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Succeeding in politics : dynasties in democracies

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Succeeding in Politics: Dynasties in Democracies

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Daniel Markham Smith

Committee in charge:

       Professor Kaare Strøm, Chair
       Professor Gary W. Cox
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2012

The Dissertation of Daniel Markham Smith is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2012

DEDICATION

To my mother and father, from whom I have inherited so much.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CLPR   Closed-List Proportional Representation

DM   Diet Member

DPJ   Democratic Party of Japan

DSP   Democratic Socialist Party

FPTP   First-Past-The-Post

JCP   Japan Communist Party

JSP   Japan Socialist Party

LDI   Liberal Democrat-affiliated Independent

LDP   Liberal Democratic Party

MMD   Multi-Member District

MMM   Mixed Member Majoritarian

MP   Member of Parliament

OLPR   Open-List Proportional Representation

PVEA   Personal Vote-Earning Attribute

PVEB   Personal Vote-Earning Behavior

SDPJ   Social Democratic Party of Japan

SMD   Single-Member District

SNTV   Single Non-Transferable Vote

STV   Single Transferable Vote

TD   Teachta Dála, Deputy in the Irish Dáil

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe a debt of gratitude to several mentors and friends who helped me develop this project and see it through to completion. My first introduction to Japanese politics was at UCLA, where an undergraduate course taught by Linda Hasunuma and Michael Thies brought to my attention the many interesting similarities between postwar Japan and Italy, which had been my area of study up to that point. My undergraduate thesis advisor, Miriam Golden, recognized my budding research interests better than I did, and recommended that I pursue graduate study at UCSD after first going to Japan to further study Japanese politics with Steve Reed at Chuo University on a Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) research fellowship. Over the course of nearly two years, Steve patiently imparted his vast knowledge of Japanese politics to me, and helped prepare me for graduate school better than anyone else possibly could. The idea to study the causes and consequences of political dynasties was hatched in 2006 during one of our many discussions.

At UCSD, I was fortunate to be trained and mentored by many more individuals, including the members of my dissertation committee: Kaare Strøm, Gary Cox, Gary Jacobson, Ellis Krauss, Krislert Samphantharak, and Matt Shugart. As my advisor and chair, Kaare Strøm thoughtfully guided me through graduate school and my dissertation research. He has been supportive throughout, and has created more opportunities for me than I can ever repay. Ellis Krauss and Matt Shugart also played an integral role in shaping my ideas, improving the direction of my project, and helping me to develop and grow as a scholar. The other members of my committee and countless other faculty and peers in workshops and practice talks at UCSD aided me to slowly but purposefully build

education and my curiosity about the world was certainly influenced by my family members. Thank you, Mom, Dad, Nate, Sarah, Jessica, and everyone else for all of your support!

Some of the original text and data included in Chapter 5 have been converted for future publication in the following co-authored papers with Ellis Krauss and Robert Pekkanen: "Looking for Locals, or Looking for Loyals? Party Nomination Strategies and Voter Preferences Following Electoral Reform," and "Building a Party: Candidate Recruitment in the Democratic Party of Japan." In each case, I was the primary author and source of the material used here. I thank Krauss and Pekkanen for giving me permission to include that material.

Parts of Chapter 6 are based on a co-authored paper, with Steven R. Reed, intended for future publication under the title "Deterring Entrepreneurial Candidate Entry in Multi-Member Districts: Inheriting an Incumbency Advantage in Japan." I thank Steve for allowing the inclusion of some original text and theoretical discussion from that paper here. I was the primary investigator of the data and analysis.

An especially warm "Thank you!" is deserved to John, Prunie, and Annie for putting up with me over the past year as I completed this dissertation, forcing me to take occasional breaks, and helping me keep focus on what really matters in life.

VITA

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PUBLICATIONS

Strøm, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Daniel Markham Smith. "Parliamentary Control of Coalition Governments." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13: pp. 517-35. 2010.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Succeeding in Politics: Dynasties in Democracies

by

Daniel Markham Smith

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, San Diego, 2012

Professor Kaare Strøm, Chair

This dissertation examines the causes and electoral consequences of political dynasties in developed democracies. The researcher develops a model of candidate recruitment and selection to explain the persistence of "legacy politics" in some democracies, such as Japan, focusing in particular on electoral rules and internal party recruitment processes. This model is then tested using legislator-level biographical data from eight democracies, and an in-depth, candidate-level case study of Japan, where electoral reform has also resulted in party adaptation in candidate selection methods. The researcher finds that "legacy" candidates enjoy an "inherited incumbency advantage" in both the selection and election stages of their careers. However, the relative value of this inherited incumbency advantage varies significantly by the institutional contexts of the electoral system and the candidate recruitment process within parties.

1. The Politics of Legacy

> It is often assumed that the Glorious Revolution settled these crucial questions in favor of a sovereign and effectively 'modern' Parliament. Dynasticism, if it figures into the picture at all, is supposed to have disappeared as a meaningful political principle then or shortly thereafter.
> -Julia Adams (2005, p. 181)

In 2004, William (Bill) Lipinski, an incumbent Democrat from the suburbs of Chicago (Illinois' 3rd District), easily won his party's primary election and was renominated for the United States House of Representatives general election. However, Lipinski withdrew his name from the ballot less than three months before the election, and convinced local Democratic Party leaders to instead nominate his 38-year-old son, Daniel Lipinski, a political science professor from the University of Tennessee. The younger Lipinski moved home from Tennessee and easily won the election, facing only weak opposition from a Republican newcomer in the heavily Democratic district. Critics argued that the elder Lipinski knew for months that he would retire, and planned his exit strategically in order to place his son in the seat.[1]

Kōichi Sekō was as a member of Japan's lower house, the House of Representatives, who represented Wakayama Prefecture's 2nd District for eight terms

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[1] Wheeler, Dennis. "Dan Lipinski aims to step into his dad's big shoes." *Star Newspapers* (Chicago South). Thursday, August 19, 2004.

from 1932 until 1960.[2] After losing twice consecutively in 1960 and 1963, he "passed the baton" to his son, Masataka, who successfully ran for his father's former seat in 1967. Masataka lost the next election, but in 1971 ran successfully for the House of Councillors, Japan's upper house, and represented Wakayama Prefecture for five terms. On September 25, 1998, Masataka died suddenly in office at the age of 75. His nephew, 35-year-old Hiroshige Sekō, was working in Tokyo as an employee of NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone) Corporation, the largest telecommunications company in Japan. Although Hiroshige had previously never visited Wakayama Prefecture, party leaders in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), particularly those belonging to the same faction as his uncle, convinced him to run in the November 8 by-election. It did not matter that Hiroshige had no prior political experience or direct ties to Wakayama; what mattered was that he was a "Sekō."[3]

The intergenerational hereditary transfer of political power between family members is not uncommon in non-democratic regimes such as monarchies or personal dictatorships, and historically, there is practically no nation that was not at one time or another dominated by a hereditary leadership. Although the Glorious Revolution of 1688 ushered in the era of parliamentary dominance in England, in some of today's most stable democracies—including Japan and several countries in Western Europe—unelected hereditary monarchs continued to exercise considerable power until the end of World War II, despite the existence of elected parliaments. Even today, an autocrat can still often successfully appoint his child as heir when the party system or leadership selection

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[2] Throughout the text, Japanese names are written according to the Western custom: given name first.
[3] Personal interview and communications with Hiroshige Sekō, September 11, 2010, and June 9, 2011.

mechanisms are weak and the extant power distributions among the broader elite are sustained (Brownlee, 2007). A recent such example was the succession of North Korea's Kim Jong-un into power on December 29, 2011, as the "Great Successor" to his deceased father, Kim Jong-il, who himself became supreme leader following the death of his father, Kim Il-sung, in 1994.

But the existence of political dynasties such as the Lipinski and Sekō families in consolidated democracies seems to run counter to widely held normative visions of democratic opportunity and fairness—even given the fact that members of democratic dynasties must ultimately be popularly elected. The democratic ideal that "all men are created equal" should presumably extend to the equality of opportunity to participate in elective office, such that no individual is more privileged simply by birth to enter into politics. As Michels (1915, p. 1) writes:

> At the antipodes of monarchical principle, in theory, stands democracy, denying the right of one over others. In abstracto, it makes all citizens equal before the law. It gives each one of them the possibility of ascending to the top of the social scale, and thus facilitates the way for the rights of community, annulling before the law all privileges of birth, and desiring that in human society the struggle for preeminence should be decided solely in accordance with individual capacity.

Democratization might thus be expected to catalyze an end to dynasties, as it provides for the legal equality of all citizens to run for public office, barring some restrictions based on place of birth, residence, age, or law-abiding conduct. Democratic competition should limit the practice of hereditary succession into political power, and increase the opportunities for capable political outsiders to achieve it. And yet, throughout the democratized world, it is still possible to find powerful political dynasties—families who have returned multiple individuals to public office, sometimes

consecutively, and sometimes spanning several generations. It is not uncommon for parties and voters in democratic countries to turn to "favored sons," "democratic scions," or the "People's Dukes"[4] for political representation, despite the availability of less blue-blooded candidates. What is more puzzling is that the presence of dynasties varies widely across democracies. In some countries, such as Japan and Ireland, members of political dynasties have at times represented over a third of all elected members of parliament (MPs). In other countries, such as Norway or Canada, dynasties are much less common.

In this dissertation, I examine the sources of such democratic dynasties, a phenomenon I will refer to generally as *legacy politics*. I define a *legacy candidate* as any candidate for national office who is related by blood or marriage (e.g., child, grandchild, sibling, spouse, son-in-law, or other such close relative) to a politician formerly or currently also holding national office. A *hereditary candidate*, exemplified earlier by the Lipinski and Sekō cases, is defined as a legacy candidate who directly runs to succeed her relative in the same legislative district immediately after that relative's retirement or death.[5] A second-generation legacy candidate who is successfully elected creates a *democratic dynasty*, which I define as two or more family members serving in national

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[4] Stephen Hess (1966, p. 1) uses this term, citing its use by Stewart Alsop in a newspaper article: "What Made Teddy Run?" Saturday Evening Post, October 27, 1962.

[5] Scholars of legacy politics in Japan have used differing definitions of legacy politicians. For example, Naoko Taniguchi (2008) uses the term "second-generation" (*nisei*) in its narrow sense to refer to candidates who directly inherit their constituency resources from their relative, while using "second-generation" in its broader sense to signify candidates who are merely related to another politician. Others (e.g., Ichikawa, 1990; Inaida, 2009; Uesugi, 2009) have variously referred to this broader category as *nisei*, while labeling the more narrow group as hereditary (*seshū*) politicians, or used the term *seshū* to refer to all types of legacy politicians. Existing studies of legacy politics in the United States do not distinguish dynasty type by direct or indirect succession. In a few cases, I also code as "hereditary" candidates who succeeded in the same district with one election gap. Other relatives, even if in the same district, are coded as "legacy."

office.[6] Some national-level politicians have family connections to politicians in sub-national political offices as well, but I will focus my attention here only on families who have a history of supplying candidates to national- level elected office.

What explains the existence, and sometimes persistence, of legacy politics in some democracies? Do legacy candidates possess attributes, such as name recognition, familiarity with politics, or financial resources above and beyond those of other candidates that allow them to "succeed in politics," in both senses of the word? Do legacy candidates represent the most qualified among all potential candidates, or is the structure of the democratic system in some countries biased in favor of those privileged by birth with better connections or simply a more recognizable name? And what is the role of the voter in perpetuating democratic dynasties, versus the role of the families themselves, or the parties who nominate them? Lastly, why does the practice of legacy politics vary from one country or party to the next, and does it in any way adversely affect the quality of democratic representation? These are the types of questions I will address in this dissertation.

1.1. Why Dynasties?

One explanation for democratic dynasties might point to the dominance of elites in political life generally. Studies of political elites have often argued that the ruling class of a society is able to perpetuate its power over the less organized masses, even within

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[6] This definition is more liberal than that used by Hess (1966: p. 2) as "any family that has had at least four members, in the same name, elected to federal office." I do not limit myself to dynasties with continuity in surname, and four members as a necessary numerical condition for dynasty status seems arbitrarily restrictive and limits analysis to countries with a longer democratic history, such as the United States.

democracy (e.g., Pareto, 1901; Michels, 1915; Mosca, 1939; Mills, 1956; Putnam, 1976). For example, Michels (1915) notes that, even in democracies, there is a tendency for those in power to maintain their position. Representative democracy necessitates political parties as organizations to aggregate diverse political opinions and interests, but such political organization "gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy" (Michels, 1915, p. 401). Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Snyder (2009) refer to this as the "entrenchment effect" of elites in representative democracy.

That members of the elite oligarchic class should want to perpetuate their status should not be surprising. Moreover, the wealth and connections of members of the elite may make them more capable of maintaining their membership at the pinnacles of power, even when faced with democratic competition. These advantages are often easily transferred to their children, either directly, or by virtue of increased opportunities for education and career advancement from the environment of their childhood. For example, Hess (1966, p. 3) notes that, with a few exceptions such as the Kennedy family, the sixteen most important dynasties in the United States shared a more-or-less common background that might be considered the "best butter" in American politics: "old stock, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, professional, Eastern seaboard, well to do." These attributes might be an indication of an initial aristocratic endowment, but they might also help perpetuate a family's membership in the democratic elite if they are electorally advantageous.[7] Mosca (1939, pp. 61-62) provides an elaboration of this point:

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[7] It is also important to note that, while these attributes may have seemed to be the "best butter" in the 1960s, they are probably no longer necessary backgrounds for electoral success in the 21st century. Today's dynasties come from all sorts of religious and racial backgrounds, and all geographic regions.

> The democratic principle of election by broad-based suffrage would seem at first glance to be in conflict with the tendency toward stability which, according to our theory, ruling classes show. But it must be noted that candidates who are successful in democratic elections are almost always the ones who possess the political forces above enumerated [resources and connections], which are very often hereditary. In the English, French and Italian parliaments we frequently see the sons, grandsons, brothers, nephews and sons-in-law of members and deputies, ex-members and ex-deputies.

Thus, democracy alone does not eradicate the ability of powerful families to dominate the political process. Even in democracies, it is inevitable that political elites will exist, and that their children should be advantaged from birth to follow in their footsteps to political power. Nevertheless, classical elite theorists such as Michels and Mosca were writing at a time when democracy was still very much a young project, and even democratic states still functioned largely according to patrimonial patterns of status and hereditary descent. One would expect the bias toward dynastic lineage in political representation to diminish over time with the process of modernization and the stabilization of democratic norms.

Even prior to full democratic reform, with modernization and the rise of capitalism, the patrimonial state should begin to decay, and powerful families should be expected to "fade from macropolitics" (Adams, 2005, p. 29). Democratization should further broaden the opportunity structure, such that a more diverse range of citizens can get involved in politics, including through direct participation in elective office. This process has occurred in most Western European democracies, for example, where the involvement in politics of members of the hereditary nobility declined steadily from the late 1800s to the point where their influence over present day politics is negligible (Rush, 2000).

Democratic dynasties are common today in developing democracies such as the Philippines, Mexico, Thailand, India, and many Latin American countries, but were prominent in the early decades of American democracy as well. The economic benefits and rents from political office in developing countries may be greater than the opportunities for riches outside of public office. Politicians' salaries in developing countries are probably larger than those of most other professions, and politicians no doubt live much more comfortable lifestyles. For example, members of political dynasties in the Philippines most often represent areas of high poverty and economic inequality (Mendoza, Beja, Venida, & Yap, 2012). Access to political decision-making authority in developing countries might allow members of powerful dynasties to live considerably better than their constituents, and this should provide greater incentive for elite families to seek to maintain their grip on power. The ability for them to do so through dishonest means may also be greater in developing democracies, and those who do may be even more inclined to keep their political secrets to success in the family.

An abundance of dynasties in the early decades of developing democracies might also reflect a shallower pool of quality candidates. Members of the elite class may be among the few with the education, wealth, and other technical skills to be effective lawmakers. A similar low supply of quality candidates might also occur in developed democracies that are very small in population. For example, over thirty percent of MPs in Iceland in recent years have been legacy politicians, but Iceland only has a population of roughly 320,000 people. It should not be surprising that politicians there might have some family ties, either directly or through marriage, to other past politicians.

The supply of candidates may also be temporarily affected following party

upheaval, as new parties lacking strong organizational roots within society turn to familiar faces for an expedient and reliable candidate pool. The apparent increase in candidates with family ties to former politicians in post-1993 Italy (Chirico & Lupoli, 2008) may be a result of this problem, as the dominant *Democrazia Cristiana* (DC) disintegrated and new parties such as Silvio Berlusconi's *Forza Italia* were formed with little time or prior organizational roots in society.

As larger democracies and political parties develop, we should not be surprised to see a temporary influx of political dynasties at the outset of democratic representation. But we should expect this initial boom in dynasties to be followed by a gradual decline, as more and more citizens gain the resources and connections required to participate effectively in the process. In Canada, for example, the percentage of legacy members of the House of Commons peaked in the 1890s at just above seven percent of all MPs.

However, this percentage subsequently declined gradually—albeit with fluctuations—until bottoming out at less than two percent in the 1980s and 1990s. The 2000s witnessed a one percentage point increase, with about ten legacy MPs sitting in recent parliaments. Recently, there was speculation that Mike Layton, a Toronto city councillor, might run in the by-election following the death of his father, New Democratic Party (NDP) leader Jack Layton; or that Layton's widow, Olivia Chow (already an MP), would seek the top leadership position, but neither ultimately pursued it.[8] But it is not likely that such recent examples represent a drastic trend toward more dynasties. Macro-level fluctuations are to be expected considering that elections can

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[8] Cohen, Tobi. "Chow opens up on Layton's final moments, vows not to seek NDP leadership." *Postmedia News*, September 6, 2011.

result in a turnover of individual MPs, but the general trend in Canada has been toward

fewer dynasties over time (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Percentage of Legacy MPs in the Canadian House of Commons, 1867-2011

Source: Parliament of Canada (www.parl.gc.ca).
Notes: Legacy MPs elected in by-elections are grouped with the previous general election. The percentage of legacy MPs in 1867 represents such by-election winners who replaced members elected in the general election of 1867.

Dynasties have been a more prominent feature of American politics than Canadian

politics. America's first dynasty, the Adams family, spanned four generations and played

a leading role in American politics for nearly two centuries (Brookhiser, 2002). Other

families, such as the Roosevelts, Kennedys, Breckinridges, and Udalls are also well

known. As Hess (1966, p. 1) notes, despite the Constitution's declaration that "No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States," Americans have consistently returned political families to office. In the early decades of American democracy, more than ten percent of all members of Congress, and over twenty percent of freshmen members were related to a former member. Parker (1996, p. 88) views it as unsurprising that there should be a greater number of dynasties in the early years of the building of the nation, perhaps due to the more narrow political class at the time and attributes of legacy members which were beneficial to effective service (such as familiarity with the norms of Congress and the legislative process).

Dynasties in Congress reached a peak of just over sixteen percent in 1849. Over time, the proportion of legacy members of Congress (including both the House of Representatives and the Senate) declined steadily as expected (Figure 1.2), but even in recent decades, between six and ten percent of members of Congress were related to members of previous Congresses (Clubok, Wilensky, & Berghorn, 1969; Laband & Lentz, 1985; Dal Bó, Dal Bó, & Snyder, 2009; Feinstein, 2010). The 110th Congress (2007-8) contained forty-four representatives (ten percent) and nine senators (nine percent) who were related to current or former members of Congress (Feinstein, 2010). Some high profile legacy candidates have also been elected to executive office, such as President George W. Bush (whose father George H.W. had served in the House of Representatives prior to serving as president himself, and whose grandfather, Prescott, served as a Senator) and Vice President Al Gore (who succeeded his father, Albert Gore, Sr., in the same Tennessee 4th district for the House, as well as the Senate).

Figure 1.2: Percentage of Legacy Members of the U.S. Congress, 1789-1996
Sources: ICPSR Study No. 7803 and Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder (2009).

Dynasties are also common in the Republic of Ireland (Figure 1.3). Members of the Irish Dáil, the first and more important chamber of the Houses of Oireachtas, are known as *Teachtaí Dála* (TDs).[9] The first Dáil was formed after elected members of the Irish separatist party, Sinn Féin, refused to take their seats in the British House of Commons following the 1918 election, while Ireland was still a part of the United Kingdom. Following Irish Independence in 1922, roughly five percent of TDs (including abstaining members) in the new third Dáil of the Irish Free State were related to a politician who had been elected to the House of Commons or the first two revolutionary parliaments.

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[9] The second chamber, the Seanad, is not directly elected and cannot veto legislation passed in the Dáil.

Figure 1.3: Percentage of Legacy TDs in the Irish Dáil, 1918-2011

Sources: Elections Ireland (http://electionsireland.org), official legislator biographies from the Houses of the Oireachtas (http://www.oireachtas.ie), and various newspaper records.
Notes: Legacy TDs elected in by-elections are grouped with the previous general election. Legacy TDs include members related to MPs in the British House of Commons prior to Irish Independence.

However, rather than a sharp initial influx of legacy TDs followed by a gradual decline, as occurred in both Canada and the United States, the pattern in Ireland has instead been a gradual increase in political dynasties over time, even beyond several generations of TDs. In the early 1990s, roughly twenty-five percent of the Dáil membership consisted of legacy TDs. In 2002, the Dáil had thirty-seven (twenty-two percent) such legacy TDs in its membership: nineteen sons, seven daughters, four brothers, three grandsons, one nephew, one granddaughter, one sister, and one son-in-law

(Gallagher, 2003). Legacy politicians have been successful in Irish electoral politics, and also occupy high positions of leadership in the parties and government (Fallon, 2011).

In 2009, the Fianna Fáil (FF) and Green Party-led cabinet, selected in 2008, contained five legacy TDs (out of sixteen ministers): Brian Cowen (*Taoiseach*, or Prime Minister), Mary Coughlan (*Tánaiste*, Deputy Prime Minister), Brian Lenihan (Minister of Finance), Éamon Ó Cuív (Minister of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs), and Mary Hanafin (Minister of Social and Family Affairs). A sixth minister, Martin Cullen (Minister of Arts, Sports, and Tourism), was formerly the mayor of Waterford, a position also once held by his father and grandfather.

The precipitous decline in Irish dynasties in 2011 is not the result of a decline in legacy candidates, but rather the devastating defeat of FF in that election, in which it went from being the largest party in the Dáil, with seventy-one seats (forty-three percent), to the third largest, with only twenty seats (twelve percent). Fine Gael (FG) and the Labour Party both gained seats, and formed a coalition government, with FG leader and legacy TD Enda Kenny as *Taoiseach*. Including Kenny, Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, Richard Bruton (FG), and Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine, Simon Coveney (FG), the new cabinet contains three legacy TDs as ministers, although the family of Minister for Education and Skills, Ruairi Quinn (Labour), was active in the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Quinn's cousin, Feargal Quinn, followed him into national office as a Senator.

The proportion of legacy politicians in Ireland may seem exceptional, but legacy politicians, and especially the direct hereditary variety, have been an even more notable part of Japanese politics. For example, in 1993, nearly twenty percent of all candidates

for Japanese House of Representatives (*Shūgiin*) were related for a current or former Diet Member (DM). Most of these candidates were successfully elected—creating a new House membership that was composed of thirty percent legacy DMs (Figure 1.4). The vast majority of the legacy candidates come from the long-ruling LDP. From 1955 (the time of the LDP's founding) to 1993, the proportion of LDP DMs who were related to previous members soared from around twenty percent to nearly fifty percent. Moreover, nearly half of all new candidates from the LDP in the 1980s and early 1990s enjoyed such legacy.

Thanks to the LDP's nearly five-decade long control of government, legacy politicians have played dominant roles in the cabinet as well, particularly in recent years. For example, of the eighteen members of the 2009 cabinet led by LDP Prime Minister Tarō Asō, twelve individuals, or two-thirds, were legacy politicians. Asō himself is a legacy politician, descended from ancestors who have occupied seats in the House of Representatives since the very first election in 1890 (in the prewar Imperial Diet under the Meiji Constitution), including his father, Takakichi, grandfather, former PM Shigeru Yoshida, and great-grandfather, Tsuna Takenouchi.

However, the percentage of legacy DMs in Japan has not increased since 1993, and decreased drastically following the 2009 general election. Much in the way that the 2011 drop in dynasties in the Irish Dáil was in the result of the historic defeat of FF, the sharp drop in legacy DMs in 2009 was caused by the LDP's astonishing electoral defeat under Asō to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which won 308 of 480 seats (sixty-four percent). The LDP won just a quarter (119) of the seats, the first time in the party's history that it lost its status as the largest party. Compared to the LDP, the DPJ overall

has fewer legacy members, most of whom were once members of the LDP, such as its party leader at the time of the 2009 election (who thus became PM), Yukio Hatoyama. Hatoyama is a fourth-generation legacy politician whose grandfather, Ichirō, was also PM and a rival of Asō's grandfather, Shigeru Yoshida.

Figure 1.4: Percentage of Legacy DMs in the Japanese House of Representatives, 1947-2009

Sources: Compiled from newspaper records and legislator biographies in almanacs such as Seikan Yōran. *Notes: Legacy DMs elected in by-elections are grouped with the previous general election. Legacy DMs include members related to members of the Imperial Diet, including the House of Peers.*

When we observe such a disproportionately large number of political dynasties in a developed democracy such as Japan or Ireland, it calls into question whether the democratic institutions are functioning in a way that assures equality of political opportunity for all citizens, particularly when the trend over time is toward more dynasties rather than fewer. But elections in both Japan and Ireland are free and fair, and neither country suffers from the economic inequality or lack of social mobility that is a problem in many developing democracies with dynasties. With a population of over 120 million people in Japan and over 4.5 million people in Ireland, it is also hard to believe that there are simply not enough willing candidates for public office. How have such democratic dynasties managed to persist and multiply in Ireland and Japan, despite the lack of formal barriers to candidacy for all eligible citizens? What factors contribute to the supply and demand of legacy candidates in such democracies?

1.1.1. *Existing Explanations and Unanswered Puzzles*

The extant literature on the causes of legacy politics in democracies has focused mainly on country-specific explanations of the phenomenon in the context of the United States or Japan (e.g., Ishibashi & Reed, 1992; Taniguchi, 2008; Dal Bó, Dal Bó, & Snyder, 2009; Feinstein, 2010). These studies have generally argued that legacy candidates possess electoral advantages, such as name recognition, ease in raising campaign funds, familiarity with politics and campaigning through increased exposure to the political life of family members, etc., that result in their being favored over non-legacy candidates in the recruitment and selection processes, similar to the advantages

more generally enjoyed by incumbents. In this sense, legacy candidates might be thought of as having an *inherited incumbency advantage*, both in terms of election, but also—owing to that perceived electoral advantage—in terms of candidate selection.

These studies are related to the arguments of the elite dominance theorists such as Michels (1915) and Mosca (1939) presented above, whereby members of the elite maintain their status either through direct manipulation of the electoral or candidate selection processes, or simply by virtue of superior endowments of wealth, education, and political connections. For example, while Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Snyder (2009) reject the idea that the presence of dynasties in the United States Congress reflects simple differences in innate family characteristics (what we might call the "best butter" argument), they argue that the probability of a dynasty forming has more to do with the length of time a founding member held office, suggesting a "power-treatment effect" acting on the ability for dynasties to self-perpetuate, meaning that dynasties are more likely to form the greater the preceding family member's incumbency advantage. While holding office for several terms does not necessarily have an effect on the innate personal characteristics of a legislator's child or other relative, it most certainly increases their political connections, familiarity with politics, and name recognition. These effects of office may thus help perpetuate an elite family's status in public office. The conclusion of Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder (2009, p. 115) is that "power begets power."

Similarly, Ishibashi and Reed (1992, p. 368) describe hereditary succession in pre-1994 Japan as an "elite cooptative model" of candidate selection, where "many conservative incumbents are safe from electoral tides, their successors are equally assured victory, and the choice of successors is made by party elites, not the voters." A legacy

candidate who can inherit the personal electoral machine (in Japan known as *kōenkai*) of a relative benefits not only from name recognition, but also from the connections his relative built to influential people in the party hierarchy, and to financial backers, which may help secure his nomination following his relative's exit from politics. Other studies of dynasties in Japan are even more pessimistic about the origins of legacy politics, condemning the practice of hereditary succession as symptomatic of an unfair narrowing of the political class (Tanaka, 2001; Inaida, 2009; Uesugi, 2009; Yazaki, 2010).

But the variation in the country cases described above calls into question the simplicity of the "power begets power" theory of political dynasties. First, why do these advantages seem to be more favored in some democracies than others? If the elite dominance theory is to be believed, why are elite families in countries like Japan and Ireland seemingly more capable of perpetuating their status than those in the United States and Canada? Surely it is not due to differences in the number of children born to politicians in these countries, or to a lack of other occupational options for the children they have—it is doubtful that being a politician is substantially more lucrative in Ireland or Japan than other potential occupations, as might be a factor in explaining dynasties in developing countries. Even in the cases of Canada and the United States where dynasties have declined, why has the "floor" to dynasty membership in Congress seemed to bottom out at around six percent, whereas the same percentage was a postwar high for the Canadian House of Commons? And in the case of Japan, what explains the decline in dynasties since 1993, even before the LDP's 2009 defeat? Thus far, there has been no attempt in the scholarly literature to systematically compare political inheritance cross-nationally to answer these questions.

A second puzzle is the variation in the proportion of legacy candidates in different *parties*, even within the same country. The most recent Irish and Japanese elections demonstrate that the percentage of legacy politicians represented in a legislature can often have as much to do with the party composition of that legislature as it does with features of the country's political system, or its society and culture at large. Why are there so many dynasties in FF compared to the Labour Party, or in the LDP compared to the DPJ, or the third largest party in Japan, the Kōmeitō? These differences call into question any explanation for dynasties that rests solely on the social or cultural norms of a country. We therefore also must account for differences, either institutional or ideological, between the parties that contest elections in these countries.

1.1.2. A Comparative Approach

In this dissertation, I will attempt to explain why dynasties have managed to persist in the political parties of some developed democracies like Ireland and Japan, and how legacy politics in candidate selection impact the functioning of democratic elections. I will do so using a comparative approach that examines not only the variation in legacy politics between countries, but also between the parties that are active in elections in those countries, focusing in particular on the institutional context of elections and candidate selection.

Models of parliamentary political recruitment and candidate selection often suggest that within a given institutional context, there are supply-side and demand-side reasons why individual politicians are recruited into running for elected office (Siavelis &

Morgenstern, 2008; Norris, 1997; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995). If the supply of legacy candidates in developed democracies were related only to the existence of capable offspring of incumbent politicians, then we would expect to see such legacy hopefuls in ample supply across all democracies (after all, politicians in all democracies are capable of producing children that could potentially succeed them). Likewise, if being a legacy candidate offered the same electoral advantages across all democracies, then we should expect to see equal demand for such candidates from the political actors involved in the candidate recruitment process in every country.

The fact that there is variation in the proportion of legacy candidates and politicians across various democracies suggests that the supply of and demand for legacy candidates differs across democracies. If we want to understand the phenomenon of legacy politics, it is therefore necessary to seek out potential explanations for why the real, or perceived, value of being a legacy candidate in a given country's institutional, social, or cultural context results in greater supply and demand incentives for recruiting and selecting such candidates. In other words, if the proportion of candidates in a given country who are legacies is larger than what we might expect from a simple random draw from the potential candidate pool (given the size of the legislature vis-á-vis the size of the eligible population, for example), then we should consider the various potential causal factors operating in that country that may be contributing to such overrepresentation of legacy candidates.[10]

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[10] My logic is this: in a small country, we might expect to see more legacy politicians simply because the political class is large relative to the entire population (compared to a very large country, say the United States, where the potential candidate pool is much larger, for a relatively smaller political class). I suppose that in a small country, the chance of a two family members being in politics is higher. If legacy politicians

In this dissertation, I will argue that political dynasties are more likely to emerge and flourish in democracies featuring electoral institutions that encourage candidate-centered elections, and when the candidate recruitment and selection processes of parties are decentralized, leaving much of the selection decision up to local actors. These two components of the institutional context of elections and candidate selection in democratic regimes will allow me to leverage variation both between countries and across the specific parties contesting elections within my case countries, in order to evaluate the broader institutional determinants of political inheritance from a comparative perspective.

I will test my theory of legacy recruitment using legislator-level biographical data from eight developed democratic regimes that vary in terms of electoral system and the candidate selection processes within parties. In addition, my analysis will make use of candidate-level data from one of those cases—Japan—to assess in detail whether differences in electoral rules and party centralization of the candidate recruitment and selection processes have any effect on the proportion of candidates in a political party who come from political families, and the effect of legacy politics on democratic competition.

I will direct considerable attention toward the case of Japan, both because legacy politics have played such a dominant role in that country, and because it provides a useful example of how institutional change can have an impact on legacy politics. The electoral reform in the House of Representatives in 1994 shifted the nature of electoral competition from candidate-centered elections focused primarily on clientelistic or geographically

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are prevalent in a large country, where the pool of potential quality candidates is large given the population, a high number of legacy politicians is more suspicious.

based appeals to voters, to more party-centered elections with a relatively greater focus on national party image, party leader image, and policies. The main political parties in Japan have adapted their candidate recruitment and selection procedures since reform, most importantly with the introduction of open recruitment (*kōbo*), and increased scrutiny by the national party leadership.

While the cross-national analysis will allow me to show variation across differing institutional contexts, the 1994 electoral reform and subsequent party reforms in Japan present a further opportunity to evaluate the effect of institutional change within a single country. No study to date has attempted to assess the relative significance of different electoral arrangements on the importance of the personal reputation of a candidate in order to explain the relative presence of legacy politicians in different democracies. Nor has any study adequately considered the potential causal contribution of various forms of party organization and candidate selection mechanisms to the phenomenon of legacy politics in democracies.

1.2. The Impact of Legacy Politics on Democracy

In the extant literature on legacy politics, the consequences of political inheritance as a method of candidate selection have been mostly ignored, or at best under-theorized. Few studies have explored the consequences of legacy politics for the functioning of democracy or the quality of democratic representation. What are the potential problems arising from legacy politics for the functioning of democracy, including the quality of democratic representation and accountability?

Electoral systems and candidate selection mechanisms are both fundamental links in the chain of delegation and accountability that comprises the core relationship between voters and their representative political agents in modern representative democracy (Narud, Pedersen, & Valen, 2002; Rahat, 2007). The quality of democratic representation can depend on who represents the electorate, and how responsive they are to the electorate's interests. In most countries, parties also first shape the nature of representation by determining whom among potential candidates the voters will evaluate at election time. As Crotty (1968, p. 260) explains:

> The party in recruiting candidates determines the personnel and, more symbolically, the groups to be represented among the decision-making elite. Through recruitment, the party indirectly influences the types of policy decisions to be enacted and the interests most likely to be heard. Candidate recruitment then represents one of the key linkages between the electorate and the policy-making process.

Candidates and elected representatives chosen through these processes can be thought of as either "standing for" their constituents (descriptive representation), or "acting for" their constituents through legislation or articulation of positions that serve the interests of those who (s)elect them (Pitkin, 1967). In the case of legacy politicians, it is fairly clear that they do not descriptively represent the electorate—most come from very privileged backgrounds and a narrow range of occupations. On the other hand, it is not necessarily true that legacy politicians do objectively "worse" at representing their constituents in the "acting for" capacity. Parker (1996), for example, argues that the decline in legacy politicians over time in the United States has coincided with greater levels of amateurism and rent-seeking behavior among congressmen, since non-legacy politicians may be less aware of legislative processes and norms, not having benefited

from the knowledge and tutorial guidance of their predecessors.

However, it could also be argued that the electoral advantages that legacy politicians enjoy might result in a decrease in the quality of representation if the median voter actually prefers a non-legacy candidate, but the resource advantages of a legacy candidate insulate them from competition or deter the entry of other candidates—a component of what I call the inherited incumbency advantage. These resource advantages might also bias the candidate selection process toward legacy candidates, perhaps resulting in a moral hazard problem. As Thomas Paine (1776, p. 30) writes:

> …it is not so much the absurdity as the evil of hereditary succession which concerns mankind. Did it ensure a race of good and wise men it would have the seal of divine authority, but as it opens a door to the *foolish*, the *wicked*, and the *improper*, it hath in it the nature of oppression. Men who look upon themselves born to reign, and others to obey, soon grow insolent; selected from the rest of mankind, their minds are early poisoned by importance; and the world they act in differs so materially from the world at large, that they have but little opportunity of knowing its true interests, and when they succeed to the government are frequently the most ignorant and unfit of any throughout the dominions.

