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SENATE, 1890-1920

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Intra-Party Preferences, Heterogeneity, and the

Origins of the Modern Congress:

Progressive Reformers in the House and Senate, 1890-1920

Abstract

In this paper, the emergence of the modern Congress, characterized by a seniority system, strong committees, and weak party leadership, is linked to changes in external electoral forces. Specifically, we argue that the changes in both House and Senate organization were driven by the rise of intra-party heterogeneity within the dominant Republican party. The theory is that the centralized systems of Cannonism and Aldrichism were incompatible with the heterogeneous preferences created by the rising numbers of Progressive Republicans, causing both Houses to reform their systems of allocation of desirable committee posts. Furthermore, the differing modes of change between the Houses are due to basic differences in structure.

In the late 1960's two excellent articles concerning the rise of seniority in the U. S. House of Representatives appeared in print. (Abrams and Cooper, 1968; Polsby, et al, 1969). Both papers end with comments on potential causes of the rise of seniority, citing the creation of more safe seats in the House, more complex governmental decisions that demanded specialization, and a split in the grass roots of the Republican Party as possibilities. While adopting somewhat different definitions of seniority, both studies agree that the institutionalization of seniority and the rules changes that took place after the revolt against Speaker Cannon were crucial to the decentralization of power in the House. Polsby emphasizes that his discussion of seniority carries direct implications for the distribution of influence in the House as well: "A seniority system is automatic. Therefore, in the U.S. House of Representatives, where committees are strong, the seniority system is sufficient to explain the decentralization of congressional power." (1969: 793) In this paper we seek to build upon the work of Cooper and Polsby in two directions: we broaden their analysis by discussing concurrent changes in the Senate and we deepen it by examining the decentralization of power in Congress during the first two decades of the 20th century within the larger context of electoral coalitions and party composition.

The United States House of Representatives at the end of the 19th Century was partisan, hierarchical, majoritarian and largely populated by members serving less than three terms (Chiu 1928; McConachie, 1898; Price, 1975; among others). The post-World War I House has been less partisan, more egalitarian and populated by careerists (Bullock, 1972; Turner and Schnier, 1970). The turning point in the development of the modern Congress occurred in roughly the years immediately before and after 1910. During this period, called the "Big Bang" by Polsby, the House became a career for its members and these members changed the institution such that it came to look like the modern House. After the 1910-11 revolt against Cannon and

its aftermath the Speakers' power as the leader of the majority was diminished, seniority came to be the most important criteria for committee assignments and chairmanships, and committees rather than parties became the major policy actors.

Interestingly, during the same period the United States Senate underwent essentially the same changes. The Senate at the turn of the century was partisan, hierarchical and majoritarian. By 1920 the Senate, like the House, had diminished the power of its party leaders, seniority was the criterion for committee assignments, and chairmen and committees rather than parties were the major policy actors. One important difference between the House and Senate was that the Senate changes occurred without a decisive event like the "overthrow" of Cannon. In this paper we put forward an argument which shows that electoral results, acting through the medium of legislative organization, drove the changes in both bodies, and we show that structural features of the two institutions account for the differences in the way the changes occurred. We utilize the comparison of the House and Senate to show how institutional characteristics shape the process and requirements necessary for change.

The dependent variable in this study is the centralization or decentralization of power in both bodies. While there are many potential definitions of centralization, we shall define it in terms of the proportion of important decision makers in each body. When the number is limited, there is centralization; when the number of decision makers is relatively large, there is decentralization. Our paper deals primarily with changes in committee assignment procedures since it was here that the insurgent Republicans focused their attention. In the House the movement to strip Cannon of his power was centered on the committee appointment power and his dual role as Speaker and Chairman of the Rules Committee. In the Senate the issue was "Aldrichism" or the centralized system which allowed a few members of the "Old Guard" to dominate committees. It is not surprising that the movement to limit the

party leaders' power centered on the committee system, since as Polsby (1969, pp. 789-90) has shown there is a strong inverse relationship between committee and party leaders' power. That is, the party's power "waxes and wanes" with the committee power.

In both the House and Senate at the turn of the century, the party and committee systems were structured such that the party leaders were also the committee leaders. In the House the man with the most votes in the majority party's caucus was Speaker and Chairman of the Rules Committee. The man with the next most votes was majority leader and Chairman of the Appropriations Committee whereas the next in votes was majority whip and chairman of Ways and Means or Judiciary (McConachie, 1898 ; Brady, 1973). The Speaker had the power under the Rules of the House to appoint all members to committees. The Senate in 1900 had a similarly partisan and centralized *modus operandi*. Allison (R-Iowa) chaired Appropriations and was second on Finance; Aldrich (R-Rhode Island) chaired Finance, was second on Rules and sat on Interstate Commerce. Platt (R-Connecticut) and Spooner (R-Wisconsin) both were on Finance and Judiciary and Spooner chaired Rules. "Never before in the history of the Senate were the outstanding committees so monopolized by party leaders." (Rothman, 1966, p. 58). In short, in both bodies power was centralized in a small group of party leaders who also held the crucial committee posts.

Within two decades this system was eschewed in favor of a system where party and committee leaders were separated and power was decentralized. What accounts for this change? We argue that the motivation for these changes came from the electoral system. Specifically, in the era of strong party leaders the two legislative parties were relatively homogeneous with each based at distinct points on a left-right policy continuum. The homogeneity of preferences within parties began to change as electoral preferences made the parties more heterogeneous. Since the Republican

party was the dominant one for most of the 1890-1932 period our focus is on the Republican Party. The Progressive Republicans in the House and Senate did not begin their political careers as Progressives. They had been Republican regulars in the 1890's and, with the exception of Borah (R-Idaho), had supported McKinley over Bryan. Moreover, "they did not emerge as Progressives until the first decade of the twentieth century, by which time they were experienced politicians in their forties and fifties.... The insurgents (Republicans) were middle-aged professionals who responded to the new political environment by transforming themselves from McKinley conservatives into progressive reformers." (Holt, 1967, p. 5) When their preferences changed, men like Norris of Nebraska disagreed strongly with stalwarts like Cannon and Dalzell (Pennsylvania) on policy questions like tariff schedules, government regulation and income taxes. In the Senate, Republican Progressives like LaFollette (Wisconsin) and Cummins (Iowa) brought preferences different from the old guard into the Republican Party ranks. Our argument is that the centralized strong party system was not viable unless the old guard could provide benefits to all Republicans regardless of preference differences.

