stability open individuals to broader social issues,

³ Results remain substantively unchanged using the original five categorizations of educational attainment: (1) primary, (2) secondary, (3) upper secondary, (4) postsecondary, and (5) tertiary.

including sexual equality (Andersen and Fetner 2008b). Moreover, prior studies suggest economic security mitigates negative attitudes toward traditionally marginalized outgroups (Svallfors 2006). Thus, we include a measure of self-reported financial satisfaction. Financial satisfaction was measured on a 4-point scale ranging from “living comfortably on the respondent’s present income” (1) to “very difficult on the respondent’s present income” (4). Next, we include controls for citizenship status (0 = native-born or naturalized) and non-citizenship status (1), as well as the length of residence in the country (0 = within the last year, 1 = 1–5 years, 2 = 6–10 years, 3 = 11–20 years, 4 = more than 20 years, and 5 = native born). Prior studies have shown that immigrants’ attitudes towards homosexuality become more accepting as the length of their residence increases (Langstaff 2011; Röder 2014).

Lastly, to control for important differences between immigrants owing to distinctive immigrant channels (i.e., Moroccans to France or Nigerians to Greece), by identifying a full set of unique “home-host dyads” observed in our data. We then created dummy variables for each dyad by survey year. In total, there were 1,120 unique home and host-dyadic pairs in our sample. Including dyadic pairs controls for any unobserved, time-invariant differences among immigrant groups, host countries, and relationships between them (Koopmans 2013). Time-invariant differences may include selective immigration policies based on the educational attainment of specific immigrant groups, etc. (Koopmans 2013). Stable differences in human capital and the religious affiliation of immigrants within specific immigrant channels may select either more egalitarian or inegalitarian than average immigrants into particular countries, leading to omitted

variable bias. Due to the large number of dyadic pairs, they are omitted for presentation purposes.

Country-level variable: Multicultural policy index

To assess the degree of multiculturalism in the host countries, we utilize the Multicultural Policy Index (MPI). The multicultural index ranges from 0 to 8. Higher values indicate greater multiculturalism. Eight policy classifications compose the index and policy specifications and can be accessed at (<http://www.queensu.ca/mcp>).⁴ Policy indicators include:

(1) Constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism, at the central and/or regional and municipal levels; (2) the adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum; (3) the inclusion of ethnic representation /sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing; (4) exemptions from dress codes, Sunday closing legislation etc. (either by statute or by court cases); (5) allowing dual citizenship; (6) the funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities; (7) the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction; and lastly (8) affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups (Banting et al. 2006, 57).

Country-level controls

There are a number of national factors that may influence attitudes toward homosexuality. Modernization theory suggests that greater levels of economic development underpin a general trend toward sexual liberalization (Inglehart 2008; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003b), albeit attitudes are conditioned by the overall income distribution within wealthy democracies (Andersen and Fetner

⁴ The MPI index was linearly interpolated for missing years.

2008b). That is, greater acceptance for homosexuality is influenced by income inequality, because liberalized attitudes tend to be concentrated within managerial and professional classes relative to working classes (Andersen and Fetner 2008b). We controlled for these time-varying, country-level characteristics by including the logged gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, the Gini coefficient, and the national unemployment rate. Data for GDP per capita and the unemployment rate were drawn from the World Bank (World Development Indicators 2013) and the Gini coefficient for countries was derived from average estimates of country years from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt 2009). Table 4.1 shows individual- and country-level covariates utilized in the study.

Analytic strategy

Theoretical arguments linking multiculturalist policies at the macro-level to individual-level attitudes require analytic strategies that account for the nested structure of the data. In this case, oft-used hierarchical linear models (HLMs) are problematic due to the limited number of level 2 observations (countries) in the study. Limited numbers of level 2 observations can lead to overconfident standard errors involving level 2 covariates. The problem is often compounded if cross-level interaction terms are included in the analysis, which is the case in this study (Bryan and Jenkins 2015). In contrast, we utilize FE estimators. First, limited level 2 units tend to diminish rather than enhance statistical power. Second, they require a less restrictive set of assumptions about the correlation between unobserved variables and right-hand side covariates (Wooldridge 2002).

Table 4.1 Individual and country-level descriptive statistics.

Variable	Means	SD	Min	Max
Individual variables				
Attitudes towards homosexuality	2.00	1.04	1	5
Immigrant status	0.09	0.29	0	1
Citizenship status	0.04	0.21	0	1
Length of residence	0.35	1.17	0	5
Gender	0.52	0.50	0	1
Age	47.85	17.31	18	105
Age-squared	2589.11	1751.46	324	11025
Educational attainment	0.30	0.46	0	1
Married	0.46	0.50	0	1
Divorced/separated	0.09	0.28	0	1
Single	0.39	0.49	0	1
Other	0.07	0.25	0	1
Presence of child	0.62	0.49	0	1
Religiosity	4.45	3.03	0	10
Catholic	0.35	0.48	0	1
Protestant	0.18	0.38	0	1
East Orthodox	0.03	0.17	0	1
Other Christian	0.01	0.11	0	1
Jewish	0.00	0.04	0	1
Islamic	0.02	0.14	0	1
Eastern religions	0.00	0.07	0	1
Other non-Christian	0.00	0.05	0	1
Non-affiliation	0.40	0.49	0	1
Employed	0.74	0.44	0	1
Self-employed	0.11	0.32	0	1
Unemployed	0.15	0.36	0	1
Financial perception	1.87	0.78	1	4
Country level variables				
Multiculturalism	2.81	1.66	0.00	7.00
Logged GDP per capita	4.58	0.17	4.11	4.99
Unemployment rate	7.11	3.16	2.60	20.20
Gini coefficient	28.70	3.86	20.65	36.72

Notes: Descriptive statistics are weighted.


