Abstract

“Seeing from the South” (Watson 2008) and “Re-engaging Planning Theory with South-Eastern Perspectives” (Yiftachel 2006) are essential calls for the development of planning theories and empirical research from the Global South. Such scholarship has interpreted the rationalities at play as informal settlements develop on the peripheries of rapidly globalizing cities and explored how they reflect the nature of state interventions. This article examines the utility of planning theories issued from the Global South and North in explaining a case of state planning for an indigenous, ethnic minority in Israel: the Negev/Naqab Arab-Bedouins. The researchers conducted 90 interviews with planners, engineers, Bedouin residents, government officials, academics, and employees of non-governmental organizations. Their aim was to understand how stakeholders comprehended, engaged with, and approached planning for the Abu-Basma Regional Council, a state initiative to plan and provide services to informal Bedouin villages in Israel’s south, as well as the program’s outcomes. The findings indicate that planning theories from the Global South, which are focused on space, resource distribution, and resident-driven spatial change, are essential to understanding the outcomes of planning. They provide a necessary context for the North’s normative/prescriptive planning theories, which highlight tangible “episodes” (Healey 2007, 78) of planning practice but risk misattributing popular resistance to a program’s communication challenges, rather than to residents’ fundamental objections.

Keywords: Participatory planning, Bedouin, Territorial control, Indigenous, Global South

Introduction

Planners working within restrictive political systems and in the Global South have indicated the irrelevance and, at its worse, harm of prevailing planning theories to their circumstances (Lo Piccolo 2008). Proceduralist planning theories issued out of the Global North have promoted methods such as “instrumental rationality” that follow “technical rules” (Thomas 1979, 72), which in promoting neutrality and universal applicability erased the legacies of historic injustices and overlooked differences. “Rational/procedural planning” catalysed assimilationist solutions to housing and employing indigenous peoples in settler states, such as the United States and Australia, by addressing the most visible expression of colonialism: poverty. Rather than correct for the forced displacement of indigenous communities from their lands and natural resources, these measures sought to urbanize indigenous peoples and provide oppor-
tunities for employment in the name of “universal citizenship” (Walker and Barcham 2010, 315; Jackson 1997).

Efforts to implement the Global North’s collaborative/communicative planning on rapidly developing cities in the Global South risk upsetting existing physical and social infrastructures. These infrastructures may not reflect democratic values or progressive ideals, but they enable communities, such as ethnic groups, to maintain networks and settlements which enable their survival (Watson 2002). Collaborative planners’ attempts at dialog may be “affirming,” but are outpaced by globalization and out-influenced by foreign capital and institutions (Harrison 2006, 329). Moreover, the regressive side of plan implementation, including forced resettlement, has not been told through case studies that evaluate participatory mechanisms (Yiftachel 1998, 2006).

In response, practitioners and scholars working in the Global South have illuminated the material impacts of urban policy on people and spaces by assessing the structural, historic, and contextual circumstances of planning programs (Roy 2009). Case studies have examined informal ways of operating and regressive planning outcomes, while giving voice to the individuals, contexts and processes ignored by planning scholarship and marginalized by the political or economic elite (Kamete 2009; Yiftachel 2008). “Theorizing from the South-East” (Yiftachel 2006, 216) and fostering “a view from the global South” (Watson 2009, 2261) are efforts to explain and understand planning in a way that prevailing planning theories have been unable to.

This scholarship seems to be influencing theory in the North as well. Major journals such as Planning Theory & Practice have called for “papers and research that not only inform practice, but challenge practice and open new frontiers or alternatives for theory and practice” (Scott 2019, 4). Planning theory is tasked with addressing the diversity of actors, contexts, processes, and outcomes which characterize the discipline, particularly in the Global South. Scholars advancing planning theory’s “Southern turn” (Satgé and Watson 2018, 1) have made important strides in reorienting scholars away from consensus and towards conflict and, in doing so, have tasked practitioners and academics with understanding the “conflict of rationalities” between state and non-state actors and how they play out over space (Watson 2009, 2267; Satgé and Watson 2018).

Nonetheless, the “cutting edge” of alternative planning in the Global South has come from the grassroots, rather than from academia or practitioners (Porter 2011, 479). There is much to do, including a “taking-to-task for our collective negligence of the political in our own domain” (Porter 2011, 479). A Johannesburg planner, Harrison (2014, 48) celebrates the “more direct engagement with ‘urban realities,’” but laments that in “distancing itself from ‘theories of the North’ . . . [planning theory from the South] now seems inappropriate for wrestling with the problems at hand”.

At such an important juncture we ask: How useful is planning theory to understanding practice in the Global South? We address this question by taking as a case the
Abu-Basma Regional Council (ABRC), a planning initiative undertaken by the State of Israel to formalize indigenous Arab-Bedouin villages in Israel’s Negev/Naqab Desert.

Government Planning for the Bedouin in Israel

Bedouins receive their name for their traditional lifestyle as peoples of the desert, or *badia* in Arabic. Bedouins living in Israel migrated north from the Arabian Peninsula between the fifth and 20th centuries, settling in today’s Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Sinai, Iraq, and the Palestinian Territories (Marx 1977). Each tribe served as a large political organization, which governed the areas its members traditionally worked in and occupied. Bedouin farmlands and dwellings were divided spatially by tribal sub-units (extended families known as *hamulas*), while pastures and wells were common property of the tribe (Meir 1997). Bedouins were pastoral nomads who were often sedentary during the rainy season, as they grew crops and settled in permanent and temporary dwellings. During the drier months Bedouins grazed herds across a wider territory, known as *dira*, or “area of migration” (Marx 1977, 351).

Settlement through Regional Service Provision and Changing Geopolitical Borders: 1900–1948

Bedouins gradually discontinued their pastoral nomadic lifestyle during the Ottoman Empire (1516–1922) and British Mandate (1922–1948). The construction of regional service centers by the Ottomans and British, such as the Ottoman City of Beer Sheva (1900), and demand for Bedouin agricultural products and labor to support the British war effort (1939–1945) triggered a gradual shift in Bedouin settlement patterns and occupations (Meir 1988; Abu-Rabia 2001). The establishment of the Israeli State in 1948 posed the most significant changes for the Bedouin population of the region. Prior to 1948, 65k Bedouins lived in the Negev/Naqab Desert. The Negev/Naqab is a semi-arid desert that encompasses the southern half of Israel, stretching from the Palestinian Territories in the east to Gaza in the west. By the close of the 1948 War, 80 percent of the Arab population of mandatory Palestine had fled or were removed by Israeli authorities to neighboring states such as Palestine, Jordan, and Egypt. In 1949, 11k of the 65k Bedouins who had lived in the Negev/Naqab remained (Meir 1988).

Regional Concentration and Planned Resettlement: 1949–1991

From 1949 to 1966 an Israeli military order concentrated the remaining Bedouins in the Negev in the *sayig*, an enclosure zone of 1000 km2 located east of Beer Sheva (Meir 1997). The *sayig* is outlined with orange dashes in Figure 1. During this time, residents suffered many economic hardships as a result of the limitations set on their access to grazing pastures and agricultural areas (Kressel et al. 1991). Over 100 “spontaneous” localities were developed by the Bedouin in the *sayig* according to traditional landholdings and family ties (Meir 1998, 261). These settlements lacked basic services with
the exception of the schools and clinics built by British administrators and Bedouins during the Mandate. Today, they exist as 45 “unrecognized villages”; lacking complete legal recognition, these villages are denied, at varying scales, many of the basic services received by Israeli municipalities such as electricity, roads, sewage, and waste removal and are threatened by demolition orders (Yiftachel 2003; Abu-Saad 2008).