Journalistic accounts of legacy politics frequently claim that legacy politicians are poor leaders and lack innovative policy ideas due to their sheltered, privileged backgrounds. In Japan, this view was recently stimulated by four consecutive legacy prime ministers—Shinzō Abe, Yasuo Fukuda, Tarō Asō, and Yukio Hatoyama—who failed to adequately confront political problems, and then left office within a year of beginning their terms. Similar critiques of hereditary politicians are sometimes made in the popular presses of the United States and Ireland. W.T. Cosgrave and his son, Liam, were the first father-son pair to have served as prime ministers of Ireland. But the third generation of the Cosgrave line, Liam T., fell rapidly from grace in 2003 after illegally

failing to disclose political donations (Fallon, 2011, p. 11).

The electoral advantages that legacy politicians enjoy might result in a decrease in the quality of representation if legacy politicians do not feel the need to perform well once in office in order to get re-elected. Otake (1996, p. 277) notes that many legacy (*nisei*) candidates in Japan were pulled into candidacy by the support organizations (*kōenkai*) of their predecessors, often with little serious interest in politics:

> Their desire to be politicians had never been strong. Compared to Diet members who clawed their way up to national politics from the local level, these nisei Diet members did not see much point in becoming Diet members. Many inherited large fortunes and could afford comfortable living without working as Diet members. They shared an "I can always quit" easy-going attitude. In this sense, they enjoyed a more comfortable way of life than their fellow Diet members.

Much like female legislators in the United States (Anzia & Berry, 2011), non-legacy politicians who run against legacy politicians might need to be of higher quality and exhibit higher legislative performance if elected, in order to overcome higher barriers to entry.

On the other hand, the electoral advantages that legacy politicians possess may in some cases translate into downstream distributive advantages for their districts. Keefer and Khemani (2009) argue that legislator effort at "bringing home the pork" is lower in constituencies where party identification among voters is stronger. In other words, legacy politicians elected on their personal reputation might be more motivated to provide benefits to their districts than politicians who owe their election to their party label alone. Legacy politicians might also be more successful at directing fiscal transfers from the central government to their districts if a better reelection rate results in greater opportunities to direct public spending and other benefits toward their districts and

constituents. If legacy candidates tend to enjoy more reelection victories, their seniority status in their parties may allow them to obtain important committee positions and influence over distributive policy decisions, although this might not always result in better economic outcomes for their districts if the resources are only directed to favored support groups (Asako, Iida, Matsubayashi, & Ueda, 2010).

An additional concern is whether there exists any correlation between legacy politics and corruption. Chang and Golden (2006) find evidence in Italy that the incentives to cultivate a personal vote may be linked to higher levels in corruption and money politics due to the pressure to promote oneself electorally, and the burden this places on candidates for amassing financial resources (sometimes illegally). It could be the case that the personal advantages in name recognition and inherited resources that legacy candidates possess over non-legacy candidates insulate them from needing to resort to corrupt practices in order to get elected. While non-legacy politicians may feel stronger pressure to engage in illegal fundraising in order to amass the personal resources necessary to be competitive in personalized elections, legacy politicians may exhibit comparatively lower levels of corruption.

On the other hand, Nyblade and Reed (2008) note that there are actually two types of political corruption: illegal acts for material gain (looting) and illegal acts for electoral gain (cheating). They find in Japan that political experience and electoral security increase the probability of looting, but that electoral insecurity combined with intraparty competition increases the probability of cheating. Therefore, we might expect that when legacy politicians do engage in illegal acts, it will more likely be of the looting variety.

Lastly, legacy recruitment in candidate selection might sometimes result in positive

effects for gender representation, as the inherited incumbency advantage may help female legacy candidates overcome gender biases in the party selectorate or the voter electorate. Hereditary succession may be one of the few ways for female candidates to break into politics in a system where women are generally disadvantaged electorally. Indeed, many female legacy candidates first enter politics when their husband dies in office, a process sometimes referred to as "widow's succession" (Werner, 1966; Kincaid, 1978). In countries and parties where women are otherwise underrepresented in politics, women might be more common among legacy candidates. At the same time, the institutional structure of elections and candidate selection that I believe contribute to legacy politics are also impediments to greater gender representation.

In short, there may be multiple ways, both direct and indirect, in which legacy politics can have consequences for the quality of representation in a democracy. In this dissertation, however, I will focus primarily on the causes on the legacy politics, especially the influence of electoral and party institutions, and the impact of legacy politics on electoral competition.

Pareto (1901, p. 36) argues that "the history of man is the history of the continuous replacement of certain elites: as one ascends, another declines." Electoral competition in modern democracies should theoretically provide for a more regular circulation of political leaders, and ensure that those in power remain responsive to the demands of the electorate. But if the new generation of politicians tends to emerge from among the children of the previous generation, this circulation might have less substantive meaning, and political change may be only nominal in nature. Rather than an elite transformation, we may simply get "old wine in new bottles." Legacy politics in democracies represent a

form of elite self- perpetuation that transcends generations, and at the same time may prevent meaningful political change.

1.3. Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation will proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, I introduce the theoretical motivation behind my argument and the relevant literature upon which it builds. I argue that electoral rules and candidate selection processes within parties contribute to the proportion of legacy candidates in a given democracy. These two system-level variables can affect the supply and demand incentives in recruitment and selection, and result in higher proportions of legacy candidates. The perceived electoral value of legacy ties is greater where electoral rules favor candidates with a strong personal vote, and when the candidate recruitment and selection process within a party is decentralized, leaving much of the selection decision up to local actors. Under such conditions, the children of long-serving incumbents will be advantaged in candidate nomination decisions.

This theory of legacy recruitment is empirically explored with legislator-level data in Chapter 3, where I introduce eight country cases—Belgium, Canada, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, and Norway—and describe the patterns in legacy politics over several decades and across parties that have employed candidate selection methods with varying degrees of central control. The case selection method for this cross-sectional analysis of democratic dynasties is based on a diverse (stratified) sample (Seawright & Gerring, 2008) of countries and parties which feature variation on my two key explanatory variables: the electoral system and the degree of party centralization in recruitment. The

purpose of this cross-national, cross-party analysis is to provide a first look at how legacy politics differ at the system and party levels across democracies, while keeping in mind that other factors unique to each country's history, society, or politics may also influence the observed variation in legacy politics, and that legislator-level data cannot paint a complete picture of how legacy politics function in a country.

To account for this challenge in cross-national comparison, I turn my attention in Chapters 4 and 5 to an in-depth case study of candidate selection in Japan, where the 1994 electoral reform and subsequent party reforms in the LDP have had an observable impact on the practice of legacy recruitment. This case study approach using Japan's reforms helps to avoid confounding issues related to history or culture for which my cross-national analysis cannot adequately control. It also allows for a more nuanced examination of the importance of incumbency for the formation of dynasties. In Chapter 4, I use candidate-level data from Japan's House of Representatives elections from 1947-1993 to examine the patterns in legacy politics under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system. Chapter 5 describes Japan's historic 1994 electoral reform to a mixed member majoritarian (MMM) system, and how this system has changed the dynamics of legacy politics in Japan. Using candidate-level data from all elections as well as two dozen personal interviews with politicians and party personnel conducted in 2011, I examine the effect of Japan's reforms on the practice of legacy recruitment, arguing that the new electoral environment has gradually shifted focus from candidates to parties, and has given those parties incentives to recruit a newer, diverse pool of candidates. The result has been a dramatic decline in legacy politicians.

In Chapter 6, I use the candidate-level data from Japan to examine the

consequences of legacy politics for the functioning of democracy, looking specifically at the electoral advantages enjoyed by legacy candidates. I argue that legacy candidates enjoy an inherited incumbency advantage, which insulates them from competition and can potentially lower the quality of representation. However, the significance of this inherited incumbency advantage has declined since Japan's electoral reform, as party label has become a more valuable signal to voters than candidate characteristics. Chapter 7 concludes.

2. A Theory of Legacy Recruitment in Democracies

> If democracy can be compared to a restaurant where customers (voters) order from a menu of parties and candidates, the process of choosing which candidates will be on the ballot is like that of devising the menu itself—*and it all happens before even a single vote is cast in a general election.*
> -Gideon Rahat (2007, p. 157)

What explains the existence, and in some cases persistence, of political dynasties in developed democracies? Why is the practice of legacy recruitment more prevalent in some countries and some parties, such as in Japan's LDP, than in others? In this chapter, I introduce a theory of legacy recruitment in developed democracies that takes into account institutional differences between countries and political parties. Such a theory, I believe, will help us better understand the observed variation in legacy politics.

2.1. The Causes of Legacy Politics

Much of the existing literature on legacy politics has taken the institutional context of the electoral and recruitment processes as exogenous when evaluating the phenomenon of political dynasties in democracies, rather than comparatively investigating why it is more likely given the institutional context (e.g., Ichikawa, 1990; Ishibashi & Reed, 1992; Taniguchi, 2008; Dal Bó, Dal Bó, & Snyder, 2009). These studies often stress the value of political power itself and the resource advantages of legacy candidates, while taking

the system and party institutions as given. Thus, existing explanations tend to emphasize the micro-level dynamics involved in the emergence of dynasties, rather than considering the macro-level sources of legacy politics in the system as a whole.

For example, Hess (1966, pp. 1-2) posits a variety of factors that might contribute to the roughly seven hundred family dynasties that served in the United States Congress from 1774 to the 1960s:

> [It] may be because public service is becoming a family tradition, as it has long been in Great Britain; or because politics is becoming a "rich man's game" and the dynasties can usually afford to play; or because Americans vote for a son under the impression that they are voting for the father—or grandfather; or because we feel assured that the "People's Dukes" will keep their hands out of the till; or because there is some ability which can be transmitted through the genes; or simply because the voters have a sneaking weakness for dynasties.

Similarly, Taniguchi (2008) and Feinstein (2010) argue that the resource advantages possessed by legacy candidates give them substantial electoral advantages over non-legacy candidates. These advantages in turn may influence party (or primary voters') decisions about who to nominate. Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Snyder (2009) find that legacy candidates are more common following a politician who has enjoyed a longer length of time in office (and thus has had more time to build the incumbency advantage of name recognition and resources), and that political dynasties tend to be self-perpetuating—suggesting a form of occupational path dependence in politics.

In addition, Gallagher (2003) notes that many dynastic candidates in Ireland are first nominated following the sudden death of an incumbent relative. Indeed, many female legacy candidates first enter politics when their husband dies in office, a process sometimes referred to as "widow's succession" (Werner, 1966; Kincaid, 1978). When an

incumbent politician dies in office, nominating a relative in the subsequent by-election is not only a convenient way to replace the incumbent (and possibly earn sympathy votes)—it may also be viewed as closely approximating the wishes of the electorate that had previously given a mandate to the now-deceased politician.

In many ways, the advantages enjoyed by legacy candidates can be viewed as extensions of the incumbency advantage of the politicians who preceded them. The incumbency advantage can be divided into three components: the electoral advantages of being in office (such as the franking privilege, constituency service, and name recognition), the quality of incumbents (including both the ex-ante quality that got them elected in the first place, and the on-the-job experience that makes them effective legislators), and lastly, the deterrence of high-quality challengers (for a discussion, see Hirano & Snyder, 2009, p. 292). Studies of the incumbency advantage in the U.S. have estimated that incumbent politicians in recent decades have generally enjoyed a vote advantage of up to eight percentage points (Cox & Katz, 1996; Levitt & Wolfram, 1997; Ansolabehere, Snyder, & Stewart, 2000; Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2002).

It is not difficult to imagine how legacy candidates, particularly those who directly succeed their relatives as hereditary candidates, could also benefit from the advantages that were part of their predecessor's incumbency advantage. I call this the *inherited incumbency advantage*. In most cases of hereditary succession, the aspect of incumbency advantage that is most easily inheritable is name recognition. Name recognition can help a legacy candidate get selected, and elected, even if they enter the political scene several years after their predecessor's exit from politics.

When a legacy candidate does not share the same name—for instance, in the case

of a son-in-law—he might still benefit from the political capital (political connections, financial resources, etc.) built up by his predecessor over the years. Legacy candidates in Iceland will rarely share the same last name as their predecessors, due to the Icelandic naming tradition of using the father's given name plus a gender-based suffix—either dóttir (daughter) for women or son for men—as one's "surname." Thus, the son of former Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson (1963-1970), current Minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs, Björn Bjarnason, might be recognized as the "son of Bjarni," but it might not be immediately clear to all voters which Bjarni he calls father. His inherited incumbency advantage more likely stems from his father's political connections and other resources related to his family background—although it should be noted that the small size of Iceland and its even smaller political class might mean that many voters will still be aware that "the son of Bjarni" is a political legacy.

Legacy candidates in most other cases may benefit electorally, or first in terms of candidate selection, from the name recognition of their predecessors. Similar to affiliation with a party label, family names can function as "brands" which convey information to voters at a low cost, helping to cue the established reputation of the political family (Downs, 1957; Feinstein, 2010). If personal reputation is important to garnering local votes, candidates whose relatives had previously represented the constituency can capitalize on the name recognition and established local support inherited from their relatives. When an incumbent has served many terms in office, herself comes from an established dynasty, or dies while in office, the value of her name recognition is likely to be much higher, particularly in the election following her retirement or death. This name recognition may serve as an inherited incumbency advantage to her offspring.

A shortcoming of existing studies of political dynasties is that they often only analyze winning candidates, or measure trends in legacy recruitment within a static institutional context. The former problem makes it difficult to disentangle the attractiveness of legacy in the candidate selection stage from the electoral advantages enjoyed by legacy candidates once they are chosen. The latter problem makes it difficult to evaluate the external validity of the findings. This is especially true given that much of the previous theoretical research and quantitative analysis of dynasties has focused on dynasties in the United States, where candidates are chosen through primary elections. In most other democracies, political parties exercise greater control over nominations.

Previous scholars have emphasized that legacy politics likely stem from the candidate-centered nature of elections (e.g., Taniguchi, 2008, p. 68), but thus far there has been no attempt to systematically test whether the institutional factors that contribute to higher levels of personalism in politics also contribute to the candidate-level supply and demand incentives to foster legacy recruitment in modern developed democracies.

What is needed is thus a comprehensive, comparative theory that takes into account the institutional context of political systems and parties, as well as candidate-level and district-level factors, in order to explain variation in the perceived value of the inherited incumbency advantage. In the remainder of this chapter, I will present such a comparative theory of legacy recruitment, building upon more general models of candidate recruitment and selection that have been advanced in the existing literature. Specifically, I will argue that the supply and demand factors that contribute to legacy politics in candidate selection are shaped by the context of the electoral process and the structure of the candidate recruitment process within parties.

2.1.1. Supply and Demand

Why might some democracies feature a higher *supply* of legacy candidates, meaning a greater number of politicians' relatives who seek public office? And on the flip side, why might there also be greater *demand* for such legacies in the candidate recruitment and selection process of some political parties? In other words, what institutional factors influence the perceived value of the inherited incumbency advantage to parties making nomination decisions?

Norris (1997) posits a conceptual framework for understanding candidate recruitment that involves four levels of analysis: (1) the political system (including the legal system, electoral system, and party system), (2) the candidate selection process within party organizations, (3) the supply of candidates, and (4) the demands of gatekeepers (such as local or national party organizations). The latter two levels of analysis, involving supply and demand, often operate at the same stage of the recruitment process, and can be understood as "nested" within the broader context of the party recruitment process and the institutional structure of the political system as a whole, such that individual candidate selection decisions take place in what Norris (1997, p. 1) describes as a "funnel of causality." This model of candidate recruitment is reproduced in Figure 2.1.

On the supply side, Norris (1997, p. 13) cites both political capital and motivation as potentially playing a role in determining the pool of candidates. Political capital might include political connections, education, previous experience, the financial resources necessary for waging a successful campaign, and sponsorship by particular interest groups in society seeking representation. Motivation, on the other hand, could include

family tradition, political ambition, or a sincere desire to advance policy preferences as an activist for a cause. In the case of legacy candidates, it makes sense that children of politicians who serve longer terms in office may be more likely to follow in their footsteps than children of less successful politicians.

Figure 2.1: A Model of Candidate Recruitment, Reproduced from Norris (1997, p. 2)

However, it is often difficult to measure all of the factors contributing to a citizen's decision to seek nomination as a party's candidate (or even run as an independent) due to the fact that most potential candidates remain "unseen" until they actually declare their candidacy (Fowler & McClure, 1989). In one of the most ambitious attempts to date to measure the factors that determine whether a potential ("unseen") candidate will decide

to run for office, Jennifer L. Lawless and Richard L. Fox surveyed nearly four thousand individuals in two waves of surveys (2001 and 2008) who were successful in careers in business, law, education, and political activism—four career paths commonly associated with a future career in politics—and asked about their personal ambitions to one day run for office (Lawless & Fox, 2010; Lawless, 2012). Survey respondents whose parents had previously run for elective office (at any level) were up to ten percentage points more likely to also envision a future in politics for themselves, strong evidence that family tradition can influence political ambition (Lawless, 2012, p. 85).

The decision of whether, and more importantly, when to run can also be influenced by the context of the race at hand, especially one's perceived chances of electoral victory. Many would-be candidates who might otherwise desire to run for office will forego the cost of running if they do not believe they can win—for example, against a powerful incumbent or in a district or election in which their party is unpopular (Jacobson & Kernell, 1983; Fowler & McClure, 1989; Kazee, 1994). Other potential candidates will prefer to wait until they gain more experience, or until their children are more grown up.

For example, Lawless (2012, p. 2) notes how Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., a potential legacy candidate who might have easily won New York's Attorney General election in 2006, decided not to run:

> Despite a competitive field of Democratic candidates, party insiders and political analysts agreed that Kennedy's name recognition, political family ties, and reputation as an environmental crusader would have positioned him as the front-runner. Kennedy opted not to seek the Democratic nomination, though, explaining that he did not want to sacrifice time with his wife and six children. He left the door open for a future run, however, stating that his political ambition would likely grow as his family circumstances changed.

In the context of American elections, it is natural for the most part to focus on the supply incentives of would-be candidates who can propel themselves into electoral competition if they have the political capital and motivation to do so. As Ehrenhalt (1991, p. 19) quips, "Who sent us the political leaders we have? There is a simple answer to that question. They sent themselves." Jacobson (2001, p. 57) explains, "Congressional election campaigns are best understood as ventures undertaken by individual political entrepreneurs in a decentralized political marketplace." Primary elections in the United States provide for easy access for hopeful political entrepreneurs to enter politics.

When it comes to explaining the emergence of a political dynasty, the existing literature in the United States has thus focused primarily on the personal attributes and ambitions of legacy candidates, their families' political power, and an assumption that members of political dynasties will want to perpetuate that power. In the United States, the demand-side choice of who will actually stand under a party label in the general election is made by voters. Yet as Hibbing (1999, p. 150) points out, "Outside the United States, recruitment of legislators is usually more structured, thanks to the intrusive role of political parties." In most democracies (i.e., those without a U.S.-style primary system), parties ultimately exercise the demand-side choice of which candidates the electorate will evaluate at the polls.

Parties are the crucial actors in candidate selection and they take nomination decisions and candidate characteristics seriously, both because the right combination of candidate characteristics can help optimize the party's vote-mobilization, and because the candidates they nominate will ultimately determine the make-up and character of the party itself. Not only must they nominate candidates who can help maximize the party's

seat share in the legislature, but they must also consider how elected legislators will likely perform in office, particularly with regard to their ability and willingness to pursue the policy goals and interests of the party. In other words, parties can be expected to nominate candidates in order to maximize their benefits in terms of the three major party objectives: vote-earning, office-holding, and policy-making (Strøm & Müller, 1999). Thus, when we want to understand the emergence of dynasties outside the U.S., it is not sufficient just to explain why children of politicians might also want to become politicians; we must also consider why parties want to nominate such legacy candidates. More important, we must examine why the incentives to nominate a legacy candidate seem to differ from country to country, and from party to party.

The relative prevalence of legacy politicians in some countries could be related to the institutional context in which candidate selection decisions are made—including the political system and candidate selection procedures noted by Norris (1997)—which results in a higher supply of legacy aspirants, or which creates higher demand for legacy contenders by party gatekeepers. At the system level, there are very few democracies where legal rules explicitly specify criteria for candidate selection beyond central guidelines (Müller & Sieberer, 2006; Rahat, 2007),[11] and of course no democracy explicitly forbids legacy candidates. The party system may contribute to the overall proportion of dynasties in some countries if the distribution of legislative seats favors parties that tend to recruit more legacies. But the party system alone tells us little about the actual nomination decisions surrounding individual legacy candidates within parties. Thus, among the potential political system variables that might contribute to legacy

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[11] Examples are Germany, Finland, New Zealand, and Norway (prior to 2002).

politics in candidate recruitment, the electoral rules are arguably the most consequential.

2.2. Electoral System Context: Candidate-Centered Elections

The electoral system may generate some basic conditions for a personalized electoral process, which in turn may increase the supply of, and demand for, political dynasties, due to the greater value of their name recognition and personal vote. The personal vote is defined as a "candidate's electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record" (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987, p. 9). The idea of the personal vote stands in contrast to a vote cast strictly for a political party, with little or no regard to, or evaluation of, the individual(s) representing that party in electoral contests. The implication of the personal vote for political representation is that in democratic systems where the personal vote matters more than the party vote, the individual politician, rather than the collective party, is perceived to be the primary agent of representation for voters.

Research on the personal vote thus probes into a fundamental tradeoff in democratic representation, between direct accountability and responsiveness of individual legislators committed to representing the interests of local districts, and more nationally based accountability based on voters' evaluation of programmatic goals articulated and carried out by responsible parties (Carey, 2009; Pitkin, 1967, p. 215). Political parties face a similar trade-off when nominating candidates—although candidates with a strong personal vote may be more likely to earn an extra legislative seat for the party, their individual strength might allow them to dissent from the party's preferred legislative

priorities with greater impunity. A party may prefer to nominate a candidate who has a weaker personal vote, but who instead contributes to the party's image or policy goals as a loyal agent of the party. The outcome of these competing incentives in candidate nomination decisions will depend on the relative electoral value of the personal vote.

The electoral value of the personal vote is heavily influenced by the electoral system and how votes are cast. Carey and Shugart (1995) generate a theoretical framework for the relationship between electoral institutions and the incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote. According to this framework, the incentives to cultivate a personal vote depend upon three distinct criteria: (1) degree of party leadership control over access to and rank on ballots, (2) degree to which candidates are elected on individual votes independent of co-partisans, and (3) whether voters cast a single intraparty vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote. These last two criteria hint at the theoretical importance of whether voters cast their ballots nominally, i.e., voting directly for a candidate's name, or whether their vote instead must be cast for a party's list of candidates.

Thus, the value of the personal vote should be higher in a country like the United States or Canada, where voters cast their ballots for an individual candidate, by name, in a single-member district (SMD) with plurality rule (a system often called first-past-the-post, FPTP),[12] than it is in a country like Israel, where voters instead vote for a "closed" party list (no preference voting or rearrangement of candidate ranking by voters), parties are allocated seats in multi-member districts (MMD) in proportion to their share of the

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[12] The FPTP system is also sometimes referred to simply as SMD, but the size of the district is not necessarily related to the voting method—for example, Australia uses SMDs but an alternative vote (AV) system, while France uses SMDs with a two-round run-off system—so FPTP is a more appropriate shorthand for my purposes here. When I refer to FPTP in later sections, I always also mean SMD as well.

vote, and the top candidates on the list are awarded those seats in order of their ranking on the list (a system of closed-list proportional representation, CLPR). Israel uses a single nationwide district and CLPR to elect all 120 members of its Knesset.

In addition, Carey and Shugart note that district magnitude has a contrasting effect on the incentives to cultivate a personal vote depending on the nature of the electoral system: as magnitude increases in electoral systems that foster personal vote-seeking (nominal vote systems), so too does the likely importance of the personal vote. So while the personal vote will be of value to candidates in the FPTP districts of the United States, it will be of even greater value in the multi-member, plurality-rule districts used in Japan, especially when there is intraparty competition. When two candidates from the same party are competing for votes, it is not enough to campaign solely on party label. Each candidate must distinguish herself from her co-partisans in addition to the candidates from other parties. In contrast, increases in district magnitude decrease the value of the personal reputation of individual candidates in party-centered electoral systems, especially CLPR (Shugart, Ellis Valdini, & Suominen, 2005). For example, the only way for an Israeli candidate who is not at the top of her party's list to assure her own election is to campaign hard to increase her party's overall vote, and this effort might only make a difference for marginal candidates.

There are two main components of the personal vote. The first component involves the ex-post behavior of elected politicians in office, predominantly constituency service or pork barrel politicking (e.g., Mayhew, 1974a; Fenno, 1978; Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987; Lancaster & Patterson, 1990; Ramseyer & Rosenbluth, 1993; Searing, 1994; Ames, 1995; Gaines, 1998; Stratmann & Baur, 2002). The electoral incentives to engage in such

personal vote-earning behavior (PVEB) can also result in a legislator defecting from her party's ideal policy positions when those positions diverge from the interests of her constituents. Thus, a legislator with a strong personal vote may often be less likely to toe the party line (Sieberer, 2010; Hix, 2004).

A second component to the personal vote involves instead at the ex-ante, pre-electoral attributes of candidates (e.g., Shugart, Ellis Valdini, & Suominen, 2005; Galasso & Nannicini, 2011). A candidate's *personal vote-earning attributes* (PVEA) can include high name recognition, quality background experience, and local ties to a community or district where the candidate is running. While the incentives to cultivate a personal vote may result in greater observed PVEB among incumbents, the same incentives might operate on a party's incentives to nominate new candidates with strong PVEA. Studies on the PVEA of candidates thus tend to focus on evaluating whether different types of individuals tend to appear in greater frequencies as candidates and legislators in different electoral contexts. A few notable studies also link the pre-electoral PVEA to post-electoral PVEB (Tavits, 2009; Tavits, 2010; Marangoni & Tronconi, 2011). A general conclusion of these studies is that local ties and candidate quality tend to be more important in candidate-centered electoral systems, and that legislators with strong personal vote support are less loyal to the party when their individual constituencies' interests are at stake.

The importance of PVEA for winning elections can increase the perceived value of the inherited incumbency advantage, and thus influence the supply and demand of legacy candidates. In nominal electoral systems where the personal reputation of a candidate (or a candidate's "brand name") is more dominant in framing campaigns and voter decisions

than the reputation of the party (the party label), the value of being a legacy candidate with a recognized family name and reputation in the electoral district might lead to legacy candidates possessing advantages in not only name recognition, but also perhaps in campaign finance, campaigning skills, or other areas related to familiarity with the political process.

The importance of name recognition as a PVEA for legacy candidates in candidate-centered elections cannot be understated. Hess (1966, pp. 7-8) recounts an example from the United States where name recognition owing to a candidate's legacy status was clearly of importance, especially given the electoral rules employed (emphasis in the original):

> A deadlock over reapportionment in 1964 necessitated the at-large election of the entire Illinois House of Representatives. The ballot of 236 names resembled an orange bath towel. On the Democratic list was Adlai E. Stevenson III, thirty-three, son of the 1952 and 1956 Democratic presidential nominee; on the Republican list was Earl Eisenhower, sixty-six, brother of the 1952 and 1956 Republican presidential nominee. *Neither legislative candidate had ever sought office before*. When the votes were counted, first among the 118 Democrats was Adlai E. Stevenson III; first among the 118 Republicans was Earl Eisenhower.

Candidate-centered electoral systems might encourage a larger supply of legacy candidates who hope that their name recognition will help to get them elected. More important, if the political actors involved in the candidate recruitment process are aware of the importance of personal reputation to electoral success, there will also likely be greater demand for such legacy candidates, who will be favored by the party in candidate nomination decisions.

However, it is important to note that the electoral system may produce different effects on different parties contesting elections. For instance, district magnitude may have

varying effects on the incentives to cultivate a personal vote depending on the size of the party and its electoral constituency (Grofman, 2005; Crisp, Jensen, & Shomer, 2007). Under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system used in Japan from 1947-1993, parties such as the LDP and JSP often ran more than one candidate in a district, creating intraparty competition that increased the value of the personal vote of each candidate. However, smaller parties, such as the religious party Kōmeitō of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), did not run multiple candidates in a district, so the value of the party label was greater, both to candidates of those parties who could campaign on the party's platform, and to voters who could use the party label as a cue when deciding among the candidates.

Similarly, in a CLPR system like that used to elect members of the Israeli Knesset, not all parties run the same number of candidates on their lists, despite a common district magnitude (in Israel's case a single nationwide district with 120 seats). The PVEA of candidates near the bottom of the list for a large party will not be relevant—neither to voters, nor to the party in terms of capitalizing on those attributes in order to increase the party vote—but candidates on a shorter party list may potentially get more attention.

The constitutional structure of the political system—namely the separation or fusion of legislative and executive power that distinguishes parliamentary and presidential regimes—may also temper the importance of the personal vote, regardless of the electoral system used. For example, both the United States and Canada use the FPTP electoral system. Yet the nature of Westminster-style parliamentary democracy in Canada means that the value of the party label and party leader image is dominant in elections to the House of Commons (Carty & Cross, 2010). Party voting among the electorate is

much higher than in the United States, where the separation of powers means that the party that controls the executive office is not determined by the composition of the legislature. For example, in the 2000 election, the local candidate's personal characteristics were the deciding factor for only five percent of Canadian voters (Gidengil, 2010, p. 238). In contrast, the greater attachment to individual candidates over parties among American voters is supported by the proportion of voters in the U.S. who split their ticket between presidential and congressional races (Burden & Kimball, 2004).

From these considerations, I posit the following general proposition related to the effect that the system-level context of elections should have on the relative proportion of legacy candidates in a given political party:

> **Proposition 1:** Legacy candidates will be more common in candidate-centered electoral contexts.

In candidate-centered electoral contexts, incumbent candidates are usually advantaged over challengers due to their greater name recognition and experience. For the same reason, parties typically will re-nominate incumbents (Ranney, 1981, pp. 98-99). When an incumbent politician retires or dies, parties might expect to capitalize on some of those advantages by nominating a relative of that politician. But these electoral advantages should be less inheritable when elections are not based around voter evaluations of individual candidates.

2.3. Party Organization Context: Decentralized Candidate Selection

An additional factor that may contribute to legacy recruitment is the set of internal rules governing the candidate selection processes in political parties. Candidate selection

can be defined as the "process by which a political party decides which of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective office will be designated on the ballot and in election communications as its recommended and supported candidate or list of candidates" (Ranney, 1981, p. 75). Candidate selection processes in parties take into account the second level of Norris' "funnel of legislative recruitment," the party-level recruitment process, which operates below the electoral system level of analysis, but can also affect the supply and demand incentives confronting candidate selection decisions.

Although the puzzle of political recruitment and legislative careers has generated considerable research about the candidate selection process, the political consequences of various methods of recruitment are sometimes ambiguous (Hibbing, 1999; Rahat, 2007; Hazan & Rahat, 2010). For example, a decentralized or internally democratic method of candidate selection may seem normatively desirable, but depending on the context of the political system and the role each individual member plays in policymaking, it may not make much of a difference in actual policy outcomes (Crotty, 1968; Cross, 2008). Moreover, often a more centralized recruitment process could ultimately result in better representational and public policy outcomes.

In the realm of legacy politics, increased party centralization of the candidate selection process at the national level might diminish the ability for a retiring incumbent to pass her electoral "rights" to her chosen successor, regardless of the degree of personalism expected from the country's electoral rules. In contrast, if candidate selection decisions are decentralized or made primarily by local party organizations or through primary elections, then legacy candidates might be more frequently targeted for recruitment. Gallagher (1988a, pp. 13-14) elaborates on this point:

> ...when selection is firmly under the control of local members, more interested in whether aspirants have 'paid their dues' with a solid track record at the local level than in their likely parliamentary capacities, the resulting parliamentarians might be older and less well educated, more likely to have local roots and to be long-standing members of the local party organization...It is possible that a locally controlled process will result in a higher proportion of deputies who are related to previous deputies, as locally prominent political families manage to pass a seat on from one generation to another.

If local nomination decisions are heavily influenced or controlled by local bosses or powerful political families, then such bossism may prevail in the form of legacy candidates being nominated. As Schattschneider (1942, p. 64) puts it, "The nature of the nomination procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party." Even in the absence of strong bossism, if candidate nomination decisions are made locally, then a local notable with name recognition will likely be advantaged over an outsider with no ties to the district. Legacy candidates inherently feature this advantage in name recognition and local ties.

Note that the above consideration of decentralization or sectionalism in the nomination process comes close to what Carey and Shugart (1995) indicate in their first criterion for deciding the level of personalism in electoral systems: the degree of party leadership control over access to and rank on ballots. However, there can be variation in party centralization in the recruitment process not only between countries using different electoral systems, but also between different political parties within a single country, and even the same party over time, or in different regions. Some political parties exhibit a higher degree of centralized control over the candidate selection process, and this centralization may be unrelated to the context of the electoral rules (Lundell, 2004), even if parties generally try to shape their candidate selection strategies based in part on the

electoral incentives they face, both routinely as part of the institutional structure of elections, as well as in response to specific electoral challenges (Epstein, 1980, pp. 225-226; Mair, Müller, & Plasser, 2004).

For example, in Chapters 4 and 5, I will describe how the three largest political parties in Japan use different processes to recruit their candidates. In both the DPJ and the LDP, most candidates are recruited and selected through the party organization branches at the local level. However, since 1999, the DPJ has experimented with open recruitment (*kōbo*) for its candidate selection process, allowing would-be candidates from anywhere in the nation to appeal to the party for a nomination in an open district, including those outside of their home turfs. The central party organization plays a dominant role in screening and selecting these candidates. In contrast, although the LDP introduced a similar *kōbo* system for recruitment beginning in 2004, its system is carried out locally, rather than nationally. In the LDP system, local party officials are dominant, despite increased scrutiny from the national headquarters. The Kōmeitō is the most centralized of the three main parties, with executive party leaders directly recruiting candidates and determining nominations.

These differences in the degree of centralization in the recruitment process of parties within the same electoral system context provide for a further opportunity to test the effect of institutional variation on the supply and demand for legacy candidates. I thus posit the following proposition related to the effect that centralization of the recruitment process will have on the emergence of legacy candidates:

> **Proposition 2:** Legacy candidates will be more common in parties where the candidate selection process and decision are decentralized to local actors.

Thus, all else equal, the system-level variants of candidate-centered elections and localized selection might both play a role in determining the perceived value of a legacy candidate's inherited incumbency advantage to political parties (gatekeepers) at the candidate selection stage of recruitment. This hypothesized relationship is depicted graphically in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: Hypothesized Effect of the Electoral and Recruitment Contexts on the Value of the Inherited Incumbency Advantage

2.4. Candidate-Level Context: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage

The electoral and party recruitment processes may generate *system-level* conditions for name recognition or local family ties to be more attractive attributes in a candidate than other potential background characteristics (ties to interest groups, policy expertise,

diversity, etc.), but the relative value of these attributes for legacy candidates—and particularly hereditary candidates—will ultimately vary depending on the *candidate-level* context surrounding their nomination, especially the attributes of their predecessors, and the districts in which they ran. If an inherited incumbency advantage exists for a legacy candidate, it is not likely to be any stronger than the actual incumbency advantage of the predecessor. The importance of incumbency may also differ depending on the needs of the district.