Theory

An essential maintained hypothesis of our analysis is that in any legislative body there are certain positions that give the members who occupy them significant influence over the course of future policy. In the cases of the U.S. House and Senate, these positions are appointments to key committees, and the hypothesis, stated succinctly, is that committees matter. It is not our intention to enter the debate as to exactly which features of congressional organization give committees power in their policy areas above that of the average floor member.¹ We will confine ourselves to noting that all institutional actors at the time behaved as if committees matter. The

¹For a current theoretical perspective on the institutional basis of committee power, see Shepsle, Weingast, and Krehbiel (1987).

Cannon revolt and subsequent rules changes in the House were fought over committee issues and Progressive demands in the Senate were met with grants of favorable committee positions.

Committee power, then, is the link between our definition of centralization as the overlap of committee and party positions and more traditional notions of centralization as the ability of a few individuals to control legislation. When party leaders are the key committee leaders in a system where committees play a significant role in shaping policy, then the laws that are passed will reflect the efforts of a relatively small number of members. Similarly, when party leaders are free to make committee appointments as they choose, rather than according to a rigid seniority system, they have more influence over the course of legislation, hence Polsby's remark that the rise of an institutionalized seniority system marks the decline of centralized party power.

If the composition of the majority party is homogeneous, then from a policy perspective it makes little difference whether the legislature is organized along centralized or decentralized lines. That is, if every Republican preferred the gold standard while every Democrat preferred the free coinage of silver at 16 to 1, then which members served on Banking and Currency would not determine U.S. currency policy; rather, the electorate's choice of which party would have a majority would determine the policy results.²

If, however, a rival faction arises within the majority party with policy preferences opposed in at least some instances to those of the leadership, then who sits on which committee assumes vital importance. The appointment of such rebellious legislators to key committees could result in their combining with the minority party

²It is important to note that we do not claim that members will not care about assignments in the strong party system. There surely will be reelection reasons for choosing committees. Our claim is that under the strong party system members' policy preferences will be met regardless of who sits on what committee.

to introduce policies that are at odds with the wishes of the majority faction of the majority party. The natural response of party leadership in this instance would be to engage in the practice of deck stacking on major committees; that is, denying the rebellious members spots on important committees.³ Unlike the homogeneous party case, the centralized system in which party leaders and their sympathizers also dominate committees will be opposed by those members of the majority party whose policy preferences are being frustrated by such an arrangement. The tension inherent in this situation will put strains on a centralized organizational structure, and this tension carries with it the possibility of toppling the centralized system altogether if the rebellious faction controls enough votes, when combined with the minority party, to constitute a floor majority. Deck-stacking is most likely to be effective when the number of rebellious members is not large enough to deny the majority faction an absolute majority of the legislature.

Schematically, our argument combines organizational characteristics (centralized-decentralized) and party preferences (homogeneous-heterogeneous) in the following fashion:

	Within-Party Preferences	
	Homogeneous	Heterogeneous
Organization		
<u>Centralized</u>	viable	not viable over time
<u>Decentralized</u>	viable	viable

Our theory of organizational change is preference-driven in that electoral results yielded heterogeneous parties. Given that under the strong-party centralized

³The notion of deck stacking, the arrangement of key institutional structures to favor a certain policy outcome, is used in a bureaucratic context in McCubbins, Noll, Weingast (1989).

system a very few members appointed committees, members with preferences different from those who appoint committees should favor changing the appointment process. This, of course, assumes that the party leaders, in order to realize their policy preferences, will systematically discriminate or stack the deck against members with different or, in our case, Progressive views. Thus, in both legislative bodies we expect the impetus for change to come from members associated with the Progressive agenda since their policy positions are not being enacted. Progressive Republicans desiring change would either have to attempt to form a coalition with members of the opposition party, which would reduce the majority party's power and thus strengthen the committee system; or convince the leadership of their party to appoint them to important committees.

The structure of the paper is as follows: 1) we show how the House and Senate's party and committee systems were combined so as to create a centralized leadership system; 2) we show that in the heyday of the strong party system each party had a distinct socio-economic base, and that over the 1904-1910 period these bases began to merge (that is, the parties looked more alike); 3) we show that during the rise of heterogeneity (prior to 1910) the strong party leadership consistently gave lesser or minor appointments to Progressive members; 4) we show that on the tariff issue the committee and floor medians were virtually indistinguishable in the 1890's and that by 1908-1910 there was within-party heterogeneity which results in significant floor median-committee median differences; and finally, 5) we show that the change to a decentralized leadership system differed in the two bodies due largely to rule differences between the House and Senate.

Committees and Parties Merged

The Speaker of the House had always had the right to appoint the committees of the House, but the party and committee leaders were not traditionally merged. Thus having the appointment process vested in one man did not ensure centralization.

The merging of party and committee leaders occurred as a reaction to the decentralization of power to the committees so aptly described by Woodrow Wilson in *Congressional Government* (1885). The combination of committee power, the disappearing quorum and the Speaker's inability to control led the House to adopt over time a set of rules and procedures which firmly placed power in the majority party's hands. Most of these changes were the work of Thomas Brackett Reed (R-Maine). Reed was chairman of the Rules Committee when the first special rule which limited debate and structured the voting was passed. When elected Speaker in the 51st House (1889-91) Reed eliminated the disappearing quorum, chaired Rules and enhanced the Speaker's floor power.⁴ The net effect of these reforms on centralization as defined herein, was to concentrate power in the hands of a few party leaders. The formal party leaders chaired the major committees and a few of their trusted lieutenants served as both committee chairs and party whips. All this is in sharp contrast to the contemporary House where committee leaders and party leaders have different career paths (Brady, 1972; Polsby, 1969).

The story for the Senate at the end of the 19th century was much the same -- it was the child of the Republican Party's internal organization. In the Senate of the 1870's, members behaved independently of party as attested to by the relatively low levels of party voting (Hurley and Wilson, 1989). "Senators in the 1870's usually performed their tasks without party superintendency. No one had the authority to keep his colleagues in line, and positions of influence were distributed without regard to personal loyalties. . ."(Rothman, 1966, pp. 4-5). Committee assignments in the Republican Party were controlled through its committee on committees. Rothman (1966, p. 58) describes the process as follows: "This was a random group; the five to

⁴Cooper and Young (1989) argue that these increases in the Speakers' or majorities' power were the capstone of a body of procedural changes that emerged gradually over 30 or 40 years. For our purposes it is sufficient that the full set of powers was present in the 1890's.

seven committeemen represented nothing more than the various geographic regions of the nation. Its [committee on committees] members did not themselves hold notable assignments, and the heads of the outstanding working committees exerted no unusual influence. Moreover, no one party faction dominated the group." The Party did not control the order of business at the time, party voting was not a necessity, there was no whip organization and no one possessed the power for reprisals. By 1900 the Republican majority had used party to organize the Senate. "The party caucus and its chieftains determined who would sit on which committees and looked after the business calendar in detail. Members were forced to seek their favors or remain without influence in the chamber. At the same time, both organizations imposed unprecedented discipline on roll calls." (Rothman, 1966, p. 4). The tight party control was cemented with the strict overlap between party leaders and committee positions noted above.