In 1966, when the military order was lifted, the government prioritized the state’s development objectives while attempting to meet Bedouins’ immediate needs for housing and services (Shmueli et al. 2011; Dinero 2004). Town planners determined that urban settlements could accommodate a large number of residents over a small area and both expedite and lessen the costs of service provisions (Horner 1982). Between 1966 and 1991, seven urban settlements were planned and built within the sayig. Each urban settlement was planned to accommodate 15k–25k people (Dunsky 2009). The localities include one Bedouin city, Rahat, and six other towns: Tel Sheva, Hura, Arara BaNegev, Kseifa, Laqiya, and Segev Shalom. They are marked in dark green in Figure 1.

The urban settlement program has relocated nearly half of Negev Bedouins from unrecognized villages (Dinero 2010). Over 127k Bedouins lived in the urban settlements in 2010, and their population grows each year (Shmueli et al. 2011). Each town has public schools, clinics, and community centers; however, they suffer from inequalities in budgets and resources as compared to Jewish towns (Swirski and Hasson 2006). Residents of unrecognized villages are encouraged to move to the localities through a ‘carrot and stick’ policy (Dinero 2010). The government provides ‘the carrot’ by subsidizing the cost of a residential plot in an urban town and compensating residents for terminating their landownership claims and demolishing their homes in unrecognized villages. Simultaneously, the state applies the ‘stick’ through the enforcement of planning regulations, such as the demolition of houses and agricultural fields by the Ministry of the Environment’s Green Patrol with police support (Dinero 2010, 55).

The seven townships have been criticized by Bedouin advocacy organizations and academics for depriving inhabitants of economic opportunities and overlooking Bedouin cultural needs (Lithwick 2000; Meir 2011; Horner 1982). Planners ignored spatial divisions among extended families, historical class differences, and the importance of agriculture to the Bedouin economy, identity and lifestyle. They also did not consider the impact of urbanization on women’s access to space and livelihood, as well as the size a residential plot would need to accommodate a large Bedouin family (Abu-Saad 2008; Fenster 1998; Meir 2011). These oversights have hindered the towns’ growth, creating some deficient neighborhoods with partial services (Abu-Saad 2008; Lithwick 2000), crime and health problems (Diamond et al. 2008; Dinero 2010), and, with the exception of Rahat, the six highest unemployment rates in the country (Swirsky and Connor-Atlas 2017). Dispossessed of their primary means of capital, the land, many male Bedouins have entered low wage positions in construction, trucking and industry (Abu-Saad and Creamer 2012; Dinero 2004). Women, who were equal contributors to the pastoral
economy, have developed informal, home-based work to supplement their families’ low incomes (Abu-Rabia-Queder 2019).

Planning scholarship has interpreted the Bedouin township program as a rational procedural planning failure; by planning for a pastoral nomadic population utilizing traditional methods and tools, the needs of a unique population were inadequately accommodated (Horner 1987; Meir 2005). Abu-Saad (2008) goes further to argue that the urban concentration of Negev Bedouins reflects the “ideological nature of spatial planning in Israel,” in which “dispersion of the Jewish population through the land continued to be one of Israel’s national planning goals” (1730). The urban towns contradict Bedouins’ traditional occupations and settlements because Bedouins’ spatial needs challenge the state’s mission to “Judaize” the Negev (Yiftachel 2003, 21).

The State-Bedouin Landownership Conflict and Grassroots Advocacy: 1966–2020

Relocating Bedouins to the sayig enabled the state to expropriate 1000 km\(^2\) of Negev lands the Bedouin had occupied before 1949. The state claimed these lands through interpretations of land tenure laws adapted from the Ottomans and British, triggering an ongoing land dispute between the Israel Lands Administration (ILA)—the landholding arm of the Israeli government—and the Negev Bedouins (Jiryis 1973). Between the 1970s and early 2000s, Bedouins registered claims to 589k dunams\(^1\) of land in the Negev with the Ministry of Justice’s Land Title Settlement Unit as the historic occupants of the region (Begin 2013). Bedouins with claims to these areas awaited court hearings in the Beer Sheva District Court to determine if they or the ILA were the rightful owners. Out of 200 decisions reached, none were found in favor of a Bedouin claimant (Elsana 2018).

Approximately 58k Bedouins have chosen to remain in their unrecognized villages, citing their need to live in low-density agricultural settlements on their own lands (Shmueli and Khamaisi 2011). Residents of unrecognized villages have objected to an ILA policy that mandates Bedouins to resolve or terminate their landownership claims before they can obtain a compensation package and relocate to the planned townships. Grassroots actions, including weekly protests by Bedouin residents and advocates, the reconstruction of demolished homes, and petitions filed to the Israeli High Court have forced the government to rethink its approach to Bedouin settlement and service provision (Meir 2009; “Unrecognized Villages” 2012; Rudoren 2013).

Residents of unrecognized villages have prepared their localities for recognition by establishing their own regional council, the Regional Council for Unrecognized Villages (RCUV). Through the RCUV, residents developed a master plan that unofficially formalized all unrecognized villages in the Negev (Meir 2005). The RCUV developed local committees in participating villages which functioned as local authorities (Local Committee 2006). Within local committees, planning sub-committees developed basic infrastruc-

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\(1\) One dunam is equivalent to .0001 square kilometers, or roughly 0.247 acres.
tures such as roads and water pipes in some villages amid the state’s denial of services. Local committees succeeded in organizing residents against regional plans, which would have evicted residents of unrecognized villages and annexed the land to surrounding municipalities. The RCUV demonstrated that residents of unrecognized villages had the capacity for self-governance; however, the organization did not gain recognition by Israeli authorities (Meir 2005; Local Committee 2006).


The Abu-Basma Regional Council² (ABRC) was founded in 2003 by the Israeli Interior Ministry to plan and provide services to initially seven (then 12) Bedouin villages in the Negev (Yahel 2006). ABRC was formed to overcome a “deadlock” between Bedouin and Israeli authorities over fundamental issues including the rejection of Bedouin land-ownership claims by the Israeli courts, as well as the non-recognition of their agricultural villages by the national planning system, the Israel Planning Administration (IPA) (Yiftachel 2003, 21). ABRC was established through the Local Councils Ordinance as part of a seven-year development project for the Negev Bedouins. The council’s founding was paired with a 400 million shekel (U.S. $116,000,000) funding package for planning, economic development, and infrastructure in Bedouin towns (Yahel 2006; Golan 2007). ABRC lists its mission to “improve trust between the Bedouins and the State of Israel . . . improve community participation in decision making, planning and implementation . . . [and] improve municipal services” (ABRC 2010). Following the council’s inauguration, residents of unrecognized villages celebrated that “the old stage of fighting for staying on this land ended, and a new stage for building and constructing had begun” (Local Committee 2006).