For example, legislator effort at "bringing home the pork" is likely to be higher in constituencies where voters are more attached to a particular candidate than they are to a party (Keefer & Khemani, 2009). If nomination decisions are made locally in nominal-vote districts, then rural or underdeveloped areas may be more susceptible to legacy politics than urban districts, as a legacy candidate from a powerful political family may be expected to bring home greater amounts of such particularistic benefits (Taniguchi, 2008; Asako, Iida, Matsubayashi, & Ueda, 2010). A district which had been previously represented for many years by an incumbent may value the established reputation of his or her family's service to the district more than if the politician had only been a temporary custodian of the district's interests, and might expect a legacy successor to continue to serve the district in a similar fashion. Communities of voters in rural districts may also be more closely knit, and more inclined to support a "favorite son" than voters in urban districts. We thus might expect to find more legacy candidates running in rural districts than in urban districts:

> **Proposition 3a:** Legacy candidates will be more common in rural or underdeveloped districts.

Other candidate-level considerations might be relevant regardless of institutional context. For example, even within a party-centered electoral environment, or when party recruitment is centralized, children of long-serving incumbents may have better party access or desire to enter politics. Candidates who serve multiple terms and reach high levels of party leadership or cabinet positions will build more of a reputation worth capitalizing on after they retire. Children of politicians may themselves have personal reasons for wanting to enter the political fray, such as a desire to continue a family tradition in politics (Lawless, 2012). Lastly, a legacy candidate may be an easy replacement for an incumbent who dies in office, regardless of the institutional or district context.[13] A complete model of legacy recruitment should thus also include the candidate-level attributes that are likely to increase the value of a legacy candidate's inherited incumbency advantage, especially her name recognition and political connections.

> **Proposition 3b:** Legacy candidates will more commonly follow incumbents with high name recognition or power (due especially to length of time in office or sudden death).

The preceding propositions together constitute a cohesive, multi-level model of legacy recruitment in developed democracies (Figure 2.3). Although there are multiple moving parts to the model, it conforms in overall structure to Norris' (1997) funnel of legislative recruitment, in that the outer levels shape the context of the inner levels, and each level successively should increase the theoretical value of the personal vote, and thus the potential transferability of incumbency advantage by proxy to a legacy heir.

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[13] However, it should be noted that these attributes can be highly correlated—for example, a popular politician may be more likely to continue running and winning until she dies.

Parties may be less motivated to take a centralized role in candidate selection under candidate-centered elections than under party-centered elections. If the selection process is thus decentralized, local actors may value the name recognition of legacy candidates. But the value of this name recognition is likely to vary depending upon the strength of the predecessor or the needs of the district.

Electoral System Level	Party Organization Level	District and Candidate Level	Candidate selection will favor legacy candidates
Voting is candidate-centered rather than party-centered	Candidate selection is decentralized to local actors	Predecessor has strong record or name recognition, especially in rural districts	

Figure 2.3: A Model of Legacy Recruitment

Of course, candidate-centered elections may also generate conditions for greater incumbency advantage and greater successive wins by the outgoing incumbent. In this respect, the characteristics of incumbents can be considered an outcome of the institutional context. But in terms of the recruitment of new candidates, the attributes of

the outgoing incumbent candidate instead can be thought of as inputs into the next nomination decision, and these inputs are interpreted in the context of the institutional setting within which decisions are taken. A predecessor's winning record may translate to an inherited incumbency advantage for legacy candidates, but such an advantage in name recognition in a district is likely to be greater if the candidate selection process is left to local actors familiar with the predecessor, and elections are candidate-centered.

In the chapters to follow, I turn to the empirical record to examine how well my theory of legacy recruitment accounts for the actual patterns in legacy politics in democracies. My analysis will first use legislator-level data from eight democracies to evaluate the differences across parties and legislatures that vary on the two key explanatory variables presented here: the electoral system and the candidate selection process within parties. I will then use candidate-level data from Japan to further evaluate the candidate-level factors affecting the recruitment and selection of legacy candidates.

3. Dynasties in Comparative Perspective

> The story of how men are elected to public office in systems of representative government is one of the most exciting and important of contemporary politics. For the electoral process is the heart of modern democracies, and the way in which it beats says a great deal about the health of the larger political system.
> -Gerald Curtis (1971, p. ix)

How well does the theory of legacy recruitment presented in the previous chapter coincide with the empirical record? The aim of this chapter is to provide a comparative look at dynasties across democracies of diverse electoral systems and party-level candidate selection processes, in order to evaluate the effect of these institutions on the practice of legacy politics. To this end, I use legislator-level biographical data from eight democracies whose institutions vary on these two key variables of interest. However, the cross-national, cross-party nature of this comparative analysis introduces two main challenges.

First, cross-national comparisons introduce many complexities in causal inference about the determinants of legacy recruitment, since unique historical trajectories, culture, and individual political leaders all could potentially mitigate the institutional incentives for legacy politics in a given party or country. For example, the practice of legacy politics in parties can be affected by factors such as the size, age, social roots, or ideology of the party, as well as idiosyncratic or temporary internal party practices. A socialist party with

an organization based around labor unions may have a steady supply of non-legacy candidates through union channels, whereas other parties may not enjoy such structured arenas for screening and selecting candidates. Some parties may also have explicit rules that discourage the formation of family dynasties, perhaps through rigidly enforced turnover practices. For example, in Italy before 1992, the Communist Party (PCI) routinely practiced an internal party rule of replacement of incumbents after two terms (Wertman, 1988). If socialization in politics and familiarity with the political process contribute to the supply and quality of would-be legacy successors, then the children of PCI incumbents would be at a considerable disadvantage in terms of exposure to a life of politics through their parents.

Country-level variation across democracies could potentially be affected by a number of factors, including population size, economic inequality, occupational mobility, legislator turnover, age of the democracy, levels of participation, or institutional variation across districts. For example, the supply of qualified non-legacy candidates will likely be higher in an economically developed country with a large population than in very small or poor countries. But even in large countries, legacy politics tend to decline with time. The number of dynasties in the U.S. and Canada was much higher a century ago than today; the nature of legacy politics in a younger democracy, such as Israel, may thus look different if observed several decades from now. District magnitude can also vary across districts even under the same basic electoral rules, and since district magnitude can influence the incentives to cultivate a personal vote (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Chang & Golden, 2006), the distribution of such variation could also affect the overall percentage of legacy politicians. Given these myriad differences between countries, some caution is

thus required in interpreting any cross-national variation in such a case-oriented, small-N study (Ragin, 1987).

The second challenge presented by cross-national comparisons is the scarcity of data with which to measure legacy ties. In contrast to other candidate characteristics (such as gender, age, and prior experience), legacy ties can be difficult to identify, especially for candidates who are not successful in getting elected. Biographical information of candidates is not consistently made available by the governments or parties of all countries, and family relations are not as straightforward to infer as something like gender or ethnicity. The availability of reliable data may thus introduce some selection bias into my sample of countries. For example, if it is difficult to find any information on family ties among politicians in a given country, it could be because such ties are extremely uncommon. By limiting my sample to countries where biographical information on family ties was available, I may be missing important cross-national variation due to truncation of the data.

Keeping these challenges in mind, my comparative analysis of legacy politics in this dissertation takes two approaches. In this chapter, I first examine the overall presence of legacy politicians across parties and countries using legislator-level data on parliamentarians' backgrounds in nearly fifty different parties that regularly contested elections in eight parliamentary democracies from the end of World War II to the present. Given the small sample size, this analysis is meant primarily to illustrate that differences do exist across countries and across parties, while acknowledging that it is difficult to determine with certainty whether a causal relationship exists between the electoral and party recruitment institutions and the observed variation.

I have chosen to focus on elected legislators in this first approach partly because biographical information is simply too difficult to find for non-elected candidates. Many countries do not maintain, or do not make public via the Internet or other accessible outlets, the biographies of legislators, let alone candidates. Where candidate biographical information is available, it is often only basic facts about party affiliation, age, gender, and sometimes occupation and previous experience.[14]

However, a legislator-level comparison is still a useful starting point for investigating legacy politics across institutional contexts, since the differences between all candidates nominated in a nominal-vote system (e.g., FPTP) and those nominated in list PR systems may not be very meaningful. This is because the characteristics of hopeless candidates who are low on a party list convey different information about a party's priorities in candidate selection than do those near the top. A comparison of elected legislators may still convey information about candidate selection priorities, as the preferred candidates near the top of the party list are also most likely to become legislators, and preferred candidates in plurality systems may be more often nominated in "safe" districts where the party is strong, or contestable districts where the party hopes to pick up or retain a seat (Galasso & Nannicini, 2011). For example, Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder (2009) find that legacy politicians in the U.S. most often represent safe districts.

Thus, although it does not account for legacy candidates who are not elected, the legislator-level analysis I present here nevertheless provides a general picture of how legacy politics differ across democracies and parties. My second approach, which I will

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[14] For example, parties in Italy up until the electoral reform of 1993 routinely nominated complete lists of candidates for all districts, with an average district magnitude of twenty seats, but reaching up to fifty-four. Information on most of these candidates is scarce.

present in Chapters 4-6, uses candidate-level data from Japan to evaluate in greater detail the candidate-level determinants of legacy politics, and the effect of legacy politics on electoral competition. The case of Japan allows me to evaluate the within-country and within-party effect of institutional reform in a context where other confounding variables, such as major differences in culture, population size, and history, remain relatively constant. As such, the case of Japan provides an opportunity for a more dynamic analysis of legacy politics. But first, let us look at the general cross-national and cross-party trends in legacy politics.

3.1. Case Selection and Data

The case selection method for this initial analysis of democratic dynasties is based on a diverse (stratified) sample (Seawright & Gerring, 2008) of countries and parties which feature variation on my two key explanatory institutional variables: the electoral system (candidate-centered voting versus party-centered voting) and the degree of party centralization in recruitment (local versus national control). In order to evaluate the effect of electoral reform in Japan, I also attempted to find cases that represented "most similar systems" to both the pre-reform and post-reform electoral environments, as I will discuss later.

My case selection was somewhat constrained by the availability of reliable data on the family ties of legislators. Nevertheless, in addition to the extensive candidate-level data I collected for Japan (1947-2011), I was able to collect detailed biographical data on legislators' family ties from seven additional parliamentary democracies: Belgium (1991-

2012), Canada (1945-2011) Iceland (1949-2009), Ireland (1948-2011), Israel (1949-2009), Italy (1946-1992), and Norway (1945-2009).[15] Although legislator-level data on dynasties in the United States Congress are available up until 1996 (see Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1), I decided to exclude the U.S. from my analysis here, as presidentialism and the primary system complicate the relationships between electoral rules, the personal vote, and party nomination decisions.

The eight comparative cases feature considerable differences, both in the national-level electoral system employed, and in the party-level candidate recruitment processes. Since the electoral system for the Japanese House of Representatives changed in 1994 from single non-transferable vote in multi-member districts (SNTV) to a mixed member majoritarian (MMM) system combining FPTP in single-member districts and CLPR, there are actually three different electoral systems under which Japanese parties have nominated candidates, and each can be compared to the electoral systems of the other country cases, keeping in mind that the MMM system may also feature several "contamination" effects from the two tiers operating in tandem and cross-nomination of candidates.

For example, Ireland uses a single-transferable vote in multi-member districts (henceforth simply STV) with district magnitude ranging from three to five. This system is similar to Japan's pre-1994 SNTV system, since parties tend to nominate multiple candidates, who thus face intraparty competition for first-rank preference votes.

[15] Data sources are as follows: Japan: Reed-Smith Japan elections datasets; Ireland: Elections Ireland (electionsireland.org) and official government web sources; Canada: PARLInfo Canadian Parliament database; Belgium: Belgian Chamber of Deputies website and Wikipedia; Iceland: Althingi parliamentary website biographies; Israel: Knesset website; Italy: Cotta and Verzichelli CIRCaP dataset "PARLIT46_92" (I thank Luca Verzichelli for generously sharing these data); Norway: Norwegian Statistics Department (NSD). I am responsible for the interpretation of the data included here.

However, it is slightly more party centered, since candidates often run as party "team," and voters rank candidates by order of preference. A vote for a candidate whose vote total is already great enough to secure election, and for a candidate who has no hope of securing a seat, is transferred to the next preference candidate until all seats are filled. Most often, though not always, second-order preference votes are cast for co-partisans. For example, in recent elections, a majority of voters report in surveys that their first preference vote is most influenced by individual candidate characteristics, but between 50-60% of voters also tend to give their second-order preference votes to their favorite candidate's co-partisans in sequence (Marsh, 2007).

In contrast, Canada uses FPTP in SMDs, with only one candidate per party, per district, which is the same system as the dominant tier (300 of 480 seats) of Japan's post-reform MMM system. Iceland, Israel, and Norway use variations of CLPR, which is the system used to elect the remaining 180 seats in Japan.[16] I include Belgium and pre-1993 Italy in order to evaluate the effect of candidate preference voting in open-list PR (OLPR) systems.[17]

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[16] Fifty-four of the sixty-three seats in the Icelandic Althingi are allocated on the basis of CLPR (d'Hondt method) in six or seven districts with ten to eleven seats each. The remaining nine seats are supplementary seats added to particular districts in order to give each party a total number of seats in proportion to its share of the national vote (but a party must win at least five percent of the national vote to be eligible for a supplementary seat). In Norway, 150 of 169 seats are proportionally allocated to parties within districts using the Sainte Laguë method. The remaining nineteen seats, one from each district, are allocated as supplementary (or "at large") seats in order to achieve national proportionality. Voters in Norway are allowed to reorder the candidates on party lists, or cross candidates' names off the list, but for these changes to be enacted over half of the party's voters have to make the same change. So in practice, list changes rarely occur, making the system CLPR for all purposes.

[17] Technically, Belgium is a "flexible list" PR system (d'Hondt method). Voters may vote for a party list as ordered, or cast preference votes for one or more candidates or even alternate candidates. However, only half of the "straight" party list votes are distributed to candidates (in order of their original ranking), and then the candidates with the most votes on the list (given the sum of preference votes and party list order votes) are elected, so preference voting can make a difference in who ultimately gets elected. The Belgian electoral reform of 2003 increased the size of the districts (eleven in total) and introduced a five percent vote share threshold for representation, but did not change the fundamental electoral rules. OLPR is

In addition, apart from the Norwegian parties, where the electoral law until 2002 regulated candidate selection, and Ireland, where only Sinn Féin exercises dominant central control over nominations (Gallagher, 1988b, p. 124), each of the country cases exhibit considerable cross-party variation in the degree of party centralization in the candidate selection processes. For example, Labor in Israel has generally used a more decentralized process (namely, internal party primary elections) than the other Israeli parties, although parties such as Likud, Meretz, and Tsomet have also experimented with greater use of party primaries in candidate selection (Shomer, 2009; Akirav, 2010). The JCP and the Kōmeitō in Japan are highly centralized, in contrast to the LDP, the JSP (now reformed as the Social Democratic Party of Japan, SDPJ), and the DPJ, though these latter parties have become more centralized since electoral reform. In Italy, national leaders of Christian Democracy (DC) did not exercise as much central control over nominations as party leaders in the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) or the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI). In the Italian Communist Party (PCI), recruitment was carried out by local party organizations, but under very strict directives from the national party headquarters (Wertman, 1988). This considerable within-country variation between parties allows me to assess the effect of centralization in the candidate recruitment process on legacy recruitment that is independent of the electoral system context.

Legacy ties are coded based primarily on the official biographies listed on government websites. Some parliament websites, such as those of the Israeli Knesset and Canadian House of Commons, list these separately and explicitly, while others, such as

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currently used in the national tier of the Japanese House of Councillors as well, but I restrict my analysis here to first chambers.

that of the Icelandic Althingi, include family relationships in each individual legislator's biography. I count as a "legacy MP," any individual who was related by blood or marriage to a national-level politician (an elected or appointed MP in either legislative chamber in bicameral systems, as well as presidents or non-MP cabinet ministers if applicable) who preceded them in office. I do not count individuals related only to local-level politicians, although such individuals are also common across all cases.

3.2. Patterns in Legacy Politics in the Parties of Eight Democracies

How much do legacy politics differ from one country to the next? Figure 3.1 presents the legislator-level trends in the percentage of legacy MPs (all parties) in each democracy from 1945 to the present (apart from Belgium, where data were only available from 1991, and Italy, where data were only collected up until the Italian electoral reform of 1993). The most noticeable cross-national difference is between Japan, Ireland, and Iceland, all with over twenty percent legacy MPs, and the five other case countries.

The extremely high percentage of legacy MPs in Iceland is likely a result of the small size of the country. The Icelandic Althingi contains only sixty-three seats, and represents a population of only about 320,000 people, more than half of who live in the greater Reykjavik area. With such a small population, it should not be surprising that politics might be practiced like a family vocation (the second smallest country in my sample, Ireland, has a population of over 4.5 million). Legacy politics are common in small Pacific island nations, such as the Marshall Islands, as well. I am thus inclined to believe that Iceland may be an outlier that is not as useful for comparison to the other

cases, which are larger democracies. However, it is interesting to note that dynasties have been declining in Iceland since the 1990s. Prominent Icelandic legacy MPs include former Finance Minister Árni M. Mathiesen, whose father, Matthías Á. Mathiesen, also once held that post, and current PM Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, whose father, Sigurður Ingimundarson, was also an MP. It does not appear to make a difference for legacy politics that Icelandic naming tradition usually results in children who do not carry the same surname as their parents. Given the small size of the political elite in Iceland, the name recognition of a family predecessor matters very little for getting the party nomination or getting elected on the party list.

In Israel, the percentage of legacy members of the Knesset (MKs) peaked at fourteen percent in 1977, but has since dropped to less than ten percent throughout the 2000s. The 18th Knesset, elected in 2009, contains eleven legacy MKs (eight percent), including Ze'ev Binyamin "Benny" Begin, the son of former PM Menachem Begin. Tzipi Livni, leader of Kadima until her resignation in 2012, is the daughter of three-term MK, Eitan Livni. The son of former PM Ariel Sharon, Omri Sharon, served in the Knesset from 2003-2006, until he was convicted of fraud and sent to prison.

In Belgium, the percentage of legacy MPs in the Chamber of Representatives has been on the rise since the 1990s, peaking at just fewer than fourteen percent in 2003. The current chamber, elected in 2012, contains seventeen legacy MPs (eleven percent). Legacy MPs are equally common in Flemish and Francophone parties—for example, the Flemish social democratic party, Socialistische Partij Anders, contained three legacy MPs in 2012, compared to two in the Francophone Parti Socialiste. Similarly, both the Flemish (Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams) and Francophone (Centre Démocrate Humaniste)

Christian Democratic party rosters each contained only a single legacy MP. Legacy MPs are most common in the small Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open Vld), with five of eight current MPs being related to former MPs. Open Vld party leader Alexander De Croo, who is not a sitting member of the chamber, is the son of MP and former chamber president, Herman De Croo. Not surprisingly, dynasties are also common at the local level, where roughly twenty percent of mayors in a 2003 survey reported that their fathers had held elective office (van Liefferinge & Steyvers, 2009).

Figure 3.1: Percentage of Legacy MPs in Eight Democracies, 1945-2012

Sources: Data for family relations of MPs for Belgium, Canada, Iceland, and Israel come from those countries' parliamentary websites; Italian data are from Maurizio Cotta and Luca Verzichelli's CIRCaP dataset "PARLIT46_92"; data for Ireland come from www.electionsireland.org and other compiled sources; data for Japan come from the Reed-Smith datasets; data for Norway from the Norwegian Statistics Department (NSD).

The percentage of legacy MPs in the Italian Chamber of Deputies (until 1993) was consistently lower than ten percent, at about seven percent prior to the 1970s, and around four percent from the mid-1970s until 1993, when the electoral system for the chamber was reformed from OLPR to a mixed member system similar to that used in Japan. Unfortunately, I do not have data on the family ties of MPs since the reform, but many political families are still active in Italian politics (Chirico & Lupoli, 2008). For example, PSI members Bobo and Stefania Craxi (brother and sister) are the children of former Socialist PM Bettino Craxi. The granddaughter of Benito Mussolini, Alessandra Mussolini, began her career in the neo-fascist MSI, and is currently a deputy affiliated with former PM Silvio Berlusconi's Popolo della Libertà (PdL) conservative alliance. The son of Lega Nord party leader Umberto Bossi, Renzo, appeared to have a future career in national politics until 2012, when it was discovered that the Lega had used public elections money to pay for his personal trips, hotels, and meals, and that he had obtained a fake degree in business management from Kristal University in Albania, without ever setting foot in that country.[18]

Until the 1960s, there were no legacy MPs in Norway. However, there has been an increase in dynasties since the 1990s (from only two percent in 1989 to eight percent in 1993), which has been stable for the past two decades. The current Storting (parliament), elected in 2009, contains ten legacy MPs (six percent). Many of them are high profile: PM Jens Stoltenberg is the son of former cabinet minister Thorvald Stoltenberg. Prior to Stoltenberg's term, the prime minister's office was held by Kjell

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[18] *Corriere della Sera*. "Houses, a Porsche, and Degrees on the List of Hand-outs to the Bossi Family." April 5, 2012.

Magne Bondevik, whose uncle Kjell Bondevik, was also a former MP, cabinet minister, and party leader. Until 2002, candidate selection in Norway was decentralized by law to local nominating conventions. The Representation of the People Act of 2002 gave parties more freedom with regard to candidate selection, but decentralized nomination norms did not appear to change drastically after the reform (Narud & Valen, 2007, p. 77). Nevertheless, even prior to 2002, there is evidence that nomination decisions in a few cases were influenced both by national party leaders and by the increasing importance of the mass media (Valen, Narud, & Skare, 2002). Whether these developments have had an impact on the trends in legacy MPs is not certain.

Do these cross-national differences conform to my theoretical predictions for the effect of institutional arrangements on legacy politics? To what extent are they the result of the electoral system, versus the candidate selection process within a party? Is there a difference within each institutional context when the other institutional variable varies?

3.2.1. Candidate-Centered Elections

According to the theory of legacy recruitment presented in the previous chapter, we should observe more dynasties in countries where elections are candidate-centered. I order the five electoral systems of the eight country cases examined here from most candidate-centered to most party-centered in the following order:

$$SNTV \rightarrow STV \rightarrow OLPR \rightarrow FPTP \rightarrow CLPR$$

This ordering coincides with the rank ordering proposed by Carey and Shugart (1995), which categorizes electoral systems by the incentives to cultivate a personal vote.[19] The Carey and Shugart categorization is based on three distinct factors: (1) the degree of party leadership control over access to and rank on ballots, (2) the degree to which candidates are elected on individual votes independent of co-partisans, and (3) whether voters cast a single intraparty vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote. The combination of these factors, as well as district magnitude, affects the incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote. In other words, these factors also help determine whether elections are candidate-centered or party-centered.

Of course, parties can be influential even in candidate-centered electoral systems. For example, while SNTV is generally considered to be more candidate-centered than STV, Swindle (2002) and Johnson and Hoyo (2012) note that the latter system in Ireland featured greater dispersion in co-partisan (first-preference) votes within constituencies than under SNTV in Japan, a finding that both studies attribute to greater party influence in coordination under SNTV, owing to the greater threat that allocation errors could cost the party (the LDP) a seat. However, alternative explanations for the LDP nomination patterns and vote distribution lie with candidate strategy (Reed, 2009), or strategic voting (Cox, 1997). Even if such differences in party influence exist between the two countries in terms of the number of candidates nominated and how to evenly divide the vote to avoid allocation errors, the impact on candidate characteristics like legacy ties should be unrelated. Moreover, in terms of campaigning, Irish candidates often campaign as a team,

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[19] Carey and Shugart (1995) order their electoral systems by letter, a to m. Johnson and Wallack (2006) translate this ordering into a numerical score.

with a large portion of second-order preferences votes being transferred to a co-partisan, and party influence in campaign strategies has been increasingly present in the past few decades, especially within the long-dominant Fianna Fáil.[20] Under SNTV, winners are determined by plurality rule, with no transferring of votes, so one candidate's increase in votes from party supporters comes out of another co-partisan's potential vote total.

I thus adopt the ranking above for ordering the electoral systems of the eight countries from more candidate-centered toward more party-centered. I code parties in Japan that did not nominate more than one candidate per MMD, e.g., the Kōmeitō and JCP, as operating under FPTP. This is because they did not face intraparty competition, so their incentives to cultivate a personal vote, rather than a party vote, are thus closer to the conditions under FPTP in SMD than under SNTV in MMD.

The ordering should be considered as a rough, or general, ordering of the electoral systems from most candidate-centered to most party-centered elections. For purposes of illustration in this chapter, I have given the electoral systems an ordinal ranking (1 to 5) from most "candidate centered" to most "party centered." However, I *do not* make any claims about how much of a quantifiable difference exists from one system to the next in terms of incentives to cultivate a personal vote, only that existing theory would predict there should be *some* difference. That is, the ranking has no cardinal meaning—no consistent measure of change from one value (electoral system) to the next. For example, a change from STV to OLPR should *not* be interpreted as a one "unit" change in "party-centeredness" or value of the personal vote; it only means that we expect OLPR to be more party centered, all else equal, relative to STV.

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[20] Interview with Fianna Fáil party organization staff member, June 22, 2011.

Following Proposition 1 outlined in Chapter 2, I expect that the percentage of legacy MPs in a party will be higher in countries contesting candidate-centered elections, and lower in countries with party-centered elections. In order to avoid a biased measure of the percentage of legacy MPs in each party (e.g., due to drastic variation across time or elections), I calculate the percentages for each of forty-nine parties based on all *individuals* who ever sat in a recent (since 1980) legislature. Thus, duplicate observations across legislative terms for the same MP are not counted, and the measures are intended to represent the stabilized patterns of legacy recruitment in each party. I exclude very small parties (those with fewer than ten members) from this analysis. Party names, time period of the samples, and exact legacy percentages are listed in the Appendix.

Figure 3.2 shows the relationship between the electoral system and the percentage of legacy MPs in the parties of eight democracies. The data show a clear relationship between more party-centered elections (moving from SNTV to CLPR) and the percentage of legacy MPs in a given party only when Iceland is excluded from the sample (the dashed regression line). Among the larger countries in the sample, there is thus some evidence that the candidate-centered nature of electoral systems may have a positive effect on the overall presence of legacy politics in a country, though the effect is largely driven by the exceptional case of the LDP in Japan. Under candidate-centered electoral systems, name recognition matters, and legacy candidates in most cases can capitalize on their predecessors' records in office and well-recognized names. Knowing this, parties may be more sympathetic to nominating them.

Figure 3.2: The Relationship Between Candidate-Centered Elections and the Percentage of Legacy MPs in the Parties of Eight Democracies

Notes: Percentages represent individual legislators serving at least once across multiple legislatures (depending on availability of data from each country) since 1980. Data for post-reform Japanese parties are for newly elected candidates in 2005 and 2009 only, after all party reforms were complete.
Source: Various sources for each country—see Appendix.

3.2.2. Decentralized Candidate Selection

The analysis thus far appears to support the proposition that candidate-centered elections contribute to the practice of legacy politics in democracies. However, according to my theory, the nomination incentives facing party actors may also vary depending on whether they are local or national. What is the relationship between party centralization in the candidate selection process and the percentage of legacy MPs in the party? Is a decentralized selection process more responsible for legacy politics than candidate-

centered elections?

To measure the degree of party centralization in candidate selection, I adopt the party centralization index proposed by Lundell (2004). Lundell measures party centralization of the candidate selection process using ordinal values (from 1 = least centralized, to 5 = most centralized) based on following descriptions of the role of the central (national) party leadership in the candidate selection process (Lundell, 2004, p. 31):

> (1) Selection at local party meetings, by local selection committees or by primaries open for all party members.
>
> (2) Selection at the district level by a selection committee, by the executive district organ or at a convention (congress, conference) by delegates from the local parties.
>
> (3) The same as 1 or 2 but regional or national organs exercise influence over the selection process, e.g. add names to the lists or have veto power. The decision, however, is taken at the district level. Formal approval by regional or national organs without actual involvement in the process belongs to the second category.
>
> (4) The same as 5, but local, district or regional organs exercise influence over the selection process, e.g. party members, the local parties or committees at the constituency or the regional level propose candidates. The decision, however, is taken at the national level.
>
> (5) Selection by the party leader, by the national executive organ, by a national selection committee, or by primaries at the national level.

The index proposed by Lundell, although simple and straightforward, has its limitations. Hazan and Rahat (2010, p. 61), for example, note that Lundell's simple index fails to account for the concept of exclusiveness of candidacy (*who is eligible* to become a party's candidate), or the fact that exclusiveness of the selectorate (*who decides* which of the eligible contenders will become a candidate) can vary independently of the degree

of centralization. For example, although candidates in the United States and Canada are both selected at the local (decentralized) level, the degree of inclusiveness in candidacy and selectorate dimensions differs. In the U.S., virtually anyone can attempt to win a party's nomination through the primary election process, which is determined by voters (inclusive candidacy and selectorate); in Canada, candidate selection processes can vary from constituency to constituency, with most candidates chosen in a much more exclusive vote by local party members, or in some cases by direct selection by the national party leader (Erickson & Carty, 1991). The distinction can also be illustrated with the case of the LDP in Japan—the introduction of open recruitment (*kōbo*) in 2004 increased the inclusiveness of the candidate pool in some districts, while the selectorate was still rather exclusive (local and national party elite).

Nevertheless, Lundell's index of party centralization in candidate selection has several advantages for present purposes. First, it provides a straightforward and easy to measure index for empirical comparison, which theory-based studies like Hazan and Rahat (2010) do not supply. Second, although it glosses over variation in inclusiveness/exclusiveness in candidacy and selectorate at different levels of centralization, it nevertheless captures the main aspect of theoretical importance to my argument, i.e., the degree of local versus national influence over nomination decisions. Thus, it is a convenient and tractable measure. Third, the coding for many of the parties in my case countries are already included in Lundell's study, which provides a consistent basis upon which I can add my additional case countries. I adopt the existing coding from Lundell's study, apart from that of the PCI in Italy, which I believe was erroneously coded as decentralized—although the nomination process in the PCI on paper was carried

out locally, it was done so with strict guidelines and supervision of the national party (Wertman, 1988). For cases that were not included in Lundell's study, the index code here is based on official party rules and scholarly studies, and in the case of Japan, personal interviews with party organization officials.

As with the previous section, the centralization index should not be interpreted as a cardinal scale with consistent meaning from one number to the next. It is merely an ordinal ranking of the degree of centralization. Based on Proposition 2 presented in Chapter 2, I expect legacy candidates to be more common in parties that use a more decentralized process for recruiting their candidates, and less common in more centralized parties. Figure 3.3 indeed indicates a significant relationship between the degree of centralization in the candidate selection process and the percentage of legacy MPs in a given party. For each successive increase in the national centralization of the process, there is a decrease in the percentage of legacy MPs in a party. However, this relationship appears to be driven largely by the inclusion of Iceland. Most Icelandic parties use a decentralized method (party primaries) to fill their party lists, and as we have seen, Iceland on the whole has an exceptional level of dynasties in its parliament. If we exclude Iceland as an outlier, the relationship between centralization in candidate selection process and legacy MPs largely disappears (dashed regression line), with only an insignificant decrease with each successive degree of centralization.

Figure 3.3: The Relationship Between Party Centralization in Candidate Selection and the Percentage of Legacy MPs in the Parties of Eight Democracies

Notes: Percentages represent individual legislators serving at least once across several legislatures (depending on availability of data from each country) since 1980. Data for post-reform Japanese parties are for newly elected candidates in 2005 and 2009 only, after all party reforms were complete.
Source: Various sources for each country—see Appendix.

3.2.3. Within-System Effects?

Lastly, what is the effect of the candidate selection processes on the percentage of legacy MPs under a given electoral system? For example, although we might expect legacy MPs to be most common in decentralized parties that contest candidate-centered elections, and least common in centralized parties that contest party-centered elections, within each electoral context, we would expect that more decentralized parties would feature more legacy MPs than more centralized parties. Likewise, across parties with

similarly structured candidate selection processes, we would expect political actors to value legacy ties more under candidate-centered elections than under party-centered elections. Table 3.1 shows a cross-tabulation of the average percentage of legacy MPs in parties by institutional context (electoral system and centralization), so that moving across columns in a given row shows the mean percentages in legacy MPs across electoral systems for parties with a given degree of centralization, and moving downward across rows in a given column represents the differences across parties in the same electoral context but with differing degrees of centralization in recruitment. The number of parties is shown in parentheses beneath each mean. Iceland is excluded.

Table 3.1: Electoral System, Degree of Centralization in Candidate Selection, and the Mean Percentage of Legacy MPs in the Parties of Seven Democracies (Number of Parties in Parentheses)

| | (More candidate-centered) | | | (More party-centered) | | |
	SNTV	STV	OLPR	FPTP	CLPR	Total
(Least centralized)						
1	.	.	6%	4%	8%	6%
	(0)	(0)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(4)
2	.	.	8%	.	6%	7%
	(0)	(0)	(3)	(0)	(6)	(9)
3	26%	23%	7%	3%	.	12%
	(2)	(3)	(7)	(3)	(0)	(15)
4	.	0%	4%	17%	6%	7%
	(0)	(1)	(4)	(2)	(2)	(9)
5	.	.	.	2%	6%	4%
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(4)	(6)
(Most centralized)						
Total	26%	18%	7%	6%	6%	8%
	(2)	(4)	(16)	(8)	(13)	(43)

Notes: Iceland is excluded. Percentages are means of party percentages.
Sources: Various sources for each country—see Table A1 in Appendix.

With so few cases, and several empty cells, it is difficult to get a clear picture of the "within institution" effect of the other institutional variable. Some of the cell values

represent just a single party, and few represent more than two parties. However, the within-institution trends do generally match expectations. For example, among parties with local selection and national influence (centralization index = 3), there is a clear decline in the mean percentage of legacy MPs as we move across the table row from more candidate-centered elections (SNTV) to more party-centered elections (FPTP). This suggests that the importance of the personal vote matters more than who is making the decision. However, the parties in OLPR who select their candidates nationally, but with local input (centralization index = 4) also exhibit fewer legacy MPs than the parties who use more decentralized methods for candidate recruitment. A similar difference exists between the highly centralized Sinn Féin (with zero legacy MPs) and the other three major parties in Ireland (STV). If Iceland were included, such a trend would be more evident across CLPR as well. This provides some evidence that centralized parties may care less about legacy ties in making their nomination decisions than decentralized parties, even in the same electoral context.

However, a regression analysis corroborates the evidence that the nature of the electoral system has a greater impact on legacy politics than the degree of centralization in the candidate selection process (Table 3.2). Even controlling for centralization, population size and party family type, parties contesting elections under party-centered electoral systems include significantly fewer legacy MPs than those contesting candidate-centered elections. The effect of increased centralization in the candidate selection process is not significant, and even changes from a negative effect to a positive effect when Iceland is excluded (Model 2).

There is also some evidence that the ideology of a given party can influence the patterns in legacy politics. The legislative rosters of socialist or labor parties are less likely to include legacy MPs than those of conservative parties (including Christian democratic parties). Niche or extreme ideological parties, such as nationalist parties, environmentalist parties, and small religious parties, are significantly less likely to feature legacy MPs.

Table 3.2: The Effect of Institutions on the Percentage of Legacy MPs in a Party (OLS Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors)

	Model 1 (Iceland included)	Model 2 (Iceland excluded)
Party Vote Index	-2.732*	-3.545***
	(1.429)	(1.082)
Centralization Index	-0.111	0.0867
	(1.604)	(1.212)
Population (logged)	-3.307***	-0.943
	(1.145)	(1.052)
Socialist/Labor Parties	-4.928	-6.041*
	(4.279)	(3.415)
Niche/Extreme Parties	-6.229*	-8.030***
	(3.503)	(2.748)
Constant	77.83***	40.16**
	(19.06)	(17.59)
Observations	49	43
R-squared	0.294	0.341

*Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Party vote index increases as electoral system becomes more party-centered. Centralization index increases as candidate selection process is more controlled by the national party leadership. The base category for party family includes conservative, Christian democratic, and catch-all centrist parties.*

3.3. Discussion

According to my theory of legacy recruitment presented in Chapter 2, parties contesting elections in more candidate-centered contexts should feature higher

percentages of legacy politicians in their ranks. In addition, my theory also predicts that parties that use a decentralized method for recruiting their candidates will also feature more legacy politicians than more centralized parties. The cross-national, cross-party analysis in this chapter provides some evidence that more candidate-centered elections are positively correlated with a higher level of legacy politics. In contrast, the impact of who makes the nomination decision—local or national actors—on the practice of legacy politics is less clear. At least in the countries in my sample, it appears that both local and national actors are influenced by the nomination incentives provided by the electoral system.