In sum, by the turn of the century both the House and Senate were characterized by a hierarchical centralized leadership system which featured partisan decision making. "Republican leaders valued party regularity, control over key committees in congress and over campaign funds, and the skillful use of patronage." (Merrills, 1971, p. 5).

Party Constituencies

One recurrent theme in the literature on party strength in legislatures is that when parties have constituent bases located at distinct points on some socio-economic continuum, party voting levels in the legislature are high. High levels of party voting implies that the parties are cohesive (they vote together) and that they vote against each other. Sartori (1976) using a compositional framework argues that party composition determines voting patterns while Sorauf (1976) argues that ideological distance determines party voting. These two approaches are, we believe, connected. Parties with distinct constituent bases are likely to elect members with relatively

homogeneous preferences while parties with mixed constituent bases are likely to elect members with diverse or heterogeneous preferences. Thus our approach in this paper is to first show that during the period of centralized partisan leadership in the Congress the parties represented distinct points on a socio-economic status continuum and later to deal with members' preferences on specific issue dimensions. It is important to note that there are other reasons besides constituent based ones which could account for a centralized and partisan decision making style. In parliamentary systems, parties must vote together in order to stay in power--this is a powerful incentive for cohesive voting. At the appropriate point we shall argue that the observed heterogeneity in the Senate and House parties in the 1910-12 period is the result of electoral politics.

The argument is that during the 1890 to 1904-06 period the constituent bases of the two parties were quite distinct. Republicans came to represent Northern industrial interests while Democrats came to represent Southern and rural interests. This pattern of representation was exacerbated by the Democratic party's adoption of Populist principles (Sundquist, 1973). Senator Dolliver and Republicans in general viewed the Populist-Democrat merger as "the threat from the West" which helped to unify and solidify the Republicans. V. O. Key, Jr. (1964) called the 1896 presidential election the most sectional in American political history. The sectional base of the two parties reflected a deeper difference in constituency bases--namely, industrialization. We collected from the U. S. Census of 1890, 1900 and 1910 data on value added by manufacture and density per square mile in an attempt to ascertain the industrial and urban bases of the senatorial parties. Collecting these data for the Senate is straight forward. In contrast, because the data is not reported by House district, data collection for the House varies. Most House districts were composed of whole counties and collecting data from these districts was straightforward. The data for cities like New York and Chicago which had many congressional districts within one

county were harder to collect. The census of cities was useful and for about 90 percent of city districts we could gather the relevant data. However, in some cities like Boston we could not collect all the data; therefore, for the House, about 10 percent of the districts could not be included in the data base. These variables, density and value added by manufacture are taken to measure levels of industrialization and urbanness in House districts and in states. These data were then used in a probit analysis to predict electoral results. Probit analysis is appropriate because the dependent variable, party of Senators and House members, is dichotomous. Figure 1 shows the percentage of correct predictions using just the two variables for selected Congresses over the 1886-1916 period. The probits shown exclude the Southern states because the South was culturally Democratic. Excluding the South lowers the level of correct predictions because southern states were non-industrial, largely rural and almost always elected Democrats. Thus our test is conservative and if the results are as predicted, the finding is clearly substantiated. The figure shows that prior to the 1890's density and value added do not predict election results very well--less than 55 percent for both House and Senate. In the 1890's and through 1906-08 density and value added predict from 70 to 85 percent of elections correctly. The 1910 election predictions drop below 70 percent and the 1912 and 1916 results are both below 60 percent. Essentially these results show that in both the House and Senate during the era of centralized leadership the constituent bases of the two parties were located at distinct points on an industrial urban-rural agricultural continuum.

During the period in which the House and Senate became committee rather than party-oriented and leadership style changed from command to bargaining, the two parties' constituent bases became mixed. Thus our first hypothesis is confirmed. Namely, the era of centralized power and partisan decision making is strongly associated with political parties located at distinct points on an urban-rural

dimension. Moreover, the breakup of the centralized system is concomitant with parties with overlapping electoral bases.

Committee Assignments

Our claim is that during the period of centralized leadership and homogeneous parties, committee assignments will not generate much controversy because members' policy goals will be satisfied regardless of who sits on what committee. If we can show that as the constituent bases of the parties come to be overlapping, Progressive members do not receive good or desired assignments, we can motivate the desire for institutional or behavioral change. That is, Progressives favored different policies than did stalwart Republicans like Cannon and Aldrich, and if they were systematically excluded from good committee assignments, they would clearly favor changing the appointment mechanism. Table 1 shows late 19th and early 20th century Senate committee assignments by region. Northwestern Senators were over-represented in terms of both important committee assignments and chairmanships. If we control for seniority the disparity is somewhat justified because on average Western Senators had less seniority than their Northeastern counterparts. Nevertheless, Western senators were unhappy over their committee assignments.

With this in mind, the sequence of events that took place before the legislative session of 1905 acquire a high degree of interest. Senators from the Rocky Mountain and Pacific states met in a preliminary conference of their own and "came into the general conference pledged to stand together and demanding the election of the Committee on Committees by ballot, but were appeased by an agreement that the committee assignments made by the chairman should be subject to confirmation by the conference." (Haynes, p. 289). Their demands did not go unmet; whereas in the 58th Congress Western senators had only two appointments on the four most important committees and no chairmanships among the 12 most important, in the 59th (1905-07) Congress the corresponding numbers were three appointments and

four chairmanships. No issues of Progressivism or insurgency had arisen at that point, and the Western senators did not espouse policy positions contrary to those of other Republicans, so it seems that they simply asked for and received a larger piece of the legislative action. The relative ease with which Western Republicans received a larger role on important committees stands in stark contrast to the difficulties faced by Progressive Republicans less than a decade later.