Third, FE estimators control for all time and country unobserved processes (e.g., culture, history, values, religious legacies, and legal institutions) that prior research suggests can impact attitudes toward homosexuality (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Brady and Finnigan 2014; Inglehart 2008; Inglehart and Norris 2003b; Takács and Szalma 2011). Lastly, we corrected for nonindependence among observations using robust standard errors centered on countries (Hoechle 2007).

To test our central research question of whether multiculturalism conditions immigrant attitudes toward homosexuality, we included the two-way interaction between immigrant status at the individual-level and the country-level variable of multiculturalism (MPI). A positive and significant coefficient on the two-way interaction would provide evidence multiculturalism exacerbates less tolerance toward homosexuality among immigrants, because higher values on the dependent variable correspond to less tolerant attitudes toward homosexuality. The analysis was carried out with STATA 13 (StataCorp 2013).

Results

We begin by examining the bivariate relationship of the differences in attitudes between Muslim immigrant and native attitudes toward homosexuality across low and high multicultural contexts in Figure 4.4. Observations are country-mean deviated, and to simplify the bivariate analysis, we categorized multiculturalism into low and high multicultural contexts. Low multicultural contexts included countries with observed MPI scores lower than the median, and high multicultural contexts included countries with observed MPI scores equal to, or higher than, the median.

Figure 4.4 The difference in attitudes on homosexuality between natives and immigrants across levels of multiculturalism.



Observations are country-mean deviated; grey bar refers to low multicultural contexts (MPI scores below the median) and the black bar refers to high multicultural contexts (MPI scores at or above the median). The bars are the difference in average scores between native and immigrants.

The results suggest that differences are greater in high multicultural contexts, consistent with hypothesis 1. However, the difference in attitudes between first-generation immigrants and natives appear marginal at best (.0145), suggesting differences may not be altogether salient. Do these results substantively change when we control for country and individual-level correlates of attitudes on homosexuality?

Parameter estimates from two FEs estimators are presented in Table 4.2, and negative coefficients represent greater acceptance of homosexuality. Model 1 introduces our baseline individual controls and we find, congruent with prior research, women and

respondents with higher educational attainment tend to be more accepting of homosexuality. Conversely, greater religiosity and perceptions of economic instability are positively associated with less tolerance for homosexuality (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Finke and Adamczyk 2008; Inglehart 2008; Inglehart and Norris 2003b; Scheepers et al. 2002; Yuchtman-Yaar and Alkalay 2007). On average, we find that immigrant respondents report less tolerant attitudes toward homosexuality ($\beta = 0.473, p < .001$), but attitudes toward homosexuality appear to become more liberalized over the length of residence ($\beta = -0.073, p < .001$), consistent with prior studies (Langstaff 2011; Röder 2014).

In model 2, we introduce country-level covariates in addition to individual-level controls. Country-level covariates include: Multiculturalism, the logged GDP per capita, the Gini coefficient, and the unemployment rate. The coefficients and statistical significance of individual controls remain consistent in model 2, while including country-level covariates marginally improves the goodness of fit between the two models.

The coefficient size of multiculturalism is negative and marginally significant ($\beta = -0.046, p < .10$), suggesting that native respondents in more multicultural countries appear to be more supportive of homosexuality, net of controls, and time and country-invariant processes. In order to test our central research question of whether multiculturalism exacerbates less tolerant attitudes to homosexuality among immigrants, we include the two-way interaction between immigrant status and multiculturalism in model 3.

Table 4.2 Fixed effects models and the conditional effect between immigrant status and multiculturalism on attitudes towards homosexuality in 16 highly industrialized countries, European Social Survey (ESS) 2002-2010.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Two-way Interaction			
Multiculturalism (MPI) X Immigrant Status			0.003 (0.391)
Main Effect			
Multiculturalism (MPI)		-0.046† (-1.719)	-0.054† (-1.764)
Individual-level Variables			
Immigrant Status (1=yes)	0.473*** (5.195)	0.475*** (5.262)	0.130 (1.340)
Citizen Status (1=yes)	-0.029 (-1.014)	-0.030 (-1.044)	0.048† (1.751)
Length of Residence	-0.073*** (-4.525)	-0.073*** (-4.592)	-0.041* (-2.005)
Gender (1=female)	-0.242*** (-22.700)	-0.242*** (-22.700)	-0.233*** (-22.490)
Age	-0.011*** (-5.959)	-0.011*** (-5.971)	-0.012*** (-5.145)
Age Squared	0.000*** (11.820)	0.000*** (11.770)	0.000*** (10.480)
Educational Attainment (1=Some college or more)	-0.174*** (-13.171)	-0.174*** (-13.172)	-0.173*** (-14.470)
Divorced/Separated (Married reference)	-0.162*** (-7.641)	-0.163*** (-7.762)	-0.156*** (-7.366)
Single	-0.059*** (-3.488)	-0.061*** (-3.618)	-0.056*** (-3.528)
Other	-0.031 (-1.631)	-0.032† (-1.682)	-0.035† (-1.706)
Presence of Child (1=No)	-0.015 (-1.129)	-0.013 (-1.018)	-0.009 (-0.664)
Religiosity	0.039*** (9.329)	0.039*** (9.394)	0.038*** (8.576)
Protestant (Catholic reference)	0.042† (1.923)	0.041† (1.864)	0.038† (1.670)
Eastern Orthodox	0.338*** (6.846)	0.338*** (6.764)	0.258*** (3.872)
Other Christian Denomination	0.398*** (5.085)	0.399*** (5.101)	0.390*** (5.462)