The first ABRC localities—Molada, Drejat, Cochle, Tarabin al-Sana, Kaser a-Ser, Bir-Hadaj, Abu-Krenat, and Umm Batin—began planning under the Bedouin Administration, a former authority within the ILA, in the late 1990s. These villages have approved master plans and began local planning through ABRC and the Bedouin Authority, a modified version of the Bedouin Administration within the Ministry of Housing. Four more villages—Ramat Tsiporim, Wadi El-Naam, Al-Fura, and Abu-Tlul—also entered the planning process in the 2000s. All but two ABRC localities encompass portions of pre-existing unrecognized villages within their planned areas. Thus, literature issued by ABRC describes the council as planning villages in-situ, “incorporating formerly unrecognized Arab Bedouin townships in the Israeli Negev” (ABRC 2010). In 2009, ABRC planners projected that 109.5k Bedouins would live in the localities by the end of 2015. By 2030, the largest of the localities could have the capacity to house 12k–17k residents, and the smallest 3k–6.5k (Dunsky 2009).

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² Regional councils are Israeli local governments that typically consist of several smaller communities in rural areas. Communities incorporated within regional councils may not have the infrastructure to stand alone as singular localities, known in Israel as local councils.
Regional Planning Addresses Village Recognition: 2005–2013

Regional planning initiatives for Israel’s south have set vague parameters for village recognition. TAMA 35, the Integrated National Master Plan for Construction, Development and Preservation (2005) produced the Partial District Outline Plan for the Beer Sheva Metropolitan Area 4/14/23 (filed in 2007 and approved in 2012) that guided land use decisions in the Northern Negev. Plan 4/14/23 approved the relocation of military bases from the rapidly developing center of the country, protected open space, and encouraged the development and revitalization of industrial areas and settlements within the Beer Sheva Metropolitan Area, including Bedouin villages (Shmueli and Khamaisi 2018). It also set forward the goal to “determine the location and rules for planning settlements in a variety of models to arrange Bedouin settlement,” though did not stipulate specific villages to recognize (Planning Administration 2019).

In 2007, the Ministry of Housing’s Goldberg Commission for Regulating Bedouin Settlement in the Negev added criteria, stipulating that “recognition be granted, to the best possible extent, to each of the unrecognized villages in which there is a minimum carrying capacity; this, on the absolute condition that such recognition does not contradict a regional master plan” (Begin 2013). Reports out of the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office (Prawer in 2011 and Begin in 2013) recommended abolishing the hearing system for settling land claims and replacing it, instead, with a set compensation scheme that values land claims based on its location, size, and evidence of cultivation. Although the compensation recommendations were not formalized into law, with few exceptions,
Bedouin land claims are no longer being heard in court. Therefore, as planning and development moves forward, land title settlement remains stagnant (Yahel 2019).

ABRC in the Literature

Literature examining the Abu-Basma Regional Council can be organized into three groups, labeled by the planning theory they most dominantly evoke: (1) collaborative planning (Begin 2013; ABRC 2010; Yahel 2019; Yahel 2006); (2) planning-as-control (Abu-Saad 2014; Abu-Saad 2008; Negev Coexistence Forum 2010; Human Rights Watch 2008); and, (3) pragmatism (Shmueli and Khamaisi 2011, 2015; Arieli 2018; Berman-Kishony 2008; Rudnitzky and Abu-Ras 2012; Meir and Stavi 2011).

Group 1: ABRC was Collaborative Planning

Publications which promote the progressive and collaborative nature of planning ABRC villages have been issued by present and former government employees. Coupled with initiatives to settle Bedouin land claims and build additional housing in the Bedouin townships, the establishment of ABRC is a “turning point” in the state’s approach to settling Bedouins in the Negev (Yahel 2006, 13). Well-attended public meetings, Bedouin committee members, and the inclusion of residents’ input in plans and reports are highlighted as collaborative shifts in state policy (Yahel 2019; Begin 2013). The practical challenges of formalizing unrecognized villages, such as providing services to low-density localities, are illustrated and promote the relocation of Bedouins outside of recognized villages to planned neighborhoods for reasons of human rights and safety (Yahel 2006). These studies highlight special incentives built into Bedouin settlement policies which are not awarded to Jewish Israelis, including access to land in a planned village for free and compensation for relocation expenses and abandoned crops or housing (Yahel 2019). Impediments to the growth of ABRC localities are attributed to inconsistent policy implementation, resident resistance, and a lack of unified local leadership (ABRC 2010; Yahel 2019).

Group 2: ABRC was Planning-as-Control

Studies positing that ABRC advances Bedouins’ dispossession of their traditional lands and exacerbates resource inequality between Arabs and Jews have appeared in academic publications and reports by Israeli and international advocacy organizations. These studies find that ABRC is “too little too late,” as the state’s efforts to engage Bedouins in planning unrecognized villages follow 50 years of forced resettlement. This legacy has seeded deep mistrust between Bedouins and the Israeli authorities, and therefore overshadows government efforts to formalize a small minority of the 45 unrecognized villages. Many of the policies utilized to fulfill the township program have also been maintained for ABRC localities, such as the requirement that Bedouins terminate land ownership claims to obtain residential land, and the use of the Green Patrol to enforce resettlement through housing demolition (Abu-Saad and Creamer
2012; Negev Coexistence Forum 2010). This suggests that the ABRC program retains similar goals.

The studies also highlight ABRC’s population density, the highest in the country. Unlike Jewish regional councils, ABRC’s jurisdiction does not include the areas between its localities—only the planned areas of the localities themselves (Human Rights Watch 2008). Such an outcome suggests a state intention to limit the expansion of Bedouin towns and deprive the Council of essential tax revenues (Abu-Saad 2008; Swirski and Hasson 2006). A lack of Bedouin representation in ABRC leadership—the mayor, for example, who was appointed by the Interior Ministry, is Jewish—and the suspension of ABRC’s municipal elections in 2008, are identified as additional indicators that the program is “control-oriented,” as it is designed to stifle self-governance (Abu-Saad 2014, 148; Abu-Saad 2008).

**Group 3: ABRC Viewed through Pragmatism**

Between these poles exists recent research which suggests that ABRC marks a change in approach by planning unrecognized villages on-site and consulting with Bedouin representatives. At the same time, these studies find problems with the incomplete recognition of Bedouin lands within the Council’s municipal borders (Meir and Stavi 2011) and persisting inequalities in the provision of basic services, including schools, to ABRC villages (Rudnitzky and Abu-Ras 2012). Some studies acknowledge internal barriers to development within ABRC localities, such as residents’ rejection of Sub-District Plan 14/4/23, and their opposition to the costs associated with building homes legally, including paying taxes, hiring an architect, and obtaining a building permit (Shmueli and Khamaisi 2015; Shmueli and Khamaisi 2011).

Ultimately, this body of research warns against further polarization by Bedouin residents and government actors, urging “pragmatic compromises” that do not allow the conflict over Bedouin lands to preclude the potential investments in infrastructure, housing, and the economy introduced by state recognition (Arieli 2018, 101). Such compromises could be the results of new planning possibilities determined by stakeholders on a village by village basis. Negotiations, rather than enforcement “from above,” will according to these researchers help develop long-term planning solutions in line with larger-scale state recommendations that more Bedouin residents will buy into (Shmueli and Khamaisi 2011; Berman-Kishony 2008).