Unlike the Western senators' request for more important committee assignments, the Progressives' challenge to Aldrich had significant policy consequences. That is, for example, promoting Warren of Wyoming to a better committee post did not entail having to place on an important committee a member who strongly disagreed with Aldrich, Allison and Spooner. Placing LaFollette (Wisconsin) or Cummins (Iowa) on an important committee meant appointing a member who opposed the Republican tariff, favored an income tax, and favored an increased role for government in regulating business. Under these conditions, Progressive Republicans found that getting good assignments was difficult. Since our argument is that Progressives were motivated to change the committee assignment process because they were not getting good assignments needed to advance their policies, it is necessary to demonstrate that the stalwart leadership systematically discriminated against Progressives. Table 2 shows the distribution of chairmanships and assignments to the big three committees (Finance, Appropriations, and Rules) by seniority and by stalwart-progressive for the 61st Congress (1909-11).⁵ We determined Senators' progressive-stalwart classification by including as a Progressive those Senators who LaFollette (R-Wisconsin) listed as attending Progressive caucuses whose purpose was to plot policy strategy (LaFollette, 1953; p. 274).

⁵Changing the definition of the big three committees or expanding the list to the big ten committees does not change the results, i.e., Progressive Republicans did not receive desired assignments.

Since all Republican Senators had at least one committee chairmanship, on a simple count basis there is no difference. This does not, of course, take quality or importance into account. In terms of appointment to the major committees a clear difference between Stalwarts and Progressives exists. Eighty percent of Stalwarts serving more than one term had appointments to the important committees while none of the Progressives with more than one term had such an appointment. One-third of stalwart Senators who were between their first and third Congress had important posts while no Progressive in the same category had an important post. In addition to these clear differences in assignments, the quality of the chairmanships given to Progressives differed. For example, Gronna of North Dakota was chair of the Expenditures in the War Department, while LaFollette was chair of the Census Committee in a year in which the census was not taken. In contrast, Crane (R-Massachusetts), elected in the same class as LaFollette, was chair of the Rules committee. The Progressive Republicans were cognizant of and concerned about the stacked committee assignments. At the opening of the special session of Congress in April 1911, ten Progressive Republican Senators caucused and presented a number of demands; the most important of which was a demand for one-fourth of the majority committee places and that the Progressives on the Committee on Committees allocate Progressive slots. The regular Republicans refused the Progressive demands arguing that they were in effect trying to establish a separate Insurgent Party in the Senate. Adding insult to injury, the regular Republicans denied LaFollette a seat on Interstate Commerce (*New York Times*, April 17, 1911, and Holt, 1967, pp. 46-48). Moreover, the insurgents' desire to control their assignments was related to the policy differences between them and the regulars. For example, they desired positions on Finance so they could affect tariff schedules, and on Commerce so they could influence railroad legislation.

The Progressive Republicans in the House of Representatives faced the same problem in terms of good assignments. Speaker Cannon and the House Republican leadership controlled the appointment process. Under the rules of the House, the Speaker was formally responsible for committee assignments and Progressive Republicans believed that they were not being fairly treated. If it is the case that Cannon systematically discriminated against Progressive Republicans then their vote to strip Cannon of his right to appoint committees is understandable, i.e., they believed they would get better assignments under a decentralized system. Categorizing Progressives consisted of estimating members' voting records based on Progressive issues and checking the resultant list of members against historians' accounts of the Progressive era. This procedure yielded a list of 45 Progressive Republican House members and 198 non-Progressive or Stalwart Republicans.⁶

Table 3 shows Committee assignments in the 61st House (1909-1911) for Progressives and Stalwarts by seniority. The results clearly show a pattern of deck stacking. Progressives with five or more terms held no seats on the big three committees while 22.4 percent of Stalwarts with similar seniority held big three posts. A full 77.6 percent of Stalwarts with five plus terms in the House were committee chairs while only 20 percent of Progressives chaired a committee, and no important committees. Twenty-four percent of stalwarts with four years seniority chaired a committee while only 11.1 percent of Progressives held chairs. Twelve percent of four year stalwarts held big three committee assignments while no Progressive held a seat on a big three committee. No Progressive with less than three years service held either a committee chair or a big three post whereas over 20 percent of stalwarts chaired committees and about five percent had big three assignments. The conclusion

⁶These 45 members included the 41 Progressive Republicans who caucused as Progressives before the special session in April of 1911.

is inescapable, Progressive Republicans did not receive their desired committee assignments.

The fact that the Insurgent Republicans voted to strip the Speaker of his appointive powers and of his chairmanship of Rules is testimony to their belief that their assignments were not fair. In December of 1908 (60th House) a group of 29 Insurgents met to press for reform. In February of 1909 they signed a resolution which called for: the abolition of the appointive power, the institution of a new Rules Committee elected by the House and which had the appointive power, and the introduction of a monthly "Calendar Tuesday" on which all the committees could present legislation. The regular Republicans gave them a modified version of Calendar Tuesday but the 29 Insurgents plus the Democrats were not enough to pass any other change because the regular Republicans were slightly over one-half of the membership of the House. In the first session of the 61st House the Insurgents had increased their numbers to about 45 and there were also more Democrats. the Progressives felt they had enough votes to defeat Cannon as Speaker; however, two factors defeated them. First, Cannon threatened President Taft with non-cooperation on his program, and Taft used his patronage to influence congressmen in favor of the regulars. Norris (Nebraska) wrote in January 1911 that claims by Taft that patronage policy was evenhanded, "is untrue and is made only for the purpose of enlisting public sentiment." (Holt, 1967, p. 46) Second, Cannon convinced Representative Fitzgerald (D-New York) and 22 other Tammany Hall Democrats to vote against their party and side with the regular Republicans on the crucial roll calls. Cannon promised certain tariff schedules favorable to Tammany Hall and other concessions to ensure his victory. (Hechler, 1940, pp. 49-58) It is clear that House Insurgents knew that the deck was stacked against them as early as 1908. Until Taft's election, they felt that with Theodore Roosevelt in the White House they might get their policy preferences enacted without changing the House Rules. Norris did not move to

change the House Rules until Roosevelt was gone. With the weaker and less Progressive Taft in the White House, the Insurgents were now themselves responsible for passing Progressive legislation on the tariff, regulation and taxes. Thus they moved after Roosevelt's departure to place themselves on committees where they might influence legislation. It is worth noting that their stridency increased as did their proportion in the Congress.