Table 4.2 Continued.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Jewish	0.001 (0.009)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.014 (-0.108)
Islamic	0.648*** (16.361)	0.648*** (16.362)	0.548*** (10.910)
Eastern Religions	-0.007 (-0.068)	-0.009 (-0.095)	-0.193* (-2.532)
Other non-Christian Denomination	0.204 (1.404)	0.199 (1.368)	0.130 (1.440)
Non-Affiliation	-0.057*** (-3.448)	-0.056** (-3.421)	-0.060*** (-3.642)
Self-employed (Employed Reference)	0.029† (1.805)	0.029† (1.813)	0.032† (1.970)
Unemployed	0.054** (2.857)	0.053** (2.798)	0.056** (2.824)
Self-perception of Finances	0.079*** (10.381)	0.080*** (10.723)	0.075*** (10.270)
2004	0.023 (0.732)	-0.161** (-2.667)	-0.163* (-2.643)
2006	0.022 (0.739)	-0.210** (-3.193)	-0.209** (-3.129)
2008	-0.164*** (-7.010)	-0.523*** (-5.369)	-0.483*** (-4.800)
2010	-0.168*** (-5.765)	-0.477*** (-5.668)	-0.435*** (-5.103)
Constant	1.877*** (33.001)	-4.676* (-2.564)	-3.617† (-1.911)
R-squared	0.166	0.167	0.188
Unreported coefficients			
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional Level 2 Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Dyadic Pairs	No	No	Yes

Notes: Additional level 2 controls include: Logged GDP per capita, the Gini coefficient, and the unemployment rate; for presentation purposes country fixed effects, additional level 2 controls, and dyadic pairs are omitted (available upon request); †p≤.10, *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001, two-tailed tests; n=126,883 for all models.

Here, we include an additional level of robustness by including the full set of dyadic pairs, which controls all time-invariant processes due to specific immigrant channels. The focal interaction (row one, column three) although positive, is not significant and close to zero ($\beta = 0.003, p > .05$). The average marginal effects by immigrant status presented in Figure 4.5, show that none of the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero across all observed levels of multiculturalism in the sample (0–7).

Figure 4.5 The average marginal effect of multiculturalism for immigrants.



The Y axis is the country-specific slope of immigrant status on attitudes towards homosexuality, estimated with Model 3 of Table 2; upper and lower bounds of the effect of multiculturalism for immigrants on country-specific slopes are 95% confidence intervals; positive slopes indicate less tolerance for homosexuality.

The results provide little supporting evidence of a universal trade-off and is incongruent with both hypotheses 1 and 2. However, the main effect of MPI remains marginally significant ($\beta = -0.054, p < .10$). In short, we find no evidence of a universal trade-off. Surprisingly, we find more support that multiculturalist policies may affect native-born rather than immigrant respondents.

Are Muslim immigrants from non-Western countries unique?

Many of the debates surrounding multiculturalist policies are centered on Muslim immigrants, who are often portrayed as culturally alien and unassimilable (Kundnani 2012; Rahman 2014). In fact, some scholars suggest shifts in how multiculturalism is increasingly understood are predicated upon religious over ethnic identities (Allen 2007; Grillo 2007). In Table 4.3, we examine whether the effect of multiculturalist policies may be unique to Muslim immigrants. Here, we examine first-generation Muslim immigrants from non-Western countries. Parameter estimates from FEs estimators are presented in Table 4.3, and models are introduced in a similar manner to Table 4.2. To examine whether multiculturalism exacerbates less tolerant attitudes to homosexuality among Muslim immigrants, we include the two-way interaction between Muslim immigrant status and multiculturalism in model 3. Once again, our focal interaction (row one, column three) is not significant and close to zero ($\beta = 0.011, p > .05$).

The average marginal effects by Muslim immigrant status in Figure 4.6, show a similar dynamic. That is, none of the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero and the standard error balloons across higher level of multiculturalism. We find the main effect of MPI attenuates (natives' attitudes), but remains marginally significant ($\beta = -0.049, p < .10$). In short, we find no evidence of a universal trade-off, even when specifically examining Muslim immigrants.

Table 4.3 Two-way fixed effects models and the conditional effect between Muslim immigrant status and multiculturalism on attitudes towards homosexuality in 16 highly industrialized countries, European Social Survey (ESS) 2002-2010.