In-situ recognition through noncontiguous regional governments appears to be the state’s chosen path forward. In 2012, ABRC was split into two regional councils, Neve Midbar Regional Council and Al-Qasum Regional Council. Neve Midbar governs four localities: Kaser a-Ser, Abu-Tlul, Abu-Krenat, and Bir Hadaj (Neve Midbar Regional Council 2017). Al-Qasum governs seven: Umm Batin, El Sayyid, Drejat, Cochle, Molada, Machol, and Tarabin a-Sana (Al-Kasum Regional Council 2018). These municipalities,
like ABRC, exclusively encompass lands within the “blue lines”\(^3\) of each recognized village and retain the same responsibilities for planning and service provision. The ABRC model therefore merits further study utilizing planning theory to understand the processes and impacts of the program and to anticipate what the future of Bedouin settlement holds.

**Methodology**

This article is the outcome of a master’s thesis entitled “Navigating the Path from Planning Paradigm to Plan Implementation: The Case of a New Bedouin Locality in Israel” at the Albert Katz International School for Desert Studies of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Initially, the thesis sought to understand the ideologies guiding the work of housing planners in the northern Negev. The chosen case, ABRC, quickly suggested that following planners around, asking them questions, and studying plans would not tell the entire story, particularly one so embedded in history and driven by bottom-up action. The researchers therefore sought to illuminate both the processes and outcomes of planning ABRC localities—and to what degree they reflect state and Bedouin goals—by selecting three Bedouin villages included within the Abu-Basma Regional Council as study sites. These villages are Abu-Krenat, a small, rural agricultural village of 2700 residents; Umm Batin, a suburban village of 4500 residents east of Beer Sheva; and, Kaser a-Ser, an agricultural village of 3500 residents located west of the city of Dimona.\(^4\) These sites are circled in Figure 1. They were selected because the state-driven planning process had been initiated around the same time, and local plans for service centers were being implemented by ABRC engineers. At the time of study, new plans for neighborhoods and additional service centers were being developed for the localities by government-hired planners. Therefore, the cases were comparable and provided ample data for the researchers to study both the process and outcomes of government planning.

We employed qualitative research methods at different sites where stakeholders went about their daily routines, including workplaces, neighborhoods, committee meetings, and public demonstrations. Our goal was to develop an understanding of respondents’ various roles in the planning process, their ideas of desired planning outcomes, and the impacts of planning as they were experienced. Methods included semi-structured interviews and participant observation.\(^5\) Stakeholder groups, with participant numbers in parentheses, were: government (19), residents (50), planners (8), academics (4), and advo-

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\(^3\) “Blue lines” are the municipal boundaries of a recognized locality that set the limits to the locality’s planned area.

\(^4\) Population numbers are estimates provided by either the village *sheikh* or head of the local committee, as government census data does not accurately reflect the number of residents.

\(^5\) 12 participant observation episodes were conducted at different sites where stakeholders met, worked, and lived. These visits shed light on the dynamics of interpersonal interactions between and within groups, the cultures governing different spaces, and each stakeholder’s interactions within space.
cacy (7). Respondents from the government group included Bedouin representatives on village committees (8), ABRC employees (7), and Southern District planning officials (4). Altogether, 90 interviews were conducted between 2010 and 2012. Interviews ranged from brief discussions while “hanging around” (Morito 2005, 7) at local places to scheduled interviews lasting approximately 90 minutes. Participant observation occurred in forums such as the Local Committee for Planning and Building, political demonstrations, and site visits with ABRC engineers. The researchers also evaluated master plans, neighborhood plans, and plans for service centers assembled by planners hired by ABRC, the Bedouin Administration, the Bedouin Authority, and residents during the plan approval process and plan implementation.

Due to the sensitive nature of planning for/with Bedouins, extra care was taken by the interviewer and her translators to respect cultural norms and confidentiality during fieldwork, particularly in Bedouin villages and government offices. The researchers were careful to approach “gatekeepers” and secure their approval before conducting interviews or participant observations in sensitive arenas. Whenever possible, interviews were conducted in the respondent’s preferred language through a translator of the same gender in the respondent’s chosen setting. These accommodations sought to provide a secure and comfortable environment for respondents.

Results

Planners’ Approach: Balancing Cultural Needs and Legal Restrictions

The term “planner” applies to a diversity of individuals who were active in planning ABRC localities. “Planners” had different clients, practices, motivations, affiliations, and areas of work. To clarify the planners discussed in this article, each has been assigned a title specific to their responsibilities and affiliations. These appear in Table 1. While these categories have been developed based on planners’ titles and associations, the authors recognize that such distinctions are not so simple; planners might have traded tasks, ideas, and allegiances at different times during the process.

Planners expressed that they were charting “a new approach to settling the Bedouin” by planning ABRC localities (Planner of Abu-Krenat 2011). ABRC exemplified “a big change in attitude . . . to look, as well as it’s possible, to the existing situation, to the existing structures, to the land claims and to the population itself” (Planner of Abu-Krenat 2011). Methods included empowering local leadership, devising culturally sensitive mechanisms for public consultation, negotiating when conflicting needs arose, and ratifying existing land uses in plans. These mechanisms were highlighted by interviews with planners, ABRC employees, some residents, and local committee members. Challenges to these approaches arose as well, including evidence that the public consultation process had not reached residents with less political or financial capital and that geographic limitations set on local plans by earlier government decisions, including Sub-District Plan 4/14/23, inhibited the realization of residents’ goals and triggered their
opposition. Here, this “new approach” will be explored from the perspectives of all stakeholders to illuminate planning mechanisms and how they worked in practice.

Resident Participation through Local Committees

When initiating public participation, social consultants—described in Table 1—organized preliminary meetings with village “gatekeepers,” primarily sheikhs or male relatives of sheikhs (Social Consultant 2010). Social consultants’ intentions were to build trust, introduce the planning process, and develop a means of communicating with
the rest of the village. These meetings confirmed that consultation with the RCUV’s local committees would respect the existing power structures and cultural practices in the village, adhere to Israeli laws for democratic local governance, and reach residents quickly in a language they could understand. Local committees were therefore utilized by planners as the primary mechanism for public involvement in planning (Social Consultant 2010; Director of Statutory Planning for ABRC 2011).

Local committees were structured to transfer the power once held autonomously by the sheikh to a committee comprised of men from every family in the village. Each family was expected to elect one or two members to the committee and a village-wide election was held to elect one head of the local committee. Once identified, local committees were formalized as local authorities under ABRC on official Interior Ministry documents that recorded the elected members. Depending on the size of the village, one or two local committee members were elected to serve as village representatives on the Abu-Basma Regional Council.

With few exceptions, residents in the villages under study expressed an awareness of the local committee system. The heads of local committees identified their jobs as “seeing the demands of the people and meeting them,” and shared that they had frequent contact with ABRC authorities and with state-hired planners (Village leader 2010). Committee members utilized their power as local authorities to approve or reject the plans presented to them by ABRC and succeeded in amending plans found to contradict their constituents’ expressed needs. The first plan for residential neighborhoods in Kaser a-Ser exemplifies how the two structures, the local committee and ABRC, worked together to democratize the planning process. The draft plan, which residents criticized as having been made without their consultation—“made from above, like a satellite . . . as if they don’t exist” (Kaser a-Ser resident 1 2011)—prescribed denser housing plots, disregarded existing roads, and was designed for a family that had refused to participate in planning. When the planner presented his draft of the neighborhood plan to Kaser a-Ser’s local committee, the members voted to reject his proposal and requested that a planner they worked with through the RCUV be commissioned for the project instead (Kaser a-Ser neighborhood planner 2011).