However, the differences that exist (or do not appear to exist) between the parties and countries in this very small sample do not allow me to determine any strong causal relationship between electoral systems or candidate selection processes and legacy recruitment. First of all, these findings must be interpreted with some caution given the data limitations. The legislator-level analysis employed here does not allow us to say much with certainty about the degree to which parties, rather than voters, have favored legacy candidates, since we are only observing those who were actually elected.

Second, this macro-level analysis cannot rule out the alternative explanation that the observed differences in legacy politics are driven by differences in micro-level variables such as the length of time in office served by MPs. If the supply of a would-be legacy candidate is encouraged by increased exposure to politics through his or her predecessor, then differences in the percentage of legacy MPs across countries and parties could be related to systematic differences in incumbent turnover across democracies. Lastly, electoral system incentives, or even temporary electoral pressures

from one election to the next can often influence candidate selection processes. In this analysis, I have avoided an attempt to paint a dynamic picture of how parties actually respond to electoral incentives in terms of candidate recruitment and selection.

To address these concerns, and to better evaluate the effect of institutions on legacy recruitment at the candidate level, I turn my attention in the next two chapters to the case of Japan, where detailed candidate-level data and institutional reforms of the 1990s and 2000s allow me to more directly analyze how institutions (and their reform) can have an impact on the practice of legacy politics.

4. Japan: Land of the Rising Sons?

> Some American voters will cast their ballot for the Democratic ticket or the Republican ticket merely because their fathers and grandfathers had voted that way. Compared to the United States, attachment to a party label is less strong in Japan; and in keeping with the Japanese mode of politics, loyalty seems to be focused more on individuals. This is probably the reason a *jiban* can often be transferred from father to son...from man to widow, or from a political leader to his chief disciple.
> -Nobutaka Ike (1957, p. 203)

Among advanced industrialized democracies, Japan has arguably been the most notable for the pervasiveness of its political dynasties. Universal suffrage and free and fair elections for the two chambers of the National Diet (parliament), the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, were introduced during the U.S. Occupation following the end of World War II, and enshrined in the postwar Constitution of 1947. Since then, despite the opportunity for all citizens to participate in politics, the proportion of candidates for the House of Representatives—the larger and more important of the two chambers—who were related to a former Diet member (DM) grew steadily, toward a zenith of over twenty percent of candidates and thirty percent of elected DMs by the late 1980s.

Dynasties have been particularly prevalent within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which formed after the 1955 election with the merger of the Liberal Party, led by Shigeru Yoshida, and the Democratic Party, led by Ichirō Hatoyama. From 1955 until

1993, the LDP was the dominant party, usually with a sizable majority in the House of Representatives. The second largest party, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), routinely earned between a quarter and a third of the votes and seats. The stability of the period from 1955 until the 1993 election, when the LDP lost its majority in the House of Representatives and a coalition of eight parties formed with the primary goal of electoral reform, has earned it the moniker the "1955 System." Over the course of the nearly forty-year dominance of the LDP under the 1955 System, the proportion of legacy candidates and DMs in the party swelled from less than twenty percent in the 1950s to more than forty percent by the 1980s (Figure 4.1). Moreover, nearly half of all new candidates for the LDP from 1980-1993 were legacy candidates.

What explains this remarkable growth in dynasties over time, and why were dynasties more common in the LDP than in other parties? In Chapter 2, I argued that democratic dynasties would be encouraged in electoral contexts that are candidate-centered, rather than party-centered, and where candidate selection decisions are taken locally, rather than by national party leaders. Chapter 3 provided some cross-national and cross-party evidence in support of that theory. In this chapter, I direct my attention toward a within-country case study analysis of legacy politics in Japan, to show how and why legacy politics flourished in Japan from 1947-1993, the postwar time period in which Japan employed the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system in multi-member districts (MMD).

Figure 4.1: Legacy Candidates and DMs in the LDP and Among All Parties, 1947-1993

Note: By-election candidates and winners are included, grouped with the prior general election.

Under the SNTV electoral system, voters cast one vote for a single candidate in an M-sized district, and the top M vote-getters are elected by plurality rule. Votes cannot be transferred between first and secondary preference candidates as under the single transferable vote (STV) system used in Ireland, or the alternative vote (AV) method used in Australia. Elections under the SNTV system have thus been characterized as "hyper-personalistic" (Shugart, 2001), as candidates from larger parties must often compete against each other for votes. In Japan, such intraparty competition resulted in elections where many candidates campaigned predominantly on particularistic or personal appeals to local voters rather than commitment to a party label or its national policies. This was particularly true for candidates from the dominant LDP.

In addition, the candidate selection processes of the two main parties were mostly decentralized to local actors. The weak value of the LDP party label coincided with a weak party organization, and a candidate selection process that was dominated by factions and local party elites who were often affiliated with the previous incumbent. Candidate selection within the JSP and the more moderate Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) was also decentralized, but with greater influence exercised by the two parties' main support networks of labor unions. In contrast, smaller parties such as the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and Kōmeitō (sometimes referred to as the Clean Government Party, or CGP), faced no intraparty competition, and used a more centralized process for selecting candidates.

Since the electoral system and candidate selection processes within parties remained generally constant over the entire time period analyzed in this chapter, I will focus my attention mainly on differences in intraparty competition within parties and the characteristics of candidates running in different district-level contexts. I am most concerned with evaluating the district and candidate-level effects of incumbency advantage on the practice of direct hereditary succession. These effects will be compared across parties to evaluate whether legacy recruitment, and especially direct hereditary succession, varied depending on the amount of intraparty electoral competition and the degree of centralization in the candidate recruitment process, even while holding the electoral strength of the outgoing incumbent constant. My focus will be on the House of Representatives, the larger and more important of the two chambers of the Diet.[21]

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[21] The House of Representatives chooses the prime minister, ratifies treaties, and passes the budget, and can override vetoes from the House of Councillors on all other legislation with a two-thirds majority.

The dataset employed in this chapter is the Reed-Smith MMD Dataset of Japanese Elections, created by Steven R. Reed and expanded by me to include additional variables, including legacy ties. The dataset contains 16,758 observations (candidacies) across eighteen general elections and twenty by-elections from 1947-1993, and differs from those used in previous work on legacy politicians in Japan in that it includes all candidates (not just those who were actually elected) and all parties (not just the LDP).[22] It also clearly distinguishes between legacy candidates and hereditary candidates. In order to identify legacy candidates who were never elected, I relied on matching last names within districts and then searching newspaper records, Wikipedia biographies, and archived records of candidates' websites in the Internet Archive.[23]

The abundance of political dynasties among the LDP's candidates for the House of Representatives under SNTV can be understood as a rational outcome from supply and demand incentives within the context of the electoral and candidate recruitment processes. The institutionalization of political inheritance as a method of candidate selection served several instrumental and informational functions for the LDP during the SNTV period. In Chapter 5, I will explain how electoral reform has shifted the emphasis in elections from intraparty competition among candidates toward greater interparty competition, and the resultant effect on legacy politics. But first, let me briefly describe the historical roots of legacy politics in Japan.

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[22] A few very minor candidates, e.g., those who earned only than a few hundred votes, are excluded.

[23] This process turned up multiple legacy candidates who were never elected (and thus had no official legislator biography), though it is possible that some obscure legacy candidates running in distant districts or with different last names escaped my coding. Nevertheless, the electoral value of legacy ties for such candidates would theoretically be weaker to both voters and parties, so I am not concerned that their potential absence will adversely affect my findings here.

4.1. Historical Development of Legacy Politics in Japan

There is a long history of hereditary succession in politics, as well as other occupations, in Japan. For example, during the Tokugawa era (1600-1868), Japanese society was highly stratified, and hereditary roles were maintained and enforced through strict rules. The *daimyō* lords were at the top of this hierarchy, followed by the samurai warrior caste. Farmers, merchants and peasants ranked below. Benedict (1946, p. 61) notes the rigidity of this class hierarchy:

> Japanese feudal society was elaborately stratified and each man's status was fixed by inheritance. The Tokugawas solidified this system and regulated the details of each caste's daily behavior. Every family head had to post on his doorway his class position and the required facts about his hereditary status.

Although class mobility was sometimes possible through marriages of mutual convenience between merchant families whose wealth was increasing, and samurai families who were on the decline, male children were generally expected to inherit the same class and occupation of their fathers. Tsunenari Tokugawa, the eighteenth head of the Tokugawa lineage, explains how the education system reinforced the rigid occupational structure of Tokugawa Japan: "each child would use a textbook suited to his father's occupation, to which he was expected to succeed in the future. There were around seven thousand different textbooks in Tokugawa Japan" (Tokugawa, 2009, p. 117).

Following the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Tokugawa caste system was abolished, and greater political participation was allowed. In the 1870s, the Meiji government allowed non-samurai to take on surnames, and granted the freedom to intermarry between classes, purchase land, and choose one's own profession. The

samurai's stipend was abolished in 1876, effectively eliminating them as a class and ushering in greater political opportunities for rural elites, wealthy businessmen, and landlords, many of whom became active in the Popular Rights Movement to establish a Constitution and elective assembly (Pratt, 1999, pp. 32-40).

Such an assembly, the Diet (*gikai*), was ultimately established in 1890 under the Meiji Constitution. The upper house of the new Diet, the House of Peers (*Kizokuin*), was modeled after the British House of Lords and restricted to hereditary peers of noble decent and appointees chosen by the Emperor with consultation from the Privy Council (*Sūmitsuin*).[24] The lower house, the House of Representatives (*Shūgiin*), was designed to be closer to the people, like the British House of Commons, yet participation was initially open only to wealthy citizens who could meet the high tax requirement for voting rights and eligibility for public office. In the first Diet election in 1890, about one-third of the new DMs elected were former samurai. The rest were local notables (*chihō meibōka*) who were both "locally secure and securely local" (Gluck, 1985, p. 69).

These elected members of the House of Representatives struggled against the Meiji oligarchs who controlled the House of Peers and the Privy Council to effect political change and party-based cabinet politics. This was all the more difficult considering that the parties during this period—including the two main parties in the House of Representatives, the Rikken Seiyūkai (Party of Friends of Constitutional Government) and the Kenseikai (Constitutional Party)—were also internally divided and unstable. Nevertheless, the period of time between the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and

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[24] Imperial appointees included 1) personal appointments at the discretion of the Emperor, 2) representatives of the highest taxpayers, and 3) representatives from the Imperial Academy. Princes of the blood were entitled to sit by hereditary right, but they did not exercise this right.

the fall of the Seiyūkai party cabinet in 1932 is generally referred to as the period of "Taishō Democracy,"[25] as it seemed as though the development of party politics was beginning to give greater democratic voice to the common man (Gordon, 2003, p. 161).

The electoral system for the House of Representatives changed multiple times as a consequence of compromises between the oligarchs and party actors, each with their own preferences. The first electoral law employed a plurality system in small districts, with district magnitude (M) being only one or two, with one or two votes. This system was opposed by oligarchs such as Aritomo Yamagata, who may have feared the development of strong parties (Ramseyer & Rosenbluth, 1995), as well as party advocates like Hirobumi Itō, who disliked the cost and localism of the small district system, and believed that larger-sized districts would shift focus to candidates with a more national base, lower costs, and strengthen the foundations of parties (Kawato, 2002).

Thus the system was changed in 1900 to feature large-sized districts (M greater than six) and the SNTV voting method. The large-sized district system was again replaced with a small-sized district system in 1919, with M ranging from one to three seats, but SNTV was retained.[26] In 1925, universal male suffrage was adopted, and the electoral system again changed to a medium-sized (M ranging from three to five) MMD system that would be used for the remainder of the prewar period and again after 1947.

Nevertheless, despite the expansion in suffrage, candidates with local prestige or connections continued to be heavily favored in elections, as did candidates from the former samurai class. Quigley (1932, pp. 264-265) describes the qualities that best earned

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[25] Named after Emperor Taishō, who succeeded Emperor Meiji in 1912 and ruled until 1926.
[26] Scholars have debated the motivations behind the adoption of SNTV and small, medium, and large-sized districts. For an extensive review of prewar electoral system changes, see Kawato (2002).

votes in the years of Taishō Democracy:

> Personal prestige appears to be the essential quality in a candidate. A connection to a formerly powerful clan, relationship to a locally respected family, reputation for cleverness as a journalist or speaker—these attributes are highly regarded by the voters. Party platforms are too indefinite and the speeches of politicians too vague to afford even the well-educated voter a hold on reality. The respect felt for officials contributes to the success of candidates who hold, or have held, prefectural or municipal offices.

Note that in these respects, the historical evolution of legacy politics in Japan does not differ dramatically from many Western societies where feudalism existed, and where political rights were gradually increased through democratic reforms that lessened the influence of the previous aristocratic elite. In many European states, the introduction of parliamentary democracy at first failed to undermine the power of the noble classes, who came to occupy powerful positions in both elective office and the military. For example, in the late 1890s to early 1900s, the proportion of MPs who were descendants of the aristocratic noble classes remained as high as twenty percent in the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. But by the end of WWII, only the U.K. had more than five percent (but less than ten percent) noble MPs (Rush, 2000, p. 30).[27] As Rush (2000, p. 29) argues,

> …the nobility both challenged and was challenged by royal power, by parliamentarism, by mass politics, and by democracy. The challenge of royal power could be met by the counterclaim of hierarchy, that of parliamentarism by the concept of representation, but mass politics and democracy challenged the very idea of aristocracy and turned representation against the nobility. The more ideas about equality and universal rights, popular consent and control penetrated European societies, the more the position of the nobility was undermined, especially economically and politically.

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[27] Unfortunately, this study measures only relations to the former aristocratic nobility, so levels of legacy relations to new political elite may be somewhat higher. Nevertheless, the general trend toward fewer political dynasties in these countries is true.

As we shall see, Japan's democratic reforms in the Taishō and post-WWII periods, while easing restrictions on political participation, actually preceded a dramatic rise in democratic dynasties. Many of today's DMs come from former aristocratic families that have had at least one member serving since the early prewar period, but many others come from newly created dynasties. I will argue that the reasons for this rise in dynasties were the candidate-centered nature of electoral competition and the decentralized process for selecting new candidates for the LDP.

4.2. Elections and Candidate Recruitment from 1947-1993

After Japan's defeat in WWII, the U.S. set about a rapid disarmament and democratization process that included institutional reform. The postwar Constitution enacted under the U.S. Occupation in 1947 guaranteed full suffrage and democratic elections for both of the two chambers of the National Diet (*Kokkai*), the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors (*Sangiin*), which replaced the former House of Peers. Most of the "militarist" prewar politicians were purged from office during the Occupation, so that the first few elections under the new Constitution witnessed an influx of new candidates, including many former bureaucrats recruited into running by the politicians who escaped the purge, particularly Shigeru Yoshida.

For the first postwar election in 1946—the first election with female suffrage—a limited vote system in large-sized districts was used. Voters had two to three votes depending on the magnitude of the district, and magnitude ranged from four to fourteen. This system was very permissive to new candidates from diverse backgrounds, and

indeed over eight percent of the new DMs elected in 1946 were women (Darcy & Nixon, 1996). However, a new electoral law in 1947 returned the electoral system rules to those used since 1925. From 1947 to 1993, the 466~511 members of the House of Representatives were thus elected by SNTV in MMD, with districts that mostly ranged in M from three to five seats.[28] For the House of Councillors, lawmakers chose a mixed system combining SNTV in districts corresponding to each of the forty-seven prefectures to elect 150 members (with M varying by the size of the prefectural population), and a national district using SNTV to elect one hundred members. The smaller-sized districts proved a barrier to more diverse representation, and the number of female representatives declined rapidly, and a stable pattern of limited career paths developed in each of the parties.

4.2.1. Elections under SNTV in MMD: Intraparty Competition within Districts

For any party to win more seats in the House of Representatives than there were districts, it had to nominate several candidates in each district, which led to high intraparty competition for votes and strong incentives to campaign on personal, rather than party, reputation in order for candidates to differentiate themselves from their co-partisans. In order to be the largest party, the LDP nominated multiple candidates in over eighty percent of all districts from 1958 (the first election after its founding) to 1993. The second largest party, the JSP, also nominated multiple candidates in many districts (Figure 4.2), but intraparty competition declined steadily over time as the party weakened

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[28] The Amami Islands elected a single candidate to the Diet from 1953-1990, when the district became part of Kagoshima 1st District. Eight other districts at some elections returned two DMs. Hokkaidō 1st District elected six DMs from 1986-1993, as did Fukuoka 1st in 1993.

and was faced with competition on the Left from both the DSP and the JCP, which gained in popularity in the 1970s, and even from the Kōmeitō (Stockwin, 1992, p. 92).

Figure 4.2: Percentage of Districts with Intraparty Competition, 1958-1993

Source: Reed-Smith MMD Dataset.
Note: By-elections not included.

As the JSP weakened in electoral strength, nominating multiple candidates in a district could risk splitting the party's support in such a way that no candidate would get elected, an outcome known as "falling together" (*tomodaore*). The party's incumbent candidates also no doubt opposed running extra candidates in elections where they felt insecure (Reed & Bolland, 1999). The Kōmeitō, which held a distant third place for party

share of the votes and seats from 1969 until 1993, never nominated more than one candidate in a district, while the JCP and DSP did so in only a handful of cases.[29] This fragmentation on the Left meant that only the LDP nominated enough candidates to secure a majority in the Diet on its own.

Candidates from the LDP and JSP also frequently faced competition from small splinter parties and independent challengers who did not receive, or chose to eschew, the official party nomination. In the case of the LDP, some established incumbents ran as independents after losing the official nomination due to a scandal or party discipline issue. For example, after being implicated in the Lockheed bribery scandal and resigning as PM, Kakuei Tanaka ran as an independent from 1976 until 1986. During the same time period, a few other LDP politicians broke with the party and formed the New Liberal Club (NLC), contesting several elections before re-joining the party.

Other would-be LDP candidates who did not receive the official nomination under SNTV would often run as Liberal Democrat-affiliated independents (LDI)—usually supported unofficially by an LDP faction—and threaten to unseat a rival LDP incumbent, since the MMD system meant a candidate could often win with less than twenty percent of the vote. The party's effective nomination policy in these cases was, "if you win, you are LDP" (*kateba, Jimintō*) (Reed, 2009). LDI candidates who succeeded in getting elected would often be given ex-post nominations (*tsuika kōnin*) by the party and would then join the LDP's legislative caucus. From 1958-1993, an average of about eight successful LDI candidates were given ex-post nominations each election, and in many

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[29] The JCP ran multiple candidates in a few districts in early elections, and in the five-member Kyoto district where the party was strong. The DSP ran two candidates in only two districts in the first election after its founding in 1960.

for the same pool of voters (Figure 4.3). While LDP and other conservative camp candidates faced intra-camp competition in nearly all districts, JSP and other socialist camp candidates faced intra-camp competition in roughly sixty percent of districts since the 1970s, even while official intraparty competition had ostensibly declined to around twenty percent of districts.

Figure 4.3: Percentage of Districts with Intra-Camp Competition, 1958-1993

Source: Reed-Smith MMD Dataset.
Notes: By-elections not included. The conservative camp includes the LDP, New Liberal Club (a brief splinter party), Shinseitō, Sakigake, Japan New Party, and all affiliated independents. The socialist camp includes the JSP, DSP, SDL, and all affiliated independents.

In districts where candidates faced intraparty and intra-camp competition, it was not enough to campaign based on party label or ideology alone. Indeed, Japan (and especially the LDP) during the SNTV period has often been cited as a case where candidate-centered elections based on the personal vote, rather than the party vote, were especially strong (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Reed & Thies, 2001). Voters in Japan during the SNTV period also cared more about individual candidate characteristics than parties.

Scholars of Japanese politics have noted that three factors, known in Japanese as the "three *ban*" (*sanban*), were especially important for election under the candidate-centered SNTV system: *jiban* (support base in the electorate), *kaban* (financial resources), and *kanban* (name recognition or reputation) (Ike, 1957, pp. 192-202; Curtis, 1971, p. 250). Faced with so much electoral competition, successful candidates for office needed to cultivate each of the *sanban* in order to build any kind of incumbency advantage in their districts.

Thayer (1969, pp. 98-102) distinguishes between two types of *jiban*: those that were organized vertically and those that were organized horizontally. Vertical *jiban* were based geographically around a candidate's hometown (*jimoto*) or main residence. In contrast, horizontal *jiban* were more spread out, and might be based on a particular policy issue, industry, or interest group network, such as union members. Most conservative politicians built *jiban* that were of the vertical type (Curtis, 1971, p. 53; Hirano, 2006; Thayer, 1969, p. 98), but horizontal *jiban*-oriented policy differentiation was also common (Tatebayashi, 2004).

Candidates built and maintained their *jiban* through vote-mobilizing organizations called *kōenkai*. Although some *kōenkai* existed during the prewar period, conservative

politicians started to build *kōenkai* as a general practice beginning in the 1950s, and candidates from other parties soon followed suit (Masumi, 1995, p. 236; Krauss & Pekkanen, 2011). *Kōenkai* helped to institutionalize a candidate's personal vote by facilitating favors, constituency service, and pork barrel projects that benefited the local residents represented by the candidate. Krauss and Pekkanen (2011, p. 37) describe how *kōenkai* were typically organized:

> Several organizational features distinguish most kōenkai. First, kōenkai are typically not single organizations; instead the kōenkai for a lone Diet member comprises dozens of groups, some of which overlap in membership. Second, there are three major different types of organizing principles for the groups: personal connection to the Diet member, geography, and function (which commonly includes gender, age, occupation or former occupation, and some interest or hobby).

The *kōenkai* were critical to the organization and mobilization of a politician's *jiban*. But building and maintaining strong *kōenkai* was incredibly expensive. An election could be called at any time, and the electoral campaign period was extremely short (from 1958-1992 only twenty days of official campaigning were permitted, today only twelve days are permitted). Politicians thus needed to cultivate close ties with their supporters throughout the period between elections. Studies in the 1970s-80s estimated the average start-up cost of creating a *kōenkai* organization at between $700,000-1,000,000 with a similar sum required yearly to maintain them (Kitaoka, 1985; Ishikawa & Hirose, 1989). This is a big reason why *kaban* (financial resources) was a second major factor in a candidate's successful election. It is also a reason why money politics and corruption were so rampant under the SNTV system in Japan (Curtis, 1988, pp. 160-164; Woodall, 1996; Schlesinger, 1997; Reed & Thies, 2001, pp. 154-157). LDP candidates received funds from their factions, but the high cost of elections often resulted in a search of funds

through more illicit means.

Kanban (name recognition) also helped to distinguish a candidate from her competitors and earn valuable personal votes. Under SNTV, voters needed to select a single candidate, often from among many with the same party label. In addition, the actual method through which ballots were (and are still) cast further reinforced the importance of name recognition: when voters cast their ballots at the polling place, it is obligatory to physically write out the name of one's favored candidate. This means that voter awareness of a candidate's name is crucial. Candidates are aware of this, and it is reflected in campaign practices, even to this day. During the short campaign period before a House of Representatives election, candidates can often be heard repeating their names and brief slogans *ad infinitum* in front of train stations, or from sound trucks that cruise through the neighborhoods of their district. Candidates with complicated or obscure Chinese characters (*kanji*) in their name often use a simplified script (*hiragana*) instead to help voters avoid mistakes that could lead to a spoilt ballot.

4.2.2. *Candidate Selection: Party Variation in the Process*

There are few legal constraints imposed on eligibility for office. According to Article Ten of the Public Offices Election Law, a candidate for the House of Representatives must be at least twenty-five years old at the time of the election, while a candidate for the House of Councillors must be at least thirty years old. Aside from additional restrictions on individuals with a criminal history, any Japanese citizen who meets these basic age requirements is eligible to run for office. In practice, however, each party has used different methods and criteria for screening and selecting its candidates.

The LDP under SNTV was highly decentralized and politician-centered, with the internal party organization based around a seniority rule and inter-factional balancing (Satō & Matsuzaki, 1986; Krauss & Pekkanen, 2011). The *kōenkai* system also resulted in what Ishibashi and Reed (1992) call an "elite cooptative model" of democracy in Japan, whereby incumbents were generally insulated from intense competition, their successors were equally assured victory, and the choice of successor was often made by local *kōenkai* elites, and never by the voters or the central party leadership. When a candidate retired or died, it was the *kōenkai* which acted as the selectorate for the new candidate, with the central party leadership and national party usually only affirming their choice (Ishibashi & Reed, 1992; Reed, 2009). This led to nominations favoring three distinct types of candidates with local ties: the personal secretaries of the previous candidate, local politicians who supported the previous incumbent, and legacy candidates (Fukui, 1997). Sometimes legacy candidates first served as secretaries to gain experience and "prime themselves" to inherit the seat.

In contrast to other parliamentary democracies (Müller, 2000), the role of the LDP party organization in the recruitment process was thus relatively low. The central party leadership (often with heavy influence of factional leaders) only played a role in affirming the local selection decision, and settling issues of how many candidates would ultimately be nominated. An attempt in 1963 by party leaders to eliminate factions and centralize party control of nominations and campaign activities by replacing *kōenkai* with local party branches failed, and the LDP remained decentralized (Nonaka, 1995, pp. 51-55; Krauss & Pekkanen, 2011, pp. 57-58).

The JSP organization resembled the LDP's in its loose structure, factionalism, and

decentralized authority (Stockwin, 1992). Candidates for the JSP also developed their own *kōenkai*, but to a lesser degree, and the *kōenkai* of outgoing incumbents played a negligible role in recruiting new candidates. A heavier influence in candidate recruitment was exerted by the party's main support organization, the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (*Sōhyō*), which represented predominantly the public sector unions. When determining which candidate to nominate, prefectural party headquarters also played a role in proposing candidates to the national headquarters for approval. For these reasons, more than half of all candidates from the JSP were active in *Sōhyō* prior to running for office, while another third were members of local or prefectural assemblies (Fukui, 1997). Similarly, the DSP was supported mostly by the Japanese Confederation of Labor (*Dōmei*), which represented mostly private sector unions that were less militant and more business-oriented than those represented in *Sōhyō*.[30] DSP candidates were also chosen locally, and thus mostly drawn from among local politicians and *Dōmei* trade union leaders.

In contrast to the conservative and socialist parties, both the JCP and the Kōmeitō were highly centralized in their organization and candidate recruitment processes, although candidates from both parties also formed *kōenkai*. The Central Committee of the JCP exercised tight control over all aspects of the party organization, including candidate selection (Shiratori, 1988, pp. 180-181). The JCP generally made efforts to nominate candidates with some connection to local affairs, but it was not uncommon for JCP-nominated candidates to change districts and run as "parachute" candidates for the party

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[30] *Dōmei* and *Sōhyō* eventually merged in the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (*Rengō*) in 1989-1990.

elsewhere. Thus local ties were not dominant in deciding nominations. The party recruited many of its candidates from party and local citizen's group activists, anti-JSP union members (particular a minority faction from the Japan Teachers Union, *Nikkyōso*), and lawyers (Curtis, 1979). By 1980, the JCP formally enforced that all *kōenkai* had to be "party *kōenkai*," in both name and form, rather than candidate-based *kōenkai* (Lam, 1996).

The Kōmeitō was founded in 1964 as a political offshoot of the Nichiren Buddhist organization, Sōka Gakkai, much in the way that many early mass parties in Western European democracies emerged out of class or religious movements. Although the party officially severed any formal ties to Sōka Gakkai in 1970, the party's core organization and support base in the electorate is nearly coterminous in many ways with the realm of Sōka Gakkai (Baerwald, 1986, pp. 8-9; Hrebenar, 1992).

The Kōmeitō's official party by-laws state that potential candidates for office are evaluated by the party's Election Strategy Committee, which then makes recommendations to the party's Central Executive Committee (or Central Secretariat) for final approval. The Central Secretariat is typically composed of the Chief Representative (Party President), the Chairman of the National Representatives, the Acting Chief Representative (Deputy President), several Vice Presidents, the Secretary General, the Policy Affairs Research Committee Chair, and several senior members. Within the Central Secretariat, the Party President and Secretary General are the most influential party leaders.

Before an election, the Central Secretariat, in consultation with the party's Election Strategy Committee, considers which candidates to nominate. Even for local (municipal

and prefectural) elections, the recommendations of the local candidate selection committees must ultimately be approved by the central party leadership, and it is not uncommon for national leaders to overrule or disregard the recommendations of local party organizations.

In contrast to the LDP, where new candidates often approached the party directly or ran first as independents in hope of getting an ex-post nomination, Kōmeitō candidates often had no prior ambitions for public office until they were contacted by a party leader asking them to run. As one veteran Kōmeitō representative puts it, the nomination philosophy of the party can be characterized as "*Detai hito yori dashitai hito*" (Rather than people who want to run, [we nominate] people who the party wants to run).[31] Individual Kōmeitō politicians often view their candidacy as part of a duty to the party, or public service to society (*kōboku*), rather than as a personal calling or vehicle for higher political aspirations.

Beyond the strong organizational link with Sōka Gakkai, the party does not have direct ties to interest groups in society from which it recruits new candidates. Nearly all Kōmeitō candidates are thus also members of Sōka Gakkai, and are frequently screened and recommended to the party leadership by influential leaders of the Sōka Gakkai organization, professors from Sōka University, or local Kōmei party branches. Sōka Gakkai and its daily newspaper, the *Seikyō Shimbun* (founded in 1951), as well as the official Kōmeitō newspaper, *Kōmei Shimbun* (first published in 1962) have also been important arenas for the screening of potential Kōmeitō candidates.

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[31] Interview with Kōmeitō DM and Election Strategy Committee chairman, Yōsuke Takagi, June 8, 2011.

Table 4.2: Party Variation in Intraparty/Intra-Camp Competition and Selection Process

Party	Intraparty Competition?	Intra-camp Competition?	Decentralized Candidate Selection?
LDP	Yes (in most districts)	Yes	Yes
JSP	Yes (in many districts)	Yes	Yes
DSP	No*	Yes	Yes
Kōmeitō	No	No	No
JCP	Very rarely	Very rarely	No

Source: Reed-Smith MMD Dataset.
Note: The DSP ran two candidates in Kanagawa 1ˢᵗ District and Tokyo 6ᵗʰ District in 1960; thereafter they never ran multiple candidates.

Table 4.2 summarizes the differences in intraparty and intra-camp competition facing candidates from the five main parties that contested election during the bulk of the SNTV period, and the nature of their candidate selection processes. This variation allows for some comparison in terms of legacy recruitment based on differing party and electoral contexts. In the next section, we will turn our attention to the empirical record to examine the patterns in legacy recruitment in the parties.

Following the propositions posited in Chapter 2, we would expect to see a greater percentage of legacy candidates in the LDP and among conservatives than the JSP and other Socialists owing to the increased intraparty (or intra-camp) competition faced by conservative candidates. A greater number of intra-camp competitors should mean that the reputation and name recognition of an individual candidate is more important for securing election. Parties might also pay less attention to the characteristics of their candidates when there is more than one "face" of the party in the district. Given that candidates from the Kōmeitō and JCP never or rarely faced intraparty competition, and that the candidate selection processes were so highly centralized, we would expect to observe the lowest percentage of legacy candidates among the nominees of those parties.

4.3. Legacy Recruitment under the SNTV System

During the U.S. Occupation, top party politicians who had been active during the wartime years, such as Ichirō Hatoyama, were purged from office. Partly because this purge, less than five percent of candidates for the House of Representatives in the first decade of postwar democracy were related to a former DM. Many of these early legacy candidates were actually "standing in" for their purged relatives, who returned after the purge was lifted in 1952. To fill the candidate gap in the interim, conservative party leaders, in particular Shigeru Yoshida of the Liberal Party, actively recruited high-level bureaucrats and other outsiders without any legacy ties. After the purge was lifted in 1952, party politicians like Hatoyama were allowed to reenter politics, yet when Hatoyama's Democratic Party merged with Yoshida's Liberal Party in 1955 to form the LDP, it still inherited many former bureaucrats from the Liberal Party.

However, by the time the Occupation-era political recruits began to retire and die, many of them had managed to build up large and successful *jiban*, which were often "transferred" to a relative (usually their eldest son), creating a new batch of political families (Curtis, 1988, pp. 95-97). In fact, the founding members of roughly thirty-five percent of all dynasties active in the late 1980s were first elected during the years of Occupation, from 1946-1952 (Ichikawa, 1990, pp. 10-11).

Legacy candidates were most common in the LDP. Of the 339 first-time legacy candidates who ran between 1947-1993, the LDP nominated 164; the JSP fielded only twenty-seven, while the DSP fielded eleven (Table 4.3). Moreover, over half of the legacy candidates in the conservative and socialist camps were direct hereditary successors.

Table 4.3: First-Time Legacy and Hereditary Candidates in the House of Representatives, 1947-1993: Number (Percent) of Candidates

	Legacy	Hereditary	Total Candidates
Conservatives (Camp)	284 (11%)	149 (6%)	2,552
LDP	164 (34%)	101 (21%)	489
LDI	53 (15%)	28 (8%)	361
NLC	4 (11%)	3 (9%)	35
Others	63 (4%)	17 (1%)	1,667
Socialists (Camp)	48 (4%)	26 (2%)	1,297
JSP	27 (7%)	14 (3%)	408
DSP	11 (6%)	7 (4%)	187
SDL	2 (33%)	1 (17%)	6
Independents/Others	8 (1%)	4 (1%)	696
Kōmeitō	4 (2%)	0	186
JCP	1 (<1%)	0	752
Others	2 (1%)	1 (<1%)	286
Total	339 (7%)	176 (3%)	5,073

Source: Reed-Smith MMD Dataset.
Notes: By-election candidates are included. For the conservative and socialist camps, "Others" include the precursor parties to the LDP (the Liberals and Democrats) and pre-1958 JSP (the Left and Right Socialists). Apart from LDI, post-1955 party-affiliated independents are grouped with "Independents/Others." There were only two legacy JSI candidates, one legacy DSI candidate. The Kōmeitō group includes one Kōmei-affiliated independent (non-legacy).

The Kōmeitō fielded a much smaller number of legacy candidates and not a single hereditary candidate. In fact there were only four legacy candidates fielded by the Kōmeitō during this period: Kōshirō Ishida, Kiyoshi Nishinaka, and Yoshiyuki Asai, whose relatives had been elected to the upper house, and Kazuo Kitagawa, whose father had been elected from a different district in the lower house. Similarly, although some JCP successors in a district had the same name as their predecessors, it was not possible in all cases to verify whether or not they were relatives due to the scarcity of information released by the JCP for non-winning candidates. One known JCP legacy candidate, Tomiyuki Takada, was the son of prewar politician Ryōhei Takada. But Tomiyuki ran as

a Communist for only the first three elections (1947-1952) before joining the JSP. The only other confirmed legacy candidate in the JCP, Hiroshi Kikunami, served one term in the House of Councillors from 1992-1998.

Figure 4.4: Legacy and Hereditary Candidates in the Three Main Parties, 1958-1993

Source: Reed-Smith MMD Dataset.
Note: By-elections not included.

The proportion of legacy candidates running in elections under the LDP party label grew steadily from just over ten percent of candidates after the party's founding in 1955 toward a zenith of over forty percent prior to the 1993 election, the last election to be held under SNTV (Figure 4.4). Legacy candidates accounted for less than ten percent of the JSP's candidates in all elections except 1990. The intraparty differences remain when the

parties are grouped by camp (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5: Legacy and Hereditary Candidates in the Three Main Party Camps, 1947-1993

Source: Reed-Smith MMD Dataset.
Note: By-elections not included.

4.3.1. *The Importance of* Jiban*,* Kaban*, and* Kanban

A great deal of research has cited the *kōenkai* system as the reason for the growth in legacy, and especially hereditary, candidates in the LDP (Curtis, 1988, pp. 95-97; Ishibashi & Reed, 1992; Taniguchi, 2008; Krauss & Pekkanen, 2011; Inaida, 2009; Uesugi, 2009; Tanaka, 2001). When an incumbent retired, he and his *kōenkai* played the largest role in determining a successor, and incumbents could "transfer" their *jiban* to

their successor through the *kōenkai* organization and its network of contacts and funds. Sometimes a successor would be a secretary or local politician with close ties to the outgoing incumbent. But often the successor was the outgoing candidate's own son or other close relative. The successor to an outgoing incumbent would thus "inherit" resources that the incumbent had developed over the course of his career in the Diet and that helped contribute to his incumbency advantage in office. Non-related successors inherited the *jiban* and *kaban* resources, but the *kanban*, since they did not share the same name. On the other hand, hereditary successors benefited from all three.