	(1)	(2)	(3)
Two-way Interaction			
Multiculturalism (MPI) X Muslim Immigrant Status			0.011 (0.327)
Main Effects			
Multiculturalism (MPI)		-0.047† (-1.778)	-0.049† (-1.810)
Muslim Immigrant Status (1=yes)	-0.022 (-0.303)	-0.024 (-0.348)	-0.224 (-1.524)
Individual-level Variables			
Citizen Status (1=yes)	0.151* (2.544)	0.151* (2.550)	0.083 (1.501)
Length of residence	-0.110* (-2.571)	-0.110* (-2.591)	-0.049* (-2.178)
Gender (1=female)	-0.242*** (-14.410)	-0.242*** (-14.350)	-0.239*** (-14.280)
Age	-0.012*** (-4.449)	-0.012*** (-4.500)	-0.012*** (-4.187)
Age Squared	0.000*** (8.063)	0.000*** (8.062)	0.000*** (7.943)
Educational Attainment (1=Some college or more)	-0.170*** (-7.737)	-0.169*** (-7.674)	-0.170*** (-8.343)
Divorced/Separated (Married reference)	-0.164*** (-23.630)	-0.165*** (-23.310)	-0.160*** (-22.640)
Single	-0.062** (-3.181)	-0.064** (-3.307)	-0.054* (-2.907)
Other	-0.030† (-1.818)	-0.031† (-1.882)	-0.031 (-1.695)
Presence of Child (1=No)	-0.013 (-1.681)	-0.011 (-1.571)	-0.011 (-1.369)
Religiosity	0.039*** (5.121)	0.039*** (5.143)	0.038*** (4.739)
Catholic (Non-affiliation reference)	0.057*** (6.897)	0.057*** (6.825)	0.060*** (4.600)
Protestant	0.101* (2.809)	0.099* (2.770)	0.101* (2.692)
Eastern Orthodox	0.396*** (13.880)	0.396*** (13.640)	0.264** (3.285)

Table 4.3 Continued.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Other Christian	0.459*** (5.010)	0.460*** (5.070)	0.446*** (5.318)
Jewish	0.029 (0.596)	0.029 (0.590)	0.078 (1.398)
Islamic	0.643*** (15.240)	0.644*** (15.630)	0.666*** (14.120)
Eastern Religions	0.014 (0.115)	0.011 (0.094)	-0.153 (-1.336)
Other non-Christian	0.301 (1.590)	0.296 (1.559)	0.276 (1.525)
Self-employed (Employed Reference)	0.032 (1.522)	0.032 (1.523)	0.035 (1.716)
Unemployed	0.054*** (4.183)	0.053*** (4.073)	0.050** (4.033)
Self-perception of Finances	0.079*** (6.838)	0.079*** (7.110)	0.074*** (7.325)
2004	0.025 (0.804)	-0.154* (-2.720)	-0.167** (-3.005)
2006	0.020 (0.714)	-0.203** (-3.736)	-0.220** (-4.071)
2008	-0.165*** (-7.741)	-0.510*** (-5.829)	-0.527*** (-6.099)
2010	-0.168*** (-5.036)	-0.466*** (-6.660)	-0.490*** (-7.035)
Constant	1.859*** (27.490)	-4.471* (-2.439)	-4.726* (-2.575)
R-squared	0.167	0.168	0.182
Unreported coefficients			
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional Level 2 Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Dyadic Pairs	No	No	Yes

Notes: Additional level 2 controls include: the logged GDP per capita, the Gini coefficient, and the unemployment rate; for presentation purposes country fixed effects, additional level 2 controls, and dyadic pairs are omitted (available upon request); †p≤.10, *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001, two-tailed tests; n=122,656 for all models.

Figure 4.6 The average marginal effect of multiculturalism for Muslim immigrants.



The Y axis is the country-specific slope of multiculturalism for Muslim immigrants, estimated with Model 3 of Table 3; upper and lower bounds of the effect of multiculturalism for immigrants on country-specific slopes are 95% confidence intervals; positive values indicate less tolerance for homosexuality.

Sensitivity analysis

Prior studies show that findings vary, often dramatically, based upon the policy index utilized and the sample of countries analyzed (Goodman, 2015). To assess the sensitivity of the null results from Table 4.2, we (1) used an alternative measure of multiculturalism; as well as (2) selected an alternative cross-national survey, the WVS, which includes English settler countries (i.e., the United States, Canada). To begin, we utilized an alternative measure of multiculturalism provided by the Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) (Koopmans 2013). Higher values on the index denote greater levels of multiculturalism and the ICRI measure includes 23 policy indicators on a five-

point scale ranging from 1 to 1.5 The ICRI index is highly correlated with the MPI index. However, it differs from the MPI index because it emphasizes the absence of assimilatory policies as an indicator of multiculturalism (see, Koopmans 2013 for review). The ICRI measure yielded a smaller number of countries and years, and included: Austria (2002, 2006), Belgium (2002–2008), Denmark (2002–2008), France (2006, 2008), Germany (2002–2008), Great Britain (2002, 2008), the Netherlands (2002–2008), Norway (2002–2008), Sweden (2002–2008), and Switzerland (2002–2008). In total, the number of observations drops by roughly half to 65,418 respondents.