Heterogeneous Parties: Committee and Floor

The best test of our thesis regarding party heterogeneity and institutional change is to show that over the period in question within party heterogeneity increased and that this heterogeneity was not reflected in committee assignments. During the period of party homogeneity we would expect there to be little difference between committee positions and floor positions; whereas by 1910 we expect committee and floor positions to be different. In the later period the committee-floor difference is a result of the party leaders' appointment of stalwarts to policy committees, whereas the floor position will be heterogeneous due to the Progressive's preferences. The tariff issue in the 1894 to 1914 period is an excellent candidate for confirming or rejecting the hypothesis. The Dingley Tariff of 1897 was a Republican protective tariff which by the middle of the first decade of the 20th century had come under fire (Baker, 1941, Chapter 2). The Payne-Aldrich tariff had also generated controversy within the Republican party. Speaker Cannon had removed representative Fowler (R-New Jersey) as chair of Banking and Currency because he had not supported the pro-protection tariff. When the Democrats took control of the House in the 1910 election (62nd Congress) they immediately passed a tariff bill which moved to the Senate Finance Committee. The Senate was still Republican and the 1911 tariff schedule before the Senate was relatively non-protectionist. If our thesis is correct the analysis should reveal little difference between committee and floor preferences on the Dingley Tariff whereas the 1911 tariff would show a much larger

Republican floor-committee difference. The argument is that in the 1890's parties were relatively homogeneous in regard to preferences thus no floor-committee difference; whereas in 1911 the Republican floor will be characterized by widely differing views and the committee will be stalwart-controlled.

In order to test this hypothesis we selected approximately 100 roll calls from the 55th (1896) and 62nd (1910) Senate which were related to tariff schedules and to final passage of the bills. These roll calls were then subjected to a Clausen (1973) style dimensionality test. The technique is roughly as follows. The roll calls are run against each other in an identity matrix where the cells are Yules Q values, and every pair of roll calls with a Yules Q of over .8 is kept. A Johnson hierarchical clustering technique then yields a normalized scale score for each Senator which indicates the direction of the Senator's policy position on tariffs. In both analyses we set the direction such that a 10.0 score represents the strongest pro-protective tariff position. Figure 2 shows the distribution of scale scores for the non Finance committee Republican and Democratic Senators in the 55th Senate, and 62nd Senate. Table 4 shows the committee and floor median policy preferences for committee and floor for both parties in both Senates.

The results strikingly demonstrate the thesis. In the 55th Senate the Republican Finance median is 10.0. That is, every Republican had a perfect pro-protective tariff voting record; and every Democrat on the Committee had a perfect 0 anti-protective tariff score. The floor median for the Republicans was 9.9 showing for all practical purposes no difference between the committee and floor median. Thus in terms of the policy output it did not matter who the committee members were; any subset of Republicans would have preferred and voted for a pro-protective position. Policy output under conditions of homogeneous parties is the result of majority status and not committee assignments.

The results for the 62nd Senate are clearly different. Figure 3 shows that both the Republican and Democratic senatorial parties have widely ranging preferences

(from 0 to 10.0). It is clear that by 1910 both parties are heterogeneous. The Republican committee median was 8.8 pro-protective tariff while the Republican floor median was 6.9. This clearly indicates that the "Senate system" generated appointments to important committees like Finance which over-represented stalwart views at the expense of Progressive views. In a debate with the stalwart Hale (R-Maine), Robert LaFollette summed up the Progressive view, "I have had the hardihood not only to doubt the divine perfection of the present arrangement, but almost to believe that if the business of considering the legislation of the Senate could be distributed among its 92 members instead of being taken in charge by less than one-third of the body it would be an improvement over existing conditions." (LaFollette, 1953, p. 487)

Progressive Senators sincerely believed that the "old guard" of the Senate had usurped power, and "exercised it in the interest of the few and thus defeat[ing] the will of the majority in Congress and the nation" (LaFollette, 1953). The data analyzed here do show that Progressive Senators were excluded from important committees in favor of those who had more orthodox views. In sum, by 1910 the parties were heterogeneous, while the Senate's leadership was centralized as they had been when the parties were homogeneous and opposed. Given this it should not be surprising to find that before the next decade was over the Senate's committee-party relationship had been significantly changed.

The story for the House of Representatives is much the same. The major exception is that since the Democrats controlled the House in the 62nd Congress we use the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909 to show the development of heterogeneity within the Republican Party. The same scaling techniques used for the Senate were applied to the House. Since the House had far fewer votes on tariff issues than did the Senate the range of scale scores is 1 through 5 with five in both Houses set as the pro-protective tariff position. Representatives (present in both the 55th and 61st Houses)

scale scores are then correlated to determine the overtime consistency of the dimension. The correlation between scale scores was .95 which strongly indicates the consistency of the pro- and anti-protective tariff views of members over this period. Table 5 shows the committee and floor median policy preferences for both parties in both Houses.

The results corroborate the hypothesis. In the 55th House (1897) the committee median position is 5.0 for Republicans and 0 for Democrats. Every committee member voted the party position on every vote. The floor medians for the parties are the same. This is, 170 Republicans voted the party position each time while two members had scores of four. One hundred Democrats had perfect anti-protective scores of 0 while eight had a score of 1. In short, there is within parties no appreciable difference between the committees' preferences and the floor's preference. The results for the Payne-Aldrich Tariff differ markedly. Republican committee members have a perfect 5.0 scale score--all twelve members voting pro-protective positions. Democratic committee members' scores range from 0 to 5.0, with four at 0, two at 1.0 and one member at 5.0. Thus, the Democrats are relatively heterogeneous on the committee while the Republicans remain homogeneous. The floor preferences for the Republicans are however, heterogeneous. In fact the median position is about 3. Democratic preferences run the full gamut of the scale with most concentrated in the 0 to 1 scores. If we take the floor median without regard to party it becomes about 2, considerably different from the committee median of 4.

Some might argue that by trying to make the scale scores for Payne-Aldrich comparable to the Dingley tariff we have forced the result. One brief example should show that the heterogeneity observed in the above tables were not a result of the roll calls chosen. There were five votes taken on timber tariffs in the 61st House and Table 6 shows the floor and committee preference distributions. As was the case for the overall Payne-Aldrich Tariff the results show Republican committee homogeneity and

floor heterogeneity. Republicans preferences on the floor ranged from 1 (anti-protective) to 5 (pro-protective) with 55 Republicans at either 1 or 2 while 158 were at 4 or 5. In contrast the Republicans on the committee were unanimously pro-protection on timber. In sum, the disparity between the committee's homogeneity and the floor's relative heterogeneity is maintained on timber issues.