A legacy candidate who ran in a separate district or many elections after his predecessor had left office might still benefit from *kanban*, and in many cases *jiban* and *kaban* if they were named successors to a non-related candidate. For example, brothers Kunio and Yukio Hatoyama (PM from 2009-2010) are the grandsons of former PM and party founder Ichirō Hatoyama, who served in the House of Representatives from 1915 until being purged in 1946 and again from 1952 until his death in 1959. Their father, Iichirō, served in the House of Councillors (1974-1992), and their great grandfather, Kazuo, served in the prewar House of Representatives (1894-1911), making them fourth generation legacy politicians. Kunio ran for office in 1976 in Tokyo 8th District (currently Tokyo 2nd), which was the constituency of his grandfather and great grandfather, but he was not able to inherit any *jiban*. As Itoh (2003, pp. 159-160) explains,

> …with the death of Ichirō in 1959, Yamada Hisatsugu, former administrative vice minister of foreign affairs and the Hatoyama family's long-time confidante, succeeded to the district. The family's *kōenkai* (politician's support groups) in the district were disbanded. At that time, the Hatoyama family and Yamada made an agreement that Yamada would return the district to the family should a family member decide to run in the future. However, when Kunio decided to run in 1976, Yamada had

already won three terms and did not honor the promise.

Despite this difficulty, Kunio was able to win election with the most votes in the district, no doubt thanks to the strong *kanban* associated with the Hatoyama name.

Yukio decided to enter politics in 1986 after earning a Ph.D. in engineering at Stanford University and working as an academic in Tokyo. Since his brother Kunio was already running in the family's old district in Tokyo, Yukio had to look elsewhere for a place to run. Luckily, a friend of the Hatoyama family, Saburō Saegusa, decided to retire and bequeath his *jiban* in Hokkaidō 4th District to Yukio (Itoh, 2003, p. 164). Thus Yukio inherited a *jiban*, while Kunio did not, despite running in the same district as the family predecessors.[32]

In the case where an incumbent died suddenly in office without naming a successor, as was the case with the Sekō succession described at the start of Chapter 1, the *kōenkai* was still influential in nomination decisions, and often the easiest candidate to unite around was a relative. When an incumbent politician died in office, nominating a relative was not only a convenient way to replace the incumbent—it could also be viewed as closely approximating the wishes of the electorate, which had previously given a mandate to the deceased politician. In addition, a relative of a deceased Diet member may have been more successful in gathering any sympathy vote available (Ishibashi & Reed, 1992).

For example, following the sudden suicide of Hokkaido 5th District's Ichirō Nakagawa in 1983, his son, Shōichi, quit his job in banking to run for the seat in the next election that year. However, Ichirō's personal secretary, Muneo Suzuki, also wanted to

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[32] By my definitions outlined in Chapter 1, both brothers would thus be considered "legacy candidates" but not "hereditary candidates."

run, and claimed that Ichirō had been opposed to legacy politics. The LDP party leadership did not want to nominate both successor challengers, as it already had two other incumbents in the district, Yoshikazu Kitamura and Kiroku Yasuda. Ultimately, Nakagawa was given the official nomination with the support of the *kōenkai* and was the top vote-getter. Suzuki ran and won as an LDI, and was given an ex-post nomination. But the combination of Nakagawa's high vote total and Suzuki's dividing the remaining conservative vote in the district resulted in both Kitamura and Yasuda losing their seats.

One hereditary successor faced competition from within his own family. Prior to the 1986 election, Kumamoto 2nd District incumbent Sunao Sonoda passed away. His eldest son, Hiroyuki, sought to succeed him, but Sunao's widow, Tenkōkō, also wanted the seat, and challenged her stepson in the race. Tenkōkō had previously been elected in Tokyo 7th District in 1946 as one of the first female DMs, and met her husband when they were both serving in the Diet. *Kōenkai* members were divided over whom to support, and the party avoided taking sides in the family dispute by declining to nominate either candidate. Tenkōkō ran as an independent with the backing of the Nakasone faction, while Hiroyuki had the support of the Fukuda faction (to which his father had belonged). Although the Sonoda *jiban* in the district was divided, Hiroyuki ultimately won, and was given an ex-post nomination.[33]

An incumbent politician who had invested many years of effort into building up his *jiban* may have had strong personal reasons to "keep it in the family" (Taniguchi, 2008), especially if he himself had inherited his seat from a relative of the previous generation. Powerful political families may have wanted to maintain their "family business" and

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[33] *Asahi Shimbun* June 27, 1986, p. 22; July 7, 1986, p. 1.

ensure the continuation of their political legacy. In most cases, it was the first-born son who would inherit the family business of politics. Politicians who did not have a biological son of their own would often adopt a son who could eventually inherit the seat. In Japan, it was common for a powerful man of business or politics who lacked a male heir to adopt a son, especially a nephew or the husband of a daughter, as their legal heir (*mukoyōshi*). In the world of politics, such "adopted husbands," such as Kazuo Aichi of Miyagi 1st District or Yasuoki Urano of Aichi 4th District, would then take the last name of their fathers-in-law, and eventually succeed them.

Politicians who had amassed large political war chests could also avoid a heavy tax burden on those funds if they were transferred through the *kōenkai* organization to a successor (Uesugi, 2009, pp. 65-78). Under the Political Funds Control Law, *kōenkai* funds are managed by a candidate's political fund organization (*seiji shikin kanri dantai*). If a candidate retires from office and disbands his *kōenkai*, any remaining funds in the accounts of the fund organization are subject to taxation. However, if the money is transferred to another candidate's fund organization (for example of a child running simultaneously) or if the name of the organization is changed to reflect a new candidate taking it over, the funds are not taxed. Political inheritance was a useful mechanism for keeping accumulated financial resources in the family without incurring a tax penalty for exiting politics and disbanding the *kōenkai* accounts.

A retiring incumbent might also have felt the need to encourage a relative to succeed him if he had acquired a substantial amount of debt to financial supporters that he could not pay off in the near future. Appointing a son as successor would signal a credible commitment to the continuity of the family business, and that the son would

repay any political debts as funds became available (Iwai, 1990).

The *kōenkai* supporters may also have had demand-side financial incentives to recruit a hereditary successor, since doing so assured their continued access to central government resources (Igarashi, 1986; Ichikawa, 1990; Asako, Iida, Matsubayashi, & Ueda, 2010). The centralized budget allocation process and highly clientelistic operation of LDP politics created incentives for local organizations, candidates, and voters to align with the LDP in order to gain access to redistributive expenditures of the central government. *Kōenkai* members and local politicians who lent their electoral support to national-level LDP politicians needed to build strong relationships with those politicians to access central government distributive decisions and maintain an important "pipeline" to pork (Abe, Shindō, & Kawato, 1994; Scheiner, 2006). When a politician retired or died, the *kōenkai* could assure its continued access to the central government by nominating a winning successor. Hereditary candidates were ideal to rally behind, since they were familiar to most core supporter and voters.

Lastly, the LDP organization itself had little reason or power to object to a hereditary successor, since most came well equipped with the funds and support network necessary to win election. In the decentralized and weak LDP, candidates' campaigns were largely self-financed or supported by individual factions, rather than by the party itself. A hereditary candidate with an established *kōenkai* and ample funds would have been an attractive and expedient choice for the LDP to nominate in order to keep a continued grip on that seat with minimal cost to the party. Moreover, if the party expected the hereditary candidate to win, there was no sense denying him the nomination, even if party leadership favored a different candidate.

The name recognition of legacy candidates was also clearly valuable. In the candidate-centered electoral context of SNTV elections, a recognizable family name could serve as a "brand name" or cue to voters in a system where party label could not always serve the same function. As Ishibashi and Reed note, "Voters who have gotten used to voting for Watanabe can continue voting for Watanabe" (1992, p. 369). Some legacy candidates, such as Shinjirō Yamamura of Chiba 2nd District or Kishirō Nakamura of Ibaraki 7th, even went so far as to change their names to be exactly the same as their father's prior to succeeding them (in Yamamura's case a family tradition preceded by ten other generations before him)!

Changing one's name to be exactly the same as a predecessor's name may sound like an extreme example of continuity in representation, but for a legacy candidate, it sometimes helped to capitalize on name recognition while avoiding confusion with less observant voters. Third-generation legacy DM Tarō Kōno first ran for the House of Representatives in 1996 from the Kanagawa 15th District, a district that included part of his father Yōhei Kōno's *jiban*. After the electoral reform in 1994, the district lines were redrawn, splitting Yōhei's *jiban* in two, and Tarō and his father ran simultaneously in neighboring districts.[34] Yōhei was leader of the LDP during the brief period from 1994-1996 when it did not hold the premiership, and had inherited his *jiban* from his father, Ichirō, after his death in 1965. Ichirō's brother, Kenzō, was also a member of the Diet, and their father, Jihei, had been involved in local politics. Tarō explains how voters would sometimes confuse him with his predecessors, despite him having a different given

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[34] There were five such simultaneous father-son candidacies in 1996, but Tarō was the only son to win. Unlike many hereditary candidates, he decided to officially disband his father's former *kōenkai* and form a new organization of his own. Nevertheless, he was running in a district that included part of his father's *jiban* and former supporters.

name: "In my first election, there were about a thousand voters who [mistakenly] wrote my grandfather's name. When I showed up to events, elderly ladies would say, 'Oh, is Ichirō Kōno here?'"[35]

In Kōno's case, being a member of a famous political dynasty carried both positive benefits as well as some negative ones. As the son of Yōhei and grandson of Ichirō, some older voters mistakenly confused him with his predecessors, even though his grandfather had long been deceased. Other voters, even conservative ones, didn't like him because they associated him with his father, and prior to electoral reform there had been bitter competition between conservative candidates in that district. But, he concludes, in the end his name recognition was an advantage as a first-time candidate:

> Name recognition is very important, and I think I got an advantage. I would be standing at Chigasaki station, and all I would say is 'Good morning, my name is Tarō Kōno.' I did it from 6 to 8, two hours a day, for about a month. A month later, I remember, a guy walked up to me and said, 'Hey, you've been here for about a month, what's your name?' I was thinking, 'That's all I've been saying for a month!' But so I said, 'my name is Tarō Kōno.' And he said, 'Oh, be careful, people might mistake you as the son of Yōhei Kōno!' So name recognition is important. Either they like you or they hate you, but at least they will know your name. If you are nobody, it's very hard because people don't even know your name.[36]

The importance of name recognition can also be seen in patterns of marriage in political families. Naoki Suzuki's father, Naoto, had been elected to both houses of the Diet prior to his death in 1957. Yet, when Naoki married Makiko Tanaka, daughter of future PM Kakuei Tanaka (1972-74) and future candidate herself, in 1969, he took his

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[35] Interview with Tarō Kōno, Tokyo, June 1, 2011 (in English).

[36] Although this anecdote recalls the dynamics of electoral campaigning in the 1996 election, after electoral reform, campaign practices at that election were still very much like elections held prior to reform. See Otake, Hideo. (1998). *How Electoral Reform Boomeranged: Continuity in Japanese Campaigning Style.* Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange.

wife's family name. Even though he ran in the same district as his father (Fukushima 3rd) in 1983, the national name recognition associated with his father-in-law, who was from neighboring Niigata prefecture, was arguably more valuable than that of his father, who had died twenty-six years prior.

The inherited resources of *jiban*, *kaban*, and *kanban* that legacy, and especially hereditary, successors enjoyed can be thought of as an *inherited incumbency advantage*. Since the *kōenkai* apparatus generally remained intact following a hereditary succession, hereditary candidates most often continued to enjoy the resource advantages that their predecessors had acquired during their tenure in office. In the context of intraparty competition and financially expensive elections, this inherited incumbency advantage also made hereditary candidates ideal nomination choices under the *kōenkai* system of decentralized candidate selection in the LDP.

4.3.2. How to Succeed in Politics: Predicting Hereditary Succession Under SNTV

The prevalence of direct hereditary succession in the LDP makes it possible to analyze which district and candidate-level characteristics of an exiting incumbent candidate increased the likelihood of a relative succeeding him, without the need to account for variation in time between candidacies (as the passage of time could weaken the *jiban* or name recognition of the family, as well as capture macro-level changes in legacy politics).

From 1958-1990, there were 3,106 incumbent candidates (not necessarily

legislators) who exited the political scene.[37] I use a logistic regression analysis to estimate the district and candidate-level determinants of hereditary succession following their exit. My dependent variable, *Bequeath*, takes on the value of 1 if the candidate immediately transferred his *jiban* to a relative in the election following his exit; otherwise *Bequeath* is equal to 0, signaling that no family member directly succeeded the outgoing candidate. The results in Table 4.4 confirm the value of the outgoing candidate's incumbency advantage for predicting when hereditary succession was most likely under the SNTV system in Japan. For candidates from all parties, the most significant determinants of hereditary succession were the candidate's length of time in office (measured by number of wins), membership in an established democratic dynasty (meaning the outgoing candidate was himself a legacy), and death in office.[38]

The more times a politician won, the more likely he was to bequeath to a relative. This corroborates the findings in the literature on political dynasties in the United States, which demonstrates that political succession is more common when a politician has enjoyed a longer length of time in office (Dal Bó, Dal Bó, & Snyder, 2009). Long-serving politicians gained powerful reputations and resources worth bequeathing, which perpetuated political power within families. In Japan under SNTV, the LDP operated under a seniority system whereby politicians gained access to key posts and cabinet portfolios only after a certain number of electoral victories. Many successive wins also

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[37] I include all exiting candidates, not just legislators, in order to evaluate the effect of electoral success on *jiban* transfer.

[38] This variable is based primarily on Diet records of eulogies given on the Diet floor. In Japan, it is customary to eulogize a politician when he or she dies in office, so official Diet records contain such events in the agenda notes. Asahi newspaper obituaries and official biographies provided further data for former incumbent candidates who intended to run again after losing, but passed away prior to the election. In total 228 deaths were recorded.

allowed an individual politician more time and resources to develop his *kōenkai*, and likely made the network more valuable to its members as well. More simply, length in office assured that outgoing incumbents would have a child old enough to eligibly succeed them in office—a common sense finding that is also supported by the significance of age as a predictor.

Table 4.4: Candidate and District-Level Determinants of Hereditary Succession (Logit Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors)

Sample:	All Parties	Conservatives	LDP Only	Socialists	JSP Only
Incumbent	0.372	0.586*	0.390	-0.476	0.110
	(0.269)	(0.300)	(0.301)	(0.655)	(0.780)
Total Wins	0.106***	0.0936**	0.0962**	0.170*	0.168
	(0.0335)	(0.0370)	(0.0381)	(0.0873)	(0.106)
Existing Dynasty	0.975***	0.817***	0.727***	1.368*	1.099
	(0.242)	(0.256)	(0.264)	(0.725)	(0.876)
Death	2.272***	1.956***	1.870***	3.041***	3.033***
	(0.230)	(0.253)	(0.257)	(0.605)	(0.679)
Age	0.0626***	0.0551***	0.0464***	0.0369	0.0340
	(0.0127)	(0.0142)	(0.0152)	(0.0336)	(0.0440)
Intra-camp Competitors	0.143	-0.686***	-0.626***	0.884**	0.784
	(0.0998)	(0.168)	(0.172)	(0.437)	(0.499)
Camp Excess	-0.417**	0.423*	0.368	-1.243*	-0.699
	(0.195)	(0.245)	(0.252)	(0.726)	(0.841)
Population Density	-0.465	-1.285**	-1.104**	-0.795	-1.240
	(0.414)	(0.513)	(0.538)	(0.942)	(1.244)
Constant	-8.038***	-4.404***	-3.799***	-7.870***	-7.888***
	(0.815)	(1.070)	(1.139)	(2.069)	(2.680)
Observations	3,106	1,430	910	873	543
Pseudo R-squared	0.3189	0.2962	0.2330	0.2547	0.2639

*Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Interestingly, while an increasing number of intra-camp competitors increased the likelihood of hereditary succession in the socialist camp, the reverse was true for the conservative camp candidates, including the LDP. One explanation for this discrepancy

might be that in districts with many co-partisan and co-camp competitors, close runners-up and recently unseated incumbents (the M + 1st candidates) might be "waiting in the wings" to take over the political territories of outgoing incumbents, making political succession more difficult. As the LDP fielded more candidates, there would be more such potential challengers waiting for their chance in the conservative camp.

Lastly, for the conservative camp, political inheritance was more common in rural districts.[39] This is not surprising, since rural and semi-rural districts depended more heavily on government transfers of funds for local development. Kitaoka (1985, pp. 58-59) finds that *kōenkai* were less active in urban areas than in small and medium-sized cities. The *kōenkai* of politicians in rural areas would have had greater incentives to maintain their established pipelines to pork.

The results also show interesting differences between parties. Figure 4.6 illustrates the predicted probability of hereditary succession following the retirement of a non-legacy incumbent candidate with a given number of election victories—in other words, the predicted probability of a new dynasty forming. Holding all else equal, conservative candidates were only more likely to create a new dynasty than socialists after about five wins. For candidates with fewer wins, the probability of succession was about equal. The average number of wins for an LDP candidate was about four, while the average for a JSP candidate was about three, so at these levels, the parties appeared rather similar.

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[39] The population density variable is measured from 0 to 1, with 1 being the most densely inhabited. I thank Yusaku Horiuchi for this variable.

Beyond five wins, however, conservative candidates were more likely to create a new dynasty than their socialist counterparts, although less than one percent of JSP candidates won re-election more than ten times. These interparty differences in hereditary succession provide some evidence that party concerns and processes mattered when it came to legacy candidate recruitment. If national parties cared equally about the strength of a legacy candidate's inherited incumbency advantage, then we would expect to see weaker differences in hereditary succession for candidates of similar incumbency strength, especially for incumbents with higher numbers of successive wins.

Figure 4.6: Predicted Probability of New Dynasty Forming, by Total Number of Wins

Notes: Predicted probabilities were calculated with all other continuous independent variables (e.g., age, etc.) set to their means; apart from Incumbent, all other dummy variables were set to zero, thus representing non-legacy incumbents who retired, rather than dying in office.

The incumbency advantage of an outgoing LDP candidate appears to have contributed significantly to the desirability of a hereditary successor as his replacement. This suggests that the perceived inherited incumbency advantage of such successors was important in the eyes of the party or the *kōenkai* who supported the successor. But the influence of the labor unions for the socialist camp, and the tight party control exercised by the Kōmeitō and JCP organizations and leaders in candidate selection appear to have prevented the same form and extent of legacy politics developing in those parties.

4.4. Discussion: History or Culture as Alternative Explanations?

In this chapter, I have shown how the intraparty competition and candidate-centered elections of Japan's pre-1994 SNTV electoral system created conditions that favored the nomination of relatives of strong incumbents to succeed them in the election following their death or retirement. I argue that institutions, namely the electoral system and the decentralized nature of recruitment and selection in the LDP, helped to foster the emergence and rampant spread of legacy politics in Japan. However, an alternative explanation might be that Japanese politicians, or Japanese people more generally, are historically or culturally predisposed to legacy politics. After all, Japan has had a long history of feudalism and a highly hierarchical social system. Could Japan's experience with legacy politics itself be a vestigial legacy of its past?

For example, Benedict (1946, pp. 72-73) writes that, unlike developments in Europe following industrialization and modernization, Japanese tendencies toward

feudalism and hierarchy were retained, due in part to mechanisms for social mobility that undercut motivations for an even playing field:

> When feudalism broke down in Europe it was due to the pressure of a growing and increasingly powerful middle class and this class dominated the modern industrial period. In Japan no such strong middle class arose. The merchants and money lenders 'bought' upper-class status by sanctioned methods…The modern era in Japan preserved the aristocratic system.

Nakane (1970, pp. 46-47, 109-111) argues that vertical hierarchy in Japanese society, whereby social organization is characterized by *oyabun* (parent)-*kobun* (child) relationships, has continued since the Tokugawa era, and helps explain modern patterns of succession in business and politics. When any leader retires, he is expected to designate a successor that is suitable to his group or subordinates. Oftentimes, this is a son. Other times, it is a non-related successor, such as a personal secretary or close associate. This type of "successor designation" is clearly evident in the patterns of *jiban* transfer during Japan's SNTV period.

Historical or cultural explanations for legacy politics such as these are common in popular references to dynasties in Japan. As recently as 2008, a *Los Angeles Times* article about Japan's dynasties cited a Japanese university professor of public management, who hypothesized that:

> The reliance on family succession is historical, a sort of underground current that still flows through Japan, whether in business or in politics. The old ways are changing in business because globalization is forcing companies to compete abroad and make profits. But politics is strictly domestic. In politics, there is no pressure to change.[40]

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[40] "Japan's dynasty politics losing favor among the public." *The Los Angeles Times*. January 22, 2008.

On the contrary, in the next chapter I will detail exactly how institutional reform in the 1990s has provided the pressure to change the patterns in legacy politics in Japan. I will argue that the 1994 electoral reform has placed greater emphasis on political parties and their national platforms. Parties have responded in kind by recruiting fewer candidates from traditional local channels, including legacy candidates, and more candidates who suit their national image or policy goals, such as women, celebrities, and policy experts.

If legacy politics were simply a result of unique aspects of Japan's history or culture, we would not expect to observe much variation across Japanese parties, and yet as we have seen in this chapter, there are considerable differences across parties when it comes to legacy politics. Moreover, since culture and historical patterns are often slow to change, we would not expect to observe much change following institutional reforms to electoral rules or candidate recruitment. And yet, as we will see in the next chapter, the nature of legacy politics in Japan has changed considerably since the 1994 electoral reform.

5. Electoral and Party Reform in Japan

> It used to be that any idiot could get the nomination if he inherited a *kōenkai*. Since the reform, we are paying much more attention to candidate selection.
> -Senior LDP staff member, interview May 31, 2011.

In the previous chapter, I described how a candidate-centered electoral process and decentralized recruitment under the SNTV system in Japan helped foster an environment where legacy politics thrived, especially within the dominant LDP. Intraparty competition meant that candidates had to rely on their own personal vote to get elected. They cultivated their personal vote by building *kōenkai*, which in turn played a heavy role in selecting new candidates. Hereditary succession was most common following the exit of an incumbent who had won election many times, was himself already part of an existing dynasty, or died in office. I argued that each of these characteristics augmented the perceived value of the inherited incumbency advantage that hereditary candidates possessed, and made them ideal candidates to nominate in such a candidate-centered system.

The rising trend in hereditary succession within the LDP might have been expected to continue well into the 1990s. However, a series of corruption scandals and voter dissatisfaction led to several party defections prior to the 1993 election. The LDP was narrowly defeated, but remained the largest party in the House of Representatives. Eight

of the anti-LDP parties (excluding the JCP) formed a coalition government led by Japan New Party leader Morihiro Hosokawa, which made electoral reform of the House of Representatives one of its top priorities.

Reformers debated several variations on a mixed member majoritarian (MMM) system that would combine FPTP in SMD with CLPR in MMD (Christensen, 1994; Otake, 1996; Reed & Thies, 2001). The MMM system they adopted was the result of a compromise between reformers who were inspired by the British model, and hoped to create Westminster-style politics in Japan—party and policy-centered elections, with two strong, cohesive parties that alternate frequently in government—and smaller parties who knew that a pure SMD system would spell their demise (Otake, 1996; Kawato, 2000). Ultimately, several members of the JSP in the upper house retreated from their support of the reform bills, fearing (among other things) that the SMD tier of the system might stymie female representation even more than the MMD system had[41], or that it might allow the LDP to achieve majorities large enough to amend the Constitution's Article IX peace clause (Kawato, 2000; Reed & Thies, 2001). Nevertheless, with the eventual support of the LDP, the Hosokawa coalition passed the electoral reform in 1994.

Many reformers and observers of Japanese politics also predicted that the MMM system would result in a decline in *kōenkai*, factions, money politics, political corruption, and other peculiarities of the 1955 System (Ramseyer & Rosenbluth, 1993, pp. 197-198; Cowhey & McCubbins, 1995, pp. 256-258). With the elimination of intraparty

[41] Women were less than three percent of all Diet members from 1949-1993. The JSP tended to field more female candidates than other parties, with the exception of the JCP. In the 1993 election, seven percent of all JSP candidates were women, compared to less than one percent of the LDP's candidates (Darcy & Nixon, 1996). The JSP was also led by a female Diet member, Takako Doi, from 1986-1991, and again from 1996-2003 in the re-founded SDPJ. Another female, Mizuho Fukushima, succeeded Doi as leader of the SDPJ in 2003.

competition in both the FPTP and CLPR tiers, there would be greater need for parties to present competing policy platforms to voters, and lesser need for individual candidates to campaign on personal or particularistic appeals, as the value of the party label would be stronger.

The reduction of legacy politics was not an immediate concern of the reformers. Indeed, many of the reformers, including Ichirō Ozawa, Yukio Hatoyama, and Tsutomu Hata, were themselves legacy politicians, and Hosokawa was the grandson of Prince Fumimaro Konoe, the last prime minister before the start of World War II. However, legacy politics were recognized in the media and among scholars as a symptom of the *kōenkai* system and candidate-centered politics.

The reform did not produce the expected results immediately, as old institutions and practices die hard, and many politicians who were first elected under the old system continued to use the campaign methods and policymaking styles to which they had grown accustomed (Otake, 1998; McKean & Scheiner, 2000; Krauss & Pekkanen, 2004; Krauss & Pekkanen, 2011). For example, in the most recent and thorough evaluation of party responses to the electoral reform, Krauss and Pekkanen (2011) note how the LDP's internal party institutions developed under the 1955 System, including *kōenkai*, factions, and the party's policymaking apparatus, the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), continued to function in many of the same ways after reform.

The period immediately after reform was also characterized by frequent party-switching, mergers, and dissolutions of parties attempting to secure a position as the alternative "third wave" party between the conservative LDP and the far Left. Eventually, the opposition parties coalesced around the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which was

founded in 1996 mainly by former members of the JSP and LDP. The JSP, renamed the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), has struggled since the reform to elect a handful of candidates to either house of the Diet, though was briefly part of the DPJ-led coalition government from 2009-2010.

Despite the initial party system upheaval, two-party competition began to take shape in the SMDs by 2003, with the LDP and DPJ capturing over 80 percent of the votes and seats in most districts (Reed, 2005; Reed & Shimizu, 2009; Estévez-Abe, 2006). Also in 2003, both parties began to produce pre-electoral manifestoes to present their policy goals to the electorate, a practice initiated by the DPJ and quickly copied by the LDP (Tsutsumi & Uekami, 2011).

The LDP skillfully managed to retain its control of government through a number of factors, including entering into a coalition agreement with the Kōmeitō in 2000, the continued weakness of the opposition at the local level, and PM Junichirō Koizumi's electoral popularity and reform image in the 2001 and 2005 elections. But some of Koizumi's most popular reforms actually undermined the LDP's support in rural areas, and by 2007, the party lost its control of the House of Councillors. In 2009, the LDP lost (and lost big) to the DPJ in the House of Representatives election, ending the party's nearly fifty-four-year dominance.[42] After fifteen years and five general elections, the reforms had finally produced their intended effects in terms of interparty competition.

But parties have been changing internally as well. Although Krauss and Pekkanen (2011) correctly note the continued use of *kōenkai* in mobilizing supporters of

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[42] Although the party was out of government briefly from 1993-1994, and did not reclaim the post of PM until 1996, it was always the largest party.

individual LDP candidates, the trends they analyze apply mainly to LDP members who were first selected and elected under the old SNTV system, or in the tumultuous first election held in 1996, while the party system was still in flux and the new system's influences were not yet evident. Such incumbents had little reason to disband their hard-built *kōenkai* simply because of the reform, especially with such a volatile and fluid party system.

In contrast, many of the candidates who were recruited for both SMDs and PR nominations *since* reform have experienced a different environment. This is because, for their part, the two main parties responded to the new electoral environment with internal reforms to their candidate selection processes, specifically by introducing a more open recruitment process to attract new types of candidates in SMDs, and at the same time strengthening the role played by party leaders in candidate selection decisions. Again the DPJ led the way, largely by necessity owing to its lack of any local organization or local politicians from which to recruit new candidates. In 1999, the party began to issue "open casting" (*kōbo*) calls for recruitment—a process which proved successful, and which the LDP began to copy in 2004. The *kōbo* system has decreased barriers to entry to attract a more diverse range of candidates, while simultaneously undermining the previous influence exercised by outgoing incumbents and their *kōenkai* in determining a successor candidate. Party leaders have taken a more active role in candidate selection, in some cases directly recruiting high-profile academics, journalists and celebrities.

In this chapter, I will explain how the electoral reform spurred these changes in candidate recruitment, and how the changes have altered the dynamics of legacy politics that flourished under the old SNTV system. The move toward party-centered campaigns

and the importance of party image means that parties like the LDP pay greater attention at the national level to candidate selection, since the party has a single electoral "face" at the district level. The emergence of more party-centered campaigns means that local personal vote-earning attributes (PVEA) like name recognition and connections to *kōenkai* that legacy candidates enjoyed under SNTV are in relatively lower demand in the candidate selection process—particularly since the dual-listing provision further reduces the winner-take-all nature of FPTP and allows parties to nominate their preferred candidates with less electoral risk. Moreover, the increased scrutiny on parties has made legacy recruitment in the LDP something of an embarrassment for the party, especially in the run-up to the 2009 election. The party, being concerned for its national image, has accelerated its reforms that are designed to attract a more diverse range of candidates.

In the next section, I will first describe how the new MMM electoral system differs from SNTV, and the expected consequences of these differences. I will then explain how the two main parties responded to the reform in terms of candidate selection, and how these responses have undermined the patterns in legacy politics that prevailed during the SNTV period. Legacy candidates have declined dramatically in SMDs, and are nearly non-existent in the regionally based PR lists, where their local name recognition serves little benefit to parties.

For comparison, I focus my analysis on the last five elections held under SNTV, during the peak of the LDP's period of legacy politics, and the first five elections held since reform. I again use electoral data from the Reed-Smith MMD dataset, combined with the post-reform MMM elections data. These data span over thirty years (with fifteen

years and five general elections on either side of the reform) and include 10,693 candidate-observations, 2,916 of which represent new candidates.[43]

Where appropriate, due to either scarcity of data or to illustrate my point, I will also cite interviews I conducted in Tokyo in 2011 with over two dozen politicians and party staff members. I interviewed both legacy and non-legacy politicians from the three major parties (LDP, DPJ, and Kōmeitō) about the process and actors involved in their initial recruitment as a candidate. I chose candidates who had first been recruited under the old system as well as new rookies recruited since reform in order to compare the similarities and differences of recruitment experiences.

5.1. The 1994 Electoral System Reform & Expectations

Under the new MMM system candidates can be elected by FPTP in one of 300 SMDs, or as part of a party list for 180 seats distributed based on a CLPR ballot in eleven regional districts.[44] The regional districts range in magnitude from M = 6 (Shikoku) to M = 33 (Kinki, reduced to 29 before the 2000 election). Each voter casts one vote for an individual candidate in the SMD tier (by writing the candidate's name), and one vote for a party list in the CLPR tier (by writing the party's name). The candidate with a plurality of votes in an SMD district is elected to serve that district, while seats in the regional PR districts are allocated to parties in proportion to their share of the vote using the D'Hondt formula. Unlike the mixed member proportional (MMP) systems used in Germany and

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[43] By-elections are also included. Post-reform SMD data come from the Reed-Smith SMD Dataset combined with PR data from the Krauss and Pekkanen J-LOD Dataset. I thank Ellis Krauss and Robert Pekkanen for permission to use the latter.

[44] In the first election under this system in 1996, there were 200 seats in the PR tier. This number was reduced before the 2000 election.

New Zealand, there is no compensation between the FPTP and CLPR tiers to produce overall proportionality in the legislature; seats are distributed in parallel within the respective tiers and districts.

A party may list a candidate in both tiers, so that if she fails to win her SMD seat she can still be elected in the CLPR tier if her position on the list is high enough to qualify for a seat given the number of seats the party wins. More than one such dual-listed candidate can be ranked at the same position on the party list prior to the election, so that the actual ranking after the election is determined by a "best-loser" calculation (*sekihairitsu*), which is based on how close the candidate came to winning her SMD seat. The general practice within the LDP and DPJ, as well as the SDPJ, is for all candidates in SMD elections to be "competitively" dual-listed in such a manner, and few have opted to abstain from this electoral safety net (Di Virgilio & Reed, 2011; c.f., Krauss, Nemoto, & Pekkanen, 2012).[45] In contrast, the Kōmeitō, JCP, and many other small parties use the dual-listing provision less frequently, and depend predominantly on the PR list to elect their preferred candidates.[46]

The LDP and DPJ often place a few important candidates, such as elder statesmen or other high-profile candidates, in "safe" list positions above the competitively ranked dual-listed candidates, before filling out the bottom of the list (below the large number of

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[45] Since 2005, the LDP has restricted candidates over the age of 73 from dual listing in SMD and PR, in an attempt to rejuvenate the party by forcing older incumbents to retire if they cannot win their SMD election outright. Even with this restriction, over ninety percent of LDP candidates, and ninety-eight percent of DPJ candidates typically run in both tiers.

[46] In the 2000 election, seven Kōmeitō candidates were dual-listed at the same rank (with the *sekihairitsu* provision used to determine post-election rank). Since then, no Kōmeitō candidate has been dual-listed. Until 2009, when nearly forty percent of its candidates were dual-listed, the JCP only dual-listed about ten percent of its candidates. In contrast to the LDP and DPJ, which usually list dual-listed candidates at rank 1 or 2, dual-listed JCP candidates, though generally equally ranked, are ranked *below* the party's top candidates on the list.

competitively dual-listed candidates) with less important candidates, usually local party staff. In early post-reform elections, safe list positions were also frequently negotiated to resolve disputes in the LDP where there was more than one incumbent in a new SMD after redistricting (Di Virgilio & Reed, 2011), but these problems have largely disappeared, and safe list positions have become more and more rare in the past few elections.

What effect has the adoption of MMM had on the rate of new legacy candidates in post-reform Japanese politics? Political scientists and reformers expected several interparty and intraparty outcomes to result from the electoral reform. First, in terms of interparty competition, the introduction of SMDs was designed to shift the electoral focus from candidates to parties and generate more national policy-centered campaigns based around two parties, while still allowing for smaller parties to gain some representation in the Diet. The rise of two-party competition in SMDs was also expected to produce alternation in government.

Second, many predicted intraparty changes within the LDP as well. The reforms were expected to catalyze the demise of several peculiarities of the LDP organizational structure that thrived under the 1955 System, including *kōenkai* and factions (for a thorough discussion, see Krauss & Pekkanen, 2011). For example, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993, p. 197) anticipated that "In its organization and functioning, the LDP would grow to resemble more closely British parties. Personnel, electoral strategy, and policy decisions would be centralized." With more nationally focused campaigns, party leaders would want to exercise greater control over policy, discipline, and candidate selection.

However, other scholars were less optimistic that the reforms would drastically

change the nature of Japanese parties and elections. Christensen (1994, p. 603) cautioned:

> …campaign laws have not been changed to give candidates better access
> to voters…and the tried and true methods of reaching voters through
> personal support networks may remain a candidate's best hope. Future
> campaigns may still turn on local alliances and personalities rather than
> party platforms.