ABRC officials honored this request by hiring the planner familiar to the local committee to begin planning two different neighborhoods, 7 and 9. These neighborhoods were intended for families who were active with the local committee and who had expressed interest in relocating to new neighborhoods. The approved plan prescribed larger residential lots (expanded from 600m$^2$ to 1 dunam, 1000m$^2$), adjoined agriculture with some parcels, and accommodated existing roads which had been moved in the master plan (ABRC 2007). The hired planner and an ABRC authority believed the plan better respected residents’ needs because it had been commissioned by ABRC, not by

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6 Some female residents, adolescents, and the elderly in all villages expressed being unaware of the local committee system.
the Bedouin Administration (Kaser a-Ser neighborhood planner 2011; ABRC Operations Director 2010). The Bedouin Administration was an agency of the ILA, which meant that decisions over the boundaries of residential lots were informed by the presence or absence of land ownership claims. Because Kaser a-Ser residents had lost their land dispute with the government in the 1970s, the Bedouin Administration could minimize lot size and increase housing density; after all, residents did not claim to own any of it.

The new planner, however, was commissioned by ABRC, which meant that objections from Bedouin Administration officials would only be heard in front of the Local Planning and Building Committee. With the backing of Amram Kalaji, then head of ABRC and a respected figure in Israeli government, the support of Kaser a-Ser local committee members, and the forum for the planner to explain his “rationale” for the plan, neighborhoods 7 and 9 were accepted by the Local Planning and Building Committee (Kaser a-Ser neighborhood planner 2011).

Limitations to Consultation through Local Committees

Despite the success of local committees in preparing ABRC localities for recognition and negotiating during the earliest plans, a few years later residents presented a scenario of public representation which differed from those illustrated by ABRC authorities, planners, and some local committee members. In their versions, local committees did not act as intermediaries between planners and residents. Rather, longstanding conflicts among families and generations, gender, the loss of strong leaders, and a family’s location within or outside the village’s planned area complicated participation in local committees.

Feuds among families in Kaser a-Ser over who served in local leadership led residents whose families did not hold the position of local committee head to object to participating, while intergenerational disagreements in Umm Batin divided the dominant family of Abu-Kaf and triggered the local committee’s collapse. In Abu-Krenat, a proactive sheikh who had united the village’s families died. This left Abu-Krenat’s ABRC representative—who was also an engineer employed by the regional council—as residents’ only link to planners (Abu-Krenat resident 1 2010; Abu-Krenat resident 2 2010). Within families, brothers accused each other of appointing themselves and “being off planning on his own” (Kaser a-Ser resident 1 2010; School employee 1 2011; School employee 2 2010). These findings oppose the founding ideology of the committee system. Rather than redistribute the authority of the sheikh to each family, in some cases residents from the largest families sidestepped the local committee or took over leadership after the committee collapsed.

ABRC planners reflected on the limits to public consultation through the committee system. The planners of Umm Batin recalled trying (and failing) to form a women’s sub-committee of the local committee. Local committees met in the sheig, a meeting area restricted to men. With the exception of local leaders’ immediate family members, (Female family of village leader 2011) all female respondents had heard about changes in
the village through “gossip” with other women. Women believed that they would participate in designing their new homes in the future (Female student 2011; School employee 3 2011; School employee 4 2011; Housewife 2011). When ABRC planners and social consultants learned about the barriers to public consultation, they implemented alternate mechanisms such as an “open door policy,” home visits, and household surveys. The household survey, written in Arabic, was found to net hundreds of responses (Planner of ABRC Agricultural Initiative 2010).

Some of these mechanisms reproduced the same power dynamics that had limited the effectiveness of local committees, however. The “open door policy” instituted by Umm Batin’s planners sought to provide a confidential meeting space for all residents outside of the village by inviting drop-in visits to the planners’ offices in a neighboring town. Ultimately, the only residents who utilized the mechanism were men in power: sheikhs, local committee members, and heads of families. Utilizing personal cars, literacy, education, gender, and family position, ABRC residents with the most social and financial capital appeared to possess more influence over planning.

Formalizing Existing Development by “Translating It”

Planners hired to design ABRC localities explained having learned about the unique socio-spatial concerns of the Bedouins after the seven townships failed to attract the full Bedouin population of the Negev. With the input of social consultants and ABRC residents, planners working for ABRC and the Bedouin Authority ascertained that Bedouin villages, unlike Jewish localities, could not be “planned by a model” (Planners of ABRC Agricultural Initiative 2010; Planner of Abu-Krenat 2010). Planners formalized existing development—what they termed “social infrastructure with a physical expression”—by “translating it” into a planning language (Planner of Abu-Krenat 2010).

New designs considered topography, family affiliations and sizes, gender norms and gendered spaces, land claims, population growth, existing open space, infrastructure and housing, and residents’ occupations within the village borders set by Partial District Outline Plan 4/14/23 (Planning Administration 2019) and its amendments. In villages where an outstanding land dispute remained between residents and the ILA, corresponding residential parcels were marked in neighborhood plans and preserved for the claimant and his male descendants (Planner of Umm Batin 2010). Umm Batin’s Northern Neighborhood illustrates how some housing lots reflected the boundaries of residents’ filed claims and accommodated existing development, therefore appearing somewhat irregular (ABRC and Bnei Shimon 2015). Such an approach acknowledged residents’ demands to remain on their lands and facilitated the formalization of other spatial expressions of Bedouin culture, such as neighborhoods for hamulot, or extended families, and open areas within neighborhoods that enabled women to pass on their family’s lands unaccompanied by a male family member.
Planning villages before the settlement of land disputes marked an additional difference between ABRC and the seven townships, as residents could use the new public services provided in their villages while remaining in the homes they had constructed prior to recognition (Attorney for Southern District 2011). ABRC tasked planners with designing service centers immediately following master planning to meet residents’ needs amid a complicated and delay-ridden neighborhood development process. To rebuild their homes in recognized neighborhoods, residents were required to lease a residential parcel from the ILA, hire an architect to plan their house, and then obtain a building permit from the municipal engineer. Those who maintained outstanding landownership claims had to certify the ILA as the parcel’s owner before obtaining a lease. Individuals completing the process would then receive a compensation package for their land and the demolition of existing structures which varied based on the land’s quality and location with respect to the village borders (Attorney for Southern District 2011; ABRC Engineer 1 2011).

As of 2015, eight years after the approval of Kaser a-Ser’s Neighborhoods 7 and 9 and nine years following the construction of a new school and clinic, no Kaser a-Ser resident had built a home in a planned neighborhood. These setbacks to neighborhood development indicated to some academics and ABRC planners that “Amram . . . was very smart in getting all the budgets to build the schools and so forth. He said, let’s do what we can. Let’s provide services, let’s give them education, let’s give them what they need” (Kaser a-Ser neighborhood planner 2011). A new public facility in Kaser a-Ser and an existing resident-provided solution to neighborhood service provision, trash burning, are found in Figure 2. Unrecognized housing can be seen to the left and right of the clinic.