It might be further argued that the tariff issue may not be representative of general voting patterns, so that the data presented above distort the amount of party conflict present before and after the rise of Progressives in both houses. More inclusive measures of party conflict, however, provide support for our thesis. In the six Congresses preceding the Cannon revolt in the House (55th through 60th), 74.3% of all roll call votes resulted in at least 50% of one party on one side of the issue and at least 50% of the other party on the opposing side. The six Congresses after the revolt (61st through 66th) saw this number drop to 57.3% . The corresponding numbers for the Senate in these two time periods are 73.3% and 56.6%, matching the House data almost exactly. Even more revealing is the reduction in percentage of votes that pitted at least 90% of one party against 90% of the other. For the House, in the same two time periods given above, the figures are 44.0% and 19.6%, and for the Senate they are 30.2% and 12.6%. Thus in both houses there was over a 50% decline in the relative number of roll call votes which closely followed party lines.

In both the House of Representatives and the Senate the homogeneous parties of the 1890's had by 1910 been transformed via the electoral system into heterogeneous parties. The Republican system of hierarchical, centralized and partisan decision making was ripe for change. The Republican party leaders in both bodies had systematically excluded Progressives from important committee positions, and LaFollette in the Senate and Norris in the House were primed for change. In 1910, 42 House Republican Progressives joined the Democrats to strip Speaker Cannon of his right to appoint committees and chair the Rules Committee. The House battle was

more dramatic than the Senate because to change the House committee assignment process required stripping the Speaker of a power granted in 1789.

The Senate in 1905 had accommodated Western Republicans' desires for better committee assignments. Presumably this accommodation was aided by the unanimous consent rule which allowed anyone objecting member to disrupt the assignment process. The Western Republicans accommodated in 1905 were not Progressives. By 1910 the resolution of Senate committee assignments was not so easily solved. LaFollette and the Progressives asked for a separate appointment process which would allow them to appoint Progressives to committees. The leadership did not allow this and as we have seen Progressive Republicans received undesirable assignments.

Aftermath

In the House, the election following the revolt against Cannon yielded a new majority party which was to control the House until the 1918 elections. During this period Oscar Underwood (D-Alabama) as Chairman of Ways and Means controlled committee assignments and continued the Democratic pattern of committee preferences reflecting floor preferences. In the 61st House (1909-1911) three of seven Democratic Ways and Means members held non-protective tariff views. The Republican minority in the 62nd House (1911-13) elected James Mann of Illinois as minority leader and he reversed Cannon's practice of favoring regular Republicans (*New York Times*, April 12, 1911), e.g., Norris (Nebraska) was promoted to Judiciary, Lenroot (Wisconsin) traded Ventilation and Acoustics for Rules.

The Iowa delegation had six insurgents who voted against Cannon in 1910 and of those, two received better assignments in the 62nd House--Kendall got Foreign Affairs and Railways and Canals and Good traded Immigration for Appropriations. The other four received appointments similar to their previous appointment. In the 66th House (1919-21), when the Republicans took control, Good was Chair of

Appropriations, Haugen was Chair of Agriculture and Kendall was ranking Republican on Post Office and Post Roads. In sum, after the rules changes in 1910-11, Progressives clearly gained in terms of assignments.

In the Senate the story differs at least chronologically. The 1910 elections resulted in increased Progressive strength in the Republican Party. The Republicans controlled the Senate with 51 Senators. Those defeated in 1910 were mainly regular Republicans and the leadership responded by giving Progressives better assignments. Three Progressive Republicans received assignments to big three committees including the appointment of LaFollette to the Finance Committee. Nevertheless, the Insurgents were not happy with either their assignments or the position of the regular Republicans on tariffs, taxes and government regulation. Democratic control of the Senate from 1912 to 1918 delayed consideration of the Insurgents demands for better assignments. The results of the 1918 elections gave the Republicans a two seat--49 to 47--margin over the Democrats in the 66th Senate. Progressive interests gave early warning to Senator Lodge (Massachusetts) that the Republicans might not be able to organize the Senate. Progressive Republican opposition centered on Senators Penrose (Pennsylvania) and Warren (Wyoming) both regular Republicans who were scheduled to chair Finance and Appropriations respectively. There were 12 Progressive Republicans in the Senate after the 1918 elections and they were still at odds with the regular Republicans.⁷ The extent of their differences was significant enough to warrant Lodge's writing James Bishop saying "we cannot talk about chairmanships of committees...until we are in the saddle." (Robertson, 1983, pp. 110, 111).

Senator Norris (Nebraska), who had proposed the rules changes in the House of Representatives which had decentralized the Speaker's power over assignments,

⁷The 12 were Johnson, Borah, Cummins, Kenyon, Copper, Norris, Gronna, Nelson, Jones, Poindexter, LaFollette and Lenroot.

spearheaded the fight against the regulars. On November 15, 1918, Norris proposed a resolution to change the rules of the Senate. His resolution would prohibit the chair of a major committee from being a member of any other major committee. This proposed change had two major effects: first, it would reduce the top leadership's ability to control committee agendas by prohibiting overlapping committee assignments on the important committees, and second, it would broaden assignment to conference committees. The procedure at that time was to appoint the chairman and the ranking majority member to House-Senate conference committees, and since, for example, the Chairman of Finance was the ranking member on another important committee and Finance's ranking member was chair of another major committee, the leadership controlled not only the agenda but also the delegation to any conference committee. "Norris' rule change would limit that power, and it would give the Progressive leaders--many of whom were possessed of seniority--a chance to exert more influence on important Senate legislation." (Robertson, p. 331; *New York Times*, November 16, 1918).

Senator Borah (Idaho) said in the *New York Times* of November 21 that Progressive Senators would vote with Democrats if Penrose and Warren were nominated by the Republican caucus to chair Finance and Appropriations. Borah claimed that Penrose's "consistent attitude of opposition to advanced policies" of the Progressives would drive them to vote with the Democrats. Given the procedures for voting committee assignments, Borah's threat was credible. The assignments were decided in caucus by each party and when the vote came to the Senate floor each party voted with no debate for the agreed-upon slate. If three or more Progressives voted with the Democrats then the Democrats would organize the Senate and if floor debate were to occur it would both break Senate tradition and publicly affirm a major split in the Republican Party less than 18 months from the 1920 Presidential election.