In Table 4.4, we present the findings in the same manner as Table 4.2, beginning with individual controls, country controls, and finally, our focal interaction variable. The models in Table 4.4 utilize identical estimators, as well as individual- and country-level controls in Table 4.2. The coefficients on control variables remained substantively consistent between models and congruent with results from Table 4.2. The two-way interaction remains null (row one, column three). The coefficient for the ICRI measure is negative and significant at conventional significance thresholds in model 2 ($\beta = -0.176, p < .05$), however, is no longer significant in model 3, once we include dyadic pairs.

Despite utilizing an alternative measure of multiculturalism, we find no effect of multiculturalist policies on immigrant attitudes toward homosexuality. Similarly, we find a null effect for the interaction term when we analyze first-generation Muslim immigrants from non-Western countries (available upon request).

Table 4.4 Fixed effects models and the conditional effect between immigrant status and multiculturalism on attitudes towards homosexuality using Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) measure of multiculturalism in 10 highly industrialized countries, European Social Survey (ESS) 2002-2010.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Two-way Interaction			
Multiculturalism (ICRI) X Immigrant Status			-0.079 (-1.322)
Main Effect			
Multiculturalism (ICRI)		-0.176* (-2.116)	-0.126 (-1.604)
Individual-level Variables			
Immigrant Status (1=yes)	0.698*** (7.496)	0.694*** (7.459)	0.055 (0.523)
Citizen Status (1=yes)	-0.046 (-1.576)	-0.045 (-1.560)	0.065† (1.745)
Length of residence	-0.109*** (-5.451)	-0.108*** (-5.406)	-0.046 (-1.436)
Gender (1=female)	-0.258*** (-21.940)	-0.259*** (-22.010)	-0.251*** (-21.020)
Age	-0.010** (-3.177)	-0.010** (-3.145)	-0.010** (-3.211)
Age Squared	0.000*** (7.097)	0.000*** (7.063)	0.000*** (7.396)
Educational Attainment (1=Some college or more)	-0.186*** (-11.130)	-0.185*** (-11.140)	-0.180*** (-11.810)
Divorced/Separated (Married reference)	-0.168*** (-5.999)	-0.168*** (-6.001)	-0.162*** (-5.823)
Single	-0.103*** (-4.434)	-0.104*** (-4.440)	-0.093*** (-4.289)
Other	-0.019 (-0.978)	-0.019 (-0.979)	-0.022 (-1.052)
Presence of Child (1=No)	-0.005 (-0.253)	-0.004 (-0.209)	-0.000 (-0.029)
Religiosity	0.033*** (5.974)	0.033*** (6.024)	0.032*** (5.523)
Protestant (Catholic reference)	0.051† (1.742)	0.051† (1.741)	0.046 (1.462)
Eastern Orthodox	0.226† (1.718)	0.228† (1.738)	0.122 (0.718)
Other Christian Denomination	0.452*** (4.631)	0.454*** (4.639)	0.447*** (4.955)

Table 4.4 Continued.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Jewish	-0.040 (-0.239)	-0.043 (-0.257)	-0.020 (-0.106)
Islamic	0.666*** (13.770)	0.666*** (13.780)	0.555*** (9.032)
Eastern Religions	0.053 (0.436)	0.055 (0.450)	-0.143 (-1.427)
Other non-Christian Denomination	0.102 (0.930)	0.101 (0.921)	0.099 (0.881)
Non-Affiliation	-0.047† (-1.939)	-0.046† (-1.931)	-0.051† (-2.007)
Self-employed (Employed Reference)	-0.009 (-0.431)	-0.009 (-0.428)	-0.008 (-0.430)
Unemployed	0.043 (1.468)	0.044 (1.508)	0.043 (1.425)
Self-perception of Finances	0.083*** (9.132)	0.083*** (9.044)	0.076*** (7.904)
2004	-0.010 (-0.507)	-0.104 (-1.659)	-0.128* (-2.206)
2006	0.031 (1.347)	-0.047 (-0.656)	-0.081 (-1.212)
2008	-0.186*** (-10.550)	-0.211* (-2.247)	-0.242** (-2.769)
Constant	1.905*** (19.280)	1.165 (0.641)	0.782 (0.467)
R-squared	0.159	0.159	0.184
Unreported Coefficients			
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional Level 2 Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Dyadic Pairs	No	No	Yes

Notes: Additional level 2 controls include: Logged GDP per capita, the Gini coefficient, and the unemployment rate; for presentation purposes country fixed effects, additional level 2 controls, and dyadic pairs are omitted; †p≤.10, *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001, two-tailed tests; n= 65,418 for all models.

Lastly, we assess whether the null results remain consistent when we used data drawn from the WVS. For analyses utilizing WVS data, country years included: Australia (1995), Canada (2006), Finland (1996), Germany (1997), New Zealand (1998), Spain (1995), Sweden (1996), Switzerland (1996), and the United States (1995). The sample of countries notably included English-speaking settler countries (i.e., Australia, Canada, and the United States). In total, the number of observations drops to 11,171 respondents. The resulting cross-sectional data set obviated the use of year FEs. However, we continued to include country FEs, all country-level controls, and nearly all individual controls from Table 4.2. It is important to note the ESS and WVS surveys did slightly differ in their measurements of several key individual control variables.