Some scholars also predicted that despite the electoral reform, little would change in

terms of the types of candidates chosen to run with the LDP label. Fukui (1997, p. 112)

wrote:

> ...the major parties are likely to remain committed to the same old rules in
> the selection of their candidates, that is, the acceptance of
> recommendations made by prefectural and local branches, respect for
> incumbency, and the importance attached to winnability. It is therefore
> unlikely that they will choose to sponsor in future elections any types of
> candidate very different from those they had chosen under the old system.
> In other words, prefectural and local politicians, party staffers, labour
> union leaders, national government bureaucrats and Diet members' aides
> will continue to dominate both the pool of candidates officially sponsored
> by the major parties and, therefore, the Diet itself. Other groups,
> particularly women, will continue to be effectively denied the opportunity
> to compete with those in the privileged groups.[47]

In terms of legacy politics, McKean and Scheiner (2000, p. 472) predicted that the

rampant practice of hereditary succession would continue unless or until the LDP lost its

control of government:

> The insistence of major LDP politicians in 1996 that they run in their
> [SMDs], rather than heading up their party's PR list, reflects how
> important it is to them that they use the new system to continue cultivating
> district-based support organizations, not just for themselves but as an
> heritable asset, just as one would try to keep family wealth of other kinds
> to bequeath to heirs. …If the long dominance of the conservative party is
> what makes inheritance of a seat worthwhile to the heirs, then we would
> expect to see less bequeathing and inheriting of parliamentary seats only if

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[47] Fukui's mention of party staffers and labor union leaders here applies to the main parties of the Left.

the new [SMD-PR] system manages to end one-party dominance.

Indeed, the first election held under the MMM system was largely a disappointment for observers who hoped to witness radical changes in campaign practices or party politics. McKean and Scheiner (2000, p. 450) quote an editorial that ran in the *Yomiuri Shimbun* the day after the election (October 21, 1996):

> The new system did not work as planned… The general election was intended to focus on policies and political parties… The poll…failed to achieve that goal and ended up being a kind of 'transitional election.' The campaign was not waged on the basis of policies, with candidates relying instead on conventional methods and their individual networks. The parties failed to come up with specific policies from which the voters could choose. Thus the election was fought in a way that was far from what was intended, exposing flaws in the new system.

Case studies of the 1996 election came to similar conclusions. Otake (1998) found that campaign practices remained largely unchanged in the first election under MMM. Even candidates who were newly nominated under the new system chose to create *kōenkai*. For example, Katsuei Hirasawa, who ran in Tokyo 17th District without any former ties to the district, built his *kōenkai* with the help of local politicians and by scraping together remnants of the *kōenkai* of his predecessors, who because of redistricting were no longer running in that district (Park, 1998; Krauss & Pekkanen, 2011, pp. 81-90).

One reason why the reforms did not have as quick an impact was the disarray of the non-LDP opposition. The biggest of these parties was the New Frontier Party (NFP), formed in 1994 by former-LDP heavyweight Ichirō Ozawa from many of the parties that had been in the anti-LDP coalition of 1993-4 that passed electoral reform. The second largest challenger to the LDP, the DPJ, was founded in 1996 by former-LDP member Yukio Hatoyama and former-SDL member Naoto Kan of the New Party Sakigake, and

Yukio's brother Kunio, who left the NFP to form the DPJ, but later returned to the LDP.[48] When the NFP broke up in 1998, Ozawa formed the Liberal Party with his followers, but members of six of the other former parties that had been part of NFP merged with the DPJ to become the "New" DPJ (Higashi, 2008; Koellner, 2011). Ozawa and the Liberal Party eventually also merged with the DPJ in 2003 (Higashi, 2008). The failure of these parties to coordinate or coalesce around a single alternative in SMDs during the first few elections helped the LDP win more seats than it would have had it faced a single viable challenger.

A second reason the MMM system did not produce immediate results in terms of party organization and behavior seems to be the dual-listing provision—since districts could be represented by both the winner of the SMD and a dual-listed PR winner (a so-called "zombie" legislator), both would behave like SMD candidates in the legislature (McKean & Scheiner, 2000). The practice of dual listing has often created SMDs with two incumbents, who compete with each other to build and maintain their personal vote in order to be the winner in the district. This reality has dampened the potential influence of the PR tier on electoral and legislative behavior.

Third, most of the candidates who ran in the first few elections, and all of their party leaders, had first been recruited and elected under the old SNTV system. They had already invested countless resources into building their *kōenkai*, had learned certain campaigning styles, and had climbed their way through the party apparatus through seniority and factional politics, and thus had little desire to radically alter the established

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[48] Both Hatoyama brothers were originally members of the LDP, with Kunio first getting his start in the LDP splinter party New Liberal Club. Kan was first elected as a member of the SDL. Yukio Hatoyama joined Sakigake in 1993 prior to the election, while Kan joined in 1994 after the dissolution of the SDL. Kunio ran as an independent in 1993.

patterns of campaigning and internal politicking that had served them well to this point (Krauss & Pekkanen, 2011). This is particularly true for mid-career politicians who had not yet reached the pinnacles of power and had the most to lose by disrupting the old system. For example, Reed and Scheiner (2003) find that during the turbulent year of LDP party splits in 1993, junior-level politicians who were electorally weak and senior-level politicians who were electorally secure were the most likely to defect from the LDP. Those who stayed in the LDP were less reform-minded and more invested in the party's status quo organization. If we want to evaluate the effect of reform on party personnel decisions, we need to look at new candidates nominated since reform.

Despite the slow start, there is strong evidence that Japan has indeed been moving toward more party-centered elections in recent years, with the LDP and the DPJ both producing party manifestos before elections since 2003, and candidate quality playing less of a role in voter decisions than party label (Maeda, 2009; Reed, Scheiner, & Thies, 2009; Reed, Scheiner, & Thies, 2012). Although the alternation in government did not occur until 2009, both parties began to change internally post-reform, and the patterns of legacy recruitment have begun to collapse as a result. The greatest impact on legacy politics has arguably resulted from internal reforms to the two main parties' candidate selection processes.

5.2. Party Responses to Reform

Recall that under the SNTV system, both main parties, the LDP and JSP, used decentralized processes to select their candidates. In the multi-member districts of the

SNTV system, a candidate could often win with only a small portion of the vote, which meant that parties could nominate candidates with very limited geographic or sectoral appeal. For example, multiple LDP candidates could often smoothly divide (*sumiwake*) the conservative vote in a district if their *jiban* were based around different home turfs or if they specialized in different policy areas (Tatebayashi, 2004; Mizusaki & Mori, 2007, pp. 103-123). A candidate who inherited an established *jiban* and its *kōenkai* organization had a head start aggregating enough votes to win, and was thus a logical choice for the party to nominate.

With the switch to MMM, parties faced several new challenges in candidate selection (see Asano, 2006). First, since the old multi-member districts were divided into fewer SMDs than the previous M number of seats, nominated candidates needed to have wider appeal beyond the narrow, geographically based *jiban* that could previously secure election. Second, since there would only be one party-nominated candidate in each SMD, party leaders had greater incentive to be concerned with who that candidate was, the extent to which their policy preferences aligned with the party leadership, and whether they contributed positively to the party's image. Third, the party list component in the PR tier of the new system encouraged parties to present a more diverse range of candidates, especially more women and young people. Since dual-listed candidates filled many of these list positions, this meant nominating more diverse candidates in SMDs as well.

Fortunately, the new system also facilitated these transitions. The dual-listing provision reduces the winner-take-all nature of FPTP in SMDs, so that non-traditional candidates in SMDs might still gain a seat through the PR tier. This is also true for potential quality candidates who might otherwise be cautious about challenging an

incumbent, making it easier for the party to find and nominate such candidates. In addition, the Political Party Subsidy Law (PPSL) of 1994 provides public funds to political parties.[49] With these funds, parties can support their preferred candidates rather than having to default to nominating self-financed candidates. Carlson (2007, pp. 42-44) notes an increasing reliance on the local party branch organizations for funds by new LDP candidates, rather than personal fund agents or *kōenkai*. With fewer hereditary candidates and weak factional "groups," DPJ candidates are especially dependent upon the party for funds. Most candidates now receive more funds from the party than from any other source, and parties have more funds to distribute, which increases the power of party leaders.

The importance of image for both party leaders and candidates has been augmented by the increasing technology and diversity of news media in covering politics (Taniguchi, 2007). Politicians have spent more time appearing on TV news and talk shows, and many politicians, especially women, will consistently wear the same outfit or color scheme, in order to create a recognizable image. For example, upper house DPJ member and former cabinet minister Renho wears a signature white blazer whenever appearing in public. In an interview, one first-term DPJ DM told me she adopted her signature turquoise beads and clothing after being encouraged to do so by party Secretary General Ichirō Ozawa in the 2009 election campaign.[50] Male candidates will also often

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[49] Parties are eligible to receive funds if they have five or more DMs, or at least one DM and exceeded two percent of the vote share for parties in the previous election. The law provides for a yearly fund of 250 yen per citizen to be allocated proportionally to parties based on their Diet membership and vote share in the most recent election. For the past several years, this has been around 30 billion yen. The JCP opposes the system on the principle that citizens must donate to parties they oppose, so it abstains from receiving any public funds.

[50] Interview with Mieko Nakabayashi, June 7, 2011.

wear the same color tie that they use for campaign materials. For example, Shinjirō Koizumi's personal website and campaign materials are all green, while Ozawa supporter Kenkō Matsuki of northern Hokkaidō's 12th District routinely wears "Okhotsk" blue suits.[51]

With their party image in mind, party leaders have paid more careful attention to the types of candidates they nominate, and as a result, the candidate selection process has become more centralized. In addition, the two main parties have resorted to creative new methods for attracting new candidates, most notably with the introduction of open casting calls (*kōbo*) for candidates. The DPJ adopted *kōbo* system first, in 1999, and the LDP followed suit in 2004. The early success of *kōbo* in recruiting new talent, and the continued desire for internal party democratization and reform has led to its increasing use for selecting new candidates by both parties.

Although legacy candidates are still often nominated without having to apply through the *kōbo* system, many have been forced to do so (and in some cases being passed over for a non-legacy candidate), and the number of districts in which candidates are selected without first competing in the *kōbo* process has been declining. The introduction of *kōbo* thus undermines the inevitability of a legacy candidate being nominated as it provides the party with a greater number of options, and places party leaders in direct control of the recruitment process.

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[51] Matsuki was expelled from the DPJ in 2011 after voting with the opposition in a non-confidence motion against PM Naoto Kan.

5.2.1. The DPJ Introduces Kōbo in 1999

At the time of its founding, the DPJ consisted of only fifty-two members of the House of Representatives and five members of the House of Councillors. Most of these were former members of the JSP (renamed Social Democratic Party, SDP, in 1996) and younger members of the Sakigake. It had virtually no organizational base in local prefectures or among local prefectural assembly members, nearly half of who have traditionally been aligned with the LDP (Uekami & Tsutsumi, 2011, pp. 12-13). Local elections were held in 1995, before the party's formation. The main existing alternative to the LDP at the time, the NFP, only managed to elect an average of five assembly members in the twenty-seven (out of forty-seven) prefectures in which it gained any representation at all (for about 4.8% of all prefectural assembly seats). Even when the DPJ was able to run candidates under its banner in the 1999 local elections four years later, it only managed to elect an average of about four members in the forty-four prefectures that held elections (about 6.4% of the seats) (Scheiner, 2006, pp. 134-135).

To add to the difficulty of recruiting candidates to run in SMDs without any local politicians, in 1996 the party had to compete for the non-Leftist anti-LDP vote with the NFP and with the older members of Sakigake who opted not to join in forming the DPJ. As a result of the party's weak local organization and inability to attract more party switchers, it was only able to field candidates in 143 SMDs in 1996, with an additional eighteen candidates running purely on the party's PR lists. Even after the NFP broke up in 1998 and many of its ex-members joined the DPJ, the "new" DPJ only had a party delegation of less than a hundred incumbents in the lower house (Kato & Kannon, 2008, p. 346). So the party needed to seek innovative new ways to attract candidates to stand

under its label in subsequent elections. One important way through which it did so was the *kōbo* system.

The DPJ introduced *kōbo* in 1999 primarily by the desire to recruit more female candidates, as well as the need for quality candidates capable of competing with the LDP.[52] Since 1999, the party has screened over 5,000 potential candidates through this process, among whom over 400 were approved, and seventy-five were ultimately nominated to stand for election in a SMD district of the House of Representatives, with personnel from the national party headquarters determining the nomination (Table 5.1).[53]

Table 5.1: Method of Recruitment for New SMD Candidates in the DPJ and LDP

	1996	2000	2003	2005	2009	Total
DPJ						
Non-*kōbo*	81 (100%)	89 (83%)	71 (89%)	36 (65%)	43 60%)	320 (81%)
Kōbo	0 (0%)	18 (17%)	9 (11%)	19 (35%)	29 (40%)	75 (19%)
Total	81	107	80	55	72	395
LDP						
Non-*kōbo*	106 (100%)	43 (100%)	45 (96%)	33 (55%)	9 (45%)	236 (86%)
Kōbo	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (4%)	27 (45%)	11 (55%)	40 (14%)
Total	106	43	47	60	20	276

Source: DPJ and LDP Election Strategy Committees.
Note: By-election candidates are grouped with the previous general election.

Kōbo is generally only used in districts where the local party organization (*kenren*) cannot find a suitable candidate on its own, or where the national party headquarters does not approve the local choice. However, both parties have plans to require *kōbo* to determine the nomination in open-candidate districts (*kūhaku senkyoku*) in future elections. The *kenren* are also primarily responsible for supplying candidates for

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[52] Interview with a senior staff member of the DPJ Election Strategy Committee, June 15, 2011, Tokyo.
[53] Recruitment data obtained from the DPJ's Election Strategy Committee at party headquarters in Tokyo in June, 2011.

the party PR list who are not dual-listed in a SMD. These are often local party staff members from the prefectural branches.

The *kōbo* process consists of three main steps: First, interested and eligible[54] applicants submit a two-page form to the party with their personal qualifications, preferred electoral districts, and a recent photograph, as well as a short (2,000 characters or less) essay describing their feelings about a chosen theme, their interest in becoming a candidate for the DPJ, and how they would appeal to voters.[55] Second, successful applicants are then further screened in an interview with party members and staff from the Elections Strategy Committee and ranked. Last, candidates who pass this stage are then registered as "approved candidates." Apart from the 2005 *kōbo* process, where the initial applications were collected locally in each district where a candidate was needed, the entire application process is carried out nationally, and approved candidates enter into negotiations with party leaders about where to run given the districts where the DPJ is in need of a candidate.

When a district has been decided, potential candidates must then meet with local party organization officials for final approval to make sure that the candidates chosen by the national headquarters will match well with the local support organization. When the proposed candidate is not acceptable to the local party, the national party headquarters will propose someone else. In a few districts, internal party primaries (*yobi senkyo*) have also been held, and all local party members are allowed to vote on the candidate. The DPJ has also sometimes forced weak candidates from the previous election to face

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[54] Candidates are required to have held Japanese citizenship for at least 25 years.
[55] In the latest round of *kōbo* (2009), the theme was "Politics after the change in government: what I want to tackle."

competition for re-nomination through a *kōbo* contest or internal party primary. Weiner (2011) emphasizes how the DPJ has improved as a party in terms of personnel quality by not running repeat losers as candidates.[56] In many cases, the *kōbo* system has been an effective way to find replacement candidates.

The DPJ used *kōbo* to select seventeen percent of its new candidates in 2000, and eleven percent of new candidates in 2003. In contrast to the first election under MMM, in which the party only managed to field candidates in 143 of 300 SMDs, after party mergers and the introduction of *kōbo*, they were able to field candidates in 244 SMDs in 2000, and 268 SMDs in 2003. The party's increased electoral presence also helped increase their share of the PR vote, which in 2003 surpassed that of the LDP.

5.2.2. The LDP Adopts Kōbo in 2004

The DPJ's success in 2003 was a wake-up call to the LDP. According to LDP House of Councillors member Hiroshige Sekō (2006, pp. 11-12) reformers in the LDP were especially surprised to learn that many of the "fresh" new faces in the DPJ who won seats in 2003 had been recruited through the party's *kōbo* process after being passed over by the LDP for more traditional candidate types like hereditary politicians or local assemblymen. Reformers like Sekō were concerned: "Our candidate selection process is a mess. If we continue like this, our [negative] image as an old party will be indelible. If we don't drastically reform the party, it will die" (Sekō, 2006, p. 12).[57]

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[56] The DPJ has an internal rule that candidates who lose three times consecutively will not be re-nominated. Most candidates are replaced or opt not to run again before that time.

[57] Ironically, many of these young reformers, including Hiroshige Sekō, Shinzō Abe, and Yasuhusa Shiozaki, were also hereditary politicians.

In 2004, the LDP incumbent in Saitama 8th District, Masanori Arai, was forced to resign after being arrested (and later convicted) of bribery in violation the Public Office Elections Law in the 2003 election. Nine other local LDP politicians from the area were also implicated in the scandal, leaving the local party organization in disarray and unable to come up with a candidate for the by-election that followed. The party's internal reform committee, led by then-Secretary General Shinzō Abe and Sekō, decided to implement *kōbo* as the method for selecting the party's new candidate. With just two months before the election, the party hired a public relations consulting company and sent out the *kōbo* announcement for "a candidate fit for the 21st century" (Sekō, 2006, p. 21). The party received applications from 81 individuals, from which it ultimately chose to interview six: five men and one woman.

In the end, the party chose to nominate Masahiko Shibayama, a 38-year-old lawyer with roots in the district. The public relations stylist quickly went to work advising Shibayama on his image, swapping eyeglasses for contact lenses, and dressing him in modern suits and colored shirts with the top button unfastened, to convey a look for the candidate that was professional, but at approachable. The PR company even created a cartoon dog mascot called "Shiba Wan" for campaign materials. Party leaders coached him to stress his local roots in the campaign, the Mori faction lent its support with additional staff, and big wigs like PM Koizumi came to support him at several events (Sekō, 2006, pp. 24-31). Against all odds, and with the LDP image badly damaged from the previous incumbent's money scandal, Shibayama managed to triumph in the election over the DPJ candidate, Atsushi Kinoshita, who was the elected through the PR list (as a

so-called "zombie") in 2003 and resigned his seat for the chance to be elected as the SMD representative.

The success of the first *kōbo* encouraged the party to use it in 2005 and 2009 to select many of its candidates in districts where the prefectural branch of the party failed to settle on a suitable candidate. In the LDP's *kōbo* process, each prefectural branch where an incumbent retires can opt to hold an open recruitment contest. Although the party also toyed with the idea of forcing unsuccessful or unpopular incumbent candidates to compete in *kōbo* as well, younger (weaker) incumbents heavily resisted such a reform.

Since 2004, *kōbo* has been employed in over one hundred district races, and more than 2,200 potential candidates have applied for the official LDP nomination through the process (an average of 14.2 per district).[58] The main difference between the LDP *kōbo* and that of the DPJ is that the LDP *kōbo* is implemented and administered locally, with would-be candidates applying district by district, whereas the DPJ *kōbo* is a national process, with approved candidates being assigned to specific districts after being selected by the party. This difference stems from the fact that the DPJ introduced *kōbo* before it had local organizations or candidates in many districts, but it also reflects the tensions between the LDP party leadership and local party organizations, whose members had previously dominated the process.

In the LDP *kōbo* process, potential candidates submit personal statements and résumés, and are then evaluated by a committee composed of both local party leaders and national party representatives. In a few districts, internal party primaries have also been

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[58] These numbers include districts where *kōbo* was used to select the candidate for the next lower house election, which must be held before 2013.

held, and all local party members are allowed to vote on the candidate. Although a few of the districts in which local branches have held *kōbo* might have been largely for show (a so-called *deki-race*, or "rigged race" where the desired winner had been determined beforehand), most have been sincere contests, and all have at least introduced the potential for outside challengers to gain the nomination.

Many legacy candidates have also been forced to participate in the *kōbo* process in order to secure the nomination. However, the use of *kōbo* may still at times be endogenous to the presence of a legacy successor—i.e., if a branch organization wants to nominate a legacy, they might not even opt to hold an open recruitment contest. Nevertheless, the national party must approve the decision even in these cases, and in some cases branch organizations have been required to hold a *kōbo* contest if the party leadership was not satisfied with the pre-selection nominee.

In some nominations, the party leadership of both parties have taken a direct and active role. For example, in the 2005 election, PM Koizumi's personal staff and the party leadership handpicked several "assassin" (*shikaku*) candidates to challenge "rebel" (*zōhan*) former LDP incumbents who were kicked out of the party when they voted against Koizumi's postal privatization reforms (Iijima, 2006). Several of these assassins were chosen from among *kōbo* applicants who were not chosen for a district race. Others, such as Dr. Kuniko Inoguchi, a Yale-educated political scientist, were contacted directly by Koizumi and given prominent list positions in PR.[59] DPJ Secretary General Ichirō Ozawa similarly recruited several new candidates in 2009, many of them women. These female candidates were dubbed "Ozawa girls" by the media, and many were specifically

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[59] Interview with Dr. Kuniko Inoguchi, May 11, 2011.

nominated to run against elderly LDP male incumbents to present a stark contrast between the "fresh" new face of the DPJ and the tired old look of the long-ruling LDP.

Table 5.2 summarizes the changes that have taken place in the arenas of elections and candidate selection following the 1994 electoral and subsequent party reforms. In contrast to the pre-reform SNTV system, elections in the post-reform MMM system have gradually become more party-centered, thanks in large part to the elimination of intraparty competition. In terms of candidate selection, political parties, especially the LDP and DPJ, have responded by taking a more active, centralized role in recruiting candidates for office, and have introduced innovative new procedures for attracting fresh talent. In the next section, I will examine how these changes have affected the patterns of legacy recruitment since reform. I will focus on the LDP, since it consistently contested elections both pre- and post-reform, and since legacy politics were most common in that party.

Table 5.2: Aspects of Change in Elections and Candidate Selection Process Following Reforms

	Pre-Reform SNTV	**Post-Reform MMM**
Elections	Intraparty competition	No intraparty competition
	Candidate-centered voting	Party-centered voting
	Need for strong PVEA	Dual-listing limits risk
Candidate Selection	Decentralized	More centralized
	Kōenkai dominant in LDP	Party dominant
	Local elites coopt process	*Kōbo* gives more choice

5.3. The Impact of Electoral and Party Reform on Legacy Recruitment

If we look simply at all candidates nominated since 1994, it does not appear that either electoral reform or party reform had a major impact on the prevalence of legacy

and hereditary candidates in elections for the House of Representatives (Figure 5.1). Indeed, legacy politicians continue to be common among candidates and elected DMs. The LDP still consists of over thirty percent legacy politicians, and because the DPJ was formed from many former LDP members, it is composed of over ten percent legacy politicians as well.


Figure 5.1: All Candidate Nominations Post-Reform

Notes: Includes both SMD and pure PR list candidates. By-elections are grouped with previous general election.

Yet, just as incumbent candidates had no reason to disband their *kōenkai* simply because of the reform (Krauss & Pekkanen, 2011), parties had no reason to suddenly

expel all incumbent politicians. Incumbent legacy politicians continue to represent their districts, and are visible in high leadership positions thanks to their seniority in the party. However, if we look at candidates recruited since reform, the percentage of legacy and hereditary candidates has been declining (Figure 5.2).


Figure 5.2: New Candidate Nominations Post-Reform

Notes: Includes both SMD and pure PR list candidates. By-elections are grouped with previous general election.

From 1996-2011, a total of 2,916 first-time candidates ran in all general elections and by-elections for the House of Representatives. Compared to the pre-reform period, both legacy and hereditary candidates have declined dramatically (Table 5.3). Recall that

during the SNTV period thirty-four percent of all new LDP candidates were legacy candidates, and twenty-one percent were of the direct hereditary variety (see Table 4.3). In the last three elections held under SNTV, over forty percent of new candidates were legacies, and roughly thirty percent of candidates had directly inherited their seats. In the post-reform period, the LDP has nominated 366 new candidates, of whom only sixty-three (seventeen percent) have been legacy candidates. Only thirty-eight candidates (ten percent) directly succeeded a predecessor as the party's officially nominated candidate in an SMD.

Table 5.3: New Legacy and Hereditary Candidates in the House of Representatives, 1996-2009: Number (Percent) of Party's Candidates

	Legacy	Hereditary	Total Candidates
LDP	63 (17%)	38 (10%)	366
LDI	13 (17%)	10 (13%)	76
NFP	11 (7%)	4 (2%)	163
DPJ	30 (6%)	6 (1%)	463
Kōmeitō	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	80
SDP	1 (<1%)	1 (<1%)	152
JCP	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	854
Independents/Others	7 (1%)	3 (<1%)	762
Total	125 (4%)	62 (2%)	2,916

Notes: By-election candidates are included. Apart from LDI, party-affiliated independents are grouped with "Independents/Others."

These trends are more evident if we look at the changes over time in each election before and after reform. It is most instructive to look at changes in the LDP, since legacy politics were most rampant in that party, and since the DPJ was not formed until after the reform. Among new candidates for the LDP, the proportion of legacy candidates has decreased significantly relative to the pre-reform average in both tiers of the new electoral system (Figure 5.3; Table 5.4). Among officially nominated LDP candidates in

SMD elections, the difference in mean proportions of new legacy and hereditary candidates between the combined average of the last five elections held under SNTV and each of the first five elections held in the post-reform environment is large and statistically significant (at the .05 level), except in 2003. In 2000 and 2003, it appeared as though the party was trending back upwards from its 1996 low. But, after party reforms in 2004, the percentage of legacy candidates among new SMD candidates in 2005 and 2009 declined.


Figure 5.3: New Candidate Nominations in the LDP, 1980-2009

Note: Electoral reform occurred prior to the 1996 election. Party reform and the introduction of kōbo began in 2004.

Table 5.4: Difference in Pre-Reform and Post-Reform Percentages of New Legacy and Hereditary Candidates in the LDP

	Legacy	Hereditary
SNTV (1980-1993)	43%	27%
FPTP prior to party reform (1996-2003)	19***	13***
FPTP after party reform (2005-2009)	20***	9***
CLPR (1996-2009)	5***	3***

Notes: Difference significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each post reform group compared to SNTV category. Adjusted for unequal variance.

In the CLPR tier, only five new legacy candidates have been nominated as pure PR list candidates, although because so few candidates are not dual-listed, the one and two legacy candidates nominated in 2000 and 2003, respectively, represented 12.5% of new pure list candidates.[60] Since 2005, not a single new legacy candidate has been nominated to the list without also running in an SMD—evidence that the de-personalized, party-centric nature of CLPR does not create incentives for parties to nominate legacy candidates to positions on their party lists, especially when such positions are nearly always below dual-listed candidates.

5.3.1. *Hereditary Candidates Become an Issue in 2009*

Prior to the 2009 election, the DPJ went after the LDP for its patterns of legacy politics. In April 2009, four months before the general election, the DPJ declared that it would no longer nominate any direct hereditary successors, effectively banning the practice within the party, including the practice of inheriting a DM's political fund management organization. The party told *Asahi Shimbun* that it hoped the policy would

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[60] Three of these candidates directly followed their predecessors into office, but I do not classify them as hereditary candidates, since heritable resources are not relevant to closed-list PR.

improve its image after party leader Ichirō Ozawa's personal aide was arrested for alleged illegal fund-raising.[61]

As the party had already selected most of its candidates for the upcoming election through the *kōbo* process three years earlier (in 2006), the ban did not directly affect any of its own candidates. Instead, the announcement of the ban was largely an electoral ploy to embarrass the LDP, which had recently come under fire in the media for its legacy politics, as the three PMs who followed PM Koizumi—Shinzō Abe, Yasuo Fukuda, and Tarō Asō—were all hereditary politicians, and each had been criticized for ineffective leadership. Many journalists were questioning whether hereditary politicians were fit to lead, or whether they were simply privileged bluebloods with little real knowledge or experience. Fueling the fire, Koizumi announced his retirement from politics in 2008, and anointed his 27-year-old son, Shinjirō, as his successor in his Kanagawa 11th District (which includes the cities of Kawasaki, Yokosuka, and Kamakura).

The Koizumi family has been active in Japanese politics for over 100 years, and Shinjirō represents the fourth generation. His great grandfather, Matajirō, represented Kanagawa 2nd District (which became the 11th District after reform) in the House of Representatives from 1908-1945, and served in the House of Peers from 1945-1946, when he was purged from office by the U.S. Occupation. Shinjirō's grandfather, Junya, married into the Koizumi family and changed his name from Samejima. Originally from Kagoshima, he served two terms in the prewar House from 1937-1945 representing Kagoshima 1st District, before also being purged. When the Occupation ended and the purge was lifted in 1952, Junya returned to the Diet, this time representing Kanagawa 2nd,

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[61] *Asahi Shimbun*, April 24, 2009.

as his father-in-law, Matajirō, had died the year before. Junya served seven terms before dying in office in 1969 at the age of 65. His son, Junichirō, inherited the *jiban* and won consecutive elections since.

In the 2005 election with him leading the LDP as PM, Junichirō won four times as many votes as his DPJ challenger, with 73.2 percent of the vote (197,037 votes). He had hinted that he intended to retire around the age of sixty-five, the same age his father died. True to his word, in September 2008 he announced that he would not seek reelection and that Shinjirō was his chosen successor. "I asked him if he wanted to be a politician, and he said, 'yes.' Please forgive me for being a doting parent, and I'd be grateful if you would offer generous support to Shinjirō," Koizumi told a crowd of supporters.[62] Shinjirō had worked as his father's secretary since 2007 after returning from the United States, where he earned a Master's degree from Columbia University and studied at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. After returning to Japan, he worked as his father's secretary. "He is more mature than I was, when I was around 27 and elected (to the Diet) for the first time," Koizumi said.[63]

The Koizumi family is immensely popular in Kanagawa 11th, and supporters had no trouble throwing their support behind the young and charismatic Shinjirō. However, former DPJ party leader Katsuya Okada criticized the Koizumi case as a typical example of legacy politics in the LDP. "It weakens the vitality of politics. Political parties need to recruit candidates from a wider field if they are to select the individuals most suited for the job."[64]

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[62] *Asahi Shimbun*. September 29, 2008.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid.

A *Mainichi Shimbun* survey before the election asked all candidates whether the practice of hereditary succession ought to be restricted (Figure 5.4). Among all candidates, eighty-two percent responded that it "should be restricted." Not surprisingly, legacy and hereditary candidates were more comfortable with the practice ("not a problem") or chose to avoid answering the question altogether. However, a surprising fifty-five percent of legacy candidates and forty-one percent of hereditary candidates answered that the practice should be restricted.

Figure 5.4: 2009 Pre-Election Candidate Survey Responses to the Question: Should Hereditary Succession be Restricted?

Source: Mainichi Shimbun 2009 election candidate survey. Legacy and hereditary coding by the author.

The LDP waffled. Deputy chairman of the party's Election Strategy Committee Yoshihide Suga, and Tsutomu Takebe, chairman of the Headquarters for Party Reform Implementation, had already advocated a limit on the practice, to begin *after* the next election. Neither Suga nor Takebe were legacy politicians, and Suga had disliked the practice ever since being passed over for a nomination to succeed an incumbent for whom he had worked as a secretary, in favor of the incumbent's son.[65] But the announcement by the DPJ put pressure on the party to speed up its reform process. At first it announced that it, too, would ban hereditary candidates, but then quickly retreated after intense opposition from other members of the party, many of whom no doubt had hopes of being succeeded by their own children.[66] Koizumi also intended to run whether he had the nomination or not, and denying him the nomination would serve little purpose. As his father's successor, he inherited all of the financial resources (*kaban*) of his father's political fund agent (*seiji shikin kanri dantai*). In fact, four million yen of the funds in the junior Koizumi's fund agent and *kōenkai* were inherited from his father—roughly ninety-nine of all his funds.[67]

In the end, the party allowed Koizumi to run, as well as one other hereditary candidate: Shōichi Usui in Chiba 1st District. However, the party denied the official nomination in Aomori 1st District to Jun Tsushima, despite him being the son of 33-year veteran and faction leader Yūji Tsushima, because the Yūji's decision to retire had been

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[65] Suga served as secretary to Hikosaburō Okonogi in Kanagawa 1st District for eleven years, before being elected to the Yokohama City Council in 1988. In 1991, Okonogi passed away, leaving an opening for Suga to run for the open Diet seat. However, Okonogi's son, Hachirō, decided to run and was given the nomination over Suga. Suga had to wait until the district lines were redrawn in 1996 and he could run in neighboring Kanagawa 2nd District instead. *Asahi Shimbun*. June 12, 2009.

[66] *Asahi Shimbun*. May 22, 2009; June 6, 2009.

[67] *Asahi Shimbun*. October 1, 2009, p. 8.

made after the party was already on the defensive.[68] The younger Tsushima ran as an independent with the unofficial support of the LDP and the Kōmeitō, but faced strong competition from the incumbent DPJ candidate, Hokuto Yokoyama, who was elected as a "zombie" in PR after losing in the SMD against Yūji in 2005. Tsushima also faced competition from a conservative independent named Sekio Masuta supported by the Hiranuma Group (a group of former-LDP conservative politicians led by Takeo Hiranuma). In the end, the two conservatives divided the vote and Yokoyama won.[69]

Ironically, although the DPJ put the LDP on the defensive about legacy politics, it still nominated six legacy (not hereditary, as promised) candidates in SMDs in 2009. Moreover, it nominated an additional four legacy candidates as pure PR candidates, despite having never nominated a pure PR legacy candidate in past years.

5.4. Change in Supply or Change in Demand?

An alternative explanation for the decreasing number of legacy candidates in the LDP is that the decline is due primarily to a decrease in the *supply* of legacy hopefuls, rather than a decrease in *demand* for such candidates by the LDP party organization. The logic would be that increased competition under MMM has already affected the perceived value to children of LDP legislators of succeeding their relative rather than pursuing an alternative career in business or some other lucrative occupation.

There are several reasons to reject the alternative hypothesis that the decline is simply caused by a decrease in supply of legacy hopefuls. First, the LDP's popularity

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[68] Interview with Yūji Tsushima, June 14 and 17, 2011.
[69] Yokoyama won with 101,290 votes to Tsushima's 68,910 and Masuta's 35,283. The combined total of Tsushima's and Masuta's votes, 104,193, would have been enough to defeat Yokoyama.

declined steadily since the 1980s, and yet the frequency of dynastic succession was rapidly increasing up until the 1996 election, with nearly fifty percent of new LDP candidates in the early 1990s succeeding their relatives into office. Second, despite the likely presence of a few non-competitive open recruitment contests in local LDP branches, the proportion of legacy candidates has declined since 2004 as the party has taken a more active role in overseeing and approving candidate selection decisions, and legacy candidates are almost non-existent among pure PR candidates, where their name recognition would be "wasted." Third, the many cases of candidates, like Jun Tsushima in Aomori 1st District, who have had to run as independents after being denied the nomination serve as additional evidence of the party's decreasing affinity for legacy candidates.

The decline in legacy, and especially hereditary candidates, is thus more likely a cause of a decrease in demand for such candidates by the LDP than a decrease in the supply of would-be legacy candidates. It is not likely that incumbents retiring in the new institutional environment have significantly fewer relatives that could potentially succeed them, or that the relatives of powerful incumbents should be significantly less interested in seeking the nomination to their predecessor's seat. It is more likely that the electoral reform has changed the incentives facing parties like the LDP in candidate selection, and that the LDP leadership has taken a more assertive role in candidate nomination decisions. Hereditary candidates are no longer the party's easiest or most desired option.

5.4.1. Predicting Hereditary Succession Post-Reform

An additional concern could be that the post-reform trends are driven by an imbalance in the types of politicians who are retiring. If fewer incumbents have retired since the adoption of MMM, then fewer of their children will have had reason to succeed them. Put differently, is the post-reform decline simply a product of different types of incumbents retiring, resulting in a lower supply of desirable hereditary hopefuls?

To better understand whether electoral and party reforms have affected the supply or the demand of hereditary candidates, it is useful to approach the question by analyzing the characteristics of exiting LDP candidates and whether the characteristics that generally increased the probability of a hereditary successor under the SNTV system have declined in relative importance following reform. For example, if the supply of legacy candidates (their political ambition) is related to the attributes of their predecessors as we found in the previous chapter (especially length in office, past legacy history, death), then the child of an exiting incumbent with that given set of attributes should have the same or similar incentives to enter politics regardless of the reform. A difference in the probability of succession given comparable predecessor qualities could therefore be interpreted as a change in party demand for such successors.