Figure 2  New public facility and existing neighborhood service, trash burning.
Source: Researchers’ survey, 2011.
Plan Implementation: Clashing Rationalities Surface

Challenges to Plan Implementation: Resident Perspective

A combination of financial barriers, cultural needs, and political objections prohibited residents from fulfilling neighborhood plans. Seven years after the approval of Abu-Krenat’s Neighborhood 1, only three residents had demolished their homes, obtained permits, and relocated to the neighborhood. Unrecognized development (left) and legal housing (right) in Neighborhood 1 can be seen in Figure 3. Bedouins in all ABRC localities pointed to unaffordability as a barrier to neighborhood development. A man who had rebuilt his home in Abu-Krenat had moved two kilometers away from his unrecognized village after paying “thousands of shekels,” NIS 180k (U.S. $52k), to purchase his lease and building permit (Abu-Krenat resident 1 2011). Household services were not provided to incomplete neighborhoods; as a result, the resident had to provide services on his own. He used a generator which cost him 300 shekels (U.S. $87) for every four hours of use, dumped his sewage in a pit, burned his garbage, and relied on an illegal water hookup.

The man’s experience indicated to others that “no one can afford to be recognized;” it also dissuaded them from following suit (Abu-Krenat Resident 2 2011). A resident of Abu-Asheba, an unrecognized village outside of Abu-Krenat, explained: “If they want them to move [to Abu-Krenat], they will move to be closer to everything for the children. But first they need to have what there! God willing, we will just go on building, put up the permanent foundations and stay here with or without recognition” (Abu-Asheba resident 1 2011). Abu-Asheba residents had been told by enforcement authorities that they needed to relocate to Abu-Krenat and found demolition notices posted on their homes. Even when faced with the threat of housing demolition, however, they refused the costs and conditions associated with living in a legal neighborhood.

The requirement that Bedouins terminate their outstanding claims, ongoing housing demolitions, and the exclusion of existing neighborhoods from the planned area of ABRC localities indicated to residents that the council was a “trick” (Village leader 2010) to take their lands and concentrate all Bedouins in townships similar to Rahat or Tel Sheva. Bedouins living in unrecognized neighborhoods celebrated the new schools and clinics ABRC had constructed, but drew on the past to indicate that the undergirding ideology remained the same: “You can see it plain and clear; it is in the history. With the Bedouin, they [the state] want them all to be concentrated” (Abu-Asheba 2 2011). Residents also identified the program as double-edged: “Officially they’re there to plan, build, put infrastructure, and put schools. Unofficially, they’re there to take land from the Bedouins because even when the state recognizes the village . . . it just recognizes the people and the village and not their landownership” (Village leader 2010).
Bedouins living outside of ABRC localities reasoned that “Abu-Basma is not just” because the state continued to utilize housing demolitions to realize plans. Children were dragged from their houses before dawn and cried as they watched their homes collapse (Abu-Asheba resident 3 2011). These respondents observed that the blue lines which excluded their neighborhoods were irrational from a planning perspective and threatened their way of life. The Abu-Ashebe family described how the state’s exclusion of their village of 400 people disregarded land uses they had made to optimize their economy and living conditions. Abu-Ashebe residents had been told by the Bedouin Authority to relocate to a new neighborhood in Abu-Krenat on hilly, agricultural lands, but explained that, “there is a reason why they are here and not there, and that is because it [the land in Abu-Krenat] is better for farming than living” (Abu-Asheba resident 2 2011). Abu-Ashebe residents concluded that such an illogical decision must have been politically motivated: “ABRC must be tool to take people’s land” (Abu-Asheba resident 1 2011).

Relocating Bedouins from outside ABRC borders to new neighborhoods within them conflicted with Bedouin laws and settlement norms. Residents whose lands were excluded by Sub-District Plan 4/14/23 did not want to move to dense neighborhoods on another family’s lands. Settling in 1000m2 plots conflicted with the traditional model
of growing families together over time as sons married and had children. Kaser a-Ser residents explained, “if we had the whole land, the whole El-Hawashala [points across Highway 25] we would have enough space, but the plan wants to squeeze everyone in one corner . . . in 10, 15 years there won’t be a place for everyone” (Kaser a-Ser resident 2 2011). The head of Umm Batin’s local committee illustrated two clashing models of growth by drawing the centrifugal, generational model utilized by Bedouins and, in contrast, a rectangular, residential plot in an ABRC neighborhood. His illustration appears in Figure 4.

Bedouin law also superseded the leases the ILA had assembled to facilitate neighborhood development. The ILA leased residential parcels to residents who were not the land’s historic claimants. Regardless of whose name was listed in a government document, the land belonged to the historic occupants in the eyes of the Bedouin (School employee 5 2010). Bedouins would not build on another family’s land; instead, the traditional landholder would lease his land back from the family the ILA had leased it to in order to preserve space for his descendants. The ILA’s requirements therefore made no sense to residents: “To give away land to buy it back? They will not agree, but the state expects them to” (School employee 5 2010). Moreover, they left Bedouins who lived outside of ABRC borders in a particularly difficult situation. These residents faced housing demolitions, but could not move to the neighborhoods that had been planned for them.

Challenges to Plan Implementation: State and Planner Perspective

State employees and planners of ABRC master plans attributed slow neighborhood development to residents’ lack of knowledge about the process, a desire to maximize individual gains, and “irrational” demands which “go beyond the rights of other citi-
zens” (Planner of Abu-Krenat 2010). Terminating land claims and leasing parcels from the ILA was not malicious, but a procedural act of “giv[ing] up his paper for another,” according to ABRC’s Municipal Engineer (ABRC engineer 1 2011). Residents were frustrated, the engineer explained, because they did not understand how to obtain a lease and building permit and therefore incurred additional expenses, such as hiring architects twice after mistakenly planning over a neighbor’s parcel. An ABRC master planner who had worked with other state authorities suggested that residents had not followed the legal home building process because they did not want to pay taxes or relinquish their land claims (Planner of Abu-Krenat 2010). The planner lamented that permitting was part of the recognition “agreement,” in which Bedouins were expected “to abide by the rules like every other citizen of Israel” in exchange for planning and services.

District-level officials suggested that residents stalled the neighborhood development process for several reasons. Residents whose unrecognized dwellings fell within the planned area of the village had not terminated their land claims and begun to rebuild because they sought to block other families from relocating to lands they perceived as theirs. Moreover, should these residents maintain and even expand their illegal construction on plots assigned to other families or set aside for infrastructures, they could negotiate for higher amounts of compensation later (Attorney for Southern District 2011). Formalizing additional Bedouin villages after the seven Bedouin townships sent the message to residents of unrecognized neighborhoods that, “if they stay, they get something better” (District planner 2010). Therefore, lethargic neighborhood growth was attributed to Bedouins’ lack of understanding the legal building process, outdated territorial claims, a selfish valuation of individual gains over the public good and the state’s shift in policy towards legalizing unrecognized villages.