Several notable differences included the lack of measures for citizenship status and length of residence in the WVS, which were present in the ESS modules. Responses on several control variables, including religiosity and financial satisfaction, were measured differently in the two surveys. Responses for religiosity ranged from “Not at all important” (1) to “Very important” (4) in the WVS, while financial satisfaction is measured on a 10-point scale (WVS) rather than a four-point scale (ESS), ranging from “Satisfied” (1) to “Dissatisfied” (10). The dependent variable using data from the WVS asked respondents, on a scale of 1–10, whether homosexuality was “Never justified” (1) to “Always justified” (10). The dependent variable was reverse coded to facilitate comparisons with Table 4.3.

Table 4.5 Differences in variable measurement between the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Social Survey (ESS).

<p>Attitudes towards homosexuality</p>	<p>WVS Rate on a scale of 1 to 10, homosexuality is (1) Never justifiable to (10) always justifiable <i>10-point scale</i></p> <p>ESS Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives as they wish (1) Strongly agree to (5) Strongly disagree <i>5-point scale</i></p>
<p>Religiosity</p>	<p>WVS How important is religion in your life (1) Not very important to (4) Very important <i>4-point scale</i></p> <p>ESS How important is religion in your life (1) Extremely unimportant to (10) Extremely important <i>10-point scale</i></p>
<p>Financial perception</p>	<p>WVS How satisfied are you with your household's financial situation? (1) Dissatisfied to (10) Satisfied <i>10-point scale</i></p> <p>ESS How do you feel about your household's income nowadays? (1) Living comfortably on present income to (4) Very difficult on present income <i>4-point scale</i></p>
<p>Length of residence</p>	<p>WVS Unavailable</p>
<p>Citizenship status</p>	<p>WVS Unavailable</p>

Recall, the WVS measure may be more likely to capture attitudes toward homosexuality that may be gender specific to gay men. Moreover, the measure may also capture abstract notions of equality, but fail to tap into attitudes surrounding civil liberties and specific practices—a similar shortcoming to the ESS module (Herek 2000). Remaining individual control variables were coded consistently between the two samples of countries. These differences between ESS and the WVS variables are summarized in Table 4.5 above.

The results from the WVS data and fixed effects analysis are presented in Table 4.6 below. Due to the loss in country years, all country-level covariates and the MPI measure are now perfectly colinear with the country FEs, and thus drop from the fixed-effects equation. Nevertheless, the two-way interaction between multiculturalism and immigrant status is estimable because immigrant status varies within countries (Allison 2009). Although control variables between the two samples slightly differ between the two samples, the results remain largely consistent. In model 1, we control for individual-level covariates. In model 2, we sequentially include the two-way interaction term between immigrant status and multiculturalism. The interaction term is not significant and once again close to zero ($\beta = 0.028, p > .05$). We find similar results for Muslim first-generation immigrants as well (available upon request).

Table 4.6 Fixed effects models and the conditional effect between immigrant status and multiculturalism on attitudes towards homosexuality in 9 highly industrialized countries, World Values Survey (WVS).

	(1)	(2)
Two-way Interaction		
Multiculturalism (MPI) X Immigrant Status		0.028 (0.291)
Main Effect		
Multiculturalism (MPI)		- -
Individual-level Variables		
Immigrant Status (1=yes)	0.869* (2.285)	0.687* (2.290)
Gender (1=female)	-1.272*** (-15.130)	-1.273*** (-15.290)
Age	-0.003 (-0.218)	-0.003 (-0.228)
Age Squared	0.000* (2.925)	0.000* (2.973)
Educational Attainment (1=Some college or more)	-1.219*** (-11.270)	-1.219*** (-11.290)
Divorced/Separated (Married reference)	-0.318† (-2.078)	-0.318† (-2.082)
Single	-0.164 (-1.257)	-0.164 (-1.265)
Other	0.051 (0.391)	0.052 (0.394)
Presence of Child (1=No)	0.219 (1.683)	0.219 (1.688)
Religiosity	0.691*** (6.792)	0.692*** (6.780)
Protestant (Catholic reference)	0.295 (1.418)	0.294 (1.422)
Orthodox	0.793 (1.361)	0.792 (1.360)
Other Christian Denomination	0.895*** (5.904)	0.893*** (5.931)
Jewish	-1.773† (-1.882)	-1.778† (-1.896)
Islamic	1.250* (2.973)	1.249* (2.954)
Eastern Religions	0.050 (0.148)	0.041 (0.120)
Non-Affiliation	-0.068 (-0.383)	-0.068 (-0.386)
Self-employed (Employed Reference)	0.174 (1.247)	0.175 (1.250)
Unemployed	0.427** (3.827)	0.427** (3.831)

Table 4.6 Continued.

	(1)	(2)
Self-perception of Finances	0.042 (1.557)	0.042 (1.552)
Constant	4.338*** (7.791)	5.060*** (10.76)
R-squared	0.278	0.278
Unreported Coefficients		
Country Fixed Effects	yes	Yes

Notes: For presentation purposes country fixed effects are omitted (available upon request); other non-Christian denomination was omitted due to small cell size; † $p \leq .10$, * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$; *** $p \leq .001$, two-tailed tests; $n = 11,171$ for all models.

In total, the results are inconsistent with both hypotheses 1 and 2. That is, attitudes toward homosexuality do not significantly vary in any direction across levels of multiculturalism. These findings are congruent across two different measures of multiculturalism (MPI and ICRI) and two large cross-national surveys (the ESS and the WVS).