From 1983-2009, there were 410 incumbent LDP candidates (not necessarily legislators) who exited the political scene prior to an election. Recall that *Bequeath* is a binary outcome of an incumbent either being succeeded by a relative or not. *Incumbent* is a dummy variable for whether or not the exiting candidate was elected in the previous election. *Total Wins* measures the additive total of returns to office. *Existing Dynasty* and *Death* are coded 1 if the exiting candidate was herself a previous legacy, and whether the

vacancy in her seat was due to her death, respectively—two additional candidate-level variables associated with hereditary succession under SNTV. Controls include population density of the district and the age of the exiting candidate.

Just as in Chapter 4, I focus on direct hereditary succession, as it is the most convenient and direct way to analyze how the qualities related to an exiting candidate's incumbency advantage *and* district covariates contribute to the likelihood they will be succeeded by a relative. I restrict my post-reform analysis to SMDs, since direct hereditary succession is not common or necessary for pure PR candidates.

Table 5.5: Changes in Candidate and District-Level Determinants of Hereditary Succession in the LDP (Logit Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors)

Sample:	SNTV (1980-1993)	FPTP (1996-2009)	FPTP (before party reform: 1996-2003)	FPTP (after party reform: 2004-2009)
Incumbent	1.733***	1.082**	1.256**	0.819
	(0.517)	(0.494)	(0.598)	(1.033)
Total Wins	0.00755	0.0785	0.00584	0.263*
	(0.0605)	(0.0717)	(0.0846)	(0.156)
Existing Dynasty	0.587	0.988**	1.049*	1.345
	(0.406)	(0.439)	(0.548)	(0.956)
Death	0.402	2.012***	2.609***	0.903
	(0.406)	(0.546)	(0.699)	(1.106)
Age	0.0485	0.0477*	0.0689*	-0.0193
	(0.0310)	(0.0285)	(0.0367)	(0.0515)
Population Density	0.731	-0.318	-0.184	-0.967
	(0.861)	(0.756)	(0.913)	(1.569)
Constant	-6.020***	-6.003***	-7.074***	-2.753
	(2.022)	(1.829)	(2.352)	(3.017)
Observations	172	239	157	81
Pseudo R-squared	0.1640	0.3188	0.3302	0.3700

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. By-election candidates are included. Category dates correspond to the time period and institutional context in which their successor would run. Candidates whose heirs did not receive the official nomination are still counted as bequeathing.

Table 5.5 shows the results of the logistic regression analyses on *Bequeath*, with separate analyses for each period corresponding to electoral and party institutional rule changes. The first two columns report the estimation results for the pooled pre- and post-reform samples, while the fourth and fifth columns show the results for the FPTP sample when it is divided into the periods before the LDP's party reform process began in 2004, and after.

Interestingly, the results indicate that during the last fifteen years of the SNTV period, the only significant predictor of a hereditary succession occurring was whether or not the exiting candidate won their last election. Legacy politics had grown so entrenched that the inherited incumbency advantage in candidate selection for potential legacy candidates applied to just about anyone whose predecessor didn't lose the last election. Since reform, incumbency still matters, but death in office and an existing family history in the Diet became more significant predictors of which exiting incumbents would be succeeded in the immediate years following the switch to MMM. However, since the 2004 party reforms, the only significant predictor that an exiting incumbent will be succeeded is a greater number of career wins.

It is no longer as likely for new dynasties to develop under the new institutional contexts, and existing dynasties are also less likely to be extended beyond the generation of the exiting incumbent. In Table 4.6, I presented the predicted probabilities of hereditary succession for non-legacy and legacy incumbents with the average number of career wins (7.26) who either retired or died under the SNTV period. During that period, when a non-legacy incumbent retired after the average number of wins there was a thirty-six percent probability of observing a hereditary succession. Today, the probability has

declined by twenty-three percentage points to only thirteen percent. Similarly, the probability of an existing dynasty continuing after the non-death exit of an average incumbent during the SNTV period was fifty percent. In contrast, in the post-2004 environment, the probability of an existing dynasty continuing has declined to thirty-seven percent.

Table 5.6: Change in the Predicted Probability of an Average LDP Incumbent Being Succeeded

	SNTV (1980-1993)	FPTP (1993-2009)	FPTP (1993-2004)	FPTP (2004-2009)
Non-legacy retires	0.36	0.20 (⇓.16)	0.21 (⇓.15)	0.13 (⇓.23)
Non-legacy dies	0.46	0.67 (⇑.22)	0.79 (⇑.33)	0.27 (⇓.18)
Legacy retires	0.50	0.41 (⇓.09)	0.43 (⇓.07)	0.37 (⇓.13)
Legacy dies	0.60	0.85 (⇑.25)	0.91 (⇑.31)	0.59 (⇓.01)

Notes: Predicted probabilities obtained by setting Incumbent to 1, and continuous variables to the SNTV average for exiting incumbents (7.26 wins, 66.33 years of age, .596 population density).

If these rates of replacement continue, the overall proportion of dynasties in Japan's House of Representatives will steadily decline. The formation of new dynasties has now become a rare occurrence, and even existing legacy politicians must be comparatively powerful if they expect to be able to extend their dynasties to the next generation. These candidate-level results lend strong evidence to the argument that parties have adapted their candidate selection priorities following the electoral system change in ways that have decreased the barriers of entry for non-legacy candidates.

5.5. Discussion

Electoral systems shape what types of candidates will be attractive to voters and parties in democracies. But party recruitment processes can also have an effect on the

types of individuals who are selected, by vesting greater or lesser control in the central party leadership, or by opening up the process and range of candidates from which parties can choose. My analysis in this chapter demonstrates that Japan's electoral reform and subsequent party reforms in the LDP's candidate recruitment process have decreased the attractiveness of one particular type of candidate: those with legacy ties to a former member of the Diet. In the new institutional environment, only the most powerful of incumbents will be able to bequeath their political "rights" to a relative when they exit the political scene. The children of less important incumbents will have greater competition for a nomination from other contenders, especially when the *kōbo* process is used, and the party may decide their collective interests in terms of party image or policy expertise are better served by an outside candidate.

However, the LDP continues to struggle with both the issue of hereditary succession, and reform more generally, as the reform process continues to be met with great resistance from within. A prime example of the tension between younger reform-minded politicians and the more "old school" of the LDP's leadership can be gleaned from the following anecdote. In 2011, the LDP party reform committee, led by Yasuhisa Shiozaki, drafted a proposal to make the LDP headquarters in Tokyo more modern by installing solar panels, switching to LED lighting, and prohibiting smoking in the building. The *Asahi Shimbun* reports that when members of the reform committee presented the proposal to LDP Vice President Tadamori Ōshima, a heavy chain smoker, he slowly and deliberately lit a cigarette in front of them to show his opposition.[70]

Many of the older generation of LDP incumbents may still wish to pass on their

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[70] *Asahi Shimbun*. June 29, 2011.

seats to their relatives when they retire. The extent to which they are able to do so may hinge on who controls the party leadership, and what type of process is used in the candidate selection process. The result may also depend, as in the 2009 election, on the popularity of the LDP party image.

An interview with LDP veteran and former cabinet minister Yoshinori Ohno of Kagawa 3ʳᵈ District provides some insight: "When I retire, my son will have to go through *kōbo* to get the nomination. If the party doesn't give it to him, I will not help the party during the election [with my *kōenkai*, etc.]. They will be on their own."[71] If the party is unpopular, they might need the personal support network of the Ohno *kōenkai* and name recognition of his son to retain the seat in Kagawa 3ʳᵈ. On the other hand, if the party is again the subject of criticism for its dynastic politics, party leaders may calculate that they have a better chance with someone unrelated.

The sun appears to be setting on Japan's scions, but it may be twilight for a few more elections.

5.6. Acknowledgments

Some of the original text and data included in Chapter 5 have been converted for future publication in the following co-authored papers with Ellis Krauss and Robert Pekkanen: "Looking for Locals, or Looking for Loyals? Party Nomination Strategies and Voter Preferences Following Electoral Reform," and "Building a Party: Candidate Recruitment in the Democratic Party of Japan." In each case, I was the primary author

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[71] Interview with Yoshinori Ohno, April 22, 2011 (in English).

and source of the material used here. I thank Krauss and Pekkanen for giving me permission to include that material.

6. The Inherited Incumbency Advantage

> We'd all like to vote for the best man, but he's never a candidate.
> -Kin Hubbard

On April 1, 2000, LDP PM Keizō Obuchi suffered a sudden stroke at the age of sixty-two, and later died following a month-long coma. As prime minister, Obuchi had been described as "cold pizza" due to his bland personality and style, but as a candidate, he had won reelection to Gunma 3rd District (5th District after reform) twelve times, and earned over seventy percent of the vote in his final election in 1996. In the June 25, 2000, general election, the LDP nominated Obuchi's 26-year-old daughter, Yūko, as his replacement. Yūko had quit her job at Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS) to become Obuchi's personal secretary when he became prime minister in 1998. In her first election attempt, she garnered 76.4% of the vote with over 160,000 votes (nearly 34,000 more than her father had in the previous election). Since then, she has consistently won between 68-77% of the vote, and has faced only weak challengers—mostly from the SDP. The DPJ fielded a candidate against her only in the 2005 election, a 36-year-old party employee with no prior elective experience.

A young and inexperienced female candidate like Yūko Obuchi would normally be considered a weak candidate in Japanese politics. Yet, by virtue of her family background, and no doubt aided by sympathy votes after her father's death, she enjoyed

an incredible advantage in her first election, both in terms of her margin of victory, and in terms of the lack of high quality challengers, and this advantage continued in subsequent elections.

I call the initial electoral advantage enjoyed by legacy candidates like Obuchi the *inherited incumbency advantage*. Just as the incumbency advantage can be defined as the additional electoral support that accrues to a candidate by virtue of her status as an incumbent, the inherited incumbency advantage can be defined as the additional electoral support enjoyed by first-time legacy candidates by virtue of their family ties to a previous incumbent. The inherited incumbency advantage is particularly relevant when candidates directly succeed their predecessors (as hereditary candidates), as in the case of Obuchi.

In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I argued that legacy candidates would be more common in candidate-centered elections and when candidate nomination decisions are made locally. The cross-national analysis in Chapter 3 and the in-depth case study analysis of Japan's 1994 electoral reform in Chapters 4-5 showed evidence that the former condition is most significantly linked to legacy politics. Candidate-centered elections generate incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote, and this personal vote helps incumbents maintain an electoral advantage over new challengers in elections, the well-known phenomenon of the incumbency advantage. Parties favor the children or other close relatives of exiting incumbents in their candidate nomination decisions when the perceived value of the legacy candidate's inherited incumbency advantage is greater. Thus, in candidate-centered systems where the personal vote matters more for election, the incumbency advantage—and by extension, the inherited incumbency advantage—will be a valuable asset for a candidate.

The results presented in Chapters 4 and 5 confirm that hereditary candidates in Japan most often follow incumbents with a winning record and established *jiban*, but that the relative value of this winning record to legacy successors seeking the party nomination has increased since electoral reform. The number of career wins associated with hereditary succession has increased under the FPTP system with SMDs relative to the SNTV/MMD period. There has been a concomitant *decrease* in the number of new hereditary successors, as the party has more reason, and leverage, to pass over would-be hereditary successors of weaker incumbents in favor of other candidates.

But aside from its perceived value to parties in candidate selection decisions, how strong is the *actual* electoral effect of the inherited incumbency advantage? This chapter uses my candidate-level data from Japan to evaluate whether, and how, legacy ties function as a form of inherited incumbency advantage in elections, *after the decision to run*. Do legacy candidates actually perform better in their first election attempt than non-legacy candidates? If so, how large is their inherited incumbency advantage, and what are its sources? And does the inherited incumbency advantage decrease when a country like Japan moves toward more party-centered elections?

In order to evaluate these questions, I will first review our knowledge of the incumbency advantage from the literature, and discuss how the concept may be extended in the form of the inherited incumbency advantage for successor candidates. The existing scholarly literature on the incumbency advantage is based predominantly on models of two-party competition in the United States (between a Democratic Party candidate and a Republican Party candidate) in FPTP races in SMDs, though some notable attempts have been made to extend the logic of these models to MMD contexts. After reviewing the

literature and introducing the concept of an inherited incumbency advantage, I will then examine whether such an inherited incumbency advantage applies to the SNTV/MMD context of Japanese elections from 1958 to 1993, looking at the advantage in terms of votes, electoral success, and the deterrence of challengers.

The existence of *jiban* in the LDP, and the practice of transferring *jiban* to both hereditary and non-hereditary successors, allows me to analyze the inherited incumbency advantage of new hereditary candidates following such transfers. I assess whether and how this advantage has changed since the introduction of FPTP/SMDs in 1994, an electoral system change that, while undermining the importance of the concept of *jiban* (due to the elimination of intraparty competition and the increasing development of party voting), also allows me to apply many of the same methods used in the U.S. literature to study the incumbency advantage.

SNTV in MMD can be thought of as an extension of FPTP in SMD where the voting rule is instead first-M-past-the-post (Reed, 1990). Conversely, FPTP in SMD is conceptually equivalent to SNTV in SMD. Given that the voting rule is conceptually the same, I refer to each system here solely by differences in the district size, MMD or SMD.

6.1. The Incumbency Advantage as a Heritable Asset?

One of the most widely studied phenomena in U.S. politics is the incumbency advantage and the growth of this advantage over time, beginning in the mid-1960s (Erikson, 1971; Mayhew, 1974b). The source of the incumbency advantage has been divided in the extant literature into three main components: 1) the direct advantages of being in office (e.g., name recognition, the franking privilege, access to committees that

can help to direct funds to one's district or create opportunities and connections to aid in fundraising, etc.), and indirect advantages owing to 2) the differential quality of incumbents and 3) the deterrence of high-quality challengers (Cox & Katz, 1996; Levitt & Wolfram, 1997; Carson, Engstrom, & Roberts, 2007; Hirano & Snyder, 2009).

The existing literature measures the incumbency advantage using two main approaches: a vote-denominated measure (what was the candidate's vote share?) and an outcome-denominated measure (did the candidate win or lose the race?). A great deal of scholarship has been devoted to measuring the incumbency advantage in terms of votes (e.g., Mayhew, 1974b; Gelman & King, 1990; Levitt & Wolfram, 1997; Ansolabehere, Snyder, & Stewart, 2000; Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2002). These studies of the vote-denominated measure of incumbency advantage have concluded that incumbents in U.S. congressional SMD elections have generally enjoyed a vote advantage of around seven to ten percentage points since the 1980s. Cox and Morgenstern (1995) and Hirano and Snyder (2009) find only slightly lower (five to six percent) vote advantages in the MMD context of state legislative elections.

But since the vote-denominated incumbency advantage may vary over time without having a strong effect on the actual outcome of which candidate wins the seat (Jacobson, 1987; Jewell & Breaux, 1988; Garand, 1991), an alternative approach to measuring the incumbency advantage is to focus simply on the probability that an incumbent will win her first re-election attempt (an outcome-denominated measure of the incumbency advantage).

Particularly in the context of MMD contests, this approach may be more applicable given the variation in the number of co-partisan candidates and challengers of

multiple parties in a given election, which makes the conventional vote-denominated measure for SMD elections—a candidate's share of the two-party vote—a less appropriate measure.[72] Using the probability of re-election as the dependent variable, Carey, Niemi, and Powell (2000) find that incumbents in MMD state legislative elections are more vulnerable than their SMD counterparts. Ariga (2010) applies an alternative approach of regression discontinuity design and similarly finds that marginal incumbents in Japan's pre-1994 MMD elections actually suffered from an incumbency *disadvantage*, due to the tendency for first-runner up candidates to surge in the next election (a phenomenon known as the runner-up rebound, *jiten bane* in Japanese).

The incumbency advantage is generally believed to be weaker in MMD elections because the vote share required to secure a victory in MMDs is much lower (only seventeen percent in a five-member district, though often much lower when there are many candidates), and individual candidates often must face both interparty and intraparty challengers. In addition, the lower threshold to victory decreases certainty about each candidate's electoral prospects and may result in an increased number of challengers. Lastly, strategic voters may desert top vote-earners in favor of the runners-up from the previous election (or these runners-up may actively pursue voters with this appeal), which can cost the election for other marginal candidates.

Studies of the deterrence, or "scare-off," effect in the U.S. SMD context have found that incumbents are often faced with low quality challengers (Jacobson & Kernell,

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[72] Cox and Morgenstern (1995) use a vote-denominated measure to measure the incumbency advantage in U.S. state legislative elections, but their analysis is limited to fully contested elections (i.e., M number of Republicans and Democrats competing for M seats), and their model treats all co-partisans together as a team and measures the party's total vote share, which does not address the fact that in MMD contexts incumbents are often competing most vociferously to defend their seats against co-partisan challengers as much as opposition party challengers.

1983; Banks & Kiewiet, 1989; Jacobson, 1989; Cox & Katz, 1996; Gordon, Huber, & Landa, 2007). Basically, the story goes that faced with an incumbent candidate in a district, would-be challengers of higher "quality" (which is generally defined as having prior elective experience, especially at the local level) will strategically opt to sit out the race and wait until their prospects for victory are higher. The result is that the challengers who do enter the race are often of lower quality. These lower quality challengers pose less of an electoral threat to the incumbent, and help to keep him or her in office.

In MMDs, the scare-off effect is likely to be lower generally, given the greater permissiveness of the system, greater uncertainty, and increased vulnerability of marginal incumbents (Carey, Niemi, & Powell, 2000; Ariga, 2010; Hirano & Snyder, 2009). Indeed, in the most recent analysis of the incumbency advantage in MMDs, Hirano and Snyder (2009, p. 303) find little evidence that an additional incumbent candidate has a "scare-off effect" on the *quality* of opposition challengers, although their findings do indicate a slight effect in terms of the *number* of opposition challengers.

How do these well-documented components of the incumbency advantage translate to elections in which a legacy candidate runs for the first time? Legacy candidates, and especially those who immediately succeed their predecessors as hereditary candidates, often possess many of the direct benefits of incumbency (name recognition, connections to donors, established campaign organizations, etc.). Just as high quality challengers might shy away from running against an incumbent candidate, would-be non-legacy candidates of high quality might also be deterred from running when faced with a legacy candidate if they anticipate that the legacy candidate will do well. On the other hand, when a legacy candidate runs, traditional measures of quality involving prior

elective experience might have less of an effect—if you are a Kennedy, does it matter electorally that you have not first served in local office? Indeed, Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder (2009, p. 132) note that legacy politicians elected to Congress were less likely to have held prior public office experience than their non-legacy counterparts.

Similarly, Feinstein (2010) analyzes all open-seat contests for the U.S. House of Representatives from 1994-2006, and finds no evidence that new legacy candidates in open races are of higher quality than first-time non-legacy candidates, yet that legacy candidates still tend to fare better electorally. Legacy candidates on average receive between 58-59% of the vote, compared to first-generation candidates who receive forty-eight percent.[73] Controlling for differences in experience, campaign expenditures, and the partisanship of the district, he estimates that the inherited incumbency advantage is between 3.5 and 4.3 percentage points, roughly half of the seven to ten percentage point incumbency advantage enjoyed by House members in the 1980s and 1990s. Feinstein attributes the inherited incumbency advantage to the "brand name" advantages (direct advantage of name recognition) possessed by legacy candidates, but is unable to verify any concomitant deterrent or "scare-off" effect in terms of the relative quality of non-legacy challengers in open races featuring legacy candidates. Feinstein's study also finds no significant advantage in terms of fundraising for first-time legacy candidates.

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[73] Feinstein uses a more expansive definition of legacy, including governors as well as legislators, and calls the inherited incumbency advantage the "dynasty advantage."

Figure 6.1: The Emergence of Two-Party Competition in Japan's SMDs: Top Two Parties' Vote and Seat Share, 1996-2009

Source: Reed-Smith SMD Dataset.
Notes: The second largest party in 1996 was the NFP, after the LDP. Thereafter, the two largest parties are the LDP and DPJ.

In the sections to follow, I will build on these studies to evaluate the inherited incumbency advantage of legacy candidates in Japan using a variety of measures and approaches. The case of Japan presents a challenge, because unlike the open-seat SMD races in the two-party U.S. context analyzed by Feinstein (2010), elections in Japan under the MMD system used until 1993 featured much greater variation in the number of co-partisan and opposition party candidates a first-time legacy candidate faced. Since the switch to MMM in 1994, candidates in the SMD districts still often face competition from multiple parties, though competition has been rapidly moving towards two-party

dominance, with the two largest parties in recent elections capturing over eighty percent of the votes and over ninety percent of the SMD seats (Figure 6.1). The remaining SMD seats are usually held by independents who split from one of the two major parties (most often the LDP) or Kōmeitō candidates running in districts with a stand-down agreement from their coalition partner (since 2000), the LDP.

The ability for a losing SMD candidate to earn a seat in the Diet through dual-listing in the PR tier also alters the calculations of would-be challengers to legacy candidates, such that those who might otherwise be deterred from running will still attempt to compete in hopes of securing a PR seat (as a so-called "zombie" winner). How has the electoral reform and its dual-listing provision altered the electoral dynamics of legacy politics when it comes to the inherited incumbency advantage?

In order to address these questions, I will first evaluate the inherited incumbency advantage under MMD using the Reed-Smith MMD Dataset introduced in Chapter 4. I will then turn my attention toward the inherited incumbency advantage post-reform, using the Reed-Smith SMD Dataset introduced in Chapter 5. Since the LDP is the only major party to span the entire time span, I will focus my attention on its candidates, as well as LDP-affiliated independents (LDI), as the unit of analysis.

6.2. The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in MMD Elections

Measuring the inherited incumbency advantage in terms of votes is complicated in MMD elections because each race can vary in terms of the number of competitors, the characteristics of those competitors (incumbency, quality, etc.), and the partisan leanings of the district. In the case of Japan, a candidate from the LDP not only faced competition

from the candidates of other parties, such as the JSP, but also faced intraparty competition from other conservatives, and indeed this is where competition was often most fierce. In general, because of the much lower threshold for victory in MMD, as compared to SMD, both the incumbency advantage and, by extension, the inherited incumbency advantage should be lower under MMD than under SMD.

Only four previous studies, to my knowledge, have analyzed the incumbency advantage in MMD races. Unfortunately, none of the existing studies provides a model that can be easily adapted to analyzing the inherited incumbency advantage in MMDs. For example, Cox and Morgenstern (1995) extend the logic of the unbiased measure of incumbency advantage first introduced by Gelman and King (1990) to free-for-all (M non-transferable votes for M seats, or MNTV) MMD races in forty U.S. states from 1970-1986, and find the vote-denominated incumbency advantage (normalized using the Droop quota to account for variations in M) increased at a much lower rate in MMD races over the time period studied than it did in SMD races. Yet they confine their analysis to fully contested races where M Democratic candidates faced M Republican candidates, and their measure of the vote advantage is based on the combined vote share of all co-partisan candidates given varying combinations of incumbency within each party's *group* of candidates.

The MNTV conditions of U.S. free-for-all MMD elections deviate from the SNTV context of Japanese elections, where each voter casts a single vote to fill M seats. In the case of Japan, there are also fewer races where the same number of LDP candidates competed against the same number of JSP candidates, and most of these races also featured competition from additional parties, making it difficult to apply the same

party vote share model used by Cox and Morgenstern.[74] More important, the focus on two-party vote share is less relevant to Japanese MMD races, where most of an LDP candidate's competition for votes was against co-partisan candidates or LDI candidates seeking to get the support of conservative voters.

Hirano and Snyder (2009) also focus on fully contested, free-for-all races in U.S. state legislative elections, but employ pair-wise comparisons between incumbents and new candidates from the same party in the same race. For example, in a two-seat district, a voter might choose between two Democrats, an incumbent and a newcomer, and two Republicans (of varying combinations). If all voters choose a "straight ticket" party vote (both votes given to the two co-partisan candidates), the result should be that the two Democrats get the same share of the vote. Hirano and Snyder thus attribute an incumbent Democrat's greater share of the vote over her co-partisan "running mate" as a measure of her incumbency advantage. This is a clever and innovative solution for testing the incumbency advantage in two-member state legislative MMDs in the U.S., but is less adaptable to Japanese MMD elections, where M ranged in most cases from three to five, and the number of co-partisan and opposition party candidates varied considerably.

Two other studies focus more on the electoral vulnerability of MMD incumbents. Carey, Niemi, and Powell (2000) argue that the outcome-denominated measure of electoral success is more appropriate for MMD elections, though their primary focus is comparing incumbency re-election probabilities between "traditional" SMD races, "post"

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[74] Only about fifteen percent of races from 1958-1993 featured the same number of LDP and JSP candidates. Within this subset, there is even less variation in terms of incumbency status within and across parties, and more variation in terms of smaller party opposition candidates.

MMD contests (which essentially function like SMDs),[75] and free-for-all MMD elections. They find that incumbents in both types of MMD races are more vulnerable to defeat than their counterparts in SMD races. Further evidence of the electoral vulnerability of incumbents under MMD is provided by Ariga (2010) who employs regression discontinuity design using Japanese SNTV elections from 1958-1993 in the Reed-Smith MMD Dataset to show that marginal winners in a MMD race actually tended to *lose* votes (and seats) in the next election, whereas marginal losers tended to *gain* votes (and seats) in the next election. Ariga's study moves our knowledge about the incumbency advantage in MMD beyond the context of U.S. state legislative elections, yet due to the methodology employed and its focus marginal candidates, does not paint a complete picture of the incumbency advantage in Japan's MMDs, nor is it particularly useful for studying the inherited incumbency advantage, as very few legacy candidates are in marginal electoral positions.

The lack of adaptable models for measuring the incumbency advantage in Japan's MMD system makes measuring the inherited incumbency advantage especially complicated. But we can still draw comparisons between the SMD and MMD systems by simplifying MMD races to cases where only one incumbent retires, and then focusing on the concept of a challenger versus the concept of a successor.

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[75] "Post" MMD elections are where a certain number of "posts" equal to the number of seats to be elected are created, and each candidate must run for only one post. Similarly, each voter has only one vote for each post. The result, in effect, is equivalent to multiple simultaneous FPTP (SMD) contests.

6.2.1. Successors and Challengers in MMD and SMD Races

Consider that, in both MMD and SMD systems, incumbency is often the most relevant source of information for both voters and potential challengers. However, incumbents eventually retire, which produces a race between two (or sometimes more) non-incumbents for the "open seat." But the informational cue provided by incumbency (or lack thereof) is different in SMD and MMD elections. Under SMD, incumbents normally run again and face one (or sometimes more) "challengers." Losing challengers seldom run again, so the challengers usually change each election. But under MMD, both the concept of a "challenger" and that of an "open seat" require rethinking.

For example, in a MMD with four seats there will be four incumbents after an election. If one decides not to run in the next election, there will be one "open seat" but also three incumbents running for re-election. In SMD systems, an open seat not only means that the incumbent must be replaced by a new candidate from his own party, but also that a candidate from the party that lost the last election has a better chance to win because she will not be facing an incumbent. Under SMD, an open seat is thus primarily a rare opportunity for the party that lost in the last election. Under MMD, however, an open seat will primarily be seen as a rare opportunity for candidates from the retiring incumbent's party. Other parties will normally already have an established candidate in the district, perhaps even an incumbent. Thus, a seat vacated by one party is not necessarily seen as "open" to any other party.

Incumbents in MMD elections can be expected to oppose running another co-partisan even under the best of circumstances (Reed & Bolland, 1999), and even when the party insists on fielding an additional candidate, incumbents may sometimes work

behind the scenes to assure that the new candidate does not pose an electoral threat (either because she will run in a different area of the district or because she is of inferior quality). However, the open seat still presents a rare opportunity for potential candidates from the retiring incumbent's party, and it is common for more than one candidate from the retiree's own party to compete to take his place. These are the conditions that best describe the intraparty competition that dominated MMD elections in Japan.

Next consider whether a candidate who is running to replace a retiree from his own party should be considered a "challenger." Under SMD, since there is only one nominated candidate from each party, the candidate who replaces a retiring incumbent is clearly a successor, not a challenger, whether or not she is a hereditary candidate. Under MMD, if only one candidate runs to replace one retiree, both from the same party, the new candidate is also a successor and not a challenger. Indeed, many new candidates were designated as such by the retiree himself. However, it was also common for more than one candidate to compete to succeed a retiring incumbent. If two candidates compete to succeed a retiree from their own party, should one be considered an intraparty challenger if she has less claim to being the retiring incumbent's successor?

Building on these theoretical considerations, the approach I take in this chapter for evaluating the inherited incumbency advantage in MMDs is to use the case of the LDP and LDP-affiliated independents (LDI) and the concept and measurement of *jiban*, introduced in Chapter 4. Recall that the intense intraparty competition under MMD generated strong incentives to cultivate a personal vote by LDP politicians, which they accomplished by building elaborate organizations known as *kōenkai*, which helped mobilize the voters who formed their core support base in the district. This support base

can be conceptualized as their personal *jiban*, or bailiwick. *Jiban* were often geographically based around a candidate's hometown, where their support was highest.

When an LDP incumbent candidate (winner or loser) retired or died, his *jiban* might become "open territory" for candidates seeking conservative votes. But because *jiban* (in the concrete form of *kōenkai*) were organized around an individual candidate, and not the party, retiring incumbents could "transfer" the political resources of their established *kōenkai* to a chosen successor. Sometimes these transfers occurred between non-related individuals, such as a retiring incumbent and his secretary. However, transfers frequently occurred along familial lines, with the outgoing incumbent passing his political resources to his son or another relative. Often the inheritance of resources was complete and direct—the *kōenkai* organization and other resources, including financial resources, were transferred to a successor mostly intact, and the operation of the *jiban* "machine" kept going. The successor candidate in these cases thus immediately gained an advantage in his first election by having an existing, well-developed support organization to mobilize voters in his behalf.

Other times, a new LDP candidate might *de facto* inherit all or part of an outgoing incumbent's *jiban* simply by being the only new LDP candidate to fill the geographic electoral void left by the previous candidate, much as new candidates from a retiring incumbent's party might similarly be considered successors under SMD, as previously discussed. In such cases, even if the *kōenkai* organization were not transferred directly, many of the previous incumbent's supporters would find themselves drawn into the new candidate's campaign mobilization activities. These new LDP candidates thus also benefited from capturing the votes of the outgoing incumbent's existing *jiban*.

In contrast, a new candidate who did not inherit any *jiban* had to build his personal vote from scratch in order to compete against the established *jiban* of other candidates in the district. Although an election following the retirement of an incumbent may seem like the most opportune time for a new candidate with no established *jiban* in the district to attempt to enter politics, such an attempt was often made more difficult by the transfer of that incumbent's *jiban* to another candidate. The designated successor in most cases would get the official nomination of the party, leaving other hopefuls with only two options: either to give up on running in that election, or contest the election as a LDI candidate (or even perhaps a candidate of a smaller conservative party) in hopes of defeating one of the party's existing candidates, or possibly a weak JSP incumbent. The LDP played a part in encouraging such candidacies, since successful LDI candidates in many cases were given ex-post nominations (*tsuika kōnin*) by the party and allowed to rejoin the LDP (see Chapter 4 and Reed, 2009).

To examine the differences in the inherited incumbency advantage given different forms of succession in Japan's LDP, I again use the Reed-Smith MMD Dataset, which includes a variable tracking each candidate's *jiban*. When a candidate retires or dies, a new candidate is coded as a successor to his *jiban* in any one of the following cases: (1) only one candidate from the party retired and only one new candidate ran; (2) a newspaper report or some other source named the new candidate as a successor; or (3) the new candidate was a hereditary candidate.[76] I define as an "entrepreneurial" candidate

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[76] Newspaper or case study accounts supersede any other data. This coding, based on *jiban*, is part of the Reed-Smith MMD Dataset. An outgoing LDP candidate's *jiban* might sometimes be coded as inherited by an LDI candidate if the second or third conditions are met—this happens occasionally when there is a feud between the outgoing incumbent and the party, resulting in the incumbent's successor being denied the official nomination.

any new candidate who ran against the established *jiban* in the district without succeeding any retiring LDP (or LDI) candidate.[77]

Thankfully, a great deal of variety exists among new LDP (and LDI) candidates with regard to *jiban* inheritance, which allows me to analyze not only the resource advantages accrued to non-legacy successors, but also the additional "name brand" advantages enjoyed by hereditary successors or legacy entrepreneurs. For example, sometimes a legacy candidate inherited a predecessor's *jiban* following a gap of one or more elections where a non-related candidate occupied the *jiban*. In these cases, while the legacy candidate is considered a successor to the *jiban*, he is not coded as a hereditary successor. He might, however, still possess name recognition above and beyond that which a non-legacy successor would enjoy, even though both candidates inherited other resource advantages. A legacy candidate who did not directly inherit any *jiban*, whether of a relative or otherwise, might still benefit substantially from his name recognition even without the extra organizational benefit of an established *jiban*. Such cases of "legacy entrepreneurs" sometimes occurred when a predecessor served in the House of Councillors or in a separate district, or when the predecessor stopped running many years earlier, and his established *jiban* was allowed to "collapse" before the legacy candidate entered the scene.[78]

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[77] This category includes candidates who might also be understood as "excess" nomination by the party in some cases, rather than "entrepreneurial" entry by the candidate. However, for my purposes here, both types of candidate are equivalent since they did not inherit any established *jiban*.

[78] There are four cases since 1958 where a family member directs inherits a *jiban* after having run in the past, and over 100 cases of non-legacies with a past record inheriting a *jiban*. Several such established candidate successions also occurred in 1952 following the end of the Occupation purge of wartime politicians. Since I am concerned here with the inherited incumbency advantage of *first-time* candidates, these *jiban* transfers will not be counted in the analyses to follow.

Each new conservative candidate can thus be categorized as one of five mutually-exclusive types: 1) a non-legacy entrepreneur, 2) a legacy entrepreneur, 3) a non-legacy successor (oftentimes the secretary of the previous incumbent), 4) a legacy successor who succeeded a non-relative (usually because of a gap between family members), and lastly 5) a hereditary candidate who directly succeeded his relative. The difference between types 1 and 2, and between types 3 and types 4 and 5, help shed light on the "name brand" advantages that legacy candidates enjoy relative to non-legacy candidates. How much better do first-time hereditary successors and legacy candidates of all succession (and non-succession) types perform electorally than non-related successors or non-related entrepreneurial candidates with no established *jiban*?

6.2.2. *Empirical Evidence of the Inherited Incumbency Advantage in MMDs*

A first glance at the success rates and vote margins for different types of first-time LDP and LDI candidates indicates substantial differences in outcomes depending on legacy status (Table 6.1). In order to account for differences in the vote share required for victory in MMDs of varying size, my measure of margin is calculated by taking the candidate's actual share of the vote divided by the Droop quota ($1/(M+1)$), which is the share of the vote that would guarantee victory in a given M-sized district.[79] A value of 1 thus indicates a guaranteed victory based on a candidate's vote share. For comparison, success rates and Droop margins for incumbents are also shown.

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[79] For example, in a SMD, the Droop quota is equal to $1/1+1 = \frac{1}{2} = 50\%$ (plus one vote to win). In a five-member district, the quota is $1/5+1 = 1/6 = 16.7\%$ of the vote. Thus, a value for the Droop margin that is greater than 1 represents a candidate who met the quota for election. Candidates with a margin value lower than 1 can still be elected, depending on the number of other candidates competing.

Table 6.1: Electoral Outcomes and Vote Margins of LDP (LDI) Candidates, 1958-1993

	First-Time Candidates					Incumbents
	Non-Legacy Entrepreneur	*Legacy Entrepreneur*	*Non-Legacy Successor*	*Legacy Successor*	*Hereditary Successor*	
Elected	88	25	74	22	78	2,866
	(34)	(5)	(12)	(3)	(6)	(32)
Proportion Elected	.46	.68	.56	.81	.79	.85
	(.13)	(.25)	(.26)	(.5)	(.22)	(.72)
Proportion of Droop	.68	.77	.75	.92	.87	.94
	(.41)	(.57)	(.58)	(.60)	(.49)	(1.05)
	.27	.18	.22	.21	.27	.22
Std. Dev.	(.24)	(.30)	(.25)	(.31)	(.26)	(.52)
Within Continuing *Jiban:*						
Δ Votes			518	-9,775	2,937	62
			(4,950)	(-1,275)	(22,644)	(5,469)
Std. Dev.			23,111	17,077	20,567	17,260
			(22,680)	(34,076)	(26,503)	(23,085)
Δ Vote Share			-.01	.02	-.01	-.01
			(-.02)	(-.01)	(-.07)	(-.01)
Std. Dev.			.06	.04	.05	.04
			(.06)	(.07)	(.09)	(.05)
N for LDP	193	37	133	27	99	3370
(N for LDI)	(261)	(20)	(47)	(6)	(27)	(44)

Source: Reed-Smith MMD Dataset.
Notes: Cells represent averages or proportions. LDI figures in parentheses. By-elections are included.