Planning over existing development provided additional complications. The unique approach created situations in which residents’ land claims and some of their land uses did not conform with regulations, best practices, or the plan’s prescriptions. Land uses which were complimentary in modern planning practice were challenged by land uses residents had developed based on Bedouin laws and traditions. Bedouin roads, for example, are often planned on higher ground, while state guidelines promote the construction of roads in low-lying areas to accommodate sewage infrastructure (Kaser a-Ser neighborhood planner 2011). Existing parks and housing in flood plains contradicted environmental guidelines (Planner of Umm Batin 2010; Director of Statutory Planning for ABRC 2011). Service center plans which zoned public facilities and infrastructure on lands claimed by residents triggered tense, sluggish, and costly negotiations with claimants to facilitate plan implementation. These agreements moved forward despite a 1965 law that enables the state to expropriate 40 percent of property for the public good (Planning and Building Law, 5725-1965).

In some cases, resident opposition to the expropriation of their land for a public use resulted in facilities and infrastructures that were unsafe and barely served their
purpose. Umm Batin’s main thoroughfare, colloquially referred to as the “saucer road” by ABRC engineers, took three years to build. The road narrows to bypass a resident’s land (ABRC engineer 2 2011; ABRC Operations Director 2010). The street is so narrow that sidewalks could not be built, and it is lined with tall, metal walls that mark the limits of the resident’s claims. Road signs have been removed or damaged. The researchers experienced how the road’s irregular shape obscures visibility and compromises safety after a near-collision with an oncoming vehicle. Similarly, a gym in Umm Batin was reduced to one basketball court after a resident had marked his lands with a wall, blocking builders from constructing the full facility. An ABRC engineer who had worked on both projects could not understand why residents would oppose projects designed to serve them. “They all wanted the road, but now they are causing troubles that stop it,” he remarked. “If you are looking for sense here, you are looking in the wrong place” (ABRC engineer 2 2011). The Umm Batin “saucer road” appears in Figure 5.

![Figure 5](image.png)  
**Figure 5**  Umm Batin “saucer road” and metal walls marking land claims.  
Source: Researchers’ survey 2011.

District-level authorities acknowledged that some residents took issue with the limits set on ABRC localities. They explained that abutting land uses blocked the extension of the village borders. ABRC’s blue lines had been determined after court battles between Bedouins and the state and negotiations among government authorities designated Negev lands for industrial development, infrastructure, other municipalities, and military areas. Members of the Hawashala tribe, for whom Kaser a-Ser had been planned, lost their land claims in the mid-1970s after Beer Sheva Court decided in favor of the Israel Lands Administration (Kaser a-Ser resident 2 2011; Attorney for Southern District 2011; Kaser a-Ser resident 3 2011). The ILA then divided Hawashala lands among Dimona, the Department of Transportation and the Israel Defense Forces. The Department of Transportation built Highway 25 through Hawashala, which was later used to mark the eastern border to Kaser a-Ser. A new neighborhood in Kaser a-Ser had been planned for the 10 percent of Hawashala residents who lived on the other side
Highway 25. ABRC villages like Kaser a-Ser would grow over time to accommodate residents who, according to Israeli law, sat on land that was not theirs.

ABRC planners and state employees further argued that “the land isn’t everything” (Attorney for Southern District 2011). Building sustainable localities that could maintain their facilities and infrastructure would not be possible by recognizing all development on all of the lands that Bedouins claimed to own. ABRC localities were the few villages that were “logical” and “plannable”; “they have at least 300 families, a central area for people to meet, and some understandable organization” (Planner of Abu-Krenat 2010). Providing utilities to other low-density settlements across the Negev would be cost prohibitive and keep residents reliant on state subsidies (Planner of Abu-Krenat 2010; Attorney for Southern District 2011). Within villages, individual households were not connected to services because their neighborhoods had not been filled. This policy was developed after piecemeal service provision to the Bedouin townships created roads and sidewalks that were half-paved and unlit by street lights. As the neighborhood grew, the infrastructure became incompatible. The financial burden of reintroducing new infrastructure to Bedouin localities—Israel’s poorest—was extreme (Kaser a-Ser neighborhood planner 2011). Therefore, according to the majority of interviewed ABRC planners and state employees, the purpose of designing and building denser localities was not to concentrate Bedouins for political gains, but to ease the provision of services and ensure that each locality could maintain its infrastructure over time.

Discussion
Illuminating the processes, forums, actors, and outcomes associated with planning Bedouin localities in the Abu-Basma Regional Council highlighted a distinct tension among stakeholders’ views of the program’s procedures, results, and intentions. ABRC planners expressed that ABRC marked a “big change in attitude,” (Planner of Abu-Krenat 2010) while residents explained, “you can see it . . . in the history. With the Bedouin, they [the state] want them all to be concentrated” (Abu-Asheba resident 2 2011). The findings suggest a clash of rationalities between most planners and government administrators and ABRC residents, which played out inside and outside of planning forums and over space. This clash demonstrated a significant power differential between the State of Israel and the Arab-Bedouin. In answering the research question, the authors therefore felt it necessary to examine the disparate theories evoked by stakeholders. The theories we have selected here include one from the Global North, communicative planning theory (CPT) (Healey 1997; Healey 1992), and one from the Global South, planning-as-control (Yiftachel 1998), as well as its offshoot, “variegated recognition” (Yiftachel, Goldhaber and Nuriel 2009).

CPT, a planning theory with a “normative dimension” and “procedural values” (Healey 2007, 69) argues that planning should serve as a tool for social and environmental justice through “inclusionary participatory democratic practice” (Healey 2006,
CPT has popularized conversations in planning theory over the past 25 years in response to rational/procedural planning solutions, which undervalued public knowledge in favor of technocratic expertise (Healey 1997). CPT planners are good listeners who develop forums and mechanisms which can augment the voices of the unheard and marginalized and who are simultaneously on the lookout for dominating actors or practices (Innes 1998). Case studies have examined both planners and planning forums to understand their communicative qualities and therefore improve practice (Healey 1992; Throgmorton 1996).

Planning-as-control theory was introduced in the late 1990s by Israeli geographer Oren Yiftachel to respond to a trend in planning thought which assumed that the discipline had progressive social and environmental intents. Drawing from his background working with ethnic minorities in Israel, Yiftachel proposes that planning is “double-edged” (Yiftachel 1998, 395). It has the potential to be reformist and lead to an improvement in people’s lives, as well as to be oppressive and lead to “a regressive deepening of intergroup disparities, inequalities, or undemocratic domination” (Yiftachel 1998, 395). Rather than tell the story of a planner’s day (as CPT has done), planning-as-control, an explanatory theory, reorients scholars to focus on both geographic and institutional territories and highlights the efforts of non-state actors to shape their own spaces. The impacts of government planning on “space, power, wealth and identity” are understood as indicators of power differentials, which can be examined for their reformist and/or regressive expressions (Yiftachel 1998, 403; Kamete 2009).

How Useful is Planning Theory to Understanding Practice in the Global South?