Discussion and conclusion

Attacking multiculturalist policies as key barriers to sociocultural integration has become more commonplace within heated political debates, but few studies have empirically addressed this controversial topic (Koopmans 2013). In this article, we address this policy gap by assessing whether immigrant attitudes toward homosexuality systematically differ across affluent democracies that widely vary in their implementation of multiculturalist policies. Although two divergent bodies of literature provide narratives as to why multiculturalist policies should matter for the sociocultural integration of immigrants

within affluent democracies, we find no such relationship empirically. Indeed, we find that multiculturalism has a null effect on immigrant attitudes and on Muslim, first-generation immigrants in particular. The null results are consistent across two large cross-national samples (i.e., ESS and WVS) and two measures of multiculturalism (i.e., MPI and ICRI). Our findings suggest that a trade-off between multiculturalist policies and sociocultural integration appears to be more a crisis of perception in mainstream political discourses than one supported by empirical evidence.

Despite the purported prominence of national immigrant policies in immigration debates, our null findings are more consistent with a growing body of literature that questions the utility of national policies over more proximate determinants of regional, labor, and education policies (Crul 2016; Crul and Vermeleun 2003; Greenman 2011). This may be because national immigration policies are too diffuse (Crul and Vermeleun 2003), or because the experiences of immigrants are more affected by local institutions (Freeman 2004). Indeed, some scholars argue that there is no such thing as a coherent national incorporation regime; rather,

One finds ramshackle, multifaceted, loosely connected sets of regulatory rules, institutions and practices in various domains of society that together make up the frameworks within which migrants and natives work out their differences (Freeman 2004, 946).

Future studies may further focus on localized over national contexts to better understand the nuances of the integration processes, which may be more obscured in studies that solely focuses on national policies (Crul and Vermeleun 2003).

Our null findings may also suggest that increasing heterogeneity in new immigrant waves may negate any discernible effect of national immigration policy. Although we control for many established correlates of attitudes at the country and individual levels, within and between, heterogeneity increasingly challenges the validity of cross-national comparisons (Vertovec 2007). Future research may more fully underscore what impact “super diversity” in new waves of immigration, and its intersection with more proximate educational and labor market institutions, have on immigration research and traditional theories of assimilation and its variants (Crul 2016; Vertovec 2007). Here, some scholars suggest that intersectional and contextual approaches provide promising advances to better understand integration processes in the coming decades, rather than relying solely on established assimilation perspectives (Crul 2016).

Interestingly, we find the main effect of multiculturalism is negative and marginally significant at an alpha level of 0.10 (Tables 4.2 and 4.3). However, the results do not appear to hold when we utilize the ICRI measure of multiculturalism (Table 4.4). Here, our findings are suggestive that multiculturalist policies may more significantly affect attitudes for natives than immigrants. Perhaps, multiculturalist policies may increase social awareness of cultural discrimination toward immigrants which, in turn, stimulates awareness of other dimensions of discrimination, such as sexual discrimination (Banting et al. 2006). However, it remains unclear whether the direction of the causal arrow runs in the opposite direction. That is, more accepting attitudes toward homosexuality may facilitate support for other types of policies that emphasize

difference, such as multiculturalism. Ancillary analyses provide a degree of skepticism. When we regress the MPI index, measured at a later time point, on attitudes at an earlier time point, we should observe a positive significant association. This would imply that more favorable attitudes on homosexuality explain greater propensity for supporting multicultural policies at a later point in time. In Table 4.7, we find no such association. That is, attitudes aggregated at the country level in, 2002 are not correlated with multiculturalism scores measured in 2004, 2006, 2008, or 2010.

Table 4.7 Lagged multiculturalism on country level attitudes towards homosexuality.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MPI 2004	-0.015 (-0.324)			
MPI 2006		0.018 (0.527)		
MPI 2008			0.010 (0.237)	
MPI 2010				0.018 (0.440)
Constant	2.076*** (14.562)	1.933*** (16.031)	1.997*** (11.774)	1.967*** (11.722)
R-squared	0.009	0.025	0.005	0.017

†p≤.10, *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001, two-tailed tests

Indeed, we find no significant effects of lagged MPI on attitudes measured in 2004, 2006, or 2008. Nevertheless, future research may more fully unpack the impact that multiculturalist policies have on native attitudes toward homosexuality.

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Chapter 5: Conclusion

Immigration is a structural feature of all post-industrial societies and foreign-born residents now account for a historically unprecedented percentage of the population in rich countries (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2013). The quantitative increase in immigration is coupled with qualitative shifts decidedly away from European to Asia and Latin American countries (Alba and Nee 2009). As such, host societies now face an increasingly diverse political constituency seeking integration policies that protect ethno-cultural diversity and explicitly provide legal accommodations of cultural heritages through multicultural policies (Castles and Miller 2003; Joppke 2004; Kymlicka 1995, 2001).