Electoral outcome and Droop margin appear less dependent on legacy or successor status for LDI candidates, who do well as incumbents (there is often a reason they can break with the party and run as independents) but do not do very well as new candidates regardless of succession (there is often a reason they are not given the official party nomination). For successor candidates, both officially nominated and LDI, who inherit an outgoing candidate's *jiban*, there does not appear to be any significant differences between legacy and non-legacy successors in terms of the number (Δ Vote) or share (Δ Vote Share) of votes that are retained from the previous election when the

predecessor ran. Of course, these summary statistics do not control for variation in the number of co-partisan competitors, the number of open seats due to retirement, or LDP party strength in different districts and across time, or even the strength of the *jiban* being succeeded, all factors that might increase or decrease a candidate's electoral prospects regardless of legacy or hereditary status.

One way to handle this concern is to look only at the differences between non-legacy successors and hereditary successors who follow the retirement of a single incumbent. In such races, where a single LDP or LDI candidate inherited the *jiban* of a single retiring candidate, we can control for the strength of the retiring candidate's *jiban* in order to see whether (or to what degree) a strong personal organization or network on the ground is sufficient for success, even without the name recognition that comes from direct hereditary succession. If inheriting a strong *jiban* is all that matters, then non-legacy successors should do just as well as hereditary successors when they both inherit a *jiban* of equivalent strength or record in the district and do not face new intraparty opposition (from entrepreneurial conservatives) as candidates. This scenario also most closely resembles the conditions of open-seat races under SMD, where a new candidate following an incumbent's retirement can either be a non-related successor or a hereditary successor.

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Table 6.2: New Non-Legacy or Hereditary Successor's Likelihood of Winning their First Election, 1958-1993

Variables	Model 6.1	Model 6.2	Model 6.3	Model 6.4	Model 6.5
Hereditary Successor	0.897***	0.945**	0.996**	1.254***	1.243***
	(0.331)	(0.388)	(0.407)	(0.467)	(0.476)
Jiban Wins	0.141***	0.136***	0.0950**	0.128***	0.0874*
	(0.0342)	(0.0369)	(0.0392)	(0.0411)	(0.0454)
LDP Nomination		1.671***	1.631***	1.503***	1.478***
		(0.342)	(0.360)	(0.393)	(0.415)
Quality Candidate		0.344	0.418	0.401	0.473
		(0.325)	(0.337)	(0.368)	(0.375)
Female		-0.305	-0.166	-0.330	-0.113
		(1.160)	(1.215)	(1.338)	(1.349)
Age		0.00471	0.0125	0.0252	0.0268
		(0.0169)	(0.0175)	(0.0217)	(0.0220)
Population Density			-1.303**		-1.452*
			(0.615)		(0.742)
Camp Excess			-0.326		-0.133
			(0.225)		(0.266)
Expenditures/Limit				2.043**	2.190**
				(1.025)	(1.079)
Constant	-0.764***	-2.283***	-1.761**	-4.548***	-3.758***
	(0.224)	(0.803)	(0.867)	(1.205)	(1.283)
Observations	241	241	241	204	204
Pseudo R-squared	0.1011	0.1877	0.2105	0.2452	0.2621

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. By-elections not included. Models 6.4 and 6.5 contain fewer observations because expenditures data are not available prior to 1967.

Restricting my analysis to such single-retirement, single-succession races, I test several variations of the following logit regression model (the results of which are presented in Table 6.2):

$\Pr(Win_{it}) = \beta_1(Hereditary\ Successor_{it}) + \beta_2(Jiban\ Wins_{it}) + \beta_3(LDP\ Nomination) + \beta_4(Quality\ Candidate_{it}) + \beta_5(Female_{it}) + \beta_6(Age_{it}) + \beta_7(Population\ Density_{it}) + \beta_8(Camp\ Excess_{it}) + \beta_9(Expenditures/Limit_{it}) + \varepsilon_{it},$

where Win_{it} is the result (0 or 1) of the successor candidate's first election attempt in district i and year t, with IT being the set of 241 district races from 1958 to 1993 in which a single new LDP or LDI candidate ran to succeed a single retiring incumbent's *jiban*;[80] *Hereditary Successor* takes the value of 1 if the LDP candidate was one of sixty-four hereditary candidates, 0 if a non-legacy successor; *Jiban Wins* is the number of previous wins by the candidate's predecessor(s), up to as high as sixteen, with an average of six; and ε_{it} is the error term. Model 6.1 estimates only the simple relationship between hereditary succession and *jiban* wins and the likelihood of victory.

Model 6.2 adds additional candidate characteristics, as follows: *LDP Nomination* takes the value of 1 for the 172 successors who had the official nomination of the party, 0 otherwise (LDI candidates). *Quality Candidate* is coded 1 if the candidate had prior office-holding experience (local legislative office, mayor, governor, or House of Councillors); *Female* (a dummy variable) and *Age* (the candidate's age at the time of the election) are also included.

Model 6.3 adds the characteristics of the district and competition: *Population Density* is the proportion of the population residing in densely inhabited districts, a measure of urbanness; *Camp Excess* is the number of conservative candidates who ran in the district minus the number that could be elected with perfect distribution of the conservative vote in the district (this measure will be further explained in the next section). It is a rough estimate of the degree of competition among conservative candidates in the district; higher integer values mean a greater number of conservative

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[80] The sample excludes four by-elections. In models where expenditures are included, the sample is reduced to 204 do to missing data prior to 1967.

candidates were running than could hope to get elected.[81] Lastly, Models 6.4 and 6.5 are equivalent to the previous two models, but with the addition of the expenditures variable. *Expenditures/Limit* represents the candidate's expenditures divided by the legal limit for expenses, signifying the proportion of the allowed expenses the candidate actually spent. This variable is available only after 1967, so the number of observations in these models is reduced.

Figure 6.2: Probability of Electoral Victory for First-Time Non-Legacy and Hereditary Successors, by *Jiban* Strength

Notes: Predicted probabilities based on estimates from Model 6.5. All other covariates are set to mean values except for female (set to zero, male) and quality (set to one, quality).

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[81] This variable ranges from -2 (under-competitive) to 2 (over-competitive), with a median of 0 (optimal candidate entry).

My choice of logit regression and the outcome-denominated measure of inherited incumbency advantage reflects the difficulty of measuring and comparing vote share in MMD contexts where district magnitude and the number of interparty and intraparty candidates all vary considerably. I agree with Carey, Niemi, and Powell (2000) that what really matters in MMD is whether or not the candidate gets elected. Model 6.5 yields predicted probabilities of victory of sixty-five percent and eighty-six percent, respectively, for first-time non-legacy and hereditary successors who are also quality male candidates (all other covariates held constant at their means). This represents roughly a thirty-two percent increase in the probability of election for hereditary candidates over non-legacy successors. This outcome-denominated measure of the inherited incumbency advantage is more pronounced for successors of weaker *jiban* than stronger *jiban*, but even with more *jiban* wins the predicted probability of electoral success for hereditary successors is over ten percentage points higher (Figure 6.2).

With such a high probability of success for hereditary candidates under the MMD system, it is no wonder that the number of dynasties grew so rapidly in postwar Japan, and that the LDP was so willing to give them the party nomination.

6.2.3. *Deterring the Entry of Challengers in MMDs?*

Another way to evaluate the inherited incumbency advantage under MMD might be to look at the number of non-successor challengers who attempted to compete for the votes of an exiting incumbent's former supporters. Studies of the deterrence, or "scare-off" effect related to incumbency advantage have analyzed SMDs (Jacobson & Kernell, 1983; Bianco, 1984; Jacobson, 1989; Cox & Katz, 1996; Gordon, Huber, & Landa,

2007), but MMDs offer the advantage of more variance on many of the variables of interest (Hirano & Snyder, 2009). Under SMD, there is usually a single viable challenger, so the literature has focused on the quality of that challenger. In MMDs, the number of incumbents and the number of challengers varies, which means that many complex coding decisions about what constitutes "quality" can be avoided, and we can simply count the number of candidates. Indeed, Hirano and Snyder studying MMDs in U.S. state legislative elections "find little evidence that increasing the number of incumbents 'scares off' high-quality challengers…[but] do find some evidence of a marginal scare-off effect in terms of the number of challengers." (2009, p. 293).

Generally speaking, the primary causal mechanism determining the number of candidates who will enter a political race is the nature of the electoral system. Indeed, the bulk of the comparative literature related to the number of candidates who run for office in competitive elections is founded on the theoretical effects of the electoral system on strategic coordination. In an electoral district with plurality rule (FPTP or SNTV) and M seats, the number of candidates who attempt to contest the election and actually receive votes will tend to reach an upper bound equilibrium over time of M + 1 (Duverger, 1963 [1954]; Reed, 1990; Cox, 1997). In SMD elections, this means that competition at the district level should approach a Duvergerian equilibrium of two parties (or candidates). This is because the mechanical effect of the electoral rules results in a specified number of candidates winning a seat, which in turn exerts a psychological or "learning" effect on voter and candidate behavior, as voters do not want to "waste" their vote on a candidate who is sure to lose, and candidates who are sure to lose might not even risk the cost of running if they expect to fail.

However, in the context of intraparty competition in MMD elections, what really matters is the number of co-partisan candidates given the number of voters in the district that support the party, and thus the number of seats that could be won by that party (or party camp). Grofman (2005) refers to the number of votes that make up the electoral constituency of a candidate or party as E. If we take E and divide it by the Droop quota for the number of votes required to win a seat in a given M-sized district, we get the number of co-partisan candidates that the party (or party camp) can safely elect given their share of the vote in the district. I represent this number with the letter C.

For example, imagine a five-member district election in which 100,000 valid votes are cast. In such an election, an individual candidate could guarantee herself victory with 16,667 votes, which is the Droop quota for that district.[82] No matter how the remaining 83,333 votes are divided between the remaining candidates, she will be elected. Now suppose the conservative share of the vote in the district, E, is 60,000 votes. With perfect distribution of the conservative vote across LDP candidates, at most three candidates can be assured election (60,000 divided by 16,667), with about 10,000 votes left over. Thus, in this example, C = 3. But with 10,000 conservative votes left over, the LDP might hope to secure one extra seat, especially if the opposition camp is heavily divided or one opposition candidate is lopsidedly popular. Or, if the LDP plays it safe, a conservative LDI candidate may hope to scoop up those remaining votes. However, we should not expect to observe any more than C + 1 conservative candidates running, as any additional candidate would have no hope of winning. Thus, C + 1 is the expected

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[82] The Droop quota is equal to (the number of votes / M + 1) + 1.

upper bound equilibrium for the number of conservative candidates, and any more than C + 1 candidates represents excess entry within the conservative party camp.

Nevertheless, excess candidates beyond C + 1 are often observed contesting elections, despite the mechanical and psychological barriers standing in their way. A key factor contributing to such excess candidate entry may be uncertainty about one's challengers, and thus an overvaluation of one's own prospects for winning. For example, an analogous phenomenon of "excess entry" has been observed in competitive economic markets (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999), and psychologists have identified several mechanisms that produce these deviations from strict rationality. Entrepreneurs, both economic and political, often tend to enter competitive markets in greater numbers than might be predicted by rational choice theories because of overconfidence in their own skills and failure to evaluate the skills of the reference group against whom they will compete (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). Overconfidence by political candidates can probably be assumed, but we can exploit variation in information about other candidates to analyze the effect of uncertainty on the probability of an entrepreneurial candidate entering a district.

One of the best-documented psychological mechanisms responsible for excess entry is the problem of the "inside view," characterized by the following: "The natural way to think about a problem is to bring to bear all one knows about it, with special attention to its unique features. The intellectual detour into the statistics of related cases is seldom chosen spontaneously" (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993, p. 26). The problem is, of course, that the statistics of related cases produce much more accurate predictions than does thinking about a single case in isolation, a problem which Camerer and Lovallo term

"reference group neglect" (1999, p. 307). For present purposes, the important point is that, under conditions of uncertainty, candidates often make unrealistically optimistic estimates of their chances of victory and "irrationally" enter a race they cannot win.

Uncertainty (or rather the lack thereof) is thus a main factor that contributes to the deterrence effect component of the incumbency advantage. On the one hand, incumbency increases name recognition and voter certainty about how a candidate will behave once in office, helping to earn them extra votes. On the other hand, potential challengers may be less willing to risk the costs of entering a race against an incumbent, since the chances of winning are much less certain.

Recall that under MMD, conservative entrepreneurial challengers (those who did not succeed any *jiban*) would often enter a race in an attempt to unseat a weak incumbent. An incumbent who only marginally won his last election might send a signal of weakness that lowers the uncertainty facing potential challengers' electoral prospects. When an incumbent retired, the opportunity for such entrepreneurial entry of conservative candidates could only increase. Excess entry of candidates beyond C + 1 should thus be more common when entrepreneurial candidates view the current set of incumbent candidates as weak, or when a incumbent retires, creating an opening in the conservative vote, and uncertainty about which candidate will fill it. However, if a hereditary candidate succeeds the retiring incumbent, does the uncertainty over where that incumbent's supporters might turn in the next election decline, thus also decreasing the likelihood that entrepreneurial candidates will enter the race?

Table 6.3: Mean Number of New Conservative *Jiban* (Entrepreneurial Entry) and Mean Camp Excess in District

	New *Jiban* Entry	Camp Excess	N
No Retirement	0.30	0.24	1162
Retirement with Hereditary Succession	0.60	0.56	89
Retirement without Hereditary Succession	0.59	0.33	296
Total	0.37	0.27	1547

Source: Reed-Smith MMD Dataset.
Note: Sample includes only district races where no more than one incumbent retired before election. By-elections are excluded.

I find no strong evidence that such a scare-off effect exists for new hereditary conservative candidates who succeed a single retiring incumbent, though it does exist in races in which no incumbent has retired (Table 6.3). In general election races since 1958 in which no LDP or LDI incumbent from the previous election retired, few races featured more than C + 1 candidates. However, in cases where a single incumbent retired, new entrepreneurial candidates (candidates who did not inherit any established *jiban*) entered the subsequent election at roughly the same frequency regardless of whether a hereditary successor took his place. Races in which a hereditary candidate ran are also more often characterized by excess entry overall of conservative candidates. Of course, an alternative explanation for this difference could be that the supporters of incumbents in over-competitive districts are more likely to seek a hereditary successor, as we saw in Chapter 3.

6.3. The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in SMD Elections

The introduction of SMDs in 1994 eliminates many of the challenges to analyzing the inherited incumbency advantage, since intraparty competition has been removed and a largely two-party system has evolved with the LDP and DPJ at the forefront. Electoral

competition at the SMD level in Japan increasingly resembles the two-party competition that reformers and political scientists expected.

In a recent study, Feinstein (2010) uses open race contests for the United States House of Representatives from 1994-2006 to evaluate the inherited incumbency advantage of new legacy candidates.[83] His model builds upon previous studies of the incumbency advantage that measure the differential advantage of an incumbent Democratic candidate over a Republican challenger in a SMD race, controlling for other factors that may systematically be related to a higher vote share for that candidate or his party (Gelman & King, 1990; Cox & Katz, 1996). Feinstein's model, which I adopt here, uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the advantage enjoyed by one new candidate (measured in terms of two-party vote share) in an open-seat race given that candidate's legacy status. Applied to the Japanese case, I thus analyze the LDP candidate's vote share in SMD races from 1996-2009 in Model 6.6 as:

$$Vote\ Share_{it} = \beta_1(Legacy\ Difference_{it}) + \beta_2(Quality\ Difference_{it}) + \beta_3(Expenditures\ Difference_{it}) + \beta_4(District\ Party\ Strength) + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where *Vote Share*$_{it}$ is the LDP candidate's share of the two-party vote in district *i* and year *t* (measured as a proportion, so that 100% is equal to 1), with *IT* being the set of fifty-two open-seat SMD races in the five general elections from 1996 to 2009 in which a new LDP candidate ran;[84] *Legacy Difference* takes the value of 1 if the LDP candidate

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[83] Feinstein refers to the advantage as the "dynasty advantage," and uses a more expansive definition of dynasty that includes state governors.

[84] Two races in which an LDP candidate ran without the official nomination (LDI) but without any competition from an LDP candidate are also included. The two-party vote is calculated with the two top-vote getters in the district race. In most cases, the second candidate is from the DPJ, but not always (especially in 1996, when the NFP was the main opposition party to the LDP).

was a legacy candidate, -1 if the main challenger candidate was a legacy, and 0 if neither candidate (or in the case of four races, both candidates) was a legacy; *Quality Difference* similarly captures the difference in prior office-holding experience (local legislative office, mayor, governor, upper house, or prior service in the House of Representatives) between the two main candidates;[85] *Expenditures Difference* represents the LDP candidate's logged expenditures minus those of his main opponent; *District Party Strength* is the LDP's PR vote at election time *t* aggregated to the SMD boundaries, a measure designed to capture the party's support *qua* party in that district,[86] and ε_{it} is the error term. Model 6.7 adds a year-specific dummy variable, α_t to the equation. Model 6.8 and 6.9 are identical to the previous models, except that *Legacy Difference* is replaced with *Hereditary Difference*, which uses the strict definition of direct succession in the district.[87]

The results of the regression analysis (Table 6.4) indicate an estimated 5-6 percentage point increase in new LDP candidate's share of the two-party vote for each one-point increase in the *Legacy Difference* scale—from a non-legacy first-time LDP candidate facing a legacy opponent, to both or neither being legacies, to only the new LDP candidate being a legacy. For first-time hereditary candidates, the inherited incumbency advantage is slightly higher, at around seven percentage points. This inherited incumbency advantage to new hereditary candidates reaches the level of the

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[85] I analyze only open-seat races in which the LDP candidate had never run, but do not exclude cases where the opponent had previously served in the House (but was not currently an incumbent).

[86] I thank Steven R. Reed for providing this measure. This is a close approximation of the party's support *qua party* because the party's coalition partner, the Kōmeitō, with whom it has stand-down agreements in most SMDs, stills runs candidates in the PR tier. Thus the LDP's party vote in the PR tier should not include many split-ticket votes from Kōmeitō supporters.

[87] Only one race featured two hereditary candidates.

seven to ten percentage point advantage for incumbents in the U.S., and is nearly double

the four percentage point inherited incumbency advantage that Feinstein (2010) finds for

open-seat U.S. races. Separate regression analyses (not shown) controlling for other

candidate-level variables such as gender and age, as well as population density, yield

similar estimates. For hereditary candidates who succeed an incumbent who dies in

office, the vote advantage jumps to twelve percentage points.

Table 6.4: Legacy Ties and a New LDP Candidate's Share of the Two-Party Vote in
SMD Open-Seat Races, 1996-2009 (OLS Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors)

Variables	Model 6.6	Model 6.7	Model 6.8	Model 6.9
Legacy Difference	0.0518**	0.0608***		
	(0.0204)	(0.0200)		
Hereditary Difference			0.0684***	0.0723***
			(0.0218)	(0.0219)
Quality Difference	0.0277*	0.0264*	0.0258*	0.0239*
	(0.0139)	(0.0132)	(0.0134)	(0.0129)
Expenditures Difference	-0.000436	-0.000566	-0.000650	-0.000660
	(0.00324)	(0.00311)	(0.00314)	(0.00306)
District Party Vote	0.692***	0.889***	0.673***	0.880***
	(0.165)	(0.171)	(0.159)	(0.168)
Constant	0.293***	0.241***	0.297***	0.244***
	(0.0526)	(0.0546)	(0.0508)	(0.0538)
Election Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	52	52	52	52
R-squared	0.435	0.550	0.470	0.564

*Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$*

New legacy candidates thus face a considerable vote advantage over non-legacy

candidates. But it is also worth considering the effect of legacy ties on the actual electoral

outcomes of the race, i.e., who gets elected, in addition to simply evaluating the effect of

legacy ties on vote share. After all, as Jacobson (1987, p. 128) correctly points out with

regard to the importance of the incumbency advantage in U.S. congressional elections,

"[w]hat matters most is winning or losing; the size of the victory or loss is of decidedly secondary importance."

Table 6.5: Legacy Ties and a New LDP Candidate's Likelihood of Winning a SMD Open-Seat Race, 1996-2009 (Logit Coefficients and Standard Errors)

Variables	Model 6.10	Model 6.11	Model 6.12	Model 6.13
Legacy Difference	0.0706	0.576		
	(0.694)	(0.819)		
Hereditary Difference			1.329	3.062**
			(0.902)	(1.463)
Quality Difference	0.766	0.755	0.753	0.878
	(0.471)	(0.517)	(0.465)	(0.552)
Expenditures Difference	-0.145	-0.197	-0.169	-0.225
	(0.186)	(0.276)	(0.206)	(0.365)
District Party Vote	21.93***	33.51***	20.51***	41.99***
	(7.803)	(11.02)	(7.711)	(13.80)
Constant	-6.564***	-9.817***	-6.273***	-12.14***
	(2.411)	(3.258)	(2.402)	(4.051)
Election Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	52	52	52	52
Pseudo R-squared	0.2355	0.3265	0.2709	0.4096

*Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$*

Table 6.5 shows the results of four logit regression analyses on the likelihood of a new LDP candidate winning a SMD contest given differences in legacy ties between the candidate and his or her main opponent. The dependent variable is a dummy variable coded as 1 only when the candidate wins the SMD; "zombie" winners revived in the party list and outright losers are both coded as 0. All other explanatory variables and models are identical in form to the previous set of models used for analyzing vote share. Models 6.10 and 6.11 estimate the inherited incumbency advantage for legacy candidates

(without and with election year fixed effects), while Models 6.12 and 6.13 do the same for hereditary candidates.

The results indicate that in terms of the "bottom line"—whether or not the LDP candidate wins or loses the SMD contest—the main determining factor is the LDP's party strength in that district. Although the coefficients on *Legacy Difference* and *Hereditary Difference* all show a positive effect for legacy ties on the likelihood of victory, only Model 6.13 shows a statistically significant hereditary advantage, controlling for year-specific fixed effects. This finding supports earlier work by Reed, Scheiner, and Thies (2012) arguing that the outcome of SMD elections in Japan now hinge predominantly on the popularity of the party, rather than individual candidate characteristics.

6.4. Discussion

This chapter has explored the inherited incumbency advantage enjoyed by first-time legacy and hereditary candidates in MMD and SMD races in Japan. The two systems are difficult to compare, given the variation in the number of interparty and intraparty competitors that a new candidate must face in each system, and the fact that in MMD systems the most severe competition often occurs between co-partisans rather than between challengers of different parties.

I have tried to comparatively evaluate the inherited incumbency advantage in the two systems by looking at the subset of MMD races where only one incumbent retired and was either replaced by a hereditary successor, or not. This scenario in MMD elections closely approximates the conditions under SMD, where there is only one

successor to an exiting incumbent, and that candidate's legacy status can set her apart from her challenger.

The results of my analysis here indicate that legacy, and especially hereditary, candidates do indeed enjoy an inherited incumbency advantage in terms of earning votes and getting elected. It appears that the advantage is related more to "brand name" advantages than to deterring or "scaring off" challengers (or at least quality challengers). This is especially clear given the differences in electoral success between hereditary and non-legacy successors under the MMD system. Under the new electoral system with SMD, however, the "brand name" of the candidate appears to matter less to voters than the party label under which he or she runs. Legacy and hereditary candidates with strong name recognition still have an advantage over non-legacy challengers, but this advantage matters less when their party is not as popular.

6.5. Acknowledgments

Parts of Chapter 6 are based on a co-authored paper, with Steven R. Reed, intended for future publication under the title "Deterring Entrepreneurial Candidate Entry in Multi-Member Districts: Inheriting an Incumbency Advantage in Japan." I thank Steve for allowing the inclusion of some original text and theoretical discussion from that paper here. I was the primary investigator of the data and analysis.

7. Conclusion

In most parties in most countries there is a powerful presumption that an incumbent legislator who wishes to be a candidate for reelection will be reselected, usually without much fuss.
-Austin Ranney (1981, p. 98)

In this dissertation, I have examined the causes and the electoral consequences of political dynasties in developed democracies. The persistence of dynasties in developed democracies is puzzling, and invites an examination of the context and process through which citizens participate in democratic politics, both as voters and as candidates. We expect the democratic process to generate equality of opportunity and a gradual decline in political dynasties over time, as more and more citizens get directly involved in participatory democracy and the composition of the political class is broadened. Yet we observe considerable variation in legacy politics across developed democracies, and in some countries, such as Ireland and Japan, the number and percentage of political dynasties has consistently *grown* since democratization, rather than declined as expected, a trend that represents an increasing narrowing of the political class since democratization.

My theoretical argument, advanced in Chapter 2, posits that legacy politics will be a more prominent part of candidate recruitment in democracies when the institutional contexts of elections and the candidate recruitment processes in parties place greater

attention on the qualities that legacy candidates inherently possess. Specifically, legacy candidates can be viewed as possessing an inherited incumbency advantage that in many cases is as strong as the incumbency advantage enjoyed by their predecessors. The inherited incumbency advantage encompasses both name recognition and resources, but the former is arguably more important.

In candidate-centered elections, the inherited incumbency advantage translates into an electoral advantage for a legacy candidate over his competitors; parties, knowing this advantage to exist, are also more likely to give the legacy candidate the nomination. In elections that are more party-centered, the inherited incumbency advantage is less relevant for electoral success, and parties in turn are more likely to pass over a potential legacy candidate for nomination in favor of a candidate who better suits their party goals. However, party nomination decisions can also be influenced by the nature of the decision-making process. Decentralized selection is more likely to favor a legacy candidate since the actors involved will have had a closer relationship to the candidate's predecessor. Centralized selection processes that are dominated by the national party leadership may take into account a greater number of factors in nomination decisions, including national party image and policy goals. These party motivations may decrease the value of legacy candidates in the absence of other quality characteristics of value to the party.

I have evaluated this theory of legacy recruitment with legislator-level data from eight countries (Belgium, Canada, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, and Norway), and with additional candidate-level data for the case of Japan. I have focused in particular on Japan since electoral reform and party reforms to the recruitment process within the LDP

provide a unique within-country, and within-party, laboratory for testing the relationship between institutional structures and the incentives to recruit and nominate legacy candidates. The in-depth, candidate-level analysis of legacy politics in Japan corroborates the cross-national and cross-party variation that exists in the other seven democracies. My findings can be summarized as follows:

- The value of a legacy candidate's inherited incumbency advantage in terms of recruitment increases with the value of her predecessor's incumbency advantage. This is illustrated in the analyses of Chapters 4 and 5, where I found that incumbent LDP politicians in Japan were increasingly more likely to be succeeded in office by a relative as their incumbency advantage and tenure in office increased.

- Across democracies, legacy politicians tend to appear in greater percentages in parties contesting candidate-centered elections, since the value of their inherited incumbency advantage is greater. This finding is demonstrated in the cross-national patterns presented in Chapter 3, as well as by the results of Chapter 5, which show the decreasing value of the inherited incumbency advantage in candidate selection in Japan following the switch from SNTV in MMD (a very candidate-centered electoral system for the LDP) to the more party-centered MMM system, combining FPTP/SMD with CLPR.

- Across parties, legacy candidates tend to appear in greater percentages in parties that employ a more decentralized candidate recruitment process, since local actors are more inclined to favor local dynastic families than national parties, which may have other national policy goals in mind during the candidate selection process. The cross-

national evidence for this claim is tenuous, given the small sample of countries and parties included in Chapter 3. However, the evidence from Japan presented in Chapter 5 provides some support. Legacy candidates in the LDP declined more rapidly in 2005 and 2009 after the party began to employ the *kōbo* open recruitment process and party leaders began to exercise greater control over nominations.

- The analysis in Chapter 6 provides evidence that in more candidate-centered elections (illustrated with the case of SNTV in MMD in Japan), the inherited incumbency advantage possessed by legacy candidates gives them an electoral advantage over non-legacy candidates in terms of getting elected. However, there is no clear evidence that it scares away other challengers. Given that challengers are not scared away, it is perhaps even more remarkable that legacy candidates are so successful at getting elected, since in many cases they face greater competition than did their incumbent predecessors.

- The electoral advantage of legacy candidates exists in more party-centered elections as well (illustrated in Chapter 6 with the case of FPTP in SMD in Japan), but it is less significant for election. This is because the value of the party label increases in more party-centered elections relative to the value of individual candidate characteristics. The findings to this effect are consistent with other research studies on Japan showing that elections there are becoming more party-centered since reform.

The quote from Austin Ranney's 1981 study of candidate recruitment that opens this conclusion emphasizes the value of incumbency in candidate selection decisions. In most cases, parties are predisposed to re-nominate successful incumbents unless they

pose some sort of risk to the unity or policy goals of the party. In the same study, Ranney

further explains why incumbents are so advantaged in terms of candidate selection

(Ranney, 1981, pp. 98-99):

> The rationale is obvious. Other things being equal, incumbents are likely to make better candidates than nonincumbents. They are better known to the constituency's voters, it is easier to raise money for their campaigns, and they already wear the mantle of the elected public official. They are also likely to be better known by the party's selectors and to have served the party for a number of years. And whatever advantages seniority may bring to a legislator and his constituents they will secure by reselecting an incumbent and lose by dropping him in favor of a newcomer. Whatever the reasons may be, the fact is that the greatest single advantage an aspirant for candidacy can have is to hold the office already.

I have argued in this dissertation that many of these logical reasons for an

incumbency advantage in candidate selection apply in one form or another to the children

or other close relatives of an incumbent as well, in the form of the inherited incumbency

advantage. Legacy candidates are better known to voters and party selectors, and in many

cases may be better able to raise campaign funds than non-legacy candidates. Their

appeal to voters and parties also increases with the seniority of their predecessors. This

may make legacy candidates an obvious choice when they are available.

However, where my argument for the inherited incumbency advantage differs

from Ranney's logic above is in the phrase, "Other things being equal." My analysis in

this dissertation has demonstrated that, when it comes to the inherited incumbency

advantage, the institutional contexts of elections and parties create an inequality in the

incentives to recruit and nominate legacy candidates across democracies. The value of a

legacy candidate's inherited incumbency advantage will depend on the institutional

context of how candidates are selected and elected. In some cases, this means that, other

things equal, legacy candidates may not be better candidates than non-legacy candidates, at least when it comes to the electoral needs of a party.

It is important to note that my analysis in this dissertation has not evaluated the actual legislative behavior of legacy and non-legacy candidates, and so I have not made any assertions about whether legacy politics generate positive or negative results overall for the functioning of a democracy. I have instead focused on explaining the sources of legacy politics that are related to the connection between elections and parties. While legacy candidates in some countries possess electoral advantages due to their name recognition and resources, and these advantages extend to, and reinforce, patterns in candidate selection, legacy candidates might also produce different effects on policymaking and political representation.

Do legacy politics open the door to "the *foolish*, the *wicked*, and the *improper*" who "soon grow insolent" as Thomas Paine warned (Paine, 1776, p. 30)? Or perhaps worse, with the greater electoral security they enjoy, do legacy politicians soon grow indolent, neglecting to adequately represent the concerns of their constituents, parties or countries? Even worse yet, do they use their positions of power to enrich themselves in office? These questions present worthwhile targets for future research.

8. Appendix

Table A1: Percentage of Legacy Politicians Among Individual Legislators in the Parties of Eight Democracies

Country	Time Period	System	Party	Personal Vote Index	Centralization Index	Percent Legacy
Belgium	1991-2012	OLPR	Christian People's Party/CD&V	3	3	6%
	1991-2012	OLPR	Ecolo/Green	3	2	0%
	1991-2012	OLPR	PRL/MR	3	2	7%
	1991-2012	OLPR	Parti Socialiste	3	1	0%
	1991-2012	OLPR	PSC/Humanist Democratic Centre	3	3	13%
	1991-2012	OLPR	PVV/Open Vld	3	2	17%
	1991-2012	OLPR	Socialistische Partij/sp.a	3	1	13%
	1991-2012	OLPR	Vlaams Blok	3	**3**	13%
	1991-2012	OLPR	Volksunie/New Flemish Alliance	3	3	3%
Canada	1980-2011	SMD	Bloc Quebecois	4	**3**	2%
	1980-2011	SMD	Conservatives	4	1	4%
	1980-2011	SMD	Liberal Party	4	3	5%
	1980-2011	SMD	New Democratic Party	4	3	3%
Iceland	2003-2009	CLPR	Independence Party	5	1	32%
	2003-2009	CLPR	Progressive Party	5	2	39%
	2003-2009	CLPR	(Social Democratic) Alliance	5	1	27%
	2003-2009	CLPR	Civic Movement	5	1	0%
	2003-2009	CLPR	Left-Green Movement	5	1	45%
	2003-2009	CLPR	Liberal Party	5	1	20%
Ireland	1980-2011	STV	Fianna Fáil	2	3	31%
	1980-2011	STV	Fine Gael	2	3	20%
	1980-2011	STV	Labour	2	3	19%
	1980-2011	STV	Sinn Fein	2	3	0%
Israel	1980-2009	CLPR	Labor	5	1	8%
	1980-2009	CLPR	Kadima	5	**5**	4%
	1980-2009	CLPR	Likud	5	5	12%
	1980-2009	CLPR	Meretz	5	**5**	6%
Italy	1979-1992	OLPR	Christian Democracy (DC)	3	3	4%
	1979-1992	OLPR	Italian Social Movement (MSI)	3	4	3%
	1979-1992	OLPR	Communist (PCI)	3	3	1%
	1979-1992	OLPR	Liberal (PLI)	3	3	9%
	1979-1992	OLPR	Republican (PRI)	3	3	4%
	1979-1992	OLPR	Democratic Socialist (PSDI)	3	4	7%
	1979-1992	OLPR	Socialist (PSI)	3	4	5%

Table A1: Percentage of Legacy Politicians Among Individual Legislators in the Parties of Eight Democracies, Continued

Country	Time Period	System	Party	Personal Vote Index	Centralization Index	Percent Legacy
Japan	1980-1993	SNTV	LDP	1	3	44%
	1980-1993	SNTV	JSP	1	3	7%
	1980-1993	SNTV	Komeito	4	5	3%
	1980-1993	SNTV	JCP	4	5	0%
	2005-2009	SMD	LDP (post-reform)	4	**4**	26%
	2005-2009	SMD	DPJ (post-reform)	4	**4**	8%
	2005-2009	CLPR	LDP post-reform	5	**4**	0%
	2005-2009	CLPR	DPJ (post-reform)	5	**4**	13%
	2005-2009	CLPR	Komeito (post-reform)	5	**5**	0%
Norway	1981-2009	CLPR	Arbeiderpartiet	5	3	2%
	1981-2009	CLPR	Fremskrittsparti	5	3	1%
	1981-2009	CLPR	Høyre	5	3	8%
	1981-2009	CLPR	Kristelig Folkeparti	5	3	8%
	1981-2009	CLPR	Senterpartiet	5	3	17%
	1981-2009	CLPR	Venstre	5	3	0%

Notes: Merged and affiliated parties are grouped with their main party name (e.g., Conservatives in Canada include "Progressive Conservatives" and Canadian Alliance, etc.). Time periods restricted to post-1980s observations in order to achieve comparability in terms of party recruitment stabilization. For the same reason, post-reform values for the Japanese parties are based on the most recent elections (2005, 2009) when electoral and party reform effects were most evident. Personal Vote Index is a simple ordering of the five electoral systems from least party-centered (1) to most party-centered (5). Party Centralization Index based on Lundell (2004), ordered from least centralized (1) to most centralized (5); bolded values were not included in Lundell's study, and were determined by using his definitions and available information on current selection methods.

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