We found the prescriptive/normative and explanatory capabilities of our chosen theories useful to understanding the ABRC case, particularly when considered together. CPT highlighted “episodes” of planning which could be analysed based on their promotion of CPT values such as “democratic, multi-vocal citizenship” (Healey 2007, 78). The utility of CPT was tangible during meetings and mechanisms that the researchers had observed and asked about, such as Local Planning Committee meetings, local committees, and household surveys. CPT’s focus on “institutional ‘sites’” (Healey 2007, 67) highlighted the ways in which ABRC worked. Using its position as an authority separate from the ILA, ABRC commissioned plans for service centers before the settlement of land disputes and utilized its institutional space apart from the Bedouin Authority to hire planners who residents were more comfortable with and who solicited resident input.

Sharing how ABRC engineers went about their daily work and how they felt about it may be, like CPT’s practice stories, “narrow and partial” (Yiftachel 1998, 396). But, it is perhaps for this very reason that the approaches, biases, emotions, and limitations of ABRC engineers, important actors who interacted with residents and possessed some power over the realization of plans, could be understood. It is CPT’s narrowness, its
focus on the “fine grain of the daily routines, discourses and practices of governance” (Healey 2003, 109), that highlighted moments where conflicting ideologies surfaced. For instance, a Bedouin Authority planner marched out of a Local Planning Committee meeting out of frustration with a proposal to extend the planned area of a village to accommodate existing development (Local Planning and Building Committee – ABRC 2011). CPT also humanized planners as practitioners motivated to improve Bedouins’ standard of living despite the constraints set on them by earlier court decisions and district plans.

Explanatory theories issued from the Global South helped the researchers understand how the methods described by participants translated into ABRC’s outcomes. Participant observation at meetings between ABRC’s permitting officer and residents, for example, highlighted the frustration residents felt while trying to navigate the costly and foreign permitting process. Visiting this forum did not explain why only a small number of residents had begun the process, however. The majority of residents had refused to obtain documentation for financial reasons or out of objections to decisions made prior to local planning by other authorities, such as the location of village borders, the requirement that residents terminate their land claims before obtaining a residential plot, and the prescribed density of villages. The shifting focus to space, both geographic and institutional—beyond the limitations of ABRC, the chosen case—illuminated the drivers of the present development stalemate.

“Variegated recognition,” a 2009 theory from Yiftachel, Goldhaber and Nuriel (2011), is particularly useful here. The authors identify three main types of recognition on a continuum that ranges from reform to control: “affirmation,” the legitimization of group identities through the fair distribution of power and resources; “indifference,” the passive acceptance of individuals and rejection of their group identities; and, “hostility,” the singling out of a group based on its identity to cause harm (120). This lens was wider than CPT. Our frame around ABRC villages and some of the unrecognized neighborhoods in close proximity to blue lines illustrated that some residents were treated with more “indifference” than others. Cleavages among residents, such as the location of their housing and land claims, their gender, and their family indicated whether or not they were part of a more empowered minority that was protected from housing demolitions, received small financial gains, and entered neighborhood planning earlier. Shifting our attention to ethnic identity and impacts, particularly on “neighbouring people and communities” (Yiftachel 1998, 403), we find that the small gains made by privileged ABRC residents paled in comparison to the benefits awarded to surrounding Jewish municipalities, such as Dimona. In line with this thinking, we ask: Why was Dimona, a Jewish city, awarded Hawashala land instead of the Hawashala tribe?

This question would probably yield different answers when posed to a CPT theorist and to Yiftachel. CPT, with its future orientation, might suggest that government decisions which allocated Hawashala land predated the project at hand and therefore
should not inhibit present opportunities for communication and transformation. CPT might identify forums through which Bedouin civil society could agitate for additional lands to promote CPT’s value of social justice, while encouraging planners to bring all resident voices to the negotiating table with district level planning authorities. Indeed, it is CPT’s focus on spaces for change that illuminated operational, locational and personnel-related differences between government agencies and enabled well-intentioned planners to plan in a way that better prioritized residents’ interests. However, this limited (but important) view might have missed the roles of the IPA, the ILA, the military, and the Ministry of Justice in forcefully expropriating Bedouin lands and implementing the Goldberg Report and Beer Sheva Plan 4/14/23, the prescriptions of which guided planning for ABRC localities.

Planning-as-control might answer that the Southern District Court, the body which decided in favor of the Lands Administration when the Hawashala land claims were adjudicated, operates within the Israeli Ministry of Justice. Its norms and policies have been set by the State of Israel, a self-proclaimed Jewish state. While Bedouins are citizens—and therefore expected to “abide by the rules like every other citizen,” (Planner of Abu-Krenat 2010) as an ABRC planner emphasized—they are ethnic minorities within a country whose core, founding ideology is the establishment of a Jewish nation and therefore the preservation of a Jewish demographic majority (Orenstein, Jiang and Hamburg 2011). ABRC planners and administrators might have been well-intentioned, but they worked within the apparatus of an ethnic state. Regardless of the transformative intentions of its actors, ABRC advanced an aspiration that was set in the early days of nation building: to control Bedouin population growth by restricting the area of Bedouin municipalities and limiting the size and number of residential plots in their neighborhoods. Assigning Hawashala lands to Dimona and other authorities facilitated the relocation of residents living on the other side of Highway 25 to a denser neighborhood where, indeed, “in 10, 15 years there won’t be a place for everyone” (Kaser a-Ser resident 2 2011).

Planning theories from the Global South and North both have utility in explaining a state planning initiative for an ethnic minority in the Global South. However, the more normative/prescriptive theory, CPT—engineered in Europe and North America—cannot be applied on its own without planning-as-control, our explanatory theory developed in the Middle East. CPT on its own risks misattributing fundamental challenges to the ABRC program, such as resident opposition to neighborhood development, to a communication breakdown rather than to a fight for Bedouin economic and cultural survival.

Pairing CPT’s attention to the “fine grain” (Healey 2003, 109) of practice and planning-as-control’s close eye to resource distribution can illuminate the rationalities guiding spatial changemaking if CPT’s basic assumptions about the beneficial nature of planning can change. CPT’s guidance for planners to serve as progressive changemakers who are future-oriented needs grounding in planning-as-control’s his-
toric and institutional contexts. In this way, CPT’s future orientation will not miss the profession’s deep, and sometimes sinister, link to the past. Incorporating elements of CPT within planning-as-control could highlight the tangible episodes of progression and regression in spatial decision-making and their measurable outcomes, the causes of which would be more accurately assigned. For the case, such a pairing would highlight legacies of mistrust between Bedouins and the State, earlier planning decisions and rationalities which have shaped the Negev, as well as the institutional limitations of planners and local authorities.

Studies like ours, which illuminate a diversity of voices from within the Global South, are essential to improving planning scholarship and to building new trajectories. Scholars and practitioners familiar with the unique range of actors and organizations involved with spatial change, the complexities of interventions occurring within and outside planning institutions, and the colonial legacies which undergird them must be heard. Further empirical research should continue to highlight cases in which human survival and imposed rules, visions and procedures may clash. Theory can help illuminate power differentials between actors, so that calls to “meet in the middle” by state bodies and corporations are shown for what they are: true compromises or demands for less empowered actors to give in. Theory-informed prescriptions can suggest a distribution of resources which considers legacies of injustice at a similar value to legal precedents. We therefore support the calls by Watson (2008), for “a widening of the scope of planning thought while grounding it specifically in the highly differentiated contexts within which planners work” (2261).

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