However, the growth in identity politics, populism, and the growing politicization of immigration have contributed to a heavy political backlash against multiculturalist policies (Grillo 2007; Triadafilopoulos 2011; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Increasingly, the socio-economic and cultural outcomes of immigrants have become the focal point of extensive criticisms by political pundits over whether a stronger stance emphasizing assimilation over accommodation is necessary. Although academic debates have been more tempered, the consequences of immigration policy on integration outcomes remain unresolved. Scholars remain incredibly divided on their social consequences (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Koopmans 2013; Ng and Bloemraad 2015), and very few studies specifically examine the impact of multicultural policies on natives'

attitudes or socio-cultural immigrant outcomes more broadly. This is unfortunate given ongoing sociopolitical debates over the wellbeing of the welfare state in rich countries (Alesina and Glaser 2004; Brady 2009; Brady et al. 2005), as well as gay and women rights—which figure centrally within fierce contemporary sociopolitical debates over the negative externalities of multicultural policies (Koopmans 2013; Okin 1999; Rahman 2014). The current void of empirical studies in these key areas motivates the research questions and goals of this dissertation. In this dissertation, I specifically examined three understudied areas concerning multiculturalist policies: (1) how do they impact natives’ attitudes towards redistributive policies; (2) the spatial segregation of immigrant communities; (3) and finally the socio-cultural attitudes of immigrants towards homosexuality.

The findings suggest that although multicultural policies are often ostensibly framed in terms of the socio-cultural integration outcomes for immigrants (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010), I find they may be more uniquely influential on natives’ attitudes. That is, state policies of multiculturalism appear to have greater social salience for natives than they do for immigrants. Multicultural policies appear to increase support for redistributive attitudes among natives (Chapter 2), and potentially facilitate more progressive attitudes towards homosexuality among natives (Chapter 4).

In Chapter 2, the findings suggest that multicultural policies appear to increase support of social policies, but specifically in policy domains (i.e., jobs, unemployment, healthcare) that are more likely to be “immigrationalized,” or politicized as being abused by immigrants at the expense of natives. The findings are consistent with prior studies

that suggest that politicized policy domains matter for redistribution attitudes (Brady 2009; Fox 2012). Moreover, attitudes are strongly shaped by different immigration dynamics—specifically immigrant flows. The results suggest immigrant inflows may be uniquely different from immigrant stock, in that influxes or more recent immigrants may acutely trigger nativists’ alarm (Brady and Finnigan 2014; Hopkins 2010). Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether the mechanisms behind the positive association we observe are driven by processes such that multiculturalist policies amplify perceptions of immigrant threat, triggering greater demand for social protections (i.e., the compensation hypothesis). Or, whether those underlying mechanisms are more consistent with the perspectives of proponents, who argue that multiculturalism reduces perceptions of threat by socializing the citizenry about the positive place of immigration (Banting et al. 2006). Future research may further test these empirically intertwined expectations, but opposing theoretical explanations.

In Chapter 3, I examine the impact of linguistic multicultural policies at the state-level within the United States. Recall, the use of within country analyses is particularly useful methodologically and substantively. Methodologically, within country analyses keep constant immigrant selection effects that are incredibly difficult to control for in cross-national research with limited number of immigrant cases (Koopmans 2013). Substantively, within country analyses give researchers granular understandings of how diversity is tied to policy in localized contexts. Lastly, the chapter’s focus on linguistic multicultural policy provides a clearer understanding of what specific type of multicultural policies impact social outcomes. The results suggest that multicultural

linguistic policies appear to marginally increase Asian-white, but not Hispanic-white segregation levels, which runs contrary to backlash narratives that problematize multicultural policies in producing self-segregating residential outcomes for immigrants. Moreover, some scholars question this relative deprivation narrative, pointing to a growth in predominantly Asian and Hispanic neighborhoods that have comparable residential amenities as predominantly native neighborhoods (Alba et al. 1999).

Finally, in Chapter 4, I examine immigrant and native attitudes towards homosexuality cross-nationally. The countervailing arguments against multiculturalism are particularly acute surrounding gender and sexual values (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Koopmans 2013; Kwon et al. 2017; Rahman 2014). Some scholars such as Norris and Inglehart (2012, 1) argue that the “true clash of civilizations” between societies are over differences in gender and sexual values, which deeply inform what normative values and behaviors should be. Contemporary political discourse in affluent democracies, suggests that immigration and multicultural policies hinder the shift toward greater egalitarianism found in host societies (Rahman 2014). Results suggest that multicultural policies do not appear to influence attitudes for immigrants or Muslim immigrants. Rather, multicultural policies appear to facilitate more progressive attitudes towards homosexuality for natives. Some scholars posit that multiculturalist policies potential may stimulate social awareness and reduce prejudice in other areas of discrimination, such as sexual discrimination (Banting et al. 2006).

Despite broad condemnatory conclusions by pundits that multiculturalism has unilaterally spurred radicalism and inegalitarianism in immigrant communities, there

have been limited empirical studies supporting such interventions (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Koopmans 2013). In sum, the results of the dissertation suggest the opposite. In most cases, multiculturalism appears to stimulate broader support for redistribution (Chapter 2) and potentially, more progressive acceptance of homosexuality among natives (Chapter 4). Or, appear to have very little social consequences in regards to segregation between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites (Chapter 3) and immigrant attitudes towards homosexuality (Chapter 4). At worst, multicultural linguistic policies appear to increase the segregation levels between Asian residents and non-Hispanic whites, however, the substantive increase is very marginal at best (Chapter 3). Moreover, whether higher segregation rates within predominantly Asian neighborhoods is a negative social consequence remains unclear, given the relatively comparable neighborhood amenities with native whites (Alba et al. 1999).

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