In January of 1919 Lodge was elected (by the Republican Senate Conference) to chair a committee to deal with Norris' proposed rule change. In the two months since the introduction of Norris' resolution, Lodge had been busy. He had promised some newly elected Progressives, like Capper (Kansas), good assignments, good office accommodations and important investigative work (Lodge to Capper and Capper to Lodge in Robertson, p. 140). In addition, some Progressive Senators were promised important chairmanships: Nelson - Judiciary, Cummins - Interstate Commerce, Gronna - Agriculture, Jones - Commerce, and Kenyon - Education and Labor. When the committee on Norris' resolution met, Senator Cummins proposed a modification of the resolution. His proposal allowed the chairmen of the ten major committees to be members of two of the ten and prohibited them from serving on the conference committee unless the legislation came from the committee of which they were chair. (*New York Times*, January 23, 1919) The Republican Party accepted this rule change and when the special session of the 66th Congress met on May 19, 1919, the new rule limiting major committee assignments and appointments of conference committees was adopted.

The Cummins compromise, though less than what Norris had hoped for, nonetheless involved a significant change in Republican committee assignments. In the last Republican-controlled Congresses, party leaders had occupied positions on a number of powerful committees. In the 60th and 61st Congresses, Aldrich was Chairman of Finance and also sat on the Interstate Commerce and Rules Committees. In these same Congresses, Penrose chaired Post Office & Postal Roads and sat on Commerce, Finance, and Naval Affairs. And Warren, in the 62nd Congress, while remaining chairman of Appropriations, also served on Agriculture and was the ranking member in both Military Affairs and Rules. This practice of Stalwarts sitting on more than two important committees was maintained throughout the period of Democratic control even though Republicans were allotted fewer total seats due to

their minority status. Senator Warren, for example, had seats on Agriculture, Appropriations, Military Affairs, and Rules in the 65th (1917-1919) Senate.

In spite of the rule change agreed to in January, and the favorable assignments promised by Lodge, Borah and a few other hard-core Insurgents were still threatening to vote against Penrose and Warren (*New York Times*, May 11, 1919). On May 12 Lodge sent a regular Republican, Senator Moses (New Hampshire), to meet with Borah and other Progressives. Moses informed the Insurgents that Lodge had an arrangement with the Democrats that would prohibit two or three of them from keeping Penrose and Warren from taking their chairmanships. The arrangement was that some Democratic Senators would stay off the floor for the vote on committee lists which would give the regular Republicans a majority. Moses informed the Progressives that if they kept their opposition to Penrose and Warren in the Conference, they would receive good assignments and have some say in party leadership posts. Only Borah refused, and the other Progressives promised to keep their opposition confined to the Conference. (Robertson, pp. 170-73) The Progressives who cooperated were rewarded with good assignments: four of the ten major committees mentioned in Norris' resolution were chaired by Progressives and nine of 28 big three assignments went to Progressives. Whereas, the three most obstreperous Insurgents were given a slap in the face. Norris chaired Patents, Borah the Committee on Inter-ocean Canals and Johnson the Committee on Cuban Relations.

One card that Lodge had to play, which is not mentioned in his correspondence, is related to the Senate's method of voting for committees. When the vote on the appointments to organize the Senate came, each Party voted, without debate, on a jointly agreed upon slate of candidates. In the 66th Senate, Lodge changed the procedure by asking for a vote on only the Republican members of the committee. Thus Lodge could withhold Republican votes from the Democratic slate if the Democrats tried to undermine the Republican slate. (*Congressional Record*, V. 543,

pt. 1, pp. 314-327) In addition, if Borah and two or three Progressives failed to vote for the Republican slate, the Democrats would organize the Senate costing the Republican Progressives a number of important chairmanships. Under these conditions the only credible threat was that the Insurgents would vote with the Democrats to organize the Senate. Senator Lodge knew that many Progressives including Borah did not want to go with the Democrats because that would mean supporting Wilson's treaty and the League of Nations. Lodge skillfully used Progressive opposition to the treaty and the League to drive a wedge between Progressives and Democrats (Robertson, chapters 5, 6)

In the 66th Senate, nine of twelve Insurgents received good committee assignments, the Progressive nominee for majority whip was elected, Cummins was elected President pro tempore and the Senate rules were changed to give the Progressives more appointments on conference committees. It seems fair to conclude that this was the Senate where power was decentralized to accommodate heterogeneous preferences within the Republican Party. While the rule changes were not as dramatic in the Senate as they were in the House, they were nevertheless changed and the end result was the same--a decentralization of the assignment process to accommodate heterogeneity. And as we have noted elsewhere the Senate leadership given the rules and norms in the Senate were never as onerous to individual Senators as they were to House members prior to 1910-11.

One potential problem remains in regard to the concessions made in the 66th Senate. Namely, the Republicans won overwhelmingly in the 1920 election and increased their majority to 59 to 37 Democratic. There were also two fewer Progressives as two of the twelve Progressives of 1918 left the Senate. Given the increased regular Republican majority, the regulars could have changed the rules and returned to the practice of stacking the deck against Progressive Republicans. A brief examination of committee assignments shows that they did not stack the deck. In fact,

they went so far as to promote the three recalcitrant Progressives. Johnson (California) was appointed to Rules, Norris (Nebraska) became chair of Agriculture, and Borah was made chair of Education and Labor. Of the seven remaining Progressives, the four with major chairmanships retained them, and eight of 27 big three committee slots were Progressives. In short, the Stalwarts did not feel comfortable enough with their slim majority in the 67th Senate to exclude the Progressives from the power structure. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the policy differences between the Stalwarts and Progressives were not as pronounced as they had been in previous years. The hard-won accommodations which had been reached between the factions provided a structure for compromise, and the Stalwarts were not willing to risk another fractious fight over committee assignments.

Institutional Features

We have seen that after the breakdown of homogeneity in the Republican party, the centralized system of control eventually disintegrated in both the House and the Senate. Yet the course of this change was quite different in each house. What institutional features account for this disparity?

Throughout the history of U.S. Congresses, the Senate has been run more through accommodation and consensus while the House is organized around rules and majoritarianism. Three basic institutional features can explain this difference. First, the greater number of members in the House inhibits a consensual decision process for much the same reason that New England-style town meetings are not possible on a national level. Second, the terms of service ensure that Senators will be dealing with many of the same people for a greater period of time (although this is less so now than it was at the turn of the century), so short term accommodation may be rewarded by long-run reciprocation. Third, geographic constituencies are larger in the Senate, making it less likely that narrow issues will divide Senators since they must to some degree seek compromises among the various constituencies in their

states. In short, the Senate can exist with less formal rules and procedures while the House needs more structure to carry out its daily business.

We should expect the different organizational forms developed in the House and Senate to affect the course of change the two institutions underwent in the decline of Republican party unity caused by the rise of the Progressives. In the House, the foremost rule favoring centralized leadership, allowing the Speaker to appoint committees, was institutionalized in both the rules of the House and in the behavior of members. Speakers from Reed through Cannon used this power to merge the party and committee systems (McConachie, 1898; Brady, 1973).

The change to a decentralized system in the Senate was somewhat different because the Senate's rules provided members with some flexibility. In the House the Speaker formally controlled committee assignments, was chairman of the Rules Committee which could limit debate and had the formal right to recognize or not recognize anyone he chose. Thus from an individual member's perspective, the Speaker had great control over a member's ability to advance either his career or his policies. The rules of the Senate assured members the right to speak, even to filibuster and committees were not formally chosen by the leadership. Thus the Progressive Senators had access to the floor and could conceivably influence committee appointments. The difficulty for Republican insurgents should also have been greater in the electoral arena since Senators were, until 1913, elected by State legislators which removed Senators at least one step from the electorate. So the trajectory of change would tend to more abrupt in the House, whereas in the Senate a slow accommodation to changed conditions over time would mask the inner conflicts caused by the tension between a centralized leadership structure and heterogeneous party preferences. Since, despite the different trajectories of change, the Senate's parties became heterogeneous at the same time as House parties, the theory of electorally driven motivation for change is robust. We regard this as confirmation of a preference driven

theory of organizational change because it compares two legislative bodies with different electoral and institutional structures.

Conclusions

This paper sought to test a preference-driven theory of institutional change in the United States Congress at the turn of the 20th century. Our specific focus was the decentralization in the committee assignment process in the House and the Senate. The rise of the Progressive movement in Midwestern and Western states brought into the Republican Party Senators and Representatives who had preferences which differed from the regular or stalwart Republicans. The result was congressional parties that were heterogeneous rather than homogeneous. The Progressive Republicans did not receive important committee assignments from the centralized and hierarchical leadership in the House and Senate. In the House, Progressive Republicans banded together with the Democrats to strip the Speaker of his appointive powers and thus to break up the system wherein party leaders were also committee chairs. In the Senate, Progressive Senators used the threat of voting with the Democrats to organize the Senate to change the committee assignment process. Once the rules governing assignments were changed, the leadership of the dominant Republican Party did not revert to its stack the deck strategy.

The development of the modern Congress where members choose, within constraints, committees which aid their reelection chances and where the money committees are representative of both inter and intra-party conflicts had its origins in the Progressive movement. (Fenno, 1966) Members of political parties who have different preferences have difficulty tolerating centralized leadership which appoints committees based on the leadership's preferences. Under conditions of intra-party heterogeneity committee assignments have important policy consequences and members whose preferences are not represented have strong incentives to change the process. The case of the Progressive Republicans in the early 20th century

demonstrates that changes in institutional arrangements are choices made by members based on their ability to serve constituents' policy preferences.

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Figure 1: Percent Senate Elections Predicted by Probit
Using Value Added and Density

Figure 2: Party Preferences on Tariff in 55th Senate

Figure 3: Party Preferences on Tariff in 62nd Senate

Table 1: Regional Representation on
Committees and within the
Republican Party: 1890-1902

Important Committee
Assignments

Region	1890		% of Difference	1896		% of Difference	% of Committee
	% of Committees	% of Party		% of Committees	% of Party		
NE, MA	45.5	33.3	+12.2	44.6	32.6	+12.0	48.4
ENC, WNC	45.5	37.3	+8.2	33.4	26.1	+7.3	39.1
S, B	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	4.3	-4.3	0.0
Mt, Pac	9.0	29.4	-20.4	22.0	37.0	-15.0	12.5

Committee Chairs

NE, MA	50.0	33.3	+16.7	66.7	32.6	+34.1	50.0
ENC, WNC	50.0	37.3	+12.7	33.3	26.1	+7.2	33.3
S, B	0	0	0	0	4.3	-4.3	8.3
MT, Pac	0	29.4	-29.4	0	37.0	-37.0	8.3

NE = New England; MA = MidAtlantid; ENC = East North Central; WNC =
West North Central; S = South;

B = Border; Mt = Mountain; Pac = Pacific.

Michigan Survey Research Center State Code

Table 2: Republican Committee Assignments in the
61st Senate (1909-11): By Seniority and
Progressive-Stalwart

<u>PROGRESSIVES</u>				<u>STALWARTS</u>		
	No.	Chairman- ships (%)	Big three Assignment (%)	No.	Chairman- ships (%)	Big three Assignment (%)
More than one term	(3)	100	0	(20)	100	80.0
Two through six years	(4)	100	0	(21)	100	33.3
First year	(2)	100	0	(8)	100	0

Table 3: Republican Committee Assignments in the
61st House (1909-11) By Seniority and
Progressive-Stalwart

Terms	No.	<u>PROGRESSIVES</u>		No.	<u>STALWARTS</u>	
		Chairman- ships (%)	Big three Assignment (%)		Chairman- ships (%)	Big three Assignment (%)
5+	(10)	20.0	0	(67)	77.6	22.4
4	(9)	11.1	0	(25)	24.0	12
3	(7)	0	0	(28)	17.9	3.6
2 or less	(19)	0	0	(78)	2.6	1.3

Table 4. Committee and Floor Medians by
Party in the 55th and 62nd Senates: Tariff Policy

Republican Committee	1896 55th Senate	Difference	Republican Committee	1910 62nd Senate	Difference
	Republican Floor			Republican Floor	
10.0	9.9	+1	8.8	6.9	+1.9
Democrat Committee	Democrat Floor	Difference	Democrat Committee	Democrat Floor	Difference
0	0.8	-.8	4.6	5.0	-.4

Table 5: Committee and Floor Medians

by Party in the 55th and 62nd Senates:

Tariff Policy

1897-99 55th House			1909-11 61st House		
Republican Committee	Republican Floor	Difference	Republican Committee	Republican Floor	Difference
5.0	4.98	-0.2	5.0	2.90	-2.10
Democrat Committee	Democrat Floor	Difference	Democrat Committee	Democrat Floor	Difference
0.0	0.2	+0.20	.8	.9	+0.1

Table 6: Committee and Floor Scale
Scores by Party on Timber Issues on
The Payne Aldrich Tariff

Scale Scores	Democrats		Republicans	
	Committee	Floor	Committee	Floor
1.0	5	124	0	24
2.0	0	0	0	31
3.0	0	0	0	0
4.0	0	0	0	2
5.0	2	37	12	156

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